

RESISTANCE TO COLONIALISM IN N-WFP: A CASE STUDY OF KHUDAI KHIDMATGAR MOVEMENT

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M. Phil Thesis



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CANDIDATE’S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis presently submitted bearing the title “**Resistance to Colonialism in N-WFP: A Case Study of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement**” is the result of my own research, and has not been submitted to any other institution for any other degree.

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DEDICATION

**To
The Memories of My Parents Fairuzah Bibi & Said Kamal
And
To those who Resisted Colonialism**

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for the purpose of any other degree.

Abdul Jabbar

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Introduction

History of the world, since the beginning of the 16th century until the twentieth century, is arguably a "story" of European expansion in 'pursuit of captive sources of wealth'.¹ Thus, throughout the period most of the non-European world, including Asia, Africa, and Latin America, came under European colonial control. During the period 1815 to 1914, European control of the world expanded from 35% of the earth's surface to 85%.² By 1944, the population that was colonized by the Great Britain only, numbered 414,713,000.³ Different scholars, depending on their frames of reference, variously define this phenomenon of expansion and domination. For Leela Gandhi, it means "historical process whereby the West attempts systematically to cancel or negate the cultural difference and value of the non-West."⁴ Ania Loomba says that colonialism is the "conquest and control of other people's land and goods".⁵ In fact, the "real" motive of colonialism was economic in nature. Initially, the colonies provided huge quantities of raw material for European industries. The colonies were looted and their resources plundered. Their trade was monopolized, and exports from the colonies far surpassed the imports to the colonies. This massive "expropriation" accelerated the so-called Industrial Revolution. Naturally, the level of industrial production reached such a level that markets had to be found outside Europe: the colonies proved to be fertile grounds for industrial goods. Resultantly, the colonies were inundated with foreign goods, thereby destroying the domestic sectors while rendering millions of people pauperized. Thus, economically, colonialism performed a double job: on the one hand, it

¹ Tariq Amin-Khan, *Genealogy Of The Post-Colonial State In India And Pakistan* (Vanguard Books, Lahore:2012),18.

² Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions Of The Orient* (Penguin Books, Delhi: 1991), 41.

³ W.E.B. Du Bois, "The Disenfranchised Colonies" in *Postcolonial Studies: Concepts In Literary And Cultural Studies vol.1* .ed. Diana Brydon (Routledge, London: 2000), 288.

⁴ Leela Gandhi, *Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction* (Routledge, London 1998), 16.

⁵ Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (Routledge, London 1998), 2.

contributed hugely to the industrialization of Europe; and, on the other, it "de-industrialized the colonies". This de-industrialization of the colonies took place under a system, which claimed that, since the non-European world could not make industrial progress on their own, therefore by colonizing them "capitalist relations of production" would emerge automatically. In other words, it was believed that the "East" would become a "mirror image of the industrialized West." Yet, in reality, colonialism, as Bipin Chandra argued, produced its opposite image: it did integrate the colonies into the "world capitalist system", but the colonies' position always remained subordinate to that of the "mother countries."⁶ In other words, colonialism was a system whereby the West developed itself, while, at the same time, the colonies were underdeveloped.

How this system worked? How some distant people, lesser in number, managed to control millions of people and captured their human and non-human resources and used these to the benefit of the "mother country"? Different techniques of domination were put to use in order to make sure their control over the colony. Political institutions such as military and civil bureaucracies were installed or modified, judicial machinery was instituted and a whole set of politico-judicial structures were employed in the service of empire. New infrastructures, such as canals, railway lines, roads, postal services, and telegraphs were constructed or improved. In addition, to complement the economic colonization, and to hide the politico-economic reality from the eyes of the colonized as well from their domestic population, the colonizers had to wear an ideological-cultural camouflage. Western values were emphasized, and were presented as superior to those of the colonized. A "West vs. the Rest" binary was constructed: if the former stood for civilization, and progress, the latter

⁶ Bipin Chandra, *Essays on Colonialism* (New Delhi: Oriental Longman Limited), 1999.

remained "uncivilized" and impervious to progress. A sense of inferiority was inducted into the "collective sub-conscious" of the colonized. To quote Ashis Nandy:

This colonialism colonizes minds in addition to bodies and it releases forces within colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once and for all. In the process, it helps to generalize the concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category. The west is now everywhere, within the West and outside, in structures and in minds.⁷

Thus, the colonizer tried to present the colonization process as a "divinely" ordained "mission" to bring the rest of the world into the fold of civilization. If, in fulfilling the mission, violence had to be resorted to, it was justified because the "natives" were not "normal" humans: rather they were "lesser humans", therefore, they could not be expected to run their own affairs. In other words, the notions of democracy, "self-rule", universal human rights, liberty, and fraternity equality could not be applied to the colonies.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly, N-WFP) has also been remained under colonialism for about a century. The British took it over from the Sikhs, in 1849, in the second Anglo-Sikh war. Until 1901, it remained a part of the Punjab province and it was ruled through "special laws" and ordinances called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCRs). In 1901, Lord Curzon, the then viceroy carved out a separate province from the five districts of Hazara, Bannu, Peshawar, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan by joining them with the five agencies of Malakand, Kurram, Khyber, North and South Waziristan and named it as the North West Frontier Province (N-WFP). Since the province was situated on a strategically important location, therefore the colonizers treated it in some "special" ways. Unlike other parts of British India, which were mainly important for their economic resources, the province was even more important on account of its geographical proximity with the Tsarist, and later,

⁷ Gandhi, *Postcolonial Theory*, 15-16.

Soviet Russia. Here, the colonial policies were determined, largely, by "geo-strategic" rather than economic considerations. Therefore, it was exposed to even harsher treatment as compared to other Indian provinces. Special laws like the FCRs were applied to the province; internal divisions along sectarian and tribal lines were created and exploited; alignments were made with local landlords and clergy. Furthermore, their histories were distorted, and their customs and traditions were tampered with. Their value systems were looked down upon with contempt. In a nutshell, like other colonies, the NWFP became what Du Bois, writing in the context of colonies in general, termed as "slums", the "centers of helplessness, of discouragement of initiative, of forced labor, and of legal suppression of all activities or thoughts which the master country fears or dislikes."⁸

Statement of the Problem:

Such an exploitative mechanism i.e. colonialism, inevitably, leads to resistance movements, on the part of the natives, to liberate themselves. Since the very beginning, a kind of enmity starts between the "native" and the "colonizer". Thus, in the 20th century decolonization of the majority of the colonies occurred as a result of anti-colonial nationalist struggles. These struggles were by no means identical but they share at least some common things such as the assertion of their own national and cultural identity defined by them rather than by their colonial masters. Nevertheless, they differed greatly in their strategies some opted for violent liberation struggles, as in Africa, others choose the path of non-violence to subvert the colonial structure, as in India. Of all the anti- colonial struggles launched in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa(NWFP), the most significant and formidable was that of the Khudai Khidmatgars under the leadership of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Launched in the late 1920s, it was

⁸ Du Bois,*Disenfranchised Colonies* in Diana Brydon, 282.

a multi-faceted movement and, as such, resisted colonialism on multiple fronts. Most importantly, it subscribed to the strategy/creed of non-violence and was therefore more effective in "decolonizing" Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in particular and India in general.

The study is an attempt at understanding the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement. The most remarkable feature of the movement was that it resisted colonialism through non-violence and non-cooperation under the leadership of Ghaffar Khan, one of the staunchest non-violent anti-colonial leaders in the world. In order to put things into perspective, the Khudai Khidmatgars' "creed" of non-violence, as propagated by Ghaffar Khan, has been juxtaposed with Frantz Fanon's "theory" of violence. Frantz Fanon was a psychiatrist by profession who joined the anti-colonial Algerian organization, the Front de Liberation Nationale, and fought against the French Empire. Being a psychiatrist, posted in the largest psychiatric hospital in Algeria, the Blida-Joinville, Fanon observed colonialism and its impact on both the colonized and the colonizers from a very close distance. He concluded that colonialism was violence in its "most natural" form, and that violence lies at the root of colonialism. Therefore, colonialism could be destroyed only through violence. However, his conception of violence is by no means limited to just physical or "instrumental" violence, which is aimed at gaining some immediate tactical goals; rather, his violence has abstract, philosophical and psychological aspects to it. This latter violence, which is generally referred to as "absolute violence", is aimed at not just physically overthrowing the colonizers from power, and not just replacing them; rather it means destroying the whole system and all the structures that it entailed, including the epistemological, cultural, economic, racial and psychological ones. In short, his "absolute violence" against colonialism is meant for creating a world where even the thought of colonialism would become impossible.

Ghaffar Khan, who led the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, agrees with Fanon as far as the exploitative, essentially violent, and racist nature of colonialism is concerned, notwithstanding the difference in their way of explaining it. Similarly, he agrees with Fanon as far as the creation of a world beyond colonialism is concerned. More interestingly, if destroying colonialism as a system should be taken as violence, Ghaffar Khan agrees with Fanon. Yet both disagree with each other, when it comes to using violence as an instrument to defeat colonialism politically. Ghaffar Khan argued, and the Khudai Khidmatgars agreed, that only non-violent strategy could pay dividends. The study, while not claiming to be a comparative study, juxtaposes Ghaffar Khan's conception of non-violence with Frantz Fanon's theory of violence so as to make a relatively fuller sense of the non-violence and its effectiveness. Furthermore, since the movement was successful, to great extent, in questioning the colonial order and its concomitant structures, it challenges the notion of anti-colonial struggles as inevitably violent.

Methodology:

The study is historical, analytical, interpretive, and descriptive. It will take into account "politico-economic" and "ideological-cultural" aspects of colonialism, in order to account for the nature of the resistance because the latter cannot be explained in isolation. The empirical data and sources will be critically analyzed .

Scope and Significance:

Temporally, the study focuses on colonialism in India since the 18th century until the first half of the 20th century. The period saw not only the expansion and consolidation of colonialism, but also the emergence of several anti-colonial resistance movements. Having said that, the study will focus on anti-colonial resistance in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, through

the case study of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement. The significance of the study lies in the fact that most of the post-colonial states, including Pakistan, inherited the colonial state structures and as such continued the same policies and techniques. Therefore, the struggles that were once anti-colonial were directed towards the newly created post-colonial states. Even today, ethno-nationalist movements and struggles pose a considerable challenge to the state of Pakistan. Thus, any understanding and solution of this challenge would require an understanding of these struggles in the colonial setting in the light of postcolonial theory. Furthermore, in the context of war on terror, the area under study is playing a very crucial role in many ways. To study its colonial past would be of help in understanding its current situation. Similarly, by understanding the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement that had principally emerged in response to foreign rule, one might be able to question the currently held common belief that the only response to the "presence" of "foreign troops" is "terrorist" violence. Finally, the study is important in that it shows that no people are essentially violent, not least the Pakhtuns. If it were the case, how could have non-violence gained such a currency in the province?

Organization of the Study:

1. Colonialism: A Politico-economic and Ideological-cultural overview

The chapter discusses the nature of colonialism in India during the 18th and the 19th century. It gives a brief account of how the colonies were "treated" at different stages of colonialism. It shows how colonialism developed the "metropolis" at the expense of colony, which was underdeveloped. In addition to the politico-economic aspect, the chapter sheds some light on the way colonialism tried to mask its "true" face from the eyes of the colonized. In other words, it also discusses the ideological-cultural aspect of colonialism.

2. Colonialism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP):

Although the broader contour of colonialism did not vary too much with geography, there were regional specificities to the system, even within the same colony. Chapter II discusses colonialism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to account for whatever specificities there might be in the Province. Thus, it shows that in the province, colonial policies were determined more by strategic than economic considerations. It also explains how the province, on account of its strategic location, received especially harsh treatment.

3. Resistance to Colonialism: Violence vs. Non-Violence:

Owing to its violent, exploitative, and repressive nature of colonialism, the colonized had always, in one way or another, resisted it, since the very beginning. However, the anti-colonial movements of the 20th century were far better in terms of organization, discipline, complexity, and singularity of purpose. That said, these anti-colonial movements adopted different strategies to resist colonialism. Some thought violence was the only answer to colonialism, while others advocated the use of non-violence. To put the non-violence of Khudai Khidmatgars into perspective, this chapter juxtaposes Ghaffar Khan's, the leader of the Khudai Khidmatgars, "philosophy" of non-violence with the "theory" of violence of Frantz Fanon.

4. Khudai Khidmatgar Movement:

Finally, this chapter discusses the emergence of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement in response to colonialism. In doing so, it briefly explains the socio-political situation of the province that led to the emergence of the movement. Moreover, it sheds light on how the Khudai Khidmatgars struggled to "cleanse" their society from "evil" customs and traditions

that were responsible for the lack of unity and national consciousness among the people. Finally, the chapter presents a detail account of the way the Khudai Khidmatgars resistance violent power with non-violence civil disobedience.

Review of the Literature:

Dispatches for the New York Tribune, edited by James Ledbetter, is a compilation of Karl Marx's letters and articles that he wrote for the New York Tribune, in the 1850s. These articles contain Marx's earlier understanding of colonialism. He argues that colonialism is a system whereby Western capitalism transforms the colonies in to fully "developed" capitalist countries. Colonialism, according to Marx, would bring about this transformation through the double process of "destruction", the destruction of colony's pre-capitalist "Asiatic Mode of Production", and the reconstruction of the colonies, the generation of capitalist relations of production. *Essays on Colonialism* by Bipin Chandra is a work of vital importance in understanding the economic nature of colonialism. The author argues that colonialism was a system that integrated the colony into the world capitalist system in such way that the interest of the colonies were completely subordinated to those of the "mother country". The work also analyses different theories and critiques of colonialism. Finally, it scrutinizes the 19th century "nationalist" critiques of colonialism. Similarly, Irfan Habib's *essays in Indian history: towards a Marxist perception* shows the pitfalls of Marxist thought vis a vis colonialism in India. It clarifies and contextualizes some of Marx's earlier positions about colonialism. The author modifies Marxist formulations to fit them into the peculiar position of colony, and shows how the exploitation of the colonies was brought about to serve "metropolitan capital". Ashis Nandy's *the intimate enemy: the loss and recovery of self under colonialism* is helpful in understanding the psychological as well as the cultural impact of

colonialism on both the colonizers and the colonized. He argues that colonialism tends to emphasize the "positive" aspects of the colonizing society, and the "negative aspects" of the colonized society to make the whole system seem "normal". Ngugi wa Thiong'O's *Decolonizing the Mind: the Politics of Language in African Literatures*; *Writers in Politics: Essays*; and *the Petals of blood*, are important works for understanding the cultural aspects of colonization. In addition, these works shed light on how colonialism can be culturally resisted.

Wretched of the earth by Franz Fanon is a text of fundamental importance for understanding psycho-cultural underpinnings of colonialism. It argues that colonialism, being violence in its "natural state", reduces the natives to sheer objects. In other words, colonialism tends to "de-humanize" and de-subjectivize" the natives. It suggests that "true" decolonization can come only through violence. Finally, the text contains the "theory" of violence as enunciated by Fanon. Aime Cesaire's *Discourse on Colonialism*, disrobes colonialism of its cultural cover and exposes the "double standards" of "Western Civilization". He challenges the notion of "universal human rights", as propagated by the "West", and maintains that no such rights were recognized as far as the colonized were concerned. Bernard S. Cohn's *Colonialism and its forms of Knowledge: the British in India* shows how colonialism was established and consolidated through the appropriation and interpretation of indigenous traditions and texts.

Settling the Frontier: Land, Law, and Society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500-900, by Robert Nichols is of considerable importance in understanding the dynamics of Pakhtun society. It sheds light on the way the Pakhtun society transformed and how new social relationships evolved in the Peshawar valley over the years. *The Problem of the North-West*

Frontier 1890-1908: with a Survey of Policy Since 1849 by C. C. Davies, is another important book. It thoroughly deals with the policies of the British Raj towards the frontier. It also throws some light on the way the colonial administrators pursued and executed these policies.

Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives, edited by Anthony, C. Allessandrini is important for understanding Fanon's thought and its relevance for contemporary cultural studies, particularly his theory of violence has been discussed from several angles.

Zama Zhwand ao Jiddo Jehad (Pashto) by Abdul Ghaffar Khan is a very important text that throws a flood of light on the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement. It is also a critique on Pakhtun society in that it highlights not only the "positive" aspects of Pakhtun Society but also its "negative" ones. It shows how the colonizers were exploiting the colonized and how it was resisted, first in the absence of an organized movement, and then in the form of a highly organized and mobilized movement. Simultaneously, it deals with "philosophy" of non-violence and its merits and importance. Khan Abdul Wali Khan's *Bacha Khan ao Khudai Khidmatgari* Vol. 1. (Pashto) describes the mechanisms of British Colonialism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with particular focus on its international geo-strategic dynamics. By sifting through secret colonial documents, it highlights the policy of "divide and rule" of British Government. Furthermore, it shows how the Khudai Khidmatgars resisted the Empire. *Da Barr-e-Sagheer Pak o Hind pa Azadai k da Pukhtano Barkha: Zama da Zhwand sara Tarrali Halat* (Pashto) by Abdul Akbar Khan is yet another valuable book, which gives first-hand information about the evolution of resistance movement in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Ali Khan Mehsud's *La Pir Rokhana tar Bacha Khana: Da Pukhtano Milli Mubarizi ta Katana* (Pashto) gives a detailed account of the evolution of nationalism among the

Pakhtuns. Most importantly, it argues how Ghaffar Khan's philosophy of non-violence was rooted in the socio-economic conditions of the province, and that how it was different from Gandhian non-violence.

Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province, (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) 1937-47 by Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah discusses in detail the role of Islam, and ethnicity in informing the politics of the province. It explains how such religious slogans as "Islam in danger" could not get public attention because the Province was predominantly Muslim. Furthermore, it explains politics in the province was nationalist rather than communal. Finally, the book presents a detailed analysis of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement; the Congress Ministries of 1937, and 1946; Ghaffar Khan's philosophy of non-violence, and its relationship with Islam and Pakhtoonwali; the role of the landlords and clergy; and the rise of Muslim League in the Province. In addition, Shah's *North-West Frontier Province: History and Politics; Abdul Ghaffar Khan; and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, The Khudai Khidmatgars, Congress and the Partition* discuss in detail the history, politics, and society of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These discuss the emergence of the Khudai Khidmatgars, their alignment with the All India National Congress and their aversion to the All India Muslim League, and, in doing so, analyzes the role of Bacha Khan as social reformer, political leader, and freedom fighter.

The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North-West Frontier by Mukulika Banerjee is an anthropological survey of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. It not only explains the rapid popularity of the movement but also dwells a lot on the creed of non-violence to which the movement subscribed. Like Shah, the author dismisses the commonly held perception about the source of Ghaffar Khan's non-violence, and maintains that Ghaffar

Khan's non-violence was different from Gandhian non-violence, in more than one ways. *Ghaffar Khan: Nonviolent Badsha of the Pakhtuns* by Rajmohan Gandhi is a reflection on the life and politics of Ghaffar Khan his relationship with the Congress and Gandhi and shows his relevance for contemporary South Asia.

Gold and Guns on the Pathan's Frontier by Abdul Qaiyum is yet another important work that addresses different aspects of the twentieth century Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: its land, geography, culture, history and politics are briefly but comprehensively discussed. It discusses how the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement emerged and how the British and their protégées conspired against it. Moreover, it contains some comments on the life and politics of some political leaders including Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib.

CHAPTER ONE

Colonialism: A Politico-Economic and Ideological-Cultural Overview

One of the major aspects of world history since sixteenth century was the colonization of vast territories, across the globe, by European nations, particularly by France and England. These Western colonial powers, which together constituted less than two percent of the world's surface, were able to subjugate and dominate entire continents of people.⁹ By 1944, 725,614,000 people and 177,321,060 areas in square miles were under the control of different colonial empires but mostly under British and French control.¹⁰ These human and territorial conquests of continental proportions were made possible through, to put it in Ngugi wa Thiong'o's words, "Christianity, Commerce, Civilization: the Bible, the Coin, the Gun: the Holy Trinity".¹¹ The underlying purpose of their outward expansion was to "get at a people's land and what that land produces": that is, to find cheap raw materials—including cheap-labor—for their industries as well as open markets for their products.¹² This was a continuous process, which attained different shapes and forms with changing time and space. Thus, the colonization of India prior to the War of Independence (1857) was different from the one that was in place post that period. Similarly, British and French ways of colonizing others were not necessarily identical. Sometimes, the same colonizing power would use differing methods in different countries, and in some cases, even the same power would apply various laws and rules within the same colony. That being said, the nature of the phenomenon called colonialism remained the same throughout the globe. Irrespective of time

⁹ Thomas Benajamin, ed., *Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism since 1450* (n.d).

¹⁰ These figures show that more than one-third of human population, inhabiting more than one-third of the total earth surface, lived under colonial conditions. W.E.B. Du Bois, "The Disfranchised Colonies", in Diana Brydon, ed., *Postcolonialism: Critical concepts in literary and cultural studies* (London: Routledge, 2000), 291.

¹¹ Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Petals of Blood* (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1977), 88.

¹² Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Writers in Politics: Essays* (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1981) 12.

and space, colonialism was essentially a system entirely based on violence of all forms. Everywhere in the colonies, tiny minorities of "settlers" would rule over the vast majorities of the "indigenous" or "native" populations, the latter being thought of as lesser or sub humans. The surplus produced in the colonies were extracted and sent to the metropolitan countries, and the local markets were inundated with goods produced in the so-called "mother country". The result being, the collapse of local industries and the supply of hundreds of thousands of jobless laborers. In short, the “end was the same: to institute an economic structure and consequently a class system, the colonizing nation can control.”¹³

But, was it all about economic exploitation and political domination? Was it possible to maintain and perpetuate such an exploitative system as colonialism through "hard power"—that is, through military means, which made it possible in the first place—alone? Is it even imaginable that the bulk of the non-European populations in Africa, Asia, and America, could be colonized politically and economically without also colonizing their cultures and traditions, their histories and literatures, their psyches, and their bodies and souls? The answers to all these questions cannot be in the affirmative. Notwithstanding the fact that its primary purpose was economic and political in nature, it was by no means limited to just these two spheres. Rather, in order to make their economic and political control more firm, the colonizers tried to control the “...cultural environment: education, religion, language literature, songs, forms of dance, every form of expression...”¹⁴ Moreover, how did the colonizers justify the exploitation of the colonies, and the brutal degradation of the bulk of humanity, both domestically and abroad, given the fact that the colonization process was being realized in a period when Europeans were raising the slogans of liberty, fraternity, and

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

equality? In other words, what was the ideology that masked what Guha considers the “historical paradox” of the colonial state, in that it was an “autocracy set up and sustained by the foremost democracy of the Western world”, from the eyes of the colonized?¹⁵ What follows in this chapter, is an attempt to address these questions briefly, and to show the infrastructure as well as the superstructure of a colonial system: that is, briefly discuss its politico-economic, and ideological-cultural aspects.

Politico-Economic aspect:

As stated earlier, colonialism was not a static phenomenon; rather it changed over time as well as with space. Notwithstanding the fact that “subordination of the colony” and the “appropriation of the colony’s surplus by the metropolis” are constant features of colonialism, the patterns of subordination as well as of surplus appropriation undergo change and, as such, determine the different stages of colonialism.¹⁶ Since temporally the phenomenon can be traced back to 1492 when Columbus “discovered” America, and geographically, it encompassed several continents, therefore it is beyond the scope of the study to take into account such a vast terrain—both in its temporal and spatial terms. Thus, what follows in the section is the study of the nature of colonialism in India during the period when it was “fully integrated into the world capitalist system in a subordinate, colonial position”—i.e., during the 19th and 20th centuries.¹⁷

There has always been a debate, among scholars of different denominations, that revolves around the true nature and function of colonialism. On the one hand, there are those

¹⁵ Guha argues that unlike its western counterpart, which is based on persuasion, the state in a colonial India was sustained through coercion rather than on persuasion. He calls this latter situation “Dominance without Hegemony”. Ranajit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (London: Harvard University Press, 1997), xii.

¹⁶ Bipan Chandra, *Essays on Colonialism*, 18.

¹⁷ Ibid. 315.

who consider colonialism as the inevitable "tool of history" to modernize the pre-capitalist "oriental" societies, the latter being unable to make progress on their own. These scholars point out to such "positive" developments as the rule of law, the "introduction" of private property, the laying down of railway lines, etc. and they justify the "failure" of the colonial bourgeoisie, to transform the colony into a capitalist society, through "the poverty of initial conditions" that prevailed in India "from which colonialism had to start industrialization."¹⁸ Some accused colonialism of deliberately retaining the "remnants" of pre-capitalist, feudal relations of production, in the colony in the interest of the metropolis; others believed that colonial societies consisted of "dual sectors", that is, capitalist mode and feudal mode "coexisted" within the colony none of which was strong enough to exclude the other.¹⁹

Karl Marx, writing about English rule in India, is of the view that what makes the British conquest of India different from all the previous ones is the fact that it was the latter, which brought about a revolution in the social structure of India.²⁰ Just as he was the staunchest critic of capitalism, and yet considered it the most revolutionary and the most progressive "mode of production" than all the previous ones in history, so was his opinion of colonialism, in the context of the non-European world—that is, he was essentially an anti-colonial thinker, yet he thought of it as the "most revolutionary" mode of production ever occurred in India.²¹ Colonialism was, in his view, a positive development in as much as it

¹⁸ Ibid. 6.

¹⁹ Ibid. 4.

²⁰ Karl Marx, "British rule in India", in ed. James Ledbetter, *Dispatches for the New York tribune: selected journalism of Karl Marx*, (London: Penguin Books, 2007) 214.

²¹ Dushka H. Saiyid, *Exporting Communism to India: why Moscow failed*, (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1995), 2.

performed the double role of destroying the pre-existing “Asiatic mode of production,” and regenerating it on western capitalist lines.²²

The two cardinal features of the Asiatic mode were, according to Marx, the self-sustaining “village communities,” and “Oriental despotism.”²³ Village communities were characterized by two contradictory but fully integrated elements: the union of agriculture and manufacturing industry with no division of labor; and yet there was an “unalterable division of labor” sustained through caste system. The economic base for this was the “unchanging market” that the community provided to the artisan, prohibiting any change in the social division of labor, once fixed.²⁴ Moreover, land was the common possession of the community as a whole and it was up to the community to decide whether the land was to be communally tilled or distributed among individual tillers.²⁵ This was precisely for these two reasons that the village community was impervious to any change. As for the “oriental despotism”, Marx—like many “orientalists”—argued that the king was the sole proprietor of land in India.²⁶ Thus, on the one hand, Marx recognizes the existence of communal property and, on the other, regards the king as the sole proprietor of all land. In order to resolve this contradiction, he distinguishes between “property” and “possession”—where the village communities are the “possessors” of land, and the king is true owner of all land who received rent from the village communities.²⁷ The fact that the Asiatic mode remained as static as

²² Karl Marx, “The future results of British rule in India”, in ed. James Ledbetter, *Dispatches for the New York tribune: selected journalism of Karl Marx*. 220.

²³ Irfan Habib, *Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception*, (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 30.

²⁴ Ibid. 21.

²⁵ Ibid. 20.

²⁶ Marx thought that since the climatic conditions of India were such as to make artificial irrigation necessary, it was beyond the scope of village communities to develop such a system on their own. Therefore, the central government had to take control the public works who claimed the bulk of the surplus. Saiyid, *Exporting communism to India*, 6.

²⁷ Habib, *Essays in Indian History*, 23.

ever—or the fact that the Indian society remained “outside history”—was due to the lack of exchange of commodities. What the village communities produced was partly used for consumption, and partly paid to the state in the form of rent.²⁸ In other words, there was no internal dynamism in the Asiatic mode that could lead to its transformation into a more developed form. Therefore, it was essential to transform it through external means: for Marx, colonialism was that “unconscious tool of history” that brought about “revolution” in “the social state” of Asia.²⁹ Marx identifies two stages, namely, the stage of monopoly trade and direct appropriation of surplus, and the stage of “free trade” or “unequal exchange” through which the transformation of the Indian society took place.³⁰ According to Marx, throughout the 18th century, the “treasures transported from India to England were much less the result of insignificant commerce than of direct exploitation.”³¹ Direct exploitation meant, firstly, the appropriation of all the revenues of the government by the East India Company, which claimed sovereign rights over the “tax-rent”. It enlarged the tax-rent and dropped government expenditures on public works to lower levels. Secondly, it meant, the making of personal fortunes through “extortion, bribery, and monopoly”.³² Thirdly, it was this preoccupation with enlarging the revenues that effected the “agrarian revolutions” which reduced the peasant to “the physical minimum of the means of subsistence”.³³ Finally, direct exploitation

²⁸ Saiyid, *Exporting communism to India*, 6. However, Irfan Habib is of the view that Marx might have implied the existence of commodities. In his view, Marx’s view can be summed up as follows: produce for subsistence; produce for state in the form of rent, which ultimately made it to the market; and a smaller amount of produce for commodity exchange. But in any case, the markets for commodities was available only outside the village community. Within the village community “natural economy” prevailed. Habib, *Essays in Indian History*, 27.

²⁹ Marx, “British Rule in India”, 219.

³⁰ Chandra, *Essays on colonialism*, 18.

³¹ Habib, *Essays in Indian History*, 36.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid. 39.

meant the monopoly over opium “trade” to China.³⁴ Similarly, the exports from India to England were in excess in proportion to its imports from the latter, and was, as such, a form of direct exploitation. Marx saw this “drain of wealth” as a form of “primary accumulation”, which quickened the process of industrialization in the metropolis. Thus, it was not just the “Indian market but also the Indian empire that kept the momentum of industrial revolution once it had started”.³⁵ In short, during this stage the “plunder and direct seizure” of the colony’s surplus was very strong, and there was no “significant import of metropolitan goods” into the colony.³⁶ During this stage, a contradiction emerged between the interests of “oligarchy”, who wanted to extract as much revenue as possible through taxation and other forms of direct appropriation, and the “millocracy”, which found the Indian market “constricted due to huge burden of tribute on the shoulders of peasants.” The tension was resolved by expanding the borders of the empire to the farthest possible frontiers—that is, the intensity of revenue was lessened by the expansion of the area on which revenue was to be levied—in the interest of market.³⁷ In this way, the transition to the second stage—that is, to the stage of “free” or “unequal” trade characterized by industrial “expropriation”—occurred.

It was during this stage, according to Marx, that the exports of British industrial goods increased manifold: British exports to India amounted to about one-eighth of its total trade, and cotton export to India amounted to one-fourth of its total trade, by 1850.³⁸ During the period 1813-35, Indian consumption of English cloth amounted to 3.9% of the total, which rose to 58% in 1880-81. As a result, the traditional “union of agriculture and manufacturing

³⁴ One-seventh of the revenues of the English govt. of India came from the opium trade with China. In addition, “the import of tea and silk from China gratis were received in the payment of Indian tribute.” Ibid. 40-41.

³⁵ Ibid. 44.

³⁶ Chandra, *Essays on Colonialism*, 63.

³⁷ Habib, *Essays in Indian History*, 44.

³⁸ Ibid. 45-46.

industry” in the village economy collapsed. For the peasant would now buy Lancashire cloth thereby dispensing with local spinner; the spinner would buy Lancashire yarn at the expense of domestic weaver; and the peasant had to produce raw materials for the market and not just for subsistence and surplus.³⁹ The process of regeneration started simultaneously with the aforementioned destructive process. Marx pointed out the political “unity” brought about by British rule into the erstwhile divided-against-itself Indian society; the telegraph, which would “perpetuate” that unity; the introduction of railway system; the emergence of an educated Indian class, “imbued with European sciences” and “endowed with the requirements of government”; the introduction of “free press”—that “great agent of reconstruction”; and to the “emergence” of private property—the “great desideratum” of Asiatic society, factors that would transform Asiatic mode of production into a fully developed capitalist mode of production.⁴⁰ In a nutshell, Marx believed that it was in the nature of capitalism as a world system that it forced all nations, “on the pain of extinction”, to adopt the “bourgeoisie mode of production”, “to become bourgeoisie” themselves. Since capitalism created a “world after its own image”, it would transform the colony into an image of the metropolis—into a “full-fledged industrial, capitalist” polity.⁴¹ But, Indian society did not transform the way Marx had predicted: true that Indian society did not remain the same as it used to be prior to colonial rule, but that did not mean that it became a capitalist society. The reason for Marx’s inability to grasp the colonial situation fully, was the fact the he did not have the opportunity to observe the colonial situation from a closer proximity and, in addition, it is worthwhile to note, that Marx was speaking of the “conditions of regeneration” not regeneration itself—he

³⁹ This led to the commercialization of agriculture, the landlessness of small peasants who could not produce for markets, and to the joblessness of millions of domestic weavers and spinners. Ibid. 46.

⁴⁰ Marx, “Future Results of British Rule in India”, 220.

⁴¹ Chandra, *Essays on Colonialism*, 6.

was pointing to the potential that might emerge from the conditions.⁴² Believing, perhaps, in the universality of economic laws, Marx failed to take into account the peculiar situation in the colony: for, as Justice Mahadev Govind Ranade, a 19th century critic of colonial rule, argued that, economic laws were neither abstract nor universal like those of physics and mathematics rather they were contingent on space and time.⁴³

As Marx's earlier conclusions—earlier because he changed, towards the end of his life, his position vis a vis the "regenerative" potential of colonialism⁴⁴—about India were based on the assumptions of government reports, and works of “orientalist” scholars, one can say that, as far as the “redemptive” nature of colonialism was concerned, he was expressing the opinion of not only the metropolitan officials and intellectuals, but also of Indian intelligentsia. For example, Raja Ramohan Roy, “the father of Modern Indian Nationalism”, thought of colonial rule as a “divine gift” in that it would set material conditions for the modernization of Indian economy and polity—a position which was almost completely reversed during the 1860s.⁴⁵ Not for nothing did these “economic nationalists” reverse their position regarding the developmental potential of colonialism; rather, their critique was substantiated by the way colonialism developed the metropolitan economy at the expense of the colonies. For colonialism had opposite impact on the metropolis and the colony: whereas it sustained industrialization in the metropolis, it completely de-industrialized the colonies.⁴⁶

⁴² Aditya Mukherjee, *The return of the colonial in Indian economic history: the last phase of colonialism in India*, (New Delhi: presidential address, Indian History Congress, 2010), 3.

⁴³ B. Surendra Rao, “Disrobing Colonialism and Making Sense of It”, *Social Scientist*, vol. 38, no. 7/8 (July-August, 2010), 20.

⁴⁴ Aditya Mukherjee, *The return of the colonial in Indian economic history*, 6.

⁴⁵ After 1860s, they thought of colonialism as the main obstruction in India's progress to a fully developed capitalist society and therefore it should be done away with. *Ibid.* 3.

⁴⁶ Mukherjee argues that economic development in Europe, both in terms of living standards and in the sense of structural breakthrough with the rise of capitalism, is closely connected to its relationship with the rest of the world from the 15th century onwards. According to him, in 1500 Asia's contribution to total world GDP was

As already noted, in the discussion on Marx's view of colonialism, the exploitation of the economy of the colony, during the first stage, was realized through revenue generation and through monopoly over trade, which consisted of unrequited exports from India—through “tribute”. The two were inseparable in that the revenues that were extracted from India were paid to buy Indian products: in other words, India paid for its exports.⁴⁷ Since the Company, by virtue of its conquest, assumed sovereignty over revenue, it was able to “buy without having to pay, and be able to sell at the full price”.⁴⁸ Habib shows that Indian exports to England rose from 12% in 1750-51 to 24% in 1797-98.⁴⁹ These were not just raw materials but “manufactured goods”, mainly textiles, which constituted the unrequited exports.⁵⁰ By 1800, the drain or tribute that England extracted from India, at the expense of the latter, amounted to no less than 4.70 million sterling⁵¹ and it amounted to 9% of the total GNP of the colony in the period 1783-83 to 1792-93.⁵² This tribute had a double effect: on the one hand, it destroyed the local economy, and on the other, its contribution to the national saving in the metropolis was no less than 30% of the total national saving and, as such, played more important role in the industrialization of metropolis than the role of the latter's domestic savings.⁵³ In other words, the “capital” extracted from the colony was used for the industrial development of the metropolis.⁵⁴ During this stage, no important changes were

three times more than that of Western Europe, but by 1913, Asia share fell to two thirds of European share. Aditya Mukherjee, “empire: how colonial India made Britain”, *economic & political weekly*, (Dec. 2010, vol. xlv no.50), 74.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 75

⁴⁸ Irfan Habib, “Colonization of Indian economy, 1757—1900”, *Social scientist*, vol. 3, no. 8 (March 1975), 23-25.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 26.

⁵⁰ Mukherjee, “Empire”, 76.

⁵¹ Habib, “Colonization of the Indian economy”, 28.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid. 29.

⁵⁴ Dietmar Rothermund, *An Economic History of India: From Pre-colonial Times to 1991*, (London: Routledge, 2003), 18.

introduced in the colonies, because the “colonial mode of surplus appropriation” through tribute did not require any basic changes in its socioeconomic base.⁵⁵

Now, with the growth in industries in the metropolis, the need to find a viable market for industrial goods emerged. There occurred a tremendous increase in the total output of textiles, which would not only limit the world market for Indian textiles but also necessitate the control of India’s home market.⁵⁶ The increase in the collection of revenues, however, continued even in the second stage. Thus during the first half of 19th century, revenue collection in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces increased by about 70% with the prices of the produce remained constant.⁵⁷ This increase in revenue coupled with stagnant or declining prices led to the pauperization of the peasantry and the joblessness of agricultural laborers.⁵⁸ Simultaneous with the pauperization of the peasantry, was the decline in urban population due to “de-industrialization”, itself a result of the control of metropolitan goods over the local market.⁵⁹ The imports of textiles from the metropolis increased from 0.80 million yards in 1815 to 100 million yards in 1839, and the export from India decreased tremendously.⁶⁰ This stage was, therefore, marked by a contradiction between the increases in the revenue that constricted the Indian market for British manufactures; on the other hand, the deindustrialization process, and the subsequent decline in export/drain, obstructed the realization of tribute.⁶¹ In order to reconcile the two without affecting any one, a “triangular trade” with China was deemed to be the only answer. British textiles were brought to India, opium from India—the “new tribute”—would be exported to China. Thus, opium would

⁵⁵ Chandra, *Essays on Colonialism*, 63.

⁵⁶ Habib, “Colonization of the Indian economy”, 30.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 33.

⁵⁸ Ibid. 36.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 37.

⁶⁰ Ibid. 37.

⁶¹ Ibid. 39.

ensure the realization of tribute in an enlarged form: it constituted, firstly, payment for British textiles; secondly, it constituted tribute from India; finally, it would be traded for tea and silk from China.⁶²

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the need for the export of metropolitan capital persuaded the colonialists to “invest” in the colonies. The focus now shifted, even more, towards subordinating the Indian market, for manufactured goods, and to finding raw materials for metropolitan industries. The twin notions of “free trade” and “development” became the hallmarks of colonial ideology. Nothing could serve this purpose better than the development of railways: for it would not only provide an outlet for metropolitan capital but also would help tame the Indian market even further. Thus by 1872, the capital investment in Indian railways, at guaranteed interest rate of 5%, amounted to 94.73 million sterling.⁶³ Similarly, huge sums of loan were taken by the Indian govt. from the British government for the same purpose thereby causing an increase of no less than 40 million sterling in the Indian debt within no more than two decades.⁶⁴ The development of railway system did not prove to be the “forerunner” of industrial revolution; rather it inhibited the very possibility of that to happen. It is argued that it destroyed the local industry by facilitating the penetration of foreign goods into India.⁶⁵ Thus British exports to India rose to 12.6% in 1865-75 from 9.15% of her total exports in 1846-55; similarly, British export of cotton yarn to India amounted to 11% of its total cotton export in 1849, which rose to 27% in 1875.⁶⁶ Furthermore, it encouraged the export of raw material—food grains, cotton, indigo etc.—from the colony. Rates were so fixed that freight rates to and from ports were less than that

⁶² Mukherjee, “empire”, 73.

⁶³ Habib, “colonization of Indian economy”, 41.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Chandra, *essays on colonialism*, 182.

⁶⁶ Habib, “colonization of Indian economy”, 41.

between inland trading and industrial centers.⁶⁷ In this way, the colonial economy was “disarticulated internally” and then “articulated” the disarticulated parts externally to the metropolitan center.⁶⁸ Furthermore, it was during this period that the *zamindar* started to become landlord: the need to produce commercial crops and the rises in the prices when the revenue to be paid remained static resulted in the total wellbeing of the *zamindar* class. Therefore, at the turn of the 20th century, rather than developing the colony, the colonizers ended in under developing it. In addition, the phenomenon of "usury" became one of the defining features of the 2nd half of 19th century. The moneylender became a claimant to a share in the surplus, and if a peasant defaulted on his debts, his land was to be confiscated by the creditor or he had to accept even harsher terms.⁶⁹

It was during the 20th century that industrial growth occurred in India, albeit with a very slow and “stunted” pace.⁷⁰ Chandra argues that whatever little industrial development did happen in the 20th century, it was not because of, but in spite of colonialism. According to him, the reasons for the development were two: firstly, the linkages of the colony with metropolitan capital had weakened due to World War I, and then due to the great depression; secondly, the growth and intensity of Indian Nationalist Movement had forced the colonizers to give the local industrialists more tariff concessions.⁷¹ During the period 1914-47, the Indian cotton textile industry gained its lost ground to a considerable extent. But, this

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ According to Hamza Alavi, it was in the nature of “colonial mode of production” that its different sectors are internally disarticulated and then these internally disarticulated parts are externally articulated, that is, linked to the metropolitan centers. Thus, railways forced the peasants to produce for the metropolitan market which resulted in the shortage of food internally; also, since the market was inundated with British goods, the peasants were forced to buy foreign goods. Hamza Alavi, “India and the colonial mode of production”, *Socialist Register*, 1975, 176.

⁶⁹ Habib, "colonization of the Indian economy", 45.

⁷⁰ Chandra, *essays on colonialism*, 90.

⁷¹ Ibid, 91.

“paltry” development had very little impact on the overall condition of the colony. The underdevelopment and exploitation of the colony continued until the end of World War II. According to Mukherjee, Britain’s financial demands on India, since 1913, increased manifold: Home Charges increased from 2 million sterling in 1913 to 32 million in 1924-25; military expenditures doubled to 10 million and charges over debt increased 14.3 million from 6 million between 1913-14 and 1932-33.⁷² The proportion of military expenditures to the total Indian budget rose to 75% during the WWII from 50% during 1925.⁷³ The principal source of revenue now was custom duties, which constituted almost 75% of the total revenues by 1925.⁷⁴ Duties on imports were increased in order to raise revenue of the government: for example, import duties on British cotton goods reached 25% in 1930 from 3% in 1890s; even higher duties, 75%, were imposed on non-British and mainly Japanese goods. This was another reason for the growth in local industries.⁷⁵ In short, the appropriation of the colony’s surplus continued even when the colonial power was declining. Contrary to the claims of the colonialists, the colony, rather than being developed, was left impoverished.

To sum up, colonialism is a phenomenon whereby a foreign nation integrates a colony into the world capitalist system, without transforming the colony into a capitalist society. That does not however, mean that a colony remains feudal: a colony is neither a capitalist polity nor a feudal one as Alavi and Chandra has shown. Its incorporation into the world capitalist system is ensured through force and its interests were completely subordinated to the interests of the metropolis. It was the “direct appropriation” of the

⁷² Mukherjee, “Empire”, 79.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

surplus, in the first place, that sustained and completed the industrial revolution; it was the colony that provided the metropolis with cheap raw material and cheap labor; it was the colony that provided an outlet for the metropolitan capital and a fertile market for metropolitan manufactures; and it was the colony that kept the metropolitan economy floating at a time when it had to face crisis after crisis. In other words, colonialism performed a dual role vis. a vis. the metropolis and the colony: while it developed the metropolis, it underdeveloped the colony. To put it in Bipan Chandra's words:

“This uneven development of capitalism—the development of one part and the underdevelopment of the other, and unequal distribution of the benefits of the development system—has been a basic characteristic of modern capitalism. From the very beginning capitalism has developed by becoming a fetter on the social, economic, and political progress of its colonies—the other countries involved in the growth of capitalism...”⁷⁶

Ideological-cultural aspect:

The previous section has shown that colonialism was, despite the claims or beliefs of its proponents as well as some of its earliest critics to the contrary, a system that was designed to serve the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie at the expense of the colonized peoples. Such an exploitative system, of course, required strong bureaucracies, both military and civil, and superior techniques and technologies of war, but it could not rely entirely on such “explicit” means of control. It needed something less observable, more subtle, more complex, and more intricate that could operate in such a manner as to render the colonized passive and incapable of resistance. Moreover, it had to be presented in a manner so that its exploitative nature could be hidden not only from the colonized but also from domestic populations. The reliance on such subtle ways of control became even more necessary in the 18th and 19th centuries because it was the period when such values as equality, fraternity, and liberty, and

⁷⁶ Chandra, *Essays on colonialism*, 27.

the ideas of self-government gained currency in the West, on the one hand, and the rapid expansion of Western empires in the East, on the other.⁷⁷ Thus, parallel with the politico-economic colonization, an equally, if not more, important cultural colonization had to take place. To affect this type of colonization, the colonizers had to "inferiorize" the colonized, as it were, to a "subhuman" level, because "men cannot be enslaved without logically making them inferior through and through".⁷⁸ According to Ngugi wa Thiong'o, the biggest weapon of imperialism is the "cultural bomb" which destroys a people's belief "in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities, and ultimately in themselves".⁷⁹ In as much as doing violence to a "fellow man" constituted a crime in the eyes of the European, the colonizers, through cultural colonization excluded the "native" from the fold of "fellow men", and reduced them to "the level of superior monkeys in order to justify the settler's treatment of them as beasts of burden".⁸⁰ In addition, once the colonized were shown to be inferior, primitive, and barbarians, the colonizers had to assume the responsibility for bringing them into the fold of civilization by subjecting them to their rule—they had to carry the "White man's burden". In other words, "it was through culture that the assumption of 'divine right' of imperial powers to rule was vigorously and authoritatively supported".⁸¹

⁷⁷ John Stuart Mill argued that his ideas in *On Liberty* and *Representative Government* were not applicable to India because the latter was "civilizationally, if not racially, inferior." Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, (London: Penguin, 2003), 14.

⁷⁸ Frantz Fanon, *Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays*, Trans. Hakoob Chevalier, (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 40.

⁷⁹ Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Decolonizing The Mind: The Politics Of Language In African Literature*, (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House (Pvt.) Ltd., 1981), 3.

⁸⁰ Jean Paul Sartre, "Preface", *The Wretched of The Earth*, Franz Fanon, Trans. Constance Farrington, (New York: Grove Widenfeld, 1991), 14.

⁸¹ Bill Ashcroft & Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001), 82.

Thus, in the eyes of most Europeans, the world was divided into two opposite poles, the West and the East. The former consisted of all of Europe, which was at the most advanced stages of civilization, and was racially, culturally, and intellectually superior; whereas the latter which comprised the whole of non-European world was the “negative image” of the former. On the one hand, there was a “dynamic” Europe, “energized by science and reason”, and, on the other, a “static orient, possessed of culture and spirit, but devoid of reason and rationality”.⁸² The “orient”, reduced to a “stable” and “inert” object of scientific knowledge, could be “known and presented as series of facts,”⁸³ in spite of it being a society based on “myths and spiritualism”.

Given the importance of culture for maintaining and perpetuating the colonial system, it is not surprising then that the colonizers were preoccupied, since the very beginning of their rule, with things oriental. Thus, the necessities of ruling the Indians compelled the British administrators to learn the languages of the ruled. For example, after the battle of Plassey, in order to make alliances with native independent princes as well to recruit local army and servants to secure the newly gained territories, the learning of Persian became of utmost importance.⁸⁴ The learning of Persian was all the more necessary on account of the fact, as William Jones pointed out, that the Company could not depend on the “fidelity” of local interpreters.⁸⁵ A similar emphasis on the learning of Persian can be seen in Warren Hastings, who argued, “...the Persian language ought to be studied to perfection, and is requisite to all the civil servants of the company as it may also prove of equal use to the

⁸² HarbansMukhya, “India Through Ideological Prisms: Filling-in some Voids,” in *Challenges Of History Writing In South Asia: Special Volume In Honor Of Dr. Mubarak Ali*, ed., Syed Jaffar Ahmed, (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre University of Karachi & Pakistan Labor Trust, Karachi, 2013), 227.

⁸³ Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its forms of Knowledge: The British in India*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 22.

⁸⁵ Ibid. 23.

military officers of all the presidencies”.⁸⁶ Similarly, the need felt by Warren Hastings to govern India after the “manners and understandings of the people, and the exigencies of the country”, forced the rulers to study and learn Sanskrit which was thought of as a language of Hindu law.⁸⁷ Hastings want to compile the “Hindu” laws with the help of Hindu pundits and then translated it to English so as to make the judges of the civil courts able to have an understanding of the Hindu personal law.⁸⁸ Finding this translation full of errors coupled with his belief that the current versions of both Muslim and Hindu personal laws were not their “pure” or “original” versions, William Jones thought it fit to excavate those versions from the debris of corruptions added to it over the years.⁸⁹ Although its most basic functions were thought to be pure political and economic, this appropriation of local languages performed other functions as well: namely, to "...construct a history of relationships between India and the West, and to classify and locate their civilizations on an evaluative scale of progress and decay"; secondly, it gave them a tinge of legitimacy in that they patronized those institutions which, in their eyes, were the carriers of Indian traditions.⁹⁰ Jones’s fascinations with Sanskrit language led him to declare in an address to the Royal Asiatic Society, in 1786, that it was closely related to the Greek and Latin languages because there was “...stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs, and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident, so strong, indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some common source which, perhaps, no longer exists.”⁹¹ This theory of a common origin of Indo-European languages implied a

⁸⁶ Ibid. 24.

⁸⁷ Ibid. 26.

⁸⁸ Ibid. 27.

⁸⁹ Ibid. 27-29.

⁹⁰ Ibid. 46.

⁹¹ Bill Ashcroft & Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said*, 48.

common origin for both European and Indian civilizations. Yet, it was asserted that if, on the one hand, the European branches of the Indo-European groups progressively developed and became more refined, the Indian branches, on the other, decayed or, at best, remained static.⁹² The effects of their degeneration were thought to be so strong that, even though they were Aryans by origin, Indians had to remain distinct, different, and inferior forever.⁹³

A very important component of the ideological-cultural artifice of colonialism was the homology between sexual and political dominance used by the Europeans across the colonial world.⁹⁴ According to Ashis Nandy, the homology, rooted in the western denial of psychological bisexuality in men, “beautifully legitimized Europe’s post-medieval models of dominance, exploitation and cruelty as natural and valid.”⁹⁵ The belief that distinctions can be based on gender was prevalent in metropolitan capitals, and it was thought that women, on account of their gender, were “fragile, passive, and emotional,” as opposed to men, who, by virtue of their being men, were “strong, active, and intellectual.”⁹⁶ Consequent upon this was the division of labor between male and female: men were supposed to engage in economic and political activities, whereas women were to remain shut indoors to look after their husbands and their children. In other words, men were destined to dominate women. In the eyes of the colonizers, the Indians were feminine in essence: in their imaginary, the Indians were fragile, lazy, emotional, and effeminate. Thus, Robert Orme, writing in 1750s, in his account of India, wrote a chapter on the “Effeminacy of The Inhabitants of Indoostan,” and made the observation that “we see throughout India a race of men, whose make,

⁹² Thomas R. Metcalf, *The New Cambridge History Of India III.4: The Ideologies Of The Raj*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 90.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, date not given), 4.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, 92.

physiognomy, and muscular strength convey ideas of an effeminacy which surprises when pursued through such number of the species, and when compared with the form of the European who is making the observation.”⁹⁷ Such being the case, it was quite normal for the “masculine West” to rule the “feminine East”. Gender helped the *Raj* in yet another way: it was a part of the British ideology that a race was civilized to the extent that how well they treated their women.⁹⁸ In other words, since the Indian women were rather badly treated, the colonizers took upon themselves the task of protecting native women from native men. They pointed out such customs as “*sati*” to show the level of moral and civilizational degeneration of the Indians. To this effect, they enacted certain laws such as the abolition of *sati* in 1829, the “Hindu Widow Remarriage Act” of 1856, and “the Age of Consent Act of 1891”.⁹⁹ In short, since Indian men were not masculine enough to rule themselves, and were not kind enough to their women, the British were therefore morally justified to rule the Indians.

The role of Christianity was no less important in justifying colonialism. In the dominant discourse of the day, Christianity stood for “civilization” as opposed to other religions, which stood for “barbarism”.¹⁰⁰ Hinduism, for example, was considered to be inferior to Christianity because it was lacking “coherent beliefs” and “principled conviction”. Missionaries were therefore eager to win over as many people as possible to their side. Although individually the missionaries might have abhorred colonialism, their activities of education and conversion helped the colonial system: education and conversion worked as

⁹⁷ Ibid. 91.

⁹⁸ Ibid. 94.

⁹⁹ Ibid. 96.

¹⁰⁰ Aime Cesaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 2.

“technologies of domination and self-control” for the natives, which ensured their subordination to the system.¹⁰¹

Although, broadly speaking, these politico-economic and ideological-cultural aspects of colonialism remained the same throughout the globe; there were certain regional specificities and peculiarities. Even within the same colony, different regions experienced colonialism in their own peculiar way. The next chapter explains colonialism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and in so doing, highlights the peculiarity of colonialism in the province: here, due to its geo-strategic location, the colonial policies and administration in the province were determined more by strategic rather than economic considerations.

¹⁰¹ Peter Pels, "The Anthropology of Colonialism: Culture, History, and the Emergence of Western Governmentality", *Annual review*, 1997. 172.

Chapter TWO

British Colonialism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP): A Brief Overview

In this chapter, the history of the rule of the British Empire and the structure of the Pashtun society of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are briefly discussed. The questions addressed in this chapter are related to the colonial way of controlling the society of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. For this purpose, the focus of research will be to answer the questions as to what was the structure of the Pashtun society before the arrival of the British Empire. What was the strategic importance of this region for the British during their rule in India? How did they occupy this land? And, what types of administrative control was adopted?

Pashtun Society in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (N-WFP) at the time of British Empire

Pashtun society before the arrival of the British had undergone a transformation from the tribal pastoral type to a "sedentarized" tribal society in the Peshawar valley that contains the present day districts of Peshawar, Charsadda, Mardan, Nowshera, Swabi, and the present day districts of the Swat Valley. This sedentarization had been a result of the Yousafzai tribe's occupation of this region, and the subsequent land distribution known as *Tapa* system, envisaged by Sheikh Malli, who was a saint and an adviser to Malik Ahmad, the chief of Yousafzai Tribes; a division of labor in terms of power and revenue, which would later play a significant role in the social order of the Pashtun society. However, the remaining parts of the areas that would become parts of the province experienced mixed economy with

tribalism.¹⁰² Religion also played a significant role in shaping the history of the Pashtuns of this region.

During the Mughal period, the Pashtun society was under the influence of Sufi saints. Later on, with the emergence of Roshanites under the leadership of Bayazid Ansari, and anti-Roshanites under Akhund Derweza, the Pashtuns Sufi Islam became "political" Islam. A militant struggle between these two opposing Islamic camps lasted for about a century in the Pashtun inhabited areas. This division of society, with a greater role for the religious clerics, was used by the Mughals as a tool of "informal" administrative control in this region. At the same time, the influence of Tribal leaders had been enhanced by the *Tapa* system, which brought a particular tract of land under the influence of the Maliks who were already influential in the social affairs of the Tribes. With the emergence of political matters i.e. interaction with the invaders and the rulers of India, these tribal chiefs became politically influential as well.¹⁰³ However, this process did not remain uniform rather there were insurrections and uprisings against the Mughals from time to time, and inter-tribal feuds as well. Besides the religious and tribal resistance, the great Pushto poet Khushal Khan Khattak introduced a form of Afghan or Pashtun nationalism against the Mughals. This suggests that social order in Pashtun society was under the influence of Pashtunwali with vast influence of the tribal elders, the role of religious clerics, nationalism and the landed aristocracy. The landed aristocracy among Pashtuns was those tribal leaders in the Peshawar and Swat valleys that had control over the vast agricultural land. It is important to note that comparatively these two Pashtun inhabited areas were fertile for agriculture. There were instances of traders

¹⁰² Arlinghaus, Joseph Theodore, *The transformation of Afghan tribal society: Tribal expansion, Mughal imperialism and the Roshaniyya insurrection, 1450—1600* (Ph.D.diss, Duke University, 1988), 168-222, 266.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 270-308.

owning the markets of urban Peshawar valley who remained also influential in the society. Notables among them were the Arbabs of Peshawar who acted as intermediaries between the British rulers of India and the locals.¹⁰⁴ So tribal elders, religious clerics, landed aristocracy and traders became the ruling elite of the Pashtun society or tools of political order in society.¹⁰⁵

The Security of India and the North West Frontier

The North Western Frontier Regions of India remained under the Sikh rule of Punjab till 1849. At that time, the clerics waged several wars against the Sikh rule. The famous among them was led by Sheikh Ahmed Bareilvi. However, his resistance weakened as he was declared by some of the local religious clerics as un-Islamic, and also because some sections of the landed aristocracy were opposed to him. It is noteworthy to mention that Syed Ahmed had not only challenged the Sikhs, but also the role of the local Khans. After his movement dissipated, the Sikh did not acknowledge the role of the aristocracy, and, in the field of tax and revenue collection, they were all bypassed by the Sikhs, with the exception of the Khan of Zaida. Later on, the British government restored the role of the landed aristocracy, when they took control of the Peshawar valley from the Sikhs.¹⁰⁶ Thus, what the British government came into contact in the region was a society with a greater role for religion, landed aristocracy, and Tribalism.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Robert Nichols, *Settling The Frontier Land, Law, and Society In The Peshawar Valley, 1500- 1900*(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 48-89.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ The Sikh had occupied Peshawar valley in 1834, after which Sultan Muhammad, the brother of Dost Muhammad Khan was made the governor of Peshawar Valley. See Ibid.,90-106.

¹⁰⁷ When in the Anglo Sikh war in 1849, the British defeated the Sikh and annexed Punjab along with Peshawar into the imperial rule.Ibid.

Meanwhile, during the early 19th century, the Russian threat to the security of India became more prominent, as it was expanding its “influence” in the north of Afghanistan and Persia, and was therefore alarming for the British Empire. On the other hand, the Afghan King was perceived to be a threat to the Empire rather than a security guarantee against the Tsarist Russia. Thus, the British Policy makers adopted two types of policy approaches towards Afghanistan, which came to be known as “the closed border policy” and “the forward policy”. The former was based on establishing friendly relations with the government of Afghanistan and the later was based on extension of control in the Afghan territory. However, the British policy towards this region oscillated between closed border and forward line periodically depending upon the situation in Afghanistan and this region. When, in the 1830s, by the Treaty of Torkmanchai, the Russians were able to replace the British influence at the court of Tehran in Persia, the British thought that Russia would help Fateh Ali Shah of Persia to extend his influence towards Kandahar and Herat and would thereby influence Afghanistan, which was construed to be detrimental to the security of India.¹⁰⁸ Based on this approach, Lord Auckland wanted to have friendly relations with Afghanistan. For this purpose, he sent a mission to Afghanistan, which failed in its objectives.¹⁰⁹ The situation became even worse when Dost Mohammad Khan, also known as “the Great Amir”, was suspected to have opened negotiations with Russia, the British government considered this move as a threat to the security of India. It is important to note that Dost Mohammad Khan had established his rule by defeating Shah Shuja at Kandhkhar in 1834 and Sikhs at Jamrud in 1837. After having defeated these two, the Amir was perceived that he would take Peshawar, whereas his negotiation with the Russian posed a two-fold

¹⁰⁸ M. Hassan Kakar, *A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan 1863-1901* (Brill: The Netherlands, 2006), 160-165.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

threat to the security of India. It was against this backdrop, that the British negotiated the Shimla manifesto of 1838 with the deposed Shah Shuja, and the Sikhs ruler, Ranjit Singh. The manifesto recognized the independence of the Sikh rule from Afghanistan and that it would be enforced once Shah Shuja had been restored to the throne of Kabul. This arrangement was an implied declaration of war with Afghanistan. Consequently, the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) took place with a short-term victory but later brought devastative results for the British forces.¹¹⁰

So, the obvious lesson for the British was the non-interference in the Afghan affairs, a policy known as “masterly inactivity”. In 1854, Lord Dalhousie proposed to the Afghan Amir, Dost Mohammad Khan, to offer a barrier against any Russian attack on India, and agreeing to this proposal, the Amir in 1855 concluded a treaty with the British India in which he declared himself as the "friend of the friends" and "enemy of the enemies" of the British Empire. By virtue of this treaty, the British would not make any interference in the territories of the Amir’s domain and Peshawar would remain the subject of the British Empire.¹¹¹ Thus, the peaceful policy or closed-door policy remained intact until the Second Anglo Afghan War (1878) and, then the third Afghan war in 1919. During these intervals, the British policy oscillated between the “closed border” and “forward line” depending upon the regimes' independence in Afghanistan.¹¹²

During that period, the Amir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali Khan, the successor of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, refused to the British influence to not to engage with the Russians

¹¹⁰ Frank A. Clements, *Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia* (California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2003), xvi-xvii.

¹¹¹ M. Hassan Kakar, *A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan 1863-1901*, 160-165.

¹¹² Mukulika Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition And Memory In The North West Frontier* (Oxford, 2000) 22-24.

and to allow stationing of British troops along the Afghan border. This led to the second Anglo-Afghan war in November 1878. However, during the war, the Afghan Amir died and Amir Yaqub Khan succeeded him, who accepted all the demands of the British government.¹¹³ He concluded the treaty of Gandumak, in May 1879, in which the external relations of Afghanistan came under the control of the British government of India. Additionally, the British government was allowed to station forces in Afghanistan. The British government was also given control of the Khyber Pass and Michini Pass along with districts of Kurrum, Pishin and Sibi.¹¹⁴ This arrangement short lived as the people in Kabul revolted against the presence of British mission in Kabul and a civil war started, the Amir was dethroned , and with this the British Indian government entered into the second phase of the Second Anglo Afghan War. However, they failed to quell the popular uprising and started retreat. In the meanwhile, Amir Abdur Rahman marched from the North of Afghanistan and succeeded in becoming the Amir of Afghanistan in July 20, 1880. The British recognized him as the legitimate ruler and retreated from Afghanistan.¹¹⁵

After the defeat in the second Afghan war, the British assured Amir Abdur Rehman of Afghanistan to protect the territorial integrity of Afghanistan as long as he followed the direction of the British foreign Policy. The Amir, although determined to protect his land with or without the British help, made use of the British arms and subsidies in resisting the Russian aggression and consolidating his own rule. The Amir did not however play direct role in the uprisings of the tribal people and the North West Frontier, yet the situation in these areas, and Afghanistan remained integral to the security of India. It was under these

¹¹³ M. Hassan Kakar, *A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan 1863-1901*, 165-167.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 27-28.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 35-43.

circumstances that British would later define the Durand Line in 1893, and the Tribal Areas and the North Western Frontier Province in 1901.¹¹⁶

The Creation of North Western Frontier Province and the Durand line

As mentioned earlier, the British policy makers changed from closed policy to forward policy depending upon the situation in Afghanistan, however, the post Second Anglo Afghan war, the British Policy contained both the element of the Closed Border and Forward Policy with respect to the Tribal Areas and the North Western Frontier Regions, which would eventually become the North West Frontier Province. During the closed border period, the British tried to experiment the Sandeman System¹¹⁷, but the survey teams were attacked in Waziristan. According to this system local influence was to be used as a means of maintaining peace in the region and that the British government would not interfere in the tribal areas. This system however, did not work in the North Western Regions. Therefore, the British government maintained its closed border policy until the second Anglo-Afghan war.¹¹⁸ The main idea behind the closed border policy with the tribal areas was to protect the border from the tribal incursions, with non-aggression on tribal areas and to respond with punitive expedition to any tribal attack. For military purposes, the Punjab Frontier Force was established which, was later on, in 1886, amalgamated in to the regular army. For strategic purposes, the pre-existing forts were renovated, new ones were raised along administrative routes, and they

¹¹⁶ R. A. Johnson, "Russians at the Gates of India"? Planning the Defence of India, 1885-1900" *The Journal of Military History* 67, No. 3 (Jul., 2003), 670.

¹¹⁷ Sir Robert Sandeman, who was the first Agent to the Governor General in Balochistan, established the "Sandeman System". According to this system, the British Government kept central points in Kalat and Tribal Territory with considerable force, linking them with linking roads. The Tribes were allowed to manage themselves their internal affairs through their own customs. The administration was carried out through Chiefs and Mailiks who were required to enlist levies paid by the British Government. See also, Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan and Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri, "Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan" IPRI. No.10, (2005).

¹¹⁸ Ibid..

were all connected with each other by means of military roads. The British government of India conducted agreements with the local tribes to maintain peaceful relations in return for subsidies. These agreements were however, frequently violated and resulted into minor and large scale military operations and expeditions. The government of Punjab conducted as many as 62 military operations into tribal areas between 1849 and 1899.¹¹⁹

Lord Lytton when became the Viceroy of India, he thought that at Kabul, Herat to Kashmir, the Hindukush mountains provides a natural bulwark to the defense of India. The pretext to abandon the closed border was provided by the Amir of Afghanistan: In response to Sher Ali who resisted British influence in Kabul, Lord Lytton adopted more aggressive line and attacked Afghanistan. After Sher Ali had fled, his son Amir Yaqub Khan, agreed to the treaty of Gandamak with the British Indian Government. According to this treaty, the areas of Pishin, Sibi, Khyber and Kurram were permanently annexed by the British Empire.¹²⁰

Lord Lytton had also presented the idea of the so-called “scientific border”, according to which the tribal belt would be separated from the rest of the India. At that time, a debate started which divided the British policy makers into two groups, one group suggested backward position, the other the forward. The backward position was based on creating the Indus River as a permanent border; whereas, the forward group suggested that the frontier should be from Kabul to Ghazni and Kandahar. However, a compromise was achieved and the British agreed with the Amir of Afghanistan on demarcating their respective "spheres of

¹¹⁹ Javed Iqbal, “An Overview of British Administrative Set-Up and Strategy In The Khyber 1849-1947” *IPRI Journal XI*, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 77-95.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

influence", what came to be known as the Durand Line in, 1893.¹²¹ However, when Lord Curzon became the viceroy of India, he envisaged the creation of the North West Frontier Province, as he was critical of the power of the Punjab government. He also lamented that the authority of the Punjab were least interested in the affairs of the North West Frontier so he raised it to the status of a separate Province in 1901. Initially, the province comprised of the five settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan; and the five political agencies of Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, South and North Waziristan.¹²² The creation of the new Province was such that the five settled districts were strategically connected to "independent regions" or tribal areas. Arnold Keppel, a British Officer, says,

...Both politically and geographically, the serrated shark's - tooth line which bisects the province, forming what is known as the " Independent Border," cannot be better understood than by clasping the two hands together and interlacing the fingers, so that those of the right hand may represent the roads running up through independent territory to the British outposts or political agencies at their heads, and the fingers of the left hand the long spurs of mountainous independent territory that run down into the rich level plains of Peshawar and the Derajat. The knuckles of the right hand will then represent the five district centers of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. In each of these districts settled government exists, and the administration does not differ in essentials from that of other provinces. In independent territory, however, we do not attempt any administration in the ordinary acceptance of the word...¹²³

Such arrangements were designed for the security of India from both the internal and external factors. Externally, it was the Afghanistan and internally it was the tribal incursions. In both the cases, this arrangement was suitable for the mobilization of British troops, it did not matter in inter district people and resource mobilization. For example, the railway lines built to every agency were parallel and directed towards Afghanistan. Similarly, there were railways tracks from Punjab towards, Malakand, Landi-Kotal, Thal, Bannu and Tank, but there were no such

¹²¹ Noor ul Haq, "Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan" (2005).

¹²² Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, *The North West Frontier Province: History and Politics* (Islamabad: NICHR, 2007), 10-12.

¹²³ Arnold Keppel, *Gun-Running and the Indian North-West Frontier* (London, 1911), 4.

railway tracks that could have connected the settled districts with each other and/or with these political agencies. All these tracks were parallel and extended towards Afghanistan.¹²⁴

Administratively, the N-WFP was placed under the Chief Commissioner of Peshawar, and agent to the governor general was directly responsible to the government of India. The political agent was responsible for the political affairs of the agencies whereas each district was under the domain of the deputy commissioner. The most important features of the judicial system were that it was "governed" through the "special laws", the Frontier Crimes regulations (FCRs).¹²⁵ When the British Indian government annexed the six Pakhtun inhabited districts in 1848, the ordinary criminal and civil law, that was operational in the rest of India, were extended to these districts. However, when the conviction rate was thought to be too low, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCRs) were promulgated in 1871 in these areas. Later on, with minor modifications, these regulations were reenacted in 1873 and 1876. But, this too was not sufficient, and in 1901, the scope of these laws were changed, what came to be known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations FCRs of 1901.¹²⁶

Direct and Indirect Rule in the North Western Frontier Province

In order to establish a firm control, the British Indian government adopted two-pronged strategy. One was the direct bureaucratic, both military and civil, control; and the other was the extension patronage to the local "traditional" institutions.¹²⁷ By these two methods, the absolute control of the NWFP was put in to the hands of the Viceroy of India with exception to the daily affairs of civil nature and criminal justice, which were administered by the Chief

¹²⁴ Khan Abdul Wali Khan, *Bacha Khan ao Khudai Khidmathgaree Vol-I*, (March 1993), 40-42.

¹²⁵ Shah, *North West Frontier Province* (2007), 10-11.

¹²⁶ *FCR: A bad law nobody can defend*, HRCF (July 2005), 2.

¹²⁷ The power of the Maliks, and Khans, and the role of indigenous levies are regarded as forms of informal control.

Commissioner of Peshawar. The chief commissioner used to be a member of the Indian Political Services who was supposed to report to the Foreign Secretary of India. The role of the Foreign Secretary was unique in this regards as other secretaries such as home, law and finance used to report to the Council of Viceroy, he reported directly to the Viceroy. The foreign secretary was given the charge of the foreign and political department, and supervising the relations with the Princely states, the frontier tribes, and territories that were in direct relations with the Indian Government. However, this portfolio was divided in 1914, and a separate political secretary was handed over the duty of the princely states. Since then, until the British rule came to an end in India, a member from the Frontier services usually filled the post of the foreign secretary. The proximity of the Frontier officers with the Viceroy, from 1920s to 1930s, over the Frontier and its problems shows their importance for the central government.¹²⁸

Locally, the administration of the N-WFP included the Chief Commissioner, Chief Secretary and the Revenue Commissioner. Under the Chief Commissioner, every settled district had a Deputy Commissioner, who happened to have the dual charge of political agent of the adjoining tribal agencies. The political agent such as that of Kurram had the sole responsibility of Tribal Areas. On the other hand, the prominent deputy commissioner was the DC of Peshawar, who used to govern Peshawar, sub-divisions of Mardan and Charsadda, and as a political agent of Mohmand Agency. There were two Assistant Commissioners of Mardan and Charsadda, who used to work under the DC Peshawar. Similarly, there was another principal administrator, the Resident in Waziristan who used to have nominal control

¹²⁸ Brandon Douglas Marsh, "Ramparts of Empire: India's North-West Frontier and British Imperialism 1919-1947" (PhD, Diss, University of Texas, 2007), 12-16.

over the DCs for Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu, and the political agents of North and South Waziristan.¹²⁹

This centralization of power was more direct, and the administration was more concerned with the control of the society. Therefore, there were no such things as legislative reforms, rather the law and order were dealt with through the infamous Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCRs). The 1901 FCRs had imposed even the concept of collective responsibility and punishment. The local police and *Khasadar*, the landed aristocracy, and the Tribal Maliks implemented these laws. These institutions as mentioned earlier acted as an indirect method of rule.¹³⁰ At times, the levy and *Khasadar* force were divided among them along tribal and sub-tribal lines, which became a source of revenue for them. The *maliks* were provided with incentives in return for getting tribal allegiance for the British rule.¹³¹ In the settled districts, and vast agricultural lands, the Khans were co-opted. These Khans acted as "intermediaries" between the people and the British Indian government. They were given a share in the revenue collection, and at some places, the rules of tenancy were chalked out in interest of the Khans. Their right to possess huge *Jagirs* was legitimized by codifying the tenancy laws.¹³² The main duty of the feudal Khans was to improve and maintain "peace" in his respective *Jagir* villages.¹³³ These khans and *maliks* acted to manipulate the local decision making processes in favor of the *Raj*. Some of the local influential people were

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ In this study the indirect rule is the use of traditional customary institutions of the Pakhtun society that helped the British colonial rule of India to control the regions of the North West Frontier Province.

¹³¹ Wali Khan, *Bacha Khan and Khudai Khidmatgar*, 29-30.

¹³² Mukulika Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memories in the North West Frontier* (New York: Oxford, 2000), 30-35.

¹³³ Ibid.

awarded *Muajabs*, i.e. monthly allowance. Such kinds of incentives acted as lucrative form of services for the local Khans and their relatives.¹³⁴

With regard to the judicial system, the Frontier Crimes Regulations and Murderous Outrageous Acts were employed to suppress the local people.¹³⁵ Similarly, as the Jirga system acted on unanimous consensus according to the Pashtu traditions, the Deputy and Assistant Commissioners and the Political Agents used to manipulate the *Jirgas* in favor of the British rule. The participants of the Jirga acted in favor of these civil servants. Sometimes, *Jirgas* were organized for getting decisions that were pre-planned.¹³⁶

This arrangement does not mean that the society remained peaceful. There were numerous uprisings in the tribal belts and also the crimes rate was high. The Mohmands, Zakhahels, Afridis and the Wazirs continued to engage in wars with colonial rulers. On the other hand, the Reforms that were introduced in other parts of India were not applied in this region. The Minto-Morley and Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 1909 and 1919 respectively, had nothing to do with affairs of the North West Frontier Province. It was in the April 1932 that the Province was given the status of a governor Province.¹³⁷ Although there were numerous uprisings and movements in the N-WFP, the next chapters would, focus on how the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement emerged in the province and how did it launched a "non-violent war" against colonialism.

¹³⁴ Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed*, 29-30.

¹³⁵ Qayum Khan, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier* (Bombay: Hind Kitab Publishers, 1945).

¹³⁶ Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed*, 30.

¹³⁷ Qayum Khan, *Gold and Guns*.

CHAPTER THREE

Resistance to Colonialism: Violence vs. Non-Violence

Colonialism, being a system essentially based on exploitation and violence, creates its own nemesis. The very fact, that it resorts to all types of techniques and violence to subordinate the natives, testifies to the fact that it is resisted right from its beginning. Its essentially violent and exploitative nature does not and cannot always remain hidden from the eyes of its victims despite the ideological-cultural camouflage that it wears. Moreover, the fact that it needs an ideological-cultural cover makes it clear that it is not an invincible system. Thus, if the history of the world since the 16th century until the second half of the 20th century is the history of colonial expansion of the western empires, it is also a history of resistance on the part of those who were being colonized. If the 18th and 19th centuries saw the consolidation of colonial regimes, the 20th century witnessed their retreat on account of anti-colonial struggles. Initially, these struggles were immature, less organized and more sporadic and were not well-planned ones. However, what is significant about the 20th century nationalist struggles were their organization, discipline, popularity, complexity, maturity, and their singularity of purpose. Their goal was simple and clear: it was the liberation of the masses from colonial oppression.

Notwithstanding the commonality of their ultimate goal of independence, the anti-colonial struggles differed in their strategies for achieving it. While there might be many

other parameters to figure out the specificities of these struggles, one way to differentiate them is through their use of violence or non-violence for overthrowing the colonial regimes. Having said that, there are the those movements, like the Mau Mau in Kenya and the Front de Liberation Nationale (F.L.N.) in Algeria, that used violence as their instrument; and there were those that resorted to non-violence like the Indian National Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgars in South Asia. What follows in this chapter, however, is not a comparative study of the two types of struggles. Rather, it is concerned with the ideas of Frantz Fanon, one of the leading members of the F.L.N., who advocated the use of violence, and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of Khudai Khidmatgars, who preached non-violence to get rid of colonialism.

Frantz Fanon : Violence:

Frantz Fanon was born on July 20, 1925 in Martinique, a French colony¹³⁸. His family belonged to what was then an emerging black bourgeoisie of the island. Therefore, he was able to get "modern" education at Lycee in the capital of the island, Fort-de-France. French education left deep imprints on his personality. In 1944, he joined the French army and served at the European Front. Due to his bravery in war he was honored with Croix de Guerre. With the passage of time, he was transforming irrevocably on account of the racism that he would experience in France and elsewhere. He noted his first experience of racism in his first book *Black Skins, White Masks* which he wrote while studying medicine at the University of Lyons. In 1951, he got admission to a program in psychiatry in Hopital de Saint-Alban. It was in 1953 that Fanon got the opportunity to serve in the largest psychiatric hospital of Algeria, Blida-Joinville as chef de service. During his service at Blida-Joinville

¹³⁸ Most of the biographical information on Fanon has been taken from Anthony c. Alessandrini, ed., *Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 1999), 2-6.

Fanon observed racism and colonialism from a closest possible position because here he got the opportunity of treating not only colonial police officials but also Algerian freedom fighters. Here he came to the conclusion that the "Arab, permanently an alien in his own country, lives in a state of absolute depersonalization."¹³⁹ Forced by his sense of "the duty of the citizen" he resigned from his post and joined the F.L.N. in 1957, and henceforward became a leading theorist of the movement and a prime target of French police and secret services.¹⁴⁰ During his association with the Algerian revolutionary movement until his death in 1961, Fanon wrote extensively for *El Moudjahid*, the journal of F.L.N. Although he died rather young at the age of 36, he left several works including *The wretched of the earth*; *Black skin, white Masks*; *A dying colonialism*; and *Towards the African revolution*. It is, however, *The wretched of the earth*, which he wrote towards the end of his life, that he is most famous for because it contains his "theory" of violence and decolonization in its most refined state.

Fanon's intellectual thinking was influenced by Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Jean-Paul Sartre, but he modified and refined the ideas of these thinkers to fit these into "his view of the world", that is, the colonial situation.¹⁴¹ His theory of violence and his understanding of the colonial world and its "dehumanization of man" were inspired by Sartre's understanding of Anti-Semitism.¹⁴² According to Sartre anti-Semitism was a form of "Manichaeism" whereby the anti-Semite divides the world into such categories as evil and good and where power tends to reduce human beings to "in-authenticity" and reduces

¹³⁹ He stated this in his resignation letter *ibid*, 3.

¹⁴⁰ Michael Azar, "In the Name of Algeria: Frantz Fanon and the Algerian Revolution", in Anthony c. Allessandrini, ed., *Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 1999), 24.

¹⁴¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, "Frantz Fanon: Reason and violence," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 15 (1970), 222-231.

¹⁴² Sebastian Kaempf, "Violence and victory: guerrilla warfare, authentic self-affirmation, and the overthrow of colonial state", *Third world quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 1, (2009), 139.

"subjects" into mere "objects".¹⁴³ Taking his cue from Sartre, Fanon explained the colonial world through the logic of Manichaeism.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, like Sartre, Fanon took into account not just the physical aspects of violence but also its psychological dimension.¹⁴⁵ Throughout his texts, Fanon tries to show how violence is inevitable for the colonized to get rid of colonialism. He believes that "national liberation", the "restoration of nationhood to the people", or decolonization is essentially a violent phenomenon.¹⁴⁶ Decolonization, for Fanon, is a process whereby one "specie" of man is replaced by an altogether different "species" of man.¹⁴⁷ Since decolonization is aimed at subverting the "order" of the colonial world, Fanon argues, it is a process of "complete disorder".¹⁴⁸ Describing the colonial world as a world of two irreconcilable and "reciprocally exclusive" zones, and "obedient to pure Aristotelian logic," he says, "of the two terms one is superfluous".¹⁴⁹ According to Fanon, "Colonialism is not a thinking machine nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence."¹⁵⁰ But, what form of violence does Fanon, every now and then, speak of?

Notwithstanding the recurring theme of violence in Fanon, his concept of violence is rather vague, and impregnated with different meanings. It encompasses an "entire range of political pressure including physical and psychological injuries, aggression, military coercion, power, and force."¹⁵¹ Broadly speaking, Fanon uses violence in terms of

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Frantz Fanon, *The wretched of the earth*, (New York: Grove Widen field, 2008), 33.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. 34.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. 35.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. 38.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. 58.

¹⁵¹ B. K. Jha, "Fanon's theory of violence: a critique", *the Indian journal of political science*, vol. 49 no.3 (July--Sept. 1988), 360.

"instrumental violence", and "absolute violence".¹⁵² Instrumental violence is the violence which is used as means towards some immediate and concrete goals. This type of violence is employed by the colonized "to upend the domination that has oppressed them."¹⁵³ It does so by causing some physical, economic, and tactical losses to the colonizer. In other words, it is the violence used by the "guerillas" to force their enemy to agree to their demands. Thus, when Fanon says that "the naked truth of decolonization evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it," he means by it the use of "instrumental" violence.¹⁵⁴ Similarly, it is the same violence that Fanon speaks of quite approvingly when he says that the peasant, the most exploited class of the colonized, comes to the realization that only violence "pays" and that his "liberation" requires the use of "all means, and that of force first and foremost."¹⁵⁵ If, on the one hand, he advocates for the use of instrumental violence, that is, the use of force; on the other, he dismisses the use of "non-violence" as an idea introduced by the "colonialist bourgeoisie" to settle the colonial problem "around a green baize table".¹⁵⁶ This idea, moreover, is meant to convince the colonized elite that their interests and those of the colonial bourgeoisie are not contradictory, that compromise and conciliation is possible between the two. He takes those "nationalists" and native "intellectuals" to task when they condemn the use of violence and feel apologetic to the media in the mother country.¹⁵⁷ Fanon justifies the use of instrumental violence on utilitarian grounds, that is, in terms of its tactical and strategic merits. To the question that is it possible, to defeat, with guns and knives, an enemy that is far superior in weapons and techniques of

¹⁵² Samira Kawash, "Terrorists and vampires: Fanon's spectral violence of decolonization", Anthony c. Allestrandini, ed., *Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives*, 239.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Frantz Fanon, *The wretched of the earth*, 36.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. 58.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 62.

war, his answer is in the affirmative. Invoking historical precedents, he refers to the defeat of Napoleon's superior army at the hands of Spaniards.¹⁵⁸ The reason that the Spaniards were able to succeed in the "colonial" war was that they possessed "national ardor" and the use of guerilla warfare.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, there is a "detached complicity" between capitalism and violent struggles, since the colonies serve as markets for metropolitan goods, capitalists do not support a government whose policy is to govern with "sword".¹⁶⁰ In addition, the colonized people in other countries might follow suit and the colonizers has to face many a battlegrounds. This coupled with the mutual rivalries among the colonizers may strengthen the position of the armed struggle vis a vis the colonizers.¹⁶¹ Although instrumental violence constitutes a great part of fanon's conception of violence, it is "absolute violence that "far exceeds instrumental violence."¹⁶² Thus, when fanon says that decolonization is essentially a violent phenomenon he does not necessarily mean by it the use of force or guerilla war. Fanon was not simply interested in reversing the colonial order and thereby reproducing the Manichaeian world. He was not interested in putting the native into the position of the settler and vice versa. If, for Fanon, colonialism was following Aristotelian logic of "reciprocal exclusivity", decolonization was a process following the logic of Hegelian dialectics.¹⁶³

Colonialism, as fanon understood it, was a system that was maintained through violence, through "bayonets and guns". But, this violence was not just limited to physical, economic or political domination. There were psychological and epistemological dimensions to it. Fanon believed that colonialism dehumanized the natives and a native was nothing

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. 63.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. 64.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. 69.

¹⁶² Samira Kawash, "Terrorists and vampires: Fanon's spectral violence of decolonization", 245.

¹⁶³ Michael Azar, "In the Name of Algeria: Frantz Fanon and the Algerian Revolution", 25.

more than a "thing".¹⁶⁴ In a colonial situation, the native did not possess any identity or subjectivity; he had been deprived of his existence and self-hood. The natives possessed no "historical agency" and the native was the "creation of the settler" living under a permanent state of "in-authenticity".¹⁶⁵ This then was the violence "in its natural state" that, Fanon thought, underpinned colonialism. In order to destroy this system and put an end to the "structures" that it entailed, a "greater violence" was needed. According to him, colonialism could be called into question only through "absolute violence".¹⁶⁶ For him absolute violence carried an "intrinsic value" because the native could get his freedom "in and through" it. Fanon sought not just the overthrow of the colonial order but also wanted to transcend it. His true liberation constituted the abolition of such colonial categories as the master and slave, white and black, and the colonizer and the colonized. In other words, Fanon's conception of decolonization through absolute violence does not mean chaos; it implies the destruction of the whole colonial universe".¹⁶⁷ If "instrumental violence" was meant to gain political and economic freedom, absolute violence aimed at the creation of "new humanism", a system beyond colonialism and its structures. In absolute violence, the very existence of the colonizer and the native was at stake. Since the native owed his existence (as native) to the colonizer, the destruction of the colonizer through absolute violence implied the destruction of the native, too.¹⁶⁸ Unlike instrumental violence, which substitutes one rule with another,

¹⁶⁴ Sebastian Kaempf, "Violence and victory: guerrilla warfare, authentic self-affirmation, and the overthrow of colonial state", 139.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. 140.

¹⁶⁶ Frantz Fanon, *The wretched of the earth*, 36.

¹⁶⁷ Samira Kawash, "Terrorists and vampires: Fanon's spectral violence of decolonization", 239.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

absolute violence was "the uprooting of the system as a whole, the supplanting of the political, existential, and corporeal reality created by colonization."¹⁶⁹

Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Non-violence

Ghaffar Khan was born in 1890 to Behram Khan, a "well to do" Muhammadzai Khan of Utmanzai, Charsadda.¹⁷⁰ At the time, Pashtoons were educationally and, therefore socially, and politically, the most backward nation in India.¹⁷¹ Even within the NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), they lagged behind every other community in terms of literacy.¹⁷² Several reasons are held responsible for their apathy towards education: their main occupation was agriculture; they mostly populated rural areas with very restricted opportunities for education; the secular nature of curricula was an anathema to "Pashtoon understanding of Islam"; pre-existing illiteracy; poverty and dependence on family labour; and internal "factional rivalries" among them.¹⁷³ In addition, the non-Pashto medium of instruction as well as the opposition of religious clergy to education at the instigation of the government contributed to the low literacy levels among Pashtoons.¹⁷⁴ But thanks to their "enlightened" father, Ghaffar Khan and his elder brother were able to get admission into Edward Memorial Mission High School in Peshawar. He was greatly impressed with the humanitarian natures of the head master, Mr. Wigram, and his brother Dr. Wigram and therefore attributed the genesis of his love for humanity, his nation, and his country to the two brothers.¹⁷⁵ After his

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 244.

¹⁷⁰ Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, *Zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, (Peshawar, Bacha Khan Research centre, 2012), 15.

¹⁷¹ Ibid. 26.

¹⁷² Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), 1937-1947*, (Islamabad, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 2015), 10.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 10-11.

¹⁷⁴ Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, *Zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 26.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 39.

elder brother Dr. Khan Sahib went to Bombay for further education, Ghaffar Khan had to live with Barani Kaka, an old family servant. Barani Kaka would tell him stories about army and persuaded him to apply for commission in the army, which he did. While Ghaffar Khan was giving his matriculation exams, that he received his appointment letter and was asked to join Mardan Guides. Barani Kaka had told him that in army there was no discrimination between a native and English soldier. However, his first personal observations disillusioned him: he saw that there was a marked difference between the residences of native *Sardars* and British officers; worst still, he saw that a British officer was humiliating a native soldier because the latter had tried to imitate English hairstyle and "wanted to become English". He could not tolerate such a state of affairs and therefore had to do away with the idea of joining the army.¹⁷⁶ After abandoning the idea of joining the army, Ghaffar Khan went to Attock, then to Qadian, and finally to Aligarh to continue his studies.¹⁷⁷ His father and elder brother wanted him to go to London for further education but owing to his mother's opposition to this, Ghaffar Khan did not go to London.¹⁷⁸ Thus unlike Fanon as well as Gandhi and many other nationalists, Ghaffar Khan had never been to the metropolis of the "mother country" during the days of the *Raj*. That being the case, he always remained rooted in his society and was therefore able to account for the causes of his community's backwardness. One of the basic reasons for their backwardness was "ignorance" due to lack of education, because "neither the government nor the people themselves were ready to do anything for education."¹⁷⁹ He took upon himself the task of opening educational institutions for his people to make them aware of their potentialities. Thus, with the support of Haji Fazli Wahid

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 57-58.

¹⁷⁷ Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, *North West Frontier Province: history and politics*, (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 2007), 59.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ghaffar Khan, *Zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 66.

Turangzai and others, he opened schools in Utmanzai (Charsadda) and Gaddar (Mardan).¹⁸⁰ Meanwhile, Ghaffar Khan developed friendship with such luminaries as Maulana Mahmud ul Hassan of Deoband, and Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi. At the insistence of the latter two, Haji Sahib of Turangzai migrated to Buner to launch a Jihad against the British government.¹⁸¹ However, Ghaffar Khan was, opposed to the call for jihad because of the fact that the Muslims were not well equipped and could not match the military power of the colonizers.¹⁸² Furthermore, violence on the part of the natives could provoke the government, which might resort to even greater violence against the civilians.¹⁸³ It is worthwhile to note that even at this early stage of his career, Ghaffar Khan was wary of using violent techniques. When the war ended the government felt threatened that disturbances might ensue owing to unrest among industrial workers and among Muslims over the harsh treatment of Ottoman Empire at the hands of the Allies, therefore it enacted the infamous Rowlatt Act.¹⁸⁴ The Act caused a stir throughout the sub-continent and demonstrations were held against it. One such demonstration was arranged by Ghaffar Khan at Utmanzai in which no less than 50,000 people took part and which was the first mass protest of its kind in the history of the NWFP.¹⁸⁵ This coupled with his attempt of supporting the King Afghanistan, Amir Aman Ullah Khan, in the third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), led the government to not only imprisoned Ghaffar Khan and his father but also forced the whole of Utmanzai village to pay a heavy fine of Rs. 30,000.¹⁸⁶ After spending six months in prison, Ghaffar Khan took part in

¹⁸⁰ Shah, *North West Frontier Province*, 89.

¹⁸¹ Ghaffar Khan, *Zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 96.

¹⁸² Ibid, 99.

¹⁸³ Mukulika Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and memory in the North West Frontier Province*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 49.

¹⁸⁴ Shah, *North West Frontier Province*, 60.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Rajmohan Gandhi, *Ghaffar Khan: Non-violent Badshah of the Pakhtuns*, (New Delhi: Penguin books, 2004), 57.

the Khilafat movement and its off-shoot, the Hijrat to Afghanistan. With the failure of the Hijrat movement, Ghaffar Khan turned his attention to the social and educational reformation of his people, laid the foundation of Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afaghana (Society for the restoration of the Afghans), and became the president of the Frontier Khilafat committee. He toured different villages to open educational instructions and bring awareness to his people. The British want his father to stop his son from his activities but to no avail. Consequently, Ghaffar Khan was arrested and imprisoned for three years, from 1921-1924.¹⁸⁷ He spent these three harsh years in Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Mianwali, and Lahore jails. He was thankful to God for enabling him to bear such an ordeal, which taught him discipline and patience.¹⁸⁸ On his return from jail, he continued with his educational activities, went for Hajj (1926), and visited the Middle East. Ever since his school days, at the Mission High School, he was aware of the importance of mother tongue in the formation of national consciousness, so he laid the foundation of a Pashto journal, the *Pakhtun*, the first ever in the history of Pashtoons. Meanwhile, he visited India to attend several political meetings including the Khilafat conference and Congress's session in Calcutta, presided by Muhammad Ali and Gandhi respectively, the latter impressed him the more than the former.¹⁸⁹ He was very impressed with the enthusiasm and the national consciousness of the women and men that participated actively in political gatherings.¹⁹⁰ throughout these formative years Ghaffar Khan had come to the conclusion that in order for his people to be independent from not just the British rule but also from the clutches of the internal regressive and reactionary forces, organized and disciplined socio-political movement based on the

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, 61.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 73.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, 80-81.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

principle of non-violence be launched. The result was the foundation of the non-violent Khudai Khidmatgar Movement in 1929. While the Khudai Khidmatgar movement will be discussed in the next chapter, what follows in this chapter is a brief analysis of the non-violence that Ghaffar Khan preached so forcefully throughout his life.

Although the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was a continuation of the religio-political movements of the 1890s and those 1910s, one of its most remarkable features, and the one that distinguished it from the previous movements, was the "creed" of non-violence.¹⁹¹ Ghaffar Khan was opposed to the colonial government to such an extent that on many an occasion he would refuse to even meet the colonial officials, let alone cooperate or collaborate with them.¹⁹² Yet he can never be said to have resorted to violence or made his followers to resort to violence against anyone including his worst opponents, the Colonial governments and its agents. For him imperialism was the greatest evil, and there was no greater *Jihad* than the one against imperialism and slavery.¹⁹³ He believed that the cruelties that the colonial government committed had no match; that the British followed the principles of justice in so far as these did not threatened their interest; and that it had co-opted some Khans and sections of clergy who not only worked as propagandists but also recruited people in service of empire.¹⁹⁴ In order to expose the double and hypocritical nature of colonial governments, he points to the difference in the way the "mother country" is governed and the way the colony is governed: whereas in the former case the welfare of the people was taken in to account, the reverse was true in the latter case.¹⁹⁵ Thus, if on the one hand the government did not take care of the welfare of the people, the people themselves

¹⁹¹ Shah, *Ethnicity Islam, and nationalism*, xxxv.

¹⁹² Ibid, xx.

¹⁹³ Ibid, 36.

¹⁹⁴ Ghaffar Khan, *Zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 109.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, 231.

were divided across tribal lines and were busy in internal feuds and settling scores with each other.¹⁹⁶ Knowing that a mutual reciprocity exists between the abovementioned twin factors, he directed his efforts towards breaking this cycle of reciprocity between imperialism and the ignorance and internal divisions of the colonized. It explains the reason that why the government was so disturbed with his social and educational reforms activities and that why they looked upon these activities as "not service, but rebellion".¹⁹⁷

Not surprisingly, then, those who were to join the Khudai Khidmatgar movement had to pledge that: "they would serve people in the name of God; that they would shun their mutual enmities (*trabganai*) and *Pari Janbi* (taking sides in feuds). They would not avenge any wrong done to them but endure them with *Sabar* (patience); that they would never resort to violence; and that they would work two hours a day regularly."¹⁹⁸ Non-violence, according to Ghaffar Khan, was a power in its own right and, like violence, it had its own army too.¹⁹⁹ Elaborating on the virtues of non-violence, he said that it created love, and courage.²⁰⁰ Violence, on the other hand, creates hate and cowardice; it is not justified even in self-defense because there is an in-built mechanism of self-defense in non-violence.²⁰¹ Notwithstanding the fact that the path of non-violence is far more difficult to tread upon, it is a "system" that knows no defeat.²⁰² Its difficulty lies in the fact that it was not just an "absence of violence" and activism, rather it was an active commission of non-violence and a

¹⁹⁶ Khan Abdul Wali Khan, *Bacha Khan ao khudai khidmatgari*, (Charsadda: Wali Bagh, 1993), 68.

¹⁹⁷ Gandhi, *Ghaffar Khan*, 62.

¹⁹⁸ Ghaffar Khan, *Zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 284. For a fuller version of the oath of the Khudai Khidmatgars, see Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 30.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

deliberate omission of violence.²⁰³ Ghaffar Khan had used the concept of non-violence in both "instrumental" and "absolute" terms. He was convinced that the British Empire was far too superior to be defeated militarily. For example, he had opposed the idea that Turangzai Haji sahib should launch a militant jihad against the empire because Haji Sahib and his followers did not possess the required logistics.²⁰⁴ Similarly, a somewhat similar argument was presented before Sultan Muhammad Khan who wanted to settle score with the British army with just four or five guns and about 20 to 25 cartridges; his argument was that the enemy possessed that much cartridges in just one gun.²⁰⁵ He was aware that for the British the "non-violent pathan was more dangerous than the violent pathan" therefore they tried their best to provoke them to violence and thereby defeat them.²⁰⁶

But, non-violence was also a matter of faith not just an instrument towards an immediate goal of getting freedom from a foreign government. For him, violence among his people was one of the most fundamental reasons of their backwardness and enslavement. His non-violent strategy was meant to serve the long-term goal of ending the internal violence: if violence against one's worst enemy could not be justified then how could it be justified against one's own kith and kin. For him, unlike the Congress, non-violence was not just a matter of "policy", rather it was a "matter of faith".²⁰⁷ thus when the Congress decided, "out of necessity", to join the World War II, Ghaffar Khan resigned from the Congress working Committee and wrote to Gandhi that:

"...I should like to make it clear that the non-violence that I have believed in and preached to my brethren of the Khudai Khidmatgar is much wider. It affects all our life, and only this permanent value.

²⁰³ Sruti Bala, *The performativity of nonviolent protests in South Asia (1918-1948)*, (?), 203.

²⁰⁴ Ghaffar Khan, *Zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 99.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. 120.

²⁰⁶ Ibid. 364.

²⁰⁷ Ibid. 588.

Unless we learn this lesson of non-violence fully we shall never do away with the deadly feuds, which have been the curse of people of the frontier. Since we took to non-violence and the Khudai Khidmatgars pledged themselves to it, we have largely succeeded in ending the feuds. It has greatly added to the courage of the Pathans..."²⁰⁸

Even when the British left the sub-continent, the Khudai Khidmatgars did not renounce their philosophy of non-violence.²⁰⁹ Ghaffar Khan's non-violence was not just a weapon of the weak: for the Khudai Khidmatgars did have some "better" weaponry prior to the movement, and if they had none, they could have arranged but they would not do so because they believed in non-violence.²¹⁰

Owing to his close association with Gandhi and the Congress, Ghaffar Khan's non-violence is usually assumed to have been taken from Gandhi. But, as Shah shows, the inspiration was taken from the lives of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and from Jesus Christ who faced "humiliation and oppression boldly by nonviolent means."²¹¹ Furthermore, the very fact that he resigned from the Congress Working Committee, in protest over its decision to join the war efforts, shows that Ghaffar Khan, though a close associate of Gandhi, was quite independent of him and so was his idea of non-violence.²¹² Similarly, Banerjee dispels the myth that the non-violence that Ghaffar Khan preached and practiced was in any fundamental way related to the Gandhian philosophy.²¹³ She argues that his non-violence was firmly rooted in Islamic ideals of "bigger jihad" and "patience" upon which the Holy Quran lays great emphasis. In addition, his non-violence was in complete accord with *Pakhtoonwali* and its values of courage and endurance in the face of real death.

²⁰⁸ Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 123.

²⁰⁹ Banerjee, *The Pathan unarmed*, 165.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Shah argues that the *stayagarah* that Gandhi preached was different from the non-violence that Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai Khidmatgar practised. Ghaffar Khan appeal was simple and in accordance with Islam which attracted people who were fed up with internal feuds and violence. *ibid.* 31. See also Shah, *North West Frontier Province*, 68-69.

²¹² Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 124.

²¹³ Banerjee, *The Pathan unarmed*, 146-165.

Moreover, Gandhian non-violence was in line with Gita; and the Holy Quran and the life and teachings of Muhammad (PBUH) inspired that of Ghaffar Khan's.²¹⁴ For Ghaffar Khan there was nothing new or surprising in the fact that the Muslims should adopt non-violence because their Prophet had done so thirteen centuries ago; the reason that Gandhian non-violence appeared to be a "novel creed" and a "new weapon" was because Muslims had forgotten it since long.²¹⁵ In addition to the ideologies of Islam and Pakhtoonwali, the socio-economic conditions of his people also called for a strategy based on the principles of non-violence.²¹⁶

The very nature of colonialism is such that it cannot remain unchallenged even at the time of its beginning. Several resistance movements have challenged it right from the beginning. Initially, these movements were not well organized and not well articulated. However, with the passage of time they became more mature and more organized. Although there might be many other ways to classify these movements, one way to categorize them is based on their strategy of violence or non-violence. The chapter is not a comparative study of violent and non-violent study as such. Rather, it concentrates on the ideas of Frantz Fanon, the "advocate" and "theoretician" of violence who fought French colonialism in Algeria from the platform of Front de Liberation nationale (F.L.N.); and on the other hand, it gives an account of the ideas of Ghaffar Khan, a staunch opponent of violence who always preached the use of violence. For Fanon, violence was important not just, because it served some immediate tactical gains but also for destroying the colonial order and the creation of "new humanism". For Ghaffar Khan, non-violence was the best strategy--a "matter of faith", in

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Gandhi, *Ghaffar Khan*, 91.

²¹⁶ Ali Khan Mehsud, *La Pir Rokhana tar Bacha Khana Pori: da pukhtano milli mubarizi ta katana*, (Pashto) (Peshawar: Danish Khparandoya), 526-547.

fact-- to defeat not only colonialism but also transform one's society. If, for Fanon, decolonization could be possible only through violence; for Ghaffar Khan, in order for decolonization to be successful, it should be based on non-violence because non-violence could not be defeated. Fanon believes that colonialism "can be called into question only by absolute violence".²¹⁷ However, this is not so with Ghaffar Khan, who says that it is wrong to assume that there is only one way of resisting colonialism, "there is another method too ... Let the Muslims see their own history and they will find that this battle of non-violence is not a new one."²¹⁸ This "battle of non-violence" against colonialism launched by Ghaffar Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars shall be discussed in the next chapter.

²¹⁷ Fanon, *The wretched of the earth*, 36.

²¹⁸ Bala, *The performativity of nonviolent protests in South Asia (1918-1948)*, 167.

CHAPTER FOUR

Resistance to Colonialism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: The Khudai Khidmatgar

Movement

The Khudai Khidmatgar movement was an anti-colonial nationalist struggle par excellence. As such, it resisted colonialism on almost all fronts. Its activities ranged from economic and political to socio-cultural fronts. Notwithstanding its emergence in late 1920s, it had its roots in the anti-colonial activities of the preceding decades. The role of Haji Abdul Wahid of Turangzai, also known as Haji sahib of Turangzai, the protests against the Rowlatt Act, and the Khilafat and Hijrat movements cannot be overemphasized in this regard. That said, the movement was the most organized, well disciplined, multi-faceted, most complex, and explicitly nationalist non-violent movement of all the anti-colonial movements that had emerged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then known as NWFP). Nationalist and anti-colonial as it was, the movement represented almost all the sections of the society including peasants, relatively small Khans, "anti-establishment" clergy, urban intelligentsia, artisans, and women. It was complex not only in terms of its composition but also in terms of its objectives. Its primary aim was the emancipation of Pakhtuns, in particular, and the independence of India from colonialism, in general. But, in order to do so, it assumed the responsibility of promoting national consciousness in the community. As such, it had to do away with all those internal socio-cultural factors that would hinder the development of such a national consciousness. Therefore, the movement was not just limited to the political sphere; rather, it was a movement of socio-cultural reform as well. More importantly, however, the movement never resorted to violence and always remained stuck to the

principle of non-violence, occasional lapses excepted. The chapter aims to discuss the above-mentioned themes in the following pages.

Background of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement:

It was in the nature of colonial government that it tended to discourage "natives" from socio-political activities. In other words, colonialism tended to depoliticize its subjects because politically active populations could not be subjugated for long. Moreover, one of the basic tenets of their ideology was the claim that the natives were not politically "trained", and could therefore not be allowed to govern themselves. However, political maturity could have come only through political activities, which they actively discouraged. Otherwise, how could have they justified their rule? Although this might have been the case everywhere, the extent to which political activities were barred in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), "an international frontier of the first magnitude from the military point of view for the whole empire", was perhaps matchless.²¹⁹ This was because of the tremendous geo-strategic importance of the province for the British Empire.²²⁰ In 1893, just eight years before the separation of the NWFP from the Punjab, the British and the Afghan governments had drawn the Durand line to demarcate their respective spheres of influence. Therefore, while dealing with the NWFP, they always kept in mind not only Afghanistan but also Russia.²²¹ The fear of both Tsarist, and later Soviet Russia, made the British regard the province as "the most important area in defense terms", which should be governed through "special laws", and was left outside the ambit of the many constitutional reforms, including the Morley-Minto and

²¹⁹ Muhammad Yunus, *The frontier speaks*, (Lahore: Minerva book shop Anarkali, date not given), 72.

²²⁰ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 16.

²²¹ Ali Khan Mehsud, *La Pir Rokhana tar Bacha Khanapori: da Pukhtano Milli Mubarizi ta Katana*, (Peshawar: Danish khparandoya, ?) 353.

Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, that were introduced in the rest of India.²²² In addition, it was one of the least developed provinces in India because until 1901 it was a part of the Punjab, whose administration had adopted a "lukewarm" approach to the development of the Frontier.²²³ Furthermore, unlike the rest of India, the people of the province were least educated and the literacy level was perhaps the lowest.²²⁴ There was no university in the province, and there was only one college, the Edwards Mission College at Peshawar affiliated with the Punjab University.²²⁵ Similarly, the government's policies of disturbing the old agrarian relations and their interference in the jirga system increased the level of violence within the community.²²⁶ Apart from these, the socio-economic structure of the society, its "segementary" and "tribal" nature, with agriculture being their primary occupation, made them even more averse to organized politics. It is therefore not surprising that the attempts of some urban intelligentsia to form provincial branches of the All India Congress and the All India Muslim League did not bear much fruits.²²⁷

However, during the second decade of the 20th century, socio-political activities got some momentum in the province owing to the prevailing circumstances both within India and at the international level. During the period, Haji Sahib of Turangzai and Abdul Ghaffar Khan embarked upon a program of social reform through education, and opened several institutions, called *Azad Madrasshas*, in different localities. Haji Sahib and his comrade Ghaffar Khan asked people to do away with such customs as "spending lavishly" on marriage

²²² Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, xxiv-xxv.

²²³ Shah, *North West Frontier province: history and politics*, (Islamabad: National institute of historical and cultural research, 2007), 11.

²²⁴ For the level of literacy in the province during the first decades of the 20th century, see Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 10.

²²⁵ There were only 15 matriculates in the province in 1891 which rose to 71 by 1901. D. G. Tendulkar, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan: faith is battle*, (Bombay: Gnadhi Peace Founadation, ?), 18.

²²⁶ Banerjee, *the pathan unarmed*, 33-35.

²²⁷ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 17.

and funeral ceremonies; to resolve their issues through *shairah* and not through official *jirgas* and courts; and to get their children educated.²²⁸ This might seem less important, but viewed against the opposition from some sections of the clergy, "who feared that if the people were enlightened they would get no more alms and gifts"²²⁹; the pro-government khans; and the government itself, such activities were no less than revolutionary steps. For example, the *fatwas* that prohibited people from sending their children to schools, and the perception that schools were "gates to hell" make visible the revolutionary nature of the *Madrassahs*. During the WWI, the leadership of the Deoband *Madrassah* started contemplation over the establishment of bases in the Frontier to launch *Jihad* against the *Raj*. They asked Haji sahib to move to the tribal territory, mobilize people, and court Afghanistan's support against the *Raj*.²³⁰ Haji Sahib moved to Buner, and fought with the government forces for some days. The government was able to quell the rebellion easily. Haji Sahib had to move to the Mohmand tribal area. The Azad *Madrassahs* were banned, and those who worked for these institutions were sent to Dera Ismail Khan Jail.²³¹ Meanwhile, the government enacted the infamous Rowlatt Act "to curb possible revolutionary and terrorist activities."²³² The act was originally meant to be active during the war-period, therefore, its continuation after the war caused huge uproar throughout India. Massive demonstrations were arranged across the country including the Frontier. One such demonstration was held in Utmanzai in which almost hundred thousand people took part.²³³ Never before in the history of the province had the people gathered in such a huge number to resist the oppressive colonial order. More

²²⁸ *ibid.*

²²⁹ Tendulkar, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan*, 23.

²³⁰ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 97.

²³¹ *ibid.*, 100-101.

²³² Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 17.

²³³ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 117-118.

significantly, women also participated in the protest in that they would fetch water and bring food for the protesters.²³⁴ The success of the anti-Rowlatt Act protests demonstrated the potential of the rural population to organize as well as their capability of bringing the colonial state of affairs to a standstill through non-violent activities. Secondly, the *Khilafat* movement and its "off-shoot" the *Hijrat* movement played no less an important role in the politicization of the people. Although both the movements ended in failure in terms of their stated objectives, these did have an impact as far as the mobilization and organization of people around some political issues is concerned. The failure of the *jihad* movement of the Haji Sahib of Turangzai, the *Khilafat* and the *Hijrat* movements, led Ghaffar Khan and his friends to the conclusion that an organization was essential, that the battle against the government could be won only through non-violence, and that the battle should be launched from Pakhtun soil rather than migrating to somewhere else.²³⁵ Furthermore, the devising tactics that the British were using by exploiting the internal feuds could be countered with such strategies as non-violence, "the path of love", and education.²³⁶

Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afaghana

Ghaffar Khan and his comrades believed that any political revolution presupposed a revolution at the intellectual level: therefore, they had to open several schools in different parts of the province as well as to launch an organization for the "social uplift" of the

²³⁴ *ibid.*

²³⁵ Banerjee, *Pathan unarmed*, 50-51.

²³⁶ *ibid.*

people.²³⁷ Thus, they laid the foundation of the *Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afaghana* (Society for the Reformation of the Afghans) on 1 April 1921.²³⁸

The *Anjuman* was meant to "promote education; get rid of un-Islamic social customs; to do away with infighting within the community; and to enable the people to sort out their issues through *jirgas*."²³⁹ Some of the conditions for joining the *Anjuman* were that a person should not be involved in *pari-janbi* (factional rivalries), should not work for the British, and should have an "attachment" with Pashto language and Pashtoons.²⁴⁰ Moreover, it was decided that the *Anjuman* would encourage poets and artists, and would arrange poetry gatherings for the promotion of the language and literature. The *Anjuman* was to be headed by a President, who would be assisted by two vice presidents, a general secretary, and a finance secretary.²⁴¹ In line with its objectives, the *Anjuman* opened the first branch of *Azad Islamia Madrassah* in Utmanzai, in 1921.²⁴² Similarly, many other branches were opened in different parts of Peshawar valley. The *Madrassahs* were supposed to educate people in English, arithmetic, history, geography, Urdu, religions, and artisanal professions.²⁴³ Besides, Arabic and Islamic teachings were taught in the schools. However, the medium of instruction was Pashto. In 1923, the school was affiliated with the Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi, and it prepared students for the matriculation examinations of the Punjab University.²⁴⁴ The leadership of the *Anjuman* donated money to the *Anjuman* and the schools according to their

²³⁷ Abdul Akbar Khan Akbar, *Da Barr-e-Sagheer pa azadai ke da pukhtanobarkha: zma da zhwand saratarali halat*, (Pashto), (Peshawar: university publishers, 2009), 5-6.

²³⁸ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 23.

²³⁹ Akbar, *Da Barr-e-Sagheer pa azadai ke da pukhtano barkha*, 6.

²⁴⁰ *ibid.* 7.

²⁴¹ *ibid.*

²⁴² Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 24.

²⁴³ Akbar, *Da Barr-e-Sagheer pa azadai ke da pukhtano barkha*, 8

²⁴⁴ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 24.

capacity ranging from Rs. 50 to Rs. 500.²⁴⁵ Due to free education in the school and the fact that the school was open to all irrespective of class, caste, religion, increased its popularity and hence number of students rose from 140 in 1921-22 to 300 in 1925.²⁴⁶ Such an education was all the more important because, on the one hand, it would enable the peasants to understand the otherwise complex mechanisms of taxation and thereby diminish the influence of the Khans and the *lambardars*; and religious education would decrease the religio-social "capital" of the "fatalistic" *Mullahs*, on the other.²⁴⁷ In addition, it would lay bare the true nature of colonialism to the masses.

Apart from education, the *Anjuman* attempted at shaking the economic base of the community. Since majority of the people were agriculturist by profession, they look down upon all other professions with contempt. The artisans were considered meaner even if they were far better than the peasants, in terms of economy, were. Similarly, there were very little entrepreneurial and trading activities that the Pakhtuns were engaged in. The result being, the Hindus and Sikhs' monopoly over business and trade activities, on the hand; and the poverty of the local population, on the other.²⁴⁸ Thus, in order to demonstrate to the people that trade and business were by no means "less" dignified professions, Ghaffar Khan along with his relative Shah Nawaz Khan opened "*gurmandai*" (sugar depot) in Utmanzai, Charsadda.²⁴⁹ Such steps, moreover, encouraged the people to bypass the "middlemen", and sell and buy products on their own.²⁵⁰ The *Anjuman's* efforts not only encouraged the community to be self-reliant but also demonstrated to them the government's negligence regarding the welfare

²⁴⁵ More interestingly the list that Akbar provides include women, such as Pyari Bibi and KundaChachi, who donated money to the Anjuman. Akbar, *Da Barr-e-Sagheer pa azadai ke da pukhtano barkha*, 8-10.

²⁴⁶ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 24.

²⁴⁷ Banerjee, *the pathan unarmed*, 52.

²⁴⁸ Mehsud, *La Pir Rokhana tar Bacha Khana*, 536.

²⁴⁹ Khan, *Bacha Khan ao Khudai khidmatgari*, 70.

²⁵⁰ Banerjee, *the pathan unarmed*, 55.

of the "subjects".²⁵¹ The *Anjuman's* leaders would argue that since the government was unwilling to educate the people, the people could do it on their own. This further implied that the government was incapable or unwilling to take care of the people, and, more importantly, contrary to the colonial claim, the natives were capable of taking care of themselves, of self-rule.

Another important step of the *Anjuman* was its decision to publish a "socio-political" journal in Pashto. Since the majority of the people could understand only Pashto, it was of utmost importance for the *Anjuman* to launch such a journal to popularize its socio-political program among the masses. Furthermore, as said in the first chapter, one of the main tactics of the colonizers were to uproot a people from their culture, and to inject inferiority complex into their minds, therefore the promotion of Pashto was all the more essential to counter such colonial tactics. Thus, the *Anjuman* decided to publish a journal called *Pakhtun*, and its first issue came out in May 1928.²⁵² Its aims and objectives included, among other things: "to safeguard the rights of Pashtoons; to awake them to any impending crisis; to expedite national integration; to enable Pashtoons to compete in the fields of education, politics, etc. with other nations; and to seek effective and workable solutions to their problems."²⁵³ In addition, the *Anjuman* also arranged several stage dramas and poetic gatherings during its annual sessions. For example in the annual session of 1926 of the *Anjuman*, Abdul Akbar Khan's drama *Tarboor* was presented which depicted the predicament of poor peasants.²⁵⁴ Such was the impact of the drama on the audience that some of them would offer money to

²⁵¹ *ibid.*

²⁵² Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 26.

²⁵³ Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, *Pukhtani khazi ao da Qam Khidmat (Pashto)*, (Peshawar: Bacha Khan Research centre, 2012), 16.

²⁵⁴ Khan, *Da Barr-e-Sagheer pa azadai ke da pukhtano barkha*, 52.

the characters as if they were really in need of help.²⁵⁵ Such activities were meant to create a sense of unity and community among the Pashtoons, to make them share each other's burden, to awake their "national consciousness", and to instill in them love for their homeland.

Formation of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement

While the *Anjuman* was busy organizing and reforming the people of the province, things were changing rapidly across the Durand line. There, Amanullah Khan, the "anti-British" Amir of Afghanistan, had embarked upon a program of modernization. Ever since their defeat in the Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 at the hands of Amanullah, the British had been trying to oust him from power because his continuation was perceived to be a threat to British interests in the region. Amanullah's friendly relationship with the USSR was also a matter of concern for the British. In addition, he was a threat in that the Pashtoons on the eastern side of the Durand line had deep connections with the Amir, their "ideal king".²⁵⁶ Thus, the British started an intensive propaganda against the Amir and used different tools, not least the religious tool, to stir an uprising against the Amir. The British were successful in removing Amanullah Khan from power, and they placed a "bandit" Habibullah alias Bacha Saqao on the throne. The *Anjuman* could not reconcile itself with this and therefore decided to launch anti-government protests, and to mobilize the people to reinstate Amanullah Khan on the throne.²⁵⁷ Although they could not restore Amanullah to power, they realized that an indigenous organization was necessary because no organization was ready to cooperate in any way with the *Anjuman* during the Afghan turmoil, and because no organization spoke for

²⁵⁵ *ibid.*

²⁵⁶ For details of the British "conspiracy" and its execution, see Khan, *Bacha Khan ao Khudai khidmatgari*, 61-92.

²⁵⁷ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 27.

reforms in "NWFP".²⁵⁸ Thus, they came up with the idea of *Afghan Zalmu Jirga* (Afghan Youth League) on 1 September 1929. The *Jirga's* headquarter was to be in Utmanzai; its proceedings should be in Pashto; all youth, provided they were literate, could become members of the *Jirga* irrespective of any caste, creed, or religion; and its members should not indulge in sectarian conflicts.²⁵⁹ Abdul Akbar Khan was chosen its first president and Ahmad Shah became its secretary general. The main objectives of the *Jirga* were "complete independence" from colonial rule through non-violence, and by encouraging communal harmony.²⁶⁰ However, in 1929, the members of the *Jirga* attended the annual session of the All India National Congress at Lahore; they were impressed with the discipline and organization of the Congress volunteers, and particularly with the female volunteers.²⁶¹ Also, in order to expand the scope of the *Jirga* and to accommodate the "illiterate and aged persons" of the community, the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement was launched in November, 1929, with Sarfaraz Khan and Hijab Gul its first president and first general secretary respectively.²⁶²

Reaching to the Masses

Soon after the movement was launched, the leadership of the movement, particularly Abdul Ghaffar Khan, embarked upon a program of mass contact so that more and more people could be brought into the fold of the movement. In order to capture the attention of the people, the Khudai Khidmatgars used drums despite the fact that the clergy had issued *fatwas* against the use of drums.²⁶³ On hearing the drums, the residents would gather around the

²⁵⁸ *ibid.* 28.

²⁵⁹ Khan, *Da Barr-e-Sagheer pa azadai ke da pukhtano barkha*, 76-77.

²⁶⁰ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 28.

²⁶¹ Khan, *Bacha Khan ao Khudai khidmatgari*, 92.

²⁶² Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 28.

²⁶³ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 285.

Khidmatgars and listen to their "message". Declaring themselves as "servants of the people", the leaders of the movement would invite the people to "rebuild their house".²⁶⁴ They tried to restore human "subjectivity" to the people, which colonialism had taken away from them, by asserting that they were humans and that they had had the potential for making progress on their own.²⁶⁵ The reason that they were dependent on others was because they lacked "unity", "national consciousness", and because they were divided against themselves.²⁶⁶ Ghaffar Khan, the moving spirit behind the movement, would expose the exploitative nature of colonialism to the people:

Fifty percent of our children are ill. The hospitals are meant for the English. The country is ours, the money is ours, everything belongs to us, and yet we are hungry and naked in it...he has made *pukka* roads because he needs them for himself. These roads were built with our money...these are our roads but we are not allowed to walk on them. He incites the Hindus to fight the Muslims and the Sikhs, and the Sikhs to fight the Muslims and the Hindus. Today these three are the sufferers. Who is the oppressor, and who has been sucking our blood? The English.²⁶⁷

But, what was so special about the English, the *ferangi*, that enable him to enslave people of far off countries? Dispelling the colonial myth of natives' natural inferiority and colonizers' superiority, Ghaffar Khan argued that both were equally humans. And, if the colonizers were in any way superior to the natives, it lay in their unity:

He is a man like you. Like you, he possesses only two hands and two feet. What is the thing, which the *firangi* possesses in addition to you? The reason, they being men like us, rule over Pakhtuns? They got a spirit of unity, which we people, lack badly. Now, you people should get up and put your house in order, and become brothers.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ *ibid.*

²⁶⁵ *ibid.*

²⁶⁶ *ibid.*

²⁶⁷ Banerjee, *the pathan unarmed*, 60.

²⁶⁸ *ibid.* 61.

People, men and women, old and young, responded positively to the Khudai Khidmatgars, and as a result, their ranks were swelling by day.²⁶⁹ Being nationalist in nature, the movement appealed to different sections of the "nation": for the "intelligentsia", it was a movement of cultural "revival"; for the smaller khans, it presented the prospects of enfranchisement and political empowerment; its anti-colonial nature appealed to the anti-establishment clergy; and it attracted the peasants in that it was against their oppressors, the colonizers and their native agents, the big Khans.²⁷⁰ There was no discrimination based on religion or class, yet its "emphasis on Pashtoon identity and values had very little appeal to non-Pashtoons."²⁷¹ Other factors that motivated people to join the movement included the "charisma" of Ghaffar Khan, the aims and objectives of the movement, and the bravery with which the Khidmatgars faced oppression.²⁷²

Since the leadership of the movement believed that the main hindrance to the development of a sense of community and goodwill among the Pakhtuns was the violent internal feuds, therefore the Khudai Khidmatgars were required to take an oath of non-violence. Thus, the Khudai Khidmatgars had to pledge that: "since God does not need service, serving His creatures was a service to God; that he would not take sides (*pari-janbi*); that he would abstain from violence even if he had been wronged; he would faithfully serve his land and people; and that he would work two hours a day regularly."²⁷³ To enhance the number of the Khidmatgars, the leadership, accompanied by the volunteers and drumbeaters, would visit village fairs, mosques, and *hujras*. Stage dramas were presented and poetry gatherings were arranged to make the people understand the spirit of the movement. For

²⁶⁹ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 283.

²⁷⁰ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 29.

²⁷¹ *ibid.*

²⁷² Banerjee, *the pathan unarmed*, 66-67.

²⁷³ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 284.

example, in a "huge gathering", held in April 1930, at Utmanzai, Abdul Akbar Khan's drama "*The Khudai Khidmatgar*" was presented which depicted the "predicament of poor peasant, the oppressive policies of the government and its agents, the aims and objectives of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, and the advancement of *Pakhtoonwali*." ²⁷⁴ In the same meeting, a *Mushaira* (poetry meetings) also took place. The theme of the meeting was, "youth have always fought for independence", and different poet presented their poems reflecting the above-mentioned theme.²⁷⁵ Such dramas and poetry gatherings were all the more necessary because the Movement had some "novel features" which could have proved otherwise difficult for the majority of the people of the province to understand.²⁷⁶ Not surprisingly, then, that the movement was gaining currency among the people and by each passing day the numbers of its volunteers swelled.

Civil disobedience Movement and Colonial Atrocities

In December 1929, the Congress, in its annual session at Lahore, had declared that they wanted no less than "fullest freedom", *Swaraj* instead of "dominion status" and would henceforth work towards that end.²⁷⁷ The goal was to be achieved through non-violent civil disobedience movement, which required patience, steadfastness, and "cool courage", because "suffering" imprisonment and even "death" could be in store for them.²⁷⁸ Gandhi appealed to the Muslims to join the civil disobedience movement and participate in its threefold task viz. non-payment of taxes, boycott of foreign cloth, and picketing of the liquor shops.²⁷⁹ However, owing to the "communal" distrust and the fear of "*Hindu raj*", Gandhi's call did not

²⁷⁴ Khan, *Da Barr-e-Sagheer pa azadai ke da pukhtano barkha*, 98.

²⁷⁵ *ibid.*

²⁷⁶ Yunus, *the frontier speaks*, 151.

²⁷⁷ Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, "the 1930 civil disobedience movement in the Peshawar valley from the Pashtoon perspective", *Studies in history*, 29, (1): 87-118, (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2013), 89.

²⁷⁸ *ibid.*

²⁷⁹ *ibid.* 93-94.

get popular response within the Muslim majority provinces, except in the Frontier Province.²⁸⁰ Here the provincial leadership of the Congress attended the annual gathering of the Khudai Khidmatgars and its "affiliated organizations", held in April 1930, and asked them to fully participate in the Movement.²⁸¹ Accordingly, the Congress leadership decided that they would observe picketing on April 23 in Peshawar. The Government, on the other hand, decided to resort to all such mechanism as to turn the event into a failure. Thus, they started arresting the leadership of the Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgars on the night between 22 and 23 April.²⁸² On hearing the news of the arrest, the workers of the Congress gathered and accompanied the Lorries that were taking their leaders to the Kabuli Police station, Peshawar. While the unarmed protesters were raising slogans in support of their leadership and "revolution", suddenly an armored vehicle ran through the crowd killing seven people on the spot and many others were injured.²⁸³ The crowd in their turn burnt one of the vehicles and the government, "in retaliation", opened indiscriminate firing on the crowd, which continued for many hours, resulting in the killings of about two hundred and thirty people, and many more were left injured.²⁸⁴ The incident was a déjà vu of the Jallianwala Bagh.²⁸⁵ To add insult to the injury, Dr. Khan Sahib and other volunteers, who tried to help the injured, were not allowed to do so by the government.²⁸⁶ Worse still, the colonial officials, particularly the Inspector General of Police of the province, "kicked the injured" who were lying on the roads.²⁸⁷ As the news of the Qissa Khani Bazar spread, the situation started getting out of control throughout the province and particularly in the Peshawar valley.

²⁸⁰ *ibid.*

²⁸¹ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 293.

²⁸² Shah, "the 1930 civil disobedience movement in the Peshawar valley from the Pashtoon perspective", 99.

²⁸³ *ibid.*

²⁸⁴ *ibid.* 100.

²⁸⁵ *ibid.*

²⁸⁶ *ibid.* 101.

²⁸⁷ Yunus, *the frontier speaks*, 155.

Although their leadership, including Ghaffar Khan, had been arrested on 22 April, the Khudai Khidmatgars pursued their civil disobedience movement with perseverance. If, on the one hand, the government intensified their repressive policies, the Khudai Khidmatgars also intensified their activities. Many more Qissa Khani Bazar like massacres took place across the province including in Mardan, Swabi, Kohat, and Bannu.²⁸⁸ The areas that were considered Khudai Khidmatgars' strong hold were exposed to harshest treatment. For instance, the Utmanzai village was kept under siege for several months: the crops of the locals were destroyed and even their cattle were barred from entering the fields.²⁸⁹ The Assistant Superintendent of Police of the Charsadda sub-division, Mr. Jameson would strip naked the Khudai Khidmatgars and would through them to nearby dirty ponds to punish them for their commitment to the movement and to their leadership.²⁹⁰ Notwithstanding, the severity and harshness of the treatment meted out to them, the Khudai Khidmatgars remained steadfast to the principles of non-violence and civil disobedience. This was even more remarkable because they remained non-violent in the absence of their leaders, many of whom were in jail.²⁹¹ The government's repression boomeranged, because, rather than suppressing the movement, it further promoted sense of community among the Pakhtuns. Thus, people from the various tribal territories made incursion in to the settled areas to help their brethren.²⁹² Moreover, the number of the Khudai Khidmatgars rose from about one thousand before 1930 to twenty-five thousand after the colonial atrocities.²⁹³

²⁸⁸ Shah, "the 1930 civil disobedience movement in the Peshawar valley from the Pashtoon perspective", 110.

²⁸⁹ Ghaffar Khan, *zama jhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 303.

²⁹⁰ Yunus, *the Frontier speaks*, 155.

²⁹¹ Shah, "the 1930 civil disobedience movement in the Peshawar valley from the Pashtoon perspective", 111.

²⁹² Khan, *Bacha Khan ao Khudai Khidmatgari*, 105. For details of 135-137. these tribal incursions see also Khan, *Da Barr-e-Sagheer pa azadai ke da pukhtano barkha*,

²⁹³ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 39.

In addition to physical violence, the Government resorted to other modes of violence: it started vigorous propaganda against the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. The movement was dubbed as fascist and Bolshevik because of their uniforms.²⁹⁴ Since they wore red shirts, the government called them agents of godless Bolshevism with enough of "communistic doctrine".²⁹⁵ To substantiate its allegations, the government would "exaggerate the anti-Khan aspect of the movement", despite the fact that Ghaffar Khan always directed his people's attention to the Government and criticized the Khans in so far as they served colonial agenda.²⁹⁶ The government moved a step further and banned not only the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, its journal the *Pakhtun* but also other organizations like the *zalmu jarga* etc. and the province was turned into a virtually no go area, it was virtually disconnected from the rest of the country.²⁹⁷

In view of these developments, the Khudai Khidmatgars realized that they had to make alliances with some mainstream organization that were active at the all India level. Thus, Mian Jafar Shah Kaka Khel, and Mian Abdullah Shah, after "secret" consultation with Ghaffar Khan, first sought the cooperation of the Muslim League but to no avail.²⁹⁸ Later, they contacted the Congress leadership, who readily accepted their alliance because like the Congress the Khudai Khidmatgars too were fighting a non-violent battle against the British Government.²⁹⁹ This was a natural and symbiotic alliance between the two because the Congress was almost non-existent in the province, and the Khudai Khidmatgars could not enjoy the freedom of action in the absence of support from a "national" organization. In other

²⁹⁴ Banerjee, *The pathan unarmed*, 106.

²⁹⁵ *ibid.*

²⁹⁶ *ibid.*

²⁹⁷ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 39.

²⁹⁸ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 307.

²⁹⁹ *ibid.* 308.

words, the alliance, on the one hand, provided a mass base to the Congress; and the Khudai Khidmatgar find a national level platform from which to plead their case. In the short term, the Congress sent an inquiry committee under Sardar Patel to prepare a report on the Frontier province, the committee, being not allowed to enter the province, prepared its report from Rawalpindi. In addition, under the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, the government was forced to not only release the Khudai Khidmatgars but also to lift the ban on the organization and its journal the *Pakhtun*.³⁰⁰ In the annual session of the Congress, held in Karachi on March 30, Ghaffar Khan announced his association with the Congress, and on August 9, 1931, "both the *zalmojarga* and the Khudai Khidmatgars were formally federated with the Congress".³⁰¹

However, after the failure of the Second Round Table Conference, the Khudai Khidmatgars had once again to face the brunt of the government. The organization was banned, and its leadership along with the rank and file was incarcerated yet again.³⁰² The self-same repressive tactics were used to suppress the Movement but it continued until Gandhi called it off in 1934. However, unlike the rest of India, the Khudai Khidmatgars remained incarcerated and the ban on the organization was not lifted. Due to Congress's demand, the government released the Khan Brothers, who, however, were not allowed to visit their home province.³⁰³ Again, the government arrested Ghaffar Khan on account of his "seditious" speeches in public and imprisoned him until 1937.³⁰⁴

³⁰⁰ Khan, *Bacha Khan ao Khudai Khidmatgari*, 106.

³⁰¹ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 41.

³⁰² *ibid.* 42.

³⁰³ *ibid.*

³⁰⁴ *ibid.*

In Government

Ever since its creation as a separate province in 1901, the Frontier province had not been treated at par with the rest of the India. It was kept out of the ambit of Morley-Minto Reforms (1909), and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919). The government considered it a zone that could not be granted any modicum of "self-rule", because it was not only given to criminal activities, but also because its strategic location required it to be treated "specially".³⁰⁵ Besides the government's unwillingness, there were no powerful organizations in the province that could have forced the government to introduce reforms. However, the popularity of the Khudai Khidmatgars and their alliance with the Congress made the government to grant full provincial status to the province in 1932, which would henceforth be treated at par with other provinces, at least constitutionally.³⁰⁶ Thus, the Government of India Act 1935, which provided for relatively greater autonomy for the provinces, and elected and responsible governments, was applicable to the N-WFP. In the light of the newly introduced reforms, the government announced general elections to the legislative assemblies to be held in 1936-37. Although, the Congress had strong reservations over the Act, it decided to fight the elections, not for the sake of cooperation but to "combat it and seek to end it."³⁰⁷ The Government did its best to deny level-playing-field to the Khudai Khidmatgars: Ghaffar Khan, the moving spirit of the movement, was not allowed to enter the province; the organization was under ban; and the government extended patronage to Khans; and processions were banned.³⁰⁸ Also, the fact that that the electorate constituted no more than 10% of the total population was against the Khudai Khidmatgars who were more

³⁰⁵ *ibid.* 47.

³⁰⁶ *ibid.* 49.

³⁰⁷ *ibid.* 52.

³⁰⁸ Khan, *Bacha Khan ao Khudai Khidmatgari*, 148.

popular with the rest of the 90% of population.³⁰⁹ Yet, despite the odds, the Khudai Khidmatgars under the leadership of Dr. Khan Sahib were able to convince the majority of the electorates. In their campaign, the Khudai Khidmatgars reaffirmed their resolve for "complete independence"; "promised immediate relief" for the peasant classes; spoke for communal harmony; and took the "landlords", Nawabs, Khans etc. to task; and promised that all repressive laws would be repealed.³¹⁰ The results proved disastrous for the government because the Khudai Khidmatgars emerged the largest party with nineteen seats out of fifty.³¹¹ Moreover, huge upsets occurred in the shape of defeats of such big names as Nawab Akbar Khan of Mardan, and Sahibzada Abdul Qayum of Sawabi at the hands of ordinary Khudai Khidmatgars.³¹²

Although the Congress had secured majority of seats in eight provinces, there was a difference of opinion among its leaders whether to form ministries or not. Those who were opposed to the formation of the ministries were questioning the viability of a cabinet in the presence of constitutionally powerful governor.³¹³ They wanted that unless the government did not assure them that the governors would not interfere in the workings of the ministries, the Congress should refuse to form the ministries.³¹⁴ While the Congress was deliberating over the formation of ministries, the governor of the Frontier Province, Sir George Cunningham, invited Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum Khan to form a ministry.³¹⁵ However, after a short of span of time the Government assured the Congress that "the governors would seek the advice of the elected ministers, and that the cabinet would be responsible to the provincial

³⁰⁹Yunus, *the Frontier speaks*, 183.

³¹⁰ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 54.

³¹¹ *ibid.*

³¹²Yunus, *the Frontier speaks*, 185.

³¹³ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao Jiddo jehad*, 463.

³¹⁴ *ibid.*

³¹⁵ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 57.

legislatures instead of British Parliament." ³¹⁶ Thus, the Congress agreed to form ministries. In the Frontier Province, Dr. Khan Sahib was successful in passing a no-confidence motion against Qaiyum Khan's ministry, and instead formed a Congress Ministry.³¹⁷ In this way a Congress Ministry was formed in the Province on September 7, 1937, with Dr. Khan Sahib as Chief Minister; Qazi Attaullah Khan as Education, Public Health & Works Minister; Bhanju Ram Gandhi as Finance Minister; and Abbas Khan as Minister for Industries and Forests.³¹⁸ The fact that the Khudai Khidmatgars were able to form a ministry, against all odds, within a decade, shows the strength of their organization in terms of its popularity, discipline, steadfastness to their goals. It also shows that non-violence can be as much effective, if not more, than violence in bringing such a strong structure as colonialism to its heels within a decade. In addition, it busted the myth that the Pakhtuns were inherently violent.

Although the Ministry remained in power for no more than two years, its performance was quite remarkable in more than one way. Firstly, it directed its energies towards the uplift of the peasants, the "worst victims of colonialism", because the Khudai Khidmatgars' support mainly came from the peasants. The peasants were living under intolerable pressure of various taxes and obligations of Khans. For instance, throughout India, the peasants' debt amounted to Rs. 900-billions, out of which Rs. 9-billion worth of debt was sustained by the Frontier province.³¹⁹ Thus, to free the peasants from the clutches of debt, the ministry introduced Agriculturists Debtor's Relief Bill. Similarly, in order to diminish the role of "middle-men", and the "money-lenders", and to give relief to peasants and small *zamindars*

³¹⁶ *ibid.*

³¹⁷ *ibid.*

³¹⁸ *ibid.*

³¹⁹ *ibid.* 63.

the Ministry introduced the NWFP Agricultural Produce Market Bill.³²⁰ Yet another pro-peasant bill was the Teri Dues Repealing Bill, which was aimed at abolishing the "unjustifiable" right of the Nawab of Teri to impose tax on peasants, conferred on his grandfather by the British in lieu of their services to *Raj*.³²¹ These steps were doubly important: on the one hand, through such steps the peasants, the bulk of the population was being empowered; and, on the other, the Khan's, the Empire's local defenders were put on the back foot.

In addition, the Ministry targeted the "notables" who were given special perks and privileges in lieu of their services to the *Raj*. For instance, under the system of Honorary Magistracy, "notables" exercised judicial and magisterial powers. The Ministry moved a motion against the system, and on October 7, 1938, it ceased to exist. Moreover, the Ministry also did away with such exploitative institutions as the *lambardari*, *zaildari*, and *inamkhori* system.³²² In the first chapter, it has been argued that rather than modernizing colony, colonialism tends to obstruct its development by co-opting and even creating new feudal classes. However, ideologically it tends to present itself as an agent of modernization and progress. The aforementioned reforms of the Ministry laid bare this contradiction between the ideology and the actual practice of the Empire. It brought to the fore the nexus between the Colonizers and its native supporter. This is evident that almost any of the reforms raised many an eyebrow in the colonial circles. The ministry was eating, as it were, into the vitals of the Empire. Furthermore, the Ministry gave full attention to the education of the people and

³²⁰ *ibid.* 64

³²¹ *ibid.* 65.

³²² *ibid.* 77-79.

tried its best to open new educational institutions. Most importantly, it made Pashto as the medium of instruction in educational institutions.

The Ministry had to face several challenges while running the affairs of the Province on myriad fronts. Firstly, the Ministry could not enjoy freedom of actions owing to the in-built flaws in the 1935 Act. The bureaucracy was more loyal to the Empire than to the Ministry, and as such did not cooperate with the Ministers. In fact, it obstructed the affairs of the Ministry and were involved in propaganda against the ministry.³²³ Secondly, for the first time had the people of the province seen "their own government", and therefore, their expectations were far too high which could not be easily fulfilled. Every one would expect the ministry to do him favor in such issues as appointment in government jobs.³²⁴ Thirdly, the government was in responsible for the restoration of law and order which at time pitted it against its "own" people. For example, when in Ghalla Dher a local Khan got court orders in support of evictions of his tenants, the provincial government had to oblige. Since the Khudai Khidmatgars and the rank and file of the Congress belonged to the peasant class, they expected the government to support them against the Khans. But, Dr. Khan Sahib made it clear that the "basic principles of law" must be adhered to.³²⁵ Thus, due to the ministry, the Movement of the Khudai Khidmatgars had to suffer to some extent. "Corrupt and opportunist" people joined their ranks for personal benefits, thereby tarnishing the image of the movement.³²⁶ Although Ghaffar Khan and Khudai Khidmatgars had concluded that the continuation of the Ministry was damaging the movement,³²⁷ it continued its work until Congress decided on 7 November 1939, to resign from all provincial governments, in protest

³²³ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 491.

³²⁴ *ibid.*

³²⁵ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 73.

³²⁶ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo Jehad*, 503-507.

³²⁷ *ibid.*

against the British Government's decision to push India into the WWII without any consultation with the people of the land.

The Final Phase of the Non-violent Battle (1940-47)

When the WWII began, initially, the Central Working Committee decided to cooperate with the Government, Ghaffar Khan resigned in protest from the Committee. He argued that non-violence had been successful in ending feuds among the Pakhtuns, and the Khudai Khidmatgars had pledged that they would sacrifice their life but would never take any one else's.³²⁸ The Khudai Khidmatgars endorsed the decision of their leader. They contended that why should a colonized people fight a war for the liberation of their colonizer.³²⁹ Thus, they started reorganizing themselves by setting camps in various localities to train people in spinning and weaving khaddar and sanitation drives. Similarly, a centre was established for the Khudai Khidmatgars at Sardaryab, Charssada. However, after the Congress decided to take back its decision, Ghaffar Khan not only re-joined it but also took part in the Individual Civil Disobedience Movement and toured across the province to persuade people to observe non-cooperation with the government in its war-effort. Although the government could not afford to repeat the same situation as that of the 1930s, it did try to thwart the activities of the Khudai Khidmatgars. For instance, it made futile attempts to assassinate Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib.³³⁰

Quit India Movement

While the British were under tremendous pressure, both internally and externally, it sent Cripps Mission to India to sort out the Indian problem. However, the Cripps Mission's

³²⁸ Gandhi, *Ghaffar Khan*, 130.

³²⁹ Khan, *Da Barr-e-Sagheer pa azadai ke da pukhtano barkha*, 238.

³³⁰ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 514-515.

proposal further aggravated the problem because it contained the "seeds" of the division of India. In reaction to this, the Congress launched Quit India Movement in August 1942. The Khudai Khidmatgars endorsed the program and actively pursued the Quit India movement. One of their tactics during the Quit India Movement was the picketing of the liquor shops, and Courts. In addition, leaders of the Khudai Khidmatgars were sent to government offices and schools to spread the message of civil disobedience among the people.³³¹ Remarkably, the Khudai Khidmatgars adopted a unique strategy: it was decided that if someone destroyed bridges or other public buildings, he would go to the police by himself and would confess that he did this, so that the Government could find no excuse for the punishment of whole villages.³³² The Khudai Khidmatgars started their picketing campaign across the province including Kohat, Bannu, Peshawar, and Mardan. In doing so, they had to bear heavy *lathi* charges. As a result, of their activities, as many as 6000 Khudai Khidmatgars were arrested including Ghaffar Khan, who had to spend about three years in prison.³³³

1946 Elections

Towards the end of 1945, the British Government announced that general elections would be held in India for the provincial and central legislatures. Both the Congress and the League decided to contest the elections. The Congress's manifesto included among other things: "equality of rights for all citizens; free democratic state; a federal structure with greater autonomy for the units; adult franchise; and a united India."³³⁴ The Muslim League's campaign revolved around Islam and Pakistan.³³⁵ In the Frontier Province, the Khudai Khidmatgars had to prove that Congress was not limited to just Hindus and that the Muslim

³³¹ Rajmohan Gnadhi, *Ghaffar Khan*, 134.

³³² Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 530.

³³³ *ibid.*

³³⁴ Shah *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 153-154.

³³⁵ *ibid.*

League was not the sole representative of the Muslims. Since the province was a stronghold of the Congress, the Muslim League gave particular attention to this Muslim Majority Province. It enjoyed the support of religious sections, the big Khans, and that of the Government. However, over the years the Khudai Khidmatgars had so firmly entrenched themselves in the province that in the elections it won thirty out of total fifty seats including eighteen out of thirty eight Muslim seats; whereas, the Muslim League won seventeen seats.³³⁶ Dr. Khan Sahib was invited to form the new cabinet.

Cabinet Mission Plan

Soon after the elections, British Prime Minister Attlee announced that a Cabinet Mission would be sent to India to resolve the Indian question. The Commission discussed the future of India with all the stakeholders, but the Indians could not reach out to a conclusion, which could have been mutually acceptable to all the parties. Consequently, the Commission came up with its own proposals: it proposed a three-tiered federal scheme; foreign affairs, defence, and communication were to be kept under the purview of the central government; and all other matters should be kept with the provinces; and the provinces would be merged into groups.³³⁷ Under this mechanism, the frontier province was grouped with Punjab and Sindh. The Khudai Khidmatgars objected to the compulsory grouping because it would lead to their being dominated by Punjab.³³⁸ Since there were no chances of Hindu Domination in the India, the Khudai Khidmatgars demanded that either the Punjab should give assurances to them or be left alone to decide "their own destiny".³³⁹ Meanwhile, Nehru, who was then Minister for external and Commonwealth affairs, made a visit to the N-WFP to take an

³³⁶ Gandhi, *Ghaffar Khan*, 141.

³³⁷ Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 166.

³³⁸ *ibid.* 169.

³³⁹ *ibid.*

appraisal of the situation there. During his tour, several disturbances and even attacks on Nehru took place to frustrate Nehru and the Khudai Khidmatgars. The Khudai Khidmatgars alleged that the colonial bureaucracy was involved in these disturbances.³⁴⁰

Partition and referendum

On 3rd June 1947, the Government announced that India should be partitioned in such a way as the Muslim Majority provinces including Punjab, Sindh, Bengal, and Baluchistan should form a separate state. As for the Frontier, it presented a paradoxical situation: it was Muslim majority province, contiguous with Punjab, yet it was one of the strongholds of the Congress. In order to resolve the issue, it was decided that a referendum should take place whereby the people would decide whether to join Pakistan or India. The Khudai Khidmatgars pointed out that since they had fought the 1946 elections on the issue of united independent India, there was no need to seek a fresh mandate. However, if there must be a referendum, they demanded, a third option should, the option of Pashtoonistan, also be given. The Government did not concede this option, nor the Congress pushed the government for it. Dejected, the Khudai Khidmatgars announced a boycott of the referendum. Although the bureaucracy,³⁴¹ the League, and some religious groups persuaded people to vote for Pakistan, the Khudai Khidmatgars toured the length and breadth of the province to campaign for a boycott. They gathered in a Bannu and passed a resolution in favor of Pashtoonistan on June 21. The referendum was held between 6 and 17 July, the result came in favor of Pakistan which was opted by 50.49 % of the total electorate.³⁴² The Khudai Khidmatgars termed the referendum

³⁴⁰ for details of the Nehru visit and the events that unfolded during his visit see Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao jiddo jehad*, 564-571, see also Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 172- 182.

³⁴¹ Even the Chief Secretary of the province confirmed to the Viceroy the allegations of the Khudai Khidmatgars pertaining to the Governor's sympathies with the League. Shah, *ethnicity, Islam and nationalism*, 225.

³⁴² *ibid.*

as a "farce", and they alleged that the polls were heavily rigged.³⁴³ It was a unique situation for the Khudai Khidmatgars: on the one hand, they were successful in forcing their main enemy, the British, out of India, yet, on the other, they had to see themselves "forcibly" amalgamated with Pakistan.

Colonialism, however strong it was, had never remained un-resisted. Like the rest of India, the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were at the forefront of resisting and fighting colonialism, ever since it became a separate province in 1901. Many sporadic anti-colonial irruptions took place in the Province in the first two decades. However, the most remarkable of all the resistance movements in the province was the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement. It waged a two-pronged battle to achieve the independence of India in general and that of Pashtoons in particular: firstly, it took upon itself to get rid of social evils that were damaging the very fabric of the society; and it opposed the government on almost all fronts. In doing so, it had to face the unspeakable colonial violence which was not limited to just physical violence. It knew that the "backwardness" of the people and their subordination to a foreign race were reinforcing each other. Therefore, if they were to emancipate their community, their struggle should be aimed at both the internal as well as the external factors. Both could be defeated if national consciousness and unity could be fostered in the community, and if self-confidence could be restored to the people. Thus, the Khudai Khidmatgars did their best to promote literacy and education, to shun traditional prejudices against business, trade, and several other professions. Within a short span of time a community that had never saw organized politics for centuries, was politicized to such an extent that not a single event of national import remained unnoticed in the province. Such was the force of their activities that

³⁴³ *ibid.*

a province that was deemed unfit for political reforms was given full provincial status within a few years since the launch of the movement. Furthermore, the Khudai Khidmatgars effectiveness and their popularity could be gauged from the fact that, within a decade, it secured the majority of the seats in the 1936-37 election despite all colonial odds. A peasant movement as it was, to a greater extent, the Khudai Khidmatgars always strived to work for their uplift. What, however, is more remarkable about the movement was its commitment to the non-violence. No matter how harsh was the treatment meted out to the Khudai Khidmatgars, they never compromised on the principle of non-violence. They preached the virtues of liberty and non-violence not only through "hard" politics, but also through such literary endeavors as the arrangement of poetry gatherings and the presentation of stage dramas. Through non-violence the Movement was able to end internal feuds and factionalism among the Pakhtuns, and a sense of community and unity was developed among them. Finally, the Movement shows that it is wrong to suppose that colonialism can be defeated only through violence. Rather, it established that the "weapon" of non-violence is more effective than that of violence. In short, the Khudai Khidmatgars had, as Ghaffar Khan said, "two objectives: independence of the country from colonial rule, and the development of a sense of nationalism, brotherhood, love, unity, and community among Pakhtuns."³⁴⁴

³⁴⁴ Ghaffar Khan, *zama zhwand ao Jiddo jehad*, 587.

Conclusion

History of the world, since the early sixteenth century until well into the twentieth century, had been remarkable for the colonization of the non-European world by Europe, particularly by France and "Great" Britain. Throughout this period, bulk of the world's population and territory including Asia, Africa, Australia, Caribbean Islands, and Americas were "conquered", and put at the service of the "metropolitan bourgeoisie". The main motives behind colonialism were economic in essence; the colonizers resorted to all such mechanisms as would make sure the approximation of maximum profit. The colonies were integrated into a "world capitalist system" in such a way that the interests of the former were always kept subservient to those of the latter. Initially, the colonies were "important" in so far as it provided raw products and cheap labor to the European markets. However, with the coming of Industrial revolution, the colonies' importance increased because, henceforth, they would serve as markets for Europeans goods. By taking the "classical case" of India, it has been shown, in the study, that how colonialism went through different stages and how in each stage the colonies' interest remained subordinated to those of the "metropolitan capital". In the early stages, direct exploitation of the colonies was brought about through assuming monopoly over the revenues and trade of the colony. Later on, in addition to the direct exploitation, the colonies were inundated with goods purchased in the metropolitan countries, thereby destroying local markets and industries, and rendering the local populations jobless and workless. Economically, colonialism was a system that integrated colonies into the world capitalist system, but without effecting any capitalist transformation in the colonies. Rather, it "de-industrialized" the colonies so that Europe could be industrialized. Worse still, it reinforced and even created new "feudal classes" to control the colonies more firmly.

However, such an exploitative system could have not been possible, if there had been no ideological-cultural camouflage. Since the era, which saw expansion and rise of colonialism, was also one of "liberty", "fraternity" and "equality", therefore, to justify the subordination of the colonies, they had to be presented as places that were in need of European rule. Thus, the colonies were depicted as the abodes of "barbarians", who need to be civilized, not out some personal drive, but to carry the divinely ordained mission, the mission of civilization, the "White man's burden". Moreover, to de-sensitize the domestic people to the predicament of the colonized, the latter were reduced to "sub-human" levels in need of "special" treatment. Similarly, to depoliticize the colonized and to render them passive, they were psycho-culturally "inferiorized". In short, economic colonization was complemented, and camouflaged with ideological-cultural colonization.

However, despite the fact that it was a part of India, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (N-WFP) experienced colonialism in somewhat different manners on account of its geo-strategic locations. Since the province was in close proximity with the archrival of British Empire, the Tsarist and later Soviet Russia, the policies of the government in the province were more of strategic rather than economic nature. As such, the province was kept under "special" laws as the FCRs, laws that were perhaps the harshest of all the colonial laws prevalent in India. Furthermore, the province was one of the most underdeveloped provinces of India. The Government had co-opted a small section of the society, such as the Khans and some religious sections, and conferred upon them several perks and privileges so as to keep the province under proper control. Moreover, whatever little reform "packages" were introduced in the rest of India, such as the Morley-Minto (1909) and the Montagu-Chelmsford (1919) reforms, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was kept outside the scope of these reforms because the

Government could not "afford" the rise politics in such a strategically vital zone of the Empire. Although one cannot ignore the economic importance of the province, the main thing that the British concerned the most was the strategic importance of the area. In other words, the British policies towards Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were determined by the rivalry between Russia, both Tsarist and Soviet, and the British Empire.

Having said that, however strong and however hard it might have tried to hide its brutal and exploitative face in the ideological camouflage, colonialism had never remained un-resisted. In fact, colonialism and anti-colonialism went hand in hand. The fact that colonialism had to establish its rule through violence, including physical, cultural, psychological and epistemological forms of violence, shows that the "natives" had in one way or another resisted colonialism, since the very beginning. Yet, resistance to colonialism that emerged in the twentieth century was organized, disciplined and well thought out that it forced the colonized to retreat. Despite the commonality of their ultimate goal, i.e. the goal of independence, the resistance movements differed in their strategies for achieving it. There were, thus, those who considered violent struggle to be the most effective tactic of defeating colonialism, and there were those who believed that only non-violence could "truly" subvert the colonial structures. Fanon, the main proponent of the former camp, argued that since colonialism was established through violence it could be overthrown only with greater violence. Decolonization, for him, was an essentially violent phenomenon. Violence, for Fanon, was not only important for "instrumental reasons" but also for "therapeutic" purposes. That is, since colonialism had "thingified" and "objectified" the native, he could regain subjectivity and human agency through violence. Fanon, however, was not concerned just with tactical and therapeutic gains, he wanted a complete end to colonialism and the psycho-

cultural, socio-economic, politico-ideological, and the epistemological structures that colonialism entailed. To achieve these goals "absolute violence" was required. Although equally anti-colonial, Ghaffar Khan's prescription for overthrowing the colonial order is almost completely antithetical to that of Fanon's. For him, the only viable option with the colonized to achieve independence was the use of non-violence. Just as Fanon advocated the use of both absolute and instrumental violence, Ghaffar Khan argued that non-violence was important not on account of its tactical viability, but also because for its own sake. He thought that the main reason that a handful of people of some distant lands subjugate the natives was the lack of unity, and national consciousness among the latter. And, national consciousness and unity could be created only when the natives shun violence and adopt the creed of nonviolence.

Like anywhere else, colonialism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had seen several instances of resistance. However, the province was administered through such laws and was treated in such a way, that earlier anti-colonial irruptions were sporadic and least organized, in addition to their being violent. The province saw the genesis of "genuine" and organized anti-colonial resistance movement, during the second decade of the twentieth century, in the form of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement. Subscribing to the "strategy" of non-violence, the movement resisted colonialism on almost all fronts. Not only did it challenge the political might of the Empire, it also attempted to destroy colonial categories and to bust colonial myths. It restored agency and human subjectivity to the natives by engaging them in socio-political activities. The movement was a two-pronged battle: internally, it fought those forces and factors that hindered the development of community and national consciousness; externally, it challenged the very legitimacy of colonialism. The movement challenged the very legitimacy

of colonialism. It lay bare the the true face of colonialism not only through politics but also through cultural activities such as poetry and stage drama, and political journal. The movement's non-violent opposition to the Empire created, apart from political crises, moral crises for the colonizers. It brought to the fore the contradiction of colonialism to such an extent that even colonial propaganda could not hid it. More precisely, it reversed the colonial binaries, whereby the natives were depicted as violent and uncouth barbarians, and the colonizers as the most humane and the most civilized creatures on earth. The civil disobedience movement of the 1930s, and the brutal way with which the Government tried to suppress it, demonstrated to the people the barbarity of colonialism and the civility of the protestors. Not surprisingly, within less than a decade, the numbers of the Khudai Khidmatgars swelled to about a hundred thousand, and they won the 1937 elections. Such a rapid popularity of the movement and its commitment to non-violence questioned the myth that Pakhtuns were essentially violent. The movement also demonstrated that non-violence could be as effective, if not more, as violence in overthrowing the colonial order.

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