

One Unit: A Case Study of Baluchistan



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I hereby declare that the thesis presently submitted bearing the title “One Unit: A Case Study of Baluchistan” is the result of my own research, and has not been submitted to any other institution for any other degree.

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**To
My Parents, Younis Khan (brother) and
Mashal Khan who was lynched in a broad day light in Abdul Wali
Khan University**

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for the purpose of any other degree.

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Introduction

The post-colonial Pakistani state has been confronting many political upheavals since its inception. These upheavals, like most of the post-colonial states, are an outcome of the power structure Pakistan had acquired from the colonial state system. The post-colonial state in this way centralized powers like its predecessors; only a few ethnic groups like (Punjabi and Muhajir), the people who migrated from India to Pakistan during the partition of the Sub-Continent, had domination over politics and economy due to their huge share in the powerful institutions of military and bureaucracy since colonial times. The ruling elites had most often adopted and perpetuated the colonial legacies to enhance and reproduce their power. For example, after independence, the state of Pakistan had accepted and adopted 1935 Act, albeit with a different name, which was framed by the colonial state. The ruling elites further centralized it instead of implementing its federal part, thus speaks volumes about the nature and genesis of political structure established soon after the Partition.

In fact, the federal portion of this constitution had never been operationalized during the colonial period also throws light on the federal-cum-unitary power structure that Pakistan had inherited and which in turn also laid the basis of future ethnic problems Pakistan had to face then. Theoretically, the state has a federal form of government; however, in practice, it has emphasised more on centralized form of government.

Moreover, Pakistan did not have a constitution for nine long years; after independence, it adopted the Indian Act of 1935, later its amended version, was framed as an Interim Constitution. Pakistan did not have uniform administrative set up in the provinces as well as in the princely states that accessed to Pakistan from the British Crown. The country even did not have defined boundaries until August 1947.

The ruling elites, mostly the bureaucrats, had to define the boundaries of newly built state and later run the affairs of the country. Even many scholars have argued that, acting as vicegeral head of the state, Jinnah himself had put hazardous precedents for the future constitutional and administrative affairs of the country. According to such writers, Jinnah retained the responsibilities of vicegeral head of state after independence in similar authoritarian manner as was carried by British authorities. Acting as Governor General Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had numerous powers, as in the words of Ayesha Jalal, that “In Jinnah’s Pakistan, the country had unique head of the state who controlled the executive, the cabinet and the assembly”.¹ This decision would later greatly affect the nascent democracy of Pakistan and create antagonism between provinces and the centre.

The nature of the ‘federation’ that came into existence at that time can also be understood by taking into account the political and constitutional status of Balochistan. The status of Balochistan remained as it was. The post-colonial state of Pakistan did not elevate the status of Baluchistan after the division of Sub-Continent in August 1947 when it became part of the new state. Balochistan did not enjoy the status of an autonomous province like the other provinces within the ‘federal constitution’, of Pakistan and that it was declared a full province only after the withdrawal of One-Unit scheme in 1970. All the colonial legacies remained unaltered for example Baluchistan did not have provincial assembly until the dismantling of One Unit that other provinces had.

Contrary to India, where Congress provided a constitution to its citizens and could integrate provinces and other areas (princely states and tribal areas) into the newly independent state, constitution making process was delayed in Pakistan due to

¹Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1995), 18.

the lack of a political party which had deep roots in masses. The ruling Muslim League, according to Hamza Alavi, had no social bases in the parts which later made Pakistan. While in Pakistan the princely states which consists large part of Pakistan were still not part of country after it got independence in August 1947, including tribal areas of British Balochistan and the princely state of Khanate of Kalate.

Located at the peripheries of the British India and very strategic to survival of its enormous empire the British authorities strictly prohibited political activities in Balochistan. The province was not only kept at bay from nationalist political movements of Congress and Muslim League, but also the reforms were not introduced in the princely state of Kalat as British India's policy to introduce reforms in the other princely states of British India. However, the 1930s saw the emergence of political parties in both British Balochistan and Khanate of Kalate. For instance, the *Anjuman-i-e-Itihad-e-Balochan* wa Balochistan, the Kalat State National Party (KSNP), the *Anjuman-e-Watan* and The Balochistan Muslim League played very important role during British withdrawl and postcolonial Pakistan.

Prior to integration into Pakistan, Balochistan's administrative position was very unique. Balochistan was not a Governor's province. Balochistan was composed of British Balochistan; most areas were inhabited by Pashtuns and areas leased by British from Afghanistan and from Khan of Kalat. While Kalat was a princely state like other princely states, however the status of independence was vaguely defined by the British. The viceroy could interfere in the affairs of Khan through his Agent to Governor General (AGG). After August 1947 and till the end of One Unit, the status of Balochistan remained same as before. Unlike other provinces that acceded to Pakistan, Balochistan did not have its constituent assembly so the province's fate was decided by the Shahi Jirga (an assembly of tribal elders and sardars) and Quetta

Municipal Committee (QMC) that were nominated bodies of the British. Due to the presence of any constitutional and democratic body, Balochistan's accession was decided by such unelected bodies through referendum at the eve of Partition.

Statement of the Problem

In fact, ethnic question and the issue of identity remained crucial in Pakistan since its inception due to the presence of cultural and geographical diversities and the absence of a coherent and popular political party in all parts of the newly made Pakistan that could bridge all such differences. The serious issue was further exacerbated by the exclusive version of nationalism adopted by the ruling elites. For instance, Urdu was adopted as an official language without the will of the province of East Bengal and the other provinces. Because of ruling elite's discriminatory policies and practices, the political leaders and common people of smaller provinces felt deprivation and alienation.

Similarly, One Unit was created in 1954 in order to convert the parliamentary majority of Bengalis into minority. The four provinces of West Pakistan were merged into single province i.e. Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan. It was one of the constitutional formulas by the then Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra to bring parity between the Eastern and Western wings of the country. The smaller provinces resisted the forceful merger of all into one province.

In a heterogeneous country like Pakistan the heavy-handed process of nation-state building through firm centralization provoked the early ethnic differences. This ethnic diversity in turn alarmed the threats to Pakistan's perception of unity and integration. The people of Eastern Pakistan had very differently imagined or considered the newly independent homeland which was achieved from the clutches of British imperialism and Hindus dominated Congress. Historically, the people of East

Bengal had shown very strict resistance to the British Colonialism and were very active in political spheres as demonstrated during the partition of Bengal in 1905. The people of Bengal were active in both Congress and Muslim League. The prominent politicians from East Bengal were A. K. Fazlul Huq, Khwaja Nazimuddin and Husyen Shaeed Surhawardy, to name a few. Having such a political conscious population and matured politicians that the people of East Bengal would not accept the centralized authority of West Pakistan headed by Punjab and Mohajir dominated state institutions. As Jinnah set the precedence due to compulsions or whatever reasons his successors would exploit this post with assistance of bureaucracy and military to undermine elected institutions in order to thwart Bengali Parliamentary majority that was the only way through which they could get their rights. However, the Bengalis were never given their political rights which later led to the succession of East Pakistan from West Pakistan.

In fact, the issue of federation remained contested and widely debated in Pakistan; the separation of East Pakistan, as discussed above, took place as a result of disharmonious relationship between centre and provinces. Ethnic conflict not only remained restricted to East Pakistan, but such sentiments were at peak in other provinces, including Balochistan, especially in the initial phase of Pakistan. The conflict in Balochistan had been sharpened by undemocratic and authoritarian steps taken by the ruling elites. The decision of implementing One Unit was one such crucial step in fuelling the tension between the centre and Balochistan.

This study focuses and analyses the role of state and the response of both political personalities and political parties to the centralized tendencies and implementation of One Unit in Balochistan. The study also focuses on how

Balochistan was deprived of economic structures and how political situation further deteriorated in the province due to One Unit.

Research Questions

- How the implementation of One Unit and other centralized policies impacted the politics of Balochistan?
- How Balochistan was treated (politically) under the scheme of One-Unit?
- What were the economic, political, and administrative outcomes in case of Balochistan under this plan?
- What was the response of political parties and political leaders in Balochistan to One Unit Scheme?

Scope and significance

Balochistan is the largest province in size among the other three provinces of Pakistan, however smallest in population wise. It has very strategic importance not only to Pakistan, but also the neighbouring Afghanistan and Iran. The geographic location has played very important role in shaping the political structure in Balochistan. It holds commands of Bolan Pass, a traditional gateway to India similar to Khyber Pass to the north. There are three dominant ethnic groups inhabited in Balochistan which are Baloch, Pashtun and Brahvi.

The present study explores first twenty-three years of history of Pakistan saw major political developments. It also goes into the background to explain significance and importance of political developments in special regard to Balochistan. This era (1947-70) is very important because Balochistan was not given the status of a province. More specifically this study focuses on the era (1955-1970), and the opposition to One Unit from Balochistan.

The significance of this study is to make sense of the political conflict in Balochistan vis a vis the centre. It deals to trace the roots of political and ethnic

conflicts in Pakistan. Understanding political conflict in Balochistan can help us to understand other ethnic and political conflicts in other parts of the country.

Literature Review

The major political figures of Balochistan in the 1950s and 1960s have recorded the events they had participated in, which have been a great source of insight for developing the argument in this thesis. "*A Journey to Disillusionment*" is the political autobiography of Sherbaz Khan Mazari which gives a detailed account of the early years of the Pakistani state, political matters of the smaller provinces during the first two decades of Pakistan, the political intrigues of the first decade and the first direct military control of the Pakistani state in the second decade. However, the writer doesn't discuss in detail One Unit scheme and the consequences thereof. This work covers all aspects relevant to One Unit in details.

The political autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, "*In Search of Solution*", provides useful insight for understanding the political unrest which developed in Balochistan after the establishment of the One Unit in West Pakistan. Moreover, "*Inside Balochistan*", the political autobiography of Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baloch, Khan of Kalat, has also been of a capital interest in understanding the political problem in Balochistan immediately after the establishment of Pakistan, the merger of Kalat with Pakistan, and the armed and political resistance in Balochistan to the One Unit plan of West Pakistan. This work has also been informed by the work of Selig S. Harrison on the dynamics of Baloch nationalism, its origin and development in the first two decades of the establishment of the Pakistani state.

Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958 by M. Rafique Afzal discusses the first decade of Pakistan 1947 to 1958. The book describes not only first decade which is of very importance but also the main political scenarios of the civil-military

relations. This book is of very significant as it elaborates the political developments during the early years of Pakistan. It describes how due to weaknesses of political parties the army dominated the political scene.

The Army and Democracy by Aqil Shah is the latest book on Pakistani army. The book describes views of army top ranks officers' imagination of Pakistan. The book explains that the army considered itself as the only guardians of the country and how army thought of politicians and elected institutions of the country. The book gives details about the Pakistan Army's interests in politics and perceived themselves as the only guardians of the new state. The book also gives insight how the military took keen interest in preparing the schemes for various constitutional formulas and scheme of One Unit especially after the Governor General appointed top two military generals in the 'cabinet of talents'.

A Princely Affairs: The Accession and Integration of the Princely States of Pakistan, 1947-1955 by Yaqoob Khan Bangash describes how the Princely States accessed and integrated into Pakistan. The book is latest and of rare accounts of Princely States that became part of Pakistan and especially Khanate of Kalate and its accession to Pakistan. The book provides the official records between British and the officials of Kalate State and also later between the Pakistani officials and Khanate of Kalate.

Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Nationalism 1915-1955 by Martin Axmann explains the early history of Kalat State its occupation from the Khan of Kalat. The book throw lights on the rise and decline of Khante of Kalat. Axmann applies modernist theory to Baloch nationalism as he argues that it was during the withdrawal of British and occupation of Balochistan that Baloch

Nationalism emerged and united the Baloch nation. In fact, the Baloch Nationalism was response to the creation of new Muslim state (Pakistan).

Politics and the State in Pakistan by Mohammad Waseem is a very comprehensive account of politics and state in Pakistan. The book thoroughly explains the nature of state from the time of Mughals, British and later Pakistan. It gives a very thorough sketch of events and developments. The book also gives details about the origins of elected and non-elected institutions in the country which is very helpful in understanding of the scheme of One Unit.

The Politics of One Unit 1955-1958 by Rizwan Malik is an important work related to this research. Initially this thesis of the author which was published by Pakistan Study Center the University of Punjab in 1988. Although the work of Rizwan Malik depends mostly on newspapers articles, it can be described as a comprehensive study. The book is divided into three chapters. Chapter one deals with the constitution making and many plans that were presented to the constituent assembly of Pakistan. The second chapter describes the resistance to One Unit from smaller provinces except Punjab while the third depicts the policies and programmes introduced after the formation of One Unit.

Zma Xhwand Ao Xhwandun (Pashtu) by Abdul Samad Khan Achkazai is very important source in this research. This book is in three volumes. Samad Khan Achkazai explains the era of British colonialism. The writer gives details about his resistance to British Colonization of Balochistan and resistance to One Unit during the post-colonial state era. The author also gives details about the Baloch-Pashtun alliance developed since colonial days.

Methodology

The methodology adopted in this work is descriptive and analytical. In order to analyse the historical development in the early twenty-three years history of Pakistan with reference to Balochistan under the One Unit Scheme is taken under consideration. For the research purpose, both primary sources and secondary sources are used. The primary sources include National Documentation Center, Islamabad, Quetta Secretariat Records, West Pakistan Assembly debates and National Assembly of Pakistan debates. In the secondary sources, I rely on books, research papers, newspapers and magazines. The research also includes secondary literature in the vernacular.

Hypothesis

The focus of this study lies on the political developments in response to the One Unit scheme in the context of Balochistan. Baloch national/ethnic movement was given impetus by the decision of implementing One Unit. The hypothesis of this work is that the implementation of One Unit scheme by the central government of Pakistan exacerbated political conflict in Balochistan which manifested itself in the form of political and armed resistance.

Organization of Study

This work is divided into four chapters. The first chapter covers the history of Balochistan, its geographical location, strategic importance of Balochistan and the emergence of political parties and their role during colonial era. Prior to colonial era, it is discussed in detail that how the emergence of Khanate of Kalat was brought into effect. The colonial history of Balochistan which had drastic effects on Balochistan had led to the emergence of a unique form of governance. The establishment of political power in Balochistan under the British into four distinct zones as; (1) Tribal

Areas, (2) Agency Territories, (3) British Balochistan and (4) Native States. It was the British period that the Khanate of Kalat was undermined to the status of princely state. Not only the administrative, executive but also the political powers were taken over by the British.

The second chapter explains the political developments during first decade 1947-1957. The centralization of power by bureaucracy and military left a unique legacy in Pakistan. It also discusses different constitutional plans and formulas presented to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP). Many of these plans including One Unit were presented by the politicians from Punjab who were in alliance with the bureaucracy and military. It discusses that how Balochistan was treated by the central government as a periphery are and also its share in the Report of Basic Principles Committees. One Unit and its relation to Balochistan is one of these plans which is discussed in detail in this chapter.

The third chapter describes how Balochistan was ruled from 1947 till 1955 and finally the imposition of One Unit. Since Balochistan did not have the status of province, it was governed through agents. How Balochistan was deprived of provincial status on the grounds that it did not have enough financial resources? Furthermore, it also describes how One Unit was depicted as panacea to all contemporary problems Pakistan's units were facing at that time. It also analyses the political and economic effects of One Unit with reference to Balochistan.

The fourth chapter depicts and analyse the resistance to One Unit in the Province of Baluchistan. It will focus first on the kind of resistance that emerged in the shape of political parties and political organisation in Baluchistan with special reference to One Unit. This chapter will also discuss the militant resistance that occurred in Balochistan against the forceful merger of Baluchistan into One Unit.

This guerrilla warfare known as Parari Movement was an exclusively unique resistance in Balochistan as compared to other anti-post-colonial movements in Pakistan.

Chapter 1

History and Politics in Balochistan

Geography, Geographical Location and History of Balochistan

Located at the edges of two empires; Persian and Indian Empires shaped the destiny of this region. The geo-strategic position has always remained a key in determining the political structure of Balochistan throughout history. Similarly, the geographical location has also played a significant role in determining the future of Balochistan. The Bolan Pass is similar to Balochistan in importance as Khyber Pass to the north-west of India. As Balochistan is adjacent to the sea, it is connected with the rest of the world. Not only physically but also geographically, “Balochistan occupies an intermediate position between the Iranian highland and the Indus lowland”.¹ The geography of Balochistan can be divided into different zones; deserts and plains, lower highlands and upper highlands. The deserts are exclusively known for black and Gravel sand and salt.² The Sulaiman range in the east and Kirthar and Pub range in the south are distinguished for lower highlands. While the north eastern and central parts of Balochistan are consisted of upper highlands. As far as the climate of Balochistan is concerned, it has significantly varied climatic regions. Keeping in view the moisture conditions, three zones are distinguished: “the aestivally arid West, which receives its extremely sparse precipitation from cyclones from the Mediterranean region during the winter time; an eastern zone with summer humidity whose uncertain precipitation stems from monsoonal offshoots; a central convergence zone with a precipitation maximum in winter and summer time”.³ Another important feature is the scarcity of water resources, which affect the fertility of the soil. This

¹Fred Scholz, *Nomadism and Colonialism: A Hundred Years of Balochistan 1872-1972* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.20

²A. W. Hughes, *The Country of Balochistan*, (Quetta: Sales and Services, 1997), 25.

³Scholz, *Nomadism and Colonialism*, 13.

factor influences the agricultural, socio-economic and political life of the people of Balochistan.⁴ Presence of international trade routes including; Bolan Pass, Gomal Pass, and Somniani Port and a gateway between South Asia and Central Asia influenced the historical development in the region. From Alexander to the British, the passes in Balochistan had been used as one of the routes for invasion and trade.

The archaeological evidences in Balochistan connected culturally with Iranian Plateau, Central Asia and Indus Valley Civilization. The influences are found in the form of pottery, architectures and figurines of prehistoric Balochistan.⁵ Balochistan's history is merely a narrative of conquerors to the Indian sub-continent and that of Central-Asia up to the sixteenth century. Darius I (522-486 BC) occupied Makran and later absorbed some areas of Balochistan into his empire. Alexander the Great also passed through Balochistan and around 323 BC Balochistan became part of Seleucus Nictar's satrapy. By AD (1150-1370) the invasions of Chengiz Khan and his successors controlled huge part of Balochistan and much devastation is reported during this era. The Tamurid reign that followed further controlled parts of Balochistan and even extended to Bolan Pass. Between the fifteenth and sixteenth century Balochistan came under the nominal domain of Mughals of India and Safavids of Iran. Balochistan became the driving force for them to either conquer Kandahar or extend trade to India and Central Asia via Bolan Pass.⁶ Contrarily the

⁴ Hughes Buller, *The Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. vi, (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1908), 273.

⁵ For further details see, Stuart Piggott, *Prehistoric India to 1000 BC* (Middlesex: Penguin Book, 1950), Elisa Cortesi, Maurizio Tosi, Alessandra Lazzari and Massimo Vidale, *Cultural Relationships beyond the Iranian Plateau: The Helmand Civilization, Balochistan and the Indus Valley in the 3rd Millennium BCE*, (Paléorient, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2008), p. 5-35 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41496521> Accessed: 09/05/2016 07:57

⁶ Martin Axman, *Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 18.

severity of ecology could not let the invaders for a permanent settlement and every invader left behind despair and destruction.⁷

The Success of the Khanate

There is a long traditional history between the tribes of Baloch and Brahui to take command of the various parts of Karachi and the mainland of Kalat.⁸ However competition for scarce resources decreased as many factions of both Brahui and Baloch tribes migrated to lower Punjab and lower Sindh in the Indus basin. Most of them settled down as settled landlords in lowland of Karachi and some of them penetrated into the Sulaiman mountain ranges to the North. The rest amalgamated with the highlands of Brahui tribes. They maintained the Indo-Aryan Balochi and Dravidian Brahui as discrete languages; moreover, they developed an alike of nomadic and tribal organization that depended on hierarchy. Access to winter pasturage became easier as the lowlands of Karachi were divided equally between the groups.⁹ According to Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the last Khan of Kalat, argues that there were three distinct divisions of the Baloch. The first division migrated to Seistan, the second division left for Makran and the last one, known as Brahvi, went to Kalat, and settled there and established the Khanate of Kalat (Balochistan).¹⁰

The slack alliance between the Baloch and Brahui tribes lapsed for a specific period of time during the early sixteenth century which paved the way for Mughals to appoint a governor and established their suzerainty. The administration of Mughals rule provided an opportunity not only to Kalat to emerge as a town but also, to those groups (Baloch and Brahui) to organize a tribal power on this very geographical

⁷Syed Abdul Quddus, *The Tribal Balochistan* (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd. (Pvt.), 1990), 13.

⁸Muhammad Sardar Khan Baloch, *A Literary History of the Balochis*, 2 vols. (Quetta: Balochi Academy, 1977), 70-129.

⁹Yuri Gankovsky, *The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History*, (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1973), 143-53.

¹⁰Innayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch Nationalism*, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987), 95.

location. The origin of dominant alliance of Baloch and Brahui tribe can be drawn back during this period in Balochistan. Earlier it was not possible for any local polity or group to emerge due to prolong instability in the region. So it was the Brahui Ahmedzai tribe that lay foundation of dynastic rule in Kalat and in 1666 Ahmed Khan (1666-95) took control of the Kalat town and established his rule over the Khanate of Kalat. The main feature of his Coronation ceremony was that all Baluch tribes introduced the solemn tradition of taking oath of loyalty and complete obedience to the ruler of the throne.¹¹

Kalat remained porous confederacy from 1666 to 1740. Kalat became popular only due to repeated external campaigns, but weaker because of internal solidarity. The sardars were independent and usually implored the external forces to come to their help in disputes not only among themselves but, also with the Khan of Kalat.¹²

The Khanate of Kalat became more consolidated when the Khan allied himself with the Persian conqueror, Nadir Shah in 1740. Nadir Shah handed over Karachi and some other areas to the Khan that were lost previously. The fertile lands of Karachi allowed the Khan (Naseer Khan I, 1749-95) to follow the programme of innovations. Naseer Khan I introduced a new system of ranks among the sardars based on their military organization and divided the khanate into Sarawan and Jhalawan administratively and each sardar leading his tribe would enter his court. In this way he transformed the traditional hierarchy into an institutionalized ranking centred on him. Nasir Khan ruled almost for forty years and this is considered as the golden era in the history of Khanate of Kalat by the Baloch nationalists. He made cordial relations with the Afghan ruler Ahmed Shah Durrani in 1748. In this way he was able to pay more

¹¹Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, *Inside Baluchistan: A Political Autobiography of his Highness Baiglar Baiigi Khan-e-Azam XIII*, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), 77.

¹²Nina Swidler, *The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation: The Barahui of Balochistan*, (Ph. D. Diss., Colombia University, 1969), 557.

concentration on the southern parts of the Khanate. Makran, Kharan and Lasbela were made part of the Khanate. Moreover, some parts of the Indian Ocean were also conquered.¹³

There is overwhelming discussion on the nature of land distribution in the Khanate of Kalat.¹⁴ The khans wanted that Khanate to become a feudal entity while the sardars espoused a decentralised structure rather than feudal. These conflicts came to surface by the 1830s as many sardars were killed and Sarawan was in revolt which resulted in British intervention. The British authorities saw the Khanate as loose entity vulnerable to internal dissension and had to be protected from disintegration.

The Khanate of Kalat was composed of political system as Nina Swidler observes, “a level of organization more inclusive than the tribe, yet something less than a state”.¹⁵ Kalat had regions of contestation instead of borders.¹⁶ The sardars never contested the legitimacy of Ahmedzai khans to office; however, they challenged certain rights allocated to them historically. The Khanship was basically a performative office, as a Khan enticed sardari support by indicating that he was deserving of it.¹⁷ There could have developed a primitive state based on tribal or feudal line, had it had been allowed. However, the Russian advancement to Central Asia and conflicts between the khans and sardars led to the British intervention.

The British Rule in Balochistan

With the advent of nineteenth century, the so-called ‘Great Game’ influenced the external policies of the British. Both the French intrigues in Persia and the fear of Russian invasion of India caused and legitimized the British expansion towards the

¹³Yar Khan, *Inside Baluchistan*, 83-104

¹⁴Swidler, *The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation*, 559- 60.

¹⁵Nina Swidler, *Remotely Colonial: History and Politics in Balochistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 32-47.

¹⁶Ibid. 47

¹⁷Ibid. 63-64.

North-West Frontier. Similarly, the idea of 'buffer zone' was circulated and the British directed their officials to define that region. Monstuart Elphinstone was sent to Afghanistan in 1808¹⁸ and Captain Grant to region of Balochistan through Makran to gather information about invasion route to India from Persia via coastal region in Balochistan in 1809. There was no importance of Balochistan in the affairs of the British India until the First Anglo- Afghan war of 1839-42. As Martin Axmann puts it 'Balochistan did not exist prior to British colonial power setting about conquering the North- West regions of India in the first half of the nineteenth century.'¹⁹ During that time period most of the mountainous regions of Punjab and Sindh were ruled by the Ahmadzai ruler of Brahui tribe of the Khanate of Kalat. Nevertheless, the British called these areas Balochistan not Brahuistan. It is not possible to trace the origin of name 'Balochistan'. Until that time it had not been used for the all areas British entitled or for areas where the Tribes of Baloch were scattered.²⁰

The British tried to open negotiations with Khan of Kalat in order to annex Afghanistan. The British wanted to replace Shah Shuja as a new Afghan monarch. The implementation of this policy needed the corporation of Khan of Kalat, Mehrab Khan 1 (1817-39). The British forces had to pass through Karachi and Bolan Pass in 1838, in order to reach Kandahar. The British sent an envoy, Sir Alexander Burnes and signed the treaty of 1839, with the Khan of Kalat, Mehrab Khan for the safe passage of the troops.²¹ Article three of this treaty states, "As long as the British army continues in the country of Khorasan, the British Government agrees to pay to Mehrab Khan the sum of one and a half lakh of Company's rupees from the date of

¹⁸Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubal* (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1990).

¹⁹Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 26.

²⁰Scholz, *Nomadism and Colonialism*, 21

²¹C. U. Aitchison. *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries: The Treaties, &c. Relating to Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province*, Vol. XI, (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1933), 350

this engagement by half-yearly instalments”.²² Nonetheless, the legitimacy was acquired through the treaty. The khan at the end of the day was not able to guarantee the treaty as he lacked internal cohesion and the British conjured it as a hostile act. On their return from Kandhar the British invaded Kalat, but Khan refused to surrender and was finally killed.²³

The British could not abandon this region completely and wanted to have influence over that in one way or the other, for it was part of the imperial ambition of establishing an ‘order’ in the frontier. For this purpose, another treaty was concluded between Khan of Kalat, Nuseer Khan (son of Mehrab Khan), and the British India on 6th October, 1841. Article 4 of this treaty states, “Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, will always be guided by the advice of the British officer residing at his Durbar”.²⁴ Since then, the colonial interference was started in the affairs of Balochistan. A permanent colonial official was appointed at the durbar who could manipulate the political decisions.

The British had to ponder over their frontier policy after the disastrous defeat in the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1941. The British agents and travellers suggested that the Khanate of Kalat should be established as separate buffer state in the line of other buffer states that the British anticipated. In the early years, British started establishing contacts beyond the frontier. Through the conclusion of treaties with the rulers of Balochistan, the imperialist Britain interfered in the internal and external affairs of the region. Friendly relations were built between Khan of Kalat, Mehrab Khan and British under the treaties of 1839, and 1841. As far as the treaty of 1841, one of the main features of it was that the British troops were allowed to station in any

²²Ibid. 350.

²³Ibid. 326.

²⁴Ibid. 351.

part of the territory of Kalat.²⁵ The involvement of the British in the affairs of Balochistan changed the political landscape. In order to secure the smooth passage of the trade, the British continued their hegemony. For this purpose, another treaty was signed between John Jacob, Political Superintendent and Commandant of the frontier of Upper Sindh and Mir Nusseer Khan, Khan of Kalat on 14th May, 1854:

Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, to prevent all plundering or other outrage by his subjects within or near British territory ; to protect the passage of merchants to and fro between the British dominions and Afghanistan, whether by way of Sindh or by the seaport of Soumecanee, or other seaports of Mekran, and to permit no exactions to be made beyond an equitable duty to be fixed by the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, and the amount to be shown in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty.²⁶

This was the time period of close border system which restricted the expansion of British Empire towards the north-west. In opposition to this system was the Forward Policy. The difference of opinion of imperialist officers about the rule in Balochistan did not lead to establish precise strategy. Robert Phayre, political superintendent of Upper Sind Frontier, said, “Khan of Kalat was not an autocratic sovereign but merely the head of a confederacy of chiefs”.²⁷ Whereas, William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, argued that “The Khan may be nominally the head of a confederacy, but in reality, he is a sovereign prince”.²⁸ Robert Sandeman came forward to enforce the forward policy and succeeded particularly in 1876. It was the beginning of colonial rule in Balochistan.

Major Robert Sandeman, was directed “to establish peace and order; to administer justice promptly, with as little interference as possible with native usages; to promote the good feeling of tribesmen and chiefs by associating with them as far as possible in the work of the government; and to improve communication, promote

²⁵Ibid. 351.

²⁶Ibid. 353-354.

²⁷Thomas Henry Thornton, *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on our Indian Frontier* (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1977), 49.

²⁸Ibid. 50.

trade, provide medical aid to the masses and preserve forests”.²⁹ Sandeman established relations with the most influential sardars viz-a-viz khan’s powers. A new treaty was signed according to which the British would be the arbitrator between the tribes and the khan. The khan would not be able to make any treaty with Afghanistan or any other independent authority other than the British. Moreover, the railway line, telegraph line and British military presence would be established in Balochistan.³⁰

With military engagement the British could protect roads, important passes and also curtail people’s movement.³¹ The British wanted to annex Balochistan not only for strategic reasons but also for economic gains. Sandeman realized that it could only be achieved by preserving the traditional and hierarchical tribal structure. First, he elevated the privileges of the different sardars and also providing financial support and assigning administrative functions. The second measure that was taken by the Sandemen was the introduction of Jirga (the assembly of inter-tribal elders). Thirdly, he started to appoint warriors belonging from different tribes to form police machinery (levies system). The purpose of the tribal levies system was to create judicial accountability on the side of tribes.³² The Sandeman policy created many centres of power and fragmented the province into many political entities.

Despite Khan’s attempts to increase his powers with help of British economic assistance, but in vain. The first administrative report of the Balochistan Agency mention in 1886:

The agent to the Governor General has practically taken the place of the khan as head of the Baluch confederation. His highness is still the nominal head; the Sarawan and Jhalawan chiefs still sit on his right and left in the darbar os of old, and till he is invested by the Khan with the Khilat or mantle of succession, a sirdar is not to be legitimized as representative of his tribe. But in the essential questions of the

²⁹Ibid. 188 -89.

³⁰Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties*, Vol. XI, 362-4.

³¹Scholz, *Nomadism and Colonialism*, 95.

³²Thornton, *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman*, 188-89.

nomination of the sirdars, the summoning of jirgas for the settlement of inter-tribal disputes, and the general preservation of peace in the country, the Agent of the Governor –General is recognized all over Balochistan as having taken the place of the Khan, and his mandate naturally commands a great deal more respect and obedience than ever did that of His Highness.³³

The Baloch nationalist historians criticize Sandeman that he “tamed and bribed the chiefs at the cost of the people and recognized Baloch sardars as feudal instead of elected”³⁴. They argue that the indirect rule introduced by the Sandeman created a new system and it replaced the Baloch unwritten constitution. Consequently, Balochistan came under British rule instead of the khan.

Another event that shaped the destiny of Balochistan was second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878. One of the three columns of British forces overran some districts and cities of Balochistan including Quetta-Chaman-Kandahar route. At the end of the war, a treaty was concluded between Afghanistan and British in the Safed Sang village in Gandumak, in eastern Afghanistan.³⁵ One of the main features of it was the control of Afghanistan’s external policies by the British. In the context of Balochistan, the article 9 of this treaty states:

... His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government: that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom.³⁶

These districts were separated from Afghanistan ‘for protection and administrative control’. On the other hand, the era of Sandeman was marked by conquest and control of other parts of Balochistan. To establish British administration to the further north,

³³Government of India, *First administration Report of Balochistan Agency for 1886* (Quetta: Qasim Printers, 1991), 125

³⁴Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 141.

³⁵M. Hassan Kakar, *A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan 1863-1901*, (Netherlands: Brill’s Inner Asian Library, 2006), 28.

³⁶Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, The Treaties, &c., Relating to Afghanistan and Persia*, Vol. XIII, (Calcutta: Central Publication Branch, 1933), 242.

Sandeman was authorised over Harnai, securing the route of the planned broad-gauge railway, and also over Thal-Chotiali.³⁷ Sandeman was also known for his coercive policies. He, therefore, led the forceful expeditions in order to annex and control further territories. Nonetheless, the Zhob expedition was one of the significant expeditions. More than one hundred people were killed and several others wounded.³⁸ In December, 1889, Zhob valley was proclaimed as the protectorate and became the new agency.³⁹ For the movement of British soldiers and goods, the British had started constructing railway lines. This Sibi railway line was built in 1880 and Quetta railway was constructed in 1887.⁴⁰ As far as the State of Kalat's niabat including Nushki was concerned, the British authorised Sandeman to install British officials there to the north of Makran.⁴¹

For the demarcation of boundary lines on its frontiers, the British sent officials to Persia and Afghanistan in the early 1890s. To Afghanistan, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary to the Government of India led the mission and concluded a treaty with Afghan Amir, Abdur Rehman in 1893.⁴² This treaty is known as the Durand Agreement. From Wakhan to the Persian border, a line was drawn which covered more than 1500 miles. In 1896, Nushki was occupied on permanent lease, after the final demarcation of the Afghan, Kalat and Iranian borders by the Durand and Goldsmid lines, and administered as part of Balochistan.⁴³ This was justification for the legitimacy of British rule.

³⁷T. A. Heathcote, *Balochistan, the British and the Great Game: The Struggle for the Bolan Pass, Gateway to India* (London: Hurst and Co. Ltd., 2015), 235.

³⁸Bruce, *Forward policy and its Results*, 132.

³⁹Thornton, *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman*, 226.

⁴⁰GOI, *Administration Report of Baluchistan Agency for 1888-89*, 33.

⁴¹Heathcote, *Balochistan, the British and the Great Game*, 237.

⁴²Kakar, *A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan*, 178-179

⁴³Heathcote, *Balochistan, the British and the Great Game*, 249.

With these Railway lines British could have easy access to Southern Afghanistan and eastern Persia. In this way the 'British administered Balochistan was to comprise all Baloch-Afghan border areas stretching from the Baloch-Persian border in the west to the Zhob and the Pasthun tribal areas in the north-east, together with a narrow strip of land connecting these frontier districts with the British India through the Bolan.'⁴⁴ The railway from Chaman to Nushki was completed in 1905, and from there it was extended into Seistan between 1917 and 1922.⁴⁵ The railway line changed the stream of trade from north-south towards the west-east. The Arabian Sea port lost its importance as no more trade could operate from Afghanistan through caravan routes. Kalat and other important towns lost its importance after the closure of the caravan routes. The only important coast of Balochistan, Sonmiani also lost its importance when Karachi was established as a new coast.⁴⁶

The Emergence of Political Movements

In the colonial world, the political activities were not encouraged. It was one of the key features of colonialism to oppose the politicization of the colonized and preached the idea of no politics in the colonial world.⁴⁷ Similarly, political activities were prohibited in Balochistan. Until beginning of third decade of nineteenth century, the organized political movement was not taking place in that region. It will be discussed in detail later. The discrimination and backwardness fetched by the 'indirect rule' of British, is lamented by Baloch scholars and historians. They argue that people of Balochistan 'were victimised in all spheres of life i.e. judiciary, education, and all other field.'⁴⁸ In 1918-1919, the number of public schools in Balochistan was 74.⁴⁹

⁴⁴Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 35.

⁴⁵Heathcote, *Balochistan, the British and the Great Game*, 249.

⁴⁶Scholz, *Nomadism and Colonialism*, 297-308.

⁴⁷Bipan Chandra, *Essays on colonialism* (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1999), 71.

⁴⁸Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 142.

⁴⁹GOI, *Administration Report of Baluchistan Agency for 1918-1919*, 49.

There was a slow progress in the field of education. During this year, the candidates sent for matriculation examination of Punjab University were thirty-nine and only twenty passed the examination.⁵⁰ The literacy rate was the lowest in this region of the sub-continent. In the later decades, development could not be seen in this field, for there was neither a single college nor university at the end of colonial rule. As Selig Harrison writes, “the British tried to subdue any political activity and resisted the temptation of introducing modern education in Balochistan during the last days of the Empire”.⁵¹ As far as the field of health was concerned, it had also the same position. Throughout the region of Balochistan there were only thirty-seven hospitals and dispensaries in 1908.⁵² The health of the military essentially the British soldiers were placed by colonial government a priority.⁵³ Generally the Western scholars concur with this view. Fred Scholz in his book, *Nomadism and Colonialism*, remarks that every action British took in Balochistan served the military purposes. “The British did not consider taking far sighted policy that would lead to economic independence of the tribal people and political maturity or make people active participants in modern development that equalled the rest of India, did not even begin to shape in Balochistan”.⁵⁴ The British did not introduce any democratic norms and reforms during their rule in Balochistan. As part of the frontier, Balochistan was also excluded from the impetus of reforms including; Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909 and Motague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919.

It was after the First World War, when the British started to associate Balochistan increasingly in the ‘Hindustani affairs’. The Khanate of Kalat was

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Selig Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), 22.

⁵²GOI, *Administration Report of Baluchistan Agency for 1909-1910*, 34.

⁵³Swidler, *Remotely Colonial*, 87.

⁵⁴Scholz, *Nomadism and Colonialism*, 96.

classified as an ordinary princely state among many other Indian princely states and assimilated the British administered Balochistan agency into British India. In order to carry this task, it was necessary to give Balochistan representation in federal legislature (ceremonial) and started to establish a Shahi Jirga (an assembly of tribal people), under the Agent to Governor General (AGG). Historically, Robert Sandeman introduced the Jirga system and maintained the indirect rule through this.⁵⁵ Since then the British encouraged the tribal elites to take part in Shahi Jirga and tried to politicize it in the city of Quetta. In fact, the arbitrary powers were in the hand of the British officials. In this context, the Frontier Crimes Regulation authorized the Deputy Commissioner as the ultimate arbitrator of traditional law.⁵⁶ The subjugated status of the natives was limited to participation in Shahi Jirga and represented its members (tribal elite) as quasi-democratic leaders of Balochistan and portrayed the Shahi Jirga an ideal form of gross root democracy and ‘highest ‘constitutional body’ of the tribally organized people,’⁵⁷ The members of the Shahi Jirga were exploiting their status and used it to increase their craft and guile. They altered their allegiances according to circumstances in order to maintain their positions. When the Subcontinent was divided they immediately changed their loyalties from the British to the newly independent state of Pakistan. Muhammad Khan Jomezai was one of them who voted for Pakistan under the 3rd June Plan.⁵⁸

This restricted revelation to education was adequate to produce ‘an upsurge of political consciousness’ in Balochistan and beneath the impetus of Russian Revolution (1917) and anti-British struggle by the congress.⁵⁹ Despite the isolation

⁵⁵Thornton, *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman*, 21.

⁵⁶Robert Nichols (ed.), *The Frontier Crimes Regulation: A History in Documents*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013) 33-38.

⁵⁷Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 22.

⁵⁸Mohammad Khan Jomezai's interview to the Orient Press, Dawn, 15 December 1946.

⁵⁹Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 22.

and marginalization of Balochistan in all aspects of life, the development in British India affected it. The establishment of Congress and Muslim League in 1886 and 1906 respectively, the political and administrative reforms incurred by Morely-Minto Reforms (1909), Montague-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) which culminated in the Indian act of 1921, the Simon Commission of 1927 and finally the Government of India act 1935 were all exterior to Balochistan.

There emerged political movements in Balochistan despite the strict censure on political activities and its geographical isolation from the British Indian affairs. The most prominent among them were, The Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochan wa Balochistan (Association for the unity of Baloch and Balochistan), and the Kalat State National Party (KSNP).

The Anjuman-E Ittehad-E Balochan Wa Balochistan

The most important event that was a triggering moment in national political movement was the All India Baloch Conference of 1932. In order to avoid the ban of political activities, the venue for this conference was selected in Jacobabad instead of Quetta which was held in December, 1932.⁶⁰ Both the Baloch and Pashtuns participated enthusiastically in this conference. The Agent to Governor General described this event as the primary effort to involve the people of Balochistan in all-India politics.⁶¹

The educated youth of Balochistan who had experienced the political scenario of British India came to realize that it was necessary to launch a political campaign equalled on the lines of Congress and Muslim League in late 1920s and the first incident which took place was the meeting of the Abdul Aziz Kurd and Yussuf Ali

⁶⁰Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, *Zma Xhwand Ao Xhwandun* Vol. I (Quetta: United Press, 2007), 387-93.

⁶¹Paul Titus and Nina Swidler, *Knights, Not Pawns: Ethno-Nationalism and Regional Dynamics in Post-Colonial Balochistan*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 32/2000, Cambridge University Press, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/259535> Accessed: 27-05-2017 19:33, 52.

Magsi⁶² (1908-35) to which Radaelli refers as 'quantum jump'.⁶³ They recognized a common stance and formed Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e Balochan wa Balochistan and in order to propagate its agenda, they started a newspaper called 'Al Baloch'. The newspaper issued the different maps of Balochistan and issued different articles. Ghulam Muhammad Baloch in December 1932 wrote an article in the same newspaper with the title of 'An Unfulfilled Dream' and demanded for 'Greater Balochistan' and mentioned the areas under Kalat, Persia, Afghanistan and the British. The Anjuman tried to unite the all Baloch and Balochistani leaders in Balochistan and voiced for united demands for the democratic and political rights of the people. However, the colonial authorities were not ready to establish a representative form of government in Balchistan and arrested most of its leaders (Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai and Abdul Aziz Kurd) while Yussuf Ali Magsi was ordered to leave Balochistan.⁶⁴ The arrest of Abdul Samad will be discussed below. Moreover, the earthquake of 1935 was also becoming one of the obstacles in Anjuuman's way of success in which several of its members died including Yussuf Ali Magsi.⁶⁵ In this way the Anjuman's unity of all Baloch and Balochistan dream did not realized. Subsequently some pro-British members supported colonial administration and some opted for radical struggle for the independence of the Balochistan. The latter group would form the Kalat States National Party.

The Kalat State National Party (KSNP)

The radical wing of the Anjuman assembled in Sibi in 1937 and formed a formal political movement.i.e. the Kalat State National Party (KSNP). The party campaigned

⁶²He was Sardar of the Magsi tribe and became vice-President of all-India Baloch Conference in 1932.

⁶³Riccardo Redaelli, *The Father's Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India, 19th-20th Century* (Firenze: Il Maestrone, 1997), 144.

⁶⁴Ibid. 145.

⁶⁵Achakzai, *Zma Xhwand Ao Xhwandun* Vol. II, 253.

for an independent state of Balochistan and succeeded to cajole dominant sardars of both the Brahui and Baloch tribes to support the party and also urged them to join it.⁶⁶ Under the leadership of Abdul Aziz Kurd the party managed to expand its cadre to the young educated Balochs of the time such as Mir Ghous Baksh Bizzenjo, Gul Khan Nasir and Muhammad Hussain Anqa. All these leaders would become the prominent members of the Baloch nationalist movement in later years.

The party supported Ahmad Yar Khan from the start and he in turn provided some positions in his cabinet to the members of the KSNP members. The party also demanded that the taxes imposed by the sardars on tribes should be abolished to which Ahmad Yar Khan agreed.⁶⁷ Ahmad Yar Khan wanted that the powers given to political agent (PA) should be transferred to khan. He also wanted to curtail the powers of the sardars given to them by the British authorities. The KSNP started its struggle for the establishment of representative institutions in the Khanate of Kalat. The party also wanted to abolish the privileges of the sardars given to them by the British. During such scenario the khan could not agree with the blunt opposition of the KSNP, as he was dependent on the support of the British and sardars. Eventually he banned the KSNP in 1939 and exiled many of its leaders from the Kalat. The ban was not due to the popularity of the KSNP, but the nationalist members of the KSNP opposed the yielding the port of Jiwani to the British Indian government.⁶⁸

The banning and exiling the party and its members did not work as the educated youth of the Baloch started their political activities in Quetta until the Second World War. The members of KSNP participated in All India States

⁶⁶Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 155.

⁶⁷Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e Balochistan*, (Quetta: Gosha Adab, 2015) 453-56.

⁶⁸Redaelli, *The Father's Bow*, 140.

Conference headed by Nehru, in Srinagar in August, 1945. In this Conference, the banning and exiling of the KNSP and its members were brought under discussion.⁶⁹

The Anjuman-E- Watan

Achakzai's involvement in the politics of all-India was not acceptable to the British. In fact, he had started active participation in politics in late 1920s. He was imprisoned along with his brother Salaam Khan on the accusation of political propaganda in the town of Gulistan in May 1930.⁷⁰ After a rigorous imprisonment of more than a year, they were released in June, 1931.⁷¹ Whenever he was released, he was more determined to struggle for the nation and country. He mentioned in his autobiography that he was invited by Yousaf Ali Magsi through a letter to participate and lead the All-India Baloch Conference in 1932.⁷² Next year, the venue for the same conference was selected in Hyderabad in December. One of the significant demands of it was that Balochistan should be included in the federation of India and the reforms should be extended.⁷³ Upon his return, the British sentenced him for three years of rigorous punishment under the Frontier Crimes Regulation.⁷⁴ In June 1936, he was freed from the jail.⁷⁵ He was rarely given opportunity to propagate and preach politics to the people, for most of the time he spent was in jail.

Achakzai did not share the views of independent or greater Balochistan as propagated by the left wing of the Anjuman. He therefore formed his own party, Anjuman-e-Watan in 1938 in British Balochistan.⁷⁶ He worked for the reforms and constitutional development and to achieve this he was even not averse to co-operate

⁶⁹M. M. S. Dehwar, *Contemporary History of Balochistan*, 270-71.

⁷⁰Achakzai, *Zma Xhwand Ao Xhwandun*, Vol. II, 32.

⁷¹Ibid. 245.

⁷²Ibid. 366.

⁷³Ibid. 57.

⁷⁴Ibid. 80.

⁷⁵Ibid. 229.

⁷⁶Achakzai, *Zma Xhwand Ao Xhwandun*, Vol III, 356-373.

with the British administration. The Anjuman-e-Watan was in alliance with Congress and supported its cause in British Balochistan openly. Unlike the Bacha Khan's Khudai Khidmatgar (God's Servants), Achakzai's Anjuman-e-Watan was a small nationalist movement. The number of its members is not known. The alliances with the Congress, "such organisations were perceived as arch enemies and traitor to the cause of Pakistan or rather to the cause of Indian Muslims in general".⁷⁷

The British could not tolerate a putative political organization in the city of Quetta. As he mentioned in his autobiography that he had always conflict on implementation of Press Act with Agent to Governor General, Carter who was later agreed and implemented the Act.⁷⁸ Achakzai was the pioneer of a newspaper in Balochistan. He published his newspaper known as 'Istaqlal' in Quetta in 1938.⁷⁹ He was also a critique of British war efforts and was therefore kept under the close British intelligence during the Second World War. In 1939 during the annual session of the Anjuman-e-Watan he announced that Balochistan was backward due to the British colonialism. While in the same year November 1939 he openly supported the views of Gandhi and Bacha Khan that India in any case should not help British war efforts.⁸⁰ When war started Achakzai and several other activists were arrested.

The British started to ponder over making an advisory council for Balochistan und the AGG. The talks started between the British Indian government and the political forces in Balochistan in which Achakzai's Anjuman-e-Watan was very active. However, the advisory council was never formed as the British authorities in Balochistan argued that reforms in Balochistan could not be introduced due to

⁷⁷Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 162.

⁷⁸Achakzai, *Zma Xhwand Ao Xhwandun*, Vol. II, 413

⁷⁹Ibid. 376.

⁸⁰Achakzai, *Zma Xhwand Ao Xhwandun* Vol. III, 356-387.

Balochistan's comparative backwardness'.⁸¹ Despite Balochistan's comparative backwardness in political realm the AGG, Poulton writes to the External Affairs in Delhi:

The political organisation's activities have been restricted to the urban areas. The tribal population of the British Balochistan is 4/5 and not interested in any political activity, while the urban population comprises 1/5.... Among which the non-local Muslim population support Muslim League and the local Muslim population support Anjuman-e Watan.⁸²

Indeed, Achakzai united and politicised the Pashtun population of British Balochistan prior to the Independence of Pakistan. It was the second popular party as AGG admits, but Achakzai was against the Pakistan movement and was therefore arrested in February 1948 on the charges levelled by the Balochistan Muslim League's President that his newspaper carried propaganda against Pakistan.⁸³

The Balochistan Muslim League

As far as the branch of All India Muslim League (AIML) was concerned, it did not have it in Balochistan till 1910.⁸⁴ Even AIML periodically suggested the introduction of reforms in Balochistan.⁸⁵ The All India Muslim League had backed the cause of administrative and constitutional developments in Balochistan in 1927 and in Jinnah's fourteen points demanded that British Balochistan and North-West Frontier should be given provincial status and brought on equal lines with the rest of British India.⁸⁶ The AIML also advocated: representation in the central legislature of British Balochistan, association and press, freedom of speech, codification of the customary law, introduction of the system of elections in the local bodies, and reforms in the

⁸¹Balochistan's Secretariate Records. Basta 25.4.330-S.1946: AGG Poulton to Crichton, External Affairs Delhi, 21, October 1946.

⁸²Balochistan Secretariat's Records, AGG Poulton to Crichton, 21 October 1946.

⁸³Titus and Swidler, *Knights, Not Pawns*, 53.

⁸⁴Rafique Afzal, *History of the All India Muslim League 1906-1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 21.

⁸⁵Ibid. 43.

⁸⁶Ibid. 179-180.

Jirga system. The demand for provincial autonomy for British Balochistan was again raised in 1937 in Lucknow.⁸⁷

Till late 1930s, no all India party was allowed to establish its branch in Balochistan, therefore, the provincial Muslim League was also not formed. Muslim League had very modest beginnings in Balochistaan. As Ian Talbot writes in his book, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement*, that it was “a one man band” and the party neither had working committee nor the office.⁸⁸ Rafique Afzal in book, *A History of All-India Muslim League*, argues, “In 1939, Jinnah asked Qazi Issa, who had just returned from England after his bar-at-law, to organize a provincial Muslim League in Balochistan”.⁸⁹ The party was established by lawyer from Pishin in a mosque gathering. The Central Muslim League was not ready to affiliate it until and unless it emerges as a proper political party. On 10-11 June, the provincial Muslim League was formally established in Balochistan.⁹⁰

The Balochistan Muslim league was unable to make its grounds in Baloch dominated areas, for there had emerged a nationalist politics which later aligned with the Congress and therefore due to nationalist and secular tendencies less empathies with a party with a communal agenda. However it could hold its feet in the Pasthun dominated areas due to religious propaganda started by the colonial empire in the entire region where Pashtuns inhabited.⁹¹ Raedelli further points out that Muslim League could protecte its support in Pashtun dominated areas and Balochi [sic Baloch] tribe was averse to the idea of great Muslim state in India.⁹² It was joined by

⁸⁷Ibid. 232

⁸⁸Talbot, *Provincial Politics*, 117-18.

⁸⁹Afzal, *History of the All India Muslim League* 420

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹For details see Abdul Wali Khan, trans. Dr Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, *Facts are Facts: The Untold Story of India's Partition*, (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 2014).

⁹²Raedelli, *The Father's Bow*, 148.

the elite group (sardars and nawabs)⁹³ to which the British referred as guardians of the so called grass root democracy.

The Balochistan Muslim League also did not unity and cohesion with in itself. The party was joined by the opportunistic elite class and the party therefore even cease to exist within the first decade after the creation of Pakistan. While the parties launched by the Balochs and Pashtuns survive even today.

The Accession

The accession of Balochistan to Pakistan is a very complex and difficult phenomenon as compare to other province that accessed to the newly born state in 1947. In case of Balochistan it is difficult and lengthy sine it was composed of different areas and the British administration had further exacerbated the process of accession. In 1947 Balochistan was composed of princely state of Kalat, tribal and leased areas and the British Balochistan. Balochistan also did not have provincial assembly like the other provinces nor any other democratic mechanism such as referendum applied in former North-West Frontier Province.

When Congress accepted the partition plan and the creation of Pakistan was inevitable and the final date of British withdrawal was announced in June 1948. The Muslim League started to consider the importance of the British Balochistan and Khanate of Kalat for the future state of Muslims due to close proximity of the Khanate of Kalat with the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea and also British Balochistan which shared borders with Persia and Afghanistan. The British officials and the Muslim League held the view that British Balochistan was the integral part of British India and the Muslim League claimed that it was successor of it due to its Muslim Population. Even the tribal and leased areas were also considered as part of the British

⁹³These sardars and nawabs were also members of the Shahi Jirga and would later decide the fate of the British Balochistan in accession process.

India. When the Partition approached there was no democratic institution that could decide whether Balochistan should become part of the Pakistan or opt any other choice. Nehru was not in favour of sardars or any Jirga and even Jinnah was against the idea of Jirga and wanted to enlarge the voting system and he wanted that the voting system must be expanded rather than limited to a few hereditary tribal heads.⁹⁴ But the British once again glorified more than earlier that 'Shahi jirga' (other than Sardars of Kalat State) was the only institution that would decide accession and could not make further arrangements and added twelve more representatives of the Quetta Municipal Committee (QMC) to it.⁹⁵

The Khan of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan claimed that tribal areas' heads (sardars) should not be included in accession process (Shahi Jirga).⁹⁶ Following with the lines of Ahmad Yar Khan, Nawab Doda Khan, head of the Mari tribe and Nawab Akbar Khan Baguti sent memorandum to the British administration and demanded that the tribal areas (Marri-Baguti) should be federated with the Khanate of Kalat. But the British administration did not pay any heed to the demand of Ahmad Yar Khan and heads of the Marri and Baguti tribes and they were excluded from the process.⁹⁷

At the end of day, the Muslim League, Congress and the British agreed that Shahi Jirga would decide the accession of British Balochistan. As mentioned above there was no alternative to decide the accession and finally the role was assigned to the Shahi Jirga in June 1947. But the validity and credibility of the Shahi Jirga is not confirmed and the conditions that made the members of Shahi Jirga vote in favour of Pakistan are very much controversial.⁹⁸ The Baloch nationalist scholars argue that

⁹⁴Jawaharlal Nehru as cited by Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 160-61.

⁹⁵Afzal 695-696.

⁹⁶Khan, *Inside Baluchistan*, 155-165.

⁹⁷Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 160.

⁹⁸There is plenty of record regarding the referendum of former North-West Frontier Province and it is well documented in Saleem Ullah Khan, *The Referendum in N. W.F.P, 1947: A Documentary Record*

Shahi Jirga actually did not vote and the British and Muslim League hatched a conspiracy to influence voting in favour of Pakistan.⁹⁹ On the other hand the Pakistani authors give more colourful accounts of the referendum and Shahi Jirga. They argue that Hindu Congress supported local sardars to sabotage the Pakistan movement.¹⁰⁰ All these accounts give different dates of the referendum not to mention the date they even give different year for example Jan mahamad writes June 1946 while Abdul Quddus and Inamul Haq kausar mention June 1947. British Balochistan acceded to the newly born state on August 15, it should be noted that the Khanate of Kalat and the Marri-Baguti tribal areas did not become part of Pakistan. The accession of the British Balochistan's to Pakistan did not resolve the constitutional and administrative problems of Balochistan as a whole.

(Islamabad: National Documentation Centre, 1996) and Pashtoon Mehra, *The North-West Frontier Drama 1945-47: A Re-Assessment* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988). However, referendum of Shahi Jirga in Balochistan has not been recorded till today.

⁹⁹Jan mahamad, *Essays*, 180.

¹⁰⁰See for Example, Quddus, *Tribal Balochistan: Awan, Balochistan*.

Chapter 2

One-Unit: Its Emergence and Establishment

The transformation that took place in Balochistan that is from colonialism to post-colonialism; the establishment of Balochistan as an independent and sovereign princely state during colonial era, and its consequent usurpation by the post-colonial state, Pakistan influenced the historical development. This chapter elaborates the constitutional and political developments that took place in Pakistan within the first decade 1947-57 and how these developments led to the establishment of One Unit. Pakistan like many other post-colonial states had to face many problems such as constitution making and distribution of powers between the centre and units to name a few. Pakistan inherited not only the Constituent Assembly, but also the amended version of 1935 Act from the colonial British. The constituent Assembly was unable to make a constitution that was acceptable to all units of Pakistan. “The representative character of the Assembly was, however, diluted the new elections to the provincial assemblies of Sind, Punjab, the NWFP, and East Bengal in 1951, 1952, 1953 and 1954 respectively changed the composition of its electorate substantially.”¹ And no provincial elections took place in Balochistan, since it did not have the provincial assembly until 1970.

The Constitution Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) which met on the 10 August 1947, prior to the establishment Pakistan had the responsibility of constitution making for the new country. However, the president of the assembly, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his colleagues could not pay much attention to the constitution making, since they were obsessed in internal and external problems of the

¹Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and The State in Pakistan* (National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Center of Excellence, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad), 121.

newly born state.² After the death of Jinnah in 1948, the responsibility of leadership fell on the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan and he moved the ‘Objectives Resolution ‘on March 7 1949 in the CAP. The Objectives Resolution outlined the basic principles of the upcoming constitution of Pakistan. Elaborating its importance, he declared:

Objectives Resolutions lays emphasis on the principles of democracy, freedom equality, tolerance and social justice and further defines them by saying that these principles should be observed in the constitution as they have been enunciated by Islam.³

Regarding the nature of future form of government, the Prime Minister said:

The Resolution envisages the federal form of government because such is the dictate of geography. It would be idle to think of a unitary form of government when the two parts of our country are divided by more than a thousand miles. I, however hope that the Constituent Assembly will make every effort to integrate units closer and forge such ties as would make use a well-integrated nation. I have always advocated the suppression of provincial feelings, but I want to make it clear that I am not advocate of dull uniformity. I believe that all the units and areas which form Pakistan should contribute to the richness of our national life.⁴

He had set the foundations for future constitution. The Resolution was adapted on 12 March despite the protest not only from Muslim members, but also the non-Muslim members from the East Bengal. For example, Sirs Chandra Chattopadhyay a argued:

... We thought that the religion and politics would not be mixed up. That was the declaration of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in this House. But the resolution before us has a religious basis.⁵

Mr. Prem Hari Barma another member from the East Bengal criticising the Objectives Resolution said:

We must not forget that our State of Pakistan consists of peoples professing various religions and having different social customs and cultures. We must not proceed with the work of framing the

²Herbert Feldman, *A Constitution for Pakistan* (Karachi: 1956), 1.

³Constitution Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol V, (Karachi: Governor General’s Press, Monday, 7 March, 1949), 3. Accessed December 19, 2017.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434692785_298.pdf

⁴Ibid, 8

⁵Ibid, 9-11.

constitution in such way as may cause apprehensions, distrust or anything of the kind to any section of the people... If we see that some portion of the Objective Resolution is not acceptable to any section of the people, then we should try to amend or modify that portion of the Objective Resolution to make it acceptable to all.⁶

The CAP appointed a committee to prepare a draft of constitution, composed of twenty-five members and Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, President of the Constituent Assembly as its president. Since the committee was to ponder over rudimentary principles of the new constitution, it was given the name of Basic Principles Committee (BPC). This committee appointed further sub- committees. The first committee had to deal on the distribution of power between the centre and units, the second committee on franchise and the third on Judiciary. On 28 September 1950, the BPC submitted its interim report to the Constitution Assembly. Neither the franchise committee nor the judiciary committee had completed its work. The report only dealt with the issue of distribution of powers between the centre and provinces.it was an incomplete report; however, it was submitted in order “to revive the confidence in the Assembly”.⁷

A bicameral legislature and federal form of government was recommended by the report. The legislature would be comprised of the House of Units also known as Upper House and the House of People or Lower House. Equal representation would be given to all the provinces in the House of Units. i.e. East Bengal, Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Balochistan, irrespective of their size. All the provinces would enjoy the status of province including Balochistan. Representation in the Lower House was to be given on basis of population. The centrally administered areas were given representation in this house. The House of Units and the House of People had equal

⁶Ibid, 7-8.

⁷Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1961), 202.

powers and in case of difference a joint session would decide the dispute between the two houses.⁸

There was severe criticism in the province of East Bengal regarding the report of BPC. As William S. Metz in his book, *Pakistan: Government and Politics*, writes that the report worried numerous sections of the Bengal. “They could not comprehend why in the matter of representation in the national legislature, West Pakistan was given an advantage over East Pakistan, although the later contained the greater population.”⁹ They construed that the basic aim of the framers of the report was ‘to create a unitary form of government’¹⁰.

The East Pakistan Muslim League Working Committee in a meeting which took place on 29 October 1950 also observed the harsh reaction of the public regarding the report of BPC. The Working Committee suggested radical amendments should be made to the report. It recommended due consideration should be given to the geographical location of the East Bengal . It termed the report in the existing form as ‘terribly anti-Bengali’.¹¹ The East Pakistan Muslim League in its provincial convention that took place at Dacca in November 1950 suggested a republican form of government and also autonomous regional governments for each wing of Pakistan, it further recommended that the central government should be elected on the basis of population having the currency, defence and foreign policy in its hands.¹²

The Constituent Assembly delayed the consideration of the report for a specific period of time and the Prime Minister invited proposals from the public on 31

⁸Constitution Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee, Vol. III, (Karachi: Governor General’s Press, Thursday 28 September, 1950), 13-14. Accessed December 20, 2017. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434692785_298.pdf

⁹William S. Metz, *Pakistan: Government and Politics*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1956), 79.

¹⁰Pakistan Observer, (Lahore) 1 October, 1950.

¹¹G. W. Choudhury, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan* (London: Longman Green and Co., 1969), 72.

¹²Ibid. 73.

January 1951, in order to make it easy for the framers of the report. He also suggested to the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly from East Pakistan the idea of equal representation both wings of the country and they unanimously accepted this proposal including Fazal Huq. The conflict between the East and West wings of Pakistan which was obstacle in the way of constituent making was never resolved through a broader national consensus and was kept secret. In the words of one scholar “The debate was behind closed doors and the public and non-League members of the Assembly had to wait until the official ranks had dragooned into line, the fascia of agreement was attained through bitter resentment and it was only limited to the committee rooms.”¹³

On 16 October 1951 Liaqut Ali Khan was assassinated and Khwaja Nazimuddin became the next Prime Minister. The other sub-committees i.e. Franchise and Judiciary also completed their reports meanwhile. In this way a complete report was presented to the CAP by the Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, after two years, on 22 December 1952.

The second draft of the BPC like the first report suggested federal form of government with bicameral legislature: The House of Units and the House of people. The seats were offered on the basis of parity formula to both wings of the Pakistan despite difference in population and size. The House of Units would be consisting of 120 members, 60 votes were given to East Bengal on the basis of single proportional votes and the remaining 60 votes were to be divided among the units of West Pakistan as follow:

¹³Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957), 98.

Punjab	27
Sind	8
Baluchistan	2
Baluchistan States Union	2
Khairpur	2
Tribal Areas	5
Bahawalpur	4
NWFP (Now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)	6
Capital of Federation	4
Total	60

¹⁴

The House of the People (Lower House) would be consisting of 400 representatives. The candidates were to be elected through direct vote by the people. These 400 seats were to be divided equally between the East Bengal and West Pakistan. The 200 seats allocated to West Pakistan were to be divided in the following way.

Punjab	90
Sind	30
NWFP	25
Tribal Areas	17
Bahawalpur	13
Baluchistan	4
Baluchistan State	5
Khairpur	4
Capital of Federation	11
Total	200

¹⁵

The House of People was to enjoy the real powers and the council of Ministers was made responsible to it and any money bill was also to originate in the House of People. If the House of People makes any legislation in haste, the House of Units could only return this legislation for revision. In case of dispute the two houses will meet and a simple majority could decide the matter.¹⁶ The salient character of the

¹⁴Constitution Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Report of the Basic Principles Committee, Vol. XII, (Karachi:Governor General's Press, Monday, 22 December, 1952), 96-97. Accessed December 26, 2017.http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434952580_649.pdf

¹⁵Constitution Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Report of the Basic Principles Committee, Vol. XII, (Karachi: Governor General's Press, Monday, 22 December, 1952), 96-97. Accessed December 27, 2017.http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434952580_649.pdf

¹⁶ Ibid.

second report was the “principle of parity”. It allocated 50 per cent seats to the East Bengal and 50 per cent to West Pakistan in both houses of the federal legislature.¹⁷

The central and provincial leadership of Punjab were not ready to accept the proposal, which vested the real powers in the House of People. They feared that despite parity, Punjab could be overwhelmed by the East Bengal. The Punjabi leaders feared that East Bengal could enter into an alliance with smaller provinces of West Pakistan like NWFP and Sind, and in this way, Bengalis would be able to rule the country and isolate the Province of Punjab.¹⁸

The Chief Minister of Punjab and also president of the provincial Muslim League of the province, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana, was an exception among the leaders of the Punjab, who expressed his support to report of BPC. In an interview with a press he accepted the parity formula proposed by the BPC. He also argued that unitary form of government was best suited to Pakistan, because in this form of government, provincial reflections would have no importance. But in case if federal form of government was to implement then the report of the BPC was “important document” and it “merited careful thinking.”¹⁹

The major political parties of Punjab such as All Pakistan Jinnah Awami Muslim League, Azad Pakistan Party, Jamaat-I- Islami Pakistan and Majlis-I- Ahrar (West Pakistan) convened all parties conference on 29 December 1952 against the interview of Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana, and they demanded that the withdrawal of the BPC.²⁰ Due to the strong agitation from the Punjabi leadership against the second drop of the report, further discussion on it was delayed in the CAP. This had repercussion in East Pakistan. The district wing of the Muslim in Chittagong

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Khalid bin Sayeed, *Political System of Pakistan* (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967), 68.

¹⁹ Rizwan Malik, *The Politics of One Unit 1955-58* (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Punjab, 1988), 15-22.

²⁰ M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958* (Islamabad: NCHCR, 1976), 149.

demanded the confederation between the two wings of Pakistan.²¹ The religious parties of East Pakistan and Awami League demanded for a unicameral legislature for both wings on the basis of population where the centre only had the powers of defence, currency and foreign affairs.²² The idea of confederation had echoed in the CAP during the consideration of BPC when, Mian Iftikharuddin, a member of the Assembly from Punjab moved the proposal to change 'Federation' and replace it with 'Confederation'.²³

The Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin's awaiting visit to the Punjab increased criticism and dissent to the second draft of BPC. There came new and alternative proposals in the province. The Lahore High Court set up a committee in order to ponder over the BPC' report and provide suggestions. This committee proposed federal form of government where the House of People was to be elected on the basis of population and in the Upper House West Pakistan should be given weightage in way that each wing get equal representation. The lawyers' committee also recommended that West Pakistan be merged into one single unit and if it is not practicable then three units should be made of entire West Pakistan known as (1) Punjab and Bahawalpur (2) NWFP and Frontier States, (3) Sind, Balochistan, Khairpur and Balochistan States Union.²⁴

Apart from the constitutional disagreement, the East Bengal's nationalist parties voiced for Bengali as a state language. They also contested the economic inequality between the East Bengal and West Pakistan when the conflict over constitution converted to economics during 1954-1955. The country's greatest-earning crop was Jute and it was produced in East Bengal, but the revenue collected

²¹Dawn, Karachi 11 January, 1953.

²² Dawn, Karachi 22 January, 1953.

²³Hasan Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 32.

²⁴Pakistan Times, Lahore, 8 January 1953.

from it was unfairly spent on military and industrial development of Western wing of the country. The centrally administered government assigned two thirds of development and non- development funds to Western wing of the country, during the first decade of independence. The East Pakistan received only 17 percent funds from the foreign development aid and loans from 1947 to 1960 while the 62 percent were allocated to West Pakistan and the rest remained with the central government.²⁵ The Bengali nationalists observed that they could only secure reasonable representation in the state structure through modest politics. On the other hand, the unelected elites of West Pakistan were not prepared to conduct the free and transparent national elections on the basis of population, since it endangered the end of their domination over politics and economy.

The disagreements between the Eastern and Western wing of country over political representation and electoral system not only postponed and complicated the process of a viable constitution making, but also free and fair elections. The Bengali nationalists were not ready to compromise on any future constitutional frame work and they were firmly dedicated to a parliamentary and majoritarian democracy where representation would be given to each wing on the basis of population. They also had differences on the issue of elections and favoured joint- elections due to ample population of Hindus in East Pakistan which consisted of more than twenty percent.²⁶ The centrally administrated government of West Pakistan favoured separate electorate system that could divide the population of East Pakistan (Hindus and Muslims). In the words of Katharine Adeney, the separate elections were “a mechanism of segregation

²⁵Aqil Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan* (India: Gopsons Papers Ltd. 2014), 73.

²⁶Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the creation of Bangladesh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 10.

and control rather than multi-culturalism, and would ultimately contribute to undermining Bengali loyalty.²⁷

The conflicts between the Prime Minister and Governor General over each other's authority or between the later and CAP during 1953 to 1954 generated an opening for the army to enter into politics. The Governor General with the support of the army actively undermined the rules of cabinet government and in this way interfering in the progress of political institutions in the country. In this way the army abandoned the practice of political impartiality and openly started interference in the crises of politics as major actor of what Morris Janowitz describes a "civil-military coalition" where the military expands its political activity and becomes an active political bloc and civilian executives or parties can 'remain in power only because of the passive assent or active assistance' of army.²⁸

The Governor General Ghulam Muhammad with the military's support dismissed the ministry of Muslim League and removed Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din on April 16 1953. Despite it had majority in Constituent Assembly and had passed the budget recently.²⁹ The reasons provided by the Governor General for the removal were the ministry's failure to control law and order and violent attacks of the mobs on Qadians in Punjab and also hasty declining economic situation in the country.³⁰ The removal of Nazim-ud-Din's ministry adversely affected the constitution making and Pakistan's emerging democratic institutions as Keith Callard notes firstly it eliminated the practice of neutrality of the Governor General, secondly the connection of cabinet

²⁷Katharine Adeney, *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 138.

²⁸Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 83.

²⁹After the dismissal of ministry, Ghulam Muhammad reappointed most of the ministers from the previous cabinet. For further details see, Allen McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 96-97.

³⁰See Safdar Mahmud, *A Political Study of Pakistan* (Lahore: Sh, Mohammad Ashraf, 1975), 60-61.

system and party was ignored and finally the role of Constituent Assembly as a law making and retaining government system was doubted.³¹

Mohammad Ali Bogra was called from the United States of America to form the new cabinet, who was serving there as ambassador. He became the new Prime Minister of the country and after assuming the office he started negotiations with provincial governments and experts, in order to provide the new constitutional formula to the country. After few months he presented his constitutional formula to the CAP on 7 October 1953. According to the formula there would be federal form of government and parity between the two wings of the country. The Upper House (House of Units) consisted of 50 members. East Pakistan received 10 seats while the remaining 40 seats were given to West Pakistan to be divided as follow:

Punjab	10
Sind and Khairpur	10
NWFP, Frontier States and Tribal Areas	10
Balochistan, Balochistan States Unions, Bahawalpur and Karachi	10
Total	40

The Lower House (House of People) consisted of 300 seats and these were to be divided among all units of the country as follow:

East Pakistan	165
Punjab	75
NWFP, and Frontier States	24
Baluchistan, Baluchistan States Union, Bahawalpur and Karachi	17
Khairpur and Sind	19
Total	300

³¹Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, 137.

³²Constitution Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. XV, Karachi, Manager of Publications, Wednesday, 7 October 1953), 13. Accessed December 27, 2017. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1435051589_599.pdf

³³Constitution Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. XV, Karachi, Manager of Publications, Wednesday, 7 October 1953), 13. Accessed December 18, 2017. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1435051589_599.pdf

The discussion on Muhammad Ali Bogra's formula along with the BPC report continued in the Constituent Assembly from 7 October till 14 November 1953. The Constituent Assembly discussed at length not only the new formula but also discussed 140 paragraphs of the BPC's report. This was the first occasion in the history of CAP to discuss constitutional issues on day to day basis for more than a month; however, the discussion was once again postponed to provide some time for various parties of East Pakistan to campaign for the imminent provincial elections in the province.

In the initial years the Muslim League had domination in both wings of the country due to absence of sombre competitor and it had won the provincial elections in 1951 and 1952 in Punjab and NWFP respectively. The ruling party was incapable or reluctant to recover and expand its support among masses and eventually lost hold over politics in the provinces, especially in the province of Eastern Bengal where the Bengali nationalists increased their grievances against the centrally administered government of West Pakistan and it did not success to address these grievances. Therefore, the Muslim League had to face sever defeat in the provincial elections of Eastern Bengal in March 1954, at the hands of United Front. This was not very strong coalition, because it composed of various political parties and their solemn aim was to defeat the Muslim League. The major parties in the United Front alliance were the Awami League, a nationalist party, Krishak Saramik, Ganatatri Dal which had leftist orientation and also a religious party, Nizam-i-Islam Party which wanted an Islamic system in the country.³⁴

Although these political parties had conflicts on many issues and had different ideological viewpoints, all these parties from the opposition were firmly dedicated to implement the twenty -one- point agenda. Some demands were related to future

³⁴Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958*, 116.

constitution making for example to make Bangali as a state language and regional autonomy according to the Lahore Resolution, where all powers would remain with the provinces except defence, currency and foreign affairs. Moreover, in the realm of defence arrangements shall be made in way that the headquarter of military should remain in Western wing of the country and the headquarter of navy should be shifted to East Bengal to make ordinance factories there. They also demanded the arming of Ansar (a civil force created in 1948 that helped police in crime suppression in East Pakistan) for the defence of East Bengal.³⁵

The Awami League and Krishak Sramik secured 223 out of 309 seats in the provincial elections of March 1954 which represented the Bengali nationalism in both the rural and urban areas. The Muslim League could secure only ten seats. The United Front unanimously elected Fazal Huq as the head of the parliamentary party and was subsequently took the oath as a Chief Minister of East Pakistan on 3 April 1954.³⁶ The law and order situation was bad prior to the establishment of United Front's ministry and it became worse during its short-lived term. The centrally administered government of West Pakistan ascribed this to communists who were in alliance with United Front. This assessment further increased due to the opposition of United Front parties especially the Awami League to the American aid to Pakistan. The intelligence wing of the army barely one month after the establishment of United Front's ministry in May 1954 was reporting 'disturbing' activity of Communists in the Eastern wing of the country to the defence ministry.³⁷ The talks between the Prime Minister and Fazal Huq and the central government regarding constitution making and the relationship between the centre and East Bengal ended in complete failure. According to the Prime

³⁵Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*, 35.

³⁶Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*, 258-259.

³⁷"Communist Situation in Pakistan," Minutes of Cabinet Meeting held on 12, May, 1954, File/458/37/54 (Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistan). 15.

Minister, Fazal Huq wanted complete 'independence' and was ready to grant currency, defence and foreign affairs to the centrally administered government only momentarily.³⁸ On 29 May the ministry of United Front was dismissed under the section 92A³⁹ governor's rule was imposed by the Governor-General and the central government took the provincial administration in its hands. Major General Iskandar Mirza who was acting as defence secretary was appointed the new governor to counter the required attitude of Bengalis with the complete strength of the state⁴⁰ The reasons provided for the dismissal of United Front's ministry was its inability to maintain law and order in the province and Fazal Huq was declared 'a self-confessed' traitor to Pakistan' by the Prime Minister.⁴¹

Despite the verdict of the people of East Bengal in the provincial elections of 1954 and later the non-cooperation from the United Front's ministry, the Prime Minister recommenced the mission of constitution making after a long period of time from place when it was abandoned in November 1953. The Constitution Assembly was summoned on 14 March 1954 and it continued on working until September 1954. During this period the constitution Assembly passed the report of the BPC.⁴² A member from the opposition and East Pakistan, Dhirandra Nath Datta, moved an amendment in order to restrict the jurisdiction of federal government only to the defence, currency and foreign affairs and reminded the house that:

The lists of subjects as amended in schedule I be as amended as to confer powers in respect of defence, foreign affairs and currency only on centre and rest of all powers be conferred on the units." Mr. President I move this amendment with full sense of responsibility but I know sir, what will be the fate of this amendment in the house like this but I deem it my duty to place these amendments before this house as

³⁸Dawn (Karachi), 29 June 1954. Speech of the Prime Minister Muhammad Ali in CAP.

³⁹According to this Act the Governor General could dismiss the provincial assemblies.

⁴⁰Some 10,000 troops along with a naval frigate were dispatched to East Pakistan by the army; Hamza Alavi, 'Class and State,' in *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State*, ed. Hassan Gardazi and Jamil Rashid (London: Zed Press, 1983), 81-85.

⁴¹Dawn (Karachi), 29 June 1954. Speech of the Prime Minister Muhammad Ali in CAP.

⁴²Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*, 35.

it is backed by the voice of the people of East Pakistan. Sir, you, know there has been recent elections in East Bengal in the month of March 1954, and in these elections the Muslim League also took part, but it was opposed by the United Front Party. The U.F.P set up an election manifesto and ML also issued an election manifesto. Of these elections manifestoes this is one of the subjects which can be called very important. They demanded the lists of subjects amended in schedule I i.e., central list be so amended as to confer in respect of defence, foreign affairs and currency only on the centre and the rest of all powers to be conferred on, the units. This was placed before the people of East Bengal and they voted with full sense of responsibility in favour of United Front Whose election manifesto was as stated by me to give only these powers to the centre. Sir, in moving this amendment I am voicing the sentiments and the clear verdict of the people of East Bengal and the people there have decided in its favour. I am really voicing the demand of the majority of the people of Pakistan. Of course, sir, I did not take part in the discussion that immediately preceded before the motion but some members who spoke here talked here as they were representing the people East Bengal. Sir it has been declared by the people of East Bengal that members sitting here do not represent the views of the people of East Bengal and they have no right to speak on their behalf.⁴³

The drastic defeat of Muslim League in the provincial elections of 1954 gave new shape to the consideration of constitution making. This election united all forces of East Pakistan on the issue of constitution making and provincial autonomy while the leadership of West Pakistan was still divided on many issues including constitution making and provincial autonomy. The leadership of Punjab started the campaign for uniting all the provinces and units of West Pakistan into One Unit. The Muslim League Assembly Party was given the responsibility of undertaking all the problems relating to constitution making. A sub-committee was appointed by the party to deliberate on the issue of relations and powers of provinces and centre. The viability of merging all provinces of West Pakistan into One Unit was discussed in a meeting of the party on 23 July 1954. The reasons provided for uniting all the provinces into One Unit were that West Pakistan is single economic unit and therefore should also become a single administrative Unit and if these provinces were merged it would also

⁴³Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol.XVI Report of the Basic Principles Committee. Wednesday, the 15th September, 1954, 375-76, Official Report, printed by the Manager, Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi, Published by the Manager of Publications Karachi: 1954.

resolve the constitutional problems. This proposal was vehemently supported by the Chief Minister of Punjab, Malik Feroz Khan Noon while it was strongly opposed by the Chief Minister of Sind, Abdus Sattar Pirzada.⁴⁴ The members from Bengal such as Nazim-ud-Din, Nurul Amin and Khan Abdul Qaiyum⁴⁵ also supported the Chief Minister of Sindh.⁴⁶ In a convention of workers of major political parties of Sind; Pakistan Muslim League, the Sind Muslim League, the Sindh Awami Mahaz and Sindh Hari Committee established an organisation known as 'Security of Sind', the organization's main purpose was to oppose the uniting of all Provinces.⁴⁷

On 15 September 1954 when the Constituent Assembly was in its last phases of accepting the report of BPC, Malik Feroz Khan surprized the members of CAP by introducing zonal scheme in the house. According to the zonal scheme each province would be given ten seats in the zonal legislature elected indirectly by the provincial assemblies. A Governor would be appointed for every zone directly responsible to the federally administered government.⁴⁸

With regard to the distribution of powers, with all humility at my command, I submit to this Honourable House that there is an overwhelming opinion in this country for more powers to the provincial Government in East Bengal and to the Provinces in West Pakistan jointly to be exercised on this side and therefore, the suggestion made by the Prime Minister is a suitable one at the moment-that as soon as he comes back we will again reconsider the question of those ten subjects which have not been decided yet. The question of a Zonal Federation is still a live issue before the country.⁴⁹

An intense and bitter discussion followed in the Constituent Assembly after the presentation of proposal from Malik Feroz Khan Noon. A member of the Constituent Assembly from East Pakistan, Syed Shamsur Rahman said:

⁴⁴Pakistan Times, 24 July 1954.

⁴⁵He was from Bengal and member of Constitution Assembly of Pakistan

⁴⁶Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958*, 158-160.

⁴⁷Ibid, 159.

⁴⁸Rizwan Malik, *The Politics of One Unit*, 18-22.

⁴⁹Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. XVI, (Karachi: Governor General's Press, Wednesday, 15 September 1954), 357.

Today he (Malik Feroz Khan Noon) thought that one unit was the best solution for Pakistan and that unitary form of Government was better; that East Bengal, Balochistan and Frontier should be governed from Karachi or from some other centre in Rawalpindi or Lahore, that is from one Centre.... No. East Bengal cannot be ruled from Karachi.⁵⁰

Pirzada Abdus Sattar Abdur Rehman, a member of the Constituent Assembly from Sind arguing in the Constituent Assembly said that all provinces should be consulted before the implementation of One Unit, zonal scheme or any other constitutional formula:

I have opposed the idea of One Unit... Then again indirectly to bring me into the question of zonal federation or sub federation was very wrong, because I have never said, favoured and supported it. I have made it clear that this is the issue over which the people of my province and the people of other provinces who are affected have to be consulted. I have said for the people of Frontier, I have said for the people of Balochistan, not only for the provinces of West Pakistan, I have also said about the province of East Bengal. They also have very important voice in this matter and I have never made a secret of it. I said that to everybody that certain subjects were being given to them, whether they were willing to take them, whether it was economically possible for them to decide. We want a constitution born of love and affection not by force.”⁵¹

A veteran politician and member of the Constituent Assembly from the then North West Frontier Province, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan famously known as Bacha Khan said:

I am not against a strong Centre but I think that only strong units can lead to a strong Centre; and units can be strong only when their administration is run by their own true representatives who are trusted by their people and who in their turn trust their people. As against this no Centre can ever be strong if its Constituent units are formed against the wishes of their peoples. This is the first lesson of democracy. I wish that we kept this lesson ever before us in solving our own problems. I shall repeat again that weak units can never mean a strong Centre; only strong units can lead to a strong Centre.⁵²

⁵⁰Ibid, 363.

⁵¹Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. XVI, (Karachi: Governor General's Press, Wednesday, 15 September 1954), 373-74. Accessed December 4, 2017.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1438773791_134.pdf

⁵²Ibid, 369.

The proposal of Chief Minister of Punjab was supported only by the members of his province; the members of smaller provinces of West Pakistan and East Bengal strongly opposed it. By and large the Constituent Assembly did not contemplate on the proposal and started the work of constitution-making.

The removal of civilian ministries both at the central and provincial level and also imposing governor's rule in the latter case provoked the members of Constituent Assembly- especially from East Bengal who had majority in house- to restrict the peculiar powers of the Governor General. On 20 and 21 September 1954 the Constituent Assembly annulled the Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act (PRODA). This legislative act could be used against the members of the Constituent Assembly. It also amended the section 10 of the Government of India Act 1935 to deprive the Governor General of his powers to dismiss the Prime Minister as he had exercised in Nazim-ud-Din's case. The Constituent Assembly in October 1954 completed the draft constitutional bill and enacted the above bills hurriedly with the help of Law Minister, and postponed the house till 27 October.⁵³

The Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad declared a state of emergency on 24 October 1954 throughout the country and dissolved the CAP. The reason given for this hasty action was that, 'It had lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function.'⁵⁴ The role of military was explicit in this intervention. The Prime Minister was called back from a visit to America and led to the residence of the Governor-General where he was intimidated with awful consequences: 'cooperate or face martial law or worse.'⁵⁵ The daily Dawn in its editorial noted that 'there have indeed been times-such as that October night 1n 1954-when a general to the right of him and a general to the left of him, a half-mad Governor General imposed upon a captured

⁵³Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and State in Pakistan*, 127.

⁵⁴'Interests of the Country Above All,' Dawn (Karachi). October 25, 1954.

⁵⁵Shah, *The Army and Democracy*, 79.

Prime Minister the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the virtual setting up of a semi-dictatorial executive.’⁵⁶

After the dismissal of Constitution Assembly, the Governor General appointed a new cabinet which he described as ‘cabinet of talents’. The distinguished character of this cabinet was that the two top ranking military generals were included in it. Major General Iskender Mirza was appointed the new interior minister while the defence ministry was given to General Ayub Khan who was commander in chief of the army. The inclusion of the top two generals in the cabinet revealed that army was the real stakeholder in power sharing. Having secured the most important portfolios in the central cabinet, ‘Ayub could now formally implement the army’s grand constitutional scheme, including the merger of the provinces of West Pakistan into One Unit, which had achieved greater urgency after the UF victory in East Bengal’.⁵⁷

The Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra in a press release on 22 November 1954 enlisted the benefits of One Unit scheme and elaborated that the scheme would increase the stability of the country by merging all provinces and states of West Pakistan. He related this scheme to the founder of the nation Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and said:

He warned if Pakistan is not to disintegrate and if it is to become stronger, we must cease to regard ourselves as Bengalis, Punjabies, Sindhies... We must think of ourselves as Muslims and Pakistanis.⁵⁸

The Prime Minister also said that if Pakistan is to become stronger it needs to be the same economic force which is only viable through the implementation of a single administrative unit. Defending the scheme, he further argued:

⁵⁶Editorial, Dawn (Karachi), August 11, 1957.

⁵⁷Shah, *The Army and Democracy*, 79-80.

⁵⁸National Documentation Centre, Islamabad, 1955, file no 20, 21, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘Agenda and minutes of the cabinet meeting held on the 27th and 28th March, 1955, 28-30.

We have one provincial administration in East Pakistan for the population of 42 million people. The extravagant luxury of six or seven provincial administration could not be justified for the population of 34 million people only.⁵⁹

The meeting of central cabinet was called upon by the Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra, in which all the Chief Ministers and Agent to the Governor-General of Balochistan were invited. The Prime Minister argued that the task of constitution could not be completed easily without the merger of all provinces and states of West Pakistan into One Unit and it is indispensable for the administration of the West Pakistan.⁶⁰ The meeting was briefed by the Mushtaque Gurmani and Chaudary Mohammad Ali that the central government had already taken steps in this direction to implement the One Unit Scheme.⁶¹

The One Unit scheme needed the approval of all the provinces and states of West Pakistan. the Provincial Assembly of NWFP was the first assembly that passed resolution in favour of the One Unit, since its Chief Minister had already promised in the central cabinet meeting to merge the province in One Unit.⁶² The Provincial Assembly of Punjab passed resolution in support of One Unit on 29 November 1954 which was followed by the state of Bahawalpur and Khairpur. In Balochistan the Quetta Municipal Committee (QMC) and Shahi Jirga passed the resolution, the Karachi Municipal Committee (KMC) followed the suit. The Sindh Legislative Assembly passed the resolution on 22 December 1954.⁶³

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰ Hamida Khuhro, *Muhammad Ayub Khuhro: A Life of Courage in Politics* (Karachi: Ferozsons Ltd., 1998), 413-15.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²G. M. Sayed, *The Case of Sindh: G. M. Sayed's Disposition for the Court* (Karachi: Naen Sindh Academy. 1955), 139-140.

⁶³Khuhro, *Muhammad Ayub Khuhro*, 515.

The central cabinet appointed a commission to finalize the merger of all provinces and states of West Pakistan till may next year (1955).⁶⁴ The cabinet had also finalized the draft constitution, but it was thwarted by the Federal Court which stated that only the new assembly could ratify the merger of West Pakistan and new Constitution. The new assembly was indirectly elected through Electoral College in 1955 and ratified the creation of West Pakistan and new constitution. According to the new constitution there would be a unicameral assembly consisting of 300 seats equally divided between the East Bengal and West Pakistan. The Powers of the President were also reduced who will replace the Governor General as head of the state. The President could no longer dismiss the Constituent Assembly; however, he could remove the Prime Minister if he was satisfied that the Prime Minister had 'ceased to command the confidence of the assembly.'⁶⁵ Balochistan still was not given the status of province and it was merged into One Unit. Some of its parts like Balochistan States Union were ruled as special Areas.

⁶⁴1955, file no.20, 21, Government of Pakistan, cabinet Secretariat, 'Agenda and Minute of the Cabinet Meeting held on 27th and 28th March, 1955, 5.

⁶⁵1956 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, article 37.

Chapter 3

Balochistan between Reforms and Provincial Autonomy

When Jinnah assumed the powers of the new state as a Governor General, he did not introduce any reforms in Balochistan on the contrary he established the ministry of states and frontier regions, in order to strengthen his position over these regions. In this way under Jinnah Balochistan was ruled as a Governor General's province. Ruling Balochistan as a Governor General was so unusual that Jinnah was asked if was in favour of a dictatorial form of government, rather than a democratic one.¹ As Adeel Khan rightly points out that 'Pakistan's interests in and treatment in the region was not very different from that of colonialists-in fact Pakistan's treatment was worse than the colonial regime's because the new nation-state was more interventionist than its predecessors.'² Thus Balochistan's constitutional status as it was during the colonial days in fact the new state did not introduce any constitutional reforms and was later merged into One Unit. After the merger of Balochistan into One Unit, it lost whatever regional identity it had. Until 1970 Balochistan was not given the provincial status and was ruled as 'centrally administered area.'

Balochistan was denied provincial autonomy and mired into councils, reforms committees and preliminary merger before finally merging it into One Unit. During the nine years in which different constitutional formulas and schemes were introduced, Balochistan remained out of context. Though the name of Balochistan and Balochistan States Union was mentioned in those formulas, in order to convert the

¹Khalid, B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1947*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1968), 239.

²Adeel Khan, *The Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan* (New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2004), 115.

majority of East Bengal, it was ruled as centrally administered area. In fact, in the latter case it was ‘ruled and governed within a complete constitutional vacuum.’³

Balochistan Advisory Council

Immediately after the creation of Pakistan, a discourse of reforms and development emerged regarding the backward and under-developed regions of the country. Balochistan Advisory Council was announced by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 in Sibi during his address to the ‘Sibi Darbar’ and this was first step in this direction. The formation of this council was not in agreement of the Muslim League’s demand for Balochistan in the colonial era. The Muslim League had demanded reforms for Balochistan in colonial era.

The Council did not include the Baloch States (Kalat, Kharan, Mekran, Lasbela) because these states had not acceded to Pakistan at that particular time. Giving details about the composition of the Council the Prime Minister said during the question and answer sections on Election to Balochistan Council:

- a) The Council was nominated on 11th January 1949 for one Year.
- b) The resolution aiming at reforms is being introduced in the current session of the Constituent Assembly.
- c) The total cost of the government on salaries and allowances paid to the advisors and nominated members up to 31st March 1950 is 34, 898-5-0.
- d) On the termination of the life of the first council, new members were nominated to the council in 1st September, 1950.⁴

The Council did not achieve anything regarding autonomy of the people of the province. The Council was active from 1949 to 1951 and disappeared from scene after the speech of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in the Constituent Assembly. Indeed,

³Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 256.

⁴Constitution Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. II (Karachi: Governor General’s Press Tuesday, 3 October 1950), 145-146. Accessed December 11, 2017.
http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1441694147_225.pdf

it was a step to keep Balochistan in a position that had in the era of British colonialism. The Baloch states were not included neither in Council nor the Committee. In fact, a committee had been established in August 1947 mentioned that “all the states of Balochistan should jointly nominate one representative agreed to by the ruler of these States”⁵ and this one representative will represent all other states jointly in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The way these states were to be represented shows that it was not democratic. The speech of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in the Constituent Assembly depicts that how the post-colonial state assumed the reason of British colonialism to exclude the people of Balochistan from mainstream politics on the excuse that people of the province have no ‘consciousness of democracy’, the Prime Minister said:

We observed that these states have no democratic institutions and one cannot bring democracy overnight to these states that we have in the rest of Pakistan. The committee has opted that representation would be given through the representative of the Government of these States.⁶

The establishment of Advisory Council and nomination of the representative from the states was only to keep those people in power structure who were already in alliance with the British and changed their priorities when the new state came into being, Partha Chatterjee describes this ‘molecular transformation’, by attempting a ‘molecular transformation’ ‘of the old dominant classes into partners in a new historical bloc and only a partial appropriation of the popular masses.’⁷ This was the best way to keep powers in the central government and deny the local people’s aspirations in power sharing.

⁵Pakistan, Constitution Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. VI, Interim Report of the State’s Negotiating Committee (Karachi: Governor-General’s Press December 20, 1949), 7-8. Accessed July 15, 2017.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434619211_559.pdf

⁶Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Interim report of the state’s Negotiating Committee Vol. VI (Karachi: Governor-General’s, Press Friday 6 January, 1950), 222-223. Accessed July 15, 2017.

⁷Partha Chaterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed Books, 1986), 30.

The nomination of the representative from Balochistan States Union including other States that acceded to Pakistan was not according to the democratic norms and this was rightly observed by Mian Mohammad Iftikharuddin on the floor of the house:

It is a very important document that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan has presented to the House this afternoon. I think if we got into the implications of this document, many of the promises that we made to our people, many of the pledges that we gave to our country, and many of the principles on which we led our struggle for freedom, have been betrayed. The people with whom our representatives have been negotiating do not and did not represent anybody. They are not the representatives of the people of the States; they are, in fact, the enemies of the people of those States who have really kept these lakhs and lakhs of humanity for the last 200 years under despotic rule? Who joined the alien invaders in overthrowing the indigenous rule in this country? In accepting them as the representatives of the States, we are legalising all their past treacheries.⁸

Regarding the method of selecting of one representative from Balochistan States Union was criticised by the member of Constituent Assembly from Bengal, Shri Dharendra Nath Datta, criticizing the report of States Negotiating Committee's Report he said in the Constituent Assembly, "But, the whole question is as to who will elect the representatives... whether the Rulers of the States will send the representatives or the people shall elect the representatives themselves".⁹

Balochistan Reforms Committee

This committee was established in 1950 after the speech of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali in the Constituent Assembly in which he promised to bring all 'backward' areas to the level of democracy prevailing in the rest of the country. The committee's purpose was to bring the former British Balochistan to the status of province and it had no jurisdiction in Balochistan States Union. The Prime Minister said:

⁸Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Interim report of the state's Negotiating Committee Vol. VI (Karachi: Governor-General's, Press Friday 6 January, 1950), 26. Accessed July 24, 2017.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434619012_396.pdf

⁹Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Interim report of the state's Negotiating Committee Vol. VI (Karachi: Governor-General's, Friday 6 January, 1950), 25-26. Accessed July 31, 2017.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434619012_396.pdf

With a view to bringing the administration of the province of Balochistan, as far as possible, to level of another province of Pakistan. It is resolved that Committee be appointed to review the entire field of administration of Balochistan and prepare a report-

- (a) recommending administrative and constitutional changes in the existing administrative and constitutional set-up of that province with due regard to the political, social and economic conditions prevailing there: and
- (b) stating the financial, political and administrative implications of the reforms recommended.¹⁰

Followings were made its members and none of them was from Balochistan:

1. Dr. Muhmud Hussain- Chairman,
2. Mr. M. A. Khuhro,
3. Mr. Mr. Malik Khuda Baksh,
4. Mr. Mr. Nur Ahmed,
5. Mr. Bhabesh Chandra Nandy.¹¹

The speech of Prime Minister is very important while announcing the Balochistan Reforms Committee this speech is quoted at length here in order to gauge the political and economic conditions prevailing in Balochistan:

In Balochistan there has been in existence a different type of administration from what exists in other parts of Pakistan. There are no local bodies; no elections of any kind take place except in the case of Quetta Municipality. The province is divided into three separate parts, the States, the tribal areas and what is called the leased area and what used to be in the old days, the British Balochistan. There are different kinds of laws that are applicable. The country is very thinly populated. The government just over a year ago started the experiment of having an advisory council to advise the Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner with regard to the administration of that province. The experiment of that Council has not proved as good as one might have expected. It is necessary that as we are approaching the time for framing the constitution the members of the Constituent Assembly should be clear in their minds as to what kind of constitution should be provided for Balochistan and for that purpose it is necessary that a committee of the House should make an inquiry and submit a report to the members so that they are able to have a clear and full picture before them of the conditions in Balochistan. This motion is intended

¹⁰Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. VIII, (Karachi: Governor General's Press, Saturday 14 October 1949), 169.

¹¹Ibid,170.

with that purpose and I hope that the House would agree with me that that we should, as far as possible, bring Balochistan to the same level of administration, as in other provinces, and the same type of democratic institutions should be functioning there as what is being done in other parts of Pakistan. There will be difficulties, I have no doubt, because as I pointed out to you the conditions there are peculiar, but we have to do it and the sooner we do it the better it will be for every concerned.¹²

It is obvious from the speech of Prime Minister that a different kind of constitution and administration should be developed as compare to other parts of Pakistan. Comparing the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan with Mr. Churchill, Mian. Muhammad Iftikhar Uddin, a member from Punjab criticized this motion and said:

I wish that instead of the name of Honourable Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, we had the name of Mr. Churchill as the mover of this motion. Sir, that was exactly the type of Resolution Mr. Churchill would have put had he had been asked to do something about the freedom of Sub-Continent. The argument that the British used to give was that we believe in freedom, that we believe in democracy, but social and economic conditions prevailing in the Indian sub-continent were not as such to enable them to give necessary freedom. We have a Churchill of our own. If Pakistan may not be able to boast of having other things, at least it can boast of having one thing that if Churchill can bring forward such motion, the Prime Minister of Pakistan or the Honourable Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, who is also the Prime Minister of Pakistan, can do the same.¹³

Mian. Iftikhar Uddin further criticized this motion and said:

This goes against the Objectives Resolution. According to this there are two points I would like a clarification from the mover of the Resolution. Firstly, according to him, the principles of freedom and democracy change with the times and secondly that they are applied in one way in one area and in another way in another area. To us the principles of freedom and democracy are eternal and universal. If that is what the Objectives Resolution stand for, then he should not have talked as used to do Mr. Churchill that in accordance with the peculiar conditions prevailing in all the areas and the demands and rights of all the people of Pakistan, high or low, Bengalis or Baluchis, Punjabis or Sindhis are the same and, therefore, there is no question of having a peculiar constitution for the province of Balochistan. Sir, it can be said that politically one province is more advanced than the other. It may be said that politically Sind is more advanced than Punjab or that Punjab is more advanced than Sind, but there is the same political consciousness in all the provinces. Somebody may get up and say that

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid, 14th October,

X-province is more advanced politically and, therefore, it should have nothing to do with the Centre, because the intelligence of the Central Ministry is far less than the intelligence of, say, Punjab Ministry. If such a suggestion comes it would be really scandalous and one would consider the person who makes such a suggestion as mad. If that is so I cannot understand how we will apply the same epithet if really this motion is moved by the House. I do hope that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan will realise this basic mistake and contradiction in this motion. On the hand, he has said: “. . . With a view to bringing it to the level of other province” . . . on the other, he says “. . . in accordance with peculiar conditions . . . There is no peculiarity so far as Balochistan or any area, however backward or any state is concerned. So, for as the principles of freedom and democracy are concerned, the first direction to this committee should have been that they are to bring it to the same level as other provinces or all provinces, if they have any peculiarities they can be treated separately. Bengal, he says is thickly populated. Bengal is far more thickly populated than Punjab, nevertheless in both provinces the nature of the constitution is the same. I cannot understand why it should not be the same in Balochistan. I am sure the mover of the motion will take a note of this objective before he presses it to the House.”¹⁴

In spite of the claims made by the Prime Minister to bring Balochistan to the level of another province it was never recommended to make Balochistan as a province until 1970. When the third amendment was made to the 1935 Act in 1953,¹⁵ Balochistan got the status of a province only on papers. The insignificance of this promotion can be assessed from the fact that the Agent to the Governor General (AGG) did not know anything about it until it was revealed in official Gazette.¹⁶

The reason why the officials did not know about the status of the Balochistan is clear that AGG was not from Balochistan and he also was not an elected representative. From the time since Balochistan became part of Pakistan all officials were appointed either by the British authorities and later the central government of the newly born state. When the Reforms Committee established by the Prime Minister Liaquat Khan recommended reforms in Balochistan, the officials in Balochistan opposed the recommendations of reforms committee and demanded that a kind of

¹⁴Ibid, 14th October 1954.

¹⁵Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 117.

¹⁶Ibid.

diarchy should be introduced in Balochistan due its ‘peculiar conditions’ and also that the people have no experience in managing the state affairs. An anonymous document in Balochistan Secretariat says:

The political system and government that is active in Sind and Punjab cannot be introduced here (in Balochistan). If introduced it would dislocate the fabric of society and will result in economic and political injustices. It is important to aware political consciousness among the people and this can be achieved if democracy is introduced steadily according to the wishes of the people.¹⁷

It was also stressed that due to people’s ‘lack of experience’ officials and ministers should be imported from the other provinces. The document further says:

There will be few people who might have the experience of legislative and administrative function. Therefore, both the legislative body and ministers must be guided in their work, in order to get experience.¹⁸

The “lack of finance” was another reason put forward by the state officials to deprive Balochistan from the provincial autonomy. They argued that Balochistan will be dependent financially on federal government. The reforms committee had finalized that the financial deficit in Balochistan’s budget will reach to 124 lakhs.¹⁹ The officials in Balochistan calculated that it will reach approximately 261 lakhs.²⁰ So, it was stressed that Balochistan should not be put under loans immediately after the provincial autonomy.²¹ Ironically the state officials argued that Balochistan could not function as a province due to financial burdens contrary to the reforms committee’s report that, “Balochistan affords abundant scope for development”²² because of its natural capitals and reservoirs. It is important to mention here that Balochistan was not the only province that had to depend financially on federal government, the other

¹⁷Balochistan Secretariat Records, Basta 27.7.624-S/51.1951, 234-236.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid, 245.

²⁰Balochistan Secretariat Records, Basta 27.7.624-S/51. 1951. AGG Balochistan to A.S.B. Shah, 2 December, 1951. 197.

²¹Ibid, Political Agent Quetta-Pishin to AGG Balochistan, 9 January 1952.

²²Pakistan. Report of the Committee on Constitutional and Administrative Reforms in Balochistan, 13.

provinces and states that acceded to Pakistan were also dependent on federal government. For example, the then North West Province was also dependent on the central government “It is deficit province with an income of about one crore and gets about 7 to 8 crores of subsidy from the center.”²³ Likewise, “revenue receipts of East Bengal in that year amounted to rupees 16.86 crores including allocations from the Centre amounting to rupees 8.13 crores.”²⁴

The ‘lack of finance’ was the very reason that was later articulated in order to justify the One Unit scheme. There is no doubt that Balochistan was not the singular province that was receiving grants from the central government; hence there was no logic and reason to deprive Balochistan from its constitutional and provincial status in the federation of the newly created state. It is obvious that Balochistan did not have adequate taxation resources like the other provinces that too were dependent on the central government. According to the reform committee’s report if Balochistan was not given the provincial status and if the central government did not introduce any kind of reforms the later will keep enduring the expenditures of Balochistan up to 118 lakhs rupees and only 6 lakhs rupees were to be ascribed to the reforms.²⁵

In this way Balochistan was deprived of its constitutional and provincial status on the basis various excuses such as ‘backward’, ‘lack of experience’, ‘peculiar conditions and ‘lack of finance’. In this way Balochistan was ruled as ‘centrally administered area’ rather than as a province in the federation of the newly created state. This fact can be assessed from the fact that even the AGG of Balochistan In 1954 expressed his discontent to the Governor General that Balochistan is almost

²³Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, The Establishment of West Pakistan Bill, Vol.VIII, 26 August,1955. 332. Accessed August 7, 2017.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1435296860_198.pdf

²⁴Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Thursday, 15 September 1955, 786. Accessed August 7, 2017.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1435298861_246.pdf

²⁵Pakistan. Report of Committee on Constitutional and Administrative Reforms in Balochistan, 25.

entirely dependent on the central government. The A.G.G of Balochistan wrote to Governor General:

I have concluded that Balochistan have very limited powers in finance and administration. All the important cases even those related entirely to the province cannot be authorized without the approval of the central government.²⁶

However, the AGG's suggestion did not have any effects, because the scheme of One Unit was already decided by the central government at the end of 1953.²⁷ Contrary to the AGG's suggestion the central government had decided to remove whatever 'autonomy' it had. Thus 'lack of finance, experience and backwardness were only political manoeuvres from the central government to placate the demands of politicians from Balochistan.'²⁸ The rejection of provincial autonomy and constitutional status were only tactics from the central government, in order to merge Balochistan into One Unit scheme.

The Preliminary Merger in Balochistan: The Balochistan States Union (BSU):

The formation of Balochistan States Union was another step towards the creation of One Unit. As noted above that Baloch States were not included in Advisory Council and Reforms Committee. Until the creation of One Unit the Pakistani state had still not solved the accession issue of many states which also included the Baloch States. There were no legal systems and laws that were enforced in rest of the country. Justice was delivered on the basis of customary and Islamic laws. The rulers of these states were not ready to resolve their status as mere pawns of the central government.²⁹ The central government in March 1952 established the Balochistan States Union. The four states i.e. Kalat, Makran, Kharan and Las Bela were merged

²⁶Balochistan Secretariat Records, Basta 27.7.624-S/51. 1951. The AGG Balochistan to Iskander Mirza, Minister of States and Frontier Regions, 29 November 1954.

²⁷Malik, *The Politics of One Unit*, 22.

²⁸Zahid Chuadahary, *Pakistan Ki Siyasi Taraaekh: Balochistan, Masla Khud-Mukhtari Ka Aghaz a* (Lahore: Institute of Study of History, 1994), 245-252.

²⁹Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 255-257.

together as a union This was considered as step towards the provincial autonomy for the people of Balochistan, however it turned out to be another way of tactics from the central government. The creation of Balochistan States Union only created deadlocks among the rulers of these states.³⁰ From among these rulers the States's Negotiating Committee would nominate one representative to represent these states in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. This method of representation was rightly criticised by Mian Mohammad Iftikaruddin on the floor of the House:

... by negotiating with these rulers, we have committed another great since we have accepted the barbarian and antediluvian principle of people being the property of individuals. That is not only undemocratic, it is also un-Islamic. We passed the Objectives Resolution a few months ago and boasted to the world that we were to build the State on a new basis, it is a betrayal of that resolution. It is going back thousands of years. It may he said that before we enter into framing important task of framing the new constitution, it is necessary to have the representatives of the States. Associating these people in the constitution making is a crime against the people. Today you cannot say that it is another country or men of another region who are keeping them down. Today the enemies of the States' people are the rulers. The battle today is against our own countrymen-the rulers. Instead of helping the people in their struggle against their oppressors, and telling the world what we meant when we passed the Objectives Resolution and instead of going on to create a new, greater and more perfect democracy, we, after two and half years in the year 1950, are bringing in a motion before this House which even 5,000 years ago could not have been brought before the village panchayats, It is important for the people of Pakistan to realise what we mean when we say that we are going to implement the Objectives Resolution.³¹

The Report of the Basic Principles Committee had declared that Balochistan States Union will be provided a legislature as provided to other units of Pakistan the Paragraph 132 (d) says:

As the Special Areas of Balochistan will constitute of Balochistan States Union and as it is possible that the Balochistan States Union will have Legislature Assembly of its own so in the case of Special Areas of Balochistan the consent of the Assembly of the State Union will be necessary. Balochistan's Special Areas will be abolished if the majority of the members of Balochistan States Union Assembly

³⁰Ibid, 263.

³¹Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Interim report of the state's Negotiating Committee Vol. VI (Karachi: Governor-General's Press Friday 6 January, 1950), 26-27. Accessed September 4, 2017. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434619012_396.pdf

demands. As the Balochistan States Union consists of four States, each of the four States can also cease to Special Areas if the majority of the members of each of those States in Balochistan States Union Assembly so demand. The president in the case will be bound to take steps to abolish the whole of Special Areas or any States forming part of those Areas, as the case may be.³²

The Balochistan States Union was merged in June 1954 with the Balochistan by the central government. The Khan of Kalat reacted violently and intimidated to explode the entire 'Baloch nation.'³³ The central government showed no response to Khan of Kalat's reaction and was busy in implementation of One Unit scheme in Karachi. The central government also pay no attention to the Jam Sahib Ghulam Kadir of Lasbela who was representative selected by the central government to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Jam Sahib demanded in the Constituent Assembly that Balochistan States Union should be given a legislature and all democratic rights should be given to the people of these states:

Sir, I think it is my duty as the representative of Balochistan States Union to voice the opinion of the people before this house. The Basic Principles Committee has failed to meet the aspiration of the people of Balochistan. To provide a legislature for the Balochistan States Union in the Basic Principles Committee would be no more than giving it an ordinary right. I therefore hope that in order to give an actuality to whatever minor powers the Union has been given, our government will set up a legislature for the Balochistan States Union, so that the people of there may have a forum for the expression of their views and a chance to take a share in the governance of their own.... Sir, there are certain things in the clause which imply that Balochistan States Union would have to remain as a subservient part of Balochistan even if the legislature of Balochistan States Union should decide by an overwhelming majority that it would not be included in or part of Balochistan and it should be given the rights of separate existence, but the iron chains of the constitution would for all times to come keep Balochistan States Union as a special area. If we just think over it, we shall see that by one single stroke of pen the people of Balochistan States Union have been deprived of their three democratic rights. It would have been but just and fair that the people of Balochistan States Union have been given an equal status with Bahawalpur and Khairpur.

³²Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol.XVI, Report of the Basic Principles Committee (Karachi: Governor-General's Publications, Monday 20 September 1954), 454-456. Accessed September 7, 2017

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1438774327_710.pdf

³³A. B. Awan, *Balochistan: Historical and Political process*, (London: New Century, 1985), 216-217.

Moreover, they deserved the same democratic rights which have been given to the provinces of in the Islamic constitution of Pakistan in which only the poor people of Balochistan States Union have been ignored. I would again submit to this House not to try to seek occasions for depriving the people of their legitimate rights. It is never right and proper for a government which represents the people to flout their opinion and take any step which is not in accordance with the democratic principles. In a democratic state the legislature alone is competent to represent the people and their views. I am sure that no undemocratic method of gauging public opinion be adopted.³⁴

The merger of Balochistan States Union and Balochistan was planned by the central government and it was against the recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee it was not debated in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and Basic Principles Committee also did not have any suggestions in this regard. It was therefore opposed by the House on the ground that the elimination of a single state would put question marks not only treaties Pakistan had signed with the British, but also on the very nature of new federation of Pakistan.³⁵ But the Minister for States and Frontier Regions, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, and Governor General Ghulam Muhammad pay no heed to the Constitution Assembly's recommendations and both were determined to merge these states with Balochistan, in order to pave the way for One Unit scheme. Mushtaq Gurmani declared on June 20 1954 that the "government was committed to bring social, economic, and administrative reforms in these areas and therefore it was necessary to reunite them."³⁶ Under duress the report of the Basic Principles Committee was also amended in September 1954 accordingly.³⁷

³⁴Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. XVI, (Karachi: Governor-General's Press, Monday 20 September, 1954), 486-87. Accessed September 7, 2017.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1438773791_134.pdf

³⁵Wayne Ayres Wilcox, *Pakistan: Consolidation of a Nation*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1963), 174-175.

³⁶The Dawn, Karachi, 21 June 1954 as cited by Wilcox, *Consolidation*, 175-177.

³⁷The Dawn, Karachi, 16 September 1954 as cited by Wilcox, *Consolidation*, 175-177.

As mentioned earlier that Balochistan was still not given the status of province even after the completion of the Report of Basic Principles Committee and the preliminary merger of Balochistan States Union, the report concluded:

It has been decided that the province of Balochistan should be given the status of a Governor's province. It will have legislature even before the enforcement of the new constitution. A bill for the purpose will come to this House. As that province will have the status of Governor's province before coming into operation of the new constitution that the status will be continued under the constitutional set-up as well.³⁸

It is obvious that the merger of Balochistan States Union was only another step in the consolidation of a single province of West Pakistan. The report of Basic Principles Committee reveals that Balochistan States Union will have no representation in the political, executive and economic affairs of the province that still did not have any constitutional status in the federation of the country.³⁹

The Basic Principles Committee declared Balochistan States Union as "Special Areas". These special areas would have no role and representation in the provincial legislature and were put under the Chief Commissioner and the Governor. The provincial legislature could not extend its jurisdiction in the "Special Areas". Only the Governor could act in these areas with approval of Governor General. The central government was also given the authority to abolish the status of "Special Areas" with the consent of the people.⁴⁰

The exclusion of Balochistan States Union from the provincial legislature led to conflict between the Khan of Kalat and federal government. However, this conflict was resolved by the Governor General after the dissolution of the Constituent

³⁸Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol.XVI, Report of the Basic Principles Committee, (Karachi: Governor-General's Press, Monday 20 September,1954), 454-455. Accessed 11 September, 2017.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1435298861_246.pdf

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

Assembly in October 1954. After dissolving the Constituent Assembly, the fortune of all states including Balochistan States Union was now in the hands of Governor General. The Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad succeeded in January 1955 to persuade all the rulers of the Balochistan States Union to sign an agreement. All the four rulers were given annual pensions. This agreement abrogated all the earlier agreements between the Pakistani state and these states. The statuses of these states were eliminated by granting a hand full of annual pensions to the rulers of these states. These states were created by the post-colonial state, in order to complete the accession of Kalat State and were eliminated after 7 years when they became obstacles in the way of One Unit. The post-colonial state created these states when it needed enormous territory, strategic location and natural resources. Later these states were abolished when their very existence became unsuited with the One Unit scheme. The central government dominated by Punjabi-Mohajir nexus from the inception of the new state intervened in the affairs of Balochistan and the four states. All the reforms and political schemes that were introduced in Balochistan and Balochistan States Union from 1947 till 1955 were inter-linked with each other and all of these reforms kept Balochistan in the peripheries. In a way Balochistan was deprived of political and economic structures of the country. The different official documents depict that Balochistan was not given the status of a province which the other provinces had and it was ruled as a “Centrally Administered Area”. This “centrally administered area” was part of Pakistan, but deprived of economic development, constitutional and political representation in the federation of Pakistan.\

“Whatever territorial identity Balochistan had left was eliminated when, in 1955, the One Unit scheme that amalgamated the four western provinces into one

was imposed”.⁴¹ The One Unit scheme provided further legitimacy to the central government to rule Balochistan through state officials from the centre and Punjab. Balochistan States Union was liability of the central government. The Basic Principles Committee Report said:

As the two Special Areas are at present the liability of the central government, the provinces of North West Frontier Province and Balochistan to which these areas will be attached will not have resources adequate enough to administer those areas and to bring them up to the level of provinces. The central government shall continue to render financial aid to the two provinces for the administration and development of their Special Areas.⁴²

The following section describes how One Unit was projected as a scheme of development for the backward areas in the West Pakistan including Balochistan and how the people of Balochistan were deprived of economic and political structure of the state.

One Unit and Balochistan

The scheme of One Unit had support only in Punjab and all other provinces and States were against it. One can estimate from the speeches of Constituent Assembly of 15 September 1955, and 26 August 1955 on discussion of the Establishment of West Pakistan Bill, in Constituent Assembly that it was only members from Punjab that advanced support to One Unit and the establishment of West Pakistan for example Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, a member from Punjab said that that West Pakistan was naturally interdependent:

West Pakistan is a compact geographical region comprising the mountain ranges extending from the Karrakuram, Himalayas and the Hindukush, running down its northern and western borders to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, and the plain of the Indus Basin on which depends its economic prosperity. Its forest and mineral wealth are located in the mountainous regions', while its agricultural activity.

⁴¹Khan, *The Politics of Identity*, 116.

⁴²Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol.XVI, Report of the Basic Principles Committee, (Karachi: Governor-General's Press, Monday 20 September, 1954), 454-455.
http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1435298861_246.pdf

are mainly confined to the plains. The agricultural economy of West Pakistan is dependent for its sustenance on the same water resources and is subject to the same economic forces. The economies of the various administrative units in this region are interlinked and interdependent.⁴³

Mr. Gurmani went to extend that there are no provincial and language difference among the provinces of West Pakistan:

.....Let us take Balochistan which is known as the home of the Baluchis. The Baluch population of Balochistan and the Balochistan States' Union is about one-fourth of the total population of the area. The three main tribal groups, namely, the Baluchis, Brohis and Pathans together form only two-thirds of the population of the area. The Baluch population of Sind is about twice as much as that of Balochistan, while the Baluch population of the Punjab is almost equal to that of the rest of West Pakistan. This will clearly show that no tribal group can lay claim to a particular Province or State as their exclusive homeland..... The artificial political boundaries have stood in the way of an overall and planned development of West Pakistan.⁴⁴

Arguments in support of One Unit were advanced from economical point of views, Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana another member from Punjab and former Chief Minister explaining the economic advantages and of One Unit and interdependency of all units of West Pakistan said:

Not only is the pattern of our economy similar but our resources, both economic and human, are so distributed that we can only live if we live together in close inter-dependence. If you consider our resources of water, they are so placed that we can only supply the needs of the lower regions if an integrated common organization looks to the manner in which these waters are used in the upper regions. In fact, it can only be a common Government that can so distribute the water resources of a single system of rivers that it is conducive to the best prosperity and optimum development of the whole land, and that organization must be a single organization equally devoted to the interests of all and dependent not upon the goodwill, and fiat of only a portion of the country, which is the situation at present.⁴⁵

⁴³Constitution Assembly of Pakistan Debates, The Establishment of West Pakistan Bill, 15 September 1955, 789. Accessed September 11, 2017.

⁴⁴Ibid, 790-793.

⁴⁵Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Establishment of the West Pakistan Bill, Friday 26 August, 1955,337. Accessed November 8, 2017.
http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1435296860_198.pdf

He further said:

... The units of West Pakistan, presents a unity. In what areas today have we the greatest - possibility for the Extension and development of agricultural land. Exactly in those areas of the Punjab and Sind where the pressure on land is the lowest. If you want to secure a balanced development and an equal prosperity to all the people you shall have to see that land is given to the landless elsewhere and anywhere, who need it most. Therefore, Sir, if you consider our economy you will find that it is only in the quickest integration and the completest co-operation of all the regions in West Pakistan that the real solution of the problems facing Pakistan lies.⁴⁶

Malik Firoz Khan Noon member from Punjab and also the chief Minister of later province gave the following economic advantages:

This question of One-Unit has four aspects. There is the political aspect, there is the social aspect and there is the administrative aspect and there is the economic aspect....., the strongest point in favour of One-Unit is the economic one..... Now unless we have One Unit to deal with the rivers and with the canals and irrigation schemes, Sind and Punjab will' always be fighting with each other and the Punjab being the upper riparian, they might start behaving in the same way as India is behaving with Pakistan and' this might leave Sind high and dry..... We are basically an agricultural land, rich in natural soil and resources but dependent almost exclusively on artificial irrigation. Our situation makes the control, provision and proper distribution of water the basic need of our economy. Indeed, our very existence depends on it. Then, Sir, in the matter of economic relationship agrarian problems in our society present the real challenge to our sense of justice and fair play. Moreover, a balanced progressive development in all our areas demands a speedy industrialization which would enable us to work up our raw materials into finished consumer and production goods, so that we might be able to give prosperity and amplitude-to our people and self-sufficiency to our economy. Not only is the pattern of our economy similar but our resource.⁴⁷

Mumtaz Khan Daultana ironically linked One Unit to the ancient Indus Valley Civilization and sargued that One Unit was historical reality and it was inevitable phenomenon he went on:

From the very earliest time, our history has been one: Mohenjo-Daro, Harappa, Taxila, the great Empire of the Emperor Kanishka, throughout the ages we have faced the world as one unity. We have always fought together the same enemies; we have faced the same problems; we have made identical adjustments; we have answered the same challenges with the same responses, from time immemorial.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Ibid, 338.

⁴⁷Ibid, 333-384.

⁴⁸Ibid, 339.

The secret⁴⁹ document of One Unit depicts that the real motto behind this unification of West Pakistan were economy, culture and geography instead of Islam. The main arguments that were advanced in this scheme of exclusion and domination were linked to economy as the secret document reveals that the main beneficiaries of this scheme would be smaller and poor units or provinces (such as Tribal Areas, Balochistan and Balochistan States Union) because this scheme would allow these backward and poor areas to enter economic pool of the country as the document says:

The electric resources of the Frontier must sustain the industry of the whole. The electric industry of the Frontier must sustain the industry of the Punjab, the capital accumulation of the Punjab must bring about equalization of prosperity through development in Balochistan and Tribal regions, the resources of Sindh and Bahawalpur must fortify the sturdy warriors in the North.⁵⁰

Almost all the Industries of Pakistan were in Punjab and Karachi. For example, 32.3 percent of large scale manufacturing industry was installed in Punjab, 29.5 percent in Karachi, 24.8 in the rest of Sind, 8.6 in then NWFP and 0.0 in Balochistan.⁵¹ These industries would be sustained through the electricity of the Frontier and Punjab would also accumulate capital and later would use this capital for the prosperity of Poor regions. Thus, the domination of Punjab could be established through pooling of resources of entire West Pakistan. All other provinces, states and regions were to depend on Punjab for their development and progress. All other poor provinces would depend on Punjab because they were unable to run their administration and economy as Mushtaq Gurmani argued that “the Provinces in the Western zone, namely, N.W.F. P. and Balochistan, will not be able to maintain their administrations with their own

⁴⁹Why it is secret see Rizwan Malik, *The Politics of One Unit*, 119-140.

⁵⁰One Unit Document as reprinted in Malik, *The Politics of One Unit*, 119-140.

⁵¹Akbar, S. Zaidi, “Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan: Some Indications” *Economics and Political Weekly* 24, (1989), 300-314.

meagre revenues and will need substantial financial aid for running their Provincial administrations”.⁵²

There was no doubt that Punjab provided 40 percent the federal revenues and also provided subsidies to the smaller provinces. It would obviously dominate the political and economic structures of the ‘backward’ areas of West Pakistan which also included Balochistan. Even prior to the establishment of One Unit scheme state officials in West Pakistan were induced that Balochistan’s economic problems must be controlled by the federal government due to its “peculiar conditions”. The exercise of powers was now in the hands of centrally appointed officials and Punjab dominating the politics and economy of the entire West Pakistan. Thus, Balochistan was directly ruled by the centrally appointed officials and majority of these officials were from Punjab. As Adeel Khan Points out that there only 181 Baloch out of 830 higher posts and in 1972 and among the twenty officials that were supervising the provincial department only one was Baloch.⁵³

The people of Balochistan were demanding provincial autonomy since the forceful and controversial accession to Pakistan. The One Unit scheme was the accumulation of power in the centre and domination of one province. Hence the people of Balochistan were deprived of whatever freedom they had and the identity of Balochistan was eradicated when the four provinces were united and merged into a single province known as West Pakistan. The parari⁵⁴ movement was started against One Unit scheme which was led by Nauroz Khan. The resistance to One Unit was more noticeable in Balochistan as compare to other provinces, and it appeared at one

⁵²Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, The Establishment of West Pakistan Bill, Thursday, 15 September, 1955, 788-789. Accessed November 9, 2017.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1435298861_246.pdf

⁵³Khan, *Politics of Identity*, 117.

⁵⁴The Parari is Balochi word which means that a group or an Individual having grievances that cannot be resolved through dialogues. See Selig S. Harrison, *Baloch Nationalism*, 21-24.

point if Balochistan had succeeded, since there was an open defiance to the authority of the central government.⁵⁵

The basic aim of implementing the One Unit scheme was to exclude all the forces which would oppose this very scheme. The secret document reveals the strategy how to establish this scheme and also how to exclude any opposition forces.

The document states:

The first phase is an immediate one. It is a negative one. It consists in clearing the decks. All obvious 'committed' obstacles in the way of 'one unit' must be removed. In political terms our country is insufficiently developed. In this atmosphere a clear and firm indication of which way the wind is blowing does actually help the wind to blow that way.⁵⁶

The document further says "hostile elements in the provinces-patent or latent must be eliminated particularly when their only power depends on central patronage".⁵⁷ There was no room for those forces that opposed the One Unit scheme or disagreed with it. All the opposition forces whether they were political or non-political were strategically eliminated from all the provinces of West Pakistan except Punjab.⁵⁸ In fact the opposition to One Unit was not acceptable to Punjabi politicians who were at the forefront in support of One Unit. Malik Firoz Khan speaking in support of One Unit not only ridiculing the Pathans, but also pointing out to the opposition of Bacha Khan to One Unit said:

Sardar Abdur Rashid, was a great favourite and a resolution in support of this One-Unit was passed in his Legislature. Then, the Pathans who, like the Scotchmen, take a little time to see through things. They say it is very dangerous to tell a Scotchman a joke on Saturday, why? Because he is sure to see it the next day and start laughing in Church. The Pathans agreed first; but then they thought over the matter and now they are against it. I assure you, Sir, you cannot say that there are no two sides to a question. There are political parties to exploit this situation in order to throw mud at each other. The Frontier position' is

⁵⁵Herbert Feldman, *From Crises to Crises: Pakistan 1962-1969* (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1972), 203.

⁵⁶One Unit Document as reprinted in Malik, *The Politics of One Unit*, 119-140.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Punjab was the only province that did not oppose the One Unit. The secret document says that the enthusiastic political workers in Punjab must be organised and put in readiness whenever needed. Ibid.

very awkward because there is Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan a very popular leader roaming about and making speeches, but the Muslim' Leaguers are trying to stick to their seats here. Why don't some of them also go there and counteract the propaganda made by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the Frontier.⁵⁹

All the political leaders and activists were arrested and put behind bars in all provinces of West Pakistan including Balochistan. For example, the prominent Baloch leader, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo survived 15 years in jails due to his opposition to the One Unit scheme. During the military regime of Ayub Khan concentration camps were operated in Balochistan where the opponents of One Unit and military regime were kept.⁶⁰

As noted above that Balochistan States Union was merged with Balochistan, in order to pay the way for a greater merger into One Unit. This scheme was also devised by the central government as the secret document reveals 'we should concentrate on a preliminary merger campaign'⁶¹, in Balochistan. Instead of introducing political and economic reforms and elevating the status of Balochistan as a province, it was merged in the One Unit. Due to the policies of central government, Balochistan became the least developed province by 1971 economically as compare to the other provinces of Pakistan. The political situation also did not improve and the central government instead of election, nominated only one representative from the Balochistan States Union. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, prior to the establishment of West Pakistan province, passed a bill known as 'The Representation of States and Tribal Areas Bill 1956' in which it stipulated that four representatives of Balochistan States Union would form a panel of three persons and then send it to the Secretary of the Constituent Assembly, the Constituent Assembly would then

⁵⁹Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, The Establishment of West Pakistan Bill, Friday 26 August, 1955, 328.

⁶⁰West Pakistan, West Pakistan Assembly Debates, 23 June 1962 (Ahmed Nawaz Bugti).

⁶¹Secret Document as reprinted in Rizwan Malik, *Politics of One Unit*, 119-140.

nominate one person among them to represent Balochistan States Union in the Constituent Assembly. This could be linked with central government's policy of 'clearing the decks'. The central government relied on nomination and therefore decreased the chances of viable opposition to One Unit scheme in the Constituent Assembly from Balochistan (Balochistan States Union). The nomination of representative from the Balochistan States Union was criticised even by the member of Constituent Assembly from other provinces Shri Dharendra Nath Datta, criticizing the report of States Negotiating Committee's Report in the Constituent Assembly he said "but, the whole question is as to who will elect the representatives... Whether the Rulers of the States will send the representatives or the people shall elect the representatives themselves."⁶²

The representative was the nominated by the central government in order to bring reforms in Balochistan States Union, one of the backward areas that the State's negotiating Committee, but whether the reforms really took place can be estimate from speech of Shri Dharendra Nath Datta in the Constituent Assembly while criticising the Committee's report and pointing out Lesbela is a case he states:

With regard to Les Bela, one of the most important States of Balochistan, as you have seen from the report, I wish to point out that the area of the State is 7,043 sq. miles and the population is 167,073. We got a report-I do not know whether any improvement has been made-that a representation was made to the Honourable the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, in the year 1948. I do not know whether any improvement has been affected. This report was submitted to the Honourable the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Secretary, on behalf of the Les Bela State Muslim League Party. Les Bela, as you know, is a very important State in Balochistan, lying on the border of Karachi, the capital of Pakistan, with a wide sea coast-about 250 miles-and a large number of people live there. In that report it has been said that the Jam Sahib has now started widespread arrests throughout the State. The arrested political prisoners are forced to hard labour; their property confiscated and family members arrested and were put in kath-a wooden instrument so made as to make a person

⁶²Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Interim report of the state's Negotiating Committee Vol. VI (Karachi: Governor-General's, Friday 6 January, 1950), 25-26. Accessed November 16, 2017. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434619012_396.pdf.

motionless, the legs being locked and then thrown in scorching sun for hours. This is the manner of oppression said to be resorted to by the Ruler of that State in respect of people who have fought for the freedom of the country, and who have fought for Pakistan and who are no other than members of the Muslim League Party. Then, Sir, the whole administration, it is stated, is confined to a few illiterate persons, namely, the Jam Sahib and his Wazirs. The Rulers themselves are the worst oppressors and the people have not tasted freedom. If the Rulers send representatives to this House, they would not be proper representatives. It is better that this is made clear. The report is silent on that point. We want to know from the Honourable the Prime Minister their method of sending representatives to our House who will be here to frame the constitution of our State. This is very necessary. If the Rulers themselves send the representatives, they cannot be called the representatives of the people living in the States.⁶³

Paradoxically the scheme of One Unit was linked to development and progress, but almost all colonial legacies remained undisturbed and the officials in Balochistan had decided that tribal system in Balochistan i.e. Sardari System, Jirga System and Levy System would be enforced even after the creation of the scheme of One Unit.⁶⁴

After the creation of One Unit the structure of government in Pakistan became unitary and the central government became more powerful. The one Unit Bill which was passed by the Constituent Assembly empowered the Governor of West Pakistan the 'judge, the jury, and also at the same time executioner. He could bring changes and modifications in laws passed by the West Pakistan assembly, but also those passed by the central assembly. He could create laws through amendments having permanent nature. The Governor had these powers for six months; however, he exercised these powers arbitrarily till the end of One Unit government. In this way Balochistan became more powerless in One Unit government. The Governor of West Pakistan became the sole authority in dealing all issues related to Balochistan.

⁶³Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Interim report of the state's Negotiating Committee Vol. VI (Karachi: Governor-General's Press Friday 6 January, 1950), 25-26. Accessed November 16, 2017. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1434619012_396.pdf

⁶⁴Balochistan Secretariat Records, Basta 27.7.624-S/51.1951: Balochistan Sibi Camp to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, 10 February 1955.

Chapter 4

Opposition to One Unit in Balochistan

The Baloch nationalists were not satisfied with the status of their province from 1947 to 1955. They demanded that Balochistan should be given its constitutional status and granted provincial autonomy. The central government denied such demands. Indeed, the constitutional status of Balochistan was kept in lure. Contrary to providing provincial autonomy and constitutional status, the central government merged Balochistan into One Unit in 1955 when the four provinces unified into One Unit. Balochistan was one of the provinces that resisted this forceful merger into what was called West Pakistan. Indeed, the nature of resistance was different from the other province that resisted One Unit. Different because in the case of Balochistan it was once divided and then again preliminary remerged prior to One Unit. The other reason why was the resistance unique in Balochistan was that it was in more organized and militant shape.

The basic aim of implementing the One Unit scheme was to exclude all the forces which would oppose this very scheme. The secret document reveals the strategy how to establish this scheme and also how to exclude any opposition forces.

The document states:

The first phase is an immediate one. It is a negative one. It consists in clearing the decks. All obvious 'committed' obstacles in the way of 'one unit' must be removed. In political terms our country is insufficiently developed. In this atmosphere a clear and firm indication of which way the wind is blowing does actually help the wind to blow that way.¹

There was no room for those forces that opposed the One Unit scheme or disagreed with it. All the opposition forces whether they were political or non-political were

¹One Unit Document as reprinted in Malik, *The Politics of One Unit*, 119-140.

strategically eliminated from all the provinces of West Pakistan except Punjab.² In fact the opposition to One Unit was not acceptable to Punjabi politicians who were at the forefront in support of One Unit. Following is the speech of Malik Firoz Khan Noon a member of Constituent Assembly from Punjab regarding the opponents of One Unit he said:

The Frontier's position is very awkward because there is Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan a very popular leader roaming about and making speeches, but the Muslim' Leaguers are trying to stick to their seats here. Why don't some of them also go there and counteract the propaganda made by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the Frontier.³

Frontier's position was awkward because Bacha Khan was one of members of Constituent Assembly who had opposed the idea of One Unit ever since "The Establishment of West Pakistan Bill" was introduced in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and had started the campaign against the scheme of One Unit. Why was Bacha Khan roaming and making speeches? What was the propaganda of Bacha Khan that Malik Firoz Khan Noon was pointing out? It was not propaganda in strict sense rather this veteran politician was just pointing out that One Unit will lead to a unitary form government and it does not suit to the contemporary problems of the country. Bacha Khan was campaigning against the One Unit not only outside the Constituent Assembly, he also spoke against the forceful merger of West Pakistan in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

There was no room for the opponents of One Unit scheme the secret document says, "Hostile elements in the provinces-potent or latent must be eliminated particularly when their only power depends on central patronage".⁴ Thus in those provinces and units where hostile elements exist would be eliminated and Balochistan

²Punjab was the only province that did not oppose the One Unit.

³Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, The Establishment of West Pakistan Bill, Friday 26 August, 1955, 328.

⁴One Unit Document as reprinted in Malik, *The Politics of One Unit*, 119-140

was one among other provinces of Pakistan where One Unit was opposed. There was strong protest against Suhrawardy when he arrived in Quetta for election campaign because he was propagating a pro- One Unit stance.⁵ Indeed here the opposition to One Unit was stronger than the other parts of Pakistan. The opposition to One Unit was resisted in a more pronounced physical form and where the authority of the central government was openly defied.⁶

All the political leaders and activists were arrested and put behind bars in all provinces of West Pakistan including Balochistan. For example, the prominent Baloch leader, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo survived 15 years in jails due to his opposition to the One Unit scheme. During the military regime of Ayub Khan concentration camps were operated in Balochistan where the opponents of One Unit and military regime were kept.⁷

On 1st August 1955 a significant political development occurred in NWFP where the Khudai Khidmatgars (Red shirts) and Awami League together formed the Anti-One Unit Front. The Anti-Unit Front rapidly expanded its base to Balochistan and attracted Wror Pashtun led by Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai and Ustoman Gal led by Abdul Karim and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo to its fold⁸. The Anti-One Unit Front refused to accept West Pakistan as a monolithic entity and feared that the scheme of One Unit fundamentally aimed that the smaller provinces “were being denied their constitutional, national and economic rights.”⁹ Within two years the political manifesto of the Anti-Unit Front became popular in the minor provinces of the West Pakistan and soon another major political development surfaced in the minor

⁵Pakistan Times 7 September as cited by Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and State in Pakistan*,

⁶Khan, *The Politic of Identity*, 116.

⁷National Assembly of Pakistan Assembly Debates, Vol. I, 21 June 1962. Attaullah Mengal. 166-167.

⁸Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo*, (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre University of Karachi, 2009) 44.

⁹Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism Its Origin and Development* (Quetta: Royal Book Company, 2004), 279

provinces of West Pakistan with the formation of National Awami Party in 1957 and united all the political forces on one point agenda.¹⁰ The manifesto of NAP clearly mentioned that it was definitely committed to the dissolution of the One Unit plan and attainment of a federation with provincial autonomy. Moreover, the immediate rise of NAP to the national stature of Pakistan, its sustained opposition to the plan of One Unit, its strong pro-democratic stance and its manifested anti-imperial struggle were received with great alarm.¹¹ The chiefs of two important Baloch tribes Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bukhsh Marri remained the prominent NAP leaders from Balochistan who continued to abolish One Unit from the West Pakistan and therefore both were removed by the Pakistani state from the sardari of the Mengal and Marri tribes respectively¹². Ayub Khan banned all political parties in Pakistan but NAP in particular came under a harsh crackdown from the martial administrators of Pakistan. Although the martial law regime had banned all political activities, NAP-Balochistan remained active under the NAP president Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo not only against One Unit but also against the martial law regime of Ayub Khan, the activities which finally resulted in the arrest of the top NAP leadership of Balochistan, including Bizenjo, and were put under the custody of army in Quli Camp¹³. The Balochistan chapter of the NAP repeatedly demanded the dissolution of One Unit in the political demonstrations all over Balochistan and the establishment of a federation with full autonomy of the federating units except in the spheres of currency, foreign affairs and defence.

¹⁰Waseem, *Politics and State in Pakistan*, 118-119.

¹¹Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions*, 47.

¹²Siddiqui, *The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan* 64.

¹³Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions*, 50

Martial Law, One Unit and Balochistan

The era of Ayub Khan from October 1958 to March 1969 is very interesting because on the one hand One Unit was imposed and on the other hand military government was imposed throughout Pakistan. The Baloch leaders opposed the One Unit scheme in the both the newly elected National Assembly of Pakistan and West Pakistan Assembly in which they were indirectly elected. This era is also of significance because Baloch leaders such as Shah Mohammad Marri and Nauroz Khan started an organized guerrilla war against the Pakistani state. Ayub Khan claimed that One Unit was his scheme and he could not tolerate any kind of resistance to this scheme. The speeches of these Baloch leaders are very important because for the first time the Baloch leadership was given opportunity to raise their voice against the oppression of Pakistani state and the people of Balochistan were not given their democratic rights for which they were struggling since the inception of Pakistan. But the speeches of Baloch nationalist leaders on the floor of newly elected National Assembly of Pakistan deny such progress and development as far as Balochistan is concerned. It was a dismal period for the people of Balochistan to survive economically and politically within the Pakistani state. However, many historians argue that Pakistan witnessed progress and development during Ayub's era.¹⁴

Ayub Khan further accelerated the policy of 'clearing the decks' and all opposition forces whether they were elected or non-elected were arrested or restricted to enter their native lands. Immediately after the imposition of Martial Law, Prince Karim, the brother of Khan of Kalat was arrested and nobody knew about his whereabouts until Ghous Baksh Bizenjo made a submission in the assembly in 1966

¹⁴For details see S. Akbar Zaidi, *Political Economy of Pakistan: A Political Economy Perspective* 3rd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005).

and was told that he would be kept in jail for another one year.¹⁵ The reason for his arrest was his opposition to One Unit scheme and had formed a political party which opposed the One Unit scheme. Khair Buksh Marri was not allowed to enter his own constituency¹⁶ after the completion of first session of the Assembly. The reason given by the state officials were to keep ‘good order and good governance’ in the area. A submission was made in this regard by Chaudhary Fazal Elahi in the National Assembly in which it was stated that he had “‘certain political views and on account of holding those political views he had been victimized.’”¹⁷ In 1963 Khair Baksh Marri and Atta Ullah Mengal were kept in jail, although they both were the elected members of National Assembly. In 1964 another member of West Pakistan Assembly, Mir Abdul Baqi Baloch, from Balochistan was arrested due to his criticism of One Unit scheme. All these elected and non-elected members of Balochistan were arrested on the basis of false charges. The only reason why these Baloch political activists were arrested, tortured, detained was that they opposed the dictates of Ayub Khan and strongly opposed One Unit scheme. The speech of Khair Buksh Marri in the newly elected National Assembly of Pakistan in this regard is very relevant in which he criticised the so called ‘Green Revolution’ of Ayub Khan and compared it with Balochistan. Khair Buksh Marri said:

Well, this really was a revolution when men were tortured. Why was it not published in the papers? They kept it as secret. Why are people tortured in camps and for about six months or so nobody got to know anything about it, and people were surprised when they heard about it later. We consider these revolutionary leaders no more than American financial dictators.¹⁸

¹⁵National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 5 December 1962, 453-454. Accessed December 27, 2017. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1444290280_554.pdf

¹⁶Khair Buksh Marri was elected from Quetta Division to represent the Marri and Bugti tribes in the National Assembly of Pakistan.

¹⁷National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 5 December 1962, 453-454. Accessed December 27, 2017. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1444290280_554.pdf

¹⁸National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol 1, 1962, 21 June 1962, 323-324, Printed by the Manager Government of Pakistan Press, Rawalpindi, 1963.

He also spoke about provincialism:

How can we talk of provincialism as being a curse? When provinces existed people voted for them; now instead of having provincial boundaries provincial is considered as a curse, a sin, we cannot understand why? It is hardly a provincial matter; it is almost individual classes now. If the provinces were a curse then I am sure the people who had lived for centuries in the former provinces would not have opted for this country. If that was a hindrance to achieving Pakistan I doubt very much whether we should have Pakistan at all. Because of these provinces we have been able to achieve a state which we call Pakistan. It is fine for people to talk about anti-provincialism. They can now send their surplus people to Balochistan where they can take mines and other things. If it is curse, why in East Pakistan, Balochistan and Sind all of us seem to express these views and opinions? Only a few seem to against it and the Majority in the North West Frontier Province, Balochistan, Sind and East Pakistan all feel the need for it.¹⁹

It is obvious from the above speech that Baloch leaders did not agree with the military regime on contemporary political matters such as the legitimacy of this regime and One Unit. Ironically, they were elected to the newly elected National Assembly of Pakistan, but later both of them were victimized by the military regime immediately after the conclusion of the first session of this new assembly. Khair Baksh Marri was not allowed to enter his constituency and Atta Ullah Mengal too was arrested after his criticism of military regime.²⁰ It was the following speech that Atta Ullah Mengal delivered in the first session of the National Assembly and was later arrested:

Soon after the so-called bloodless revolution of October 1958-they call it a bloodless revolution. Our homes were raided for full six months 15,000 men of our armed forces tested the arms received in American Military Aid on us. They did not stop short either at firing their rifles and guns or showing their bombs upon us who were none other than their own compatriots. Soon a campaign of arrests was started and our benefactors threw hundreds of prisoners into what was called the National Camp.²¹

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰During Ayub's regime all political activists were victimised. It was not limited only to Baloch political activists. All those who disagreed with military regime were arrested, tortured and victimised. For details on this issue see Saadia Toor, *The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2001).

²¹National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. I, (Rawalpindi: Manager Government of Pakistan, 19 June 1962), 166-167.

He also provided details about the concentration camps established after 1958 Martial Law. Mengal said:

After a year's torture they could not establish anything against them and were finally convinced of the baseless of their conviction. . . The prisoners who were released their camp were prosecuted under the Martial Law Regulations in the Military Courts on false charges of murder, spreading false rumors and indulging in anti-state propaganda. Seven prisoners were hanged seven were awarded life imprisonment and many other sentenced to fine or awarded other Punishments.²²

It is clear that One Unit was not very prevalent among all the provinces of West Pakistan except Punjab and there was strong criticism against it among the political leaders of Sind, N.W.F.P and Balochistan. The leaders of these provinces formed 'Anti-One Unit Front' later it was changed into Pakistan National Party and finally organised in the form National Awami Party (NAP).²³ Not to mention even the Muslim League and ruling Republican Party had started to disband the One Unit scheme which created fears of civil disobediences in the provinces against One Unit scheme and this became the primary cause of imposition of 1958 Military coup.²⁴ In such scenario Ayub could not reconcile with Baloch leadership's criticism to One Unit scheme which he claimed his own. The criticism of Baloch leaders seems fear because Balochistan lingered as the least developed region even in a decade that is considered as a 'decade of development' in terms socio-economic development. By and large Balochistan had agricultural land and given the industrial prejudice practiced in this era²⁵, it could not be anticipated to 'develop'.

Another reason that could be put forward that why Balochistan did not develop economically was that all industrial houses were located in Punjab and Karachi as specified above and therefore the people of Balochistan like other marginalized provinces were not included in the decision making of industrialization

²²Ibid

²³Sayed, *One Unit Ki Kahani*, 27.

²⁴Malik, *Politics of One Unit*, 94-104.

²⁵Omar Noman, *The Political Economy of Pakistan, 1947-85* (London: KPI Limited, 1988), 18.

and development.²⁶ It is obvious that the owners of these industrial houses were not in Balochistan and they played important role in shaping the economy of the country in the early decades in which Balochistan was completely absent. Thus, industrial development took in an imbalance shape in which the post-colonial state did not give any attention to Balochistan and other backward region. Due to this imbalance economic and industrial development, backward areas like Balochistan could not be included in the process of development and industrialization because it was not 'developed' and therefore could not support industrialization.²⁷

It is self-evident that the ethnic and regional imbalances in Pakistan were the product of capitalist development complemented by the industrial imbalance.²⁸ Hence the Baloch leaders' criticism seems sound regarding One Unit and miserable treatment in terms of economic development as compare to the other regions of the country. Explaining the reasons of underdevelopment and exclusion of the people of Balochistan from the decision-making Atta Ullah Mengal said in the National Assembly of Pakistan:

Successive Ministries over the years pledged themselves to the service of the country, but it is a pity that this unfortunate land remained neglected. I think the only reason for this indifference is that Balochistan in proportion to its population did not take part in the political manoeuvrings which was the only way to gain one's ends in Pakistan.²⁹

It is clear that Balochistan remained backward not only economically, but also politically. The representatives from Balochistan were not allowed to express the resentment of the people of Balochistan. Some of them were not allowed to enter their constituencies and others were jailed in the decade of development. The reason they

²⁶Stanley A. Kochanek, *Interest Groups and Development, Business and Politics in Pakistan* (Oxford: University Press, 1983), 170.

²⁷Zaidi, "Regional imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan: Some indications", 13.

²⁸Naved Hamid and Akmal Hussain, "Regional Inequalities and capitalist development: Pakistan's experience," in *Regional imbalances and National Question in Pakistan*, ed. S. Akbar Zaidi (Lahore: Vanguard, 1992), 1.

²⁹National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 166-167.19 June 1962, 166.

were not allowed to express these resentments was that Baloch leadership did not agree with the narrative of the state. They criticised the economic and political policies of the military regime. They argued that Basic Democracies were another political manoeuvring to concentrate powers in the centre and deny the legitimate rights of provinces.³⁰ The scheme of One Unit was the rule of few and no room for those who oppose it as the secret documents says “we must silence and render inoperative all opposition of which we morally are convinced that it is motivated by evil.”³¹

With the prospect of British departure from India approached, the Baloch leaders became active with regard to the future status of Balochistan. But even in this regard the aspirations of the Baloch leaders were unmistakable, and the Khan of Kalat made it clear that the state of Kalat wanted full-fledged independence, arguing that the states of Nepal and Kalat had the legal status different from the other princely states in the British-Indian Empire, in the sense that all other princely states were directly in treaty-relationships with the British-Indian government at New Delhi, while the two states of Kalat and Nepal maintained treaty-relationships directly with the Whitehall, the seat of British government in London.³² The Khan of Kalat also put the matter before the Cabinet Mission³³ in 1946, arguing that the states succeeding the British Raj would inherit the treaty relationships made with the New Delhi and none of those made directly with the Whitehall. The Khan of Kalat maintained:

... the Kalat state is an independent sovereign state... that being an independent state, the Khan, his government, and his people can never agree to Kalat being included in any form of Indian union; and that with the termination of the treaty with the British government, the Kalat state would revert to its pre-treaty position of complete independence, and will be free to choose its own course for the future".³⁴

³¹One Unit secret document as reprinted in Malik, *The Politics of One Unit*, 119-140.

³²Titus and Swidler, *knights not Pawn*, 58.

³³The Cabinet Mission finessed the future status of the princely states with non-committal statements, leaving the question of the princely states in the lurch.

³⁴Ibid. 267-8

Similarly, after the announcement of the 3rd June Plan, several meetings were held between the future Government of Pakistan, the outgoing British Indian government, and the representative of Kalat State to decide the future of Kalat State. Thus, on August 4, 1947, a Round Table Conference was held which was chaired by Lord Mountbatten, the Pakistani side was represented by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, and the Kalat state was represented by the Khan of Kalat. During the Conference, Pakistan recognized the "different" and "independent" status of the Kalat state, in so far as it had treaty relations with the British Government; it was agreed upon to obtain legal opinion to decide whether Pakistan could be a successor to such treaties and leased areas; and, once legal opinion was obtained the two parties--i.e. the Kalat State, and Pakistan-- would hold further talks, while signing, in the meanwhile, a "standstill agreement", over the question of leased territories.³⁵ On August 11, another treaty was signed between Pakistan and the Kalat state, whereby Pakistan recognized the "independence" status of the latter was different from the rest of the Indian States in that it had treaty relations with British Government.³⁶ The *New York Times* reported that "under the agreement Pakistan recognized Kalat as an independent and sovereign state different from other Indian States."³⁷ Thus on August 12, the Khan of Kalat declared "independence", and promulgated a constitution, namely the Government of Kalat State Act 1947.³⁸ However, the Pakistani state rejected the Khan's declaration and demanded the unconditional accession of Kalat.³⁹ The Khan put the question of "accession" before the two houses of the Kalat State legislature-- *Dar-ul-Umara* and *Dar-ul-Awam*-- both the houses rejected it. Ghaus

³⁵B.M. Kutty, ed., *In Search of Solutions: The Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo* (Karachi: Pakistan Labour Trust and University of Karachi's Pakistan Study Centre, 2009), 29.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Bukhari, *Pakistan, Ethnic Nationalism and Politics of Integration*, 122.

³⁸Kutty, *In Search of Solutions*. 29.

³⁹Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 24.

Bakhsh Bizenjo, the leader of House in Dar-ul Awam, argued that "we have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the fact that we are Muslims requires us to be amalgamated with Pakistan then Afghanistan and Iran should also be amalgamated with it"⁴⁰. Finally, within a year, on 1st April 1948, the Pakistani troops entered Kalat to "secure" the accession of the State, the Khan, perhaps under duress, agreed to join the state. However, his brother, Prince Abdul Karim, "retired to the mountains" and launched a guerrilla war against the Pakistani state. The Kalat state national party extended its support to the guerillas, therefore, it was banned by the Government. In 1951, the Liaquat Ali Khan Government instituted a reform committee to carve a future for Balochistan. In line with its committee's recommendations, the Government created the Balochistan States Union comprising Kalat, Makran, Kharan, and Lasbella. For the nationalists it was "a step forward towards the creation of One Unit, and a lure to the Khan of Kalat to trap him into the eternal oblivion of one unit."⁴¹ This first spell of Baloch insurgency was nipped in the bud by 1950 with the surrender of Abdul Karim.⁴² Yet, the Baloch grievances continued to grow thereby causing further political restlessness in Balochistan. The "nationalists" once again burst open into armed rebellion against the scheme of "One Unit", a scheme of the Muslim League regime, which aggressively pursued the centralizing policy, and widely perceived in Balochistan as a step towards framing a monolithic polity of the heterogeneous West Pakistan to counter the demographic majority of the East Pakistan.⁴³ As a matter of fact, the scheme of One Unit, which the West Pakistani leaders, particularly from "Mohajir-Punjabi elite", saw would effectively deal with the numerical majority of the Bengalis and would bring political parity in the two wings,

⁴⁰Kutty, *In Search of Solutions*, 29.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Khan, *The Politic of Identity*, 115.

⁴³Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 27.

proved to be one of most important "milestones" that ultimately led to the cessation East Pakistan.⁴⁴ The central government correctly perceived beforehand that the opposition to the scheme of One Unit would emerge more intensively from Balochistan. As a prelude to the larger integration of the Baloch States Union into the administrative structure of West Pakistan, Khan of Kalat was ordered to reach Karachi to meet the "Minister for States and Frontier Regions", where he was clearly told that he could not leave the room wherein he was sitting and Karachi until the Khan agreed to the merger of Kalat in One Unit. The very first clause of the integrating agreement put an end to the political history of Kalat as a state:

His Highness the Khan-i-Azam cedes to the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan his sovereignty and all his rights, authority and power as President of the Council of Rulers of the Union, together with all his territories including the territories known as leased area.⁴⁵

The Consolidation Act of the West Pakistan was passed on 30th September 1955, and on 14th October of the same year, as the Governor-General officially proclaimed the merger of heterogeneous West Pakistan into a single administrative unit, six out of the ten princely states⁴⁶ in Pakistan had become a history.⁴⁷ From the outset, the Pakistani state had conceived five major objections,⁴⁸ that would arise from the minor provinces that would be integrated in One Unit, which have been thus summarized by Rizwan Malik: "(1) the fear of the Punjab domination; (2) elimination of the candidates from smaller provinces in competition with the better educated Punjabis; (3) administrative complexity and remoteness; (4) the effect of One Unit on the distribution of lands developed in Sindh; and (5) the fear of suppression of provincial cultures."⁴⁹ Indeed,

⁴⁴Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions*, 38.

⁴⁵Wilcox, *Pakistan*, 186.

⁴⁶The six states included Kharan, Makran, Las Bela, Kalat, Bahawalpur and Khairpur.

⁴⁷Wilcox, *Pakistan* 196.

⁴⁸As it happened, the opposition to the scheme of One Unit from the minor provinces was indeed on those lines.

⁴⁹Malik, *The Politics of One Unit*, 44.

Balochistan was the only province where the scheme of One Unit was resisted in a more pronounced physical form and where the authority of the central government was openly defied⁵⁰. In fact, suspicion ran through Punjab, which was controlling the military and bureaucratic power of the central government that the three minor provinces might make the same cause with the East Pakistani Bengalis against them. The violent opposition to the One Unit plan was immediate in the province of Balochistan. Abdul Karim had just returned Balochistan in 1955 after completing his prison term and immediately made the “*Ustoman Gal*” (Peoples’ Party), which vehemently opposed the formation of One Unit and made the demand of the restoration of the "unified" Balochistan. What is more, the Khan of Kalat also immediately revived his claim for independent Kalat and the other Baloch areas that were taken away by the colonial state and mobilized demonstrations widely in Balochistan against the formation of One Unit. The resistance against the One Unit, indeed more severely in Balochistan was also at the same time vehement in other smaller provinces as well, and hence a movement against the formation of One Unit was gradually building up throughout Pakistan.⁵¹ Immediately after the establishment of One Unit, political crisis was gradually growing in Balochistan, until on 6th October 1958, a day before martial law was declared all over Pakistan, we had another march of the Pakistani army on Kalat and another capitulation of the Khan of Kalat along with three hundred other Baloch political leadership.⁵²

Following the establishment of the military regime of Ayub Khan, for the next two years Jhalawan and the districts around it saw violent encounters between the Baloch Guerrilla fighters and the Pakistani army. The intensity of the insurgency was such that tanks and artillery were deployed throughout the Jhalawan district, and

⁵⁰Khan, *The Politics of Identity*, 116.

⁵¹Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions*, 46.

⁵²Ibid. 47.

finally with a view to curtail insurgency the army blockaded all the mountain passes from Jhalawan to Sarwan. This blockade resulted in the Battle of Wad on 10th October 1958 between the army and the insurgents led by the ninety years old Nauroz Khan of the Zehri tribe, who proclaimed to fight until One Unit plan is abolished. Nauroz Khan kept the fire of insurgency flaming in Jhalawan and the adjacent districts for one whole year, until he was captured by army and four years later he died in 1964 in Hyderabad Central Jail.⁵³ The second spell of insurgency in Balochistan resulted in more militarization of Balochistan and at key points, new garrisons were set up in the interior of the province. The insurgency in Balochistan, however, did not come to stop with the imprisonment of Nauroz Khan and the insurgents, called *parari*, continued their activities; so much so that the *pararis* were running twenty-two base camps over the area spreading from Jhalawan in the south to the Marri and Bugti territories in the north⁵⁴, and Ali Muhammad Mengal, Mir Hazar Ramkhani and Sher Muhammad Marri were the chief leaders of the *pararis*. The *pararis* continued their activities until 1969 when Yahya Khan finally agreed to abolish One Unit. Having said that, the scheme of One Unit was not only militantly resisted in Balochistan but the fact of the matter is that it was widely resisted with equal intensity on the political front as well.

On 1st August 1955 a significant political development occurred in NWFP where the Khudayi Khidmatgars (Red shirts) and Awami League together formed the Anti-Unit Front. The Anti-Unit Front rapidly expanded its base to Balochistan and attracted Wror Pashtun led by Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai and Ustoman Gal led by Abdul Karim and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo to its fold⁵⁵. The Anti-One Unit Front refused to accept West Pakistan as a monolithic entity and feared that the scheme of One Unit fundamentally aimed that the smaller provinces “were being denied their

⁵³Ibid. 50-51

⁵⁴Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, 112.

⁵⁵Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions*, 44.

constitutional, national and economic rights.”⁵⁶ Within two years the political program of the Anti-Unit Front became popular in the minor provinces of the West Pakistan and soon another major political development surfaced in the minor provinces of West Pakistan with the formation of National Awami Party in 1957. The manifesto of NAP clearly mentioned that it was definitely committed to the dissolution of the One Unit plan and attainment of a federation with provincial autonomy. Moreover, the immediate rise of NAP to the national stature of Pakistan, its sustained opposition to the plan of One Unit, its strong pro-democratic stance and its manifested anti-imperial struggle were received with great alarm.⁵⁷ The chiefs of two important Baloch tribes Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bukhsh Marri remained the prominent NAP leaders from Balochistan who continued to abolish One Unit from the West Pakistan and were therefore both were removed by the Pakistani state from the sardari of the Mengal and Marri tribes respectively⁵⁸. Ayub Khan banned all political parties in Pakistan but NAP in particular came under a harsh crackdown from the martial administrators of Pakistan. Although the martial law regime had banned all political activities, NAP-Balochistan remained active under the NAP president Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo not only against One Unit but also against the martial law regime of Ayub Khan, the activities which finally resulted in the arrest of the top NAP leadership of Balochistan, including Bizenjo, and were put under the custody of army in Quli Camp⁵⁹. The Balochistan chapter of the NAP repeatedly demanded the dissolution of One Unit in the political demonstrations all over Balochistan and the establishment of a federation with full autonomy of the federating units except in the spheres of corruption, foreign affairs and defense.

⁵⁶ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism Its Origin and Development*, 279.

⁵⁷ Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions*, 47.

⁵⁸ Siddiqui, *The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan* 64.

⁵⁹ Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions*, 50.

The stance of NAP on the autonomy of the federating units struck great influence on the nationalist politics in Balochistan, hence the Baloch nationalist political forces brought the political programs within the ambit of resistance politics in Pakistan and provided the Baloch nationalist tendencies the platform for alternative discussion on how the Pakistani state should actually be. Thus 1960s turned out to be highly decisive in the history of Baloch nationalism and intensively resisted the attempt of the Pakistani state to replace the Baloch sardars with the state protégées. The political activities of the Baloch nationalists affiliated with NAP left a great influence on the student politics in Balochistan as well, and it was during this period, precisely in 1967, that a major political development was made with the establishment of Baloch Students Organization (BSO). Moreover, the Baloch press and literature reached to the level it was never achieved before. In late 1968 the opposition parties launched the “Democratic Action Committee” (DAC) for the full restoration of the democratic rights of the people of Pakistan and the dissolution of One Unit⁶⁰. Ayub being pushed to the corner by 1969, with people of Pakistan up in arms against him, Ayub asked his C-in-C Yahya Khan to impose another martial law in Pakistan but Yahya responded that it was not possible in face of growing resentment in both wings of Pakistan and instead asked Ayub to hand over power to the armed forces, which Ayub accepted and resigned as the president of Pakistan and transferred power to Yahya Khan on 25 March 1969⁶¹. The growing political pressure in the smaller federating units of the West Pakistan and a war of independence in East Pakistan, Yahya Khan abolished One Unit in West Pakistan, released the Baloch leaders, withdrew the army from Balochistan, and agreed to establish the unified Baloch

⁶⁰Ibid. 63.

⁶¹Ibid. 65.

province. The abolishment of One Unit and the restoration of unified Balochistan was indeed a great achievement of the Baloch nationalist politics in 1960s.⁶²

The opposition to One Unit organised political scale. Baloch nationalism organised on new political patterns. The Baloch political personalities had the chance to interact with other veteran politicians across the country. They successfully fought against the forceful merger of their province into West Pakistan. It was due to this political organisation and strength that they not only secured autonomy for Balochistan and NAP- Balochistan secured majority of seats in the first provincial elections in 1970.

⁶²Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism Its Origin and Development*, 281.

Conclusion

After independence Balochistan faced several challenges with reference to its political, economic and constitutional position. Likewise, all constitutional and political developments agreed with Balochistan led to diminish. Between 1947 and 1955 Balochistan was ruled for eight years under the suzerainty of Assistant to Governor General. He had the complete say in the political decision making of Balochistan. In fact, when Balochistan acceded to Pakistan in 1947, there succeeded four types of different administration: (1) Tribal areas, (2) Agency territories, (3) British Balochistan and (4) Native States. Balochistan was mired into Councils and Reforms Committees. The name of Balochistan and Balochistan States Union were mentioned in the report of Basic Principles Committee. It mentioned that Balochistan and Balochistan States Union would be provided Provincial assembly and complete provincial autonomy. However, this did not realize in practical shape and Balochistan was merged into One Unit.

In 1948 a special body was formed namely Baluchistan Advisory Council in order to pacify the political grievances of Balochistan. Rather finally it did not work properly and disappeared from the scene in 1951 this council was dissolved without any fruitful results. Following the failure of the council, in 1950 Balochistan Reforms Committee was made. The primary objective of the committee was aimed at bringing all backward units of the Pakistan to the level of other units. It was also included in the committee that Balochistan would be given a separate legislature and identity. Consequently, this committee seemed to fail similarly what the others encountered and Baluchistan remained “a centrally administered area”.

In March 1952, the post-colonial state of Pakistan created Balochistan States Union. The areas of Kalat State were divided into four sub-states i.e. Lasbela, Kharan,

Mekran and Kalat. And these states were preliminary merged in 1954 into Baluchistan. In fact, this was an initial step to merge Baluchistan and Baluchistan States Union into One Unit as a whole. After merging Baluchistan into One Unit, it lost whatever territorial identity it had and took 23 years to grant the provincial status to Baluchistan. It is very ironical that Balochistan States Union was merged into Balochistan which had no provincial autonomy and constitutional status.

The merger of Balochistan into One Unit was decided by the Agent to the Governor General and later approved by the Shahi Jirga and Quetta Municipal Committee. In fact, this merger was opposed not only by the Khan of Kalat, but also all the political forces in Balochistan. All the political parties and political personalities opposed the merger of Balochistan into One Unit. They demanded that Balochistan should be given all political, economic and constitutional rights enjoyed by the other units and provinces of Pakistan. However, the central government ignored such demands from the political parties and political personalities from Balochistan and merged it into One Unit.

As Pakistan did not have a constitution and it inherited 1935 Act and later amended some of its versions. The ruling elites of West Pakistan could not come to terms with the political parties of East Bengal. The later wanted a centralized and unitary form of government while the former wanted parliamentarian and majoritarian democracy and a constitution which guarantees provincial autonomy to all units and provinces of Pakistan according to the spirits 1940 Lahore Resolutions adapted by the founding fathers of the country. However, the consensus did not develop between the West Pakistan and East Bengal over a unanimous constitution for nine years after independence. During these nine years the Agent to the Governor General dismissed several Prime Ministers and dissolved the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan

The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan which had the responsibility to form new constitution met on August, 10, 1947. The assembly could not make the constitution in early years, since the leadership of the new country was obsessed with numerous problems that the nascent state was facing. After the death of the Quid-I Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan introduced the Objectives Resolution on 7 March 1949 which outlined the basic principles of the upcoming constitution. The Objectives Resolution outlined that the new constitution would be drafted on Islamic lines. This was not acceptable to Hindu members from East Bengal; however, no heed was given to their criticism.

The Constituent Assembly also appointed a committee known as the Basic Principles Committee which was given the responsibility of constitution making for the country. On 28 September 1950, the BPC submitted its report in which equal representation was given to both wings of the country. Equal representation was given to all provinces of Pakistan including Balochistan in the House of Units. The leadership of the East Bengal rejected this report that they were not given their fair share. After a lot of considerations, the second draft of the Basic Principles Committee was presented by Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din on 22 December 1952 in the constituent Assembly. While the second report was rejected from the province of Punjab because not only was East Bengal was given equal representation in the legislature, but also it feared that East Bengal could come into alliance with the smaller provinces of West Pakistan and could make an alliance against Punjab in the future.

Pakistan's constitution dilemma was never resolved and the Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dismissed the ministry of Muslim League and ousted the Prime Minister Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din from the office. A new constitution formula was

introduced by the Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra that too did not resolve the country's constitutional problem. The issue of political autonomy got its immense importance when in the ruling Muslim League was washed out in the provincial elections of East Bengal in March 1954 by the United Front. The United Front was an alliance of different political parties. They wanted complete provincial autonomy except defence, currency and foreign policy. However, the Ministry of United Front was dissolved by the Governor General with in less than a month on 29 May under the section 92A.

The Constituent Assembly continued working on the new constitution. On 15 September Malik Froze Khan Noon presented Zonal Scheme to the Constituent Assembly. The leaders of smaller provinces of West Pakistan opposed such a move. When the Constituent Assembly was in its last phase of Constituent making, the Governor General dissolved the Constituent Assembly and declared a state of emergency on 24 October 1954. A new cabinet was appointed by the Governor General known as 'cabinet of talents'. The salient character of this cabinet was that it included top military generals were included in it. Having secured positions in the new cabinet, Ayub Khan now could easily implement One Unit scheme which had attained greater urgency after the United Front's victory.

On 22 November 1954 the Prime Minister enlisted the importance of One Unit and called the meeting in which all the Chief Ministers including the Agent to the Governor General of Balochistan were invited. Subsequently all the Provinces of West Pakistan except Balochistan passed the resolutions in favour of One Unit. In the case of Balochistan, since there was no provincial assembly the resolution in favour of One Unit was passed by the institutions established since Colonial era. In case of Balochistan it was the Shahi Jirga and Quetta Municipal Committee that decided to

merge Balochistan into One Unit. After getting approval from all the provinces, the central government appointed a commission to finalize the merger of all Province and states into One Unit till May 1955.

In general, across the country all the smaller provinces of West Pakistan opposed the One Unit and started to fight against this scheme. Bengalis, Pushtuns, and Baluch and all other ethnic groups played an important role against One Unit and particularly Baluch leaders opposed One Unit both politically and rebelliously against One Unit. The resistance to One Unit was very unique. In Balochistan One Unit was resisted militarily. In one stage it seems that Baloch fighters openly defied the authority of the state. In fact, the gorilla war was maintained throughout Baloch dominated areas till the abolition of One Unit. In 1955 the Pushtun leader Bacha Khan under the platform of Khudai-i-Khidmatgars and Bengali political parties opposed the idea of One Unit. Anti-one-unit movement across the country had larger effects on the political landscape of Balochistan. Ultimately all these political parties converted into National Awami Party. The Baluchistan's NAP section was very active in opposing the One Unit scheme. In this political front plethora of ethnicity based political parties involved. NAP's basic objective was to dissolve One Unit. Within Balochistan Khan Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai a key prominent Pushtun leader and other Baluch leaders resisted openly One Unit. Rallies, pamphlets, and other political strategies moved the idea. Finally, national political environment did not let One Unit linger for a longer period of time. Anti-One Unit political fronts and its realization on national level led to dismantle One Unit in 1969. This resistance to One Unit gave a new shape to the politics of Baluchistan and veteran politicians of Balochistan became convinced that only through proper political manoeuvrings, Baluchistan could get its due shares in the federation of Pakistan.

On Political fronts Baluch leaders namely, Khair Buksh Marri and Attaullah Mengal resisted One Unit openly in their speeches in the newly built National Assembly of Pakistan. Baloch leaders exposed not only that One Unit was not the interests of smaller provinces but only in the interests of Punjab, they also expressed vehemently in their speeches on the floor of the house that, no development occurred in Balochistan in the so called 'decade of development'. They said that only concentration camps and operations are operated in Balochistan. Another way of resistance to Unit was depicted by young Baloch Students. They formed Baloch Students Organization and played active role in the dissolution of One Unit.

In fact, Balochistan was not given provincial autonomy until 1955 and when One Unit was established the Pakistani state deprived Balochistan of whatever political identity it had. The One Unit was depicted as panacea to all contemporary problems. Infact no industrial development took place. The federal government did not introduce any mega projects that could alter the agriculture of Balochistan. Balochistan remained behind in other sectors also for example in education and health. Balochistan was excluded from all economic and political decisions taken during the imposition of One Unit. The military government of Ayub khan, in which there was no space for dissent voices, started operations against all Balochs that opposed One Unit.

Balochistan was deprived of provincial autonomy when the new state of Pakistan came into being and whatever provincial autonomy it had was denied when the One Unit scheme was implemented during 1955. Balochistan had no provincial status and power for 23 years after the creation of Pakistan. Even after the abolishment of One Unit in 1970 several areas of Balochistan were administered

under the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). Many obsolete laws created during British era were rampant.

It was pledged that the backward and poor areas of West Pakistan will be bring equal to that of developed areas such as Punjab, but Balochistan did not experience any development during One Unit and remained as backward as it was under the British colonialism. Until 1970 it did not have any University and college. The administration of Balochistan was not smooth and sufficient, because all the powers were in the hands of AGG who was responsible to the Governor General. The demand from the nationalist leadership of Balochistan to grant provincial autonomy and provincial status was denied and instead of granting provincial autonomy and provincial status, Balochistan was merged into One Unit.

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