

Indian Cold Start Strategy Implications for South Asian Stability



By

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Department of Defence and Strategic Studies

Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

2014

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**A thesis submitted to Quaid-i-Azam University in the partial fulfilment
of the requirement of the degree of**

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In

Defence and Strategic Studies

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FINAL APPROVAL

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Supervisor-----

External Examiner-----

Chairperson-----

Indian Cold Start Strategy

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**Dedicated
To
Students of
Defence and Strategic
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Cold Start Implementation

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State of Logistic and other Support to Cold Start Doctrine

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Cold Start Supposition and Limitations

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Stability Vs Instability Paradox

Stability/Instability Paradox in India Pakistan Case

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Asymmetric Conventional Military Equilibrium

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Misapprehension and Threat to Escalation Control

Significance of International Community Mediation

Cold Start and Menace of Inadvertent Escalation

Warnings of Inadvertent Escalation between India and Pakistan

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

Strategic Restraint Regime Control

The Lahore MOU and Nuclear Risk Reduction Scheme

Analysis

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IAF	Indian Air Force
IBG	Integrated Battle Group
LoC	Line of Control
NCA	National Command Authority
NFU	No First Use
NSC	National Security Council
PAF	Pakistan Air Force
PNF	Pakistan Naval Force
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
USA	United States of America

INTRODUCTION

Topic

Indian Cold Start Strategy Implications for South Asian Stability

Background / Introduction

The nuclear weapons cannot prevent war but can change its course and control of its conduct. Concern about stability are now more applicable at regional level where nuclear capability has emerged , especially in South Asia where bipolar regional rivalry has changed security dynamics and violent non state actors have created potential of triggering a war between the two already distrusting nuclear states.

Statement of the Problem

As a to get some political and military advantage out of event of Dec 13, 2001 attack on India's parliament and Jan 2002 attack on Kaluchak army camp, the Indian government staged a military mobilization along Indo-Pak border. This mobilization of 2002 shows that Indian had restructured its strategy after Kargil had graduated from defensive to proactive. India's failure to achieve political goal through coercive diplomatic action in 2002 against Pakistan brought new philosophy in Indian defence policy formulators' about the conduct of limited war under nuclear environment which has its repercussion on deterrence stability in the all ready volatile region of South Asia and state of mistrust/ misperceptions. Indian limited war doctrine is structured on two assumptions and they are firstly that Indian policy thinkers assume that asymmetric assured destruction both at conventional and nuclear levels enable India to attack Pakistan exclusive of fear of retaliation and secondly that there is sufficient space for limited actions under nuclear cover and Indians would be able to have effective escalation control.

Failure of past strategies and tactics lacked effectiveness, embarrassed Indian military policy makers after the conduct of 2001-2002 conflict. Indian operation

Parakram, they realized that the quality and arrangement of the military operation was not perfect for quick response or actual military aggression that they wanted to mount on Pakistan. In April 2004 they announced a new Indian war fighting doctrine for limited operations against Pakistan called “**Cold Start**” that would allow Indians to mobilize its considerable conventional military strength in a limited war against Pakistan.

The study deals with the Cold Start Doctrine and issues relating to its implementations. Indian efforts to achieve its political objectives by executing the CSD raised some issues like escalation control and Indian internal restraints that restricts Indians to achieve their goals. Resultantly this study will prove that Indian Limited Conventional War Doctrine Cold Start would be proactive and escalatory in nature for the region of South Asia and would bring serious repercussions for stability of South Asia.

Aim and Objectives

The Aim and Objectives of this research is to study the effects of limited war strategies between India and Pakistan on deterrence stability its likely outcome and historical events that brought two nations to brink of total war but contained due to nuclear deterrence and how the deterrence stability worked in limited war scenarios in past thus avert total wars. Also analyzing the threats of limited war between India Pakistan in order to suggest the ways to counter war threats by studying the strengths and weaknesses present in Indian conventional war capability. The efforts would be made to see different possibilities to counter the Indian Cold start doctrine in the shape of defensive and counter offensive strategies by Pakistan followed by short and long term approaches to neutralize the Indian conventional superiority.

Relevance of Study

The existing literature is mostly related to India’s limited war fighting strategy but lacks enough material in particular about limited war under nuclear deterrence. The threat to deterrence stability in case of limited war strategies by both countries is not enough to explain Indians and Pakistani management of limited wars and how they can be contained in conventional modes only to avoid threat of escalation in South Asia.

Literature Review

There is lot of literature on India Pakistan relationship. Cold Start is relatively new concept, and due to operational security reasons, limited number of articles have been analysed. These articles only provide limited insight of the doctrine in terms of its objectives and operational limitations.

“A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” by Walter C Ladwig III¹, views Cold Start as risky undertaking that has potentials to destabilize South Asia. Ladwig has viewed the recent exercises and development in Indian military for implementation of Cold Start Strategy the Indian efforts to reconstruct their existing infrastructure and bring organizational changes in military’s operational capabilities.

The thesis presented by Quinn J. Rhodes in 2010, “Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella: An Analysis of India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Its Implications for Stability of Subcontinent”², is study which is based on Indian Cold Start strategy and their problem of compellence to undertake limited war against Pakistan in nuclear shadow. Rhodes presents that the Cold Start is not an option to address Indian problem of compellence as it is associated with fundamental risk of escalation to nuclear response. As explanation given by Rhodes in Cold Start the rapid deployment, misperception, and international deception he explains that these components of in Cold Start do not have good history in Pakistan and Indian conflicts. As a result in future any undertaking of such type of action would have serious implications for strategic stability of South Asia.

¹ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

² Quinn J. Rhodes ,’ Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella: An Analysis of India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Its Implications for Stability on the Subcontinent,’ available at http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/thesis/2010/Jun_Rhodes.pdf

G.D Bakshi conducted a study, “Interface Between Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence: A Case Study for Indian Subcontinent”.³ The theme of this study is based on assumption that Pakistan is of the view that Indian conventional supremacy can be completely curtailed by Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. This could be a vital mistake as it could bring catastrophic results. It is therefore important to have interface between conventional and nuclear deterrence on the Indian subcontinent through calibrated models for escalation and credible conventional response to proxy wars.

Khurshid Khan in his work “Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia”, (2005)⁴ , analyses the problems and risks involved in the concept of conventional war under nuclear shadow in the India and Pakistan with its impact on regional stability. Khan’ paper also discusses some factors like inaccuracy in assessment of political objectives, poor intelligence on combat numeric and an unexpected conventional attack that would be chief source of escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan.

Feroz H Khan , in his article “Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia”, (2003),⁵ has narrated the previous conflict and crises were not affected by either deterrence or US influence and both factors failed to prevent the happening of crises between India and Pakistan and identifies the core problems due to which deterrence in the region is unstable. He also highlights the dispersal of weapons to ensure survivability is prone to accidental use. And he explain that dispersal of weapons make them vulnerable to unauthorized use and accidents prone. While keeping in view the risk of nuclear exchange as a response to conventional attack he also suggests for peace full relations between India and Pakistan to avoid future conflict under the shadow of nuclear arsenal. He also hopes for challenges to be met by considering a regime based on stability measures and mutual understanding.

³ G.D Bukshi, ‘ Interface Between Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence: A Case Study for the Indian Subcontinent,’ available at , http://ndc.viburnix.com/uploads/editor_files/pdf/06_RKPat.pdf

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V.R .Raghvan, in his article, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia”⁶ represents the limited war theory in western literature and limited war in South Asian background. While talking about the implications of limited war in south Asia in nuclear atmosphere, he made an argument that, “Probability of nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high in the event it two countries engage in direct military confrontation”.⁷ Raghvan further talks about Indian and Pakistani asymmetric nature of military capabilities, doctrines and strategic depths which are considered to be the core issues related with maintenance of stability in the region.

Hypothesis

The implementation of limited war strategies by India in South Asia may become another factor of confrontation between India and Pakistan due to inborn risk of escalation, it may have severe implications on deterrence stability in terms of risk provoking and escalating crises which could breach nuclear threshold between India and Pakistan, thus Cold Start may induce major threats on stability of South Asia.

Explanation

Indian forces have conventional edge over Pakistani forces and they are developing new strategies to fight conventional limited war against Pakistan. Indian military has been working on their new strategy of limited war called Cold Start which is exclusively meant for attacking Pakistan with limited force and punish Pakistani military in case Indians are attacked through terrorist activities. The Cold Start Strategy is meant to conduct punitive strikes against Pakistan without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear redlines. It might be possible that Pakistan might use its strategic weapons as a last option rather than accepting a conventional defeat. Conventional war between India and Pakistan would rise to nuclear stage since the asymmetry in their doctrines, strategic depth and conventional military capabilities undermines strategic stability and could lead to the use of strategic weapons if two countries become engaged in limited conventional conflict in future.

⁶ V.R.Raghvan, ‘Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,’ available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/83/ragh.pdf>

⁷ ibid

Supporting Questions

Questions, which would be discussed in dissertation, are as follows:-

- ✓ What are the similarities & dissimilarities in the Indo-Pak limited war scenarios?
- ✓ What is Pakistan's existing capability in terms of countering Cold Start doctrine?
- ✓ What is the effectiveness of Pakistan defence against Indian weapons?
- ✓ What all options does Pakistan have to counteract or invalidate the Indian limited war threat?

Methodology

The mentioned questions will to be addressed by internet sources (websites), research articles, and books. Analytical and comparative analysis skills will also be used to write the paper. The researcher shall also make use of the qualitative research approaches with historic and descriptive research designs.

Division of Study


This piece of study is divided into four chapters. Chapter I explain and introduce the theories of limited wars and its requirements and need to implement limited war operations. Chapter II focuses on the chances of limited war in South Asian stage and deterrence stability of South Asia. Chapter III outlines the Indian needs to introduce new strategies of limited war in the form of Cold Start Doctrine and failure of its past war doctrines to achieve political goals. Chapter IV discusses the implications which are likely to bring nuclear exchange between South Asian states in cases of offensive operations carried out under Cold Start Doctrine. And last part deals with conclusion embedded with recommendations.

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Hypothesis

The implementation of limited war strategies by India in South Asia may become another factor of confrontation between India and Pakistan due to inborn risk of escalation, it may have severe implications on deterrence stability in terms of risk provoking and escalating crises which could breach nuclear threshold between India and Pakistan, thus Cold Start may induce major threats on stability of South Asia.

Explanation

Indian forces have conventional edge over Pakistani forces and they are developing new strategies to fight conventional limited war against Pakistan. Indian military has been working on their new strategy of limited war called Cold Start which is exclusively meant for attacking Pakistan with limited force and punish Pakistani military in case Indians are attacked through terrorist activities. The Cold Start Strategy is meant to conduct punitive strikes against Pakistan without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear

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Supporting Questions

Questions, which would be discussed in dissertation, are as follows:-

- ✓ What are the similarities & dissimilarities in the Indo-Pak limited war scenarios?
- ✓ What is Pakistan's existing capability in terms of countering Cold Start doctrine?
- ✓ What is the effectiveness of Pakistan defence against Indian weapons?
- ✓ What all options does Pakistan have to counteract or invalidate the Indian limited war threat?

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The mentioned questions will to be addressed by internet sources (websites), research articles, and books. Analytical and comparative analysis skills will also be used to write the paper. The researcher shall also make use of the qualitative research approaches with historic and descriptive research designs.

Division of Study

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operations carried out under Cold Start Doctrine. And last part deals with conclusion embedded with recommendations.

Chapter I

Conventional Limited War

Introduction

The focus of this part of context is related to the concepts of Limited Wars, requirement and necessities that give rise to the need of limited wars. The limited war concepts started growing out once the world realized the destructions of total wars. The concept of limited war got its major influence from the post World-War II reactions against total wars. This response includes the denunciation of the total war the knowhow and dynamics of war itself with the addition of the requirements of ends and means associated with war. The destructive power of nuclear and thermo nuclear weapons had put all the theories of war out-of-date. Sir Basil Liddell Hart the supporter of limited war emphasized on the realization of use of nuclear weapons and considers that there is going to be no one victorious in case of scenarios where atomic weapons are put in effect. The reasons behind re-emerging of conjecture of limited war could be two, one to achieve political objective through limited war means and two to restrain on use of force in order to deter without military growth to contain risk of destruction against communism. Eighteen and nineteen centuries military policies were influenced by concept of blitzkrieg and total destruction of adversary.

Meaning of Limited War

A limited war is type of armed conflict between adversaries in which the two sides restrict their objectives to certain limitation and keep a check on use of force and means employed in war. The two sides keep the room for negotiation and keep the window open for any peaceful settlement of conflict at any point during the conflict. Limited war is defined as a war in which neither side has the advantage of total annihilation of the adversary. The latest discernment of limited war came out during

Cold War which is perceived to be short of nuclear exchange. This type of war contains small conflicts or battle operations limited to specific geographical patches and focused on targets those are of direct military significance.

Robin Brown explains that 'Limited War' theory had been built on the assumption that the opponents was cautious and value maximizing , not fanatically determine individual who will battle on until the weapons are dashed out of hands'.⁸ Thomas Schelling advocated a 'strategy of coercive diplomacy' with whole menu of actions ranging from 'diplomatic protest and warning' through 'demonstration of force', to engagement of a group of targets valued by the adversary and piling on more and more destruction until the enemy would realize that the cost of aggression would outweigh the benefits likely to build up from persisting with offensive action.⁹

Aims of Limited War

The limited war lacks clear definition due to variation and abundance of parameters associated with it and drawing of these parameters for purpose of definition is not an easy assignment. Various strategists had drawn different rules and principles which are attached with limited war objectives. There are different writers who used different terms related to limited war. Some of the parameters drawn to recognize aims of limited war according to present day literature are,

- Limited war should be restricted to particular geographical space.
- War fought for limited political intentions.
- War fought with limited resources and means.

In case of limited war calculated interest of adversaries will keep the clash limited. So as the limited war should be commenced to accomplish limited objectives

⁸ Brig Naeem Ahmad Salik," Perils of 'Limited War ' In a Nuclear Environment,' *The Institute of Strategic studies Islamabad* , available at , http://www.issi.org.pk/ss_Detail.php?dataId=317

⁹ Subha Chandran , 'Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India's Interest ?' available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia'sInterests.pdf>

through limited means in limited time outline and should restrict to particular geographical boundaries.

Defining the importance of geographical constraint over limited war Henry Kissinger argued that, “the limited war should confine to defined geographical area, or war that does not utilize the entire available weapon system. It may be a war which utilizes entire weapons systems but its employment to specific targets”.¹⁰ The other premise connected with the limited political objectives in the way of limited war is that the main rationales of limited war are political not military gains. Limited war is fought to gain political objective, “the political leadership must assume the responsibility for defining the frame work; with in which the military are to develop their plans and capabilities. To demand of the military that they set their own limits is to set in motion a vicious cycle.”¹¹ Limited wars were to be fought for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state’s will to another’s using means that involve far less than total military resources for the belligerents and leave the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents largely intact.¹²

Henry Kissinger argues;

“The purpose of limited is to inflict losses or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under dispute. The more moderate the objectives, the less violent the war is likely to be. This does not mean that the military operations cannot go beyond the territory or the objectives of dispute; indeed one way of increasing the enemy’s willingness to settle is to deprive him of something he can regain only by making peace”.¹³

There other argument about limited war is the limited mobilization of war resources and military personnel. The limited mobilization of force is necessary policy to keep support of public that the war would not trial the nation’s existence one feature of

¹⁰ V.R.Raghvan, ‘Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,’ available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/83/ragh.pdf>

¹¹ V.R.Raghvan, ‘Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,’ available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/83/ragh.pdf>

¹² Robert.E.Osgood, *Limited war revisited* (US: Westveiw Press/ Boulder Colorado, 1979), p-3.

¹³ Subha Chandran , ‘Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India’s Interest ?’ available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia’sInterests.pdf>

limited mobilization is to choose right military personnel for correct rationale. Besides the extent and necessity for mobilization by any state in any war depends upon situations. Total mobilization is a gesture to enemy, the world at large, and the home front of the kind of war that is projected. ¹⁴

The economy of force and resources are also accentuated intention of limited war. In the framework of limited war the open ended goals of doing all possible injury to the enemy is driven out. Each function of military power must be customized to a precise military objective based in turn, on explicit political goals. The principle of economy of force reflects the fact that a belligerent's resources are unrestrained; they must be aimed towards achievement of the key intentions and must be used as cautiously as is consistent with accomplishment of objectives.

Succession and Improvements in Limited War Concepts

The current perception of limited war originated from the cold War. The two main actors playing the game of world politics were Soviet Union and United States, where as in United States the concept of limited war became prominent as a political and military strategy against the Soviet Union. The concept of limited war started off mainly as a conventional limited war in the era of 1950s and 1960s but later it stretched to limited nuclear war in following decade.¹⁵ The limited war assumption materialized as both offensive and defensive strategies to guard the strategic interests of United States. As an offensive strategy, limited war was element of the US strategy to deal with Soviet Union; as a defensive strategy, it intended to look after the interests of the United States and its allies, particularly in Europe.¹⁶

¹⁴ Robert.E.Osgood, *Limited war revisited* (US: Westveiw Press/ Boulder Colorado, 1979), p-3.

¹⁵ Subha Chandran , 'Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India's Interest ?' available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia'sInterests.pdf>

¹⁶ Subha Chandran , 'Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India's Interest ?' available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia'sInterests.pdf>

Clausewitz and Liddell Hart both supported limited use of force beside absolute military mobilization or total war. With the arrival of nuclear age, it became clear that substitutes to nuclear war must be sought as a theme of biggest main concern. It was argued that nuclear war prohibited the supplementary utility of armed coercion as a mean of policy. After 1949 the Soviet Union was able to break the rule of United States on atomic power this helped to neutralize the strategy structured on atomic weapons and forced United States to lock into nuclear doctrines.

The connotation of limited war today is consequence of trends in the present-day international system since its establishment in the seventeenth century. The present so called Westphalia system of numerous sovereign states actors materialized from a period of religious wars. These wars had inclined in many ways to become total war. Military thinker of 19th century highlighted connection between political goals and military means.¹⁷

Effects of Limited War on Deterrence Stability

The approach of deterrence is build upon the hypothesis that in concluding possibly that the deterred policy makers will react to threats by making very logical cost-gain computations. Deterrence according to John Mearsheimer, “in the vastness means influencing an adversary not to begin an explicit action because the apparent benefits do not justify the probable costs and risks.”¹⁸

Nuclear deterrence assumes that existence of nuclear weapons, particularly in dyadic relationship, will promise the absence of nuclear war. This confidence is based

¹⁷ Brig Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Perils of ‘Limited War ‘In a Nuclear Environment,” *The Institute of Strategic Studies* Islamabad , available at , http://www.issi.org.pk/ss_Detail.php?dataId=317

¹⁸ John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy, II, The Nuclear Powers*, (Britain: Croom Helm Ltd), p.214.

on the concept that use of nuclear weapons by one side will guarantee a nuclear vengeance by the other side to, therefore, there would be no encouragement for either side to commence a nuclear war except, of course, to commit suicide, which is illogical. This was founded on the impression due to the extremely destructive character of these weapons; they were weapons of last choice and would be used only when the very existence of the state was in question.¹⁹

The condemnation was made by some of the scholars of limited war theory. They claimed that a limited war strategy might chip away with the strategy of deterrence followed by two superpowers. The argument was made by them that the prospects of global nuclear destruction prevented the outbreak of a war between the two blocs for at least four decades. If, based on a limited war theory, a war could be considered as not inevitably leading to a nuclear war, the reluctance to wage war might decrease thus weaken the strategy of deterrence. Under limited war theory, this argument continues, war would be regarded as a usable technique for achieving political objectives, to be used whenever deemed appropriate and controllable in a way so as to prevent escalation to total war. Therefore the prospect of wars would increase.²⁰

The theory of deterrence further revealed its weakness during the period of 1950s this was due to the Soviet Union's breaking the barrier of nuclear technology and accessed the nuclear weapons which broke down the dominance of United States in this field. Despite the fact that there appeared a slight reservation that a direct attack on the United States could be deterred by massive penalizing damage, the competence of such a threat to deter lesser aggravations looked much more dubious.

¹⁹ John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy, II, The Nuclear Powers*, (Britain: Croom Helm Ltd), p.216.

²⁰ *ibid*

The emerging nuclear capability questioned United States guaranteed Western Europe's security. As long as the United States itself was invulnerable to retaliatory strike, Europeans would feel convinced of the shield provided by their major ally's threat of massive retaliation. Maintaining US reliability in Europe was decisive constituent of the limited war doctrine when Soviet Union acquired potential to "take out" American cities.²¹ This European security concern was defined openly by John Garnett that , "threatening the Soviet Union with massive retaliation even for relatively minor aggression in Europe lacked all credibility when consequences of implementing the threat were likely to result in the complete destruction of the American way of life."²² To this degree, limited war was seen as perilous since it would destabilize, rather than harmonize, the deterrence policy. The argument claimed that limited war damaged strategic deterrence that was pursued by two Cold War nuclear competitors. It was suggested that as the key motive that in spite of bitter Cold War resentment, no hot war had broken out in post war years. Besides the opposition, the limited war gained opinion in the mind of American policy makers. The supporters of limited war theory stressed the significance and limited war policy for plausible deterrence. Henry Kissinger argues,

"Deterrence is greatest when military strength is coupled with the willingness to employ it. It is achieved when one side's readiness to run risks in retaliation to the other is high; it is least effective when the willingness to run risks low, no matter how powerful the military capability."²³

All the consequences now demanded that the deterrence be substituted with some other elastic theory to restrain the Soviet hostility. The era of 60's saw a stylish explanation of limited war doctrine. US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara predominantly invented a strategic policy that embraces both deterrence and limited war. His idea was to make turn the retaliatory or aggression into flexible mode that he

²¹ *ibid*

²² Subha Chandran , 'Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India's Interest ?' available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia'sInterests.pdf>

²³ Subha Chandran , 'Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India's Interest ?' available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia'sInterests.pdf>

called as “flexible response”. The logic of this doctrine was to make corresponding connection between limited war and deterrence rather than to increment each other to deter Soviet intimidation. McNamara defended his policy and supports it by arguing that,

“A deterrent threat must be rational instrument of policy, implying that the same must be true for the war theory forming the fundamental of the deterrent threat. Otherwise, deterrence would not be credible. And in very threatening circumstances, massive retaliation would be incredible response and hence a poor deterrent; whereas limited war as a credible response would be much more of a deterrent in most of the conflict scenarios conceivable.”²⁴

Escalation Control and Limited War

In any conflict when any opponent reaches to conclusion that if it increases its strength of forces, enhances number of offensives, or changes its outlook for further aggression believing that it will augment its chances of success relates to escalation of conflict. This action is not likely to be a blind move and such steps also enhance the anxieties of adversaries.²⁵ As a natural psyche the opponents under threat shall go for counter measures to match the adversaries action which is going to result in rise in conflict intensity thus contributes towards the escalation of conflict. Escalation control is supposed to be a joint agreement between nuclear rivals to fight for limited ventures.

Elevated stakes will enhance the risk of escalation; therefore by boosting the stakes, escalation spiral would result into dangerous and costly consequences for both sides. Unintentional escalation is termed as escalation that results from unintended energetic events that spin out of control of a central authority or government, eventually leading to escalation while on the other side in order to avoid defeat or from fear of defeat the adversary may escalate the conflict. Limited war escalation depends on

²⁴ Trevor N. Dupuy, *‘International Military and Defence Encyclopaedia,’* {New York: Brassy’s (US), Inc} Vol.3, p-148.

²⁵ Quinn J. Rhodes, *‘Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella: An Analysis of India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Its Implications for Stability on the Subcontinent,’* available at http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/thesis/2010/Jun_Rhodes.pdf

limited objectives, the level of strategic stability, strategic equivalence and strategic communication between two nuclear rivals.²⁶

Limited Objectives

The core issue of limited war is to maintain the war events within limits predicted which is not possible by unilateral contention or actions. It becomes difficult for warring parties to settle limited objectives of war with limited means and resources.

As per argument posited by Brodie it calls for “deliberate restraint”. Any unlimited objectives or objectives aiming at total destruction of the adversary both politically and militarily would escalate a limited war. Any attempt to “reduce the enemy to impotence would remove the psychological balance which makes it profitable for both sides to keep the war limited. Faced with the ultimate threat of complete defeat, the losing side may seek to deprive its opponent of the margin to impose his will by unleashing a thermonuclear holocaust.”²⁷

Limited war does not associate absolute victory under possible conditions, so while engaging in limited war conflicts the belligerent must remain conscious of the fact that they must stick to objectives and gains planned out of limited war in order to avoid escalation. The two sides must keep the diplomatic doors open for escalation control since diplomacy is major actor through which conflict could be restricted to go out of proportion. According to Henry Kissinger diplomacy is the third vital factor of limited war doctrine. His further arguments are that, “the concept of limited war and the diplomacy appropriate to it reflects the fact that in the nuclear age the possibility of total solutions no longer exist.”²⁸

²⁶ Subha Chandran , ‘Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India’s Interest ?’ available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia’sInterests.pdf>

²⁷ Subha Chandran , ‘Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India’s Interest ?’ available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia’sInterests.pdf>

²⁸ Subha Chandran , ‘Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India’s Interest ?’ available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia’sInterests.pdf>

Strategic Stability

The contemporary procedure adopted by two super powers includes following steps:

- A communication link that could be effective during confrontation to prevent conflict escalating.
- Initiation of nuclear response that could make adversary incapable of retaliation and development of second strike options which made two sides believe that first strike would leave adversary incapable to strike back.
- That total war is unthinkable and to accommodate the concept of strategic parity.
- Effective arms control treaties and evading of unimpeded arms race.
- An associated confidence building procedures.
- Individual command and control measures for strategic forces on either side.²⁹

Limited war scholar Halperin strengthens his idea of limited war which could take place in the environment of strategic instability. The question arise can limited war be an option between two adversaries which have strategic parity but no strategic stability, so Halperin states that,

“should a local war occur in a period of strategic instability, both of the major powers will probably seek to minimize their stake in the war so that no outcome will appear to affect their basic relationship in ways that make dangers of an explosion more likely... with both sides alert to the danger of inducing a pre-emptive attack, the local war is likely to remain at low key while both sides refrain from expansionist actions such as the introduction of nuclear weapons or the crossing of an international border which will heighten the tension and expectations that an explosion is imminent.”³⁰

Halperin is also of the opinion that,

“An unstable strategic balance is also likely to provide profitable payoffs for a side willing to take risks. Faced with a fait accompli, the defending side is likely to be inhibited from joining the battle in a situation of unstable deterrence. Thus, if local military action does not lead to pre-emption, it is

²⁹ James A Russell, 'Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East.' Security Studies Centre, Spring 2009, available at , http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009

³⁰ James A Russell, 'Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East.' Security Studies Centre, Spring 2009, available at , http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009

also not likely to lead to intervention. An unstable strategic balance, then, is likely to reduce the danger of local war and central war by expansion, if both sides act cautiously.”³¹

Strategic Uniformity

It is important for the rivals to be well aware of their potentials of military, economic and political levels this will help to avoid the escalation of conflict. To evade escalation it is also imperative to have strategic uniformity between the warring parties in terms of weapons, exploitation of force and the war plans.

Strategic Communication

Communication is vital to keep the war limited, the inability or deficiency in this aspect could make the conflict go out of proportion. It is important for the reason to communicate to adversary the limit to which action would be taken against it in limited war situation.³² According to Barry Posen, “Inadvertent escalation may also result from the great difficulty of gathering and interpreting the most relevant information about a war in progress and using it to understand, control, and orchestrate the war.”³³

In real meaning the whole perception of ‘limited war’ is erected around two fundamental ideologies namely the “minimum necessary” and “the maximum feasible”³⁴. To establish the necessities and feasibilities is not easy during the course of limited plans because inaccuracy from either side could lead to detrimental consequences. Analyzing the opinion of limited war strategies, limited war has two alternatives one that it is either war confined to defined geographical area and other exploitation of limited

³¹ ibid

³² James A Russell, ‘Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East.’ Security Studies Centre, Spring 2009, available at, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009

³³ Michael Krepon, ‘Limited War, Escalation Control and Nuclear Option in South Asia,’ available at, <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ESCONYTR0LCHAPTER7.pdf>

³⁴ Brig Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Perils of ‘Limited War’ In a Nuclear Environment,” The Institute of Strategic studies Islamabad, available at, http://www.issi.org.pk/ss_Detail.php?dataId=317

war means. It should be unambiguous from the preceding that the idea of limited war at conventional level and nuclear level is difficult to classify precisely since the threshold involved are matter of degree, and partly because they are matter of national outlook. It is important while engaging adversary for limited war that the account of opponent's redlines may be respected and in order to avoid inadvertent escalation.

Conclusion

The concept of limited war evolved out of necessity to reduce the war destruction the nuclear weapons because of their enormous destructive power gave birth to idea of limited war. The nuclear weapons are believe to be so disastrous that it is not in favour of going for this option for both victor and defeated and limited war is also meant to counter weigh the West's popular thinking of use of force to its maximum limits to coerce enemy for unconditional capitulation. Limited war from its core meaning is defined as the war in which no one adversary seeks the total annihilation of opponent. The idea of limited war is generally related to conventional conflicts and use of conventional war fighting scenarios and skill but after the induction of nuclear weapons in inventory by two United States and Soviet Union it further expanded to limited nuclear war in around the decade of 1970's. The present conceptualization of limited war emerged in the wake of Cold War and among the actors of Cold War the United States and Soviet Union the concept of limited war shined on political as well as military screens. This development was aimed to achieve restriction on intentional wars. The limited war is fought for some particular objectives whether political or military, it is kept within limited resources that are put in it and the area boundaries well defined and conflict confined in geographical limits. The purpose is to achieve limited objectives through limited means and not meant for complete destruction of adversary or going for its threshold.

Chapter II

Deterrence Stability and Limited War in South Asia

Armies can signify but little, unless there is counsel and wise management at home.

– Cicero

Introduction

The international politics always remain naturally anarchic, this anarchy than also demand that states must strive for their security and sovereignty. A known fact is that states mostly try to find, or at least validate, their nuclear acquisitions, once they are come across a significant military threat to their security which seems that it cannot be met through alternate means. In light of such circumstances the potency of deterrence becomes major factor in preserving peace. In a two-sided relationship between nuclear armed adversaries, the usefulness of deterrence is the prime leap towards ensuring stability, since this constitutes basic element of threat which can impose restraint among parties. Once these threats are removed, most will prefer to remain non-nuclear.³⁵ On the other hand, other than security considerations there are several factors that could possibly guide nuclear motivations of candidate states, such as prestige, domestic political considerations, or a combination of two or more factors that Scott Sagan has termed 'multi causality'.³⁶ If deterrence is effective then the likely hood of any party disturbing the equilibrium reduces considerably. The effectiveness of deterrence implies that all conditions necessary for deterrence are to be fulfilled in particular situation. The realist paradigm insists on that states, once taken as unitary actors, search for nuclear weapons because their security, which is unsteady in an anarchic world asks for it.³⁷ It

³⁵ See, Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," in Michael Brown, et al., (eds). *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*, London: The MIT Press, 2010, p.03.

³⁶ See, Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb", in Michael Brown, et al., (eds). *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*, London: The MIT Press, 2010, p.34.

³⁷ William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzanova, "Divining Nuclear Intentions, in Michael Brown, et al., (eds.), *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*, London: The MIT Press, 2010, p.92.

means that the state making the deterrent threat must have the capacity to induce unacceptable damage on others. And, in this nuclear era, to deter potential aggressor, the desired standard of deterrence is nuclear.³⁸ This, on the other hand, may be more applicable for asymmetric states that are unable to maintain conventional parity with their opponents. According to this school of thought, regional and international environment are major determinants that could drive security perceptions of an individual state. The part of individuals in shaping threat perceptions and suggesting counteractive measures, nevertheless, mostly take the lime light. Jacques Hymans has tried to bring out the psychological dimension of individual decision-makers, and other dominant individuals who could affect policy course that could escort towards nuclearization or even denuclearization of a country. Waltz has been more explicit in explaining the balance of power syndrome, stating that "states exist in an anarchical international system and must therefore rely on self-help to protect their sovereignty and national security."³⁹

Scenario in South Asia

Countries like Pakistan which are still in stages of developing got set back after their great power alliance got away when the Cold War ended and they were now exposed to powerful regional neighbour (India) and there has been history of wars and crises with it. In this situation, the whole justification for a nuclear deterrent became even more pertinent for Pakistan. In case of major nuclear weapon states are considered, regional security weakens in its value, but nuclear proliferation was considered as a main threat for international security. United States initiates policies to avoid the proliferation in war prone areas in order to avert nuclear war between two

³⁸ Jacques E.C. Hymans, "Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field", *The Non-proliferation Review*, November 2006, Vol. 13, No.3, p.455.

³⁹ 14 For detailed study, see, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979.

nuclear states. This was particularly true for South Asia where protracted outstanding conflicts had been shaped into active hostility.⁴⁰

The historical roots of conflict between India and Pakistan are multifaceted. It emerged with the independence of two states in 1947, and it has unrelenting ever since, with the incessant conflict and crises. After the partition of Sub-continent, India and Pakistan fought three full fledged wars and went through frequent border clashes. Pakistan's anxieties and fears about India are entrenched as much in the disparity of power and India's intention for regional security as in the pre-partition communal conflict and divergent ideas about nationalism. Inclusive of the entire dispute over Kashmir has continued to ignite the clashes and conflicts. Right with independence from British rule dispute over Kashmir territory remained unsolved and relation between the two states remained a major victim of this dispute. The first dispute between India and Pakistan emerged right after independence over Kashmir in 1948, than again in 1965 the two countries went against each other in battle field over Kashmir. The conflict terminated once both countries agreed for cease fire over Tashkent agreement. The South Asia again saw the two countries in battle ground in 1971, resulting in emergence of Bangladesh after it dismembered from Pakistan.

Pakistan is a small country as compared with India in aspects of economy and resources and this develops a deep sense of insecurity. To counter numerical and technological superiority of its arch rival Pakistan developed nuclear weapons mainly to deter military aggression from India, and therefore nuclear weapons continue to play the fundamental role in Pakistan's military strategy. India already well ahead in a conventional military, developed nuclear weapons primarily to augment its political standing within the region and beyond. Though India continues to justify its nuclear acquisitions by illuminating China as a major security concern, the history of Indian

⁴⁰ Feroz Khan, 'Pakistan and Israel,' *The Henry Stimson Centre*, April 2009 available at <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/reseacrh-pdfs/PAKITAN ISRAEL.pdf>

nuclear program suggests that the country moving on the nuclear weapons path much before China became a nuclear weapon state in 1964.⁴¹

The design of relationship between India and Pakistan changed with the acquiring of nuclear capability by two states during this development the two countries again underwent military crises. The new type of tension and instability emerged as the conflicts like religious tensions, arms competitions and military deployments side by side to nuclear threats occurred. The practical aspects that threatened peace process and jolted the strategic stability were the Siachen conflict during period of 1986-87 still continuing, the Brass Tacks exercises of Indian military in years 1987-88 the Kashmir insurgency were those events that brought the India and Pakistan at the brink of all out military conflict.⁴² During this era both countries suffered challenges on domestic political separatist issues for which countries continued to accuse each other for unrests.⁴³

Pakistan and India were able to have peace in their relations after the 1971 war since then both countries were able to avert any conflict that could escalate to all out war. This period that started after dismemberment of Pakistan into Pakistan and Bangladesh after Indian intervention in the then East Pakistan was the longest since independence from British rule in 1947. Not much of change occurred in policies of security and stability and it remained confined to conventional show of force only. But the things changed dramatically in 1998 when both countries openly conducted their hot nuclear tests. This nuclearization of South Asia brought a new aspect in regional security and stability paradigm. This event actually brought a change in security paradigm of South Asia and even with overt nuclear capabilities both countries engaged

⁴¹ Adil Sultan, 'Pakistan's emerging nuclear posture: Impact of drivers and technology on nuclear doctrine,' available at http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf

⁴² Stay Out: Why Intervention Should Not Be America's Policy,' published by Strategic Studies, Quarterly an air force-sponsored strategic forum for military, government and academic professionals. Vol.3 available at, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Summer/Summer09.pdf>

⁴³ Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia,' published by the Non-Proliferation policy Education Centre in Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Reigning in the Risk available at <http://www.npolicy.org/files/20090813-khan%20final.pdf> (<http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=112&rtid=1>)

into limited war in 1999 in Kargil but were able to successfully avert escalation to all out conflict merely due to US political pressures. Similarly once again the two countries became eye to eye. In 2002 after Indian Parliament building was attacked. The two countries could have added nuclear dimension to their conflict but international community was able to intervene and avoided the break out of war.

The latest technological accomplishments have surface interesting new ambiguities in the relationship especially in case of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. Pakistan is assumed to be lowering its nuclear threshold to deny India the space for a limited military operation. It may also be moving in the direction of a strategy of graduated military options, or possibly a 'flexible response options'.⁴⁴ While it may be early to draw such results, as Pakistan continues to maintain purposeful ambiguity in its nuclear weapon use doctrine, yet, the cardinal principle of Pakistan's nuclear guidelines remains hinged to deter all forms of aggression, mainly from India. Pakistan's labours to counter-balance India's military expansion, including India's new limited war fighting concepts through its nuclear capability threats, which could be understood by analyzing various factors that drive the nuclear program of both India and Pakistan. Pakistan's denial to pledge to a 'No First Use' (NFU) nuclear policy and India's declaration of an its acceptance could possibly be due to letting Pakistan's aggression open in front of international community to block all their sympathies and support for Pakistan in case of limited aggression by India against Pakistan.

In distinction, Pakistan has an overt first-strike oriented nuclear force. Strong Pakistani proclamations of its nuclear doctrine emphasize that India could cross one of Pakistan's "red lines" relatively early during a conventional conflict.⁴⁵ Pakistan is consequently playing a huge game of chicken with itself, India, the entire world.

⁴⁴ Adil Sultan ' *Pakistan's emerging nuclear posture: impact of drivers and technology on nuclear doctrine,* available at http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf

⁴⁵ Peter Lavoy (2008), "Islamabad's Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation," available at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/47509/ichaptersection_singledocument/4d3c686a-b6f1-46c5-95be-c512e9ad13fb/en/Chapter+5.pdf

Pakistan's refusal or inability to terminate its use of Islamic terrorists to further its goals in Kashmir and Afghanistan and its decreasing capacity to organize terrorist groups it shaped advocate that another terrorist attack against India could take place at any time. Such an attack could take place with or without unambiguous Pakistani government consent. Particularly with Indian 'Cold Start' conventional military doctrine and modernization, the world could face an additional nuclear crisis in South Asia at any time. This type of a crisis could be initiated by a terrorist group that has limited resources and capabilities and no inclination to foster stability among nuclear-armed states.⁴⁶

Historical Roots of Threats and Nuclear Brinkmanship

Historical events and disagreements between the India and Pakistan gave birth to numerous conflicts between India and Pakistan. These conflicts continued to rise in periods from covert to overt acquiring of nuclear capabilities by the two states. The history reflects a very limited time periods when bilateral relation between the two states remained peace full to satisfactory levels. Such type of peaceful tenures mostly ended either due to change in local political theatre or acts of terrorism on either side of international borders and LoCs to which both sides specially India showed a little tolerance to accept. Some of the crises that brought both countries at the edge of all out conflict between the two states and brought a major turn in relationship are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. These events had direct impact on stability and deterrence equation between India and Pakistan. In chronological order the events are discussed specially in reference to pre and post nuclearization aspects.

Exercise Brass Tacks 1986-87

This crisis occurred when there were large and well equipped forces of Soviet Union were present in the neighbours of Pakistan. This crisis emerged when the India

⁴⁶ Nuclear Weapons Stability or Anarchy in the 21st Century: China, India, and Pakistan Thomas W. Graham, Ph.D. Brookhaven National Laboratory available at http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Nuclear_Weapons_Stability_or_Anarchy_in_the_21st_Century_China_India_and_Pakistan_250211_1545.pdf

mobilized a quarter of millions of its troops close to vicinity of merely 20 km from Pakistani Indian international borders near Sind. Pakistan was caught in a fear of a two front war on one side from Soviet forces on its western borders and on eastern side from India. Indian military mobilization on this scale was unprecedented which it termed as an exercise named “Brass Tacks”. The enormous strength ranged warning sirens in Pakistan due to so large build up of troops along LoC.⁴⁷ Moreover the Indian military carried ammunition that was meant for war fighting and not for exercise purpose and armoured tracks which could be used in desert for attack purposes. These indicators were more than enough to raise fear in Pakistan that India is probably in preparation to attack Pakistan alongside its southern borders.⁴⁸

This type of situation was not affordable for Pakistan due to presence of forces of super power at borders though Indian threat alone could be tolerable. To counter with this situation the then President of Pakistan a military ruler used diplomacy conventional military posture backed by nuclear weapons. The capital goal of for Pakistan was to avoid war with India due to its full engagement with Afghan supporters against Soviet forces. In order to blow out the Brass Tacks situation Pakistan initiated for the first time in history of region the threat of nuclear weapons capability.

Kashmir Crisis 1990

Following Brass Tacks during the contemporary period of clandestine nuclear atmosphere, another most dangerous confrontation between India and Pakistan occurred in 1990. This crisis bear a resemblance to the Brass Tacks but this conflict did not went into an open confrontation. In the back drop of Brass tacks, the existence of nuclear weapons significantly restricted the possibilities of the conflict between sub-continent rivals. The backgrounds for 1990 crisis were home-grown fight for independence in the valley of Kashmir. India suspected Pakistan of supporting the

⁴⁷ Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia,’ published by *The Non-Proliferation Policy Education Centre in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: reigning in the Risk*, available at, <http://www.npolicy.org/files/20090813-khan%20final.pdf>

⁴⁸ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability in South Asia’, available at <http://www.sassi.org/pdfs/cheema.pdf>

movement in Kashmir by arming, training and infiltrating the Kashmiri Mujahidin. Pakistan held a large military exercise called Zarb-e-Momin. India therefore placed its strike corps beside the border near Rajasthan in the south while taking defensive arrangement in north as it had done during Brass Tacks mobilization.

Fearing Indian threats and practical steps taken during the course of action and Indian strategy to wage an attack on Pakistan to deflect pressure from Kashmir Pakistani military counter mobilized its elite troops in the north. But owing to conventional military asymmetry, Pakistan reportedly moved its embryonic nuclear weapon capability⁴⁹. The clash had nuclear element but United States involvement prevented the crisis to escalate to nuclear intensity.

Kargil Issue 1999

The Kargil conflict arose in May 1999. It was the first major problem that occurred between India and Pakistan that involved militaries of two countries and was also the first one after two states went overtly nuclear capable. This dispute consisted of a short war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir territory alongside the line of control the place where two forces are separated in Kashmir. This crisis was a bleak prompter of the fact that despite of declaration of nuclear capability and possession of nuclear weapons did not essentially conclude the probability of spill over of conventional hostilities into a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan.⁵⁰ This conflict had full potentials to become a full fledged war between the two nuclear rivals and had all the possibilities of becoming a nuclear deadlock.

The compulsion during any military action is that one should be ready for the maximum instead of minimum possible retaliation from other side and accordingly

⁴⁹ Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics and Insecurity*, *ACIDIS Research Report* (Illinois, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, 2000), available at <http://iripak.org/journal/summer2004/therole.shtml>

⁵⁰ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, 'Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability in South Asia', available at <http://www.sassi.org/pdfs/cheema.pdf>

structure a planning that could permit it operational flexibility.⁵¹ In an atmosphere where two adversaries meet head-on each other it is equally imperative for both to evade disproportionate use of force, especially in offensive positions, it is here when a conflict is likely to step up to higher level. Pakistan's initiative to intrude into Kargil region has an argument that Pakistan tried to get strategic over ride on India to threat Indian troops mobility to avenge its military knock over experience during 1971 war and Siachen conflict with Indians. This conflict gradually reached to degree of armed response when Indian forces responded to Pakistani incursion and made an effort to take out Pakistani military units from their entrenched positions on top of the Srinagar-Leh Highway.

At the outset, the Indians could not drive out the Pakistani due to futile leadership efforts, poor logistics, and due to short of understanding in topography. After given permission to use air power, the Indians were able to exploit that advantage by maintaining artillery support and an adequate operational arrangement to push Pakistani forces from their positions. The presence of massive fire power from air dramatically increased the prospects of escalation. Although Pakistan did not counter used air power option in kind to Indian conventional attacks, Islamabad did approve an increase in alert status of its nuclear arsenal and hinted at the possible use of such weapons. The Indian government despite of increasing its war potential and enhancing ground support through a counter moved with mechanized units in Rajasthan to facilitate counter attack to expand the conflict beyond Kashmir in case they fail to expel Pakistani troops out of Kargil, this action raised the concerns at Islamabad.⁵² The end of crisis occurred due to intervention of United States with a Declaration signed by the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with President Bill Clinton.

The end of Kargil crisis surfaced some elementary doubts about the strategic equivalence and deterrence stability in Subcontinent. On the other hand the crisis

⁵¹ Tariq M. Ashraf, 'Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,' available at <http://www.grandstrategy.com/2009/03/9333813-doctrinal-reawakening-of-indian.html>

⁵² Quinn J. Rhodes, 'Limited War Under Nuclear Umbrella: An analysis of India' Cold Start Doctrine and Its Implications for Stability on the Subcontinent available at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524749.pdf>

spoiled projection of peace and security, whose basis were laid earlier in 1998-1999. Under severe international sanctions, India and Pakistan were forced into bilateral dialogue concluding in a summit from which the famous Lahore Declaration that included the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was drawn in February 1999. The Lahore MOU documented the nature of the changed strategic environment and laid down the basis of the potential peace, security and confidence building measures.

Military Stand Off 2001-2002

The event following the Kargil conflict was the mass mobilization of Indian forces in 2001-2002 which was attached to terrorist attacks and suspected backing by Pakistan. This once again brought the south Asia to the brink of war. This was considered to be a part of coercive diplomacy which was aimed at compelling Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism. This was the largest ever India Pakistan military standoff between December 2001 and October 2002. This standoff crisis occurred in two stages, first began after December 13 attack, 2001 attack on Indian parliament building when the session was going on. In agony of this the India launched Operation Parakram which consisted of mobilizing about half a million troops and stationed them along side Indian Pakistani border line of control. In counter to that Pakistan also mobilized its war resources and two military came face to face across the border.⁵³ The second event in which on May 14, 2002 terrorist killed 32 people at an Indian army camp at Kaluchak in Jammu launched the second phase of crisis. The two militaries remained eyeball to eyeball for almost 10 months with exchange of threats and warning of nuclear response from both sides. The confrontations concluded with cease fire and extended diplomatic process started which was termed as Composite Dialogue that started in 2004 and served a kind of shelter for discussing conflicts.

The failure of Operation Parakram to achieve its goals produced vital lessons to be learned by India's military planners. To start with an all-out war with Pakistan is not

⁵³S.Paul Kapur, 'South Asia's Unstable Nuclear Decade,' Strategic Analysis, Vol.33, No.3 (May 2009)

possible without risking nuclear retribution against major Indian cities. Next, full military mobilization for accomplishing limited political objectives is neither reasonable nor economical, and would become difficult to justify and also to meet similar challenges in the future, India required to reconstruct its force structure, which should have rapid response time and have the capacity of achieving limited political objectives without disturbing stability at the strategic level.⁵⁴

Limited War in the South Asian Scenario

Paradoxically the blame of waging a conventional in nuclear environment is placed on Pakistan. India held Pakistan responsible for initiating a limited war in Kargil and was quick to adopt this thinking and rapidly incorporated this aspect into their strategic planning. The Indian Defence Minister George Fernandez said, “We had understood the dynamics of limited war especially after India declared its nuclear weapons status nearly two years ago. Nuclear weapons did not make war obsolete; they simply imposed another dimension on the way war could be conducted”.⁵⁵ This was noticeable in 2001-02 standoffs as well. Similarly a description by Sood and Sawhney depicts that Indians had pre-planned an offensive against Pakistan, however a trial of this strategy is not possible due to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence.⁵⁶ Captivating the Indian viewpoint into deliberation, Pakistan is likely to endeavour a limited war as a way to extract Kashmir from Indian control. On the other hand if Pakistani viewpoint were to be kept in consideration, then India may also carry out limited war in order to dismember Pakistan. Indians nevertheless, have continually displayed their intentions to use limited war in order to curtail alleged Pakistani support to the Kashmiri insurgency. Such tactics may involve tracking down across LoC, salami slicing, and surgical strikes on suspected terrorist training camps in Azad Kashmir. Over a period of time Indian’s had materialized two distinct doctrines in Indian strategic thinking to chase this policy

⁵⁴ Adil Sultan '(Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture: impact of drivers and technology on nuclear doctrine,' available at http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf

⁵⁵ Inaugural address by Defence Minister in a Seminar on , “The Challenges of Limited War” on 5 January 2000)

⁵⁶ Lt Gen (Rtd) V.K Sood and Parvin Sawhney, “*Operation Prakaram: The War Unfinished*”(New Delhi: Sage Publications,2003)

objective. The first was the 'Limited War doctrine' and the second was the 'Cold Start Strategy'. On the Pakistani side there has been no expression of such a strategy to launch conventional war, visibly due to the marked Indian superiority in this sphere.

India-Pakistan Strategies and Scenario of Limited War

In Indo-Pakistan scenarios, the limited war theory is gaining supporter in acquiring its own doctrinal respectability, and even being advertised with historical precedents.⁵⁷ The political use of nuclear weapon in accordance with the desires of policy to deter and threaten Pakistan, Indian strategists adopted the Western concept of limited war. Indian policy makers and scholars expressed limited war explanation with slighter reframing according to their need and requirement in the existing strategic regional environment. On the others side the concept of limited conventional war is not in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan's weakness in terms of conventional capabilities as compared to India the nuclear weaponization of Pakistan and its nuclear weapon policy is meant for chiefly to deter Indian aggression. The Pakistani analysts have not put in much effort in the area of limited war because the Pakistan's nuclear policy guidelines do not foresee any logic of fighting a limited war in nuclear environment.⁵⁸

Rationality behind Limited War Indian Perspective

The national policy of Indians is based on the fact that its nuclear strategy is designed on India's offensive lines with full employment of conventional capability in the same manner. It is evident from the events that after six months of announcing the Draft Nuclear Strategy the Indian planners announced the Limited War Doctrine. Indian supports of limited conventional war want to extract two objectives one to justify the requirement of maintaining huge conventional force and other is that despite of nuclearization of South Asia the utility of conventional force in limited war is also applicable and is not an obsolete thought. The Indian think tanks have adjusted the

⁵⁷ Khurshid Khan , ' Limited War Under Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia,' available at, <http://sacw.pagesperso-orange.fr/saan/khurshidkhan.pdf>

⁵⁸ Khurshid Khan , ' Limited War Under Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia,' available at, <http://sacw.pagesperso-orange.fr/saan/khurshidkhan.pdf>

definition to fulfil their own requirements of a limited war. Indian military command believes that after Kargil conflict it is evidently inferred that it is still possible to wage a limited war in the presence of nuclear weapons till the stage of not pricking the redlines of adversary for retaliation in tone.⁵⁹

Prudence behind Limited War Pakistani Perspective

In line with Indians conceptualizing limited war in nuclear environment Pakistani planners also support the concept of limited war in nuclearized South Asia. There is no a query that a limited war waged by India has its effects on the stability in South Asia but is this adventurism would secure Indian political goals? If Indians feel that they can secure their political objectives through limited war they should find opportunity to fight against Pakistan through limited war option under nuclear shadow. Pakistan fighting a limited war against India is totally ruled out by its strategic thinkers and planners but still some other think tanks see the probability of such step. In response to it the Indians declared limited war doctrine, and Pakistan announced its creation of nuclear command and control organization and hence delegated the roles and responsibility to organs of state. As discussed at many stages the Pakistan's objective of acquiring the nuclear weapons is to deter Indian military and strategic threats which are perceived by it due to conventional military advantage which India has got over Pakistan.

Conclusion

The challenges that are there for the deterrence in the South Asian situation can be seen in the light of Andre Beaufre's categorization of the Cold War level. Beaufre identifies that in the Cold War level the aim of both sides is to maintain freedom of action while denying the same to the adversary. Pakistan aims to counteract the conventional superiority of India by threatening a nuclear reply to Indian propositions. India in contrast attempts to uphold freedom of action by deflating the nuclear deterrence of Pakistan. It is therefore not new that all the challenges to deterrence materialize from India. Indian strategic and military planning has been vigorously busy in

⁵⁹ Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces", available at <http://www.usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/milreveiw/download/English/NovDec04/ashraf.pdf>.

evolving ways and means to achieve strategic space against Pakistan. But even the success of such strategies is debatable, the prediction of instability are established beyond doubt. The limited war doctrine has been uttered to counter the alleged apprehensions regarding the Pakistani 'Proxy War' in Indian controlled Kashmir. Whether the allegations are correct or not, the strategy does not reflect the best option for action. The chances of escalation and failure to achieve political objectives prohibit limited war from being a feasible option.⁶⁰ Instead of getting convinced that the use of force is not a viable option, Indians still pursue this policy and are in a process of generating an effective policy for this type of warfare which can take advantage of the strategic space below Pakistani threshold. The vagueness surrounding this threshold makes any strategy inherently dangerous.

The strategies of pre-emption are not part of military options in South Asia, but growing disparity at the conventional level and the threat of limited war force Pakistan to prepare for this possibility as well. The prospects of such strategies would be elevated when actual war breaks out. BMDs can be seen as an endeavour to grind down the deterrence and create space for the aforementioned strategies. Their development critically threatens the stability of the region. The cumulative effect of all these challenges would be the maintenance of a high alert status and enlargement in the existing stockpiles of weapons. This type of "offensive-defence" competition could initiate hair trigger forms of instability, a loss of control cannot be ruled out in future nuclear or military crises.⁶¹ The existing conventional disproportion between two nuclear rivals would funnel to nuclear war if each side miscalculates or misinterprets each other's moves during fog of war. It would be equally tricky for India to utilize the strategic gap to attain its objectives without crossing nuclear threshold of Pakistan. It would be difficult for both sides to constrain their moves during the clash according to the moves taken by each side due to lack of communication and existence of misconception.

⁶⁰ Andre Beaufre, "*Deterrence and Strategy*" p-134

⁶¹ R W Jones , Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia, available at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/99915/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/9727fab7-f489-42b2-8a47-ee45a8f2e4be/en/RR+No+01.pdf

Finally, any potential conflict between India and Pakistan would have overwhelming consequences on the security and stability of South Asia as no matter how limited it would be kept from both sides.

Chapter III

Cold Start Doctrine

In this chapter the main focus is on Indian cold start doctrine, Indian rationale and objectives of this new limited war doctrine. The capacity of Indian armed forces to launch this strategy and its operational readiness / inadequacies and a brief overview of military exercises conducted to implement this strategy are also part of this portion. The organizational changes for CSD implementation the operational requirements for its execution, resources and infrastructure required for conduct of operations under this doctrine shall also be seen here.

Introduction

Cold Start Strategy was result of military crises in 1999 and standoff 2001-02. During 2001-02 standoffs the two countries India and Pakistan fully mobilized there armed forces for war operations. The diplomatic intervention of United States helped to defuse the crisis. The objective of this vast mobilization by Indian' was primarily the result of terrorist attack believing Pakistani involvement and Indians urge to respond it through military means. As a lesson from 2001-02 crises the objective of this doctrine to reduce the role of political leaders, decision making and pre-empt international diplomatic intervention to defuse the crisis and thrash the Pakistani military's counter mobilization capability.⁶²

Cold Start Doctrine

Indian army Chief General Padmanabhan started fresh restructuring of war doctrine under heading of "Cold start" on April 28, 2004 which circles around the

⁶² Feroz Hassan , "Pakistan and Israel", the Henry L.Stimson centre ,April 2009, available at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/PAKISTAN_ISRAEL.pdf

employment of battle groups as a mean of defensive operation called “Integrated Battle Groups”.⁶³ Cold Start doctrine includes restructuring of Indian defensive formations positioned close to international borders and the enhancement of their offensive capability with higher mobility and more focus on combined air, land operations.⁶⁴ Major role is played by Indian Air Force to gain air superiority against PAF and to provide edge to ground units for their military operations. The holding corps is primarily meant for checking advancement possessing limited power for offensive actions.

Cold Start is based on the concept of pre-emptive strike and it calls for rapid deployment of “Integrated Battle Groups” comprising of major elements of Army with close support of the air force and if need arises new fronts may be opened and expanded to include Naval operations the primary aim of the operations is aimed at creating conditions for limited war. The battle groups could be used individually for limited operations of greater scale based on the concept of blitzkrieg.⁶⁵ The main constituents of Cold start are:

- > The surprise
- > Integrated battle group establishment
- > Quick mobilization
- > Massive fire power with close air support
- > Destruction below Pakistan’ nuclear red lines
- > Favourable politically and militarily for Indian interests

⁶³ Dr Subhash Kapila, India’s New Cold Start Doctrine Strategically Reviewed’, paper No.991, 04 May 2004, available at, <http://www.southasiananalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html>.

⁶⁴ Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence, Pakistan Perspective (Pakistan Oxford University Press 2009),pp.242

⁶⁵ Y.I.Patel, ‘Dig Vijay to Divya Astra: A Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army’s Doctrine,’ available at, <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/History/Millennium/324-A-Paradigm-Shift.html>

Gurmeet Kanwal regards Cold start as India's desire of seeking "mass fire power rather than forces".⁶⁶ India has redesigned its military forces i.e. the Indian army from three offensive corps to smaller sized integrated battle group with division sized structure comprising of mechanized infantry , artillery and armour support. The task of holding pivot corps is now aimed to only limited offensive operations to give time to IBGs to strike massively on already softened targets by pivot corps. The self contained IBGs would be highly mobile adequately supported by massive air cover and artillery fire for quick thrust into enemy defence with major offensive task in initial ninety six hours.⁶⁷

Indian Logic to Limited War Doctrine

Indian advocates of limited war wanted to achieve two objectives, the need to maintain a large conventional forces and that nuclearization of South Asia and hence not giving away the option of use of force at limited level. The new strategy was debated in public and Indian think tanks have mixed the existing nomenclature of limited war with their own strategy with slight modifications. Nuclear doctrine is adopted as national policy by Indians, which constitutes offensive designs with scope to fight conventional war fighting capabilities. After announcing the First Draft Nuclear Doctrine on 24 January 2000, India declared its limited war doctrine in an open address to 2nd International Conference on Asian Security in 21st Century , the then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandez presented the "limited war doctrine". He declared that the Kargil incidence was proof of India's capabilities to fight and win limited war at time and place selected by aggressor. Indian army commanders were convinced that it is still

⁶⁶ Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

⁶⁷ Dr Subhash Kapila, 'India's New Cold Start Doctrine Strategically Reviewed', paper No.991, 04 May 2004, available at, <http://www.southasiananalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html>.

possible to fight a limited war even after South Asia is nuclearized, with prohibition of not violating adversary's nuclear red lines.⁶⁸

Dr Chari believes that nuclearization has rendered "total war unthinkable". He claims that limited war has become necessity and must be central to the military input provided to decision, makes an option to ensure conflict remains limited. If India does not address this aspect in its strategic and operational planes it would be negligent of its mandate.⁶⁹

The employment of limited war to counter against proxy war and terrorism, sponsored by state mechanism is under enormous debate in Indian circles for quite some time. The supporters of limited war in India against Pakistan erect their logic on following arguments:

>Gap for Limited war with Pakistan under nuclear umbrella

>The political, economic and human outlay of the use of nuclear weapon would disallow both India and Pakistan from taking into account the use of nuclear weapons in any limited conflict with each other.

> India is conscious of Pakistan's redlines and to steer clear of nuclear intensification of conflict.

> India is attentive of the limits short of full scale conflict to which Pakistan can be pressed in limit war situation.

⁶⁸ Tariq M. Ashraf, 'Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,' available at <http://www.grandstrategy.com/2009/03/9333813-doctrinal-reawakening-of-indian.html>

⁶⁹ Khurshid Khan, 'Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia,' available at, <http://sacw.pagesperso-orange.fr/saan/2005/khurshidkhan.pdf>

> US pressure on Pakistan, during any limited conflict situation, would hinder the latter from swelling conventional war.

> The fear of massive retaliation from Indian side, in scenario of Pakistan's first nuclear smack, would dissuade Pakistan from initiating the nuclear option.⁷⁰

The main aspects of Indian limited war thinking and doctrine remained ambiguous, the statement of India's defence minister George Fernandez gave birth to further brain storming in strategic and military circles, about the impact of nuclear weapons on limited/ conventional wars. Result drawn from the India Pakistan conflict of Kargil 1999 is that despite of nuclear weapons possession war cannot be prevented but both sides nuclear weapons kept it limited. But still ambiguity in India Pakistan scenario is that how this limited war is conducted; how any one side maintains the political and operational objectives limited? Can this be done unilaterally? The outcome of these aspects remains vague because the other party could view one side's limited military objectives as unlimited and unacceptable. Indians on one hand picked up option of "no first use doctrine" and adopted "no high alert status" but on the other side India wants not to give up the use of conventional force in limited contingencies.

The Indian limited conventional war doctrine is based on two aspects, first that asymmetric assured destruction at conventional and nuclear level will help India to punish Pakistan without fear of retaliation and 2nd is that escalation control below nuclear redlines. The limited war options discussed by Brig F H Khan suggest that it gives basically four options to India:

"The first option is to attack across the International border or Loc, but to keep the objectives limited. The second option to attack at selected points along the Loc, presenting Pakistan with option of escalation by responding with riposte. The third option is to capture

⁷⁰ Subaha Chandran, Limited War, Revisiting Kargil in the Indo-Pak conflict, (Delhi: Indian Research Press), pp.89-90.

and hold a critical area along the Loc. The final option to carry out surgical strikes across the border, then return”.⁷¹

During 2001-2002 crisis Indian government mobilized and prepared for limited war and was confident of the effective escalation control. On the other hand Pakistan was convinced that behind this the objective is to test the “limited war concept”, under cover of political compellence. But as Indians failed in achieving its political goals through coercive diplomatic action, this crisis (2001-2002) exposed defects in Indian conventional war policy at operational level. However, the escalation was controlled and the crisis remains below nuclear threshold, but Indian military failed to achieve its objective of surprise and coercion at conventional level through limited war actions.

Limitations of Indian Conventional Limited War Strategy

Indians are capable to secure its political objectives by limited war against Pakistan Yes or No this is the question which is unpredictable here. The minimum essential requirement for India to consider before going for limited war against Pakistan can be seen in following backgrounds:

- > Internal support
- > External pressure
- > The threat of use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan and probabilities of failure of escalation control
- > Intervention by International community⁷²

⁷¹ Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Challenges of Nuclear Stability in South Asia,' available at <http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Challenges%20to%20Nuclear%20Stabilty%20in%20South%20Asia%.pdf>

⁷² Subaha Chandran, 'Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests?' available at, <http://acdis.illinois.edu/assets/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillitSecureIndiasInterests.pdf>

Internal support; Indian government would need full support at political level while deciding to go for limited war against Pakistan. The amount of internal support would be decided by achievements on battle ground. The level of internal support would be determining factor for achievements of Indian goals through limited war. The level of internal support would enhance if Indian army's offensive could produce positive result in destroying militant camps inside Pakistan and forcing Pakistani military to remain defensive, but on the other hand if things occurred otherwise than above or India suffers return loses or heavy casualties through Pakistani military's counter action the internal support will surely diminish, at very early stages.

The second factor which would squeeze India to wage limited offensive is external support. The International community's first reaction would surely be condemning Indians for breaching Loc or International border. The external pressure from International community if intervened at early stage would surely force Indians to cease fire and return or halt military operation which could render Indian efforts of limited war as futile. As seen in the past as well that during conflict between the two International community forced both to go for negotiation on table.⁷³

The very crucial factor in this category comes as a result of aggression by Indians is Pakistan's response. Due to undefined threshold by Pakistan it is difficult for Indians to correctly weigh the Pakistan's likely response and this situation creates a scenario where India could conduct limited war keeping conflict below the threshold to nuclear breakout.⁷⁴

In order to neutralize all the above stated threats and likely escalation beyond control of India, the India brought in a new strategy of limited war. The new doctrine was named as "Cold Start" and as narrated earlier was unveiled in 2004 after Sundraji Doctrine failed in Operation Parakram. The Cold Start is designed to address all the problems faced by Indian military due to Sundraji doctrine which was merely designed for defence inside Indian territories. As narrated by Shahzad Massod Roomi, "Cold Start

⁷³ Subaha Chandran, 'Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests?' available at, <http://acdis.illinois.edu/assets/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillitSecureIndiasInterests.pdf>

⁷⁴ ibid

Doctrine” dictated major structural changes in Indian military. Basic idea of Cold Start revolves around a short and intense war with focus on quickness, surprise and swift manoeuvring of, newly introduced, division sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) to inflict maximum damage to Pakistani military infrastructure and forces in shortest possible time before world community could intervene”.⁷⁵

As for merely all the doctrine it’s easy to contemplate but needs really hard to follow principles while undergoing operation under that doctrine. The Indian Limited war in future structured on Cold Start would likely to bring serious outcomes, failure on any side during the conflict will provide opportunity and motivation to escalate which is not desirable for any one side and would likely and surely shake the South Asian Stability. The Indian Limited war strategy is dangerous because of its inherent and some hidden chances of escalation which is going to have negative impacts on South Asian security and stability.

Talking about limited conventional war options V.P.Modike views Limited War between Indo-Pak the geographic limitations the Indian can only manage tactical space and even if India succeeded in capturing that space, it will not serve India the required political objectives. He also concludes that any conventional war launched by India may be seen limited from Indian perspective but same may not be viewed by Pakistan as limited and therefore any such initiative by India in the near future would straight away lead to full scale conventional war.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Shahzad Massod Roomi, ‘4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

⁷⁶ Khurshid Khan, ‘Limited War Under Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia,’ available at <http://sacw.pagesperso-orange.fr/saan/2005/khurshidkhan.pdf>

India's Justification to Cold Start Strategy

The rationale behind Cold Start strategy formulation to overcome the shortfalls in the existing Indian military strategy and to increase offensive capabilities of Indian army for future crisis by increasing its capabilities of rapid punitive strike against Pakistan while remaining below nuclear redlines. Indian army designed this new offensive strategy to address issues that resulted in failure of compellence which occurred during Operation Parakram.

Fundamental Structure of CSD

The Indian operational frame of Cold Start is based on following assumptions:

- Rapid deployment of strike force for quick result.
- Element of surprise assuming restraining Pakistan's counter response.
- It will not push Pakistan to respond with nuclear option.
- By conducting operation on multiple fronts and at unpredictable places rapidly would achieve military objectives and before international pressure would come in situ.
- Pakistan will be compelled to play by the rules set by India and still remain restricted in escalating the conflict by responding at the places of its own choice.

India's Conventional Military Strategy Preceding Cold Start

During the period from 1981 to 2004 Indian military followed conventional military strategy formulated by the then Indian Army's Chief General Krishna Swamy Sundarajan. This strategy was popular as Sundraji Strategy. This was followed in number of operations by Indian forces to confront Pakistan. Under this doctrine the International borders of India were protected by seven corps called "Holding Corps" in defensive role. These Holding Corps consisted of infantry division for static defence roles, mobile mechanized division to respond against enemy penetrations and small

number of armour units support. The purpose of this doctrine was merely to keep enemy movement in sight.⁷⁷

The army's offensive power according to Sundraji Doctrine was concentrated via three mobile armoured columns that had the capacity to strike deep into Pakistan. The "Strike Corps" was concentrated around an armoured division with mechanized infantry and massive artillery support.⁷⁸ The shortcomings of this doctrine were exposed during the mass mobilization by Indian army in Operation Parakram in 2001-2002 stand-off where this operation failed to gain its political goals through limited military operation where there was unprecedented mobilization of armed forces on large scale. The armies of India and Pakistan stood eye ball to eye ball for considerable period alongside international border and LoCs.⁷⁹ Even to extent of exchange of nuclear threats from both sides. The entire exercise by India proved futile to achieve coercive diplomacy since Indians failed to achieve its political objective in back drop of this operation and failure of Indian army to present requisite and timely threat to Pakistan.

There were multiple reasons for failure of Operation Parakram to succeed in achieving desired results, although there were some limited gains as well but over all this proved ineffective to achieve desired out come. The failure could be due to causes listed below:

- Pakistan's high stakes in Kashmir region.
- India's inability to put greater International pressure on Islamabad.
- Incomprehensible expansion of Indian objective and the resultant introduction of aggressive element into the equation.

⁷⁷ V.R.Raghavan, 'Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,' Non-proliferation Review, Vol.8, No.3(Fall/Winter2001), available at, <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/83ragh.pdf>

⁷⁸ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'An Overview and Assessment of the Indian Army's Cold Start Strategy,' *Merton College University of Oxford*, available at, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk

⁷⁹ Prof. Dr. Razia Musarat, 'US War On Terrorism and its Impact on South Asia,' available at <http://www.pu.edu.pk/polsc/jops/Currentissue-pdf/RAZIA.pdf>

- The non-calibrated nature of adopted and needless persistence with mobilization.⁸⁰
- Lack of political will; the reason for India to conduct operation Parakram failed and India's inability to wage a war against Pakistan because first Pakistan ignored the threat and India lacked political will to do so. Despite of large scale mobilization which started in December 2001 no objective was forwarded to three services Chief's of Staffs for implementation or achievement of political objectives which went overdue till August 2002. On contrary the Indian Army Chief was asked to lighten the army from entanglement.

Lack of Exit Strategy

For any military operation to achieve its goal the exit strategies is paramount for both adversary and own self. The Operation Parakram lacked this basic aspect and as a result while demobilization of army was to be initiated this was termed as "Strategic Relocation" and Indian Army was withdrawn from borders.⁸¹ The overall result of operation to put Pakistan under compulsion of ceasing its support to non-state actors through limited war operation was thwarted by Indian Army's failure to mobilize timely and swiftly. The lack of swiftness closed the window of opportunity for Indian to conduct any punitive operation against Pakistan, but also the Pakistan' forces were able to counter mobilize against Indians as result of shorter distance from border to their home locations and also shorter interior communication lines.

As perceived inability of Indian military to timely react to December 2001 incidence of Indian Parliament Building attack termed by Indians as Pakistani backed operation through Kashmiri militant and resultant standoff with Pakistan in Operation Parakram the Indian army needed badly to reconsider its old doctrine. As a result New

⁸⁰ S.Kalyanarman, 'Operation Parakram: an Indian exercise in coercive diplomacy,' Strategic Analysis, Vol26, Issue 4 October 2002, pp.478-492, available at <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all=a791918985~frm=ablink>

⁸¹ Major Gen Ashok Mehta, paper presented on, 'Coercive Diplomacy: Operation Parakarm: An Evaluation,' at IPCS seminar held on 8 August 2003, available at <http://www.ipcs.org/seminar/indopak/coercive-diplomacy-parakram-an-evaluation-577.html>

Delhi announced New Limited War doctrine of “Cold Start” in April 2004, which would allow Indian armed forces to mobilize quickly and under take retaliatory attacks in response to special challenges forwarded by Pakistan’s “Proxy War” in state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Former General and Vice Chief of Army Staff Indian Army General Vohra talks about requirement of limited war strategies in contemporary environments, he explains that the occupation of countries is no longer acceptable. The Clausewitzian dictum that “War is continuation of policy by other means” would not work in the new political and military environments. Total wars are obsolete and unconditional surrender is no longer realistic. The parameters for limited war include setting limited political objectives for which the application of force has to be tailored accordingly; achieving these objectives as early as possible without bringing the enemy down to its knee; and not missing the opportunity to bargain and bring an end to hostilities.”

Aims of Cold Start

Cold Start is ingenious attempt to design a military solution to the security challenges on India’s western border. Cold Start seeks to weigh India’s considerable conventional strength to respond to Pakistan’s continued irritation. The objective of this limited war structure is to launch a conventional strike against Pakistan as retaliation, before International Community come into play for any mediation actions to inflict significant harm on Pakistan army while keeping Islamabad bound not to escalate the clash to nuclear level.⁸²

The major focus of Cold Start is on the agility, the quick deployment and swift operation. Cold Start is not strategy to invade Pakistan and occupy it but instead it is rapid, time and distance bound operation into Pakistani soil with an objective of swiftly punishing Pakistan primarily in response to a Pakistani backed terrorist attack inside

⁸² Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘An Overview and Assessment of the Indian Army’s Cold Start Strategy,’ *Merton College University of Oxford*, available at, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk

Indian state with view to avoid threatening the survival off the Pakistani state or forcing Pakistan to answer with nuclear blow.⁸³

“Basic task of IBGs, with Russian T-90 and T-72 M1 tanks at their core, would be to make shallow territorial gains by invading 50-80 km deep inside Pakistan, mainly by out flanking heavily guarded cities like Lahore and Sialkot.”⁸⁴

The Indian forces would try to seek advantage of surprise at the strategic and operational levels to reach the decisive edge before International pressure and major powers like United States and China would get up to help Pakistan. The goal of Cold Start is to make some territorial gain of 50-80 km deep inside Pakistan that could be used as bargain chip in any future conflict negotiation to gain concessions from Pakistan.

Importance of Cold Start

The Indian Cold Start Doctrine is assumed to be new organizational setup for Indian army that would help in its short time deployment programs. This new concept is major shift from India’s so called traditional defence orientation of past to new offensive warfare strategy which is back bone of Cold Start doctrine.

Equating new Cold Start and past’s Sundraji doctrines it can be easily found the significance of Cold Start for Indian Army in two ways, first the Sundraji Doctrine mainly focused on Indian Army as consisted of seven holding corps positioned along the International border and LoCs to hold back Pakistan’s incursion. The offensive capability of Indian army according to this doctrine consisted of three strike corps, located inside Indian central location, with their capability to launch devastating counter

⁸³ Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence, Pakistan Perspective (Pakistan Oxford University Press 2009),pp.242

⁸⁴ Shahzad Massod Roomi, 4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

blow into Pakistani territory, mainly through Rajasthan Desert.⁸⁵ In Cold start the Indian forces offensive power is now divided into eight smaller division sized strike groups called “Integrated Battle Groups” (IBGs). To reduce deployment time of these groups they are now positioned closer to border areas with Pakistan to take rapid action against Pakistani forces. The existing three strike corps of Indian army is I corps, II corps and XXI corps, which are now transformed into smaller parts in the form of groups eight in number under restructuring in light of Cold Start Strategy. This will not only enhance capability of Indian Army but will give flexibility for multiple offensive options at one time and at least at eight different locations. Each IBG constitutes armour units, mechanized infantry and artillery support. Also each IBG would have air support by Indian Air Force providing massive fire power against defensive deployments and position of Pakistani forces alongside Indian border area.

Along with air support from IAF the India army helicopter gunship fleet will provide cover to advancing battle groups. Locating offensive element close to their launching pads for attack against Pakistan would reduce reaction time and early warning normally available to Pakistan. Placing offensive element where they could immediately launch an offensive would permit the Indian arm to achieve surprise.⁸⁶ The second significance for Indian army of Cold Start Doctrine is that under Sundraji doctrine Indian Army lacked flexibility to fight limited operational capability without crossing nuclear threshold. The offensive strike actions against Pakistan according to past doctrine was structured to “Sledge hammer blows”, against Pakistani forces in Pakistani territory rather than achieving limited objectives of “Shallow Territorial Gains” or causing calibrated damage to Pakistani military.⁸⁷ Where as in new doctrine of CSD the IBGs are designed to cause Pakistan limited damages inflicting losses to Pakistan

⁸⁵ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

⁸⁶ Tariq M. Ashraf, ‘Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,’ available at <http://www.grandstrategy.com/2009/03/9333813-doctrinal-reawakening-of-indian.html>

⁸⁷ Quinn J. Rhodes, ‘LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA’S COLD START DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT’ available at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524749.pdf>

Army and panicking Pakistani command and control thus freezing Pakistan's nuclear strike back capacity. The three corps designed under Sundraji Doctrine would be reconstructed with added support armour and artillery to their basic defensive structure. This offensive capability would allow the Defensive Corps to now new role of "Pivot Corps" to conduct weighted strikes independently thus paving way for IBGs to conduct follow on operations.⁸⁸

Cold Start Implementation

The military operations to be success full needs three basic ingredients which are theory, testing and on ground execution. These indicators are identified by Thomas Mahnken as new combat techniques. These indicators include new military arrangements the dissemination of new branches or career outlets to support emerging concepts and training in the newly formulated war fighting technique.⁸⁹

The first phase for execution of CSD requires theoretical progress and exploring new ways to solve existing military challenges. Indian military, however completed primary part by formulating and unveiling its new Cold Start doctrine in 2004, with wide assumptive structure but the latter two parts or phases still remained hazy due to non existence of information about vast organizational restructuring required for full scale implementation, the operational capacities required to launch Cold start, required organizational change and development of the resources and main frame required to carry out military operations under new limited war fighting strategy the Cold Start Doctrine.

The events show that Indian military is continuously working on essential level of operational abilities in army and air force to carry out cohesive operations envisaged in Cold Start the recent military exercises conducted by Indian Military to test Cold Start applicability on ground shows that Indian army is struggling in enhancing its capacities

⁸⁸ ibid

⁸⁹ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

in three major aspects. Seeing all the efforts and anticipating Indian plans may need some essentials that are must for execution of Cold Start:

- The first is to show the capability to carryout tasks required by Cold Start like offensive operations by Pivot Corps, short mobilization operations and independent operation abilities by units involved in Cold Start.
- The next is capability to carry out joint services operations. The joint operations are main foundations on which Cold Start is formulated because army units require massive support from Indian Air Force for fire power and close air support.
- Then are the capabilities of Network Centric Warfare. This capability is not only important for enhancing decision making and improving synchronization among dispersed forces but also to amplify situational alertness and intelligence sharing.⁹⁰

During and after the formulation of this doctrine since 2004, Indian forces had conducted some major exercises to test and improve Cold Start. Squat scrutiny of objectives of these exercises are seen in following paragraphs one by one since 2004 where Indian Military strived to test military capabilities for implementation and execution of Cold Start Doctrine.

Exercise Divya Astra

The English of which is Divine Weapon. It was conducted in 2004 at Mahajan firing ranges in Rajasthan about 70 km from Pakistan India International borders. This was the initial exercise conducted by Indian forces to test the ability of Indian Military's various combat units to deliver integrated fire power in coordination with air power.⁹¹. This was a tactical structure exercise mean to check the operations that are designed to

⁹⁰ Shahzad Massod Roomi, '4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

⁹¹ 'Exercise Divya Astra,' Pakistan Defence, available at, <http://wwedefence.pk/forums/military-photos-multimedia/322-triservices-exercise.html>

penetrate through enemy fortification by mechanized assault which was backed by artillery and ground attack aircraft.⁹²

Exercise Vajra Shakti

Vajra Shakti was conducted a year later Divya Astra in May 2005 at location 80 km from Pakistan India borders in the plains of Jalandhar in Indian Punjab. The English translation of Vajra Shakti means “Thunder Power”. In this exercise about 25,000 Indian military troops participated and was spread on ten days exercises schedules.⁹³ This exercise was 1st show of new offensive of new offensive strategy in which holding Corps were assigned new role of Pivot Corps and new responsibilities of limited offensive operations along with maintaining defensive role against counter offensive operations that would occur at the outbreak of hostilities at on wider scale. Pivot Corps will launch offensive operations parallel in enemy territory which would then be further enhanced and exploited through other strike formations.⁹⁴ This exercise was significant in manner that Indian army holding corps for the first time practiced offensive roles in the West from its defensive role. This was regularized as net work centric warfare in Indian military terms.

The implementation of Cold Start Doctrine means swift day and night operations the offensive attacks were supported by command, control, communication, computers and intelligence (C4I) network and systems. Under this network system force multiplier actions were used to enhance flow of real time information of enemy to combat units which is collected by use of satellites, UAVs aerial reconnaissance, radars, communication interceptions and host of other means. The position of enemies was transmitted through real time photography and was forwarded to units engaged in operations helping commanders for quick decision making.⁹⁵

⁹² ibid

⁹³ Shahzad Massod Roomi, '4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

⁹⁴ Subhash Kapila, 'Indian Army Validates Its Cold Start Doctrine: Introductory Background,' South Asian Analysis Group, available at , http://www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/papser1408.html

⁹⁵ ibid

“In the scenario “Blue Land” (friendly) forces squared off against the adversary “Red Land” forces across the Sutlej River, which simulated the International Border with Pakistan. The exercise presupposed that relations between the two nations had degenerated to the point where the Blue forces launched pre-emptive attack followed by a rapid advance into Red territory. Nine days of simulated attacks and counter attacks by both sides resulted in the Blue forces advancing 30kms into enemy territory setting the stage for strike force to launch a substantial follow on offensive.”⁹⁶

Desert Strike 2005

These exercises were conducted in November 2005 in Rajasthan Thar desert and lasted for fourteen days. Major objective of these war games was to enhance joint operations cohesion and capacity of Indian army which included armoured divisions and air force strike elements. The main focus of these operations was to test the Indian Military’s ability to overcome enemy by causing psychological setbacks by use of pre-emptive dislocation and disruption.⁹⁷ The desert environment was selected for testing and employing electronic and information warfare assets along with fast pace of operations to be conducted by other participating units.

Sanghe Shakti

This was conducted in May 2006, to further test and evaluates Cold Start at corps level. The corps selected was tasked to launch thrust in Pakistan’s area of Cholistan. The exercise meaning Joint Power was to test the capabilities of strike force to rapidly mobilize in enemy defences that and then exploit gaps in enemy defences that had been created by Pivot corps un-predicted attack. The focus of exercise was structured on German Blitzkrieg armoured attack into hostile territory. This exercise

⁹⁶ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

⁹⁷ ibid

emphasized on swift penetration, security of flanks provided by army's gunships while enemy's strong holds were by passed and cut-off by forward advancing units.⁹⁸

This was bigger exercise then the previous ones since as name suggests Joint Power it included air force strike elements, tanks and massive strength of 40,000 troops from 2nd Strike Corps and purpose of Joint Power was "to test 2004 war doctrine to dismember a not so friendly nation effectively."⁹⁹

Ashwamedh 2007

To test Cold Start Strategy the fifth exercise conducted by Indian military was in May 2007, which included 25,000 Indian Army personal this time from I Strike Corps supported by Infantry fighting vehicles, main battle tanks, heavy artillery and army's attack helicopters.¹⁰⁰

Out-come of Exercises

The five exercises conducted by Indian Army only showed a moderately successful strategy employment in simulated war conditions. The capabilities of Indian military under this strategy of Cold Start were to put to test under varying conditions such as plains and deserts along with varying climatic conditions.

The exercises Vajra Shakti, Sanghe Shakti and Ashwamedh the major part of exercise fighting operations were conducted at night which tested the capability of Indian military to fight in night conditions and employment of night vision and thermal imagers under realistic battle conditions.

The exercises Vajra Shakti and Desert Strike were done in open desert terrains. On the other hand Divya Astra, Ashwamedh and Sanghe Shakti included such

⁹⁸ Shahzad Massod Roomi, '4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

⁹⁹ ibid

¹⁰⁰ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

conditions which Indian military is likely to face in actual assault across India Pakistan borders. In Divya Astra Indian Army engineer bridged 60 meter wide canal with in span of thirty minutes using truck mounted bridges having capacity to support tanks and armoured vehicles. Similarly in Ashwamedh an attack across the canal feature defence line was practice. The Sanghe Shakti included conduct of operations in the congested terrain with build ups , putting advancing units to use navigation techniques in inhibited area and practice of crossing water obstacles.

Operational Margins of Cold Start

As all the new doctrines normally suffer from some inherited limitations same is the case with Cold Start. Cold Start strategy to be effectively implemented (as outcome of exercises conducted and available literature Cold Start documentation is very limited as far as its actual plans is considered it is highly classified and is not disseminated) it appears that Cold Start is still in development and experimental stages and it will be easy to identify the problems related to its on ground implementations. But as narrated above the arguments on this new strategy and its limitations can be assumed by studying and analyzing previous strategies and doctrines connected with limited war in India Pakistan context. At present the apparent areas of Cold Start doctrine that hinders operationalization and employment of this doctrine can primarily be graded into three categories:

- The organizational changes required for Cold Start still needs its execution practically.
- The development, availability of resources and infra-structure required to support military related operations still needs major improvement and execution.
- The operational capabilities required to execute Cold Start are still not visible and majorly either assumed or predicted but lacks demonstration on ground clearly.

In following portions the discussion about operational limitations and capabilities are discussed. Due to lack of availability of actual plans of action of Cold Start and its

classification as highly classified the main chunk of deduction is done from articles by Walter C Ladwig, Quinn J Rhodes thesis and Shahzad Massod Roomi's analysis all available on internet sites in PDF versions.

Organizational Changes

Following are the initial organizational changes which are vitally essential for Cold Start implementations:

- Restructuring / establishment of the force.
- Cold Start and Civil Military Distrust.
- Inter services differences.

Force Restructuring

The major aspect for Indians to implement Cold Start constitutes restructuring of forces on Pakistani borders. The Indian army Western Command is endowed with responsibility of international borders from Jammu to Rajasthan which lays heavy burden on it. To reduce this load a new command was set in the form of South Western Command initiated in April 2005, which was placed on border with Pakistan and its headquarters in Jaipur. This new command shared the burden of Western Command by taking responsibility to cover key area of Punjab and Rajasthan, this new command is to focus on border region of Jammu to Pathankot.¹⁰¹ The outcome of this newly established command will not only reduce the load to look after large stretch of territory from Western Command but will also make more efficient command and control of the forces placed alongside Western borders.

The offensive forces can only achieve element of surprise and quick mobilization advantage if they are stationed closer to their area of predicted operation in case of India Pakistan, at international borders or line of control. In case of Indian military the deployment of its offensive force near border mean employment of Cold Start Strategy.

¹⁰¹ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

Still the IBGs formalization and existence is not clear and their deployment along with Pivot Corps is also not evident. In exercises conducted by Indian Army's under Cold Start, the Indian Military's offensive units operated as a Strike Corps not as IBGs which also indicative of the fact that IBGs are yet not in place.

The offensive units from Strike Corps attached with South Western Command are not apparently placed at forward position which further augments the non formulation of IBGs and also no such unit is located near border yet.¹⁰² Due to non-availability of actual plans of Cold Start most of above outcome is assumption based but it is also not logical to believe that this task could be accomplished with appropriate deliberations.

Cold Start and Civil Military Disbelieve

The next important hurdle for decision makers to undertake limited war is to formulate a strategy and its related goals that are achievable by use of military force, but still have room to ensure that conflict does not reach to nuclear threshold. The ways and means to carry out limited war operation is challenge for civil and military authorities because of high degree of non-connectivity as their built in character. The complex issue to civil military distrust has major impact on Cold Start employment, because this type of offensive strategy requires very close and cohesive relations between the civil and military structures.

Indian civil military distrust and inter services friction are continuously putting influence on the defence policy and new war doctrines, creation and their implementation, since there are some fundamental problems with Indian military establishment that persisted from inception of India.¹⁰³ In 2001 -2002 crises the Civilian Government failed to provide Indian Military with clear objective as to desired end

¹⁰² Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

¹⁰³ Quinn J. Rhodes, 'LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA'S COLD START DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT' available at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524749.pdf>

state.¹⁰⁴ The result of this lack of understanding between Indian politician and military became evident during Operation Parakram which wasted lot of efforts but outcome of this operation failed to bring the desired results; the disconnect between two institution military and civil hampered Indian Military actions. For this purpose the civilian politicians may evolve a tightly integrated strategy with clearly defined objectives but must extend responsibility to the military leader ship to execute their strategy.

According to Barry Posen “the intervention of civilian leadership is necessary to ensure that a state’s military doctrine is well integrated with its grand strategy i.e., situation that does not appear to be the case with Cold Start”.¹⁰⁵ Also Stephen Cohen notes politician dislike the move towards a limited war doctrine because it gives the military “more of a role in decision making”¹⁰⁶ where as in that case there is required to be clear civil and military goals that are required to be reached at the start of limited war operations. The Operations Parakram shows that the lack of clear civil military objectives resulted into an operation that ended with unachieved results. Instead of achieving objectives of invasion into Pakistan the Indian military found itself face to face for ten months which resulted in negligible gains over all for Indian security.¹⁰⁷ The continuation of civil military distrust would bring only disadvantage to the Cold Start Doctrine; for Cold Start to be effective the civilian leadership needs to undertake the capacities of its military as far as the achievement of connected goals are concerned. Without sufficient knowledge of skill and limitations associated with operations under Cold Start the civilian leadership could overestimate the military’s capabilities which could bring disaster and setbacks.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘An Overview and Assessment of the Indian Army’s Cold Start Strategy,’ *Merton College University of Oxford*, available at, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk

¹⁰⁵ *ibid*

¹⁰⁶ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

¹⁰⁷ Quinn J. Rhodes, ‘LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA’S COLD START DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT’ available at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524749.pdf>

¹⁰⁸ *ibid*

In this situation the military means need to be clearly understood by politicians where limited goals are to be achieved in an environment which can trigger nuclear outbreak which is not an easy task to handle. This issue needs to be resolved by Indian Civilian Command for coordination and successful employment of Cold Start Strategy.

Inter Services Friction

As for all the world military institutions have inherited issue of inter services rivalries and Indian military is not an exception to it. This inter services friction is historical in Indian military and could hinder the effective execution of Cold Start operations, especially when such type of operation needs very robust joint coordinated efforts to achieve its ends. The on ground employment of Cold Start requires very high degree of understanding and coordinated efforts between political and military institution and among inter-services of Indian military. The design of Cold Start may not give political leader a chance once operation became to unfold due to rapid and swift mobilization and operations.¹⁰⁹

The commanders of three services of Indian Military are acting as advisor to President since the Commander-in-Chief's office now lies with President instead of being military's responsibility. In the absence of non existence of integrated command post, India's military services operate autonomously and are facing issues of leadership vacuum and uniformed command.¹¹⁰ The civilian leadership failed to construct an overall doctrine under which three forces are assured to be placed equally to overcome the issue of inter-service rivalries. To overcome this issue the major participants of Cold Start i.e., Indian Army and Air Force needs a strong leadership to integrate their wartime strategies and tactics.

¹⁰⁹ Tariq M. Ashraf, 'Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,' available at <http://www.grandstrategy.com/2009/03/9333813-doctrinal-reawakening-of-indian.html>

¹¹⁰ Quinn J. Rhodes, 'LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA'S COLD START DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT' available at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524749.pdf>

The major structure of Cold Start Doctrine stands around eight IBGs which bring Indian military's two services i.e. air force and navy under the Indian army subordination. In Cold Start the use of air power is requirement and joint vision of Indian Army and hence all the elements of Indian military participating in operations under Cold Start would be under control of unified commander which could be assumed as from Indian Army.¹¹¹ Indian Air Force has vital role to play in Cold Start since it is to pave way for ground operations, the blitzkrieg type military operations cannot be possibly undertaken without overwhelming air superiority and close integrated air support.¹¹² The Indian Air Force has major part for successful operations in Cold Start Strategy primarily it needs to execute following requirements and dedicate efforts to accomplish following requirements:

- IAF needs to achieve that level of air superiority which could render its adversary ineffective against area of operations of Cold Start offensive element i.e., integrated battle groups.
- Indian homeland is to be given air defence security for which IAF needs to dedicate its combat assets for this role.
- Dedicate close air support and ground attack units for their direct role in support of battle groups.¹¹³

The Indian Air force is of the opinion that putting aircraft on task of ground units in fixed space as integrated battle group concept demands is principally under utilization and misuse of air power which will render its numerical superiority over Pakistan's Air force ineffective.¹¹⁴ This issue of Indian Air Force to support battle group is unlikely to conclude since Indian Air force focuses on air to air combat and strategic bombing while

¹¹¹ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

¹¹² Dr Subhash Kapila, 'India's New Cold Start Doctrine Strategically Reviewed', paper No.991, 04 May 2004, available at, <http://www.southasiananalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html>.

¹¹³ *ibid*

¹¹⁴ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'An Overview and Assessment of the Indian Army's Cold Start Strategy,' *Merton College University of Oxford*, available at, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk

giving less attention to importance of close support as its core objective in Cold Start Strategy.

State of Logistics and Other Support to Cold Start Doctrine

Like other aspects infrastructure problems as well as technology and equipment shortcomings are to be overcome which is vital for successful implementation of Cold Start. Cold Start demands competent use of technology and numerical advantages. Viewing within the Indian Army, at present apparently there is sufficient material shortfalls that puts question mark on its ability to execute Cold Start in the near time. The Indian Army's armour units suffer from low operational readiness rate because much of its equipment is at the end of its service life. Similarly by creating eight IBGs Indian military necessitates self-propelled artillery to have quick mobilized action and massive firepower to carry out its goal of rapid action in operations of Cold Start.¹¹⁵

The Indian army also is deficient in mobility and logistical capability to implement Cold Start. It is anticipated that only thirty–five percent of the army is equipped to move about India, and even smaller portion possesses the mobility to execute cross-border operations.¹¹⁶ Limited supplies of spare parts, primitive logistical networks, and inadequate maintenance facilities will also hinder offensive operations. Indian Army's own aviation assets heavier utility helicopters of Air Force would need considerable assembling for logistic sustain of "Cold Start" battle group.¹¹⁷

Indian Future Military Procurement Program

As with the induction of new doctrine Indian military required employment of highly mobile units. These units needs extensive intelligence resources , air power and exceptional command and control capacity to organize multiple combined armed battle group operation in coordination with air support. To get all these aspects in one

¹¹⁵ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'An Overview and Assessment of the Indian Army's Cold Start Strategy,' *Merton College University of Oxford* , available at, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk

¹¹⁶ *ibid*

¹¹⁷ *ibid*

consolidated forms needs highly trained officers as well as field commanders able of taking initiative and acting to the demands of battle field as the events unfold in operations.

While looking into the operations under Cold Start Doctrine following are vital for fighting a decisive war in order to make Cold Start effective and giving enemy a forceful blow :

- Special forces
- Air Assault Division
- Air Cavalry brigades
- Light infantry divisions with air transportable combat power.”¹¹⁸

India is planning to spend over US \$100 billion for procurement of modern weapons under its force restructuring program by 2022. All these procurement of arms and force restructuring in the three services specially Air Force and Army is to overcome shortfalls that are vital for employing the Cold Start Doctrine on ground effectively and efficiently.¹¹⁹

India’s plans to procure huge cache of weapons and equipment for future employment and modernization programs and is planning to re-equip all the three arms of its military. The types of weapons and equipments which are under procurement process are listed below:

Indian Air Force

- Advance 4th generation fighter jets, medium category multi role combat aircraft (MMRCA).
- Phalcon AWACS deal with Israel.

¹¹⁸ Bharat Rakshak, ‘Cold Start an Overview available at <http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=141&start=0&sk=t&sd=a>

¹¹⁹ Shahzad Massod Roomi, ‘4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

- Stealth fighters from Russian and self production in collaboration with Russians.
- Self production of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) with extensive equipment support from Western countries.
- Air defence equipment from Israel and joint ventures for their production at home.
- Heavy air transport aircrafts C-17 and C-130Js for boosting deployment capability and high mobility.¹²⁰

Navy

- Nuclear Submarines
- Aircraft carrier from Russia with support and up-gradation program with Russia and Israel.
- Modern conventional submarines from France.
- Akula class nuclear submarines from Russia.
- Russian frigates.
- Mig-29 K multi role aircraft for naval air arm.
- US Poseidon aircraft for maritime patrol and reconnaissance purpose.¹²¹

Army

- Light weight towed Howitzer guns.
- New gunship and heavy support helicopters.
- New T-90 Russian main battle tanks.
- Enhancing of links and roads leading to border and LoCs area.¹²²

¹²⁰ ibid

¹²¹ ibid

¹²² ibid

Despite of acquiring all the above military hard ware and weapon systems the Indian military is to improve its Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C4I) for implementation of network centric warfare an important aspect of Cold Start Strategy. More over the reliability of Indian air force in target accusation and intelligence is to be improved with its dependency from conventional fixed wing aircraft reconnaissance to more advance means like satellite based powerful sensor utilization and tactical reconnaissance through improved versions of advance UAVs. A continuous update would be required of all the battle field scenarios in order to avoid any sort of surprise while under taking Cold Start based operations of enemy's range and location. This would be an important aspect when the operations are at the opening stage and onset of conflict under this limited war theatre.¹²³

By and large evaluation of progress of the Indian Army's towards executing Cold Start represents that it remained in the experimental phase. Military exercises demonstrate that the considerable progress has taken place in organization of various components, but still it required more work to achieve the goals presented in doctrine at operational level. Restructuring of force on border area the creation of the South Western Command represents a positive step, but there is no evidence of offensive units being forward deployed as the doctrine requires. Inter service and civil military tension remains major obstacle to the process Cold Start Strategy for implementation. Above and beyond Technological and equipment deficit, India also lacks sufficient number of capable officers who can execute Cold Start operations on ground independently and help and instructions of senior commanders.

Exit Strategy for Cold Start Operations

“It is easier to get into the conflict, than to get out of one, greater attention is needed to cover this aspect by the military and strategic establishment. Exit strategies needs are combination of the ‘carrot’ of political incentives,

¹²³ Air Marshal BK Pandey, 'Indian Air Force 2020By Issue Net Edition| Date: 30 Oct, 2010, Air Marshall Bk Pandey <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/indian-air-force-2020/0/>

diplomatic persuasion and military restraint and the 'stick' of political pressure, diplomatic isolation and military violence. It is essential for any military doctrine to pre identify the exit points for the successful gain of objectives defined for that military operation."¹²⁴

Conflict demands an exit strategy which should be multiple utility that can be worked at varying conditions and stages of conflict. Since Cold Start encompasses multiple options of use of force across a vast field of operation that includes offensive action by pivot/holding Corps, with added booster from strike corps and all these efforts put together and placed near the International borders between Pakistan and India. As the operations based on Cold Start are launched the pivot corps actions and then strike corps operations deeper into Pakistani territory without giving any break to Pakistani forces would not likely allow it to offer resistance to strike corps of Indian military. In order to get chances of exit from conflict following may be formulated as exit strategy featuring political, military and diplomatic pressures.

The main objective of Cold Start to wreak damage to the adversaries in such a fashion that it submits to desired objectives. In this context the launching of offensive is not the only option as the threat of offensive before the launch of operations can bring out the desired objectives and hence gives a chance to achieve desired goals without getting into conflict.

The next option for exit could be at the very onset of conflict meaning there by that exploiting the threat of escalation and threatening adversary with further setback in order to get desired concessions.

The later stage of exit could come once the strike corps reaches to the desired penetration. This stage could be critical because at this stage Pakistan's nuclear trigger may be armed and may force Pakistan to respond with nuclear strike warning, in order

¹²⁴ Reconciliation Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia, 'IDSA Monograph Series No3. September 2010, available at <http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Mnongraph No.3.pdf>

to halt the Indian forces further advance. In case of determined uprising from Pakistan, conventional operations may continue and so also the effort to stop conflict as well.

The last option for exit is in the immediate stir of nuclear switch over for terminating the nuclear exchange probably and surely at the lowest stair of nuclear steps. But of course if this conflict reaches to above stage the very theme and aim of Cold Start would diminish and it would be failure of Cold Start Doctrine.

Indian military despite of its all military preparedness of Cold Start is still conflicting with the issue of exit strategy at conventional level. War is not only about fighting but is an exercise of national power and includes non-military instruments.¹²⁵ For this reason the belligerents should have clear lines of communication to convey the messages at all the stages of operations.

Conclusion

During standoff of 2002 Indians faced the problem of long communication lines, which rendered their mobilization too slow and by the time the Indian troops got deployed, Pakistani force were there waiting. On the other hand this also gave time to international community to react and call for restraint.¹²⁶ In order to solve this problem of time consuming mobilization, the Indian military came up with the “Cold Start” strategy¹²⁷. This strategy incorporates “eight readily deployed ‘integrated battle groups,’ drawn from Navy and Indian Air Force. These groups would be trained to make swift and hard in roads into enemy territory. These strikes should be ‘limited’ and ‘calibrated’ to ensure nuclear weapons do not come into play.”¹²⁸ The Cold start strategy revolves around the concept of swift mobilization. Given the long lines of communication, India

¹²⁵ Reconciliation Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia, 'IDSA Monograph Series No3. September 2010, available at [http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Mnongraph No.3.pdf](http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Mnongraph%20No.3.pdf)

¹²⁶ “Cold Start to New War Doctrine”, The Times of India ,April 14, 2004, available at URL <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/616847.cms>

¹²⁷ Reconciliation Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia, 'IDSA Monograph Series No3. September 2010, available at [http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Mnongraph No.3.pdf](http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Mnongraph%20No.3.pdf)

¹²⁸ ibid

would rely on troops closer to the border to initiate the onslaught and achieve an advantage against Pakistan. The troops deeper inside India, would be mobilized in the mean time and subsequently consolidate the advantage gained by initial onslaught. This strategy is also very rudimentary and subject to criticism. The resources required for such an operation may not be possible for a country like India. The timing factor is also very crucial in this strategy which requires thorough deliberation and accurate execution. On the other hand Pakistani forces are not so benign and require much less response time in critical areas, so they may be able to face the Indians and at the same time gain advantage before Indian troops arrive. The problem of relevancy between ends and means also remains an issue.¹²⁹

Cold start is facing various challenges the type of rapid and self-sustained operations needs independent decision making that is acceptable to all components of Government including three fighting arms among themselves as well. Cold Start is in prelude stage and its execution would have serious ramifications to strategic stability of South Asian region. The Indian Army's defensive posture has shifted to offensive as a result of Cold Start. Such type of bearing would only bring in potentials for security dilemma that encircles India and Pakistan if in future Cold Start is put into service.

¹²⁹ Brodie, "War and Politics", p-1-3.

Chapter IV

Implications of Cold Start and Limited War Doctrines on South Asia

Introduction

This chapter constitutes discussion on strategic stability by probing stability/instability paradox to comprehend the relationship between conventional and nuclear strategies and doctrines of India and Pakistan. The circumstance and conditions outlined here argue that conventional warfare between India and Pakistan has all the potentials to escalate to nuclear level. India and Pakistan have long history of intermittent crises caused by a number of aspects, but the persistent theme is the perception or misperception, strategic approaches, preferences, competence, the dynamics of interface and strategic communication that are posing overwhelming threat on each side. There is no possibility of limited conventional conflict between India and Pakistan, due to asymmetrical configuration of strategic force configuration, doctrines, conventional equilibrium, issue of strategic depth and additional aggressive conventional war fighting doctrine (like Indians had introduced CSD). Any action in the aspect of hot pursuits or surgical strikes against Pakistan in future would result in the significantly escalating the crisis to the nuclear level.

The supporters of nuclear force dig their logic on this aspect of nuclear weapons that they remained source of stability between the two super powers during the era of Cold War. Hence it is assumed that same thing will happen with the stability in other regions of world where instability persists. But on the other side the structure of security is altogether different form that of Cold War rivals and conditions that persisted during the Cold War era. On the stage of India and Pakistan any conventional conflict has all the divergence to rise above the conventional level to reach to nuclear exchange. In this context the Waltz and Sagan views oppose each other, Waltz assumes that nuclear

weapons have ability towards stability since the cost of war is not acceptable¹³⁰ and the views in other aspect by Sagan advocates that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons is far ahead of any stabilizing effect that they accompany.¹³¹

It is accepted reality that nuclear weapons are capable to over ride the cost of war to potential objectives and boost the risk of escalation. The nuclear weapon theories along with conflict history of Subcontinent between India and Pakistan concludes that any exchange of nuclear weapons between them is likely to be grown out of escalation of conventional conflict which may be result of impulsive unleashing of nuclear arsenals. Asymmetrical capabilities at conventional and nuclear level between India and Pakistan, doctrinal asymmetry, war on terrorism and threat of cross border terrorism increased brinkmanship, and overriding all of them is Indian concept of limited war to counter these activities create grave hazard to South Asian stability and includes the risk of escalation.

War constitutes lots of factors that make it vulnerable to escalation and once it breaks out than it constitutes uncertainty that to what extent it is going to escalate since the magnitude of actions and counter actions are not predictable. The steps to escalation ladder starts from minor conflicts starting from limited conventional war to full scale conventional war followed by limited nuclear war to full scale nuclear war.¹³² Any arm conflict has tendency of escalation. The issue in front of Indians is of sub-conventional war, the Indian policy makers regard it as “limited war under nuclear

¹³⁰ G.D Bukshi, ' Interface Between Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence: A Case Study for the Indian Subcontinent,' available at , http://ndc.viburnix.com/uploads/editor_files/pdf/06_RKPat.pdf

¹³¹ *ibid*

¹³² Rajesh M Basur, "International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence," *In the India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship, Theories of Deterrence and International Relations*" (Ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Rout ledge, 2007), pp.142.

conditions” has all the capability of escalating to full-fledge conventional war.¹³³ Limited war escalation stands on the level of strategic stability, strategic parity and strategic communication between two nuclear rivals.¹³⁴ These three factors hold the strings to keep the limited war limited. In nuclear environment these three factors provide pillars to limited war strategies. In case of India-Pakistan these three factors are still hazy.

Cold Start and Risk of Escalation Control

Escalation appears to be inherent between India and Pakistan because of their desire and required inevitability of relationship. In conflict between India and Pakistan one’s aspiration is to win and an obligation not to lose by other side. The India Pakistan history of military incidents clearly prove so much chances of conflict to escalate to total war or to the threshold of nuclear war. Equating India-Pakistan relationship on conventional and strategic level, India hangs on a position of escalation superiority with the support of its advance military capabilities and technology as compared to Pakistan’s fragile defence structure. India on its conventional military base is trying to rule the escalation ladder from low intensity conflict to conventional war, limited or all out, while Pakistan seems leaning towards addressing the asymmetric strategic balance with its nuclear deterrent capability.

The crisis precedents between India and Pakistan suggest the risk of escalation between India and Pakistan was much more but controllable, but now due to Indian developing and improving military capabilities are widening the conventional gap between India and Pakistan which could not guaranteed that in future crisis the complex structure of escalation between the two would be controllable. Indian new limited war

¹³³ Varuni Sahni, ‘The Stability Instability Paradox: A less than Perfect Explanation,’ in *The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relation*, (Ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Rout ledge, 2007), p.193.

¹³⁴ Subha Chandran, *Limited War, Revisiting Kargil in the Indo-Pak conflict*, (Delhi: Indian Research Press, 2006), p.105.

doctrine Cold Start permits India to take punitive actions against Pakistan in response to any terrorist activity taken place on Indian Territory from Pakistan. Indian Cold Start doctrine is erected on assumption that through superiority at conventional and strategic level India can obtain its desired objectives by conflicting limited war with Pakistan under conditions which do not threaten the risk of escalation.

Cold Start Suppositions and Limitations

- First its aim for swift mobilization could enhance instability in South Asia, since Pakistan would have to increase its readiness to counter any possible Indian attack.
- Second, because of the less time to move forces, the ability of the Indian government to reconsider its actions would be limited as would the ability of international community to intervene to prevent escalation. As a result, a minutely considered crisis could potentially balloon into full scale war.
- The next option focuses on making territorial gains through rapid and hard inroads into Pakistani territory across international border penetration could be up to 50 miles. The goal might be narrow from the adversary's point of view, but may have strategic implications for Pakistan thus it would respond with full potential to dilute the Indian offensive at all levels.
- Unable to achieve the desired aims or in case of stalemate, Indian leadership might be psychologically forced to push for to launch full scale conventional war. Here the Indian declaratory policy to keep limited war below nuclear level would fail at operational level.

As a result Cold Start imposes a major challenge to future India Pakistan relations because of its proactive, offensive stance and the historical legacies of escalation, misperception, and deception. Two major instances, the 1971 East Pakistan War and Exercise Brass Tacks (1986-87), clearly represent how events can quickly spiral for each side in both outright armed conflict as well as military exercises. At this

intent Cold Start is considered as imminent threat to strategic stability of South Asia as it has a basic tendency to escalate to total war and might cross nuclear threshold that may be resulted into nuclear exchange.

Strategic Stability

According to international theory of nuclear weapons brings interdependence between nuclear rivals. In case of India and Pakistan both had generally remained in a constant state of flux. Times of peace have at best remained uneasy and have been characterized by what analyst Ashley Tellis terms “Ugly Stability”.¹³⁵ Stability must be classified in both its strategic and technical contexts. Strategic stability relates to ensuring the safety, security, and survivability of nuclear weapons under all conditions peace, on alert in crisis, and war.¹³⁶ Stability assumes a state of balance between two adversaries even if there may be no parity between them.

It is significant here to stress that the concept of strategic stability in South Asia is complex and subject to minor agreement. Strategic stability becomes a vital requirement between two nuclear rivals. There are three main components for strategic stability. “First stability lies in the presence of few incentives for the first strike during the military confrontation. Second ‘Arms Stability’ lies in constraints, both unilateral and bilaterally agreed to competitive and destabilizing weapons acquisitions. While arms stability is more vital, combining two together contribute to general stability.”¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Challenges of Nuclear Stability in South Asia,’ available at <http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Challenges%20to%20Nuclear%20Stabilty%20in%20South%20Asia%.pdf>

¹³⁶ *ibid*

¹³⁷ Rajesh M Basur, ‘International Relation Theory and Minimum Deterrence,’ in *The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E. Sridharan (NewYork: Routledge, 2007), p.134-135.

Escalation control stability is the conception of status-quo at the nuclear level that there is no space for conventional war due to deterrence stability those exists between two states. Unfortunately all of these criteria of stability are missing between India and Pakistan. Indian readiness to fight limited war with Pakistan to counter react future terrorist attacks by posing higher military and political war with Pakistan without realizing the failure of such an action and Pakistan unconstrained response to such an act of Indian aggression. The asymmetries existing between India and Pakistan at conventional, doctrinal, and strategic level does not allow between India and Pakistan to make stable relationship.

Stability Vs Instability Paradox

The stability instability paradox recommends that the stability induced by nuclear weapons through mutual deterrence at the strategic level opens up the possibility of more frequent resort to force, and increased instability, at lower levels of violence.¹³⁸ This perception was to analyze the relationship between superpowers during the Cold War. Liddell Hart argued that the introduction of nuclear weapons had made limited conventional war more viable.¹³⁹ The stability vs. instability paradox is associated with Glenn Snyder, who identified and expressed it in 1965, “the greater the stability of the ‘strategic’ balance of terror, the lower the stability of the overall balance at its lower level of violence”.¹⁴⁰

The paradox defines that rather than bring stability to a pair of potential adversaries, nuclear weapons may create instability by encouraging one or both sides to engage in ‘limited’ military adventures against the other, as long as they do not put a

¹³⁸ Varun Sahni, ‘The Stability Instability Paradox: A Less than Perfect Explanation, ‘in *The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (Ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.187.

¹³⁹ *ibid*

¹⁴⁰ *ibid*

risk the critical interest of the target country. Two decades after Snyder's classic formulation, Robert Jervis redefined the stability/instability paradox more elegantly; 'To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.'¹⁴¹ Michael Krepon elaborates on stability/instability paradox that, "Nuclear weapons can generate risk taking because they presumably provide an insurance policy against escalation".¹⁴²

Stability/Instability Paradox in India and Pakistan Case

The nuclearization of South Asia has an asymmetric and differentiated effect on India and Pakistan as far as their respective tendency to use force against each other is concerned. While the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent has given option to Pakistan to use nuclear force first against India due to its conventional inferiority, where as it has simultaneously placed severe constraints on the use of force by India to counter Pakistan, as it acknowledged its nuclear weapons as an instrument of politics.

"How a nuclear Pakistan unhampered by no-first use policy would prevent means to wage conventional war against Pakistan was clearly documented by General K.Sundraji, former Chief of the Indian army, when he observed that 'historical manoeuvres resorted to by India in response to Pakistani aggressive behaviour in Kashmir could now be denied to it by nuclear Pakistan'.¹⁴³It is considered that the nuclear symmetry gives upper hand to Pakistan and bound India to take aggressive action against Pakistan to get its political objectives through limited military means. "To put the matter more pointedly, the acquisition of 'strategic parity' by the weaker state has not only restricted the range of policy options and manoeuvrability of the stronger

¹⁴¹ ibid

¹⁴² G.D Bukshi, ' Interface Between Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence: A Case Study for the Indian Subcontinent,' available at , http://ndc.viburnix.com/uploads/editor_files/pdf/06_RKPat.pdf and also on <http://idsa.in/system/files/Monograph10.pdf>

¹⁴³ Rifaat Hussain, "Deterrence and Nuclear Use: Doctrines in South Asia," in *The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.160.

state, an outcome to be expected, but it has also given the former the confidence to initiate offensive action against latter”.¹⁴⁴

The difficulties encountering India and Pakistan are far greater than faced by US and Soviet Union during the Cold war because the environment and conditions are not the same. On the one side, there are geographical and strategic asymmetries between India and Pakistan that present challenges different from those encountered by super powers during the Cold War. On other side asymmetry at doctrinal level is incompatible to strategic stability of the region.

Pakistan India Mismatched Doctrines

India and Pakistan have adopted radically different declaratory nuclear postures due to differences in their geographical conditions, size, security environments, threats perception and domestic political foundations.¹⁴⁵ In doctrinal context, it would appear that the basic problem is that the need for credibility imposes very different requirements on Pakistan-India doctrine. Pakistan to balance Indian conventional superiority declared nuclear first use policy. It is primarily an indicator to offset India's conventional advantage by signalling that even in the event of conventional attack, Pakistan may retaliate with nuclear weapons.

On the other hand India because of its conventional advantage over Pakistan and the lack of an impending threat from China, it offers a more relaxed deterrent policy of no first use (NFU), while declaring a doctrine of retaliatory use of nuclear weapon and

¹⁴⁴ Varun Sahni, 'The Stability Instability Paradox: A Less than Perfect Explanation, 'in *The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Rout ledge, 2007), p.194.

¹⁴⁵ Rifaat Hussain, "Deterrence and Nuclear Use: Doctrines in South Asia," in *The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Rout ledge, 2007), p.180.

as of late massive retaliation.¹⁴⁶ These differences are well summarized by Ashley Tellis:

“If the term nuclear weaponry is treated as the frame work of an analysis, New Delhi is likely to place its greatest emphasis on the adjective nuclear, as in ‘nuclear weaponry,’ there by using this term to connote national political assets that insure against strategic blackmail and potential nuclear use...Islamabad in contrast, is more likely to place greater emphasis on the noun weaponry, as in ‘nuclear weaponry,’ thus using the term to refer to military instruments that might have to be employed in extremis for purposes of ensuring national safety.”¹⁴⁷

For India the entire concern of credibility revolves around the question of avoiding nuclear war by waging limited conventional war under nuclear conditions.¹⁴⁸ Whereas Pakistan strategy is to refute India the space for waging a conventional war and to be prepared to expand any war, retain the nuclear use option, and make costs exceed any benefits that India might calculate basically, to deny India success through the use of nuclear weapon.

These different doctrinal thinking has enormously complicated the challenging task of achieving strategic stability in South Asia. Due to lack of allowance and accommodation in India Pakistan doctrines under the current political and strategic environment of South Asia, conflicting doctrines are themselves a source of instability.

¹⁴⁶ Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia,’ published by The Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Reigning in the Risk, available at <http://www.npolicy.org/files/2009813-khan%20final.pdf>

¹⁴⁷ Ashley Tellis, ‘India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrence and Ready Arsenal’ (Santa Monica, C A: RAND, 2001), p.279.

¹⁴⁸ Varun Sahni, ‘The Stability Instability Paradox: A Less than Perfect Explanation,’ in *The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E.Sridharan(New York:Routledge,2007).p.195

The doctrinal disagreement mentioned above is the declared and undeclared policies of India and Pakistan. In the absence of an official dialogue between two countries the materialization of a strategic model remains problematic. Deterrence perception between two countries, also need time to develop. India–Pakistan attempts to describe the nuclear stability in their particular terms and tried to relate those in different conflict which is not suitable for deterrence stability.

Asymmetric Conventional Military Equilibrium

Above mentioned problem of incongruity between India and Pakistan at doctrinal level is due to the difference that exists between India and Pakistan at conventional and strategic level. The disparities in modern conventional capability never the less suggested that India's capacity to fight offensively with combine arms techniques have significantly outpaced Pakistan's predominantly over the last two decades. This implies that India could chase military goals of conventional warfare against Pakistan more rapidly today, limiting the duration of a conflict, and achieving decisive results before the international community could get deeply involved. The same factors tend to condense the time available for deliberation and augment the chances of escalation to the nuclear level.

Indian military doctrine of Cold Start inherits the risk of unintentional escalation. Indian military preparedness in wake of CSD in term of capability and technological advancement would make it more superior against Pakistan in term of conventional military competence. India-United States nuclear deal which grants India status of de-jure nuclear weapon state and would augment India's fissile material stockpiles leading to quantitative as well as qualitative improvements in India's nuclear arsenals.

Increasing capabilities in advance information, surveillance and reconnaissance systems acquisitions of Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems; and the steady militarization of outer space in which Indian have recently shown interest.¹⁴⁹ If strategic weapons asymmetry between India and Pakistan intensify, it will increase India's first strike options in terms of capabilities, notwithstanding India's declared intentions of no first use in its official doctrine.¹⁵⁰

Pakistan India Asymmetric Strategic Depth

Distance facilitates in escalation control. This gave advantage to two super powers during the time of Cold War and it is what India and Pakistan are lacking between them as they shared common border. India has all of the advantages of strategic depth. This allows India to scatter strategic forces widely among numerous sites, installations and airfields whereas Pakistan's lack of strategic depth means its airfields and strategic assets are very much vulnerable to Indian attack as they are close to India. India's greater strategic depth allows it to scatter its strategic nuclear forces to area beyond the normal range of enemy ground and air operations. Longer-range platforms, such as the Su-30 aircraft and the Agni-2 missiles, additionally decrease Indian vulnerability.¹⁵¹

The asymmetric strategic depth gives benefit to Indian military at operational level and exposes Pakistan military assets and strategic facilities vulnerable to Indian attack. Pakistan's shorter range Hatf-3 / M-11 ballistic missiles must be stationed fairly far forward to reach strategic targets in India, possibly leaving them vulnerable to air and ground attack. The same is true for Pakistan's forward air bases, which are within

¹⁴⁹ Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia,' published by The Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Reigning in the Risk, available at <http://www.npolicy.org/files/2009813-khan%20final.pdf>

¹⁵⁰ V.R.Raghvan, 'Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,' available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/83/ragh.pdf>

¹⁵¹ Peter R. Lavoy, Stephen A. Smith, 'The Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear Use between India and Pakistan,' *Strategic insights Vol II Issue .2* (February 2003) available at , <http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-8464.html>

easy striking distance of the border.¹⁵² The survival of Pakistan's strategic forces is critical to Pakistan, therefore to deal with this threat Pakistan places emphasis on its first use policy to deter Indian conventional force while the strategic forces are still intact and capable of making a credible impression upon India.

Misapprehension and Threat to Escalation Control

Any nature of war based on some goals, which are either political or military both but limited war is essentially to accomplish political purposes through military means. Therefore it is necessary for nuclear rivals to know each other intentions before going to conflict. Another principle of stability-instability paradox is preventing unintended escalation; lines of communication need to be reliable and messages conveyed over these channels need to be trustworthy.

The intrinsic difficulties in communicating with an adversary whose difference of views and objectives were so great that they would result in conflict. If miscommunication with, or misreading of an adversary lead to conflict, this would suggest that communication to keep that war limited might also fail-assuming that lines of communication remain intact. But as Barry Posen has noted, "Inadvertent escalation may also result from the great difficulty of gathering and interpreting the most relevant information about a war in progress and using it to understand, control, and coordinating the war."¹⁵³ Miscalculation and misinterpretation always subsist between two adversaries while disproving force operations. In India-Pakistan background due to geographical proximity and Pakistan's lack of strategic depth it is essential for both to keep their communication lines intact in both peace and conflict time. As it is seen in current India-Pakistan military stand-offs of 2001-2002, and in Kargil crisis that the lines of communication have been mostly blocked. This type of disconnection during crises

¹⁵² *ibid*

¹⁵³ Michael Krepon, 'Limited War, Escalation Control and Nuclear Option in South Asia,' available at , <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ESCONYTR0LCHAPTER7.pdf>

between two nuclear rivals would have serious repercussions that might be resulted into inadvertent escalation.

Despite the fact that this is a reasonable purpose and practical means of communication, it has not been used in such a manner; instead hot lines have typically been used for deception, at worst and post crisis management at best. There are lots of examples of such misuse of this otherwise productive tool: hot lines were useful after Kargil crisis, but not during it; hotlines between the **DGMOs** did not work when the 1999 Indian plane hijacking crisis was at its peak.¹⁵⁴

Indian military planners might not have measured how threatening Cold Start offensive operations could appear to an opponent. The objective to pursue limited goals may not be clearly perceived by the other side. Given the Pakistan Army's doctrine of "offensive defence" that seeks to take action to an Indian attack with aggressive counterattacks on Indian Territory, Pakistan could react to Cold Start in a manner that Indian leaders view as "disproportionate" to the amount of force employed in pursuit of their desired limited goals. This could compel India to escalate the conflict, thereby heightening Pakistan's perception that Indian aims are not limited, and potentially leading to an escalation spiral between two sides.

Cold Start heightens apprehension about misperception because the doctrine explicitly seeks to confuse Pakistani forces and disrupt their making cycle. Although in conventional war, disorienting the enemy's leadership is a virtue, in a limited war between nuclear powers, transparency and the clear signalling of intentions are required to prevent escalation. Therefore in limited war both countries would have

¹⁵⁴ Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms control and Confidence Building Measures,' available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NWC_prospectsforIndianandPakistaniArmsControl.pdf

difficulty in establishing the salencies that control escalation. The political military objectives which India consider limited , might not be considered limited by Pakistan and might be unacceptable for Pakistan and Pakistan might plan to use nuclear weapons in the event of deep military offensive by India. How deep it would be it is remained unclear and not easy to identify.

Significance of International Community Mediation

Last but not the least the international community always play important role in Pakistan India conflict mediation. Cold Start has assumptions of ruling out the role of International Community in future conflict is also a serious threat to escalation control. India-Pakistan tested their deterrence limits in couple of crises, and each time international community intervene to end conflict below the level of nuclear exchange. The deterrence is held due to the reality of existing conventional imbalance which did not allow India the freedom of action or the confidence in its ability to conduct limited war to gain its political objectives below nuclear threshold. But this is not only the measure which prevent escalation between two states in past conflicts, it is clearly emerged thing did not spiral out due to sustained high level diplomatic efforts made by US. India should become conscious of this aspect that before going to adventurism with Pakistan that in the absence of such high-level mediation, the possibility of an intended or unintended disaster cannot be ruled out.

Cold Start and Menace of Inadvertent Escalation

Any Indian limited military operations on Pakistan's territory, whether punitive, preventive or pre-emptive conventional air strikes in the form of Cold Start strategy targeting Pakistan's conventional armed forces, nuclear forces and strategic facilities, would activate an inadvertent use of nuclear weapon in conventional limited war are as follows. These all are factors that poses serious threat to deterrence stability between India and Pakistan.

- Indian and Pakistan's asymmetry at doctrinal level
- India and Pakistan's incompatibility at conventional level
- India Pakistan asymmetric strategic depth

Warnings of Inadvertent Escalation between India and Pakistan

The greater the threat of Indian conventional military adventurism lower would be the threshold to use nuclear deterrence by Pakistan. In future any Indian military adventurism on Pakistan's territory targeting Pakistani military, strategic assets would surely compel Pakistan to retaliate. Therefore Indian assumption of asymmetric assured destruction against Pakistan on the foundation of its conventional superiority and escalation control are based on false lines. Indian limited conventional war did not consider inadvertence to be of any significance, but was based on the predictability of the Pakistan nuclear threshold.¹⁵⁵ A markedly defined redline erodes nuclear deterrence and provides room for conventional force manoeuvre or destruction by fire power. Pakistan feels inherent asymmetries in a limited or total war with India is detrimental to it, and to avert this discomfort it uses its nuclear capabilities to maintain strategic symmetry against India. And possibility of risk of escalation in future conflict is due to current Indian military structural evolution and technological development in wake of Cold Start Doctrine which enables India to carry out military operation against Pakistan. If Cold Start implemented it would elevate the risk of inadvertent escalation, it might be possible that India undertake limited action that would destabilize Pakistan's political and domestic order and give serious blow to its economy which might result in nuclear exchange.

India's challenge to engage Pakistan in a limited war would to ensure that Pakistan does not face situations in which a nuclear strike becomes necessary. The circumstances under which Pakistan would use nuclear strike would therefore be reliant on the military and territorial losses it can sustain. Ambiguity about the state of

¹⁵⁵ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, 'Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development, and Implications for South Asian Security (Karachi Oxford University Press, 2010), p.461.

weaponization and deployment of nuclear forces is the deliberate part of both India and Pakistan. As consequences on escalatory spiral is ever ready to come into being. Predicting how the opponent will respond and what impact it will have on the conflict is part of the cost benefit analysis.

As evident from the Cold Start rationality that in future the most triggering point of conflict between India-Pakistan would be terrorist confrontations as it was seen in past (Parliament Building Attack) and currently after the Mumbai attack of 2008. In this scenario one can take for granted that the peace time status of nuclear forces in South Asia would shift from non-deployment posture to high alert status. On this hypothetical situation "India-Pakistan could keep their nuclear weapons in close to ready status to avoid being caught unprepared in the event that conventional war begins to go badly, both sides would likely to bring their nuclear forces at high alert status at virtually the same time that they assembled their conventional forces."¹⁵⁶ All possibilities of inadvertent escalation erected on misinterpretation, and miscommunication that exist between India and Pakistan are because of existing ambiguity in their declaratory policies. In peace time Pakistan's nuclear forces are not on high alert status. But in crises situation both states can select to deploy their forces on "ready state" without communicating with other side. At this stage the threat of inadvertent use of nuclear weapon would become imminent due to high alert and the haze of war. These developments will force Pakistan into countervailing strategies and augment Pakistan's geo-physical vulnerabilities besides Indian aggression.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

All the problems can only be solved by bringing trust between the two neighbouring nuclear states by taking comprehensive bilateral measures between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan go back a long way in negotiating bilateral treaties and confidence building measures (CBMs). But due to existing mistrust between two states their implementation are rather unimpressive.

¹⁵⁶ Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Challenges of Nuclear Stability in South Asia,' available at <http://www.sassu.org.uk.pdfs/Challenges%20to%20Nuclear%20Stabilty%20in%20South%20Asia%.pdf>

Three major agreements can be attributed to Indian and Pakistani bilateral reactions. Again, each of these agreements had crises backdrop.¹⁵⁷

- The Simla agreement of 1972, directly in reaction to the 1971 war.
- The Lahore agreement of 1999, in reaction to the crisis spawned from the 1998 nuclear tests and the ongoing Kashmir issues.
- The 2004 Islamabad Accord, resulting from 9/11 and the 2001-2002 military crises and Kashmir conflict.

Nevertheless, CBMs are no answer to and security, but they are a useful foundation for potential structural arms control agreements. The basic reasons for failure of CBMs is continuing distrust, aggressive force postures, forward deployment of military units, and continuing violence in the region.¹⁵⁸The leading issue regarding CBMs between India and Pakistan is of conceptual nature. The argument behind strategic CBMs is that nuclear measures on their own are meaningless if conventional force restraints are not applied. There are number of occasions where both states underwent for confidence building measures with regards to their requirements of that time. All of these agreements replicate thoughtful ideas but incredibly poor implementation. Neither side has built upon such measures; instead each has used them as means to counteract the other.

Strategic Restraint Regime Control Proposal

To deal with the risks of nuclear inadvertence inherent in the India–Pakistan confrontation Pakistan proposed a “Peace, Security and Development initiative for

¹⁵⁷ Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms control and Confidence Building Measures,’ available at

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NWC_prospectsforIndianandPakistaniArmsControl.pdf

¹⁵⁸ Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms control and Confidence Building Measures,’ available at

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NWC_prospectsforIndianandPakistaniArmsControl.pdf

South Asia”.¹⁵⁹ In October 1998, during the expert level meeting between India and Pakistan in Islamabad, nuclear risk reduction measures also come under debate. Besides calling for non use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan, three points were initiated by Pakistan that the two sides should work together on “Strategic Restraint Regime”. This proposal contained not only nuclear missile restraint measures but also suggestions regarding conventional balance and restraints.¹⁶⁰

The Lahore MOU and Nuclear Risk Reduction Scheme

The nuclear risk reduction measure outlined in the Lahore MOU were ever codified into bilateral agreement due to the Kargil episode of 1999, which brought two countries near on the verge of a full scale war¹⁶¹, unfortunately, the dialogue process broke down after Lahore MOU and no formal discussion has been taken place on Strategic Restraint Regime measures between two countries.

Analysis

The main area of concern that needs to be recognized is the contradictory implementation of the existing CBM's. It was decided at Lahore to periodically evaluate the implementation of existing CBM's and to establish appropriate consultative mechanisms in this regard. It is therefore necessary that reviews and oversight mechanism should be established to meet biannually to review the advancement on the implementation of existing CBMs. It must be also kept back in mind that only such measures would have any chance of success, in which both sides perceives a

¹⁵⁹ Rifaat Hussain, “Deterrence and Nuclear Use: Doctrines in South Asia,” in *The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (Ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.160.

¹⁶⁰ Naeem Salik, “The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence, Pakistan Perspective” (Pakistan Oxford University Press 2009), p.249.

¹⁶¹ Rifaat Hussain, “Deterrence and Nuclear Use: Doctrines in South Asia,” in *The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E.Sridharan (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.162.

mutability of interest. For this reciprocated trust is required, any forceful measure on one or another party would become unproductive in this regard.

Conclusion

The South Asian neighbours have the potential of moving very rapidly from peace to time of crises, which compels the command system to make adjustments along the spectrum of control at the same rate. The existence of challenges to deterrence in the form of limited war, pre-emption and decapitation necessitates high alert rates and encourage mistrust. Additionally prospects of intended BMD deployment would further augment the alert states and fears of pre-emption on Pakistani side. As a state moves up deployment ladder, the probability of inadvertent exchange increases. With the introduction of early warning plate forms, the capacity of threat assessment would increase, but it would also lead the side to gain capability and hence adopt launch-on-warning profiles. This would add another source on instability.

The relations between India Pakistan have not been strengthened through efficient arms control agreements and confidence building measures. The two states are still in process of incorporating nuclear weapons in their strategic consideration and policy. If the nuclear developments between the two states create a competitive spirit then the risk of deterrence breakdown would become elevated. If however they are embraced in a spirit to create a sustainable balance, it would strengthen stability. The role of arms control agreements, nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures would be instrumental in this regard, additionally if this paradigm brings about realization to the India and Pakistan that a peaceful solution to all the disputes is the only way to their salvation, then stable deterrence can be constituted. A stability situation brought about through reassurance and confidence is what should be the final objective, rather than one based on threat of mutual devastation and annihilation.

The existence of these challenges means that stability will continue to remain conditional in at least the immediate futures. When a realization sets in that the two

sides cannot resort to any sort of use of force or coercion, the balance would shift markedly in the favour of stability. This condition existed in the earlier days of Cold War as well. The initial eras were marred with frequent crises and arms races. It was quite late that the two sides settled into a relationship. Although, the South Asian nuclear neighbours have carefully avoided some of the mistakes of the Cold War rivals, they are following the same pattern in certain ways. Having tested the various options, now the time has come the two sides to get settled in a stable relationship.

Pakistan would naturally endeavour to maintain some sort of conventional parity, and may depend on tactical nuclear weapons to deter conventional or limited war on one hand, and increase credibility on other. The development of BMD on the Indian side would be reciprocated by qualitative and quantitative advancement as well. The pressures should be on both sides to develop assured second strike capabilities in the form of sea-based assets. Acquisition of real time surveillance and early warning assets would be priority. The declared nuclear doctrines both states impose restraint on each other. India with its conventional superiority over Pakistan bounds Pakistan nuclear decision makers to hold their stance of nuclear first use, whereas Pakistan put constraints through its nuclear first use declaratory policy on Indian conventional doctrine of limited war under nuclear shadow. Asymmetry that exists between two states at doctrinal level is due to the existing incompatibility of conventional balance. This asymmetric relationship between India-Pakistan poses threat to escalation control in future crises. It is dubious whether the cryptic issues imbedded in the concepts of escalation dominance and escalation control have been thought through by the strategic establishments in South Asia.

Conclusion

South Asia is bounded in a lethal nuclear relationship. The history represents that conflict between India and Pakistan are in complex spiral because after partition both countries had undergone three major wars and numerous border conflicts. The major factor in all these conflicts mostly remained the Kashmir issue. The South Asian stability was shaken when first major war over Kashmir started in 1965 followed by next in 1971 which resulted in dismemberment of Pakistan. In addition to these wars the conflicts like Siachen, exercises Brass Tacks, Kashmir Militancy crisis, the Kargil Conflict and Military Standoff of 2001-2002 were the potential threats to South Asian stability and could have broken down the deterrence shell. Indian leadership has considered very seriously the fighting and winning a conventional limited war against Pakistan. Such types of limited conventional strategies are meant for fighting a war that could be kept below the limits of nuclear threshold. Indian supporters of limited war wanted to get twin objectives the justification of maintaining a large conventional force and ensure that the presence of nuclearized environment does not outdate the concept of using force at limited levels.

The experience of Kargil has set the minds of Indian planners that they can conduct limited war under nuclear shadow without pricking the bubble of nuclear threshold. The Kargil induced a new thought in the Indians about limited war and the 2001-2002 standoff compelled Indians to dig new ways to conventional war at limited levels. The actual cause of failure of Indian Operation Parakram forced Indian to look for some new options and they reached numerous conclusions and major out of it is Cold Start Doctrine unveiled in April 2004 for limited use of force to get desired objectives in nuclear environment. The idea behind Cold Start is to reframe Indian army so as to readdress the problems faced during mass mobilization in 2001-2002 crises. This new strategy gives room to Indians to react against Pakistan quickly thus denying Pakistan the reaction time to retaliate militarily and before it can get international community to come to its help for political solutions.

The Cold Start is facing major obstacle at institutions level in India. The quick deployment time and choices of multi axis attacks thought by planners of Cold Start require both military force having capacity of independent decision making that is fully trusted by the civilian regime and that all the arms of military can operate in combination regards less of individuality. The strategy of Cold Start requires the major organizational changes in Indian defence formations stationed near international border and enhancing their offensive strike capacity with more mobility and boosted air land operations. Regardless of Indian military's capacity to put in place the Cold Start doctrine, as displayed in exercises can be evaluated in three areas: the ability to execute tasks related to Cold Start, the holding of joint operations, and the placing of information technology to gain the advantages of network centric warfare, despite of all this the Indian military still needs much more work and effort in this field of implementing Cold Start Doctrine.

No matter the Cold Start is still in the nip phase but its application on ground would bring serious repercussions for the South Asian strategic stability. The Indian forces have now reshaped their role from defensive to offensive with the formulation of Cold Start which is now potential cause of security dilemma spiral between the two South Asian nuclear neighbouring states.

The purpose of Cold Start doctrine as seen by India is to achieve the limited objectives while on the other side for Pakistan Cold Start is taken as major threat to South Asian strategic stability. But on contrary Pakistan's response in terms of military and diplomatic fields in the form of Exercises Azm-e-Nou and enhancement of capabilities of military with modern force structures is a message to Indians that there exists no element of surprise in case of applying Cold Start Doctrine.

In contrast it had been evident from the exercises that Pakistan still holds strategic equilibrium with India. The belief of Pakistani military planners is that India may have confused the effect of Cold Start which might have very serious outcome and

disastrous results. The Cold Start is founded on certain assumptions and out of these one is that the Pakistani military would not react equally to Indian military in mobilization of troops and fire power. Such Indian thinking and behaviour could only increase the chances of crisis between two nuclear states. It would also raise the chance that the level of crises would be incrementing rapidly in conventional sphere as well as from conventional to nuclear state. "Cold Start" has all the capability to trigger the conflict from lower level of political crises to all out war. In the case of nuclear environment Cold Start will force Pakistan to rely more on strategic deterrence sources.

The issue of conventional imbalance between India and Pakistan is a matter of grave concern for stability of South Asia. The existing conventional asymmetry between both south Asian neighbours raises the query that if this type of annihilation would pave way for another war that might end up with the use of nuclear weapons. The Indian thought of using the massive use of fire power through air against Pakistan has all the potentials for pushing Pakistan to the edge of using nuclear response against India due to Pakistan's inferior conventional forces as compared to India. The question which surface here is that what will be result if India failed to achieve its political objectives through military use and what will be effect on escalation control? Such type of issues are matter of consideration for military planner on both sides before formulating the war strategies for limited objectives because Indian desire to apply the superior conventional force against Pakistan for offensive actions during any conflict will bring serious consequence for South Asian stability.

The capacity of bringing the stability through strategic parity in South Asia is not possible because the India and Pakistan are engage in confronting with issues of stable nuclear deterrence. The declared nuclear capabilities in South Asia have coiled the holding of war due to diverse perception of nuclear stability. The Indians are more concerned the use of nuclear force facility for political use but had given little thought to their military implications but on Pakistani side the things are in opposite direction to it. In Pakistan the military planners give military logic to nuclear weapons.

The nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan impose restraints on each other. The Indian with superiority in conventional forces over Pakistan holds Pakistan nuclear strategists to keep their stance of nuclear first use, where as Pakistan put restraints by its nuclear first use declaratory policy on Indian conventional doctrine of limited war under nuclear umbrella. This asymmetry that is present in the doctrines of both countries is due to the existing incompatibility of conventional military balance which is also cause of threat posed to escalation control in future conflicts.

Indian strategy of limited war is founded on two objectives, first Indian policy makers thing that asymmetric assured destruction at both conventional and nuclear levels empowers India to attack on Pakistan without fear of retaliation and the second it is assumed that there exists sufficient space for limited conventional war under nuclear cover and that Indians have effective control over escalation. India has misinterpret that there will be complete subordination from Pakistan side. India also shows its wish for the Pakistan to subordinate it by implementing Cold Start strategy without recognizing the threat in Indian limited war planning. The Indian side do not consider Pakistan's nuclear potential, perceives an accurate assessment of Pakistan's nuclear redlines, predicts that India can control the degree of escalation, under estimates Pakistan's reciprocal conventional preparations and the subsequent retaliatory damage, assumes both governments will accept fate accompli, and believes the reaction of external powers would be bearable and would help keep the crises conventional and maintain ably limited. All these assumptions are sizable and significant; the failure of any one will open the opportunity of uncontrollable escalation to nuclear level. Pakistan as nuclear state has declared nuclear policy in which boundaries are clearly marked by planners that by which way Pakistan would go for nuclear option in crises.

The possible outcomes for maintaining such type of doctrine consists of increase in build-ups on India Pakistan border, continued tension and pressure to maintain strategic weapons deployment, and a regional arms race. All these long term outcomes

restricts the development of both countries, but would be especially being deliberating in case of Pakistan as it struggles to maintain two borders and multitude of domestic crises.¹⁶²

The new strategy of Indian military to launch limited offensive operation against Pakistan has got all the potentials to jeopardize the stability of South Asia. The Indian forces are already much ahead of Pakistani military in conventional aspects. This disparity of conventional forces between the two South Asian rivals cannot guarantee that in future any conventional military decision will be limited and would not be risk provoking and not escalate to nuclear response. Therefore if Cold Start would be implemented it would have serious repercussions for South Asian Stability.

The best option for both South Asian nuclear rivals is to solve their issues through peaceful means instead of going for military solutions and indulging in nuclear and conventional arms race. Till the time the problem between two nuclear adversaries remains the future of South Asian security remains unstable. Consequently there is need for uninterrupted peace development and Confidence Building Measures at strategic level to overcome the threat of future conflict which might generates into full fledged war and nuclear exchange.

¹⁶² Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms control and Confidence Building Measures,' available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NWC_prospectsforIndianandPakistaniArmsControl.pdf

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Chapter I

Conventional Limited War

Introduction

The focus of this part of context is related to the concepts of Limited Wars, requirement and necessities that give rise to the need of limited wars. The limited war concepts started growing out once the world realized the destructions of total wars. The concept of limited war got its major influence from the post World-War II reactions against total wars. This response includes the denunciation of the total war the knowhow and dynamics of war itself with the addition of the requirements of ends and means associated with war. The destructive power of nuclear and thermo nuclear weapons had put all the theories of war out-of-date. Sir Basil Liddell Hart the supporter of limited war emphasized on the realization of use of nuclear weapons and considers that there is going to be no one victorious in case of scenarios where atomic weapons are put in effect. The reasons behind re-emerging of conjecture of limited war could be two, one to achieve political objective through limited war means and two to restrain on use of force in order to deter without military growth to contain risk of destruction against communism. Eighteen and nineteen centuries military policies were influenced by concept of blitzkrieg and total destruction of adversary.

Meaning of Limited War

A limited war is type of armed conflict between adversaries in which the two sides restrict their objectives to certain limitation and keep a check on use of force and means employed in war. The two sides keep the room for negotiation and keep the window open for any peaceful settlement of conflict at any point during the conflict. Limited war is defined as a war in which neither side has the advantage of total annihilation of the adversary. The latest discernment of limited war came out during

Cold War which is perceived to be short of nuclear exchange. This type of war contains small conflicts or battle operations limited to specific geographical patches and focused on targets those are of direct military significance.

Robin Brown explains that 'Limited War' theory had been built on the assumption that the opponents was cautious and value maximizing , not fanatically determine individual who will battle on until the weapons are dashed out of hands'.¹ Thomas Schelling advocated a 'strategy of coercive diplomacy' with whole menu of actions ranging from 'diplomatic protest and warning' through 'demonstration of force', to engagement of a group of targets valued by the adversary and piling on more and more destruction until the enemy would realize that the cost of aggression would outweigh the benefits likely to build up from persisting with offensive action.²

Aims of Limited War

The limited war lacks clear definition due to variation and abundance of parameters associated with it and drawing of these parameters for purpose of definition is not an easy assignment. Various strategists had drawn different rules and principles which are attached with limited war objectives. There are different writers who used different terms related to limited war. Some of the parameters drawn to recognize aims of limited war according to present day literature are,

- Limited war should be restricted to particular geographical space.
- War fought for limited political intentions.
- War fought with limited resources and means.

In case of limited war calculated interest of adversaries will keep the clash limited. So as the limited war should be commenced to accomplish limited objectives

¹ Brig Naeem Ahmad Salik, " Perils of 'Limited War ' In a Nuclear Environment,' *The Institute of Strategic studies Islamabad* , available at , http://www.issi.org.pk/ss_Detail.php?dataId=317

² Subha Chandran , 'Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India's Interest ?' available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia'sInterests.pdf>

through limited means in limited time outline and should restrict to particular geographical boundaries.

Defining the importance of geographical constraint over limited war Henry Kissinger argued that, “the limited war should confine to defined geographical area, or war that does not utilize the entire available weapon system. It may be a war which utilizes entire weapons systems but its employment to specific targets”.³ The other premise connected with the limited political objectives in the way of limited war is that the main rationales of limited war are political not military gains. Limited war is fought to gain political objective, “the political leadership must assume the responsibility for defining the frame work; with in which the military are to develop their plans and capabilities. To demand of the military that they set their own limits is to set in motion a vicious cycle.”⁴ Limited wars were to be fought for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state’s will to another’s using means that involve far less than total military resources for the belligerents and leave the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents largely intact.⁵

Henry Kissinger argues;

“The purpose of limited is to inflict losses or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under dispute. The more moderate the objectives, the less violent the war is likely to be. This does not mean that the military operations cannot go beyond the territory or the objectives of dispute; indeed one way of increasing the enemy’s willingness to settle is to deprive him of something he can regain only by making peace”.⁶

There other argument about limited war is the limited mobilization of war resources and military personnel. The limited mobilization of force is necessary policy to keep support of public that the war would not trial the nation’s existence one feature of

³ V.R.Raghvan, ‘Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,’ available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/83/ragh.pdf>

⁴ V.R.Raghvan, ‘Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,’ available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/83/ragh.pdf>

⁵ Robert.E.Osgood, *Limited war revisited* (US: Westveiw Press/ Boulder Colorado, 1979), p-3.

⁶ Subha Chandran , ‘Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India’s Interest ?’ available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia’sInterests.pdf>

limited mobilization is to choose right military personnel for correct rationale. Besides the extent and necessity for mobilization by any state in any war depends upon situations. Total mobilization is a gesture to enemy, the world at large, and the home front of the kind of war that is projected.⁷

The economy of force and resources are also accentuated intention of limited war. In the framework of limited war the open ended goals of doing all possible injury to the enemy is driven out. Each function of military power must be customized to a precise military objective based in turn, on explicit political goals. The principle of economy of force reflects the fact that a belligerent's resources are unrestrained; they must be aimed towards achievement of the key intentions and must be used as cautiously as is consistent with accomplishment of objectives.

Succession and Improvements in Limited War Concepts

The current perception of limited war originated from the cold War. The two main actors playing the game of world politics were Soviet Union and United States, where as in United States the concept of limited war became prominent as a political and military strategy against the Soviet Union. The concept of limited war started off mainly as a conventional limited war in the era of 1950s and 1960s but later it stretched to limited nuclear war in following decade.⁸ The limited war assumption materialized as both offensive and defensive strategies to guard the strategic interests of United States. As an offensive strategy, limited war was element of the US strategy to deal with Soviet Union; as a defensive strategy, it intended to look after the interests of the United States and its allies, particularly in Europe.⁹

⁷ Robert.E.Osgood, *Limited war revisited* (US: Westveiw Press/ Boulder Colorado, 1979), p-3.

⁸ Subha Chandran , 'Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India's Interest ?' available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia'sInterests.pdf>

⁹ Subha Chandran , 'Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India's Interest ?' available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia'sInterests.pdf>

Clausewitz and Liddell Hart both supported limited use of force beside absolute military mobilization or total war. With the arrival of nuclear age, it became clear that substitutes to nuclear war must be sought as a theme of biggest main concern. It was argued that nuclear war prohibited the supplementary utility of armed coercion as a mean of policy. After 1949 the Soviet Union was able to break the rule of United States on atomic power this helped to neutralize the strategy structured on atomic weapons and forced United States to lock into nuclear doctrines.

The connotation of limited war today is consequence of trends in the present-day international system since its establishment in the seventeenth century. The present so called Westphalia system of numerous sovereign states actors materialized from a period of religious wars. These wars had inclined in many ways to become total war. Military thinker of 19th century highlighted connection between political goals and military means.¹⁰

Effects of Limited War on Deterrence Stability

The approach of deterrence is build upon the hypothesis that in concluding possibly that the deterred policy makers will react to threats by making very logical cost-gain computations. Deterrence according to John Mearsheimer, “in the vastness means influencing an adversary not to begin an explicit action because the apparent benefits do not justify the probable costs and risks.”¹¹

Nuclear deterrence assumes that existence of nuclear weapons, particularly in dyadic relationship, will promise the absence of nuclear war. This confidence is based

¹⁰ Brig Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Perils of ‘Limited War ‘In a Nuclear Environment,” *The Institute of Strategic Studies* Islamabad , available at , http://www.issi.org.pk/ss_Detail.php?dataId=317

¹¹ John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy, II, The Nuclear Powers*, (Britain: Croom Helm Ltd), p.214.

on the concept that use of nuclear weapons by one side will guarantee a nuclear vengeance by the other side to, therefore, there would be no encouragement for either side to commence a nuclear war except, of course, to commit suicide, which is illogical. This was founded on the impression due to the extremely destructive character of these weapons; they were weapons of last choice and would be used only when the very existence of the state was in question.¹²

The condemnation was made by some of the scholars of limited war theory. They claimed that a limited war strategy might chip away with the strategy of deterrence followed by two superpowers. The argument was made by them that the prospects of global nuclear destruction prevented the outbreak of a war between the two blocs for at least four decades. If, based on a limited war theory, a war could be considered as not inevitably leading to a nuclear war, the reluctance to wage war might decrease thus weaken the strategy of deterrence. Under limited war theory, this argument continues, war would be regarded as a usable technique for achieving political objectives, to be used whenever deemed appropriate and controllable in a way so as to prevent escalation to total war. Therefore the prospect of wars would increase.¹³

The theory of deterrence further revealed its weakness during the period of 1950s this was due to the Soviet Union's breaking the barrier of nuclear technology and accessed the nuclear weapons which broke down the dominance of United States in this field. Despite the fact that there appeared a slight reservation that a direct attack on the United States could be deterred by massive penalizing damage, the competence of such a threat to deter lesser aggravations looked much more dubious.

¹² John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy, II, The Nuclear Powers*, (Britain: Croom Helm Ltd), p.216.

¹³ *ibid*

The emerging nuclear capability questioned United States guaranteed Western Europe's security. As long as the United States itself was invulnerable to retaliatory strike, Europeans would feel convinced of the shield provided by their major ally's threat of massive retaliation. Maintaining US reliability in Europe was decisive constituent of the limited war doctrine when Soviet Union acquired potential to "take out" American cities.¹⁴ This European security concern was defined openly by John Garnett that , "threatening the Soviet Union with massive retaliation even for relatively minor aggression in Europe lacked all credibility when consequences of implementing the threat were likely to result in the complete destruction of the American way of life."¹⁵ To this degree, limited war was seen as perilous since it would destabilize, rather than harmonize, the deterrence policy. The argument claimed that limited war damaged strategic deterrence that was pursued by two Cold War nuclear competitors. It was suggested that as the key motive that in spite of bitter Cold War resentment, no hot war had broken out in post war years. Besides the opposition, the limited war gained opinion in the mind of American policy makers. The supporters of limited war theory stressed the significance and limited war policy for plausible deterrence. Henry Kissinger argues,

"Deterrence is greatest when military strength is coupled with the willingness to employ it. It is achieved when one side's readiness to run risks in retaliation to the other is high; it is least effective when the willingness to run risks low, no matter how powerful the military capability."¹⁶

All the consequences now demanded that the deterrence be substituted with some other elastic theory to restrain the Soviet hostility. The era of 60's saw a stylish explanation of limited war doctrine. US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara predominantly invented a strategic policy that embraces both deterrence and limited war. His idea was to make turn the retaliatory or aggression into flexible mode that he

¹⁴ *ibid*

¹⁵ Subha Chandran , 'Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India's Interest ?' available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia'sInterests.pdf>

¹⁶ Subha Chandran , 'Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India's Interest ?' available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia'sInterests.pdf>

called as “flexible response”. The logic of this doctrine was to make corresponding connection between limited war and deterrence rather than to increment each other to deter Soviet intimidation. McNamara defended his policy and supports it by arguing that,

“A deterrent threat must be rational instrument of policy, implying that the same must be true for the war theory forming the fundamental of the deterrent threat. Otherwise, deterrence would not be credible. And in very threatening circumstances, massive retaliation would be incredible response and hence a poor deterrent; whereas limited war as a credible response would be much more of a deterrent in most of the conflict scenarios conceivable.”¹⁷

Escalation Control and Limited War

In any conflict when any opponent reaches to conclusion that if it increases its strength of forces, enhances number of offensives, or changes its outlook for further aggression believing that it will augment its chances of success relates to escalation of conflict. This action is not likely to be a blind move and such steps also enhance the anxieties of adversaries.¹⁸ As a natural psyche the opponents under threat shall go for counter measures to match the adversaries action which is going to result in rise in conflict intensity thus contributes towards the escalation of conflict. Escalation control is supposed to be a joint agreement between nuclear rivals to fight for limited ventures.

Elevated stakes will enhance the risk of escalation; therefore by boosting the stakes, escalation spiral would result into dangerous and costly consequences for both sides. Unintentional escalation is termed as escalation that results from unintended energetic events that spin out of control of a central authority or government, eventually leading to escalation while on the other side in order to avoid defeat or from fear of defeat the adversary may escalate the conflict. Limited war escalation depends on

¹⁷ Trevor N. Dupuy, *International Military and Defence Encyclopaedia*, {New York: Brassy's (US), Inc} Vol.3, p-148.

¹⁸ Quinn J. Rhodes, ' Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella: An Analysis of India's Cold Start Doctrine and Its Implications for Stability on the Subcontinent,' available at http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/thesis/2010/Jun_Rhodes.pdf

limited objectives, the level of strategic stability, strategic equivalence and strategic communication between two nuclear rivals.¹⁹

Limited Objectives

The core issue of limited war is to maintain the war events within limits predicted which is not possible by unilateral contention or actions. It becomes difficult for warring parties to settle limited objectives of war with limited means and resources.

As per argument posited by Brodie it calls for “deliberate restraint”. Any unlimited objectives or objectives aiming at total destruction of the adversary both politically and militarily would escalate a limited war. Any attempt to “reduce the enemy to impotence would remove the psychological balance which makes it profitable for both sides to keep the war limited. Faced with the ultimate threat of complete defeat, the losing side may seek to deprive its opponent of the margin to impose his will by unleashing a thermonuclear holocaust.”²⁰

Limited war does not associate absolute victory under possible conditions, so while engaging in limited war conflicts the belligerent must remain conscious of the fact that they must stick to objectives and gains planned out of limited war in order to avoid escalation. The two sides must keep the diplomatic doors open for escalation control since diplomacy is major actor through which conflict could be restricted to go out of proportion. According to Henry Kissinger diplomacy is the third vital factor of limited war doctrine. His further arguments are that, “the concept of limited war and the diplomacy appropriate to it reflects the fact that in the nuclear age the possibility of total solutions no longer exist.”²¹

¹⁹ Subha Chandran , ‘Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India’s Interest ?’ available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia’sInterests.pdf>

²⁰ Subha Chandran , ‘Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India’s Interest ?’ available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia’sInterests.pdf>

²¹ Subha Chandran , ‘Limited War with Pakistan : Will It Secure India’s Interest ?’ available at <http://www.acdis.illinois.edu/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillSeureIndia’sInterests.pdf>

Strategic Stability

The contemporary procedure adopted by two super powers includes following steps:

- A communication link that could be effective during confrontation to prevent conflict escalating.
- Initiation of nuclear response that could make adversary incapable of retaliation and development of second strike options which made two sides believe that first strike would leave adversary incapable to strike back.
- That total war is unthinkable and to accommodate the concept of strategic parity.
- Effective arms control treaties and evading of unimpeded arms race.
- An associated confidence building procedures.
- Individual command and control measures for strategic forces on either side.²²

Limited war scholar Halperin strengthens his idea of limited war which could take place in the environment of strategic instability. The question arise can limited war be an option between two adversaries which have strategic parity but no strategic stability, so Halperin states that,

“should a local war occur in a period of strategic instability, both of the major powers will probably seek to minimize their stake in the war so that no outcome will appear to affect their basic relationship in ways that make dangers of an explosion more likely... with both sides alert to the danger of inducing a pre-emptive attack, the local war is likely to remain at low key while both sides refrain from expansionist actions such as the introduction of nuclear weapons or the crossing of an international border which will heighten the tension and expectations that an explosion is imminent.”²³

Halperin is also of the opinion that,

“An unstable strategic balance is also likely to provide profitable payoffs for a side willing to take risks. Faced with a fait accompli, the defending side is likely to be inhibited from joining the battle in a situation of unstable deterrence. Thus, if local military action does not lead to pre-emption, it is

²² James A Russell, 'Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East.' Security Studies Centre, Spring 2009, available at , http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009

²³ James A Russell, 'Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East.' Security Studies Centre, Spring 2009, available at , http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009

also not likely to lead to intervention. An unstable strategic balance, then, is likely to reduce the danger of local war and central war by expansion, if both sides act cautiously.”²⁴

Strategic Uniformity

It is important for the rivals to be well aware of their potentials of military, economic and political levels this will help to avoid the escalation of conflict. To evade escalation it is also imperative to have strategic uniformity between the warring parties in terms of weapons, exploitation of force and the war plans.

Strategic Communication

Communication is vital to keep the war limited, the inability or deficiency in this aspect could make the conflict go out of proportion. It is important for the reason to communicate to adversary the limit to which action would be taken against it in limited war situation.²⁵ According to Barry Posen, “Inadvertent escalation may also result from the great difficulty of gathering and interpreting the most relevant information about a war in progress and using it to understand, control, and orchestrate the war.”²⁶

In real meaning the whole perception of ‘limited war’ is erected around two fundamental ideologies namely the “minimum necessary” and “the maximum feasible”²⁷. To establish the necessities and feasibilities is not easy during the course of limited plans because inaccuracy from either side could lead to detrimental consequences. Analyzing the opinion of limited war strategies, limited war has two alternatives one that it is either war confined to defined geographical area and other exploitation of limited

²⁴ ibid

²⁵ James A Russell, ‘Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East.’ Security Studies Centre, Spring 2009, available at, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009

²⁶ Michael Krepon, ‘Limited War, Escalation Control and Nuclear Option in South Asia,’ available at, <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ESCONYTR0LCHAPTER7.pdf>

²⁷ Brig Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Perils of ‘Limited War’ In a Nuclear Environment,” The Institute of Strategic studies Islamabad, available at, http://www.issi.org.pk/ss_Detail.php?dataId=317

war means. It should be unambiguous from the preceding that the idea of limited war at conventional level and nuclear level is difficult to classify precisely since the threshold involved are matter of degree, and partly because they are matter of national outlook. It is important while engaging adversary for limited war that the account of opponent's redlines may be respected and in order to avoid inadvertent escalation.

Conclusion

The concept of limited war evolved out of necessity to reduce the war destruction the nuclear weapons because of their enormous destructive power gave birth to idea of limited war. The nuclear weapons are believe to be so disastrous that it is not in favour of going for this option for both victor and defeated and limited war is also meant to counter weigh the West's popular thinking of use of force to its maximum limits to coerce enemy for unconditional capitulation. Limited war from its core meaning is defined as the war in which no one adversary seeks the total annihilation of opponent. The idea of limited war is generally related to conventional conflicts and use of conventional war fighting scenarios and skill but after the induction of nuclear weapons in inventory by two United States and Soviet Union it further expanded to limited nuclear war in around the decade of 1970's. The present conceptualization of limited war emerged in the wake of Cold War and among the actors of Cold War the United States and Soviet Union the concept of limited war shined on political as well as military screens. This development was aimed to achieve restriction on intentional wars. The limited war is fought for some particular objectives whether political or military, it is kept within limited resources that are put in it and the area boundaries well defined and conflict confined in geographical limits. The purpose is to achieve limited objectives through limited means and not meant for complete destruction of adversary or going for its threshold.

Chapter II

Deterrence Stability and Limited War in South Asia

Armies can signify but little, unless there is counsel and wise management at home.

– Cicero

Introduction

The international politics always remain naturally anarchic, this anarchy than also demand that states must strive for their security and sovereignty. A known fact is that states mostly try to find, or at least validate, their nuclear acquisitions, once they are come across a significant military threat to their security which seems that it cannot be met through alternate means. In light of such circumstances the potency of deterrence becomes major factor in preserving peace. In a two-sided relationship between nuclear armed adversaries, the usefulness of deterrence is the prime leap towards ensuring stability, since this constitutes basic element of threat which can impose restraint among parties. Once these threats are removed, most will prefer to remain non-nuclear.²⁸ On the other hand, other than security considerations there are several factors that could possibly guide nuclear motivations of candidate states, such as prestige, domestic political considerations, or a combination of two or more factors that Scott Sagan has termed 'multi causality'.²⁹ If deterrence is effective then the likely hood of any party disturbing the equilibrium reduces considerably. The effectiveness of deterrence implies that all conditions necessary for deterrence are to be fulfilled in particular situation. The realist paradigm insists on that states, once taken as unitary actors, search for nuclear weapons because their security, which is unsteady in an anarchic world asks for it.³⁰ It

²⁸ See, Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," in Michael Brown, et al., (eds). *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*, London: The MIT Press, 2010, p.03.

²⁹ See, Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb", in Michael Brown, et al., (eds). *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*, London: The MIT Press, 2010, p.34.

³⁰ William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzanova, "Divining Nuclear Intentions, in Michael Brown, et al., (eds.), *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*, London: The MIT Press, 2010, p.92.

means that the state making the deterrent threat must have the capacity to induce unacceptable damage on others. And, in this nuclear era, to deter potential aggressor, the desired standard of deterrence is nuclear.³¹ This, on the other hand, may be more applicable for asymmetric states that are unable to maintain conventional parity with their opponents. According to this school of thought, regional and international environment are major determinants that could drive security perceptions of an individual state. The part of individuals in shaping threat perceptions and suggesting counteractive measures, nevertheless, mostly take the lime light. Jacques Hymans has tried to bring out the psychological dimension of individual decision-makers, and other dominant individuals who could affect policy course that could escort towards nuclearization or even denuclearization of a country. Waltz has been more explicit in explaining the balance of power syndrome, stating that "states exist in an anarchical international system and must therefore rely on self-help to protect their sovereignty and national security."³²

Scenario in South Asia

Countries like Pakistan which are still in stages of developing got set back after their great power alliance got away when the Cold War ended and they were now exposed to powerful regional neighbour (India) and there has been history of wars and crises with it. In this situation, the whole justification for a nuclear deterrent became even more pertinent for Pakistan. In case of major nuclear weapon states are considered, regional security weakens in its value, but nuclear proliferation was considered as a main threat for international security. United States initiates policies to avoid the proliferation in war prone areas in order to avert nuclear war between two

³¹ Jacques E.C. Hymans, "Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field", *The Non-proliferation Review*, November 2006, Vol. 13, No.3, p.455.

³² 14 For detailed study, see, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979.

nuclear states. This was particularly true for South Asia where protracted outstanding conflicts had been shaped into active hostility.³³

The historical roots of conflict between India and Pakistan are multifaceted. It emerged with the independence of two states in 1947, and it has unrelenting ever since, with the incessant conflict and crises. After the partition of Sub-continent, India and Pakistan fought three full fledged wars and went through frequent border clashes. Pakistan's anxieties and fears about India are entrenched as much in the disparity of power and India's intention for regional security as in the pre-partition communal conflict and divergent ideas about nationalism. Inclusive of the entire dispute over Kashmir has continued to ignite the clashes and conflicts. Right with independence from British rule dispute over Kashmir territory remained unsolved and relation between the two states remained a major victim of this dispute. The first dispute between India and Pakistan emerged right after independence over Kashmir in 1948, than again in 1965 the two countries went against each other in battle field over Kashmir. The conflict terminated once both countries agreed for cease fire over Tashkent agreement. The South Asia again saw the two countries in battle ground in 1971, resulting in emergence of Bangladesh after it dismembered from Pakistan.

Pakistan is a small country as compared with India in aspects of economy and resources and this develops a deep sense of insecurity. To counter numerical and technological superiority of its arch rival Pakistan developed nuclear weapons mainly to deter military aggression from India, and therefore nuclear weapons continue to play the fundamental role in Pakistan's military strategy. India already well ahead in a conventional military, developed nuclear weapons primarily to augment its political standing within the region and beyond. Though India continues to justify its nuclear acquisitions by illuminating China as a major security concern, the history of Indian

³³ Feroz Khan, 'Pakistan and Israel,' *The Henry Stimson Centre*, April 2009 available at <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/reseacrh-pdfs/PAKITAN ISRAEL.pdf>

nuclear program suggests that the country moving on the nuclear weapons path much before China became a nuclear weapon state in 1964.³⁴

The design of relationship between India and Pakistan changed with the acquiring of nuclear capability by two states during this development the two countries again underwent military crises. The new type of tension and instability emerged as the conflicts like religious tensions, arms competitions and military deployments side by side to nuclear threats occurred. The practical aspects that threatened peace process and jolted the strategic stability were the Siachen conflict during period of 1986-87 still continuing, the Brass Tacks exercises of Indian military in years 1987-88 the Kashmir insurgency were those events that brought the India and Pakistan at the brink of all out military conflict.³⁵ During this era both countries suffered challenges on domestic political separatist issues for which countries continued to accuse each other for unrests.³⁶

Pakistan and India were able to have peace in their relations after the 1971 war since then both countries were able to avert any conflict that could escalate to all out war. This period that started after dismemberment of Pakistan into Pakistan and Bangladesh after Indian intervention in the then East Pakistan was the longest since independence from British rule in 1947. Not much of change occurred in policies of security and stability and it remained confined to conventional show of force only. But the things changed dramatically in 1998 when both countries openly conducted their hot nuclear tests. This nuclearization of South Asia brought a new aspect in regional security and stability paradigm. This event actually brought a change in security paradigm of South Asia and even with overt nuclear capabilities both countries engaged

³⁴ Adil Sultan, 'Pakistan's emerging nuclear posture: Impact of drivers and technology on nuclear doctrine,' available at http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf

³⁵ Stay Out: Why Intervention Should Not Be America's Policy,' published by Strategic Studies, Quarterly an air force-sponsored strategic forum for military, government and academic professionals. Vol.3 available at, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Summer/Summer09.pdf>

³⁶ Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia,' published by the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Centre in Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Reigning in the Risk available at <http://www.npolicy.org/files/20090813-khan%20final.pdf> (<http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=112&rtid=1>)

into limited war in 1999 in Kargil but were able to successfully avert escalation to all out conflict merely due to US political pressures. Similarly once again the two countries became eye to eye. In 2002 after Indian Parliament building was attacked. The two countries could have added nuclear dimension to their conflict but international community was able to intervene and avoided the break out of war.

The latest technological accomplishments have surface interesting new ambiguities in the relationship especially in case of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. Pakistan is assumed to be lowering its nuclear threshold to deny India the space for a limited military operation. It may also be moving in the direction of a strategy of graduated military options, or possibly a 'flexible response options'.³⁷ While it may be early to draw such results, as Pakistan continues to maintain purposeful ambiguity in its nuclear weapon use doctrine, yet, the cardinal principle of Pakistan's nuclear guidelines remains hinged to deter all forms of aggression, mainly from India. Pakistan's labours to counter-balance India's military expansion, including India's new limited war fighting concepts through its nuclear capability threats, which could be understood by analyzing various factors that drive the nuclear program of both India and Pakistan. Pakistan's denial to pledge to a 'No First Use' (NFU) nuclear policy and India's declaration of an its acceptance could possibly be due to letting Pakistan's aggression open in front of international community to block all their sympathies and support for Pakistan in case of limited aggression by India against Pakistan.

In distinction, Pakistan has an overt first-strike oriented nuclear force. Strong Pakistani proclamations of its nuclear doctrine emphasize that India could cross one of Pakistan's "red lines" relatively early during a conventional conflict.³⁸ Pakistan is consequently playing a huge game of chicken with itself, India, the entire world.

³⁷ Adil Sultan ' *Pakistan's emerging nuclear posture: impact of drivers and technology on nuclear doctrine,* available at http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf

³⁸ Peter Lavoy (2008), "Islamabad's Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation," available at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/47509/ichaptersection_singledocument/4d3c686a-b6f1-46c5-95be-c512e9ad13fb/en/Chapter+5.pdf

Pakistan's refusal or inability to terminate its use of Islamic terrorists to further its goals in Kashmir and Afghanistan and its decreasing capacity to organize terrorist groups it shaped advocate that another terrorist attack against India could take place at any time. Such an attack could take place with or without unambiguous Pakistani government consent. Particularly with Indian 'Cold Start' conventional military doctrine and modernization, the world could face an additional nuclear crisis in South Asia at any time. This type of a crisis could be initiated by a terrorist group that has limited resources and capabilities and no inclination to foster stability among nuclear-armed states.³⁹

Historical Roots of Threats and Nuclear Brinkmanship

Historical events and disagreements between the India and Pakistan gave birth to numerous conflicts between India and Pakistan. These conflicts continued to rise in periods from covert to overt acquiring of nuclear capabilities by the two states. The history reflects a very limited time periods when bilateral relation between the two states remained peace full to satisfactory levels. Such type of peaceful tenures mostly ended either due to change in local political theatre or acts of terrorism on either side of international borders and LoCs to which both sides specially India showed a little tolerance to accept. Some of the crises that brought both countries at the edge of all out conflict between the two states and brought a major turn in relationship are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. These events had direct impact on stability and deterrence equation between India and Pakistan. In chronological order the events are discussed specially in reference to pre and post nuclearization aspects.

Exercise Brass Tacks 1986-87

This crisis occurred when there were large and well equipped forces of Soviet Union were present in the neighbours of Pakistan. This crisis emerged when the India

³⁹ Nuclear Weapons Stability or Anarchy in the 21st Century: China, India, and Pakistan Thomas W. Graham, Ph.D. Brookhaven National Laboratory available at http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Nuclear_Weapons_Stability_or_Anarchy_in_the_21st_Century_China_India_and_Pakistan_250211_1545.pdf

mobilized a quarter of millions of its troops close to vicinity of merely 20 km from Pakistani Indian international borders near Sind. Pakistan was caught in a fear of a two front war on one side from Soviet forces on its western borders and on eastern side from India. Indian military mobilization on this scale was unprecedented which it termed as an exercise named “Brass Tacks”. The enormous strength ranged warning sirens in Pakistan due to so large build up of troops along LoC.⁴⁰ Moreover the Indian military carried ammunition that was meant for war fighting and not for exercise purpose and armoured tracks which could be used in desert for attack purposes. These indicators were more than enough to raise fear in Pakistan that India is probably in preparation to attack Pakistan alongside its southern borders.⁴¹

This type of situation was not affordable for Pakistan due to presence of forces of super power at borders though Indian threat alone could be tolerable. To counter with this situation the then President of Pakistan a military ruler used diplomacy conventional military posture backed by nuclear weapons. The capital goal of for Pakistan was to avoid war with India due to its full engagement with Afghan supporters against Soviet forces. In order to blow out the Brass Tacks situation Pakistan initiated for the first time in history of region the threat of nuclear weapons capability.

Kashmir Crisis 1990

Following Brass Tacks during the contemporary period of clandestine nuclear atmosphere, another most dangerous confrontation between India and Pakistan occurred in 1990. This crisis bear a resemblance to the Brass Tacks but this conflict did not went into an open confrontation. In the back drop of Brass tacks, the existence of nuclear weapons significantly restricted the possibilities of the conflict between sub-continent rivals. The backgrounds for 1990 crisis were home-grown fight for independence in the valley of Kashmir. India suspected Pakistan of supporting the

⁴⁰ Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia,’ published by *The Non-Proliferation Policy Education Centre in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: reigning in the Risk*, available at, <http://www.npolicy.org/files/20090813-khan%20final.pdf>

⁴¹ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability in South Asia’, available at <http://www.sassi.org/pdfs/cheema.pdf>

movement in Kashmir by arming, training and infiltrating the Kashmiri Mujahidin. Pakistan held a large military exercise called Zarb-e-Momin. India therefore placed its strike corps beside the border near Rajasthan in the south while taking defensive arrangement in north as it had done during Brass Tacks mobilization.

Fearing Indian threats and practical steps taken during the course of action and Indian strategy to wage an attack on Pakistan to deflect pressure from Kashmir Pakistani military counter mobilized its elite troops in the north. But owing to conventional military asymmetry, Pakistan reportedly moved its embryonic nuclear weapon capability⁴². The clash had nuclear element but United States involvement prevented the crisis to escalate to nuclear intensity.

Kargil Issue 1999

The Kargil conflict arose in May 1999. It was the first major problem that occurred between India and Pakistan that involved militaries of two countries and was also the first one after two states went overtly nuclear capable. This dispute consisted of a short war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir territory alongside the line of control the place where two forces are separated in Kashmir. This crisis was a bleak prompter of the fact that despite of declaration of nuclear capability and possession of nuclear weapons did not essentially conclude the probability of spill over of conventional hostilities into a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan.⁴³ This conflict had full potentials to become a full fledged war between the two nuclear rivals and had all the possibilities of becoming a nuclear deadlock.

The compulsion during any military action is that one should be ready for the maximum instead of minimum possible retaliation from other side and accordingly

⁴² Stephen P. Cohen, P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics and Insecurity*, *ACIDIS Research Report* (Illinois, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, 2000), available at <http://iripak.org/journal/summer2004/therole.shtml>

⁴³ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, 'Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability in South Asia', available at <http://www.sassi.org/pdfs/cheema.pdf>

structure a planning that could permit it operational flexibility.⁴⁴In an atmosphere where two adversaries meet head-on each other it is equally imperative for both to evade disproportionate use of force, especially in offensive positions, it is her when a conflict is likely to step up to higher level. Pakistan's initiative to intrude into Kargil region has an argument that Pakistan tried to get strategic over ride on India to threat Indian troops mobility to avenge its military knock over experience during 1971 war and Siachen conflict with Indians. This conflict gradually reached to degree of armed response when Indian forces responded to Pakistani incursion and made an effort to take out Pakistani military units from their entrenched positions on top of the Srinagar-Leh Highway.

At the outset, the Indians could not drive out the Pakistani due to futile leadership efforts, poor logistics, and due to short of understanding in topography. After given permission to use air power, the Indians were able to exploit that advantage by maintaining artillery support and an adequate operational arrangement to push Pakistani forces from their positions. The presence of massive fire power from air dramatically increased the prospects of escalation. Although Pakistan did not counter used air power option in kind to Indian conventional attacks, Islamabad did approve an increase in alert status of its nuclear arsenal and hinted at the possible use of such weapons. The Indian government despite of increasing its war potential and enhancing ground support through a counter moved with mechanized units in Rajasthan to facilitate counter attack to expand the conflict beyond Kashmir in case they fail to expel Pakistani troops out of Kargil, this action raised the concerns at Islamabad.⁴⁵ The end of crisis occurred due to intervention of United States with a Declaration signed by the than Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with President Bill Clinton.

The end of Kargil crisis surfaced some elementary doubts about the strategic equivalence and deterrence stability in Subcontinent. On the other hand the crisis

⁴⁴ Tariq M. Ashraf, 'Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,' available at <http://www.grandstrategy.com/2009/03/9333813-doctrinal-reawakening-of-indian.html>

⁴⁵ Quinn J. Rhodes, 'Limited War Under Nuclear Umbrella: An analysis of India' Cold Start Doctrine and Its Implications for Stability on the Subcontinent available at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524749.pdf>

spoiled projection of peace and security, whose basis were laid earlier in 1998-1999. Under severe international sanctions, India and Pakistan were forced into bilateral dialogue concluding in a summit from which the famous Lahore Declaration that included the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was drawn in February 1999. The Lahore MOU documented the nature of the changed strategic environment and laid down the basis of the potential peace, security and confidence building measures.

Military Stand Off 2001-2002

The event following the Kargil conflict was the mass mobilization of Indian forces in 2001-2002 which was attached to terrorist attacks and suspected backing by Pakistan. This once again brought the south Asia to the brink of war. This was considered to be a part of coercive diplomacy which was aimed at compelling Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism. This was the largest ever India Pakistan military standoff between December 2001 and October 2002. This standoff crisis occurred in two stages, first began after December 13 attack, 2001 attack on Indian parliament building when the session was going on. In agony of this the India launched Operation Parakram which consisted of mobilizing about half a million troops and stationed them along side Indian Pakistani border line of control. In counter to that Pakistan also mobilized its war resources and two military came face to face across the border.⁴⁶ The second event in which on May 14, 2002 terrorist killed 32 people at an Indian army camp at Kaluchak in Jammu launched the second phase of crisis. The two militaries remained eyeball to eyeball for almost 10 months with exchange of threats and warning of nuclear response from both sides. The confrontations concluded with cease fire and extended diplomatic process started which was termed as Composite Dialogue that started in 2004 and served a kind of shelter for discussing conflicts.

The failure of Operation Parakram to achieve its goals produced vital lessons to be learned by India's military planners. To start with an all-out war with Pakistan is not

⁴⁶S.Paul Kapur, 'South Asia's Unstable Nuclear Decade,' Strategic Analysis, Vol.33, No.3 (May 2009)

possible without risking nuclear retribution against major Indian cities. Next, full military mobilization for accomplishing limited political objectives is neither reasonable nor economical, and would become difficult to justify and also to meet similar challenges in the future, India required to reconstruct its force structure, which should have rapid response time and have the capacity of achieving limited political objectives without disturbing stability at the strategic level.⁴⁷

Limited War in the South Asian Scenario

Paradoxically the blame of waging a conventional in nuclear environment is placed on Pakistan. India held Pakistan responsible for initiating a limited war in Kargil and was quick to adopt this thinking and rapidly incorporated this aspect into their strategic planning. The Indian Defence Minister George Fernandez said, “We had understood the dynamics of limited war especially after India declared its nuclear weapons status nearly two years ago. Nuclear weapons did not make war obsolete; they simply imposed another dimension on the way war could be conducted”.⁴⁸ This was noticeable in 2001-02 standoffs as well. Similarly a description by Sood and Sawhney depicts that Indians had pre-planned an offensive against Pakistan, however a trial of this strategy is not possible due to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence.⁴⁹ Captivating the Indian viewpoint into deliberation, Pakistan is likely to endeavour a limited war as a way to extract Kashmir from Indian control. On the other hand if Pakistani viewpoint were to be kept in consideration, then India may also carry out limited war in order to dismember Pakistan. Indians nevertheless, have continually displayed their intentions to use limited war in order to curtail alleged Pakistani support to the Kashmiri insurgency. Such tactics may involve tracking down across LoC, salami slicing, and surgical strikes on suspected terrorist training camps in Azad Kashmir. Over a period of time Indian’s had materialized two distinct doctrines in Indian strategic thinking to chase this policy

⁴⁷ Adil Sultan '(Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture: impact of drivers and technology on nuclear doctrine,' available at http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf

⁴⁸ Inaugural address by Defence Minister in a Seminar on , “The Challenges of Limited War” on 5 January 2000)

⁴⁹ Lt Gen (Rtd) V.K Sood and Parvin Sawhney, “*Operation Prakaram: The War Unfinished*”(New Delhi: Sage Publications,2003)

objective. The first was the 'Limited War doctrine' and the second was the 'Cold Start Strategy'. On the Pakistani side there has been no expression of such a strategy to launch conventional war, visibly due to the marked Indian superiority in this sphere.

India-Pakistan Strategies and Scenario of Limited War

In Indo-Pakistan scenarios, the limited war theory is gaining supporter in acquiring its own doctrinal respectability, and even being advertised with historical precedents.⁵⁰ The political use of nuclear weapon in accordance with the desires of policy to deter and threaten Pakistan, Indian strategists adopted the Western concept of limited war. Indian policy makers and scholars expressed limited war explanation with slighter reframing according to their need and requirement in the existing strategic regional environment. On the others side the concept of limited conventional war is not in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan's weakness in terms of conventional capabilities as compared to India the nuclear weaponization of Pakistan and its nuclear weapon policy is meant for chiefly to deter Indian aggression. The Pakistani analysts have not put in much effort in the area of limited war because the Pakistan's nuclear policy guidelines do not foresee any logic of fighting a limited war in nuclear environment.⁵¹

Rationality behind Limited War Indian Perspective

The national policy of Indians is based on the fact that its nuclear strategy is designed on India's offensive lines with full employment of conventional capability in the same manner. It is evident from the events that after six months of announcing the Draft Nuclear Strategy the Indian planners announced the Limited War Doctrine. Indian supports of limited conventional war want to extract two objectives one to justify the requirement of maintaining huge conventional force and other is that despite of nuclearization of South Asia the utility of conventional force in limited war is also applicable and is not an obsolete thought. The Indian think tanks have adjusted the

⁵⁰ Khurshid Khan , ' Limited War Under Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia,' available at, <http://sacw.pagesperso-orange.fr/saan/khurshidkhan.pdf>

⁵¹ Khurshid Khan , ' Limited War Under Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia,' available at, <http://sacw.pagesperso-orange.fr/saan/khurshidkhan.pdf>

definition to fulfil their own requirements of a limited war. Indian military command believes that after Kargil conflict it is evidently inferred that it is still possible to wage a limited war in the presence of nuclear weapons till the stage of not pricking the redlines of adversary for retaliation in tone.⁵²

Prudence behind Limited War Pakistani Perspective

In line with Indians conceptualizing limited war in nuclear environment Pakistani planners also support the concept of limited war in nuclearized South Asia. There is no a query that a limited war waged by India has its effects on the stability in South Asia but is this adventurism would secure Indian political goals? If Indians feel that they can secure their political objectives through limited war they should find opportunity to fight against Pakistan through limited war option under nuclear shadow. Pakistan fighting a limited war against India is totally ruled out by its strategic thinkers and planners but still some other think tanks see the probability of such step. In response to it the Indians declared limited war doctrine, and Pakistan announced its creation of nuclear command and control organization and hence delegated the roles and responsibility to organs of state. As discussed at many stages the Pakistan's objective of acquiring the nuclear weapons is to deter Indian military and strategic threats which are perceived by it due to conventional military advantage which India has got over Pakistan.

Conclusion

The challenges that are there for the deterrence in the South Asian situation can be seen in the light of Andre Beaufre's categorization of the Cold War level. Beaufre identifies that in the Cold War level the aim of both sides is to maintain freedom of action while denying the same to the adversary. Pakistan aims to counteract the conventional superiority of India by threatening a nuclear reply to Indian propositions. India in contrast attempts to uphold freedom of action by deflating the nuclear deterrence of Pakistan. It is therefore not new that all the challenges to deterrence materialize from India. Indian strategic and military planning has been vigorously busy in

⁵² Tariq M. Ashraf, "Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces", available at <http://www.usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/milreveiw/download/English/NovDec04/ashraf.pdf>.

evolving ways and means to achieve strategic space against Pakistan. But even the success of such strategies is debatable, the prediction of instability are established beyond doubt. The limited war doctrine has been uttered to counter the alleged apprehensions regarding the Pakistani 'Proxy War' in Indian controlled Kashmir. Whether the allegations are correct or not, the strategy does not reflect the best option for action. The chances of escalation and failure to achieve political objectives prohibit limited war from being a feasible option.⁵³ Instead of getting convinced that the use of force is not a viable option, Indians still pursue this policy and are in a process of generating an effective policy for this type of warfare which can take advantage of the strategic space below Pakistani threshold. The vagueness surrounding this threshold makes any strategy inherently dangerous.

The strategies of pre-emption are not part of military options in South Asia, but growing disparity at the conventional level and the threat of limited war force Pakistan to prepare for this possibility as well. The prospects of such strategies would be elevated when actual war breaks out. BMDs can be seen as an endeavour to grind down the deterrence and create space for the aforementioned strategies. Their development critically threatens the stability of the region. The cumulative effect of all these challenges would be the maintenance of a high alert status and enlargement in the existing stockpiles of weapons. This type of "offensive-defence" competition could initiate hair trigger forms of instability, a loss of control cannot be ruled out in future nuclear or military crises.⁵⁴ The existing conventional disproportion between two nuclear rivals would funnel to nuclear war if each side miscalculates or misinterprets each other's moves during fog of war. It would be equally tricky for India to utilize the strategic gap to attain its objectives without crossing nuclear threshold of Pakistan. It would be difficult for both sides to constrain their moves during the clash according to the moves taken by each side due to lack of communication and existence of misconception.

⁵³ Andre Beaufre, "*Deterrence and Strategy*" p-134

⁵⁴ R W Jones , Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia, available at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/99915/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/9727fab7-f489-42b2-8a47-ee45a8f2e4be/en/RR+No+01.pdf

Finally, any potential conflict between India and Pakistan would have overwhelming consequences on the security and stability of South Asia as no matter how limited it would be kept from both sides.

Chapter III

Cold Start Doctrine

In this chapter the main focus is on Indian cold start doctrine, Indian rationale and objectives of this new limited war doctrine. The capacity of Indian armed forces to launch this strategy and its operational readiness / inadequacies and a brief overview of military exercises conducted to implement this strategy are also part of this portion. The organizational changes for CSD implementation the operational requirements for its execution, resources and infrastructure required for conduct of operations under this doctrine shall also be seen here.

Introduction

Cold Start Strategy was result of military crises in 1999 and standoff 2001-02. During 2001-02 standoffs the two countries India and Pakistan fully mobilized there armed forces for war operations. The diplomatic intervention of United States helped to defuse the crisis. The objective of this vast mobilization by Indian' was primarily the result of terrorist attack believing Pakistani involvement and Indians urge to respond it through military means. As a lesson from 2001-02 crises the objective of this doctrine to reduce the role of political leaders, decision making and pre-empt international diplomatic intervention to defuse the crisis and thrash the Pakistani military's counter mobilization capability.⁵⁵

Cold Start Doctrine

Indian army Chief General Padmanabhan started fresh restructuring of war doctrine under heading of "Cold start" on April 28, 2004 which circles around the

⁵⁵ Feroz Hassan , "Pakistan and Israel", the Henry L.Stimson centre ,April 2009, available at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/PAKISTAN_ISRAEL.pdf

employment of battle groups as a mean of defensive operation called “Integrated Battle Groups”.⁵⁶ Cold Start doctrine includes restructuring of Indian defensive formations positioned close to international borders and the enhancement of their offensive capability with higher mobility and more focus on combined air, land operations.⁵⁷ Major role is played by Indian Air Force to gain air superiority against PAF and to provide edge to ground units for their military operations. The holding corps is primarily meant for checking advancement possessing limited power for offensive actions.

Cold Start is based on the concept of pre-emptive strike and it calls for rapid deployment of “Integrated Battle Groups” comprising of major elements of Army with close support of the air force and if need arises new fronts may be opened and expanded to include Naval operations the primary aim of the operations is aimed at creating conditions for limited war. The battle groups could be used individually for limited operations of greater scale based on the concept of blitzkrieg.⁵⁸ The main constituents of Cold start are:

- > The surprise
- > Integrated battle group establishment
- > Quick mobilization
- > Massive fire power with close air support
- > Destruction below Pakistan’ nuclear red lines
- > Favourable politically and militarily for Indian interests

⁵⁶ Dr Subhash Kapila, India’s New Cold Start Doctrine Strategically Reviewed’, paper No.991, 04 May 2004, available at, <http://www.southasiananalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html>.

⁵⁷ Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence, Pakistan Perspective (Pakistan Oxford University Press 2009),pp.242

⁵⁸ Y.I.Patel, ‘Dig Vijay to Divya Astra: A Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army’s Doctrine,’ available at, <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/History/Millennium/324-A-Paradigm-Shift.html>

Gurmeet Kanwal regards Cold start as India's desire of seeking "mass fire power rather than forces".⁵⁹ India has redesigned its military forces i.e. the Indian army from three offensive corps to smaller sized integrated battle group with division sized structure comprising of mechanized infantry , artillery and armour support. The task of holding pivot corps is now aimed to only limited offensive operations to give time to IBGs to strike massively on already softened targets by pivot corps. The self contained IBGs would be highly mobile adequately supported by massive air cover and artillery fire for quick thrust into enemy defence with major offensive task in initial ninety six hours.⁶⁰

Indian Logic to Limited War Doctrine

Indian advocates of limited war wanted to achieve two objectives, the need to maintain a large conventional forces and that nuclearization of South Asia and hence not giving away the option of use of force at limited level. The new strategy was debated in public and Indian think tanks have mixed the existing nomenclature of limited war with their own strategy with slight modifications. Nuclear doctrine is adopted as national policy by Indians, which constitutes offensive designs with scope to fight conventional war fighting capabilities. After announcing the First Draft Nuclear Doctrine on 24 January 2000, India declared its limited war doctrine in an open address to 2nd International Conference on Asian Security in 21st Century , the then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandez presented the "limited war doctrine". He declared that the Kargil incidence was proof of India's capabilities to fight and win limited war at time and place selected by aggressor. Indian army commanders were convinced that it is still

⁵⁹ Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

⁶⁰ Dr Subhash Kapila, 'India's New Cold Start Doctrine Strategically Reviewed', paper No.991, 04 May 2004, available at, <http://www.southasiananalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html>.

possible to fight a limited war even after South Asia is nuclearized, with prohibition of not violating adversary's nuclear red lines.⁶¹

Dr Chari believes that nuclearization has rendered "total war unthinkable". He claims that limited war has become necessity and must be central to the military input provided to decision, makes an option to ensure conflict remains limited. If India does not address this aspect in its strategic and operational planes it would be negligent of its mandate.⁶²

The employment of limited war to counter against proxy war and terrorism, sponsored by state mechanism is under enormous debate in Indian circles for quite some time. The supporters of limited war in India against Pakistan erect their logic on following arguments:

>Gap for Limited war with Pakistan under nuclear umbrella

>The political, economic and human outlay of the use of nuclear weapon would disallow both India and Pakistan from taking into account the use of nuclear weapons in any limited conflict with each other.

> India is conscious of Pakistan's redlines and to steer clear of nuclear intensification of conflict.

> India is attentive of the limits short of full scale conflict to which Pakistan can be pressed in limit war situation.

⁶¹ Tariq M. Ashraf, 'Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,' available at <http://www.grandstrategy.com/2009/03/9333813-doctrinal-reawakening-of-indian.html>

⁶² Khurshid Khan, 'Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia,' available at, <http://sacw.pagesperso-orange.fr/saan/2005/khurshidkhan.pdf>

> US pressure on Pakistan, during any limited conflict situation, would hinder the latter from swelling conventional war.

> The fear of massive retaliation from Indian side, in scenario of Pakistan's first nuclear smack, would dissuade Pakistan from initiating the nuclear option.⁶³

The main aspects of Indian limited war thinking and doctrine remained ambiguous, the statement of India's defence minister George Fernandez gave birth to further brain storming in strategic and military circles, about the impact of nuclear weapons on limited/ conventional wars. Result drawn from the India Pakistan conflict of Kargil 1999 is that despite of nuclear weapons possession war cannot be prevented but both sides nuclear weapons kept it limited. But still ambiguity in India Pakistan scenario is that how this limited war is conducted; how any one side maintains the political and operational objectives limited? Can this be done unilaterally? The outcome of these aspects remains vague because the other party could view one side's limited military objectives as unlimited and unacceptable. Indians on one hand picked up option of "no first use doctrine" and adopted "no high alert status" but on the other side India wants not to give up the use of conventional force in limited contingencies.

The Indian limited conventional war doctrine is based on two aspects, first that asymmetric assured destruction at conventional and nuclear level will help India to punish Pakistan without fear of retaliation and 2nd is that escalation control below nuclear redlines. The limited war options discussed by Brig F H Khan suggest that it gives basically four options to India:

"The first option is to attack across the International border or Loc, but to keep the objectives limited. The second option to attack at selected points along the Loc, presenting Pakistan with option of escalation by responding with riposte. The third option is to capture

⁶³ Subaha Chandran, Limited War, Revisiting Kargil in the Indo-Pak conflict, (Delhi: Indian Research Press), pp.89-90.

and hold a critical area along the Loc. The final option to carry out surgical strikes across the border, then return”.⁶⁴

During 2001-2002 crisis Indian government mobilized and prepared for limited war and was confident of the effective escalation control. On the other hand Pakistan was convinced that behind this the objective is to test the “limited war concept”, under cover of political compellence. But as Indians failed in achieving its political goals through coercive diplomatic action, this crisis (2001-2002) exposed defects in Indian conventional war policy at operational level. However, the escalation was controlled and the crisis remains below nuclear threshold, but Indian military failed to achieve its objective of surprise and coercion at conventional level through limited war actions.

Limitations of Indian Conventional Limited War Strategy

Indians are capable to secure its political objectives by limited war against Pakistan Yes or No this is the question which is unpredictable here. The minimum essential requirement for India to consider before going for limited war against Pakistan can be seen in following backgrounds:

- > Internal support
- > External pressure
- > The threat of use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan and probabilities of failure of escalation control
- > Intervention by International community⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Challenges of Nuclear Stability in South Asia,' available at <http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Challenges%20to%20Nuclear%20Stabilty%20in%20South%20Asia%.pdf>

⁶⁵ Subaha Chandran, 'Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests?' available at, <http://acdis.illinois.edu/assets/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillitSecureIndiasInterests.pdf>

Internal support; Indian government would need full support at political level while deciding to go for limited war against Pakistan. The amount of internal support would be decided by achievements on battle ground. The level of internal support would be determining factor for achievements of Indian goals through limited war. The level of internal support would enhance if Indian army's offensive could produce positive result in destroying militant camps inside Pakistan and forcing Pakistani military to remain defensive, but on the other hand if things occurred otherwise than above or India suffers return loses or heavy casualties through Pakistani military's counter action the internal support will surely diminish, at very early stages.

The second factor which would squeeze India to wage limited offensive is external support. The International community's first reaction would surely be condemning Indians for breaching Loc or International border. The external pressure from International community if intervened at early stage would surely force Indians to cease fire and return or halt military operation which could render Indian efforts of limited war as futile. As seen in the past as well that during conflict between the two International community forced both to go for negotiation on table.⁶⁶

The very crucial factor in this category comes as a result of aggression by Indians is Pakistan's response. Due to undefined threshold by Pakistan it is difficult for Indians to correctly weigh the Pakistan's likely response and this situation creates a scenario where India could conduct limited war keeping conflict below the threshold to nuclear breakout.⁶⁷

In order to neutralize all the above stated threats and likely escalation beyond control of India, the India brought in a new strategy of limited war. The new doctrine was named as "Cold Start" and as narrated earlier was unveiled in 2004 after Sundraji Doctrine failed in Operation Parakram. The Cold Start is designed to address all the problems faced by Indian military due to Sundraji doctrine which was merely designed for defence inside Indian territories. As narrated by Shahzad Massod Roomi, "Cold Start

⁶⁶ Subaha Chandran, 'Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests?' available at, <http://acdis.illinois.edu/assets/docs/253/LimitedWarwithPakistanWillitSecureIndiasInterests.pdf>

⁶⁷ ibid

Doctrine” dictated major structural changes in Indian military. Basic idea of Cold Start revolves around a short and intense war with focus on quickness, surprise and swift manoeuvring of, newly introduced, division sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) to inflict maximum damage to Pakistani military infrastructure and forces in shortest possible time before world community could intervene”.⁶⁸

As for merely all the doctrine it’s easy to contemplate but needs really hard to follow principles while undergoing operation under that doctrine. The Indian Limited war in future structured on Cold Start would likely to bring serious outcomes, failure on any side during the conflict will provide opportunity and motivation to escalate which is not desirable for any one side and would likely and surely shake the South Asian Stability. The Indian Limited war strategy is dangerous because of its inherent and some hidden chances of escalation which is going to have negative impacts on South Asian security and stability.

Talking about limited conventional war options V.P.Modike views Limited War between Indo-Pak the geographic limitations the Indian can only manage tactical space and even if India succeeded in capturing that space, it will not serve India the required political objectives. He also concludes that any conventional war launched by India may be seen limited from Indian perspective but same may not be viewed by Pakistan as limited and therefore any such initiative by India in the near future would straight away lead to full scale conventional war.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Shahzad Massod Roomi, ‘4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

⁶⁹ Khurshid Khan, ‘Limited War Under Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia,’ available at <http://sacw.pagesperso-orange.fr/saan/2005/khurshidkhan.pdf>

India's Justification to Cold Start Strategy

The rationale behind Cold Start strategy formulation to overcome the shortfalls in the existing Indian military strategy and to increase offensive capabilities of Indian army for future crisis by increasing its capabilities of rapid punitive strike against Pakistan while remaining below nuclear redlines. Indian army designed this new offensive strategy to address issues that resulted in failure of compellence which occurred during Operation Parakram.

Fundamental Structure of CSD

The Indian operational frame of Cold Start is based on following assumptions:

- Rapid deployment of strike force for quick result.
- Element of surprise assuming restraining Pakistan's counter response.
- It will not push Pakistan to respond with nuclear option.
- By conducting operation on multiple fronts and at unpredictable places rapidly would achieve military objectives and before international pressure would come in situ.
- Pakistan will be compelled to play by the rules set by India and still remain restricted in escalating the conflict by responding at the places of its own choice.

India's Conventional Military Strategy Preceding Cold Start

During the period from 1981 to 2004 Indian military followed conventional military strategy formulated by the then Indian Army's Chief General Krishna Swamy Sundarajan. This strategy was popular as Sundraji Strategy. This was followed in number of operations by Indian forces to confront Pakistan. Under this doctrine the International borders of India were protected by seven corps called "Holding Corps" in defensive role. These Holding Corps consisted of infantry division for static defence roles, mobile mechanized division to respond against enemy penetrations and small

number of armour units support. The purpose of this doctrine was merely to keep enemy movement in sight.⁷⁰

The army's offensive power according to Sundraji Doctrine was concentrated via three mobile armoured columns that had the capacity to strike deep into Pakistan. The "Strike Corps" was concentrated around an armoured division with mechanized infantry and massive artillery support.⁷¹ The shortcomings of this doctrine were exposed during the mass mobilization by Indian army in Operation Parakram in 2001-2002 stand-off where this operation failed to gain its political goals through limited military operation where there was unprecedented mobilization of armed forces on large scale. The armies of India and Pakistan stood eye ball to eye ball for considerable period alongside international border and LoCs.⁷² Even to extent of exchange of nuclear threats from both sides. The entire exercise by India proved futile to achieve coercive diplomacy since Indians failed to achieve its political objective in back drop of this operation and failure of Indian army to present requisite and timely threat to Pakistan.

There were multiple reasons for failure of Operation Parakram to succeed in achieving desired results, although there were some limited gains as well but over all this proved ineffective to achieve desired out come. The failure could be due to causes listed below:

- Pakistan's high stakes in Kashmir region.
- India's inability to put greater International pressure on Islamabad.
- Incomprehensible expansion of Indian objective and the resultant introduction of aggressive element into the equation.

⁷⁰ V.R.Raghavan, 'Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,' Non-proliferation Review, Vol.8, No.3(Fall/Winter2001), available at, <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/83ragh.pdf>

⁷¹ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'An Overview and Assessment of the Indian Army's Cold Start Strategy,' *Merton College University of Oxford*, available at, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk

⁷² Prof. Dr. Razia Musarat, 'US War On Terrorism and its Impact on South Asia,' available at <http://www.pu.edu.pk/polsc/jops/Currentissue-pdf/RAZIA.pdf>

- The non-calibrated nature of adopted and needless persistence with mobilization.⁷³
- Lack of political will; the reason for India to conduct operation Parakram failed and India's inability to wage a war against Pakistan because first Pakistan ignored the threat and India lacked political will to do so. Despite of large scale mobilization which started in December 2001 no objective was forwarded to three services Chief's of Staffs for implementation or achievement of political objectives which went overdue till August 2002. On contrary the Indian Army Chief was asked to lighten the army from entanglement.

Lack of Exit Strategy

For any military operation to achieve its goal the exit strategies is paramount for both adversary and own self. The Operation Parakram lacked this basic aspect and as a result while demobilization of army was to be initiated this was termed as "Strategic Relocation" and Indian Army was withdrawn from borders.⁷⁴ The overall result of operation to put Pakistan under compulsion of ceasing its support to non-state actors through limited war operation was thwarted by Indian Army's failure to mobilize timely and swiftly. The lack of swiftness closed the window of opportunity for Indian to conduct any punitive operation against Pakistan, but also the Pakistan' forces were able to counter mobilize against Indians as result of shorter distance from border to their home locations and also shorter interior communication lines.

As perceived inability of Indian military to timely react to December 2001 incidence of Indian Parliament Building attack termed by Indians as Pakistani backed operation through Kashmiri militant and resultant standoff with Pakistan in Operation Parakram the Indian army needed badly to reconsider its old doctrine. As a result New

⁷³ S.Kalyanarman, 'Operation Parakram: an Indian exercise in coercive diplomacy,' Strategic Analysis, Vol26, Issue 4 October 2002, pp.478-492, available at <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all=a791918985~frm=ablink>

⁷⁴ Major Gen Ashok Mehta, paper presented on, 'Coercive Diplomacy: Operation Parakarm: An Evaluation,' at IPCS seminar held on 8 August 2003, available at <http://www.ipcs.org/seminar/indopak/coercive-diplomacy-parakram-an-evaluation-577.html>

Delhi announced New Limited War doctrine of “Cold Start” in April 2004, which would allow Indian armed forces to mobilize quickly and under take retaliatory attacks in response to special challenges forwarded by Pakistan’s “Proxy War” in state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Former General and Vice Chief of Army Staff Indian Army General Vohra talks about requirement of limited war strategies in contemporary environments, he explains that the occupation of countries is no longer acceptable. The Clausewitzian dictum that “War is continuation of policy by other means” would not work in the new political and military environments. Total wars are obsolete and unconditional surrender is no longer realistic. The parameters for limited war include setting limited political objectives for which the application of force has to be tailored accordingly; achieving these objectives as early as possible without bringing the enemy down to its knee; and not missing the opportunity to bargain and bring an end to hostilities.”

Aims of Cold Start

Cold Start is ingenious attempt to design a military solution to the security challenges on India’s western border. Cold Start seeks to weigh India’s considerable conventional strength to respond to Pakistan’s continued irritation. The objective of this limited war structure is to launch a conventional strike against Pakistan as retaliation, before International Community come into play for any mediation actions to inflict significant harm on Pakistan army while keeping Islamabad bound not to escalate the clash to nuclear level.⁷⁵

The major focus of Cold Start is on the agility, the quick deployment and swift operation. Cold Start is not strategy to invade Pakistan and occupy it but instead it is rapid, time and distance bound operation into Pakistani soil with an objective of swiftly punishing Pakistan primarily in response to a Pakistani backed terrorist attack inside

⁷⁵ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘An Overview and Assessment of the Indian Army’s Cold Start Strategy,’ *Merton College University of Oxford* , available at, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk

Indian state with view to avoid threatening the survival off the Pakistani state or forcing Pakistan to answer with nuclear blow.⁷⁶

“Basic task of IBGs, with Russian T-90 and T-72 M1 tanks at their core, would be to make shallow territorial gains by invading 50-80 km deep inside Pakistan, mainly by out flanking heavily guarded cities like Lahore and Sialkot.”⁷⁷

The Indian forces would try to seek advantage of surprise at the strategic and operational levels to reach the decisive edge before International pressure and major powers like United States and China would get up to help Pakistan. The goal of Cold Start is to make some territorial gain of 50-80 km deep inside Pakistan that could be used as bargain chip in any future conflict negotiation to gain concessions from Pakistan.

Importance of Cold Start

The Indian Cold Start Doctrine is assumed to be new organizational setup for Indian army that would help in its short time deployment programs. This new concept is major shift from India’s so called traditional defence orientation of past to new offensive warfare strategy which is back bone of Cold Start doctrine.

Equating new Cold Start and past’s Sundraji doctrines it can be easily found the significance of Cold Start for Indian Army in two ways, first the Sundraji Doctrine mainly focused on Indian Army as consisted of seven holding corps positioned along the International border and LoCs to hold back Pakistan’s incursion. The offensive capability of Indian army according to this doctrine consisted of three strike corps, located inside Indian central location, with their capability to launch devastating counter

⁷⁶ Naeem Salik, The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence, Pakistan Perspective (Pakistan Oxford University Press 2009),pp.242

⁷⁷ Shahzad Massod Roomi, 4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

blow into Pakistani territory, mainly through Rajasthan Desert.⁷⁸ In Cold start the Indian forces offensive power is now divided into eight smaller division sized strike groups called “Integrated Battle Groups” (IBGs). To reduce deployment time of these groups they are now positioned closer to border areas with Pakistan to take rapid action against Pakistani forces. The existing three strike corps of Indian army is I corps, II corps and XXI corps, which are now transformed into smaller parts in the form of groups eight in number under restructuring in light of Cold Start Strategy. This will not only enhance capability of Indian Army but will give flexibility for multiple offensive options at one time and at least at eight different locations. Each IBG constitutes armour units, mechanized infantry and artillery support. Also each IBG would have air support by Indian Air Force providing massive fire power against defensive deployments and position of Pakistani forces alongside Indian border area.

Along with air support from IAF the India army helicopter gunship fleet will provide cover to advancing battle groups. Locating offensive element close to their launching pads for attack against Pakistan would reduce reaction time and early warning normally available to Pakistan. Placing offensive element where they could immediately launch an offensive would permit the Indian arm to achieve surprise.⁷⁹ The second significance for Indian army of Cold Start Doctrine is that under Sundraji doctrine Indian Army lacked flexibility to fight limited operational capability without crossing nuclear threshold. The offensive strike actions against Pakistan according to past doctrine was structured to “Sledge hammer blows”, against Pakistani forces in Pakistani territory rather than achieving limited objectives of “Shallow Territorial Gains” or causing calibrated damage to Pakistani military.⁸⁰ Where as in new doctrine of CSD the IBGs are designed to cause Pakistan limited damages inflicting losses to Pakistan

⁷⁸ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

⁷⁹ Tariq M. Ashraf, ‘Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,’ available at <http://www.grandstrategy.com/2009/03/9333813-doctrinal-reawakening-of-indian.html>

⁸⁰ Quinn J. Rhodes, ‘LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA’S COLD START DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT’ available at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524749.pdf>

Army and panicking Pakistani command and control thus freezing Pakistan's nuclear strike back capacity. The three corps designed under Sundraji Doctrine would be reconstructed with added support armour and artillery to their basic defensive structure. This offensive capability would allow the Defensive Corps to now new role of "Pivot Corps" to conduct weighted strikes independently thus paving way for IBGs to conduct follow on operations.⁸¹

Cold Start Implementation

The military operations to be success full needs three basic ingredients which are theory, testing and on ground execution. These indicators are identified by Thomas Mahnken as new combat techniques. These indicators include new military arrangements the dissemination of new branches or career outlets to support emerging concepts and training in the newly formulated war fighting technique.⁸²

The first phase for execution of CSD requires theoretical progress and exploring new ways to solve existing military challenges. Indian military, however completed primary part by formulating and unveiling its new Cold Start doctrine in 2004, with wide assumptive structure but the latter two parts or phases still remained hazy due to non existence of information about vast organizational restructuring required for full scale implementation, the operational capacities required to launch Cold start, required organizational change and development of the resources and main frame required to carry out military operations under new limited war fighting strategy the Cold Start Doctrine.

The events show that Indian military is continuously working on essential level of operational abilities in army and air force to carry out cohesive operations envisaged in Cold Start the recent military exercises conducted by Indian Military to test Cold Start applicability on ground shows that Indian army is struggling in enhancing its capacities

⁸¹ ibid

⁸² Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

in three major aspects. Seeing all the efforts and anticipating Indian plans may need some essentials that are must for execution of Cold Start:

- The first is to show the capability to carryout tasks required by Cold Start like offensive operations by Pivot Corps, short mobilization operations and independent operation abilities by units involved in Cold Start.
- The next is capability to carry out joint services operations. The joint operations are main foundations on which Cold Start is formulated because army units require massive support from Indian Air Force for fire power and close air support.
- Then are the capabilities of Network Centric Warfare. This capability is not only important for enhancing decision making and improving synchronization among dispersed forces but also to amplify situational alertness and intelligence sharing.⁸³

During and after the formulation of this doctrine since 2004, Indian forces had conducted some major exercises to test and improve Cold Start. Squat scrutiny of objectives of these exercises are seen in following paragraphs one by one since 2004 where Indian Military strived to test military capabilities for implementation and execution of Cold Start Doctrine.

Exercise Divya Astra

The English of which is Divine Weapon. It was conducted in 2004 at Mahajan firing ranges in Rajasthan about 70 km from Pakistan India International borders. This was the initial exercise conducted by Indian forces to test the ability of Indian Military's various combat units to deliver integrated fire power in coordination with air power.⁸⁴. This was a tactical structure exercise mean to check the operations that are designed to

⁸³ Shahzad Massod Roomi, '4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

⁸⁴ 'Exercise Divya Astra,' Pakistan Defence, available at, <http://wwedefence.pk/forums/military-photos-multimedia/322-triservices-exercise.html>

penetrate through enemy fortification by mechanized assault which was backed by artillery and ground attack aircraft.⁸⁵

Exercise Vajra Shakti

Vajra Shakti was conducted a year later Divya Astra in May 2005 at location 80 km from Pakistan India borders in the plains of Jalandhar in Indian Punjab. The English translation of Vajra Shakti means “Thunder Power”. In this exercise about 25,000 Indian military troops participated and was spread on ten days exercises schedules.⁸⁶ This exercise was 1st show of new offensive of new offensive strategy in which holding Corps were assigned new role of Pivot Corps and new responsibilities of limited offensive operations along with maintaining defensive role against counter offensive operations that would occur at the outbreak of hostilities at on wider scale. Pivot Corps will launch offensive operations parallel in enemy territory which would then be further enhanced and exploited through other strike formations.⁸⁷ This exercise was significant in manner that Indian army holding corps for the first time practiced offensive roles in the West from its defensive role. This was regularized as net work centric warfare in Indian military terms.

The implementation of Cold Start Doctrine means swift day and night operations the offensive attacks were supported by command, control, communication, computers and intelligence (C4I) network and systems. Under this network system force multiplier actions were used to enhance flow of real time information of enemy to combat units which is collected by use of satellites, UAVs aerial reconnaissance, radars, communication interceptions and host of other means. The position of enemies was transmitted through real time photography and was forwarded to units engaged in operations helping commanders for quick decision making.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ ibid

⁸⁶ Shahzad Massod Roomi, '4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

⁸⁷ Subhash Kapila, 'Indian Army Validates Its Cold Start Doctrine: Introductory Background,' South Asian Analysis Group, available at , http://www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/papser1408.html

⁸⁸ ibid

“In the scenario “Blue Land” (friendly) forces squared off against the adversary “Red Land” forces across the Sutlej River, which simulated the International Border with Pakistan. The exercise presupposed that relations between the two nations had degenerated to the point where the Blue forces launched pre-emptive attack followed by a rapid advance into Red territory. Nine days of simulated attacks and counter attacks by both sides resulted in the Blue forces advancing 30kms into enemy territory setting the stage for strike force to launch a substantial follow on offensive.”⁸⁹

Desert Strike 2005

These exercises were conducted in November 2005 in Rajasthan Thar desert and lasted for fourteen days. Major objective of these war games was to enhance joint operations cohesion and capacity of Indian army which included armoured divisions and air force strike elements. The main focus of these operations was to test the Indian Military’s ability to overcome enemy by causing psychological setbacks by use of pre-emptive dislocation and disruption.⁹⁰ The desert environment was selected for testing and employing electronic and information warfare assets along with fast pace of operations to be conducted by other participating units.

Sanghe Shakti

This was conducted in May 2006, to further test and evaluates Cold Start at corps level. The corps selected was tasked to launch thrust in Pakistan’s area of Cholistan. The exercise meaning Joint Power was to test the capabilities of strike force to rapidly mobilize in enemy defences that and then exploit gaps in enemy defences that had been created by Pivot corps un-predicted attack. The focus of exercise was structured on German Blitzkrieg armoured attack into hostile territory. This exercise

⁸⁹ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

⁹⁰ *ibid*

emphasized on swift penetration, security of flanks provided by army's gunships while enemy's strong holds were by passed and cut-off by forward advancing units.⁹¹

This was bigger exercise then the previous ones since as name suggests Joint Power it included air force strike elements, tanks and massive strength of 40,000 troops from 2nd Strike Corps and purpose of Joint Power was "to test 2004 war doctrine to dismember a not so friendly nation effectively."⁹²

Ashwamedh 2007

To test Cold Start Strategy the fifth exercise conducted by Indian military was in May 2007, which included 25,000 Indian Army personal this time from I Strike Corps supported by Infantry fighting vehicles, main battle tanks, heavy artillery and army's attack helicopters.⁹³

Out-come of Exercises

The five exercises conducted by Indian Army only showed a moderately successful strategy employment in simulated war conditions. The capabilities of Indian military under this strategy of Cold Start were to put to test under varying conditions such as plains and deserts along with varying climatic conditions.

The exercises Vajra Shakti, Sanghe Shakti and Ashwamadh the major part of exercise fighting operations were conducted at night which tested the capability of Indian military to fight in night conditions and employment of night vision and thermal imagers under realistic battle conditions.

The exercises Vajra Shakti and Desert Strike were done in open desert terrains. On the other hand Divya Astra, Ashwamedh and Sanghe Shakti included such

⁹¹ Shahzad Massod Roomi, '4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

⁹² ibid

⁹³ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

conditions which Indian military is likely to face in actual assault across India Pakistan borders. In Divya Astra Indian Army engineer bridged 60 meter wide canal with in span of thirty minutes using truck mounted bridges having capacity to support tanks and armoured vehicles. Similarly in Ashwamedh an attack across the canal feature defence line was practice. The Sanghe Shakti included conduct of operations in the congested terrain with build ups , putting advancing units to use navigation techniques in inhibited area and practice of crossing water obstacles.

Operational Margins of Cold Start

As all the new doctrines normally suffer from some inherited limitations same is the case with Cold Start. Cold Start strategy to be effectively implemented (as outcome of exercises conducted and available literature Cold Start documentation is very limited as far as its actual plans is considered it is highly classified and is not disseminated) it appears that Cold Start is still in development and experimental stages and it will be easy to identify the problems related to its on ground implementations. But as narrated above the arguments on this new strategy and its limitations can be assumed by studying and analyzing previous strategies and doctrines connected with limited war in India Pakistan context. At present the apparent areas of Cold Start doctrine that hinders operationalization and employment of this doctrine can primarily be graded into three categories:

- The organizational changes required for Cold Start still needs its execution practically.
- The development, availability of resources and infra-structure required to support military related operations still needs major improvement and execution.
- The operational capabilities required to execute Cold Start are still not visible and majorly either assumed or predicted but lacks demonstration on ground clearly.

In following portions the discussion about operational limitations and capabilities are discussed. Due to lack of availability of actual plans of action of Cold Start and its

classification as highly classified the main chunk of deduction is done from articles by Walter C Ladwig, Quinn J Rhodes thesis and Shahzad Massod Roomi's analysis all available on internet sites in PDF versions.

Organizational Changes

Following are the initial organizational changes which are vitally essential for Cold Start implementations:

- Restructuring / establishment of the force.
- Cold Start and Civil Military Distrust.
- Inter services differences.

Force Restructuring

The major aspect for Indians to implement Cold Start constitutes restructuring of forces on Pakistani borders. The Indian army Western Command is endowed with responsibility of international borders from Jammu to Rajasthan which lays heavy burden on it. To reduce this load a new command was set in the form of South Western Command initiated in April 2005, which was placed on border with Pakistan and its headquarters in Jaipur. This new command shared the burden of Western Command by taking responsibility to cover key area of Punjab and Rajasthan, this new command is to focus on border region of Jammu to Pathankot.⁹⁴ The outcome of this newly established command will not only reduce the load to look after large stretch of territory from Western Command but will also make more efficient command and control of the forces placed alongside Western borders.

The offensive forces can only achieve element of surprise and quick mobilization advantage if they are stationed closer to their area of predicted operation in case of India Pakistan, at international borders or line of control. In case of Indian military the deployment of its offensive force near border mean employment of Cold Start Strategy.

⁹⁴ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

Still the IBGs formalization and existence is not clear and their deployment along with Pivot Corps is also not evident. In exercises conducted by Indian Army's under Cold Start, the Indian Military's offensive units operated as a Strike Corps not as IBGs which also indicative of the fact that IBGs are yet not in place.

The offensive units from Strike Corps attached with South Western Command are not apparently placed at forward position which further augments the non formulation of IBGs and also no such unit is located near border yet.⁹⁵ Due to non-availability of actual plans of Cold Start most of above outcome is assumption based but it is also not logical to believe that this task could be accomplished with appropriate deliberations.

Cold Start and Civil Military Disbelieve

The next important hurdle for decision makers to undertake limited war is to formulate a strategy and its related goals that are achievable by use of military force, but still have room to ensure that conflict does not reach to nuclear threshold. The ways and means to carry out limited war operation is challenge for civil and military authorities because of high degree of non-connectivity as their built in character. The complex issue to civil military distrust has major impact on Cold Start employment, because this type of offensive strategy requires very close and cohesive relations between the civil and military structures.

Indian civil military distrust and inter services friction are continuously putting influence on the defence policy and new war doctrines, creation and their implementation, since there are some fundamental problems with Indian military establishment that persisted from inception of India.⁹⁶ In 2001 -2002 crises the Civilian Government failed to provide Indian Military with clear objective as to desired end

⁹⁵ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

⁹⁶ Quinn J. Rhodes, 'LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA'S COLD START DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT' available at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524749.pdf>

state.⁹⁷ The result of this lack of understanding between Indian politician and military became evident during Operation Parakram which wasted lot of efforts but outcome of this operation failed to bring the desired results; the disconnect between two institution military and civil hampered Indian Military actions. For this purpose the civilian politicians may evolve a tightly integrated strategy with clearly defined objectives but must extend responsibility to the military leader ship to execute their strategy.

According to Barry Posen “the intervention of civilian leadership is necessary to ensure that a state’s military doctrine is well integrated with its grand strategy i.e., situation that does not appear to be the case with Cold Start”.⁹⁸ Also Stephen Cohen notes politician dislike the move towards a limited war doctrine because it gives the military “more of a role in decision making”⁹⁹ where as in that case there is required to be clear civil and military goals that are required to be reached at the start of limited war operations. The Operations Parakram shows that the lack of clear civil military objectives resulted into an operation that ended with unachieved results. Instead of achieving objectives of invasion into Pakistan the Indian military found itself face to face for ten months which resulted in negligible gains over all for Indian security.¹⁰⁰ The continuation of civil military distrust would bring only disadvantage to the Cold Start Doctrine; for Cold Start to be effective the civilian leadership needs to undertake the capacities of its military as far as the achievement of connected goals are concerned. Without sufficient knowledge of skill and limitations associated with operations under Cold Start the civilian leadership could overestimate the military’s capabilities which could bring disaster and setbacks.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘An Overview and Assessment of the Indian Army’s Cold Start Strategy,’ *Merton College University of Oxford*, available at, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk

⁹⁸ *ibid*

⁹⁹ Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’ http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

¹⁰⁰ Quinn J. Rhodes, ‘LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA’S COLD START DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT’ available at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524749.pdf>

¹⁰¹ *ibid*

In this situation the military means need to be clearly understood by politicians where limited goals are to be achieved in an environment which can trigger nuclear outbreak which is not an easy task to handle. This issue needs to be resolved by Indian Civilian Command for coordination and successful employment of Cold Start Strategy.

Inter Services Friction

As for all the world military institutions have inherited issue of inter services rivalries and Indian military is not an exception to it. This inter services friction is historical in Indian military and could hinder the effective execution of Cold Start operations, especially when such type of operation needs very robust joint coordinated efforts to achieve its ends. The on ground employment of Cold Start requires very high degree of understanding and coordinated efforts between political and military institution and among inter-services of Indian military. The design of Cold Start may not give political leader a chance once operation became to unfold due to rapid and swift mobilization and operations.¹⁰²

The commanders of three services of Indian Military are acting as advisor to President since the Commander-in-Chief's office now lies with President instead of being military's responsibility. In the absence of non existence of integrated command post, India's military services operate autonomously and are facing issues of leadership vacuum and uniformed command.¹⁰³ The civilian leadership failed to construct an overall doctrine under which three forces are assured to be placed equally to overcome the issue of inter-service rivalries. To overcome this issue the major participants of Cold Start i.e., Indian Army and Air Force needs a strong leadership to integrate their wartime strategies and tactics.

¹⁰² Tariq M. Ashraf, 'Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,' available at <http://www.grandstrategy.com/2009/03/9333813-doctrinal-reawakening-of-indian.html>

¹⁰³ Quinn J. Rhodes, 'LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA'S COLD START DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT' available at <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524749.pdf>

The major structure of Cold Start Doctrine stands around eight IBGs which bring Indian military's two services i.e. air force and navy under the Indian army subordination. In Cold Start the use of air power is requirement and joint vision of Indian Army and hence all the elements of Indian military participating in operations under Cold Start would be under control of unified commander which could be assumed as from Indian Army.¹⁰⁴ Indian Air Force has vital role to play in Cold Start since it is to pave way for ground operations, the blitzkrieg type military operations cannot be possibly undertaken without overwhelming air superiority and close integrated air support.¹⁰⁵ The Indian Air Force has major part for successful operations in Cold Start Strategy primarily it needs to execute following requirements and dedicate efforts to accomplish following requirements:

- IAF needs to achieve that level of air superiority which could render its adversary ineffective against area of operations of Cold Start offensive element i.e., integrated battle groups.
- Indian homeland is to be given air defence security for which IAF needs to dedicate its combat assets for this role.
- Dedicate close air support and ground attack units for their direct role in support of battle groups.¹⁰⁶

The Indian Air force is of the opinion that putting aircraft on task of ground units in fixed space as integrated battle group concept demands is principally under utilization and misuse of air power which will render its numerical superiority over Pakistan's Air force ineffective.¹⁰⁷ This issue of Indian Air Force to support battle group is unlikely to conclude since Indian Air force focuses on air to air combat and strategic bombing while

¹⁰⁴ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine,' http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf

¹⁰⁵ Dr Subhash Kapila, 'India's New Cold Start Doctrine Strategically Reviewed', paper No.991, 04 May 2004, available at, <http://www.southasiananalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html>.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid*

¹⁰⁷ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'An Overview and Assessment of the Indian Army's Cold Start Strategy,' *Merton College University of Oxford*, available at, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk

giving less attention to importance of close support as its core objective in Cold Start Strategy.

State of Logistics and Other Support to Cold Start Doctrine

Like other aspects infrastructure problems as well as technology and equipment shortcomings are to be overcome which is vital for successful implementation of Cold Start. Cold Start demands competent use of technology and numerical advantages. Viewing within the Indian Army, at present apparently there is sufficient material shortfalls that puts question mark on its ability to execute Cold Start in the near time. The Indian Army's armour units suffer from low operational readiness rate because much of its equipment is at the end of its service life. Similarly by creating eight IBGs Indian military necessitates self-propelled artillery to have quick mobilized action and massive firepower to carry out its goal of rapid action in operations of Cold Start.¹⁰⁸

The Indian army also is deficient in mobility and logistical capability to implement Cold Start. It is anticipated that only thirty–five percent of the army is equipped to move about India, and even smaller portion possesses the mobility to execute cross-border operations.¹⁰⁹ Limited supplies of spare parts, primitive logistical networks, and inadequate maintenance facilities will also hinder offensive operations. Indian Army's own aviation assets heavier utility helicopters of Air Force would need considerable assembling for logistic sustain of "Cold Start" battle group.¹¹⁰

Indian Future Military Procurement Program

As with the induction of new doctrine Indian military required employment of highly mobile units. These units needs extensive intelligence resources , air power and exceptional command and control capacity to organize multiple combined armed battle group operation in coordination with air support. To get all these aspects in one

¹⁰⁸ Walter C. Ladwig III, 'An Overview and Assessment of the Indian Army's Cold Start Strategy,' *Merton College University of Oxford* , available at, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk

¹⁰⁹ *ibid*

¹¹⁰ *ibid*

consolidated forms needs highly trained officers as well as field commanders able of taking initiative and acting to the demands of battle field as the events unfold in operations.

While looking into the operations under Cold Start Doctrine following are vital for fighting a decisive war in order to make Cold Start effective and giving enemy a forceful blow :

- Special forces
- Air Assault Division
- Air Cavalry brigades
- Light infantry divisions with air transportable combat power.”¹¹¹

India is planning to spend over US \$100 billion for procurement of modern weapons under its force restructuring program by 2022. All these procurement of arms and force restructuring in the three services specially Air Force and Army is to overcome shortfalls that are vital for employing the Cold Start Doctrine on ground effectively and efficiently.¹¹²

India’s plans to procure huge cache of weapons and equipment for future employment and modernization programs and is planning to re-equip all the three arms of its military. The types of weapons and equipments which are under procurement process are listed below:

Indian Air Force

- Advance 4th generation fighter jets, medium category multi role combat aircraft (MMRCA).
- Phalcon AWACS deal with Israel.

¹¹¹ Bharat Rakshak, ‘Cold Start an Overview available at <http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=141&start=0&sk=t&sd=a>

¹¹² Shahzad Massod Roomi, ‘4th G w, Indian Cold Start & Future Pak-India Conflict available at http://www.academia.edu/527465/Indian_Cold_Start_Analysis

- Stealth fighters from Russian and self production in collaboration with Russians.
- Self production of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) with extensive equipment support from Western countries.
- Air defence equipment from Israel and joint ventures for their production at home.
- Heavy air transport aircrafts C-17 and C-130Js for boosting deployment capability and high mobility.¹¹³

Navy

- Nuclear Submarines
- Aircraft carrier from Russia with support and up-gradation program with Russia and Israel.
- Modern conventional submarines from France.
- Akula class nuclear submarines from Russia.
- Russian frigates.
- Mig-29 K multi role aircraft for naval air arm.
- US Poseidon aircraft for maritime patrol and reconnaissance purpose.¹¹⁴

Army

- Light weight towed Howitzer guns.
- New gunship and heavy support helicopters.
- New T-90 Russian main battle tanks.
- Enhancing of links and roads leading to border and LoCs area.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ ibid

¹¹⁴ ibid

¹¹⁵ ibid

Despite of acquiring all the above military hard ware and weapon systems the Indian military is to improve its Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C4I) for implementation of network centric warfare an important aspect of Cold Start Strategy. More over the reliability of Indian air force in target accusation and intelligence is to be improved with its dependency from conventional fixed wing aircraft reconnaissance to more advance means like satellite based powerful sensor utilization and tactical reconnaissance through improved versions of advance UAVs. A continuous update would be required of all the battle field scenarios in order to avoid any sort of surprise while under taking Cold Start based operations of enemy's range and location. This would be an important aspect when the operations are at the opening stage and onset of conflict under this limited war theatre.¹¹⁶

By and large evaluation of progress of the Indian Army's towards executing Cold Start represents that it remained in the experimental phase. Military exercises demonstrate that the considerable progress has taken place in organization of various components, but still it required more work to achieve the goals presented in doctrine at operational level. Restructuring of force on border area the creation of the South Western Command represents a positive step, but there is no evidence of offensive units being forward deployed as the doctrine requires. Inter service and civil military tension remains major obstacle to the process Cold Start Strategy for implementation. Above and beyond Technological and equipment deficit, India also lacks sufficient number of capable officers who can execute Cold Start operations on ground independently and help and instructions of senior commanders.

Exit Strategy for Cold Start Operations

“It is easier to get into the conflict, than to get out of one, greater attention is needed to cover this aspect by the military and strategic establishment. Exit strategies needs are combination of the ‘carrot’ of political incentives,

¹¹⁶ Air Marshal BK Pandey, 'Indian Air Force 2020By Issue Net Edition| Date: 30 Oct, 2010, Air Marshall Bk Pandey <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/indian-air-force-2020/0/>

diplomatic persuasion and military restraint and the 'stick' of political pressure, diplomatic isolation and military violence. It is essential for any military doctrine to pre identify the exit points for the successful gain of objectives defined for that military operation."¹¹⁷

Conflict demands an exit strategy which should be multiple utility that can be worked at varying conditions and stages of conflict. Since Cold Start encompasses multiple options of use of force across a vast field of operation that includes offensive action by pivot/holding Corps, with added booster from strike corps and all these efforts put together and placed near the International borders between Pakistan and India. As the operations based on Cold Start are launched the pivot corps actions and then strike corps operations deeper into Pakistani territory without giving any break to Pakistani forces would not likely allow it to offer resistance to strike corps of Indian military. In order to get chances of exit from conflict following may be formulated as exit strategy featuring political, military and diplomatic pressures.

The main objective of Cold Start to wreak damage to the adversaries in such a fashion that it submits to desired objectives. In this context the launching of offensive is not the only option as the threat of offensive before the launch of operations can bring out the desired objectives and hence gives a chance to achieve desired goals without getting into conflict.

The next option for exit could be at the very onset of conflict meaning there by that exploiting the threat of escalation and threatening adversary with further setback in order to get desired concessions.

The later stage of exit could come once the strike corps reaches to the desired penetration. This stage could be critical because at this stage Pakistan's nuclear trigger may be armed and may force Pakistan to respond with nuclear strike warning, in order

¹¹⁷ Reconciliation Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia, 'IDSA Monograph Series No3. September 2010, available at <http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Mnongraph No.3.pdf>

to halt the Indian forces further advance. In case of determined uprising from Pakistan, conventional operations may continue and so also the effort to stop conflict as well.

The last option for exit is in the immediate stir of nuclear switch over for terminating the nuclear exchange probably and surely at the lowest stair of nuclear steps. But of course if this conflict reaches to above stage the very theme and aim of Cold Start would diminish and it would be failure of Cold Start Doctrine.

Indian military despite of its all military preparedness of Cold Start is still conflicting with the issue of exit strategy at conventional level. War is not only about fighting but is an exercise of national power and includes non-military instruments.¹¹⁸ For this reason the belligerents should have clear lines of communication to convey the messages at all the stages of operations.

Conclusion

During standoff of 2002 Indians faced the problem of long communication lines, which rendered their mobilization too slow and by the time the Indian troops got deployed, Pakistani force were there waiting. On the other hand this also gave time to international community to react and call for restraint.¹¹⁹ In order to solve this problem of time consuming mobilization, the Indian military came up with the “Cold Start” strategy¹²⁰. This strategy incorporates “eight readily deployed ‘integrated battle groups,’ drawn from Navy and Indian Air Force. These groups would be trained to make swift and hard in roads into enemy territory. These strikes should be ‘limited’ and ‘calibrated’ to ensure nuclear weapons do not come into play.”¹²¹ The Cold start strategy revolves around the concept of swift mobilization. Given the long lines of communication, India

¹¹⁸ Reconciliation Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia, 'IDSA Monograph Series No3. September 2010, available at [http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Mnongraph No.3.pdf](http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Mnongraph%20No.3.pdf)

¹¹⁹ “Cold Start to New War Doctrine”, The Times of India ,April 14, 2004, available at URL <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/616847.cms>

¹²⁰ Reconciliation Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia, 'IDSA Monograph Series No3. September 2010, available at [http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Mnongraph No.3.pdf](http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Mnongraph%20No.3.pdf)

¹²¹ ibid

would rely on troops closer to the border to initiate the onslaught and achieve an advantage against Pakistan. The troops deeper inside India, would be mobilized in the mean time and subsequently consolidate the advantage gained by initial onslaught. This strategy is also very rudimentary and subject to criticism. The resources required for such an operation may not be possible for a country like India. The timing factor is also very crucial in this strategy which requires thorough deliberation and accurate execution. On the other hand Pakistani forces are not so benign and require much less response time in critical areas, so they may be able to face the Indians and at the same time gain advantage before Indian troops arrive. The problem of relevancy between ends and means also remains an issue.¹²²

Cold start is facing various challenges the type of rapid and self-sustained operations needs independent decision making that is acceptable to all components of Government including three fighting arms among themselves as well. Cold Start is in prelude stage and its execution would have serious ramifications to strategic stability of South Asian region. The Indian Army's defensive posture has shifted to offensive as a result of Cold Start. Such type of bearing would only bring in potentials for security dilemma that encircles India and Pakistan if in future Cold Start is put into service.

¹²² Brodie, "War and Politics", p-1-3.

Chapter IV

Implications of Cold Start and Limited War Doctrines on South Asia

Introduction

This chapter constitutes discussion on strategic stability by probing stability/instability paradox to comprehend the relationship between conventional and nuclear strategies and doctrines of India and Pakistan. The circumstance and conditions outlined here argue that conventional warfare between India and Pakistan has all the potentials to escalate to nuclear level. India and Pakistan have long history of intermittent crises caused by a number of aspects, but the persistent theme is the perception or misperception, strategic approaches, preferences, competence, the dynamics of interface and strategic communication that are posing overwhelming threat on each side. There is no possibility of limited conventional conflict between India and Pakistan, due to asymmetrical configuration of strategic force configuration, doctrines, conventional equilibrium, issue of strategic depth and additional aggressive conventional war fighting doctrine (like Indians had introduced CSD). Any action in the aspect of hot pursuits or surgical strikes against Pakistan in future would result in the significantly escalating the crisis to the nuclear level.

The supporters of nuclear force dig their logic on this aspect of nuclear weapons that they remained source of stability between the two super powers during the era of Cold War. Hence it is assumed that same thing will happen with the stability in other regions of world where instability persists. But on the other side the structure of security is altogether different form that of Cold War rivals and conditions that persisted during the Cold War era. On the stage of India and Pakistan any conventional conflict has all the divergence to rise above the conventional level to reach to nuclear exchange. In this context the Waltz and Sagan views oppose each other, Waltz assumes that nuclear

weapons have ability towards stability since the cost of war is not acceptable¹²³ and the views in other aspect by Sagan advocates that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons is far ahead of any stabilizing effect that they accompany.¹²⁴

It is accepted reality that nuclear weapons are capable to over ride the cost of war to potential objectives and boost the risk of escalation. The nuclear weapon theories along with conflict history of Subcontinent between India and Pakistan concludes that any exchange of nuclear weapons between them is likely to be grown out of escalation of conventional conflict which may be result of impulsive unleashing of nuclear arsenals. Asymmetrical capabilities at conventional and nuclear level between India and Pakistan, doctrinal asymmetry, war on terrorism and threat of cross border terrorism increased brinkmanship, and overriding all of them is Indian concept of limited war to counter these activities create grave hazard to South Asian stability and includes the risk of escalation.

War constitutes lots of factors that make it vulnerable to escalation and once it breaks out than it constitutes uncertainty that to what extent it is going to escalate since the magnitude of actions and counter actions are not predictable. The steps to escalation ladder starts from minor conflicts starting from limited conventional war to full scale conventional war followed by limited nuclear war to full scale nuclear war.¹²⁵ Any arm conflict has tendency of escalation. The issue in front of Indians is of sub-conventional war, the Indian policy makers regard it as “limited war under nuclear

¹²³ G.D Bukshi, ' Interface Between Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence: A Case Study for the Indian Subcontinent,' available at , http://ndc.viburnix.com/uploads/editor_files/pdf/06_RKPat.pdf

¹²⁴ ibid

¹²⁵ Rajesh M Basur, "International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence, " *In the India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship, Theories of Deterrence and International Relations*" (Ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Rout ledge, 2007), pp.142.

conditions” has all the capability of escalating to full-fledge conventional war.¹²⁶ Limited war escalation stands on the level of strategic stability, strategic parity and strategic communication between two nuclear rivals.¹²⁷ These three factors hold the strings to keep the limited war limited. In nuclear environment these three factors provide pillars to limited war strategies. In case of India-Pakistan these three factors are still hazy.

Cold Start and Risk of Escalation Control

Escalation appears to be inherent between India and Pakistan because of their desire and required inevitability of relationship. In conflict between India and Pakistan one’s aspiration is to win and an obligation not to lose by other side. The India Pakistan history of military incidents clearly prove so much chances of conflict to escalate to total war or to the threshold of nuclear war. Equating India-Pakistan relationship on conventional and strategic level, India hangs on a position of escalation superiority with the support of its advance military capabilities and technology as compared to Pakistan’s fragile defence structure. India on its conventional military base is trying to rule the escalation ladder from low intensity conflict to conventional war, limited or all out, while Pakistan seems leaning towards addressing the asymmetric strategic balance with its nuclear deterrent capability.

The crisis precedents between India and Pakistan suggest the risk of escalation between India and Pakistan was much more but controllable, but now due to Indian developing and improving military capabilities are widening the conventional gap between India and Pakistan which could not guaranteed that in future crisis the complex structure of escalation between the two would be controllable. Indian new limited war

¹²⁶ Varuni Sahni, ‘The Stability Instability Paradox: A less than Perfect Explanation,’ in *The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relation*, (Ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Rout ledge, 2007), p.193.

¹²⁷ Subha Chandran, *Limited War, Revisiting Kargil in the Indo-Pak conflict*, (Delhi: Indian Research Press, 2006), p.105.

doctrine Cold Start permits India to take punitive actions against Pakistan in response to any terrorist activity taken place on Indian Territory from Pakistan. Indian Cold Start doctrine is erected on assumption that through superiority at conventional and strategic level India can obtain its desired objectives by conflicting limited war with Pakistan under conditions which do not threaten the risk of escalation.

Cold Start Suppositions and Limitations

- First its aim for swift mobilization could enhance instability in South Asia, since Pakistan would have to increase its readiness to counter any possible Indian attack.
- Second, because of the less time to move forces, the ability of the Indian government to reconsider its actions would be limited as would the ability of international community to intervene to prevent escalation. As a result, a minutely considered crisis could potentially balloon into full scale war.
- The next option focuses on making territorial gains through rapid and hard inroads into Pakistani territory across international border penetration could be up to 50 miles. The goal might be narrow from the adversary's point of view, but may have strategic implications for Pakistan thus it would respond with full potential to dilute the Indian offensive at all levels.
- Unable to achieve the desired aims or in case of stalemate, Indian leadership might be psychologically forced to push for to launch full scale conventional war. Here the Indian declaratory policy to keep limited war below nuclear level would fail at operational level.

As a result Cold Start imposes a major challenge to future India Pakistan relations because of its proactive, offensive stance and the historical legacies of escalation, misperception, and deception. Two major instances, the 1971 East Pakistan War and Exercise Brass Tacks (1986-87), clearly represent how events can quickly spiral for each side in both outright armed conflict as well as military exercises. At this

intent Cold Start is considered as imminent threat to strategic stability of South Asia as it has a basic tendency to escalate to total war and might cross nuclear threshold that may be resulted into nuclear exchange.

Strategic Stability

According to international theory of nuclear weapons brings interdependence between nuclear rivals. In case of India and Pakistan both had generally remained in a constant state of flux. Times of peace have at best remained uneasy and have been characterized by what analyst Ashley Tellis terms “Ugly Stability”.¹²⁸ Stability must be classified in both its strategic and technical contexts. Strategic stability relates to ensuring the safety, security, and survivability of nuclear weapons under all conditions peace, on alert in crisis, and war.¹²⁹ Stability assumes a state of balance between two adversaries even if there may be no parity between them.

It is significant here to stress that the concept of strategic stability in South Asia is complex and subject to minor agreement. Strategic stability becomes a vital requirement between two nuclear rivals. There are three main components for strategic stability. “First stability lies in the presence of few incentives for the first strike during the military confrontation. Second ‘Arms Stability’ lies in constraints, both unilateral and bilaterally agreed to competitive and destabilizing weapons acquisitions. While arms stability is more vital, combining two together contribute to general stability.”¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Challenges of Nuclear Stability in South Asia,’ available at <http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Challenges%20to%20Nuclear%20Stabilty%20in%20South%20Asia%.pdf>

¹²⁹ *ibid*

¹³⁰ Rajesh M Basur, ‘International Relation Theory and Minimum Deterrence,’ in *The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E. Sridharan (NewYork: Routledge, 2007), p.134-135.

Escalation control stability is the conception of status-quo at the nuclear level that there is no space for conventional war due to deterrence stability those exists between two states. Unfortunately all of these criteria of stability are missing between India and Pakistan. Indian readiness to fight limited war with Pakistan to counter react future terrorist attacks by posing higher military and political war with Pakistan without realizing the failure of such an action and Pakistan unconstrained response to such an act of Indian aggression. The asymmetries existing between India and Pakistan at conventional, doctrinal, and strategic level does not allow between India and Pakistan to make stable relationship.

Stability Vs Instability Paradox

The stability instability paradox recommends that the stability induced by nuclear weapons through mutual deterrence at the strategic level opens up the possibility of more frequent resort to force, and increased instability, at lower levels of violence.¹³¹ This perception was to analyze the relationship between superpowers during the Cold War. Liddell Hart argued that the introduction of nuclear weapons had made limited conventional war more viable.¹³² The stability vs. instability paradox is associated with Glenn Snyder, who identified and expressed it in 1965, “the greater the stability of the ‘strategic’ balance of terror, the lower the stability of the overall balance at its lower level of violence”.¹³³

The paradox defines that rather than bring stability to a pair of potential adversaries, nuclear weapons may create instability by encouraging one or both sides to engage in ‘limited’ military adventures against the other, as long as they do not put a

¹³¹ Varun Sahni, ‘The Stability Instability Paradox: A Less than Perfect Explanation, ‘in *The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (Ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.187.

¹³² *ibid*

¹³³ *ibid*

risk the critical interest of the target country. Two decades after Snyder's classic formulation, Robert Jervis redefined the stability/instability paradox more elegantly; 'To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.'¹³⁴ Michael Krepon elaborates on stability/instability paradox that, "Nuclear weapons can generate risk taking because they presumably provide an insurance policy against escalation".¹³⁵

Stability/Instability Paradox in India and Pakistan Case

The nuclearization of South Asia has an asymmetric and differentiated effect on India and Pakistan as far as their respective tendency to use force against each other is concerned. While the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent has given option to Pakistan to use nuclear force first against India due to its conventional inferiority, where as it has simultaneously placed severe constraints on the use of force by India to counter Pakistan, as it acknowledged its nuclear weapons as an instrument of politics.

"How a nuclear Pakistan unhampered by no-first use policy would prevent means to wage conventional war against Pakistan was clearly documented by General K.Sundraji, former Chief of the Indian army, when he observed that 'historical manoeuvres resorted to by India in response to Pakistani aggressive behaviour in Kashmir could now be denied to it by nuclear Pakistan'.¹³⁶It is considered that the nuclear symmetry gives upper hand to Pakistan and bound India to take aggressive action against Pakistan to get its political objectives through limited military means. "To put the matter more pointedly, the acquisition of 'strategic parity' by the weaker state has not only restricted the range of policy options and manoeuvrability of the stronger

¹³⁴ ibid

¹³⁵ G.D Bukshi, ' Interface Between Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence: A Case Study for the Indian Subcontinent,' available at , http://ndc.viburnix.com/uploads/editor_files/pdf/06_RKPat.pdf and also on <http://idsa.in/system/files/Monograph10.pdf>

¹³⁶ Rifaat Hussain, "Deterrence and Nuclear Use: Doctrines in South Asia," in *The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.160.

state, an outcome to be expected, but it has also given the former the confidence to initiate offensive action against latter".¹³⁷

The difficulties encountering India and Pakistan are far greater than faced by US and Soviet Union during the Cold war because the environment and conditions are not the same. On the one side, there are geographical and strategic asymmetries between India and Pakistan that present challenges different from those encountered by super powers during the Cold War. On other side asymmetry at doctrinal level is incompatible to strategic stability of the region.

Pakistan India Mismatched Doctrines

India and Pakistan have adopted radically different declaratory nuclear postures due to differences in their geographical conditions, size, security environments, threats perception and domestic political foundations.¹³⁸ In doctrinal context, it would appear that the basic problem is that the need for credibility imposes very different requirements on Pakistan-India doctrine. Pakistan to balance Indian conventional superiority declared nuclear first use policy. It is primarily an indicator to offset India's conventional advantage by signalling that even in the event of conventional attack, Pakistan may retaliate with nuclear weapons.

On the other hand India because of its conventional advantage over Pakistan and the lack of an impending threat from China, it offers a more relaxed deterrent policy of no first use (NFU), while declaring a doctrine of retaliatory use of nuclear weapon and

¹³⁷ Varun Sahni, 'The Stability Instability Paradox: A Less than Perfect Explanation, 'in *The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Rout ledge, 2007), p.194.

¹³⁸ Rifaat Hussain, "Deterrence and Nuclear Use: Doctrines in South Asia," in *The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Rout ledge, 2007), p.180.

as of late massive retaliation.¹³⁹ These differences are well summarized by Ashley Tellis:

“If the term nuclear weaponry is treated as the frame work of an analysis, New Delhi is likely to place its greatest emphasis on the adjective nuclear, as in ‘nuclear weaponry,’ there by using this term to connote national political assets that insure against strategic blackmail and potential nuclear use...Islamabad in contrast, is more likely to place greater emphasis on the noun weaponry, as in ‘nuclear weaponry,’ thus using the term to refer to military instruments that might have to be employed in extremis for purposes of ensuring national safety.”¹⁴⁰

For India the entire concern of credibility revolves around the question of avoiding nuclear war by waging limited conventional war under nuclear conditions.¹⁴¹ Whereas Pakistan strategy is to refute India the space for waging a conventional war and to be prepared to expand any war, retain the nuclear use option, and make costs exceed any benefits that India might calculate basically, to deny India success through the use of nuclear weapon.

These different doctrinal thinking has enormously complicated the challenging task of achieving strategic stability in South Asia. Due to lack of allowance and accommodation in India Pakistan doctrines under the current political and strategic environment of South Asia, conflicting doctrines are themselves a source of instability.

¹³⁹ Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia,’ published by The Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Reigning in the Risk, available at <http://www.npolicy.org/files/2009813-khan%20final.pdf>

¹⁴⁰ Ashley Tellis, ‘India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrence and Ready Arsenal’ (Santa Monica, C A: RAND, 2001), p.279.

¹⁴¹ Varun Sahni, ‘The Stability Instability Paradox: A Less than Perfect Explanation,’ in *The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E.Sridharan(New York:Routledge,2007).p.195

The doctrinal disagreement mentioned above is the declared and undeclared policies of India and Pakistan. In the absence of an official dialogue between two countries the materialization of a strategic model remains problematic. Deterrence perception between two countries, also need time to develop. India–Pakistan attempts to describe the nuclear stability in their particular terms and tried to relate those in different conflict which is not suitable for deterrence stability.

Asymmetric Conventional Military Equilibrium

Above mentioned problem of incongruity between India and Pakistan at doctrinal level is due to the difference that exists between India and Pakistan at conventional and strategic level. The disparities in modern conventional capability never the less suggested that India's capacity to fight offensively with combine arms techniques have significantly outpaced Pakistan's predominantly over the last two decades. This implies that India could chase military goals of conventional warfare against Pakistan more rapidly today, limiting the duration of a conflict, and achieving decisive results before the international community could get deeply involved. The same factors tend to condense the time available for deliberation and augment the chances of escalation to the nuclear level.

Indian military doctrine of Cold Start inherits the risk of unintentional escalation. Indian military preparedness in wake of CSD in term of capability and technological advancement would make it more superior against Pakistan in term of conventional military competence. India-United States nuclear deal which grants India status of de-jure nuclear weapon state and would augment India's fissile material stockpiles leading to quantitative as well as qualitative improvements in India's nuclear arsenals.

Increasing capabilities in advance information, surveillance and reconnaissance systems acquisitions of Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems; and the steady militarization of outer space in which Indian have recently shown interest.¹⁴² If strategic weapons asymmetry between India and Pakistan intensify, it will increase India's first strike options in terms of capabilities, notwithstanding India's declared intentions of no first use in its official doctrine.¹⁴³

Pakistan India Asymmetric Strategic Depth

Distance facilitates in escalation control. This gave advantage to two super powers during the time of Cold War and it is what India and Pakistan are lacking between them as they shared common border. India has all of the advantages of strategic depth. This allows India to scatter strategic forces widely among numerous sites, installations and airfields whereas Pakistan's lack of strategic depth means its airfields and strategic assets are very much vulnerable to Indian attack as they are close to India. India's greater strategic depth allows it to scatter its strategic nuclear forces to area beyond the normal range of enemy ground and air operations. Longer-range platforms, such as the Su-30 aircraft and the Agni-2 missiles, additionally decrease Indian vulnerability.¹⁴⁴

The asymmetric strategic depth gives benefit to Indian military at operational level and exposes Pakistan military assets and strategic facilities vulnerable to Indian attack. Pakistan's shorter range Hatf-3 / M-11 ballistic missiles must be stationed fairly far forward to reach strategic targets in India, possibly leaving them vulnerable to air and ground attack. The same is true for Pakistan's forward air bases, which are within

¹⁴² Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia,' published by The Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Reigning in the Risk, available at <http://www.npolicy.org/files/2009813-khan%20final.pdf>

¹⁴³ V.R.Raghvan, 'Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,' available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/83/ragh.pdf>

¹⁴⁴ Peter R. Lavoy, Stephen A. Smith, 'The Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear Use between India and Pakistan , '*Strategic insights Vol II Issue .2*(February 2003) available at , <http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-8464.html>

easy striking distance of the border.¹⁴⁵ The survival of Pakistan's strategic forces is critical to Pakistan, therefore to deal with this threat Pakistan places emphasis on its first use policy to deter Indian conventional force while the strategic forces are still intact and capable of making a credible impression upon India.

Misapprehension and Threat to Escalation Control

Any nature of war based on some goals, which are either political or military both but limited war is essentially to accomplish political purposes through military means. Therefore it is necessary for nuclear rivals to know each other intentions before going to conflict. Another principle of stability-instability paradox is preventing unintended escalation; lines of communication need to be reliable and messages conveyed over these channels need to be trustworthy.

The intrinsic difficulties in communicating with an adversary whose difference of views and objectives were so great that they would result in conflict. If miscommunication with, or misreading of an adversary lead to conflict, this would suggest that communication to keep that war limited might also fail-assuming that lines of communication remain intact. But as Barry Posen has noted, "Inadvertent escalation may also result from the great difficulty of gathering and interpreting the most relevant information about a war in progress and using it to understand, control, and coordinating the war."¹⁴⁶ Miscalculation and misinterpretation always subsist between two adversaries while disproving force operations. In India-Pakistan background due to geographical proximity and Pakistan's lack of strategic depth it is essential for both to keep their communication lines intact in both peace and conflict time. As it is seen in current India-Pakistan military stand-offs of 2001-2002, and in Kargil crisis that the lines of communication have been mostly blocked. This type of disconnection during crises

¹⁴⁵ ibid

¹⁴⁶ Michael Krepon, 'Limited War, Escalation Control and Nuclear Option in South Asia,' available at , <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ESCONYTR0LCHAPTER7.pdf>

between two nuclear rivals would have serious repercussions that might be resulted into inadvertent escalation.

Despite the fact that this is a reasonable purpose and practical means of communication, it has not been used in such a manner; instead hot lines have typically been used for deception, at worst and post crisis management at best. There are lots of examples of such misuse of this otherwise productive tool: hot lines were useful after Kargil crisis, but not during it; hotlines between the **DGMOs** did not work when the 1999 Indian plane hijacking crisis was at its peak.¹⁴⁷

Indian military planners might not have measured how threatening Cold Start offensive operations could appear to an opponent. The objective to pursue limited goals may not be clearly perceived by the other side. Given the Pakistan Army's doctrine of "offensive defence" that seeks to take action to an Indian attack with aggressive counterattacks on Indian Territory, Pakistan could react to Cold Start in a manner that Indian leaders view as "disproportionate" to the amount of force employed in pursuit of their desired limited goals. This could compel India to escalate the conflict, thereby heightening Pakistan's perception that Indian aims are not limited, and potentially leading to an escalation spiral between two sides.

Cold Start heightens apprehension about misperception because the doctrine explicitly seeks to confuse Pakistani forces and disrupt their making cycle. Although in conventional war, disorienting the enemy's leadership is a virtue, in a limited war between nuclear powers, transparency and the clear signalling of intentions are required to prevent escalation. Therefore in limited war both countries would have

¹⁴⁷ Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms control and Confidence Building Measures,' available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NWC_prospectsforIndianandPakistaniArmsControl.pdf

difficulty in establishing the salencies that control escalation. The political military objectives which India consider limited, might not be considered limited by Pakistan and might be unacceptable for Pakistan and Pakistan might plan to use nuclear weapons in the event of deep military offensive by India. How deep it would be it is remained unclear and not easy to identify.

Significance of International Community Mediation

Last but not the least the international community always play important role in Pakistan India conflict mediation. Cold Start has assumptions of ruling out the role of International Community in future conflict is also a serious threat to escalation control. India-Pakistan tested their deterrence limits in couple of crises, and each time international community intervene to end conflict below the level of nuclear exchange. The deterrence is held due to the reality of existing conventional imbalance which did not allow India the freedom of action or the confidence in its ability to conduct limited war to gain its political objectives below nuclear threshold. But this is not only the measure which prevent escalation between two states in past conflicts, it is clearly emerged thing did not spiral out due to sustained high level diplomatic efforts made by US. India should become conscious of this aspect that before going to adventurism with Pakistan that in the absence of such high-level mediation, the possibility of an intended or unintended disaster cannot be ruled out.

Cold Start and Menace of Inadvertent Escalation

Any Indian limited military operations on Pakistan's territory, whether punitive, preventive or pre-emptive conventional air strikes in the form of Cold Start strategy targeting Pakistan's conventional armed forces, nuclear forces and strategic facilities, would activate an inadvertent use of nuclear weapon in conventional limited war are as follows. These all are factors that poses serious threat to deterrence stability between India and Pakistan.

- Indian and Pakistan's asymmetry at doctrinal level
- India and Pakistan's incompatibility at conventional level
- India Pakistan asymmetric strategic depth

Warnings of Inadvertent Escalation between India and Pakistan

The greater the threat of Indian conventional military adventurism lower would be the threshold to use nuclear deterrence by Pakistan. In future any Indian military adventurism on Pakistan's territory targeting Pakistani military, strategic assets would surely compel Pakistan to retaliate. Therefore Indian assumption of asymmetric assured destruction against Pakistan on the foundation of its conventional superiority and escalation control are based on false lines. Indian limited conventional war did not consider inadvertence to be of any significance, but was based on the predictability of the Pakistan nuclear threshold.¹⁴⁸ A markedly defined redline erodes nuclear deterrence and provides room for conventional force manoeuvre or destruction by fire power. Pakistan feels inherent asymmetries in a limited or total war with India is detrimental to it, and to avert this discomfort it uses its nuclear capabilities to maintain strategic symmetry against India. And possibility of risk of escalation in future conflict is due to current Indian military structural evolution and technological development in wake of Cold Start Doctrine which enables India to carry out military operation against Pakistan. If Cold Start implemented it would elevate the risk of inadvertent escalation, it might be possible that India undertake limited action that would destabilize Pakistan's political and domestic order and give serious blow to its economy which might result in nuclear exchange.

India's challenge to engage Pakistan in a limited war would to ensure that Pakistan does not face situations in which a nuclear strike becomes necessary. The circumstances under which Pakistan would use nuclear strike would therefore be reliant on the military and territorial losses it can sustain. Ambiguity about the state of

¹⁴⁸ Zafar Iqbal Cheema, 'Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development, and Implications for South Asian Security (Karachi Oxford University Press, 2010), p.461.

weaponization and deployment of nuclear forces is the deliberate part of both India and Pakistan. As consequences on escalatory spiral is ever ready to come into being. Predicting how the opponent will respond and what impact it will have on the conflict is part of the cost benefit analysis.

As evident from the Cold Start rationality that in future the most triggering point of conflict between India-Pakistan would be terrorist confrontations as it was seen in past (Parliament Building Attack) and currently after the Mumbai attack of 2008. In this scenario one can take for granted that the peace time status of nuclear forces in South Asia would shift from non-deployment posture to high alert status. On this hypothetical situation "India-Pakistan could keep their nuclear weapons in close to ready status to avoid being caught unprepared in the event that conventional war begins to go badly, both sides would likely to bring their nuclear forces at high alert status at virtually the same time that they assembled their conventional forces."¹⁴⁹ All possibilities of inadvertent escalation erected on misinterpretation, and miscommunication that exist between India and Pakistan are because of existing ambiguity in their declaratory policies. In peace time Pakistan's nuclear forces are not on high alert status. But in crises situation both states can select to deploy their forces on "ready state" without communicating with other side. At this stage the threat of inadvertent use of nuclear weapon would become imminent due to high alert and the haze of war. These developments will force Pakistan into countervailing strategies and augment Pakistan's geo-physical vulnerabilities besides Indian aggression.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

All the problems can only be solved by bringing trust between the two neighbouring nuclear states by taking comprehensive bilateral measures between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan go back a long way in negotiating bilateral treaties and confidence building measures (CBMs). But due to existing mistrust between two states their implementation are rather unimpressive.

¹⁴⁹ Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Challenges of Nuclear Stability in South Asia,' available at <http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Challenges%20to%20Nuclear%20Stabilty%20in%20South%20Asia%.pdf>

Three major agreements can be attributed to Indian and Pakistani bilateral reactions. Again, each of these agreements had crises backdrop.¹⁵⁰

- The Simla agreement of 1972, directly in reaction to the 1971 war.
- The Lahore agreement of 1999, in reaction to the crisis spawned from the 1998 nuclear tests and the ongoing Kashmir issues.
- The 2004 Islamabad Accord, resulting from 9/11 and the 2001-2002 military crises and Kashmir conflict.

Nevertheless, CBMs are no answer to and security, but they are a useful foundation for potential structural arms control agreements. The basic reasons for failure of CBMs is continuing distrust, aggressive force postures, forward deployment of military units, and continuing violence in the region.¹⁵¹The leading issue regarding CBMs between India and Pakistan is of conceptual nature. The argument behind strategic CBMs is that nuclear measures on their own are meaningless if conventional force restraints are not applied. There are number of occasions where both states underwent for confidence building measures with regards to their requirements of that time. All of these agreements replicate thoughtful ideas but incredibly poor implementation. Neither side has built upon such measures; instead each has used them as means to counteract the other.

Strategic Restraint Regime Control Proposal

To deal with the risks of nuclear inadvertence inherent in the India–Pakistan confrontation Pakistan proposed a “Peace, Security and Development initiative for

¹⁵⁰ Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms control and Confidence Building Measures,’ available at

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NWC_prospectsforIndianandPakistaniArmsControl.pdf

¹⁵¹ Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms control and Confidence Building Measures,’ available at

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NWC_prospectsforIndianandPakistaniArmsControl.pdf

South Asia”.¹⁵² In October 1998, during the expert level meeting between India and Pakistan in Islamabad, nuclear risk reduction measures also come under debate. Besides calling for non use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan, three points were initiated by Pakistan that the two sides should work together on “Strategic Restraint Regime”. This proposal contained not only nuclear missile restraint measures but also suggestions regarding conventional balance and restraints.¹⁵³

The Lahore MOU and Nuclear Risk Reduction Scheme

The nuclear risk reduction measure outlined in the Lahore MOU were ever codified into bilateral agreement due to the Kargil episode of 1999, which brought two countries near on the verge of a full scale war¹⁵⁴, unfortunately, the dialogue process broke down after Lahore MOU and no formal discussion has been taken place on Strategic Restraint Regime measures between two countries.

Analysis

The main area of concern that needs to be recognized is the contradictory implementation of the existing CBM’s. It was decided at Lahore to periodically evaluate the implementation of existing CBM’s and to establish appropriate consultative mechanisms in this regard. It is therefore necessary that reviews and oversight mechanism should be established to meet biannually to review the advancement on the implementation of existing CBMs. It must be also kept back in mind that only such measures would have any chance of success, in which both sides perceives a

¹⁵² Rifaat Hussain, “Deterrence and Nuclear Use: Doctrines in South Asia,” in *The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (Ed) by E. Sridharan (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.160.

¹⁵³ Naeem Salik, “The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence, Pakistan Perspective” (Pakistan Oxford University Press 2009), p.249.

¹⁵⁴ Rifaat Hussain, “Deterrence and Nuclear Use: Doctrines in South Asia,” in *The India- Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations* (ed) by E.Sridharan (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.162.

mutability of interest. For this reciprocated trust is required, any forceful measure on one or another party would become unproductive in this regard.

Conclusion

The South Asian neighbours have the potential of moving very rapidly from peace to time of crises, which compels the command system to make adjustments along the spectrum of control at the same rate. The existence of challenges to deterrence in the form of limited war, pre-emption and decapitation necessitates high alert rates and encourage mistrust. Additionally prospects of intended BMD deployment would further augment the alert states and fears of pre-emption on Pakistani side. As a state moves up deployment ladder, the probability of inadvertent exchange increases. With the introduction of early warning plate forms, the capacity of threat assessment would increase, but it would also lead the side to gain capability and hence adopt launch-on-warning profiles. This would add another source on instability.

The relations between India Pakistan have not been strengthened through efficient arms control agreements and confidence building measures. The two states are still in process of incorporating nuclear weapons in their strategic consideration and policy. If the nuclear developments between the two states create a competitive spirit then the risk of deterrence breakdown would become elevated. If however they are embraced in a spirit to create a sustainable balance, it would strengthen stability. The role of arms control agreements, nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures would be instrumental in this regard, additionally if this paradigm brings about realization to the India and Pakistan that a peaceful solution to all the disputes is the only way to their salvation, then stable deterrence can be constituted. A stability situation brought about through reassurance and confidence is what should be the final objective, rather than one based on threat of mutual devastation and annihilation.

The existence of these challenges means that stability will continue to remain conditional in at least the immediate futures. When a realization sets in that the two

sides cannot resort to any sort of use of force or coercion, the balance would shift markedly in the favour of stability. This condition existed in the earlier days of Cold War as well. The initial eras were marred with frequent crises and arms races. It was quite late that the two sides settled into a relationship. Although, the South Asian nuclear neighbours have carefully avoided some of the mistakes of the Cold War rivals, they are following the same pattern in certain ways. Having tested the various options, now the time has come the two sides to get settled in a stable relationship.

Pakistan would naturally endeavour to maintain some sort of conventional parity, and may depend on tactical nuclear weapons to deter conventional or limited war on one hand, and increase credibility on other. The development of BMD on the Indian side would be reciprocated by qualitative and quantitative advancement as well. The pressures should be on both sides to develop assured second strike capabilities in the form of sea-based assets. Acquisition of real time surveillance and early warning assets would be priority. The declared nuclear doctrines both states impose restraint on each other. India with its conventional superiority over Pakistan bounds Pakistan nuclear decision makers to hold their stance of nuclear first use, whereas Pakistan put constraints through its nuclear first use declaratory policy on Indian conventional doctrine of limited war under nuclear shadow. Asymmetry that exists between two states at doctrinal level is due to the existing incompatibility of conventional balance. This asymmetric relationship between India-Pakistan poses threat to escalation control in future crises. It is dubious whether the cryptic issues imbedded in the concepts of escalation dominance and escalation control have been thought through by the strategic establishments in South Asia.

Conclusion

South Asia is bounded in a lethal nuclear relationship. The history represents that conflict between India and Pakistan are in complex spiral because after partition both countries had undergone three major wars and numerous border conflicts. The major factor in all these conflicts mostly remained the Kashmir issue. The South Asian stability was shaken when first major war over Kashmir started in 1965 followed by next in 1971 which resulted in dismemberment of Pakistan. In addition to these wars the conflicts like Siachen, exercises Brass Tacks, Kashmir Militancy crisis, the Kargil Conflict and Military Standoff of 2001-2002 were the potential threats to South Asian stability and could have broken down the deterrence shell. Indian leadership has considered very seriously the fighting and winning a conventional limited war against Pakistan. Such types of limited conventional strategies are meant for fighting a war that could be kept below the limits of nuclear threshold. Indian supporters of limited war wanted to get twin objectives the justification of maintaining a large conventional force and ensure that the presence of nuclearized environment does not outdate the concept of using force at limited levels.

The experience of Kargil has set the minds of Indian planners that they can conduct limited war under nuclear shadow without pricking the bubble of nuclear threshold. The Kargil induced a new thought in the Indians about limited war and the 2001-2002 standoff compelled Indians to dig new ways to conventional war at limited levels. The actual cause of failure of Indian Operation Parakram forced Indian to look for some new options and they reached numerous conclusions and major out of it is Cold Start Doctrine unveiled in April 2004 for limited use of force to get desired objectives in nuclear environment. The idea behind Cold Start is to reframe Indian army so as to readdress the problems faced during mass mobilization in 2001-2002 crises. This new strategy gives room to Indians to react against Pakistan quickly thus denying Pakistan the reaction time to retaliate militarily and before it can get international community to come to its help for political solutions.

The Cold Start is facing major obstacle at institutions level in India. The quick deployment time and choices of multi axis attacks thought by planners of Cold Start require both military force having capacity of independent decision making that is fully trusted by the civilian regime and that all the arms of military can operate in combination regards less of individuality. The strategy of Cold Start requires the major organizational changes in Indian defence formations stationed near international border and enhancing their offensive strike capacity with more mobility and boosted air land operations. Regardless of Indian military's capacity to put in place the Cold Start doctrine, as displayed in exercises can be evaluated in three areas: the ability to execute tasks related to Cold Start, the holding of joint operations, and the placing of information technology to gain the advantages of network centric warfare, despite of all this the Indian military still needs much more work and effort in this field of implementing Cold Start Doctrine.

No matter the Cold Start is still in the nip phase but its application on ground would bring serious repercussions for the South Asian strategic stability. The Indian forces have now reshaped their role from defensive to offensive with the formulation of Cold Start which is now potential cause of security dilemma spiral between the two South Asian nuclear neighbouring states.

The purpose of Cold Start doctrine as seen by India is to achieve the limited objectives while on the other side for Pakistan Cold Start is taken as major threat to South Asian strategic stability. But on contrary Pakistan's response in terms of military and diplomatic fields in the form of Exercises Azm-e-Nou and enhancement of capabilities of military with modern force structures is a message to Indians that there exists no element of surprise in case of applying Cold Start Doctrine.

In contrast it had been evident from the exercises that Pakistan still holds strategic equilibrium with India. The belief of Pakistani military planners is that India may have confused the effect of Cold Start which might have very serious outcome and

disastrous results. The Cold Start is founded on certain assumptions and out of these one is that the Pakistani military would not react equally to Indian military in mobilization of troops and fire power. Such Indian thinking and behaviour could only increase the chances of crisis between two nuclear states. It would also raise the chance that the level of crises would be incrementing rapidly in conventional sphere as well as from conventional to nuclear state. "Cold Start" has all the capability to trigger the conflict from lower level of political crises to all out war. In the case of nuclear environment Cold Start will force Pakistan to rely more on strategic deterrence sources.

The issue of conventional imbalance between India and Pakistan is a matter of grave concern for stability of South Asia. The existing conventional asymmetry between both south Asian neighbours raises the query that if this type of annihilation would pave way for another war that might end up with the use of nuclear weapons. The Indian thought of using the massive use of fire power through air against Pakistan has all the potentials for pushing Pakistan to the edge of using nuclear response against India due to Pakistan's inferior conventional forces as compared to India. The question which surface here is that what will be result if India failed to achieve its political objectives through military use and what will be effect on escalation control? Such type of issues are matter of consideration for military planner on both sides before formulating the war strategies for limited objectives because Indian desire to apply the superior conventional force against Pakistan for offensive actions during any conflict will bring serious consequence for South Asian stability.

The capacity of bringing the stability through strategic parity in South Asia is not possible because the India and Pakistan are engage in confronting with issues of stable nuclear deterrence. The declared nuclear capabilities in South Asia have coiled the holding of war due to diverse perception of nuclear stability. The Indians are more concerned the use of nuclear force facility for political use but had given little thought to their military implications but on Pakistani side the things are in opposite direction to it. In Pakistan the military planners give military logic to nuclear weapons.

The nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan impose restraints on each other. The Indian with superiority in conventional forces over Pakistan holds Pakistan nuclear strategists to keep their stance of nuclear first use, where as Pakistan put restraints by its nuclear first use declaratory policy on Indian conventional doctrine of limited war under nuclear umbrella. This asymmetry that is present in the doctrines of both countries is due to the existing incompatibility of conventional military balance which is also cause of threat posed to escalation control in future conflicts.

Indian strategy of limited war is founded on two objectives, first Indian policy makers thing that asymmetric assured destruction at both conventional and nuclear levels empowers India to attack on Pakistan without fear of retaliation and the second it is assumed that there exists sufficient space for limited conventional war under nuclear cover and that Indians have effective control over escalation. India has misinterpret that there will be complete subordination from Pakistan side. India also shows its wish for the Pakistan to subordinate it by implementing Cold Start strategy without recognizing the threat in Indian limited war planning. The Indian side do not consider Pakistan's nuclear potential, perceives an accurate assessment of Pakistan's nuclear redlines, predicts that India can control the degree of escalation, under estimates Pakistan's reciprocal conventional preparations and the subsequent retaliatory damage, assumes both governments will accept fate accompli, and believes the reaction of external powers would be bearable and would help keep the crises conventional and maintain ably limited. All these assumptions are sizable and significant; the failure of any one will open the opportunity of uncontrollable escalation to nuclear level. Pakistan as nuclear state has declared nuclear policy in which boundaries are clearly marked by planners that by which way Pakistan would go for nuclear option in crises.

The possible outcomes for maintaining such type of doctrine consists of increase in build-ups on India Pakistan border, continued tension and pressure to maintain strategic weapons deployment, and a regional arms race. All these long term outcomes

restricts the development of both countries, but would be especially being deliberating in case of Pakistan as it struggles to maintain two borders and multitude of domestic crises.¹⁵⁵

The new strategy of Indian military to launch limited offensive operation against Pakistan has got all the potentials to jeopardize the stability of South Asia. The Indian forces are already much ahead of Pakistani military in conventional aspects. This disparity of conventional forces between the two South Asian rivals cannot guarantee that in future any conventional military decision will be limited and would not be risk provoking and not escalate to nuclear response. Therefore if Cold Start would be implemented it would have serious repercussions for South Asian Stability.

The best option for both South Asian nuclear rivals is to solve their issues through peaceful means instead of going for military solutions and indulging in nuclear and conventional arms race. Till the time the problem between two nuclear adversaries remains the future of South Asian security remains unstable. Consequently there is need for uninterrupted peace development and Confidence Building Measures at strategic level to overcome the threat of future conflict which might generates into full fledged war and nuclear exchange.

¹⁵⁵ Feroz Hassan Khan, 'Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms control and Confidence Building Measures,' available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NWC_prospectsforIndianandPakistaniArmsControl.pdf

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