

**CONDITIONS, CONTEXT, AND OUTCOMES OF PRACTICING
VEIL (*HIJAB*) AMONG PAKISTANI WOMEN**



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(Prof. Dr. Anila Kamal)
Supervisor

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ABSTRACT

The present research aims to develop a theoretical framework around the phenomenon of hijab and has placed hijab in the context of Pakistan, where there is a multiplicity of dress code and hijab has replaced the traditional forms of covering in the last decade. Hijab in this study has been defined in two forms, niqab (face veiling) and head scarf, and compares these forms to other types of clothing worn in Pakistan. The research comprises two studies. Study 1 involves five focus group discussions with women and one with men, conducted at different university campuses. Grounded theory analysis was employed under the paradigm of conditions, context, and consequences. The analysis led to the emergence of three main categories: religious commitment, social/environmental adjustment, and psychological satisfaction. The three seemed to converge on a core theme named psychological satisfaction. Based on these findings, research questions were designed for Study 2. These questions related to causal conditions, religiousness, well being, sexual harassment experiences, religious and family background, and ethnic identity of the hijab-wearing women and women wearing other types of dress. Study 2 was a quantitative survey carried out in two phases. Phase I involved selection and adaptation of instruments, try out, and pilot study. Four self-report measure, namely, Religiousness Measure (Sethi & Seligman, 1993), Psychological Well Being scales (Urdu version; Ansari, 2010), Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire (Iqbal & Kamal, 2001), and Social Desirability Scale (Stöber, 2001), were chosen. Standard procedures were adopted for adaptation of instruments. Try out was conducted with thirty three women (mean age = 25.79 years, SD = 6.84). Changes were made according to the feedback obtained from this pretesting. Pilot study was performed with 107 women (mean age = 24.55, SD = 5.77). Psychometric analysis showed that the internal reliabilities of

the instruments were acceptable, but not satisfactory. A short analysis was done with this data regarding the research questions, but was not interpreted due to small sample size. Phase II of Study 2 was the final study. This was done with 511 participants, wearing five types of dress and belonged to various urban parts of the country. Their mean age was 24.90 years (SD = 5.70). Psychometric analysis mentioned that the scale reliabilities were quite satisfactory. Exploratory Factor Analysis was performed with newly adapted Religiousness Measure. It was shown to have four factors instead of originally three components. Results regarding the major research questions showed that the hijab-wearing women adopt their dress on religious and protective needs, whereas other dress groups exercise their personal will to choose their dress. Social desirability did not co-vary with the outcome variables. The hijab-wearing women were significantly higher on religiousness as compared to other dress groups. However, they did not significantly differ from other dress groups on psychological well being. The face-veiling and the head-covering women reported significantly less harassment experiences as compared to other women. However, consistency and continuity of dress practice had interaction effects for well being and sexual harassment, though less strongly. Family dress, religious affiliation, and sub-cultural identity had a significant relationship with the dress of the participants. The theoretical framework presented for future research suggests that social psychological factors related to hijab should be given more attention instead of political discourse on hijab.

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LIST OF NON ENGLISH WORDS USED IN THE TEXT

Non English word/phrase (in alphabetical order)	Translation/Meaning
Abaya	Long gown, usually black in color.
Ahle Hadis	Religious school, supporters of which believe in fundamentals of Islam and do not particularly follow any of four common <i>fiqh</i> (as followed by the <i>Sunni</i> school of thought.
Azaan	Calling for prayers.
Barelvi	Religious school of thought founded on <i>Hanafi fiqh</i> .
Beshya	Prostitute.
Burqa	A garment that covers the entire body and allows only a net material in front of eyes.
Chador	Shawl / A relatively larger piece of cloth used to cover head and upper part of the body.
Deobandi	Followers of <i>Hanafi fiqh</i> ; considered to be hardliners as compared with <i>Barelvīs</i> .
Dupatta	A relatively thin piece of cloth used to cover head
Farz	Obligatory.
Fiqh	Islamic jurisprudence.
Fitna	Evil.
Hadith	Sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
Hajj	Islamic Pilgrimage.
Hijab	Piece of cloth covering hair and neck fully, showing only the face from forehead to the upper part of the neck; Also involves face-veiling.
Jalabeeb	Big chador hanging down the head so that it covers the face as well.
Jihad	Crusade; fighting for Islam.
khumur	A piece of cloth used to cover head in pre-Islamic Arab society.

Madrissa	Institution; In this study, it means institution of Islamic studies
Munafiqins	Hypocrites.
Mustahab	Virtuous.
Niqab	Face veil (along with <i>abaya</i>).
Pir	A spiritual guide; leader of a religious cult.
Purdah	Veiling; connotation of segregation of women from social life.
Sahi	Authentic.
Shalwar qameez	Trousers with loose upper part and relatively narrow bottom along with long shirt; However, its form keeps changing with time and changing fads in Pakistan.
Shariah	The Islamic code/canonical law.
Shiite	Religious school, followers of which believe in a family of jurists (which is different from <i>Sunni</i> jurists); Regard Hazrat Ali (RA) as the legitimate heir to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).
Sunni	Followers of the Four Islamic jurists (most prominent among them is Abu Hanifa); <i>Sunnis</i> are further divided in two major sections: <i>Barelvi</i> and <i>Deobandi</i> .
Syed	Descendant from the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) family.
Ulemas	Religious scholars.
Wahhabi	One of the religious schools of thought in Islam, analogous to <i>Ahle Hadis</i> .
Zenana	Female portion of the house.

INTRODUCTION

Humankind has used dress for various purposes. Among these purposes are modesty, protection, and adornment (Flugel, 1930/1969). The Holy Qur'an has focused on modesty and adornment, yet emphasized dress of piety at the same time (7: 26). The attire we adopt is also connected with identity. It is linked with the sense of one's self (Humphreys & Brown, 2002). Different sections of society wear different dress to mark their status and standing in society. Kings and ruling families have worn heavy and elaborate robes while public outfits have been simple. We use different uniforms to declare our jobs or institutions. Our clothes reflect norms and role expectations (Brower, 2013). People of different cultures put on different dresses. Besides civilization and region where we live, dress code is also determined by our faith. This way dress appears as a symbol of one's religious identity and the modesty connected with it (Droogsma, 2007).

Head covering has been usually viewed as one of the most important identifier of a Muslim woman and has been practiced more or less throughout the Muslim world. *Hijab* in particular (headscarf/face-veil along with *abaya*, a long gown) has also been the part of women outfit in various Muslim states. However, it gained more popularity during the Islamic movements towards the last quarter of the previous century (Carvalho, 2013; El Guindi, 1999). In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11 henceforth), immigrant Muslim women in western states had to rethink of their identity. *Hijab* came up as a sign of their religious identity and Muslim solidarity (Murshid, 2005). *Hijab* practice increased in Muslim majority nations as well. At present debate on *hijab* is continuing in both western societies and many Muslim countries (Golnaraghi & Mills, 2013; Kelcic, 2011).

Muslim women have found a very strong distinctiveness by adopting *pardah/hijab*. Many earlier studies have addressed question of Muslim identity related with *hijab* (e.g., Cole & Ahmadi, 2010; Droogsma, 2007; Scott & Franzmann, 2007). The present researchers divert their direct focus from this issue because the present study is being carried out in a country where majority are already Muslims (96.3%) (Pakistan Census Organization, 1998). Therefore, a separate identity is not a core concern. Additionally, the present study is set to explore the phenomenon of *hijab* with respect to social and psychological aspects of the wearer herself.

Hijab carries different symbolic meanings (Jorgensen, 2008). To Muslims, it is a symbol of modesty whereas Europeans and some feminists see it as a mark of the inferior status and oppression of women (Golnaraghi & Mills, 2013). The construction of veil as oppression has been challenged by many scholars. Clark (2007) believes that *hijab* is ultimately a symbol; it oppresses, liberates, empowers, according to society, tradition, and the woman who places it over her hair. Cole and Ahmadi (2010) established that women adopt *hijab* under religious obligations and parental expectations. They also wear it as a sign of Muslim identity and modesty. Jones (2005) asserts that wearing it is, however, their own choice. Droogsma (2007) and Kopp (2005) found that *hijab* defines Muslim identities, performs a behavior check/control, resists sexual objectification, affords more respect, preserves intimate relations with family, and provides freedom. Therefore, we note that observing *hijab* has diverse reasons and functions. A part of the present research will target to find out conditions and functions of the said phenomenon in Pakistan where Muslims are a majority and women cover themselves in diverse ways. Also, *hijab* being a non indigenous dress has replaced the traditional form of covering in Pakistan. Therefore, the reasons for taking *hijab* might be different from those found in the above studies,

most of which have been carried out in Western countries where Muslims are only a minority.

In the first part of the study, focus group discussions will be conducted. We will not ask direct questions about the above mentioned factors. Instead we will brainstorm the ideas about the conditions, course, and functions of *hijab*. In this way we may also be able to address the issue of Muslim identity already prevalent in existing literature. In this study, the researchers do not take any position to favor or disfavor *hijab* as a religious decree. In this text, we will be using the terms *hijab*, veil, headscarf, and *purdah* alternatively.

Hijab (Veil)

Before moving to the issues related to *hijab*, there is a need to define multiple terms used in this text to represent the practice of covering head and face (see the list of meanings/translation of non English words in Contents section). In the present work, the word *hijab* has been used as a general term because of its diverse and multifaceted nature. For example, while a Saudi woman may wear a *niqab*/face veil and call it *hijab*, a Canadian Muslim woman could use a headscarf and also identify it as a *hijab*(Cole & Ahmadi, 2010; Ruby, 2006). Ruby asserts that the veil, which is often interpreted in Western traditions as a covering of the head, does not illuminate the complexity of the practice in the Muslim context. However, besides using *hijab* as a generic term, we have tried to differentiate it from *niqab* and other types of covering, wherever necessary. Thus, *Hijab*, veil, and headscarf will be used interchangeably (Blomfield, 2009; Ruby, 2006) and will stand for any piece of cloth covering hair and neck fully, showing only the face from forehead to the upper part of the neck (Cole & Ahmadi, 2010). Originally in Arabic, *hijab* means a curtain /screen.

In the Holy Qur'an, companions of the Prophet (PBUH) were commanded to communicate with his wives through a screen (33: 53). *Dupatta* (relatively thin piece of cloth used as headgear) and *chador* (shawl) serve the same purpose as headscarf, but are a bit looser than the modern day headscarf and also cover chest and back. These two usually do not accompany *abaya* (a long gown), which is often worn along with headscarf. *Niqab* means covering hair as well as face, except the eyes. *Abaya* is also used along with the face veil (Blomfield, 2009; Cole & Ahmadi, 2010). It is generally distinct from *burqa*, a garment that covers the entire body and allows only a netted material in front of eyes. At some places in this text, *niqab*, *hijab* and veil will carry the same meaning.

Purdah is taken as a broad term. It is the customary seclusion and segregation of women from stranger men and the world outside homes (Anderson, 2005; Papanek, 1971). In a physical sense, *purdah* means covering of woman's body along with a headscarf or a *dupatta* / shawl. In moral and social terms, it means enforcement of high standards of chastity on women and making them subservient to men. Drawing support from the injunction in *Ahzaab* and supporting *Hadith* (sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad [PBUH]), women have adopted various forms of head covers in recent times, such as the *hijab* or headscarf (Europe), *chador* or shawl (Iran and Pakistan), and *burqa* (Afghanistan) (Cole & Ahmadi, 2010). *Burqa* is also practiced in northern parts of Pakistan.

The divine purpose of dress is to cover and groom the body: "O children of Adam, We have bestowed upon you clothing to conceal your private parts and as adornment. And the clothing of righteousness is the best. That is from the signs of Allah that perhaps they will remember." [7:26] (F. Hashmi, personal communication, December 14, 2010). Whereas Flugel (1969) believed that dress cannot be adopted for

modesty and beautification at the same time, as both motives are conflicting. Flugel's argument can be countered in that the Holy Qur'an does not purport adornment for alluring others' attention. Clothing is adopted only to enhance the quality of appearance and not for exhibition of beauty. Note the conjunction where the Holy Qur'an stresses the dress of righteousness and piety (F. Hashmi, personal communication).

Shariah law (Islamic code/laws) is one of interpretations of religious texts, and therefore has led to widely differing interpretations in Muslim majority countries (Kopp, 2005). These interpretations are a reflection of those countries rather than a reflection of the religion itself (Murshid, 2005). The interpretation of *shariah* law has ranged from a liberal tolerance of difference in Malaysia and Indonesia to violent enforcement of conformity in dress and behavior in pre-war Afghanistan and contemporary Algeria. However, recently in a Malaysian province, even police is seen to enforce wearing *shariah* dressing (*Dawn*, 2009, Dec 2). Similarly women wearing tight trousers or jeans in Indonesia have been warned to avoid this practice (*Dawn*, 2009, Oct 28). Men would also be dealt in the same way for wearing shorts. Another example of that strictness comes from Dubai, where all female staff at Dubai Bank was directed to wear *shaila* (headscarf) and *abaya*. These orders were issued for the women belonging to all religions. At an extreme stage, a woman belonging to National Youth Services Corps, Nigeria was raped to death by some men, who seized at her just because she was putting on khaki trousers (as part of her uniform!) (Joda & Obidi, 2009).

Religious commandments. There is widespread disagreement about what Islam requires on the issue of head covering (Murphy, 2006). Some think that the *pardah* is undoubtedly mandatory (e.g. Abbasi, 2009; Al-Azhari, 1399 AH; Maududi,

1939/2005). According to them there are clear commands in the Holy Qur'an and *Hadith* in this regard. The only point of difference is whether women should also veil their faces besides covering head. On the other hand, Ghamidi (2009) and Khan and Farooq (2001) posit that the Holy Qur'an does not make clear reference to head covering, and injunctions for face covering are only time- and situation-specific. Khan and Farooq emphasize that *Hanafi fiqh* (jurisprudence) allows uncovering of face when a woman is outdoors and is among strangers. Shafi (as cited in Khan & Farooq) contends that due to dominance of *fitna* (evil) in society, full face veiling should be observed these days. Other scholars such as Qadri (as cited in Khan & Farooq) oppose this hard stance and stress that simpler versions of religious ordains should be presented so that it becomes easier for all to practice religion.

Modesty in dress and appearance is required in the Holy Qur'an in the following way (translation by Yusuf, 1934/2003):

Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty: that will make for greater purity for them...And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their... close family members (24:30-31)

The instructions here are to avoid staring with lust, dress with modesty, and for women, to cover their bosoms. However, there are some traditions that certain women would already use *khumur* (a piece of cloth) to cover their heads at that time. Another verse says faithful women *should cast their outer garments over their persons (when out of doors): That is most convenient, that they should be known and*

not molested (33: 59) (translation by Yusuf, 1934/2003). Yusuf interprets it in terms of an obligation for all Muslim women, where they are required to cover their faces too. Ghamidi (2009) asserts that this passage has been understood to address the wives of the Prophet in special and women of Medina in general. However, this commandment was revealed under special circumstances in Medina where *munafiqins* (hypocrites) were torturing Muslim women.

Ghamidi (2009) also asserts that wives of the Prophet have special importance and dignity. So there are stricter commands for them so that their noble status may be maintained. That is why, they were also enjoined to show discretion in speech, so as not to arouse anyone's lust, and were asked to stay at home and not display their beauty: *And when you ask them (the Prophet's wives) for anything you want, ask them from before a screen (hijab); that makes for greater purity for your hearts and for them* (33:53). Several Muslim defenders of the veil marshal such Qur'anic passages to infer that face-veiling and home-bound life is obligatory for all Muslim women, whereas few think that these demanding conditions were addressed only to Prophet's wives (Mernissi, 1985).

When the cultural scene of Arabia is analyzed, it appears that veiling / face-covering might not have been very common practice during Makkan period of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) (Ali, 1992). Its evidence comes from the Qur'anic description of the incident in which the Prophet praised the beauty of Zainab in her house. In fact, women are commanded to reveal their faces when performing *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Makkah. Although some religious scholars consider that wives of the Prophet veiled their faces at the last pilgrimage of the Prophet (Khan & Farooq, 2001), others believe that common women did not follow veiling on that occasion. For example, the Prophet himself turned away the head of a companion who was

staring keenly at a very beautiful woman during the journey for *hajj*. The Prophet did not tell the woman to cover her face instead.

It is further argued that if draping the veil on the face had been mandatory, as seems to be suggested by the passage in chapter 33 narrated above, why Muslim men were enjoined to lower their gaze in chapter 24, which was actually revealed later than chapter 33 and why Muslim women of Medina are reported to rush in search of *dupatta* or proper cloth after the revelation of chapter 24 (Imran, 2012). If there had been *niqabs* on the faces by that time, what these men had to look at? Maududi (1939/2005) infers that face veil must have been in regular practice; otherwise there was no need of prohibition in a particular situation of *hajj*. Khan and Farooq (2001) counter this inference by clarifying that face covering was restricted at *hajj* because the practice was otherwise common among a selected class in Arabia even before Islam. Moreover, it was mandatory for wives of the Prophet somehow.

Pro-veiling Muslim scholars also defend veiling on a number of nonsexual grounds. They consider that veiling can assure the Muslim woman's unwavering obedience to the tenets of Islam; a clear indication of the essential differences distinguishing men from women; a reminder to women that their proper place is in the home rather than in pursuing public-sphere activities; and a sign of the devout Muslim woman's disdain for the profane, immodest, and consumerist cultural customs of the West.

On the other hand, many feminists are opposed to veiling. Mernissi (1985) being the most salient of them, argues that women's Islamic fidelity should not be judged merely by veiling. Veiling was already a practice in Arabia and surrounding areas before Islam. So it is not a religious but more of a cultural practice. Some of

these scholars ask why women in an Islamic society are deemed responsible for the management of men's sexuality (for example, Read & Bartkowski, 2000).

Naik (2008b) assumes a moderate stance in that the whole body except face and hands should be covered but covering the face is not *farz* (obligatory). It is *mustahab* (virtuous). He says that although some scholars consider face-covering as obligatory, such as those from *Humbali* school of *fiqh*, yet there is not a single Qur'anic verse or *sahi* (authentic) *Hadith* that institutionalizes the face-covering. Despite this, one who covers face is not to condemn, rather is to commend. At the same time, those who cover face should not ridicule those who do not.

In short, the verses relating to *hijab*/veiling enjoin the Muslim men and women, equally to behave decently and morally in their public appearance and activities, such as not to peer or ogle at each other in the course of their outdoor movements, but to control their chastity (Khan, 1972; Khan & Farooq, 2001). Women are required to be properly dressed and not to display publicly their beautification / ornamentation and when they talk to other men, they should confine themselves to the relevant matter and not to indulge in ornamental display. If there is any apprehension of molestation, they should conceal their faces from the miscreants.

In effect, the *hijab* as a garment, while marking her out as a separate entity, offers a Muslim woman the means to move between the private (domestic) and public spheres and to be a spectator (or participant) in the public world of men. This is in a situation where men may not observe the world of women (in *hijab*). This reading of the veil as a means of entering the public domain, rather than as an exclusion from it, is unpopular in some secular and Western feminist circles (Franks, 2000). Some work reframed the *hijab* in terms of the Middle East and read it as a sign of resistance (El

Guindi, 1999). Islamist women as well as Islamist activists for women's rights see the *hijab* in this positive light.

History of Veiling / Hijab

Besides the religious and liberal scholarship on veiling, it is required to look into how veiling has been actually practiced by women in different parts of history. Veiling stems from various cultural traditions that predate Islam (Maududi, 1939/2005). The practice has flourished throughout the ages. Noble Greek and Roman families followed it. However, it is believed that immorality made way in these cultures. This led to their downfall. The social and cultural significance of the headdress in the Judaic and Christian traditions was not particularly different from Islam. It protected women from undue male attention and harmful elements. Doctors would keep dummies at their clinic so that women could indicate the point of their disease by putting finger on different parts of the dummy (Ali, 2005). Even up to 16th century, male youth played the female parts in Shakespearean plays. The followers of Christianity had adopted such intense attitudes that they considered woman a sign of evil and thus segregated her from entire social life.

However these thoughts changed gradually, these limitations set on woman's life declined. However, she was made to appear as a sexual object. From this, Maududi, (1939/2005) infers that she was still not liberated as a human being and was yet being treated as a thing or object. Mernissi (1985) finds that this mutilation of woman's integrity has no other goal than economic profit. Mernissi believes that while Muslim exploitation of the female can be cloaked under veils and hidden behind walls, western exploitation has the bad taste of being bare and over-exposed.

The system of female seclusion undoubtedly possesses many advantages in the social well being of unsettled and uncultured communities. Even in countries where the diversity of culture and moral conceptions is great; a modified form of seclusion is not absolutely given up. This seclusion has prevailed in forms more or less strict, among nations far removed from Muslim influences (at least up to 20th century). In Korea, female seclusion was carried to the height of absurdity. Veiling has been observed in China and among the Spanish colonies of South America (Ali, 1910/1992). Thus veiling seems to be for sacredness, not for religion.

Khan (1972) presents the idea that *pardah* is not essentially an Islamic institution. It was not there in earlier days of Islam. The present *ulemas* (religious scholars) who think so are mistaken. The Prophet of Islam found it existing among the Persians and other Oriental communities; he perceived its advantages, and it is probable that, in view of the extensive laxity of morals among various classes of people, he recommended the women-folk the observance of privacy (Ali, 1910/1992). But it is hard to suppose that he ever intended his recommendation should take its present inelastic form. However, whenever there will be fear of molestation and abduction, it can be adopted. The Prophet's counsel regarding the privacy of women served undoubtedly to stem the tide of immorality, and to prevent the diffusion among his followers of the custom of disguised polyandry (having more than one husband / male mate) which had evidently, until then, existed among the Arabs (Mernissi, 1985).

Seclusion of women has been practiced in many cultures, generally by elite groups; the practice has been more prevalent among the Muslim populations of the Middle East, north Africa, Asia, and certain Brahmin castes in India (White, 1977). In Muslim history, *pardah* was a symbol of prosperity, a means of distinguishing the

wives of landowners from peasant women (see also El Guindi, 1999; Shah & Bulatao, 1981). With rising prosperity, the lower class also started adopting some form of veiling, though the practice varied among different sections of this class. The association of *purdah* with high social and economic status is still found in rural areas, but the twentieth century has brought a change in the pattern of *purdah* observance in urban areas. In every Muslim nation there is a small class of educated, urban women who do not observe *purdah*. As this group increases in number and influence, the tendency to associate *purdah* with rising socio-economic status changes. At the turn of the 20th century, veiling was more prevalent in cities than in villages. There was seen a steady decline in the use of the veil thereafter. However, at the turn of the 21st century there is again a rise.

Purdah/veiling is also common in Hindu, or say, Indian sub-cultures. For example, Rajasthani women drop a *dupatta* or *chador* down the face in the presence of all men including those of the family (Khan, 1972). They do so also for the husband when other men are around. It is in this respect that Hindu and Muslim *purdah* differ, since Muslim *purdah* does not apply within the immediate kin unit but only outside, whereas Hindu *purdah* is based on a set of avoidance rules between a woman and her male members of the in-law family (El Guindi, 1999; Papanek, 1971).

In European and Christian cultures, nuns and royalty still wear it. Victorian women would wear a sort of hat. It has been an essential part of the wedding attire in Europe. Rural women in Europe still don a kind of headdress. The movie *The Girl with the Pearl Earring*, displays that a 17th century painter catches his model off her guard, as she lets her hair down from her headgear. She quickly covers her hair, as if to protect herself from the gaze. He looks on fascinated, yet guilty (Murshid, 2005). Social attitudes in Europe have changed now. But so have these been in the Muslim

world, though less dramatically. Murshid asks why is then the headscarf worn by Muslim women such an emotive issue in Europe.

The former liberal politician Elisabeth Nielsen of Denmark donned a *hijab* to have her-self photographed in front of a statue of a headscarfing fishwife, as the Danish women commonly did until 1960s. The gesture was made to show that hiding one's hair has been common practice for female workers in Denmark. Thus, it seemed paradoxical that members of Danish People's Party and others wanted to prohibit Muslim women from hiding their hair (Jorgensen, 2008). Also the rhetoric of Muslim woman as a victim pervades much of English Romantic literature, as presented in the Byronic tale of the white man rescuing the Turkish *harem* girl from her male oppressors (Clark, 2007). There are other opinions as well. For instance, Duval (1998) believes that European attempts to rescue women from such a dilemma since the days of colonialism have been misunderstood as hostile to Islam. The reality of this symbolism was intensified, no doubt, by the expansion of colonial domination over the Muslim world.

The British colonialism created similar circumstances in India in nineteenth century. A debate about whether *hijab* is religious started not due to any logical or religious requirement, but only under the influence of a dominant and attractive western civilization. In addition, this pressure was exacerbated due to inferiority that developed as a result of direct attacks at backwardness of local civilization. Women clad in veil were dehumanized by such labels as "walking tents." (Maududi, 1939/2005; pp. 35-36).

Similarly, Mernissi (1985) comments that the budding liberty of Muslim women (Arab/Moroccan) has indeed borrowed many characteristics of western

women's way of life. The first gesture of liberated Arab women was to give up the veil for western dress, which in the mid 1900s was that of the wife of the colonizer. Muslim women are likely to claim the right to their bodies as part of their liberation movement. Previously a Muslim woman's body belonged to the man who possessed her. The mushrooming of beauty salons and boutiques in Moroccan towns, for instance, can be interpreted as a forerunner of women's urge to claim their own bodies, which will culminate in far-reaching claims, such as the claim to birth control and liberation.

The modern trends took place in late nineteenth century in Indo-Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Ottoman Turkey and other Muslim lands (Khan, 1972). Strict restrictions and taboos with regard to veiling have been questioned and thus relaxed in some Muslim countries and, since the thirties of twentieth century, it was discarded first in Kemalist Turkey and then in a few other lands. However, in Pakistan and several other Muslim countries, it still prevails. Even women in those Muslim countries that were not under colonial rule (such as Egypt, Turkey, and Iran) followed the European dress (Maududi, 1939/2005).

However, there was seen an Islamic uprising in last quarter of the 20th century. Still earlier, many women withdrew from society after Reza Shah banned the veil in 1936. Now, women in Egypt have started putting on headgears in spite of the secular position of their governments (Murphy, 2006). There seems a clear demarcation in old secular Turkish women and their Islamist-oriented daughters. Beginning in the 1970s, Islamic symbols, beliefs, and practices won increasing commitment and support throughout. Increased adherence to Islamic codes of social behavior (e.g. female covering, abstinence from alcohol) was witnessed (Huntington, 1996). It seems that

the present generation of Muslim women is attempting to adopt a religious outlook in their lives. The following section sees how it is being done.

Hijab in Present Muslim Societies

Khan (1972) argues that the present non-achieving character of Muslims has roots in traditions of *pardah*, polygamy, and harem life. No other weapon could be as detrimental to women as these practices. Seclusion of women from social life and their limitation to only a servile, pleasure object kept disintegrated the whole fabric of family life of Muslims. This led to lack of achievement motivation in women, and consequently, among the men born to them.

Colonialism in Muslim countries, nevertheless, brought changes at least in dress code. In the 1970s, these women walked the streets wearing western attire: skirts and dresses below the knee, high heels, sleeves that covered the upper arm in the summer; their hair was usually exposed, and they wore make-up. Their bodies faced a cultural battle. The western outfits carried the capitalist construction of the female body (sexualized and objectified) and the traditional construction of the body (a possession, property, trustees of family honor). This ambivalence was resolved by adopting the Islamic fundamentalist dress in 1980s. Women have revised their dress, from colonial non-veil to present veil. These veiled women are generally urban lower and middle classes. They work as civil servants, schoolteachers, secretaries, bank employees, and nurses. Others are university students. They are usually young women in their twenties and early thirties (Odeh, 1993).

Despite the above description, the veiled woman is not a monolithic entity. There is diversity. There are some who when take off veil, they show up fashionable and tight clothes beneath. Their make-up and style in public is more subtle and

creative. They invent different ways to tie scarf on their heads, showing hair under colorful scarves. A few sections of Pakistani society blame women for adopting *hijab* merely as a fashion and that they use attractively decorated *abayas* and scarves (Hasan, 2013). It is perhaps in human nature that when certain things are suppressed in one way, they surface up in other ways (Khaddarposh, 2004). Some retain a fiercely ambivalent relationship with veil. So we see them taking it on and taking it off, alternately. Some women give a statement of different and supreme identity over those who are not wearing *hijab*.

While the *niqab* or strict face covering remains relatively rare in most Muslim countries, the simple headscarf (or *chador*) has made a dramatic comeback in recent decades as both a public sign of piety and, in many cases, a fashion statement. For example, in the Egypt of 1970s, headscarves were donned mainly by rural women. Today on the streets of Cairo, at least eighty percent of women cover their hair. Certain hardliners, however, attempt to apply it forcefully (*Shirkat Gah*, 2009b). In Palestine, *Hammam* sent unofficial orders to schools for not allowing the girls without a long traditional gown and a headscarf (Hammami, 1990). Recently, in a Malaysian province, even police is seen to enforce *shariah* dressing (*Dawn*, 2009, Dec 9).

But all this is not just for segregation. It may also be for empowerment. For instance, policewomen in Iraq (Najaf), clad in black *hijab*, train on weapons (*The News*, 2009, Dec 23). It is just like their counterparts in Pakistan (police women observing *chador* in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa). There is little hard data on how many women cover their hair in Muslim societies, but what is certain is that the popularity of the headscarf is rising against both official and societal resistance.

Although practicing veil has instigated a heated debate in western countries (such as England, France, and Netherlands) after 9/11, it is no less an issue in Muslim countries themselves such as Turkey and Egypt (Murphy, 2006). From Morocco and Tunisia to Turkey and pre-revolution Iran, many Muslim states have at various times restricted, and in some cases banned, women's head coverings. To varying degrees, such restrictions stem from a view that public exhibitions of religious commitment are a political, not a personal act and hence a potential threat to the government.

Relating the history of attempts at unveiling women, White (1977) has reported that such attempts have met with failure. For example, first in Turkey in earlier part of twentieth century; then followed by Afghanistan, Iran, and Tunisia, etc. Only few women unveiled themselves and they were mostly those who got opportunities to be educated and better employed. *Purdah* remains a social reality for a common woman of the Muslim world. Following lines show how different Muslim nations have dealt with veiling during the last century.

Arab world. The present discussion is about mostly those Arab countries that have adopted western way of life during the 20th century / post colonial times. In Turkey, Ataturk regime and his followers introduced a vast program of reforms designed to transform the country into a modern, westernized, and secular nation state. These have included the banning of the veil at public places and at the same time low-necked dress and mini skirts (Humphreys & Brown, 2002). Some authorities believed that uniform-like veiling threatens other secular students and the state. It never took the form of complete banning, however .Tunisia is the only Muslim country that constitutionally bans *hijab* (Imran, 2012).

As mentioned earlier, the barring of *hijab* in Turkey has met with resistance (Saktanber & Corbacioglu, 2008). Murphy (2006) argues that it's covering her hair, not her brain. That's not empowerment. It's what is in the head that counts not what is on the head (Humphreys & Brown, 2002). Restriction on *hijab* is not solely based on democratic and secular attitudes. Rulers' political interests and fears of losing power to the opposition camps (here the Islamists) are the important determinants of such attempts at seclusion of the *hijab*-wearing women and other religious elements.

However, the present government of an Islamic party has shown some religious trends, where the wife of the Turkish premier dons headscarf. The govt. has now been receptive to demands against dress restrictions. But there is a deadlock in recent efforts of the government to lift ban. It has been due to two factors, first is the dissent of secular sections and the other is the element of history of secular Turkish republic.

Egypt is another country with secular orientation, where veiling has been seriously discouraged at the state level. However, there is a boom of *hijab* these days. Government-linked newspapers are waging a heated campaign against the increasingly popular Saudi-style *niqab*. State TV stations ban their newscasters from wearing the garment, which leaves only a slit for a woman's eyes, and a top university recently followed suit. Even a religious scholar from Al-Azhar ordered a schoolgirl to remove her *niqab* commenting that the *niqab* is a tradition; it has no connection with the religion. Yet for most women who cover their hair, it's simply a matter of bowing to the will of God (Blomfield, 2009). Wearing the veil has been seen as a coping strategy women use to gain or maintain societal esteem and a small measure of autonomy in a patriarchal society in which opportunities for autonomy are increasingly limited (Mule & Barthel, 1992). We similarly observe that veil practice

has gained popularity in present day Pakistan and the number of veiling women have increased, specially among the young.

Post-revolution Iran is the best example of forcefully requiring the women to carry *hijab* (Murphy, 2006). *Hijab* has almost been made legal and fines are imposed for not following it. But these days some women are switching to modern trends including adorned faces and smartly cut clothes along with *hijab*. It was remarked about old-styled *chador*, which is practiced there, that it was expensive, hot, and difficult to wear. Keeping these new trends in thought and practice, Iranian police arranged a fashion show in 2007 that promoted *hijab* by presenting women in more modern and attractive ways. It was a sort of dictation by the police as to how women can adopt fads and scarf simultaneously. As a result, newly designed *chador* with sleeves has been introduced (Harrison, 2007).

As asserted earlier, such happenings pin down the nature of humans that does not accept any prohibitions from the outside (Khaddarposh, 2004). Carvalho (2013) suggests that compulsory veiling can lead to a decline in religiosity. Harrison (2007) thinks that when you push women so far, they become very innovative: they come up with things that Khomeini (who was instrumental in bringing about such changes) would never have predicted. Many women in the cosmopolitan parts push the boundaries of what is commanded by the state, artfully draping their head coverings to reveal as much hair as they can get away with. Nonetheless women are, of course, just as artful in fighting restrictions on the veil. After Turkey banned wearing head scarves for driver's-license photos in 2000, many women simply took to using computer programs to insert images of hair over their scarves.

In Morocco, Islamist activists complain that women who wear the headscarf are hounded out of jobs and schools. Whenever states get involved with it, it gets worse whether it is for banning the scarf or imposing it (Shirazi, as cited in Murphy, 2006). In Kuwait, the electoral law stipulates that women voters and candidates for the parliament should comply with Islamic *sharia* law (*Shirkat Gah*, 2009b). Its interpretation among the public included wearing *hijab*. However, the Constitutional Court there has recently ruled that female lawmakers are not required to wear *hijab*. This ruling came in response to a petition brought by four voters seeking to invalidate the election of two of the four women because they refused to wear the *hijab*. These became the first female members of the Kuwaiti National Assembly.

Southeast Asia. *Hijab* is not indigenous to Southeast Asia. However, practices related to covering bodies are observed with great zeal. In last few decades, there has been seen a turn to religious mode of life. For instance in Maldives, the former president Maumoon Abdul Gayoom is said to bring Islam to the forefront of the nation's identity. This has, many believe, destructed the indigenous Islam in the Maldives and is a source of cultural identity crises. At one time this nation was quite open in its outlook on life and was known as a matriarchal society. But women seem to be loser in the present situation. An upsurge of devotion has led to number of headscarves worn soaring, though often through social pressure than piety. Nonetheless the present liberal regime is attempting to re-appropriate its heritage (Omidi, 2009).

In Bangladesh the apex court gave a historic ruling that Ministry of Education should ensure that women employed in public institutions are not required to wearing the veil or *hijab* against their will (Gomes, 2010). The historic ruling comes after a dispute where a government official had insulted woman director of State elementary

school, by calling her *beshya* (prostitute) because she was not wearing a veil. In Java (Indonesia) the growing trend among women toward wearing Islamic clothing (veiling) challenges local traditions as well as western models of modernity. Analysis of Javanese women's conversion to veiling reveals that veiling represents both a new historical consciousness and a process of subjective transformation that is tied to larger processes of social change in Indonesia (Brenner, 1996).

The American intervention in Afghanistan was partly justified as an attempt to free Afghan women from the shackles of the Taliban. US media and government named Taliban regime the most brutal ever in Afghanistan. Afghan women frequently challenged the Taliban's *Wahhabi* interpretation of Islam (a religious school of thought), implying that it emanated from the funding they received from Saudi Arabia. Women chose to wear the traditional shuttlecock *burqa* rather than the Arab *hijab* that some Taliban attempted to enforce. Instead, many women told the Taliban to don Arab-style dress themselves. Yet after the Taliban have been overthrown, the veil has not been abandoned by many Afghan women, stressing, "Give me security and I will remove my *burqa*." Women could be feeling more insecure at present than before 9/11(Khattak, 2002).

From the above descriptions, it comes forth that there are both trends, revolting against the regimes that attempt to impose a dress code and at the same time challenging those powers that try to put ban on veil. Women seem to be struggling to create their impression and seek autonomy by warding off that is put on them forcefully. It also surfaces that the headscarf carries different symbolic meanings (Jorgensen, 2008). To Muslims it is a symbol of modesty whereas Europeans and feminists alike see it as a mark of the inferior status of women (Murshid, 2005). *Hijab* ultimately is a cloth. It is merely a symbol. It oppresses, liberates, empowers,

according to society, tradition, and the wearer herself. But only the political symbolism of the *hijabis* taken as principal reason for its prohibition, with its associated dimensions of cruelty and terrorism (Clark, 2007). However, there might be number of reasons for adopting it, as *hijab* is a dynamic phenomenon and is not static (Woldesemait, 2012).

***Hijab* Ban/Discrimination**

Hijab observance is not only limited to the Muslim majority countries but also a familiar sight among the Muslim women living in the countries where they are only a minority (Murshid, 2005). A great debate has surrounded *hijab* and other religious representations in the aftermath of 9/11. Many women have described facing discrimination on account of *hijab*, They have been removed from flights for security screening, having difficulty obtaining employment, and receiving angry looks and shouts from passersby on the streets, to name just a few (Droogsma, 2007; Lueck, 2003).

Amid these circumstances, an Egyptian born German woman was killed by a man during a trial in the court on 4 September, 2003. The woman had sued him for calling remarks at her due to her *hijab*. The act occurred when the court had convicted him and levied some penalty. The fourth of September became also the international day of *hijab*, decided after a conference in England called by the then mayor in the aftermath of ban on public veiling in France (Imran, 2012).

Bakht (2009) notes that *niqab*-carrying women are discouraged to appear in courts in Canada, Britain, and the United States. She emphasizes the need to accommodating such women in their multiple roles as lawyers, jury members, witnesses, and the accused, specially in few instances where seeing faces is necessary.

But when women demand to wear headscarf in these circumstances, they offer a challenge to the state (Seckinelgin, 2006). On the other hand, punitive actions of governments relating to *hijab* threaten the right to education and justice in a democratic system.

When former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw insisted that female Muslim constituents show their faces when meeting with him, he set off a fiery debate about whether face-covering should be allowed in Britain's multicultural society (Murphy, 2006). Non-Muslims see wearing the scarf as 'very unBritish' and women who wear it are even seen as fanatics or terrorists (Franks, 2000). The state continues to discourage, if not overtly ban, displays of visible symbols such as *niqab* (face veil) (Bhimji, 2008). The *hijab* (headscarf) is much more accepted in public spaces and is a common sight. Muslim women wear their scarves in combination with the latest British fashion and trends.

The ban in France has led to the exclusion of several Muslim girls and some Sikh boys from public institutions. They have either been moved to private schools or a sort of distance learning courses. Although the Jewish skullcaps, Sikh turbans, Christian crosses, and the habits of nuns are also disallowed but they have not had the same effect. Roman Catholic nuns in Germany were outraged at a comparison of the oppressive headscarf with their habit made by the German president. It seemed that beneath the rhetoric of equality, actual target was the Muslim dress code (Murshid, 2005). It is not an attack on dress code only. It is an instance of clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996), though this thesis was seemingly denied by president Obama in his lecture at *Jamia tul Azhar*.

France later imposed complete ban on *niqab*/any dress designed to hide the body and face. Those who did not comply would be fined or sent on a course to learn the values of French citizenship. Anyone who forced someone through violence, rough threats, or misuse of authority to cover her face because of her sex will be jailed for a year and be fined. Lawmakers focused on husbands who force their wives to full veil (*Shirkat gah*, 2010). In 2011, the ban was fully implemented, where police were given right to make a woman unveil at public places (Sweeney, 2011). Similarly, in the last week of April 2010, Belgian parliament put to vote a law banning women from wearing *burqas* in public spaces and fixed a fine or some imprisonment for the offence.

In America, Muslim immigrants did change their symbolic identities after 9/11. For example, a psychology teacher removed her scarf as depicted in a bollywood movie. However, when the hero of the movie earns good name for Muslims, the teacher revisits her identity by covering her head again. She pronounces that it is not just her religious symbolism, it is part of her existence (Johar, Khan, Khan, & Johar, 2010). Pakistanis, associated more with Islam than other Muslims, faced discrimination in post 9/11 America. Women started to wear trousers and men shaved off their beards. However, it was less of discrimination under the law or from authorities; it was more from a part of population. Perhaps having considered this reality and to profiting from the better opportunities, these Pakistanis will remain there (Iqbal, 2003).

Malos (2010) reports that EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) charge statistics for workplace discrimination claims indicate that the reported incidence of such conduct has continued to increase. *Hijab* women, as a member of the Muslim group, are also subjected to stigmatization in the workplace.

Consequently, the *hijab* wearing women had lower expectations of receiving a job offer than Muslim women who do not wear the *hijab* (Ghumman & Jackson, 2010). Malos presents some actual situations that may cause problems for the both the employee and employer. In one of the situations, a temporary worker who wears a *hijab* is asked to remove it while working at the front desk or to have her agency assign a different worker so as not to present the undesired image to clients or customers.

It is interesting that the Muslim Canadian Congress itself called on the federal government to prohibit the *niqab* and *burqa* (Shirkat Gah, 2009b). Their standpoint is that to cover face is to conceal your identity and concealing one's identity is a common practice for criminals. They also view that covering faces is a tradition rooted more in Middle Eastern culture than in the Islamic faith. It has no place even in the controversial, ultra-conservative tenets of *shariah* law. However, they add that the ban would not extend to the *hijab*/headscarf as it easily allows for identification.

Similarly, some Muslim commentators and western feminist theorists oppose the veil as a symbol of oppressive hierarchies and male domination (Humphreys & Brown, 2002). On the other hand, feminists like Sadr (2010) complaint that major human rights organizations like Amnesty International are fierce upon Belgian and other European governments for banning veiling but do not issue even a state of condemnation against Iran that forcefully binds its women to observe Islamic attire.

Beyond political and feminist standpoints, it will be interesting to frame these issues in social psychological prospects. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) observes that there is a tendency to perceive their outgroup as relatively homogeneous and treat them unfairly. The west experienced extremism from the

Muslim hardliners in 9/11 events. Taking hijab as a symbol of extremism, the western and American societies might treat these Muslim women with discrimination. The principles of conditioning might also be operative behind this phenomenon.

Muslim women, on the other hand, are likely to have conformed to their group norms because of their social identifications. The more they attach themselves with their groups, the stronger they sense the threat from the dominant cultures in which they live (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). The western society at the same time can perceive their ingroup as more heterogeneous and thus believe that only a few of them are biased toward these Muslim women (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Legal aspects. Critics have argued that if it is objectionable to force one to wear a headscarf, it is equally condemnable to be forced not to wear one. It is surprising that many liberals and feminists do not see ban as an affront to international law, and the right to freedom of religion and expression (Murshid, 2005). They perhaps forgot that ban on veil can inhibit social integration and on the reverse, such steps can increase religiosity (Carvalho, 2013).

EEOC guidelines emphasize that legal prohibitions on discrimination, harassment, or retaliation apply to any improper employment action based on affiliation or association with a particular religious or ethnic group; physical, linguistic, or cultural traits as well as clothing associated with any such group; or the perception or belief that a person is a member of a particular racial, national origin, or religious group, whether or not such a perception is correct (Malos, 2010).

The actions of the governments of these countries related to ban on *hijab* clearly collide with the United Nations human rights laws (Clark, 2007). It seems that the proclaimed policy of multiculturalism has failed in the west. Within the Islamic

world, apart from Saudi Arabia and Iran, dress code does not fall within the purview of enforceable laws in most Muslim countries (Sweeney, 2011). It is a matter of supreme irony that in a free society such as France, the state should rule on matters of dress (Jones, 2005; Seckinelgin, 2006). But some Muslim nations such as Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia are also following European secular trend in this area (Anderson, 2005).

Commercialization of *hijab*. These negative attitudes towards *hijab* led the west to another direction, which can be seen in commercialization of *hijab*. Round the time of Afghanistan's presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005, there were noticeable shifts in apprehensions of the *burqa* in the Western media. In 2006, *burqa* images even appeared on the Paris runways and in *Vogue* issues. This evolution of *burqa* from shock to chic is actually a process of its commodification in the western media (McLarney, 2009). Some scholars even find the new styles of *hijab* as not absolutely religious, but only a new way of clothing (Woldesemait, 2012).

The growing popularity of *hijab* was not ignored by Denim, which manufactured *abayas* made out of jeans (Bregenzer, 2011). Amidst this marketing of *hijab*, a painter named Princess *Hijab* began grafitting billboards in Paris in 2006. She used a black marker to inscribe *hijab* on the bodies of women, men, and children in fashion ads. Some interpret it as a satire on western sexualization of human body; others interpret it as her anti-Islamic attitude (Cawley, 2013).

In Turkey, veiling fashion-industry has emerged and progressed rapidly as part of the marketing sector fuelled by its liberal policies and entry into Customs Union with the European Union (Gökarıksel,& Secor, 2009). However, veiling-fashion becomes ambivalent, caught between its function as modest covering according to

Islam and its aesthetic and pleasure aspects. In their negotiation of this ambivalence, consumers of these styles turn this fashion into an ethical practice (Gökarıksel,& Secor, 2012). *Hijab* has also been seen as a part of fashion industry in Pakistan. Many brands have introduced products for the *hijab*-wearing women, including shampoos and garments. *Hijab* also reached the ramp of the fashion shows in this country.

Apart from the legal and commercial matters, political motives seem to sway the scene. The cloaked difference of Muslim women allowed Western media and political institutions to exaggerate it with layers of symbolism representing foreignness and female oppression (Lueck, 2003). Fully draped, these unseen women were ripe for interpretation. They became the victim in need of rescue by the democratic values of the United States. After 9/11 they rushed to set free the veiled women allegedly being downcast by the *Taliban* in Afghanistan. They did not bother to know the standpoint of these women themselves. Americans believe *hijab* functions to oppress women; veiled women probably possess alternative understandings (Droogsma, 2007). The following section outlines some of these explanations.

Conditions of *Hijab*

The adoption of a specific type of clothing in a given social context can be based on a number of conditions, including family influence and sanctions, pressure from peers, laws, economic position, or religious beliefs. Selection of one kind of veiling over another in order to communicate a message or accomplish some task can be deemed as analogous to an actor wearing a certain costume to look convincing in a particular role to an audience (Shirazi-Mahajan, 1995).

Researchers seldom consult veiled women in order to understand how the veil functions in their lives. Indeed, scholars tend to assign meaning rather than describe the meaning the veil has for women Murphy (2006). Murphy answers that in Egypt donning scarf provided some women a sense of independence from parents (who stressed not to cover heads), sense of morality, and stopped men calling at them in streets. Correspondingly, Jones (2005) also noted that Muslim women in France stress that *hijab* was their own choice to wear scarf, even to the extent that their parents tell them to unveil themselves so that they should continue their education. It may also appear to follow an idealized figure (Rehman, 2004). For example, after conversion of poetess Kamla Das to Islam, Muslim girls in Kerala (India) started donning scarf over head under her inspiration. In Egypt in the past 20 years, some middle-class families have watched stunned as their daughters have taken to covering their hair under the influence of popular television preachers like Amr Khaled (Murphy, 2006).

Kopp (2005) reports that while living in the United States, the question of veiling takes on a great importance when communal solidarity is threatened. Religious self and group solidarity are the reasons for the observed increase in covering. Women even with skirts feel pressure to do what the other women around in the close community are doing. Therefore, covering is not for shame or for protection, but for a religious recognition. Similar was the situation in Medina when the divine message appeared in the chapter *Ahzaab* (Ghamidi, 2009). It told Muslim women to cast their *jalabeeb* (big *chador*) down their faces, when outdoors, so that they convey their identity to *munafiqins* (hypocrites) and not be maltreated. If we generalize this ruling, women should veil when their identity is at risk or they are under the threat of assault. Such conditions may occur in certain non-Muslim societies that discriminate on the basis of religion.

Hijab in America has been seen to function to define Muslim identity, execute a behavior check / control, defy sexual objectification, obtain more respect, preserve intimate relationships (with family), and provide freedom (e.g., to move about) (Droogsma, 2007). Elaborating on her study, Droogsma reports that women feel that one of the most important functions of *hijab* is in connecting herself to other Muslim women (see also Carvalho, 2013; Parveen, 2013). *Hijab* functions as a reminder to the women to guard their behavior so that their lives please God. Since they cannot control the men's behavior, they feel the need to change their own behavior in the hope of not inviting this unwanted attention.

Women receive more respect from both Muslim and non-Muslim men just because they veil. If one is walking into a mall, there will be a man with his wife or girlfriend, who will rush to open a door for her, and his own wife or girlfriend will open the door for herself. The women frequently referenced nuns and the Virgin Mary as women who cover their bodies and are revered in other faiths; they feel that they are often associated with these figures when in public (Droogsma, 2007). Being very precious, she would prefer to keep diamond in a very safe place and only the very intimate (e.g. husband) will be allowed to see it (see also Kopp, 2005). The researchers have also noted such reasons expressed by women in Pakistan during some informal discussions. One of the participants compared woman to a diamond. These women also mentioned the positive effect of the veil on other familial relationships (anonymous, personal communications, January 2010).

Franks' (2000) study in Britain yielded somewhat similar results. Many comments highlight the positive elements of wearing the *hijab* including a sense of security, a reminder of commitment, a sense of space and the right of scrutiny. Far from being a sign of conformity and fulfilling the function of making the wearer

invisible the converse may be true. Contrary to the common perception, the respondents were found to wear *hijab* not under any family pressures through individual choice as an expression of their religious faith commitment and for the benefits they perceived it to bestow. They gained respect through wearing Islamic dress. However the practice had ill effects too.

In somewhat similar line, Siraj (2011) found in her comparative study of *hijab*-wearing and non-*hijab* wearing that veiling practices are deeply related to the spatial practices shaped by the local Scottish context, i.e. *hijab* is contextual and acculturation and assimilation does occur. While the *hijab*-wearing women view the *hijab* as an embodiment of modesty, virtue and respect, the non-wearers of *hijab* consider it a needless piece of clothing. Nevertheless, despite their contrasting views on veiling, both groups hold quite similar views on the importance of female modesty.

Hijab can make veiled women a target of disrespect in the post-9/11 world in America. These discrepancies demonstrate Americans' changing perceptions of *hijab*. Indeed, several of the women noted feeling fairly unmarked before 9/11, but being glared at and shouted at after that event (Ghumman & Jackson, 2010). An Irish convert to Islam described that she had been often called 'white Paki' which was the cleanest phrase so far (Franks, 2000). In this case it can be argued that the racism is against the Pakistani group who are perceived as being visible Muslims (perhaps synonymous with Muslim). Another respondent suggested that non-Muslims see wearing the scarf as alien and women who wear it are even seen as hardliners. Girls from Pakistani and Moroccan families who wear *hijab* to school find themselves being treated with hostility by some of the Pakistani boys. For this reason she thought that the aggression is not coming only from the non-Muslim community.

While *hijab* clearly symbolizes a woman's religious affiliation, it also shapes Muslim women's independent identities, often acting as an element of resistance to patriarchal norms and standards (Droogsma, 2007; El Guindi, 1999). In some societies, the choice to wear the veil subverts patriarchal rules that attempt to control women's lives. Wearing *hijab* in these countries reflects women's attempts to gain or maintain esteem within a patriarchal society in which possibilities for autonomy are exceptionally limited. In this way, *hijab* becomes a different concept from that of *purdah* (seclusion of women / remaining indoors). While *purdah* has been a source of segregation from men and outer world, *hijab* develops as an instrument of independence, mobility, and participation in public sphere activities.

The new rhetoric of the *hijab* and the new styles of the *hijab* give Muslim women agency instead of taking away their agency (Woldesemait, 2012). For instance, a Saudi sportswoman was at last allowed to run in track and field in London 2012 olympics. She ran in headscarf, long shirt/top and trousers. Iranian women, clad in *hijab*, made part of the hiking team to conquer the sky reaching peaks of Pakistan. There are numerous other examples of this achievement orientation. Scholars such as El Guindi (1999) advocate veiling practices because of their association with female sanctity, privacy, and respect, and more specifically, resistance to Western consumerism.

Strangely women not just start donning veil at some stage of life; they also abandon it suddenly after having practiced it for years and become 'visible' again (Franks, 2000). Such happenings are not uncommon in Pakistani society as well (Khaddarposh, 2004). The researchers also found similar tendency among some women during informal discussions with them. These tendencies also indicate their attempts to exercise their autonomy and will.

Hijab in Pakistan

It has been noted that non-Arab women may feel more eager to express their religious identity visibly. The women who converted to Islam in their adulthood describe *hijab* as an important marker of identity; they emphasize this aspect more than those who grew up in the faith (Droogsma, 2007). In a non-Arab nation like Pakistan, it has been commonly observed that *hijab* as well as *niqab* has comparatively increased during the last decade. Although only a minority of women in Pakistan lived in *purdah* (seclusion) earlier and were not seen completely veiled, modesty in dress and manner has been the norm. Segregation of the sexes has mostly been sought at the public space (Papanek, 1971).

Khan (1972) stated that our *purdah* houses changed from the grim, prison-like harems of the middle ages to the more modest and natural *zenanas* (female portions in houses) of the modern times. Later, in most sections of the society *zenanas* may not exist but the social environment is *purdah*-like. Overall, there have been four types of *zenanas* in Muslim society. First, the harem like *zenanas* mostly found in the tribal areas and the feudal sections of Muslim societies. Secondly, the old-fashioned *zenanas* among the conservative sections and backward provincial towns and cities, where *zenanas* are separate but adjacent section of the house. Third type grew at the turn of the twentieth century. Male and female portions are within the same building, with *zenana* being usually in the rear part of the house having no physical partition. Finally, there are also houses where such portions may not exist at all.

Khan (1972) argues that this segregation and disempowerment of women was transmitted to the children born to them. The worst aspect of character development of their offspring is the utter lack of noble and lofty ideals and aims in life. They

pursue family and personal interests. They have no love for learning and knowledge, no desire to serve the public or nation at large, and no motivation for achieving distinctions.

Purdah originally evolved as a means of controlling women of the feudal or tribal groups (Mumtaz, 1987). This is evident from the uneven distribution of the practice of *purdah* in Pakistan where the strongholds are the feudal families of different provinces such as Punjab, Sind, tribal Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). *Purdah* has been practiced differently in different parts of Pakistan and depends on class, family background, and urban or rural residence (Anderson, 2005; Shah & Bulatao, 1981). These variations in *purdah* also related to differences in class, income, place of residence, level of education, occupation, religious or sectarian affiliation, group membership and individual life circumstances (Papanek, 1971). However, a particular geographical culture may be as enforcing as a law. For example, *purdah* (*chador* or shawl) for women in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan) does not only include a mandatory veil but also teaches segregation from men and the world outside home (Anderson, 2005).

In Pakistan, like many other countries there has always existed a conflict between various elements of society on the issue of *purdah* and veiling. Ansari's (2009) examination of the newspaper articles published in 1950s reveal that women of the new state Pakistan were asking if they should continue to veil their faces and take a back seat, or should they cast aside the *burqa* and step forward to claim their rightful place as equal partners of men folk in the service of the nation? Various women who were active in working for the welfare of the new state wanted that *burqa* should be abolished as it not only hinders the progress of women, but a large number of its users become victims of diseases like tuberculosis and typhoid (see also

Khaddarposh, 2004; Khan, 1972). They were critical of the few idle women who had taken a fancy to wearing *burqas* for fashion's sake. Some asserted that no matter what men might write or think, nothing is going to stop the woman from the course that she had set for herself. If she chooses to remain in *purdah*, nothing will bring her out; if she is out of *purdah*, she will remain out.

Pakistan National Alliance against Bhutto regime in late 1970s introduced such religious symbols as *burqa* (Naheed, 2007). During Zia regime in 1980s, various national institutions such as Pakistan Television received directives that required of the women at the state TV should cover their heads. This practice was also followed later in some democratic regimes. Women were not allowed to participate in any sports that were open to public viewing. Hudood Ordinance of 1981 was another suppression. An atmosphere of hatred against women developed whereby any male could object to the women's dress and/or activities in the marketplace. These practices was somehow an attempt to segregate women or was to gain support of religious quarter for prolonging the monarchy (Mumtaz, 1987). In somewhat similar direction, Nadeem (2004) in his play *Burqa Vaganza* [veil vaganza] views that *hijab*/veiling is a political or politicized institution and is not a gender or religious issue. He constructs *hijab* as a non-gendered veil used by all the hegemonies to fulfill their vested interests.

In Pakistan, Shah and Bulatao (1981) reported that eighty seven percent of the women in the walled-city of Lahore observed *purdah* by wearing either a *burqa* or a *chador*. Seventy percent of them with higher than primary education, compared with eighty nine percent of those with primary or lower education, observed *purdah*. Thus, comparatively fewer of the women with higher education in Pakistan wear *purdah*.

However, there has been a great rise in *hijab* practice in recent years (Kopp, 2005). Although *pardah* has always been practiced in Pakistan, the present form (*niqab*/headscarf with *abaya*) is a new phenomenon and seems to be Saudi style of *pardah* (Bloomfield, 2009). Feminists propose that a religious radicalization in these years is likely to be associated with it. We propose that upsurge of religious organizations during Afghan war and Kashmir *jihad* (crusade) and their consequent role during peace years in late 1990s focused their attention on reformation with regard to religious practices. This stance is somehow supported by Huntington (1996) and Mernissi (1987). This seemingly pan-Islamism and specially its Arabic version seems to have been a direct outcome of the perceived segregation and discrimination of Muslims in the after math of 9/11.

Sociological factors. It is usually argued that instead of religion, *pardah* is actually an issue of class (Hammami, 1990; Khan, 1972). For instance, women belonging to higher class, specially in rural areas, have practiced it to show their dignity and nobility (Mumtaz, 1987; Shah & Bulatao, 1981). In this sense, *pardah* observance is, to some extent, a luxury (Papanek, 1971). Khan adds that *pardah* is, in fact, the institution of the middle and upper classes. It cannot be observed or practiced by all classes and sections, for reasons of poverty and economic needs. The poorer classes cannot keep their womenfolk strictly confined within the house, because they have to go out to work and earn livelihood. But with their migration to urban areas, Mumtaz adds, they also switch to this practice. This activity not only gives them a sense of protection in a relatively stranger and diverse society, but also a sense of being like the higher class (see also Papanek).

Papanek (1971) also concludes that the lower middle class in urban areas has to observe *pardah* for a status statement; otherwise it is harder for them to afford it,

mainly owing to their financial responsibilities. Shah and Bulatao (1981) found that in urban areas, the elite and the highly educated woman is, however, less likely to veil or wear *burqa*. Mobility is not a bigger problem for her. *Purdah* has virtually disappeared among educated upper classes, except in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and perhaps, in some other pockets of traditionalism. *Purdah* is still a major fact of life for the lower middle class in urban areas. Correspondingly, women in rural area have never worn *burqa*.

Also should be considered the fact that Shah and Bulatao's (1981) findings are based on a National Impact Survey held in 1968-69. Much of its results may not be applicable in present period of Islamic radicalization. In this survey, *purdah* observance was positively associated with husband's and wife's occupation and education, and ownership of land and goods. It demonstrates that a woman who observes such customs is religious, and that her family is affluent enough to maintain her in *purdah*. In the broadest sense, the *purdah* system is related to status, the division of labor, interpersonal dependency, social distance, and the maintenance of moral standards as specified by the society (Papanek, 1971).

The full veiling of women was rarely practiced within the villages surveyed by Khan (1999). The only women, who wore *burqa*, were orthodox Shiite women or women from the *pir's* (spiritual guide) family in one village, who were its wealthiest landowners. It is in line with researchers' own observation that veil in a village was practiced only by *Syeds* (descendants of the Prophet's family). *Purdah* was generally demonstrated by women covering their body and head with a *chador* while in public. Women over thirty five years had increased freedom of movement in Punjabi village, in terms of visiting the market alone, visiting a health centre unescorted, and relaxation of *purdah* norms.

But in certain areas of Punjab, such as Sunakhi village in Muzaffargarh, there is strict *pardah* observance. Women move among their own family cluster. But strangely, this segregation does not affect their mobility for economic reasons. They go for agricultural work in *burqa*, take it off at fields and again put it on while returning home (Bari, 1994). In Frontier, all women in village Lora, Hazara, observe strict *pardah* (*chador*), be it elite or lower class (Naz, 1991).

The association of seclusion of women with the upper classes in Pakistan has led unfortunately to other classes imitating the practice as a sign of affluence (Mumtaz, 1987). A veiled woman thus becomes a symbol of social status. In Pakistan *hijab* is usually urban, whatever the class. Pakistani urban society presents a diverse population, ranging from no head covering to complete covering including face, whereas in rural society all cover their heads but almost none is with *niqab* (Shah & Bulatao, 1981). Those who wear head covering are divided in two classes. The elite observes it regularly but the lower class and workingwomen do not strictly practice it in all situations (e.g. in agricultural work). In this sense, it is the poorest women who enjoy the greatest movement of freedom.

Mumtaz (1987) asserts that only lower middle class is faced with confinement at home and needs strict veiling to move outside. They need the veil so that they could communicate that they are not from lower class. However, commonly it is seen that the middle class woman has the same situation and in some cases veiling and segregation (separate space in offices) is always required of her (see also Kousar, 2011). Though the middle class woman is better employed, it is not without cautionary measures. Sometimes upper or upper middle class put more limitations on their women's movement. These women do not don veil, but somehow attempt is

made that she remains unrecognizable while venturing outside (for example, by travelling in car).

From this review of literature, it seems that the scholarship on *hijab/purdah* in Pakistan is quite old and is largely based on anecdotal assertions. Therefore, we feel the need to explore role of such demographic variables as socioeconomic status and family aspects in observing veil in Pakistan.

Gender relations. Pakistani culture dictates that all decent women remain at home and venture outside only when completely covered and unrecognizable (Khan, 1999). The slightest misbehavior on the part of a woman results in dishonor for her family. One of the underlying reasons for *purdah* itself is the desire to guard against the possibility of a woman encountering a man with whom she may want to develop a relationship. If upper middle class women have been given greater freedom of movement in the cities, it is only in those places where the probability of encountering men from their own or similar classes is negligible. Conversely, in order to minimize the chances of interaction between the sexes of the same class, educational institutions and most forms of entertainment have been kept segregated or heavily organized (Mumtaz, 1987).

Closely associated with the *purdah* system is the custom of the arranged marriage, which is typical of many, if not all, sections of Pakistani society (Papanek, 1971). Indeed, it could be argued that the *purdah* system is the most important mechanism through which the parentally arranged marriage continues to function. As depicted in a teleplay *Phaans* [stranglehold], some families in Pakistan do not allow the boys to meet or see their daughters when the proposal is in progress. As a result girls may not get a suitor for them all their life (*Pakistan Television*, 2008, Sept 10).

Hijab wearing students at an Islamic institute in Islamabad reported that it was also difficult for them to have an offer of a suitable match for marriage (Shahid, 2008).

In this connection, wearing *hijab* becomes beneficial as well. A girl wearing Islamic dress announces herself to be one of the moral types men like to marry and may attract a man's attention on campus as a result (Mule & Barthel, 1992). The veil is a helpful device in the competition for husbands, which increasingly finds in the universities a major arena. Similarly, Zwickm and Chelariu (2006) established that the motivation to mobilize information about *hijab* in the profile of woman on an online matchmaking site is predominantly instrumental. An indication of a woman's willingness to wear the *hijab* after marriage in her personal web profile implies conservative attitudes, religiosity, and Islamic values to a potential husband. Conversely, by indicating a refusal to wear *hijab* after marriage, the young woman can signal a more liberal and individualistic identity. So such profiles become a quick way to find the match of choice. Boys may look for modern girl friends but prefer simplicity and veiling for a life partner (Kousar, 2011).

On the other hand, Mahmud and Swami (2010) observed that British Muslim and non-Muslim men did not significantly differ on their evaluations of women's attractiveness and intelligence. Both had a tendency to rate higher the non-*hijab* women. The *hijab*-wearing women get discriminated in this regard. However, the British nationality might have operated behind Muslim men's rating. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that Muslim men's ratings of women wearing *hijab* was positively correlated with self-reported religiosity. Therefore, religion as a demographic characteristic (born as Muslim) may not effect the results but religion as a personality attribute (i.e., religiosity) does have an effect.

The role of in-laws in deciding what the daughter-in-law will wear is influential. Sometimes wearing *hijab* is seen a positive characteristic of a bride-to-be. A mother-in-law can have a significant effect on the dress code of her daughter-in-law (Read & Bartkowski, 2000). Pakistani husbands in Britain do not share the liberal religious views held by their young counterparts. To them pure submissive attitude is required of their wives. Some of these married women reject their husband's accusation that these wives are ignoring Islamic teachings by wearing western clothing along with *hijab* or not wearing *hijab* at all (Charsley, 2005).

From the above reports, the question arises whether *hijab* can be imposed. Attempts at preaching *burqa* by Khaddarposh (2004) and his affiliates in pre-partition Pakistan met a failure. He was himself disappointed with his efforts. He realized that a woman, by nature, does not accept any such prohibition. He also experienced that certain harms as well as some illnesses like tuberculosis can be caused by this practice. Harrison (2007) had similar findings in Iran. Khaddarposh also noted that women are already in a closed environment, so whenever they find chance they remove this hindrance of *burqa*. The researcher had a similar personal observation at a wedding, where two veiling sisters put off their face veil and *abayas* and boldly socialized (including with boys who were strangers to them) during three days of the ceremony. From this, it may also be suggested that if *hijab* has been imposed from outside and without the willingness of women, it may create identity confusion and at one extreme may repress sexual desires.

The research work described in above lines seems to be old and thus requires a new outlook. In the wake of 9/11, Muslim societies have been taking a new shape (Golnaraghi & Mills, 2013; Murshid, 2005). Our interest grew in studying *hijab* because of observed increase in this dress practice in Pakistan. In post 9/11 world,

Muslim women have found a very strong distinctiveness by adopting *hijab*. This attempt has met serious responses in western countries (Ahmed, 2009). Similarly in most Muslim nations the rulers have interfered with the practice of veiling. However, here are two extreme conditions in this case. Countries like Iran (Harrison, 2007), Palestine (*Dawn*, 2009, Dec 9), Saudi Arabia (Murshid, 2005), Kuwait (*Shirkat Gah*, 2009a) and even non-Arab Malaysia (*Dawn*, 2009, Dec 9), have ordered women to cover their heads. On the other hand countries like Turkey (Humphreys and Brown, 2002), Egypt (Saktanber & Çorbacioglu, 2008), Morocco and Tunisia (Anderson, 2005), Maldives (Omidi, 2009) and even former Iran have banned or restricted head covering.

Rationale of Present Study

In Pakistan no regime has strictly involved itself with such matters relating to dress. There is neither permission nor any ban. Currently, women in Pakistan have dealt with the new scenario after 9/11 by adopting varied practices (a few wear *niqab*, most drape headscarf / shawl only and many do not cover head at all). Moreover, *hijab* being non indigenous attire has been seen to dramatically increase in during the past decade and replace the traditional forms of covering. These traditional forms include, for example, *chador* and *burqa*. While *hijab* possesses some shared religious purposes for the Muslim women who wear it, as a cultural artifact the veil does not have one universal meaning for all Muslim women in the world (Reece, 1996). Therefore, women in Pakistan are also likely to have different reasons for adopting *hijab* than cited in most studies done in the west.

Among these reasons, social psychological aspects might be important determinants of veil practice because there is hardly any political anomaly on issue of

dress code in Pakistan. At the same time, veil in Pakistan may be oppressive i.e. enforced from a dominant group (Khaddarposh, 2004) rather than liberating i.e. the individual choice commonly observed in foreign lands (Clark, 2007). Though, in Muslim minority countries, veil is an identifier of Muslim separate religious and cultural identity (Kopp, 2005), it might have been perceived as a heightened religious self-concept (“I should feel religious”) or even superior religious outlook (“I should look religious”) (Droogsma, 2007; Jorgensen, 2008). On the other hand, it might just be used to look stylish (Naheed, 2007).

The literature reviewed in previous sections lacks serious efforts to study *hijab* from psychological standpoint. Most studies have been done from socio-political perspective (for instance, Bhimji, 2008; Carvalho, 2013; Papanek, 1971). Some scholars have explored social psychological dimensions such as identity and family relations of immigrant Muslim women (for example, Droogsma, 2007; Franks, 2000; Kopp, 2005). Such studies did not find their way in a Muslim majority country like Pakistan. Earlier work in Pakistan has been anecdotal and speculative (Khan, 1972), social political (Mumtaz, 1987) or in the form of a case study (Abid, 2010).

Considering these gaps in research on *hijab*, especially in Pakistan, the present study will be unique in that it attempts to address psychological and social psychological factors about *hijab* by directly inducting the hijab wearers from various sections of society and aims to present a theoretical framework around the phenomenon of practicing *hijab* by involving other women practicing other dress codes as well. The present study is set to address the following questions:

1. The causal conditions of adopting *hijab*. This question will be dealt with through focus group discussions.

2. The context and intervening variables that might influence the trend of *hijab*. Various social and demographic factors may count in this regard. For example, socioeconomic class, family, and ethnicity, etc. Some of these factors have been found of importance in the literature cited above.
3. Consequences related to practicing *hijab*. The nature and type of factors in second and third questions will also draw from focus group discussions.

As the study is an exploratory one and relies on data emerging from brainstorming sessions and focus groups, hypotheses are not being formulated.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The present research targets to grasp the phenomenon of *hijab* practice in Pakistan and explore the causal conditions, contexts, and functions of this dress practice. *Hijab* has been defined by two types: *niqab* (face veil) and headscarf, both worn with *abaya*. The research is a comparative study and hence involves other types of dress also. These dresses include head covering, *dupatta* carrying, and modern dress. The research started with a review of anecdotal, feminist, and empirical literature. The research has been divided in two studies. Study 1 is a qualitative study and involves focus group discussions. Study 2 is a quantitative survey, which is based on the findings obtained from Study 1.

Study 1: Exploring the *Hijab* Phenomenon in Pakistani Context

The main objective of this study was to identify a theoretical base to explain the phenomenon of *hijab* practice in Pakistan. This was done by eliciting the personal knowledge and experiences of women. Five focus groups were carried out with women wearing different types of dress (*niqab*, headscarf, head covering, *dupatta* carrying, and the modern dress). One discussion was also conducted with men. Besides finding a theoretical base, other objective of the study was to determine the variables to be quantitatively examined in Study 2.

Grounded theory analysis was applied. Five dress groups were compared at a preliminary level. The themes emerging from this analysis were employed in Study 2. Before starting Study 2, the literature was revisited. This was done to search whether scientific scholarship existed on the variables/themes that emerged from Study 1

(focus groups). This search would also help to select measures relating to these variables.

Study 2: Comparison of Five Dress Groups on Study Variables

This is a comparative study and builds on the variables that were found important according to the findings of Study 1. This study is divided in two phases.

Phase I: Selection, Adaptation, and Psychometric Properties of Instruments. This part of study had three steps. Step 1 involved selection and adaptation of instruments. Step 2 was the try out of instruments in order to have feed back on the comprehensibility of instruments and feasibility of their administration. Step 3 was done to find out psychometric properties of instruments. A preliminary analysis was also done to grasp the trends of data.

Phase II: Comparison of Five Dress Groups on Study Variables. After having established the psychometric properties of instruments, Phase II was conducted with a larger sample. This study addressed the major questions of study. These questions included conditions of choosing a particular dress, comparison of dress groups on the variables that were extracted from Study 1 and influence of social desirability on responses of the participants. Additionally, it explored the effect of certain social and demographic variables such as ethnic identity, familial aspects, religious affiliation, and income level. The study concluded with presenting a theoretical framework around the phenomenon of *hijab* practice in Pakistan.

STUDY 1: EXPLORING THE *HIJAB* PHENOMENON IN PAKISTANI

CONTEXT

The present study targets to identifying a theoretical base to understand the phenomenon of *hijab*. The method of grounded theory (Strauss, 1987; Straus & Corbin, 1998) was followed, owing to its suitability for a newly studied phenomenon in a particular cultural setting. It is a qualitative research method designed to aid in the systematic collection and analysis of data and the construction of a theoretical model. In a grounded theory study, the design of the study and nature of sampling is likely to evolve during the process of data collection. The initial stage of this study involves informal interviews with feminists and religious scholars. The final and primary part of the study includes focus group discussions (FGDs) / brain storming with both *hijab*-wearing (HW) and non-*hijab* wearing (non-HW) women as well as men.

Objectives

Study 1 is aimed at:

1. Identifying a theoretical base to explain the phenomenon of *hijab* in Pakistani society by eliciting the personal knowledge and experiences of women practicing different dress codes.
2. Determining the dimensions/variables to be explored in the next study (Study 2).
3. Comparing various classes of *hijab* women at a preliminary level.

Participants

At the very initial stages of the research, we targeted to involve only the *hijab*-wearing (*niqab*-wearing and headscarfing) women. However, as the literature review progressed, the need was felt to compare the *hijab*-wearing women with other female sections of society. Further, brain storming with the participants led to the need of having the say of all dress groups. Other groups involve those women who use headscarf, *dupatta* to cover their heads as well as those who wear modern dress. This discourse led to further sampling. Those who adopt qualitative methods often avoid finalizing decisions on selection of participants in advance of data collection. The participants/groups are inducted with the emerging requirements of the study (Strauss, 1987). Thus we ended with FGDs with five different classes of women and also one with men, at different university campuses in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Pakistani is a patriarchal society and *hijab* is usually considered to have been imposed by the males (Anderson, 2005). Therefore, men were also involved in the discussions.

As a result of above observations, the present study targets four levels of covering, namely, the *Niqab*-Wearing (NW), Head-Scarving [along with *abaya*] (HS), Head-Covering [with *chador* or *dupatta*] (HC), *Dupatta*-Carrying [carrying *dupatta* or any piece of cloth around neck/chest and not using it for covering head] (DC). We also undertook discussion with the Modern-Dressed women [wearing modern/western dress, using either no *dupatta* or using it in a way that does not cover head or body] (MD). However, following the tradition of theoretical literature, we specify the term *hijab* for *niqab* and headscarf only.

The participants were approached through personal and social contacts. Total sample comprised 53 respondents, 45 women (84.9%) and eight men (15.1%). The

number of participants in each focus group ranged from seven to eleven. Their age ranged from 21 to 32 years. Mean age was 23 years. The participants were predominantly university students ($n = 47, 88.7\%$). Six of them were employed (11.3%). Forty nine of the participants were unmarried (92.5%) and four were married (7.5%). They belonged to middle class ($n = 43, 81.1\%$) and upper middle class ($n = 10, 18.9\%$). Their religious affiliations were *Sunni* ($n = 38, 71.7\%$), *Ahle-hadis* ($n = 2, 3.8\%$), *Shiite* ($n = 3, 5.6\%$), and *Deobandi* ($n = 3, 5.6\%$). Those who did not mention their religious affiliations or reported that they were Muslims were seven (13.2%).

Instruments

A demographic sheet was prepared involving information about age, education, religious affiliation, marital status, etc. of the participants (for details see Appendix A). Guideline for FGDs was prepared by the researcher and was reviewed by three experts experienced in qualitative research and conducting FGDs. Two of them were PhD scholars and one was a PhD. All the three were members of a teaching faculty (two of them were lecturers and one was retired as associate professor). A major opinion was that some of the items/questions were quite focused. It was advised that these should be made open and broader in order to elicit the original knowledge and varied experiences of the participants. The guideline was modified consequently (see Appendix B-1). Each of our group was of different nature with regard to *hijab* practice and presented unique view points. Therefore, we made revisions in the guideline almost after every discussion, following the grounded theory tradition (see Appendices B-2 to B-6). Discussion points addressed conditions, context, and outcomes of practicing *hijab*. One point was, for example,

 (What do

you think what is *hijab*, what are its kinds and how is it being practiced in our society?).

Procedures

Informal interviews with three religious scholars and three faculty members of social sciences were carried out with unstructured and open-ended points of discussion. These points involved their opinion about *hijab* and/or any experiences related to *hijab*. They were asked about the religious, cultural, and psychological aspects involved in practicing *hijab*. These interviews were done with a view to understanding the social discourse surrounding *hijab* and *purdah* (covering the body). Four of them were contacted in person, while the rest of the two were communicated electronically.

The religious intellectuals considered that faith requires us to follow what is obviously manifest in Qur'an. *Hijab* is religious demand as well as a call of the immoral social environment. Concern over interpretations by Islamic jurists was also expressed. It was opined that there are even cultural differences within Islamic world. They were also of the view that Islamic teachings about covering the face and head are situational and flexible. Some extremists killed one of these theologians for his liberal views in general. This happened while we were in electronic contact with him and meeting for interview was due in few days.

Social scientists displayed their worries about the non-indigenous nature of present day *hijab* growing rapidly in Pakistan. They thought it as a type of religious radicalization / Talibanization and hence of extremism. They also considered *hijab* as a religious political statement and therefore a strategy of impression management.

One unique opinion was that *hijab* may be a symbol of repressed guilt around sexual motivation.

In the next step, we adopted FGD approach as it is particularly suited to answering questions about how social phenomena work and to topics such as the one investigated here in which context and social interaction are critical to understanding an issue (Miles, 2002). The participants were approached through personal acquaintances at various university campuses in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. All the discussions with women were moderated by an experienced female researcher and co-moderated by the present researcher himself. Ethical standards such as anonymity and consent were maintained. The discussions lasted within a range of 50 to 80 minutes. Sometimes order and language of the points of discussion was adjusted as per situation. All discussions were tape recorded with permission of the participants. Field notes were also taken. Later all the recorded material was transcribed verbatim.

Grounded theory analysis was applied. This analysis was carried out under the paradigm of conditions; context, interactions, strategies/tactics; and consequences (Strauss, 1987) (see Figure 1). Within the description and discussion of results, attempts have been made to mention whether a category is a condition, an interaction, or consequence, etc. At the end of each excerpt from the data, it has been mentioned who has narrated that specific verbatim at what page number of the transcribed data. For example, if a *niqab*-wearing woman has given a statement at page 2, it has been shown by the abbreviation 'NW-2' in parentheses. Code number was also inserted along with this description.




Figure 1. Coding Paradigm (after Strauss, 1987)

The participants had diverse practices with regard to covering the body. Moreover, FGDs were undertaken with both men and women. Despite these factors, a clear-cut comparison method was not used. We presented results in the form of overall patterns. However, in the analysis, these differences were indicated along with the responses.

Results

The transcribed data (gathered through FGDs) were analyzed in three stages, open coding, axial coding, and selective coding (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). At the initial stage, open coding provided broad and concrete categories. Axial coding is a step towards searching the true meaning and is hence relatively more abstract. It helped to reduce the categories on the basis of common and frequent responses. Some codes were dropped; others were merged in relevant categories. A codebook was prepared which shows all the sub-categories and their corresponding codes (see Appendix C). These sub-categories were placed under the relevant main categories (see Table 1).

Table 1

Main Categories and Corresponding Sub-categories of Hijab Practice

<p>Textual sources</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Religious texts as source of deciding on <i>hijab</i> 2. Reflection on religious sources 3. God’s will and support 4. Religious commitment/identity 5. Consistency through commitment <p>Religious Environment</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Religious family 2. <i>Madriisa</i> (Religious school) 3. Shifts under religious context <p>Religion in relative terms</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Freedom in religion 2. Intrinsic nature of <i>hijab</i> / Modesty of character 3. <i>Hijab</i> defined as proper covering of the body 4. <i>Hijab</i> defined as simple Head covering 5. Religion as additional condition <p>Normative behavior in a socially demanding environment</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Normative behavior in a socially demanding environment 2. Inconsistency in practicing <i>hijab</i> <p>Geographical culture</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Impact of geographical culture 2. Assimilation/Development relaxes covering 3. Multiple ways to cover the body 	<p>General social environment as insecure condition</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Hijab</i> for protection in an insecure environment 2. Protection from harassment as consequence 3. Protection from insecure environment as condition 4. <i>Hijab</i> is for hiding the body for protection <p>Specific insecure environment</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Adopting <i>hijab</i> in specific insecure circumstances <p>Comfort</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Psychological comfort 3. Comfort through protection and mobility 4. Respect 5. Physical comfort through appearance control 6. Choice / willingness and self-decision to adopt <i>hijab</i> 7. Personality differences related to <i>hijab</i> 8. Satisfaction related to <i>hijab</i>/dress 9. Developmental shifts <p>Dealing with negative consequences</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Disrespect under stereotypical view of <i>hijab</i> 2. <i>Hijab</i> as symbol of conservatism 3. Insecurity/harassment to the <i>hijab</i>-wearing 4. Biased treatment in social arena 5. Difficulties with <i>hijab</i>
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Spatial shifts under normative influences

1. Situational shifts to wearing *hijab*

Family Influence

1. Family's passive influence through tradition of *hijab*
2. Father's influence
3. Family (other than father) attempting to influence
4. In-laws' discretion on dress code

6. Health issues related to *hijab*

Means to other ends

1. *Hijab* for attraction
 2. Misuse of *hijab*
 3. *Hijab* for a religious impression and statement of morality
-

This process provided patterns and central themes and thus helped in transiting to the third and final step which is Selective coding. At this level of coding we integrated the theoretical points to build a story line of the whole data. This integration and organization of the data along with the mapping of the themes and main categories helped to infer theoretical assumptions about the *hijab* phenomenon (see Figure 2 for mapping). Thus, the process has moved from codes to sub-categories to main categories to themes / central categories.




Figure 2. Interrelations among themes and main categories associated with *hijab* practice in Pakistani society

Before moving to the main analysis of FGD data, an independent coder was employed to establish inter-rater agreement with regard to open coding on a small part of the transcribed data. The coder was a PhD scholar and member of a university faculty, who was experienced in conducting focus groups and writing reports. The coder performed open coding under some guidance from the researcher. Cohen's kappa was calculated. Its value was $k = 0.68$. We also shared the summaries of group discussions with participants so as to establish the agreement between their views and our understanding of those views.

The main categories and their sub-categories that emerged from the data are presented in Table 1. Three central categories/themes appear from these main categories. These are *religious commitment*, *environmental adjustment*, and *psychological satisfaction*. These central categories encapsulate the data as follows:

1. Religion / Religious commitment. This theme includes references to religious injunctions, but these are mixed with insecure environment, culture, family influences, and personal/psychological satisfaction. Only few narrations are focused exclusively on religion and religious commands. Finally, this theme includes three main categories including Textual sources, Religious environment, and Religion in relative terms.

Textual sources. *Hijab/covering* has been recommended at two places in the Qur'anic text (24: 30-31 & 33: 59) and on various occasions in *Hadith* (for example, as cited in Maududi, 1939/2005). Those who refer exclusively to religion and religious text give such statements as *I adopted it after Allah's command* (NW-2 [i.e., narrated by a *niqab*-wearing woman at page 2], code 28). A Headscarf (HS) woman exclaimed *When Islam said it then no excuses, face and even hands should be covered...when Allah said it, He said it. No more arguments* (HS-11, 223).

Then there are others who do not follow the text blindly. They reflect and interpret it. *I would scarf before marriage. Then I read chapter Nur and Ahzaab from Qur'an. It made me think. I felt it's not casual. It is as obligatory as prayers* (HS-3, 140). This type of viewpoint helps to foster the feeling that God is with them and all this is not possible without His support. Such viewpoint also inculcates deep commitment and a sense of distinct identity (Droogsma, 2007; Kopp, 2005). This commitment further strengthens perseverance and continuity of *hijab* practice. Such people resist to various pressures to uncover their faces or heads (El Guindi, 1999; Saktanber & Corbacioglu, 2008).

- *When you pay heed to others' opinion, then it makes you worry about your dress. When you come out of it, only then you will be free and will feel satisfied. (HC-5, 300).*
- *Those who are devoted do not care much about heat or blood pressure. Perhaps I am stronger than others. Those who do not want to cover will not cover in any way. It shows how strong is your faith [dupatta-carrying (DC)-5, 389).*

However, few people are committed at such high levels. It's only a minority (summary code 209). However when they become committed they show resolve and resistance to various situational and social pressures which are aimed at uncovering:

- *Once I had to prove identification in exams. I put my hands on my picture to hide it from a male invigilator. I demanded a woman to come and check it. They had to comply... (NW-10, 105).*

It is the non-committed people who keep inconsistent:

- *Some of the followers of the Prophet showed more faith when they were in proximity to him, but not when they were away. Similarly those who come to madrissa [Al Huda here, a famous religious institute for women in Pakistan] keep practicing as long as they are there, but when they leave, they drop it. These were the women who rarely attended classes there and did not seem interested. (HS-13, 237).*

Religious environment. Religious environment includes religious family, *madrissa* (religious institute), and religious context. As we noted above, *madrissa* and religious sermons can influence the students. They can affect their behavior in two

ways. One is normative, by inspiring through an atmosphere created by senior role models present in the school. And the other is psychological (non-normative), by creating awareness in a way that motivates to meditate on religion. Here are some comments

- *I was learning the Holy Qur'an by heart. I was very fascinated by the elder girls there, who were carrying hijab. So I started it by observing them. It is comfortable now (HS-2, 123, 124).*
- *Many people practice hijab without having really understood the phenomenon. However, Al Huda has created awareness these days...(HS-9, 208).*

However, almost all responses relating to influence of *madrissa* have come from HS women. These Head scarfing women might have more experience of being a part of *madrissas* or being related to the people who have been in touch with such schools. But at the same time some women might be disillusioned with the norms of this school. For example, it was also exclaimed that Al Huda is a platform of elite class. ...*Women from elite class come to Al Huda. Their dupatta is merely a fashion statement, fabric of which is georgette and is see-through. What use of that?* [modern-dressed (MD)-12, 549). Therefore, we may assume that *madrissa* experience is likely to have mixed influence on the minds of the students of such schools.

Religious families may also provide a normative ideal for their children. When one belongs to a *Syed* (descendants of the Prophet's family) or *pir* family (leader of religious cult) or to a particular religious affiliation, it becomes essential to cover them to communicate that they are religious people. It becomes a normative behavior for the women of such families.

- *Some define hijab as face covering, as the syed families usually do. It becomes a question of identity for them. (DC-2, 357, 358).*
- *One of our relatives used not to cover. Now she has become associated with a particular religious ideology. We are almost equal to her grandsons. She even observes purdah from us now [Men (M)-9, 642].*

Some consider that these religious families may be hypocrite:

- *In our area gilanis and syeds much pronounce about purdah, but actually do not practice much.*

The above assertion indicates that religion is sometimes not the sole reason of observing *hijab*. It may just be to show the religious nature of a particular class or people. It may be used to state apparent religious nature of a particular class or people (Shirazi-Mahajan, 1995). *My college mate used to do it only as a formality. (NW-10, 101).* In this line, various social researchers argue that *hijab* is more an issue of class rather than religion (e.g. Hammami, 1990; Khan, 1972; Mumtaz, 1987). However, apart from these sociological determinants, there may be social psychological nature of these practices. Participants see some people as either being forced to covering by their elders, families, or social pressures or constructed as uncommitted and unaware people who merely start the practice to experience a new thing or create a particular/religious image. Such people show inconsistency in their *hijab* practice. They merely cover in certain situation and/or occasions of religious nature, for instance, during *Ramadan*, while listening to *azaan* (calling for prayers), at someone's death, etc. So, *hijab* may serve as an instrument of forming and managing impressions.

Religion in relative terms. Apart from the above assertions, many of the participants describe religion in relative terms. When a religious marker like *hijab* is used for managing impression, it is somewhat natural that this dress might not be considered as a primary component of religious life. Consider the following narrative.

- *Woman's body is naturally inviting sin* (HS-9, 207)
- *Islam recommended face covering but I feel comfortable in scarf* (HS-10, 220).
- *Niqab is obligatory, but we do not practice it as situation does not allow and some believe that it is not obligatory* (HS- summary code)
- *Hijab means covering oneself. Dupatta or face-covering or Head covering. It is good if it satisfies you. Society also approves it. Islam does approve too* (DC-1, 351).

Note how religion is discussed as an additional explanation for a social and natural phenomenon. In fact, covering the body seems to be more important than a particular type of dress. Therefore, this covering can be done in multiple ways, especially in Pakistan, not necessarily in religiously recommended ways. Moreover, participants stress the intrinsic nature of *hijab*, where modesty of character becomes imperative. *Modesty and shame are important. Looks should be pure. It is not necessary that you take hijab to meet this purpose. One, who has no shame, has no faith* (HC-2, 266, 268). Therefore, some other explanations and constructions of the *hijab* phenomenon are displayed by the participants of our study. One of the other explanations is the environment in which one has grown and socialized.

2. Environmental adjustment. The adjustment to environment occurs in two ways: normative, when *hijab* practice is prevalent in a social environment and non-normative, when *hijab* is used as an instrument of protection from insecure and harassing environment.

a. Normative practice / Social adjustment. This occurs in following ways

Normative behavior in a socially demanding environment. The wearer has adopted *hijab* under normative expectations. Religion seems either less important or is of complementary nature with social and cultural norms. Note how societal expectations are emphasized: ...*you should think about what elders prefer, what others opine; these must be considered...* (HC-2, 267). However, when norms define dressing other ways, one has to assimilate to these differences. *When there is migration, you have to modify to meet the dominant culture...going abroad brings a change* (M-3, 593). Societal norms are quite pressing. People who migrate to the dominant cultures usually tend to assimilate the practices of that culture to properly adjust in the new environment. Recently, we have seen this phenomenon being experienced by the Muslim minorities in USA and Europe, specially after 9/11 (Droogsma, 2007; Kopp, 2005). So, veil can also be abandoned in such situations. That the covering practices recline on social environment is also evident in another way. Many women are reported to put off *hijab* whenever it is acceptable in a given space and situation, for instance, at university campus.

Despite emphasizing the social norms, role of religion along with these norms is also acknowledged. *The constraints that a society imposes are actually derived from religion* (M-1, 572). This story is reaching such climax where it is often difficult to differentiate between various roles and characters. Here the two characters are

environment and religion which appear as the conditions of practicing *hijab*. They are so interwoven that an exclusive stance about any of the two becomes tricky. While discussing religion in relative terms, we had seen that the participants added various factors to religious text and here they are mixing again religion with social factors. The following stuff may enlighten us on this issue.

Geographical culture. Certain geographical cultures make the *hijab* practice as necessary as a rule (Anderson, 2006). Quite a number of our participants who are from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK, a province of Pakistan) do not practice *hijab* in Islamabad or Rawalpindi, but shift to *hijab* when they visit their home town. *When we go back KPK, we use a big chador. Not full covering but chador or a big shawl* (MD-4, 468). Men who belong to less developed areas declare that they may not expect *hijab* from their wives-to-be, but would prefer or force them to at least temporarily veil while among their families: *She may not head scarf, but should practice dupatta. When we have to visit my home, she should at least don shawl, if not niqab* (M-11, 661).

Geographical cultures can also be dominant cultures. The male participants in our discussion referred to the urbanization and the related pressures linked with dress. *When we come to big cities, we leave our old norms at home. Here we adopt new things and again wear old attire when return native land* (M-7, 628). This kind of shifting behavior epitomizes the importance of societal and cultural adjustments. There are many ethnicities in Pakistan. This multicolored nature of Pakistani culture also brings about multiplicity in the ways of covering. That's why participants repeatedly signified the need of varied practices in different spaces and geographies.

Family influence. Family institution is influential in terms of family tradition, father's and other family members' influence, and in-laws discretionary attitude. Some of the participants adopt *hijab* simply because there is a family tradition of practicing. They report that they are not directed to do so and they observe *hijab* willingly. It is their own decision. But inspiration is there, however. *Family background matters. Our family observes dupatta. So do I* (DC-2, 363). A non-covering woman explained why she didn't cover *if my circle were like this, if my parents had told me to cover, then perhaps I might start doing it* (MD-11, 545).

On the other hand, many women did not accept this practice in a straightforward way. There were many interactions before their deciding on covering themselves. *It is a common practice in our family. The friends of my sister tried to stop her from covering herself, but she had to wear niqab as it was a family norm* (NW-6, 67). So, we see that it is not always personal decision or commitment. Many are doing so because it is a role expectation (Cole & Ahmadi, 2010). One very prominent figure in this regard is Father. We record that father has played a very important and sometimes decisive role in motivating and modifying the thinking and behavior of many participants:

- *I belong to Syed family. I was quite tall, so looked elderly. Father asked me to try niqab. I went to tuition with niqab. Later, when I was to take it off for going outdoors, he suggested now it would not be good...to take veil off. Thereby I started it continually* (NW-4, 45).
- Another NW explained her covering behavior: *My father very much favors purdah. I donned niqab also to please him* (NW-6, 70).

This gratifying behavior continues from the maternal family to in-laws family as well, and often with stronger pressures (Barkho, Fakhouri, & Arnett, 2010). *One who wears abaya becomes a favorite for marital proposals. It has become a discourse that they are modest. They don't like the jeans-carrying like us...* (NC-2, 453). Men opine this way: *I can't force my girl friend as she still belongs to society, not to me. But when she becomes the part of my family, she must veil. I will force her and get it done, by all means* (M-12, 671).

On the other hand, some sections of society do not prefer veiling or headscarfing girls as their daughters-in-law. Proposals of many NW have been rejected in Pakistan (Shahid, 2008). A NW referred to another friend; *she is very pretty. She observes Islamic purdah (niqab). Her expected in-laws rejected her, saying that how can they bring her to their home if she can't interact with others* (NW-8, 79). The conclusion is reaching that it is not the question whether in-laws ask to veil or unveil. Important issue is this that it is in-laws who seem to decide for their daughter-in-law what to wear (Read & Bartkowski, 2000).

Spatial shifts under normative influence. Many people are not habitually veiling. They do it as per contextual demands. Apart from pressures from in-laws, these social actors have to adopt *hijab* because they would look odd in a situation where *hijab* is a normative behavior. *Where all are carrying it and one who has not, one will feel insecure. But where all are like me (not covering), I won't feel insecure* (MD-6, 491). These women often switch to *hijab* temporarily in such situations as elders' presence, particular ethnic space, and family gathering etc. Here *hijab* functions as an instrument of impression formation.

b. Non-normative / Protection. One important function of wearing *hijab* has been protection from harassment (Kousar, 2011). In this study, the most prevailing and profound explanation for adopting *hijab* has appeared to be the insecure environment. When women adopt *hijab* to move out in an insecure atmosphere, they are negotiating with the environment for protection from harassment; they are not fulfilling a social norm.

General social environment as insecure condition. Sometimes this environment is thought to be rampant in the whole country and sometimes it is from certain sections of society. First we discuss the general environment:

Our country circumstances are such that it has become necessary to do hijab. Hijab is not compulsory Islamically, but we have to don it due to country situation. Where there are Islamic rules and regulations, men have a different attitude. But hijab has become a need here because it is insecure outside...of home (NW-2, 16-17).

Note that insecure environment is more important than religion in deciding whether to cover. Some combine both religion and environment: *The purpose of adopting hijab is that I should not be tortured; I should be secured. That is why the Holy Qur'an told to adopt purdah because no one molests you this way (NW-7, 71).* Others do primarily for protection in insecure environment: *I have chosen hijab for security. It repels any problems...Hijab is necessary even without God's command (NW-2, 22-25).* Here, *hijab* is more a strategy than a social or religious norm.

Specific Insecure Environment. Some wearers show inconsistencies. They take *hijab* when a specific environment or situation is irritating and they drop it elsewhere. These are the strategies and tactics that provide protection and ease of mobility. Some

of the specific spaces include marketplace, pathways, and where lower/illiterate class is working.

- *There are certain things, which are only available at downtown markets. People have piercing eyes there. I used my university gown to veil myself. This way I felt comfortable... (DC-372).*
- Another DC commented: *... the laborers stare at you openly. The educated do not do this way, perhaps because they are concerned with their personality image (DC-5, 385).*
- A head scarfing woman told: *I had to walk through such places as bus stand. It was not secure. So I covered myself with scarf (HS-2, 121).*

Why some social actors keep shifting and do not remain consistent. One explanation was lack of religious commitment. Then we saw that the *hijab* practice is in one sense normative and predominantly a security behavior in another. Yet we saw that a few practitioners do not remain stable. They do drop *hijab* whenever and wherever it is conducive to do so. Examples include such space as educational institutions and such situation as party functions. There might be some other conditions and strategies for this kind of behavior. These may be as follows.

- One DC commented: *For me the environment and the comfort related with it is important (DC-9, 426).*
- A HC asserted: *it depends on environment... Comfort is also required, whether it is abaya, dupatta, or whatever. We should do what makes us comfortable (HC-2, 258-259).*

This indication of significance of comfort points to psychological aspects of *hijab* practice. Both religious commitment and environmental adjustment seem good but insufficient justification of complex phenomenon of *hijab*. We now turn to the psychological factors related to *hijab* practice.

3. Psychological satisfaction. The term satisfaction used for labeling this category is derived directly from the participants' repeated allusions to satisfaction and comfort. The wearers derive this satisfaction by making independent choices related to religious influences, family pressures, social norms, and protection in an insecure environment.

Comfort. Comfort comes through various sources such as willingness, personal style, protection, and appearance-control, etc. Self-decision and willingness is a source of satisfaction and comfort (Jones, 2005). Interactions among certain participants occur during discussions and some of them question as to what will be left of satisfaction and comfort if they adopt the forced choice. Others reply like that *all are saying that feeling comfort is essential but no, it is not so. It is not hijab, it is my environment, my family observes this, Islam has told us to do so. These are the reasons for which I do this. I am Pakistani; it's culture* (HC-3, 282). Reaction to this comes: *all my people wear at home, but I don't like it. I don't believe in it. Dress should be such that covers you properly and that looks fair. Hijab is not compulsory. My brothers do object to my behavior. They are angry and are not on terms with me* (HC-261-265)

Comfort comes with the dress matched with personal style or belief. Some women shift from one form of *hijab* to other for ease of practice. Those who do not wear *hijab* or carry *dupatta* are convinced of their own choice. *We are carrying*

western-type dress not just because peers would resist if we do not wear. But we are carrying it because we like this. We do not want to abandon it. We are fond of it (MD-11, 547).

Perhaps the best source of comfort and satisfaction for the participants is the protection as motive and protection as consequence of *hijab* practice (see also Kousar, 2011). *I feel comfort in hijab and abaya. Boys throw remarks on my college friends, but did nothing of this sort to me (NW-7, 74).* Others opine that the dress that provides comfort is sufficient; it may not be *niqab* or *abaya*. *Wear what makes you comfortable. But one thing must be kept in mind; no parts of body should be prominent...(HS-6, 174).*

Comfort is also brought about by controlling the physical-appearance. A *niqab*-wearing reported: *There is a girl in my hostel. When she is late from class, she wears abaya. This way she is able to hide the rough clothes (NW-10, 99).* A few told that they started *hijab* to control elderly looks at an early age. Few started *hijab* in summer to control the visibility of summer clothes. Though, it appears to be a mundane use of *hijab*, still it implies modesty in some instances.

Hijab practice bears positive outcomes for the wearer. These include respect, confidence, mobility, and above all security and protection.

- *Purdah is restoring the lost status and respect of women, which is not otherwise possible in a society with ills and insecurities. (NW-1, 13).*
- *I did it for security. As a result, it poses no hurdle when I am in niqab. I can shop confidently. So, it becomes essential to take hijab, even if there were no injunction from Allah (NW-2, 22-25).*

Hijab as means to other ends. Beyond protection and respect, women have used *hijab* for such purposes, which are not usually expected. *Hijab* practice may be driven by other motives than identity, protection or social adjustment. As we mentioned earlier, the wearers have been inconsistent in their practice. One condition behind this inconsistency may actually be insecure circumstances. But some people are reported to using *hijab* merely to create certain impressions (for instance, of religiosity) or they are practicing it under familial or other social pressures.

- *Most people take hijab off when they come out of home. A girl who is carrying abaya on leaving home, puts on chador in the bus, and on reaching university, she is left with dupatta only (HS-8, 193,194).*
- *They are carrying abaya and beneath there is jeans etc. they are different from what is their usual image. (HC-3, 276).*
- *The NW have specially adorned and beautified their eyes, to attract boys...(HC-291).*

The above statements also add to the knowledge that beautifying oneself is perhaps natural and it reveals even under all oppressions and restrictions (Harrison, 2007; Khaddarposh, 2004; Woldesemait, 2012). It will be valid to quote what Qur'anic text has on it: *O children of Adam! We have bestowed dress upon you to cover your genitals and serve as protection and adornment. And dress of the piety is best (7: 26)*. It seems using dress for a better appearance is religiously acceptable unless it goes beyond piety. One of the men in our discussions surmised...*hijab is reconciliation between security and attractability (M-8, 637)*.

However, this utilitarian use of *hijab* sometimes catches up to worse directions. For instance, there are others who are regular wearers and use *hijab* only when they have to hide their identity for very personal reasons like dating and prostitution. However such people are few and make only a minority of the wearers:

- *Some girls borrow burqa from us and go for dating. It degrades the image of other niqab-wearing girls like us* (NW-3, 35).
- *Hijab is used for illegal and indecent purpose. Therefore, people have a negative view of hijab women* (NW-3, 42).

Dealing with negative consequences. Despite the HW women are stigmatized due to immodest practices of a small group of women, they show deterrence and stability. They have to deal with demands to uncover their faces in certain situations. They exhibit perseverance in response. However, they are disillusioned when they perceive that they are still being harassed, the primary condition under which they had adopted the practice. This reading of veil is missing in the known literature. A NW woman reported:

- *I am not secure even after having adopted hijab. People show the same behavior* (NW-1, 2).
- *People stare at every girl, be in jeans, be in niqab. The completely covered girl will be more focus of attention, thinking that she is more original...*(DC-11, 438, 439).

The *hijab*-wearing are treated negatively at work place in Muslim minority countries (Syed & Pio, 2010). The present analysis showed that they face discriminatory treatment in academic, public, and workplace settings. They get low

grades, are viewed as conservative and are treated differently at party functions. Sometimes, they are favored in public organizations and for teacher jobs. But in private organizations, they are not welcome and are less likely to be hired.

I applied for a job. They told me not to wear abaya and commented that it was not Al Huda institute/sermon. I was asked to wear in a simple way such as dupatta etc. So it does cause hindrance (HS-5, 161, 162).

In this social arena, there are communication and identification problems as well. However, these hindrances are not limited to responses of other people. There are some natural and inherent problems. For instance, some wearers report that *hijab* is an arduous practice to continue in the heat of summer and for those who have breathing and related problems. Veiling may cause tuberculosis (Khaddarposh, 2004) and ventilatory problems (Alghadir, Aly, & Zafar, 2012).

Discussion and Conclusions: Identifying a Theoretical Base

Despite the negative consequences, the *hijab* actors show resilience and continue their practice. What helps them do so? Earlier we found that it is their religious commitment. When the analysis proceeded, the argument expanded to include the psychological satisfaction that comes through adjustment in an insecure environment and sometimes also through following the social norms. However, those are better able to retain the practice, who have adopted the phenomenon by their own choice and willingness. Despite this focus on the self, our participants report that the personality dispositions of the *Hijab*-wearing (HW) are not essentially different from the non-HW. However, they may develop changes after having adopted *hijab*. For instance, they exhibit less socializing and more honest behavior.

When religion asks to cover, what does it aim at? There are two references in Qura'n relating to covering the body; the first one emphasizes protection from harassment in an insecure context and second is modesty so that society could avoid sexual chaos (Naik, 2008). The participants in the present study reasoned that Islam requires them to cover their bodies when they go out of home. Thus they are indicating the condition of insecure environment and requirement of protection. They also think that *hijab* is more intrinsic i.e. modesty of character (*It is all in heart and lies in the eyes of the beholder* (NW) than extrinsic (covering the body). Nonetheless, in a sexually intimidating atmosphere extrinsic covering also becomes necessary. But still they argue that *it can be done in multiple ways and that there is freedom of choice in Pakistan. It is up to you* (HS).

From this argument, we summarize that phenomenon of *hijab* is of diverse nature. The conditions of practicing *hijab* are so interrelated that one cannot be separated from the other. Women emphasize their agency in choosing a dress code. When they opt for *hijab*, they do exercise this autonomy. They do not ignore their psychological satisfaction while choosing this dress, which also provides them security and protection. This decision is sometimes guided by religion and sometimes by a particular family and cultural environment in which they are living (as there are many subcultures in Pakistan which recommend their own way of covering) (Anderson, 2006). Nevertheless, this decision is primarily governed by their personal choice that matches their minds and temperaments. That is why the modern dressed women also feel secure in their own attire, as their outfit matches their personality and their immediate social environment. Nevertheless, a majority of those who remain inconsistent in *hijab* practice, wear *hijab* in order to achieve normative adjustment

and perceived protection. The following epilogue supports the notion that we are trying to heading to.

Hijab means woman's protection, it shuns bad looks. It depends on environment. There are different modes (of covering). Comfort is also required. Some wear abaya, other wear dupatta. We should do what makes us comfortable. I wear abaya when I go outdoors (HC).

On the basis of this analysis, we propose that there are three factors / conditions for *hijab* in Pakistan (see Figure 3). These are religion, environment, and psychological satisfaction. However, these three are not just conditions, but interwoven in such a fashion that one becomes condition for the other and the other becomes a context for the third one. For instance, environment and social norms are a condition for wearing *hijab* and sometimes people switch to this dress temporarily in a context where wearing such dress is a norm. Sometimes psychological satisfaction is a function /consequence of *hijab* practice, but it also serves as a condition for certain women who are not willing to follow religious and cultural norms unless they find *hijab* as satisfying and comfortable. From this, it appears that a *hijab* actor wears this dress code under environmental and religious conditions to negotiate with an insecure environment and this practice bears her comfort and satisfaction by adopting a particular mode of covering which is at once socially acceptable, is endorsed by religious text, and matches personal temperament.




Figure 3. Central themes around *hijab* practice in Pakistani society

Theoretical propositions. A work based in grounded theory requires generating a theory (McLeod, 2001). Following propositions and hypotheses are derived from the grounded theory analysis of the data obtained from group discussions. These propositions belong to three spheres.

1. Religion / Religious commitment. Those who are more religiously committed show more continuity and perseverance. Religiously committed people are those who have strong faith in religion. Therefore, these people will show high religiosity with regard to beliefs. As they are practicing *hijab* under religious influence, the more consistent practitioners are also more likely to practice other tenets of Islam such as prayers and fasting. The *niqab*-wearing in general and the headscarfing in particular refer more to religion than other participants. Those who happen to live in a religious environment such as religious family (especially *Syeds*), a particular religious sect, or attending a religious school are more likely to adopt *hijab*. It is the headscarf group that expresses more religious environmental experiences, especially of *madrissa* influence.

Although religious text is the source of deciding on *hijab*, majority of the people consider that there is a freedom of choice in religion and modesty of character

(intrinsic *hijab*) is more important than a particular dress code. Such people are likely to choose among multiple ways to cover. However, the headscarfing are relatively less likely to be contented with modesty only and will be more concerned with satisfaction/comfort in extrinsic dress code, i.e., *hijab*. On the other hand the headcovering and *dupatta*-carrying may be looking for alternative ways to cover.

At the same time, those who believe in multiplicity of choices are also more likely to show shifts in this practice, perhaps because they have not internalized the phenomenon and are not strongly committed. They may wear *hijab* more at their native locality, at religious occasions, and other such situations where they are expected to communicate their religious identity.

Religiosity and covering practice is evident more in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and less urbanized areas of Pakistan. We presume that covering practice (not strictly *niqab* and scarf) is more common in KPK, Baluchistan, and less developed areas of Punjab and Sind in comparison to more developed urban areas of Punjab and Sind.

2. Cultural and environmental adjustment. Urbanization necessitates acculturation. Women from KPK and other less developed areas leave *hijab* practice temporarily, but on return to their hometowns, they do shift to *hijab*. Moreover, it is the headcovering and *dupatta*-carrying group who display more concern for environmental adjustments and normative behavior. They keep shifting to other modes of covering in different contexts.

Family norms and influence play an important role in choice of dress. One peripheral proposition is that in-laws determine or at least influence the decision as to what their daughter-in-law will wear after marriage. Though some people object to

her wearing *hijab/niqab* before marriage, most prefer this practice. We infer from this that these women may be well adjusted in their marital life.

The predominant condition of *hijab* practice is protection in an insecure environment, whether women do permanent veil or make shifts. This is more pronounced a condition among the *niqab*-wearing and more pronounced a context among the *dupatta*-carrying. Though many report and believe that there is no differential effect of dress, we suggest that the *hijab* wearing women (*niqab* and scarf) will have less harassment experiences than other women. The difference may be small though.

3. Psychological Satisfaction. One of the primary function as well as motive of *hijab* is comfort. As a consequence of *hijab* practice, they gain satisfaction, confidence, and ease of mobility. Some of them also show resilience and persistence in their practice. Sometimes those who choose to cover only temporarily also gain such purposes. We presume that *hijab* practice (*niqab* and scarf) in this way increases self-efficacy, esteem, and hence their psychological well-being. This effect is likely to be stronger for those who practice it consistently. However, the modern-dressed are also satisfied in their dress as it is their own choice.

Despite the satisfaction and comfort gained at psychological level, the *hijab*-wearing women may face a biased treatment at social level, namely, marketplace, entertainment/parties, and most importantly, at workplace. On the basis of our results we propose that the *niqab*-wearing and headscarf women have a more risk of discrimination at private organizations and relatively equal chance of hiring at public organizations. Some of the *hijab*-wearing persist even against health odds. Others are

inconsistent in this regard. Therefore, it is likely that the *hijab*-wearing (*niqab* and headscarf) face more health problems than other women.

Some or most of the above propositions or hypotheses can be verified in future research by using surveys, longitudinal studies and/or post-hoc experiments. However, the generalization power of the study might have been compromised as we inducted the participants only from the educated middle class of urban areas. But like most qualitative studies, we assume that these propositions have important implications for a major section of society and can therefore be inductively employed to formulate theoretical foundation on a macro level.

Some of the above assumptions are also supported by previous literature (e.g., health issues). However, for next study (Study 2), we are interested in only those constructs that centrally surround the phenomenon of *hijab* and were strongly asserted in focus group discussion. We will also be looking for those, which can have different implications in Pakistan (e.g. variability of dress code in geographical cultures). Therefore, for next study, we will explore the propositions related to religious commitment and religiosity (by measuring religiousness), environmental adjustment (by reporting sexual harassment experiences), and psychological satisfaction (by assessing psychological well being).

We will also tap the impact of such sociological variables as ethnic differences (e.g. Punjabi, Sindhi, etc; this variable is derived from importance of geographical cultures), religious affiliation/sect (e.g. *sunni*, *shiite*, etc; this factor is derived from literature on *hijab* and from the focus of *madrissa* influence in the present study), familial aspects (such as type of covering practiced in family), and socioeconomic conditions (income) on choosing particular attire. Other important assumptions such

as those about marital adjustment, family/father influence, discrimination and biased treatment, physical health, and personality differences seem to be lying at the peripheries and were not predominantly stressed in focus group discussions. Hence, these may be explored in future extension and confirmation of the theory that may emerge from the present research.

The next study of the present research is designed to be a quantitative measurement of the themes categories derived from the grounded theory analysis. Drawing from the propositions given above, the next study (Study 2) addresses the following research questions:

1. What are the various conditions under which women choose a particular type of dress? More focus will be on knowing what conditions guide women to opt for *hijab* (*niqab* and headscarf).
2. Do women wearing various types of dress differ on religiosity, psychological well-being, and sexual harassment experiences? Specially we will focus on whether the *hijab*-wearing women (*niqab* and headscarf) differ from other women on the said variables. We are also interested in examining whether these differences hold more strongly for those women who have been covering themselves consistently and for longer period of time.
3. Do women from different social cultural background differ with respect to their dress code? That is, whether *hijab* is practiced more in a certain social group than the other. The social cultural factors that we will target are ethnic identity, religious affiliation/sect, familial aspects, and economic conditions.

4. Does social desirability have any effect on self-reporting of religiosity, psychological well-being, and sexual harassment experiences? This question has been selected because of the fact that desirable responding can seriously affect such variables as religiosity and sexual harassment (McAndrew & Voas, 2011).

INTRODUCTION TO VARIABLES EMERGING FROM FOCUS

GROUP DISCUSSIONS

The present study aims at understanding the phenomenon of *hijab* practice and addresses the question as to under what conditions and contexts some people take to veiling in a country where *hijab* is neither banned nor compulsory. Study 1 was a qualitative research and involved focus group discussions. Carrying over the findings from the previous study, we intend to expand them on a larger and representative sample in this study. In the following lines, we present an overview of the literature related to construct definitions and measurement issues about the variables that emerged from Study 1.

Religion and Social Cultural Factors

A major problem faced by all social scholars is trying to measure constructs that have no clear principles. A similar challenge is faced while measuring how religious an individual is. Religion is a multi-dimensional concept consisting of behaviors, experiences, beliefs, and social or cultural traditions (Scheitle, 2008). Religion is a highly complex phenomenon. It covers a diversity of meanings as well as being multi-faceted in construct: cultural, organizational, personal, and behavioral. This is clear from the variety of disciplines which cover or overlap with religion such as theology, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and political science (McAndrew & Voas, 2011).

The first formal theoretical model was presented by Glock (as cited in McAndrew & Voas, 2011) who suggested that religiosity had five core dimensions: belief, knowledge, experience (religious emotional), practice, and social consequences

(welfare). Nonetheless, the social-consequences dimension and religiosity have not much to do with one another, as recent extremist activity and fundamentalist activism often shows. Further, very rarely is religious knowledge an indicator of religiosity. In fact, a profound disparity exists between nonbelievers and the faithful; the former expressing far more religious knowledge than the latter. This fact led to a humor article titled “Want to Know More About God? Ask an Atheist” (Crawford, 2011, p.10).

It has become conventional to focus on three aspects of religiousness: belief, practice, and affiliation. Belief in God and in afterlife or a transcendent order is fundamental to most religions. Religious behavior, such as prayer or attendance at services, may be a more exacting standard, requiring a commitment of time. Some people may attend purely for family or social reasons, and other highly religious people may not be able to do so for physical reasons, but generally it is reasonable to assume that practice and belief correspond (McAndrew & Voas, 2011). Other measures of religiosity include formal religious service attendance, personal practices, beliefs and views on the importance of religion, religious identity, and family communication or community connections (Lippman, Michelsen, & Roehlekepartain, 2005).

Qualities and categories such as religious denomination, place of worship, frequency of worship or type of religiosity can accordingly be quantified so long as we are clear about what they mean. Measurement also requires discipline and use of definitions which can be justified to others and replicated by them. While quantification of religiosity is possible (with a large scholarly literature testimony to this), there are still no clear standards regarding what aspects should be measured. Different aspects may relate to fundamentally different types of religiosity

(McAndrew & Voas, 2011).

There is another problem. Social desirability bias can affect responses on a religious survey. People may not admit to unusual beliefs or practices, or conversely, exaggerate their religious conformity or frequency of churchgoing. People exaggerate their attendance at religious services to a surprising degree. In a major study, Hadaway et al. (as cited in McAndrew & Voas, 2011) compared self-reported attendance from polls with actual counts of people in church, finding substantial differences. A study in this regard found that about 22 percent of Americans actually attend religious services in any given week, in contrast to the 40 percent usually found from opinion polling. A similar phenomenon has been found in Britain (Brierley, as cited in McAndrew & Voas). Therefore, for all measures of religion and religiosity, the reliability of people's responses over time can be surprisingly low.

Keeping the above complications under consideration, we are attempting to measure religiosity by beliefs, practices, importance of religion, and religious affiliation / religious sect. Religious sect will be inquired about in a separate demographic sheet and will not form a part of questionnaire. We are thus excluding religious knowledge and social consequences dimension. As social desirability may inflate the responses on any religious scale, we will control this effect by using a social desirability measure. Social desirability works more strongly in a culture where religion is an unquestioned entity. Similarly, Liaquat's (2012) study indicated that people in Pakistan score invariably high on religiousness measures. We will deal with this issue in two ways. First, we will field test our selected measure(s) with regard to response variance and go ahead for the final study with an appropriate instrument. Second, we will also focus on practices component. This component is more likely to dig out the individual differences on religiousness among the Pakistani population.

The analysis in Study 1 indicated that some women are influenced by *madrissas*. These religious schools represent a particular religious school of thought. This school of thought is specifically linked with extremism shown during and after 9/11 incidents. In post-9/11 scenario in Pakistan, we noted a radicalization in some parts of society. Many social scholars are of the view that religiousness increased as a result of this radicalization. This also had an impact on dress code. Arabic outlook of dress made ways into our lives. Consequently, some social scholars believe, *abaya/niqab* replaced the indigenous *burqa* (F. Bari, personal communication, August 2, 2010; M. Pervez, personal communication, July 12, 2010). In this regard the present study aims to compare incidence of *niqab/abaya* among participants of different religious affiliations / schools of thought.

The findings of Study 1 showed that family environment plays a pivotal role in inculcating particular attire among women. One of its dimensions is religious, where religious families (particularly those who are descendants of Prophet's family, called *Syeds*). The other dimension is cultural, where families teach their female children to cover themselves for preserving their honor under the norms that require women of modest and high strata families to cover themselves (Khan, 1999; Mumtaz, 1987). Both dimensions will be targeted in Study 2. Other cultural and social factors have been defined in Chapter V.

Psychological Satisfaction

To measure the theme of psychological satisfaction that emerged from Study 1, three indicators have been selected from Ryff's (1989) and Ryff and Keyes' (1995) model of well being. This model has been opted because of its global application and being a first attempt to work on a theory-guided definition of positive psychological

functioning with additional statistical merit. We selected three subscales, namely, Autonomy, Purpose in life, and Self-acceptance. These scales can measure the psychological satisfaction in three ways: positive self image anticipated on opting *hijab* or obtained by adopting *hijab*; emphasis on self-decision/choice in selecting a particular clothing; and control that a person gains over one's life by having chosen a particular kind of dress. The selected subscales are also in line with various feminist studies that say that *hijab* is empowering and is a source of autonomy and self-esteem (for example, Corrigan, McCorkle, Schell, & Kidder, 2003; Mule & Barthel, 1992; Rastmanesh, Gluck, & Shadman, 2009).

Sexual Harassment Experiences

In focus group discussions, the insecure environment was seen as forcing women to take to covering themselves. Some opt it permanently while others switch to covering practices in harassing environment. In Study 2, we aim to measuring harassment experiences to see if women can avert sexual harassment by covering themselves. We do not consider harassment as occurring at workplace only, rather we take it up as happening at various places and in multiple contexts. It is reported that harassers are more likely to be co-workers than supervisors. Thus, the harassment may occur at any place where the perpetrators are of equal status, not just by the boss at the workplace. Feldman (2006) suggests that sexual harassment is not merely an issue of workplace. Various girl students have also reported being the target of some kind of harassment. Overall, estimates reveal that one of every two women will be harassed at some point during her educational or working life.

We turn to EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as cited in Helgeson, 2005) for our understanding of the phenomenon. EEOC defines sexual

harassment as: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decision affecting such individual or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. In the present study, Gelfand, Fitzgerald, and Drasgow's (1995) model will be followed through an indigenously developed measure, namely, Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire (Iqbal & Kamal, 2001). This model outline three levels of harassment: Gender harassment such as sexist remarks and stories; Unwanted sexual attention such as physical touching, frequent requests of dating; and Sexual coercion such as negative results for refusals to having sex.

With the research questions presented in the previous chapter and having outlined the nature of the variables included in these questions in the above section we head towards Study 2. This will be a quantitative survey of the questions based on the themes emerging from Study 1.

STUDY 2: COMPARISON OF FIVE DRESS GROUPS ON STUDY

VARIABLES

The present study is based on findings of previous study (Study 1). Study 1 was a qualitative research and involved focus group discussions (FGDs). The present study involves two phases, Phase I and Phase II.

Study 2: Phase I (Selection, Adaptation, and Psychometric Properties of Instruments)

Phase I aims at adapting the instruments selected to measure the variables derived from Study 1 and establishing psychometric appropriateness of these instruments. An elementary analysis will be undertaken to explore religiousness, psychological wellbeing, and sexual harassment experiences among urban women wearing *hijab* and other modes of dress (as specified in the previous chapter). Phase II will involve a relatively larger sample to conduct the main/final analysis of the study.

Objectives. Following are the purposes of the Phase I of Study 2:

1. Adaptation of instruments
2. Examining the comprehensibility, feasibility of administration, and psychometric properties of adapted versions of instruments.
3. A preliminary analysis regarding main questions of the study.

Operational Definitions. Based on the findings of Study 1 and review of literature, certain variables were selected to be measured in the present study. These have been defined in following lines.

Religiousness. Religiosity comprises three components: religious practices, religious hope (faith), and importance of religion in daily life and will be assessed through Religiousness Measure (Sethi & Seligman, 1993).

Psychological well being. Psychological well-being (PWB, hereafter) will be tapped by three constructs. These include autonomy, purpose in life, and self-acceptance. These three have been selected from total six scales of Ryff and Keyes' (1995) model of PWB.

Self-acceptance. High scorer possesses a positive attitude toward the self; acknowledges and accepts multiple aspects of self, including good and bad qualities; feels positive about past life. Low scorer feels dissatisfied with self; is disappointed with what has occurred with past life; is troubled about certain personal qualities; wishes to be different than what he or she is.

Autonomy. High scorer is self-determining and independent; able to resist social pressures to think and act in certain ways; regulates behavior from within; evaluates self by personal standards. Low scorer is concerned about the expectations and evaluations of others; relies on judgments of others to make important decisions; conforms to social pressures to think and act in certain ways.

Purpose in life. High scorer has goals in life and a sense of directedness; feels there is meaning to present and past life; holds beliefs that give life purpose; has aims and objectives for living. Low scorer lacks a sense of meaning in life; has few goals

or aims, lacks sense of direction; does not see purpose of past life; has no outlook or beliefs that give life meaning.

Sexual Harassment Experiences. The participants will be asked to report their sexual harassment experiences (SH or SH experiences, henceforth) as defined by Gelfand , Fitzgerald, and Drasgow's (1995) dimensions, and as incorporated in Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire (SHEQ; Anila, 1998). This model includes:

Gender harassment. It involves such behaviors that aim at degrading and hostile attitude toward women. These behaviors are not targeted to sexual cooperation. Examples include sexist remarks and stories.

Unwanted sexual attention. It includes verbal and nonverbal behaviors that range from physical touching and frequent nonreciprocal requests of dating to forcing a sexual assault.

Sexual coercion. The coercive behaviors condition work-related benefits on sexual cooperation. There are negative results or threats for negative results for refusals to having sex.

Sexual harassment experiences are intended to be measured as one of the consequences/outcomes of *hijab* in negative direction. That is, the more one covers oneself, the less the harassment experiences.

Social Desirability. Social desirability is the tendency to present a favorable impression of oneself (Van de Mortel, 2008) and will be assessed by Stöber's (2001) Social desirability Scale.

Types of Dress. The following types/groups were partly modeled after Dunkel, Davidson, and Qurashi (2010) and Harmensen's model (as cited in Kopp, 2005) in USA, and largely by considering the diverse nature of dressing in Pakistani society.

Niqab-Wearing (NW). They wear *niqab* (face veil, a cloth/headscarf that cover head, neck, and face except eyes) along with *abaya* (long, usually black cloak/gown) etc.

Head-Scarving (HS). They wear headscarf, with face open, along with *abaya* etc.

Head-Covering (HC). They cover their head with *chador/dupatta* but don't wear *abaya* etc.

Dupatta-Carrying (DC). The DC mostly carry some piece of cloth along their usual dress but do not cover head with it. They usually wear traditional Pakistani dress such as *shalwar qameez* (trousers with loose upper part and relatively narrow bottom along with long shirt).

Modern-Dressed (MD). Modern dressed are the women who do not wear *dupatta* formally. They may carry such piece of cloth as a muffler or fashionable scarf. They may also wear western type attire.

Ethnicity / ethnic identity. The respondents will report to which ethnic group they identify with (for example, Punjabi, Baluchi, etc).

Religious affiliation/sect. Religious affiliation is represented by the sect / school of thought to which one belongs. For example, *Barelvi*, *Deobandi*, and *Shiite*, etc

Familial aspects. Familial aspects will be assessed in three ways. These include: type of dress worn by other women in family, family environment / in-laws' will as a reason for adopting *hijab*, and whether one belongs to a *Syed* family. The findings from the Study 1 present familial aspects as both conditions and interactional strategies of *hijab*-wearers (HW).

Socioeconomic conditions. It will be assessed through monthly income of participants' own and their family's monthly income. Following variables also have been defined according to the findings of Study 1.

Conditions of hijab. Condition stands for the external reason or the motive of a participant for choosing a specific type of dress. Nine conditions were derived from the findings of Study 1. These include: culture/environment of the country, family environment/influence, husband/in-laws/fiance's influence, feeling of protection /security, religious commands, influence of religious sermon / religious institute (*madrissa*), self-decision/will, satisfaction and comfort, and respect. Some of these factors may also act as context of wearing a dress. Such factors are family, in-laws' influence, and religious institute.

Context of dress. Context refers to those conditions and situations that may lead a person to make certain modifications in the ways of covering oneself. For example, if one does not cover one's head usually, but almost always cover their heads with *chador* while staying at native town. Here the context may be termed as influence of geographical culture / ethnic space, which is also a condition for those who permanently practice this mode of dressing while living in their home towns. Among the variables given here, ethnicity, religious sect, familial aspects, and socioeconomic conditions may serve contextual factors.

Consistency of dress. Consistency refers to how frequently a person wears a specific dress. This may implicitly mean consistency across the situations as well. This factor is covered by having respondents choose one among the 4-point continuum, from *seldom* to *almost always*. This constitutes one of the situational strategies of *hijab*.

Continuity of dress. This means how many years and months one has practiced a particular dress.

Outcomes/Consequences. These refer to those factors which either reside in the mind of a person while deciding on a dress or emerge as a result after having practiced such dress. Here, psychological well being and sexual harassment experiences are likely to be the outcomes of wearing a certain dress. Well being can, however, be a correlated factor and not necessarily an outcome of wearing a dress.

Phase I: Step I (Selection and Adaptation of Instruments)

The themes arising from Study 1 need to be expanded to a larger population. To meet this purpose, certain self-report instruments were chosen. The present part of study deals with adaptation of some of the tools (Religiousness Measure and Social Desirability Scale) so that their appropriateness for indigenous culture could be ensured.

Instruments. Following instruments were selected and adapted/modified in Step I of Phase I.

Informed Consent Form. This form included brief introduction to the purpose of the research and the information about the right of the participants about

confidentiality of the data. Participants were required to sign the statement that they are participating in the study with their willingness (see Appendix D).

Demographic sheet/questionnaire. Results of Study 1 led to the construction of demographic sheet, specially in such points as conditions of *hijab*/dress, incidence (consistency) of *hijab*/dress practice, *hijab*/dress practice in family, etc. Other information such as age, education, ethnic identity, occupation income, type of *hijab*/dress, and religious affiliation, etc. found their way into demographic sheet because of their importance as emphasized in theoretical literature about *hijab* (for details, see Appendix E). As the information required in demographic sheet is quite broad and has taken the shape of a questionnaire, we will be using interview format for those participants who are not able to easily grasp the nature of information sought in the sheet.

Religiousness Measure (RM).The issues and problems related to measuring religiousness have been discussed in previous chapter. One of them is invariability and extreme positive response pattern in a society like Pakistan where religion has die-hard followers. To address this hazard, we selected some measures and pre-tested them on 32 women living in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Most of them were university students and few were working in university.

Response analysis and feedback obtained from the participants showed that most of the measures were not either well understood by the participants or were responded on extreme positive end of the options. Such instruments can be of no use because they provide no variation in a construct and hence are useless in understanding a construct as well as for carrying statistical analysis. Of these instruments, Religiousness Measure (Sethi & Seligman, 1993) was, however, an









instrument that was relatively easily understood and yielded varied responses to some extent. It also seemed to be applicable to an Islamic society. Hence we decided to go ahead with this tool.









Religiousness Measure (RM; Sethi & Seligman, 1993) included three topics: Religious influence in daily life, Religious involvement, and Religious hope (see Appendix F). The measure of religious influence in daily life had seven items (e.g., "To what extent do your religious beliefs influence whom you associate with?"; "To what extent do your religious beliefs influence what you eat and drink?"). Each question was placed on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all influential) to 7 (extremely influential). Religious involvement was measured by three items (e.g., "How often do you attend religious services?"; "How often do you pray?"). To answer these, six choices were available, ranging from "several times a day" to "less than once a month." The religious hope measure contained six questions (e.g., "Do you believe there is a heaven?"; "Do you believe your suffering will be rewarded?"). Answers to these questions were on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (disagree) to 7 (agree). Item 1 is a monotheistic sorting item and item 7 is used for additional information. Thus, these items are not used for computing composite religiousness score.

The questionnaire was standardized with 623 Americans belonging to different religions, including Islam. Reliability was not assessed in any formal manner. Validity was found by establishing significant differences between the fundamentalist, moderate, and liberal sections of the standardization sample (Sethi & Seligman, 1993).

Psychological Well Being Scale (PWB). PWB (Urdu version; Ansari, 2010) is a 54-item scale that includes six subscales, *Autonomy, Environment mastery, Personal growth, Positive relations with others, Purpose in life, and Self-acceptance* (Appendix G). These scales are derived from Ryff’s (1989) and Ryff and Keyes’ (1995) model of well-being. Ansari’s Urdu subscales were standardized on adult Pakistani sample and yielded Cronbach’s alpha equal to .85. Internal consistency coefficients were not reported for subscales. We selected three subscales, namely, *Autonomy, Purpose in life, and Self-acceptance*. These are the three variables that suit measuring what we found from grounded theory analysis of FGDs in Study 1.

The three selected subscales make 27 items. These items are responded on 6-point Likert scale, ranging from Strongly Agree to Strong Disagree. Each subscale is composed of nine items. Examples include:

        “ (My decisions are not usually influenced by what everyone else is doing.) (Autonomy)

        (I like most aspects of my personality.) (Self acceptance)

Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire (SHEQ). SHEQ was developed by Anila (1998, based upon three-component model by Gelfand, Fitzgerald, & Drasgow, 1995) for employed women. The measure was later modified for various research purposes. One of them was to use with student population by Iqbal and Kamal (2001). One of the important modifications was to replace Boss/co-worker’ with ‘Man’ (see Appendix H). This modified version is a 35-item measure with 4-point Likert scale, response options range from Never to Often. All the items are phrased in positive direction. The questionnaire has three sub-scales. These are

The 2001 version of the scale contains 16 items, though still called SDS-17 (Appendix I). One item that had negative item-total correlation was discarded in this version. Items can be responded on True/False format. Example statements include: “I always accept others’ opinions, even when they don’t agree with my own” and “I occasionally speak badly of others behind their back.” Maximum score is 16. Items 1, 5, 6, 10, 14, and 16 are reverse keyed.

Procedures. Religiousness Measure (Sethi & Seligman, 1993) was adapted and translated with advance permission of authors (Appendix J). A panel of three Ph.D experts was inducted. These experts were asked to review the measure with regard to its difficulty, cultural appropriateness, and questions of present research. These judges had experience in qualitative research and had scholarly knowledge of religion. We incorporated their guidance and suggestions. Hence we made certain modifications and changes in the questionnaire. These change involved rephrasing some items (for example, original item no. 10 *How much influence do your religious beliefs have on whom you associate with?* was replaced with *How much influence do your religious beliefs have on with whom you will relate or be friends with?*). Certain words were replaced (e.g. *Qur’an* replaced *Holy scriptures* in original item 3). Item no. 1 *Do you believe in God* was replaced with *How religious person you consider yourself*. It was done because all the respondents were Muslim women and there was weak probability of any negative response. Response format was also changed from 7-point to 5-point rating, as the judges thought that it might be difficult for the local population to comprehend the anchors of 7-point scale. The order of items was also changed in order to reduce the response set. This response set was likely because in original instrument, certain items belonging to one subscale were given together in a series.

This initial adapted version was distributed among eight bilingual experts for translation into Urdu. Five of these experts had minimum qualification of M.Phil (psychology) three were English language teachers who had minimum five years teaching experience. Five translations were returned. The committee approach was adopted to review and finalize the translation. This committee was composed of a Ph.D. member, the research supervisor, and the researcher himself. The new Urdu version was thus finalized in two committee meetings.

We then inducted experts for the back translation of this version into English. Six bilinguals were involved. The same procedure and criteria as cited above was adopted to finalize the back translated version. The adapted and back translated versions were shared with the author of the original measure who extended some suggestions. No major change was suggested by the author. However, few minor changes were requested. We integrated these accordingly. For example, *How much you consider yourself a religious person?* was replaced by *How religious person you consider yourself?* This final version (Appendix K) was then approved by the original authors (Appendix L). No particular amendment was done in PWB scales, except for slight modification in Instructions. These scales were used and modified with the permission of author (Appendix M).

Earlier version of SHEQ was used in various organizational settings. Present study targets to study harassment experiences in various public situations. So we required modifying this tool. This was done with the due permission of authors (see Appendix N). Additions were made to item 26 and 32 [added *talimi idara waghaira* (education institution etc)], and item 27 [added *talim ya kisi kaam* (education or other things)]. We added two new phrases “email” and “sms” to earlier phrase “love letter”

in item 22. We did so to make the statement more suiting to the current social networking world.

SDS-17, though developed in the west; the researcher and the supervisor considered this measure as having no culture-sensitive content. However, it contained some difficult phrases and words. We decided that these difficulties were likely to be reduced or removed while translating the scale. Same procedure and criteria as cited above was adopted for translation and back translation of SDS-17, with the due permission of the author (Appendix O). Bilingual experts were required to translate in simple Urdu so that oddities in English version may be eliminated. The committee reviewed the translation and finalized the Urdu version in two meetings.

Phase I: Step II (Try Out of Instruments)

This section of Study 2 is aimed at establishing comprehensibility, response patterns and feasibility of administration of the newly adapted instruments.

Participants. Thirty three women between the age of 20 and 43 years ($M = 25.79$, $SD = 6.84$) participated in the study. Purposive sampling, a non probability technique was used to induct the participants. In actual we target to engage women from 20 to 40 years. It has been decided because the *hijab*-wearing are usually urban women in their twenties and early thirties (Khan, 1999; Odeh, 1993). It has been commonly observed that, in Pakistan, women in their forties usually do not use face veil and *abaya* and take to other forms of covering (such as *chador*). Majority of the participants were students of public sector universities ($n = 24$, 72.7%). Others were university employees in different capacities. These respondents represented all the five types of clothing that are the target of the study, though the headcovering (HC) category outnumbered the other groups ($n = 20$, 60.6%). These women were residing

in Rawalpindi and Islamabad; most of them having Punjabi identity ($n = 20$, 74.1%). The rest belonged to KPK, Kashmir, and Northern areas. Most participants were from *Sunni* sect ($n = 17$, 54.8%).

Instruments. Following adapted or modified versions of instruments were used:

1. Informed Consent Form
2. Demographic sheet
3. Religiousness Measure (RM; Sethi & Seligman, 1993)
4. Psychological Well Being Scales (PWB; Ansari, 2010)
5. Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire (SHEQ; Iqbal & Kamal, 2001)
6. Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Stöber, 2001)

Procedures. The adapted versions of instruments were then taken to the field. The participants were contacted with due permission of the authorities of the institution. Informed consent was obtained from respondents. They were briefed about the purpose of the study. Most administrations were in group-setting, while others were distributed individually. It took 20 minutes on average to complete the self-report instruments. Female associate was employed to contact the participants specially in certain instances where it was probable that women would be hesitant to respond to sensitive issues of *purdah* and sexual harassment experiences. Homebound women might be among such persons who show reluctance in such affairs. The female associate was Masters in psychology and was briefed about the nature and purpose of research. She was also given informal training in the procedures related to

administration of instruments. Respondents were also required to provide feedback regarding the comprehensibility and suitability of questionnaires and demographic information.

Results and Discussion. The responses about the suitability and difficulty of instruments were carefully considered. Modifications to the tools were made accordingly. We noted that women were somewhat reluctant in openly reporting their harassment experiences. It might be possible that some women might not have ever had any such experiences, yet a few verbally expressed their disliking for reporting on such questionnaires. Though a good number of respondents were contacted by female associate, some data were obtained by the researcher himself as well. So we decided to eradicate this hesitation by adding the name of female supervisor along with the mail researcher's name given in the Informed Consent Form. Consequently we replaced the pronoun for the researcher [I] with that for both researchers [we]

There were some problems in demographic sheet too; For example, in respondents' failure to identify themselves on ethnic identity, reporting their income, and religious affiliation/sect. This hindrance will be dealt with by encouraging the respondents to report openly and assuring them confidentiality and anonymity of the data in subsequent phases of our study. We also decided to write off the details/examples provided to respondents in entries about occupation and residential address, because these points seemed to confuse rather than facilitate them. Some of the participants opted more than one reason for adopting a particular dress. In next phase of the study, we will instruct them to limit their responses to one option only. Order of the entries in demographic sheet was also changed in order to have more sequential flow of information.

There were some comments on questionnaires as well. Respondents perceived PWB scales as difficult. Based upon their feedback we undertook the retranslation of response options and that of item 18(*In many ways, I feel disappointed about my achievements in life*) because these were not clearly understood by the participants. Similar criteria and procedure as cited above, were adopted for the re-translation. The suggestions of participants for SHEQ and SDS-17 were followed as well. We made additions to item 22 of SHEQ (see Appendix P for the final version) and inserted English alternative in item 8 of SDS-17. We did not use this field-tested data for any formal / statistical analyses.

Overall, conducting a field-testing was a fruitful activity. This provided some insights into the feasibility of instruments, dynamics of administration of tools, and sample characteristics. We had set the age limit of the sample at 40 years. However, *hijab* was seen to be adopted at older age as well. Therefore, we will include women up to 45 years in our next studies.

Phase I: Step III: Pilot Study (Establishing the Psychometric Properties of Instruments)

This section of Study 2 targets to finding psychometric properties of instruments. In extension to the Try-out, this phase continues to check for the practicability, comprehensibility, and viability of administration of the adapted instruments.

Participants. One hundred and seven women residing in Rawalpindi and Islamabad participated in the study. Purposive sampling was used. Frequency of their dress was: NW = 14 (13.3%), HS = 19 (18.1%), HC = 47 (44.8%), DC = 15 (14.3%), MD = 10 (9.5%). Participants represented almost all ethnic identities. They were

predominantly Punjabis ($n = 55, 66.3\%$), Pakhtoon ($n = 10, 12.0\%$), Kashmiri ($n = 6, 7.2\%$). Each of the other identities such as Sindhi, Hazarewal, and Urdu-speaking, etc were below 5.0%. A large portion of the sample identified themselves as *Sunni* Muslims ($n = 42, 52.5\%$). Others reported themselves as *Barelvi* ($n = 14, 17.5\%$), *Ahle Hadis* ($n = 7, 8.8\%$), *Deobandi* and Shiite ($n = 5, 6.3\%$ each). Majority of the participants were university students ($n = 79, 75.2\%$). Next were university faculty ($n = 17, 16.2\%$). Clerical workers were 4.9% and housewives were 3.8%. Their age range was 19 to 45 years ($M = 24.55, SD = 5.77$). Unmarried women comprised 81.3% of the sample ($n = 87$). Mean income was Rs. 142,530 ($SD = 437,864$). This variable was highly skewed due to few very high incomes reported by the participants. Therefore, median income was calculated (Rs. 75000).

Instruments. Following adapted or modified versions of instruments, as altered after try-out, were used in this phase of the study:

1. Informed Consent Form
2. Demographic sheet
3. Religiousness Measure (RM; Sethi & Seligman, 1993)
4. Psychological Well Being Scales (PWB; Ansari, 2010)
5. Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire (SHEQ; Iqbal & Kamal, 2001)
6. Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Stöber, 2001)

Procedures. Same procedures as had been used in field-testing were employed here. However, group administrations were rare. The forms were distributed individually to prospective participants and instructions were given. Two

female associates were employed in this part of the study. Data were collected at university campuses and from neighborhood. Respondents were approached with due permission of concerned authorities. We briefed them about research purpose and built rapport with them. Informed consent was obtained. Nearly 210 forms were distributed, out of which 155 (73.8%) were returned. This is fairly a good response rate for such surveys (Michener, DeLamater, & Schwartz, 1986). All these forms were carefully checked for any missing information, response set, and general attitude of the respondents. As a result, 48 forms were discarded. Thus we had a preliminary analysis on 107 cases.

Results. One of the purposes of this section of study was to judge the feasibility of administration of tools. Following the responses of our respondents, we moved to alter the writing of demographic sheet and other tools. In demographic sheet, we increased response options in information about marital status, ethnic identity, and sects (for example, *Saraiki*, *Hazarewal*, and *Balti* were added to options for ethnic identity). This was done because the participants had not restricted themselves to the given options and had reported other information than just given in the options provided to them. We also provided easy Urdu words, e.g. *pehchan* (recognition) along with *shanakht* (identity). We did so because some participants had shown difficulty in understanding such words (see Appendix Q for the final form demographic sheet). Like try-out, we still found some problems in demographic sheet. For example, some respondents failed to report on ethnic identity, reporting income, and religious sect. However, situation is slightly better in pilot study than try-out study. Also, the other information that was lacking on demographic sheet in the try-out, has become available in the present phase of the study. We expect it will further improve in upcoming final phase of the study.

Only a slight improvement was seen in getting responses on SHEQ. Respondents were still hesitant to respond on SHEQ, though we had involved female associate to collect data from them. This problem was dealt by discarding such forms which provided silent responses on SHEQ. After the try-out, female supervisor's name had been added along with the male researcher's name in order to desensitize the participants from the feeling of sharing their private information with a male (researcher). This alteration did not work much in the present step of the study. Therefore, for the next study, we have also omitted male researcher's name from Informed consent sheet and retained only the female supervisor's name (see Appendix R for final Informed Consent Form).

Psychometric properties. Primary purpose of the pilot study was to find out if our instruments are psychometrically fit. Descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Psychometric Properties of Study Variables (Pilot Study)

Variables	Number of			SD	α	Skew
	N	items	M			
RM	107	15	58.47	6.97	.75	-0.44
RI		3	10.80	2.15	.58	-0.41
RIDL		6	23.39	4.23	.83	-0.60
RH		6	24.27	2.89	.38	-0.54
PWB	106	27	113.97	18.99	.88	-0.51
AT		9	35.24	9.29	.86	-0.39
PL		9	38.28	6.64	.68	-0.31
SA		9	40.45	7.73	.80	-1.15
SHEQ	106	35	22.32	12.28	.88	0.94
GH		7	6.23	3.53	.57	0.06
UWSA		21	15.31	8.72	.83	1.08
SC		7	0.78	2.11	.89	5.42
SDS	103	16	10.45	2.60	.59	0.05

Note. RM = Religiousness Measure; RI = Religious Involvement; RIDL = Religious Influence in Daily Life; RH = Religious Hope; PWB = Psychological Well Being; AT = Autonomy; PL = Purpose in Life; SA = Self Acceptance; SHEQ = Sexual Harassment Experiences Questionnaire; GH = Gender Harassment; UWSA = Unwanted Sexual Attention; SC = Sexual Coercion; SDS = Social Desirability Scale.

RM does not include Item no. 1 and 5. These two items are not used for calculating composite score.

Table 2 shows that coefficient alpha for Religious Hope (faith) is alarmingly low ($\alpha = .38$). To diagnose the reason for this issue, we looked into item analysis (see Appendix S for item-total statistics). We found that for corrected item-totals, item 7 and 8 have very low coefficients [$r = -.08$ & $.09$ respectively, whereas required coefficient is $.3$ (Field, 2009)]. These items, if deleted, increase scale reliability to

.40s. Content examination of item 7 reveals that as this item is about belief in heaven. Belief in heaven makes the basic article of religious faith. So, it may not correspond to some other items of the subscale, which are related about belief in miracles and rewards of suffering. Item 8 is about hope about general social life; whereas some other items of this scale are about hope in future life. Thus, items 7 and 8 may need to be revised or omitted. Religious Involvement (practices) has less than the required level of internal consistency ($\alpha = .58$). However, this is acceptable coefficient considering the small number of items included in this scale (Field, 2005; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). Further analysis showed that if item 3 of this scale is deleted, coefficient alpha increases to .64. Finally, the authors of the original questionnaire have not reported the internal consistency coefficients for these subscales. To our best knowledge, the present study is the first attempt to report scale reliabilities of this measure. Therefore, it is expected that the coefficients will improve in the final phase of the present research and other studies in future. Exploratory Factor Analysis to be performed in the next phase of the study may also elucidate the structure of the subscales.

Reliability estimates for scales of PWB and SHEQ are quite satisfactory. They range from .68 to .86 for PWB and from .57 to .89 for SHEQ. For PWB, Purpose in Life subscale has a bit low coefficient, $r = .68$. This might be due to the item 2 (*I live life one day at a time and don't really think about the future.*) has a corrected item total of .06. If omitted, it betters the internal consistency of Purpose in Life subscale up to .71. Gender harassment subscale of SHEQ has low scale reliability ($r = .57$). For this subscale, item 7 has low item-total, $r = .04$. Removal of this item improves the internal reliability up to .64. KR-20, obtained through alpha, for SDS is .59. Split-half reliability for the scale is .67. Item-total for items 4, 8, and 11 was low ($r = .001, .01,$

& -.06 respectively). These items also increase alpha coefficient to .60s, when they are deleted from the scale. However, Stöber and Dette (2002) emphasize that the indicators requiring dichotomous responses (as in SDS) often give lower internal consistency than those with Likert-type continuous responses. Further evidence of reliability has been shown in the form of inter-scale correlations in Table 3 below.

Skewness values show that all the scales on RM and PWB are somewhat negatively skewed (values range from -0.41 to -0.60 for RM scales and from -0.31 to -1.15 for PWB scales). It means data are somewhat clustered on a tail towards high scores. These values are, however, not very much deviated from ideal value of zero. Data on SHEQ show two positive skews for UWSA and SC (1.08 & 5.42 respectively). Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) was used to check for the assumption of normality of all our dependent variables. They all showed significant values (p 's < .05). So, these variables may not be normally distributed.

Table 3

Inter-scale Correlations of Study Variables (N = 107)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1.RM	–	.60***	.88***	.68***	.25**	.14	.10	.38***	-.25**	-.21*	-.28**	.03	.13
2.RI		–	.39***	.13	.24*	.09	.18	.33***	-.34***	-.26**	-.37***	-.02	.21*
3.RIDL			–	.37***	.12	.07	-.01	.22*	-.25**	-.22*	-.28**	.05	.10
4.RH				–	.26**	.17	.11	.34***	.01	.03	.01	.01	.01
5.PWB					–	.81***	.72***	.88***	.03	-.01	.06	-.10	.31***
6.AT						–	.27**	.54***	.02	.00	.04	-.04	.26**
7.PL							–	.58***	.08	.05	.12	-.10	.18
8.SA								–	-.03	-.07	.01	-.11	.29**
9.SHEQ									–	.82***	.96***	.50***	-.22*
10.GH										–	.67***	.35***	-.29**
11.UWSA											–	.32***	-.16
12.SC												–	-.12
13.SDS													–

Note. RM = Religiousness Measure without items 1 and 5. RI = Religious Involvement; RIDL = Religious Influence in Daily Life. RH = Religious Hope; PWB = Psychological Well being Scales. AT = Autonomy; PL = Purpose in Life; SA = Self Acceptance; SHEQ = Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire. GH = Gender Harassment; UWSA = Unwanted Sexual Attention; SC = Sexual Coercion; SDS = Social Desirability Scale

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 3 shows the inter-scale correlations of different study variables. It mentions that Religious involvement/practices is non significantly related to Hope (faith) ($r = .13, p > .05$). That is, those who are strongly faithful and hopeful might not be as strong on religious practices. Other correlations are at moderate level. All the subscale have high and significant relation with total scores ($r = .60$ to $.88, p$'s $< .01$).

Inter-scale correlations for PWB scales range from $.27$ to $.58$ and are significantly related (p 's $< .01$). Their moderate values show that they are also independent of each other. At the same time, they have high and significant correlations with total scores ($r = .72$ to $.88, p$'s $< .01$). Hence, they become the part of a unitary construct when related with total scores of PWB. These finding are up to the recommended statistical targets. The three subscales of SHEQ have moderate and significantly related coefficients ($r = .32, .35, \text{ and } .67, p$'s $< .01$). The scale-total coefficients are significantly high, except for sexual coercion ($r = .50, p < .001$). Sexually coercive experiences might be relatively low as compared to gender harassment and unwanted sexual attention.

Conditions of Hijab. One of the aims of the study was to carry out initial analysis for major questions of the study. First question of the study was to know about the conditions operating behind choice of a particular dress to cover oneself. The respondents were asked to choose one among the nine conditions given in the data sheet. The frequency data given in Table 8 helps us to answer this question.

Table 4

Frequencies and Percentages for Dress Type by Conditions for Choosing Dress (N = 97)

Condition	Type of dress					Total
	NW (n= 14)	HS (n= 16)	HC (n= 44)	DC (n= 14)	MD (n= 9)	
Environment/	0(0)	0 (0)	1(2.3)	2(14.3)	1(11.1)	4(4.1)
Family influence	1(7.1)	2(12.5)	8(18.2)	3(21.4)	0(0)	14(14.4)
In-laws' influence*	0(0)	0 (0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)
Protection	5(35.7)	2(12.5)	3(6.8)	2(14.3)	2(22.2)	14(14.4)
Religious command	6(42.9)	5(31.3)	16(36.4)	2 (14.3)	1(11.1)	30(30.9)
<i>Madri</i> ssa influence	1(7.1)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	0(0)	1(1.0)
Self-decision/Will	1(7.1)	5(31.3)	13(29.5)	4(28.6)	5(55.6)	28(28.9)
Satisfaction and comfort	0(0)	1(6.3)	2(4.5)	1(7.1)	0(0)	4(4.1)
Respect	0(0)	1(6.3)	1(2.3)	0(0)	0(0)	2(2.1)
Total	—	—	—	—	—	97(100)

Note. NW = *Niqab*-wearing; HS = Headscarfing; HC = Headcovering; DC = *Dupatta*-carrying; MD = Modern dressed

*In-laws include fiancé, husband, and family/kin of the husband/fiancé.

From Table 4, it is evident that religious commands and self-decision/will are the strongest reasons for choosing a particular mode of covering (see totals). To be more clear, we move ahead to compare all the conditions within each type of dress to more clearly answer the problem.

The data are not equally proportioned among different groups of dress. This was one reason for too many cases (90%) that had expected frequencies less than five.

This condition does not warrant the use of chi-square test. However, it was noticed that the *niqab*-wearing women, more than any other group, chose religious command as the primary reason for adopting their attire (42.9%). They were followed by the headcovering group (36.4%). This group also outnumbered other groups in selecting protection as their main motive for adopting face-covering themselves (35.7%). At the same time, the modern dressed group also thought that their dress can provide them protection (22.2%) (Siraj, 2011). It was predominantly the modern dressed women who had adopted their dress by their self-decision (55.6%). Only 7.1% preferred to adopt veil (*niqab*) by their own will. This reason of adopting a dress was somewhat equally distributed among other three categories of dress.

The respondents had also been asked to rank the reasons/conditions of their wearing a particular outfit to cover themselves. This option was offered to them where they thought it was difficult for them to pick only one reason. Seventy percent of the participants did rank their choices, but quite a many did not rank all the nine conditions. Most of them went up to five to six rankings. Therefore, we will also limit up to only five ranks. Religious command was 23.4 times placed at first rank. Self-decision/will, family influence, and protection followed religious command respectively. Religious condition had also highest percentage at second rank (15.9%). At the subsequent ranks, respect, protection, and satisfaction/ comfort got highest rankings respectively.

Effect of Dress on Religiousness, Well Being, and Sexual Harassment. The second question of the research pertains to find how groups of our study (types of dress) differ from each other on religiousness, psychological well-being, and sexual harassment experiences. We applied post-hoc tests for one-way ANOVA to meet this purpose. These results are given in following lines.

Table 5

Means, Standard deviations, and F Values for Scores of Five Dress Groups on Religiousness

Group	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i> (4,100)	<i>p</i>	95% CI		η^2	<i>i</i> → <i>j</i>
						<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		
NW	14	59.36	6.34	3.62	.009	55.69	63.02	.13	1,2,3,4 > 5
HS	19	59.32	5.28			56.77	61.86		
HC	46	59.15	7.04			57.08	61.22		
DC	15	59.07	6.44			55.50	62.34		
MD	10	50.80	7.68			45.30	56.30		
Total	104	58.40	6.97						

Note. NW = *Niqab*-wearing = 1; HS = Headscarfing = 2; HC = Headcovering = 3; DC = *Dupatta*-carrying = 4; MD = Modern dressed = 5.

CI = confidence interval; *LL* = lower limit; *UL* = upper limit.

Table 5 shows that there is a significant difference among the dress groups on religiousness, $F(4, 100) = 3.62, p = .009, \eta^2 = .13$. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was met, Leven's statistic $(4,100) = 0.97, p = .430$. To check which of the group differed from one another, we ran post-hoc tests (Hochberg test was used because the groups were largely unequal in size). Results showed that the modern dress group was significantly low from all other groups on religiousness. An additional analysis was done. We took Item 6 of Religiousness Measure as dependent variable and compared the groups on post-hoc test. This item reads "How much influence do your religious beliefs have on what you wear?" Similar results were seen by this analysis. These findings are somewhat in line with the above information that most of the modern dress group didn't adopt their dress on religious reasons. The *niqab*-wearing and the headcovering groups had mentioned religious command as the

main condition of their choice of *hijab*. Likewise, one-way ANOVA showed that they were also higher on religiousness. The headscarf women showed higher and less scattered scores ($SD = 5.28$) as compared to the rest of the groups. Other observations made during our focus group discussions (FGDs) also showed that they were more consistent in religious attitude.

Table 6

Means, Standard deviations, and F values for scores of Five Dress Groups on Psychological Well Being

Group	N	M	SD	F(4,99)	p	95% CI		η^2	i → j
						LL	UL		
NW	14	96.71	23.81	5.18	< .001	82.97	110.46	.17	1 < 3,4,5
HS	19	108.58	18.54			99.64	117.52		
HC	45	119.56	15.31			115.02	124.11		
DC	15	115.60	13.93			107.89	123.31		
MD	10	118.70	20.63			103.94	133.46		
Total	103	113.83	18.97			110.18	117.52		

Note. NW = *Niqab*-wearing = 1; HS = Headscarfing = 2; HC = Headcovering = 3; DC = *Dupatta*-carrying = 4; MD = Modern dressed = 5.
CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.

Table 6 presents that the five dress groups are significantly different on well-being, $F(4, 99) = 5.18, p < .001, \eta^2 = .17$. Equality of variance was also confirmed, Levene's statistic $(4, 99) = 1.28, p = .283$. *Post hoc* analysis showed that the *niqab*-wearing score significantly less on well being than all other groups except the headscarf group. The headscarf women also scored less on well being as compared to other groups. The difference, however, was not significant. This finding contrasts the literature and results of focus groups with the *hijab*-wearing women (the *niqab*-

wearing and headscarf group), which report that *hijab* or other religious practices provide autonomy, self-esteem, and control on their lives (see also Ellison, 1993; Mule & Barthel, 1992).

Table 7

Means, Standard deviations, and F values for scores of Five Dress Groups on Sexual Harassment Experiences

Group	N	M	SD	F(4, 99)	p	95% CI		η^2	i → j
						LL	UL		
NW	14	20.07	9.19	5.38	< .001	14.77	25.38	.18	1,2,3 < 5
HS	19	20.26	9.56			15.66	24.87		
HC	45	19.26	11.09			15.97	22.55		
DC	15	28.53	15.91			19.72	37.35		
MD	10	35.20	11.23			27.17	43.24		
Total	103	22.42	12.38			20.02	24.83		

Note. NW = *Niqab*-wearing = 1; HS = Headscarfing = 2; HC = Headcovering = 3; DC = *Dupatta*-carrying = 4; MD = Modern dressed = 5.
CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.

One-way ANOVA results in Table 7 depict that harassment experiences have significantly different distribution among five groups of the study, $F(4, 99) = 5.38$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .18$. Post-hoc analysis mentioned that the modern dress group has reported significantly more harassment experiences than other groups, except the *dupatta*-carrying category. The *dupatta*-carrying also revealed more harassing experiences than the three groups who cover their heads, but the difference was not significant. This pattern supports the results of our earlier discussions with these women and the scientific literature that says that *hijab* provides respect and shuns sexual objectification (Droogsma, 2007; Franks, 2000).

Role of social cultural factors in adopting a dress type. The third issue of research was to see whether women from various sociological backgrounds vary on their dress code. To meet this purpose, we used crosstabs and chi square analysis. First we examined women from different ethnic identities on their dress code. It was found that the two factors are non-significantly related, $\chi^2(36) = 28.78, p = .835$. However, we cannot interpret this relation any further because a large number of expected counts is below five. We can only consider the descriptive information thus. Since the identities other than Punjabi are fewer in number, descriptive statistics about the two factors is also of little use. But we can make one point. Among all the ethnic identities, head covering is most common type of dressing. Same is true for participants belonging to different religious sects. For relationship of dress and religious sect, chi square values were non-significant, $\chi^2(24) = 24.72, p = .432$.

Similar problem occurred for analysis of independence of religious sect and type of dress, where participants other than *Sunnis* were quite few in number. Even if we collapse other categories into one group, the size of the second group will be quite low. Hence the two resultant categories will not be comparable. This state of affairs will get better when there are larger strata available in up coming study. Relationship between type of dress worn by family and type of dress put on by the participants was significant, $\chi^2(20) = 80.11, p < .001$. Here again the same problems were faced as cited above. Hence we are reluctant to conclude that family environment has influence on women's attire.

Next analysis related to socioeconomic conditions, as measured by the monthly income of the respondents' families. Point biserial correlation was calculated. For this particular purpose, dress groups had to be made dichotomous. The

niqab-wearing, headscarfing, and the headcovering were named ‘Covering group’; whereas the *dupatta*-carrying and modern dressed were termed the ‘Modern dressed’. Income was taken in thousands (rupees). Results showed that income is significantly related to type of dress, $r_{pb} = .23, p = .042$. Though the relation is not highly significant, we interpret that with increase in income, there is a move from *hijab* to relatively modern dress. Education and occupation were not incorporated into analysis because data were highly overrepresented in favor of highly educated and the student section of the society.

Effect of Social Desirability on Religiousness, Well Being, and Sexual Harassment Experiences. Fourth and final question of the study was to see if social desirability can bias the responses on our dependent variables. For this purpose, we calculated bivariate correlations.

Table 8

Correlations of Social Desirability with Religiousness, Psychological Well Being, and Sexual Harassment Experiences (N = 107)

Variable	1	2	3	4	M	SD
1.Social desirability	-				10.44	2.60
2.Religiousness	.13	-			58.47	6.97
3.Well-being	.31***	.25**	-		113.97	18.99
4.Sexual harassment	-.22*	-.25**	.03	-	22.32	12.28

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Results in Table 8 portrayed that social desirability is non-significantly related to religiousness, $r = .13, p = .202$. Whereas, it had significant relationship with well-

being and sexual harassment experiences, $r = .31$, $p = .001$ and $r = -.22$, $p = .027$, respectively. Desirability bias seems to influence perception of one's well being in positive direction and reporting of harassment experience in negative one. However, the criterion of actual influencing requires that correlations be very high, i.e., up to .80s and .90s (Field, 2009). It also became a question of interest whether one group is more motivated by faking good than others. For this purpose, respondents were compared on social desirability. *Post hoc* tests surmised that there were non-significant differences among the five dress groups on social desirability (p 's > .05).

Actually analysis of covariance should be used here. But, as controlling the effect of social desirability is not the objective of this phase of the study, we restrict ourselves to rudimentary analysis and do not make final conclusions.

Discussion. Phase I of the study was conducted with the purpose of finding psychometric suitability and some preliminary analysis regarding relationship of dress to certain constructs as religiousness and some social cultural aspects such as ethnic identity.

Psychometric analysis with regard to Religiousness Measure (RM) showed that coefficient alpha for Hope/faith was drastically low. This might be due to items 7 and 8, which relate to belief in heaven and in harmony of humankind respectively. They seem to have been scored invariably high, while other items of the scale showed variable response. These items had low item-totals and were thus responsible for low internal reliability of the scale. The question arises how we can modify these elements of the scale.

We do not seem to be able to change religious beliefs and shall have to accept that some beliefs are stronger than others. For example, having faith in heaven is

obligatory and is asserted in Qur'an, while belief in miracles (Item 9 of the same scale) is not ordained in the Holy text. So, the statistical quality of the scale might be threatened by the low coefficients. But the purity of faith might remain intact, despite the statistically unfavorable evidence! Yet, we will make a humble effort to improve the situation. A few respondents had shown difficulty in understanding Urdu words in the items of this scale. Following this feedback, we provided English alternatives in parentheses while retaining the Urdu words as well. These items include items 8, 9, and 11. We attempted to use the English phrases/words from the original versions of these questionnaires. However, we used simple English alternatives wherever the original English words were difficult (see Appendix T for final version of Religiousness Measure).

Reliability estimates for scales of Psychological Well Being scales (PWB) and Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire (SHEQ) are quite satisfactory. However, Item 2 had quite low item-total correlation. But still we retain it for further study. If it shows similar results, we will exclude it for reliability analysis. In response to the reaction of the respondents, we are providing English alternatives also in PWB. This was done for item 16. Masculine gender was removed from items because the scales are being used only for women. Use of both genders in the statements might waste time and cause some obstruction in responding (see Appendix U for the final form of PWB scales).

Items 7 and 35 had low item-totals in their respective scales of SHEQ. As removal of these items does not improve the internal reliabilities, it was decided to retain them. It can also be argued that SHEQ measures experiences and not constructs. One may or may not have any bad experiences to be reported in this questionnaire. One of these items is about whether a man has tried to share obscene

material with respondents and the other inquires whether they have been victim of any rape attempt. These experiences might be very rare in actual. Therefore, these low item-totals may not tease the researchers as well as statisticians.

Internal consistency of Social Desirability Scale (SDS) is also not ideal, though acceptable. Item-totals for items 8 and 11 were low and their deletion increased the reliability estimate. However, we are not removing them presently. Like the previous practice with other scales, English alternatives were added for those Urdu words that were reported to be difficult by some respondents. Item 8 is one of those items that were so reported (see Appendix V for the final version of SDS).

Negative skews for RM and PWB and positive skews for SHEQ might be due to social desirability bias. Participants might be faking good on these two variables. Similarly, the same motive might be making the participants to under report their harassment experiences. However, it is very likely that the respondents actually feel that they are quite religious and consider themselves as mentally healthy. In the same vein, they might not actually have had any harassment experiences. It can be seen that most of the participants are in their early and mid 20s and have not had entered in occupations. As sexually coercive experiences usually relate to job environment, it is probable that these women might not have had faced bad experiences at workplace. However, we will see in subsequent analysis whether scores on social desirability have some relation to inflated or deflated scores on these variables. Besides this argument, the deviations from bell shape might entirely be due to the small size and non probability nature of the sample. The condition is likely to get better when we head towards working with larger number of people in the next study.

The meager coefficient between faith/hope and religious practices reveals that the strong believers may not be very regular in religious practices or good practitioners of religion may not have that good faith in religious dogma. However, other two dimensions of religion are not very strongly (though significantly) related to each other. It means that religion in our culture is not an integrated entity or at least religiousness is not a coherent and unitary construct. Nonetheless, these findings may also indicate that these elements are not actually related to religion. But at the same time these components have high and significant relation with total scores, thereby justifying and verifying their relation to religiousness as a whole construct. We also noted that Hope/faith shows less variation ($SD = 2.89$) than Religious influence ($SD = 4.24$), which has as many items as Hope (6 each) and not very different means ($M = 24.27$ and $M = 23.39$ respectively). This displays the intuitive reasoning that faith is more stable than importance/influence of religion in our daily lives. In other words, people are more hardliner with respect to faith, but have individual differences in deriving inspiration from religion in their daily lives.

Inter-scale correlations for PWB scales show healthy results, except for scale-total correlation of sexual coercion. Its low value might be due to the line of reasoning developed earlier. That is, sexual coercion may be less common than other types of harassment in population in general and among young stratum in special.

We opted to have an elementary analysis to answer the main questions of the study. First question was related to having empirical knowledge of under what conditions the social individuals come to wear *hijab* (veil and headscarf) or other types of dress. Two most significant conditions/reasons were religious commands and self-decision/will. careful analysis of cross tabulations showed that only *hijab* and head covering were being opted on religious grounds (Kopp, 2005; Scott & Franzmann,

2007) whereas self-decision/will works more for the modern dressed, who do not cover themselves in any traditional way. Well, they do need this autonomous decision because religion and society are not likely to favor them for taking to modern clothing. The self and the will are also important for them because none of them reported that modern clothing was practiced in their families.

However, those who adopted headscarf were also wearing it on their own will. Our previous study (based on focus groups) showed that this group had been very active and assertive in their discussions. So, it is likely that they do not only opt for religious reasons but also internalize religious teachings. They do not wear their garments under any compulsion. Nevertheless a good number of participants from all the groups, except the *niqab*-wearing, attribute their dressing to self-decision. It is interesting to know that none of our participants reported the influence of their in-laws in deciding on *hijab*. One of the reasons might be that the sample was mainly composed of university students, almost all of whom were unmarried. Overall, from the rankings of these conditions depicted in Results section, we can conclude that religious teachings, self-decision/will, sense of protection, and family influence, respectively, are most important conditions of wearing a certain type of dress.

Differences among these study groups on outcome variables (religiousness, well being, and sexual harassment experiences) were found through *post hoc* tests for one-way ANOVA. The modern dress category was significantly less religious than other groups. This finding might explain why this group had not selected religious command as their main influence for adopting their outfits. The rest of the groups are almost equal on religiousness. This is in line with the findings cited while answering the first question of the study. Empirical literature is loaded with the evidence that religion and mental health are positively related (for example, Alferi et al., 1999;

Dunkel, Davidson & Qurashi, 2010; George, Ellison, & Larson, 2002; Rastmanesh, Gluck, & Shadman, 2009). So were the results of Study 1. However, the present study goes in opposite direction with respect to the finding that the modern dressed are higher on well being. We found that other dress groups also show a sense of well being, but it is the *niqab*-wearing who are lowest on sense of well being. Such findings take us to the old anecdotal literature where most scholars thought that *purdah* (covering oneself and remaining indoors) has a negative impact on self-growth and positive thinking (for example, Khan, 1972; Pastner, 1974; White, 1977). Presently, we cannot say with conviction that *hijab* has a detrimental effect on feeling well about oneself unless we test this construct with a large number of respondents.

With respect to harassment experiences, we had proposed in our previous study that the *hijab*-wearing (including *niqab*/face veil and headscarf) are less likely to face harassment experiences. The quantitative findings of this study are also testimony to that proposition, where all the three types of covering (veil, headscarf, and head covering with *dupatta*) report less harassment experiences than the *dupatta* carrying and the modern dress group (Franks, 2000; Kousar, 2011)

Next we moved to answer the third question. It involved examining whether women from different social cultural backgrounds differ on their covering practices. We found that participants from all the ethnic identities and from religious sects mainly practiced head covering with *dupatta* or *chador*. The chi square results are not being interpreted because of under representation of various categories and the resultant low number of expected counts.

The final issue of the research was to gauge the affect of social desirability on the outcome variables of the study. Though, there were some significant correlations,

they were not as strong as considered to be affecting the perception of the participants on these variables (van de Mortel, 2008). We also tested through ANOVA whether any group is more biased due to social desirability factor. We found non significant differences on this variable. In next study, Analysis of Covariance will be used to find whether desire to create favorable impressions can prejudice the assessment of the targeted psychological variables of the study.

With some confidence in an acceptable, though not very satisfactory, reliability and validity of the instruments and a partial examination of the research questions, we move to the next and final phase of the present study. As we intend to present a theoretical framework for young urban women, we need to have a proportionate sample for various strata of women urban population. Most important of them is the type of dress they wear. The sample that we approached was predominantly headcovering women. We will have to have other groups as well, specially the *niqab*-wearing and the headscarfing women, who are the major target of this study. As regards ethnic identity/ethnicity, we will have a good representation of these identities when we move across the country in next phase of the study. Some other elusive representations of population are less educated, less earning, aged, and household women. Effort has to be made to involve these components of population as well. Instructions need to be carefully read by the participants and more clearly be communicated by the researchers, specially if the survey forms are distributed or mailed to the potential participants. We have seen that respondents did not complete some information about demographic factors and were resistant on harassment questionnaire. Trained female associates are required to work with such hesitant women. All the participants need to be assured of anonymity and confidentiality of the information provided by them.

We attempted to partially answer the questions of the present research by conducting some basic analysis. This analysis can best be taken as an expression of data trends. In the next and final phase of the research, the questions of the study will be comprehensively dealt with larger/representative sample and suitable analysis.

Study 2: Phase II (Comparison of Five Dress Groups on Study Variables)

The first phase of this study involved selection, adaptation, and pilot testing of some self-report measures. These self-report instruments were intended to assess the themes/variables that had emerged from focus group discussions (FGDs). These variables were religiousness, psychological well being, and sexual harassment experiences. The present study is the second and final phase of Study 2, the ultimate goal of which is to develop a theoretical framework around phenomenon of *hijab*. This purpose will be achieved by conducting a comparative analysis on the said variables among urban women wearing veil/*hijab* and other modes of dress.

Objectives. Following are the purposes of the present study:

1. To carry exploratory factor analysis on the newly adapted Religious Measure.
2. To explore the various conditions under which women choose a particular type of dress.
3. To examine the effect of social desirability on religiousness, psychological wellbeing, and reporting of sexual harassment experiences.
4. To compare *hijab* wearing women (HW) and other women wearing different types of dress on religiousness, psychological well being, and sexual harassment experiences.

5. To compare *hijab*-wearing women and other women wearing different types of dress on certain social cultural factors such as religious affiliation/sect, familial aspects, and ethnic identity.

As the present research is an exploratory one and expands on themes that emerged from FGDs, hypotheses are not being formulated in this study.

Participants. It was intended that proportionate number of participants be chosen with regard to many factors such as dress type, geography, age, and occupation. Quota sampling was employed. However, proportionate sampling could not be made possible due to constraints on time and resources. Also it becomes quite difficult to equate the sample when we want to include a number of demographic factors. So, we ended up with non proportional quota sampling. The sample numbered to 511 women representing various urban parts of the country. These included Islamabad, Swabi, Mansehra, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Lahore, Bahawalpur, Karachi, and Quetta. Age range was 19 to 47 years ($M = 24.90$ years, $SD = 5.70$, skew = 1.77). Details of the sample demographics are given below in Table 9.

Table 9
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample (in Percentages)(N = 511)

Characteristic	NW (n = 125)	HS (n = 87)	HC (n = 149)	DC (n = 90)	MD (n = 60)	Total
Identity						
Punjabi	38.9	47.4	38.9	64.4	68.2	48.1
Pakhtoon	20.0	15.4	17.5	2.7	4.5	13.7
Hazarewal	13.7	6.4	11.9	1.4	4.5	8.7
Baluchi	13.7	3.8	14.3	2.7	0	8.7
Sindhi	3.2	6.4	7.9	6.8	4.5	6.0
Urdu speaking	6.3	10.3	4.0	11.0	11.4	7.7
Kashmiri	4.2	10.3	5.6	11.0	6.8	7.2
Religious affiliation						
Sunni / <i>Ahle sunnut</i>	38.1	35.8	38.6	50.0	50.0	41.1
<i>Barelvi</i>	10.3	14.9	11.4	8.6	11.4	11.3
<i>Deobandi</i>	21.6	16.4	16.7	1.7	2.3	13.9
<i>Ahle Hadis</i>	15.5	13.4	8.8	17.2	18.2	13.7
Shiite	2.1	9.0	11.4	8.6	9.1	7.9
Muslim*	12.4	10.4	13.2	13.8	9.1	12.1
Education completed						
Grade 8 to 12	23.0	4.6	12.8	10.2	5.0	12.5
Bachelors	45.9	54.0	41.9	46.6	68.3	48.9
Masters or higher	31.1	41.1	45.3	43.2	26.7	38.6
Occupation						
Unemployed / Student	53.9	60.0	57.2	58.8	70.2	58.7
Employed	35.7	30.0	37.7	34.1	28.1	34.1
Housewife	10.4	10.0	5.1	7.1	1.8	7.2
Marital status						
Unmarried	61.9	66.3	72.3	68.3	76.9	68.4
Married	26.3	22.5	19.7	18.3	13.5	20.9
Engaged	11.9	11.3	8.0	13.4	9.6	10.7

*'Muslim' is not a religious affiliation. This identity chosen by some of the participants indicates their trend of segregating themselves from any of religious sect/affiliation.

Participants wearing five types of dress were included in the study. They were *Niqab-Wearing* (NW) ($n = 125, 24.5\%$), *Head Scarfing* (HS) ($n = 87, 17.0\%$), *Head Covering* (HC) ($n = 149, 29.2\%$), *Dupatta-Carrying* (DC) ($n = 90, 17.6\%$), and *Modern Dressed women* (MD) ($n = 60, 11.7\%$). Though these statistics do not show a proportionate picture of the dress categories, they do show the dressing trends in the country. For example, it is commonly observed that, most part of the population practice head covering (though no statistical evidence is available to augment this observation). So our sample is more occupied by this group than other ones. Similar patterns will be seen in other demographics of the participants, where certain categories will be over represented because of their greater numbers in the actual population.

Most participants had Punjabi identity ($n = 200, 48.1\%$). The figures of different identities given in Table 9 fairly represent the proportions of Pakistani population (Pakistan Census Organization, 1998). A large portion of the sample identified themselves as *Sunni / Ahle Sunnat* ($n = 156, 41.1\%$). As the monthly income was highly skewed, median value was required to be reported. This value was Rs. 50,000 (range Rs. 8000 to 1,000,000; $M = 87.26, SD = 123.53, skew = 5.17$). The percentages given here and those in the Table have been obtained by collapsing some very small categories into major ones. For example, those who identified themselves as *Potwari* were combined with the category of Punjabi.

Instruments. Details of changes in three instruments, namely, Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire (SHEQ), Demographic sheet, and Social Desirability Scale (SDS) were given in previous chapter. For their final versions see Appendixes P, Q, and V respectively. Other Instrument details are as follows.

Religiousness Measure-Adapted (RMA). Religiousness Measure (Sethi & Seligman, 1993) was adapted and translated for use in present study. The details of the original version are given in section on Study 1. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was performed on the newly adapted measure. The present EFA resulted in four-factor solution. Original version had theoretically specified three factors. With the present data, Religious Hope factor of the original version was shown to have two underlying dimensions. These dimensions were labeled as Religious Faith and Optimism. Finally a new version was established with 17 items and was named as Religiousness Measure-Adapted (RMA) (Appendix T). This new measure has four components, Religious Involvement (RI, three items), Religious Influence in Daily Life (RIDL, six items), Religious faith (RF, three items), and Optimism (OP, three items). Examples of the new factors include: *How much do you believe that there is a heaven?* (RF); *How much do you believe it is possible for all humans to live in harmony together?* (OP). Items 1 and 5 were not used by original authors for computing composite scores. These two items do not make part of any of the components of this measure. However, these can provide additional information about the religious attitude of the respondents. Internal consistency coefficients for the full scale was .84 and ranged from .58 (RF) to .85 (RIDL) for sub-scales. Details of the EFA are given in the relevant section below.

Psychological Well Being Scales (PWB). PWB (Urdu version; Ansari, 2010) was used in previous phases. Of the 54 items (six subscales), only 27 items (three subscales) had been used. The psychometric analysis in the present phase showed that Item 2 (Purpose in Life subscale) and Item 13 (Autonomy subscale) of the present shorter version affected the coefficient alpha due to their poor item-total correlations. The coefficients were .60 and .67 respectively. These items were deleted from the

scales, as a result of which the scale reliability improved to .64 and .71 respectively. Further details are given in the section of psychometric analysis below. Thus, the new measure used for analysis in this study has 25 items, Autonomy (eight items), Purpose in Life (eight items) and Self Acceptance (nine items) (Appendix U).

Procedures. Same procedures as used in pilot study were employed here. Data were collected at university campuses, educational institutions, neighborhoods and through social networks in various parts of the country as mentioned above. It took about four months to complete the data collections. Respondents in institutions were approached with due permission of concerned authorities. We briefed our potential participants about research purpose and built rapport with them. During this process, at times we found it quite hard to convince some authorities and participants. They were hesitant to disclose their private information due to the sensitivity of the topic and questions asked about sexual harassment. So these people either refused to respond or returned blank forms after having kept them for a short period of time. However, overall there was a good cooperative attitude. Informed consent was obtained from those who were willing to participate.

More than 1000 forms were distributed, out of which 760 forms (76%) were returned. All these forms were carefully checked for any missing information, response set, and general attitude of the respondents. As a result, 211 forms were discarded. Thus we had final set of 549 participants. During checking for psychometric properties, some data were found to be affecting the internal consistency of certain instruments. As a result, 38 entries were deleted from SPSS data editor. Thus final analysis was conducted on 511 cases.

Results. Results regarding various analyses are given below.

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of Religiousness Measure-Adapted (RMA). The first objective of the study was to carry out EFA to find out the factorial structure of RMA. EFA was preferable to confirmatory factor analysis because of two reasons. First, a good number of changes have been made in the instrument for this particular study, such that original form has changed to a great extent. Second, the original version had not undergone any statistical attempt to determine the factors of the measure. The authors of this measure had devised items on the basis of theoretical understanding of various dimensions of religiousness. Though the authors found, as an estimate of validity, that the measure significantly discriminated liberals, moderates, and fundamentalists, no statistical evidence was collected for the factorial validity (Sethi & Seligman, 1993). Therefore, we need to conduct the EFA to determine the underlying component structure of this scale. EFA was not run at earlier stages of the study due to small samples.

Principal Component Analysis was used for factor extraction. For factor rotation Direct Oblimin (an oblique rotation method) was selected. This was done because of theoretical evidence that the dimensions of religiousness are interrelated. There was also some statistical evidence. For example, all inter-item correlations, except one, were statistically significant ($r = .09$ to $.64$, p 's $< .05$). Criterion of factor solution was placed at eigenvalues > 1 and factor loading at or above $.40$.

Results showed that Keyser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value is $.85$ which verifies the adequacy of sample size for factor analysis. Bartlett's test of sphericity was also significant, $p < .001$. Both extraction and rotation methods yielded a four-factor solution. These factors explained a cumulative 58.8% variance. See Table 10 for the

items and labels of each component of the scale. In this Table, pattern matrix is being reported for ease of understanding. Additionally, component correlation matrix was also seen. It also provides support for the suitability of four-component solution. Correlation values ranged from $r = .16$ to $.36$, which means that the four components are not highly interrelated. Final factorial structure is shown in Table 10.

Table 10

Factorial Structure of the Religiousness Measure-Adapted (N = 510)

Item no	Items	Factors			
		1	2	3	4
15.	How much influence do your religious beliefs have on what social activities you undertake?	.80			
10.	How much influence do your religious beliefs have on what you eat and drink?	.74			
6.	How much influence do your religious beliefs have on what you wear?	.74			
4.	How much influence do your religious beliefs have on the important decisions of your life?	.73			
12.	How much influence do your religious beliefs have on with who you will relate or be friends with?	.72			
2.	How much important is religion in your life?	.62			
13.	How much do you believe that in future next generations will be able to lead a better life than yourself?		.83		
14.	How much do you believe that the future will be a better place to live?		.81		
8.	How much do you believe it is possible for all humans to live in harmony together?		.51		
17.	How often do you offer <i>prayers</i> ?			.86	
16.	How often do you read <i>Quran</i> ?			.84	
3.	When there is a religious ceremony/activity in your social circle (e.g. preaching/ <i>daras</i> , congregational prayer, <i>Quran khwani/khatm, milad</i> , etc), how much are you likely to participate in it?			.50	
7.	How much do you believe that there is a heaven?				.77
11.	How much do you believe that your suffering will be rewarded?				.64
9.	How much do you believe there are miracles?				.63
Eigenvalues		4.85	1.46	1.32	1.18
% Variance		32.3	9.8	8.8	7.9
α		.85	.62	.69	.58

Note. Item no. 1 and 5 are not included.

Factor 1 = Religious importance in daily life; Factor 2 Optimism; Factor 3 = Religious involvement; Factor 4 = Religious faith

We excluded two items from the analysis because, as earlier explained, the said items are not used to measure the composite score. These are item 1 (*How*

religious person do you consider yourself?) and item 5 (*Given a choice, how much it is likely that you would marry someone of another religion?*). The analysis was now run on the remaining 15 items.

The major finding of EFA is that we have four components, whereas original questionnaire is structured around three factors. The present analysis showed that the Religious hope subscale of the original measure comprises two factors and is not a unitary construct. This subscale originally consisted of six items. In present analysis, three of these items (item no. 7, 9, and 11) comprise one factor while other three items (item no. 8, 13, and 14) build another factor. A qualitative examination of the content of these items showed that the first set of three items emphasize religious beliefs (for instance, item 7 asks about belief in heaven), while other set of items emphasize hope about general future life (for example, item 13 asks about belief in better life of future generations). During data collection, a few respondents had also put remarks about the second set of three items. In these comments, they inquired whether these questions are being asked with religious perspective or otherwise. It means these items may not have a religious outlook. Therefore, both qualitative and quantitative analyses lead us to two-factor nature of this subscale.

The original labels have been retained for those factors which have not changed in the present analysis, while four judges were involved to examine the content of and assign labels to the new components. All the judges were part of different teaching faculties and were PhD scholars. Based upon the labels assigned by the judges and the decision of the committee involving the researcher and supervisor, final labels were assigned. Items 8, 13, and 14 were labeled Optimism and Items 7, 9, and 11 was named Religious faith.

It is to note that while adapting the Religiousness Measure, we had not made any considerable modification with the items originally included in the Religious hope subscale. Yet the factor structure has changed with regard to this dimension of religiousness. On the other hand, EFA has retained all the three items of the Religious involvement subscale as one factor, despite the fact that significant alterations had been done with this scale.

Psychometric properties of instruments. Data were first explored with regard to assumptions relating to parametric analysis. One of the important assumptions is whether the data are normally distributed. For this purpose three ways were followed. They were: looking at histograms, applying Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test), and finding skew values. Histogram is a good method to check the distribution of scores, but is judgmental. K-S tests were applied, most of which showed significant results, thus disconfirming the normality of the data. However, one issue with K-S test and such other tests that they readily show significant values as the sample becomes larger. When this and some other tests (for example, Levene's test) were applied after reducing the size of data at SPSS, non significant values were obtained. Thus these tests are also not a reliable estimate of normality. Finally, skew values can be used. Parametric and psychometric characteristics of study variables are shown in Table 11.

Table 11

Psychometric Properties of Major Study Variables (Final Study)

Variables	<i>N</i>	Number of items	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	α	Skew
RMA	510	15	56.73	8.50	.84	-0.86
RI		3	10.46	2.46	.69	-0.45
RIDL		6	22.60	4.66	.85	-0.89
RF		3	13.32	1.78	.58	-1.23
OP		3	10.38	2.53	.62	-0.43
PWB	498	25	105.81	15.91	.81	-0.24
AT		8	33.00	6.94	.71	-0.22
PL		8	33.03	6.49	.64	-0.33
SA		9	39.78	6.76	.65	-0.49
SHEQ	509	35	18.69	15.71	.94	1.48
GH		7	5.51	3.91	.73	0.65
UWSA		21	12.06	10,79	.92	1.46
SC		7	1.12	2.46	.85	3.58
SDS	503	16	10.40	2.86	.66	-0.56

Note. RMA = Religiousness Measure-Adapted, without items 1 and 5. RI = Religious Involvement; RIDL = Religious Influence in Daily Life. RF = Religious Faith; OP = Optimism; PWB = Psychological Well being Scales. AT = Autonomy; PL = Purpose in Life; SA = Self Acceptance; SHEQ = Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire. GH = Gender Harassment; UWSA = Unwanted Sexual Attention; SC = Sexual Coercion; SDS = Social Desirability Scale

From Table 11, it can be observed that skewness values for RMA range from -0.43 to -1.23. For the scale of RF, it was seen that there were three outliers on the lower side that could be affecting the shape of the distribution. These were adjusted to

three standard deviations below the mean. Thus the skew improved from -1.73 to -1.23. Negative skew displays that most respondents are clustered towards high scores. It might have been due to social desirability level of the respondents. The effect of social desirability on all the study variables will be elaborated through ANCOVA in the relevant section below.

For SHEQ, skew ranges from 0.65 to 3.58 for three subscales. It shows that most respondents have scored quite low on this measure. There were a number of outliers on higher side. This many number of outliers cannot be adjusted as this act will seriously change the nature of data. On the other hand, it does not seem to be a problem with distribution itself. As harassment is an experience, women in certain societies or communities might have less experiences of this type. As for RMA, the effect of social desirability will be studied in detail in the relevant section below. Distributions with regard to PWB and SDS seem satisfactory. Skew values for PWB scales range from -0.22 to -0.49. For SDS, it is -0.56. As regards the comparison with pilot study, skew values have changed but trends (i.e. whether the skew is positive or negative) have remained the same with all the study variables. Skew has increased for RMA and has decreased for PWB and SHEQ.

As the independent variable (Dress type) is a nominal variable, it is required to check whether all the groups have equality of variance on dependent variables. To meet this purpose, Levene's test for homogeneity of variance was applied. This test confirmed homogeneity for SDS, two subscales of RMA (RI & OP), and all PWB scales (p 's > .05). Homogeneity of variance could not be established for any of SHEQ scales. As we saw with reference to skew, homogeneity problems are again with SHEQ and partially with RM. In order to address the issue of violation of

assumptions, non-parametric analysis will also be run on those variables which are not meeting the criteria of parametric analysis.

Psychometric analysis involves EFA for RMA and scale reliabilities of all the tools being used the study. EFA was reported in the beginning part of this section. For RMA, scale reliability measured through Cronbach's alpha is .84. Alphas for subscales range from .58 (RF) to .85 (RIDL). The small values for RI, RF, and OP should be considered quite satisfactory while considering the small number of items (three each) in these subscales. Additionally, Kline (1999) suggests that Alpha lower than .70s is also acceptable, specially for psychological constructs as opposed to cognitive tests for which higher consistency is deemed necessary. Bollen (1989) suggests the alpha coefficient is a conservative estimate of internal reliability.

All the scale reliabilities have shown improvement over those obtained in pilot study. The new subscales of RF and OP, which made up one subscale in the original version, had a composite coefficient alpha equal to .38 in the pilot study. Their coefficient alphas are now .58 and .62 respectively with three items each. Item 7 (RF subscale) and item 8 (OP subscale) had low item-totals previously (less than .30) (Appendix W). English alternatives had been provided for difficult Urdu words in these items. Consequently their item-total coefficients have improved from -.08 to .36 (item 7) and from .09 to .33 (item 8). Therefore, the exercise of inserting English words has definitely worked and improved the reliability of the subscales. However, it was observed in EFA that these two had quite different factor loadings than other items of the relevant scales. Though presently the EFA has shown these items to be part of their respective factors, they can be carefully examined and revised in future studies.

For full scale PWB, Cronbach's alpha is .81, while for subscales, alpha's range from .64 (PL) to .71 (AT). These coefficients were obtained after we removed items 2 and 13 from the analysis. Item 2 (*I live life one day at a time and don't really think about the future*) of PL was seen to have very low item-total, $r = .05$. Internal consistency increases from .60 to .64 if it is deleted from the scale. The same item had caused problems in pilot study. During the screening of the data it was observed that this item was not responded consistently with respect to other items of the scale. The participants might not have understood it well. The content examination of this item shows that though it is reverse scored, its phrasing is likely to present its content as desirable trait. Item 13 (*I tend to be influenced by people with strong opinions*) of AT had negative item-total coefficient ($r = -.02$) and its removal improves the scale reliability from .67 to .71. One reason for deviant responses on this subscale might be that it may be considered a positive habit in Pakistani society to be influenced by great people, considering them a role model. The influence taken from these personalities might not affect the autonomy in the respondents' personal routine life.

The coefficients are still lower than those obtained in pilot study. One reason for this change might be that the pilot sample was quite educated and was from developed urban areas like Rawalpindi and Islamabad. So they might have been more able to understand items and respond carefully and responsibly. Among other subscales, PL needs special attention. Items 17 and 26 of this subscale also have somewhat low item-total coefficients ($r = .19$ each). However, their removal does not improve internal consistency of the subscale. Item 24 (SA subscale) has also slightly low item totals ($r = .16$). But as its deletion does not increase the alpha, this item will also be retained.

Lower reliabilities might have been due to lack of interest or concentration on behalf of the respondents. However, the reliabilities of other measures filled in by the same sample have been quite satisfactory. Another issue with the PWB scales is that almost half of the items have been reverse phrased, many of which seem of positive nature. For example, item 2 may emphasize focusing on present life instead of worrying about future life. This trait is often considered positive by certain psychologists such as humanists. Such items might have contaminated the unitary nature of each subscale. However, we decided to move ahead with these subscales as it was indicated earlier that the coefficients between .60 and .70 can be considered acceptable. So, present scales of PWB can be taken as workable, while being cautious during analysis and interpretations.

Coefficient alphas for SHEQ are considerably high. The coefficient is .94 for full scale and ranges from .73 (GH) to .92 (UWSE) for subscales. In pilot study, items 7 and 35 had poor item-totals in their respective subscales but have shown improvement in the present phase. KR-20, calculated through alpha model was .66 for SDS. This coefficient might be considered low yet satisfactory. The indicators requiring dichotomous responses often give lower internal consistency than those required continuous responses. Stöber and Dette (2002) in their comparison of dichotomous and continuous responses on a same instrument (Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding) found that coefficient alpha for dichotomous responses was considerably lower than for responses given on Likert-format. The reason behind this, they argue, is that bipolar responses are like extreme options on a continuum involved in Likert-format and hence low internal consistency. For further psychometric considerations inters-scale correlations, which can also be considered as evidence of construct validity have been presented in Table 12 below.

Table 12

Inter-scale Correlations of Study Variables (N = 509)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1.RMA	-	.68***	.87***	.64***	.61***	.23***	.11*	.19***	.24***	-.25***	-.24***	-.25***	.13**	.28***
2.RI		-	.45***	.31***	.26***	.09*	.04	.05	.13**	-.26***	-.26***	-.27***	-.11*	.29***
3.RIDL			-	.46***	.32***	.19***	.09*	.16**	.20***	-.25***	-.24***	-.25***	-.14**	.21***
4.RF				-	.28***	.19***	.09*	.15***	.21***	-.07	-.06	-.07	-.05	.12**
5.OP					-	.20***	.11**	.20***	.18***	-.08	-.08	-.07	-.04	.17***
6.PWB						-	.78***	.78***	.81***	-.06	-.01	-.06	-.12**	.22***
7.AT							-	.38***	.44***	.01	.04	.01	-.04	.17***
8.PL								-	.48***	-.10*	-.05	-.10*	.12**	.14***
9.SA									-	-.06	-.01	-.06	-.13**	.21***
10.SHEQ										-	.86***	.98***	.70***	-.31***
11.GH											-	.79***	.44***	-.31***
12.UWSA												-	.63***	-.30***
13.SC													-	-.18***
14.SDS														-

Note. RMA = Religiousness Measure-Adapted, without items 1 and 5. RI = Religious Involvement; RIDL = Religious Influence in Daily Life. RF = Religious Faith; PWB = Psychological Well being Scales. AT = Autonomy; PL = Purpose in Life; SA = Self Acceptance; SHEQ = Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire. GH = Gender Harassment; UWSA = Unwanted Sexual Attention; SC = Sexual Coercion; SDS = Social Desirability Scale

N's vary for different scales.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 12 displays that for RMA, all the indicators of religiousness have high and significant correlation with the full scale (r ranges from .61 to .87 for OP and RIDL respectively, p 's < .001). On the other hand all the subscales have low to moderate inter-correlations ($r = .26$ to $.46$). It can be noted that OP has somewhat lower correlations than other components of religiousness. It should be kept in mind that respondents had also a query regarding the subscale to which this item belongs. They wanted to know if these questions are being asked with religious or general perspective. Judges had also shown some dissent with regard to whether the items of this subscale had a relation with religious faith. However, in a supplementary analysis, there was seen almost a perfect correlation between the composite score when this subscale is retained and the composite score when it is excluded, $r = .96$, $p < .001$. Therefore, there seems to be no harm in retaining this subscale and its inclusion will not affect the results associated with this measure. So, presently this component is being retained.

The above information is evidence of their distinct statuses as well as relatedness as part of one underlying construct of religiousness. It can also be noted that RF (Religious faith) is not highly, though significantly, related with RI (Religious involvement), $r = .31$, $p < .001$. It means it is not necessary that a strong believer is also strong practitioner of religion.

We get similar evidence for construct validity for PWB. However inter-scale correlations for SHEQ are from moderate to high. There is a very strong relationship between GH and UWSE, $r = .79$, $p < .001$. However, as we have earlier discussed, sexual harassment is measured by experiences occurring to a person, hence it is not unusual that one indicator of harassment overlaps with the other. So far, it has been

seen that the instruments of present research are satisfactorily reliable and valid. Therefore we can now turn to the main analysis of the study.

Following sections involve main analysis for research questions of the study. One fact should be borne in mind that the number of participants will vary for different analyses. It is because not all the respondents gave full information. For example, 63 out of 511 participants did not report their identity.

Conditions of dress. The second objective of this research related to exploring various conditions under which women choose a particular type of dress. Most of the causes/conditions were derived from Study 1 and respondents in this phase of the study were asked to choose one particular condition from nine options given to them or rank these options. Crosstabulation and chi-square analysis was incorporated for this purpose (see Table 13).

Table 13

Frequencies and Percentages for Dress Type by Conditions for Choosing Dress (N = 507)

Condition	Type of dress					Total
	NW (n = 123)	HS (n = 85)	HC (n = 149)	DC (n = 90)	MD (n = 60)	
Environment	2 (1.6)	2 (2.4)	8 (5.4)	11 (12.2)	9 (15.0)	32 (6.3)
Family influence	10 (8.1)	9 (10.6)	23 (15.4)	16 (17.8)	4 (6.7)	62 (12.2)
In-laws' influence	1 (0.8)	1 (1.2)	2 (1.3)	(1.1)	–	5 (1.0)
Protection	19 (15.4)	19 (22.4)	14 (9.4)	9 (10.0)	7 (11.7)	68 (13.4)
Religious command	56 (45.5)	26 (30.6)	41 (27.5)	10 (11.1)	3 (5.0)	136 (26.8)
<i>Madrissa</i> influence	–	1 (1.2)	1 (0.7)	–	–	2 (0.4)
Self-decision/Will	16 (13.0)	12 (14.1)	35 (23.5)	32 (35.6)	28 (46.7)	123 (24.3)
Satisfaction/comfort	12 (9.8)	13 (15.3)	17 (11.4)	7 (7.8)	9 (15.0)	58 (11.4)
Respect	7 (5.7)	2 (2.4)	8 (5.4)	4 (4.4)	–	21 (4.1)

$\chi^2(32) = 107.59, p < .001, V = .23$

Note. NW = *Niqab*-wearing; HS = Headscarfing; HC = Headcovering; DC = *Dupatta*-carrying; MD = Modern dressed

31.1% cells have expected count less than 5.

Table 13 shows that there is a significant relationship between dress type and conditions of *hijab*, $\chi^2(32) = 107.59, p < .001$. It means different groups of dress have different reasons for wearing a particular dress. Owing to larger contingency table, odds ratio was not used as a measure of effect. Instead Cramer's *V* was taken (Howell, 2007). Its value is .23; maximum value can be 1. The cells having expected counts less than 5 are 31.1%, which value is acceptable for larger contingency tables (Field,

2009). For in-depth comparative analysis, we need to look into figures given for each dress in the table and the Figure 4 given below.




Figure 4. Frequency of Conditions for Choosing Dress within Dress Type

It can be seen that overall religious commands is the strongest explanation for a dress (26.8%), followed by self-decision/will (24.3%). However, these two are spread differently among different dress groups. As we move from the NW group to other dresses the religious explanation decreases and self-decision/will increases. Also look at the bar chart, which tells that religion / religious command remains the most salient for the first three groups and self-decision remains most significant for the last two groups. Will/self-decision is somewhat important for all the groups. A well-defined continuum may be that importance of religious obligation increases from the MD to NW and importance of will and choice increases from NW to MD. However, quite a small number of the MD (5% only) also regard their dress as an influence of religious command. But this finding reminds us of the focus groups where this group asserted that their dress is not un-Islamic.

Other important conditions are sense of protection, Family influence, and satisfaction and comfort (13.4%, 12.2%, & 11.4% respectively). The size of difference among these conditions does not vary much. So, all the three can be considered equally important. Comparison shows that protection counts most for the HS group, followed by the NW. Similar observation was made for focus discussions in Study 1. Here, this is the most important condition after religion for both groups. On the other hand, family influence is the second most important for the DC group and third most important for the HC women. Satisfaction/comfort is second most important for the MD group. The same was found in Study 1. However, environment is also equally important for this group. Other conditions, specially in-laws' influence and influence of *madrissa*, do not make any significant contribution. This is somewhat inconsistent with what was earlier established in Study 1. Overall, these findings are in line with those observed in pilot study. However, there are some variations too on inter-group percentages.

The validity of findings with respect to religion was checked by comparing the five groups on their mean scores on item 6 of Religiousness Measure-Adapted. This item reads *How much influence do your religious beliefs have on what you wear?* The method of choosing dress from among the given conditions can be considered forced-choice, while responses to the said item can be thought of as relatively free choice. Therefore, comparison of responses on both methods can confirm the results of each other.

Table 14

Means, Standard deviations, and F Values for Scores of Five Dress Groups on Religiousness Measure-Adapted (Item 6)

Group	N	M	SD	F(4, 505)	p	95% CI		η^2	i → j
						LL	UL		
NW	125	4.04	0.93	28.32	< .001	3.88	4.20	.18	1 > 3,4,5
HS	87	3.90	0.85			3.72	4.08		2,3 > 4,5
HC	148	3.72	0.93			3.57	3.87		4 > 5
DC	90	3.27	0.95			3.07	3.46		
MD	60	2.63	1.09			2.35	2.91		

Note. NW = Niqab-wearing; HS = Headscarfing; HC = Headcovering; DC = Dupatta-carrying; MD = Modern dressed

One-way ANOVA results given in Table 14 show that there was a significant difference among these groups on the said item relating to influence of religion on wearing, $F(4, 505) = 28.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .18$. *Post hoc* test (Hochberg's GT2) was used for follow up comparisons. It showed that the NW women did not significantly differ from the HS group ($p = .96$), while they significantly differed from all other groups (p 's < .05). That is, the NW and the HS were higher on religiosity item. The HS group had non-significant difference from the HC group, $p = .81$, while significantly differed from the subsequent groups. The HC also had significant difference with the subsequent groups that do not cover heads (p 's < .01). The DC and MD groups (that do not cover heads) significantly differ from each other as well as from all the three covering groups. That is, they are lower on this religiosity item. These findings are quite similar to those obtained in crosstabulation given above. Hence findings of both methods have been cross-validated.

Ranking of the conditions. Besides the one-condition option, Respondents were also asked to rank the nine given conditions. They were required to rank according to the importance of these conditions in determining their decision on wearing a particular dress. However, this was not mandatory for them to do so. It was offered only if they felt being forced to choose just one reason. Nearly half of the respondents did some ranking. But not all of these ranked all the nine conditions. Majority of them made choice up to fourth or fifth rank. Therefore we limit the analysis only to fifth rank. It must be added that this analysis inferential statistics. Hence the interpretations and conclusion may not be valid without a reasonable technical support.

Table 15
Rankings of the Conditions for Choosing Dress by Five Dress Groups

Condition	Rank 2 (n = 309)					Rank 3 (n = 266)					Rank 4 (n = 216)					Rank 5 (n = 152)				
	NW	HS	HC	DC	NC	NW	HS	HC	DC	NC	NW	HS	HC	DC	NC	NW	HS	HC	DC	NC
Environment	3.8	3.3	4.0	11.1	11.1	4.2	5.6	8.5	8.1	9.5	1.6	2.6	4.4	6.9	-	-	3.6	19.2	15.8	14.3
Family influence	9.0	8.3	16.2	24.4	11.1	4.2	9.3	14.6	2.7	23.8	9.5	15.4	17.6	6.9	17.6	25.6	7.1	13.5	5.3	7.1
In-laws' influence	-	6.7	2.0	-	-	-	5.6	1.2	2.7	-	-	2.6	-	3.4	-	-	-	1.9	-	-
Protection	19.2	6.7	12.1	8.9	14.8	18.1	27.8	22.0	24.3	4.8	19.0	10.3	8.8	13.8	-	12.8	7.1	19.2	10.5	35.7
Religious command	21.8	26.7	23.2	17.8	33.3	13.9	9.3	8.5	18.9	4.8	7.9	5.1	10.3	13.8	11.8	-	10.7	11.5	10.5	-
<i>Madrissa</i> influence	5.1	5.0	14.1	-	-	2.8	3.7	2.4	2.7	-	3.2	2.6	2.9	3.4	5.9	7.7	3.6	1.9	5.3	-
Self-decision/Will	10.3	20.0	-	13.3	11.1	9.7	13.0	7.3	8.1	19.0	15.9	17.9	20.6	6.9	11.8	28.2	21.4	3.8	21.1	14.3
Satisfaction/comfort	16.7	13.3	11.1	11.1	14.8	26.4	9.3	22.0	13.5	23.8	15.9	28.2	19.1	24.1	23.5	17.9	14.3	9.6	15.8	7.1
Respect	14.1	10.0	17.2	13.3	3.7	20.8	16.7	13.4	18.9	14.3	27.0	15.4	16.2	20.7	29.4	7.7	32.1	19.2	15.8	21.4

Note. NW = *Niqab-wearing*; HS = *Headscarfing*; HC = *Headcovering*; DC = *Dupatta-carrying*; MD = *Modern dressed*

Table 15 shows that analysis starts from rank2 instead of rank 1. This is because responses on rank 1 were the same as the responses given on sole condition. Results showed that the pattern of ranks does not differ very much from the findings given above in one-condition analysis. However, some unique findings were also seen.

For the MD group, One-condition analysis showed that religion was perhaps not central to their choice of dress. But at rank 2, religious command at once became the most important condition for this group. Earlier, respect was shown to have no significant place among all the reasons. But in the subsequent ranks, this condition also appeared to be a good reason. These findings lead to referring to the results of Study 1 where this group had exclaimed that they are not less religious than the *hijab*-wearing women and that they feel self-respect in their own dress. Besides group analysis, respect also became an overall important condition in subsequent ranks, whereas results given above portray respect as a less significant condition. In-laws' influence and sermon/*madrissa* influence remained insignificant here too. But some how it can be seen that HS are choosing their dress under inlaws' influence more readily than other groups. *Madrissa* influence works more for the covering groups (NW, HS, and HC) than the other two groups.

From all above, it can be summarized that covering groups choose more of external or social reasons (religion, protection, and family influence, etc). Whereas the Modern dressed groups give more of internal or psychological conditions (self-decision/will and satisfaction/comfort). However, in the middle groups (HS, HC, and DC), these conditions overlap. For instance, family influence becomes immediately important for the DC and self-decision/will is the second important condition for the

HC. It can also be observed that middle groups attempt to rank all the nine conditions, whereas the NW and the MD assign ranks to fewer conditions.

Effect of Social desirability on religiousness, psychological well being, and sexual harassment experiences. The third objective of the study was to examine the effect of social desirability on responding to the three dependent variables, namely, religiousness, psychological well being, and sexual harassment experiences. Analysis for this objective is being conducted prior to the fourth objective due to the fact that desirable responding on the dependent variables of the study, specially religiousness and sexual harassment, might confound the results and present a biased picture of the actual situation. Therefore, it seems essential to at least statistically control the effect of the tendency of this biased responding. To meet this purpose, a preliminary analysis was done at first step. This analysis involved correlation analysis and one-way ANOVA. Correlation analysis was done to identify the overall effect of social desirability and one-way ANOVA was applied to examine the differences among women wearing five types of dress on social desirability (see Tables 16 & 17). Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was finally employed to control the effect of social desirability (see Tables 18 to 21).

Table 16

Correlations of Social Desirability with Religiousness, Psychological Well Being, and Sexual Harassment Experiences

Variable	1	2	3	4	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1. SDS	-	-	-	-	10.40	2.86
2. RMA	.28*	-	-	-	56.73	8.50
3. PWB	.22*	.23*	-	-	105.81	15.91
4. SHEQ	-.31*	-.25	-.06	-	18.69	15.71

Note. RMA = Religiousness Measure - Adapted; PWB = Psychological Well Being; SHEQ = Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire

* $p < .001$.

Table 16 shows that there are significant relationships between social desirability and the dependent variables (p 's $< .001$). However, the relation is not highly strong. Following analysis can indicate how much this variable affects the dependent variables for the type of the dress.

Table 17

Means, Standard deviations, and F Values for Scores of Five Dress Groups on Social Desirability

Group	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i> (4, 498)	<i>p</i>	95% CI		η^2	<i>i</i> → <i>j</i>
						<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		
NW	124	10.73	2.63	6.05	< .001	10.27	11.20	.05	1,2,3,4>5
HS	86	10.28	2.90			9.66	10.90		
HC	147	10.82	2.65			10.39	11.25		
DC	87	10.40	2.74			9.82	10.99		
MD	59	8.81	3.42			7.92	9.70		

Note. NW = *Niqab*-wearing; HS = Headscarfing; HC = Headcovering; DC = *Dupatta*-carrying; MD = Modern dressed
CI = confidence interval; *LL* = lower limit; *UL* = upper limit.

Table 17 displays that the modern dress group was significantly lower on social desirability as compared to all other groups, $F(4, 498) = 6.05, p < .001, \eta^2 = .05$. Follow up analysis involving Hochberg *post hoc* test showed that the other four groups were quite close on desirability and the differences among their scores were non-significant (p 's > .05). It leads us to believe that desire to create an impression may be more found in those groups who cover their bodies in one way or other. Main analysis is as follows.

Table 18

Analysis of Covariance of Social Desirability as a Covariate for Effect of Dress on Religiousness and its Subscales

Source	Variable	Type III sum of squares	<i>df</i>	Mean square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Dress	RMA	5410.33	4, 505	1352.58	21.79	<.001	.15
	RI	436.89		109.22	20.96	<.001	.14
	RIDL	1504.33		376.08	19.93	<.001	.14
	RF	73.83		18.46	6.10	<.001	.05
	OP	39.89		9.97	1.57	.182	.01
SDS	RMA	1584.29	1, 496	1584.29	27.15	<.001	.05
	RI	159.24		159.24	32.75	<.001	.06
	RIDL	204.03		204.03	11.19	<.001	.02
	RF	13.21		13.21	4.47	.035	.01
	OP	82.29		82.29	13.30	<.001	.03
Dress	RMA	4498.69	4, 502	1124.67	19.27	<.001	.14
	RI	353.67		88.42	18.18	<.001	.13
	RIDL	1345.82		336.45	18.45	<.001	.13
	RF	67.02		16.76	5.67	<.001	.04
	OP	28.90		7.22	1.17	.324	.01

Note. RMA = Religiousness Measure-Adapted, without items 1 and 5. RI = Religious Involvement; RIDL = Religious Influence in Daily Life. RF = Religious Faith; OP = Optimism; SDS = Social Desirability Scale.

Results in Table 18 show that the covariate, social desirability, is significantly related to all the indicators of religiousness. Its greatest effect is for religious involvement, $F(1, 496) = 32.75, p < .001, \eta^2 = .06$, while it minimally affects religious faith, $F(1, 496) = 4.47, p = .04, \eta^2 = .01$. However, after controlling the effect of social desirability, the differences among the dress groups on all factors of religiousness remained significant (p 's $< .001$), except for the optimism that was already non significant before removing the effect of social desirability. Therefore, it seems that though desirable responding is strongly related to the religiousness, but it does not substantially affect the strength of the relationship between dress and religiousness.

Table 19

Analysis of Covariance of Social Desirability as a Covariate for Effect of Dress on Psychological Well Being and its Subscales

Source	Variable	Type III sum of squares	<i>df</i>	Mean square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Dress	PWB	456.74	4, 493	114.19	.45	.773	.004
	AT	131.05		32.76	.68	.608	.01
	PL	159.25		39.81	.94	.438	.01
	SA	271.05		67.76	1.49	.204	.01
SDS	PWB	5462.95	1, 484	5462.95	22.83	<.001	.05
	AT	699.60		699.60	14.96	<.001	.03
	PL	374.30		374.30	9.06	.003	.02
	SA	790.45		790.45	18.28	<.001	.04
Dress	PWB	201.45	4, 484	50.36	.21	.933	.00
	AT	198.62		49.66	1.06	.375	.01
	PL	122.40		30.60	.74	.565	.01
	SA	153.07		38.27	.89	.473	.01

Note. PWB = Psychological Well being Scales. AT = Autonomy; PL = Purpose in Life; SA = Self Acceptance; SDS = Social Desirability Scale

Table 19 presents that social desirability is significantly related to psychological well being and its subscales (p 's < .01). However, it can be seen that the relationship between dress and well being scales remained non significant both

before and after controlling the effect of desirability (p 's > .05). Social desirability also did not largely suppress the effect sizes.

Table 20

Analysis of Covariance of Social Desirability as a Covariate for Effect of Dress on Sexual Harassment and its Subscales

Source	Variable	Type III sum of squares	<i>df</i>	Mean square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
Dress	SHEQ	20369.89	4, 504	5092.47	24.44	<.001	.16
	GH	1113.99		278.50	21.12	<.001	.14
	UWSA	8975.69		2243.92	22.54	<.001	.15
	SC	242.48		60.62	10.78	<.001	.08
SDS	SHEQ	6630.14	1, 495	6630.14	33.80	<.001	.07
	GH	445.18		445.18	36.08	<.001	.07
	UWSA	2849.48		2849.48	30.18	<.001	.06
	SC	48.25		48.25	8.67	.003	.02
Dress	SHEQ	15716.85	4, 495	3929.21	20.03	<.001	.14
	GH	838.25		209.56	16.99	<.001	.12
	UWSA	6957.86		1739.47	18.43	<.001	.13
	SC	197.66		49.42	8.88	<.001	.07

Note. SHEQ = Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire. GH = Gender Harassment; UWSA = Unwanted Sexual Attention; SC = Sexual Coercion; SDS = Social Desirability Scale

Table 20 mentions that social desirability has also significant effect upon the scores of SHEQ and its subscales (p 's < .01). As with above two, effect of dress on SHEQ did not change and remained statistically significant before and after controlling the effect of social desirability. Despite having high significance levels,

relationship between social desirability and psychological well being had quite small effect sizes. A critical assumption, homogeneity of regression slopes (same effect of the covariate across all the groups) has been checked in Table 21.

Table 21

Regression Slopes of Dress × Social Desirability for RMA, PWB, SHEQ, and their Subscales

Source	Variable	Type III sum of squares	<i>df</i>	Mean square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Dress x SDS	RMA	344.09	4, 492	86.02	1.48	.207
	RI	48.32	4, 492	12.08	2.52	.041
	RIDL	75.35	4, 492	18.84	1.03	.390
	RF	19.06	4, 492	4.77	1.62	.168
	OP	3.93	4, 492	0.98	0.16	.960
	PWB	1144.54	4, 480	286.13	1.20	.311
	AT	189.31	4, 480	47.38	1.01	.400
	PL	104.35	4, 480	26.09	0.63	.642
	SA	181.95	4, 480	45.49	1.05	.380
	SHEQ	1151.31	4, 491	287.83	1.47	.209
	GH	27.16	4, 491	6.79	0.55	.700
	UWSA	500.00	4, 491	125.00	1.33	.261
	SC	52.21	4, 491	13.05	2.37	.051

Note. RMA = Religiousness Measure-Adapted. RI = Religious Involvement; RIDL = Religious Influence in Daily Life. RF = Religious Faith; OP = Optimism; PWB = Psychological Well being Scales. AT = Autonomy; PL = Purpose in Life; SA = Self Acceptance; SHEQ = Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire. GH = Gender Harassment; UWSA = Unwanted Sexual Attention; SC = Sexual Coercion; SDS = Social Desirability Scale

Table 21 shows that assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was met for all the three measures (RMA, PWB, & SHEQ). All the interaction terms of dress code by SDS were non-significant, p 's > .05. This finding clearly portrays that social desirability is not significantly or actively interacting/moderating the relationship between dress and the dependent variables (see Anglem, 2007). There are similar results for the subscales of the three measures. However, interaction term for religious involvement subscale was significant, $F(4, 492) = 2.52, p = .041$. Earlier it was seen that social desirability was most strongly related with this indicator of religiousness (see Table 18). Also, for Sexual coercion, the effect is nearly significant, $F(4, 491) = 2.37, p = .051$. It means that desirable responding does affect scores on these two variables.

Apart from these few exceptions, these results showed that desirable responding did not alter the pattern of individual and overall pictures for any of the group or for any of the variable. Therefore, we can be confident that the results on dependent variables are not biased and we can consider the upcoming analyses and interpretations as valid. However, as social desirability has statistically significant relationship with all the dependent variables, we will discuss its impact when and where necessary.

Relationship of dress with religiousness, psychological well being and sexual harassment experiences. The fourth objective of the study deals with finding differences among five dress classes on three variables, namely, religiousness (RMA), psychological Well Being (PWB) and sexual harassment experiences (SH).

To begin with, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was applied to address the issue of normality violations discussed earlier in the section of psychometric analysis. This test is based on chi-square distribution and calculates results by

converting mean scores into ranks (Field, 2009). All the effects were significant (p 's < .001), except for Optimism, $H(4) = 6.41$, $p = .169$. These results are similar to those obtained from parametric analysis (ANOVAs) given below. Therefore, the findings from the parametric test are confirmed and the use of parametric analysis may be considered legitimate.

For main analysis, there might be a temptation to run MANOVA as the study involves multiple dependent variables. However we did not incorporate MANOVA since these variables are not interrelated theoretically, nor there is statistical evidence that there can be one underlying composite variable (see Table 12 for interscale correlations). Thus univariate ANOVA's and *post hoc* tests were adopted to analyze inter-group differences. Factorial ANOVA was then used to examine whether Dress consistency and Dress continuity had some effect on these variables. The results for univariate ANOVAs and *post hoc* tests are given in Tables 22 to 24.

Table 22

Means, Standard deviations, and F Values for Scores of Five Dress Groups on Religiousness Measure – Adapted and its Subscales

Variable	Group	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i> (4, 505)	<i>p</i>	95% CI		η^2	<i>i</i> → <i>j</i>
						<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		
RMA	NW	60.18	6.73	21.79	< .001	58.99	61.38	.15	1 > 3,4,5
	HS	57.99	7.19			56.46	59.52		2,3 > 4,5
	HC	57.43	7.58			56.19	58.66		4 > 5
	DC	54.48	8.38			52.72	56.23		
	MD	49.37	10.57			46.63	52.10		
RI	NW	11.50	2.14	20.96	< .001	11.13	11.88	.14	1 > 3,4,5
	HS	10.70	2.19			10.30	11.24		2,3 > 4,5
	HC	10.64	2.16			10.29	10.99		4 > 5
	DC	9.72	2.47			9.21	10.24		
	MD	8.47	2.68			7.77	9.16		
RIDL	NW	24.10	4.37	19.93	< .001	23.32	24.87	.14	1,3 > 4,5
	HS	23.31	3.98			22.46	24.16		2,4 > 5
	HC	23.22	3.96			22.58	23.87		
	DC	21.56	4.24			20.67	22.44		
	MD	18.47	5.69			17.00	19.94		
RF	NW	13.77	1.53	6.10	< .001	13.50	14.04	.05	1 > 4,5
	HS	13.57	1.44			13.27	13.88		2 > 5
	HC	13.30	1.72			13.02	13.58		
	DC	12.96	1.84			12.57	13.34		
	MD	12.60	2.34			12.00	13.20		

OP	NW	10.82	2.26	1.57	.182	10.42	11.22	.01	-
	HS	10.33	2.50			9.80	10.87		
	HC	10.28	2.72			9.84	10.73		
	DC	10.29	2.60			9.74	10.83		
	MD	9.90	2.46			9.26	10.54		

Note. RMA = Religiousness Measure-Adapted. RI = Religious Involvement; RIDL = Religious Influence in Daily Life. RF = Religious Faith

OP = Optimism.

CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.

For *post hoc*s: 1 = NW (*niqab*-wearing), 2 = HS (headscarfing), 3 = HC (headcovering), 4 = DC (*dupatta*- carrying, 5 = MD (modern dressed).

$n_1 = 125, n_2 = 87, n_3 = 148, n_4 = 90, n_5 = 60$.

Table 22 displays univariate ANOVAs for scores of five groups on RMA and its components. Except for optimism, $F(4, 505) = 1.57, p = .182$, dress groups significantly differ on all the components of RMA as well as on composite scores (p 's < .001). There were no statistically significant differences on optimism among any of the groups. It was earlier discussed that optimism may not make form of Religiousness. However, we had retained it due to the fact that its inclusion or exclusion did not affect composite scores on RMA. As regards the components of RMA, groups differ most strongly on religious involvement, $F(4, 505) = 20.96, p < .001, \eta^2 = .14$, and least strongly on Religious faith (RF), $F(4, 505) = 6.10, p < .001, \eta^2 = .05$. It is also a fact that we are more interested in examining religious involvement (religious practices) because *hijab* practice is often referred to as a fulfillment of religious command (Clark, 2007; Droogsma, 2007). In pilot study, it was observed that only the modern dressed group significantly differed from other groups on composite scores on religiousness. All the remaining groups had scored very close to each other and did not significantly differ from each other. In the present and final phase, the mean scores seem to vary across various groups. For this purpose,

post hoc tests were used to see which group differed from which. Hochberg's GT2 was applied as the group sizes are noticeably unequal. This test is also a conservative test that can save from Type 1 error.

This follow up analysis revealed that the *niqab*-wearing women significantly scored higher than *dupatta*- carrying and modern dressed groups on all the subscales of religiousness measure (except optimism), p 's < .01. On the other hand the modern dress group significantly scored less than all the four groups on all the indicators of religiousness (p 's < .001), except for religious faith where this group did not significantly differ from the headcovering and *dupatta*-carrying women (p 's > .05). The *dupatta*- carrying had somewhat similar pattern. However, this group had non-significant difference with the headscarfing women on religious influence/importance in daily life and non-significant differences with the headscarfing, headcovering, and *dupatta*- carrying on religious faith. The first three groups of the study had mostly non-significant differences with each other, except where the *niqab*-wearing significantly varied from the headcovering on religiousness and religious involvement (p 's < .05).

Table 23

Means, Standard deviations, and F Values for Scores of Five Dress Groups on Psychological Well Being Scales

Variable	Group	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i> (4, 493)	<i>p</i>	95% CI		η^2
						<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>	
PWB	NW	105.44	14.10	0.45	.773	102.90	107.98	.004
	HS	105.93	15.29			102.63	109.23	
	HC	106.97	15.24			104.47	109.46	
	DC	105.63	19.10			101.61	109.65	
	MD	103.75	16.97			99.25	108.26	
AT	NW	32.11	6.82	0.68	.608	30.88	33.34	.01
	HS	33.41	7.36			31.82	35.00	
	HC	33.20	6.24			32.18	34.22	
	DC	33.31	7.85			31.66	34.97	
	MD	33.32	6.84			31.50	35.13	
PL	NW	32.97	6.49	0.94	.438	31.80	34.14	.01
	HS	32.41	6.68			30.97	33.85	
	HC	33.86	6.40			32.82	34.91	
	DC	33.62	6.67			31.21	34.02	
	MD	32.61	6.17			30.98	34.25	
SA	NW	40.36	5.84	1.49	.204	39.31	41.42	.01
	HS	40.11	6.49			38.71	41.51	
	HC	39.90	6.98			38.76	41.05	
	DC	39.70	7.50			38.12	41.28	
	MD	39.82	7.02			35.96	39.69	

Note. ; PWB = Psychological Well being Scales. AT = Autonomy; PL = Purpose in Life; SA = Self Acceptance.

CI = confidence interval; *LL* = lower limit; *UL* = upper limit.

$n_1 = 121$, $n_2 = 85$, $n_3 = 147$, $n_4 = 89$, $n_5 = 57$.

Table 23 presents the effect of dress code on PWB. The table shows non-significant differences on all PWB scales (p 's > .05). This finding is contrasting to the results of pilot study. In that study, there were highly significant differences, the

niqab-wearing being the lowest and the modern dressed being the highest scores on the PWB scales. There might be some issues with the low scale reliabilities for PWB scales and the effect of social desirability. However, the size of p values is so high (p 's > .20) that even if these factors had been controlled, the differences could not become significant. This was earlier demonstrated through ANCOVA. *Post hoc* analysis showed only one homogenous group for PWB, which included all the five dress types. So it can be concluded that the participants, independent of their dress code, are similar on psychological well being. *Post hoc* analysis was not carried out as all the differences are non-significant.

Table 24

Means, Standard deviations, and F Values for Scores of Five Dress Groups on Sexual Harassment Experiences Questionnaire and its Subscales

Variable	Group	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i> (4, 504)	<i>p</i>	95% CI		η^2	<i>i</i> → <i>j</i>
						<i>LL</i>	<i>UL</i>		
SHEQ	NW	11.96	11.47	24.44	< .001	9.93	13.99	.16	1 < 2,4,5
	HS	19.39	15.26			16.14	22.64		2,4 < 5
	HC	16.12	13.00			14.01	18.23		3 < 4,5
	DC	21.92	14.19			18.95	24.89		
	MD	33.39	21.14			27.88	38.90		
GH	NW	3.70	3.10	21.12	< .001	3.15	4.24	.14	1 < 2,3,4,5
	HS	5.77	4.10			4.90	6.64		2,4 < 5
	HC	4.96	3.23			4.43	5.48		3 < 4,5
	DC	6.70	3.77			5.91	7.49		
	MD	8.49	4.58			7.30	9.68		
UWSA	NW	7.79	8.14	22.54	< .001	6.35	9.23	.15	1 < 2,4,5
	HS	12.25	10.36			10.04	14.46		2,4 < 5
	HC	10.39	9.11			8.91	11.86		3 < 5
	DC	13.98	9.66			11.95	16.00		
	MD	22.10	14.52			18.32	25.89		
SC	NW	0.47	1.39	10.78	< .001	0.23	0.72	.08	1,2,3,4 < 5
	HS	1.37	2.46			0.84	1.89		
	HC	0.78	1.81			0.48	1.07		
	DC	1.24	2.45			0.73	1.76		
	MD	2.80	4.27			1.68	3.91		

Note. SHEQ = Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire. GH = Gender Harassment; UWSA = Unwanted Sexual Attention; SC = Sexual Coercion.

CI = confidence interval; *LL* = lower limit; *UL* = upper limit.

For *post hoc*s: 1 = NW (*niqab*-wearing), 2 = HS (headscarfing), 3 = HC (headcovering), 4 = DC (*dupatta*- carrying, 5 = MD (modern dressed).

$n_1 = 125$, $n_2 = 87$, $n_3 = 148$, $n_4 = 90$, $n_5 = 59$.

Table 24 displays the results for mean differences among five dress groups on SHEQ and its subscales. There is a highly significant difference between dress groups

on SHEQ as well as on all subscales (p 's $< .001$). The *hijab*-wearing groups seem to have less harassment experiences as compared to other groups. However, the situation for the headscarfing might be a bit different. For instance, when we see at mean scores on sexual coercion, the headscarfing ($M = 1.37, SD = 2.46$) experienced more harassment than the headcovering ($M = 0.78, SD = 1.81$) and even slightly more than the *dupatta*-carrying ($M = 1.24, SD = 2.45$). However, the situation will be clearer with the follow up analysis.

The follow up analysis involving Hochberg *post hoc* tests showed that the *niqab*-wearing had significantly less harassment experiences than all other groups (p 's $< .01$) on all types of sexual harassment except the headcovering and except on sexual coercion. They significantly differed from the headcovering only on gender harassment ($p = .043$). On sexual coercion, they had non-significant difference with all other groups, except the modern dressed. It means most groups have roughly equal coercive experiences.

The headscarf women significantly scored higher than *niqab*-wearing (p 's $< .01$) on all SHEQ scales, except at sexual coercion, where they had non significant difference with the *niqab*-wearing ($p = .068$). This group, however, did not significantly differ from both the headcovering and *dupatta*-carrying on any of the scales (p 's $> .05$). On the other hand, the headcovering seem to be more secure than the headscarfing, though non-significantly. Therefore, the headcovering appear as the second most secure group, followed by the headscarfing and the *dupatta*-carrying. The modern dressed, on the other hand, are significantly higher on all types of harassment experiences than all other groups (p 's $< .05$).

Effect of consistency and continuity of dress on religiousness, psychological well being and sexual harassment experiences. The second part of the objective dealt with above was to examine whether the effect of dress on the dependent variables is stronger for those who practice their dress consistently across situations and continually over a period of time. Consistency was measured by inquiring on a 4-point rating question “How frequently do you practice your chosen dress.” Those who endorsed “Seldom” and “Sometimes” were very few. They were only 5.3% ($n = 27$) and 7.3% ($n = 37$) respectively. So, these cases were excluded for the analysis (when they were included in a preliminary analysis, a non-significant effect was observed). Two categories were then left: “Often” and “Almost always”. These categories were labeled Low and High consistency. However, these two options are closer to each other on a continuum and do not create poles in the strict sense. Therefore, it is required that results be interpreted carefully. Continuity of dress practice was assessed in terms of years of practicing a particular dress. This period ranged from .25 years (4 months) to 38 years and was quite skewed. It was decided to divide the period in two groups by median split. Median value was 8 years.

Factorial ANOVA was run to assess main and interaction effects of dress consistency and dress continuity (consistency and continuity respectively, to be short) on religiousness, psychological well being, and sexual harassment experiences. The effects of the consistency and continuity on the subscales of the said dependent variables are not being reported in the results given below, because almost all of the effects for these subscales were non significant. Results of the final analysis are given in Tables 25 to 27.

Table 25

5 × 2 × 2 Analysis of Variance for Dress × Consistency × Continuity on Religiousness

Source	Sum of squares	<i>df</i>	Mean squares	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η_p^2
Dress	3696.86	4	924.22	16.31	< .001	.13
Consistency	16.85	1	16.85	.30	.586	.00
Continuity	83.42	1	83.42	1.47	.226	.00
Dress × Consistency	435.39	4	108.85	1.92	.106	.02
Dress × Continuity	210.63	4	52.66	.93	.447	.01
Consistency × Continuity	105.31	1	105.31	1.86	.174	.00
Dress × Consistency × Continuity	191.84	4	47.96	.85	.496	.01
Error	23973.77	423	56.68			
Total	1482109.00	443				

Table 25 shows that dress had a significant main effect on religiousness, $F(4, 423) = 16.31, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .13$, whereas dress consistency and dress continuity did not have a significant main effect. Interaction effects were non significant as well. However, interaction of dress type and dress consistency were not highly non-significant ($p = .106$). Addition of three way interaction might have suppressed its effect. So, the two way interaction might have some effect, if assessed separately. See Figure 5 to grasp the effect of this interaction.




Figure 5. Effect of Dress Type by Dress Consistency on Religiosity

As the results are non significant, interpreting the graph (Figure 5) will be avoided.

Table 26

5 × 2 × 2 Analysis of Variance for Dress × Consistency × Continuity on Psychological Well Being

Source	Sum of squares	df	Mean squares	F	p	η_p^2
Dress	631.41	4	157.85	.64	.635	.01
Consistency	210.62	1	210.62	.85	.357	.00
Continuity	59.48	1	59.48	.24	.624	.00
Dress × Consistency	609.25	4	152.31	.62	.651	.01
Dress × Continuity	2398.96	4	599.74	2.43	.048	.02
Consistency × Continuity	458.29	1	458.29	1.85	.174	.00
Dress × Consistency × Continuity	435.92	4	108.98	.44	.779	.00
Error	102135.82	413	247.30			
Total	5006769.00	433				

Table 26 mentions that all the effects are non-significant, except of interaction of dress and continuity, $F(4, 413) = 2.43$, $p = .048$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. This means that though dress does not have a significant effect of its own, its combination with continuity of wearing the particular dress does have a relationship with well being of the participants. Figure 6 can help in understanding this relationship further.




Figure 6. Effect of Dress Type by Dress Continuity on Psychological Well Being

From Figure 6 it appears that psychological well being increases for the NW (*niqab*-wearing) and HS (headscarfing) groups with increase in continuity of practicing their particular dress. However, well being decreases for the remaining three groups when they practice their respective dress code continually for longer period of time.

Table 27

5 × 2 × 2 Analysis of Variance for Dress × Consistency × Continuity on Sexual Harassment Experiences

Source	Sum of squares	<i>df</i>	Mean squares	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η_p^2
Dress	15706.05	4	3926.51	20.41	.000	.16
Consistency	294.00	1	294.00	1.53	.217	.00
Continuity	876.85	1	876.85	4.56	.033	.01
Dress × Consistency	4782.32	4	1195.58	6.21	.000	.06
Dress × Continuity	252.79	4	63.20	.33	.859	.00
Consistency × Continuity	4.81	1	4.81	.03	.874	.00
Dress × Consistency × Continuity	923.74	4	230.94	1.2	.310	.01
Error	81203.80	422	192.43			
Total	245737.00	442				

Table 27 shows that interaction effect of dress and consistency is significant, $F(4, 422) = 6.21, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .06$. It means that though consistency itself does not significantly affect scores on harassment experiences, but its combination with dress type may alter these scores. Continuity had an independent effect, showing less harassment scores for those who practice longer ($M = 18.16, SD = 16.08$) than those who have practiced their dress for shorter period ($M = 19.29, SD = 15.29$).




Figure 7. Effect of Dress Type by Dress Consistency on Sexual Harassment

When we look at the plot (Figure 7), it is evident that harassment experiences decrease for the *niqab*-wearing and headscarf groups when they practice their dress consistently across different situations. However, it works negatively for the MD (modern dressed). It does not seem to have effect for the HC (headcovering) and the DC (*dupatta*-carrying). Their harassment experiences do not change when they practice their dress less or more consistently. Before drawing any conclusions, it should be kept in mind that the data for those who practice inconsistently were not included. The main effects for consistency might have been different if such data were available.

Hijab and social cultural factors. The fifth and final objective of the research targeted to explore whether women from different social cultural background differ with respect to their dress code. That is, whether *hijab* is practiced more in a certain social group than the other. The social cultural factors are familial aspects, religious

affiliation/sect, ethnic identity, and socioeconomic conditions. Importance of familial aspects was seen in our focus group interviews with the participants. Here we have tried to cover familial aspects by asking the participants as to what type of dress is worn by other women in their families. Importance of the rest of the variables has been derived partly from theoretical literature. Religious affiliation/sect means the religious school of thought. Ethnic identity is measured by asking the respondents with what province/region they identify with. The analyses involved loglinear/chi-square tests.

Effect of religious affiliation/sect and family dress. At the first step of the analysis, family dress and religious affiliation/sect have been considered. Both of them are related in that the religious sect is often not chosen individually but is received from the family tradition. Loglinear hierarchical analysis was run to see the relationship of three nominal variables, namely, Family dress, Sect, and Dress (of the participants).

Before moving into the analysis, some recoding of the said variables was done. Categories of 'Muslims' and 'Sunni/Ahle-sunnat' were excluded. Sunni/Ahle-sunnat were eliminated because they both can either be *Deobandi* or *Barelvi*, so it remains inconclusive where to classify this category. Muslim category was excluded, because they also might not be believers of sects and hence should not be treated as a sect themselves. In a separate analysis, it was seen that though their inclusion showed a barely significant effect ($\chi^2 = 26.50, p = .048, V = .17$), their exclusion increased the strength of the effect. Four categories were finalized then (*Barelvi, Deobandi, Ahle Hadis/Wahabi, and Shiite*). This analysis is presented in Tables 28 to 31.

Table 28

Effect of Sect × Family Dress × Dress Type (N = 142)

Effect	<i>df</i>	χ^2	<i>p</i>
Higher- and lower-order	99	476.31	< .001
Higher-order	88	223.07	< .001
Highest-order	48	17.97	1.000
Main effects	11	253.24	< .001
Two-way interactions	40	205.10	< .001
Three-way interaction	48	17.97	1.000

Table 28 shows that the main effects and higher-order effects (two-way interactions) are significant, $\chi^2(11) = 253.24, p < .001$ and $\chi^2(40) = 205.10, p < .001$. The highest-order (three-way) effect is non-significant, $\chi^2(48) = 17.97, p = 1.00$. Therefore the final model established by this analysis is that two-way interacts and main effects suitably describe the data. So, in partial associations table (Table 29), the three-way interaction term is not included.

Table 29

Partial Associations of Sect, Family Dress, and Dress Type

Effect	<i>df</i>	Partial chi-square	<i>p</i>
Sect × Family dress	12	21.99	.038
Sect × Dress type	12	32.13	.001
Family dress × Dress type	16	101.80	< .001
Sect	3	6.71	.082
Family dress	4	115.30	< .001
Dress type	4	25.78	< .001

Table 29 shows that the interaction term of Sect × Family dress has a significant effect, partial $\chi^2(12) = 21.99, p = .038$. Also, this interaction term is not of interest because the relationship of religious sect and family dress does not make part of the research question. We are interested in religious sect and family dress as predictors for the dress choice of the participants. These two show a significant effect on dress of the participants, $\chi^2(12) = 32.13, p = .001$ and $\chi^2(16) = 101.80, p < .001$, respectively. Main effects are not interpretable for two reasons. One, when high-order effects are significant, it is not required to look into the significance of lower order effects. It is because lower order effects are confounded with the higher effects and therefore can be non-significant (Field, 2005). Second, the single variable may show main effect just because of unequal counts in the cells explained by the uncontrolled sampling; they do not show any relationship with the dependent variable (Howell, 2007).

Hence the best retained model for the present study is two of the two-way interactions (Sect \times Dress type and Family dress \times Dress type). There was a goodness of fit for the overall two-way model, $\chi^2(48) = 17.97, p = 1.00$. Therefore, it can be concluded that family dress and religious sect have significant effect on dress worn by the participants, but the three factors together are not mutually related. To elaborate on these findings, follow up analysis involving separate chi-square tests was conducted.

Table 30

Frequencies and Percentages for Dress by Sect (N = 178)

Sect	Dress					Total
	NW (n = 48)	HS (n = 36)	HC (n = 55)	DC (n = 21)	MD (n = 18)	
<i>Barelvi</i>	10(20.8)	10(27.8)	13(23.6)	5(23.8)	5(27.8)	43(24.2)
<i>Deobandi</i>	21(43.8)	11(30.6)	19(34.5)	1(4.8)	1(5.6)	53(29.8)
<i>Ahle Hadis</i>	15(31.3)	9(25.0)	10(18.2)	10(47.6)	8(44.4)	52(29.2)
Shiite	2(4.2)	6(16.7)	13(23.6)	5(23.8)	4(22.2)	30(16.9)

$\chi^2(12) = 25.49, p = .014, V = .22$

Note. NW = *Niqab*-wearing; HS = Headscarfing; HC = Headcovering; DC = *Dupatta*-carrying; MD = Modern dressed

Percentages are given in parentheses

15% cells have expected count less than 5.

Table 30 shows that there is a significant relationship between Religious affiliation / Sect of the participants and Dress type worn by them, $\chi^2(12) = 25.49, p = .014$ with an effect/strength of Cramer's $V = .22$. The most obvious figure of the

contingency table is about the *niqab*-wearing, 43.8% of which belong to *Deobandi* sect/school of thought, then followed by 31.3% belonging to *Ahle Hadis* school of thought (percentages calculated vertically). Very few of them belong to Shiite school. On the other hand least of the *dupatta*-carrying and modern dressed belong to *Deobandi* school (4.8% & 5.6%, respectively). Somewhat strange finding is that majority of the *dupatta*-carrying and modern dressed (47.6% and 44.2%, respectively) belongs to *Ahle Hadis/Wahabi* sect. For the headscarfing and headcovering, distribution among the religious affiliations is roughly even, though more in favor of *Deobandi* school.




Figure 8. Distribution of Dress by Sect

A careful conclusion from this analysis is that *Deobandi* sections of the society are likely to be stricter in terms of dress. Before finalizing this argument, some issues need to be considered. First, small counts in some of the cells in contingency table must be kept under consideration. Second, the main effect of the sect in loglinear model

was not statistically significant. It might have an effect through an interaction with other variables such as Family dress. Table 31 may clarify this influence of family dress.

Table 31

Frequencies and Percentages for Dress Type by Family Dress (N = 398)

Family dress	Dress type					Total
	NW (n = 101)	HS (n = 65)	HC (n = 122)	DC (n = 71)	MD (n = 39)	
NW	55(54.5)	12(18.5)	9(7.4)	2(2.8)	-	78(19.6)
HS	4(4.0)	15(23.1)	3(2.5)	2(2.8)	3(7.7)	27(6.8)
HC	40(39.6)	35(53.8)	105(86.1)	48(67.6)	15(38.5)	243(61.1)
DC	1(1.0)	1(1.5)	4(3.3)	18(25.4)	14(35.9)	38(9.5)
MD	1(1.0)	2(3.1)	1(0.8)	1(1.4)	7(17.9)	12(3.0)

$\chi^2(16) = 242.76, p < .001, V = .39$

Note. Note. NW = *Niqab*-wearing; HS = Headscarfing; HC = Headcovering; DC = *Dupatta*-carrying; MD = Modern dressed
36% cells have expected count less than 5.

Table 31 shows that there is a highly significant relationship between Family dress and dress of the participants $\chi^2(16) = 242.76, p < .001, V = .39$. Looking at the table diagonally from left to right, it can be noted which dress follows the dress of their family women. The headcovering most strictly follow the dress of their family (86%), while more than half of the *niqab*-wearing also practice their dress according to their families (54.5%). For the headcovering, this finding is consistent with Study 1 propositions. For all other groups, similarity with the family dress occurs at second level. For example, 67.6% families of the *dupatta*-carrying women practice

headcovering, while 25.4% of the families wear the same dress as worn by the participants. Earlier, it was found that this group gives importance to familial dress practices as compared to other dress groups. Here, findings may be somewhat different. However, this result is not all contrasting with that of Study 1.




Figure 9. Distribution of Family Dress by Dress Type

Though they give more importance to the condition of family dress across other groups, the most important within the conditions was, after all, self-decision/will. Similarly, earlier finding with regard to self-decision for the modern dressed can be verified here, where only a minority of them is following their family dress (only 17.9%).

This finding (along with high significance and moderate strength) in combination with the model obtained from the loglinear analysis leads to the assumption that family practices are likely to influence the dress of women more than their religious affiliation/sect. While the sect has its own significant effect, it may have more impact when it works in combination with the familial dress practices.

Effect of Religious Family. To enhance such interpretation, we also had a supplementary analysis. Respondents of this study had also been asked to report their caste. The participants who belonged to *Syed* families were selected (because of the presumption that their religious descent would influence them to adopt religious dress). One-variable chi-square was calculated manually. This was done to see if there is a significant difference between observed and expected counts. The result showed a non-significant relationship, $\chi^2(4) = 1.44, p > .05$. It suggests that being a *Syed* or belonging to a *Syed* family may not have an effect on the dress. This finding again supports the conclusion that it is the family dress practice that influences the dress of their children more than their religious background or a particular religious affiliation.

Effect of ethnic identity. In the next step of the analysis, ethnic identity was involved. Similar categories were merged due to small number of counts in certain groups. For example, Saraiki and potwari categories were merged with Punjabi group (both the languages resemble Punjabi in speech and script). It resulted in seven categories (Punjabi, Sindhi, etc). The results with regard to relationship of ethnic identity and dress are given in Table 32.

Table 32

Frequencies and Percentages for Dress Type by Identity (N = 416)

Identity	Dress					Total
	NW (n = 95)	HS (n = 78)	HC (n = 126)	DC (n = 73)	MD (n = 44)	
Punjabi	37(18.5)	37(18.5)	49(24.9)	47(23.5)	30(15.0)	200
Kashmiri	4(13.3)	8(26.7)	7(23.3)	8(26.7)	3(10.0)	30
Sindhi	3(12.0)	5(20.0)	10(40.0)	5(20.0)	2(8.0)	25
Hazarewal	13(36.1)	5(13.9)	15(41.7)	1(2.8)	2(5.6)	36
Urdu speaking	6(18.8)	8(25.0)	5(15.6)	8(25.0)	5(15.6)	32
Pakhtoon	19(33.3)	12(21.1)	22(38.6)	2(3.5)	2(3.5)	57
Baluchi	13(36.1)	3(8.3)	18(50.0)	2(5.6)	-	36

$$\chi^2(24) = 62.63, p < .001, V = .19$$

Note. NW = *Niqab* carrying; HS = Head-scarf; HC = Head covering; DC = *Dupatta* carrying; MD = Modern dressed
20% cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.64.

Table 32 shows that a significant relationship between the identity and the dress of the participants, $\chi^2 = 62.63, p < .001, V = .19$. It can be observed from the table and Figure 10 that the participants from Sindhi and Baluchi identity practice headcovering (with *dupatta* or *chador*), 40.0% and 50.0% respectively (percentages calculated horizontally, within Identity). This dress is also most frequently observed among the Hazarewal and Pakhtoons, 41.7% and 38.6% respectively; though closely followed by the *niqab*-wearing practices, 36.1% and 33.3% respectively. Punjabis and

Urdu speaking respondents practice mixed dress, while Kashmiris show more trend towards middle dress types (HS, HC, and DC).




Figure 10. Distribution of Dress by Identity

Effect of socioeconomic level. Final analysis of social cultural factors involved relationship of monthly income of the families of the participants (divided in four quartiles) with the dress code of the participants.

Table 33

Frequencies and Percentages for Dress by Family Income (N = 360)

Family income (Rupees)	Dress					Total
	NW (n = 86)	HS (n = 68)	HC (n = 107)	DC (n = 59)	MD (n = 40)	
8000-35000	34(39.5)	17(25.0)	35(32.7)	6(10.2)	2(5.0)	94(26.1)
36000-50000	30(34.9)	21(30.9)	27(25.2)	10(16.9)	6(15.0)	94(26.1)
51000-100,000	17(19.8)	24(35.3)	33(30.8)	27(45.8)	14(35.0)	115(31.9)
>100,000	5(5.8)	6(8.8)	12(11.2)	16(27.1)	18(45.0)	57(15.8)

$\chi^2(12) = 70.43, p < .001, V = .26$

Note. NW = Niqab-wearing; HS = Headscarfing; HC = Headcovering; DC = Dupatta-carrying; MD = Modern dressed
0 % cells have expected count less than 5

Table 33 reveals that there is a strong significant relationship between income level and type of dress worn by the participants, $\chi^2(12) = 70.43, p < .001, V = .26$. It seems that majority of the NW belonged to lower income strata while the DC and MD women came relatively more from high earning families. The HS and HC groups show a spread of their family incomes.

Discussion. This final phase of the study was targeted to answer the questions relating to conditions of *hijab* practice, relationship of dress with religiousness, psychological well being, and sexual harassment experiences, and role of social cultural factors in practicing a dress code. Additionally, effect of social desirability on responding to the self-report measures was assessed.

Data for this study were obtained from 511 women representing various urban parts of all provinces of the country. Participants wearing five types of dress were included. These were the *niqab*-wearing, headscarfing, headcovering, *dupatta*-carrying, and the modern dressed. Most of the participants were from Punjab and practiced head covering (with *dupatta* or *chador*). The sample became disproportionate in this way. Nonetheless, it represents the common trends in the society. For example, more than half of Pakistani population resides in Punjab and majority of women are seen practicing head covering. Female associates were inducted to contact the participants where it seemed impossible or unsuitable for the male researcher to have an access to the respondents.

Psychometric properties of the instruments were re-checked. It had been assumed that the psychometric character of the instruments would improve because of the further modification done after pilot test and because a larger sample would be available in the second phase of the study. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted on Religiousness Measure (RM; Sethi & Seligman, 1993) to establish its construct validity. Though it was not the main objective of the study, it was done because basic psychometric information was not available for this tool and also because major changes were made in this instrument to make it suitable for indigenous population of the present study. The factor solution resulted in four components of this measure, whereas originally there were three components. The third component (Religious Hope) of the original measure was shown to have two underlying factors instead of unitary structure. It might be because the content of three of its items did not seem to carry religious perspective. Respondents had also mentioned some confusion while responding to them as whether these items involved religious or social standpoint. The same three items were confirmed as measuring a

different construct in the factor analysis. This fourth component was named Optimism and was retained for calculating composite score. However, it was excluded from analysis where it was not important. The second of the two new factors was named Religious faith. The new version of the instrument was named Religious Measure-Adapted (RMA).

Internal consistency estimates of all the four measures of the study were in acceptable range. There were some issues with Psychological Well Being (PWB; Ansari, 2010) scales. Coefficients were in .60s. These were low as compared to those coefficients obtained in pilot study. The attempt to diagnose the problem showed that two items belonging to two different scales had very low item-total correlations. Therefore, these were removed from the scales. Internal consistency improved as a result of this step. Scale inter-correlations for all the measures established that the subscales are different dimensions in their own right, yet being part of one underlying construct. So, in final analysis the changed versions of RMA and PWB were used. No change was done in Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire (SHEQ; Iqbal & Kamal, 2001) and Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Stöber, 2001) after the psychometric analysis. Main analysis was then carried out.

Conditions of hijab. The first question was about finding the causes or conditions of choosing *hijab*/a particular dress. The participants had to select from among the nine given conditions or had to rank these conditions. Chi-square analysis showed that there is a significant relationship between different causes and type of dress chosen by the wearers. So, different dress wearers have different reasons to choose particular attire. Being more interested in *hijab*-wearing (which involves the *niqab*-wearing and headscarfing), it was noted that these groups predominantly describe religious command as the primary condition of adopting *hijab* (Clark, 2007;

Droogsmma, 2007). They are also concerned with protection from sexual harassment. This finding is in line with the propositions of Study 1 (involving focus groups). Protection was, however, seen to be more important than religious commitment in that study. It might be that in Study 1, it was an open interview where there was no forced choice. In the present study, religious command was among the given options. Perhaps, the self-consciousness of the majority of the *hijab*-wearing women did not allow them to pick any other cause than religion.

However, like Study 1, protection remains more important for the headscarfing group than most other dress types. This group seems a bit divided on religious and protection needs. It was also observed in Study 1 that the headscarfing persons show more shifts from other types of dress to headscarf. It is likely that they have tried to negotiate on harassing environment and the need to be religious person and have thus finally decided to adopt headscarf. They might not have adopted *niqab* because their earlier stance (before converting to scarf) was covering their head only (with *dupatata* or *chador*). And thus they might find *niqab*/face-covering as uncomfortable. It must be remembered that comfort and satisfaction was very much stressed by them in the focus discussions and they have presently mentioned satisfaction/comfort as the third most important condition of wearing *hijab*.

Majority of the *dupatta*-carrying and modern dress groups show self-decision/will to be the condition of their respective costume. It seems that these groups are more independent in their choice of the dress code. Owing to the nature of their dress, they perhaps could not attribute their outfit to religious foundations. But it was observed that the modern dressed might be eager to do so. So, they did choose to rank the reasons and then hurriedly ranked religion as the second most important reason for their dress. Overall, the *hijab*-wearing seem to adopt external conditions

(religious commands and protection) (Kousar, 2011) while those who do not cover their heads choose internal conditions (self-decision/will and satisfaction/comfort). The headcovering, being the middle group, showed both characteristics of the *hijab*-wearing and those who do not cover their heads. For example, they nearly equally opt for the condition of religious command and self-decision/will. Family influence is also important for them.

It was also observed that the three middle groups choose multiple and overlapping reasons whereas the two extreme groups (the *niqab*-wearing and modern dressed) stick to few reasons. It might be that the latter are perhaps more clear and steadfast on why they are wearing what they are wearing. On the other hand the middle groups may be pragmatic with respect to their cognitive functioning. There might be more individual differences among them on the conditions of their respective costume. When the participants ranked the conditions, respect also appeared to be important for all the groups (Droogsma, 2007; Kousar, 2011). General environment/culture of the country got only a humble size of representation. However, it was seen to be somewhat important for the *dupatta*-carrying and modern dressed. It is a bit strange that they consider their apparel as representative of Pakistani culture, whereas common observation and the structure of present data portray that most Pakistani women wear simple headgears (*dupatta* or *chador*) (see also Siraj, 2011).

Effect of dress on religiousness, well being, and sexual harassment experiences. Here, it was seen that social desirability had significant relationship with all the three dependent variables, namely, religiousness, psychological well being and sexual harassment experiences (McAndrew & Voas, 2011). Nevertheless, the strength of the relationship was not very high. ANCOVA revealed that after removing the

effect of social desirability, there was no noticeable change in the size or significance of the relationships of dress and the said dependent variables. Therefore, we can have confidence in the findings in this section.

Overall, the first three dress groups have non significant differences with each other on almost all the dimension of religiousness. This was further supported when Hochberg *post hoc* created homogenous subsets. The first three groups were in one subset. It might be predictable because these three groups cover their heads, whatever the way they choose. However, the headscarfing and headcovering groups were also included in second group along with the *dupatta*-carrying. This indicates their tendency to be in the middle and pragmatic, as asserted earlier. The modern dressed remained in the third group. These findings again illustrate that the *niqab*-wearing and modern dressed belong to poles, whereas the middle three groups keep on a continuum. The structure of these groupings supports and supplements what was observed in the analysis on conditions of dress. That is, the extreme groups (the *niqab*-wearing and modern dressed) retain their distinct stature, while the middle three groups overlap. However, the two (headscarfing and headcovering) of these middle groups also overlap with the *niqab*-wearing

There have been non-significant differences on PWB scales. This means that for each group, their dress gives them a sense of well being and hence satisfaction and comfort. The emphasis on satisfaction and comfort during FGDs is also highlighted here. However, the findings in above section had showed that satisfaction and comfort was more important for the non *hijab*-wearing. But findings in this section may indicate that in actual life, all groups may have subjective well being. However, we are far away from concluding any cause and effect relation. The happy lives of the

participants of this study may not necessarily be just because they wear a particular dress.

With regard to Sexual harassment, the *niqab*-wearing women have significant less such experiences than all other groups (Franks, 2000). This finding is in accordance with what was proposed in Study 1. After this group, the headcovering are the most secure with regard to harassing experiences. Like above results, the headscarfing group shows some unlikely results here too. It was proposed in Study 1 that they, like *niqab*-wearing, will have less harassment experiences than non *hijab*-wearing women. Here their scores are higher than headcovering and are closer to the *dupatta*-carrying, though the differences were statistically non significant. The homogenous subsets allocated the *niqab*-wearing and the modern dressed to separate subsets, while the middle three groups were placed in a single subset. These analyses repeatedly indicate that the headscarfing may not be included in the *hijab*-wearing group along with the *niqab*-wearing. They may be paired more easily with the headcovering, at least for the present study. It is because in real life situations, it can be noted that only *abaya* brings them close to the *niqab*-wearing group. Otherwise, their face is not covered, just like the headcovering. Then the scarf is likely to become a mere replacement of the *dupatta/chador* worn by the headcovering people.

We were also interested whether above mentioned effects hold for all the wearers or for those who practice their dress consistently across space and situations and with continuity over time. Though the main effects of consistency and continuity of dress practice had predominantly non-significant effect, few two-way interactions involving dress type showed significant effects. The religiousness of the *niqab*-wearing was not affected whether they practiced more or less consistently. However, that of the middle groups increased slightly when their consistency increased.

However, these relations were non-significant. Those *hijab*-wearing women who practiced consistently had less harassment experiences, while the other groups showed no difference whether consistent or inconsistent practitioners. For the modern dressed, the more consistent the more harassment experiences.

Dress continuity had a significant main effect, but did not moderate the relationship between dress and harassment experiences. It means that longer period of time the women practice their dress code, the less the harassment experience. Continuity along with dress type also significantly influenced well being. It increased the well being of those who wear *hijab*, but the other groups seem to be slightly less happy when they have practiced their dress code over a long period of years. The propositions of the Study 1 that the *hijab*-wearing women with strong religious commitment/faith will show more consistency and that the *hijab*-wearing will have less harassment experiences are supported (though not strongly) by present findings. Generally, we have concluded that consistency and continuity do moderate the already established main effect of dress code. Though, this effect does not hold true for all the variables and for all the dress types. For dress continuity, it must be borne in mind that continuity actually may represent age maturity.

Hijab and social cultural factors. The social cultural factors studied in the present research are familial aspects, religious affiliation/sect, ethnic identity, and monthly incomes of the families of the participants. Familial aspects were measured by the dress worn by the women in the families of the participants. Often the religious sect of the children in a family is the same as practiced by the family. So, in a way both variables related to family aspects. Therefore, they were taken together in the analysis. Loglinear analysis revealed that two-way interactions significantly predicted the outcomes.

It was observed that followers of *Deobandi* sect/school adopt *niqab*, head covering and headscarf more than other sects. Followers of *Ahle Hadis* school equally highly adopt *hijab* and the non-covering dress. Wearing modern dress by this sect is somewhat contrasting with the view that *Ahle Hadis* are more fundamental and stricter in religious practices. However, *Deobandis* may be more adopting the *hijab* owing to the Islamic movements within their circles, which vocalize heavily in favor of this dress code (for instance, *Al Huda* network). At the same time, earlier analysis has disclaimed the influence of religious sermons/*Madrissa*. *Barelvis* are commonly thought of as a moderate sect. Therefore, it can be seen that they equally adopt all kinds of dress. The Shiites have fewer trends towards *hijab*. However, small number of cell counts for this sample may bar us from drawing any solid conclusion.

More than sect, the family dress seems to have stronger impact. Most of the *niqab*-wearing and headcovering women were seen following the same dress as of their families. Though the *niqab*-wearing had not emphasized much on the family influence during FGDs; for them, it might not be an obvious reason. But it could have an unseen impact on their dress. Other groups deviate one level from their family dress. For example, majority of the families of the headscarfing women actually wear head covering. It may support the earlier observations that the headscarfing people have shifted from head covering to headscarf. This observation is similar to those made by some feminists where women adopted *hijab* against their family traditions (e.g. Jones, 2005; Murphy, 2006). Whereas, the *dupatta*-carrying and modern dressed deviate from their family dress on account of their free will, the headscarfing women may do the same because of religious and protection needs.

The fact that the family dress has a stronger effect than religious affiliation indicates that the religious affiliation may be a passive feature of the familial aspects.

It is passive in the sense that it was seen to influence the dress code through interaction with family dress. Another evidence on this argument was obtainable. When we looked for any differences on dress among the participants belonging to *Syed* families, no significant relationship was found. *Syed* families, having a descent from Prophet's generation, are considered to be religious families. Hence Religious affiliation and religious descent seem to have less effect than actual religious practices of the family (here the religious dressing). Practices seem to be more important than beliefs.

Beyond the social aspect of family, a macro cultural factor like ethnic identity may be one of important determinants of one's dress code. There was noted a significant relationship between how a person identifies oneself and the dress code adopted by that person. However, a careful analysis of the cells in the contingency table showed that the differences were not that high. Head-covering with *dupatta* or *chador* seemed to be most frequently observed among all identities. This finding is in line with our earlier assertion that *dupatta/chador* is a common dress among Pakistani women. Face veiling trend was seen more among Pakhtoon, Baluchi, and Hazarewals than other identities. Whereas modern dressing was relatively more prevalent among Punjabis, Kashmiris and the Urdu speaking.

From the results discussed in this section, it can be concluded that the social cultural factors play a considerable role in the choice of the dress code of Pakistani women. Their attire becomes different when they belong to different families with different religious bents and different ethnic identities. When these social demographics assume relatively traditional and less urbanized stature, the dress code comes in the form of face- and head-covering. This assertion was complemented by

another finding that more of the *hijab*-wearing belonged to lower income groups, while people wearing modern dress came from high earning families.

The present phase of the study was, in the known literature, first or at least among the rare efforts to gauge the social psychological variables related to *hijab* in a quantitative and systematic mode. It is also unique in the sense that it has made a humble attempt to separate the effects of two types of *hijab*, i.e. *niqab* and scarf. Previously, these have commonly been considered as one type and have been named Islamic dressing. In the next chapter, we endeavor to assemble the findings and align the literature to build up a theoretical framework that can be used in future scientific studies related to phenomenon of *hijab*.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present study started with some questions in the mind about the nature and functions of *hijab* and with the possible solutions and answers to these questions. However, there was a need to turn to the literature. There was a good amount of scholarship, but was mostly related to immigrant women in western countries (for instance, USA and UK) and/or in those Muslim nations where *hijab* is a source of debate and has become a politicized institution due to the involvement of the states (for example, Turkey and Iran) (see, for example, Droogsma, 2007; Siraj, 2011; Saktanber & Corbacioglu, 2008). Scientific literature was scarce for Pakistani women; not more than some demographics of *hijab*-wearing women and interviews with these women in a special setting like university campus or religious school (see, for example, Abid, 2010; Kousar, 2011). Therefore, the study was geared to first brainstorm the *hijab*-wearing women themselves, find their vantage point, consult literature, and then formulate/ refined research questions to be tested in a systematic quantitative study.

However, it must be acknowledged that scientific studies have grown in number since the present project was undertaken. *Hijab* has been studied with various angles (such as health and marketing) (Alghadir, Aly, & Zafar, 2012; Bregenzer, 2011) and in different countries such as Indonesia and India (Nisa, 2012; Parveen, 2013). Despite this, we argue that *hijab* is after all a cultural process and can not be grasped fully unless placed in a particular context (Siraj, 2011). In addition to this, it cannot be understood with single and isolated aspects. Therefore, it was required to site *hijab* in Pakistani culture and give it a broader coverage. In this sense, the present

research was aimed to put forward a theoretical framework for the phenomenon of *hijab* in Pakistan.

This study had started with a focus on *hijab* (*niqab*/headscarf along with *abaya*). But while discussing the research problem with peers and talking informally with the women themselves and *hijab*-wearing women of focus groups, it was felt that those women, who cover their head in any way, cannot be excluded from *hijab*/veiling umbrella. It was also sensed that exploring the aspects related to the *hijab*-wearing women in isolation would be of less use to advance scientific knowledge. It would be more appropriate to take on a comparative study which also includes other dress groups. Hence the present research is a comparative study which examines different variables across five dress groups.

The event of 9/11 has strongly split the world. Muslims have been cornered and considered as the ignorant brutes. Their religious markers such as beard and *burqa* have become symbols of extremism. Due to these symbols, they have been persecuted where they are minority (Reeves, McKinney, & Azam, 2013). Pakistan takes special significance in this scenario because it borders Afghanistan and is home to the tribal belt where all terrorism has been considered to originate and mushroom. So, it becomes salient to see how the post 9/11 facts have influenced these religious symbols in Pakistan. *Hijab* is one of those symbols which have seen a substantial rise in the previous decade. In the present study, *hijab* has therefore been selected to focus on. Before entering the discussion, it seems reasonable to state the researcher's own position on *hijab*. The researcher is of the view that proper covering of the body is sufficient for modesty and *hijab* does not necessarily make an element of covering and/or modesty. This lens of viewing *hijab* may bias the interpretations. However, the researcher will best attempt to evaluate the results impartially.

This study began with exploring the scientific literature on *hijab*. This exploration concluded with certain research questions. These questions were almost same as were at the beginning of literature review. It was because we found that there were certain gaps in the existing scholarship on *hijab*. These gaps were, as already stated, about focus on Pakistani women and a broader theoretical perspective on *hijab*. Nonetheless, these questions became refined and focused after examination of literature. These questions related to conditions, context, and consequences of practicing *hijab* in Pakistan and were placed in a grounded theory paradigm (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The research was distributed in two studies.

Study 1 involved brain storming/focus group discussion (FGDs), which were conducted with five groups of women to draw personal experiences and knowledge about *hijab* practice. These women were *niqab*-wearing (face veil with *abaya*), head scarfing (with *abaya*), headcovering (with *dupatta/chador*), *dupatta*-carrying (around neck), and the modern-dressed/western dress women. One group also included men. They were involved to investigate the societal/patriarchal discourse on *hijab*. Grounded theory was undertaken to analyze the verbatim obtained from these discussions. Three core categories emerged. These were religious commitment, environmental adjustment, and psychological satisfaction. These variables were quantitatively surveyed and expanded on a larger sample in Study 2.

In the first phase of Study 2, certain self-report tools were chosen to gauge the said variables. These instruments were modified and translated into Urdu for indigenous applicability. These tools were pretested and further modified, where necessary. Reliability and validity of these measures were found and a cursory analysis was done. There were certain flaws, but we moved to second and final phase of Study 2, assuming that these shortcomings will subside while working with a larger

number of participants. Final phase of the study was performed with 511 respondents from various parts of the country. The results were treated mainly with chi-square test and tests of ANOVA family (univariate, factorial, and *post hoc*s). The findings were discussed at an initial level in the corresponding chapters. Following lines present the finale of this discussion along with theoretical framework, implications, and limitations of the research.

Study 1. Exploring the *Hijab* Phenomenon in Pakistani Context

Before starting for the FGDs, we had some unstructured interviews with religious and social scholars. These were performed with a view to inviting social intellectual discourse on *hijab*. Religious scholars considered *hijab* as a religious obligation and a demand of modesty in coercive social circumstances. Some of thought that *hijab* is contextual and is interpretable as a religious command. Social scientists had guarded view about the rapid increase in *hijab* practice and were worried about the non indigenous nature of this attire and religious radicalization associated with it. A few thought *hijab* as an indication of weakness and repressed sexual guilt of the wearers.

It was found that phenomenon of *hijab* has diversity in itself. Three aspects / conditions emerged. These were religious commitment, environmental/social adjustment, and psychological satisfaction. These factors are interwoven in such a way that one cannot be disjointed from each other. However, the said themes seem to converge on psychological satisfaction of women. This psychological commitment comes through autonomy/self-decision, internal satisfaction, physical and mental comfort. These social actors exercise their autonomy and agency in deciding on an outfit. Religious teachings guide them to their behavior. Some reflect on Holy text

and Islamic traditions. They want to become good Muslims. Nevertheless, they adopt it specially when this practice also bears them security and protection. All above, they derive comfort from these religious and protective needs. However, as this happiness and comfort can be found in multiplicity of dress, other women adopt the kind of dress that suits their dispositions and temperament. Those who do not wear *hijab* also show contentment in their dress and regard their apparel as equally modest (Siraj, 2011).

The wearers attempt different dress codes. They make shifts in space and time. They take to *hijab* in some religious situations and put it off in other social and personal spaces. They may not practice it in their kinship, but drape it in a context where it is culturally expected. Some causal conditions serve as context sometimes and other act as functions on other times. This becomes a fluid life space, where things do not retain the same position and character permanently. They continually negotiate with social/familial expectations and insecure circumstances, take guidance from religion and inspiration from the self and adopt the attire that suits them. A work based in grounded theory follows presenting a theory (McLeod, 2001). These propositions belong to three themes as cited above. Detail of these propositions has already been given in Chapter III. These will be further discussed below along with the results of Study 2.

Study 2. Comparison of Five Dress Groups on Study Variables

Study 2 was a cross-sectional survey research to expand on the findings obtained from Study 1. It must be borne in mind that the findings/research questions are associated to all kinds of dress and are not limited to *hijab* only. In Phase I of this

study, such measures were carefully selected to match the constructs related to these findings.

These instruments were modified/adapted and translated through standard procedures. They were pretested and were further modified as per respondents' feedback. The experiences gained from this try out / pretesting were valuable. Women were reluctant and some were even vocal about the intrusive nature of questions asked in the Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire (SHEQ; Iqbal & Kamal, 2001). Religiousness Measure (RM; Sethi & Seligman, 1993) had issue with internal consistency of some of the scales. Thus, further alterations were done. These changes involved retranslation and/or providing easy English synonyms. It might be important to mention here that Pakistani society uses mixed languages. They add various English words and phrases during their conversation. So, at certain places they are likely to feel hampered by classical Urdu vocabulary. At these places, English expressions can help them understand meaning of a communication. Finally, the tools were further put to a test in second phase of this study.

Another point to make is that there was a very small correlation coefficient between religious faith and religious practices. It reveals that often the believers may not be very regular in religious practices or good practitioners of religion may not have that good faith in religious dogma. However, dimensions of religiousness were also not very strongly (though significantly) related to each other. It means that religion in our culture is less likely to be an integrated article or at least religiosity is not a consistent and unitary construct. Nonetheless, these findings may also point out that these elements are not actually related to religion. But at the same time these components have high and significant relation with total scores, thereby justifying and verifying their relation to religiousness as a whole construct.

Nonetheless, exploratory factor analysis run in the final phase of the study showed that the Religious hope component actually had two dimensions. One of them is religious (religious faith) and other is bent towards social hope (optimism). Thus the new measure has four components and is named Religiousness Measure-Adapted. We also ran brief analyses on main research questions with the small data of the pilot study. These findings will be discussed below along with the results of final phase of the study.

The second and final phase of the study aimed to answer the major questions of the study. These questions relate to finding causal conditions of practicing *hijab*, comparing the five dress groups on religiousness, psychological well being, and sexual harassment experiences. Effect of social desirability was also assessed. Other variables of interest were religious affiliation/sect, familial dress practices, and ethnic identity of the participants. Findings related to the psychometric considerations have been discussed in Chapter V. Below is presented the argument on major research issues of this study.

The first research question was to find out under what causal conditions women choose *hijab* or other dress. Chi-square analysis mentioned that there is a significant relationship between nine given conditions and the five dress groups. It was seen that the *hijab*-wearing women (*niqab*-wearing and headscarfing women) choose *hijab* for religious reasons (see also Nisa, 2012 for Indonesian women; Droogsma, 2007 for American Muslim women). Protection from harassment is their second main concern. In Study 1 (FGDs), protection was the major reason. This change might have occurred due to the fact that the participants had to choose among given options, whereas in Study 1 the stage was open. Seeing religious command among the given causes, the participants might have become conscientious and could

not avoid selecting this cause as the primary determinant. After all, religion was significantly important in FGDs as well. The *dupatta*-carrying and the modern dressed demonstrate their own will in selecting their attire. These findings are in line with the propositions derived from Study 1. However, influence of *madrissa* (religious institution) has not been shown to be an important determinant of practicing *hijab*. Therefore, *hijab* may not be associated with the fundamentalism usually attributed to certain *madrissas*.

If we place these two conditions on a continuum, religion seems to increase in importance when we move from modern dress to *niqab*-wearing/face-veiling, whereas will/self-decision rises when we proceed from the face veil to modern attire. But there is one exception. The headscarf women show less tilt towards religious command and more towards protection as compared to the headcovering (*dupatta/chador*; the middle group). Earlier it was observed that the headscarf women show more shifts in their dress code and along with religious obligation, were also concerned with protection needs. As the propositions of Study 1 suggest, the headscarfing women also stress comfort in their dress. It seems that they have shifted from simple head covering to headscarf (along with *abaya*) to adjust religion, protection, and comfort all at the same time. However, they did not adopt face veil, might be because they found it a bit uncomfortable. That they try to adjust various motives and conditions is supported by the finding that they have assigned weightage to multiple conditions.

If we place headscarf among the three middle groups (other two being the headcovering and the *dupatta*-carrying), we can note that these groups select multiple reasons for their dress, whereas the extreme groups, face veil and modern dress, select exclusively one reason: religious command and self-decision, respectively. The middle groups, on the other hand, can be seen as more practical. Usually, it is these

three dress groups that make shifts in their dress codes (anonymous, personal communications, January 2010). So possibly, they might have more reasons to consider while they pick any of the attire. For example, the headcovering and the modern dressed are also influenced by their immediate social environment and practice the same dress as other women in their family. These observations are again supporting the propositions put forward for this study.

The second main question was to investigate differences among dress types on religiousness, well being, and sexual harassment experiences. Effect of desirable responding was statistically controlled. Thus we built a confidence in the interpretations of results. The *hijab*-wearing groups were found significantly more religious than the other groups. Effect of consistency and continuity of dress practice was also assessed. The more consistent practitioners were more religious. This is as per the theoretical propositions for this study, but with two exceptions. First, the consistency does not influence religiousness for the *niqab* women or, put in other way, religiousness does not make them more or less consistent practitioner of their dress. Second, *post hoc* subsets display that women with headscarf are more close to headcovering women in religiousness. There are overlappings among the middle three groups, while *niqab* and modern women remain significantly far away from each other on religiousness. This relates to what we have discussed shortly ago. Though there are significant differences on religious faith as well, *post hoc* subtests do not show distinct dress groupings for this article of religion. This indicates the strong beliefs of Pakistani women in religion, whatever dress they wear. As faith is likely to be considered a dividing line between being and not being a Muslim, there are fewer chances that people will differ on this dimension of religiousness. There was another evidence available to support this premise: social desirability did not significantly

effect scores on faith. On the other hand, reporting of religious practices significantly changed as a function of desirable responding. Considering their dress as religious act, the *hijab*-wearing might think that other religious practices should also correspond with that of dress and thus gave unrealistic endorsement of questions on religious practice.

Though there are non significant differences on psychological well being, it is not without the moderating effect of continuity of dress practice. The interaction effect was significant and it revealed that the relationship held strong for those *hijab*-wearing persons who practice continually over years and less strongly for the dress groups. These findings go along the propositions and partially support the earlier findings that religiousness and religious practices enhance well being and esteem (see, for example, Dunkel, Davidson & Qurashi, 2010; George, Ellison, & Larson, 2002; Rastmanesh, Gluck, & Shadman, 2009). However, as overall differences are non significant, it can be suggested that all dress codes are likely to provide well being, autonomy, and esteem to their wearers. Though findings related to first research question showed that the non *hijab*-wearing had stressed autonomy and Will more than the *hijab* wearing in choosing their dress. Similarly, it was earlier observed that those who wear modern dress also display satisfaction and confidence in their westernized apparel. However, the findings with regard to well being might be considered less dependable as there were some psychometric issues with this measure.

The face veiling women had significantly less harassment experiences than all other dress groups. It might be that these women are more safeguarded by their kins while moving outside. As a result, they are less harassed by ill-behaved persons. However, in our focus discussions with these women it was stressed by them that their dress provides them comfort and freedom of mobility (see also Droogsma,

2007). Therefore, hijab has helped them to move independently, where they do not need any guard to protect them. So, it is likely that they get secured because of their hijab and not because of safeguards.

The headscarf group had unexpectedly, though not significantly, more such experiences than the headcovering women (see Hawkins, 2008). Hawkins argues that the *hijab* attracts men because they read *hijab* as a message from the wearer to be interested in marriage. It might also be the fact that these relatively more harassment experiences have led these women to adopt headscarf. Earlier we saw that they emphasized the need of protection along with the religious commands. If these experiences have occurred before switching to veil, the face veiling or the head covering persons could also have had such experiences before they started their covering practices and thus should have reported similar level of harassment experiences. But they did not. So, the conclusion that the headscarf women show more such experiences than the face-veiling and the headcovering women holds.

Overall, the face-veiling and headcovering groups were more protected groups. Both consistency and continuity had their effects. Continuity had a main effect, i.e., independent of the type of the dress, each one's dress if practiced continually wards off the harassing experiences. Perhaps, continuity of a dress practice becomes a personal identity and fosters such a confidence in the wearer that she can stand and shun the harassing elements around her. However, consistency had an interaction with the dress type. Those *hijab* women, who observe their dress code consistently across different spaces and situations, face fewer such experiences. Consistency did not seem to have influence on *dupatta/chador* and headscarf practices, but significantly negatively affected the modern dressed. It is likely that modern dress is not expected in some of the situations (such as religious ones); certain

elements of society might consider such persons as not bearing good morals and thus attempt to harass them.

Next we turn to the third question of the study, which relates to examining relationship between wearing *hijab* and social cultural factors. These were religious affiliation/sect, familial dress practice, ethnic identity, and family income. This fact must be considered that the three questions of the research are not independent of each other and have more or less emerged from Study 1. For instance, self-decision/will was one of the conditions in question 1 and was also measured by Autonomy (PWB scale) as dependent variable in question 2. Similarly, family dress was also a causal condition in question 1 and was taken as a social cultural factor in question 3. Thus, we are attempting to measure same things with a multimethod approach in order to have a holistic picture of the phenomenon.

It was observed that religious affiliation and dress practices of the families were important predictors of the dress code of the participants. More of the face veiling women belonged to *Deobandi* sect/school of thought. In recent decades, the *madrissas*, which have taken to teaching of *hijab*, usually belong to this school of thought (for instance, *Al huda* and *Jamia Hafsa* in Islamabad) (Abid, 2010). The extremist groups are also said to belong to this faith. These findings remind us of the voices of social scholars mentioned earlier. They had considered *hijab* as imported from Arabia and as a symbol of extremism and religious radicalization. However, the fact needs to be considered that the headscarf women belonged relatively equally to all sects and the head covering group predominantly belonged to *Deobandis*. This observation counters the common view that headscarf is more of a fundamental religious dress. Rather head covering seems to be more close to religious factions. On the other hand, the *dupatta*-carrying and modern dress (non headcovering) groups

belong more to *Ahle Hadis* school of thought. It might be because that this sect, despite considered more fundamentalist, are not much active in social political mobilizing.

Before finalizing this premise, some issues need to be taken into account. First, small frequencies in some of the cells in contingency table must be kept under consideration. Second, the religious affiliations/ sects were not independently selected and were restricted by the affiliations to which the participants (non probability sample) already belonged. At the same time earlier analysis has dismissed the influence of religious sermons/*Madrisa*.

The headscarf persons continue their unique behavior by showing that they use a different dress code from that of their family women (who use *dupatta/chador* to cover themselves). At the same time, the *dupatta*-carrying and modern dress women also diverge from the dress observed in their families. However, their departure might be due to the asserted free will whereas the headscarf women may adopt their attire as a function of their religious and security needs. The observation that the *niqab*-wearing and the headcovering women abide by the familial dress practices extends another evidence that the two groups are close to each other.

The assertion that the face-veiling and headcovering population is in contiguity is further enhanced by the finding that the former dress was practiced frequently where the latter was practiced most frequently (i.e., among Hazarewal, Pakhtoons, and Baluchis). Other dress kinds were relatively evenly distributed among other identities, modern dress being more common with Punjabis than other populations. However, the head covering (with *dupatta/chador*) remained the most salient practice among almost all identities.

To wrap up, it can be noted that most of the findings of the final study were in accordance with the theory/propositions drawn from Study 1. Though, the findings of pilot study took a bent from these propositions to some extent; the final study supported these theoretical points to a large extent. There were some exceptions too. For instance, wearers of all kinds of dress were found to be equally happy and autonomous in their lives and that the headscarf persons did not seem to make much part of the *hijab*-wearing group. In many aspects, they were close to the headcovering women. On the other hand, this headcovering population was more close to the face veiling in certain dimensions. Overall, the middle three groups were more diverse in their practice, make shifts, and had multiple aspects to consider while deciding and maintaining their clothing. On the other hand, the extreme groups have exclusive stance on their apparel, the face-veiling more inclined to religious determinants and the modern dressed displaying independent choices.

Developing a Theoretical Framework

The ultimate goal of this study was to present a theoretical framework. In following lines we discuss the conclusions by developing a theoretical perspective on *hijab* and other dress codes. Though *hijab* practice has increased in the decade after 9/11, it does not appear to be an outgrowth of the religious extremism usually associated with Pakistani Muslims. Though the *hijab* wearers discuss the influence of social religious conditions, such as *madrissas* (religious institutions), on the costume of the women affiliated with them, they themselves have other social cultural conditions under which they choose *hijab* (see also Shirazi-Mahajan, 2007). One of the important of these is family. Family is the focal point where religious and normative influences converge. Religious families (such as *Syeds* and *Deobandis*) may not directly influence the attire of their girl children, but they are likely to

impress their decisions through their own religious practices. That is, the children wear what other women in their families wear. However, these practices of elders have more influence in terms of *niqab*/face-veil in general and head covering (*dupatta/chador*) in particular. The youth that adopts headscarf and *abaya* belong usually to those families where women use simple headgear (*dupatta/chador*). However, this act of theirs cannot be understood as a form of revolt, but should be considered as an assertion of their religious and protective needs (see also Jones, 2005).

Besides the practices of family women, fathers play a significant role in influencing their daughters in adopting *hijab*. At first gaze, it may be read as a face of patriarchal control. Careful analysis manifests that this is a form of interaction and negotiation. *Hijab* is no longer a structural obedience or imprisonment as emphasized by some feminists (for instance, Khan, 1972; Kelcic, 2011). Though women do cultivate the honor and modesty of their (religious) families by maintaining the Islamic dress; it is without the threat and enforcement of previous centuries. However, this society might not have yet come out of the submissive demands from women. This apprehension is due to the finding that the women belonging to lower income families and to the less developed sub-cultures such as KPK and Baluchistan take to face veil more than the other women. Watched with other lens, these women may also adopt this type of clothing because of their economic and mobility requirements. In this way veil assumes the apparatus of autonomy and righteousness (see also Mule & Barthel, 1992).

The *hijab* wearers (particularly the *niqab* wearers) validate their righteousness when they report high religiousness as compared to other groups. That they are highly religious is validated when they choose religious command as the strongest cause of

their dress selection. However, religiousness is not the only drive behind this attire of theirs. They are exceedingly apprehensive of the insecure circumstances of the country. They vocalize their protection needs, sometimes above the religious obligations. They interpret verses of chapter *Ahzaab* where the veiling was enjoined upon the Muslim women so that they may not be harassed by the unfaithful miscreants. Their veiling functions well to bear them this protection and security. Spatial and temporal consistency enhances their protection. This consistency demands commitment, commitment to religious importance in their daily lives and to their religious practice. This commitment helps them resist the biased, discriminatory, and challenging behavior of the social forces around them (see also Shahid, 2008). The veiling is not likely to be a culturally normative behavior then, though it might be a norm in a religious and familial context. The resilience and resistance thus enacted by them functions to enhance their autonomy and self-acceptance.

Those who use headscarf and *abaya* somewhat lean away from the above endorsements. Their cognitive functioning is seemingly not focused. They have multiple conditions to look to: religious, protective, familial, and of comfort. They seem to be ambivalent and are less religious and less protected as compared to the face-veiling. To them, *hijab* is not merely religious but also a new mode of dress that functions for them to adjust socially, manage impressions, obtain physical and psychological comfort and look like a modern person (see also Woldesemait, 2012; these findings were supported by some personal communications, 2011 to 2013).

Whereas autonomy and self-acceptance is a function of *hijab* practice for the face-veiling; those who use modern attire and do not use any headgears employ their dress to communicate their autonomy, comfort, and conviction. They are contented with their costume and regard it equally modest, though not equally religious as

compared to *hijab*. The three middle dress groups, i.e., the headscarfing, head covering, and *dupatta*-carrying believe in multiplicity of dress code and select the one which lends them psychological comfort and contentment. This satisfaction may be derived from their religious belief about dress, social norms, and sexually offensive environment, but above all from their own personal dispositions. They feel modesty and morality in their preferred outfit. Among all dresses, head covering with *dupatta* or *chador* is the only code that displays at once equally high standing on religiousness, well being, and protection. As this is the central group of all dress forms and already most practiced code in Pakistan; we present the use of *dupatta/chador* to cover heads as highly representative, adaptive, and convenient dress in the country.

Hijab or *purdah* (covering the body) is likely to be a continuous variable than a categorical one. It moves along a continuum both across space and time. With respect to space, women switch to different dresses as per situation and geography. They become pragmatic in this sense. From prayers to parties, they have different modes of covering and grooming themselves. From mores to merits, they adopt different outlooks, so that they can manage their personalities and impressions (see also Brower, 2013). With regard to time they develop and mature through different forms of attire. From childhood to youth to middle age to old age, they select a particular kind of outfit to negotiate with environment as well as meet the developmental changes occurring in them. This reading of dress presents *hijab* as an instrument rather than institution, an instrument that has a functional and contextual essence. Thus there is a continuous battle between the self, the society, and the milieu where one resides. Women resolve this conflict by adopting the dress that provides them autonomy, worth, and satisfaction.

Conclusions

The theoretical model inferred from the findings of this study may be that dress has a significant relationship with religiousness and sexual harassment experiences. This relationship holds positively for the covering groups, with some exception for the headscarf population. Spatial consistency and temporal continuity of dress practice selectively moderate these relationships. Continuity interacts for psychological well being, while consistency for sexual harassment experiences. Continuity, independent of dress type, has desirable effect on harassment experiences. Dress itself is influenced by familial dress practices and religious affiliations of the wearers, the former being stronger of the two.

The present study is one of the rare attempts to differentiate within the types of *hijab*. It has separated the effects of wearing face veil and using headscarf. It includes also those who cover themselves properly but are not usually considered as observing Islamic dressing and has also inducted those who wear modern dressing. This way, this research is an inclusive study with regard to dress practices in Pakistan. Moreover, it has comparative nature and is the first attempt in the known literature to compare various dress levels on related factors and variables. We have also avoided the traditional religious political perspective and have tried to bend on social psychological aspects of *hijab*/dress.

Implications

This study can help to understand the motives and cognitions of the *hijab* wearing women in Pakistan and can weaken the apprehensions of certain feminists and social political quarters about the radicalism usually attributed to veiling. The study has revealed Pakistani women do not practice it under familial or cultural

subjugation. However, they adopt it under familial inspiration and personal needs. Veiling also does not seem to be a political revolt. It might be because the recent Pakistani regimes, unlike its neighbors like Iran and Afghanistan, have not meddled with the dress habits of its citizens. Practicing *hijab* may also not be considered as outcome of religious oppression. Rather it can be a symbol of religious commitment. However, this commitment might be brought about sometimes by the clergy of some religious institutes. Moreover, the present findings emphasize the will and well being of the wearer. Therefore, we suggest that future studies frame their research on the psychological makeup of the wearers and their social psychological aspects of life.

Recent work with regard to *hijab* practice by minority Muslim women has its own importance. However, present study points to the significance of studying *hijab* in any Muslim majority nation where there is multiplicity of dress code. Dimensions of lives of *hijab*-wearing women can be different from their compatriots. For example, non *hijab*-wearing women also consider their dress as part of their religious identity. Thus, for the *hijab*-wearers, their dress may be an expression of their religiousness along with their religious identity. These results are likely to determine dimensions of new research in such areas as women studies, sociology, social psychology, and positive psychology.

Limitations and Suggestions

Conclusions based on this work should not be without care and scruples. First study of this project was carried out with university women. Married, employed, and women from lower economic class could not be given proportionate place. In this way, it was not a very representative sample. And also no strong technical method was applied to find reliability and validity of the findings. However,

when the researcher investigated these findings with fairly representative large sample, these findings were reasonably supported through standard statistical procedures.

The instruments I selected to assess the variables associated with *hijab* should also be reviewed. Measuring religiousness has always been a source of confusions (McAndrew & Voas, 2011). Religiousness Measure (Sethi & Seligman, 1993) was adapted for indigenous applicability. However, it may not be considered as a complete measure of religiousness. It does not seem to cover all elements of faith and practices. One of the subscales labeled as Optimism was not found to be related to religiousness. In future research, I suggest this subscale to be dropped from the measure. I also feel dissatisfied with Psychological Well Being scales (Urdu version; Ansari, 2010). The participants were quite perplexed while responding to its items. Certain items were seen to be not conveying the intended meaning of the constructs under question. It is proposed that other versions of Ryff's (1989, 1995) scales or some alternatives measures should be used. However, the present measure can be used after having eliminated the two items described in the relevant chapter.

The effect of desirable responses cannot be ignored as self-report measures were used and the theme of the research was also sensitive and to some extent offensive. Though I have statistically ruled out its effect in the present research, the variable Religious practices and Sexual coercion were still influenced by social desirability. Thus, future work should reconsider this variable. Future studies may also involve detailed outlook on conformity as a predictor. In a way, the present work took this variable as predictor besides main objective of using it as a covariate. However, this could not be accomplished with a reasonable literature support and technical excellence.

It was also felt that a survey research could have some anomalies. The inability of the respondents to understand the questionnaires, their response set and need to hurry, and lack of interest and seriousness can seriously hamper accessing their actual cognitive and affective functioning. Thus both reliability and validity go at stake. Though the data collection experiences were satisfactory, it was below accomplishment. The individual administration of instruments on interview format could be a desired way in this regard. In this way size of the sample and significance of statistical results may be compromised; validity of findings can be improved, however. It should also be noted that though overall sample size was quite large, certain individual analyses were run on small sample sizes. It was due to unavailability of information on certain factors, for instance, religious affiliation. Non probability sampling might also have affected the results.

I expanded on the themes emerging from qualitative study and examined some of the propositions founded on those themes. And have lastly presented a theoretical skeleton for future work. There were left certain aspects, such as health and discrimination at educational and organizational sites. It can also be explored whether harassment experiences occur prior to or later than shifting to *hijab* or a particular dress. It is also proposed that a more suitable technique such as cluster analysis can be adopted for ranked conditions of practicing a dress. Moreover, planned contrasts for demographics and path analysis for overall picture can be performed to afford a technical base for the newly founded theory.

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Demographic Sheet for Focus Group Discussions

Group: _____

Moderator: _____

Place: _____ Date: _____

ذاتی کوائف

نام: _____ کوڈ _____ عمر _____

تعلیم: _____ پیشہ: _____ معاشی پس منظر: _____

والد کی تعلیم: _____ والدہ کی تعلیم: _____

خاندان کا سربراہ کون ہے: _____ سربراہ کی تعلیم: _____

سربراہ کا پیشہ: _____

ازدواجی حیثیت: _____ اگر شادی شدہ ہیں تو شادی کس عمر میں ہوئی: _____

مذہبی فرقہ: _____ کسی مذہبی تنظیم/درس سے تعلق/نام: _____

شہری/دیہاتی: _____ گاؤں/شہر اور صوبے کا نام: _____

Guideline for Focus Group Discussion (with Niqab-Wearing Women)

Moderator _____ Date _____ Place _____

1. آپ کے نزدیک حجاب کیا ہے۔ ہمارے معاشرے میں اسکی کیا اقسام ہیں اور اسے کس طرح کیا جاتا ہے۔
 2. آپ نے کب نقاب کرنا شروع کیا اور اسکی کیا وجوہات تھیں۔
 3. کیا آپ کو نقاب کرنے سے جو مقصد تھا وہ حاصل ہوا۔
 4. کئی دفعہ یہ سننے میں آتا ہے کہ نقاب سے کچھ مسائل پیدا ہوتے ہیں۔ آپ کو اگر ایسے کچھ تجربات ہوئے تو وہ بتانا پسند کریں گی؟
 5. کچھ لوگ کہیں پردہ/حجاب کرتے ہیں اور کہیں نہیں کرتے۔ اگر آپ کو ایسے حالات پیش آتے ہیں تو آپ کیا کرتی ہیں؟
- نوٹ: جب رد عمل ادھر اہو تو وضاحت طلب کریں۔ جو گفتگو میں شریک نہیں ہو رہے ان کی حوصلہ افزائی کریں۔ زیادہ بولنے والوں ا بے مقصد بولنے والوں کو روکیں۔

Guideline for Focus Group Discussion with Headscarf Women

Moderator _____ Date _____ Place _____

1. آپ کے نزدیک حجاب کیا ہے۔ ہمارے معاشرے میں اسکی کیا اقسام ہیں اور اسے کس طرح کیا جاتا ہے۔
2. آپ نے حجاب کب کرنا شروع کیا۔ اس کی کیا وجہ یا وجوہات تھیں۔
3. آپ نے کبھی نقاب کیا؟ شروع کرنے کی کیا وجہ تھی اور چھوڑ دینے کی کیا وجہ تھی؟ اگر کبھی نہیں کیا تو کیا کبھی کرنے کا سوچا؟
4. حجاب نہ کرنے والی خواتین یا بالکل دوپٹہ نہ لینے والی خواتین کے بارے میں آپ کا کیا خیال ہے۔ ایسی خواتین آپ سے کیسے پیش آتی ہیں۔ (ایسی تمام categories کے بارے میں معلوم کریں)
5. نقاب کرنے والوں کے بارے میں آپ کے کیا خیالات ہیں۔ وہ آپ سے کس طرح پیش آتے ہیں؟
6. حجاب کرنے سے آپ کو کیا فائدے ہوتے ہیں اور کیا مسائل پیدا ہوتے ہیں؟

Guideline for Focus Group Discussion with Head-Covering Women

Moderator _____ Date _____ Place _____

1. آپ کے نزدیک حجاب کیا ہے۔ ہمارے معاشرے میں اسکی کیا اقسام ہیں اور اسے کس طرح کیا جاتا ہے۔
2. کیا آپ نے کبھی نقاب / حجاب کیا یا سوچا؟ اگر کیا تو شروع کرنے کی کیا وجہ تھی۔ چھوڑ دینے کی کیا وجہ تھی۔ اگر کبھی نہیں کیا تو اس کی کیا وجہ ہے۔
3. کچھ لوگ کہیں / کبھی سر ڈھانپتے ہیں اور کبھی نہیں۔ آپ کیا کرتی ہیں۔
4. نقاب کرنے والی خواتین کے بارے میں آپ کا کیا خیال ہے۔
نقاب کرنے والی خواتین آپ سے کس طرح پیش آتی ہیں۔
5. جو لوگ سر نہیں ڈھانپتے یا دوپٹہ بالکل استعمال نہیں کرتے ان کے بارے میں آپ کا کیا خیال ہے۔ (علیحدہ علیحدہ معلوم کریں)۔
وہ آپ سے کس طرح پیش آتے ہیں۔
6. نقاب / دوپٹہ نہ کرنے سے آپ کو کس قسم کا فائدہ یا نقصان ہوتا ہے۔

Guideline for Focus Group Discussion with Dupatta-Carrying Women

Moderator _____ Date _____ Place _____

1. آپ کے نزدیک حجاب کیا ہے۔ ہمارے معاشرے میں اس کی کیا اقسام ہیں اور اسے کس طرح کیا جاتا ہے۔
2. کیا آپ نے کبھی نقاب / حجاب / سر ڈھانپنا شروع کیا یا ایسا سوچا۔ شروع کرنے کی کیا وجہ تھی اور پھر چھوڑ دینے کی کیا وجہ تھی۔
3. ہمارے معاشرے میں بہت ساری خواتین سر ڈھانپتی ہیں۔ کیا وجہ ہو سکتی ہے کہ آپ ایسا نہیں کرتیں یا آپ کو اس کی ضرورت نہیں پڑتی۔
4. کوئی ایسے حالات ہیں جہاں آپ سر ڈھانپتی ہیں؟ ایسا کب ہوتا ہے اور آپ کے سر ڈھانپنے کی کیا وجہ ہوتی ہے۔
5. نقاب / حجاب کرنے والی خواتین کے بارے میں آپ کا کیا خیال ہے۔
نقاب / حجاب کرنے والی خواتین آپ سے کس طرح پیش آتی ہیں۔
6. نقاب / حجاب نہ کرنے سے آپ کو کیا فائدہ / سہولت حاصل ہوتی ہے یا کیا مسائل پیدا ہوتے ہیں۔

Guideline for Focus Group Discussion with Modern-Dressed Women

Moderator _____ Date _____ Place _____

1. آپ کے نزدیک حجاب کیا ہے۔ ہمارے معاشرے میں اسکی کیا اقسام ہیں اور اسے کس طرح کیا جاتا ہے۔
2. کیا آپ نے کبھی نقاب / حجاب / سر ڈھانپنے کے متعلق سوچا یا شروع کیا۔ شروع کرنے کی کیا وجہ تھی اور پھر چھوڑ دینے کی کیا وجہ تھی۔
3. ہمارے معاشرے میں بہت ساری خواتین سر ڈھانپتی ہیں / دوپٹہ لیتی ہیں۔ کیا وجہ ہو سکتی ہے کہ آپ ایسا نہیں کرتیں یا آپ کو اس کی ضرورت نہیں پڑتی۔
4. کوئی ایسے حالات ہیں جہاں آپ سر ڈھانپتی ہیں؟ ایسا کب ہوتا ہے اور سر ڈھانپنے کی وجہ کیا ہوتی ہے۔
5. نقاب / حجاب / سر ڈھانپنے والی خواتین کے بارے میں آپ کو کیا خیال ہے۔
نقاب / حجاب / سر ڈھانپنے والی خواتین کا آپ کے بارے میں کیا خیال ہوتا ہے اور وہ آپ سے کس طرح پیش آتی ہیں۔
6. حجاب / دوپٹہ نہ کرنے سے آپ کو کیا فائدہ / سہولت حاصل ہوتی ہے یا کیا مسائل پیدا ہوتے ہیں۔

Guideline for Focus Group Discussion with Men

Moderator _____ Date _____ Place _____

1. آپ کے نزدیک حجاب کیا ہے؟ ہمارے معاشرے میں اسکی کیا اقسام ہیں اور اسے کس طرح کیا جاتا ہے؟
2. حجاب کرنے والی اور نہ کرنے والی خواتین کے متعلق آپ کا کیا رویہ ہے؟
3. آپ کے خاندان میں خواتین کیا پردہ/حجاب کرتی ہیں؟ کون کرتا ہے اور کون نہیں کرتا؟
4. آپکے خاندان میں حجاب وغیرہ کرنے کے کیا اسباب ہیں؟ آپ کا اس میں کیا رول ہوتا ہے؟
5. آپ پردہ/حجاب کے حوالے سے کیسی بیوی پسند کرتے ہیں؟
اس سلسلے میں آپ اپنی گرل فرینڈ سے کس طرح پیش آسکتے ہیں یا آتے ہیں؟

Informed Consent Form - Initial

میں قومی ادارہ نفسیات، قائد اعظم یونیورسٹی، اسلام آباد سے پی۔ ایچ۔ ڈی ریسرچ کر رہا ہوں۔ اس تحقیق سے میں یہ معلوم کرنا چاہتا ہوں کہ کسی خاص قسم کا حجاب / لباس اپنانے میں نفسیاتی، مذہبی، اور معاشرتی عوامل کس طرح کار فرما ہیں۔ اس سلسلے میں ہم آپ کا مذہبی رجحان، آپ کی نفسیاتی صحت / نفسیاتی بہتری اور آپ کو ستائے جانے / تنگ کئے جانے کے تجربات کے بارے میں جاننا چاہیں گے۔ آپ سے درخواست ہے کہ آپ ہمیں صحیح معلومات فراہم کریں تاکہ یہ ریسرچ کامیابی سے حقائق تک پہنچ سکتے۔

معلومات فراہم کرنے اور سوالنامے پُر کرنے میں آپ کو صرف 15-20 منٹ لگیں گے۔ آپ سے حاصل شدہ معلومات کسی اور کو نہیں بتائی جائیں گی۔ یہ صرف ریسرچ کے لیے استعمال ہوں گی۔ اگر آپ کو سوالنامے پُر کرنا مناسب نہ لگے تو آپ انہیں ادھورا چھوڑ سکتی ہیں۔ آپ کو یہ حق بھی حاصل ہے کہ معلومات دینے کے بعد آپ ہمیں ان معلومات کو تحقیق میں استعمال کرنے سے روک سکتی ہیں۔

شکریہ

میں تمام معلومات اپنی مرضی سے دے رہی ہوں۔ مجھے ان معلومات کے ریسرچ میں استعمال کیے جانے پر کوئی اعتراض نہیں ہے۔

دستخط (اگر مناسب سمجھیں)

تحقیق کنندہ / ریسرچر:

وسیم فیاض

قومی ادارہ نفسیات، قائد اعظم یونیورسٹی، اسلام آباد

فون نمبر: 03345862827

Demographic Sheet - Initial

عمر _____ تعلیم _____ پیشہ (طالب علم / اسکے علاوہ) _____

ازدواجی حیثیت (شادی شدہ، غیر شادی شدہ، دیگر): _____

مادری زبان: _____ ذات: _____

میں اپنے آپ کو پنجابی / سندھی / پٹھان / بلوچی / کشمیری / مہاجر کے طور پر شناخت کرتی ہوں _____ اسکے علاوہ کوئی اور

شناخت (آپ بتانا چاہیں تو) _____ آپکی / آپکے خاندان کی کل آمدنی _____

موجودہ رہائشی علاقہ (علاقہ، شہر، مثلاً بارہ کہو، اسلام آباد) _____

مذہبی وابستگی (بریلوی، دیوبندی، اہلحدیث، شیعہ، دیگر) _____

آپ کس قسم کا پردہ / حجاب کرتی ہیں / لباس پہنتی ہیں: _____

1. نقاب اور عبایا 2. سکارف عبایا (بغیر چہرہ ڈھانپنے)

3. دوپٹہ / چادر سے سر ڈھانپنا 4. دوپٹہ / چادر کا استعمال (سر ڈھانپنے بغیر)

5. ماڈرن لباس / غیر روایتی لباس مثلاً جینز ٹاپ، دوپٹے کے بغیر شلوار قمیض یا دوپٹے کا بہت کم استعمال وغیرہ

6. اسکے علاوہ کوئی اور طریقہ (تفصیل بتائیں) _____

☆ آپ اوپر منتخب کردہ لباس / پردہ / حجاب کس حد تک استعمال کرتی ہیں _____

1. تقریباً ہمیشہ 2. اکثر 3. بعض اوقات 4. کبھی کبھار

☆ آپ اوپر منتخب کردہ لباس کتنے عرصے سے استعمال کر رہی ہیں _____

☆ اوپر بیان کردہ پردہ / حجاب کی اقسام میں سے آپ کے گھر / خاندان میں کون سا لباس / پردہ / حجاب استعمال کیا جاتا ہے _____

☆ آپ اوپر منتخب کردہ حجاب / پردہ کس وجہ سے کرتی ہیں _____

وجوہات:

﴿ منلکی کلچر / ماحول ﴾ ﴿ گھر کا ماحول / اثر ﴾ ﴿ شوہر / سسرال / منگیترا کا اثر ﴾

﴿ تحفظ کا احساس ﴾ ﴿ مذہبی احکام ﴾ ﴿ درس / مدرسہ کا اثر ﴾

﴿ ذاتی فیصلہ / مرضی ﴾ ﴿ اطمینان و سکون ﴾ ﴿ عزت و احترام ﴾

اسکے علاوہ کوئی اور وجہ _____

اگر ان میں صرف ایک وجہ نہیں ہے تو اوپر دی گئی وجوہات کو اہمیت کے لحاظ سے ترتیب دیں۔ (سب سے زیادہ اہم کو پہلا نمبر اور سب سے کم اہم کو آخری نمبر دیں)

1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____ 5. _____ 6. _____

7. _____ 8. _____ 9. _____

اس سوالنامے میں جو پوائنٹ مشکل ہو وہ بتائیں، اس کے علاوہ دیگر تجاویز

Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire-Original

یہ دیکھا گیا ہے کہ ہمارے ملک میں خواتین کو کئی طرح سے ہراساں کیا جاتا ہے یا لائن سے چھیڑ خانی کی جاتی ہے۔ آپ سے درخواست ہے کہ ہر واقعہ کو پڑھیں اور جواب دیں کہ کیا آپ کے ساتھ کبھی ایسا واقعہ ایسے مرد کے ذریعے پیش آیا ہے جس کے ساتھ آپ ذاتی یا دوستانہ مراسم نہیں یا جس کے ساتھ آپ ایسے مراسم نہیں بڑھانا چاہتیں۔ اگر آپ کے ساتھ ایسا واقعہ کبھی نہیں پیش آیا تو "کبھی نہیں" والے خانے میں (✓) کا نشان لگادیں۔ اگر ایسا واقعہ ایک سے زیادہ مرتبہ پیش آیا تو "چند مرتبہ" یا "ایک مرتبہ" والے خانے میں (✓) کا نشان لگادیں۔ اگر ایسا واقعہ ایک سے زیادہ مرتبہ پیش آیا تو "چند مرتبہ" یا "ایک مرتبہ" والے خانے میں (✓) کا نشان لگادیں اور اگر ایسا واقعہ اکثر اوقات پیش آتا ہے تو "اکثر" والے خانے میں (✓) کا نشان لگادیں۔

نوٹ: ہر واقعہ کے لیے صرف ایک ہی خانے میں نشان لگانا ہے۔

نمبر شمار	بیانات	کبھی نہیں	ایک مرتبہ	چند مرتبہ	اکثر
1.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو بے ہودہ لطفہ سنایا ہو۔				
2.	کسی مرد نے آپ کے جسم کی تعریف کی ہو۔				
3.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو سر سے پاؤں تک گندی نظروں سے گھورا ہو۔				
4.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو بہانے بہانے سے اپنے پاس بیٹھانے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
5.	کسی مرد نے آپ کے لباس یا میک اپ کی تعریف کی ہو۔				
6.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو اپنے ساتھ گھومنے یا ہوٹل میں کھانا کھانے کی دعوت دی ہو۔				
7.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو بیہودہ تصویروں والا رسالہ دکھانے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
8.	کسی مرد نے آپ کے ساتھ فلرٹ کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
9.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو گاڑی وغیرہ میں لفٹ دینے کی پیشکش کی ہو۔				
10.	کسی مرد نے آپ کی موجودگی میں بیہودہ گانے گنگنائے ہوں۔				
11.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو کارڈ دینے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
12.	کسی مرد نے آپ کا کام روکا ہوتا کہ آپ اپنے کام کی وجہ سے بار بار اسکے پاس جائیں۔				
13.	کسی مرد نے آپ کے ساتھ فون پر بیہودہ گفتگو کی ہو۔				
14.	کسی مرد نے آپ کی گھریلو زندگی میں دلچسپی لی ہو اس نیت سے کہ اس بہانے آپ اسکو لفٹ کرانا شروع کر دیں۔				
15.	کسی مرد نے آپ کی یا اپنی جنسی زندگی کے بارے میں گفتگو کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				

نمبر شمار	بیانات	کبھی نہیں	ایک مرتبہ	چند مرتبہ	اکثر
16.	کسی مرد نے آپکی جنسی زندگی کی محرومیوں کو کریدنے کی اور اپنے آپکو ہمدرد ظاہر کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
17.	کسی مرد نے آپکو نوکری میں ترقی یا کسی اور قسم کے فائدے کا یقین دلایا ہو اگر آپ اسکے غیر اخلاقی مطالبات پورے کرنے کو تیار ہو جائیں۔				
18.	کسی مرد نے آپکے پاس سے گزرتے ہوئے آپ کو ٹکرماری ہو۔				
19.	کسی مرد نے کوئی چیز پکڑاتے ہوئے آپکا ہاتھ چھونے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
20.	کسی مرد نے آپکو "ڈانگ" "میری جان" وغیرہ جیسے ناموں سے پکارا ہو۔				
21.	کسی مرد نے کسی کام کے دوران آپکے کندھے یا کمر پر ہاتھ رکھا ہو۔				
22.	کسی مرد نے آپکو رومانی خط (Love letter) دینے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
23.	کسی مرد نے آپکے چہرے یا بالوں کی تعریف کی ہو۔				
24.	کسی مرد نے کسی کام کے بہانے آپ کے ساتھ لگ کر بیٹھنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
25.	کسی مرد نے آپ کے ساتھ کسی بیہودہ فلم یا ٹی وی پروگرام کے بارے میں گفتگو کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
26.	کسی مرد نے آپکو نوکری سے نکلوانے کی دھمکی دی ہو اگر آپ نے اسکے ساتھ رومانی تعلقات نہ قائم کیے۔				
27.	کسی مرد کے غیر اخلاقی مطالبات پورے نہ کرنے پر آپکو نوکری میں نقصان اٹھانا پڑا ہو۔				
28.	کسی مرد نے غیر اخلاقی مطالبات پورے نہ کرنے پر آپ کو بدنام کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
29.	کسی مرد نے آپکے ساتھ غیر اخلاقی گفتگو کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
30.	کسی مرد نے آپکی ذاتی مجبوریوں کا فائدہ اٹھاتے ہوئے اپنی غیر اخلاقی مطالبات پورے کرنے پر مجبور کیا ہو۔				
31.	کسی مرد نے آپکے کام کی تعریف کرتے ہوئے آپکے کندھے یا پیٹھ تھپکنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				

نمبر شمار	بیانات	کبھی نہیں	ایک مرتبہ	چند مرتبہ	اکثر
32.	کسی مرد نے آپکو نوکری سے نکلوانے کی دھمکی دی ہو اگر آپ نے اسکے ساتھ جسمانی/جنسی تعلقات نہ قائم کیے۔				
33.	کسی مرد نے کوئی کام سیکھانے کے بہانے آپکے ہاتھ کے اوپر ہاتھ رکھ دیا ہو مثلاً کمپیوٹر سیکھانا یا کوئی بھی اور کام۔				
34.	کسی مرد نے آپکو چومنے (Kiss) کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
35.	کسی مرد نے آپکو (Rape) کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				

اس سوالنامے کے آسان یا مشکل ہونے کے بارے میں بتائیں۔ جو پوائنٹ مشکل ہے وہ بتائیں۔ اسکے علاوہ دیگر تجاویز

شکریہ

our-subject (2)

Iyengar, Sheena

To Me

Jan 27, 2014

Dear Waseem,

The religiousness measure can be found at <http://www.columbia.edu/~ss957/publications.shtml>. That page includes the blanket permission statement "Free to use and adapt for research purposes with attribution."

You have my permission to modify and use the religiousness measure for your research.

Best
Sheena

(6)

Appendix L

On behalf of Sheena Iyengar

Me Snippet unavailable

Aug 18, 2012

Me Snippet unavailable

Aug 28, 2012

Me Snippet unavailable

Sep 4, 2012

Kelly Price

Sep 12, 2012

To Me

Hi Waseem,

The changes are fine. You can use the adapted version.

Thanks,

Kelly

ansari80@gmail.com

Search Mail

Search Web

Compose

Inbox (761)

Drafts (35)

Sent

Spam (326)

Trash (6)

Folders

Recent

Messenger

Contacts

Calendar

Notepad

Yahoo Mail for Mobile

Search results | Delete | Move | Spam | More

psychological well being scale-54 items (4)

Me Snippet unavailable

sadia azizansari

To Me

Dear Waseem,

I consent you to use urdu version of Ryff scale.

enclosed please find description of scales and link

Good Luck for your research

Best Regards

On Tue, Jul 24, 2012 at 11:42 PM, Waseem Fayyaz <w_fayyaz@yahoo.com> wrote:

--- On Fri, 7/6/12, Waseem Fayyaz <w_fayyaz@yahoo.com> wrote:

From: Waseem Fayyaz <w_fayyaz@yahoo.com>
Subject: psychological well being scale-54 items
To: "sadia@iobm.edu.pk" <sadia@iobm.edu.pk>
Date: Friday, July 6, 2012, 6:27 PM

Hello

I am working on my phd research at National Institute of Psychology. I need to use your translated version of well being scale. I need your permission in this regard.

I also request you to please provide sub-scale information (indicating items included in a sub-scale).

I further request you to give me the link where I could know the development of original 54-item version.

I hope you will cooperate

Regards
Waseem

Waseem Fayyaz
*Asst Prof of Psychology
Govt. Gordon College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan
*PhD scholar at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
03009613555;03345862827


--
--

Ms.Sadia Aziz Ansari

2 Attachments View all Download all

The Ryff Scales of P...docx View Download

PBR_1007_244_Cros...pdf View Download



TEST APPLICATION FORM


Name of Applicant WASEEM FAYYAZName of Supervisor/Professor DR. ANILA KAMALInstitution / Department NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PSYCHOLOGY

Test Required: (title, year, author, edition, and publisher):

SEXUAL HARASSMENT EXPERIENCE QUESTIONNAIREPurpose: Research / Teaching / Clinical Assessment / Any other RESEARCHTopic of research / teaching CONDITIONS, CONTEXT, AND OUTCOMES
OF PRACTICING VEIL (HIJAB) AMONG PAKISTANI WOMENM.Sc./M.Phil./Ph.D./M.S./Diploma/Any other Ph.D

Undertaking

This is hereby specified that the above mentioned information is correct. I applied for the above mentioned scale after appropriate research and consultation with my supervisor. I am convinced that this Test/Videos/Resource Material is especially relevant to my work. I also understand that I have to follow the copy rights requirements of the test developers and will not violate the ethics of research at any moment. This work is the intellectual property of the author / publisher. No part of this test may be reproduced or photocopied or disseminate or to republish without written permission from the author / publisher. I am also under obligation to share my data and research findings with the TRC of NIP.



Supervisor/Professor




Student



Practitioner

Permission granted for the above mentioned research only



Coordinator (Signature & Stamp)

Test Resource Centre

National Institute of Psychology, Quaid-i-Azam University

Joachim Stoeber

To Me

Dear Waseem:

I am happy for you to translate the SDS-17, but please make sure you use standard backtranslation procedures as recommended eg. by Brislin (1970, 1973) to ensure a valid translation.

I am attaching all PDFs on the SDS-17 I have.

Hope this helps.

Else, many thanks, but no need to send me the translated version.

All best & good luck with your projects,

Joachim

References:

Brislin, R. W. (1970). Back-translation for cross-cultural research. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 1(3), 185-216. doi: 10.1177/135910457000100301

Brislin, R. W., Lonner, W. J., & Thorndike, R. M. (1973). *Cross-cultural research methods*. New York: Wiley.

Dr Joachim Stoeber

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Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NP, UK

Phone: +44 (0)1227 82-4196; Fax: +44 (0)1227 82-7030

Email: J.Stoeber@kent.ac.uk

Web: <http://www.kent.ac.uk/psychology/people/stoeberj/>

Sexual Harassment Experience Questionnaire-Final

یہ دیکھا گیا ہے کہ ہمارے ملک میں خواتین کو کئی طرح سے ہراساں کیا جاتا ہے یا ان سے چھیڑ خانی کی جاتی ہے۔ آپ سے درخواست ہے کہ ہر واقعہ کو پڑھیں اور جواب دیں کہ کیا آپ کے ساتھ کبھی ایسا واقعہ ایسے مرد کے ذریعے پیش آیا ہے جس کے ساتھ آپ ذاتی یا دوستانہ مراسم نہیں یا جس کے ساتھ آپ ایسے مراسم نہیں بڑھانا چاہتیں۔ اگر آپ کے ساتھ ایسا واقعہ کبھی نہیں پیش آیا تو "کبھی نہیں" والے خانے میں (✓) کا نشان لگادیں۔ اگر ایسا واقعہ ایک سے زیادہ مرتبہ پیش آیا تو "ایک مرتبہ" والے خانے میں (✓) نشان لگادیں۔ اگر ایسا واقعہ ایک سے زیادہ مرتبہ پیش آیا تو "چند مرتبہ" والے خانے میں نشان لگادیں اور اگر ایسا واقعہ اکثر اوقات پیش آتا ہے تو "اکثر" والے خانے میں (✓) نشان لگادیں۔

نوٹ: ہر واقعہ کے لیے صرف ایک ہی خانے میں نشان لگانا ہے۔

نمبر شمار	بیانات	کبھی نہیں	ایک مرتبہ	چند مرتبہ	اکثر
1.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو بے ہودہ لطفہ سنایا ہو۔				
2.	کسی مرد نے آپ کے جسم کی تعریف کی ہو۔				
3.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو سر سے پاؤں تک گندی نظروں سے گھورا ہو۔				
4.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو بہانے بہانے سے اپنے پاس بیٹھانے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
5.	کسی مرد نے آپ کے لباس یا میک اپ کی تعریف کی ہو۔				
6.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو اپنے ساتھ گھومنے یا ہوٹل میں کھانا کھانے کی دعوت دی ہو۔				
7.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو بیہودہ تصویروں والا رسالہ دکھانے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
8.	کسی مرد نے آپ کے ساتھ فلرٹ کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
9.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو گاڑی وغیرہ میں لفٹ دینے کی پیشکش کی ہو۔				
10.	کسی مرد نے آپ کی موجودگی میں بیہودہ گانے گنگنائے ہوں۔				
11.	کسی مرد نے آپ کو کارڈ دینے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
12.	کسی مرد نے آپ کا کام روکا ہوتا کہ آپ اپنے کام کی وجہ سے بار بار اسکے پاس جائیں۔				
13.	کسی مرد نے آپ کے ساتھ فون پر بیہودہ گفتگو کی ہو۔				
14.	کسی مرد نے آپ کی گھریلو زندگی میں دلچسپی لی ہو اس نیت سے کہ اس بہانے آپ اسکو لفٹ کرانا شروع کر دیں۔				

نمبر شمار	بیانات	کبھی نہیں	ایک مرتبہ	چند مرتبہ	اکثر
15.	کسی مرد نے آپکی یا اپنی جنسی زندگی کے بارے میں گفتگو کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
16.	کسی مرد نے آپکی جنسی زندگی کی محرومیوں کو کریدنے کی اور اپنے آپکو ہمدرد ظاہر کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
17.	کسی مرد نے آپکو نوکری میں ترقی یا کسی اور قسم کے فائدے کا یقین دلایا ہو اگر آپ اسکے غیر اخلاقی مطالبات پورے کرنے کو تیار ہو جائیں۔				
18.	کسی مرد نے آپکے پاس سے گزرتے ہوئے آپ کو ٹکرماری ہو۔				
19.	کسی مرد نے کوئی چیز پکڑاتے ہوئے آپکا ہاتھ چھونے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
20.	کسی مرد نے آپکو "ڈارلنگ" "میری جان" وغیرہ جیسے ناموں سے پکارا ہو۔				
21.	کسی مرد نے کسی کام کے دوران آپکے کندھے یا کمر پر ہاتھ رکھا ہو۔				
22.	کسی مرد نے آپکو رومانی خط (Love letter) دینے یا ایسا SMS/e-mail/MMS/ کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
23.	کسی مرد نے آپکے چہرے یا بالوں کی تعریف کی ہو۔				
24.	کسی مرد نے کسی کام کے بہانے آپ کے ساتھ لگ کر بیٹھنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
25.	کسی مرد نے آپ کے ساتھ کسی بیہودہ فلم یا ٹی وی پروگرام کے بارے میں گفتگو کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
26.	کسی مرد نے آپکو نوکری / تعلیمی ادارے وغیرہ سے نکلوانے کی دھمکی دی ہو اگر آپ نے اسکے ساتھ رومانی تعلقات نہ قائم کیے۔				
27.	کسی مرد نے غیر اخلاقی مطالبات پورے نہ کرنے پر آپکو نوکری / تعلیم یا کسی کام میں نقصان اٹھانا پڑا ہو۔				
28.	کسی مرد کے غیر اخلاقی مطالبات پورے نہ کرنے پر آپ کو بدنام کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
29.	کسی مرد نے آپکے ساتھ غیر اخلاقی گفتگو کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
30.	کسی مرد نے آپکی ذاتی مجبوریوں کا فائدہ اٹھاتے ہوئے اپنی غیر اخلاقی مطالبات پورے کرنے پر مجبور کیا ہو۔				

نمبر شمار	بیانات	کبھی نہیں	ایک مرتبہ	چند مرتبہ	اکثر
31	کسی مرد نے آپ کے کام کی تعریف کرتے ہوئے آپ کے کندھے یا پیٹھ تھپکنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
32	کسی مرد نے آپ کو نوکری / تعلیمی ادارے وغیرہ سے نکلوانے کی دھمکی دی ہو اگر آپ نے اسکے ساتھ جسمانی / جنسی تعلقات نہ قائم کیے۔				
33	کسی مرد نے کوئی کام سیکھانے کے بہانے آپ کے ہاتھ کے اوپر ہاتھ رکھ دیا ہو مثلاً کمپیوٹر سیکھانا یا کوئی بھی اور کام۔				
34	کسی مرد نے آپ کو چومنے (Kiss) کی کوشش کی ہو۔				
35	کسی مرد نے آپ کو (Rape) کرنے کی کوشش کی ہو۔				

Gender harassment = Item number 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 23, & 25

Unwanted sexual attention = item number 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, 31, 33, 34, & 35

Sexual coercion = Item number 12, 17, 26, 27, 28, 30, & 32

Demographic Sheet - Final

عمر _____ تعلیم _____ پیشہ _____
 موجودہ رہائشی علاقہ اپتہ _____ آپکی اور آپکے خاندان کی کل ماہانہ آمدنی _____
 ازدواجی حیثیت (شادی شدہ، غیر شادی شدہ، منگنی شدہ، طلاق یافتہ، یا کوئی اور) _____ مادری زبان _____
 ذات _____ میں اپنے آپ کو پنجابی / سندھی / پنجتون / بلوچی / کشمیری / مہاجر / سرایتیکی / ہزارے وال / بلتی کے طور پر
 شناخت / پہچان کرتی ہوں _____ یا اسکے علاوہ کوئی اور پہچان (آپ بتانا چاہیں) _____
 مذہبی وابستگی (بریلوی، دیوبندی، اہلحدیث، وہابی، شیعہ، یا کوئی اور) _____

آپ کس قسم کا پردہ / حجاب کرتی ہیں / لباس پہنتی ہیں:
 1. نقاب اور عبایا
 2. سکارف عبایا (بغیر چہرہ ڈھانپنے)
 3. دوپٹہ / چادر سے سر ڈھانپنا
 4. دوپٹہ / چادر کا استعمال (سر ڈھانپنے بغیر)
 5. ماڈرن لباس / غیر روایتی لباس مثلاً جینز ٹاپ، دوپٹے کے بغیر شلوار قمیض یا دوپٹے کا بہت کم استعمال وغیرہ
 6. اسکے علاوہ کوئی اور طریقہ (تفصیل بتائیں)

☆ آپ اوپر منتخب کردہ لباس / پردہ / حجاب کس حد تک استعمال کرتی ہیں
 1. کبھی کبھار 2. بعض اوقات 3. اکثر 4. تقریباً ہمیشہ

☆ آپ اوپر منتخب کردہ لباس کتنے عرصے سے استعمال کر رہی ہیں

☆ اوپر بیان کردہ پردہ / حجاب کی اقسام میں سے آپ کے گھر / خاندان میں کون سا لباس / پردہ / حجاب استعمال کیا جاتا ہے

☆ آپ اوپر منتخب کردہ حجاب / پردہ کس وجہ سے کرتی ہیں (نیچے دی گئی وجوہات میں سے صرف ایک پر نشان لگائیں)

وجوہات:

☆ منگنی کلچر / ماحول ☆ گھر کا ماحول / اثر ☆ شوہر / سسرال / منگنیتر کا اثر
 ☆ تحفظ کا احساس ☆ مذہبی احکام ☆ درس / مدرسہ کا اثر
 ☆ ذاتی فیصلہ / مرضی ☆ اطمینان و سکون / comfort and satisfaction ☆ عزت و احترام

اسکے علاوہ کوئی اور وجہ _____

اگر ان میں صرف ایک وجہ نہیں ہے تو اوپر دی گئی وجوہات کو اہمیت کے لحاظ سے ترتیب دیں۔ (سب سے زیادہ اہم کو پہلا نمبر اور سب سے کم اہم کو آخری نمبر دیں)

1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____
 5. _____ 6. _____ 7. _____ 8. _____ 9. _____
 10. _____

Informed Consent Form-Final

ہم قومی ادارہ نفسیات، قائد اعظم یونیورسٹی، اسلام آباد سے پی۔ ایچ۔ ڈی ریسرچ کر رہے ہیں۔ اس تحقیق سے ہم یہ معلوم کرنا چاہتے ہیں کہ کسی خاص قسم کا حجاب/الباس اپنانے میں نفسیاتی، مذہبی، اور معاشرتی عوامل کس طرح کارفرما ہیں۔ اس سلسلے میں ہم آپکا مذہبی رجحان، آپکی نفسیاتی صحت/نفسیاتی بہتری، اور آپکو ستائے جانے/تنگ کیے جانے کے تجربات کے بارے میں جاننا چاہیں گے۔ آپ سے درخواست ہے کہ آپ ہمیں صحیح معلومات فراہم کریں تاکہ یہ ریسرچ کامیابی سے حقائق تک پہنچ سکتے۔

معلومات فراہم کرنے اور سوالنامے پُر کرنے میں آپکو صرف 15-20 منٹ لگیں گے۔ آپ سے حاصل شدہ معلومات کسی اور کو نہیں بتائی جائیں گی۔ یہ صرف ریسرچ کے لیے استعمال ہوں گی۔ اگر آپکو سوالنامے پُر کرنا مناسب نہ لگے تو آپ انہیں ادھورا چھوڑ سکتی ہیں۔ آپ کو یہ حق بھی حاصل ہے کہ معلومات دینے کے بعد آپ ہمیں ان معلومات کو تحقیق میں استعمال کرنے سے روک سکتی ہیں۔

شکریہ

میں تمام معلومات اپنی مرضی سے دے رہی ہوں۔ مجھے ان معلومات کے ریسرچ میں استعمال کیے جانے پر کوئی اعتراض نہیں ہے۔

دستخط (اگر مناسب سمجھیں)

تاریخ

تحقیق کنندہ/ریسرچر:

اینیلہ کمال

قومی ادارہ نفسیات، قائد اعظم یونیورسٹی، اسلام آباد

فون نمبر: 03345862827

Religiousness Measure-Adapted-Final

ہدایات:

ذیل میں مذہب کے متعلق کچھ بیانات دیئے گئے ہیں۔ ہر بیان کو غور سے پڑھیں اور فیصلہ کریں کہ بیانات آپ کے مطابق کس حد تک ٹھیک ہیں۔ خیال رہے ہم صرف آپ کی رائے جاننا چاہتے ہیں۔ ان میں سے کوئی بھی بیان درست یا غلط نہیں۔

نمبر شمار	بیانات	بہت کم	کم	کسی حد تک	زیادہ	بہت زیادہ
1.	آپ اپنے آپ کو کتنا مذہبی شخص سمجھتے ہیں؟					
2.	آپ کی زندگی میں مذہب کتنی اہمیت رکھتا ہے؟					
3.	جب آپ کے معاشرتی حلقے میں کوئی مذہبی تقریب یا سرگرمی ہوتی ہے (مثلاً تبلیغ ادرس، باجماعت نماز، قرآن خوانی / ختم، میلاد وغیرہ) تو اس میں آپ کی شرکت کا کتنا امکان ہوتا ہے؟					
4.	آپ کے مذہبی عقائد آپ کی زندگی کے اہم فیصلوں پر کتنا اثر انداز ہوتے ہیں؟					
5.	اگر آپ کو چوائس (choice) دی جائے تو اس بات کا کتنا امکان ہے کہ آپ کسی دوسرے مذہب کے فرد سے شادی کریں گی؟					
6.	آپ کے مذہبی عقائد آپ کے پہننے اوڑھنے پر کتنا اثر انداز ہوتے ہیں؟					
7.	آپ جنت کے ہونے پر کتنا یقین رکھتی ہیں؟					
8.	آپ کو کتنا یقین ہے کہ تمام انسانوں کا ہم آہنگی (harmony) کے ساتھ میل جُل کر رہنا ممکن ہے؟					
9.	آپ معجزات (miracles) کے ہونے پر کتنا یقین رکھتی ہیں؟					
10.	آپ کے مذہبی عقائد آپ کے کھانے پینے پر کتنا اثر انداز ہوتے ہیں؟					
11.	آپ کو کتنا یقین ہے کہ آپ کی اٹھائے جانے والی نکالیف کا آپ کو اجر (صلہ) (reward) ملے گا؟					
12.	آپ کے مذہبی عقائد آپ کے تعلقات اور دوستیاں بنانے پر کتنا اثر انداز ہوتے ہیں؟					
13.	آپ اس بات پر کتنا یقین رکھتی ہیں کہ اگلی نسلیں مستقبل میں آپ سے بہتر زندگی گزارنے کے قابل ہوں گی؟					

					آپ اس بات پر کتنا یقین رکھتی ہیں کہ مستقبل کی زندگی بہتر ثابت ہوگی؟	14.
					آپ کے مذہبی عقائد آپ کے معاشرتی کاموں پر کتنا اثر انداز ہوتے ہیں؟	15.

نمبر شمار	بیانات	تقریباً ہمیشہ	اکثر	کبھی کبھار	بہت کم	تقریباً کبھی نہیں
16.	آپ کتنا قرآن پڑھتی ہیں؟					
17.	آپ کتنی نمازیں پڑھتی ہیں؟					

Religious Involvement = item number 3, 16, & 17

Religious Influence in Daily Life = item number 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 7 15

Religious Faith = item number 7, 9, & 11

Optimism = item number 8, 13, & 14

Psychological Well Being Scales-Final

ہدایات:

مندرجہ ذیل سوالات اس بات کے متعلق ہیں کہ آپ اپنی زندگی کے بارے میں کیسا محسوس کرتے ہیں۔ برائے مہربانی یاد رکھیے کہ ان میں کوئی صحیح یا غلط جواب نہیں ہے۔ ہر سوال کے لیے دیئے گئے نمبروں (اعداد) میں سے وہ جواب چنیے جو آپ کے خیالات کی بہترین ترجمانی کرتا ہو۔

strongly agree	agree somewhat	agree slightly	disagree slightly	disagree somewhat	strongly disagree	بیانات	نمبر شمار
مکمل متفق	کسی حد تک متفق	تھوڑا متفق	تھوڑا غیر متفق	کچھ حد تک غیر متفق	مکمل غیر متفق		
						میں اپنے خیالات کے اظہار سے کبھی نہیں ڈرتی چاہے وہ زیادہ تر لوگوں کے خیالات سے مختلف ہی ہوں۔	1.
						میں مستقبل کے بارے میں واقعی نہیں سوچتی اور اپنی زندگی کو ہر روز جیتی ہوں۔	2.
						جب میں اپنی زندگی کی کہانی پر نظر ڈالتی ہوں تو خوش ہوتی ہوں جس طرح حالات نے کروٹیں بدلیں۔	3.
						میرے فیصلے دوسروں کے عمل سے متاثر نہیں ہوتے۔	4.
						میں حال پہ نظر رکھتی ہوں، کیونکہ مستقبل عموماً میرے لیے مشکلات لاتا ہے۔	5.
						عموماً میں اپنے بارے میں پُر اعتماد اور مثبت محسوس کرتی ہوں۔	6.
						میں پریشان رہتی ہوں کہ لوگ میرے بارے میں کیا سوچتے ہیں۔	7.
						مجھے میرے روزمرہ کے کام اکثر بے مقصد اور غیر ضروری نظر آتے ہیں۔	8.
						مجھے محسوس ہوتا ہے کہ دوسروں کو ان کی زندگی میں میرے مقابلے میں کچھ زیادہ حاصل ہوا ہے۔	9.
						دوسروں کی رضامندی سے زیادہ میرے لیے اپنی ذات سے مطمئن ہونا ضروری ہے۔	10.

strongly agree	agree	agree	disagree	disagree	strongly disagree	بیانات	نمبر شمار
کامل متفق	کچھ حد تک متفق	تھوڑا متفق	تھوڑا غیر متفق	کچھ حد تک غیر متفق	کامل غیر متفق		
						میں بہتر تعین نہیں کر سکتی کہ میں زندگی میں کیا حاصل کرنے کی کوشش کر رہی ہوں۔	11
						مجھے اپنی شخصیت کے بہت سے پہلو پسند ہیں۔	12
						میں ان لوگوں سے متاثر ہونے کی کوشش کرتی ہوں، جو مضبوط خیالات رکھتے ہوں۔	13
						میں عموماً اپنے لئے مقاصد کا تعین کیا کرتی تھی لیکن اب یہ وقت ضائع کرنے جیسا ہے۔	14
						میں نے ماضی میں کچھ غلطیاں کی ہیں، لیکن میں نے محسوس کیا ہے کہ جو سب ہوا اچھے کیلئے ہوا۔	15
						میں اپنے خیالات میں پُر اعتماد ہوں چاہے وہ عام موافقت (general opinion) کے برعکس ہوں۔	16
						میں مستقبل کی تدبیریں سوچنے اور ان کی حقیقت بنانے سے لطف اندوز ہوتی ہوں۔	17
						میں نے زندگی میں جو کامیابی حاصل کی ہے، میں اس سے کئی طرح سے مایوس ہوں۔	18
						دوران بحث اپنے خیالات کا اظہار میرے لئے مشکل ہے۔	19
						جو مقاصد میں نے اپنے لئے طے کیے تھے انہیں پورا کرنے میں کامیاب رہی ہوں۔	20
						میں اپنی ذات کے بارے میں مثبت نہیں سوچتی جیسا بہت سے لوگ اپنے بارے میں محسوس کرتے ہیں۔	21
						اگر میرے دوست اور گھر والے غیر متفق ہوں تو میں اکثر اپنی رائے بدل لیتی ہوں۔	22
						کچھ لوگ ساری زندگی بے مقصد گزار دیتے ہیں لیکن میں ان میں سے نہیں ہوں۔	23

						بیانات	نمبر شمار
strongly agree	agree somewhat	agree slightly	disagree slightly	disagree somewhat	strongly disagree		
مکمل متفق	کسی حد تک متفق	تھوڑا متفق	تھوڑا غیر متفق	کچھ حد تک غیر متفق	مکمل غیر متفق		
						ماضی کے اپنے اتار چڑھاؤ تھے لیکن میں عموماً ان کو تبدیل کرنا نہیں چاہوں گی۔	.24
						میں اپنی اصلاح اس سے کرتی ہوں کہ میں کیا سوچتی ہوں بجائے اس کے کہ لوگ کیا سوچتے ہیں۔	.25
						میں کبھی کبھی محسوس کرتی ہوں کہ میں نے زندگی میں وہ سب کچھ کر لیا ہے جو کرنا چاہیے۔	.26
						جب میں اپنا مقابلہ اپنے دوستوں اور واقف کاروں سے کرتی ہوں تو میں اپنے بارے میں اچھا محسوس کرتی ہوں۔	.27

Autonomy = item number 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, & 25

Purpose In Life = Item number 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, & 26

Self-Acceptance = Item number 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, & 27

Negatively scored items = 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, & 22

Social Desirability Scale-Final

ہدایات:

نیچے بیانات کی ایک فہرست دی گئی ہے۔ براہ مہربانی ہر بیان کو غور سے پڑھیں اور فیصلہ کریں وہ بیان آپ کے حالات اور خیالات کے مطابق ہے یا نہیں۔ اگر کوئی بیان آپ کے حالات اور خیالات کے مطابق ہے تو "صحیح" پر ورنہ "غلط" پر (✓) کا نشان لگائیں۔

نمبر شمار	بیانات	صحیح	غلط
1.	میں کبھی کبھار کوڑا کرکٹ / کچرا ادھر ادھر پھینک دیتی ہوں۔		
2.	میں ہمیشہ اپنی غلطیاں کھلے عام تسلیم کرتی ہوں اور اُنکے ممکنہ منفی نتائج (possible negative consequences) کا سامنا کرتی ہوں۔		
3.	دورانِ ٹریفک میں ہمیشہ مہذب رہتی ہوں اور دوسروں کا خیال رکھتی ہوں۔		
4.	میں ہمیشہ دوسروں کی رائے قبول کرتی ہوں اگرچہ وہ میری رائے کے مخالف ہی ہو۔		
5.	میں کبھی کبھی اپنے بُرے موڈ کا اثر دوسروں پر نکال دیتی ہوں۔		
6.	ایسا موقع بھی آیا جب میں نے کسی دوسرے سے فائدہ اٹھالیا۔		
7.	گفتگو کے دوران میں ہمیشہ دوسروں کی بات توجہ سے سنتی ہوں اور دوسروں کو اُن کی بات پوری کرنے دیتی ہوں۔		
8.	ہنگامی حالات (emergency) میں میں کسی کی مدد کرنے سے کبھی نہیں ہچکچاتی (hesitate)۔		
9.	جب میں وعدہ کر لیتی ہوں تو بغیر حیل و حجت / اگر مگر کے (without if's and but's) اُسے پورا کرتی ہوں۔		
10.	میں کبھی کبھار دوسروں کی پیٹھ پیچھے اُن کی بُرائی کرتی ہوں۔		
11.	میں کبھی دوسروں پر بوجھ بن کر اپنے اخراجات پورے نہیں کروں گی۔		
12.	میں پریشانی میں ہوں تب بھی میرا رویہ ہمیشہ دوسروں کے ساتھ شائستہ اور دوستانہ ہوتا ہے۔		
13.	دورانِ بحث میں حقیقت پسند اور غیر جانبدار (impartial/objective) رہتی ہوں۔		
14.	کم از کم ایک موقع ایسا آیا ہے جب میں ادھار مانگتی ہوئی چیز واپس کرنے میں ناکام رہی ہوں۔		
15.	میں ہمیشہ صحت بخش غذا کھانا کھاتی ہوں۔		
16.	بعض اوقات میں صرف اس لیے مدد کرتی ہوں کیونکہ مجھے بدلنے میں کچھ پانے کی توقع ہوتی ہے۔		