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# **Pakistan-Soviet Union Relations during the Cold War Era**

BY

**Muhammad Naveed Akhtar**

**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the  
Degree of Master of Philosophy in Department of History.**



**DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY  
QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD**

**2007**

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BY


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2007**

## DECLARATION


I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research, and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree.



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I hereby recommend that the dissertation prepared under my supervision by **Muhammad Naveed Akhtar**, titled “**Pakistan-Soviet Union Relations during the Cold War Era**” be accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Philosophy in History.

  
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***FINAL APPROVAL***

This is to certify that we have read the thesis submitted by Mr. Muhammad Naveed Akhtar and it is our judgment that this thesis is of sufficient standard to warrant its acceptance by the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad for the award of degree of Master of Philosophy in the Department of History.

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Chairman: \_\_\_\_\_

To  
My Grandfather

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First and foremost, I owe profound gratitude to Allah Almighty, the creator of the entire universe and the source of all knowledge. I thank Allah Almighty for giving me the strength and ability to accomplish this task. I also thank the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), who is forever a torch of guidance for humanity.

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**Muhammad Naveed Akhtar**

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## Introduction

During Cold War era Pakistan-Soviet Union relations had neither been in a smooth surge, nor accommodating and cooperative attitude for a long time at all. Varying political environment and strategic conditions dragged the relations of both countries through various phases of upheavals. At the time of Pakistan's creation world had been divided into two camps, yet Pakistan earlier decided to opt a non-alignment policy towards the bipolar world of USA and USSR rivalry namely Cold War. Conversely later on Pakistan remained a staunch ally of western bloc owing to its security needs and ideological compatibility. Except the mid 1950s and Bhutto era, Pak-Soviet Union remained hostile and aggressive towards each other.

The analysts have described an assortment of causes about distrust, unresponsiveness and antagonism between Pakistan and Soviet Union: 1) In the beginning it was said that this hostility was due to the incompatibility of Leninism-Marxism with Islam; 2) Some hold that Pakistan's inclination towards USA and signing of the SEATO and CENTO western agreements had created the distrust and suspicion between both countries; 3) Some scholars interpreted that Soviets perceived threat that Pakistan's ideological standpoint and Islamic resurgent movements would be a cause of overflow into Central Asian States, which comprised the large Muslim population; 4) Another illustration is that Soviet Union had had a 'grand design' of expansion establishing its hegemony over the world. In this regard, Soviet Union considered Pakistan an obstacle in the way to South Asia. Another variant of 'grand design' theory is that Soviet Union wanted to act on the 'North American Formula; 5) It is also said that

Soviet Union's excessive support to India, in spite of creating a balance between India and Pakistan, strained the relations of Pakistan and Soviet Union.

Anyhow, it can be pointed out that international relations are based on the mutual interest of the states and on the principle of 'give and take.' Pakistan-Soviet Union relations must be analyzed under the '*realpolitik*' approach in order to comprehend states' relations which always depend upon the interests and security problems rather than ideological conceptions and ethical norms. The convergence of the interests created a détente between USSR and Pakistan. But Pakistan's threat perception of Soviet communist expansionism formed a gulf between both states. Throughout the course of cold war the Soviet foreign policy remained to establish its Marxist-Leninist ideology within the Russia and out side it as well, which was termed as 'World revolution.' Just after its independence Pakistan realized the international scenario that pushed it into isolation, especially having a distance from the USSR that was not ideologically compatible with Pakistan.

The study would also provide the ample understanding of the regional politics and the interests of the super powers, USSR and USA, in the South Asian region. After getting independence from British colonialism Pakistan found itself in severe economic and administrative troubles. Along with these domestic problems Pakistan also had to get recognition in the comity of independent nations. Nevertheless, Pakistan's geopolitical and strategic location made it an important and lucrative state for great powers. At the very outset Pakistan had decided to adopt the policy of non-alignment towards confrontation of giant powers, USA and USSR, but it had to fall on one of the sides. The present study would analyze the Pakistan's earlier problems in the context of its relations with neighboring countries — India, China, Afghanistan and Iran and then its relations

with USSR and USA and its implications on Pakistan. During the period of Cold War, the economic, political, strategic, sociocultural and ideological dimensions and dynamics in Pakistan and Soviet Union relations would be given the specific importance.

Though South Asia was a region of third world states but its importance for USSR, or even for USA, had been manifold due to its geographical location, and its natural sources—oil and gas reserves. The trade, industry and agriculture were also a reason of competition between these powers in the region. Pakistan's expected leading role in the Islamic world and the potential capacity of the region for the formation of Islamic bloc was an alarming sign for them. The diversity of ethnicity and religion, vulnerability and political instability were the factors, which were assumed by USSR as an ideal environment in South Asia for the penetration of communism.

The study addresses the complex issues of how a small state like Pakistan could be compelled and trapped to follow the great powers' agenda? How did Great Powers act in the international system? How do Third World states respond for their survival and security? To what extent democratic process of the country could play a role to adopt an independent foreign policy? To what extent ideologies of states and ethical norms play a role in the formulation of states' foreign policies? Pak-Soviet relations would be analyzed under the Marxist-Leninist conception that how the class interests, domestically massive political activities and the role of parental state's attitude can play a role in the formation of the policies of the state especially in the foreign policy. What kind of problems could end the fate of a super power like USSR?

Methodology applied in the present research would be descriptive and analytical. Maps, charts and figures will also be included in the present research for the arrangement

of statistical data and comprehension and explanation of the factual datum.

An assortment of the literature is available on the “Pakistan–Soviet Union relations during the cold war era.” Thus the study would be based on published and unpublished sources including books, thesis, research article, journals, book chapters, research reports, Newspaper articles surveys, compiled books on statesmen's letters and mutual official documents. Both primary and secondary sources would be consulted for the formulation of the study.

Regarding the primary sources, one of the most significant consulted sources is R. K. Jain's book *"Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978."* Vol. 1-2, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978). This book presents a collection of official documents, mutual pacts, correspondents, transcripts of radio broadcasts and the speeches of statesmen, significant statements of the foreign ministers, diplomats and liable personnel representatives from both sides, USSR and Pakistan. These sources give an inclusive understanding of the interactions between both countries. Besides this Liaquat Ali Khan speeche: *The Aims of a New Nation*, published in Hameed A. K Rai's book: *Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1981), Muhammad Ayub Khan's political autobiography, *Friends Not Masters*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) and *Diaries of Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972*, ed., Craig Baxter, (New York: Oxford, 2007). G. W. Coudhury's book: *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*. (New York: The Free Press, 1975), Maqbool Ahmed Bhattay's work, *Great Powers in South Asia: Post Cold War Trends*. (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1996), are consulted. In order to comprehend Soviet point of view about Pakistan, the works of Soviet writers A. Dyakov,

G. Yakubov, E. Zhukov, Yuri V. Gankovsky, has been consulted. So as to develop the theoretical framework for the present inquiry the selected works of Scott Burchill, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert L. Wendzel, Vernon Marston Hawitt, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Timothy Dunne, have been the focus of the present inquiry.

Besides the epistemology of the inquiry the study is divided into five Chapters. Chapter One discusses the background of Pakistan and Soviet Union relations. It explores the historical, ethnic and cultural ties of Muslim community of Indian subcontinent and the Soviet Union. It will discuss how did Soviet Union respond to the separatist movement of Indian Muslims?

Chapter Two covers the period of 1947 to 1960. This period witnessed the early draftiness and coolness rather in last half the relations between Pakistan and Soviet Union remained antagonistic due to the Pakistan's joining of SEATO and CENTO agreements. This chapter explores the different dimension of security and defense of Pakistan in the context of Cold War rivalry of Great Powers—Soviet Union and United States.

In the chapter Three, the discussion revolves around the regional problems of Pakistan-India and China and the role of Great Powers. The chapter focuses on the period from 1960 to 1970. The initiation of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and Pakistan, Indo-China war of 1962, Indo-Pak War of 1965, Soviet role in India Pakistan mediation, and the afterwards improvement in Soviet-Pakistan relations would be the focus of discussion. Chapter Four explains the Soviet Union's role in Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and Prime Minister Bhutto's 'dynamic Bilateralism.' Last chapter describes Pakistan's proxy war in Afghanistan with the help of United States against Soviet Union and the phenomenon of Soviet disintegration.

## Epistemology of the Inquiry

The task of research can be accomplished on three archetypes: firstly, by applying a theory; secondly, by formulating a hypothesis; and thirdly, by raising certain inquiry questions. This study is conducted by applying one of the major variants of theory, *Realism*, i.e. 'Structural Realism' of international politics. As theories, concepts, ideas, and paradigms are generated and modified from time to time and place to place in different social empirical environment; due to this reason their significance and interpretation is relative and different in philosophical variation. So, this study is operational one rather than engaging complexities of different philosophical discussion. Moreover, the study has a further extension along with realist approach that unlike realist school of thought it also discusses the regional and domestic environment as well. As Vernon Marston Hawitt, an expert on international politics of South Asia, opines that discussing a function of super powers' rivalry in the third world region, without any reference to internal politics, has no appropriate and purposive element in research.<sup>1</sup> However, in order to comprehend states' interest, their security dimensions and their ambitions and threats, realist approach has been applied in the present inquiry. So, it focuses on some of mainstream Realist school of thought represented by E. H. Carr, Kenneth Waltz, Scott Burchill and Timothy Dunne.<sup>2</sup> Realism is considered one of the dominant and most influential theories in international relations: accordingly, this study is the replication of one major aspect of this theory i.e. 'Structural Realism'. History is the "study of past with the eye of present"<sup>3</sup> hence the course of events till date has made possible the better understanding of entire stipulation of the relations of both countries—Pakistan and USSR. In past, ideological factor was promoted and propagated zealously as a fundamental principle of the foreign policy of states like Pakistan and that of Soviet Union. But now it is realized in academic circles that it was an idealistic approach. In fact,

realism premises to focus on the interests rather than ideology and to realize the fact that sovereign states can coexist even if they have antithetical values and beliefs.<sup>4</sup>

There are certain questions which need to be raised here: why we need a theory to conduct the research? What is Realist Paradigm and how many are the variants of Realism? Why Realism is necessary to interpret state's relations? What is the role of ethics in formulation of foreign policy of a state? What does state's interest play a role in international system? How much the concept of collective security is workable pragmatically? To what extent international system permit ideological principle to be materialized in the objectives of the foreign policy of states.

What could be the possibilities of collective security of the states?

## Use of theory

In research methodology theory has very important place. It is used to arrange the data in a systematic way. And gaps are to be filled with logical interpretation of the events.<sup>5</sup> Theory is a tool of analysis, which makes the task of intellectual explanation possible. Without theory all we are left with are disconnected and randomly selected facts which tell us very little about the subject of our inquiry. According to Waltz, a theory is an intellectual construction in which we select facts and interpret them. The challenge is to bring theory to bear on facts in ways that permit explanation in which we select facts and predict different kinds of possibilities.<sup>6</sup> Carr believed that history is a sequence of cause and effect, which could only be properly appreciated by intellectual effort. Anyhow, present study in spite of theoretical work is an analysis of Pakistan-Soviet Union relations according to the realist approach.

## Realism

As this term suggests, "*realism seeks to describe and explain the world of international politics 'as it is' rather than how we might like it to be*". Accordingly, the world is revealed to realists as



a dangerous and insecure place, where violence is regrettable but endemic. In their account of the conflictual nature of international politics, realists give high priority to the centrality of the nation-state in their consideration, acknowledging it as the supreme political authority in the world.

Realists are unified in their pessimism about the extent to which the international political system can be made more peaceful and just. International system is characterized by conflict, suspicion and competition between nation-states, a logic that prevents the realization of alternative world orders. Realism is a pessimistic theoretical tradition. According to this fundamental changes to the structure of the international system are unlikely, even if they are needed. The apparent immutability to the international system means that it will not come to resemble domestic liberal order, however desirable the analogue may be. For realists, international politics is a world of recurrence and repetition, not reform or radical change.<sup>7</sup>

## Huntington and Realism

Samuel P. Huntington narrates that according to this theory states are the primary, indeed, the only important actors in world affairs; the relation among states is one of anarchy, and hence to ensure their survival and security, states invariably attempt to maximize their power. If one state sees another state increasing its power and thereby becoming a potential threat, it attempts to protect its own security by strengthening its power and/ or by allying itself with other states.<sup>8</sup>

The 'Realist picture' of the world is a starting point for analyzing international affairs and it explains much about state behavior. States are and will remain the dominant entities in world affairs. They maintain armies, conduct diplomacy, negotiate treaties, fight wars, control international organizations, influence and in considerable measure shape productions and commerce. The governments of states give priority to insuring the external security of their

states. On the whole, this statistic paradigm provides a more realistic picture of and guide to global politics than the one or two-world paradigm.<sup>9</sup>

## The early Realists

The first coherent expression of a realist approach to the study of international politics evolved out of the apparent failure of liberal principles to sustain peace in Europe after the First World War. Realists believed that no amount of wishful thinking or the application of domestic political principles to the international sphere would change the nature of global politics, in particular its endemic violence. However, the desirable progress towards the pacification of international politics might be, unless the 'realities of power' were given priority in understanding international relations, few advances could be made and normative expectations could not be met.

Unlike the successors, early realists recognized the need for international political reforms and were not blind to alternative forms of political organization. For them, the nation-state was not necessarily the ultimate expression of political community. And another account now seem unscientific and lacking in intellectual precision, many early realists believed that they could uncover the patterns and laws of international politics through a more sophisticated understanding of human nature; the most important of these early realists are E.H Carr and Hans Morgenthau.<sup>10</sup>

## Why Realism?

Realism is generally regarded as the most influential theoretical tradition in international relations, even by its severe critics. Its ancient philosophical heritage, its powerful critique of liberal internationalism and its influence of the practice of international diplomacy have secured it an important if not dominant position in the discipline. No other theory has given as much

form and structure to the study of international politics, especially to the sub-fields of the Security Studies and International Political Economy (IPE).

The philosophical aspect of the science of international politics has been conspicuous from the outset. The passionate desire of liberalists to prevent war settled on the whole initial path and direction of the study which made it obviously utopian as a result of its preoccupation with the end—international peace. International Relations in its initial stage was a discipline based on idealism in which, wishing prevailed over thinking, generalization over observation. A little attempt is made at a critical analysis of facts or available means. Until the 1930s, International Relations was a discipline in which teleology preceded study. Although it is a wish that world should be more peaceful and harmonious. But this was not a useful basis on which to erect a scientific study of world politics.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, a rigorous approach was needed which emphasized the realities of power in international politics rather than one which took as its starting point, an image of how the world could be: in other words, what is rather what ought to be.

The consequences of thinking upon wishing which, in the development of a science, followed the collapse of its first visionary projects. For that particular reason realism marks the end of its specifically utopian period. Representing a reaction against the wish-dreams of the initial (utopian) stage, realism is liable to assume a critical and cynical aspect. In the field of thought, it places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences. It tends to depreciate the role of purpose and to maintain, explicitly or implicitly, that the function of thinking is to study a sequence of events that it is powerless to influence or alter. In the field of action, realism tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces

and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to these forces and these tendencies.

## Realist Condemnation of Idealism/ Utopianism

Realism was a necessary response to the enthusiasm of Utopianism. Utopianism had ignored the essential element of power in its consideration of international politics. Until the unequal distribution of power in the international system became the central focus of a dispassionate analysis, the root causes of conflict and war would not be properly understood. The liberal utopians were so concerned with eradicating the curse of war they had completely neglected its basic rationale. Moreover, Liberals had imputed common interests to states. But such interests were clearly not as widely shared as they thought. This was in fact nothing more than an expression of the 'satisfied powers' with a vested interest in the preservation of the 'status quo'.<sup>12</sup>

The liberals/Utopians believed that international harmony could be achieved by the widest possible application of their views. This is because the absolute and universal principles—peace, harmony of interests, collective security, and free trade – were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time. Similarly, how it could be possible as far as the states had unequal sources, capacities and status.<sup>13</sup>

## Possibility of harmony of interest

The stronger do what they have the power to do and weak accept what they have to accept, in line with the principle of the 'survival of the fittest.' Kenneth Waltz says "countries that have nuclear weapons co-exist peacefully, because each knows the other can do horrendous damage to it." Later realists would concur with the Thucydides' suggestion that the logic of the power

politics has universal applicability.<sup>14</sup> The doctrine of the harmony of interests is the natural assumption of a prosperous and privileged class. The members of this class have a dominant voice in the community. Therefore, they are naturally happy to identify its interest with their own. In virtue of this identification, any assailant of the interests of the dominant group is made to face the hatred of assailing the alleged common interest of the whole community. It is also told to them that in making this assault he is attacking his own higher interests. Thus, the doctrine of the harmony of interests serves as an ingenious moral device. This is invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant position.<sup>15</sup>

## Power and national power and national interests

The liberal utopians had wanted to eliminate power as a consideration for states in the international system. Realists, on the other hand, believed that the pursuit of national power was a natural drive, which states neglected at their peril. Nation-states that eschewed the pursuit of power on principle simply endangered their own security. For realists, the pursuit of power by individual states took the form of promoting 'national interests' a term later to be more broadly defined as the foreign policy goals of the nations but understood by realists specifically to mean strategic power. Clashes of national interests were inevitable: it was futile and dangerous to suggest otherwise. Such sort of clashes and the incidence of war can only be averted by ensuring a rough balance of power between the states in the international system.

## Ideology, Power, Morality and Reality

### **Question of Ideology**

Ideology may be the prompter and shaper of action. It also performed a complex of other functions such as political propaganda, policy legitimating, popular mobilization domestically and internationally. However, it is used as an instrument rather than shaper of foreign and

domestic policy. Moreover, ideology is not static but ever-changing subject to different interpretations by its adherents, and not always internally consistent and coherent. The character and depth of ideological beliefs and commitments and how they express themselves in practice varies from person to person. Question always has to be posed: whose ideology, whose action, whose purpose.<sup>16</sup>

### **Role of ethics/ or moralities and struggle for power**

Realists are convinced that a new international order would be shaped by the realities of global power rather than normality. So, morality was an irrelevant consideration. In fact international peace was most likely an irrelevant consideration, when the dominant power is generally accepted as tolerant and un-oppressive. However, power is a necessary ingredient of every political order<sup>17</sup>. Ethics had been a consideration to legitimize aggression, to inspire and to motivate officials and masses for the attainment of imperialist objectives. Hence, ethical concerns were used to affect so called *self-image* that a state possessed, and as a catalyst for action or the action undertaken much more intense.<sup>18</sup> It inferred that ethics, morality and ideology are the subjective and relative approaches, rather than having a universal appeal for harmonious international system for collective peace and security. For Morgenthau, international politics was a struggle for power between states: the pursuit of national interests was a normal, unavoidable and desirable activity, above everything else. Morgenthau wanted to attack the idea that any state could attempt to universalize its own particular moral and ethical principles.<sup>19</sup>

### **Collective security**

Far from being a cause of international conflict as the liberals had argued, 'the balance of power system' resembled the law of nature: it was the normal expression of international power and the best assurance of peace. Collective security, the liberal alternative, was little more than method

of placing predominant power in the hands of the victorious states, thus institutionalizing the status quo. The League of Nations proved to be incapable of rising above the national interests of its principal members, failing to take account of the shifting differentials of power between the status quo and revisionist states. Laissez-fair economics is an example to refute the notion of a harmony of interest between states. Laissez-fair is the ideology of the ruling elites within dominant economic states which claims that what is good for them is, by definition, of benefit to all.<sup>20</sup>

For realists, peaceful change comes with adjustments to new relations of power: that is, shifting strategic alliances between states. Peace comes through diplomacy, negotiation and compromise, recognizing the different interests of status quo and revisionist powers. This is what is meant by ‘the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies’.<sup>21</sup>

#### **No Overarching Authority/ Binding International Law or Legal System**

For all realists, conflict between states was inevitable in an international system without an overarching authority regulating relations between them. The absence of a compulsory jurisdiction for states—an ‘anarchical’ international system—confirmed the principal distinction between domestic and international politics. In civil society, an individual must submit to the rule of law or pay the consequences: voluntary compliance is not an option. In the international system on the other hand, there is no equivalent regulatory system, which can enforce compliance on states. There is no binding international law or legal system that can bring states to account for their behavior. States can get away with whatever their power allows to achieve.<sup>22</sup>

Realism holds two strands which need explanation here:

Offensive realism declares that anarchy—the absence of an international government or universal sovereign—provides strong conditions for expansion or imperialism. All states strive to exploit their power comparative to other states because only the most powerful states can guarantee their survival. They pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits of doing so would be more valuable than the costs. States under anarchy face the ever-present threat that other states will use force to harm or conquer them. This compels states to improve their relative power positions through arms buildups, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile or even independent foreign economic policies, and opportunistic expansion.<sup>23</sup>

Defensive realism described that the international system provides a good environment for expansion only under certain conditions. Under anarchy, many of the means a state exercises to increase its security decrease the security of other states. In the same vein, Henry Kissinger opines that a state's desire for absolute security means absolute insecurity for all other states. This security problem causes states to worry about one another's future intentions and relative power. Alliances of states may pursue purely security-seeking strategies. However, such states unintentionally generate clouds of mutual hostility or conflict. States often, although not always, look for expansionist policies because their leaders falsely consider that aggression is the only way to make their states secure. Defensive realism predicts greater variation in internationally driven expansion and suggests that states ought to generally pursue moderate strategies as the best route to security. Under most conditions, the stronger states in the international system should formulate military, diplomatic, and foreign economic policies that facilitate self-control.<sup>24</sup>



## References and Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Vernon Marston Hawitt, *International Politics of South Asia*, (New York: Manchester Press, 1992), p. 104.
- <sup>2</sup> Some of the realists, unlike E. H. Carr, Waltz, Scott Burchill and Timothy Dunne, view that anarchy is not ineradicable and universal.
- <sup>3</sup> E. H. Carr, *What is History*, (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 31.
- <sup>4</sup> As Pakistan-China cooperation emerged in spite of the ideological differences. But the key factor for cooperation was the convergence of interests. Timothy Dunne, *Realism in the Globalization of the World Politics*, ed., John Baylis and Steve Smith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 109-124.
- <sup>5</sup> Ayaz Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-65*, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 1.
- <sup>6</sup> Scott Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 88.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.
- <sup>8</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster), p. 33.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p.34.
- <sup>10</sup> Scott Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 70-71.
- <sup>11</sup> Ken Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 67, No. 3. (Jul., 1991), pp. 527-28.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.
- <sup>13</sup> Robert L. Wendzel, *International Politics: Policy Maker and Policy Making*, (New York: John Willy and Sons, 1981), p. 34.
- <sup>14</sup> Timothy Dunne, *Realism in the Globalization of the World Politics*, ed., John Baylis and Steve Smith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 109-124.
- <sup>15</sup> The doctrine of Harmony of interests relates to the Leninist-Marxist conception. This very notion had been perceived and propagated by the Soviet leaders, policy makers and intellectuals about the creation of Pakistan will be discussed in next chapter.
- <sup>16</sup> Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, (London: Clays Ltd. St Ives PLC, 1999), pp.7-8.
- <sup>17</sup> Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*, pp. 72-73.
- <sup>18</sup> Wendzel, *International Politics*, pp. 34-5.
- <sup>19</sup> Burchill, *Theories of International Relations*. p. 80.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p.75.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
- <sup>23</sup> Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3. (Winter, 2000-2001), p. 161.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

## Chapter I

# Historical Background of Pak-Soviet Relations

Historically, ethnically and culturally, the people of the North-Western part of the Indian Subcontinent had close relations with Central Asia. In fact, some of the ruling dynasties in India had come from the area which later became Soviet territories—now a day Central Asian States (CARs). However, mutual contacts between the two pre-dominantly Muslim regions were basically disturbed with the loss of their political independence to Britain and Russia respectively.<sup>1</sup> The struggle for power accumulation through exploiting sources of other nations, and impulsive urge for hegemonic role proved all ties impotent and the notion of mutual cooperation false. This phenomenon has twofold significance of analysis: firstly, imperialist powers had no ethics for respect of others' socio-cultural and religious-emotional values; they satisfy the natural instinct to be dominant or hegemonic; secondly, people become prey to such powers, if they did not find favorable environment for rebellion and begin to associate their affiliations and concerns with their masters who had no common ideologies, culture, norms, ethics and moralities. This chapter discusses the historical background since the establishment of the Sub-continent-Soviet Union relations before 1947. The kind of social, cultural, religious and ethnic relations USSR and Indian subcontinent would also be discussed. Why was this relation disturbed in the colonial period of history? How anarchy had the part and parcel of international politics of Indian subcontinent and what were the interests of major powers in the subcontinent? How did the local people of subcontinent, especially Muslims, respond to the situation and modern political challenges?

## Ideological and religious aspects

The history of Islam in Russia is long, glorious and tragic, dominated as it has been by seven centuries of conflict with Muscovy<sup>2</sup> and later Russia and the USSR. The Socialist Revolution in 1917 could never annihilate this inheritance. The past has not been forgotten, but on the contrary is still present, continuing to mould the *Weltanschauung* of the Soviet Muslims as well as that of the Soviet Russians, from the most sophisticated intelligentsia to the rural and urban masses. We believe that the roots of this problem go back to the time of the Golden Horde<sup>3</sup>, the conquest of Kazan<sup>4</sup> in 1237, and also to the revolt of the Basmachi<sup>5</sup> in 1920 and the 'Holy War of Shamil'<sup>6</sup>. Alexander Benningen and Marie Broxup argued 'a religious culture fourteen centuries old which is as deeply rooted in the popular lore Islam, penetrating all aspects of everyday private and public life, could not and has not been destroyed in fifty years of massive propaganda.'<sup>7</sup> Anyhow, the questionable fact is whether their private and public life remained as usual now as was before the Socialist revolution and Soviet implementation of their policies. Moreover, what about their relations with other Muslim communities living in rest of the USSR? How much they cooperated with Islamic Revolutionaries (struggling for Pan-Islamic movement or those Muslims who are engaged in struggle for their freedom) rather than those revolutionaries who claimed for bringing World Communist Revolution.

To Alexander Benningen and Marie Broxup, historically, Russia, which was centered on Europe, interacted mainly with the West. Even though, the ancient and medieval periods had witnessed migrations and invasions originating in the Asian heartland. It left a lasting imprint on Russia by the Mongols from the 13<sup>th</sup> century onwards, and the establishment of the rule of the Golden Horde. There emerged

substantial colonies of people of Central Asian origin in Russia. As a result of Timur's invasion towards the end of the 14<sup>th</sup> century the empire of the Golden Horde broke up into several Khanates. These Khanates<sup>8</sup> were progressively conquered by the Russians during the 16<sup>th</sup> Century. The 300-year long occupation of most of Russia by the Golden Horde, which became Islamized, embedded a lasting sense of inferiority in the Russians with regard to the Tatar.<sup>9</sup> Some analysts describes that when forced to yield to the supremacy of the Russians, the Muslim Tatars did not feel inferior in culture that developed between the Muslim population and the Russians, and this antipathy persist till day.<sup>10</sup> But basic point ignored in the fact is that the cultural transformation is natural and irresistible phenomenon, the culture of Muslim communities of Central Asia is quite different from the culture of South Asian Muslims and same is the fact with Muslim communities of Middle East. It changes place to place and time to time with the interaction of people and with the need of modern challenges. Thus the dispute is not about cultural values and norms (which is a changeable feature of life); it is game of interests, i.e. security and survival, which has an ineradicable and universal appeal. People had to accept oppressor's imposed norms, if they had not force to resist and revolt.

### Initiation of Russian expansionist tendencies towards the South

Several historians traced Russian ambitions to be emerged as imperialist power from the 16<sup>th</sup> century towards the east and from 18<sup>th</sup> century to southwards, the period of Russian Emperor, Peter the Great.<sup>11</sup> Maqbool Ahmed Bhatti wrote that Russia's attention remained concentrated largely westwards, though Peter the Great, who began a process of modernization by moving the capital to St. Petersburg, his window on Europe, and also

dreamed of an empire in Asia. Eventually finding itself blocked in the West, Czarist Russia found its main avenues for imperialist conquest in Asia. Starting from the 19<sup>th</sup> century, international observers became concerned with Russian expansion into Central Asia, into China, and possibly towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.<sup>12</sup> Similarly Mahbood Ahmed Popatia holds that Russian advanced southward and began to settle in Kazakhstan. The Russian southward expansions continued under the successors of Peter the Great, so that by the 1855 Russia got control over Kazakhstan and in the year 1868, the Khanates of Bukhara, with its renowned centers of learning and culture, was reduced to the status of a Russian protectorate. By late 1860s Russia had reached the Amu Darya which constituted the northern border of Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup>

### Russian intellectuals' aspirations

Russian intellectuals in the 19<sup>th</sup> century were fascinated by the Orient. Alexei S. Khomyakov (1804-1860) studied Sanskrit and not only considered Slavs as outstanding representative of the Aryo-Iranian race but even valued Islam higher than Catholicism. Konstantin Leontev studied Tibetan and Hindu traditions. As revolutionary impulses arose in Czarist Russia, Alexander Herzen (1812-70) forecasted an anti-Western rising in the East in revenge for its colonial exploitation. Another Russian revolutionary, Nikolai Y. Danilevsky (1822-85) saw the vision of a future Russian-dominated pan-Slav union extending from the Adriatic to the Pacific, with Constantinople as its natural seat. Arguing that the major Eurasian races (Aryan, Semite, Turanian) and religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) originated in Asia, he saw a deep cleavage between the currently dominant Romano-German civilization of Western Europe and the Graeco-Slav civilization whose inevitable conflict would result in Russia succeeding Byzantium and

Ottoman Turkey as the historical heir to Constantinople. Even the great Russian novelist Dostoevsky (1822-81) pointed towards Central Asia as the future New Russia, following the Russian conquests in Turkistan in 1881.<sup>14</sup>

### Strategic railroads plans: A Soviet strategy for penetration into Indo-Persian region

Soviet policy to penetrate the Indo-Persian region and reach the Indian Ocean has to be understood in the context of the strategic railroads planned and build in Central Asia and adjoining areas of West and South Asia. In the second half of the 19th century, as Russia built railways linking it European system to its Asian territories, notably the Transcaspian Railway (1880-88), the British perceived a threat to the North-West Frontier in India, and proceeded feverishly to extend their Indian railroad network towards the region. Russia's Central Asian railway system to railheads at the Afghan border at Kushka and Termez increased the threat. However, the German project of a Berlin-Baghdad railway, that would bring German presence into the Balkans and Asia Minor, persuaded the Russians to sign the St. Petersburg Convention of August 1907 with the British that averted the Russian threat to invade India.<sup>15</sup> Hence, Czarist Russia made all their efforts to materialize their intentions to establish Great Russian Empire.

South Asia became the centre of imperialist rivalry of Britain and Russia long before the period of the Great Game in the latter part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Russia and Britain first clashed over India during the Napoleonic Wars, when Napoleon proposed a Franco-Russian military campaign,<sup>16</sup> with France and Russia each providing 35,000 soldiers, to invade India across Persia via Herat and Kandhar. Emperor Paul I of Russia ordered an advance towards India by Don Cossacks under the command of General Orlov

in January 1801, but Paul's assassination ended the first Russian military expedition in the direction of India. While, Napoleon persisted in his plans to reach India via Persia with Russian assistance. Britain successfully counteracted by sending a military mission under Mount Stuart Elphinstone from India into Afghanistan and Persia who successfully halted major thereat.<sup>17</sup>

General Andrei Snegarev (1865-1937) was a representative the more aggressive school of thought that stood for Russia's historic mission to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. A military geographer and Orientalist, General Snegarev defined Central Asia consisting of Turkistan, Khiva, Bukhara, northern India, Kashgaria, the Pamir, Tiber, Afghanistan, Baluchistan and eastern Persia. He lamented the fact that after a period of expansion in Central Asia, Russia had got stuck hopelessly along the Amu Darya<sup>18</sup> (River Oxus) stopping a few hundred kilometer from the Indian Ocean. Snegarev's belief in Russia's historic mission persisted despite the Bolshevik Revolution. As Moscow turned its attention eastwards towards colonial Asia, and specifically towards British India, Leon Trotsky, the leader in-charge of international revolutionary propaganda, recalled Snegarev in 1919 from his military post on the Polish frontier and made him director of the General Staff Academy in Moscow. Trotsky urged the future Soviet generals and diplomats "if you want to destroy capitalist tyranny over the world, beat the British in India." He resurrected an old saying, "He who rules Herat commands Kabul, and he who rules Kabul commands India." His blue print for a military invasion of India via Afghanistan and Pamirs, and subsequent Soviet plans were seen as a serious threat to India's security by the General Staff in New Delhi till 1941.<sup>19</sup> Such sort of mind

set of Soviet leaders and military generals, later on, kept Soviet Union engaged in a hectic struggle with other western imperial powers.

## First World War

During the First World War, India supported the British against its enemies and provided help to it, both in cash and kind. Indian soldiers defended the British Imperialism even in the remote corner of the Empire. British government showed many incentives to the Indian people as return of the services of the Indian soldier.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, it also promised with Indian Muslims to protect the Turkish *Khilafat* institution with which Indian Muslims had great political religious sympathetic affiliations.<sup>21</sup> Afterwards, in spite of rewarding them they introduced new 'oppressive laws' like Rowlett Act. Resultantly, the incident of Jalianwala Bagh happened in which several innocent people were killed. Indians showed large scaled agitation and resentment against British government. When law and order situation worsened in India, people started to migrate towards Afghanistan, Germany and Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup>

There were Several Indian revolutionaries who had been working for the German Emperor during the First World War. Now they transferred their allegiance to Lenin to conduct propaganda from Tashkent, at the gate of India; among them were Moulvi Barkatullah, Maulana Obeidullah Sindhi, V.N. Chattopadhaya and Raja Mahendra Pratap. By early twentieth century national movements began to take shape in several countries under colonial or despotic rule including India and Russia. Due to the repressive measures adopted by the British in India, a number of Indian political activists migrated to Europe and America from where they continued to struggle for the liberation of their country. Many of those who settled in Europe had the advantage of exchanging



with the Russian revolutionary exiles. Shyamji Krishnavarma, Madame Cama, S.R. Rana and Virendranath Chotopadhyaya, who stayed in Paris came into contact with Russian Social Democrats and learned about their political ideas.<sup>23</sup>

During the First World War there was a huge enthusiasm of activities to liberate India from the British oppression and imperialism. Often, these activities were foreign based, especially assisted by the Germans and Turks. One group of the Indian emigrants was that of Raja Mahendra Pratap, Maulvi Barkatulla, Maulana Obeidullah Sindhi and others who had set up what was known as the Provisional Government of Free India at Kabul.<sup>24</sup>

### *Khilafat* Movement and Soviet Revolution

The October Revolution (1917) in Russia coincided with an equally powerful political and emotional upheaval among the Muslims, caused by the *Khilafat* movement in India. Allied with Germany, the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph had urged the Muslims to sabotage the war effort and thus save the Caliphate. To the Indian Muslims the caliphate had a deep emotional significance, throughout the Sultanate and Mughal period. Responding to the call of the Turkish Caliph, the Indian Muslims organized the Caliphate Conference in December 1919.<sup>25</sup>

The *Khilafat* Conference, in July 1920, insisted the Muslims to migrate out of India. For the British Government had failed to respect Turkey's territorial rights. Many people migrated in the direction of Afghanistan. Many of the students also discontinued their studies and without keeping their future in view marched towards the Afghanistan.<sup>26</sup>

During the same time, Afghanistan signed a treaty with British India. The Indian *Muhajreen*, who were present in a large number in Kabul, regarded as 'betrayal' on the

part of Amanullah Khan, hence; Afghanistan was no more an ideal sanctuary for them. According to Syed Wiqar Ali Shah, 'by signing this treaty with British Afghanistan it became a country similar to rest of the Islamic countries in the World.'<sup>27</sup> So, under such conditions, the Indian migrated people were not happy living in Afghanistan anymore, and they decided to leave Afghanistan for Soviet Union, which they consider the "Land of Revolution." Soviets extended facilities to these Indian *Muhajreens*.<sup>28</sup>

A group of 180 students eventually drifted into Soviet Central Asia. They got different socio-political and educational orientation interacting with the soviet socialists. Among this group of Marxist-Leninist converts, there were several well-known Indian communist leaders, including Firoze-ud-Din Mansur, Fazl-i-Ilahi Qurban, Mir Abdul Majid, Mian Akbar Shah, Abdullah Safdar, Fida Ali Zahid and Gauhar Rehman. In 1920, they united at Tashkent, with Hindus to create the CPI. One more group of Muslim communist leaders acquired their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism from Britain during the late 1920s. Prominent among them were Dr. Muhammad Ashraf and Sajjad Zaheer, both of them first joined and worked for CPI, and after partition of Indian Subcontinent, after 1947, they played a significant role in organizing CPP.<sup>29</sup>

## Soviet Union and the Formation of CPI in India

The pattern of the relationship between a superpower and a regional state had always been 'asymmetrical'. Such disparity among states and anarchy in international system led states to put 'instruments of their diplomacy and self-projection' in exercise. For the Soviet Union, Marxism-Leninism and the foreign communist parties since 1917 were formidable tools in the conduct of its foreign policy both toward the West and the East.<sup>30</sup>

Lenin, in 1919, established the Communist International (the Comintern), which subordinated all foreign communist parties to Moscow. Communists were called upon to make propaganda within their own countries' armed force, when necessary by secret and illegal means, make special efforts to win peasant support, achieve emancipation of oppressed nationalities and colonial peoples, and develop among their own workers fraternal feelings towards the workers of colonies or oppressed nationalities subject to their own nation, and to function legally and to maintain parallel with their legal organization a clandestine organization capable for the decisive movement of fulfilling its duty towards the revolution.<sup>31</sup> Communist parties thus emerged in foreign lands as the ideological allies of the Soviet Union, and often did not hesitate to function against the perceived national interests of their own states. These parties were an instrument in Soviet hands to their ideology, through which they can legitimize its imperialist and hegemonic role.

Throughout this period, however, the Comintern recorded some major successes in organizing Communist parties in Asian countries. The Communist Party of India came into existence in Soviet Central Asia in response to the anti-imperial policy of the Comintern. It can be seen that how Soviet leaders were attracted towards India through Lenin's view. He wrote as early as 1921, "British India stands at the head of these countries and there the revolution is developing all the more rapidly... despite the fact that they are still backward, will play an important role in the coming phase of the world revolution".<sup>32</sup>

Muslim League and Soviet Union/ Partition of India

Earlier the Soviet attitude towards the partition of India especially towards the “Two Nations Theory” pursued by the Muslim League was of extreme adversity to the idea and the League’s stand was severely criticized by the Soviet media and commentators. They denounced ‘Muslim League’ as a sectarian party bent upon destroying the traditional and historical unity of the sub-continent. For instance A. Dyakov, a leading Soviet commentator saw League as the chief asset of the British in realizing their plan to retain their rule in India. In an article, Dyakov and B. Bushevich condemned the Muslim League for “disrupting the front of struggle of the Indian people” for its independence.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, they regarded “Indian National Congress as the sole representative of all the Indians”.<sup>34</sup>

The Soviet literature had not given much attention to Mohammad Ali Jinnah and to Liaquat Ali Khan. They regarded Jinnah as pro-British and, therefore, to them a hostile politician. Dyakov distinguished three schools of thought: the pro-British school which viewed India as a conglomeration of races and religions which could only live in one state thanks to the British rule. The Congress school of one nation and the Muslim League and Muslim League school which saw India as composed of two nations, Muslims and Hindus. Dyakov believed that this last school was inspired by British who later on adopted it themselves.<sup>35</sup>

However, once the Soviet Government got engaged in mortal combat with the Nazi Germany it needed all the support that it could gather. The Soviet attitude towards the Muslim League took an about turn, as soon as the League announced to throw its weight behind the war effort of the Grand Alliance to which Soviet Union was a party and to which the Indian National Congress was opposed in principle. The Soviet

commentator described Muslim League as “the premier political organization of the second largest community.”<sup>36</sup>

The Communist Party of India, like the Soviet leadership, changed its stance about Muslim League. In September 1942, the Central Committee of the CPI took up a resolution explicitly advocating the demand of Muslim League. Even they proclaimed, “Every section of the Indian people which has a contiguous territory as its homeland, common historical tradition, common language, culture, psychological make-up, and common economic life” would be accepted as a separate nationality with the right to exist as an autonomous state within the free Indian Union or Federation. Sajjad Zaheer admonished the Congress:

Congressmen fail to see the anti-imperialist, liberationist role of the Muslim League, fail to see that the demand for Muslim self-determination of Pakistan is a just, progressive and is the positive expression of the very freedom and democracy for which Congressmen have striven and undergone so much suffering all these years.<sup>37</sup>

P.C Joshi, the prominent CPI leader, supported the League’s demand for a separate state. In 1943, he admitted, “the demand for Muslim self determination or Pakistan is a just progressive and national demand.”<sup>38</sup> An Indian scholar attributed this policy of CPI to two reasons: one, to gain a strong hold in the Muslim constituencies and second, to cater to the timely need of Moscow.<sup>39</sup>

## After the War

Once the war ended, Soviets started reverting back to their earlier position, but the noticeable fact was that they were rather careful and adopted an attitude of “wait and see” and their approach toward both Congress and the League was more or less balanced. The Soviet leadership, however, favored transformation of India into a loose federation rather

than its division on communal and religious lines. It is interesting to note that this line was in contrast to CPI's line, which supported the right of succession. The League demand was once again seen as a plot by the Muslim bourgeoisie in collaboration with the British imperialism for a share in administration. However in pursuance of the "wait and see" policy the Soviets held that the idea of Pakistan had a different meaning for Muslim masses than for the reactionary League leadership. This view is evident in the Soviet writings. The Mountbatten Plan of June 3, 1947 was denounced as a "British maneuver calculated to perpetuate imperialist control of the sub-continent."<sup>40</sup>

The dominant opinion in Soviet Union was that the Indian leaders accepted the June 3 Plan under the pressure of the wealthy classes who would use the partition plan in order to enhance their own wealth and power and avert a real democratic revolution. To them the plan was nothing more than a deal struck between the British imperialism and the Indian bourgeoisie.

### June 3 Plan

Some writers hold that the fundamental reason for their opposition and disagreement to the June 3 Plan and the later on transfer of power was that the Soviet leadership thought of any division along religious or ethnic lines as 'non-Marxist'. Another reason was that if they had accepted the partition of sub-continent along the religious lines, same could have been argued in the case of their own Central Asian Republics. Soviet analysts argued that owing to the fragility of the British Power, the resulting constraints, and pressure the imperialists were compelled to make certain concessions to the nationalist struggle movement in India but without adversely affecting the imperialist interests.<sup>41</sup> Henceforth, according to Geoffrey Wheeler, "It suited the

Soviet government to see partition as a result of an unholy agreement between the Moslems, capitalist Gujrati and Marwari Hindus in control of the Congress, and the British, with the object of averting a mass movement in the lower ranks of Congress.”<sup>42</sup>

Describing the Soviet attitude towards the partition of India Ayaz Naseem took few lines from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, which elaborates “the partition of India enabled British imperialism to weaken the economy of the country, and inflaming of differences between India and Pakistan that facilitated British domination in both domains” in the same passage the encyclopedia described both the new dominions as “parts of the British empire, former British colonies, retaining to a different degree their dependence on Great Britain and...members of the so called British Common Wealth of Nations.”<sup>43</sup>

Pakistan’s emergence on the world scene almost went unnoticed in the Soviet Union. The Soviets did not even send a message of felicitations to the newborn state. This was in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union’s establishment of relations with India as early as April 1947. The only comment to come from Stalin was rather cynical when he termed that it was to create a state on the basis of religion. Soviet leaders and commentators expressed serious doubts about the prospect of Pakistan surviving as an independent state.<sup>44</sup>

The Soviet analysts on British Imperial India, who were closely watching the activities taking place in India, considered the British concessions to the Indian people in 1940s nothing but the effort to keep Indian people under British tutelage: for example, commenting on the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946), B. Bushevich observed that the concessions offered in the Plan “originated from the desire to preserve India, though in

the changed form, in a colonial position and to keep it subordinate to the interest of British imperialism.”<sup>45</sup> Similarly, A. Dyakov, another analyst of prominence, had keenly observed the role of different classes in Indian national liberation movement.

Almost all the classes took part in the Indian national freedom struggle. Among these first of all come the working masses, the labor class, and peasantry, which participated quite actively in the national freedom movement, then comes the national Intelligentsia and important national bourgeois circles.<sup>46</sup>

Dyakov also analyzed the socio-religious character of Muslim League slogan of ‘Divide India’. His attitude towards the two nation theory, like other Soviet scholars, was of extreme adversity. He denounced League as a sectarian party bent upon destroying the traditional and historical unity of the subcontinent. He saw “Muslim League as the chief asset of the British in realizing their plan to rule India.” He, however, observed that the Indian National Congress did not represent the Muslims of India, as the Hindu bourgeoisie controlling it was not accommodative of the socio-economic and the religious requirements of the Muslims.

There can be no doubt that many Hindu political leaders, who are against Pakistan, are reflecting the strong urge of bourgeoisie to rule on the whole of Indian market. These circles are not only against Pakistan but do not even acknowledge the elementary democratic rights of self determination in Muslim majority areas.<sup>47</sup>

The Soviet analysts were also much critical of the June 3rd Plan of Mountbatten which envisaged the partition of India. The Soviet Union looked down upon the plan as a colonial device to “divide and rule” aiming at “Balkanization” of India without transferring real powers to the Indians. E. Zhukov out of this skepticism observed:

The adoption of the British Plan about the partition of India having the consent of Indian Leaders, to satisfy the statute of the two dominions while preserving the majority of princes as an important stronghold of the British Empire, showed that the Indian bourgeoisie and the Indian landlord, did not try to attain true independence of India which was useless without progressive reforms and without the active support of Indian people. The Soviet higher-ups are striving for a compromise with England, which looked after the class interests of Indian.<sup>48</sup>



As regards Muslim bourgeoisie and its ploy of 'divide India' on the basis of two nation theory, Yury V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gorden Polonskaya observed that the Muslim landlords, bent upon seizing the commanding political heights in areas with Muslim majority, and the big Muslim bourgeoisie, which was out to win a market of its own and to get rid of more powerful competitors, had used the idea of partition to their advantage. These were the interests of these classes not the two nation theory that were the *raison d'etat* of Pakistan movement.<sup>49</sup>

Concluding the discussion, Soviet expansionist policy for the World Revolution—or for the security purpose or for the sake of national interests—for which Comintern was established, had actually been the policy of the Tsarist Russia also. It meant that states' temperament had been tilted to security consciousness with expansionist designs and power accumulation. This very fact can be seen in that after the socialist revolution in Russia. Soviet leaders gained a new tool i.e. ideology to pursue its foreign policy objectives which were based on national interests and security concerns. During and after the period of Second World War, Indian leaders including Muslim ones had been interacting with Soviet leaders and scholars. They got a new socialist orientation in USSR, which they propagated with synthesis of Islam in India. Many of the Muslim ideologue did not view its socio-economic aspect incompatible with Islam. Some of the Muslim migrant students studying in Central Asia learned and others who were living in London, at the time of chaotic situation due to the *Khilafat* and *Hijrat* movements, learnt about the Leninist-Marxist ideas returned to the country and established Communist Party of India to escalate the movement of World Communist Revolution in Indian society. This phenomenon showed ideological diversities are not the irreconcilable

matters. Progressive ideologue of the every society always had the mild corner towards new ideas for the betterment of present and future of the society.

Soviet leaders and CPI initially condemned the Muslim League and Jinnah considering them the tool to cultivate the seeds of British imperialism and to counter the Congressite anti-imperialist activities. Moreover, they dubbed Muslim League a party of land lords who were working to save their vested interests rather than the interests of Indian Muslims.

But when the USSR was with the 'Grand Alliance' against the Germany, in Second World War, it favored the Muslim League to win the support of Indian Muslim masses. For, unlike Congress, Muslim League was willing for the recruitment of Indian soldiers in the British Army to fight against the German forces. At this historical juncture three rival forces were active—Great Britain, Soviet Union and Indian Muslim faction i.e. Muslim League—which were apparently antagonistically struggling with each other while the time they found convergence of interests of their security and survival they collaborated against their enemies leaving aside their ideological differences.

## Notes and References

<sup>1</sup> Mahboob A. Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union, 1947-1979*, (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre University of Karachi, 1988) p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Former principality in western Russia centered on Moscow.

<sup>3</sup> It is the Mongol army that invaded and dominated large parts of Eastern Europe and western part of Russia in the 13th century.

<sup>4</sup> Now a capital of Tataristan.

<sup>5</sup> In Central Asia Soviets face a conservative movement known in historical accounts of Soviets as "the Basmachi movement" (1918-1928). See for further details, Alexander Benningen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, (Lahore: Services Book Club, 1983), p. 63, 66-67, 114.

<sup>6</sup> A Nashbandi leader and Imam of Dagestan in 1956, see Benningen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, p. 17, 20, 41, 54.

<sup>7</sup> Benningen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, n.p.

<sup>8</sup> Khanate implies the territory governed by a medieval Chinese emperor or Mongolian or Turkish khan.

<sup>9</sup> Benningen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, (Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad), 94-95.

<sup>11</sup> He was a Russian emperor who ruled from 1672 to 1725. His victory over Sweden established Russia as a major European power.

<sup>12</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, pp. 94-95.

<sup>13</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's relations with the Soviet 1947-1979*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>14</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 95.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

<sup>16</sup> In post-Vasco de Gama period, the European powers began to gain a foothold in this region which the locals or the coastal states failed to resist. The first Dutch fleet of four ships sailed in 1595 from Java. In 1601, the English East India Company, in 1602, the Dutch East India Company, and in 1664, the French East India Company were established. These events marked the beginning of the colonial rivalry between the leading European powers in the Indian Ocean.

For further discussions of the role of the superpowers in the Indian Ocean, see T. B. Millar, *The Indian and Pacific Oceans: Some Strategic Considerations*, Adelphi Paper No. 57 (London: IISS, May 1969); Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, eds. *The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance* (New York: Praeger, 1972); R. M. Burrell, *The Persian Gulf*, The Washington Papers, No. 1 (New York: The Library Press, 1972); Geoffrey Jukes, *The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy*, Adelphi Paper No. 87 (London: IISS, May 1972); Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, "Soviet-U.S. Naval Competition in the Indian Ocean," *Orbis*, Winter 1975; W. A. C. Adie, *Oil, Politics and Seapower: The Indian Ocean Vortex*, National Strategy Information Center, Strategy Paper No. 24 (New York: Crane Russak, 1975). Moonis Ahmar, *Super Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean Since the Withdrawal of Great Britain*, (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe, 1986) pp. 13-14.

<sup>17</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 95.

<sup>18</sup> A river in central and western Asia flowing from the Pamir plateau toward the Aral Sea, Length: 2,540 km/1,580 mi.

<sup>19</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 96.

<sup>20</sup> Syed Wiqar Ali Shah, "Mian Akbar Shah." ed. Toru, Parvez Khan and Marvat, *Celebrities of NWFP*. Vol. I and II. (Peshawar; 2005). p.317.

<sup>21</sup> M. Naeem Qureshi, "*Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of Khilafat Movement*," (Netherlands: SEPSMEA, 1999), p. 439.

<sup>22</sup> Shah, "Mian Akbar Shah." 317.

<sup>23</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics 1947-1992*. (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 9-10.

<sup>24</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union, 1947-1979*, p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, 1947-92*, p. 12.

<sup>26</sup> Qureshi, "*Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*," p. 96-67.

<sup>27</sup> Syed Wiqar Ali Shah, "Mian Akbar Shah." p.316.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, 1947-92*, p. 12.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>32</sup> V.I. Lenin, *Lenin's Prediction on the Revolutionary Storm in the East*, (Peking: Foreign Language Press) pp. 13-14.

<sup>33</sup> Ayaz Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-65*, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 33.

<sup>34</sup> Dushevich and A Dyakov, "India and Second Imperialist War," *World Economy and World Politics*, 1940, in R K Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*, Vol., (Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978), p. 175.

<sup>35</sup> A. Dyakov, "Contemporary India," *Bolshevik*, 1946, in Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*, Vol., (Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978), p. 179.

<sup>36</sup> Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-65*, p. 33.

<sup>37</sup> Sajjad Zaheer, *A Case for Congress-League Unity*, (Bombay: 1944) I, in Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, 1947-92*, p. 12.

<sup>38</sup> As quoted by Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, 1947-92*, p. 10.

<sup>39</sup> Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-65*, p. 34.

<sup>40</sup> Ragnath Ram, *Soviet Policy towards Pakistan*. (New Delhi, S. Chand and Co. 1983), p. 6, in Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-65*, p. 34.

<sup>41</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union, 1947-1979*, p. 62.

<sup>42</sup> Geoffrey Wheeler, "Soviet Publications on India and Pakistan," *Asian Review*, Vol. LIV, 197, (January, 1958), p. 8.

<sup>43</sup> Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-65*, p. 36.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> B. Bushevich, and A. Dyakov, "India and Second Imperialist War," *World Economy and World Politics*, 1940, in Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*, Vol., p. 175.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 180.

<sup>47</sup> Wheeler, "Soviet Publications on India and Pakistan," pp. 6-7.

<sup>48</sup> Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*, Vol., pp. 185-86.

<sup>49</sup> Yury V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gordon Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan*, (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1964), pp. 6-7.



**Pakistan**

Pakistan, India, and China each claim all or part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. A cease-fire agreement in 1949 divided the region into two sectors: the eastern part administered by India as the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the western part administered by Pakistan as Azad (Free) Kashmir and the Northern Areas. In 1950 China occupied the northeast portion of Kashmir, known as Aksai Chin.

Source: Encarta Dictionary, 2000



## Russia

Source: *Encarta World English Dictionary*, 1999.

## Chapter 2

# Pakistan-Soviet Union relation in the Context of Non-Alignment and Alignment Policies (1947-60)

After the decolonization and partition of subcontinent, for more than a decade and a half, relations between Pakistan and the USSR were not good. This was not because of different value systems and ideologies, but rather to their different perceptions of their own self-interest. The Soviet Union was not impressed with the reasons which had led to the creation of Pakistan. Nevertheless, when Pakistan was formed, the Soviet Union evidenced no hostility and promptly established diplomatic relations with the new State. Both states waited for each others' gestures and evaluated the strengths, weakness, temperaments and overall outlooks of foreign policy priorities and strategic maneuvers.

### Nature of Pakistan-Soviet Relations

Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union have been patterned by unresponsiveness, distrust, and mutual recrimination on one account or another, although there were brief period when these could be described as correct and cordial. The analysts presented different perception about the reason of such a long-standing antagonism.

For some, the non-compatibility of Islam with Marxism-Leninism makes its difficult for the two states to develop lasting friendship. This line of thinking was subscribed to more often by the ruling elite in the early years of independence, and cited as one of the reasons to justify Liaquat Ali Khan's decision not to avail himself of the invitation to visit Moscow. Subsequently, this argument was pushed into the background but an untested fear that friendship with Moscow would compromise Pakistan's Islamic character was entertained by right wing/ religious groups. Some

analysts viewed that Soviet opposition to Pakistan was a consequence of their perception that Pakistan's Islamic disposition and Islamic resurgent movements could cause an ideological spillover into Soviet Central Asia which had a large Muslim population. Another explanation describes the Soviet Union an expansionist power which has a 'grand design' to establish its hegemony in the world, and that, as Pakistan stands in the way of southward expansion, it views Pakistan as an obstacle to the realization of its foreign policy goals.<sup>1</sup>

Still others attribute the difficulties in Pak-Soviet relations to Pakistan's pro-West disposition, and especially its participation in security arrangements with the West (the alliance system of the fifties and security ties in the context of the Afghanistan crisis). There are those who take a balanced view of arguing that both Pakistan and the Soviet Union have to share the blame. They also argue that, because of Pakistan's resource constraints and the geo-strategic environment, it cannot afford to permanently antagonize the Soviet Union. Pakistan should improve its relations with the Soviet Union and support its initiatives for defusing tension in the international system.<sup>2</sup>

### **Role of Leadership**

A Soviet perception on South Asia during this period remained rooted in the view held by Moscow ideologues that bourgeois nationalism in the colonies had gone over to imperialism. An expert on Asia, E. Zhukov, speaking to the Soviet Academy of any middle road between capitalism and socialism, and condemned the national bourgeoisie in the former colonies for their attempts to make the masses believe that they had attained independence, whereas all that the imperialists had done was to "replace open, tactless forms and methods of colonial rule with more refined and secret forms," such as Dominion Status. Arguing that the bourgeoisie who had assumed power in these independent states were only agents of imperialist masters, he dubbed nationalist leaders like Gandhi and Nehru "lackeys of imperialists" and "betrayers of their nations."<sup>3</sup> Even the usefulness of the



Chinese path of revolution in the colonies was doubted. As a consequence to this attitude, the Soviet Union adopted a policy of indifference towards the newly independent states of South and Southeast Asia. This had the effect of preventing the Kremlin from exerting any significant influence on developments in Asia until the death of Stalin in 1935.<sup>4</sup>

Stalin believed the independence of Pakistan and India as a myth, and further regarded them as tool of continuation of “Anglo-American imperialism”. He, therefore, saw the leaders of these countries as stooges, agents and lackeys of the Anglo-American imperialism. His attitude to the freedom of India and Pakistan was one of complete indifference, and this was reflected in the Soviet media, which did not even report the emergence of the courtiers to independence.<sup>5</sup> Authoritative Soviet publications of this period reflect Stalin’s view of the partition of India as a deal struck between the “Indian bourgeoisie and British imperialism,” and as a maneuver by British imperialism to retain its positioning the subcontinent.<sup>6</sup>

The Stalinist period saw the Soviet Union basically preoccupied with its Cold War with the West, and Moscow took note of developments in South Asia mainly in relation to their impact on this rivalry. The Indian and Pakistani decisions to remain in the Commonwealth came in for severe criticism by Soviet Commentators, mainly because it was seen as confirming their thesis of continued subservience of the two countries to the British.<sup>7</sup>

Pakistani leaders also did not show much interest in cultivating the Soviets in the early years of independence. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, who recorded two special broadcasts for the people of the United States to introduce Pakistan to them, did not make such a gesture towards the Soviet Union. The top Pakistani leadership had no contact with the Soviet Union in the pre-independence period and could not come out of the British mould of keeping a distance from the Soviets. The fact that Britain represented Pakistani interests in the Soviet Union until they

exchanged ambassadors could not be helpful to promoting any rapport.<sup>8</sup>

The Pakistani leadership was extremely pro-West due to their ideological disposition, educational and cultural exposure to the West (i.e. Britain), and their personal contacts with the British. They felt that the West was a natural ally and that, being more advanced than the Soviet Union in science and technology; it had more to offer to Pakistan.<sup>9</sup>

Therefore, it was not surprising that Pak-Soviet relations developed rather slowly. Though they exchanged notes for the establishment of diplomatic relations on 1 May 1948, the Pakistani and Soviet ambassadors took up their assignments in December 1949 and March 1950 respectively. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, was invited to Moscow in June 1949 (after the United States had extended a visit invitation to Nehru). The invitation was accepted but Liaquat Ali Khan did not undertake the trip. He went to the United States a development that reflected the biases of the Pakistani leaders. Prime Minister Khan's speeches and statements during his visit to the United States in May 1950, emphasizing the shared values between Pakistan and the United States and paying a glowing tribute to the people of that country reinforced Soviet distrust of.<sup>10</sup>

On the level of leadership, Nehru, as against Jinnah, was praised as left wing progressive.<sup>11</sup> However, soon afterwards, the Soviet started eyeing him with suspicion, especially his liberalism, pro-British sentiments and his notions of Pan-Asians were viewed with doubt and criticized bitterly. Nehru's Pan-Asians raised the fear in Moscow of a possible Indo-Chinese collaboration in order to fill up the vacuum created by the defeat of Japan and the retreat of British from the subcontinent.<sup>12</sup> Similarly Nehru's pronouncement on neutrality and non-alignment did not fit in the Soviet view of peace and neutrality. Non-alignment to the Soviets, at that time, was a deceptive tactic by the Anglo-American leadership to encourage the newly independent ex-colonies against the Soviet Union. Reports such as one by the transport department of the government of India, stating, "the growth of

Soviet power and its closeness to India necessitates the urgency to build roads in certain strategic places” were considered by the Soviet as a reflection of Indian subjugation to British political and military plans.<sup>13</sup>

### **Question of Ideology**

The Communist and the Islamic world represent a community of strong believers, attractive to people obtaining an intense psychological satisfaction from membership in such groups. Muslims and Communists are influenced with a pronounced sense of the righteousness of their convictions and possessed by a missionary spirit. In spite of the democratic aspects of the ideal Islamic polity, historically the Muslim world has known few liberal and many autocratic states. Intellectual Communist propaganda can make these features appear more similar than they are and gloss over the basic incompatibility of Islam with Communism.<sup>14</sup> Werner Levi argued that ideology is in any case not a very important determinant of foreign policy. The practice of states, as well as the nature of ideology and its influence upon behavior, shows that friendships and enmities among nations are formed far more effectively by such factors as the national interest in survival than by ideological affinities or contradictions.<sup>15</sup> The ideological basis of Pakistan’s foreign policy was forecast by the former Prime Minister, Firoz Khan Noon, when he announced before partition that “if the Hindus give us Pakistan and freedom then the Hindus are our best friends. If the British give it to us, then the British are our best friends. But if neither will give it to us, then Russia is our best friend.”<sup>16</sup>

Among the supporter of the alarmist thesis, primarily, are those who are of the opinion that the distortions in Pakistan-Soviet Union relations are mainly due to the ideological differences between the two systems. They operate from the assumption that the differences between the two countries are a reflection of incompatibility and irreconcilability of Marxism-Leninism having an inherent and intransigent, disregard for world, religion is intolerable of a state found on the Islamic

ideology. Proponents of this school quoted Stalin's remarks that the creation of a state on the basis of religion is primitive. For instance it is argued that, "there are important divergences of outlook between Pakistan, with its Islamic background and the Soviet Union, with a back ground of Marxism, which is atheistic."<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand, it is argued "the ideologies of Islam and Communism are similar in that both stand for a complete social revolution Further, that if in the light of Iqbalite principles, which more or less hold a semi official position then, "it is difficult to imagine many important differences between the resultant Iqbalite society and a communistic one, apart from certain organizational disparities."<sup>18</sup> The argument is furthered that, though Islam and Christianity are more compatible yet the later evokes reactionary sentiments about its colonial and imperialist character, and that "the decisive factors in an alignment with the west have been on the one hand historical contact ideology does not seem to have played any particular role, unless by ideology is meant the particular ideologically opposed to Pan-Islamism, while the West in theory does not opposed sentiments of Islamic unity. These points of similarity or dissimilarity can be emphasized by Pakistanis according to the circumstances."<sup>19</sup> Anyhow, whatever could be the case with the differences and similarities among different ideologies, the social reformist always tried to reconcile clashing idea of the society in every age. But, it is also evident that states developed their relation ever on the basis of interests rather than ideologies. States' relations wherever find the convergence of interests they come closer despite the clashes of ideology.

## Partition of India (1947) and early diplomatic relations

With a distinctive turn of history, the Soviet attitude towards South Asia on the eve of independence had gone through a major change, which was to cast a shadow over relations for

several years. As the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western powers ended, the rivalry and mutual suspicion generated by the Cold War increasingly dominated global politics. The Soviet Union had established the Comintern, and engaged in struggle of “two camps”. Andrei Zhadnov, a close associated of Stalin, in his speech in Poland in September 1947, drew the battle-lines clearly between “the imperialistic and democratic” camps. He also divided the countries, which had broken away from imperialism into two groups: those who remained sympathetic to the camp, placing India in the latter category.<sup>20</sup>

Pandit Nehru sent his own sister, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, as the first Indian Ambassador to Moscow in August 1947. However, Mrs. Pandit found the Soviet attitude cool and even negative, since she was not allowed to visit the Central Asian Republics, or even Georgia. She complained, with some bitterness, on returning home in April 1949 that she had not met Stalin even once. On their part, the Soviets, who considered India’s status as still subservient to Britain imperialism, the violent movement of subversion started by the Communist Party of India was the direct result of the Soviet attitude that refused to recognize the reality of Indian independence. The Soviet media accused the Congress leaders of having entering into deal with Anglo-American imperialism. There was no acknowledgement of Gandhi’s position, and no message of condolence was sent form Moscow on his assassination.<sup>21</sup>

As for Pakistan, the Soviets believed that the British decision to divide the Subcontinent was a part of the old strategy of “divide and rule”. The Moscow paper, *New Times*, wrote on 4 July 1947 that British calculations were based “on an aggravation of national antagonisms,” and “on the creation of a situation that will favor British interference in India, internal affairs.” Though both Indian and Pakistani leaders were subjected to criticism for accepting the division of the country, Pakistan, being the main exponent of partition, was viewed as the favorite tool of imperialism.<sup>22</sup>



Contrary to India, where there existed as a creation fascination for the political and economic model represented by communism, Pakistan's intellectuals and ideological leaders were inclined to be critical of the godless Bolshevist creed. Whereas Nehru had stretched the hand of friendship to Moscow even before India became constitutionally independent, Soviet-Pakistan relations got off to a cool start because the Soviet Union moved slowly in extending recognition, and no congratulatory message was sent to Karachi when Pakistan came into existence. The first move to set up diplomatic relations was not made until April 1948, when foreign minister Zafrullah Khan proposed to Soviet deputy exchange of ambassadors, while the announcement of an agreement to establish diplomatic relations was made shortly, therefore, it was in late December 1949 that the first Pakistan ambassador presented his credentials in Moscow, and it took another three months before his counterpart assumed his post in Pakistan in March 1950.<sup>23</sup>

#### **Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's Visit**

In 1949 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was invited to visit Moscow, but instead he went to the United States. Why this change of plans occurred has never been satisfactorily answered by the Government of Pakistan. Perhaps the only explanation is that Pakistan was in need of economic and military aid for development and defense purposes, and the United States was in a better position to supply Pakistan the required aid. However, Pakistan had no intention of having exclusive relations with the United States. While in the United States, Liaquat Ali Khan repeatedly stated that Pakistan had much to gain in the agricultural field through better relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>24</sup> His stay in the United States became a turning point in Pakistan's foreign political orientation. The Prime Minister's visit was judged successful by all concerned. A number of misunderstandings with the US were cleared up and new understandings reached. The outbreak of the Korean War (1950 to 1953) led to a general awakening in the United States to the importance of Asia other than just Eastern

Asia. Public opinion in Pakistan now appeared as happy with closer ties to the United States as it had previously been in regard to the Soviet Union.

There was extensive enthusiasm in Pakistan over these developments, as there has always been when a friend was believed to have been won. Yet some disillusionment set in almost as soon as these new relations assumed concrete form. In May 1948, the Soviet Union granted legitimate recognition to Israel and Pakistan students demonstrated in protest in Karachi. Moscow criticized the very harmless International Islamic Economic Conference, annoying its Pakistani organizers. There were disclosures of Communist infiltration into the Muslim League for the purpose of creating dissension. The Pakistan government became disturbed by the Soviet request that in addition to an embassy in the capital there should also be an amply staffed Soviet office in Peshawar, a crucially strategic spot in relation to the Khyber Pass and the tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier Agency. As the American aid program gathered momentum, the Pakistani government also felt that in comparison the Soviet Union would be unable to supply either the quantity or quality of materials Pakistan needed for her development and protection. Even before the first Soviet ambassador presented his credentials a perceptible revulsion against the flirtation with the Soviet Union had taken place.<sup>25</sup>

In early years of Pakistan, Pakistani leaders and intelligentsia spoke out ideological features of the foreign policy of Pakistan. Yet this ideological perception was the determinant of foreign policy rather than its objective. First of its reason was to justify the bases of Pakistan and to get recognition in international community. As Liaquat Ali Khan pointed out, "In the geography of the world, Pakistan's name is not yet three years old. What led to the emergence of this new State on the map of Asia is perhaps not universally known. Nor do except it yet to be common knowledge what urges stir and inspire us in the task that we know lies ahead of us."<sup>26</sup> So he

further explains justifying the creation of Pakistan:

Pakistan was founded by the indomitable will of a hundred million Muslims who felt that they were a nation too numerous and too distinct to be relegated forever to the unalterable position of a political minority, specially when, in the vast subcontinent which was their homeland, there was enough room for two great nations—the Hindus and the Muslims—to enjoy peace and full sovereignty in their respective dominions. They believed that thus alone would the vast multitude of the followers of Islam be uninhibited in the development of their culture and free to follow their own way of life. Pakistan was founded so that millions of Muslims should be enabled to live according to their opinions and to worship God in freedom, which they sought for themselves they conceded to others, with the determination to live as peaceful neighbours when to live as more than neighbours seemed to be more than hazardous. Like some of the earlier founders of your great country, these Muslims, though not Pilgrims, nevertheless embarked upon an undertaking, which, in aim and achievement, represented the triumph of an idea. That idea was the idea of liberty which has had its ardent followers in all climates and all countries. When our time came, its call summoned us too, and we could not bold back. The partition of subcontinent into two independent sovereign States did not, nor was it expected to, eliminate or efface minorities. But it brought magnitudes within focusable limits and saved the political architecture of the new Asia from a strain which might well have proved excessive and dangerous.<sup>27</sup>

So it doesn't mean he was not conscious of the realist principle of power struggle among nations and states, he was fully realized with the sensitivity of security and survival, national interests of state and external threats. Accordingly, Liaquat mentioned, "Our strongest interests, therefore, are: firstly, the integrity of Pakistan... Pakistanis are likely to acquiesce in it that the slightest dent should be made in the territorial integrity of their country. Secondly, our culture... and thirdly, our desire and our dire need is for economic development."<sup>28</sup> Realizing the vulnerable external and internal conditions Pakistan needed some strong ally outside.

### **Pakistan's Policy of Non-Alignment**

The Soviet Union was deeply involved in Europe in 1947. The Cold War had started and the world lay divided between two power blocs, one led by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States. Pakistan wanted to steer clear of both power blocs, and, therefore, pursued a policy of peace and friendship with all countries, whether Communist or non-Communist. At any rate, neither antipathy nor political intimacy between Pakistan and the Soviet Union was expected or achieved during the early years, and there was hardly any contact between the people of the two countries.<sup>29</sup>



When the Indian decision in April 1949 to remain in the Commonwealth was followed by the announcement by Nehru in May that he had accepted an invitation to visit the US in October of that year, Moscow perceived an Indian inclination towards the West, to which it reacted. It was thus that the first invitation to a South Asian leader to visit the Soviet Union was extended to Liaquat Ali Khan in June 1949. As *The Daily Telegraph* (London) noted, this would make him the first Commonwealth head of government to visit Russia, at the same time that the Indian Prime Minister would be visiting the US.<sup>30</sup>

The Soviet invitation provoked the US to extend a personal invitation from President Truman to the Pakistani Prime Minister to visit the US in May 1950. Though it was maintained in Karachi that this did not affect the Prime Minister's proposed Moscow visit, the Soviets reacted by not pressing the invitation when informal enquiries for suitable dates were made subsequently. Indeed, as Liaquat Ali Khan voiced friendly sentiments towards his American hosts in the course of his visit; Soviet criticism of Pakistani policies was stepped up. Various steps taken by Moscow also reflected Soviet displeasure, such as suspension of on-going trade talks and cancellation of the visit of Pakistani writers to the Soviet Union. Liaquat Ali Khan was denounced for his "zealous subservience to Washington" and some press comments even accused him of giving assurance to his American 'bosses' to convert Pakistan into a base for anti-Soviet activities.<sup>31</sup> In analyzing the reasons for preferring the US connection, observers in Pakistan at that time noted the divergence between Islamic Pakistan and a Marxist Soviet Union. "Furthermore, there was the question whether Russia could supply the aid, both material and technical, which Pakistan so urgently needed."<sup>32</sup>

India's role in the Korean War changed New Delhi's image in Soviet eyes, and Moscow began to look at the policy of non-alignment as a positive force in international politics. Indeed, Nehru's gradual shift from condemnation of North Korean aggression to upholding China's rights in

the UN affected the Soviet attitude significantly. Stalin, who had not met a diplomat for the two years, gave a parting interview to Indian ambassador Radhakrishnan (subsequently President of India) in 1952, while his successor, K. P. S. Menon, was the last diplomat to see Stalin.<sup>33</sup>

Moreover, the un-earthing Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case (1951) to overthrow the Government of Pakistan also alienated Pakistan from the Soviet Union.<sup>34</sup> Liaquat Ali Khan arrested high-ranking military officers, because, he said that they had plotted to overthrow the government with the help of a foreign country (USSR) in order to establish a new government on a Communist pattern.<sup>35</sup>

Another significant shift in the Soviet attitude towards South Asia concerned Kashmir. Whereas the Soviets had kept aloof in UN debates on this dispute till the end of 1951, they chose to adopt an active stance in January 1952 when, in the course of the debate, they attacked the US and Britain, charging them with seeking to convert Kashmir issue in the Cold War initially embarrassed Nehru who sought to reassure Washington and London that India had not sought Soviet support on the dispute.

Immediately after that, American aid arrived in Pakistan and the American position on Kashmir seemed favorable. Almost automatically, this new relationship with the United States led to a deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, although the Karachi government has never admitted abandoning an independent policy aimed at friendship with all nations. For a few years, until about 1953, cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union continued and trade steadily increased over the years. The Communists conveniently explained that Pakistan was a victim of Anglo-American rivalry for its exploitation, with the collusion of high officials.<sup>36</sup>

The Congress leadership, which had developed certain clear ideas on foreign policy during the pre-Independence period, embarked on a course which could keep India out of block politics and give her a position to maneuver things to her advantage. Nehru adopted the policy of 'non-

alignment<sup>37</sup> which he characterized as enlightened self interest. This polity was designed to keep India away from power politics and enabled her to take different stands on different issues on the basis of the merits of each case rather than blindly supporting a particular bloc.<sup>37</sup> Speaking in the Columbia University in 1949, Mr. Nehru outlined the main objectives of India's foreign policy in the following words:

...the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or group of powers, but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation of subject peoples; the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual; the elimination of racial discrimination and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance which effect the greater part of the World's population.<sup>38</sup>

While The Muslim League leadership did not develop definite views on foreign policy before the attainment of independence because it was too engrossed in the struggle for the establishment of Pakistan to have time to prepare a clear cut political strategy for the new state. A look on the resolutions and the statements of the Muslim League leaders indicated a general frame of reference they intended to follow. Immediately after independence the leaders of Pakistan expressed their desire to strengthen their ties with the Muslim States; work for the promotion of peace and respect each other's sovereignty.<sup>39</sup> Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Jinnah's statement in February 1948 served as guideline of the foreign policy during the early stages of Pakistan's existence. He said :

Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and good will towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair-play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.<sup>40</sup>

### **Impact of the Cold War 1953-1959/ Alliance Policies**

A number of developments in 1953 changed the attitude of the Soviet Union towards South Asia from that of relative indifference to active involvement. In the US, with the election of General

Dwight D. Eisenhower as president, a policy of containment towards the Communist bloc was vigorously pursued, and secretary of state John Forster Dulles set out to promote alliances in the Middle and Far East to shore up the “soft underbelly” of the non-Communist world. In view of its own compulsions of national security in the face of threats from India, Pakistan responded positively to US overtures that began with a visit to the subcontinent by Dulles in May 1953. Following further high level visits in both directions; Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in May 1954. With the West suffering reverses in Indo-China in early 1954, it was decided to establish a collective defense system in Southeast Asia. Pakistan joined SEATO in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact a year later. It thus became the most trusted ally of the US in its region.<sup>41</sup>

Political and diplomatic support over Kashmir issue, ammunition aid to strengthen its military capabilities, failure of Pan Islamic flank, other factors which virtually put Pakistan into US camp was the country’s economic situations. By the end of the 1952 Pakistan was faced with desperate economic situation. There was an unprecedented rise in prices, increase in unemployment and disillusionment among the people.<sup>42</sup> With such a desperate economic situation and various security concerns Pakistan was left with little choice not to look forward towards United States.

As a reaction to join western defense pacts Soviet Union took three measures:

- Soviet Union sent protest notes on different on two particular occasions. In November 1953 Moscow send a chain protest notes to Karachi, asking for clarification of Pakistani-American negotiations regarding military collaboration and American air bases in Pakistan. Karachi replied in December. The interference in internal affairs and in the formulation of Pakistani foreign policy was resented and rejected; any consideration of establishing foreign air bases was denied. In March 1954 another protest note arrived, this time criticizing the Pakistani-American aid agreement as an unfriendly act. It too was rejected as unjustified and as based

upon false inferences. The Soviet Union protested once more when Pakistan and Turkey signed an agreement for “friendly cooperation” on April 2, 1954, the nucleus for the later Baghdad Pact. Similar protests were raised in the same year on the conclusion of the SEATO (Manila Treaty) agreement.

- The second diplomatic counter-measure of the Soviet Union was to give strong support to Afghanistan. Russian experts helped in developments which would be as useful to the Soviet Union strategically as they might be economically profitable to Afghanistan. Riots against Pakistan occurred in Kabul. Eventually Pakistan closed the frontier, even though this meant throwing Afghanistan into Russia’s embrace. By 1955 the situation on the border was extremely tense and the Soviet government did its best to keep it so. In spite of Pakistan’s expressed dislike of the action, Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Kabul in December 1955. In addition to providing spectacular aid and renewing a neutrality and non-aggression treaty, the Soviet Union announced, and thereafter continued, its support of Afghanistan against Pakistan in the demand for a state of “Pakhtoonistan.”
- The Soviet Union’s third diplomatic measure was a change of policy on Kashmir. Initially, its position had been non-committal. Up to 1953 USSR had usually not participated in the Kashmir debates in the United Nations and abstained from voting. Thereafter, USSR voted consistently in ways favorable to India and also declared its solidarity with India on Kashmir and Goa during Bulganin’s and Khrushchev’s visit to India in 1955.<sup>43</sup>

The death of Stalin brought a new leadership to the helm in the Soviet Union, which had to respond to the latest alliances. India was seen as major factor favorable to Soviet aims on account of a non-alignment that was increasingly critical of the West. Prime Minister Malenkov, who succeeded Stalin, praised the “significant contribution” made by India towards ending the Korean

War in a speech in August 1953, and expressed the hope that in future 'relations between India and the USSR will grow stronger and develop in the spirit of friendly cooperation.'<sup>44</sup>

On the 37th anniversary of the Great October Revolution in 1954, India ranked first among the non-communist that year onward the USSR worked actively for the inclusion of India in all international forums such as the UN Disarmament Commission and the Commission on Indo-China. In India also, the signing of the Pakistan-US Defense Agreement was seen as "a development of the greatest concern" which in the words of Nehru, "would bring the Cold War nearer and disturb the area of peace".<sup>45</sup> It resulted in a chain of events that could not but bring India closer to the Soviet Union.

Side by side with the growing cordiality at the official level, the Soviet media began to speak highly of the Nehru government, and to hail India as a factor for peace in Asia. The frequency of the exchange of delegations between the Soviet Union and India increased. The Soviet Union offered assistance for India's Second Five Year Plan and in September 1954, entered into negotiations for building a giant steel mill at Bhilai, an agreement for which was signed in February 1955.<sup>46</sup>

In the context of the growing cordiality of Pakistan-US relations, the return visit of the Soviet leaders, Khrushchev and Bulganin, to India in November 1955 was marked by a tumultuous welcome. The Soviet leaders acknowledged India as a great power, raised no objection to India receiving Western aid, called India's integrity, unity, independence and non-alignment of utmost importance, and most importantly, extended unreserved support to India's claim on Kashmir. The two leaders went on to state that "the question of Kashmir as one of the states of the Republic of India, had been settled by the people of Kashmir when they decided to join the Indian Union. The Soviet Union accepted their verdict."<sup>47</sup>

The joint declaration signed by the Soviet visitors and Nehru condemned military alliances, which extended the area of the Cold War and added to the tension. On the way back to Moscow, the Soviet leaders paid a visit to Afghanistan where they further expressed their displeasure with Pakistan by supporting Afghanistan on the “Pakhtunistan” issue.<sup>48</sup>

The United States, by the time was getting more and more concerned with the growing menace of communism. The US plan of creating a *cordon sanitaire* included not only the Soviet Union but also the People Republic of China for the latter had shown great hostility and socialist ambition during the Korean crisis. In order to contain effectively any further expansion of communism it started enlisting allies. Outlining the US Foreign Policy, John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, said:

In our own interest you have to pay close attention to what is going on in the rest of the world, and we need to have friends and allies. The reason is that we have enemies, powerful enemies, who are plotting our destruction. These are the Russian Communists and their allies in other countries, who already number 800,000,000 people.<sup>49</sup>

The Prime Minister’s visit was judged successful by all concerned. A number of misunderstandings with the US were cleared up and new understandings reached. The outbreak of the Korean War led to a general awakening in the United States to the importance of Asia other than just Eastern Asia. Public opinion in Pakistan now appeared as happy with closer ties to the United States as it had previously been in regard to the Soviet Union.<sup>50</sup>

When, American aid arrived in Pakistan, the American position on Kashmir seemed to most Pakistanis more favorable. Almost automatically, this new relationship with the United States led to a deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, although the Pakistan government had never admitted abandoning an independent policy aimed at friendship with all nations. For a few years, until about 1953, cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union continued and trade steadily increased

over the years. The Communists conveniently explained that Pakistan was a victim of Anglo-American rivalry for its exploitation, with the collusion of high officials.<sup>51</sup>

Thus, condemnation of the government still permitted a relatively friendly attitude toward the people and, most important, continued Communist activities. But when the American endeavor to strengthen the Middle Eastern region against Communist aggression became known, relations worsened rapidly. Pakistan's willingness to join this Western effort not only confused the Soviet Union-how could an Asian nation side with the "colonialists" against the Communist "liberators", but provoked wrath. Moscow engaged in a multi-barrelled attack, the end of which is not yet in sight. In addition to branding the whole undertaking as a major aggression against the Soviet Union and a disguised resumption of imperialism and colonialism, Moscow took a number of diplomatic steps to punish Pakistan for its increasing commitments to the Western world.<sup>52</sup>

In Karachi, Mikoyan spread good will; ended his speeches with "God be with you," and promised aid, atomic energy, and more trade. Nothing was said about Afghanistan nor was Pakistan's denunciation of Soviet imperialism at the Bandung Conference ever criticized. On Kashmir, Mikoyan made the rather stunning remark (after his colleagues in New Delhi had just identified the Soviet position with India's) that its fate should be decided by consulting the will of the people. Such a statement in Pakistan could only be, and was, interpreted as siding with her position on a plebiscite. The concrete result of the new approach was the signing in June 1956 of the first trade agreement between the two countries, and a rapid increase in trade followed. The climate of Soviet-Pakistani relations had obviously changed, but Russian policies had not.<sup>53</sup>

The principal objective of an alliance system, as generally perceived, was to create and maintain stability, including a sense of stability. Weak states had to trap in such attractive assurances to their securities and ultimately had to fall in hands of their aid donor countries. The



foreign policy of a state is the total response of the state's internal environment, as perceived and represented by the state's political and administrative systems and decision-makers, to the external environment, also as perceived. States that are internally weak, or are governed by a weak elite, tend to import intervention, and states that are internally strong tend to export intervention. Just as a man with weak physique needs vitamin than normal food contains and sometimes even more oxygen than inhaled in , normal breathing, a state often needs more from its environment, e.g. other states, than the international system normally offers. It is common ground that in 1953-55 Pakistan was suffering from internal disorders, economic crisis, and a weak leadership Pakistan also had, as we have seen, objectives of foreign policy, such as: survival, identity and international role, development, Kashmir, to pursue. Quite clearly Pakistan was ripe for external intervention, which might even have come from India.<sup>54</sup>

This was, according to Kalim Saddiqui, in 1954, were in the market for allies in competition with the immoral neutralism of Nehru, and Pakistan could only be an ally if it did survive as a state. With no more than a stroke of the pen, Pakistan's decision-makers of 1954-55 ensured the survival of Pakistan by making its "survival" part of the "national interest" of the dominant power, the USA. Other states of the Middle East and South-East Asia which became the West's allies had one thing in common—they all had weak elite governments with low legitimacy among their peoples. They invited dollars to save their "positions and ranks".<sup>55</sup> For Pakistan's leaders, weak though they were, moreover, they joined the US system of client states on the periphery of the Soviet Union and China on the premise that it was better to survive as a client state than not to survive at all. Thus, this alliance system served the Third World states on the one hand, and "oligarchy" of these states on the other hand. For this reason such alliances system developed the culture of non-democratic norms, but harmonious, helpful and

accommodating environment for military dictators and 'class egotism' in the Third World countries.

The United State was in fact the first country to offer economic aid to Pakistan. After the first agreement was signed in February 1951, subsequent agreements were signed in February 1952, March 1953 and December 1953. Pakistan under the first agreement received a total of US \$ 500,000 and was granted another US \$ ten million under the second agreement. By 1953 it had received US \$ 34.2 million by virtue of agreements signed in March and December.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore interesting point in these agreements was that that Pakistan was not allowed to accept technical assistance from other countries or international organizations without the consent of the government of USA. Pakistan was not allowed to developed trade relations with those countries about which Pakistan was told by USA, the most of those countries included Soviet Union and East European countries.

Kalim Saddiqui mentions that all states strives to build their distinctive images in the society of states. The strongest have bold images, not always of their own choice. Sometimes the image that a state acquires has been given by the propaganda of its opponents. For example USA has an image of a wealthy, powerful, interventionist state. United Kingdom is known as imperialist. The perception about USSR is of a strong, idealist, revolutionary, interventionist state. France is famous as a state of split personality, unsure, home of middle-class revolutions. Germany projected its image as an aggressive state. Japan seems as clever and opportunist state. India by 1954 had succeeded in acquiring a world image of wisdom in poverty, with a high moral tone, leading a naturalist crusade against the evil designs of big imperialist powers. At the same time India had tried to label Pakistan as a reactionary and theocratic state. Pakistan had tried to compete with India for influence in the Middle East, trying to exploit its Muslim and Islamic character in the homeland of Islam, but had failed. It looked very much as though the under-developed emergent world of Asia and Africa would

follow Nehru's India. In that company, Pakistan could hardly hope to compete with India for friends or influence. The great powers, too, paid more attention to India. The total attention potential of great powers is limited. In this situation it becomes part of international politics to draw and hold attention.<sup>57</sup>

Pakistan's alliance policies certainly succeeded in attracting attention. Now Pakistan was simultaneously a major factor in the foreign and defence policies of both the USA and its allies and of the Soviet Union. True, the Soviet Union was angry and hostile, but at least it was no longer indifferent. These alliances also enabled Pakistan to have an exclusive company—member states of Cento and SEATO—in which India was not present. Pakistan had thus succeeded in a negative sense in having a sort of sphere of influence. Pakistan now also had an identity and being America's most trusted ally served this purpose. It had acquired a role markedly, even dramatically different from India.<sup>58</sup>

Keeping in view constraints of relations with the major powers, Ayub Khan stated in his dairies that Pakistan had to have good relations with China and Russia for two reasons: firstly, geographic compulsions; and secondly due to economic and military reasons. He asserted, "For economic and other reasons, we cannot afford to turn our faces away from USA. Emotional approach has no answer. Cold war is receding our value not so much as it used to be. The reasons for, why we are not getting out of SEATO and CENTO. We shall be quite happy if we are told to leave. Even France is not walking out of SEATO. Our presence has a steadying effect." Talking about relationship with India he remarked, "I do not see any chances of settlement on Kashmir. A weak government in India with powerful armed force is a source of danger. We have to live much more cautiously. Under such a situation, what do we do? Keep leaning against the enemy and await our chance. Wisdom and patience is the key to the problem."<sup>59</sup>

Economic development, which also became a “national interest” as a result of Indian pressure, was pursued with a vigour unmatched in Asia or Africa outside China and Japan. As a direct result of alliances Pakistan secured massive economic aid—more than twice as much per capita as India—which was needed to put Pakistan’s industrial development on a par with India’s in the shortest possible time. Makers of economic policy in Pakistan were singularly uninhibited by ideas of social justice or the equitable distribution of new wealth. The capitalist path—the accumulation of wealth in the hands of those few who know how to multiply it in quick time—has been relentlessly pursued, because growth of GNP is wanted primarily for its power content and only incidentally for its welfare value. By keeping to this right and narrow path Pakistan has found that “favorite son” treatment from western aid-givers is still forthcoming, years after the alliances were virtually discarded.<sup>60</sup>

Regarding Pakistan-Soviet Union relations, the period was marked by rising Soviet criticism of Pakistan’s developing links with the Western security system. Following the signing of the Pakistan–US Defense Agreement, a Soviet protest note in May 1954 linked US military aid to Pakistan to the establishment of American military bases on Pakistan’s soil. The signing of the SEATO pact was described by the Soviet Foreign Ministry as being directed against “the security interests of Asia and Far East, and at the same time, against the freedom and national independence of Asian peoples.” The Baghdad Pact was seen as a threat not only to the Soviet Union “but to all peace loving peoples of Asia and Africa.”<sup>61</sup>

While directing criticism and pressure towards Pakistan over its alignment with the West, the Soviet Union proceeded to make it highly worthwhile for India to remain non-aligned by extending generous assistance in the spheres of development and trade, the agreement to build steel at Bhilai had dramatized Soviet commitment to India’s economic development. The signing of the second

Indo-Soviet trade agreement in 1958 constituted a qualitative leap in their economic relations. All accounts were to be settled in Indian rupees and Soviet assistance was to be repaid through the export of Indian goods. As a result, Indian exports to the Soviet Union expanded three-fold between 1960 and 1965.<sup>62</sup>

With the passage of time the Soviet political and economic support brought a decidedly pro-Soviet bias in India's "non-alignment." While strongly critical of Anglo-French aggression against Egypt in 1956, Nehru maintained silence over the Soviet intervention on the UN resolution condemning the Soviet Union. India's foreign policy was clearly moving towards more cordial relations with the USSR which on its part supported India over Kashmir for a second time in late 1957 when action on the Jarring Commission report was halted by the threat of a veto.<sup>63</sup> In the meantime the Soviet leadership kept reiterating its interest in the development of friendly relations with Pakistan if it would abandon its policy of alignment with the West.<sup>64</sup> The Soviet Union showed awareness of the economic and political compulsions that had led Pakistan to join the alliance, including the need for assistance, both economic and military, and for support in its dispute with India over Kashmir.

Though the Soviet Union moved closer to India following Pakistan's alliance with the West, which reflected its preoccupation with the tensions of the Cold War, the death of Stalin, in 1953, had ended the doctrinaire and oppressive era in Soviet foreign policy which now became more flexible and imaginative with new initiatives aimed at befriending the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. By 1955, the new Soviet worldview took into account the relaxation of the Cold War tensions made possible by such developments as the signing of the Austrian Peace Treaty in May 1955. The Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung later that year made the Soviet Union realize the constructive role that the newly emerging developing nations could play in the international arena.<sup>65</sup>

At the landmark twentieth party congress held in 1956, the relative view of the role of the national bourgeoisie in former colonies, which had been current during the Stalinist period, was corrected, as party secretary Nikita Khrushchev emphasized the role of the uncommitted nations in international politics. The Congress adopted peaceful coexistence as a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy because it was seen as the only alternative to what might be the most destructive war in history. The essence of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, according to the Kremlin, the socialist system was much stronger than the capitalist system and would, therefore, be able to keep the warlike propensities of the capitalist system in check, and eventually attain victory by peaceful means, however, peaceful coexistence was not a state of tranquility but one of development and struggle.<sup>66</sup>

As reflection of the convergence of perceptions, India and the Soviet Union adopted a common attitude of condemnation towards the Anglo-US intervention in Lebanon and Jordan in July 1958, and also shared similar views on arms control in the disarmament talks. When a difference of opinion emerged over Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia, Khrushchev responded mildly by conveying to Nehru, "I hope you will let us solve our ideological disputes in our own way."<sup>67</sup>

In October 1958, Martial Law was proclaimed and General Muhammad Ayub Khan came into power in Pakistan. He was a staunch supporter of Pakistan's close military relations with the United States. He wanted to improve relations with US which received some setback because during 1957-58 the United States extended economic assistance to India on large-scale to overcome its acute economic crisis. Pakistan was unhappy with United State because India was a non-aligned country. But on 28 July the Baghdad Pact Council met at London to discuss the bilateral defense agreement between United States on one side, and Iran, Turkey and Pakistan on the other side. Now

Pakistan got another opportunity for bilateral defense agreement which Ayub Khan did not want to miss.<sup>68</sup>

A review of foreign policy in the light of the changing world situation might have saved Pakistan headaches at a later date. It was extraordinary; however, that Pakistan made no serious effort to remove Russian suspicions concerning the construction of launching sites for guided missiles or rockets.<sup>69</sup> In April, 1958, the USSR charged Pakistan with having such sites and military bases in proximity to the Soviet Union. The Government of Pakistan replied to these charges, but the Soviet Union remained suspicious. In an *Aide-Memoire* dated February 18, 1959, the Soviet Union repeated its charges and warned that the entire responsibility for the consequences of the steps taken by Pakistan towards turning its territory into a foreign military base will rest with the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan in its reply expressed regret at the threatening tone of the *Aide-Memoire*, and noted that Pakistan has categorically and authoritatively stated several times that it entertains no aggressive designs against any country nor will it allow its territory to be used for aggressive purposes by any other power.<sup>70</sup>

The Soviet Union kept up its campaign of strong protest on various developments relating to Pakistan's alignment with the West, notably its support of the "colonizing proposals" of the Western powers on the Suez Canal issue and its condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. In February 1957, the Soviet Union cast its first veto in the Security Council proceedings on Kashmir in a resolution to use a UN force to facilitate demilitarization.<sup>71</sup> The signing of the bilateral US Pakistan Defense Agreement, in March 1959, was severely criticized. Khrushchev issued a strong warning to Pakistan following the downing of a U-2 spy plane that had taken off from Peshawar

## U2 Incident

Because of the American economic and military aid, the policy of Ayub's government remained unchanged towards the Soviet Union during the early period of his rule. Pakistan also provided air bases to the US. These enabled United States to watch the military activities of the Soviet Union. This confuted Pakistan to hostile action by the Soviet Union. But the unease between Pakistan and the Soviet Union touched the apex after the flight of a U.2 plane from Peshawar in May 1960. It provoked the anger of Khrushchev, the then Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, who threatened Pakistan with horrible penalty. It has already been discussed that the Soviet Union vetoed every resolution suggesting plebiscite in Kashmir during these years. Soviet Government sent a protest note to Pakistan, 13 May 1960.<sup>72</sup>

The "U-2 incident" took place in May, 1960, and situation for Pakistan became very critical. An American investigation plane took off from Peshawar, crossed into Soviet territory, and was shot down by a Soviet rocket. The pilot, who parachuted to safety, was convicted of spying by the military division of the Soviet Supreme Court. The USSR was irritated not only against the United States but also against Pakistan. Premier Khrushchev even drew a red-ring about Peshawar as a bombing target on his strategic map of the world.<sup>73</sup> The Soviet leaders became even more stubborn in their support of India on the Kashmir question. Twice the Soviet Union vetoed Security Council resolutions on Kashmir which merely demanded that India and Pakistan should settle the dispute amicably.<sup>74</sup>

Though Pakistan faced the situation with apparent confidence and Ayub Khan, who was at that time in London, firmly stated, "after all, Russian threats are not new things for us. We are not afraid of such threats."<sup>75</sup> In fact after the incident, Pakistan Government began to realize that the country might have to face serious consequences if the government got provoked to an extent where



it decided to retaliate.<sup>76</sup> According to Surndra Chupra, the soviet warning helped bringing an element of realism into Pakistan's foreign policy, and rulers of Pakistan realized that their country would be prime target of Soviet striking power in a global war, for the Soviet Union almost touched Pakistan's northern border while the US was thousands of miles way.<sup>77</sup> Pakistan accordingly informed Washington that in future American aircraft would be able to use air fields only after their further destination was made known in advance.<sup>78</sup>

Summing up the account, after getting independence Pakistan's numerous establishment problems, getting legitimacy and recognition in international communities, Pakistan's out-look was as a theocratic state—a state of irrational religious passionate people. This created lot of suspicion in the outer world especially in Soviet Union. Pakistan's leaders and policymakers reluctant to develop their relation with Soviet Union, due to Soviet's criticizing and unfriendly response to Pakistan Movement and its leaders and its ideological *raison d'être*. Pakistan until 1953 did aligned with any of the conflicting blocs of Cold War. Yet, sudden international and domestic developments like failure of Pan Islamic venture by Muslim states, dissatisfactory support from Common Wealth to Pakistan over Kashmir issue, defense and military needs to counter Indian threat, and dwindling economic situation in Pakistan drove Pakistan to make it aligned with the West. And Pakistan joined SEATO & CENTO, Western defense pacts proposed by Eisenhower to contain Soviet Communism. With the formation of Defense pacts US-Soviet rivalry was on its apex. Being a small and weak state, Pakistan had to endure threats from all sides in the struggle of Super Powers. Soviet Union showed great resentment on Pakistan's action to join anti-Soviet pacts, and sent protest and warning notes. Soviets rendered diplomatic support to Afghanistan over the Pakhtunistan issue. After 1953, Soviet Union's neutral stance on Kashmir got a new shift, and supported diplomatically in the UNO debates and later on cast its vote always in the favor of India stance.

With the formation of Defense alliances, in Third World countries, a culture of patronage was developed by 'oligarchy' (ruling classes) by the Great Powers. United States and Soviet Union provided huge political and economic assistance to those who associates themselves with the cause and agenda of these powers. Military dictatorship and role of aristocracy got their roots deep and deep.

## References and Notes

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- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.
- <sup>3</sup> E. Zhukov, "Situation in India," *World Economy and World Politics*, No. 23, 1947, in R. K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*, Vol., 1, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978), pp. 180-81.
- <sup>4</sup> Ayaz Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-65*, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers. 1989) pp. 37-38.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*,
- <sup>6</sup> Werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 3. (Autumn, 1962), pp. 212-14.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 214.
- <sup>8</sup> Askari, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment*, pp. 113
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>11</sup> A. Dyakov, "Contemporary India," *Bolshevik*, 1946, in Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*, Vol., 2, pp. 179-180.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.
- <sup>13</sup> Ayaz Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-65*, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers. 1989) pp. 18-19.
- <sup>14</sup> Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," p. 212.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*,
- <sup>16</sup> A. B. Rajput, *The Muslim League Yesterday and Today*, (Lahore, 1948), 109. in Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," p. 215.
- <sup>17</sup> Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-65*, pp. 18-19
- <sup>18</sup> Arif Hussain, *Pakistan its ideology and Foreign Policy*, (London: Frank Cass & Co. 1966), p. 91-93, in *Ibid.*, p.19.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p.22.
- <sup>20</sup> Soviet scholars meeting in Moscow in the summer of 1947 reflected the hostile Soviet posture toward Pandit Nehru, and Zhukov, an expert on the Far East, even condemned Indian non-alignment as a concept designed to "justify a policy of collaboration with English capitalism". M.K. Gandhi was described in the Soviet press as "an enemy of class struggle and mass revolution." Conversely, Nehru had a romantic vision of the Soviet Union, which he saw as "the greatest opponent of imperialism," and whose friendship he sought as a neighboring Great Power which had implemented socialist ideals and could also render assistance to India in transforming its economy.
- Singh, S. Nihal, *The Yogi and the Bear, The story of Indo-Soviet Relations*, (New Delhi: Allied Publications, 1983), p. 4, quoted in Maqbool Ahmed Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia: Post Cold War Trends: Post Cold War Trends*, (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1996), p.100.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101.
- <sup>22</sup> S.M. Burke, and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 97-98.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 101-02.
- <sup>24</sup> Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, *Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union*, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 9. (Sep., 1966), pp. 492.
- <sup>25</sup> Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," p. 215.
- <sup>26</sup> Liaqat Ali Khan, *The Aims of a New Nation*, in Hameed A. K Rai, *Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1981), p. 2.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.7-8.
- <sup>29</sup> Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 492.
- <sup>30</sup> Burke, and Ziring. *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 99.
- <sup>31</sup> K.D. Kapur, *Soviet Strategy in South Asia*, (New Delhi: Young Asian Publication, 1983), in Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, pp. 104.
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- <sup>34</sup> Hasen Askari Rizvi, *The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974), p. 4.

- <sup>35</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, 1947-92*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1994) p. 109.
- <sup>36</sup> Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," p. 216-17.
- <sup>37</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, p. 2.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>40</sup> The New York Times, 18 October 1949. quoted in Rizvi, *The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, p.2.
- <sup>41</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, pp. 105-106.
- <sup>42</sup> The balance of payment deficit in 1952 was Rs. 47.32 million.
- <sup>43</sup> Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," pp. 211-222.
- <sup>44</sup> M Saleem Kadwai, *Indo-Soviet Relations*, (New Delhi: Rima Publishing House, 1985), p. 28, in Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 106.
- <sup>45</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p.106.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>47</sup> Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," p. 212.
- <sup>48</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*,
- <sup>49</sup> Syed Rifaat Hussian, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union 1947-87," *Strategic Studies*, Vol. X, No. 3, (Spring, 1987) 72-74.
- <sup>50</sup> Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," p. 215.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid., p.216
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 17-18.
- <sup>54</sup> Kalim Saddiqui, *Pakistan's External Environment*, in Hameed A. K. Rai, *Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1981) 25-26.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid.,27.
- <sup>56</sup> Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-1965*, pp. 82-83.
- <sup>57</sup> Saddiqui, *Pakistan's External Environment*, pp. 25-26.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 25-26.
- <sup>59</sup> Ayub Khan, *Diaries of Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972*, ed., Craig Baxter, (New York: Oxford, 2007) p. 87.
- <sup>60</sup> Saddiqui, *Pakistan's External Environment*, pp. 25-26.
- <sup>61</sup> Burke, and Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 208.
- <sup>62</sup> Soviet economic aid not only constituted an additional source of assistance but also stimulated greater help from the Western source; Bhilai provoked Britain and West Germany to build steel plants in India in more favorable terms. US aid was stepped up so that between 1956 and 1975 India received more than \$10 billion, half of it in PL-480 food grain. As Khrushchev told Indian finance minister Morarji Desai in Moscow in June 1960: "We help you in order that Americans might give you more aid." Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 109.
- <sup>63</sup> Kashmir question remained in deadlock since last ten years, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Columbia and Philippines presented a draft resolution for consideration in Security Council. Soviet Union point of view it that such sort of resolutions had been presented by the western powers in order to divert the intention of Security Council from the heart of problems. According to Soviet representative of the United Nations Western Powers particularly the United States were using the time to open the way into the strategically important area of Kashmir. Soviet Union drew the intention of Security Council on the fact that Pakistan was encouraged by western powers for military preparation against India and for establishing US military bases in the Kashmir. In order to develop Consensus, Swedish delegate, Gunner Jarring, proposed some amendments in the western powers resolution. In between the two vetoes, Hence, Soviet Union endorsed the Mr. Jarring's report for the Kashmir problems. Soviet representative Sobolev declared that the draft resolution still bypassed Jarring's conclusion One major shortcoming was that it proposed "demilitarization. For further details see Statements by Soviet representative Sobolev in the Security Council, 5 November 1957, 21 November 1957, and 2 December 1957 in R. K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*, Vol., 1, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978), pp. 33-45. See also Hemen Ray, *How Moscow Sees Kashmir*, (New Delhi: Jaico Publishing House, 1985), pp. 44-45.
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- <sup>65</sup> M. Saleem Kadwai, *Indo-Soviet Relations*, (New Delhi: Rima Publishing House, 1985), p. 60.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>67</sup> Bhatta, *Great Powers and South Asia: Post Cold War Trends*, p. 110.

<sup>68</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's Relation with Soviet Union*, pp. 68-69.

<sup>69</sup> Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 495.

<sup>70</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's Relation with Soviet Union*, pp. 66-67.

<sup>71</sup> Burke, and Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 196.

<sup>72</sup> Soviet Protest Note to Pakistan, 13 May 1960. in Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*, pp. 22-23.

It stated as:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics deems it necessary to state the following to the Government of Pakistan:

A military aircraft violated the frontier of the USSR at 5 hours 36 minutes Moscow Time on May 1 of this year and penetrated more than 2,000 kilometers within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, naturally, could not leave unpunished such a gross violation of the Soviet state frontier. When the intentions of the intruder plane became clear, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in the area of Sverdlovsk... [The] plane belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey and sent via Pakistan with a hostile mission into the Soviet Union... It has been established that the plane in question was based on the American-Turkish Air Force base of Incirlik near Adana, whence it flew on April 27 to the airport of Peshawar, Pakistan.

It was thereby admitted that this flight pursued aggressive purposes. Pakistan played in the preparation and implementation of this act, hostile to the Soviet Union... In its statements of December 26, 1958, February 20, 1959, and March 25, 1959 the Soviet Government already called the attention of the Pakistani Government to the grave consequences connected with the lending of Pakistani territory for the establishment of foreign war bases and their use by third powers for aggressive purposes against the Soviet Union and the other peace-loving states.

The take-off from Pakistani territory of a United States Air Force plane, which penetrated into the Soviet Union on May 1 of this year, confirms again with ample clarity what a dangerous policy the Pakistani Government pursues by allowing foreign armed forces to use its territory.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests to the Government of Pakistan in connection with the granting of Pakistani territory to the United States for the commitment of aggressive actions against the USSR by the American Air Force and warns that if such actions are repeated from Pakistani territory, it will be compelled to take proper retaliatory measures."<sup>73</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," p. 217.

<sup>74</sup> The pilot of the U-2 plane was sentenced to 10 years confinement. The U.S. did not protest against the shooting down of the plane, or against the imprisonment of the pilot. Washington eventually admitted that the U-2 flight had been deliberately undertaken for military intelligence purposes.

Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 496.

<sup>75</sup> *Dawn*, 11 May 1960. in Popatia, *Pakistan's Relation with Soviet Union*, p. 74.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>77</sup> Surendra Chopra, *Perceptive on Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, (Amertsar: GND University Press, 1983), p. 252.

<sup>78</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's Relation with Soviet Union*, p. 75.

## Chapter 3

### Pakistan-Soviet Union Relations 1961-1971

#### 1961 Pakistan-Soviet Economic interaction

In September 1961, Nehru paid another visit to the Soviet Union, after attending the NAM Summit in Belgrade, this time, the welcome extended to him was less effusive as he had voiced concern at the Summit over the resumption of nuclear testing. However, the two countries remained mindful of each other's concerns, as was evident from Soviet proposals at the Paris Disarmament Conference at which the strength of the UN Disarmament Committee was increased from 10 to 18, mainly to include India. However, it was their common hostility towards China that provided a significant area of mutual interest in a friendship carefully built up by the two governments.<sup>1</sup>

By 1961, Pakistan was also re-evaluating its foreign policy. At the same time, the Soviet Union made an offer for prospecting oil, which was readily accepted, under Pak-Soviet Agreement (4 March 1961) Pakistan received a loan of 30 million dollars and technical assistance for oil exploration. The oil deal proved to be the beginning of a series of agreements for the operation of air services, exchange of cultural delegations, assistance for the mechanization of cultural delegations, assistance for the mechanization of agriculture, building of power projects, and for the promotion of technology and scientific knowledge. In 1961, the Soviet Union also offered Pakistan a credit of 530 million dollars and also offered to train Pakistani engineers. In 1964, the Soviet Union extended a credit of 519 million dollars for the purchase of heavy machinery. In 1966, Pakistan entered into barter agreements with the Soviet Union under which, for the export

of rice, cotton, jute, etc. Pakistan obtained Soviet vehicles and agricultural machinery. To cap it all, assistance extended by the USSR for the building of a steel mill in Pakistan and air transport agreement were expected to play an important role in further consolidating these friendly relations.<sup>2</sup>

In March, 1961, Pakistan and the Soviet Union had signed their first agreement under which the USSR promised 30 million dollar credits for oil exploration and research to be repaid at the low interest rate of 2.5%. By accepting this aid, Pakistan invited protests from American, British and Dutch companies. "The fact that the Soviet Union offered assistance in the face of these difficulties is a measure of its eagerness to win a foothold in Pakistan."<sup>3</sup>

### India-China War of 1962

The highly decisive moment in Pakistan's relations with 'Great Powers' came as a result of the Sino-Indian Conflict in October-November 1962. Because of American diplomatic support and arms supply, India considered the political conditions in its own favor, and took a tough stand on its border dispute with China. India had for some time engaged itself in offensive actions against the Chinese territories in the Ladakh region. On 12 October Nehru disclosed that he had ordered the Indian armed forces to take action against the Chinese forces in the north-east frontier area.<sup>4</sup> On 24 October, China launched a counter-offensive both in the eastern and western border with India and secured considerable military gains. India found itself inescapable situation. Nehru's estimation about Chinese capabilities proved wrong.

Due the uncontrollable circumstances, Nehru made appeals to friendly countries for assistance to get out of perils of the war or to counter Chinese military supremacy.

The United States and Britain instantly responded to Nehru's call. The Kennedy Administration decided to make emergency shipment of \$ 70 Million worth of military equipment to India.<sup>5</sup> Kennedy also wanted Ayub Khan to assure Nehru that Pakistan would not take any action on its border to alarm and create further problems for India. In his reply to Kennedy's message, Ayub Khan expressed surprise that such a request was being made because "what we have been doing is nothing but to contain the threat that was continuously posed by India to us" Ayub Khan showed his feelings of doom that the arms being supplied to India by the United States would be used against Pakistan.<sup>6</sup> He also protested that Pakistan was not taken into confidence before the decision was taken to provide ammunition to India.<sup>7</sup>

The USSR was very circumspect and prudent to show any response towards the Sino-Indian conflict. Since the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union's relations with China had begun to show signs of stresses, in particular there were differences over ideological rather political and strategic issues.<sup>8</sup> But the Sino-Indian war had erupted in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis and, therefore, the Soviet Union was initially reluctant to support India. Soviet support to India against China could be the cause of disunity within the Communist bloc. On 25 October Soviet media stated that the dispute between India and China was a legacy of British colonialism in India and its aggravation would only in the benefit of common enemy of the two "international imperialism". In an editorial published in *Pravda* stated that the Soviet people viewed the Chinese proposals, which the Chinese Government had presented a day earlier for talks with India to settle the dispute but had not been accepted by India, as a manifestation of China's sincere concerns over its relations with India and of its desire to end the



conflict, which *Pravda*, which termed as 'constructive proposals.'<sup>9</sup> However, after the easing of tensions created by the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union gradually tilted towards India.

China had limited objectives in launching the counteroffensive and did not want to prolong or escalate the war. Therefore, in the early hours of 20 November, China announced that it would cease fire along its entire border, with India by mid-night the same day and that, beginning from 1 December, its forces would withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the lines of actual control which existed on 7 November 1959.<sup>10</sup>

Because of the Indo-China confrontation, the United States failed to keep a distinction among the allies and neutral countries.<sup>11</sup> On 20 November China unilaterally announced ceasefire, and President Kennedy stated that along with Pakistan, India would be an important recipient of the United States military aid. He said, "In providing military assistance to India we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan." To him, the purpose of Indian aid to India was to defeat Chinese communist subversion. A Chinese incursion into the subcontinent was a threat to Pakistan as well as India and both had a "common interest in opposing it." He mentioned that American help to India in no way would diminish or qualify American commitment to Pakistan.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, a Pakistani author Safdar Mahmood holds that the India-China War of 1962 accelerated the process of rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Pakistan, which had begun in 1961. First, due to the supply of Western arms to India, Pakistan gradually moved out of the Western orbit. Secondly, the Soviet Union recognized the changing trends in Pakistan's foreign policy and wanted to encourage these by making attractive offers of economic and technological assistance. Moreover, India began to bend seriously

towards the West after its military defeat in the war with China. It obtained massive military assistance from the US and other Western countries, which perturbed the Soviets.<sup>13</sup> *The New York Times* apprehensively wrote that Washington, by rushing arms to India, intended to force its entry into the SEATO and the CENTO. Pakistan, on the other hand, was gradually adopting a neutral posture. In 1963, Sir Zafarullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, visited Moscow and said on his return that, Russia would respond to any Pakistani move for friendship.<sup>14</sup>

India, whose dreams of acquiring the leadership of the non-communist Asian countries were battered by the military set back at the hands of the Chinese in October 1962, availed of the opportunity to cover the lost ground with the backing of the Soviet Union. The opposition to China and the identity of views on the future power structure of Asia brought India and the Soviet Union very close to each other. Although cooperation in political economic, cultural and defense fields dates back to 1953-54 yet never before they shared identical views on so many political issues as they did in the seventies.<sup>15</sup>

As Sino- Indian relations worsened over their boundary dispute and took the form of a military clash owing to India's forward policy. In October 1962, the Soviet Union was initially supportive of Chinese proposals of October 24, largely because of the Cuban crisis. As that crisis receded by the end of 1962, the Soviet Union became more critical of China and after a brief interruption of military hardware during the conflict, it resumed the confidential sale of sophisticated arms to India. Reeling from the effects of its defeat in the border war with China, India launched an ambitious programme of military build-up in which the Soviet Union became the principal source of sophisticated weapons.

Arms worth \$ 140 million were supplied in the two years after the clash, among them air-to-air missiles, cargo planes and an anti- aircraft missile complex.<sup>16</sup>

During this period, Pakistan's policy of alignment with the West confronted with a decisive test. Due to entire dependency upon the West, Pakistan had undermined its bargaining position. In 1962 the world situation had rapidly changed to the detriment of Pakistan's policy of alignment. Ideological disagreement had widened the gulf between China and the Soviet Union, and the dispute between China and India over their Himalayan border had exploded into an armed conflagration. The United States, as part of its "containment" of China policy, rushed military aid to India. The Soviet Union, which had been competing with the United States for India's affection and had followed pro-India policy, joined the United States in the race to strengthen India's defense. By 1964, the Soviet Union had supplied or committed military aid to India valued at some \$ 131 million against \$110 million by the United States.<sup>17</sup> In the process, the balance of power in the sub-continent was changed, and moreover, Pakistan's fear that India might use the newly acquired weapons to maintain its control over Kashmir was enhanced. Pakistan protested to the United States, but Washington ignored Pakistan's protests. This shook Pakistan from the illusions on which its foreign policy had been based. Pakistan quickly took steps to normalize relations with both China and the Soviet Union which set into motion a chain response.

Sino-Pak rapprochement was particularly ostracized by the United States. In April 1965, President Johnson unexpectedly cancelled President Ayub's visit to Washington and the consortium meeting which was to provide funds for Pakistan's Third Five Year Plan. Yet Pakistan changed its foreign policy from alignment to complete independence,

and membership in the non-aligned bloc of Afro-Asian States. Pakistan also established relations on a new footing with states south of Russia-Turkey and Iran. These developments prompted Moscow to take a new look at her policy towards Pakistan. In April, 1965, President Ayub was invited to visit Moscow, and he was the first Pakistani President actually who took a visit to Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup>

The negotiation between the Soviet leaders and Ayub Khan (April 1965) played a vital role to departing the confusions and wrong perceptions which had overwhelmed relations amid both countries since 1947. The joint communiqué issued at the end of their talks condemned colonialism and imperialism and supported the people who were fighting for their right of self-determination.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the Soviet Union seemed to move away from Khrushchev's support of India on Kashmir and to accept the view that the people of Kashmir should decide their own future. Commenting on the outcome of President Ayub's visit to Moscow, a leading Pakistani daily observed that it has broken "the barrier which Indian diplomacy has succeeded in erecting between Pakistan and the Soviet Union over the past decade."<sup>20</sup>

Another outcome of President Ayub's visit to Moscow was the signing of an agreement on trade, economic cooperation and cultural exchange. The Soviet Union agreed to assist Pakistan in implementing 30 major development projects during the Third Five-Year Plan period, including steel plants, power plants, radio communications, sea ports and air fields. Soviet Union increased its credit for the Third Plan from \$30 million to \$50 million for oil exploitation and the purchases of industrial machinery. Thus, by 1965 Pakistan's foreign policy has undergone a definite change. As a result Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union improved and it received more Soviet

economic aid. Indeed, many Pakistanis felt that contacts between Pakistan and the Soviet Union should have been established earlier. Expressing regret at this delay while in Moscow, Foreign Minister Bhutto stressed his government's desire to redouble efforts to make up for the lost time.<sup>21</sup>

Many international developments took place in the year 1964. Nehru died in May and the Khrushchev ousted in October. It was also the year in which China experimented its first nuclear test.<sup>22</sup> The Soviet leadership under the 'troika' of President Podgorny, party secretary Brezhnev and premier Kosygin moved towards a more flexible policy in order to contain Chinese influence on Pakistan, and even made subtle overtures to promote a settlement in Kashmir. When president Radhakrishnan visited Moscow in October 1964, the joint communiqué did not endorse the Indian position on Kashmir, which was a significant omission. President Ayub Khan's visit to Moscow in April 1965 made a considerable impression and when foreign minister Bhutto visited Moscow in November 1965, he raised the matter of the supply of Soviet arms to India. The Chinese nuclear program, the policy of reducing Pakistan's dependence in china led the Soviet Union to adopt neutral position on the clash between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch in 1965. Pakistan got a mention for the first time in the May Day slogans in 1965, which also reflected the desire to take advantage of growing anti-Western Pact and anti-American trends in Pakistan.<sup>23</sup>

Ironically, the course of events took a new turn at the time of the Indo-Pakistan war in September, 1965. The Security Council of the United Nations acted promptly, but neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was prepared to accept Pakistan's allegation of Indian aggression, nor did they encourage other countries to support

Pakistan's struggle. This was probably due to the desire on both their parts not to intervene in opposition to one another. As a result the Security Council quietly shelved its own plebiscite resolutions for Kashmir. This led the Prime Minister of India to declare that the Soviet Union has been most helpful to India and "in the Security Council Russia simply refused to agree to any resolution or motion which was not acceptable to India."<sup>24</sup> In an attempt to bring peace to the sub-continent, the Russian Prime Minister Kosygin invited the leaders of India and Pakistan to meet and discuss their differences. It was for the first time that the Soviet Union had come forward as an intermediary between the two Asian states, who also happened to be the members of the Commonwealth. Pakistan interpreted the Soviet invitation as an offer of good office to help solve the Kashmir dispute. President Ayub therefore announced readiness to talk peace; the late Prime Minister Shastri appeared to be more reluctant to accept the invitation and maintained that Kashmir was an integral part of India. However, India considered the Soviet Union on its side in the Kashmir dispute. While the war was going on, the Soviet Union had continued to supply arms to India. Thus India found it difficult to decline the Soviet invitation.

Only mutual respect for the principles of self-determination and peaceful co-existence would further strengthen relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union and provide a solid framework for peace in Asia. Foreign Minister Bhutto, while in Moscow in April, 1965, had stated that "Pakistan believes and subscribes to peaceful co-existence and to the Bandung principles, complete and general disarmament, and liquidation of colonialism of whatever form or texture-white or brown-that may take place." To this he

added: "We are an ideological state. So is the Soviet Union as an Eastern thinker has said, let one hundred flowers bloom and let one hundred schools of thought contend."<sup>25</sup>

It appeared that Pakistan and the Soviet Union had come a long way in improving their mutual relations. Apart from efforts by the leaders of Pakistan and the Soviet Union, the contingencies of international politics have played a decisive role in shaping the course of relations between the two countries.<sup>26</sup>

### The 1965 War and Tashkent Declaration

The 1965 War between Pakistan and India which embarked on with aggression and violence in the disputed land of Jammu and Kashmir from September 1. These hostilities were raised by an Indian attack across the international border towards Lahore and Sialkot on September 6, saw the Soviet Union assume a major diplomatic role to promote a ceasefire, followed by mediation for peace settlement. Twice in the course of the 17-day conflict, Kosygin sent urgent messages to the two governments calling for an end to the conflict and offering Soviet good offices in the shape of hosting a summit conference in Tashkent. US president Johnson threw his weight behind the initiative, since both the superpowers were concerned at the degree of Chinese influence over Pakistan.<sup>27</sup>

The conflict over the Rann of Kutch broke out on 9 April 1965, only nine days before Shastri's visit to Moscow; an informal silence was arranged from 30 April till a formal truce could be negotiated. Shastri's visit thus took place while hostilities were continuing. Tass issued an official Soviet statement on 9 May endorsing the willingness of Shastri and Ayub to solve their differences through direct negotiations.<sup>28</sup> However, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, persuaded Shastri and Ayub on 30 June 1965 to agree on a self-executing procedure for the settlement of this territorial dispute.<sup>29</sup>

During the September 1965 war Kosygin expressed his profound concern over the situation and offered his services for mediation. It was obviously a design of departure in the Soviet policy, which, until a couple of years back, was confined to supporting India in the Security Council. It was on the initiative of the Soviet Prime Minister that Pakistan and India signed a peace treaty at Tashkent, called the Tashkent Declaration, which served as the framework for normalization of their relations in the aftermath of the 1965 war.<sup>30</sup> Consequently, Pakistani authorities accepted Kosygin's invitation on 11 November 1965 to meet with Shastri at Tashkent on 4 January 1966. Almost one month later Shastri responded positively only when he was assured that Ayub had agreed to discuss the total relationship of India and Pakistan. Shastri thus succeeded in removing the exclusive focus on Kashmir, enabling him to deal with Kashmir as the symbol and not the cause of the conflict between the two neighbors.<sup>31</sup>

For the USSR, the Tashkent Conference was an unprecedented experiment in Soviet diplomatic history as it brought two bourgeois states to peace-parley on its own territory. The Soviet leaders expected a rise in the USSR's stature among non-communist Afro-Asian states as a responsible and constructive superpower smothering conflict in Asia, rather than fishing in troubled waters, as the Americans always described their international behavior. They took upon themselves a new responsibility of preventing new outbreaks of hostilities in South Asia, and in promoting détente between India and Pakistan with their 'benevolent cooperation'. Remarkably, this initiative was taken in open opposition to an ideologically fraternal nation, the Peoples Republic of China.<sup>32</sup>

President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri met at Tashkent in January, 1966. Kosygin as intermediary worked hard to find a common ground between India and



Pakistan. Finally, his tireless effort was crowned with success, and President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri signed the Tashkent Declaration. Commenting on Tashkent Declaration a Pakistani writer Ahsen Chaudri narrates that it would be sufficient to say that the declaration was a triumph of Soviet diplomacy. Most of the clauses of the declaration were aimed at restoring normal relations between India and Pakistan, but it provided no mechanism for resolving the Kashmir dispute which was the basic problem between the two neighbors. However, Pakistan made one positive gain at Tashkent; an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. The official explanation of the Tashkent Declaration issued by the Pakistani Foreign Office gives the impression that the Soviet Union now understands Pakistan's point of view on Kashmir. It was hoped in Pakistan that the Soviet Union, in the future, will act objectively on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council and may also try to resolve it from outside.<sup>33</sup>

If the official Pakistani explanation was correct, the Tashkent Declaration marked the beginning of a new role for the Soviet Union in South Asia which in turn implied a greater degree of cooperation with the United States in bringing peace, stability and economic progress to the subcontinent. The fear of China had enhanced the prospect of their cooperation in settling differences between the two Asian neighbors. It was not certain, however, in what manner the differences will be resolved. If the big powers followed the advice of Machiavelli that might is right, there will be no lasting peace in Asia.<sup>34</sup>

The Soviet hosting of the Tashkent Conference in January 1966, following the indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965, was a landmark in the history of Soviet policy towards South Asia. During the first five days, from January 4 to 9, there was a deadlock, with

India pressing for a no-war pact which Pakistan would endorse only if a self-executing machinery was agreed upon to settle disputes, notably Kashmir which had been the cause of the recent conflict. President Kosygin moved into intensive lobbying from the morning of January 9 and shuttled between the two delegations, housed in different parts of Tashkent, in order to secure agreement to a compromise document that was finally signed in the afternoon. The Tashkent Declaration did not give much satisfaction to either of the belligerents, the Kashmir issue remained unresolved and India had to be content only with Pakistan's commitment to the UN Charter rather than any categorical commitment to non-use of force. The only concrete result was a result the pre-war positions together with a vague pledge to promote peaceful co-existence.<sup>35</sup>

If any party could derive complete satisfaction from the Tashkent Conference, it was the Soviet Union, which had performed the unprecedented feat of getting India and Pakistan to meet on neutral ground and agree on a statement. This success raised the prestige of the Soviet Union in the Afro-Asian arena where it was competing with China for influence. Soviet diplomacy achieved a dramatic break-through in South Asia and emerged as a major factor in the power politics of the region. In the context of the cold War, Moscow was able to project itself as a peacemaker at a time when the US was escalating the war in Vietnam.<sup>36</sup>

Soviet efforts to cultivate Pakistan were stepped up after the Tashkent Agreement and not only were high-powered delegations exchanged but cooperation in trade and development also increased significantly. By the end of 1966, the Soviet Union had provided economic assistance worth \$ 176 million while the overall trade reached a level of \$ 3.7 million ten years earlier.<sup>37</sup>



A Pakistani military delegation headed by Air Marshal Nur Khan, chief of the Air Force, visited the Soviet Union in July 1966 and though no arms agreement resulted, the visit did produce “a sense of mutual confidence and understanding.” President Ayub Khan paid another visit to Moscow from 25 September to 4 October 1967, and stressed the need to maintain a power balance in South Asia.<sup>38</sup>

This did not only affect the flow of Soviet military hardware to India in substantial quantities, but effect of the continuing efforts of Pakistan to obtain Soviet arms was that in July 1968 Moscow agreed to sell a small quantity of military equipment following the visit of premier Kosygin to Pakistan and the announcement terminating the lease of the US communication unit at Badaber near Peshawar.<sup>39</sup>

During the period of late 1960s, Pakistan adopted a balance approach towards Great Powers. Ayub Khan expressed with Turkish Prime Minister on 28, April 1967:

[I] held a discussion with the [Turkish] prime minister separately on US-Pak relations, our attitude towards CENTO and the RCD. I told him that we have lost faith in CENTO as it failed us as a critical time, but for the sake of our friends, Iran and Turkey, we do not want to break away from it. Also, the circumstances have changed. There is less tension between the US and the Soviets. The relationship between Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan with Russia is also improving. So the need for CENTO as a military pact has receded. In any case, the Americans have no intention of putting military life into it. If it has to continue, it should be called what it is: an economic arrangement of a limited type.

About Pak-US relations, I told him that the Americans have told us plainly that in future its scope will be limited. They have stopped military aid and are giving economic aid in a reduced form and halting fashion. Meanwhile, immense resources are being given to India, who, in turn, is turning their resources into military hardware. I gave him a copy of the aide-memoir which I had given to Locke for delivering to Johnson.<sup>40</sup>

The supply of a limited quantity of Soviet arms, consisting mainly of artillery pieces and helicopters, caused a considerable furor in India. Vice Foreign Minister Foryubin visited India in September 1968 to underline that there was no downgrading of relations with India, which was no downgrading of relations with India, which was receiving vastly larger quantities of Soviet arms. When Kosygin visited India in May 1969 to attend the

funeral of President Zakir Hussain, he still found considerable resentment over this issue, and argued that the Soviet arms to Pakistan were meant to reduce Chinese influence there and induce Pakistan to be friendly.<sup>41</sup>

According to Soviet perspective, 'by creating hotbeds of tension and acute war danger in various parts of the globe, the imperialists have been trying to put pressure on the forces of freedom, the national liberation movements, democracy and peace. However, these aggressive acts, far from strengthening their positions, have in fact led to their international isolation.'<sup>42</sup> Thus at the time of developing cooperation on both sides Pakistan and USSR highly admired Pakistan's stance about Israel's aggression and Vietnam issue. Degtyar expressed that the peace movement had virtually become the concern of the people of the whole world. To him, it was a matter of great satisfaction for the people of the Soviet Union that in this situation the Government of Pakistan strongly condemned Israel's aggression and demanded a liquidation of its aftermath. The Soviet part also noted with satisfaction that the Government of Pakistan came out for granting to the Vietnamese people of the right to decide its own destiny in accordance with the Geneva Agreements.<sup>43</sup>

On 6 April 1968, Pakistan government informed the United State that it did not intend to renew the Badar Communication Centre Agreement of 1959 which was to expire next year.<sup>44</sup> In same month in 17 April 1968, Soviet President Kosygin visited Pakistan. Ayub Khan, in his speech at the state banquet held in honor of Kosygin; described the different dynamics and dimensions of Pakistan-Soviet Union relations. He asserted that the differences of political system and ideology should not hinder both countries to develop their relations for better future of states. President Ayub Khan emphasized without

assurance of peace and security Pakistan could not be able to pursue its objectives and goals settled as a nation.<sup>45</sup>

On 20 April 1968, Pakistan and the Soviet Union signed a Cultural and Scientific Cooperation Pact. It envisaged exchange of scientists, educationists, writers and sportsmen. It also provided for exchange of text-books, children literature, radio and television programmes, films and other utilities for mutual cooperation.<sup>46</sup> Soviet Union also signed an agreement for providing technical and economic assistance for the construction of nuclear plant in East Pakistan, and a steel mill at Kalabagh. However the venue was changed to Pipri near Karachi. Along with many other projects it was also decided that the cooperation in the field of geological exploration for oil and gas in Pakistan would continue.<sup>47</sup>

Soon after his visit to Pakistan Kosygin suggested to Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, that some mutually acceptable solution of the dispute which had arisen between India and Pakistan over the Indian plan to construct Farakka Barrage on the river Ganga should be found. Indira declared that Farakka project was vital to Indian needs and especially to the very survival of the Calcutta Port. But India was willing to talk to Pakistan about their legitimate interests. Thus, she showed her reluctant willingness to exchange of technical data and information.<sup>48</sup> Soviets showed its foreign policy's new dimensions that Soviet Union was striving to develop harmony and cooperation suggesting solution for Pakistan and India clashes. B. Pyadyshev, a soviet analyst, stated about these developments that the extension and deepening of all-round Soviet Pakistani cooperation shared the vital interests of the people of both countries. It was not aimed against any other country. But it was to strengthen world security and ease tension in

Asia and other part of the world.<sup>49</sup> Soviet efforts to develop cooperation were actually a preparation to set a stage to put their proposal for Asian Collective security.

## Asian Collective Security

During late 1960s, the high motive of Soviet Union, as a European and Asian power, was to neutralize Chinese and American influence from the Asia in order to establish its own dominancy and hegemonic influence particularly in South Asia and generally in Asia.<sup>50</sup>

In an article written by V. Pavlovsky, the writer stated, “the Soviet Union firmly convinced that an essential normalization of international climate and the establishment of necessary confidence between the states should be sought along the lines of creating a Collective System in Europe and Asia which would take the place of existing military grouping.”<sup>51</sup>

This proposal, initially, was put forward by the Soviet Union in June 1969. The 1968 British decision to withdraw gradually from the Indian-Ocean, and Soviet confrontation with China led the Soviets to work towards expanding their influence in the region by promoting political, economic and strategic cooperation in Asia. Such an arrangement, they thought, would exclude their adversaries, i.e. the United States and China, and link the major Asian states in a pro-Soviet cooperative framework. They were also encouraged by the fact that their relations were equally good with Pakistan and India. Pakistan sloped down to the Soviet proposal for an Asian Collective Security system when it was raised during Bhutto’s visit to Moscow in March 1972. In May 1968, Kosygin suggested economic cooperation, especially trade arrangements amongst Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan India and the Soviet Union. He offered generous Soviet economic and military assistance to Pakistan for joining such an arrangement. This was followed by General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev’s statement in June 1969, stressing the need of establishing an Asian Collective Security system by developing a consensus on the regional security environment.<sup>52</sup> The Soviets expected to play a coordinating, if not commanding, role in bringing about and then

sustaining such an arrangement. They hoped that this would establish Soviet credentials as an Asian power and protect the participant countries from Chinese and American influences.

Pakistan maintained in 1969 that, in view of its several on-going disputes with India, the proposal for economic cooperation and trade was premature. It turned down the Asian Collective Security, as it appeared to be directed at China. This issue was raised during Yahya Khan's visit to Moscow in 1970. He reiterated Pakistan's objections on Soviet proposals and expressed his unwillingness, to make Pakistan a party to any anti-China alliance.<sup>53</sup>

In July, the Soviet ambassador met with Yahya Khan and Pakistan's foreign Secretary, and tried to convince Pakistan on the prospects for cooperation in economic, cultural and scientific fields. While Pakistan's viewpoint was that scheme would be directed against China. Moreover Pakistan had not gotten satisfactory answers that what would happen if a member of the proposed Collective Security member committed aggression against another—indicating towards India Pakistan antagonism.<sup>54</sup> So Pakistan considered it right not to join or accept proposed scheme of Asian Collective Security.

According to G.W. Choudhury, due to Pakistan's refusal to join or accept proposed scheme of Asian Collective Security, Soviet Union also showed their unwillingness for the cooperation in the construction projects of Pakistan's steel mill at Pipri, and oil and gas exploration project. When issue of continued supply of arms to Pakistan came up for discussion Kosygin said, "You can not expect Soviet arm while you are unwilling to endorse our Asian Security System." He further indicated that Pakistan acceptance of the Soviet proposed scheme would be the best guarantee to its territorial integrity.<sup>55</sup>

In 1971, Pakistan had to face severest consequences because of its rejection of Soviet proposal of Collective Security. Soviet Union joined India by signing of Soviet Indian Friendship Treaty. Because of East Pakistan crisis, Soviet Union and Indian collaboration got their best opportunity, to teach Pakistan a lesson for not accepting their hegemonic role in South Asian affairs.



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- <sup>2</sup> Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 212.
- <sup>3</sup> Tetsreji Yasuhira, "Soviet Economic Aid in Non-Aligned Countries and the Soviet Program in South and Southeast Asia," *New Nations in a Divided World*, ed. by Kurt London (New York: 1964), p. 218, in Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 9. (Sep., 1966), p. 496.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*,
- <sup>5</sup> Chester Bowles, "America and Russia in India," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 4, (July 1971), p. 640.
- <sup>6</sup> "On 5 November Ayub Khan issued a formal statement on Sino-Indian conflict which, *inter alia*, said. From all account, a large amount of military equipment is being rushed to India from the United States of America, United Kingdom and elsewhere. For one thing, it may have the effect of enlarging and prolonging the conflict between China and India, and secondly, add to the serious concern already existing in the minds of our people that these weapons may well be used against them in the absence of an overall settlement with India." Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, Vol., IV (July 1961-June 1962), p. 53.
- <sup>7</sup> Lawrence Ziring and S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, ed., 2, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 278.
- <sup>8</sup> Thought Marxist conception and Leninist-Stalinist interpretation are two different variants of Marx's philosophy of communism and its operational differences, Chinese socialist viewed to develop 'small scale industry', while Soviet have the opinion to develop 'large scale urban industry'. Besides the ideological difference, Russian expansionist design and hegemonic role of USSR was not acceptable to China. Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolutions and Cold War 1945-1991*, (London: Clays Ltd., 1999), pp. 51-54.
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- <sup>10</sup> *Dawn*, 21 November, 1962.
- <sup>11</sup> Muhammad Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliances: Stress and Strains," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 2, (January: 1964), 200.
- <sup>12</sup> Department of State Bulletin, 10 December 1962, 874. in Papatia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union 1947-1979*, p. 87.
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- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>15</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974), p. i.
- <sup>16</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 112.
- <sup>17</sup> Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 9. (Sep., 1966), p. 496.
- <sup>18</sup> *Dawn*, April 12, 1965.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, April 8, 1965.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*,
- <sup>21</sup> Papatia, *Pakistan's relations with the Soviet 1947-1979*, p. 91.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.
- <sup>23</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 113.
- <sup>24</sup> Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 497.
- <sup>25</sup> Foreign Minister Bhutto's interview with *New Times*, correspondent in Moscow, 25 January, in *Ibid.*,
- <sup>26</sup> Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 499.
- <sup>27</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 113.
- <sup>28</sup> R. K. Jain, "Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978." P. 61.

- <sup>29</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, 1947-92*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), p. 184.
- <sup>30</sup> Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999*, p. 213.
- <sup>31</sup> Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, 1947-92*, p. 188.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 188-89.
- <sup>33</sup> Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 500.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 501.
- <sup>35</sup> Ayub Khan's Broadcast to the Nation on the Tashkent Declaration, 14 January 1966, and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's Broadcast to the Nation on the Tashkent Declaration, 15 January 1966, quoted in Soviet Protest Note to Pakistan, 13 May 1960. Quoted in, R. K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*, pp. 99-102.
- <sup>36</sup> Ziring and Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 352.
- <sup>37</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, pp. 114-15.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>40</sup> Ayub Khan, *Diaries of Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan*, ed., Craig Baxter, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2007), p.89
- <sup>41</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 115.
- <sup>42</sup> M. Degtyar, "Fifty Years of Soviet Union Diplomacy," *Pakistan Times*, 20 January 1968, in, R. K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*, pp. 60-61.
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>44</sup> Papatia, *Pakistan's relations with the Soviet 1947-1979*, p. 97.
- <sup>45</sup> Ayub's speech at the state banquet held in honor of Kosygin, 17 April 1968, in R. K. Jain, Vol. 2, pp. 63-64.
- <sup>46</sup> Dawn 22 April 1968.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>48</sup> Mrs. Indira Gandhi's statement in Rajya Sabha on the supply of Soviet arms to Pakistan, 24<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, in R. K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-178*, p. 364.
- <sup>49</sup> B. Pyadyshev, "New Developments in Pakistan," *International Affairs*, Moscow, (June 1968), p. 80, quoted in Papatia, *Pakistan's relations with the Soviet 1947-1979*, p. 98.
- <sup>50</sup> Moonis Ahmar, *The Soviet Role in South Asia 1969-1987*, (Karachi: Area Study Center for Europe, 1989), p. 75.
- <sup>51</sup> V. Paylovsky, "Collective Security: The way to peace in Asia," *International Affairs*, Moscow, (July, 1972). Quoted in Moonis Ahmar, *The Soviet Role in South Asia 1969-1987*, (Karachi: Area Study Center for Europe, 1989), p. 76.
- <sup>52</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 116.
- <sup>53</sup> Papatia, Pakistan's relations with the Soviet 1947-1979, 99; Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the Geo strategic Environment*, 1993, 119; G W Choudhury, *India Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers*. (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 63.
- <sup>54</sup> Maboob A Papatia, *Pakistan's relations with the Soviet 1947-1979*, (Karachi: Paksitan Studies Centre, 1988), p.100.
- <sup>55</sup> G.W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers*. (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 67-68.

## Chapter 4

### Pakistan-Soviet Union Relations during Z.A Bhutto's Era (1971-1977)

Without the understanding the legacy of partition and its subsequent forms of Indian and Pakistani nationalism, bilateral relations within the region and interactions with Great Powers make no comprehension and sense. Britain had drawn up the boundaries on distinctive areas of ethnic and cultural affinity and divided them between successor states. Because of such kind of problematic legacies of colonial period, the issues of boundaries and borders remained unresolved in South Asia. This legacy had been the cause of regional friction and stress. Regional policies of the Pakistan and India had been dominated by these issues. The irredentist problems of Pakistan, Kashmir, Phukhtunistan, Baluchi and Bengali nationalism, were not only caused by the colonial legacy, but ruthless and discriminatory policies of the undemocratic rulers, especially military, played a vital role in this regard. The dictators of the country some time implement oppressive measures to save their own authoritarianism and at other occasion they are doing it to assert their authority in the same way as they were enjoying it earlier. Anyhow, whatever problems could be Great Powers—US and USSR—took up these sensitive issues for manipulating the policies of small states like Pakistan.

### The Soviet Union and East Pakistan Crisis

Pakistan's political system failed to manage the continuously aggravated federal crisis, particularly Punjab-Bengal conflict that had been converted into East Pakistan and West Pakistan rift, after the establishment of constitutional parity between two wings, which ultimately led to the traumatic event of 1971.<sup>1</sup> Ayub Khan was removed from office by another military coup. But unlike the 1958 event, General Yahya Khan resumed the office of Chief Martial Law Administrator to handover power back to a civilian government. In December 1969 General Yahya Khan announced the

holding of general election; both at national and provincial level on the basis of adult franchise i.e. one man one vote. Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, a leader of Bengali nationalist party—Awami League, was permitted to contest the general election with its Six Points agenda. Awami League captured 150 seats out of 300 seats. While, Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) won eighty-one seats none in the East wing, with sixty-two Punjab alone. Thus, Awami League commanded an absolute majority in newly elected House. The provincial elections were also held in same month at the time. It revealed a complex blend of competing political identities, with the Awami League clearly established in East. But with the PPP only in control of two provinces: Sindh and Punjab. In reality, the worst fears of the Mohajjar-Punjabi elite had been realized that a Bengali-speaking politician had won an election in Pakistan. JUI had won four seats in the National Assembly.<sup>2</sup>

National and provincial struggle became beyond the control of state. There was a high need for genuine ‘decentralization and democratization’ of the state’s political structure. Yet despite an early announcement by Yahya Khan that he welcomed Mujibur Rehman as Pakistan’s new Prime Minister, there would be no subsequent deal over the Six Points programme.<sup>3</sup> It was seemed that if the session of the Constitutional Assembly were held, the Awami League would proceed with its party programme of Six Point agenda.<sup>4</sup> Yahya Khan postponed the session of the Assembly scheduled to meet on 3 March 1971 and a few days later, fixed 25 March as the new date. On the other hand, Bhutto had rejected the logic of sharing power with “anti-national” forces. Accordingly, Awami League, doubting the sincerity of Yahya Khan, launched violent civil disobedient movement in the history of Pakistan demanded, inter alia, immediate lifting of the Martial Law and transfer of power to the elected representative of the people. Yahya Khan, Bhutto and some West Pakistani leaders met Mujibur Rehman and negotiated the problems, but no compromise formula could be evolved. Eventually, a political deadlock was created. Owing to worst law and order situation in East Pakistan, Yahya Khan ordered for a military action in East

Pakistan and the arrest of Mujibur Rehman. Military action caused a number of Bengalis' migration; most of them were Hindus, to the West Bengal. India did not lose the opportunity to make up and mobilize the opinion of international media.<sup>5</sup>

Soviet Union took the situation going on in East Pakistan with a great solicitude and showing its anxiety on governments of Pakistan's atrocities on the people of East Pakistan and the arrest of Bengali nationalist leader Mujibur Rehman. On 28 March 1971, the Counsal General of Soviet Union at Karachi conveyed Prime Minister Kosygin's oral message to Yahya Khan expressing Soviet apprehensions. Another message President Yahya Khan received from Soviet President Podgorny, who expressed his grave feeling about the "bloodshed and repression against the people of East Pakistan" and asked him for "turning to the method of peaceful settlement." Mentioning about Mujibur Rehman, a leader who received a convincing support by the overwhelming majority of the population of East Pakistan, Podgorny also criticized Pakistan Government's persecution of him.<sup>6</sup>

On 5 April 1971, Yahya Khan responded to the message and justified indicating his efforts regarding solution of the constitutional problem. He further stated that "The situation in East Pakistan is well under control and normal life is being gradually restored." Moreover, talking about India he said, "I request your Excellency to use your undeniable influence with the Indians in order to impress upon it the need for refraining from interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs."<sup>7</sup> Addressing a press conference at the Party's central office, Z. A. Bhutto expressed his displeasure over the message and termed it a "blatant interference" in the internal affairs of Pakistan. He further added that the stand taken by People's Republic of China on the current political crisis of Pakistan was "correct and just," the Soviet attitude was contrary to the teachings of "Leninism and Marxism."<sup>8</sup> Afterwards, more discordant comments were exchanged and Yahya Khan reminded the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan of the ruthless measures taken by the Soviet Union in

Czechoslovakia and Soviet Central Asian republics. This infuriated the Soviet Union and consequently the series of cordial relations of the late 1960s was replaced by aggression and hostility.<sup>9</sup>

#### **USSR and Indo Pakistan War of 1971**

After months of war on border of East Pakistan and providing of arms and other assistance to Bengali nationalists, ultimately, on November 1971, Indian forces crossed the international border. On 3 December hostilities broke out on the western front as well.<sup>10</sup>

Watching Pakistan's obstructive attitude towards the Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia and not accepting hegemonic role of Soviet Union in South Asia, USSR bent to favour and support Indian cause in 1971 War. Moreover, historical Indian intimacy and Indian economic, military and strategic superiority over Pakistan led USSR to render support to India. Accordingly, Soviets decided to "punish" Pakistan for its hindering and unwilling attitude. The role of overarching body, UNO, was nothing more than the role of Great powers' self interests in international system.<sup>11</sup>

Situation in East Pakistan changed drastically in March 1971, when a military crackdown was order by the Yahya's administration. Mrs. Gandhi called it "the opportunity of the century" to undermine Pakistan. The Soviet attitude since Tashkent had been to maintain a balance in relations with the two leading countries of South Asia, despite having reached agreement in principle with India over the draft of a friendship treaty.<sup>12</sup> During his visit to Moscow in June 1970, President Yahya Khan extended an agreement for construction of steel mill near Karachi. However, President Podgorny wrote to Yahya Khan on 2 April 1971, following the army action in March, urging "the adoption of the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the population of East Pakistan, and for turning to methods of a peaceful political settlement."<sup>13</sup> When Yahya stated in his reply that no country could "allow anti-national and unpatriotic elements to

destroy the country,”<sup>14</sup> Kosygin promised Yahya that the Soviet Union had no intention to support any country against another one.

In late July 1971, Henry Kissinger's visited Beijing via Islamabad,<sup>15</sup> and the possibility of a Washington-Beijing-Islamabad entente heightened the feeling of isolation in India. Mrs. Gandhi sent an envoy to Moscow on August 1971 to conclude the niceties of the friendship treaty and to invite foreign minister Gromyko to New Delhi to sign it. On 9 August 1971, Gromyko reached posthaste and signed the treaty, India represented by its foreign minister Swaran Singh. Mrs. Gandhi stressed the security side of the treaty and, though the Soviet side underplayed it, the strategic and military dimension was quite evident from Indian Soviet Friendship Treaty.<sup>16</sup> While the Soviet aim in signing the treaty was to achieve progress in the concept of Asian Collective Security directed mainly against China, India's objective was to deter Chinese or American intervention in possible Indo-Pakistan war. It also provided assurance to Soviet diplomatic support in the United Nations, if the issue reached that forum. The treaty was therefore a significant factor in the Indian decision to bring about the dismemberment of Pakistan by military intervention.<sup>17</sup>

The Soviet Union showed its commitment to India by sending additional warships into the Indian Ocean when the US ordered a task force of eight ships, led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, *Enterprise*, into the Bay of Bengal. However, Moscow did pressure India to desist from attacking West Pakistan. The Indian leadership achieved the aim of humbling Pakistan and reducing it to nation of 55 million so that its capacity to challenge India was no longer credible. The Soviet Union also viewed the result of the war as a triumph by demonstrating its ability to help friend despite the support of the other superpower and China to the opposite side. As Kissinger concluded, the Soviet support to India was “in part to deliver a blow to our system of alliance, in even greater measure to demonstrate Chinese impotence.”<sup>18</sup> Speaking in April 1972, Brezhnev called the treaty a “brilliant illustration of the community of interests between the two

countries,” and even two years later, other Soviet analysts characterized it as “a deterrent to external anti-Indian forces.”<sup>19</sup>

Soviet policy towards Asia should be viewed in the perspective of its global strategy. It would be difficult to disassociate the Indo-Pakistan conflict from the triangular relationship between the USSR, China, and US. The war brought into sharp focus the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean and big power rivalry to gain control of the entire area in order to outflank China and to open a bridgehead into South East Asia. The north-western portion of the Indian Ocean is likely to become an attractive deployment area which would in due course be utilized by the American navy. To deny unrestricted freedom of the areas to the US in this potential deployment area, the Soviet Union had adopted the strategy of introducing its own naval presence in the Indian Ocean.<sup>20</sup>

### Soviet Point of View

Soviet scholars held responsible Pakistan for the Indo-Pak War. According to G. Yakubov, the conflict broke out because the military rulers of Pakistan ignored the will of the 75-million-strong East Bengali population, a will which was clearly expressed during the December 1970 elections, and tried with the help of arms to suppress the popular movement for inalienable democratic rights and liberties. Over a million people were killed and about 10 million people fled to India as a result of mass reprisals. All this had sharply aggravated Indo-Pakistani differences. On December 3, 1971, Pakistan launched military operations against India. There is no doubt that the military rulers of Pakistan would not have ventured to take such actions if it had not been aware of instigating support from outside. And this support was a considerable one.<sup>21</sup> Yakubov’s analysis indicated that Soviet interference was mainly due to the Pakistan’s accepting US and China’s support and denial to accept USSR’s hegemonic role in the South Asian fairs.

The US Government, as Yakubov stated, actually encouraged the policy of repression pursued



by Islamabad, ignored the need for a political settlement in East Pakistan and for solving the problem of refugees. The US position during the discussion on this question in the Security Council was directed against the people of East Bengal and did not help remove the factors that had led to the war. This position helped in many ways created a tense situation in South Asia.<sup>22</sup>

### Soviet arms and diplomatic assistance to India

According to Some Pakistani writer, Soviet Union's military and diplomatic assistance to India was the major reason of the continuity of war. USSR's role in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 had a great impact on the pattern of politics in South Asia. In the months before the war, the USSR's attitude towards the crisis in East Pakistan was on the whole ambivalent. On the one hand, the Soviet Union repeatedly stressed that it upheld the territorial integrity of Pakistan and it carefully refrained from giving overt support to the insurgents, but on the other hand, Moscow adopted a posture of hostility towards Islamabad. At a time when Indo-Pakistan relations had reached their lowest point, the Soviet Union extended full diplomatic and military support to India. Without tacit support from the Kremlin, it is unlikely the Indian government would have sustained, since its inception, the guerrilla movement in East Bengal and pursued its policy regarding Bangladesh with its underlying danger of a military conflict. Publicly the USSR upheld the territorial integrity of Pakistan, but covertly it worked to destroy the unity of Pakistan by extending assistance by proxy to the insurgents. Thus India not only launched the attack on East Pakistan with knowledge of Soviet Union but with its explicit endorsement.<sup>23</sup>

Soviet Union had promoted neutrality and non-partisanship since the Tashkent meeting of January 1966, but when the war broke out, it cast aside all pretensions of impartiality. During the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the Soviet leaders had sought to promote accommodation between the two parties. But in 1971, the Russian government suspended its economic aid to Pakistan and the

Russian experts working on various projects left the country. The Soviet import organization advised the Afghan Bank-i-Milli not to permit any movement of Pakistani goods into Afghanistan that serves as the overland transit route for Pakistan–USSR trade. Sea trade was also suspended and after November 1971 no Soviet ship came to pick up cargo from Karachi. However, the factors which decisively determined the outcome of the war were: firstly, Soviet military assistance to India; secondly, the USSR's role in the UN Security Council; and thirdly, Russian strategy to prevent a direct Chinese intervention in the war.<sup>24</sup>

In the wake of the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship signed in August 1971, there was a further airlift of sophisticated Soviet including missiles and weapons to India. In early November 1971, Soviet transport aircraft carried military equipment, mainly advanced versions of SAMs to New Delhi and Bombay. The equipment arriving by air was primarily meant for training purposes and was reported to have been accompanied by Russian military instructors. Meanwhile, a Russian consignment of 250 tanks, forty 120mm rockets, and a large number of radio sets and other equipment were dispatched as negotiations were initiated for the supply of supersonic medium bombers, medium reconnaissance aircraft, and MIG-23 fighters.<sup>25</sup> This resulted in a positive shift in the military balance in the subcontinent in favor of India, thus removing all restraint upon India from resorting to the use of force against Pakistan. Furthermore, it is alleged that during the war the Russians rendered active assistance to the Indians.

The notable realist aspect here is that Soviet Union had been striving to accumulate its power by countering China, America and India was strengthening itself by enhancing its military capabilities by taking ammunition aids from USSR.

#### United Nations Debates

United Nations, an overarching body, remained insignificant to provide the peace and security to in South Asian region. Keeping in view its own interests Soviet Union had been monopolizing in

Security Council's discussions and manipulating the Indo-Pak dispute. Soviet role in the debates of the Security Council was also very important to summon discussion on the India-Pakistan conflict. Moscow's position was that a ceasefire was inconceivable without a political settlement in East Pakistan. Soviet delegate held responsible Pakistani "military authorities" for the situation. The delegation also suggested that representative of Bangladesh also must be given a hearing in the Council.<sup>26</sup>

As Indian forces moved on Dhaka, the USSR used its veto twice on 4 and 5 December 1971 to prevent the Council from adopting a resolution calling for a ceasefire. Expressing views identical with those of the Indian government, the Soviet representative first vetoed an American draft resolution proposing that the Security Council should call upon India and Pakistan to cease fire immediately and to withdraw their troops from each other's territory and the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan. At the next meeting the USSR again exercised its veto to prevent the adoption of an eight-power draft resolution containing same agenda. Thus the Russians effectively blocked all international diplomatic pressures on India giving it time to bring its military operations in the East to successful conclusion. In the General Assembly, where the issue was transferred under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Soviet Union voted against a draft resolution calling upon India and Pakistan to cease-fire and withdraw their forces. The resolution was adopted by the Assembly out of whose total membership of 131, 104 states voted for it. Despite this mandate from an overwhelming majority of the world community, the USSR vetoed for the third time in the Security Council a draft resolution drafted on similar lines as the previous ones, it was only after the Indian occupation of Dhaka that Moscow dropped its "obstructive" approach.<sup>27</sup> United Nations' role to establish peace and security in the international system and prevent wars among nations was remained in inconspicuous position, and great powers had been persuading for their own objective

and policies. The atrocious war could not be prevented. However, President Podgorny and Prime Minister Kosygin had been criticizing and the expressing their grave feeling over the ruthless policies of Yahya government towards the people of East Pakistan.

### The China Factor

G. W Choudhury holds that due to its ideological outlook and security constraints, China faced a dilemma. Because of its traditional sympathy for national liberation movements, China might have been expected to extend support to the movement for Bangladesh. But in the context of friendship with Pakistan, more rightly to say, hostility towards USSR and India, China could hardly support a India and Moscow backed independent movement for the Bengalis. Thus China chose pragmatism over ideology.<sup>28</sup>

China played a crucial role in the South Asian “power balance” under the “Cold War structure”. China’s role was not so much to actively support Pakistan although it certainly did that in some respects-as to separate Indian forces and thus weaken India. India was required to maintain 11 mountain divisions on the border with China, and each mountain division was three times more costly to support than an ordinary infantry division. At times, such as during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, China maneuvered on the border and issued ultimatums to India in order to pin Indian troops down and assist Pakistan. In the lead-up to the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, India was forced into closer alliance with the Soviet Union in order to neutralize China.<sup>29</sup>

However Soviet commentators portray Chinese role with opposite view point. Yakubov mentioned that an enormous share of responsibility for the conflict rests with the Chinese leaders who sow animosity between peoples and act as instigators of wars. Trying to make its hegemonic claims look respectable, Peking professes respect for the sovereignty and independence of peoples and talks of non-interference in the affairs of other countries and of peaceful coexistence. Meantime all its actions in relation to India and Pakistan show that these fine-sounding

declarations in no way reflect the real aims of the policy of the Peking leadership.

He stressed that ever since the military clashes between China and India in the Himalayas in 1959, Chinese leaders had been following an openly hostile course against India. They had been trying in every way to discredit India, particularly in the eyes of the peoples of developing countries and to isolate it. In this way they wanted to make it easier for them to take a leading position in the so-called Third World. At the same time, China would like to complicate the situation in the region and to deteriorate India. It was for these reasons that Peking leaders were delaying a settlement of the border issue with India and from time to time and always aggravated the situation on the frontier with India. In this connection the offensive operations of Chinese troops was launched against India in 1962. And same was the reason for Peking's threats and ultimatum-like demands to India in September 1965.<sup>30</sup> Yakubov asserted that the Maoists are shamelessly interfering in the internal affairs of India. They are trying hard to create difficulties in the way of India's independent development. By giving moral and political support to adventurist, extremist groupings, they divide the ranks of the Left and democratic forces which come out for stronger political and economic independence, for progressive social and economic reforms in India. All this is being done to weaken India and undermine its international prestige.<sup>31</sup>

Showing sympathies with India, Soviet commentators criticized that Peking propaganda constantly attacks India's foreign policy in an effort to arouse distrust toward it in Asia and Africa. According to Yakubov, three or four years ago, Peking brought pressure to bear on Burma, Nepal and Ceylon to draw these countries into the struggle against India. Chinese leaders fanned in every way difficulties that arose in relations between Nepal and India and projected China as a defender of Nepal. They hoped to use against India districts of northern Burma where a secessionist-insurgent reactionary movement became active recently with China's support. Peking diplomacy hoped to provoke anti-Indian sentiments in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), too. Peking's aim clearly is to try

and surround India by states that would be hostile to India and to isolate India.<sup>32</sup>

Like other soviet scholars and leaders, Yakubov also blamed China for sabotaging Tashkent Declaration. He wrote that Peking attacked the Tashkent Declaration of 1966 which put an end to the India-Pakistan armed conflict in 1965 and opened the way to the normalization of the situation in the region. The Tashkent Declaration, which was worked out by the Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan with the assistance of the Head of the Soviet Government, was described by Chinese propaganda as nothing less than a result of collusion between the Soviet Union and American imperialism at the expense of Pakistan.<sup>33</sup>

According to Soviets, the Peking leaders fanned in every way the Kashmir question and promised Pakistani generals to support them. This was discussed with the Chinese side during the visit of Pakistani Air Marshal Nur Khan to Peking in July, 1969. A similar statement was made by Kuo Mojo during his visit to Pakistan in February, 1970. The former President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, who visited Peking in November, 1970, was given new assurances of the same kind.<sup>34</sup>

When the situation in Pakistan grew worse, after the December elections of 1970 and West Pakistani troops began mass reprisals against the East Bengali population, Peking took these actions under its protection. The Chinese leaders decided that a convenient moment had come for an attempt to strengthen their positions in South Asia. It was with this aim in view that Peking prodded West Pakistani leaders towards new ventures. The Maoists cast aspersions on the Soviet Union which called for an end to repressions and for a solution of the problem with due account taken of the will of the people of East Pakistan. They slandered India which sought a political settlement in East Pakistan and which wanted conditions to be created for the refugees to return home. The Premier of the People's Republic of China in his message to Yahya Khan on April 12, 1971, alleged that the Government of India was interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan.<sup>35</sup>

## Chinese Military Aid

Soviet Union criticized the Chinese sympathetic and association attitude towards Pakistan. For the Indian government, the major deterrent to resort the armed forces against Pakistan would have been the fear of direct Chinese intervention across the Himalayas. This flank was secured through the Indo-Soviet Treaty of friendship of August 1971. Furthermore, India launched a full-scale attack on Pakistan only after winter had set in and the northern passes were blocked with snow. But most significant was the report that Soviet leadership assured the Indians that it would make military moves against China if the threat of Chinese intervention materialized. This would not have involved a major military maneuver as the USSR had deployed more divisions on its eastern frontier with China than in east Europe.<sup>36</sup>

At the same time China increased aid to Pakistan evidently with a view to preparing that country for a war with India. A Pakistani military delegation visited China early May. In June, China supplied arms and ammunition for two Pakistani divisions intended for action in East Pakistan. An armaments plant, built with Chinese help and Chinese credit, was presented in Dhaka to the Commander of the East Pakistani military district, on September 10. Early in November a Pakistani delegation was invited to Peking. It included the Air Force Commander, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Navy of Pakistan.<sup>37</sup> Peking began supplying 400 fighters and bombers, tanks and anti-aircraft installations to Pakistan.

Soviet writers criticizing Sino-Pak collaboration in the war mentions that Pakistan's 10-day notice on a possible beginning of war with India coincided with the stay in Pakistan of a Chinese delegation led by the Minister of the Machine-Building Industry, Li Shui-ching. The notice period expired on December 3 and on the same day the Pakistani Air Force made a bombing strike on Indian airfields. All these actions of the Chinese leaders, coupled with Washington's pro-Pakistani course, helped to prolong a military conflict in the region. Already during the conflict when the


Soviet Union and other socialist countries were taking measures in the Security Council to have the hostilities ended and measures taken to guarantee a political settlement, the Chinese representatives tried in every way to prevent the Security Council from adopting appropriate decisions. In doing so, the Maoists displayed striking unanimity with the American delegates. One cannot fail to note also the timing of the United States and Chinese actions to put pressure on India. When the Pentagon sent warships to the Bay of Bengal in mid-December Peking came out with threats to India accusing it of alleged violation of the frontier in the Himalayas.<sup>38</sup>

However, Soviet military support to India, its propaganda campaign in international media against Pakistan and China, its role in United Nations provides an ample understanding of Soviet foreign policy objectives in the South Asian region. Moonis Ahmer ironically stated that Soviet Union deserves to take the credit for the formation of Bangladesh and the subsequent rehabilitation of the economy of new infant state.<sup>39</sup>

Despite its support for India during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the Soviet Union immediately tried to restore its relations with Pakistan following Yahya Khan's replacement by President Bhutto. While at the governmental level the USSR made an effort to promote peaceful relations between India and Pakistan, behind the scenes it encouraged factionalist movements in Baluchistan and Pakhtunistan aimed at complicating the closer relationship between Islamabad and Teheran.<sup>40</sup>

The entire analysis of Bangladesh crisis offers a picture realist behavior states, which were struggling for their own so called objectives of security, and self-interests wearing them the mask of ideologies and moralities. Accordingly, G W Choudhury rightly stated that, above all, Washington and Peking acted as they did because of *realpolitik* imperatives. Soviet Union bent on expanding its influence and power no matter what the cost in human lives and sufferings, found in the Bangladesh crisis a unique opportunity to weaken and humiliate China and also to further its





Map of Bangladesh

Source: *Encarta World English Dictionary*, 1999.

own global interest regarding the United States. The Soviets did not act out of love and righteousness any more than the Americans and Chinese backed Yahya because they enjoyed the butchering of babies. But for the Soviet Union's direct encouragement of regional tensions between India and Pakistan, the dreadful War of Bangladesh might have been averted. He quite explicitly explains the role of all involved actor, "When the full story of the disintegration of Pakistan and the role of the three major powers and India is fully examined in proper perspective, the world will be examined in proper perspective, the world will see that United States and China were considerably less than devils, the Soviet Union and India considerably less than gods."<sup>41</sup>

### Bhutto Era: Bilateralism

Bhutto defined bilateralism as the idea of conducting and developing Pakistan's relations with each great power on a bilateral basis, identifying areas of cooperation without abrogating an alliance with other states. Pakistan should evolve its internally consistent and integrated policy which requires no justification and implies no moral pretense.<sup>42</sup>

Bhutto's approach of bilateralism was not suddenly emerged when he became the President of Pakistan in 1971. He asserted it, soon after his resignation as a Foreign minister of Pakistan, in June 1966. The US stoppage of aid to Pakistan and extraordinary favor and military aid to India during Sino-Indian War in 1965, Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, Tashkent Declaration of 1966, the drift in Soviet-China relations were the factors which evolved the '*realpolitik*' approach of Bilateralism. Moreover, because of the role of Great Powers in Indo-Pak War of 1971, it became the basic principle of President Bhutto's foreign policy.<sup>43</sup>

In December 1971 Mr. Z.A. Bhutto had assumed the leadership in Pakistan. Following in the wake of defeat, Bhutto faced with serious problems at home and was eager to overcome difficulties, decided to accept Moscow's offer of help. Bhutto visited Moscow, in March 1972, in order to ease Soviet hostility and secure a continuation of Soviet economic aid to Pakistan. He had

received a warm congratulatory message from President Podgorny on assuming the presidency, and the Soviets had tried to demonstrate their objectivity by pointing out to India in February 1972 that a long deadlock with Pakistan would not be good for India or, for that matter, the Soviet Union. Bhutto was told by Kosygin in Moscow to display a 'realistic approach' towards the matter of prisoners of war and to help the process of relaxation of tension with a view to creating an atmosphere of mutual trust in the region. This advice clearly constituted pressure for the early recognition of Bangladesh.<sup>44</sup>

During Bhutto's visit to Moscow, the matter of collective security again discussed. However, Pakistan did not accept the collective security proposal, despite apparent Soviet pressure on this particular issue. Pakistan had never been receptive to the idea of collective security because of its friendly relations with China and the feeling that India was the key to an Asian system of collective security while Moscow was the linchpin.<sup>45</sup>

As far as India's reaction to the Soviet proposal for Collective Security was concerned, India had been influenced by events and force outside its control. In 1969 when the proposal was first made, the Indian government accepted it but without particular enthusiasm. India, at that time, could understand the Soviet attempt to fill the vacuum left by the British, or any other superpowers could attempt to impose a military and economic supranational organism over Asian countries. Instead, India advocated U.N. guarantees for the countries of the region. In fact, growing tensions between India and Pakistan were to compel the Indians to pay lip service to the Soviet proposal.<sup>46</sup>

Thus, Soviet military power and especially the presence of the Russian Navy in the Indian Ocean had been a source of discomfort to both political and military leaders in India. The "vacuum" theory in the Indian Ocean was rejected by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. During her visit to Ceylon (Sri Lanka), she declared that the Indian Ocean must remain a "zone of peace" and "free from military contests."<sup>47</sup> The most important factors to affect India's reluctance to maintain

a close alliance with the Soviet Union were the 'expansion of its air force' and naval power in the Indian Ocean, including the construction of the Andaman Island base, the desire to improve relations with China and the U.S. while continuing its cooperation with the USSR and, most importantly, the new regional role, political and military, which India was prepared to fulfill in Asia.<sup>48</sup>

Indian aspirations seemed to be hampered by a continuing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and by the collective security design. Normalization of relations with Pakistan during the summer and the signing of the agreement for the repatriation of the POWs significantly contributed to a *détente* in South Asia. Nevertheless, in order to preserve its sovereignty, increase its political and military role while at the same time improving relations with China, a nuclear capability was felt to be necessary.

The exercise of the nuclear option by India was seen as a major step toward eroding the 'anti-Chinese' collusion image of India and opening the way to a new pattern of improved Sino-Indian relations. Whether growing Indian military and naval power would undermine the traditional policy of non-alignment was an open question. But the new orientation of India's foreign and defense policy toward regionalism is hindered by the Soviet proposal for a system of collective security in Asia which advocated a non-regional European power to play a role in an Asian regional system.<sup>49</sup>

Hasan Askari holds that the changing political order in South Asia, re-alignment of the big powers and the gradual withdrawal of the British forces east of Suez, had given rise to yet another struggle for dominance of the region amongst the three major powers i.e. the US, the USSR and China. Out of all the three powers, the Soviet Union had shown greater impatience and adopted a ruthless approach to establish its hegemony in the region. According to him, the Soviet Union had a "long history of expansion," though it had always tried to "camouflage the policy of expansion"

under the cover of treaties of friendship and co-operation. It had sufficient control of the Eastern Europe. Soviet Union decided to adopt a similar strategy in South Asia, particularly the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. From the Soviet point of view, its assertion in the region was exclusively essential because of the rapid rise Republic of China as a major power in the world, equipped with nuclear weapons. As the Chinese leaders were not prepared to toe Moscow's line, the Soviet leaders were compelled to take necessary steps to contain the Chinese influence lest it challenged their leadership in the Communist world and put the Soviet Union in an embarrassing position in the third world.<sup>50</sup>

Kosygin's visit also marked the beginning of negotiations on the Soviet proposal for a friendship treaty with India. It was to be a link in the Soviet policy of isolating China by erecting a series of relationships with countries around it. As a part of Moscow's concept of Asian Collective Security articulated by Brezhnev later that year. By that time, the Soviet Union had become aware of the efforts undertaken to bring about a Sino-US rapprochement, which had received a fillip following the election of President Nixon. In September 1969, Indian Foreign Minister, Dinesh Singh visited Moscow and the draft of a treaty had been completed and was agreed upon during his visit. However, Mrs. Gandhi was hesitant about signing such a treaty, both for domestic and foreign policy reasons. She also took note of the strong Chinese reaction to the Asian Collective Security idea, and of the moves made by China to placate India by ending its support to the Naxalites. Her own political position was greatly strengthened by a landslide victory in the election held at the end of 1971 and obviated the need for communist support to what had been a minority government.<sup>51</sup>

On 24 January 1972, Soviet Union had extended recognition to Bangladesh, and offered extensive economic aid to the new state. It reportedly expressed its willingness to help in the restoration of communications, to train and equip the Bangladesh air force and navy and to rebuild

the naval base at Chittagong. In March 1972, the Bengali leader, Shiekh Mujibur Rehman, visited the USSR where he conferred with the Russian leaders mainly on economic topic. The two sides reached agreement on Soviet aid in the construction of a Bangladesh thermal power plant, radio stations and an electrical engineering plant. It was also agreed upon that Russia would also help the new state in the reconstruction and development of the merchant marine and sea fisheries. Bangladesh would also be assisted by the Soviet Union in the reconstruction of railway transport and the USSR would also supply helicopters for interior communications. Aid would also be rendered in the training of national cadres for industry and agriculture. These agreements were of great important, as they enabled the Soviet Union to establish a foothold in this region. Thus, the seemingly mild fishery agreement was in line with the Soviet method of penetration by means of the fishing fleet, which operates in conjunction with the growing Soviet fleet of ocean-going submarines. Soviet offer to develop the naval base at Chittagong and supply a squadron of MIGs to the Bangladesh air force, when viewed in the context of Russian strategic aims in the Indian Ocean, acquire great significance. Moscow's influence in the new state had been further enhanced through the India-Bangladesh treaty of friendship concluded in March 1972. With India already aligned with the Soviet bloc, this treaty brought Bangladesh formally into the Indo-Soviet equation in South Asia.<sup>52</sup>

### **Balance of power in South Asia**

The Soviet interests in Indian Ocean were of two types: firstly, short terms—to reduce the Indian hold in Indian Ocean and to establish its hegemony, Secondly, long terms—to establish hold over the oil producing area of the Gulf. In this context, a strong oceangoing navy was created to use it for long term and short term objectives.<sup>53</sup> The USSR moved to establish its 'hegemony' in the Indian Ocean region had led to counter moves by the Western powers. On 14 December 1971, a US naval armed force headed by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise entered the Indian

Ocean as a symbolic show of support for Pakistan and to discourage the Indian government from concentrating its full military might on the Western front. The Soviet reaction was quick and hardly had the American ships cleared the Strait of Malacca when a Soviet force headed by a Kresta-class guided missile cruiser sailed into the Bay of Bengal. Another Russian cruiser arrived in early January. The US force left for the South China Sea on 10 January 1972 after carrying out routine maneuvers in the region. It was disclosed that thenceforth the Seventh Fleet would operate more frequently in the Indian Ocean and shadow the Soviet ships there. As for the Russian fleet, which arrived during the war, it was expected to remain there. This marked the beginning of active big power rivalry in the Indian Ocean.<sup>54</sup>

As the balance of power in South Asia was undergoing a process of realignment, the Soviet Union had not lost the opportunity to regain some of its lost influence in Pakistan. In the first place, it shrewdly did not crow over its triumph in the India-Pakistan war but exercised great restraint. Moscow extended recognition to Bangladesh more than a month after the fall of Dhaka. Secondly, Soviet recognition followed that of four other communist states, viz. East Germany, Mongolia, Poland, and Bulgaria. This gave the Pakistan government time to reassess the situation. Initially it reacted by implementing in a limited. But when the USSR recognized the new state, Islamabad did not break off diplomatic ties with Moscow.<sup>55</sup>

In January 1972, President Bhutto paid surprise visit to Kabul and it was reported in the press that 'Pakistan is no longer averse to the idea that flow of traffic on the Asian Highway and open her borders with Afghanistan and India for the purpose.'<sup>56</sup> This idea was linked with the Russian proposal for an Asian Security system. Though a spokesman of the foreign office denied report that Pakistan was backing a regional security pact to maintain some links with East Pakistan, there was no denial in respect of economic arrangements. It is significant that the announcement regarding the resumption of shipment of Soviet machinery was made just after the

Kabul visit. Furthermore, the USSR expressed its willingness to initiate bilateral talks between India and Pakistan for an overall peace settlement. Russia's keenness to preserve its ties with Pakistan had been generally noted. The USSR's strived to normalize its relations with Pakistan and Soviet media set out to explain and justify the Soviet role in the December war.<sup>57</sup>

An important faction within the Indian General Staff seemed to believe that undue dependence on both the Soviet-Indian treaty and the Simla agreement of 1972 between India and Pakistan were no alternates for vigilance and military attentiveness.<sup>58</sup> Commenting on Simla Agreement Bhutto enunciated that India's negative attitude toward Pakistan descended to the overtly hostile in the conflict over the Ran of Kutch 1965, when India tried to seize that disputed territory in disregard of an agreement for a standstill, pending a peaceful settlement. Then followed the war of September 1965 over Kashmir, was succeeded six years later by the devastating war over East Pakistan. In spite of this past record, it was his hope that the Simla Agreement of July 1972 would lead to a more cooperative attitude on the part of India and its acceptance of the necessity of peace in the subcontinent. The agreement expressed the resolution of both Governments to put an end to the conflict and confrontation that had until now marred their relations and asserted their determination that the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries.<sup>59</sup>

The major Soviet thrust in the immediate post-Bangladesh war years was to promote economic and trade relations. India's trade with Eastern Europe rose dramatically, so that 20% of India's exports and 11% of imports originated in this region by 1971-72. A joint economic commission was set up in September 1972. The Soviet economic offensive culminated in a visit by Brezhnev in November 1973, when a 15-year trade agreement was signed, with the target of doubling the trade in five years. The Soviets promoted Indo-Iraq cooperation, and even backed the Indian claims on the Sino-India border, The Soviet Union welcomed the Simla Agreement



between Pakistan and India, signed in early July 1972.<sup>60</sup>

The Soviets had expected India to show its gratitude for the support extended by Moscow over the Bangladesh crisis by granting base facilities to the Soviet navy, which was maintaining a presence in the Indian Ocean to rival the US presence. However, they were disappointed by India's refusal. The US presence in the Indian Ocean was increased following the 1973 Middle East War, mainly through the expansion of facilities in the British owned island of Diego Garcia. As Pakistan hosted a major CENTO naval exercise in November 1974 with ships from Britain, Turkey and Iran participating, both India and the Soviet Union reacted. An expansion of the Indian navy had been in progress with the assistance of the Soviet Union which provided four submarines as well as several missile boats. Indeed, the Soviet Union became the main supplier of sophisticated naval equipment to India, and until 1981, the Indian submarine fleet was entirely of Soviet origin.<sup>61</sup>

## Economic Cooperation

During Bhutto period, number of bilateral agreements for economic cooperation had been signed between Soviet Union and Pakistan. The Soviet Union approved in March 1973 to relieve Pakistan of repayment of Soviet loans (1971), and other debts were partly rescheduled. The Soviets also supplied humanitarian assistance to the flood-affected areas of the Punjab mid Sindh in 1973. Agreements were signed for the supply of equipment and material for the installation of a thermal power generator at Gudu tractors and agricultural machinery, including their repair facilities, and bilateral trade.<sup>62</sup> Soviet experts visited Pakistan in connection with the Soviet offer of setting-up a steel mill. Work on steel mill project was initiated in December 1973. An accord for cultural and scientific exchanges was signed in February 1973. these two major agreements followed by several arrangements and agreements in 1973-4 for cooperation in educational and cultural fields, broadcasting and telecasting participation in film festivals and exchange of delegations in these fields.<sup>63</sup>

A minor irritant appeared when several Soviet fishing trawlers engaged in fishing near Pakistan's territorial waters on the Makran Coast during October 1972-March 1973. The Pakistani fishermen felt that the Soviets, with their modern fishing equipment, would adversely affect their fish catch. Many thought that these trawlers might also be engaged in intelligence gathering. Pakistan took up the matter with the Soviet Union and in March 1973, it extended its Exclusive Fishery Zone (EFZ) up to 50 nautical miles from the coastline, modifying the February 1966 decision to fix the limits of territorial waters and the EFZ at 12 nautical miles. The Soviet trawlers quietly left the area.<sup>64</sup>

The Pak-Soviet, joint communiqué which said very little on Indo-Pakistan problems except noting Bhutto's desire for establishing peaceful conditions in South Asia, underlined their desire for developing good neighborly and mutually advantageous cooperation. Respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of each others were emphasized as the cardinal feature of their relationship. They agreed to maintain regular contact on matters of mutual interest and the Soviets agreed to revive cooperation in geological prospecting power generation and construction of a steel mill.<sup>65</sup>

It is argued by Niloufer Mahdi that Soviet Union agreed to Pakistan's steel mill project was not for placing Pakistan at level with India or it was addressing the security concern. In fact, the Soviet Union was encouraging Bhutto's efforts to reduce dependency on the West and to minimize the degree of identification with that bloc. Thus, the Soviet Union approved the Soviet mill with the same spirit as they lauded Bhutto's domestic reforms, his moves to quit SEATO (November 8, 1972) and recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (November 7, 1972), the Democratic Republic of North Korea, and the Sihanouk-led government of Cambodia in exile (January 25, 1973 and November 15, 1973 respectively) and the German Democratic Republic on November 15, 1973.<sup>66</sup>

The Soviet leadership revived the proposal in 1972-7 as a measure for consolidation of peace in Asia. Citing the efforts to set up an all-European security system, Soviet President Podgorny said in Kabul in May 1973 that the proposed Asian Collective Security would provide for the renunciation of the use of force in the relations between states, respect of sovereignty, inviolability of the frontiers, non-interference into each other's internal affairs, an extensive development of mutually beneficial economic and other cooperation on an equal footing.<sup>67</sup>

Bhutto was confronted with the Asian Collective Security proposal during his visit to Moscow in March 1972 as a guarantee of peace and its international borders, and as an alternative to Pakistan's revived interest in CENTO. Bhutto reiterated Pakistan's earlier negative response and argued that until the major territorial and other, disputes were settled, such an arrangement was impractical. He maintained that Pakistan had to take into account the views of other states like Japan, India, China and Afghanistan on this proposal. Bhutto was more categorical in his opposition to Asian Collective Security in 1975. He argued that a conference of Asian states on the lines of the European conference at Helsinki (1975) was premature for two major reasons. Firstly, the existence of several territorial disputes and other problems amongst the Soviet Union made it difficult to replicate the European experience. Secondly, as China perceived the Collective Security System as being hostile to its interests, no purpose would be served by setting this up while China stayed out. The Soviets were naturally unhappy over Pakistan's response but they did not press the issue.<sup>68</sup>

Bhutto's October 1974 visit to Moscow was undertaken in a much more relaxed political context than was the case during his earlier visit. Pakistan had recognized Bangladesh, the POW question was amicably settled, and other steps for the normalization of relations between India, Bangladesh and Pakistan were under way—something the Soviets had been urging since 1972—Bhutto's socioeconomic reforms and nonalignment in foreign policy was appreciated by the

Soviet leaders who welcomed Bhutto with a lot of courtesy and cordiality.<sup>69</sup>

In the next three to four, years following Bhutto's visit, interaction between the two states had been relatively promoted with good progress. They avoided propaganda against each other and the Soviet Union did not extend material support to the rebellious Baluch tribes who were engaged in a confrontation with Pakistan's federal government. Similarly, the Soviet Union did not fully endorse the revived irredentist Afghan claims on Pakistani territory. To Daoud's dismay, they advised Afghanistan and Pakistan to settle their differences through dialogue and peaceful ways.<sup>70</sup>

Economic, commercial and cultural relations showed an upward trend and a wide range of Soviet publications, including political magazine were available in Pakistan. The diplomatic contact was strengthened and the two sides often highlighted their expanding ties. One important agreement that needs mention in this regard was concluding on 26 July 1975, providing for supply of equipment and other materials amounting Rs. 5230 million by the Soviet Union for Pakistan Steel Mill.<sup>71</sup> The Soviet ambassador to Pakistan, Azimov, went to the extent of suggesting that Bhutto's Moscow visit had opened a new chapter in the development of relations between the two countries. Important Soviet visits to Pakistan included those of the special emissaries, A. Zorin in August 1975, Deputy Foreign Minister, Nikoli Firyubin in March 1976, and an eight member parliamentary delegation in March 1976.<sup>72</sup>

In March 1977, parliamentary elections were held in Pakistan and according to the official results, Bhutto's PPP secured two third majorities in the House. Soviet Union welcomed the result and Soviet media stated that in the event reactionary circle wanted to reinforce "the position of big capital." Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) launched a country wide agitation for re-election of the National and Provincial Assemblies and the resignation of Bhutto as the Prime Minister. As the law and order situation deteriorated, Bhutto accused the United States of assisting PNA. However, on 5<sup>th</sup> July, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq staged a coup *d'etat* to oust Bhutto and proclaimed

Martial Law in the country.<sup>73</sup>

With the ouster of Bhutto from power, the phase good relations between Pakistan and Soviet Union came to an end. And future regional developments in Afghanistan brought again hostilities and antagonism in Pakistan Soviet Union relations. As a front-line state, Pakistan fought a large scale proxy war in Afghanistan with military and economic support of United States against Soviet Union.

## Notes and Reference

- <sup>1</sup> Slahuddin Ahmed, *Bangladesh Past and Present*, (New Delhi, APH Publishing Corporation, 2004), p.204-06.
- <sup>2</sup> Vernon Marston Hewitt, *The International Politics of South Asia*, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 116-117.
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 117.
- <sup>4</sup> Ahmed, *Bangladesh Past and Present*, p. 158.
- <sup>5</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union, 1947-1979*, p. 109.
- <sup>6</sup> 'Soviet President' message to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan, 2 April 1971, in R. K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*. Vol. 1, p. 105.
- <sup>7</sup> Yahya's reply to Podgorny, 5 April 1971. in R. K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*. Vol. 1, pp. 106-07.
- <sup>8</sup> Bhutto's protest against Podgorny's message, 14 April 1971 (Extract). in R. K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*. Vol. 1, pp. 108-09.
- <sup>9</sup> G. W. Choudhury. *India, Pakistan Bangladesh and Great Powers: Politics of Divided Subcontinent*, (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 205.
- <sup>10</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union, 1947-1979*, p. 110.
- <sup>11</sup> Zubeida Mustafa, "USSR and Indo Pakistan War of 1971," ed., Mahrnisa Ali, *Reading in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 31.
- <sup>12</sup> Maqbool Ahmed Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1996). p. 116.
- <sup>13</sup> 'Soviet President' message to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan, 2 April 1971, in R. K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*. Vol. 1, p. 105.
- <sup>14</sup> Yahya's reply to Podgorny, 5 April 1971. in R. K. Jain, *Soviet South Asian Relations*. Vol. 1, pp. 106-07.
- <sup>15</sup> In 1970, President Nixon faced severe criticism indigenously on the disastrous invasion of Cambodia and shooting at Kent University, that is why his administration was defensive at home. Nixon wanted to develop good relations with China in order to avert criticism. Seymour M. Hersh wrote that by early October, Nixon's popularity fell, and his anxiety about China became acute. Pakistan and Romania had been choosed for playing mediatory role. On October 25, Nixon met privately for fifty-five minutes with President Yahya Khan and told him, "we had decided to normalize our relation's with China." While China demanded in return for repproachment that united states reduce its troops level from Taiwan. Because China considered that Taiwan was China's affair. Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*, (New York: Summit Books, 1983), pp. 365-75.
- <sup>16</sup> Article IX of the treaty stated "In the event of either party being subjected to attack or threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultation in order to remove such threat and to take effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries."
- <sup>17</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 117.
- <sup>18</sup> Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 889.
- <sup>19</sup> Quoted in Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 117.
- <sup>20</sup> Mustafa, "USSR and Indo Pakistan War of 1971," p. 31.
- <sup>21</sup> G. Yakubov, "Conflict on the Indian Subcontinent and the Provocative Role of Mao's Group," *Pravda*, 28 December 1971 in R. K. Jain, *Pakistan South Asian Relations 1947-1978*. p. 94.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>23</sup> Mustafa, "USSR and Indo Pakistan War of 1971," p. 27.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 28.
- <sup>26</sup> Statement by Soviet representative Malik in Security Council 6 December 1971, 7 December 1971, 13 December 1971, in R. K. Jain, *Pakistan South Asian Relations 1947-1978*. pp. 144-49.
- <sup>27</sup> Hesan Askari, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment*, p. 116.
- <sup>28</sup> G. W. Choudhury. *India, Pakistan Bangladesh and Great Powers*, p. 210.
- <sup>29</sup> Sandy Gordon, "South Asia after the Cold War: Winners and Losers," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 10. (October: 1995), p. 880.
- <sup>30</sup> Yakubov, "Conflict on the Indian Subcontinent and the Provocative Role of Mao's Group," p. 94.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>32</sup> Since Burma, Nepal and Sri Lanka firmly uphold their independence and did not wish to be tools of Peking's anti-Indian policy Peking strategists pinned the greatest hopes on the Yahya Khan regime in their struggle against India. The Chinese leaders, far from helping overcome Pakistani-Indian differences, interfered in every way with the settlement of relations between Pakistan and India, provoked Pakistan to anti-Indian actions in the hope of drawing Pakistan into the net of their geo-political strategy. Article entitled "Conflict on the Indian subcontinent and the provocative role of Mao's group." Ibid. p. 95.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p.94.

<sup>35</sup> Mustafa, "USSR and Indo Pakistan War of 1971," p. 29.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>38</sup> To soviet analysts, the unprincipledness and adventurism of Mao Tse-tung's policy were revealed once more during the Indo-Pakistani conflict. This conflict showed that the Maoists while posing as allies and even leaders of the national-liberation movement, betray this movement if they find that their selfish nationalistic interests call for a deal with reaction. This conflict also demonstrated that the Peking leaders are pursuing a great-power, social-chauvinist course which not infrequently unites them and American imperialism. Finally the behaviour of the Chinese leaders during the conflict showed that they are trying to use every opportunity to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria.

<sup>39</sup> Moonis Ahmer, *Soviet Role in South Asia 1969-1987*. (Karachi: Area Study Center for Europe, 1989), p. 90.

<sup>40</sup> Alexander O. Ghebbardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 13, No. 12. (Dec., 1973), pp. 1078-1079.

<sup>41</sup> G. W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan Bangladesh and Great Powers*, p. 214.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics*, p. 228.

<sup>44</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 118.

<sup>45</sup> Ghebbardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," p. 1079.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>47</sup> Indira Gandhi, "India and the World," *Foreign Affairs*, (October 1972), pp. 72-74, in Alexander O. Ghebbardt, *The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia*, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 13, No. 12. (Dec., 1973), p.1088.

<sup>48</sup> W. L. Sondhi, 'India and Nuclear China,' *Pacific Community*, V. 4: No. 2, (January, 1973) p. 269.

<sup>49</sup> Ghebbardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," 1079.

<sup>50</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974), p. i.

<sup>51</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, pp. 115-16.

<sup>52</sup> Mustafa, "USSR and Indo Pakistan War of 1971," p. 28.

<sup>53</sup> Moonis Ahmar, *Super Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Since the Withdrawal of Great Britain*, (Karachi: Area Study Centre for Europe, 1986), pp. 40-41.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>55</sup> Mustafa, "USSR and Indo Pakistan War of 1971," p. 29.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ghebbardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," p. 1086.

<sup>59</sup> Z. A. Bhutto, "Pakistan Builds a New," ed. Hameed A. K. Rai, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 100.

<sup>60</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p. 119.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>62</sup> Papotia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union 1947-1979*, p. 131.

<sup>63</sup> Hasan Askari, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment*, p.120

<sup>64</sup> Niloufer Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981: the Search for Security*, (Karachi: Ferozsons Ltd., 1999), p. 233; Hasan Askari, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment*, p.120

<sup>65</sup> Hasan Askari, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment*, pp. 120-121.

<sup>66</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981*, p. 232.

<sup>67</sup> G. W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan Bangladesh and Great Powers*, p. 227.

<sup>68</sup> Papotia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union 1947-1979*, pp. 126-28.

<sup>69</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981*, pp. 232-33.

<sup>70</sup> Askari, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment*, p. 121.

<sup>71</sup> Papotia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union 1947-1979*, p. 131.

<sup>72</sup> Askari, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment*, p. 121.

<sup>73</sup> Papotia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union 1947-1979*, pp. 132-33.

## Chapter 5

### **Afghan War and Soviet Decline (1977-1992)**

After ouster of the Bhutto regime, Pakistan's relations with Soviet could not remain cordial for a long time. Various regional and international developments led both states towards the most severe antagonistic and inimical operation. This chapter addresses the issues of Saur Revolution in Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its strategic interests, Pakistan's threat perceptions and its proxy war against Soviet Union, withdrawal of Soviet's troops, its disintegration and its implications on Pakistan's foreign policy.

#### **Saur Revolution**

On the military takeover in Pakistan, in July 1977, and the arrest of Bhutto, Soviet Union showed modest disapproval commenting, 'the periods of civilian rule were most favorable for Pakistan.' Because General Zia initially declared that the military did not come with any ambition and soon elections would be held in October 1977 and power would be transferred to elected representatives of Pakistan.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, he did not declare any change in the foreign policy of Pakistan. Zia continued the Bhutto era policy of bilateral relationships towards the great powers.<sup>2</sup> However, in Afghanistan Noor Muhammad Taraki's ouster of Daud from power, introduction of basic changes in the Afghan society particularly changes in social and economic structure of Afghanistan, in addition to, under new setup, the changes which were termed as 'Saur Revolution'—declaring Afghanistan as Peoples Republic of Afghanistan Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> This upset the traditional conservatives and Afghan Society into a new setup in Afghanistan, based upon Soviet system of economy. It led to resentment by various sections of tradition Afghan



society. Afghan clergy and landed aristocracy were at the frequent of opposition to Tarakai regime.<sup>4</sup> At this stage, Soviet Union intervened to protect the Saur Revolution: initially the Soviet support was continued to material help, but slowly and gradually, to counter the resistance against Khalq government, the Soviet troops crossed the river Oxus, in December 1979 and started the direct intervention in the afghan affairs. This was termed by the International Community as Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup> The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the tiny state of Afghanistan became a popular demand in the contemporary world. During the whole period i.e. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan until its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan's could not feel secure its territorial integrity. Though Soviet Union argued that it had no imperialist motives but Pakistan did not impress by the soviet statement.<sup>6</sup>

In July 1973, King Zahir Shah's first cousin and brother in law Daud Khan dethroned the king with help of Babrak Karmal, who was the head of Parcham faction of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In April 1978, the both components of PDPA, the Parcham and Khalq, headed by Noor Muhammad Taraki and Hafeezulluha Amin, collaborated and staged coup *d'etat*, which is termed as "Saur Revolution."<sup>7</sup> They ousted Daud Khan and killed him. It is argued by Pakistani diplomats, especially late Shah Nawaz, the Secretary General of Foreign Office, believed, that one of the very reasons of the Daud's overthrow from power was the Soviet's disapproval of his decisive shift in Afghanistan's foreign policy.<sup>8</sup> It is further argued that Due to the efforts of Shah of Iran, Daud had been drifting away from Soviet policies opening avenue for the Western influence in the country and he was also eager to establish cordial relations with Pakistan. Daud also wanted to recognize the Durand Line as the international border with Pakistan, but due to internal difficulties could not do so.<sup>9</sup> Hafeez Malik wrote that if the

Daud Regime had continued in Afghanistan, Zia would not change the Bhutto's principle of foreign policy of bilateralism.<sup>10</sup>

Within six months of the PDPA takeover, the Parcham leaders were deposed from the government office and some of them were sent as ambassadors to East European countries. In this period large scaled violent opposition and uprising against the Marxist-Leninist policies emerged in Afghanistan which also spilled over into Pakistan.<sup>11</sup> Taraki's pro-Moscow policies were largely the source of resentment of traditional power center and Ulema who commanded great respect among the masses. Due to the political conditions in Afghanistan, about 12,000 Afghans had crossed the border and entered into Pakistan.<sup>12</sup>

Because of the distrusted conditions of Afghanistan the refugees who came to Pakistan among them were the political activists and religious elements as well. They had the opinion that Taraki Government was pursuing anti-religious policies in the country. Some of them were those who had vested interests in undoing the Saur Revolution due to socio-economic reasons and tribal feud. These people—migrated to Pakistan and residing in Afghanistan—were collectively engaged in insurgency in Afghanistan. They assumed the title of *Mujahidins*. Afghanistan accused Pakistan that the counter-revolutionaries were trained and supported by Pakistan.<sup>13</sup>

Taraki visited Soviet Union in December 1978 and discussed Pakistan and Afghanistan political problems with Soviet leaders. Both countries signed Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Soviet Union also charged Pakistan, China, United States, and Saudi Arabia for providing military training and ammunition to the insurgents against the pro-Soviet Afghan regime. However, as the resistance intensified in Afghanistan Soviet media openly began to declare Pakistan as troubleshooter.<sup>14</sup>

## Threat Perception to Pakistan

Responding to the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty, President Zia-ul-Haq said that the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship with India in 1971 and later Pakistan was dismembered and Bangladesh was created. The Soviet Union went into a Treaty of Friendship with Ethiopia and Somalia was threatened. The Soviet went into a Treaty of Friendship with Vietnam and Kampuchea had gone. The Soviet Union had now a treaty with Afghanistan, and Zia stressed that he did not say Pakistan would go but it certainly created a threat to Pakistan.<sup>15</sup> Pakistan felt threatened because if Soviet Union established its bases in Afghanistan Pakistan would be sandwiched between two unfriendly powers, the India and Soviet Union, which had a long history of friendship.

From 1977 to 1979, relations between the United States and Pakistan were strained and far-fetched, because firstly, Bhutto's accusation that the US was involved in destabilizing his government; secondly, Bhutto's execution by Zia, thirdly Pakistan's nuclear development of Pakistan;<sup>16</sup> thirdly, in 1979, the American Embassy in Islamabad was blazed by infuriated mob when rumor spread in Pakistan that United States and Israel had captured the Holy Mosque in Makkah.<sup>17</sup>

In April 1979, United States had suspended Pakistan's economic and military aid. United States listed Pakistan among the ten countries whose support was completely cut off, and due to its traditional policy of appeasing India, United States had not given any assurance for Pakistan's security.<sup>18</sup> Zia realizing the fact provoked United States and China and emphasized that guerilla movement in Afghanistan could not last long unless it got support from the outside. It should get support from China, America and Western Europe. He stressed that it should pass through Pakistan, but at the moment Pakistan was

not in the position to support them what they needed, because Pakistan would only be burning its own fingers that way.<sup>19</sup>

Pakistan's threat perception can be noted by an address of President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq on 13 February, 1986. He explicated his *realpolitik* approach:

[T]he dispute between Soviet Union and Pakistan is not on anything else; it is on Afghanistan and only Afghanistan. Pakistan cannot compromise on principles. We have good bilateral relations with the Soviets. We have educational and cultural exchange with the Soviet Union. We have excellent trade relations. The steel mill in Karachi, a project of 2.5 million dollars, is the biggest monument to the relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan. We have no bilateral differences with Soviet Union except on Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, a superpower, is now twisting Pakistan's Arm to accept what has happened in Afghanistan. This can not be done... Pakistan wishes to solve the problem of Afghanistan, not militarily but politically. There is no military solution to the problem. Pakistan is not in the position to match up with super power. We must therefore, fend for security through better understanding.<sup>20</sup>

## Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) and its repercussions on the region

Afghanistan which had undergone the "Saur Revolution" in April 1978, and it came under the control of the People's Democratic Party (PDA). In September 1979, a *coup d'etat* was staged in which Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin ousted President Noor Mohammad Taraki. Amin wanted to build up relations with the Muslim countries and the United States, in order to make Afghanistan independent of Moscow's hegemony,<sup>21</sup> the Soviet Union acted upon Brezhnev Doctrine,<sup>22</sup> and sent Soviet troops to enter Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. Hafizullah Amin was accused of being a CIA agent, and he was assassinated by the Soviet troops. In his place, Babrak Karmal, the exiled leader of the Parcham faction, returned and was installed as president of the country. In January 1980, the Soviet Union increased its military presence to about 100,000 troops, supported by tanks and air power. The Soviet government claimed that a limited number

of troops had been sent to Afghanistan in response to the appeal of the fraternal Afghan government there for help under article 4 of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty, But this justification lacked credibility, since the head of the government in Kabul, Hafizullah Amin, was executed on 27 December 1979 by the Soviet forces.<sup>23</sup> Hafeez Malik wrote that two weeks before Soviet intervention, Amin stated that no military bases would be allowed in Afghanistan because they do not need them. Resultantly, his was executed by Soviets.<sup>24</sup>

Soviet initiative to invade Afghanistan was due to multiple reasons. US retreat from the region, after the Vietnam War in 1973, enhanced the Soviet hegemonic role in the region. In 1979, the change of pro-western regime of Shah of Iran by the radical clerics also weakened the American influence from the Persian Gulf. Moreover, Soviet-Afghanistan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and political turmoil and anarchy of Afghanistan stimulated Soviet Union's expansionist characteristic, which it had already exercised in East Europe, Korea, and Vietnam as well. Soviet Union saw, then, a best opportunity get access to Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf for getting trade routs and the natural sources of the region and to deprive United States from them.<sup>25</sup> Barnett R. Rubin believed that Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan has a long history, going back to Tsarist expansions in the so-called "Great Game" between Russia and Britain, which started in the early 19th Century. This interest in the region continued on through the Soviet era in Russia, with billions in economic and military aid sent to Afghanistan between 1955 and 1978.<sup>26</sup>

The Soviet Union defended its position diplomatically by saying that the intervention was a limited response to a call for help from a friendly government and maintained that this did not affect the interest or security of other countries. Brezhnev



**Afghanistan**

Source: *Encarta World English Dictionary*, 1999.

refuted the allegation that the Soviet Union had some expansionist plans regard to Pakistan, Iran, or other countries in the area. In a speech in Damascus on 27 January 1980, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, refuted the charge that Soviet Union was trying to reach the warm southern seas. Brezhnev, speaking in February in Moscow, called the attempts being made by Pakistan, China and the US to intervene in Afghanistan from Pakistan territory as a threat to the Soviet Union. He justified with the reason "as soon as the reasons prompting their presence there no longer exist, and the Afghanistan government considers their presence no longer necessary."<sup>27</sup>

In December 1979, with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the US attitude vis-à-vis Afghanistan had drastically changed. Many factors were involved in United States changing behavior; firstly, the consolidation of the Soviet hold on Afghanistan along with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, signed in 1971, would enable the two powers to crush Pakistan in any hostility of future. Secondly, politically stable and militarily strong Afghanistan's with the support of Soviet Union would be unmanageable for United States or its ally Pakistan. Thirdly, ideologically Pakistan would be vulnerable to resist 'Socialist Revolution.' Fourthly, because of domestic determinants Zia, being a western ally, needed support for powerful decision making.<sup>28</sup> Lastly, United States wanted to secure gulf oil fields by extending its support to Afghan *Mujahideens* and Pakistan.<sup>29</sup>

## Reagan Doctrine

The Reagan doctrine explicated that United States had a right to intervene against Marxist-Leninist government because they had brought to power by illegitimate methods. However, CIA was facing logistical problem to supply arms to Mujahideen. They needed

a direct route and help from Pakistan army and its agencies for the success to Afghan War. William Casey, CIA director, approached Zia-ul-Haq, who allowed United States and its agencies to use facilities in Pakistan. After Zia's approval US support got momentum. In October 1984, Casey arrived secretly in especially equipped C-141 Starlifer transport plan to discuss strategy against Soviet Union. He also met General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, head of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). They discussed their strategies to train Mujahideen and equipped them with heavier weapons including 122-mm rocket launchers and artillery batteries, surface to air missiles SMSs and SAM-7, Air borne Warnig and Control System (AWACS), Sindewinder air to air missile F-15s and KC-35 tankers.<sup>30</sup> Pakistan fought a long proxy war against Soviet Union as a 'front line state.'

One of greater supporter of Afghan *Mujhedeem* was Congressman Charles Wilson. He was convinced that Afghan war was the right war at right time. He wanted revenge of 58,000 Americans killed in Vietnam by Soviets. In House Appropriation Committee meeting for Defence Department budget, Wilson said he wanted only one thing, more money for the Afghan rebels. He remained successful in providing extra \$ 48 million in July 1980 and additional \$ 50 million in July 1981. However, under Reagan Doctrine US military aid to Afghan *Mujahideem* rose from \$ 80 million in 1983 to \$ 120 million in 1984, \$ 250 million in 1985, \$ 470 million in 1986, and \$360 million in 1987.<sup>31</sup>

## US Military and Economic Aid to Pakistan

Throughout the Afghan crisis, Pakistan received a large scaled military and economic aid from China, United States and Saudi Arabia. The biggest aid donor to Pakistan was United States; Pakistan came among the top four countries which were



receiving economic aid from United States. It provided the arms and ammunition to Pakistan to protect its commercial and strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region. Thus Pakistan army was better equipped and its security was improved with United States assistance. It included improved warning and communication system, anti-tank missiles, ground attack aircraft, tanks and armored personnel carriers. In 1981, the Reagan administration provided the package of \$ 343 to buy 40 General Dynamic F-16 Hornet fighters with most advanced version. The aircrafts were equipped with more sophisticated ALR-69 electric counter measure system. Additionally, Pakistan obtained the AIM 9L version of the Sidewinder missile. Pakistan also received Harpoon anti-ship missiles, upgraded M-48 tanks, tanks recover vehicles, towed and self-propelled field artillery, armed helicopters, and warning systems.<sup>32</sup>

Throughout the 1980s, the United States assistance committed to Pakistan's military and economic budgets was more than \$ 7.2 billions. In August 1981, the United States provided a five year (1981-1985) aid Package to Pakistan in the amount of \$ 3.2 divided equally between military and economic assistance. During 1982-1988 USAID provided \$ 954.2 million in developing aid to Pakistan and \$ 205 million for the development of irrigation, form water management project. In 1985 the US approved a package of \$ 4.02 billion in military and economic aid for the next four years (1986-1990), on generally concessional terms, and Pakistan emerged as second recipient of the US aid, after Israel.<sup>33</sup>

### Geneva Accord (1988)

In response to US economic and military aid, General Zia persistently pursued four major objectives in regard to the Soviet Union and Afghanistan and put aside two-

sided relation with Soviet Union. He demanded, firstly, complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan; secondly return, and rehabilitation of about three million Afghan refugees, thirdly, maintenance of the Islamic character of Afghanistan, and fourthly, and restoration of non-aligned status of Afghanistan.<sup>34</sup> In the very beginning of 1980, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly voted to approve these principles. Informal negotiations for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had been underway since 1982. The UN through the appointment of General Secretary's Special representative initiated the negotiating process between the four powers, USSR, USA, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In April 1988, in Geneva, negotiations eventually shaped out accords for the Afghan crisis.<sup>35</sup> Among other things the Geneva Accords identified the U.S. and Soviet non-intervention with internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan and a timetable for full Soviet withdrawal.<sup>36</sup> The agreement on withdrawal held, and on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet troops departed on schedule from Afghanistan.<sup>37</sup>

The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to guarantee the pact, but also acknowledged that the United States had the right to continue providing arms to the Mujahideen if the Soviet Union continued to aid the Afghan government. The Soviet Union further undertook to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Its withdrawal was complete in February 1989. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev brought Najeebullah and Babrak Karmal to Moscow to clarify Soviet policy and warned that Najeebullah had to strengthen political bases because Soviet Union would be withdrawn in twelve months.<sup>38</sup> However two years later Soviet Union declined and disintegrated.

## Soviet Collapse

From 1989 to 1991, Soviet Union was inevitably moving towards its decline. The completion of the down fall is conventionally dated as autumn 1989 for the Eastern

Europe and autumn 1991 for the Soviet Union. Raymond Pearson narrates that “the beginning of the Soviet decline has been variously identified as the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev to the supreme Soviet Power in 1985 and the turning-point year of 1987, when both *perestroika* and *glasnost* developed a momentum beyond the power of authority to halt, control or even channel.”<sup>39</sup> Gorbachev came into power, in 1985; denounced Stalinist policies, “the totalitarian bureaucratic system.” In order to reform the Soviet system fundamentally, Gorbachev initiated the policy of *perestroika* (reconstruction) to remove corrupt economic system, and *glasnost* (openness) for liberal socio-political system. He thought his policies would bring an era of democratic socialism, the real objective of the Leninist-Marxist revolution. Resultantly, the removal of the Stalinist model of the Soviet Union was Gorbachev’s affirmed objective. Without any alternative system to replace the old model, Gorbachev’s policies made Soviet political and economic structure incomprehensible.<sup>40</sup>

The disintegration of Soviet Union accompanied the fall of Gorbachev in December 1991. The factors which led his denouncement were: the opposition of CPSU and corruption within its ranks, decline in the economy, the policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* against Stalinist model, and the inexorable march of Soviet Republics for the independence and succession. All these factors catch up the decline of Soviet Union<sup>41</sup>

In August 1991, Boris Yeltsin staged a coup *d’etat* and he seized the key Soviet economic and financial institutions. Yeltsin started to undermine the Gorbachev’s devised Union Treaty, which had been strongly supported by a popular referendum in March 1991. In December 1991, Yeltsin met with his presidential counterparts in Ukraine and Bulgaria, and announced the establishment of Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS). This caused the end of Union Treaty and to the Soviet Union.<sup>42</sup>

With the high-cost reform programme within the Soviet Union as the dominant concern, attitudes and policies based on four decades of superpower rivalry were abandoned, and, instead, the emphasis was on securing western goodwill and support. Though, the Soviet Union did not stop behaving as a major player in the world stage, its weight and capacity to influence events declined rapidly. President George H. W. Bush (1989-1993), whose presidency saw this remarkable transformation, made it a point to carry to Moscow with him on major initiatives and pro-American thinking also emerged in Russia. The Gulf War of 1991 saw the Soviet Union making some efforts to play an independent role, but its initiatives had no impact, and one of the lessons of influence that last major conflict was that Moscow no longer had the influence or capability to shape events, or even to apply considerable influence on the debates of the United Nations.<sup>43</sup>

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in February 1989 marked the end of direct involvement in a country bordering that region, though Moscow continued to provide economic and military support to the Najibullah regime in Kabul, till the Soviet Union imploded in December 1991.<sup>44</sup> However, a significant policy shift by the declining Superpower had taken place in November 1991 when Moscow voted, for the first time, for Pakistan's proposal for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Though the actual content of the advantageous commercial and military arrangements declined as instability and confusion within the vast Soviet empire created conditions in which normal transactions and interaction became possible. Total bilateral trade between India and the Soviet Union, which was of the order of Rs. 88 billion in 1990, fell to Rs. 20 billion in 1992. The personal prestige and influence of Gorbachev himself were affected by the diminishing standing of his country and by the challenges he was facing from leaders of various republics within the Soviet Union. He himself sought to project a more even-

handed attitude during his last visit to India in 1991 when he showed consideration for Pakistani concerns in some of his public utterances. Moreover, he sent the then Vice Foreign Minister Kozyrev to Pakistan in August 1991, after the announcement of the restoration of the Indo-Soviet Treaty which was due to expire on 9 August 1991.<sup>45</sup>

In the post Soviet period, the detente between Russia and West was emerged, and new orientation about the Non-Arab Pan-Islam, which enhanced due to Afghan *jihad*, became the concern of the Western powers. Old western policy of containment of Communism was replaced with the containment of Islam.<sup>46</sup> After the end of cold war the Russian and American economic and military aid were stopped, because it was no more beneficial for them. They very well knew the fact that the aid would be used by India and Pakistan to enhance their military capabilities against each other.

During the Afghan war period, Soviet Union acted one of the major powers of the international system and preceded Afghanistan to protect pro-Moscow government of Afghanistan. On the other hand Pakistan, being a small vulnerable state, perceived a threat to its security, survival and integrity, and responded it with true defensive realist approach collaborated with United States—which was striving to defend its on interests in Indian Ocean an Persian Gulf region—and used its entire diplomatic, strategic, and political means to defend its territorial sovereignty and integrity until the withdrawal of Soviet troops from neighbourly state of Afghan.

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- <sup>3</sup> Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan A New History*. (London: Curzon Press, 2001), pp. 128-29.
- <sup>4</sup> Grover, *Afghanistan Government and Politics*, pp. 62-64.
- <sup>5</sup> Ewans, *Afghanistan A New History*, pp. 142-143.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 293-94; Grover, *Afghanistan Government and Politics*, pp. 62-24
- <sup>7</sup> Ewans, *Afghanistan A New History*, pp. 136-37, 124, 146, 153.
- <sup>8</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, London: Macmillan Publishing Co. 1994), p. 227-29.
- <sup>9</sup> Maboob Ahmed Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union*, (Karachi: Pakistan Studies Center, 1988), p. 133.
- <sup>10</sup> Malik, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*, p. 338.
- <sup>11</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics*, pp. 228-29.
- <sup>12</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union*, p. 134.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38.
- <sup>14</sup> Askari, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment*, p. 122.
- <sup>15</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union*, p. 136.
- <sup>16</sup> In August 1979, due to American pressure France concealed the deal with Pakistan for reprocessing unclear plant.
- <sup>17</sup> Malik, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*, pp. 338-39.
- <sup>18</sup> Mushtaq Ahmed, *Foreign Policy Pakistan's Options*, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995), p. 340.
- <sup>19</sup> Popatia, *Pakistan's Relations with Soviet Union*, p. 136.
- <sup>20</sup> Address of President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq at Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 13 February, 1986, in M. Iqbal Gondal, "Pakistan's Relations with Russia 1947-2003," *Pakistan Vision*, Vol., 5, No., 2, (December, 2004), pp. 69-70.
- <sup>21</sup> Maboob Ahmed Popatia wrote, "Hafizullah Amin, the Afghan Prime Minister and ideologue the April Revolution, was a hard-liner and insisted on adaptation of harsh measures against the opponents. During July-September 1979, he also enthusiastically advocated the concept of 'Greater Afghanistan' stretching from the Oxus River (Afghanistan's northern boundary with the Soviet Union) to the Abasin (River Indus in Pakistan) which constitute North Frontier border with Punjab. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
- <sup>22</sup> The Brezhnev Doctrine was a model of Soviet foreign policy, first and most clearly outlined by S. Kovalev in a September 26, 1968 *Pravda* article, entitled "Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries." Leonid Brezhnev reiterated it in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on November 13, 1968, according to Brezhnev Doctrine any threat to a Communist state would be considered as threat to the Soviet Union itself.
- <sup>23</sup> Maqbool Ahmed Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia*, (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies), pp. 119-20.
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- <sup>25</sup> Mehrunnisa Ali, "Soviet-Pakistan Ties since the Afghanistan Crisis," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 9. (September, 1983), p. 1025.
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- <sup>27</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and South Asia* p. 121
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- <sup>29</sup> Mehrunnisa Ali, "Soviet-Pakistan Ties since the Afghanistan Crisis," p. 1031.
- <sup>30</sup> A. Z. Hilali, *US-Pakistan Relationships: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, (London: MPG Books Ltd., 2005), pp. 162-64.
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- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp.195-96.
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- <sup>37</sup> Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan A New History*, p. 196.
- <sup>38</sup> Hilali, *US-Pakistan Relationships: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 86.
- <sup>39</sup> Raymond Pearson, *The Rise and Fall of Soviet Empire*, (China: Palgrave, 2002), p.176.
- <sup>40</sup> Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, (London: Clays Ltd. St Ives PLC, 1999), pp. 87-90.
- <sup>41</sup> Malik, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*, pp. 340-341.
- <sup>42</sup> Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics*, p. 99.
- <sup>43</sup> Bhatti, *Great Powers and Soviet Asia Post-Cold War Trend*, " p. 126.
- <sup>44</sup> Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan A New History*, p. 196.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 124
- <sup>46</sup> Malik, *Soviet Union-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics*, p. 316.

## CONCLUSION

Pakistan-Soviet Union relations during the Cold War era cannot be analyzed in isolation. Great Powers' struggle to enhance their areas of influence and hegemony; the role of regional actors, India, China, Afghanistan and Bangladesh; and domestic variants determine the pattern of the relations of both states.

The international system of power politics/struggle, since World War II until the collapse of USSR, had largely remained divided into two camps, using two conflicting ideological slogans, Capitalist-liberalism and Communism. This bipolarity was emerged because of new distribution of power in the world and vacuum created by Second World War. After the declining of the 'power and influence' of Europe, the great power status shifted to the US and the Soviet Union. 'Power' and 'ideology' (a states' tool for mass mobilization) divided the World into two camps. Ambitions, interests and roles of the two post-war major powers began to diverge. Wartime allies failed to develop on the consensus of issues. The rivalry between the USSR and US generated by 'conflict of interests,' and perceived world roles gave rise to 'competitive globalism'. This most of superpower interaction was bound to influence the basic dynamics of world politics. The United States and the Soviet Union succeeded "global penetration, influence and hegemony" by unprecedented "accumulation of power resources, destructive technologies and organizations." The process of change introduced by the colonial retreat



of Europe from the third world, and the absence of any similar centre of power left the various sub-system of the world open to superpower influence and penetration.

Inherent domestic problems—security, peace and political stability—and international system of bipolarity put the Third World countries into the conundrum of choice of friends and enemies for mutual interactions. In the early period of Cold War, small and fragile states had to face external pressure for alignments ignoring their domestic ideological and ethical norms and values in order to deter external threats. Pakistan, like other Middle East countries, had to fall on the Western side and joined SEATO and CENTO, in order to fulfill its defense capabilities. Because of Soviet and US military aid, Indo-Pakistan inherent antagonism opened the way of military and weaponry race in the South Asian region. In Pakistan military cadre used public sentiments against India to achieve legitimacy for their takeover and large share of budget. In the same way Soviet Union and United States exploited the regional problems of India and Pakistan during the East Pakistan crisis, and afterwards in Afghan War.

Pakistan's foreign policy towards Soviet Union had been derived by two types of South Asian constrains. First one was higher degree of instability in the international system. Second is the liability and vulnerability of the South Asian system to the great powers struggle to establish their hegemony in the region. Bipolarity and Cold War tensions were successfully exploited by the regional antagonist to enhance their powers in order to use against each other. This can be seen in events of Indo-Pakistan wars, Indo-China War, and Pakistan's involvement in Afghan war. Competitive globalism of the great powers motivated them to establish relationship with the local powers in the various sub-systems of the world.

During cold war era, in spite of alliance system, cooperation among states emerged only with the convergence of interests. In Sino-Indian war of 1962, United States remained committed to provide military support to India, though Pakistan, being a staunch ally of the West protested against American favor to India. During 1980s, US attitude was same in favor of Pakistan despite the criticism of India.

As far as the question of collective security was concerned, the United Nations was established with the aim to defend international peace. But it remained under the influence of great powers rivalry, and could not provide peace and security especially to the smaller and weaker states. The United Nations, despite the universality of its membership, was divided against itself. Resultantly that collective security rapidly turned into a regional complexion. Self-sufficient and self-contained loyalties of members of United States often violated boundaries and ideological frontiers of other states. This attitude of great powers disqualified the checks and balances operating inside the United Nations. Sometimes the Superpowers were determined to impose their supremacy in the United Nations due to their economic and strategic interests. The conflicts and wars of India and Pakistan, India and China, Pakistan's defaulted role in Afghan War, are the explicit evidence of the failure of United Nations.

Exclusive focus of the study of Pakistan-Soviet Union relations reveals that in initial period, just after the creation of Pakistan, both states were reluctant to develop good relations due to their past unfriendly interactions and distrust and suspensions for future. Soviet Union had not manifested any positive response to the Pakistan movement; the movement leader had been criticized by the Soviet Union, which created a gap of understanding regarding each others among the policymaker and leaders of both states. In

such circumstances, Pakistani leaders' developed intimacy and familiarity with its parental state that caused Pakistan's tilt towards the western powers. In addition to this, it was perceived in Pakistan that the western bloc could be more helpful in order to strengthen Pakistan more willingly than Soviet Union, which had expansionist tendencies.

Until 1962, Pakistan remained a staunch ally of the western powers. However, American exorbitant armed supply to India, despite the protest of Pakistan, during Sino-India war of 1962, created a sagacity of 'self help' among the Pakistani leaders and policymakers. Pakistan started to consider other options as well. Soviet intentions to play a hegemonic role in South Asia and Pakistan's new approach took both states closer during the period of 1970s. Soviet Union exceeded in its intention and proposed Asian Collective Security System which was not admissible to Pakistan, because Pakistan perceived it against its frontal state of China. Resultantly, Soviet Union appeased India against Pakistan during Bangladesh crisis and Indo-Pak war of 1971. Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto pursued more realist approach of '*bilateralism*' towards the superpowers. But soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, created a sense of insecurity and a threat to survival of Pakistan President Zia invoked western powers interested for Pakistan's support against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Sense of insecurity in Pakistan became the cause of Pakistan's proxy war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan till the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan.

**TABLE**  
**Volume of Soviets Foreign Trade with**  
**the South Asian Countries (1970-1980) in million roubles**

Country	1970	1975	1980	1981	1982
India					
Turnover	364.9	685.6	1739.8	2397.9	2514.0
Exports	122.3	292.1	861.2	1064.1	1040.2
Imports	242.6	393.5	878.6	1333.e	1473.8
Pakistan					
	60.4	60.7	176.6	124.6	142.0
	32.1	37.1	126.2	76.3	71.4
	28.3	33.6	50.4	48.3	70.6
Sri Lanka					
	17.0	22.4	30.3	24.0	21.1
	5.0	12.0	4.6	2.8	3.1
	12.0	10.4	253	21.2	18.0
Nepal					
	1.3	5.5	14.4	22.0	23.8
	0.7	5.0	9.2	20.0	22.1
	0.6	0.5	5.2	2.0	1.7

Source: V.Klochek, A. Alexeyew, N. Tretyukhlin, *Soviet Foreign Trade: Today And Tomorrow* (Moscow: Praeger Publishers, 1985), pp.267-669, in Jain, R. K. *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-1978*. (Vol. 1-2, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978).

**Table: Industrial Assistance to Pakistan**

Description of project	Allocations	Dale of credit
1. Oil exploration	\$ 30 million	4 March 1961
2. Import of Soviet agricultural machinery	\$ 11 million	17 June 1964
3. First general credit	\$ 50 million	7 April 1965
4. Second general credit for these projects	\$ 85 million	6, 9 Sept. 1966
1) Guddu thermal power station of 210 MW capacity over the Indus River.		
2) A high-voltage transmission line more than 1000 km long.		
3) Fifteen broadcasting stations of different capacity (including one for Islamabad and one for Quetta).		
4) Two plants for the production of electrical machinery with an annual capacity of 20 000 tons of electrical equipment.		
5) A <sup>combined</sup> railroad-highway bridge over the Rupsu River.		
6) Geological surveys to prospect for solid minerals.		
5. Karachi steel mill (financing the cost of machinery and equipment (1971 allocation was \$ 200m was increased to S 493m)	\$ 493 million	22 Jan. 971
6. Karachi steel mill (additional credits for	160 million	October 1974
7. Twelve years at 2.5% interest)	rubles	
8. Karachi steel mill (USSR to provide equipment and construction material)	Rs 5230 million	26 July 1975

Sources: George Ginsburg and Robert M. Slusser (eds), *A Calendar of Soviet Treaties* (Rockville, Maryland: 1981); R. K. Jain (ed.), *Soviet-South Asian Relations, 1947-1978* (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: 1979).

**Soviet Economic Aid Agreements with Major  
Indian Ocean Status  
(In Million US \$)**

Country	1955-64	1965-74	1975-79	Total
Egypt	1,000	440	0	1,440
Iran	65	725	375	1,165
Iraq	185	370	150	705
Afghanistan	530	300	450	1,290
India	010	1,130	340	2,200
Pakistan	40	655	225	920

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Centre, *Communist Aid Activities In Non-Communist Developing Countries, 1979 and 1954-79* (Washington, D.C., October 1980), p.7 cited in Elizabeth Kird Valkenier *The Soviet Union And the Third World An Economic Bind* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 153, in Moonis Ahmar, *Super Powers Rivalry in Indian Ocean: Since the Withdrawal of Great Britain*, (Karachi Area Study Center for Europe, 1986).

**Soviet Economic Aid Agreements with major  
Indian Ocean States  
(In Million US \$)**

Country	1955-64	1965-74	1975-79	Total
Egypt	1,000	440	0	1,440
Iran	65	725	375	1,165
Iraq	185	370	150	705
Afghanistan	530	300	450	1,290
India	010	1,130	340	2,200
Pakistan	40	655	225	920

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Centre, *Communist Aid Activities In Non-Communist Developing Countries, 1979 and 1954-79* (Washington, D.C., October 1980), p.7 cited in Elizabeth Krald Valkenier *The Soviet Union And the Third World An Economic Bind* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p.153, in Moonis Ahmar, *Super Powers Rivalry in Indian Ocean: Since the Withdrawal of Great Britain*, (Karachi Area Study Center for Europe, 1986).

Table  
Soviet Friendship Treaties with the Indian Ocean  
States

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1. Egypt	27 May 1971, unilaterally abrogated by Egypt on 15 March 1979
2. India	9 August 1971
3. Iraq	9 April 1972
4. Somalia	11 July 1974, unilaterally abrogated by Somalia on 13 November 1977
5. Angola	9 October 1976
6. Mozambique	31 March 1977
7. Vietnam	3 November 1970
8. Ethiopia	20 November 1978
9. Afghanistan	5 December 1978
10. South Yemen	25 October 1979
11. Syria	October 1980

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Source: Moonis Ahmar, *Super Powers Rivalry in Indian Ocean: Since the Withdrawal of Great Britain*, (Karachi Area Study Center for Europe, 1986).



Table: Refugees' influx into Pakistan

Month/ years	Numbers
June 1980	900,000
December 1980	1,400,000
June 1981	2,080,000
December 1981	2,300,000
June 1982	2,700,000
December 1982	2,740,000
June/ July 1983	2,820,000
December 1983	3,000,000

Source: Dr. Abdul Hameed Malik, *Implied Afghan Migration to Pakistan 1978-1983*, (Peshawar: Area Study Center Peshawar, 2002), p. 33.

#### Area-wise breakdown of Afghan emigrants in July, 1983

Area	Total	Males	Female	Children	Families
NWFP/FATA	2077,748	508,486	676,123	993,139	294,624
Balochistan	698,709	162,876	176,807	359,026	116,106
Punjab	44,028	8,574	9,721	25,733	7,475
Total	2,820,485	679,936	762,651	1,377,898	418,201

Source: Dr. Abdul Hameed Malik, *Implied Afghan Migration to Pakistan 1978-1983*, (Peshawar: Area Study Center Peshawar, 2002), p. 34.

Table: US Arm Supply to Pakistan 1980-1987

No	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Years	Years of delivery
5	E-2C-Hawkeye	Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (AEW)	1986	1987
3	Model 204 UH-4B	Helicopters	1986	1987
88	M-109 A-2	Self Propelled Howitzer	1985	1986-87
110	M-113-A-2	Armoured Personnel Carrier	1985	1986-87
60	155mm	Tracking Howitzer	1986	1987
1	AN-IPO	Tracking Radar	1987	1987
500	AIM-7	Air to Air Missiles	1985	1986-87
400	BGM-71C1-TCW	Air Targeting Mode (ATM)	1986	1987
86	BGM-71D TW-3	ATM-Military Aircraft	1987	1987
150	FIM-92 Stinger	Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)	1987	1987
40	F-16	Fighting Falcon	1984	1986
3	P3s	Maritime Reconnaissance	1985	1985
2	Naval Ship	Carrier Class Destroyers	1985	1985
21	Cobra	Combat Helicopters	1985	1986
10	Radars	Ground-based Air Defense Radars	1985	1986
2	Naval Ship	Gearing Class Destroyers	1985	1986
80	Naval Missile	Harpoon	1985	1986
2	M-189	Howitzers	1985	1986
100	M 1A1 Abrams & M 48 A5	Battle Tanks	1984	1986
50	M113 Military Vehicles	Armed Personnel Carries	1984	1985
9000	SMAW-anti-amour rocket	Shoulder-fire Rockets	1985	1986
50	Self-propelled	Self-propelled Artillery	1985	1986
100	AIM 9L Sidewinder	Advanced AAM	1985	1986
2	Mohawk	Observation Aircraft	1986	1987
560	AIM-7 Sparrow	Air-to-Air Missile	1986	1987
200	AIM 9L Sidewinder	Anti-Tank missiles	1986	1987
150	TOW	Anti-Tank Missiles	1986	1987
124	TOW	Air-to-Air Missiles	1987	1988

Sources: "Commentary on US Military Aid to Pakistan," *Delhi General Overseas Service*. (6 January 1988), reported in FBIS-NES-88-004, (7 January 1988), p. 48; and see *US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1990* (Washington, DC: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991), p.9; Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World 1986-1993" (Washington, DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (29 July 1994), pp. 38-56; and Michael T. Klare, "The Arms Trade: Changing Pattern in the 1980s," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1987), pp. 1257-81. in Z. A. Hilali, *US-Pakistan Relationships: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, (Peshawar: University of Peshawar Pakistan, 2005), p. 195.

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