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**DEVELOPMENT OF  
PAKISTAN NAVY; AN  
ANALYSIS OF FACTORS  
HAMPERING ITS  
PROGRESS**

**By**

**SARWAT SULTANA**

**National Institute of Pakistan Studies  
Quaid-I-Azam University  
Islamabad  
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
**NATIONAL Institute of Pakistan Studies  
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Dated: Feb \_\_\_\_\_ 98

**FINAL APPROVAL OF THESIS**

This is to certify that we have read the thesis submitted by **Mrs Sarwat Sultana** and it is our judgement that this thesis is of sufficient standard to warrant its acceptance by the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad for the award of degree of Master of Philosophy in Pakistan Studies.

Thesis Examination Committee



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(Dr Gulam Haider Sindhi)



**Supervisor**  
(Dr Mujawar Hussain Shah)



**External**

**Sarim Ahmed Sami**

**my loving son**

**Dedicated to**

## ACKNOELEDGMENT

All praise to Almighty Allah who enabled me to complete this dissertation in time.

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I have inevitably committed some errors or have misunderstood, let it be attributed to ignorance, not intention.

Islamabad  
February 25, 1998

**Sarwart Sultana**

**Topic:      Development of the Pakistan Navy; Analysis of the Factors Hampering its progress:**

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# INTRODUCTION

## Purpose of Study

The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean has come to be recognised increasingly in recent decades. It is accompanied by growing militarisation throughout the area which has included naval build up both by the littoral states and the great powers.

Pakistan is a littoral country having 900 km long coastline. Its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is spread over 2400 sq km in the Indian Ocean. Its geographical location, in the close proximity of Gulf, is of special strategic significance.

There are numerous sources of conflict in the region and these tend to spur on local naval expansion. Nature of India-Pakistan relations are hostile since the inception of these states. These facts demand vital naval role as it is a part of defence mechanism. After independence not much has been written on Navy and particularly its performance. This study plans to look into the development of Pakistan Navy and particularly the factors which have hampered its progress.

## Significance of the study

It is generally believed that geography can be a great asset or a great liability. Pakistan's location in the Indian Ocean gives it a special character. Pakistan has a readily identifiable threat from India whose growing strength at sea and deployment of nuclear capability and

medium range ballistic missiles on the borders can not be ignored. The defence of a country including the protection of sea frontiers, is a prerequisite for a nation's survival. In this perspective, the role of Pakistan Navy is very complex and manifold. Our geographical location, geopolitical environments, international trade, the resources of the country and a host of other factors make it all the more pertinent.

Since independence, Navy remains third in priority among three armed forces of Pakistan. After fighting two major wars with India and a span of five decades of its establishment, Pakistan has not been able to develop its Naval capabilities as compared to other two forces. It will be easier to identify the problems after having analysed various factors hampering the progress of Pakistan's Navy.

## **Method of Study and Sources**

As Pakistan Navy is numerically a small force and it has not played any significant role in the global scenario, foreign authors have seldom touched this topic. Even the personnel of Pakistan Navy have not written a single book on Pakistan Navy. So the material on the topic is very scarce. In order to complete the study, heavy reliance was laid upon field notes, interviews from concerned sources and material from the newspapers. The Naval personnel were reluctant even to discuss about the topic and some avoided to disclose any thing because of "SECRET OFFICIAL ACT". Some of them did provide useful information but insisted not to disclose their identity. Therefore, they have been quoted as anonymous. These in-depth informal interviews

were without any proper schedule. In cases where a schedule was prepared, the discussions turned them up down that's why there was no proper questioner as the demand of the topic was the same.

Naval Headquarter's Officials were also reluctant to provide the required information quoting them as "Official Secrets", where the figures of almost all secrets e.g. equipment purchased, indigenous production and the personnel are available in all the year books of armament and defence.

There is only one official document "**Story of The Pakistan Navy**" written by "History Section" of Pakistan Navy in 1991 which only covers the period from 1947 to 1972. The rest of 25 years period from 1972 to 1997 is covered by the "Official Secret Act" In this book, apart from many books, many official documents like Official Records, Admiralty Files, Minutes of NHQ Staff Meetings, Minutes of D.C.C. Meetings, Minutes of C-in-C's Meetings, Minutes of Meeting on US Aid and personal notes of Rear Admiral (Retd) J.W. Jefford, Vice Admiral (Retd) HMS Choudhry, Rear Admiral (Retd) U.A Saied, Commodore (Retd) IK Mumtaz and Commodore (Retd) SB Salim were consulted.

Due to the peculiar nature of the research work, the descriptive/analytical method has been adopted in the study.

## **Review of Literature**

As mentioned earlier, except "**Story of The Pakistan Navy**" there is not any particular published book on the subject. The "**Story of**

**The Pakistan Navy (1991)**” is an official publication and a first attempt to narrate the establishment and evolution of Navy over the first quarter of a century in Indo-Pak Subcontinent. This book gives the background before partition and the difficult birth and the development of the Pakistan Navy up to 1972. It is a simple narrative which is written without any effort to analyze or express any opinion.

Commander E.C. Streatfield James, a retired Royal Indian Naval officer, in his book **“In the Wake”** (1983) has narrated the story of the birth of the Indian and Pakistan Navies. This book is mainly concerned with an account of duties during his service in Royal Indian Navy (RIN) and provides no information about the evolution of Navies in India and Pakistan.

R.N. Misra's, **“Indian Ocean and India's Security”** (1988) and some books of Admiral S.N. Kohli i.e. **“Sea Power and Indian Ocean”** (1979) and **“We Dared”** (1989) are biased and one sided. These books contain many false and baseless statements regarding the two wars between India and Pakistan and do not have any academic worth. However, Admiral Kohli has presented his case quite confidently which is the Indian version of the two wars between Pakistan and India.

The **“Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery”**(1976) by Paul Kennedy is an historical account of the Royal Navy. It chronologically covers its establishment, formation of different companies, their achievements and finally their role in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century which was the dawn of British Naval Mastery. A part of this book,

dealing with East India Company has some relevance with the present study.

Fazal Muqeem Khan, in his book **"Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"** (1973) lifts the curtain from the tragic events in Pakistan during the crucial period of 1969-1971. It is the first detailed account on 1971 events. The book contains a chapter "Pakistan Navy in the war" which is unbiased. An authentic analysis of the performance and causes of failures of Pakistan Navy in 1971 have been given.

**"Navies and Foreign Policy"** (1979) is a theoretical study of the role of Navy in the formation of foreign policy of any state which elucidates the relationship of foreign policy with naval power.

## **Frame Work of the Study**

The present study is divided in two parts. Part-I contains an introduction, purpose and significance of the study, method of study, sources, review of literature and background including the formation of Naval force in the sub-continent, geographical location of Pakistan, division of assets, command and control structure of Pakistan Navy, maritime security interests/ threats and strategic doctrine.

A detailed analysis of factors like lack of political will/ supervision, economic problems, under development of ports, indigenous production, inter wing rivalries, politics inside Armed forces, absence of adequate three dimensional Navy, Super power's interest and Indian's hegemony in the Indian Ocean has been given in

Part-II. This part consists of three chapters, which have been grouped as under:

- a. Political factors
- b. Institutional factors and
- c. International factors.

Lack of political will/ supervision, economic problem, inter wing rivalries and lack/under development of ports have been discussed in chapter-II. The defence forces and their inter-departmental relations, indigenous production and absence of adequate three dimensional Navy are parts of third chapter, while fourth chapter discusses the interests of super powers and Indian hegemony in Indian Ocean which is entitled as "International Factors".

The study concludes with the recommendations that for up-dating and modernization of Pakistan Navy is essential in order to meet any future challenge as well as to assist other forces.

# PART I

## CHAPTER I

### BACK GROUND

#### **a: Formation of Naval Force in the Indo-Pak Sub-continent**

Hindus of ancient India were of the view that they must not leave their country and should not cross the sea and protect their frontiers. Their threat perception was land based, and no incident of building naval force in ancient India is recorded in history. Even earlier Muslim rulers of the sub-continent neglected this aspect (Ibne Ali:UP:13).

These were Britishers who introduced this idea to the natives. In the later part of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the rising English nation decided to discover new lands (Story:1991:12). However, much of the driving force behind English overseas expansion was provided by economic desires. Therefore, a whole lot of chartered companies were founded for different regions. East India Company was one of them (Kennedy:1976:25).

When captain Best, with his two ships, Dragon and Osiander entered Surat in the Gulf of Bombay in 1612, it was to afford protection to the East India Company' factory at that port (Kennedy:1976:28). Captain Best had presented his credentials to the Great Mughal Emperor Jehangir and was warmly received. He was accorded with the dignity of an Admiral to the Mughal Emperor with an annual salary of Pound Sterling 5,600 in addition to the 'Farman' or

'licence to trade'. Emperor AurangZeb decided to establish a Mughal fleet since he already had an Admiral (James:1983:13). Till 1639 East India Company had established itself in many cities of Indian sub-continent. These years are considered as the take-off stage for that fruitful inter-action of colonies, shipping, trade and strength upon which a world empire and naval mastery was to be erected (Kennedy:1976:37).

In 1686, British ships were shifted to Bombay from Swallow (Surat). They were then named Bombay Marine (James:1983:15). They fought many wars with Dutchs and Frenchs. During most of the later half of the 18th century, the Bombay marine, either on its own or in conjunction with Royal Navy, carried out various operations (Kennedy:1976:35). During 1768-99, they fought against Haider Ali and his son Tipu Sultan. Both were helpless and weak at sea frontiers (Story:1991:9)

Since its formation, this Naval force had borne various titles, which include:-

1612 Honourable East India's Company Marine.

1686 Bombay Marine

1830 Indian Navy

1863 Bombay Marine (at expiry of HEIC and  
transfer to the crown)

1877 Her Majesty's Indian Marine

1892 Royal Indian Marine

## 1934 Royal Indian Navy

(James: 1983: 14)

When the British crown assumed the direct rule of the Indian Empire on Monday 1st Nov 1858, the booming of the Naval canons in a celebrating ceremony was a death knell not only of the company but also of the free India (Story:1991:16). The area of the operation of the service, despite whatever designation it might bore, was from the longitude of the cape of Good Hope on the West to that of Cape Horn on the East, i.e. the waters of the Indian and Pacific Ocean. This service came in for operational service from New Zealand in the East to the Nile in the West (James:1983:14).

During both the world wars, it served transportation and lodging purposes and performed active services in almost all major theatres of war. The Royal Navy played an effective role under the British Command during World War II (James:1983:98). The Navy was engaged primarily in duties such as transporting troops and maintaining gun boats on the Irrawaddy and Tigris, government light craft used for military duties and light ships and light houses around the coasts of India, the Red Sea and marine survey of India (Ibne Ali:UP:23). On the conclusion of war, a Chiefs of Staff Committee was set up to re-organize the Royal Indian Navy. The committee's view was that India's central position in Indian Ocean might invite an aggressive superpower Russia (Story:1991:34). Therefore, it had to be prepared at all time. For this purpose it was decided to increase the number of men and equipment. Total personnel were estimated as

1500 officers and 15000 sailors to be trained over a phased programme and replace Royal Navy personnel (Story:1991:19).

Until 1939 the sailors of the Navy were mostly from Ratnagiri district and the sea-coast of Konkan, south of Bombay Muslims comprised 75 % of the total force but the picture rapidly changed after 1939 (Ibne-Ali:UP.24). This difference is clearly depicted in following table which describes the comparative class-wise composition over the same period expressed in percentage. This indicates a remarkable increase of the Hindus and decline of Muslims in recruitment in navy when the strength of the service was expanded from 1310 in 1939 to 27,763 at the peak period in 1945 (James:1983:132).

Caste	In 1939(%)	In 1945(%)
Hindu	9.25	42.5
Muslim	75	35.5
Christian	13	19
Sikhs	.5	1.5
Anglo Indians	2	1.25

(James:1983:132)

## **b: Division of Assets**

Following the second World War, the Labour Government which had come to power in Great Britain, sent Cabinet Mission to India which failed (Qureshi:1982:13). In Feb 1947, Lord Louis Mountbaten was appointed as Viceroy to India with the mission to

grant independence to India before June 1948. But Mountbatten, after heated discussions, announced to complete the task of transfer of power by Aug 1947 (Collins & Lapiere:1975:23). There was very short time of two and a half months to prepare for partition. Important decisions had to be taken regarding, (a) Demarcation of boundaries, (b) Division of armed forces and Division of installations, stores and defence services (Ali:1973:174).

The division of the Armed forces was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck. He set up a committee under the name of Auchinleck's Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee (AAFRC) which was to be assisted by three sub-committees for all three forces. The naval subcommittee was headed by Commodore J.W. Jefford. The members included the equal numbers of naval officers from the perspective navies of India and Pakistan (Ibne-Ali:UP:33). The shores establishments naturally became a part of the dominion in which they happened to be located. The division of the ships was not so difficult but the dockyard machinery posed a problem. After prolonged discussions, it was decided to divide it (Story:1991:49).

As far as the division of the ships was concerned, the division seems to have been arrived at on the basis of the actual needs of the two dominions rather than on exact arithmetical split (Story:1991:50). Two third of the total ships were given to India because of its larger coast line. In short, the major part of the fleet went to India. She was given 32 ships and all existing landing crafts. Pakistan, on the other

hand, received 16 ships, 2 sloops, 2 frigates, 2 trawlers, 4 mine sweepers, 2 motor mine sweepers and 4 HDMLS (Story:1991:52).

Before partition, most of the training establishments were situated in Bombay or some other areas which comprised of India.. Pakistan only got a Boy Training Establishment HMPS Bhadur in Karachi at Manora island and also a Gunnery Training School HMPS Himalaya. Two Frigates namely Sind and Jhelum, one training ship Samsher and a survey vessel Zulfiqar were given for deep ocean survey and few coastal mine-sweepers were also the part of Pakistan's Naval force.

Afterwards, a general referendum was held to determine who opted to serve in which Navy. The general principle was that a Muslim in India and a Hindu in Pakistan could opt for either of the two Navies whereas a Muslim in Pakistan and a Hindu in India had no choice (Ali:1973:183). Those who did not wish to serve in either navy could be released but without pension and other benefits. The number of Muslim officers in the RIN was approximately 15 %. With the data received from the general referendum, a gigantic drafting programme was put into operation (Story:1991:52). Senior most officer of Royal Navy H.M.S Choudary had only fourteen years commissioned service. It was decided that Commander J.W. Jefford's services will be retained and he was appointed Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of Navy (Story:1991:69).

With the creation of India and Pakistan came the birth of the Royal Pakistan Navy and the Royal Indian Navy (Ibne-Ali:UP:24).

Like other Navies of the Common Wealth countries, Pakistan's Navy also had the prefix Royal until the country was proclaimed a Republic in 1956 (Story:1991:59).

### **c: Command and Control Structure**

The overall command and control of the Pakistan Navy is in the hands of the Chief of the Naval Staff who is assisted by four Principal Staff Officers, namely the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Operations), the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Personnel), the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Supply Services) and the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Technical Services). Each Principal Staff Officer (PSO) heads a separate branch. Other Staff Officers (not classified as PSOs) and directly responsible to Chief of the Naval Staff include: (i) Naval Secretary (ii) Director of Medical Services (iii) Judge Advocate General (Navy) and (iv) Director of Regulations. The functions of each are briefly as under:

**Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Operations):** Formation of strategic plans/policies; organization; operational development, fleet training/exercise programme and naval intelligence.

**Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Personnel):** He deals with the terms and conditions of services, pay and pension. He is responsible for welfare, recruitment, discipline, education and training of service personnel.

**Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Technical Service):** He deals with matters regarding repair, refit, docking of ships, ordinance

engineering problems, technical advice on PN Dockyard and bases, technical training of establishment, technical development, standardization/ inspection of material, including armament inspection, quartering, planning and execution of civil works and maintenance of shore establishment.

**Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Supply):** His responsibilities include initiation/development/execution of logistic plans in respect of naval armament, clothing and victualling stores, procurement/ storage and issue of stores.

**Naval Secretary:** His duties include co-ordination of briefs; organization of conferences/meetings; promulgation of Chief of the Naval Staff's decisions/directives; overall security of NHQ, postings/ transfers/ promotions, selections of courses for officers and naval commissions.

**Judge Advocate General (Navy):** He advises the CNS on legal matter and deals with legislation of amending various acts affecting the Navy.

**Director of Medical Services (Navy):** He deals with matters of health affecting the Navy.


**Commodore-in-Charge Karachi (COMKAR):** He has the administrative control on all the shore establishments of the Navy at Karachi. He is also responsible for providing aid to civil power on behalf of the Navy and making protocol arrangements on VIPs visits and National Days.

Commodore Commanding Pakistan Navy Flotilla (COMPAK):

He commands the Pakistan Navy Fleet and supervises exercises at sea.

In other words, the Navy afloat comes under COMPAK and the shore establishments are commanded by the COMKAR (NHQ:1987).

#### d: Geographical Location of Pakistan



#### The Indian Ocean Region

Since this study deals with the earlier period of Pakistan, it would be appropriate to discuss the geographical location of East and West Pakistan.

At the eve of independence, Pakistan comprised of the north-west portion and north Eastern portion of the sub-continent without much compactness and also without a corridor excepting the sea and that too right round the whole Indian Peninsula (Pithawala:1948:4). Both Western and Eastern Pakistan covered a vast area of approximately 233,100 sq miles, of which 179,000 square miles belonged to the former and 54,100 to the later. Western Pakistan is nearly 900 miles in length and 200 miles in breadth and falls between the latitudes of 23°N and 36°N and between the longitudes of 60°E and 75°E (Pithawala:1948:9).

Western Pakistan is also connected with the Muslim states through the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf has assumed great significance for the West and USA in recent years. It is <sup>a</sup> region which has invited the attention of all great captains of war and all super powers in the history of this world. The Persian Gulf, due to its location, offers the shortest route between east and west and the port of Basra at the North Western side as transit point for the flow of multi directional influences (Khan: 1982:8). The developed and developing states are increasingly dependent on this region for material well being and growth which has enhanced its strategic importance for the West (Khan:1982:1).

Geographically, now Pakistan is located between the Middle East and India in the southern region of Asia. In the north, it has common borders with China and Afghanistan. In the south, it has a 540 miles coastline on the Arabian Sea, extending from India to the East

and Iran on the West. With the oil-rich Gulf region in close proximity to the West, it is strategically placed astride to the sea lines of communication from Persian Gulf through the straits of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman (Ghaziudin:1995).

The new law adapted in 1982 granted Economic Zone and Continental shelf rights to littoral states up to 200 and 350 nautical miles respectively into the sea along the coast. This law extended the area approximately by 100,000 sq miles in the north Arabian Sea (Ahmed:1997). West Pakistan consists of four former provinces of British India; Sind, Baluchistan, North-West-Frontier and the bulk of Punjab, together with the former states of Bhawalpur, Kahirpur, Swat, Chitral, Kalat and Lasbella. The North Western parts of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir, including that fell to Pakistan in the 1947-48 war have expanded the West Pakistani's frontiers to join with the Chinese Sinkiang (Siddiqui:1980:18).

The bulk of East Pakistan consisted of the eastern part of the old Bengal province, the Chittagong hill tracts and the district of the Sylhet which was detached from the former Assam province in 1947 because of its population predominantly Muslims. It lies between  $21^{\circ}\text{N}$  and  $27^{\circ}\text{N}$  latitudes and between  $88^{\circ}\text{E}$  and  $94^{\circ}\text{E}$  longitudes (Pithawala:1948:9). Except for a short land frontier with Burma and the coast line of the Bay of Bengal, East Pakistan was surrounded on all sides by India (Akhtar:1954:4). Both the ports of Pakistan had good sea boards in the south communicating with the Indian ocean, via the Arabian Sea on one side and the Bay of Bengal on the other and was

nearly 1,500 miles apart by land and 3,000 miles by sea (Pithawala:1948:9).

Nearly nine-tenth of East Bengal is a low flat country dominated by three great rivers; the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Karnaphuli. It is covered with a fluvial deposits and so shallow that if the sea waters were to rise suddenly over the Ganges delta ever by a few feet, nothing would be left above the waters except some hill-tops and the high lands in the east (Pithawala:1948:11). In the South, the Bay of Bengal limits the province with the southern extension of the coastal strip of the Chittagong district (Akhtar:1954:6). The whole province, though largely lying outside the tropics has a typical tropical moon soon climate; the hottest month is May (82 °f) and the average rainfall is over 130 inches (Pithawala:1948:30).

### **e: Maritime Security Interests**

Professionally speaking security is the sum total of vital interest of a state for which it is willing to go for a war either immediately or ultimately. It is really core value and interests which are vitally important to the security of a state (Bajbai:1983:9). A state can, therefore, be secured to the extent it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values, if it wishes to avoid war (Saigal:1978:105). The core values do contain economic, political, social, geographical and military aspects of national interests. For security of these interests, sufficient human and material resources are to be allocated in

a rational manner to check the foreseeable threats and challenges (Misra:1986:114).

It is generally maintained that geography can be great asset or a great liability (Kohli:1979:24). The known history of mankind and man's desire of geographical division and demarcations seems to go hand and hand. This desire materialized well on solid, full of features land and distinctions such as mountains, valleys, forests, river banks and even man made walls were used to draw boundaries. The sea on the other hand, looked too vast, remote and fluid for any such activity. As a result oceans of the world carried with them an air of internationalism and an unwritten law of freedom for all (Hussain etc. 1994:24).

However, as man progressed, things started to change. The introduction of maps and charts shrunk the world into a piece of paper. Marking the boundaries became much simpler as coast lines started to emerge as natural boundaries. Position of various seas in relation to various lands, became more meaningful. The vast oceans started to look less indomitable and their importance, though only geographical, began to bubble in minds. Oceans of the world had always been a cradle for the world trade (Kennedy:1970:24). Thus with the appearance of steam ships, sea became a reliable and thrifty means of communication instead of a dare devil adventure and the economic importance of the seas started to take shape. The number of ships riding the oceans increased every day and the concept of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) came into vogue. These SLOC's, though

mostly making use of sea expense, did pass through passage in close proximity with land and were not always friendly (Booth:1979:23). As a result the "freedom for all" concept of the sea started to crack and the domain of boundaries and division started to crawl seawards. Since any boundary becomes a law and law has an inherent requirement of complementation which ultimately requires use of force (which only came in the form of coastal guns at that time) therefore the first boundary drawn on the seas was up to a distance from the coastline equal to the range of these guns (about 3Nautical miles) (Hussain etc:1994).

This de-limitation of the sea might have stopped at this stage but there are two events that led to the present law of the sea i.e. the technological revolution and the post WW-II political changes. With these, the seas which were basically a means of free trade and navigation became a potential source of economic well-being, material resources both living and non-living, strategic gains and above all military dominance (Jonathan:1980:77). The subject convention, however, could not have emerged without involvement of the second event mentioned above. At the end of thesecond World War, World seas were dominated by the countries which later came to be known as the developed or the first world. At the same time, a host of newly emancipated colonies started to litter the worldglobe which formulated the third world. They had acquired their freedom from the countries of the first world (Booth:1979:28). Now as free and sovereign states, their interests obviously clashed with the interest of their ex-masters in

every department and sea was no exception. Nonetheless, with reference to the sea, the third world faced peculiar dilemma. They understood both, the potentials and importance of the seas but lacked the means to either exploit them to their advantage or safeguard them against exploitation by those capable of doing so. Under these conditions, they had but one option; to ensure and safeguard their rights through an internationally accepted law which finally emerged as the law of the sea (Grove:1992:94).

This law has brought vast oceanic areas under the domain of littoral states. This obviously affected almost all the departments of human activities essentially those related to statesmanship i.e. politics, economics and military (Booth:1979:74). The indivisibility of sea and un-biquitousness of naval power were responsible for the long domination of India from London. The powerful impact of sea power over the history of India obliged Pannikar to conclude that India had never lost her independence till she lost the command of the sea (Pannikar:1945:7).

#### **f: Maritime Security Threats**

Maritime threats are quite different in nature. Threat at sea does not necessarily have to be from the next door neighbour with a common land frontier (Kohli:1979:31. Indivisibility of water, gives the navy accessibility to any part of the world which touches the waters of the high seas. The sea has no frontiers and therefore for naval commanders, there are no frontages (Misra:1988:151).

A naval task force can move about <sup>100.k.</sup> meters in 24 hours. One therefore, needs to visualize this mobility in great depth. In physical terms, it gives the naval forces the inherent capability to move one's weaponry fully supported by men, ammunition, spares and mobile repair workshops literally from one ocean to another in short span of time (Till:1994:11). Navy, therefore, monitors the geopolitical environment well beyond its sea shores and evaluates as to how this will effect her operational capability (Cheema:1994:11).

Pakistan's location in the Indian ocean gives it a special character. The Indian ocean has become the focus of global strategic attention after the discovery of oil in Middle East (Till:1994:14). Oil has given added importance to the shipping routes of the Indian<sup>o</sup>cean. Pakistan lies in the close proximity of Gulf (Cheema:1994:3). The Persian Gulf has assumed great significance in recent years. Developed and the developing states are increasingly dependent upon this region for material well-being and growth, and this has enhanced its strategic importance for the West (Khan:1982:1). It gives enormous advantages and intensive influence to Pakistan over the vast stretches of oceanic water. But these advantages can remain intact as long as the security of this area and oceanic environment are well guarded otherwise it will be a great source of insecurity (Cheema:1994:11).

Threats to Pakistan's security from the oceanic front is basically from India. It has proved by two major wars during which India tried to attack through sea. In 1971 war, Indian Navy's role was decisive (Kohli:1989:101). The Indian Naval build up aims at giving

the Indian Navy, the capability to effectively dominate the choke points of the Indian ocean from the Malacca straits in the East to the Red Sea in the West (Till:1994:16). The power projection and offensive capabilities of the Indian Navy are embodied in its large multidimensional navy supported by its shore based aviation. In the first decade of Independence Indian Naval development remained subdued (Kohli:1989:30). However, in the past two decades, we have witnessed enormous expansion and increase in the size and stature of the Indian Navy which is much beyond its genuine need (Cheema:1994:12).

Indian Navy's budget during last decade has increased by 1917%. This percentage increase is more than the combined percentage budget increase of her Army and Air force (Choudry:1992:63). Indian Navy has a large surface force. Availability of integral Air Arm in the form of two Aircraft Carriers provides her greatest flexibility of operation (Janes:1996:408). In addition to air defence and air threat, this capability also enhances her anti submarine effort (Tellis:1992:139). The surface combatants of Indian navy are equipped with surface to surface and surface to air missiles, with the capability of launching 102 surface to surface and 34 surface to air missiles at one time, against any surface and air threat at sea (DPR Navy:90:3).

Now Indian Navy is the fifth largest navy of the World with two Aircraft Carriers, 2 submarines and 150 ships of all kinds which

undertake all major maritime operations i.e. sea denial~~sea~~ control and power projection (Cheema:1994:12). Keeping in view these threats, we need an effective Navy in protecting our national interest and responsibilities and to guard against all threats to our security. India's central position in the area, geographical extent, the size of its population, armed forces and economic capacity all combine to make it the dominating local power (Tellis:1992:141). Inevitably this preponderance of strength excites suspicion and fear on the part of Pakistan. Thus one Pakistan Army Lieutenant Colonel quoted in the USNI proceedings for July 1993:

"The Indian navy which is already the 5th largest in the world and the largest in the Indian Ocean region is not predicated solely on the rationale of defensive security doctrine. There are clear indications from the force levels, expansion programme and statements of Indian political and military leaders and defence experts, of an offensive maritime security doctrine for the Indian Navy, with regional and global objectives" (USNI:1993:21).

Indian's predominance also militates against the creation of an effective NATO style regional collective security organization (Khanna:1991:119). Inevitably, the response of the smaller nations of the region was and remains to bring in outsiders to redress a local imbalance (Tellis:1992:156). Thus in the cold war era, the USSR, the USA and China all became players in Indian ocean political scenario (Menan:1991:305). They supplied arms and more importantly diplomatic support to their local portages but often for their own

reasons. But now with the end of the cold war such external support may no longer be so readily available (Khanna:1991:120).

### **g: Strategic Doctrine**

Strategy is the art of planning operations in war, especially the movements of the forces into favourable position for fighting (Oxford Dict: 1982). As for as the strategy of Pakistan is concerned, the aim for the defence forces laid down by the Government at the time of independence was the defence of the territorial integrity of the country (Anonymous: 1998). It has, however, been spelt out and explained differently by different governments in accordance with the changes in the international situation and the political environment at home (Field Notes). The strategy all along had been that the main battle for Pakistan would be fought on the western frontiers. This was endorsed in clear terms by nearly all the governments formed at the centre from time to time (Khan:1973:105). There were, of course two reasons for adopting this strategy. Firstly the political centre gravity of Pakistan lay in the West Wing, and secondly nearly all industries, the main defence installations and recruiting areas were located here. East Pakistan having been out of the path of strategic threat to the subcontinent except during world war II, had neither of them for centuries (Khan:1973:100).

As a consequence of complete belief in a continental type of strategy, which was continuously opposed by the Navy, the defence thinking against the threat from Indian relied on a possible war being

of a short duration which could be waged on the stock piles of arms and ammunition (Choudry:1997). The main battle of survival, it was thought would be jobbed on the plains of the Punjab and therefore, all efforts were made to strengthen the Indian factor (Sharif:1996). This precluded any significant role by the Navy to keep the sea lanes open for the supplies by sea between the two wings of country during emergencies. It also precluded the development of riverine warfare in the East Pakistan (Khan:1973:220).

The key note to the defence strategy according to Ayub Khan was "the defence of the East does not lie in that part of the country". He maintained that East Pakistan was not defensible even if the entire military strength was thrown there as long as the Western base is not made strong (Rizvi:1974:182). The military commanders were of the view that the large scale war could not break out simultaneously on both the fronts. In case if East Pakistan was invaded by India, they could adapt the offensive strategy in the West to capture the Indian territory or advance in Kashmir (Field Notes). This would check the India's pressure in the East (Rizvi:1974: 183).

The assumption underlying the defence strategy was partly based on British military training and partly on the experience during the post-independence period (Anonymous: 1996). The military commanders of India and Pakistan were orientated towards the use of armour which can move rapidly in the plain areas (Rizvi:1974:184). According to the first Pakistan C-in-C Navy H.M.S. Choudry, "this wrong threat perception and strategy was the main cause of the delayed

development of the Navy because Ayub Khan and politicians under his influence were heavily depending on stock-piles". (Story:1991:102).

They never conceived that how long, they can survive with these stock piles without the open sea line communication (Sharif:1996). Ayub Khan was also of the view that in case of a long war, there must be some effective international intervention (Story:1991:162). This international factor was always there but the Indians accepted cease fire only when it suited them. For instance, in 1948, due to its weak position in Kashmir, India went to the UNO. In 1971, it ignored all the international pleas for cease-fire until it achieved its goal (Field Notes).

The Naval thinking was that not only a strong Army but an efficient Navy can also assure the defence of Pakistan by keeping the enemy busy on both the sectors. Due to this strategy, India had upper edge in 1971, when Indian Army had engaged Pakistan Army in West and literally paralysed it in the East (Story:1991:162), therefore, it was the enemy who decided the length of the war and got desired results in the short period (Anonymous:1996). Therefore, a defence plan, if it has to be effective and economical, must be based on a clear understanding of the military responsibilities to be discharged (Lodhi:1997).

The strategic doctrine followed by Pakistan not allow Pakistan Navy to develop on the lines other forces i.e. Army and Air force progressed. Among other factors, lack of political will, economic problems, inter-wing rivalries, and non-production of required equipments also contributed to halt the development of Navy. This has

been thoroughly discussed and analyzed in part-II and chapter-II of the study.

**Analysis of the Factors Hampering  
Progress of Pakistan Navy**

**PART I I**

## CHAPTER II

# POLITICAL FACTORS

### a: Lack of Political Will/ Supervision

Since the establishment of Pakistan, maritime thinking has not yet found its rightful place in the country's defence planning (Choudry:97). This is because of the peculiar history of both recent and past of the Muslims in the sub-continent, that the significance of the sea to a state has not been fully appreciated either by the people or the ruling elite and Pakistan is not an exception (Mohiuddin:97). Pakistan remained under Martial Law for about 23 years (Choudry:97). Being president, Ayub Khan enjoyed all the powers as head of the state as well as C-in-C of the Army. He knew that his only base was army because of which he paid full concentration for strengthening Army (Rizvi:1974:26). Moreover during the period under civil governments, the heads of the government were so busy in saving their own skin specially in 50's that due attention was never paid to the other forces as Army was most influential and had always say in decisions making at highest levels (Lodhi:1997). Secondly, the institutional structure of Army has grown so strong that all civilian governments remain subservient to this institution and can not take decisions against its will.

The lack of political will and supervision on the part of ruling elite did not allow Navy to develop on lines like Army and Air force is the theme of this chapter. However, here it is suffice to narrate that in

the initial period the system of financial control, in defence, was very much centralized. The system inherited from the colonial era gave little or no powers to the Ministry of Defence or Services Headquarters to commit funds for expenditure, even after budgetary approval had been accorded (Story:1991:119).

On 1st February 1949 Admiral Jefford placed before the staff meeting, in Naval Headquarter (NHQ), his basic assumption for a five year plan for the Royal Pakistan Navy (RPN) which covered all aspects of the Navy's expansion (Anonymous:1996). The policy paper provided for a PN fleet consisting of two Escort Flotillas and the necessary support structure ashore to meet the requirements of the two wings of Pakistan. The proposal shuttled between NHQ and the Ministry of Defence for nearly two years without any result. At that stage the Ministry decided to set up a Joint Planning Staff to integrate defence policy (Story:1991:112). Had the decision been taken earlier much valuable time could have been saved and much infructuous paper work avoided (Story:1991:112). Another incident which proved the lack of political will in the formation phase of navy is that a case was presented about the proposed size of the RPN literally man by man to obtain necessary approval from the financial authorities. When the proposal was finally agreed to in October 1947, there was the astounding demand that NHQ would be required to present a justification for the cadre all over again in January 1948 (Story:1991:144).

The first C-in-C Admiral Jefford has regretfully recorded that Mr. Ghulam Muhammad, holding the finance portfolio, did not seem convinced that Pakistan needed a Navy at all except perhaps by way of a small token force for prestige purpose. Admiral Jefford was of the view "but for the positive attitude of Quaid-i-Azam and Prime Minister Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the situation for the Navy could have been really grim in its critical formative stage" (Story:1991:144).

Vice Admiral H.M.S. Choudry, who became the first Pakistan Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Navy, throughout his service career, carried on something of a crusade to create among the powers that be a proper understanding of the role of the Navy in the defence of Pakistan. He did not feel comfortable as this vital matter was not given due importance by the decision makers and views expressed by them consciously or otherwise, indicated the lack of appreciations of factors which constituted Pakistan's Maritime Defence (Story:1991:161).

Admiral Choudry commenting on the non-development of PN opined:-

"Our greatest obstacle in consolidating and expansion of what we inherited from the RIN was the lack of appreciation of the Navy's role in the defence of the country by the people, in general, specially in the West Pakistan and by the central Government and a section of Army leadership at the time in particular. The people and leaders in East Pakistan are more conscious of the importance of the Navy than in West Pakistan for geographical and historical reasons.... the Army Chief General Muhammad Ayub Khan did not appreciate the need for a Navy for Pakistan except for local naval defence to keep the harbours clear of the mines. The ships we inherited from pre-partition India were getting old. The Pakistan Government was not

sufficiently interested to allocate funds to acquire new warships needed for replacement and expansion of the Navy: " (Personal notes of Adm Choudry: UP).

After 1965, material failures in the aged Destroyers had become an incessant worry. Lack of reliability of ships and equipment was recurrent problem. It also affected morale (Anonymus:1996). The situation in the fleet had wider implications. The rank and files in the Navy and even some seniors seemed to have given up hope that the Government would agree to provide better surface ships to the Navy despite the persistent pleas of the C-in-C. Those in the naval staff branch, of-course were aware of the strenuous efforts made in various forms. The numerous papers were addressed to the Ministry of Defence and President on a variety of subjects such as maritime defence, management of higher defence and constitution of a defence resources board in collaboration with the National Planning Commission . It was proposed to devise a methodology for determining priorities in the allocation of resources for defence , and utilisation of aid received from the United States. Regrettably, these papers were seldom acknowledged let alone followed up (Story:1991:257).

The Naval share of the defence budget continued to be restricted to about 6% with no capital outlay. The high powered Yaquub Committee had taken note of the increasing threat posed by the Indian Navy and its expansion plans for the next decade with assistance from the USSR. The recommendations on the Armed Forces goals by the

committee were also of no avail (Story:1991:257). This situation created despair and despondency.

In November 1969, a communication was received from the Government instructing the Navy to undertake the training of a large number of Libyan personnel. It was a government commitment and therefore an order. The influx of the Libyan trainees (which continued for the next five years) had a very disturbing effect in the training establishments. The officer shortage in the PN had further aggravated. Navy was very busy in this and similar other foreign training commitments to provide skills to the rising Arab nations (Story:1991:277). Considering the PN's own personnel problem as well as the lack of modern facilities, the commitment had become very large and beyond the Navy's financial resources. These training activities of foreign personnel, did not allow PN to concentrate on her own progress.

The frigate programme consisting of the type 21 of the Vosper design was approved in principle by General A.M.Yahya with the comments that "belated as it was, further delay would mean spending even more to provide the Navy with the bare minimum" (Anonymous:1996). It seemed that all the efforts of the past years had at least borne fruit. A formal sanction for the ships followed but it soon became evident that there were simply no funds. Fortunately, no letter of intent had been issued to the builders otherwise the resultant embarrassment would have been acute apart from any penalties for which the Navy would have become liable (Story:1991:316). In spite

of paucity of funds and additional expenditure on the build up in East Pakistan, the cumbersome and slow management system prevented the utilisation of foreign exchange allocated to the Navy and about Rs.10 million lapsed. This was not unusual (Story:1991:320).

In November 1971, when Indian activities were increased in Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, the need of maritime air was badly required. After a detailed survey of POL stock, the C-in-C Navy went to General Headquarters to convey his fears in case of blockade during hostilities. The chief was told that corrective measures were in hand and no positive steps were taken at this stage. The C-in-C was not briefed about the measures taken (Story:1991:326).

Rear Admiral Sharif, the Flag Officer Commanding East Pakistan attending a Command and Staff meeting on 9th November 1971, described that Navy was very active in riverine areas. Neither he nor any body else in the NHQ had any idea of commencement of open hostilities with India. Nor they could foresee the rapid collapse of the Army in the Eastern Wing as a result of confusion and mismanagement in the higher echelons of the Government as well as at the political and military levels (Sharif:int:1997).

During 1971, a Marine force for action in inland riverine was formed. After a short period of training, they were sent to East Pakistan in late November. On assembly at Chittagong, its commander was informed to his horror and disgust that the weapons to be supplied by Eastern Command at Dacca were not available (Story:1991:327).

During 1971 war, the success of Pakistan's counter-plans depended largely on re-enforcement and resupply at the Eastern theatre of war by sea which could only be accomplished by a strong Navy capable of breaking India's Naval blockade (Majeed:1992). The possible effect of a blockade of Pakistan's sea ports by the Indian Navy had all along been vigorously brought to the notice of the Government. However, such a force had not been developed, although plans for a two Flotilla Navy core, each based at the two wings had been put up to the Government as early as 1949 (Field Survey Report). The plans, unfortunately, had become victim of seemingly endless bureaucratic indifference and of vague concept such as "the defence of East lies in the West" and a "short, sharp war" which stood in the way of the Pakistan Navy expansion and re-organization since the early fifties (Anonymous:1996). General Ayub Khan was one of the major exponents of such concepts. After the 1965 war, the Indian Navy underwent rapid expansion and modernization. Indian Naval plans were thoroughly revised after 1965 war. Their total Navy budget increased from Rs.33 crores to Rs.115 crores almost three folds. Its surface, air and under water fleet were strengthened and new six Osa missile boats were acquired from USSR. (MB:1972:33). Pakistan did not care to modernize and equip PN to meet the unforeseen challenges. No proper training was provided to our sea-men and they were not in a position to confront any challenge from a well organized and modernized navy like India.

During the 1971 war, missiles were fired on PNS Khyber which was thought to be an aircraft engaged by Bofor guns. But it struck the boiler room. Another missile hit the other boiler room and ship sunk within minutes. Same was the fate of PNS Muhafiz. It appears that none of those who saw the missiles that night recognized them as such (Field Notes). Had the policy makers and planners informed their fighting force how to counter the attack, the loss of men and material could have been avoided (Anonymous:1996). This discussion clearly indicates that no interest was taken by the heads of the states and the Army Chiefs to build-up navy and strengthened it for defence.

## **b: Economic Problems**

Although the major amount is always allocated for defence in every budget but it is the Army which shares major chunk and Navy gets a very small portion of the budget even lesser than the Air force. It is believed that this is because of the reason that the Navy is not given that much importance like Army and Air force. It might be the strategy of our policy makers. One of the reasons for neglecting Navy is that the Army is involved in almost all policy decisions at the top levels and it is the only strongest and well organized institution of the country.

Pakistan's threat perception is land-based from India as pointed out before. This is the reason that our defence planners always headed their planning energies and resources in this direction

(Anonymous:1996). Prior to partition, British India had large land forces and in fact it was the Army personnel producing area (Field Notes). British Imperial Navy was one of the best Navy of its time. India had no maritime threat due to which much importance was not given to Navy in India. Schemes of expansion were prepared and re-prepared, costed and re-costed so frequently during 1936 and the following years that it became a veritable price catalogue and human calculator (James:1983:63).

After independence, Pakistan followed the British policy. Stress was laid on keeping large land forces as any threat was from across the border. Navy was numerically very little. With the passage of time, Air force got due attention of the policy makers but Navy remained almost neglected. Even today, the Navy has 22,000 officers and sailors in active service (JFS:1996:9) which has by no means any comparison with the Army and Air force. From 1958 to 1971 and 1977 to 1988, the governments were headed by the Army Chiefs (Rizvi:1996). Ayub Khan also kept the portfolio of Defence Minister and it was army alone which benefited during the periods when it was completely patronised and supported by the heads of the state and C-in-Cs (Khan:1973:45). There had been a long standing background of differences between Admiral Choudry, C-in-C Navy and General Ayub Khan, C-in-C Army. Admiral Chaudry was commissioned in service before General Ayub Khan. He considered himself to be senior while due to the importance, and presence of army in government, General Ayub never missed a chance to contradict and oppose him

(Anonymous:1996). General Ayub was persistently opposed to the Navy's plan for acquisition of a Cruiser and favoured allocating maximum resources for the development of the Army and the Air Force. It seems that personal differences also played a vital role in giving lower priority to the plans for the development of Navy (Story:1991:199).

It was a considered opinion that naval ships are very much expensive and a huge allocation for the purpose was not bearable by the nation. In order to meet the requirements, old ships with low cost were preferred. This did not allow Pakistan's Navy to develop in order to meet the new challenges and therefore latest technology and naval equipment were unknown to our navy (JFS:1996:10). The old or second hand ships cannot perform well if they are updated and equipped with modern war-fare equipment as their speed becomes slow. It is amazing to note that Pakistan Navy has Destroyers and Frigates which participated in World War II (Anonymous:1996). The Submarines which are considered part and parcel of modern warfare were acquired at a very belated stage. This indicates the importance given to the promotion of Navy by our policy makers and planners.

It would be more appropriate to throw some light on the economic and financial problems faced by the Pakistan Navy. A five year plan prepared by the Naval Headquarter (NHQ) for the development of RPN was considered by the Joint Commanders Committee and Defence Committee of the Cabinet in the early 1950 and the C-in-C was directed to recast it to the minimum. The plan was

re-submitted to the Government covering the period from 1951 to 1954. A committee headed by Ch. Muhammad Ali, Secretary General examined the question of bringing the three forces to their sanctioned establishment and approved the plan regarding first three years. Meanwhile, new directives were issued that all future plan for RPN would be based on the condition that India was the only enemy whenever the RPN had to fight. In its light an exercise "Insurance" was held which was attended by the Prime Minister and others. As a result of that exercise, a most suitable plan for the size of future RPN was approved unanimously. This plan was submitted to Government in 1952 but could not be pursued any further because of financial stringency (Sharif Report:1969).

The sanction already accorded for the implementation of the proposals for the first three years of the plan for the minimum RPN also became ineffective because the amount of Rs.600crores for the purpose could not be made available later on (Sharif;1969:14). Further, it is said that ever since Pakistan's inception, the Navy had been plagued by the uncertainty of availability of money to man and maintain operating forces. No meaningful or sensible planning has ever been possible as prior knowledge of assumed resources is the basis of all planing activities (Anonymous:1996). Without it no planning for future development was possible.

Financial approval for the purchase of the Destroyers to augment the fleet in its preliminary phase posed a major stumbling block. Mr. Ghulam Muhammad, Finance Minister was not satisfied with the

reasons given by Naval Headquarters for ships. He was of the opinion that Destroyers were costly and useless luxury. He maintained that advice sought by him from his own contact-outside also confirmed this opinion which was in fact from an old naval officer of Turkey who had retired several years earlier. Turkish officer expressed the wrong view that destroyers had been superseded by a new and cheaper vessel, the Corvette: Admiral Jefford explained that Corvette were a rough and ready answer during the battle of Atlantic as their speed, endurance and sea keeping qualities were inadequate. The Minister nevertheless remained unimpressed. However in a personal meeting with Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the plan was approved and accepted (Story:1991:102). During 1965 War, Pakistan Navy played a minimum role as enemy concentrated on the land frontiers. Moreover, due to the potential threat of submarine Ghazi, Indian Naval ships avoided any direct encounter (Field Notes).

The reservations in certain segments of the Government appeared to have persisted with regard to acquisition of ships for Pakistan Navy even after the war of 1965 (Anonymous:1996). At the time of negotiations for the Daphne class submarines, Mr Shoiab the Finance Minister had observed that the Navy would have to give up three surface ships in order to accommodate the submarines. Admiral countered the suggestion with the remarks that "It appears you wish to accomplish what the Indians could not achieve during the war" (Story:1991:210).

Due to the lack of modern and updated equipment, it was not possible to train Naval officers and sailors. Pakistan depended upon the Royal Navy of United Kingdom for advance and higher training of Naval personnel. The training cost by Royal Navy (UK) was increased manifold in October 1969 which made impossible for PN to get its officers trained within the limited resources (Story:1991:214).

An effort was made by the Naval C-in-C in Nov-Dec 1969 to acquire new equipment from France and England. The prices were so high that Ministry of Finance did not allow any purchase (Story:1991:278).

Another problem which caused great difficulty in manning P.N. with skilled and qualified staff was low wages (Anonymous:1996). Wages were fixed by the Central Government on a country wide basis and weightage was not allowed for local conditions. Karachi, an Industrial metropolitan was equated with cities like Wah, where only Ordinance factories were source of income. This problem continued in seventies, leading to unrest and occasional unauthorized strikes (Story:1991:279). It is interesting to note that pay and other fringe benefits being enjoyed by PN are not comparable with Army and Air force.

In late sixties when the Daphne class submarine was acquired from France. It was decided to train P.N. personnel for maintenance of submarines at home. The best course of action was to invite French technicians to Pakistan for the purpose. But the Government decided to send Navy personnel to France. The language barrier was

insurmountable for the officers and they could not adjust themselves and came back without any training. This was a useless exercise and wastage of money as well (Story:1991:299).

The PN's development programme including the provision of maritime air was given a bit more active consideration at the ministerial level in 1968 and it was hoped for a positive move. The Inter Service Defence Evaluation Committee had also supported the programme under the head of 'minimum forces' But like the previous committees recommendations on forces goals., as predicted by Vice Admiral Ahsan, remained of academic values only as funds were not provided for the purpose (Story:1991:205).

All ships of PN were in poor condition. The fact came into light when PNS Badar was returning from EastPakistan in August 1968. Due to mon-soon weather, suddenly a portion of the plating in the bows sheared off, leaving a gaping hole. Emergency measures were adopted and it was felt that almost all the ships were in the same very poor condition (Story:1991:321).

Earlier a "Sharif Committee" was constituted headed by Capt M. Sharif PN in Oct 69. In its report, it was clearly mentioned that the accepted life of a ship is between 20 to 24 years with a margin of 4 years provided the ships are maintained well. On the basis of this formula, the committee was of the opinion that all ships with PN were beyond their life and their repair was also impossible as there seemed little chances of availability of obsolescent spare parts for the old ships (Sharif:1969:16).

It clearly indicates that sufficient funds were never made available for the replacement of all ships. The naval share of the defence budget continued to be restricted to about 6% with no capital outlay. The condition of Pakistan navy could not be improved. The President of the Sharif Committee who later became C-in-C of PN (Sharif:1979:23) himself confessed in his report in 1979 that condition of Pakistan Naval ships was that of 1967 and he was of the opinion that there was no choice in the matter as the new ships could not be consolidated because of shortage of funds and the old could not be discarded because of the developing maritime dynamics of Pakistan. The major share of Pakistan's budget is allocated to defence as shown in table 1. Comparatively it is now less than half of its earlier allocation in 1947-48 as shown by graph I. The amount is increasing steadily (Graph II). How much is allocated to any particular force is never disclosed (Anonymous:1996). The Navy is getting the lesser share as compared to other two force (Field Notes). Since independence, the PN always made pleas for increase in its budget but of no avail because due to the high cost of Naval equipment, little was always left for further development or expansion. The allocation was never disclosed to the Navy because of which proper planning was never possible. The lack of planning and adhocism contributed to slow and delayed development of PN (Anonymous:1996).

# Military Expenditure for Pakistan


1947-1996

Year	Million Rs	% age of Mill exp	Year	Million Rs	% age of Mill exp
1947-48	153.8	65.2	1972-73	4439.6	59.3
1948-49	461.5	71.3	1973-74	4948.6	42.2
1949-50	625.4	73.1	1974-75	6914.2	42.8
1950-51	649.9	51.3	1975-76	8103.4	46.1
1951-52	779.1	54.9	1976-77	8120.6	44.7
1952-53	783.4	56.7	1977-78	9674.5	42.5
1953-54	653.2	58.1	1978-79	10167.6	34.1
1954-55	635.1	57.1	1979-80	12655	23.2
1955-56	917.7	64	1980-81	15300	24.1
1956-57	800.9	60	1981-82	18631	26.2
1957-58	854.2	56	1982-83	23224	26.7
1958-59	996.6	50.9	1983-84	26798	26.8
1959-60	1043.5	56.5	1984-85	31866	27.3
1960-61	1112.4	58.7	1985-86	35606	26.5
1961-62	1108.6	55.8	1986-87	41335	27.1
1962-63	954.3	53.2	1987-88	47015	26.1
1963-64	1156.5	49.5	1988-89	51053	25.4
1964-65	1262.3	46.1	1989-90	58708	26.5
1965-66	2855	63.5	1990-91	64623	24.8
1966-67	2293.5	60.9	1991-92	75751	23.6
1967-68	2186.5	53.6	1992-93	87461	25
1968-69	2426.8	55.5	1993-94	93781	24.1
1969-70	2749.1	53.8	1994-95	100220	23.4
1970-71	3202.5	55.7	1995-96	115254	26.7
1971-72	3725.5	59.1	1996-97	131400	26.3


Source: Economic survey of Pakistan and Federal Budget 1995-1996

Table - I

Military spending in Pakistan



Graph - I



Military spending of Pakistan in %age

Graph - II

### **c: Inter Wing Rivalries**

The location of East and West Pakistan posed operational challenges because both the wings were separated by the wide expanse of Indian territory and were accessible to each other by sea only after a voyage of over 2600 miles (Majeed:1992). At the outset, there was only a token Naval representation in East Pakistan with a Resident Naval Officer and his small staff at Chittagong. Logistically, it was not feasible to base a sizeable fleet there. At the same time, it was also important politically that East Pakistan should not feel that its legitimate needs were not being fully met with (Story:1991:73). Karachi became the capital of newly established Government and was the centre of attraction because of its sea port and commercial importance. The Naval Headquarters was based in Karachi and persons even from East Pakistan preferred to serve Navy in Karachi (Anonymous:1996).

During pre-partition days, it was the Calcutta sea port which got more importance as it was linked by roads from all areas of West Bengal, the main producer of Jute. So Chittagong remained a neglected sea port because of monopoly of Hindus (Field Notes). After partition when inter country journey through roads was not allowed, the foreign buyers of jute had to come to Chittagong for the collection. It was the need of the time to develop the Chittagong port. It developed with the passage of time but with much slow pace (Field Notes).

The British had divided the population of India into two groups i.e. Martial and non-Martial races. In the former category, they placed the

Pathans and Punjabis-the people of what later became West Pakistan and recruited them in large numbers for the Army. The people of Bengal were considered non-martial. They were considered unsuited for military life and relatively few actually found service (Hayes:1986:31). This under representation of Bengalis in the military was a pattern which continued after the creation of Pakistan (Field Notes). Due to the peculiar geographical conditions of East Pakistan, Bengalis were more interested in Navy. That is why at the early stage, East Pakistan, demanded increase in their representation in RPN from existing 30 percent to 50 percent. This matter received the attention of Defence Council which promised increase in future (Story:1991:82). But very few were selected from large number of East Pakistanis as they did not meet the prescribed physical standard for the Naval services (Anonymous:1996).

Representation of East Pakistanis in Navy has been shown in the following table which indicates that their number was smaller in Navy even from other forces.

#### **East Pakistani's Representation in Navy**

<b>Ranks</b>	<b>Actual %age</b>
Officers	10
Branch Officers	5
Chief Petty Officers	10.4
Petty Officers	17.3
Leading sea-men and below	28.8

(Source:Rizvi:1974:181)

## Officers Recruitment in the Navy

Year	West Pakistan		East Pakistan	
	Applied	Recruited	Applied	Recruited
1956	110	11	22	3
1957	294	15	39	3
Total	404	26	61	6

(Source: Rizvi:1974:182)

After the 1965 war the quota in defence forces was fixed by allocating forty percent of vacancies of the ratings to East Pakistan and fifty percent to West Pakistanis and remaining ten percent on the shift basis was allocated to Baluchistan and East Pakistan (Rizvi:1974:182).

The war of 1965 between India and Pakistan was fought on the borders of West Pakistan which supported the view of military strategists that defence of East lies in the West (Field Notes). This was our threat perception which basically hampered the progress of Navy in East. During the war, Indian strategy was land based. Naval role was not very active. Moreover, the presence of submarine Ghazi posed a potential threat to the Indians which kept them away from Pakistan's coasts (Ashley:1992). After war, Admiral Ahsan visited East Pakistan several times. By and large however, appointments to the Eastern wing were not popular. Even East Pakistanis personnel preferred to remain in the main stream of Naval life which was concentrated at Karachi. Clearly, this could only be corrected by having more naval assists ashore and afloat in East Pakistan and the Bay of Bengal (Field Notes).

However lack of funds was severe limitation. The small budget available barely sufficed to run half a dozen operational ships. The prolonged neglect of the maritime defence of East Pakistan was to cost the country clearly in the future (Story:1991:248). The Government had planned to develop a small establishment at Khulna, East Pakistan where operations of patrol craft was needed. The communication facilities, base workshop ready-use naval and victualling stores etc. could not be made available because of the paucity of funds (Story:1991:251). The budget allocation for Navy in 1967-68 was five percent of total defence budget. Most of the foreign exchange available was for repayment of outstanding credits leaving only a small amount for import of spares and stores (Story:1991:250).

After 1965 war, Pakistan Navy had acquired Daphne Class Submarines from France (JFS:1992:405). Their range and endurance were such that they could not operate in the Bay of Bangal except Karachi (Anonymous:1996). This meant that there was an acute need of developing shore facilities, increasing the strength of personnel and setting up a large organization in East Pakistan. For the purpose, "East Pakistan Base Plan" was prepared but later abandoned (Story:1991:253).

The PN budget for 1969-70 stood at Rs. 16.25 crore, far below the estimated expenditure to support the fleet (Story:1991:263). Perforce it was decided that except the development of underwater forces and completion of ongoing progress, all would be reviewed and slowed down to reduce expenditure (Field Notes). Among them was the plan

of construction of a Naval jetty and spillway, boat house in Chittagong which was also abandoned (Story:1991:264).

East Pakistan experienced floods on a scale more severe than usual in 1970 and Navy contributed generously for the relief of the flood victims. Casualties were very high and urgent relief was required (Field Notes). The climate was also an opportunity for people in the Western province to demonstrate some fellow feelings for their Eastern brothers, but this opportunity could not be fully exploited (Anonymous:1996). The Government also sought help from Navy and requested the stationing of a destroyer to act as a base ship for relief operations in the coastal areas but it was never sent ostensibly for operational reasons (Story:1991:299).

Although East and West Pakistan were separated in Dec 1971 but as early as February, the Government directives were received in NHQ with much surprise that all East Pakistani officers and sailors should be segregated and take off from active services (Field Notes). This measure was taken obviously because of the situation of East Pakistan and as a consequence, Navy lost one third of its personnel (Anonymous:1996). It had almost paralysed the Pakistan Navy because there was an acute shortage in all branches. Moreover, Navy was assigned another task of assisting Army during operations in riverines: a role not visualized, hence not planned for, nor included in its mission (Rizvi:1974:225). In terms of personnel, therefore, the Navy was in desperate condition. The rail and road communications were in a state of disarray, hence logistic support too was entrusted to the Navy, not

only for the Army but also for the civil administration and it was a difficult task to cope with small numbers (Rizvi:1974:224).

The C-in-C Navy paid his last visit to East Pakistan in August/September 1971. He visited all over the province where-ever Navy was operating (Story:1991:301). He was quite satisfied with their high morale and efficiency. He realised the importance of an effective and well equipped Navy at that critical juncture and felt that there was need for more armed boats/ more men/ more shore batteries and greater surface radar coverage along the coast (Story:1991:323). He even continued to urge his staff to hasten the build up of Navy in East Pakistan. The plan for a Naval Dockyard, upgrading of a Military hospital at Chittagong in priority and a proposal for the facility by the National Shipping Corporation was also given (Field Notes). After the twenty five years of its independence, when the potential threat of India was knocking at our doors, the policy makers and planners felt what they must have done much earlier, it was too late (Anonymous:1996). This clearly indicates the lack of vision as well as will on the part of those who ruled the country which hampered the development of Naval capabilities.

No worth mentioning performance or political foresight was shown by our planners when 1971 war broke out. In fact, the Indian eastern fleet based at Visakhapatnam faced virtually no opposition from the Pakistan Navy in the Bay of Bengal (Moore:1986:74). There were air craft carrier and sub-marines deployed by India (Kohli:1989:82). On the other hand Pakistan Navy had never

maintained in East Pakistan more than a gun boat squadron and a few old riverine craft on the permanent basis. Moreover, repair and logistic facilities for large ships had not been developed at Chittagong (Anonymous:1996). Further, the division of the Destroyer Squadron would only have further weakened the force in the Arabian sea, without being able to generate any comparable opposition in the Bay of Bengal (Antony:1992). India's aim was enforcing of a complete blockade of East Pakistan and cutting off its line of communications from the West (Kohli:1989:42). Moreover, Indians used their Naval Crafts to supplement Air force and Army by bombardment on airfields, ports, ships, riverine traffic of Army, troops concentrations and amphibious landing (Story:1991:341). Pakistan Naval strategy was only defensive (Anonymous:1996). Due to the blockade by India, no logistic support was possible. This fact lowered the morale of sea men and soldiers particularly and of the public generally. The policy makers of Pakistan should have thought well before time that age old threat perception should be changed but it was never realized by them in time (Field Notes).

#### **d: Under Development / Lack of Ports**

Pakistan had two ports; Karachi and Chittagong, at the time of its establishment (Field Notes). Karachi was given the status of a first class port in 1907 and soon it developed into one of the four major ports of India (Story:1991:65). The port of Chittagong, which in pre-partitions days had been merely a small provincial port, handling a

small amount of the jute export trade, remained subordinated permanently to Calcutta where all the jute mills were situated. After partition, absence of jute mills in East Pakistan posed great problems (Field Notes). As the inland routes were closed, the merchant ships from all over had to now come directly to Chittagong to collect the much needed supplies of jute and the result was the saturation of the small ports facilities and exasperating delays. The only remedy was its expansion (Story:1991:97).

Karachi being the capital of Pakistan attracted a great number of refugees from all over India for better opportunities of Government/private jobs and business. It became mini Pakistan which later on developed into a major sea port of the area (Field Notes). Naval Headquarters and almost all of its establishments were situated in Western zone. Karachi, being the only port in the area, Navy as well as merchant ships completely relied upon it (Field Notes). From the security point of view, it was necessary to have another Naval port as one port could be blocked or destroyed. Far greater efforts are required to block or destroy more ports (Cheema:1994:3). The 1971 war proved the inadequacy when India almost succeeded in blocking the Karachi port.

The port of Karachi lacks in depth and is narrow throughout its length (Anonymous:1996). It also has a number of vital installations like Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) and Pakistan Air force Base Masroor within gun range from seaward. All these render Karachi highly vulnerable to gun and missiles attack from the sea

because of the mining of harbour and its approaches (Sharif int:1997). C-in-C Navy Admiral H.M.S Choudry believed in early fifties that an alternate naval port was needed as Karachi was extremely short of berths. It could not accommodate the naval ships without endangering the berthing position of the merchant ships. Ormara, Pasni, Gawadar, Somiani harbour and Phitti Creek were considered possible sites for the purpose. The new sites required shelter anchorage. However, paucity of finances proved a major stumbling block in establishing naval ports facilities in some of these areas (Ibne Ali:UP:51).

At Phitti Creek, Port Qasim was established in early 70's but it was within close proximity of Karachi and relied upon the same approaches over the sea as well the common road linkage and thus became an extension of Karachi port complex (Cheema:1994:13). However, in 1994, a major breakthrough occurred in the form of development of maritime by the start of the construction of the Naval port Ormara, situated 150 Kilo metre from Karachi on Mukran Coast and 80 Nautical mile away from Gawadar port. The foundation stone was laid on 17 March 1994. According to the master plan, it was to be built in three phases in three and half years at an estimated cost of Rs. four billion (Navy News:1994:4). Till the completion of separate Naval Port, Pakistan Navy has to depend upon Karachi (the only commercial port of Pakistan) (Field Notes). However, with Pakistan keen to improve its long-term economic prospects by offering as an outlet to the sea for Afghanistan and some of the Central Asian Muslim Republics, the strategic importance of Karachi itself evident. Even

there are plans to build a new Naval Base at Ormara (Janes:1993:464) which can share the burden of Karachi and can play a vital role in strategic perspective.

It is believed that the defence of any country depends heavily on its well integrated and organized forces i.e army, navy and air force. They all can perform well in the hours of crisis provided there is complete co-ordination and mutual understanding between them. The next chapter deals with this issue and after having discussed their inter-departmental relations, it would be easier to judge the type of relations these forces enjoy.

## CHAPTER III

### INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

#### **a: Defence Forces and their Inter-departmental Relations**

Institutions like defence forces of any country can be strengthened provided there is co-ordination and mutual understanding between them. These forces i.e. Army, Navy and Air force are considered back-bone of a country's defence. Their advancement and progress solely depends upon opportunities made available to them in shape of funding and proper training in latest warfare technologies. This gives them a vision and power to foresee the challenges ahead. Proper training and awareness with latest equipments enables them to adopt specific strategic courses in view of the threat perceptions from outside. In order to achieve these objectives, it is necessary that these forces are well integrated and organized on sound footing. This can only be done through vision by making policies and plans keeping in view threat perceptions (Field Notes).

The strategic doctrine followed by Pakistan was land-based which did not bring fruitful results and it particularly hampered the progress of Pakistan Navy (PN) (Anonymous:1996). It was assumed that future wars between India and Pakistan would be fought on Western frontiers. More importance was, therefore, given to the Army and Air Force instead of Navy. The Air Force was strengthened in order to provide cover to the Army as well as to the Navy. The

assistance of Air Force was necessary for the Navy for submarines operations, patrolling, surveillance of coastal areas and its other activities in the sea (Field Notes). In the early phase of Pakistan, it was decided that if the Navy is interested to have air crafts, it would be the responsibility of Air Force to provide funds for the purpose (Story : 1991:203). But because of preoccupations and other responsibilities of Air Force, Navy had to purchase aircraft from its own resources (Story:1991:210).

Any from of defence planning is contingent on an effective and responsive higher defence organization with the power to plan and execute the business of war. The debate on the form which our higher defence organizations were supposed to adopt, continued after independence but without any fruitful result. This was during the 1971 war when lack of such an organization was realized.

After 1971 war, a committee, consisting of able and experienced persons was formed to study this problem and propose solutions. By and large all of them came to the conclusion that the Services Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence must be integrated to provide sensible and effective leadership to the Armed forces. Opinions varied on the method to achieve this, but there was no difference of opinion on the end result (Sharif:1996). These recommendations were resisted from various quarters, twisted out of shape and finally resulted in emergence of another organization viz. Joint Staff Headquarters as entities (Lodi:1997). It created more conflict between operational commanders and the supreme

commanders (Anonymous:1996). Joint Staff Headquarters was manned by senior and experienced officers but had no authority over Services Headquarters. It had even no effective say in the articulation of the Governments defence policy and defence planning (Choudry:1997). As such it could not serve any useful purpose. This practice still continues, which in fact is the waste of money and talent. Till such time proper integration of services Headquarters with Ministry of Defence, as originally conceived and recommended is not realized there seems no possibility of improvement. If the three services continue to go their separate ways and plan for their separate wars would bring results similar to if not worse than 1971 (Sharif:1996:10).

The last two wars with India have proved that lack of such co-operation could be fatal and result in heavy personnel and material losses (Field Notes). Well planned and jointly co-ordinated operations against the enemy can be successful only if during peace each service conducts individual as well as joint training exercises (Lodhi:1997). However, there is no evidence during peace time that our three forces would have participated in joint exercises. Zarbe-Momen in 1989 was one of the special kind (Field Notes). It was the biggest ever Army Exercise in the history of Pakistan. The Pakistan Air force had co-ordinated its annual High Mark Exercises later with the Army exercise (ISPR:1990), but the Navy remained aloof (Anonymous:1996).

The Air force also took part in Annual Naval Exercise Sea Spark-89 (ISPR:1990). Non participation of Navy in Zarbe-Momen

and High Mark was not a Naval boycott but indicated the separate strategic role of the Navy, a role which it is ill-equipped to play even at present despite of its acquiring 10 Destroyers and frigates between Sept 1988 to July 1989 (Niazi:1989). Navy alone can neither fight the coastal war or defend the area without the co-operation of Air force and Army, nor it can perform its basic functions.

The past fifty years of history of Pakistan is clearly indicative of the fact that due to lack of political direction and clear cut aims, the civilian governments could not provide political leadership. This lacuna provided the Army Chief an opportunity to remain supreme (Khan:1976:264). The question of the relative seniority of the services was once raised at the meeting of Joint Chief's Committee by General Muhammad Ayub Khan, C-in-C Pakistan Army. Admiral H.M.S Choudry of Pakistan Navy was of the view that the Navy merited senior service as it dated back to the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The Prime Minister opined that it was the Army which dated much earlier than the 17th century and ruled out that the order of the precedence effective from 23 Mar 1956 would be Army, Navy and Air force (Story:1991:186).

Another incident clearly proves the Army's intention for asserting its supremacy. During a Joint Chief Committee meeting on 16 Aug 1956, the C-in-C Navy proposed that a Naval Force almost of the size of the existing Navy, should be based in East Pakistan to ensure its defence and proposed the requisite budget to be sanctioned for developing the essential infrastructure. General Ayub insisted that the future war would be fought on land frontiers, therefore, adequate

Air force was must and the available resources had to be diverted to the development of the PAF (Anonymous:1996). The C-in-C Army reiterated the same view in yet another meeting of Commanders-in-Chief Committee on 11 Nov 1956 and expressed strongly for building-up of an adequate Air force. The Admiral proposed for a cruiser in order to keep the line of communications open. Mr. Shurawardy, then Prime Minister also favoured a strong Air force to<sup>a</sup>ssist land forces and preferred to buy 4 Canberra Bombers instead of cruiserAdmiral had clearly warned that in case of Naval blockade, Army and Air force would be unable to survive. Instead of strengthening the Navy, reliance upon outside forces was made as Ayub Khan thought that "USA could help Pakistan in such a critical situation" (Story:1991:190).

After the transfer of capital from Karachi to Islamabad, it was assumed that eventually Naval Headquarters would<sup>a</sup>lso find a place along with other Services Headquarters in the new capital. However, Field Marshal Ayub Khan opposed the idea of an integrated Ministry of Defence, comprising the existing Ministry and Services Headquarters (Story:1991:269)

Fleet Officer Commanding East Pakistan visited Karachi at the end of June 1971. He gave his assessment of the situation in the area of his command. According to him, the Army was entirely dependent upon the Navy's transport element to keep them going (Field Notes). He felt that there was lack of short or long term planning on a joint basis or any guidance political or military, from the central government (Story:1991:320). No attention was paid to these suggestions made by

the Navy's Chief which was indication of an indifference on the part of Army. The Defence Minister had to follow the directives of C-in-C Army and did not enjoy any authority. Mr M.A.Khoro, Defence Minister during a briefing by C-in-C Army at GHQ was clearly told that "I make the recommendations and you just sign". All Defence Ministers after Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had to follow the line. They had no clues to defence matters and were not capable of contributing anything, nor had they enough political backing to exert their authority (Khan:1973:265).

During the out break of hostilities in 1970 and 1971 in East Pakistan, the Navy had neither been consulted nor in any way associated with the decision to take military action in East Pakistan (Field Notes). The C-in-C Navy had learnt about it only by chance from remarks of the President when he received him at the Airport at the midnight of March 25 at Karachi on his return from Dacca. (Khan:1973:224).

The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted near Gwadar a formation of eight enemy ships when the war of 1971 between India and Pakistan had just started but being unaware of the war having started, the Naval observer reported as a matter of routine. (Story:1991:334). Had the Pakistan Navy been consulted or at least informed well in time, this enemy force would have been destroyed or seriously damaged by our submarines. The outcome of naval warfare would then have been completely different (Field Notes).

Like other major military decisions, the C-in-C Navy had neither been consulted nor associated with any of the deliberations that resulted in the decision to counter-attack from West Pakistan (Anonymous:1996). He was merely called upon by Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), to Rawalpindi on November 27, 1971 and formally informed of the President's decision to open hostilities against India from the Western border in a few days. He was not even told about the actual date and time which were to be conveyed to him by C-in-C Air through a mutually agreed code word at the appropriate time (Khan:1973:228).

When the Indian missile boats sunk two PN ships, air attack on those missile boats was requested but the local PAF officer in Karachi answered in negative, therefore the C-in-C Navy pursued the PAF C-in-C at Rawalpindi but after all sorts of pleading the answer he obtained was; "Well old boy, this happens in war. I am sorry your ships have been sunk. We shall try to do something in future" (Khan:1973:230).

Due to the lack of air cover and possible fear of Indian air attack, all the ships were called back because Navy had only anti-aircraft guns at harbour and was not able to defend the ships at open sea (Field Notes). The overall performance of Navy during the 1971 war was very much defensive. India had completely benefited from its aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean. They used it as a base for further attacks and blocked as well. Moreover, the Osa missile boats posed a potential threat to Pakistan Navy ships. The port of Chittagong was

heavily attacked by the enemy forces. All this added tremendous victory on the Indian part and obviously a shameful defeat for Pakistan,s (Field Notes).

The Naval Headquarters was completely unaware of the cease fire negotiations between the Eastern Command and the Indians (Anonymous:1996). The C-in-C Navy learnt about it only when Flag Officer Commanding in East Pakistan informed him and asked for instructions in the early hours of the morning of December 16, 1971 (Bokhari:1997). Later on the same day, he learnt of the cease-fire through the same source. Ironically when he sought conformation from the Defence Adviser, the later showed his inability to deny or confirm the news. The Admiral could only confirm when he managed to contact General Hamid, COAS Army later in the day (Khan:1973:227).

All these incidents are enough to prove that even during the war, there was no co-ordination between the Navy and other two forces. The personalities clash and personal conflict within the higher echelon of three forces were also responsible for hampering the progress of Navy (Field Notes). Ayub Khan, who had also held the port folio of Defence Minister before taking over as President favoured strong combination of Army and the Air Force, while Naval Chief Admiral H.M.S Chaudry was interested to develop Navy (Bokhari:1997). They never compromised on this issue. After Ayub Khan had taken over as President and CMLA, the pay of Air Force personal was increased and a decision to scrap the cruiser was made

(Anonymous:1996). These two things annoyed Admiral Chaudry so much that he decided to resign immediately (Anonymous:1996). When he informed the President Ayub he said "if you want to resign, do it, sooner the better" (Story:1991:200).

There was an idea of the formation of National Security Council consisting of the Prime Minister, Defence Minister, heads of three forces, Chairman of Senate and the Speaker of National Assembly but nothing concrete has so far happened (Field Notes).

The Navy did not get proper funding during the past as compared to other three forces of the country. Its allocation and priorities always stood at the lowest. Even after having experienced two wars with India, no proper attention has been paid towards the progress and development of PN. In contrast, the Indians are spending more on their Navy as shown by the table on the next page:-

## Budget Distribution by Services 1985-86 to 1995-96

Year	Navy %	Army %	Air force %
1985-86	12.9	63	24.1
1986-87	12.9	64.3	22.8
1987-88	13.3	62.9	23.9
1988-89	14	62.7	23.3
1989-90	13.9	62.1	23.9
1990-91	13.8	61.8	24.3
1991-92	13.95	61.1	25.4
1992-93	13.2	60.2	26.5
1994-95	12.8	58.5	28.7
1995-96	13.7	60	26.5

(Source: 'Gordan Indian Defence Spending...' Govt of

India Budget Papers 1995-96, Christie, DN. Indian's Naval strategy and Role of the Andman and Nicobar Island in Strategy and Defence Study Centre Australian National University Dec 1995).

The percentage of the share allocated to the Indian Navy is very significant and almost double of Pakistan Navy's share. Moreover, there is a slight increase in the Indian Naval Budget which is of grave concern for Pakistan's Defence Budget planners.

## **b: Indigenous Production**

On the eve of independence, the division of the Naval ships was made on the basis of the actual need of the respective Navies (Choudry:1997). It was not very difficult task but the problematic matter was the division of shore establishments. They had to be the part of the country where they were situated (Story:1991:74). India had got two major ports of Bombay and Calcutta while Pakistan had only one developed port of Karachi. Most of the training establishments and dockyards were in Bombay (Sharif :1996).

Since independence, Indians emphasized on the indigenous production while Pakistanis heavily depended upon to purchase equipments and ships from foreign countries (Field Notes). Although there was no facility of ships building or refitting in Pakistan but efforts were never made in this direction and adhoc arrangements were preferred (Anonymous:1996). It was the doctrine of our planners and decision-makers since birth of the country that they preferred to buy second hand ships from British and American Navy as a new ship was a very costly affair to them (Anonymous:1996). These old and outdated ships were always available on very meagre prices. This policy, no doubt, increased the number of ships in Naval fleet but it was of no avail. The efficiency of old ships was affected after equipping them with modern weapons (Field Notes). The first submarine Ghazi was borrowed from USA through US Aid programme in 1964 (SPN:1991:209). Being old, it was sent to Turkey

for refitting and overhauling which took a long period. Its old-age machinery was one of the major cause of its failure in 1971 (NTS:190).

In 1963 the Admiral of Pakistan Navy visited Holland, France and Germany to negotiate for the purchase of three submarines (Story:1991:210). The plan took three years to get shape and in 1966, an agreement was finalized for the building of three submarines. But even then Govt suggested to Navy to give up the three planned surface ships and purchase submarines (Story:1991:210). Admiral did not agree with the suggestion. It was decided that refit facilities would be established in Pakistan. That project took almost 5 more year<sup>s</sup> and was completely financed by the French Government (Story:1991:235).

The French Government had shown her interest for joint production of missile craft to meet PN requirements as well as sale to Gulf countries. This proposal could not get through from the Ministry of Finance and was shelved (Story:1991:278).

The surface arm has been a weak link in Pakistan's Combat Fleet since late 1960's. The lessons of its incapacity was as an eye opener for Naval planners (Field Notes). The new administration of Bhutto planned to overcome this problem by a sound strategy of constructing the Frigates in Karachi with dependable foreign collaboration (Aroosa:1997). Meanwhile, British Navy offered some old Frigates on throw away prices and Pakistan lost some million pounds for nothing. (Anonymous:1996). In mid 70's when the Pakistan Navy was struggling to recover from that collapsed deal and was turning afresh to the new construction plans, it was the US Navy which

offered a tempting package of enriching Pakistan's Navy with its 40 years old Gearing-Class destroyers which had been lying in reserve. The offer was accepted (Majeed:1997).

It was China who offered to build new Frigates in collaboration with Pakistan Navy on credit basis and complete transfer of technology to the Pakistan Navy (Sharif :1997). The plan was rejected by the Defence Production Division. The offer was again made in May 1994 but nothing seems to have happened so far (Majeed:1997).

According to the Jane's Fighting ship 96-97, only one large patrol craft Larkana was built in Karachi Shipyard. All others 7 Submarines, 11 Destroyer/Frigates, 4 Mine-sweepers, 12 Patrol Crafts and other small survey vessels and Tugs were acquired from United Kingdom and other countries (JFS:96:97:489). During 1995, it was learnt that Pakistan Government had decided to buy Sub-marines from France (Field Notes). There were rumours in the newspapers that the deal with the French involved commission. Admiral Sharif commenting on the deal said: "We had offers from China for collaboration and transfer of technology, but preference was given to French deal" (Sharif int:1997). This indicates that how much priority and importance was given by our policy makers to indigenous production. Their preference always remained to buy from outside the country for the reasons best known to them (Anonymous:1996). The policy makers are of the view that they cannot depend upon the indigenous production because of influence of bureaucratic channel of Finance and Military in delaying the issues (Sharif :1996). Kick backs

and short term policies provide ready made solution without much efforts and with personal gains as well (Choudry:1997). Following table shows that how much arm we had imported and exported.

Arms Sales to and by Pakistan  
(1979-1989)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Arms Imports</u>	<u>Arms Exports</u>
1979	6.2	0.5
1980	8.4	0.4
1981	5.7	1.4
1982	10.1	0.8
1983	8.1	9.7
1984	10.7	12.1
1985	8	1.5
1986	5.8	0.1
1987	5.5	0.1
1988	6.4	0.2
1989	6.4	0.4

ñ as percentage of total imports and exports

Source US Arm Control and Disarmament Agency and Economic Survey of Pakistan and Federal Budget 1995-96

As compared to Pakistan, Indian Industries is defence oriented as they got all these facilities right from the partition (Desmond:1987). They have even planned to build Aircraft carrier at home. Their Bombay Dockyard is capable enough to build even submarines. With the collaboration of Russians, they gained to much. They did not depend upon any outside agency and as such acquired self sufficiency. Pakistan's policy remained altogether different. Because of lack of political will, frequent change of governments institutional rivalries

and economic weakness contributed too much in hampering the development of Navy. Moreover Pakistan has not so far given that much importance to research and development programmes for Pakistan Navy (Moore:1987).

### **c: Absence of Adequate Three Dimensional Navy**

There are three types of conflicts; maritime, continental and the complex area of amphibious operations which exist at the interface of maritime and continental conflicts. To counter them, surface units are the most vital components of any Navy (Moore:1987). No Naval force worth its name can combat its adversary without them just as no Army can combat its adversary without infantry. Ships are also unique as they can sustain themselves at sea for considerable length of time, ensure control of waters of interest and venture deep in pursuit of their assigned missions (Cheema:1994:13).

At the time of partition, all the ship building capabilities were left in Indian hands. Pakistan Navy faced great problems (Field Notes). Even the ships had to go to foreign docks for bottom cleaning and minor repairs, whereas India was already constructing small ships and had good facilities for repairs at Bombay (Tellis:1992). In 1953/54 PN started building a graving dock and since then the PN ships are repaired and routine maintenance including refits is carried out in Karachi (Ali int:1995). But unfortunately, our dockyard could not produce any surface ship except a few small Midget type under water

boats and the latest patrol boat PNS Larkana after about 40 years (JFS:1995:438).

So far ships are concerned, our Navy always depends upon age old foreign second hand ships which after a few years become un-operative and are replaced by another batch of old ships (NTS:1988). In this regard, scarcity of resources is always mentioned but why not they opt one new instead of two old ones (Field Notes).

Submarines embody the key military attributes of surprise and uncertainty which are valuable elements of a flexible and balanced fleet (Kaleem:97). They are powerful means of achieving deterrence and power projection. They are difficult to detect even with modern sensors. This allows them to operate freely in enemy waters (Bric:1994:13). Because of these qualities, submarines have become the most required equipment of Naval warfare. Pakistan Navy could only get a submarine in 1964 when Pakistan bought an old submarine from USA which posed a potential threat to Indian ships in 1965 (Sharif:1996). Because of its old age it burst into pieces during laying mines on the Indian coast (Field Notes). Three Daphne Class submarines were acquired from France in 1969 (JFS:1997). But their operational sphere was limited and East Pakistan was unable to have its benefits (Anonymous:1996). Three more were acquired from France of Agosta Class in 1975. One of them Hangor was badly damaged in a collision in Sep 1990 but was back at sea in 1992 (JFS:1995:488).

Now Pakistan is planning in terms of building submarines at home. A provisional order for a second batch of three Agosta Class submarine was reported in Sep 1992 and this was confirmed on 21 Sep 1994. The plan is to build the first one in France and to co-operate on the second with final assembly in Pakistan, to transfer of technology and third in Pakistan. The programme will span 10 years (JFS:1995:489).

Another versatile arm and in a way cutting edge of any Navy is its aviation (Field Notes). Combination of sea based air assets and a landing force elements, obviously very potent allowing projection of air power and landing of ground forces to secure objectives (RN:Brief:1994:7). In the early days, the maritime needs of the Pakistan Navy were being met by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The Navy was left without any maritime air support when Air Force disbanded its squadron. In 1963 a joint team of the PN and PAF examined the problem in detail because an air cover was essential for reconnaissance as the value of a ship was decreased by 40% if it had no eyes. The team proposed the acquisition of a Maritime Squadron of Breguet Atlantic Aircraft. The proposal was approved by the Joint Chiefs Committee at its meeting on 4Feb, 1964 but lack of funds precluded further action. Since the acquisition was entrusted to Air Headquarters inevitably naval requirements took second place to pressing needs of the Air Force (Story:1991:212). Pakistan Airforce which was assigned responsibility of financing for Naval Aircraft did not give required priority. It was felt that in such way, the Navy would

get scant support. So plans were prepared for the induction of aircraft at the earliest (Story:1991:249). During the 1965 war the Air Force could not perform its responsibility of Karachi's defence as it was heavily occupied with other tasks and had been unable to develop a proper long range surveillance at sea. It was clear that navy should have purchased LRMR air craft to develop an air arm. Options for other air crafts from France and Russia were also under consideration (Story:1991:293). However, due to the arm purchase ban USA refused to sell while Russians had not the proper technically suitable plan. A Naval Air Development Plan was submitted to the Inter Service Defence Evaluation Committee but its final decisions remained only of academic value, as funding had not been possible (Story:1991:305).

In November 1971 when Indian activities were increasing steadily in Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal, need of proper Air-support was felt urgently. When the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff was sent to convey his fears to General Headquarters, and Air Headquarters he was told that corrective measures were in hand. What these measures were, was not elucidated (Story:1991:326). In the last week of November 1971, inner and outer patrol of Karachi was arranged. The possible attack from Osa missile boats was under consideration due to the lack of air arm, heavy emphasis was laid on Air force which was big mistake indeed (Story:1991:334).

After war, in a meeting with his counter part in Navy, C-in-C Air force explained the reasons for the PAF's inability to provide adequate air support to the Navy during the war. He said, this was

largely due to the overwhelming commitment to support the Army in ground operations (Story:1991:366). Although he was of the view that Navy must have air arm but when this matter was at their disposal, low priority was given to Naval Air arm, however the lack of Air arm was felt at highest level and it compelled the NHQ to fund the aircraft from the Navy's own budget. Thus after 25 years of its inception, Navy was able to get LRMR aircraft in 1972.

Now Navy has four Allouette III, three lynx and six seeking helicopters, five mirage air crafts, and four Breguet Atlantic I air crafts for sea strike and watch. It is not enough for the long coastal area's protection. But it definitely helps Navy to give it the status of 3 dimensional Navy. Along with domestic factors, international factors too contributed for slow progress of Pakistan Navy. The super powers which had their own vested interests in the Indian ocean and Persian Gulf made it a point that Pakistan should not be able to expand its Navy on modern lines. They, therefore, kept Pakistan totally dependent to purchase their rejected and outdated lots and it could not concentrate to produce any equipment or facility for navy at home. It has been clearly demonstrated in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER IV

### INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

After having discussed political and institutional factors, it is necessary to throw some light on international factors which were also responsible to slow down the progress of Pakistan Navy.

International interest in this region is due to its geographical location. The blue water's of Indian Ocean occupies the area of 29,340,000 sq miles (Omar:1997). Pakistan is one of the littoral state of the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean has become the focus of global strategic attention after the discovery of oil in the Middle East. Dependence of the Western world and Japan on Middle East oil has given an added importance to shipping routes of Indian Ocean. Pakistan lies in the close proximity of Gulf and by virtue of its position enjoys a special significance as nearly 17 million barrels of oil (approximately 41% of world oil) passes through the Straits of Hormuz daily. Any political or economic changes here could affect Pakistan directly. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, new political trends are emerging in the area (Cheema:1994:19).

#### **a: Super Powers Interests**

Soon after independence in 1947, the Pakistan Government opted for the open hand cooperation with Americans (Arif:1984:14). In this way Pakistan fell into the Western Block. Russians were ignored and so they sided with India. Since the early years of Pakistan, India

and Pakistan presented themselves as toughest enemies of each other. However, Pakistan remained in good terms with People Republic of China (PRC) throughout its history (Rizvi:ND:22).

Pakistan's geographical location attracted both the USA and USSR as both were keen to exert their pressure/ influence in this area. Pakistan had joined Western Defence Pacts. Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MDAA) with the USA in May 1954 and joined the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in Feb 1955 (Burke:1973:148). The latter was re-named the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after Iraq's withdrawal from the pact (Khan:1967:116). The motivating force behind Pakistan's participation in these pact was her desires to strengthen her defence viz-a-viz India. Under this programme, the USA was to provide military equipment and training assistance to the Pakistan Armed Forces (Burke:1973:243). Along with other forces, Navy also got aid for development. The Karachi Naval base was modernized and equipment was provided to build a new Naval base at Chittagong. The size of the Navy was enlarged and more ships were provided (Khan:1973:87), American Aid came to the rescue of Pakistan Navy, but with old ships of UK and USA. The average age of Destroyers/ Frigates given under aid programme was more than the normal life expectancy of 20 years (Sharif:int).

Pakistan Navy had the technical know how and ability to build surface ships since early 60's but whenever the Naval authorities planned to get new ships or wanted to build their own, they were

offered second hand ships at throw away prices through joint aid programmes (Majeed:1995). It happened more than once with Pakistan Navy. In the early 70's when, Pakistan Navy decided to have its indigenous production and the proposals were under consideration, UK offered some of its moth eaten old Frigates. The efforts of PN were again jeopardised in mid 70s (Anonymous:1996) for new construction plans when US Navy offered a package of gearing class destroys on low cost (Majeed:1995).

It has been a misfortune of the Pakistan's Navy to have always been forced to accept old warships which had reached their retirement age in their respective countries (Anonymous:1996). Once sold to Pakistan, the old work horses were equipped with new sonars, radars, weapons and other assorted equipments. That is how they began their new lives-growing under the weight of new equipment, losing essential parts without proper replacements, struggling to stay afloat a long time after they should have rested in peace (Majeed:1995). The spares of the ships are no longer manufactured by the present companies and in case of availability their prices are charged far higher. The operating cost of second hand ships has risen to such an extent that it has left the senior naval officers distraught (Rizvi:1995). In 1969, the Pakistan Navy had appointed a high level "Sharif Committee" to examine the state of Pakistan Navy ships. This committee stated that the state of the ships was totally unacceptable (PN:1969) In an interview in 1997, Admiral Sharif (Retd) was of the view that the state of the surface fleet was same in 1979 and more or

less like wise in 90's (Sharif:1997). Admiral Mansur, the Naval Chief in 1995 was recently quoted as saying "We acquired warships from various countries during the last 20 years by spending over a billion dollars but without keeping in view (after sales) support, I will not do that" (Rizvi:1995).

Another incident worth mentioning regarding superpowers influence in the area is of 7th fleet. The visit of the Enterprise task force to the Bay of Bengal was considered by most people as a symbolic show of support for Pakistan in its war against India in 1971 and possibly to divert some of New Dehli's planes and ships for the action against the Pakistanis (Khanna:1991:NR). But the fact is that the US fleet stayed 1100 miles away from the war area as disclosed later by the Pentagon. However, the seventh fleets action was described as 'stupid' by a section of press, because it disappointed Pakistan and annoyed the Indians (Kohli:1989:22). One scholar is of the view that "it has now become clear that the Enterprise was sent neither to evacuate the Pakistan Army and American citizens, nor was it intended to provide fire power, or to stop the fall of East Pakistan" (Anonymous:1985). Henry Kissinger had himself admitted that the USA favoured political autonomy for East Pakistan and it had gone in any case. The real purpose was to save West Pakistan from dismemberment because USA had long range strategic interests there and did not desire India or the USSR to dominate the region (Kohli:1989:23).

It is interesting to note that there was a community of interest between the former Soviet Union (USSR) and United States (with Britain in tow). Outwardly, they kept their traditional global show of mutual hostility, but below the surface, their actions were same as they favoured India and never supported Pakistan. The USA and USSR had set the precedent in the 1962 during Indo-China war when both assisted India through all means (Majeed:1997). In 1965 both the super powers professed neutrality to India and Pakistan (Khanna:1991). The US clamped an arm embargo on Pakistan which was its ally by SEATO and CENTO (Burke:1973:245). Most of the arms were in pipeline. Arm embargo had far greater negative affects for Pakistan. Besides, India continued to receive arm supplies from the Soviet Union. USA and USSR also pressurized Pakistan to forget its planned, counter offensive against India and to accept cease fire. The Tashkent Conference after 1965 war was also a joint effort of USA and USSR where Pakistan lost what it had won in the battle fields. Their intentions to benefit India and inflict more injuries to Pakistan were proved in 1971 war (Majeed:1997).

In 1965 and onward, there was a bilateral move regarding military cooperation and aid assistance between Pakistan and Soviet Union. But it is very strange that after too much efforts, there was no end product. In 1965, USSR had shown interest in advancement of PN and a PN delegation visited USSR in June 1967, which informed the Soviet Officials about Pakistan's need. The Soviets regretted that the LRMR aircraft were not available. Later in May/ June 1968, two ships

of the Soviet Navy visited Karachi and they were apprised of PN requirements. Russian Naval experts were also called for technical advice. A bigger Soviet military delegation again visited Pakistan in March 1969. Pakistani demands included Osa missile boats and fitting of Stynx missile in the Destroyers/Frigates (Story:1991:285). The Russians clear intentions were to eliminate Western and especially American and Chinese influence from Pakistan's defence forces. The officers and sailors were selected for Russian language courses. Meanwhile Pakistan was told that it was not feasible to install Stynx missile in the existing PN ships (Subsequently the Russians helped Indian Navy carry out the same modification in their frigates) and also that Russians had no plans for building larger missile boats. The PN was advised to stay with the Osas. These were regarded as politically motivated recommendations (Story:1991:281). The chapter of Naval assistance from the USSR was closed sensing the disinterest of the Soviets in this direction (Story:1991:288).

## **b: India's Hegemony in the Indian Ocean**

The geo-strategic location of Pakistan, past history and Indian hegemonic designs in Indian Ocean, significantly, reflect that India is the only country in our region which threatens Pakistan maritime interests. With the present Naval might, Indians may declare a selective quarantine, but not a blockade, which is an act of war, on pretext that Pakistan is assisting Kashmiri Militants or even that Pakistan is arming itself beyond its needs and therefore posing a threat

to India. One can very easily ascertain that how long Pakistan can sustain economically without imports in peace time and how worse would be the situation in war time both of the population and armed forces. Continuous maritime threat from India always force to Pakistan Navy to develop with the accelerating speed which was never possible due to many constraints discussed before.

It is worth mentioning that the Indian leadership had begun to think of the Indian Ocean much before independence . As back as 1945, Indian ambassador to the Peoples Republic of China, Mr. M. K. Pannikar urged the future leaders of the country to take a direct responsibility for the defence of the Indian Ocean. It was viewed that unless India was prepared to stand forth and shoulders the responsibility for peace and security of the Indian Ocean, her freedom would mean little (Khokhar:1997). This indicates Indian leaders and states-men's vision regarding the future role of India in the Indian Ocean. Under this policy, on the one hand, India sought to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace by asking the big powers to withdraw their naval forces and on the other hand, she had all along been busy in building herself into a formidable military and naval power (Choudry:1992).

At the time of partition the major of the fleet went to India. She was given thirty two ships and all existing landing crafts; four sloops, two frigates, twelve mine sweepers one ML, four HDML's (Story:1991:52). In the first decade of independence, naval development remained some what subdued (Cheema:1994:12).

However in the next three decades, for its quest for development and modernization Indian Navy took three steps. In 1950's they acquired fleet air arm, a modest beginning culminating in the commissioning of a light fleet carrier. In 60's they acquired submarine arm and in 70's missile bearing naval crafts were inducted in Indian Navy after which it got the three dimensional capability of Naval warfare (Kohli:1989:30).

In the past two decades we have witnessed enormous expansion and increase in the size and stature of the Indian Navy. Now Indian Navy is the fifth largest Navy of the world and the largest bordering the Indian Ocean (Choudhry:1992). Much of India's industrial and economic activities are located within 200 miles of its 75,00 km long coast line along which are 180 ports (although many are only fishing ports). The country encompasses 1,200 far flung islands and its economic exclusive zone, covers more than 2 million Sq Km. (Jane Navy, Nov 97). It has two Aircraft carriers, nineteen submarines, and about 150 ships of all kind which undertake all major maritime operations i.e. sea denial, sea control and power projection (Cheema:1994:12). India has also the largest merchant fleet than any other country in the Indian Ocean region. 730 Ocean going vessels out of which 443 are large ships (Jane Navy:1996). A comparison of Pakistan and Indian Forces is given on the next page. It clearly presents the contrast situation prevailing in defence assets.

### Comparison of Pakistan and India's Forces

	Pakistan	India
Defence Budget	4.32 Bn \$	8 Bn \$
<b>ARMY</b>		
Land force/Army Tps	520,000	11,00,000
Conventional Mobile force	277,000	906,500
Army Commands	0	5
Departmental Divisions	9	12
Foot Infantry Divisions	19	32
Mechanised Divisions	0	1
Armoured Division	2	2
Artillery Division	0	1
Independent Infantry Brigades	7	5
Tanks	1950	3740
Infantry      hicles	820	1060
Vehicle		
Gun Towers	1566	3325
Helicopters	140	140
<b>AIRFORCE</b>		
Troops/Manpower	45,000	110,000
Land Strike Squardons	7	22
Fighter Squardons	10	20
Recce squardons	1	2
Fighter Squardons	430	799
Transport Aircrafts	21	192
Helicopters	140	140
<b>NAVY</b>		
Troops/Manpower	22,000	55,000
Aircraft Carrier	0	2
Fighter Naval Aircraft	9	23
Submarines	6	15
Patrol Aircraft	4	19

(source : JYB 1995)

At the turn of the century, the Indian ocean will find itself a centre of attention, Jane's argues. It quotes senior Indian Naval

sources as saying that the Indian Navy, "will need to shift its focus from the confines of the North Arabian Sea to the broader reaches of the Indian Ocean" (Janes Navy:1997). That's why India is well on its way to play a dominant role in Indian Ocean. Indian Navy decision to get involved in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, operations in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Maldives in 1988 are the examples which can easily be termed as demonstration of power muscles (Ahmad:1997). India further aims to acquire the capability to effectively dominate the choke points of the Indian Ocean from the Malacca Straits in the East to the Red Sea in the West (Cheema:1994:13)

The importance of maintaining territorial security in the Indian Ocean is the requirement of all the coastal states. Pakistan is the next door neighbour of India. Relations between two countries never remained friendly. This hostile attitude resulted in the shape of war thrice (Majeed:1992).

Our military and defence planners consider India as the only possible threat from land and sea (Khan:1973:106). As far as threat from other neighbours is concerned, there are brotherly and friendly relations between Pakistan and its Muslim neighbouring countries of the region that's why there is very little chance of any confrontation with them. Therefore India is the only potential threat (Majeed:1992). Right from the beginning, India has upper edge quantitatively. Unlike Pakistan, India inherited a dockyard in Bombay which definitely provided it strong base for indigenous production (Story:1991:54). Sea has no frontier and frontage. It is a very easy source for the

mobilization of forces. Therefore, it serves Indians hegemonic plan very well. Moreover, after the 1965 war, India was able to get foreign aid from Western block while India and the Soviet Union (former USSR) signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation on arms and equipment (Story:1991:322).

After the Indo-Soviet treaty, Russia started supplying all that India wanted. After the visit of the Soviet delegation, headed by the Deputy Foreign minister to Delhi at the end of October 1971, the Soviet Chief of Air Staff, with a team of experts went to India. The Soviet Commitment was then firmed up and the great airlift of equipment had started along with supplies by sea. This was only to supplement the supplies which Russia had been giving to India for a long time (Khan:1973:145). India got the capability to target any city of Pakistan and Karachi was an easy target for the newly acquired Russian missile boats, Osa (Story:1991:346).

Although Pakistan Navy acquired submarines and air arms in 70's and 80's but they have no match to Indian Navy aircraft carrier as Indians are much more spending on their Navy. In the Indian Governments budget for fiscal year 1996-1997, the Navy's allocation was Rs.40 billion (\$ 1.1 billion), Rs.42 billion for 1997-98 which is roughly 30 percent of the Indian defence budget (Jane Navy:1997) where as Pakistan's allocation for the Navy is much smaller as compared to India. Till such time Pakistan does not double the size of its present naval capabilities, it would not be able to meet the growing threat to its security posed by the Indian Navy (Majeed:1992).

## CONCLUSION

There is no record in known history of Indo-Pak subcontinent regarding the establishment of the Naval Force despite of the fact that two third of its area was surrounded by Ocean Waters. British were aware of its importance and they ruled the world through their Navy. East India Company was the founder of British Raj in India when Queen formally assumed the rule of India. A small Indian Marine was already established. During next hundred years, the service took many forms until it was called Royal Indian Navy. During both the World Wars, it only performed the transportation duties. On the eve of independence, it was also divided into Royal Pakistan Navy and Royal Indian Navy. Comparatively, Pakistan Navy was to defend small coastal area, therefore, it got lesser share in the division of defence assets. They were two shore establishments and 16 ships. Total 15% of Muslim RIN personnel opted for Pakistan. The area they had to defend was strategically very important. The country consisted of two separate wings, more than 1000 miles apart. Only possible route was by sea.

With the introduction of maps and charts, the world has shrunk. Moreover the coastlines also emerged as the boundaries. Later on, the law of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) increased the responsibility of any naval force. Keeping in view the geographical location of Pakistan, Pakistan faces a number of threats but the major one is from India. The nature of the hostile relations with India posed maritime threat to the sovereignty of Pakistan as India has become a

super naval power in the Indian Ocean region. It is already the fifth largest Navy of the world. There are clear indications from the force levels, expansion programmes and statements of Indian political and military leaders and defence experts of an offensive maritime security doctrine for the Indian Navy with regional and global objective.

In this situation, there is a dire need of the development of a strong Navy but maritime thinking has not yet been developed in the minds of our think tanks. There are numerous factors which hampered the progress of the Pakistan Navy. These factors can be grouped in three categories; they are political, Institutional and International.

In political factors, the major one is the lack of political will and supervision. Our successive governments never considered Navy as a vital factor in the defence of the country, therefore it always suffered due to lack of proper attention. Economic factor was the major reason for unwanted delays in acquiring modern maritime warfare equipment. Moreover ports were not developed and there no separate Naval Base has so far been established. Even before 1972 when the Eastern Wing was entirely dependent on sea for transportation as well as commerce and trade, no effort was made to develop any Naval sea Port and Navy remained a neglected force in East-Pakistan.

Institutional factors which hampered the progress of Navy were indigenous production, absence of adequate three dimensional Navy and politics inside armed forces. Due to the adhoc budgetary arrangements and lack of planning at Government level, it was always impossible to go for long term indigenous production. That's why

ready made equipments were always preferred for Navy. Due to this policy, Pakistan Navy suffered lack of modern equipment. Army has more influence and importance whereas Navy claims importance being coastal and sea frontier defender. There has been no proper coordination between the Navy and Air force and during 1965 & 1971 wars Air force could not provide aircover which made easier for Indian Air force to target Karachi and Chittagong's shore establishments. The role of super powers always remained one sided and they helped India to achieve her hegemonic objectives. No efforts were made to promote indigenous production because of reliance on foreign countries. Indians have expansion plans and they are spending at least 13 % of their budget on Navy. To counter these measures, Pakistan also has to build with the pace of India which is obviously not possible due to the numerous factors mentioned above.

In view of the slow progress of Pakistan Navy as compared with that of India, following suggestions are made if we want to modernize and strengthen our navy.

The strategic doctrine to be adopted by Pakistan for future should be realistic one and threat from sea should not be ignored. For this purpose more funding is necessary for upgrading of navy on modern lines. We should not rely upon old ships and second hand submarines and go for new and latest one for which more money would be needed.

There is an acute shortage of ports and it is necessary that more Sea-ports are developed so that at critical moments we do not feel the

danger of blockade. The building-up of more new sea-ports will not only help our Navy to progress, but much can be achieved by trade through Central Asian Republics. Newly established land locked Central Asian States look at Pakistan for their sea trade. That's why we must provide them facilities within short span of time.

Total strength of Pakistan naval manpower is almost 22,000 which is very little as compared to the task assigned. It is traditionally considered as a silent service. However there must be more men at board and more surface force. Although PN is no match for India<sup>31</sup> but it should be according to the needs of the country.

Non-serious attitude of different governments towards acquiring technology, posed many problems. If Pakistan really wants to compete with India and match her Naval's strength, it is necessary that indigenous production should be promoted by acquiring technology transferred from countries like France and China. This could only be achieved through collaborations and a strong determination. The Navy is also required to be strengthened on institutional basis. Efforts should be made to integrate all these three forces, and there is dire need of their co-operation and mutual understanding.

There is no concept of modern warfare without the mix and match forces. Without proper air cover, submarines and ASW<sup>is</sup> ~~is quite~~ vulnerable to the enemy. There is a grave need of co-operation between three services during war and peace. Personnels of each of three forces should attend the refresher courses of each other. Close co-

operation and integrated activities will be much more effective and useful.

Quality should not be sacrificed for the sake of quantity. During 1965 war it was our superiority in quality that Indians, despite of their numerical majority were fearful of Pakistan.

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