

Dr. TIAL
9

ISLAM AND NATIONALISM

IN

TAJIKISTAN

BY

SAIMA ASHRAF KAYANI

Taxila Institute of Asian Civilization,

Quaid – e – Azam university,

Islamabad, Pakistan 2006.

✓

ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN TAJIKISTAN


BY

SAIMA ASHRAF KAYANI

A Dissertation Submitted in Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in The Taxila Institute of Asian Civilization, Quaid – e – Azam
University, Islamabad, 2006.

CERTIFICATE


This is to certify that this dissertation of Saima Ashraf Kayani is accepted in its present form by The Taxila Institute of Asian Civilization, Quaid – e – Azam University, Islamabad, as satisfying the dissertation requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




Dr. A.H. Dani,

Professor Emeritus,

Thesis Supervisor and Director of TIAC



External Examiner



External Examiner

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my individual research and it has been not submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree.

Saima Ashraf Kayani

ABSTRACT

Islamic resurgence is not a recent phenomenon. Islam possesses a long tradition revival (Tajdid) and reform (Islah), dating from the early Islamic centuries to the present day. It had different forms that gripped the whole Muslim world in less or more acute form. This work identified three periods of resurgence in the history of Islam, Pre Modern or Islamic Revivalism, Modern or Islamic Reformism and Neo-Modern or Islamic Radicalism . Tajikistan remained part and parcel of their region while sharing a historical twirl, common faith and civilization with Muslims in the rest of the world. After passing through the period of Islamic revivalism and Islamic reformism Tajikistan has entered its third period of Islamic resurgence and that is Islamic radicalism This work emphasized the third phase of the Islamic resurgence. In the period of radicalization of Islam in Tajikistan, two issues must be separated, Islamic survival and Islamic revivalism. The Soviet period can be termed as Islamic survival; despite soviets atheist propaganda, religion remains the major identity of the people because like every Muslim of the world, Islam is part of Tajik culture.

The last ten years of the Soviet Union can be called the time of Islamic revival. With internal there are external factors that give a new shape to the Islam in Tajikistan and it is labeled as radical Islam, extreme Islam, militant Islam or fundamentalists. This is purely an external dimension and not the out growth of traditional, tolerant, and moderate Central Asian Islam. The internal factors for the revival of Islam in Tajikistan resulted in the acceptance of the external influence.

The post 9/11 developments are indicative of resurgence of nationalism in the

region, but in Tajikistan Islamic forces seems to have brighter prospects. since owing to the fragmentary nature of Tajik national identity, Islam can emerge as the only stabilising factor, an anchor and reference to which mass mobilisation can coalesce around. While being the member of international community, it has to rely on its nationalistic ideology.

DEDICATED TO MY FAMILY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgement	xii
Abbreviations	xv
Maps	xvii
Table	149
Introduction	1
— CHAPTER ONE	
THEORETICAL FRAME WORK	21
1.1. Islamic Resurgence	21
1.2. Survey of Islamic Resurgence	25
1.2.1. Premodern Islamic Resurgence	25
1.2.2. Modern Islamic Reformers	27
1.2.3. Islamic Radicalism or Neo – Revivalism	31
1.3. Causes of Islamic Resurgence	34
1.4. Nationalism: New Identity	37
1.4.1 State	41
1.4.2. Nation	44
1.4.2.1 Administrative Revolution	45
1.4.2.2.Economic Revolution	46
1.4.2.3. Cultural and Educational Revolution	46
1.4.2.4. Modernization Revolution	47

1.4.2.5. Civic or Territorial Concept	47
1.4.2.6. Ethnic or Genealogical Concept	48
1.5. Nationalism	50

— CHAPTER TWO

HISTORY OF TAJIKISTAN	70
2.1. Location	70
2.2. Language	72
2.3. Term Tajik	73
2.4 History of pre Soviet Tajikistan	74
2.4.1. Early History	74
2.4.2. Islam In Tajikistan	75
2.4.3. The Sammanids: Commencement of Nationalism	76
2.4.4. The Turks: New Ethnicity	77
2.4.5. The Mongol Invasion: New Ethnic and Religious Element..	79
2.4.6. The Tamurids	80
2.4.7. Russian Invasion: We Vs Them	81
2.4.7.1. Jadid Movement: Islamic Reformists	84
2.5. History of Soviet Tajikistan	87
2.5.1. Basmachi Movement: Islamic nationalists	88
2.5.2. Korenizatsiya Period(1921-1927)	92
2.5.3. Assault Period (1927-1941)	95

2.5.4. The Great Patriotic War and Its Aftermath	
(1941-1956)	97
2.5.5. Sblizhene (Drawing Together) and Sliyane(Merger) Period	
(1956-1985)	100
2.5.6. Glasnost and Perestroika Period (1985-1990)	103
2.5.7. Disunity of the Union	107

— CHAPTER THREE

NATIONALISM IN TAJIKISTAN	135
3.1. Emerging Signs of nationalism	135
3.2. Post Independence Tajikistan: Unstable Factors	
for Tajik Nationalism	141
3.3. Factors For Weak Tajik Nationalism	146

— CHAPTER FOUR

ISLAM IN TAJIKISTAN	181
4.1. Manifestation of Islamic Resurgence	182
4.2. Survival of Islam in Tajikistan	185
4.2.1. Internal Factors	185
4.2.2. External Factors	188
4.3. Islamic Radicalism In Tajikistan	189
4.3.1. Causes of Islamic Radicalism	200

— CHAPTER FIVE

RADICALISATION OF ISLAM IN TAJIKISTAN:

EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS	211
5.1. The New Great Game: Is Islam The Target	211
5.1.1. USA	211
5.1.2. RUSSIA	215
5.1.3. China	218
5.2. Radicalisation of Islam from Neighbours	219
5.2.1. Uzbekistan	219
5.2.2. Afghanistan	222
5.3. Muslim Countries: Spreading Muslim Ideology or Radicalisation	227
5.3.1. Iran	228
5.3.2. Turkey	231
5.3.3. Pakistan	232
5.3.4. Saudi Arabia	235
CONCLUSIPON	249
Appendix i	
Treaty of Peace Between Russia and Khiva	282
Appendix ii	
Enver Pasha's Rebellion in Turkistan.....	285
BIBLIOGRAPHY	295

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All thanks and prayers for Almighty, without His blessings it was impossible, to accomplish this great achievement of my life which is no doubt a big milestone in my life and professional career.

Dr. A. H. Dani , a great scholar and human, make me proud and distinguished among all peers, after his agreement to be my supervisor. He not only contributed towards my voluminously academic career, enhancing the perimeters of knowledge and sharpening the spirit of inquiry through out the period of my research work. Each meeting (twice a month) with him brought such richness of ideas that stimulated my mind and keep me on track. His deep interest and knowledge about Tajikistan further widened the horizon of my research work. As his supervisee, I enjoyed the most rewarding and enlightened experience of my life.

I am such a fortune person that Dr. Najma Najam, vice chancellor of Fatima Jinnah Women University, always provided me support and encouragement, which enable me to complete my research work. Whenever, I approached her for any kind of support, guidance or favor, always found her kind, very human and very professional. I am sure that without her support it was impossible.

My humble thanks to Professor Malik Fateh Mohammad, renowned scholar and teacher, for his paternalistic and encouraging remarks and guidance throughout the duration of my work. I am also indebted to Dr. M. Salim for his guidance and timely

suggestions. I take this opportunity to thank all my class fellows and seniors especially Mr. Arif (late) for their (his) positive criticism during the two seminars which I delivered during my research work.

I also owe my thanks to Dr Tahir Amin, chairman, international Relations Department QAU, Dr. Syed Waqar Ali Shah, chairman History Department QAU, Dr. Riffat Hussain, Chairman Defense and Strategic Studies Department, Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Dean faculty of Social Sciences QAU and Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, president, Islamabad Policy and Research Institute.

I am also great full to Ambassador of Tajikistan, Mr Saidbeg saidov for giving me an informative interview. For me great help in real sense is Mr. Saadi, a Pamiri, who not only listen and reply me patiently but also help me to understand so many Persian words which I was unable to properly pronounce or to understand.

I also owe my thanks to Khana-e-farangh for making me to read and write Persian also in this regard is the great help by Persian Department at NUML university Islamabad.

For me a real help in improving my spoken Persian was by Ms Zakia and her daughter Ms Arzoo. Both of them not only laugh at my Urdu cum Persian style of pronunciation but also tried to make me comprehend different Persian pronunciations. Both of them are from North of Afghanistan.

I am thankful to Imran Sadiq and Halim Sahib of the Taxila Institute of the Asian

Civilization for their secretarial support. I would also like to thank the library staff of TIAC, QAU, for their material support.

I also thank Rana Saleem of Cabinet Division for helping me in collecting the Relevant material related to my topic. I owe my heartiest thank to Army Central Library for allowing me to use their library facilities.

I also thank the family members, particularly my husband whose moral help throughout the duration of my research was a constant source of support for me. I am greatly thankful to my daughter Fatima and son Mohammad for helping me as not complaining about the busy schedule of their mother. In the last to all those people whose name I may have left out inadvertently, without all of you, this project may not have been possible.

In the last but not least, my mother, my last hope, a ray of courage in my life. Whose prayers always made me strong and powerful to take charge of any challenge. Thanks to all aforementioned personalities for their contribution.

ABBREVIATIONS

CARS	Central Asian Republics
CIS	Common Wealth of Independent States
CNR	Commission on National Reconciliation
CP	Communist Party
CPSU	Communist Party of Soviet Union
DPT	Democratic Party of Tajikistan
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
GBAO	Gorono Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IRPT	Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
JIA	Jamat – I – Islam – Yi - Afghanistan
JMLA	Jamat – I – Milli – Yi – Afghanistan
KM	kilo Meter
MIRT	Movement for Islamic revival of Tajikistan
NF	National Front
PFT	Popular Front of Tajikistan
PBUH	Peace Be Upon Him
SCN	Supervisory Council of the North
SU	Soviet Union

TDP	Tajikistan Democratic Party
USA	United States of America
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNMOT	United Nations Military Observers in Tajikistan
UTO	United Tajik Opposition
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VS	Verses

INTRODUCTION

Central Asia¹ is a unique region in the world in terms of its geographic location, history, culture and civilization. Historically² this region can be divided into three transitional phases happening from the conquest of Arabia in the seventh century, October Revolution 1917 and to the disintegration of Soviet Union in the twentieth century resulted in the independence of Tajikistan – one of independent Central Asian State. These transitional phases resulted in significant changes regarding introduction of common Islamic culture, civilization, history and its integration with ideology of Ummah after the conquest of Arabia. The 1917 October Revolution brought a new set of political changes that lead to Communist rule providing new identities at national level different from tribal religious identity. Third transitional phase ended with the independence of Central Asian States³ These states are still trying to redefine and readjust themselves according to the new geo-political situation and circumstances.

Like other international relations students I was also persistently involved and observing the constant changing situation in Central Asia especially of Tajikistan. It was only in this country that civil war erupted and catches the attention of researchers. Like many others I also keenly discern the unfolding of the events in Tajikistan. It is the present phase which stimulated me to initiate my research in this region. It is also predominantly the out come of debates in media, academics and public personalities about the different dimensions of resurgence of Islam, status of nationalism,

compatibility among different isms, future role of Central Asia and the emerging geopolitics of the region.

Problem

The autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan declared its independence from the former Soviet Union (SU) on 9th September 1991. It covers an area of 143,000 square kilometers and has a population of 6.5 million⁴, including 73% rural population⁵. It is the least urbanized state in Central Asia⁶ with 95% of the population being Muslim. Its neighboring countries are Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, China and Afghanistan.

The political scenario in Tajikistan remained unsettled from the day of independence; this resulted in political unrest, formation of rival groups, politicization of Islam and foreign intervention etc. In the 90s ex communists refused to share power with the opposition and civil war began. It was soon won by the former communists, who named Imamali Rakhmanov as chief executive. Even then the conflicts continued. Between 1993 and 1996 disputes flared in several regions of Tajikistan resulting in trans national influence and involvement. In 1993 a multi-national force named Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) landed Tajikistan. The government signed a peace agreement with the opposition due to which National Reconciliation Council (NRC) was formed. It was to be a forum where terms for permanent peace would be negotiated. Even after signing the peace treaty the conditions did not improve.

The civil war has been analyzed in term of its regional and ideological background. Both these approaches are relevant but the underling factor seems to be the weak national identity of Tajik people. Different identities of the people of Tajikistan make it difficult for the government to create unified national identity and have minimized the prospects for national unity and state building. After independence Islam became the main component of the population's self identity and national pride of Tajik people.

To begin with, it was by the end of the 19th century, that nationalism started taking roots in Tajikistan. Before the revolution religion was the binding force among the masses of the region. Soviets tried to eradicate Islam systematically and forcefully. Mass education along with industrialization and modernization created groups which were supported by the Soviet government. Soviet State even though provided them with legal status but did not give them any political or decision making authority⁷. Nationalism emerges only when the state exists because the problem of nationalism does not arise for the stateless societies.

Newly born states faces lots of challenges even under best of the conditions; same is the case for Tajikistan: first nation state status was reluctantly accepted and the Minsk's Agreement of December 8, 1991 destroyed any hope for preserving the Union. Secondly Tajik leaders are not nationalist or democratic, they came to power by defending Soviet internationalism⁸. There is no old leadership, ideology, administrative

structures etc for the new states to follow. Such situation created competition between the traditionally dominated power and the new comers as well as between the new comers themselves. So for Tajikistan as a new state there is no set objectives, no ideologies etc⁹ and the result was civil war.

In Tajikistan regional cleavages played a vital role in causing and starting the civil war.¹⁰ The Soviet rule resulted in various changes in Tajik Republic; formation of national identity and exploiting the existing regional cleavages to maintain power. Under Soviet patronage, the northern region of Khojend dominated Tajikistan's politics¹¹ and secured more benefits from the central government. Since South's economic, political and social development began to suffer; the groups from South became more vocal and aggressive of Khojendi dominance in the country. Communists supported the north while democratic Islamic opposition¹² concentrated in the South. Major parameters to be dealt with are: What are the emerging signs of nationalism in Tajikistan? Is nationalism going to be the ideology of masses? Why did nationalism fail in Tajikistan? On what types of pyramids is Tajik nation going to build its nationalism?

After Independence a wave of Islamic resurgence started and Islam became a common denominator between people. They felt that Islam saved them from the process of Russification. Tajik leaders knew that religion is an important tool to question the regime's legitimacy. In Tajikistan Islamic revival has to coexist and come in terms with another emerging trend of ethnicity.¹³ Some analysts believe that ethnicity is not a

building force but it is religion which will bring stability because efforts by the Russians and Soviets¹⁴ to eliminate Islam from Tajikistan were not successful.

Islam came to Central Asia in 642 when Arab defeated the Persian Sassanid Empire¹⁵. By the eighth century Islam became a dominant religion in Central Asia. The complete Islamization of nomadic people took several more centuries¹⁶. During the 19th century it was thought that Soviet Muslim were cut off efficiently from developments of other Islamic countries. However it should be kept in mind that many top clerics in the official Soviet religious establishment studied and lived in Arab cities, like Haji Akbar Turanjonzoda, where they were exposed with Muslim thinkers and their followers.¹⁷ 1979 marked a profound change in this fake isolation. First Islamic Revolution in Iran energized the forces of political Islam to a virtually unprecedented extent.¹⁸ Secondly the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought the issues of Islamic identity and its struggle to the door steps of the Central Asia. ¹⁹A large number of Central Asians joined the Afghan Mujahidin's and later brought the seeds of fundamental movements in Central Asia. It can be said that the Soviet invasion actually brought new concept of Islam, extremists, radicals, to the territories of the Central Asian states.

Islam is not only a faith but also a socio cultural system for the people of the region which provides unity among people. After independence it had to exist with a new sense of identity, nationalism. Nationalism at present gives the sense of belonging to a particular geographical group with its own characteristics, language, culture, history etc.

According to some analysts²⁰ the popularity of Islam in Central Asia is embedded in the Communist suppression of Islam, which waited to explode. For others²¹ it is the conditions like poverty, deprivation, repressive policies of the Central Asian governments towards Islam that resulted in the revivalism of Islam with tension, clashes and regionalism as its outcomes. This revivalism of Islam is also known as radicalization of Islam. Due to this different religious movements like Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tehrir (HT) emerged in Central Asia. Related to religion are some basic questions that are what is meant by Islamic resurgence? Is Islamic resurgence a modern phenomenon or has it roots in history of the region? What are the impetuses behind such resurgence? Is it appropriate to term it fundamentalists? At the same time many of the most fundamental questions remain debatable: what is a radical Islam? How powerful are Islamic radicals in this area? What are the sources, both external and internal from which they are drawing support? What are the goals that these groups hope to achieve? And finally what will be the future of Islam in Tajikistan? The answers to all these questions are influenced by the political objectives.

The question behind the rise of Islamic militancy and its popularity among the masses has been researched and analyzed. Beside the disagreements²² among analyst there has been a general agreement²² that the foundation of militant movements are depend on ideological factors especially by those who interpreted Islam. It is also known that the selection of fighters for the militant groups depend on the social and economic

conditions of the countries they are operating in. It is the unfavorable social and economic conditions which create a favorable environment for drastic ideas. At regional level the rivalry among Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia to have control in Afghanistan and Tajikistan has worsened the Islamist problem.²⁴ Not only that, the new great game and the war against terrorism has also blurred the phenomenon. Moreover, Tajikistan decision to join international coalition against terrorism has been motivated by the spirit of nationalism and not of Islam.

After independence in Tajikistan scholars, politicians and analysts have commented over the issues like identity crisis of a new nation, strength and weaknesses of nationalism and the role of Islam. For some it is seen as a difficult task, for others it is Islam that act as a parameter for identity of the inhabitants.²⁵ There was time when 'fundamentalist' Islam became a threat to Russia²⁶, while at other instance political Islam in the region has been considered as an exaggerated phenomenon²⁷. However in mostly all the cases Islam and Nationalism has been descriptive or polemic, at best scattered references are made either to Central Asia's past or to nearby states such as Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.²⁸ With no efforts for a search for relative models in the broader Islamic world.

Basic arguments of this research work are²⁹ that nationalism is a form of politics whose origin lies in western liberal culture; this ideology became popular all over the world due to a variety of factors. Now it is being challenged by a variety of

communitarian internationalism, one such form of communitarian internationalism is Islamic revivalism. In Muslim world nationalism competes with Islamic Trans nationalism which is one of the most significant phenomenons of the world. Presently misunderstanding of Islamic communitarian internationalism is common. The word fundamentalism is commonly used to give a negative impact to Islamic revivalism, Muslims who wish to return to the past. It is argued here that it is a gross misperception. Going through the history of Islam one finds that Islamic revivalism is not a new phenomenon. On the other hand after independence Tajikistan entered in the club of international community. The membership of this is based on the concept of nation-state. However, Tajikistan faced lot of problems related to its new identity: First is the reluctant acceptance of nation state status and under such condition other factors played their role to reassert power. Secondly Tajikistan remained part and parcel of the region and being a part of the Ummah, shared a common faith and civilization with Muslims of the world. Being a part of Ummah, Tajiks also witnessed the waves of Islamic resurgence. Thirdly both Islam and nationalism has been recurred and came in conflict with each other as both forces are powerful and reality of the present age. Hence an effort has been made to study the two divergent pulls and to see which of the two is likely to dominate the Tajik society.

Islamic resurgence witnessed the first movement when Muslim Ummah lost its unity, internally and externally. The main concern of Islamic revivalist were the decline in religion, its survival and revitalization. The most important and significant revivalist

movement in Turkistan was the uprising of Andizhan 1898.³⁰ Also it had influence of Wahhabism.³¹ Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier³² argued on same lines. Second wave of Islamic resurgence appeared in the form of Islamic Reformists that emerged in the 19th century on the structure already built by the revivalists. These movements started as a result of European supremacy, and colonization of the Muslim world. The Islamic reformists in Tajikistan began to realize that their religion and society was in a "state of decline" in comparison with Russia. They took up the scientific spirit, positivism and faith in progress from Russian reformers.³³ At this time more emphasis was given on the desire to come at equality with the west (Russia), without calling in to question the religious foundation of the society. This movement was more political and vigorous than its predecessors.³⁴ Those parts of the Muslim world, where Islamic reformists were already present, became the fertile ground for Islamic Radicalism. Islamic Radicals reacted against modernists and tried to distinguish Islam from the West. Radicals considered revival of Ummah as a mean towards the establishment of a new society where Sharia would be applied. It called for "the creation of new system of thought and a new epistemology which is free of "corrupt" western influence and is rooted in Islam."³⁵ From 1950-1970 all Islamic countries underwent a change in their economic structure, political institutions and cultural system. Now "religion was subordinated to nationalism, socialism, popular democracy and an excess of novel goals."³⁶ All the alternative ideologies were rejected by the Muslims who distanced from the West and tried to have stronger bonds with their Islamic identity.

In the period of radicalization of Islam in Tajikistan, two issues must be seen: Islamic survival and Islamic revivalism. The Soviet period can be termed as Islamic survival where religion remains the major identity of the people despite Soviet atheist propaganda because like all Muslims, Islam is part of Tajik culture. So the life of people from birth till death is based on Islamic teachings and environment. Under communist rule Muslims could not find model or ideology to imitate – an ideology that would be compatible with the spirit of Islam and the demands of the modern age – this forced them to fall back on their own ideology and values.

The last ten years of Soviet Union can be called the time of Islamic revival. This revival can be seen among all sections of the Tajik society. External and internal factors gave a new shape to Islam in Tajikistan and are labeled as radical Islam, extreme Islam, and militant Islam or fundamentalists. This is purely an external dimension. The internal factors for the revival of Islam in Tajikistan resulted in the acceptance of the external influence. Islamic radicals are successful among the urban educated middle and lower classes like students, teachers, state employees, unemployed youth, artisans etc. They are considered as “strength” of the radicals. It is at this stage of history of Islamic resurgence that the West began to label the Islamic revivalism as Fundamentalism. The term has been associated with, a radical struggle against western political and economic domination³⁷, rejection of modernity and western way of life³⁸ and the problem associated with retire states.³⁹ The word has been associated with militant and terrorists and in any case depreciatory so that it is rejected by many for this reason.

Significance of the Study

The study of nationalism and Islam is important in contemporary world. Its importance can be assessed both in theoretical as well as practical terms. Nationalism as an ideology has not only generated national rivalries and wars but also played an important role in the development of the contemporary world. This ideology is even more multifaceted and created problems in the CAR. The need is to understand the phenomenon in Central Asian states, particularly in Tajikistan. On the other hand, Islamic revival has been leading towards the rebirth of idea of Muslim Ummah. This has been strongly demonstrated during the recent events of the Muslim world. Being the part of Ummah Tajikistan has also witnessed the current of Islamic revivalism. From a practical approach the work tried to answer the above-mentioned significant questions. There is a need to understand the phenomenon of nationalism and Islam thoroughly and systematically because of its multi-dimensional implications at national and international levels. It is surprising to note that recent assessments of the literature on nationalism and Islam concluded that our understanding of the subject remains underdeveloped.

This work is not an attempt to write on the modern history of Tajikistan, rather the modest purpose is to touch on all those things and issues which help to form and distort the collective consciousness of Tajiks as a nation. It also tries to analyze the survival and revival of Islam in Tajikistan with emphasis on the radicalization of Islam in the country. These two issues and the conflicts that they engendered are the main theme of this

research. I hope this will contribute to the understanding of a new political entity that shows promise of becoming independent actor on the international stage.

Research Methodology

Qualitative research has been used in this research work. Historical, descriptive and analytical approaches have been used. In Published work, books, research articles, newspaper and magazine articles, news items etc, on Tajikistan has been extensively used. Data in Urdu and Persian languages has also been consulted. In order to understand some of the historical events primary data was also utilized. Semi structured interviews are also conducted. Wherever it is indispensable, geo political and demographic information has been used. Through accessible data and information an effort has been made to comprehend the related issues in the region particularly in Tajikistan.

The research work is organized into five chapters and concluding remark. First chapter Theoretical Framework deals with the resurgence of Islam and new ideology nationalism with its impact on Muslim countries. The chapter traces the resurgence and re-emergence of Islam from the Wahhabism to present age Taliban. But the main theme is that the Islam as religion has always been considered as main and strong source of identity among its believers. Second part of the chapter is about nationalism, as another strong source of identity of the present age. This identity has penetrated among the Muslim and divided the Ummah on the basis of nation states, a concept accepted in the present day world politics.

After providing the theoretical foundation, the second chapter is about the History of Tajikistan. It describes in historical perspective the development of Islamic and Tajik nationalist identity. The chapter has been divided into two parts, part one deal with pre-Soviet period and part two traces the Soviet period. The chapter tries to trace the identity making process among the Tajik people. As the main source of identity, before the advent of Islam, was their sedentary way of life, which has been changed by a new identity, religion, and this identity remains strong and intact till now. Along with religion, the chapter also traces step the growth of nationalism, first in an embryonic form than in a concrete manner after the Stalin's policy of national delimitation. From onward the chapter deals with different periods, which traces the development and contradiction between Islam and nationalist polices in Tajikistan. Nationalism in Tajikistan, the third chapter is about the independence of Tajikistan and its identity crisis. After independence Tajik people are still caught in a dilemma of identity. People are Muslims and believer of Islam but the leaders are still living in the past and wanted to cover them under the cloak of nationalism.. The problems for them are the hindrances in the way of developing a concept of one nation among Tajiks. Here an attempt has been made to know the emerging signs of nationalism before disintegration of Soviet Union and afterwards why civil war started in the country, it also highlighted the weak national awareness among Tajiks. Islam in Tajikistan, fourth chapter deals with the issue of Islam and tried to see Islamic resurgence through ages. Here a reference has been made to Islamic revivalism, reformism but with emphasis on Islamic radicalization. The issue started with the manifestation of Islam at different segments of society, dealing mainly with internal

factors and emerging radical groups in the country along with the main reasons behind it. The next chapter, Radicalization of Islam in Tajikistan; External Dimension is the role of external players in radicalization of Islam in the country. Here an attempt has been made to see how the regional, Muslim and great world powers are playing their role in radicalization of Islam in Tajikistan and finally the concluding remarks, which bring to the lime light the fact that Tajikistan remained part and parcel of Ummah and shared its culture and civilization. On the other hand, after independence Tajikistan has been judged by the international community on the criteria of nation state. Thus both Islam and nationalism in Tajikistan has been recurred and came in conflict with each other as both forces are powerful and reality of the present age.

NOTES

1. The term is used for the five states that achieved independence after the disintegration of Soviet Union, these are, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
2. Shirin Akiner, Sander Tideman and Jon Hay, ed., *Sustainable Development in Central Asia*, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998, see part one.
3. Dr. fazal – ur – Rehman, “The Enigma of Tajikistan”, *The Frontier Post*, 18 May 1995.
4. *Encarta Encyclopedia, 2004*. Tajiks constituted 62.3 percent. Major nationalities living in Tajikistan are Uzbeks, Russians, Tatars, and Kyrgyz.
5. Muriel Atkin, “ Religious, National and Other Identities in Central Asia”, in Jo-Ann Gross, *Muslims in Central Asia*, London: Duke University Press, 1992, p. 60. Interview with Tajik Ambassador.
6. In regards to administrative and territorial division, Tajikistan consists of Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, Khatlon and Sughd Oblasts and Direct Ruled Districts. Tajikistan can be divided into four large zones: Northern , Kuhistan , Southern Tajikistan, and Pamir.
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/tajikistan/SOCIETY.html

7. Kemal Karpat, "The Old and New Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.12, No.4, 1993, pp. 415-416.
8. Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult To Independence", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No.3, Summer 1992, pp. 108-109.
9. Akbar S Ahmed, *From Samarkand To Stornoway: Living Islam*, London: B.B.C.Books, 1993, p. 184.
10. Davalt Khudonazar, "Conflict In Tajikistan: questions of Regionalism", in Roald Z. Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, *Central Asia: conflict, Resolution and Change*, USA: CPSS Press, 1995.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. Barnet R. Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan", *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Winter 1993-94, p.77. Also see Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, "Civil War in Tajikistan: Genesis and Impacts on the Region, in K.M. Asaf and Abul Barakat, *Central Asia, Internal and External Dynamics*, Islamabad: Pan Graphics (Pvt.) Ltd. 1997, p.159.
13. Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's post –Empire Politics", *Orbis*, Spring 1992, p. 225.

14. Shireen T Hunter, "Religion, Politics, and Security in Central Asia", *SAIS Review* Vol.21, No.2, Summer/Fall 2001, p.69. http://muse.jhu.edu/cgi-bin/access.cgi?url=/journals/sais_review/v021/21.2hunter.html
Also see Mark Batunsky, "Islam and Russian Culture in the first half of the 19th Century," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.9, No.4, 1990. Ahmad Hasan Dani, "Central Asia: Emergence of Modern States", *The Muslims*, 24 July 1992.
15. Ibid. See also Waheed Ahmad Siddiqui, *Muslims of Central Asia* (Urdu), March-April 1993, p.16.
16. Ibid. See also Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1962.
17. Keith Martin, Whither Central Asia's Islamic Radicals? A Comparative Framework for Examining Political Islam in Central Asia, http://www.cac.org/dataeng/m_martin.shtml
18. Ibid. See also Allen Hetmanek, "Islamic Revolution and Jihad Come to the Former Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Tajikistan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1993. Also see, Allen Hetmanek, "The Political Face of Islam in Tajikistan: A Review of Muriel Atkin's *The Subtlest Battle*", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1990.

- 19: Ibid. Also see Alexandre Bennigsen, "Islam In Retrospect", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1989. _____, "Soviet Islam since the Invasion of Afghanistan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.1, Spring 1985.
20. Ibid. Also see Dr Ahmad Hassan Dani, *Central Asia Today*, Lahore: Sang – e – Meel Publishers, 1994.
21. Ibid. Also see John L Esposito, "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace", *Current History*, January 1994. Also see Stephan Blank, "Central and South Asia in a New World Order", *Current Affairs*, Book 21, May 1996, pp. 1 – 16.
22. Shireen T Hunter, op.cit. Adil Zareef, "Central Asia: Nationalism or Islamic Revival", *The News*, 16 November 1991.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. Also see Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994. Also see K.M. Asaf and Abul Barakat, op.cit.
25. Keith Martin, op.cit. Also see K.M. Asaf and Abul Barakat, Ibid. Ghulam Sarwar, "Civil War in Tjikistan", *Pakistan Observer*, 17 December 1992. Babar Sattar, "Russia's Integrationist Temptation and the Future of Central Asia", *Current Affairs Digest*, Eook No.26, October 1996.

26. Keith Martin, *op.cit.* Also see Ahmad Rashid, "The Disintegration of Soviet Union", *The Nation*, 21 December 1991. _____ "The Crescent of Islam Rises in Tajikistan", *The Nation*, 25 December 1991. _____, "Revival of Sufism", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 December 1992. R. Pipes, "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 9, Nos. 2-3, Spring-Summer 1995.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. Also see Yang, John, "US, Turkey to Expand Aid to Central Asia", *Dawn*, 13 February 1992.
29. Idea is taken from Dr. Tahir Amin, *Nationalism and internationalism in Liberalism Marxism and Islam*, Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1991.
30. Beatrice Forbes Manz, Central Asian Uprisings in the Nineteenth Century: Ferghana Under the Russians, *Russian Review*, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 1987. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-0341\(198707\)46:3A3%3C267%3ACAUITN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C](http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-0341(198707)46:3A3%3C267%3ACAUITN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C)
31. Ibid.
32. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier- Quelqueja, *Islam In The Soviet Union*, London Pall Mall Press, 1967, p.32.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, Vol. 3., New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 433.

36: Yousef M. Chouhri, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, London: Pinter, 1997, p. 57.

37. Ernest Gellner, *Post Modernism: Reason and Religion*, London: Routledge, 1992. Cited in Lubna Abid Ali, *Foreign Policy Behaviour of a Post Revolutionary State: A case Study Of Iran 1979-2002*, QAU (Unpublished): Islamabad, 2003.

38. John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Cited in Ibid.

39. Ira M Lapidus, "Islamic Political Movements: Pattern of Historical Change", in Edmund Burke I and Ira M Lapidus, ed., *Islam: Political and Social Movements*, Berkely: University of California Press, 1988. Cited in Ibid.

THEORETICAL FRAME WORK

The resurgence of Islam, after a long period of decline, has made the twentieth century an important landmark in context of Islamic history. Caliphate institution was no doubt a symbol of Islamic unity, power and prestige and when it was dismantled Islam had lost its vigor and strength. However, within a few decades the world has witnessed the resurgence of Muslim world. Although this resurgence has become the catching phrase and printed material with titles like *Islam and Politics*, *Islam and Development: A Fundamental Fear*, *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, *The Next Threat*, etc not only has popularized the concept but also distorted the image and nature of Islam and Islamic resurgence. It was after the Iranian Revolution that world began to notice the Islamic resurgence and a list of alternative terms, Islamism, political Islam, Islamic resurgence, fundamentalism, reassertion, renaissance and revival has gained currency. Scholars¹ mentioned that resurgence of Islam has become a significant subject of prominent debate and discussion among all segments of society throughout the world.

1.1 *Islamic Resurgence*

Islamic resurgence has different manifestations;² it can be the growing awareness among Muslims about their separate identity other than nation-state. Islamic resurgence means the revival of Islam at social, political and military level, not only in the Islamic

world but also in those countries where Muslims are in minority. Islamic resurgence is considered as another global ideological danger to fill the threatening vacuum created by the demise of communism.³ With the end of SU the West has no longer any common enemy to justify their arms budget, offensive policies or more appropriately, “license to intervene” at any place, at any time.⁴

Mostly the Islamic resurgence has been explained under the term fundamentalism. It is a distinctive way of defining and implementing a particular worldview about fundamentalism that most frequently presents a style of religious experience within broader religious traditions⁵ and is used in different ways.⁶ First are those who feel the need to practice the basic principles and teaching of religion. In that case, the entire Muslim world falls under this category because they all believe in Quran and Sunnah. The second category refers to those anti-modernists who idealize the time of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) and Khulfa-e-Rashideen. They would like to replicate that time with the present. Third, those who are labeled as political activists, extremists, fanatics, terrorists, and anti-Americans and are called or compared with fundamentalists. This explanation once again implies to the Muslims because majority of them consider the West in general and USA in particular the main cause of their sufferings.

The question arises: is it appropriate to term Muslim-Islamic resurgence as fundamentalism? This is a term devised by west themselves (historical aspects of fundamentalism is out of scope of this research). Esposito, a western scholar explaining

the phenomenon in *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* prefers to speak of Islamic revivalism and Islamic activism rather than of Islamic fundamentalism. He regarded the term, Islamic fundamentalism, as too laden with Christian pre-supposition, and western stereotypes as well as implying a monolithic threat that do not exist. More fitting general terms are Islamic revivalism or Islamic activism that are less value-laden and have roots within the Islamic tradition. Furthermore, Islam possesses a long traditional revival (Tajdeed) and reforms (Islaah) from early Islamic centuries to the present day.⁷ Andrea Lueg shared the same views.⁸ The authors like Hugh Goddard in *Christians and Muslims: From Double Standards to Mutual Understanding*, provided useful insight about the Muslims and the Christian communities. The question of fundamentalism is given particularly detailed analytical treatment. Applying the term for both Christian and the Muslim world, while the Bobby S Sayyid in *Fundamental Fear*, equated the term with some organizations in Israel, India and USA. In his approach, fundamentalism is not specific to Muslims; they are just one example of same thing that is a general feature of our contemporary world.⁹ Whatever explanation may be given for the Islamic resurgence, it manifests itself at three levels.

1. Grass Roots Level
2. Middle Level
3. Upper Level.¹⁰

At grass, root level there is a growing awareness among people about their own religion. For them it is an honor to follow their religion and set their lives according to

the values and codes of Islam. The resurgence is based on fundamentals of Islam as “an all embracing system of life – a faith as well as an ideology and programme of life”.¹¹ For instance, for Muslims, women veil is a sign of respect and honor whereas in the West it symbolizes backwardness. I myself witnessed the growing use of, if not proper veil, headscarf by the Pakistani girls. Generally, the parents wish to impart religious education or memorizing of the Holy Quran first and world education later to their children. The indices of an Islamic resurgence resulting in person’s life are many. At mid-level of society there is a growing dissatisfaction regarding the current system. Intellectuals, students, women, politicians, etc. formed the core of this group. They feel that the current systems in their country are an alien, borrowed from the West, and have given way to corruption, exploitation, un-employment, poverty, injustice etc. For them the salvation lies in true Islamic system as envisioned by the Holy Quran and Sunnah. At upper level, i.e. the government and the elite, publishing of Islamic literature and religious program are an important source of resurgence and some higher government authorities and opposition members demand abolition of non Islamic laws and implementation of Islamic Shariat. Therefore, whoever is in power in the Islamic world tries to glorify Islam only to enhance his own popularity and credibility. What so ever is the driving force behind the government sponsored Islamic programme, it appear to manifest in the Islamic resurgence. One can witness the resurgence of Islam in Pakistan after Zia’s Nifaz-i-Nizam-i-Islam.¹² Although it’s the desire of every Pakistani to enforce Islamic laws or Shariat but this desire took a concrete shape and force after the Zia’s Islamization programme. Behind the diversity is a common belief, by the believers, in the truth of

Islam, regardless of changing circumstances. John O. Voll ¹³ has explained the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence as reaffirmation by Muslims of their faith and with different manifestations.

The Islamic revivalism does not mean that it had completely disappeared from the Muslim community and has now reemerged. It means that after experiencing all the “alien theories, ideologies and systems” Muslims have turned to their own belief. Thus, Islam became the reality of the modern world.

1.2 Survey of Islamic Resurgence

If studied closely, one finds that Islamic resurgence is not a recent phenomenon in the history of Islam. The resurgence of Islam can be divided into following three main periods:

1. Pre Modern Islamic Revivalism
2. Modern or Islamic Reformism
3. Neo-Modern or Islamic Radicalism. ¹⁴

1.2.1 Pre Modern Islamic Revivalism

The basic principles of the Muslim society were promulgated under the guidance of Holy prophet (PBUH), which became a model for the followers. The period of Holy Prophet (PBUH) and Khulfa-e-Rashideen is considered as the “golden era” of the Muslim community. After the caliphate system three Muslim empires known as Ottoman, the

Safavid and the Mughal Empires were established. These empires, after eighteenth century entered a phase of decline in economics, politics and culture. There was a concern among the masses. The pre modern revivalists were of the view that Muslim world was in a state of decline due to deviation from the straight path set by Quran and Shariat in personal and public life. For them Islam is a complete code of life.

Saudi Arabia was the first country to witness the first pre-modern Islamic revivalist movement, Wahhabism with the aim to “clear religious practices and thoughts from all its alien elements to save the Muslim people from divine wrath.”¹⁶ This movement urged the followers of Islam to remodel the Islamic community as established by the Holy Prophet (PBUH), at Madina. Emphasis was made on the elimination of corrupt innovations of modernization, implementation of Islamic Shariat, and discarding rigid imitation of medieval jurists in favor of Ijtihad.¹⁷ Since in their view the pure Islam was practiced by the first generation of Muslims, every Muslim was urged to follow them.¹⁸

The pre-modern revivalist period, due to the influence of Wahhabism, witnessed different movements in different parts of the Islamic world e.g. Jihad movement in the subcontinent, Faridi movement in Bengal¹⁹, Madhist uprising in Sudan,²⁰ Sanusiyya movement in Libya²¹ and Mahdism in Egypt.²² The only notable influence of Wahhabism in Turkestan was the uprising in Andizhan in 1898.²³ Though different in many respect, these revivalist movements shared the following characteristics:

1. Belief that Muslim world was in a state of decline due to the fact that they abandoned pure and true Islam.
2. Call “to go back” to original Islam and shed the superstitions inculcated by popular forms of Sufism and spread by unbelievers.
3. Advocacy of independent reasoning in the matters of legal judgment (ijtihad) and rejection of blind imitation (taqlid).
4. Need of leaving (hijrat) the territories dominated by the unbelievers.
5. Call to carry out the revivalist reforms through Jihad if necessary.
6. Belief in the expected Mahdi or imam, as one single leader of the Muslims.²⁴

With the passage of time, all revivalist movements lost their vigour and strength. Some of these movements were deflected by the well organized political forces²⁵ or by mere advanced European military technology.²⁶ Some of the revivalist movements, coping with the situation changed their structure and transformed into modernistic entities.²⁷ Thus the defeat, disintegration and transformation of the various revivalist movement provided opportunities for the Islamic reformists to rise and fill the gap between tradition and modernity.

1.2.2 Modern or Islamic Reformism.

The Islamic reformists or modernists emerged in the 19th century on the basis already built by the revivalists. The reformist movement emerged mainly because of European supremacy, and colonization of the Muslim world. The end of the 19th century

and the start of the 20th century were considered as the time of realization and comparison. It was then that the Islamic reformists began to realize the decline in their religion and societies as compared to the West. They were in response to cope with the external threat. Basically the reformist movement started as a result of European supremacy, and colonization of the Muslim world. The Islamic reformists in these centuries began to realize their religion and societies in a "state of decline" in comparison with the European nations. John L. Esposito remarked that this movement was led by men like Jamal al-Din Afghani and Muhammad Abdul in the Middle East and Sayyid Ahmed Khan and Muhammad Iqbal in South Asia. All of them argued for Islamic reform and expressed the need to reinterpret Islam in the light of new questions and issues brought by modern life. Maintaining that Islam and modernity, revelation and reason, were compatible, they advocated religious, legal, educational and social reforms to revitalize the Muslim community.²⁸ The standards that were set by the Revivalists were radically altered due to the western dominance. The intellectual horizons of the reformists were exposed in the shape of new ideas, concepts and beliefs from the west. Now for them important issues were women rights, scientific education, political reforms, constitutional and representative forms of government, etc. This, according to Youssef M. Choueiri,²⁹ presented western norms and values as an authoritative code of practices in the form of political systems, military presence and economic domination in the Muslim world.

With such changes, many felt the need to move towards modernization. This phenomenon resulted in the emergence of three distinctive classes in the Muslim society.

1. Secularist: This group consisted of people educated from the West was of the view that in the wake of progress Muslims had to blindly follow the West.
2. Traditionalist: This group constituted of Ulemas and general public and was not ready to accept any change brought by the West.
3. Islamic Reformers: This category referred to the class which in order to envisage progress in the Muslim society, availed the scientific knowledge and technology from the West but also criticized secularist.³⁰

The reformists started in the 19th century in the form of military and bureaucratic system reforms by the Ottoman rulers like Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39), Sultan Abdulmejid (1839-61) and Abdul Hamd II (1876-1909). The Ottoman reform movement known as Tanzimat, also extended land reforms, legal codes and courts to regulate civil, commercial and penal affairs.³¹ As more Muslim territories came under the domination of the west, more acute became the awareness, among the Muslims, about the degeneration of the Muslim societies. This awareness prevailed among the intellectuals, bureaucrats, state officials, members of urban middle class and those who had any sort of contact with the Europeans. Thus the desire for reforms spread in its first phase to Egypt (Mohd Abdul), Tunisia (Khatir-al-Ain), Subcontinent (Sir Syed Ahmed Khan). At the turn of the century it had encompassed Indonesia, Algeria, Iran Iraq, Morocco, Sudan and almost all the urban centers of Islamdom.³² For Central Asia, Turkestan, the increasing contact with

Russian (Western) culture and civilization resulted in the emergence of a “group of individuals” who laid the foundation of modernism in the form of Jadid movement by Ismail and Gasprinsky in 1883,³³ and later in early 20th century the Basmachi movement also challenged the Soviet hegemony in Central Asia (see 2nd chapter). If critically analyzed, almost all the Reformist movements exhibited the following common characteristics.

1. Recognizing the role of reason in people’s lives. Taqlid was rejected as it made the believer entirely dependent on ancient interpretations of texts.
 2. Ijtihad to be extended to vital modern problems exceedingly faced by the Muslim society.
 3. Salafiya’s opposition to Sufism was rejected.
 4. To implement political reforms.
 5. To improve the status of women in the society.
1. Revival and renewal in the area of education in general and Islamic education in particular.³⁴

As a result of Islamic reformism many initiatives were taken by the respective governments. Thus new social groups were formed, who were well educated, and well informed so as to widen the field of reforms. They started demanding, along with political liberties, the liberation or independence from their colonial masters. Once the independence was achieved and modern Muslim nation states emerged, majority of them were inspired and influenced by western political, legal and educational developments

and advocated for the systems “with a minimal recognition of the role of Islam in public life.”³⁵ with no systematic reinterpretation of Islam. Group of individuals emerged who criticized Islamic modernists for adopting western models of development and westernizing the Muslim societies. Thus the seeds for the renewed Islamic resurgence and radicalism were sown.

1.2.3 Islamic Radicalism or Neo-Revivalist (1945-onwards)

Radicalists reacted against modernists and tried to distinguish Islam from the West. They considered strict application of Shariat as means towards the establishment of a new society purely based on Quranic injunctions and Shariat. It called “for the creation of new system of thought and a new epistemology which is free of “corrupt” western influence and is rooted in Islam.”³⁶

After independence, Muslim countries began to rebuild their societies. The two models followed were capitalism and socialism. From 1950-1970 almost all, the Muslim countries had undergone a change in their economic, political and cultural system. The nation-state took the precedence and there were glimpses of renewal and transformation as “religion was subordinated to nationalism, socialism, popular democracy and a plethora of novel goals.”³⁷ However, all the ideologies proved to be rejected by the Muslims who were realizing and demanding, aloofness from the West in order to have stronger bonds with their Islamic identity.

In order to understand the Islamic Radicalism, two organizations are worth mentioning. Brotherhood of Hassan al-Banna (1906-49), Sayyid Qutb (1906-1979) and Jammaat-i-Islami of Maulana Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979). The founders of these two organizations have their impact over the development of Islamic radical movements throughout the Islamic world.

Hassan al-Banna and Mawdudi, both considered the European colonialism and western educated elite as curse for the Muslim societies. They considered "...not only a cultural threat to Muslim societies. Westernization threatened the very identity, independence, and way of life of Muslims."³⁸ However they were not against modernization. They differentiated between westernization and modernization. They maintained, "Muslims should not look to western capitalism or communism (white or red imperialism) but solely to Islam, the divinely revealed foundation of state and society."³⁹

Sayyid Qutb, in Egypt, radicalized neo-Modernism. He was considered as "authoritative articulator" of this theory. He divided the Muslims community into two camps, the party of God and the party of Satan as revealed in the Holy Quran. Thus modern societies are either un-Islamic or anti-Islamic. To reverse the order, that is to implement a new Islamic order Jihad (armed struggle) is obligatory.⁴⁰ Sayyid Qutb's writings became the starting point for many radical groups. Yousef M. Choueiri divided the Muslim countries into five categories, where Islamic radicalism found the breeding ground.

1. Egypt, Syria and Iraq.
2. Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.
2. Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
3. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, the Sultanate of Brunei, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain.
4. Malaysia, Afghanistan, Palestine, Lebanon, the Sudan and Nigeria. ⁴¹

The impact of Islamic Radicalism can also be observed in almost all Central Asian States, particularly Tajikistan, where the opposition Islamic parties demanded Islamic constitution, through armed struggle to establish an Islamic state. ⁴² The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is also active in Central Asia with the goal to carry a Taliban-style Islamic revolution deep into the heart of formerly Soviet Central Asia, to the Republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. ⁴³ The analysis of Islamic radicalism, despite some differences, exhibited the following common characteristics:

1. To overthrow the existing regimes.
2. To create awareness that the West has dominated the Muslim ummah and is corrupting Muslim society through its culture.
3. Western culture, values, laws, etc are alien to native Muslim beliefs and values.
4. To establish divine law, Shariat, and to eradicate other ideologies.
5. To free humanity from Kufr, a jihad must be carried out.
6. Criticism on the apathy of the Muslim world towards the major issues like Palestine. ⁴⁴

Islamic radicalists were equally popular among the urban educated middle and lower classes like students, teachers, state employees, unemployed youth, artisans etc. They are considered as “strength” of the radicalists. From Africa to South East Asia, Islamic organizations are working on the ideology of radicalism⁴⁵ e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood Jamnat al-Muslimin, Jamaat al-Jihad, salvation from Hell (Egypt), AMAL, Hizbullah (Lebanon), Islamic Tendency Movement, Renaissance party (Ennahda) (Tunisia), Muhahidin-i-Khalq (Iran), Islamic Salvation front (Algeria), Taliban, Jamat-i-Islami (Pakistan), Islamic Renaissance party (Tajikistan) etc are few examples to cite. It is at this stage of history of Islamic resurgence that west begins to label the Islamic revivalism as “Fundamentalism”. Whatever meaning may be given to the Islamic resurgence, one chain of reasoning links revivalism, reformism and radicalism, that is rejection of other ideologies. There is an encouraging awareness among the Muslim world that a new era of unity and inward strength based on the broad teachings of Islam has dawned on the great Islamic Community.⁴⁶

1.3 Causes of Islamic Resurgence

Although the causes of the Islamic resurgence may vary from country to country, at least some of them appear to be common to all. These major causes are as follows:

For Muslims, Islam is a complete code of life and not merely a set of rituals. It covers all aspects of this material world and world hereafter. They consider each aspect of their lives under the guidance and surveillance of Allah and attribute every achievement or misfortune to the will of God. Masses particularly feel that if government enforces some

un-Islamic laws that would result in Allah's wrath. Some Muslims believe that, one cause of the Taliban's downfall may be their deviation from the true Islam or straight path. There is strong desire among the masses of the Muslim world to implement the Islamic laws to replace the existing Un-Islamic laws with the Islamic ones.

A Muslim living in any part of the world, belonging to any race, colour, culture or creed speaking any language is a member of Ummah.⁴⁷ One God, One prophet, One book and One center Kabah – are the symbols, which organized the believers into one cohesive unit. unity is also reflected in the rituals of Islam in every day life.⁴⁸ Being a part of one Ummah, Muslims consider it their responsibility to speak for the sufferings of Palestinians, Bosnians, Chechens, Afghans, Kashmiris, Gujarati Muslims (India), therefore they criticize the policies of different governments of Muslim world and deem it as their sacred duty to provide a guide line by which they would be able to restructure their societies on Islamic lines through arm struggle (Jihad)⁴⁹

The science that Muslims borrowed from the West, makes them realize that it is not a means of "being better," but of appearing better.⁵⁰ Similarly the proverb "each for himself and God for all" found its place in European social organization, but proved fatal in contradiction and tried to replace the essential social principle of Islam with "each for all and all for each".⁵¹ Muslims cannot find a model or ideology that would be compatible with the spirit of Islam and the demands of the modern age. It forces them to fall back on their own ideology and values.⁵²

Islam has always been misunderstood in terms of women's rights, cultural development, modernity, scientific education, philosophical concepts, democracy and other political concepts, etc. Particularly the West portrays Islam as being hostile to human rights.⁵³ In response of their objection Muslim intellectuals have tried to give positive answer of every criticism.⁵⁴ This process resulted in the growing awareness among the Muslims on one hand and on the other it further widened the gap between Islam and the West. The discriminating policies adopted by the West for Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Taliban, forced the Muslim youth to compare them with the policies for Israel, East Timor, India, etc. It is not only the question of solving the dispute but the way the West treats the Muslims. This discrimination forced not only the illiterate masses but also the well educated Muslims to welcome the concept the Jihad open heartedly.⁵⁵

Urbanization also played a major role in Islamic resurgence. The rural communities of the Muslim societies come to the cities with an aim of having better livelihood. However, most of them experience unemployment, crimes, selfishness, corruption with no sense of belonging and security. The only alternative they conceive is the package of religious values, which give them, hope, security, confidence and strength. They feel that the guidance of Allah will never let them down. Fischer⁵⁶ also explains the same phenomenon. Nationalist elites have been unable to establish their legitimacy and meet the hopes and aspirations of their people.⁵⁷ Thus, the disappointed masses of the Muslim world turned their attention to those movements, which offered Islam as perfect solution.

Revolution in print and electronic media made communication between Islamic leaders and followers, to spread the message of Islam, much easier.⁵⁸ Religious scholars like Dr. Israr Ahmed, Dr. Zakir Naik, utilized the modern devices to preach Islam. Thus, knowledge of Islam reached even the Muslim villagers who seem to be no more illiterate, ignorant, isolated and solely dependent upon their local religious leaders to gain the knowledge of Islam.⁵⁹ Modern concepts of economics also provided confidence to the Muslim world. Islamic resurgence in Muslim world, e.g. Libya, was the outcome of the oil wealth, which gave a new impetus to Muslims. This wealth increased the influence of conservative Arab/Muslim governments. Muslim countries sought developmental projects on one side and on the other provided financial assistance to the poorer Muslim countries in term of aids, loans and financing Muslim institutions and parties.⁶⁰ Small segments of society began to feel the uneven distribution of wealth. These dis-satisfied masses turned out to be the strong supporters of Islamic movements which promised them equal distribution of wealth, prosperity as envisaged by Islam.⁶¹ To summarize poverty has been considered as the vital factor that creates the need to own religion⁶² and thus becomes a reason of revival of Islam in any society.

1.4 Nationalism: New Identity

The idea that came to be termed as nationalism arose in the 18th century and has been, since then, an extremely powerful force in human history. During the 19th and 20th centuries, nationalism played a major role in redrawing the map of Europe and gradually

led to major political developments in various parts of the world especially in many countries of Asia and Africa. Nationalism a product of Europe's historical experience found its way to the Muslim world and achieved a lot of currency and advocates in its ethnic and religious forms. During the 20th century, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the gradual withering of the colonial system, Muslim people achieved the status of nationhood one after another.

Unlike so many other political doctrines, nationalism lacks a founding father whose ideas would have served as inspiration and model for his successors. It is, however, possible to trace the intellectual origins of nationalist doctrine in the 18th century.⁶³ The nationalist ideology flourished by French and German philosophers like Jean Jacques Rousseau, J.G. Herder and J.G. Fichte, was completely alien to the majority of Europeans living in the 19th century. The question was how nationalism could be universally accepted? Different scholars have given different stages for growth of nationalism.⁶⁴ Dr. Tahir Amin⁶⁵ has given answer to this in term of 3 waves across the globe. One might ask: what are the element, which constitute nationalism? It's the achievement of past and accomplishment for the future was the answer given by Renan.⁶⁶ While John Stuart Mill called it common sympathies⁶⁷ for the conationalists. Different writers emphasized integrative and disintegrative aspects of nationalism.⁶⁸

According to Dr Tahir Amin, the first wave of nationalism that began with the French revolution and Napoleonic war and stretched up to the second World War, transformed the face of the western world. A close link between nation and state arose in

the course of European history and with the rise of nationalism, each nation demanded its own state. This led to the creation of modern European states.

The second wave began with the end of Second World War to the early 1970 and led to the decolonization and independence of most of the developing countries. However most of these states formed were not nation state i.e. states representing a single ethnicity. Being the poly-ethnic these states are faced with the problem of becoming nations and the problem in each case is with older identities with the result they lack national integration. The third wave appeared in the form of the rise of ethno national movement during 1970 and the world has been affected to this to-date.

It was due to the second wave that nationalism penetrated in a concrete form into the Muslim world. During the 19th century, Muslims accepted the European's political ideas. The most widely accepted ideology was nationalism. This was due to many reasons: First to achieve independence from the colonial rulers on the right of national 'self determination'. Secondly, to impress the European statesmen that Islamic countries were rapidly going to transfer themselves into modern states". Thirdly nationalist leaders took nationalism as a guiding principle for the development of their nation-state.⁶⁹ Theodore A. Coulounlis and James H. Wolfe defined nationalism in the following words:

Nationalism can be defined as a perceived identity of one self with a territorially organized political collectivity such as the United States, the USSR and other countries. The psychological need to define oneself in

terms of membership in a given community is at the root of nationalist sentiment. The hallmarks of nationalism are a sense of territoriality manifested in a love of one's homeland a written and spoken language, a tradition of achievement in the arts and literature, a narrative history (as opposed to legends or folk tales), and, frequently, the perpetuation from generation to generation of the fear of the enemy.⁷⁰

Hans Kohn defined nationalism as:

A state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members, it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization, and nationality as the source of all creative and cultural energy and economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore due to his nationality, and his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare⁷¹.

Any consideration of the concept of nationalism required the definition and explanation of two key concepts STATE and NATION.

1.4.1 *State*

In modern Western political thought, the idea of the state is often linked to the notion of an impersonal and privileged legal or constitutional order with the capability of administering and controlling a given territory.⁷² If the definition of state is analyzed it can be seen that: population, territory, government and sovereignty, are the four pillars of the state and are called the Constituent Elements of a state.⁷³ They are essential for forming a state. For liberal the question of sovereignty, citizenship and political accountability are important.⁷⁴ The liberal state is a minimal state; it just has to protect the security and the property of the individual. It is a juridical state and its most important institution is judiciary through which it manages its market and thus develops its market economy.⁷⁵ The liberal state is almost opposite to the nationalistic state. From 18th century up to the 20th century various scholars discussed the relationship between the rights of state⁷⁶ and the duties of subjects⁷⁷ and sovereign power.⁷⁸ J.J. Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and J. S. Mill⁷⁹ remain the leading classical articulators of the modern state systems.

Marxism rejected both liberalism and liberal democracy and stressed upon class structure and forces of political coercion. Karl Marx (1818 - 83) and Frederick Engel (1820 - 95) articulated the first systematic critique of political economy and visualized the state as a superstructure that develops on the foundation of economic and social relations. There are two (often-interconnected) strands in Marx's account of the relation between classes and the state. According to the first strand, the state in general and

bureaucratic institution in particular should be strong enough so that any external force does not dominate them. The second strand, upholds the view that the state is merely a superstructure serving the interest of the dominant class. Throughout his political essays and especially in Communist Manifesto, Marx insisted on the direct dependence of the state on economic, social and political power of the dominant class.⁸⁰ Lenin (1870 - 1924) followed the tenets of Marx's position 2nd and conceived of the state as a machine for the oppression of one class by another.⁸¹

Ralph Milliband in 1969 argued that in contemporary western societies is a dominant or ruling class, which owns and controls the means of production, and has close links with powerful institutions, political parties, the military, the media, etc. And it has disproportionate representation at all levels of the state apparatus. The capitalist class constitutes constraint on western government and state institutions.⁸² In order to be politically effective the state must be able to separate itself from ruling-class factions. Under exceptional circumstances, the state can achieve a high order of independence from class interests, e.g. in national crisis or war. Claus Offe and Jurgen Habermes, belong to a quite different tradition of Marxist thought. Among their criticisms is the charge that Milliband regards capitalist states only from a negative perspective.⁸³

There is tendency on the part of modern political theorists, including Islamists, to define the state in terms of the major components of the nation state, the basic political unit in the contemporary international system. The defining of the state in terms of

population, sovereignty, territory and government are of little help in identifying the essential elements that distinguish the Islamic state from other types of states.

The word "dawlah" (dawlah) was first used in the Quran. Until the late 15th century, one could hardly find any reference to state in Muslim literature, or in western literature for that matter. Other terms such as *alamsar* or *daral Islam* were employed whenever a reference was made to the territories under Muslim control. Alternatively, the state as political body was identified by its political organs i.e., *al Khilafah* or *al Imam*. Muslim scholars of 6th and 7th centuries began to employ "dawlah" in reference to the various Muslim dynasties that emerged when the institution of *Khilafah* lost its executive power. The term *dawlah* began to acquire a political connotation.⁸⁴ In the light of Islam, Islamic state is Allah's state or the kingdom of God on earth. In this state, there is only one supreme sovereign and that is Allah. The Islamic state is the demonstrator of this system where the concepts of *Tauhid*, *Risalat*, *Caliphate*, *Jihad* and *Ijtehad* are being practiced. Islamic state has practical objectives towards its citizens.⁸⁵ An Islamic state coexists with a society. Islamic state is impossible without an Islamic society. Islamic state rather evolves from an Islamic society.⁸⁶ Hassan-al-Turabi has outlined the ideological foundation of an Islamic state.⁸⁷ Sayyid Abdul A'la Maududi, on this subject gives a precise account that the political system of Islam is based on three principles: *Tauhid*, *Risalat* and *Khilafat*.⁸⁸ Legislation in an Islamic state should be within the limits prescribed by the *Sharia*, which comprises of four sources, the Holy Quran⁸⁹, *Sunnah*⁹⁰, *Ijma* (Consensus)⁹¹, and *Ijtehad* or *Qiyas*⁹²

Beside, executive and legislature, judiciary is another important and fundamental institution of an Islamic state. Islamic judiciary is not placed under the control of the executive. Ruler and the ruled are subject to the same law with no discrimination based on position, power or privilege. Islam places its complete state structure upon its basic principles of justice. In an Islamic state, the non-Muslim minorities are given fundamental rights. Non-Muslims also have the right to regulate their private life, education, and family life by adopting their own family laws "There should be no interference with (the practice of) their faith or observance, nor any change in their rights or privileges" ⁹³. Thus, Islam has invariably pledged the security of life, religion and property of the non-Muslims.

Islamic state is an ideological state and is different from the western democratic states⁹⁴ and moulds every aspect of life and activity in accordance with the moral norms and standards of social reforms. It gives individual liberty to its citizens. The administrators in an Islamic state have to necessarily implement the reformatory programs.

1.4.2 Nation

There is no commonly agreed definition for the word NATION. A.D. Smith defines nation as:

A named human population, sharing historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public

culture a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.⁹⁵

For Rupert Emerson:

A nation is a community of people who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have common destiny for the future.⁹⁶

The word nation is derived from the Latin word "natio", "natus", or "nastro" which means birth or race or to be born⁹⁷, and originally mean a group of people born at the same place, whether that place is thought of as a few dozens or many thousands of square miles⁹⁸.

Somewhat later, primary (political usage) and secondary (legal usage) meanings evolved.⁹⁹The two meanings at first remain distinct enough. The victory of popular government in Europe in the period from 1789 to 1918 led to a blending of two meanings for nations which were proclaimed sovereign.¹⁰⁰

1.4.2.1 Administrative Revolution

It is said that the nation is created by the state and the activities such as taxation; administration, etc keep the public bound to law and order.¹⁰¹The citizenship rights,

building of infrastructure and communication networks with the state borders drew more areas and classes into the national arena and created images of national communities of England, France, Spain, that evoke such powerful feelings of commitment and belonging to this day.¹⁰²

1.4.2.2. Economic Revolution

The movement to a market economy began in a few core states of the late medieval West and spread outward to other areas of Europe, Latin America, Asia, America and ultimately Africa¹⁰³. The capitalist revolution involved vastly increased trading networks in the West and then in selected peripheries, which in turn encouraged the accumulation of capital and the rise of wealthy urban centers and merchant capital¹⁰⁴. European states, often at war with one another, benefited from the activities of their bourgeoisies. This helped them having a well equipped armies and more efficient administration staff.

2.3. Cultural And Educational Revolutions

This allowed the development of secular studies, notably classical humanism and science, popular modes of communication, novels, plays and journals. The intellectuals played an important role in this process. The creation of secular mass nations was ultimately the outcome of a vigorous programme of political socialization through the public mass education system.¹⁰⁵

1.4.2.4. Modernization Revolution

The most important revolution was modernization that began in Europe. Traditional feudal system turned out to be complicated.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, colonial empires were considered having dissimilar aspects. By contrast, nation-states of intermediate size provided a political framework for equality of opportunity, comprehensive division of labor and hence a modern industry and scientific technology came into being. This modernization provided a network linking a number of nearby cities, each with its rural hinter - land. An outside challenge to that new way of life and the advent of a new generation acted as catalysts in shaping a political consciousness of nationality.¹⁰⁷ Thus in the modern liberal world we find two overlapping concepts of the nation.

1.4.2.5 Civic or Territorial

The civic conception treats nation as a unit of population which inhabits a democratic territory, possesses a common economy, common laws with identical legal rights and duties and public, mass education system, with a single civic ideology. Territory, economy, law and education constitute the four spheres through which nations, in this view, are formed¹⁰⁸. It is very much a western conception.

1.4.2.6 Ethnic or Genealogical

It sees nations as a named human population, which has common traditions, customs, history and ancestors. It is a conception of the nation that has found favour mainly outside the West, and often opposed to civic conceptions.¹⁰⁹ This suggests that behind the rival models of the nation stand certain common beliefs about what constitutes a nation as opposed to any other kind of collective, cultural identity.¹¹⁰

Like other scholars Marx and Engels and Lenin also define nation within their own school of thought. Marx and Engels were explicitly internationalist in their approach. However by 1872 they were prepared to admit that special regard ought to be paid to the institutions, customs, and traditions of various lands.¹¹¹ He divided nations of the world into three categories. In the West, progressive national movements of the bourgeoisie long ago ended and purely oppressive regimes prevailed. In Eastern Europe and especially Russia, bourgeois democratic and nationalist movements were now in progress. Thirdly, in colonial areas, such as Asia, where bourgeois nationalism had as yet hardly begun its appearance was to be encouraged.¹¹² Lenin's support of national revolutionary movements was particularly relevant to the Russian situation¹¹³. Under his influence the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, adopted in 1903 as a clause in its program, the right of self-determination for all nations following part of the state.¹¹⁴ Thus by the right of self-determination, he meant the right of secession. Stalin does not identify the nation with the state. According to him nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people.¹¹⁵ For him nations are sovereign, and all nations are equal".¹¹⁶

The word Ummah is derived from the root amm, meaning aim at or intended, "Ummah", therefore, carries many senses devoting this original meaning intending. Primarily, however, it means the people who intend to follow a leader (imam), a law (Shariah), a religion (Din) or a path (Minhaj) and also the thing intended. Hence two principle concepts denoting the term Ummah are community and religion. They are used separately and combined to imply a religious community.¹¹⁷ Quran has used the word in a different connotation.¹¹⁸ To a Muslim, the entire world is his abode and place of worship, for it lies within the mulk of Allah.¹¹⁹ Since all the Muslims believe in one God, one Prophet, one Book and one center - Kabah. Ummah is described in the Quran as Ummatul Wahidah. Islam prescribes a code of conduct that is called Shariat (Divine Law). It divides human obligations into huquq Allah and huquq al-ibad.¹²⁰ According to Islam a man is not only responsible for his own conduct before God but also accountable for his social conduct and behaviour being a part of the Ummah.¹²¹ This great concern for maintaining inner cohesion and unity is also reflected in the rituals of Islam in every day life.¹²² Watt has described it as Charismatic Community.¹²³ This ideological community of Islam aims at restoring the ideological unity of mankind and it is in this sense that it is called Ummah Wahiddah in the Quran¹²⁴ It's the duty of every Muslim to convert the entire world into a single community.¹²⁵ Islam believes in the basic unity of mankind and does not aim at the division of humanity into nations.

1.5 Nationalism

Various liberal scholars have given different views on nationalism. As Hans Kohn¹²⁶ emphasized the integrative aspects of nationalism, scholars like Carleton Hayes¹²⁷, Toynbee¹²⁸, E. H. Carr¹²⁹, perceived nationalism as a negative force and held it responsible for the breakdown of civilization. Writers like Karl W. Deutsch¹³⁰, Ernest B. Haas¹³¹, Ernest Gellner¹³², concentrated on internationalism, integration and interdependence and largely neglected the study of nationalism, disintegration and dependence. While Walker Connor's¹³³ theme of literature was disintegration. He believed that a majority of the states are multiethnic and that "ethnic consciousness has been definitely increasing, not decreasing, in recent years"¹³⁴. His emphasis on ethnic groups brought to light the issue of multiple loyalties into sharp focus.¹³⁵ A. D. Smith's¹³⁶ work gives nationalism a positive outlook and defines it as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation"¹³⁷. According to his definition, nationalism is a step towards independence and modernization. He believed that nationalism is going to stay for ever.¹³⁸ and the main reason for this is the world state system that will continue for good.¹³⁹

Marx and Engels, did not have a coherent and well-articulated theory on nationalism because they were internationalist in their outlook. According to Marx nationalism was a historical fact and a stage between the transition from feudalism to capitalism. His work has predicted that integration would eventually be achieved at the international level under socialism. Lenin was convinced that nationalism was a transitional phenomenon.¹⁴⁰ For the

Postmodernization writers the rise of ethno nationalism and old state nationalism and religious revivalism were the new realities, which were often ignored by the Marxists. Tom Nairn believes that the theory of nationalism represents Marxism's "great historical failure".¹⁴¹ In explaining the persistence of nationalism, Nairn believes the cost would be great: the cost would be "Marxism" itself.¹⁴²

The Islamic scholars viewed nationalism in a different way. For them the basic ideal was Universal Ummah but to liberate the Muslims from the colonial rule and create a new world order adopting nationalism was suggested. Allama Iqbal a modern Muslim philosopher at the start of the twentieth century came up with the concept of Muslim nationalism with a clear purpose of creating a Muslim Community throughout the world. For him nationalism was something which created hatred, rivalries and wars among the people¹⁴³ but he also knew its importance to overthrow the western imperialism.¹⁴⁴ The Modernization theorists of the Islamic World who were influenced and educated in the West accepted the western nation, liberal nationalism and their systems as the reality. For them everything had to be modernized, these theorists are primarily of two types: Liberal nationalists such as Kamal Ataturk, Shah of Iran Ayub Khan etc and the National Socialist such as Jamal Abdal-Nasir, Saddam Hussain, Z. A. Bhutto, etc. Following characteristics are common in the writings of the above leaders:

1. They were all nationalists, some of them paid lip service to internationalism, such as pan Islamism. They were motivated primarily by the real politik considerations rooted in the domestic politics or foreign policy of their countries.

2. Their ideologies were of syncretised variety. They combined liberal or socialist variety of nationalism with the ethnic tradition. The goal in each case was modernization. Their model in most of the cases was the west.
3. Nearly all of them included Islam as one of the factors in the composition of their ideologies. Faced with the legitimacy crises, most of them resorted to Islam and expounded and patronized their own official version of Islam. One can witness different versions of nationalism, Iranian, Egyptian, Pakistani nationalism.¹⁴⁵

Jamal Abdal Nasir, for instance, was primarily concerned with creating strong, cohesive and modern nation - state along national socialist lines. He reinterpreted the history of Egypt essentially in nationalist terms. Both his domestic and foreign policy agenda are drawn in the nationalist context with scant regard for Islamic internationalism.¹⁴⁶

Post modernization Islamic theorists, schooled in the indigenous educational system, were internationalists in their approach. They insisted on rejecting nationalism and considered it as a concept different from Islamic tradition and its culture. For them Islam on its own is a complete concept of life which one should understand on its own without adding any other ideology to it. Khomeini regards patriotism as natural sentiment but rejects nationalism on two grounds, it is contrary to the Islamic teaching and it is an alien idea propagated by foreigners in order to divide the Muslim community.¹⁴⁷ He urged the Muslims to overthrow the existing nation states. For Sayyed Maududi, Islam is international and its message is universal. Nationalism is inconsistent with Islam because it divides the

human being on the basis of nationality. Nationalism simply means that a nationalist ought to give preference to his own nationality over all other nationalities. ¹⁴⁸ Once the nationalism infiltrated into the Muslim world, it proved to be more destructive. It destroyed the basic force of unity, i.e., the Ummah and divided the Muslim world into a number of nation-states. Secondly, Muslims also lost credibility in the teachings of Islam and instead of thinking of problems and security of the Muslim world collectively the Muslim states got preoccupied with their own national problems. ¹⁴⁹ Only paying lip service to the Kashmir's, Chechens, Palestinians, and Bosnians etc. Thus creating negative feelings among Muslims. Most of the Muslim states considered that to achieve modernization they had to follow the West. So instead of developing relations with the Muslim states they became allies of the West. In a nation state, believers and non-believers are equal. ¹⁵⁰ The citizens of Muslim nation states are no more divided into Muslims and dhimmis (non-Muslims) but every one is considered as equal and this nationalism, eliminated altogether emphasis upon the religious bonds holding the polity together. ¹⁵¹ Another problem that emerged was the continuous conflict between the Ulemas and the nationalists on various issues. Muslim Nationalists tried to organize their nation-states on the criteria of the West. The organizations and institutions were developed on the pattern of western political thought. "Liberal-nationalism continued to borrow almost exclusively from western thought, maintained a determined confidence in the superiority of a western system and its appropriateness..."¹⁵²

When Muslim world was colonized, the concept of Muslim Ummah was also colonized and replaced by nationalism. During their struggle for independence, nationalism really provided a solid ground for the nationalists to achieve their goal. Once the Ummah was replaced by nation-states, the rulers failed to solve the problems of their nations, as promised by them in the name of nationalism. The masses began to turn to religion (Islam) for solutions of various problems. Thus nationalism, Islam and Islamic revivalism, continued to be debated throughout the world.

NOTES

1. Flora Lewis, "upsurge in Islam," *New York Times*, 28-30 Dec 1979, cited in G.W. Choudhary, *Islam and the Contemporary World*, London: Indus Thames Publisher limited, 1990, p. 193.
2. Fazlur Rehman, "Islam: challenges and opportunities," in Alford Twelch and Pierre Cachia, ed., *Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenges*, USA: state University of New York Press, 1979S p.305. Spread of Islam in certain western countries; strengthening of certain traditional Islamic laws and values in Muslim countries.
3. John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p.3.
4. Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg, *The Next Threat: Western Perception of Islam*, London: Pluto Press, 1995 , p. 4.
5. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, Vol. 2.,New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 32.
6. Ibid, pp. 249-250.
7. John L. Esposito, op.cit, pp. 15-25.
8. Andrea Lueg, "The perceptions of Islam in Western Debate," Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg, ed., op. cit., p. 13.

9. Bobby S. Sayyid, *A fundamental Fear: Euro centrism and the Emergence of Islam*, London: Zed Books Ltd., 1997, p. 7.
10. Idea was taken from Alexander Bennigsen, "Islam in Retrospect," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 7, 1989.
11. Anlin Saikal, "Islam: Resistance and Reassertion," *World Today*, London,, Nov, 1987, cited in G.W. Choudhary, op.cit., p. 195.
12. G.W. Choudhary, op.cit, pp. 203-212.
13. John O.Voll, "The Islamic Past and the present Resurgence," *Current History*, April 1980.
14. Alford Twelch and Pierre Cachia, op.cit. , pp. 315-336. Also see Charles Kurzman, *Liberal Islam: A Source book*, New York oxford University Press, 1999. He used the terms, customary, revivalist and liberal Islam.
15. Yousef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, London: Pinter, 1997, p. 7.
16. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*: Vol. 3, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 432.
17. Elizabeth Sirriyeh, *Sufis and Anti Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection and Sufisim in the Modern World*, Great Britain: Curzon, 1999, p. 23.
18. John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991, pp. 35-37.

19. Qayamuddin Ahmad, *The Wahhabi Movement in India*, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 1994.
20. Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab world*, London: Routhledge, 1991, pp. 104-119.
21. John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, op.cit., pp. 38-4.
22. Jay Spaulding and Stephen Beswick, ed., *White Nile Black Blood*, Eritrea: The Red Sea Press Inc, 2000, [http:// www. Expotimes. Net/books/Spaulding.htm](http://www.Expotimes.Net/books/Spaulding.htm).
23. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier- Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, London: Pall mall press, 1967, p. 32.
24. Alfred Twelch and Pierre Cachia, op.cit, pp. 317. Also see Youssef M. Choueiri, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
25. Wahhabists were defeated by the Ottoman Reformists governor of Egypt.
26. Jihad Movement was defeated by British in Sub-Continent.
27. In 20th Century Sanusiyya Movement struggle for the national liberation of libya.
28. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, Vol. 2, op.cit., pp. 248-249.
29. Youssef M. Choueiri, op.cit., p. 24.
30. Omer Awass, "Secular Nationalism and Islam in the 20th Century Muslim World," *Hamdard Islamicus*, Vol. XIX, No. 4, winter 1998, pp. 92-93.

31. John. L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, op. cit., p. 44.
32. Youssef M. Choueiri, op.cit., p. 22.
33. P. L.Dash, " Ethnic Tussles in the Soviet Muslim Republics," in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1992. Also see Ahmad Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam and Nationalism*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994.
34. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, Vol. 3, op.cit., pp. 432-433.
35. Ibid., vol. 2., p. 248.
36. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 433.
37. Youssef M. Choueiri, op.cit., p. 56.
38. John. L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth and Reality*, op. cit., pp. 121-122.
39. Ibid., pp. 125.
40. Ibid., pp.129.
41. Youssef M. Choueiri, op. cit., Pp. 123-157. Also see, John L. Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1982.

42. Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "Islam and Akheisum: Dynamic Tension in Soviet Central Asia," William Fierman, ed., *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. Also see Ahmad Rashid, op. cit.
43. Christian Caryl, "In the Hot Zone", *News Week*, 8 Oct. 2001.
44. For detail see Omer Awass, op. cit and Youssef M. Choueiri, op. cit.,p. 123-157.
45. See Youssef M. Choueiri, op. cit.
46. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World*, Vol. 3, op.cit. Also see John, L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth and Reality*, op.cit
47. Flora Lewis, "Upsurge in Islamic," *New York Times*, 28-30 Dec, 1979. Cited in G.W. Chaudhary, op. cit., p. 193.
48. Henry Siegman, "The State and the Individual in Sunni Islam," *The Muslim World*, Vol. 54, No. 7, January 1964, p. 14.
49. Manzooruddin Ahmad, *Islamic Political System In Modern Age: Theory and Practice*, Karachi: Saad Publications, 1983, pp. 48-57.
50. Jihad should not be considered only as the arum struggle against Kafirs but it should be taken in broader sense. Jihad required by all believers to carry out against the evils instincts of human being.
51. Asma Rashid, *Islam in History and Society*, Islamabad: Islamic research Institute, 1988, p. 43. Translated Malek Bennabrs, *Vacation de Islam*, Paris: Edition An Semil, 1954.

52. Ibid., p. 42.
53. Ibid., p. 62.
54. Andrea Lueg, "The Perceptions of Islam in western Debate," in Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg, op.cit., p. 21.
55. Ibid., p. 22.
56. John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth and Reality*, op. cit., pp. 10.
57. Michael M.J. Fischer, "Islam and the Revolt of the Petit Bourgeoisie," in *Daedalus*, III (1) winter 1982, cited in Bobby S. Sayyid, op.cit., p. 2.
58. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
59. John L. Esposito, *Voice of Resurgent Islam*, op. cit., p. 41.
60. John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth and Reality*, op. cit., pp. 10.
61. Bobby S. Sayyid, op. cit., pp. 20-21.
62. For instance Mahbob-ul-Haq in 60's revealed that more than 80% of Pakistan's wealth is in the hand of 22 families while remains is in the hand of rest of Pakistanis.
63. ___ "African Islam and Competitive Religion" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2. April 1988, pp. 514-518.

64. Norman, D P almer and Howard C. Perkins, *International Relations: The World Community in Transitio*. Lahore: National Book Foundation, 1988, Explains states and growth of Nationalism. Theodore A Couloumlis and James H Wolfe, op. cit. Traces the origin of Nationalism in the time period of B. C.
65. For detail see: Anthony H. Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, A.D.Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, New York: Holmes and Meier publishers, 1983. Klie Keddourie, *Nationalism*, New York: Frederick A Preager, 1960. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York: MacMillan, 1967, see chapter 1.
66. Dr. Tahir Amin, *Nationalism and internationalism in Liberalism Marxism and Islam*, Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1991.
67. Quoted in Sharp and Kirk, *Contemporary International Policies*, New York: Reinhart, 1940, p. 113. Cited in Frederick H Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co, 1978, p. 30.
68. Ibid.
69. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York: Macmillian, 1948. A.J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol, I and II, London: Oxford University Press, 1947, E.H. Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939*, New York, Harper and Row, 1964. cited in Dr.Tahir Amin, op.cit.
70. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Political Thought*, Edinburgh: The University press, 1998, pp. 116-117.

71. Theodore, A. Couloumlis and James H. Wolfe, op cit, p. 38.
72. Hans Kohan, op.cit., cited in Dr. Tahir Amin, op.cit.
72. David Held, *Central Perspective on the Modern State*, The Open University Press, 1983, p. 1.
73. H. Rehman, *Beginners Civics*, Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1984, p. 28.
74. David Held, op. cit., pp. 4 - 14.
75. Ibid., pp. 4 - 9.
76. C.B Macphe son, Harmondsworth,ed., *Leviathan*, Penguin, 1968, p. 728, cited in David Held, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
77. David Held, op. cit., pp. 9 – 10
78. Ibid., pp. 11 · 14.
79. Ibid., pp. 15 · 16.
80. Ibid., pp. 23 -- 29.
81. Ibid., p. 30.
82. S.F Bloom, *The World of Nations: A study of the National Implications in the Work of Kal Marx 1941*, cited in Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and national Self-Determinaticn*, London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1969, p. 189

83. Ibid.
84. Louay M. Safi, "The Islamic State: A Conceptual Frame Work", *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1991, pp. 221 - 23.
85. Hassan - al - Turabi, "The Islamic State", in John L. Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent of Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 242.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., pp. 241 - 243.
88. Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", in John Esposito, ed., op. cit., p. 117.
89. The sacred book of Muslims, revealed on Holy Prophet (PBUH)
90. The Sunnah is the saying and practices of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H).
91. Ijma means, the system of independent legislation that in case of silence of Shariah, the people having religious understanding and clarity of concepts make certain rules to clarified the particular situation.
92. The word ijihad means exerting one's power or ability in the prosecution of the affairs to one's utmost advantage. But as a technical term of Muslim jurisprudence it refers to the application of individual reasoning for discovering solutions of new legal problems.

93. Ayatullah Mahmud Taliqau, "The Characteristics of Islamic Economy", in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, ed., *Islam in Transition*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 212 - 213.
94. G. W. Choudhury, *Islam and the Contemporary World*, London: Indus Thames Publishers Ltd, 1990, pp. 42 – 43
95. A. D. Smith, *National Identity*, op. cit., p. 14.
96. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nations*, Cambridge: M. A. Harvard University Press, 1959, p. 91, cited in Dr. Tahir Amin, op.cit.
97. H. Rehman, op. cit., p. 19.
98. In the European universities of late Middle Ages, "nation" was groups of students who came from the same region and country. David L. Sills, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Volume 15, New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, p. 8. Also see K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, National Book Foundation, 1977, p. 11.
99. David L. Sills, op. cit., p. 8.
100. Ibid.
101. A. D. Smith, *National Identity*, op. cit., pp. 59 – 60, cited in Dr. Tahir Amin, op.cit.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., pp. 60 - 61.

104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. David L. Sills, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-14.
107. Ibid.
108. A. D. Smith, *The Myth of Modern Nation and The Myths of Nations*, London: Routledge, 1988, pp. 8 - 9.
109. Ibid.
110. A. D. Smith, *National Identity*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
111. S.F Bloom, *The World of Nations, a study of the National Implications in the Work of Kal Marx*, 1941, cited in Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and national Self-Determination*, London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1969, p. 189.
112. Alfred Cobban, *Ibid.*, p. 190.
113. *Ibid.*
114. *Ibid.*
115. *Ibid.*, pp.192-193
116. *Ibid.*

117. Manzooruddin Ahmed, *Islamic Political System in Modern Age: Theory and Practice*, Karachi: Saad Publications, 1983, p. 48.
118. Quran frequently uses the word Ummah in the absolute sense of a nation and described as the Ummah Muslimah and Ummah Wahidah. Islam and unity are the two most important foundations for the Ummah.
119. Saiyyed Ab dul A'la Maududi, *Political Theory of Islam*, Lahore, 1960, cited in Dir Tahir Amin , op. cit. , p.76.
120. Ibid. , p. 77.
121. Ibid.
122. Hameed A.K. Rai, *International Relations: Theory and Practice*, Lahore: Aziz publishers, 1983, pp. 405-407.
123. Frederick H Hartman, op.cit., p 34.
124. Abul I Ala Maududi, "Nationalism and Islam", in Hjohn L. Esposito, ed., *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 94.
125. Ibid.
126. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York: Macmillan, 1967, see chapter 1, cited in Dr. Tahir Amin, op.cit.

127. C.J.H Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion*, New York: Macmillan, 1960.cited in Dr.Tahir Amin, op.cit.
128. J.Toynbee, *A study of History vol I and vol II*, London: Oxford University press, 1947 and 1957.
129. E.H.Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939*, New York: Harper and Row, 1964,cited in Dr.Tahir Amin, op.cit.
130. K.W.Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1969, cited in Dr.Tahir Amin, op.cit.
131. B.Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.
132. Ernest Gellener, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, cited in Dr.Tahir Amin, op.cit.
133. Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and strategy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, cited in Dr.Tahir Amin, op.cit
134. Ibid.
135. Dr. Tahir Amin, op.cit., pp 32-34 and 39.
136. A.D.Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, op.cit, cited in Dr.Tahir Amin, op.cit, p.36.
137. Ibid.

138. Dr.Tahir Amin, op. cit, p. 37.
139. A. D. Smith, "Ethnic and Nation in the Modern World Millenium", *Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, summer 1985, cited in Tahir Amin, op. cit, p. 37.
140. Vladimir Lenin, *Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalists*, Moscow; Progress Publishers, 1953.
141. Tom Narin, "The Modern Janus", *New Left Review*, November - December, 1985, cited in Tahir Amin, op. cit., p. 57.
142. Dr.Tahir Amin, op. cit.
143. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore: S. M. Ashraf, 1944, p. 169, cited in Tahir Amin, op. cit., p. 67
144. S. A. Vahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Lahore: Ashraf, 1964, p. 396, cited in Tahir Amin, op. cit., p. 68.
145. Dr. Tahir Amin, op. cit. , pp. 68-72.
146. Ibid.
147. Imnam Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, tr. Hamid Algar, Berkely: Mizan Press, 1991, p.49, cited in Tahir Amin, op. cit., p. 73.
148. Tahir Amin, op. cit, pp. 75 - 76.

149. Hameed A.K Rai. Op.cit., pp 405 – 409.
150. Frederick H Hartmann, op.cit., p34.
151. Daniel Crecelins, *The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt*, in John L. Esposito, ed., *Islam and Development: Religion and Socio Political Change*, New York: Syracuse University press, 1980, pp. 49-85.
152. Ibid. , p. 63.

Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.2, no. 1 – 2, Jan-Feb, 1994
Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.2, no. 3-4, March-April, 1994
Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.2, no. 5-6, May- June, 1994
Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.2, no. 7-8, July - August 1994

HISTORY OF TAJIKISTAN

2.1 *Location*

Central Asia has a total area of four million Kilometers and a population of more than fifty million. Borders of this region meet Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, China and Caspian Sea. The different names given to the region were, Turan,¹ Turkistan,² Mavara-al-Nahre,³ Asia-i-Miana i.e. Middle Asia⁴. The territories currently occupied by Pakistan, China, Afghanistan and areas of Tibet, Mangolia and southern Siberia were all parts of Mavara-al-Nahre.⁵ Regarding the geographical limitation of the area two approaches minimalist and maximalist emerged⁶. After the disintegration of SU five central Asian Republics of Kirghistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan emerged with a new identity.

Geographically Central Asia is divided in to four natural regions:

1. The Steppe Region
2. The Semi Desert Region
3. The Desert Region
4. The Mountain Region.⁷

Tajikistan is the smallest of the five CARs, and has an area of 143, 100 sq km. It is located in the north-east corner of Central Asia⁸ and Dushanbe is its capital.⁹ China, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizistan and Pakistan are its neighboring countries. Tajikistan stretches from west to east, the west side mostly consists of deserts and the east covers the mountainous ranges. 93 percent of the territory is taken

up by Pamir "the roof of the world". On the north is Tien Shan, the Zerafshan, the Hissar and the Alai ranges are in the Southern part.¹⁰ Valleys located in the Southwest like the Vakhsh, the Kizilshi, and the Hissar are the most populated areas of Tajikistan. They consist of 10 percent of fertile land and 90 percent accommodates population.¹¹

Tajikistan's economy primarily is based on agriculture. However, it has moved towards industrialization as well. At present the northern part comprises the major industrial region and the southern part is used for agriculture.¹² Though the total cultivable land is 7 percent of the total area, Tajikistan's economy still depends on agriculture which contributes nearly 40 percent of the net material product and the industrial sector contributes about 30 percent of the net material product.¹³ Events like Tajik civil war, floods and earthquake weakened the economy and left Tajikistan dependant on Russia, Uzbekistan and international community for its basic needs.¹⁴ In agricultural sector the situation is also grave.¹⁵ The floods and rain not only damaged the infrastructure¹⁶ but also left negative impact on the agricultural production and transportation.

Tajikistan population mostly comprises of Sunni Muslims of Hanafite School, but there are also Shite and Ismaili communities. Some traces of Zoroastrianism (ancient Iranian fire worship) can also be seen.¹⁷ The national groups in Tajikistan are Tajiks 58.8 percent, Uzbeks 22.9 percent, Russians 10.4 percent and others 7.9 percent¹⁸. Tajiks are scattered throughout the other Central Asian Republics, China and north of Afghanistan.¹⁹

2.2 *Language*

On the basis of language the people of Central Asia can be classified into two groups:

1. Altaic languages.
2. Indo-European language.

Altaic languages have three families of languages – Turkic, Mongolian and Manchu Tungusic. Turkic is the only widely spread in Central Asia and has “contributed the former name of Turkistan, country of Turks”.²⁰ Tajik language is an Indo-European language of southwestern group of Iranian languages. Barthold was of the view that earlier languages of the Central Asian Iranians, including the Sogdian literary languages, gave place to the language which is now called Tadjik, which differs little from Persian.²¹ Sogdians, an Iranian language is identified as the first language of the Eastern parts of the Interior Asia.²² In 9th and 10th century Persian became the national language of the Safavids and Samanid Empires and has been used by great poets and scholars.²³ Freyman also confirmed the same view.²⁴ The classification of Iranic language is the following:

1. North-Northwest dialects (Kurgan Tyube, West Fargana, Samarkand, Bukhara, Khojend, Macha, Upper Zerafshan.
2. South-southwest dialects (Mountain Tajik-Kulyb, Karategin, Vakhia, Gorno - Badakhsan, - Darvaz – Vanch, Zerafshan, Hissar.
3. Farsi (Persian).
4. Other (Afghanistan, Baluch, Kurd).²⁵

2.3 Term Tajik

The term Tajik is used to differentiate Persian speakers from the Turkic People. It was in 1920 that Soviets used the term Tajik to associate it with a specific nationality. Before that anyone who spoke "Tajiki or Persian" was associated with the same term.²⁶ Barthold was of the view that the name Tadzhiik originally meant Arab to whom the term was applied by Persians, then by Turks and Chinese in the VIII century.²⁷ The term Tajik was derived from Taz or Taj.²⁸ After the conquest of Muslims, the term changed from its original meaning i.e. Arabic nationality and now includes all the Muslims. The whole information about the evolution of the term Tajik has been summarized by Shirin Akiner:

.....it is derived from the Arabic tribal name Taiy, originally form was Tazik or Tezik, term simply used for "Arab" in Central Asia. Later it was used for Iranian subjects of the Arabs in contrast to the Turks, in further broader sense, meaning all people of Muslim faith regardless of nationality. For Russians in the 16th and 17th centuries, the term was used in much wider sense, simply a trader from Central Asia. Thus connection with trade and urban way of life was so strong that until the early 20th century the Tajiks were known as Sart: an alternative term used for the sedentary population of Central Asia.²⁹

In 14th and 15th centuries Sarts, Tajik, Timurids and Persian were considered the same. It was Babar who differentiated them on the basis of places where they lived.³⁰ With the passage of time Tajiks were divided in to two groups plain Tajiks and mountain Tajiks. Plain Tajiks are Dhakans and agriculturists. Galchans is a term used

collectively for mountain Tajiks.³¹ It was the Stalin's policy of nationality, which became a basis of national identity of people of Tajikistan.

2.4 HISTORY OF PRE SOVIET TAJIKISTAN

2.4.1 Early History

Since ancient times Central Asia has been inhabited by different races and civilizations. The original population belonged to the same race as the Persians.³² It was in the mid 6th century BC when the Iranic speakers came to settle in the valleys of Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Cyrus I, a Persian Monarch, founded "Cyropolis" city and made the areas of Khoarezm, Soghdia and Ustrushana part of his empire.³³ Thus it goes without saying that the early population of this area comprised Iranic speaking people.³⁴ Chinese, Greeks and Persians, major powers of the time, were actively involved in the affairs of Central Asia.³⁵

The area was conquered by Alexander the Great in 4th century BC (334-1), where he formed his empire known as Graeco Macedonia.³⁶ This kingdom was conquered by the Tartar tribe, that laid the foundation of Great Kushan Empire,³⁷ which ruled the area for the next five hundred years. The period is considered as "the Golden Age"³⁸ in ancient history of Central Asia. White Huns (Ephthalites), the new masters of the area, were also of Iranian descents.³⁹ They introduced new systems of warfare, tribal ownership and female dresses and promoted inter and intra regional trade.⁴⁰ The white Huns were driven out by the "new invasion"⁴¹ of nomadic Turks in the 6th century AD.

2.4.2 *Islam in Tajikistan*

Arabs conquest of Central Asia in 7th and 8th centuries, was considered a “land mark” in the history of the region. They formed a state – Mavara-al-Nahre. Islam was introduced first to the settled population and later to the nomads. This popularized new Arabic script, religious organizations, classical learning, particularly that of the ancient Greeks, architectural changes, and a new world view.⁴² Faiths like Christianity, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism etc were eradicated.⁴³ And a uniform social pattern was provided for different races of the region. Before Islam, there were two major sources of identity for the Central Asians:

1. Primordial ties, which individuals claim by virtue of their family, common blood and ancestry, language, age, sex etc.
2. Acquired identities, which are attained by individuals in terms of their occupation.⁴⁴

Islam replaced these identities with political identity, Ummah. With this Central Asians remained the residents of their region sharing a common faith and civilization with Muslims in the rest of the world.⁴⁵ The first half of the 7th century proved successful for the Muslims.⁴⁶ By the end of the 7th century when the Arab conquered the area, it was divided into small states, for example, the kingdom of Samarkand, Fargana and Khoarezm.⁴⁸ The areas on the Eastern bank of Amu Darya were conquered in the time of Hazrat Usman. In 672 AD Pamirs, Nisa and Bakand were conquered. These areas were 6km away from Bukhara.⁴⁸ Finally by the middle of the 8th century all the lands in Central Asia, Bukhara, Samarkand, Khorasan, Tashkent, Fargana up to the Tien Shan were conquered by the Arabs.⁴⁹

Soon after anti Arab feelings started increasing among the Iranian population and Turks of the region. People of Sogdian rose against Arab administrations and requested Turks to interfere.⁵⁰ The most important revolt occurred in 776-83 in the leadership of Mukanna.⁵¹ By 750 AD the Ummayyads were replaced by the Abbasids. Direct Arab rule came to an end and Turks rule in Khoarezm and Transoxiana started.⁵² This transition led to a real Islamization of the Turkistan including Tajikistan (part of Turkistan). Culture and civilization of Islam continued to flourish.⁵³ Abbassid missionaries were actively involved in spreading Islam. Abdal Rahman Ibn Muslim, known as Abu Muslim won the hearts of local feudal elite and rural masses by advocating the compromise between Islam and local belief system.⁵⁴ This had a great lasting impact on the natives. Besides the introduction of new religion, the area was economically prosperous and developed due to trade activities and new agricultural techniques. Commercial relations were established with Khoarezm, China, Russia and the Muslim world.⁵⁵

2.4.3 The Samanids: Commencement Of Nationalism

From the 9th century to the beginning of 13th century, there was an important period for the people of Turkistan due to the development of feudal conditions, the aggravation of class differences, and the formation of a series of feudal states, as well as prolonged struggle for independence".⁵⁶ "Golden Age" for Tajik people began in the 10th century when the foundation of Samanid dynasty was laid. Bukhara became the capital and all the uprisings were crushed. The Samanids, the first Muslim rulers of Persia, were Tajiks by origin.⁵⁷ The Samanid rule provided economic prosperity

and cultural development. Bukhara, the capital city, became a centre of learning for the Muslim world.⁵⁸ Sayran-al-Hikmat, a grand library in Bukhara, became a centre of learning.⁵⁹ New Persian Renaissance⁶⁰ occurred during the Samanid's rule. Arabic became the language of Ulema and subjects related to science, philosophy, judicial literature etc were taught. Farsi was considered as the language of "cultural activities" and was used by scholars, poets and learned men.⁶¹ Ismail, in his reign sent scholars, ulemas and poets to Samarkand and Baghdad and Bukhara.⁶² This tradition had constructive influence over the development of Tajik culture. Tajiks became a separate national group during this era.⁶³ They achieved separate identity from Arabs and Turks. Arab conquest of Tajik population of Fargana, Zerafshan, Khojend and Panjikant resulted in anti Arab activities.⁶⁴

The Samanids preferred and encouraged Sunni Islam. Islamic leaders, scholars and qazis were given a lot of respect. Bukhara at that time was known as the main center of Islamic theology.⁶⁵ Turkic settlers who agreed to embrace Islam were granted lands.⁶⁶ Samanids never launched a systematic religion campaign for Turkic nomads or others.⁶⁷ Due to the policies of Sammanids, Islam spread among the sedentary population but did not penetrate into the steppes.. The similar period also witnessed the rise of Turks and the decline of Sammanids.

2.4.4 The Turks: New Ethnicity

Due to nomadic attacks, the Samanid ruler kept on losing important towns.⁶⁸ Thus Turkish power superseded the Iranians for the first time, for at least three centuries. The Karakhandis, the first Turkis tribes to embrace Islam, were defeated by Mahmud

of Ghazni. Thus making Amu Darya the line of bifurcation between the two powers,⁶⁹ the early 11th century witnessed the formation of Ghazzar Oghuz, the important Turks tribal conglomerates. Out of 24 tribes three were the most important in the Islamic history: Khaljis, Seljuks and Ottomans.⁷⁰ All these dynasties had their impact on the Islamic civilization and heritage. Karakitays tribes which were nomads of Mangolian origin and Chinese in culture and traditions were the new ethnic elements in Central Asia.⁷¹

With the imposition of the rule of Turks, new elements were added into the cultural, social, economic and political life of Central Asia. Turk was referred to all the Turkic speaking people and further divided the Persian speaking from the Turkish speaking. A new Turk-Islamic culture including new war techniques and warfare was introduced. People adopted agriculture and established relations. Thus providing the economic prosperity to the whole region. Interaction with the Persian speaking people resulted in influence on the Turkic language and vis-à-vis.⁷² Islam was embraced by the majority of the tribes. Islam at that time was characterized by "Sufi Tariq"⁷³ and holy places like shrines and mosques were frequently visited by pilgrims from Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen etc.⁷⁴ Under the Turkic rule, the Persian speaking Tajiks played a major role in Urban affairs like ruling bureaucracy of the successive conquerors, controlling trade, business, markets, etc. Political changes neither modified the profile of Tajik Islam nor interrupted the development of Iranian culture.⁷⁵

From the conquest of Arabs till the rule of Kara Kilayas, Islam enjoyed expansion and penetration into the corners of Central Asia. However, a Christian, Kuchlog, overthrew the Kara Kitayes emperor in 1211 AD. He openly opposed Islam, suppressed public prayers forced the Muslims to convert.⁷⁶ This period indirectly provided a sense of unity to the Muslims irrespective of Persian or Turkic origin.

2.4.5 The Mongol Invasion: New Ethnic/Religion Element

After the Arab conquest, the Mongol invasion of 13th century was considered as second milestone in the history of Central Asia. Ghingiz Khan, the lord of nomad Mongol subjugated the areas like Bukhara, Samarkand, Khojend, Merv, Heart, Neshapur and other Oasis cities of Central Asia. Intellectual life was brought to an end. Thousands of people including men, women and infants were slaughtered. They forced the people to pay them heavy tribute. Any opposition or uprising was savagely suppressed.⁷⁷ Mongols adopted anti-Islamic policies.⁷⁸ Buddhists and Christians were in majority among the Mongol leaders.⁷⁹ As a result, Islam as state religion lost its dominant character. Instead of state religion, it became the religion of masses. Mongol conquest changed the balance of power between the nomad and settled groups. Behind the scene this rule also contributed in the development of the cultural life of the area. Chaghtei (literary Turkic language) was named after Ghingiz Khan's son Chaghtai. Descendants of Tuchi (elder son of Ghingiz Khan) provided new ethnic element of Islamized Turko-Mongol people-Tatar. The ideological express of legitimacy was also provided.⁸⁰

2.4.6 *The Tamurids*

At the end of the 14th century most of the Central Asia was under the rule of Tamerlane. His period was considered as “Golden Age” of Central Asia.⁸¹ Being a staunch Muslim, he strengthened the Islamic traditions. He had a great respect for the Muslim saints and built a number of mosques, dargahs and madrassahs in various cities.⁸² Sufi brotherhood was strengthened and Naqshbandi order was encouraged during the Timurid dynasty.⁸³ Three kingdoms rose over the ashes of the Timurid Empire.

1. Shaibandi in Central Asia, incorporate Bukhara, Samarkand, Bulkh, Tashkent and Fargana.
2. Babar laid the foundation of Mughal Empire in Delhi and Agra.
3. Safavid dynasty in Iran and Khurasan.⁸⁴

The defeat of Timurid successors by Uzbek Shaibanid,⁸⁵ resulted in the downfall of the Persian and Tajik influence in the region. Shaibandi dynasty was also a “great period” in the history of Central Asia. Shaibandi contributed, not only to the Central Asian cultural and intellectual activities but also to the Mughal and Safavids territory. As a consequence, both Persian and Turkish literature developed. Education was widespread and few madrassahs were opened. The fame of Bukhara rose to its peak. Uzbeks left nomadism and became agriculturists.⁸⁶ Commerce and trade also developed during the same period. However, like other Muslim rulers, Shaibanid hardly made any progress in science and technology.⁸⁷ By and by, Shaibanid's rule weakened and area was passed to Janid rulers and then to Mangits tribe.⁸⁸ After Shaibanid till the coming of the Russians no ruler or dynasty could hold paramount

control in Central Asia. By the time the Russians entered the region, the people of Central Asia had completed the process of their ethnic and political formation.⁸⁹

By the mid of 18th century, the Uzbek Khanate was divided into different independent states, such as, Bukhara, Khiva, Kokand, Gissar and Badakhshan. However, all of these were at war with one other. Under Uzbek rule, the Tajiks, dispersed throughout the many principalities in the area. In the mountains, they formed semiautonomous groups and paid tribute to the Bukhara emirate.⁹⁰ Khanates Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand shared certain common traits. They all acknowledged Suni orthodoxy. The population was well settled, shariat was practiced and all their traditions and practices all held Islamic flavour.⁹¹ Still the concept of nationalism was not found

2.4.7 Russian Invasion: We Vs Them

Russian expansion in Asia falls into three phases.⁹² During the first phase, from the Urals to the Pacific, only primitive tribes were overrun by Russian settlers. In the second phase, was covered the steppe region The third phase started when Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand lost the buffer zone, Kazakhstan, and came in direct contact with Russia. It started in 1855 and ended with the battle of Goktepe in 1881.

Tajiks, Uzbeks and some Old Turkic groups showed more adherences to their families, clans and tribes with no concept of nationalism. Consequently between khanates there was constant wars that hampered any development in the field of culture and politics. To Geoffrey Wheeler all this indicated one thing and that is the

non existence of the concept of modern nation states with no national consciousness.⁹³

Under such conditions they offered an easy pray to the Russians.

Khanate of Bukhara also occupied the area of the modern Uzbekistan including parts of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The Bukhara Emirate was founded by the Magnot dynasty in 1753.⁹⁴ and had an estimated population of 2 to 3 million in the beginning of the 19th Century.⁹⁵ There were one half being Uzbeks, one third Tajiks and one tenth Turkmen. The majority of the population observed strict Sunni orthodoxy.⁹⁶ Emir of Bukhara with the help of 40,000 mullhas declared holy war against the Russian, but that also could not save him. Russians occupied Chimkent and Tashkent in 1865, Khojend in 1866, Zerafshan valley and Samarkand (northern part of Tajikistan) in 1868. They also forced Bukhara to accept their protectorate.⁹⁷ The Khanate of Khiva, was located on the south of Aral Sea.⁹⁸ It occupied the present day territory of Turkmen, Kazakh and Karakalpak. Khan of Khiva was forced to sign a peace treaty (See appendix) with Russia in 1873.⁹⁹ The Khanate of Khokand came into existence in 1798¹⁰⁰. In 1884 Turkmen were subjugated by Russians.¹⁰¹

When the Russian advancement reached the boundaries of Afghanistan and Persia, it alarmed the British who considered the area as their "sphere of influence". However they carefully evaluated the situation and came to the conclusion that it was not feasible for the Russians or for the British to wage war against each other (See appendix). On the Russian proposal, a joint delimitation of the Afghan frontier was decided. Britain retained the access to Pamirs in 1895. It left Soghdiana, Rushan, part of

Vakhan or more specifically the Pamirs west of the Sarykal range and north of the river Panj, under Russian influence. All these linked with Bukhara protectorate.¹⁰² This area was later given the name Gorn-Badakhshan. After completing the invasion, Russians organized the area into two general Governorship: Steppe Region and Turkistan. Turkistan was divided into five regions of Syr-Darya, Fargana, Samarkand, Senirechge and Transcaspian. Khiva and Bukhara retained the status of Protectorate.¹⁰³ This territorial organization continued until 1917 revolution. Russians decided not to interfere in the affairs of the locals¹⁰⁴ In Turkistan and steppe region local government, tradition, customs, laws, law courts, social organizations etc were left just as they were and Islam was recognized as the faith of the Central Asians. The shariat and Adat were retained.¹⁰⁵ The architect of this policy was General Von Kaufaman.¹⁰⁶ He believed that it was Islam alone that could unite the people.¹⁰⁷ But later on Russians changed this policy.

Serfdom was abolished in 1861 in Russia. As a result, Russian needed land for the settlements of their people. In 1891 Tsarist authorities occupied surplus land in Kazakh and Kirghizia (oasis were thickly populated).¹⁰⁸ Natives were forced to move into less desirable areas that resulted in conflicts between the natives and new comers. Russians who considered themselves as the "representative of European civilization and Superior to natives"¹⁰⁹ tried to make the area as Russian dependency¹¹⁰. The local people considered Russians as intruders and enemies of Islam.¹¹¹ Out of all the popular uprisings¹¹², the most important and significant was the revolt of Andizhan by Muhammad Ali. Sufi brotherhood of Naqshbandi in 1898 declared holy war with 200 followers. Through his military success, he anticipated to provoke the population of

Tashkent and Samarkand, reestablish the Khanate, and rush onto the conquest of Dar-ul Islam.¹¹³ The revolt was crushed down by the Russians. The consequences of the uprising were manifold.

1. It indicated that the natives had challenged the Russian policy in Central Asia.
2. The policy of ignoring Islam was seriously condemned.
3. Several villages were destroyed and Russian settlers were allotted the well-irrigated lands.
4. The military administrative power over the local hierarchies was increased.
5. Muslims educational institutions, maktabas and madrassahs were brought under the government control.
6. Russian language and culture were introduced to the local elite. The main objective behind this policy was to keep the elite away from the religious leaders and expose them to the modern Russia.¹¹⁴
7. Russian gave birth to the nationalist feeling, which previously didn't exist. This embryonic nationalism gradually began to replace the older loyalties and sense of separateness from their masters prevailed in every aspect.

2.4.7 Jadid Movement: Islamic Reformists

As explained previously the colonization of the Muslim world resulted in the emergence of modernists who encouraged the Muslims to follow the West in every field of life. Central Asia was also influenced by the modernists like Jamal-ud-din Afghani (1838-97), Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Moh Abduh, Rashid Rida, Allama Iqbal (see chapter 1). Jadids or Islamic reformers was the movement that started in the Muslim part of the Russian Empire.¹¹⁵ In Central Asia Ahmed Mahdum, the

contemporary of Jamal-ud-din Afghani (1827-1897) was considered as the first westernizer in Central Asia.¹¹⁶ He was impressed by western development, education, intelligentsia, etc. He returned from Petersburg with new ideas and liberal thoughts.¹¹⁷

Ismail Bey Gasprinsky (1851-1914), the founder of Jadid Movement was a Tatar Muslim of Crimea. He brought new liberal ideas to Central Asia. Initially the movement was related to educational field but with the passage of time cultural autonomy, representative government and opposition to the feudal and clerical system became their main slogans.¹¹⁸ Gasprinsky introduced Usual Jadid schools that started a conflict between Jadids and the supporter of Usul Kadim.¹¹⁹ Gasprinsky's principles, the unity of language, mind and action,¹²⁰ laid the foundation of Pan Turkism and Islamism in the region. Unity of language proved to be as an indicator of awareness for Tajik nationalism. By unity of language, he insisted on the study of Turkish language in Muslim schools. He imported modern Turkish text books from Turkey and tried to replace them with Old Persian textbooks of Arabic grammar.¹²¹

If we critically examine the Jadid movement, we find that it contributed towards the Muslim renaissance. The modern, western educated Muslims accepted the fundamentals of Islam and advocated that Islam is neither against modernization and it is not anti scientific¹²² The attempt by Jadids to transform traditional literary culture¹²³ provided a solid ground for the Pan-Turkism ideology. This ideology laid the foundation for the unity among the Muslims. Educational reforms¹²⁴ gave the Muslims confidence throughout the world. Many educated Muslims got recognition

and admiration throughout the world. These individuals also provided platform for the future unity among the Muslims.

This movement had its impact on all aspects of life. This was the time, when Muslim world was colonized by the West and individuals well equipped with modern education lead the nationalist movements and sought liberation from the colonized masters. For Muslim leaders and thinkers the best way of recovering the lost power and prestige was the political revival that could be achieved by harnessing the Muslim society with political awareness and institutions of the modern age. Reformists and liberals believed that peaceful coexistence and cooperation with Russia could prove fruitful results for Islam and the Muslim world.¹²⁵

Meanwhile, the defeat of Russians in the Japanese war and revolution of 1905 gave the Muslims further confidence and they tried to organize themselves politically.¹²⁶ The newspapers and periodicals published in Central Asia by Jadids were stepping-stone in spreading the revolutionary and modern idea. The newspapers from the neighboring countries gave the people a new sense of unity and direction. However, in 1908 publications of southern Central Asian Jadid newspapers ceased.¹²⁷

In Bukhara the Jadid movement started much later. Intellectuals of this movements faced the problem of text books in Tajik language. In order to solve the problem they formed Union of Holy Bukhara and S. Aini wrote first Tajik text book¹²⁸ But the situation was deteriorated when it was made compulsory for the teachers to be of the same ethnic groups to which their pupils belonged and prohibited

Tatars from opening or teaching in any reformed school. As a solution Jadid's founded Jamiyat-i-Tarbiya-i-Atfal, Marifat, and Barakat.¹²⁹ So as to popularize the liberal ideas.¹³⁰ Meanwhile threatened by the popularity of Jadids, Emir of Bukhara closed all the Jadid schools and many teachers were deported to Eastern Bukhara, Russia and even to Istanbul.¹³¹ Those who were deported to Turkey were impressed by Young Turks Movement in 1905¹³² and founded the Young Bukharans, they saw Turkey as a model for a modern Muslim state.¹³³

World War I had adverse effect on the economy of Turkestan¹³⁴ However it did provide a sense of unity to the Muslims. Muslims at first supported Tsars against Germany and Austria but their unity was disrupted when Turkey declared war against Russia.¹³⁵ The situation was worsened by the Imperial Decree of June 25, 1916 that caused resistance and revolt in various cities.¹³⁶ It was suppressed by the Russian army.¹³⁷ Jadids though supported resistance did not take any active part in the 1916 revolt that failed to be significant for the Muslim masses and leaders except further widening the gap of we vs they.

2.5 HISTORY OF SOVIET TAJIKISTAN

In 1917¹³⁸, the Russian Central Asia, consisted of the Emirate of Bukhara, Khanate of Khiva and Governor General of Turkistan. For locals the downfall of Tsars was attached new hopes and aspirations.¹³⁹ Muslim organizations became active and the Muslim Council dominated by the Jadids and Ulema Jemyeti, a conservative organization, convened First Regional Muslim Congress in Tashkent and demanded return of all confiscated Lands and creation of National Center.¹⁴⁰ Muslim

nationalists called Muslim Congress¹⁴¹ and put forward their demands. Tajik clan leaders played a prominent role in the first conference of the Ittefaq ul Muslimeen that was held in Khokand in November 1917. The conference set up a provisional Khokand Autonomous Republic and demanded the promulgation of shariat and the private ownership of land.¹⁴² At this point, there was no demand or declaration of independence from Russia. This showed that Tajiks as a group had little sense of national identity. The demands were rejected by the Bolsheviks and Khokand city was attacked. The dismissal of Khokand government gave rise to the Basmachi movement. By 1918 the northern part of Tajikistan were included in Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) while the Eastern part was under the control of Emir of Bukhara. In March 1918 Internal coup and Military attack was averted.¹⁴³ Bolsheviks recognized the independence of the Bukhara Khanate

2.5.1 Basmachi Movement: Islamic Nationalists

Basmachi derived from the Turkish verb “Basmak” means to “press, oppress or violate”. In Uzbek language it means “bandit, robber or violator”.¹⁴⁴ It was considered synonymous with nationalism, Islam and nationalist rebels.¹⁴⁵ The death of Khokand government was considered as the main cause of the movement, which gave rise to the national consciousness. But there were other causes too i.e. famine and economic crises.¹⁴⁶ Land policy, when the land was taken away from natives and distributed among the Russian and Ukrainian settlers, was another cause. The difficult living conditions, lack of personal security, and representatives of power with no political frame work¹⁴⁷ are some of the factors responsible for the Basmachi as a natural phenomenon. Out of all these the most important one was the decree of the

Council of the People's Commissars of the RSFSR, on 23rd June 1918. According church was separated from state, and all religious organizations were nationalized. Mosques were demolished and Mullahs were shot dead. In such plight Muslims found Basmachi as centrifugal force to rely around¹⁴⁸

The Basmachi struggle may be divided into four phases.¹⁴⁹

1. The first phase started in January 1918 and lasted up till November 1919. The revolt started in Fargana, under the leadership of Madanin (Muhammad Amin) whom an Afghan delegation promised arms and financial help. Meanwhile in the beginning of 1919 Irgash, a conservative, proclaimed himself as Amir-ul-Muslimin. Irgash who was defeated made peace with Soviet authorities and didn't interfere with Madanin.¹⁵⁰
2. Turkistan Commission under the command of General Frunze, was considered as the second phase that began for the movement. General Frunze launched a new policy of cooperation.¹⁵¹ Soviet authorities made peace offers to Basmachi leader which included:
 - a. The right to retain their territory, arms and troops.
 - b. No Soviet organizations would be to set up in Basmachi territory.
 - c. Each Basmachi was to enjoy the status of Soviet Brigade commander.¹⁵²

Basmachi leaders accepted the offer and by 1921 Soviet forces got hold of the Fargana valley. Reconciliatory policy was adopted for the Muslims. Closed mosques were reopened and shariat courts were reestablished. Friday was declared as holiday

and religious schools were restarted. This helped government to win the support of clergy and intelligentsia.¹⁵³

3. When Red Army attacked Bukhara in 1920¹⁵⁴ the third phase began. Emir Said Ali fled to eastern Bukhara, and Kabul and tried to regroup his troops.

People's Soviet Republic was established in Bukhara in October 1920. With the help of Jadids and Young Bukharans, a program adopted by the government was on nationalistic lines¹⁵⁵ A treaty of military, political and economic cooperation was signed between Moscow and Bukharan government.¹⁵⁶ During the same time Basmachi movement revived again. Young Bukharan with the assistance of the Red Army turned their attention towards Eastern Bukhara and in February 1921 occupied it.¹⁵⁷ At this time the Khivan government was transformed in to Soviet Republic, this incident intensified the Muslim nationalist resistance in Bukhara. The Bukharan leaders along with their supporters joined the Basmachis. Eastern Bukhara became headquarter of the Basmachis and different Basmachis from Turkistan gathered and organized "United Committee for National Liberation of Central Asia".¹⁵⁸ The Young Bukharan government signed a treaty with the Basmachi leaders. Russians refused to accept this treaty. In September 1921 Basmachis were able to oust the Russian troops from Dushanbe and gained control over the towns of Namangan, Mergela and Anidjan.¹⁵⁹

The final, phase of the Basmachi movement started in October 1921, with the arrival of Enver Pasha.¹⁶⁰ To calm down the situation Lenin decided to send Enver to

East of Bukhara which he accepted due to his personal ambitions.¹⁶¹ In Bukhara Enver met various groups,¹⁶² and became aware of the situation of famine, mayhem of Red Army, political disorder. He finally decided to join the Basmachi (See appendix). Ahmed Rashid¹⁶³ is also of the view that the entire condition of the area forced the Enver to join the opposite side

Enver was appointed as the commander in chief and was given the title of Savior of Islam¹⁶⁴. "Muslim of the World Unite", was the Enver's slogan against the communist slogan "Workers of the World Unite".¹⁶⁵ By 1922 his forces occupied the whole of the Eastern Bukhara, including Dushanbe.¹⁶⁶ The struggle of all Muslims and the creation of a Central Asian Muslim state¹⁶⁷ aimed at uniting the Basmachi groups. However, there developed clashes between Enver and Ibrahim Bek, commander-in-Chief of Emir army.¹⁶⁸ This cause great hurdle for the movement, Soviets took the advantage of the disunity and captured Denan, Dushanbe, Kurgan Tyube, Kulyab and Bopldzhan.¹⁶⁹ Enver forces retreated in Beljuvan near the Afghan border. He was caught up by the Red Army and died like a hero's death on 8th August 1922.¹⁷⁰ Although officially, the movement ended in 1924 but it continued for several years as thousands of Tajik Basmachis went underground or took refuge in Afghanistan to become active later on.

Although Basmachi movement lost its vitality due to disunity of its leaders, but it provided a sense of oneness to the Muslims. During this movement lots of heroes came to lime light and became the symbol of nationalism and independence. Due to this movement Stalin never trusted the communist part of Tajikistan and

constantly accused its leaders of being in contact with the British.¹⁷¹ Tajikistan economic and cultural development was constantly ignored. Thus a new period started in the history of the Muslims of Central Asia including Tajikistan. Soviet authorities took advantage of this situation and introduced series of important reforms. However the fundamental aim remained the transformation of Central Asia by a supposedly superior Russian model.¹⁷² Foreign culture could dominate, assimilate and socialize Russian Muslims.¹⁷³ From 1921 till the disintegration of Soviet Union, the history of Soviet Tajikistan can be divided into following periods.

2.5.2 Korenizatsiya Period (1921-1927)

During this time period the Soviet adopted the policy of nativization which would help in disarming the Basmachis and creating good will towards the Soviets. To achieve this end, their attitude towards Islam changed. Lands confiscated by the government were returned to the Muslims, religious schools reopened, shariat courts allowed to function and Muslims were included in the political frame work.¹⁷⁴ The president of Turkistan Central Committee and the president of Fargana Revolutionary Committee were both Muslims and thus the representation of Turkistan in Moscow was enjoyed by Muslims.¹⁷⁵ The 1922 constitutions of Bukhara and Khoarezm Republics provided religious, political and cultural rights to all Muslims and they were citizens treated with full rights.¹⁷⁶

Soon after tackling the administrative issues of the Muslim regions, the government changed its policy. The traditional courts were not allowed to take any criminal or civil case. By 1927 Muslim and customary laws were prohibited and only

17 and 11 traditional courts remained in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan respectively.¹⁷⁷ Related closely to religious reforms was the Lenin's New Economic Policy¹⁷⁸ which improved the economic status of the masses. In November 1923, Central Asiatic economic Council was formed to integrate the whole economy, agriculture, irrigation, communication, transportation and monetary system in Russian government.¹⁷⁹

The leniency in religious and economic policies bore positive results for the Soviets as the Muslims started to consider them their friends. This resulted in the down fall of the Basmachi movement and they lost 3500 men in Fargana valley.¹⁸⁰ Still the movement continued and during 1923 and 1924 Matcha, Darvaz and Karategin,¹⁸¹ in East Bukhara, remained the major base of Basmachis. The consolidation of Soviet power began with the arrival of Turkistan Commission in Tashken. This commission drafted the constitution for the Republic of Turkistan but was rejected by Moscow.¹⁸² The new constitution was adopted in 1920.¹⁸³ While the Soviet administration in Central Asia was recognized with the adaptation of the first Soviet federal constitution in 1924¹⁸⁴ which was federal in form and socialist in character. The recognition came to be known as National Delimitation based on the criteria of unity of language, territory, economy and historical and cultural traditions.

New political units were created i.e. two socialist Republics, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were established and three autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, Kazakh, Kirghiz and Tajiks, on lower administrative levels were created.¹⁸⁵ Tajikistan ASSR includes all parts of eastern Bukhara, parts of Samarkand, Fargana province and Pamirs. In 1925, Pamirs gained autonomy as the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous

oblast with its capital at Khorog and on 15 October 1929, Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic was created.¹⁸⁶ Dushanbe was declared as Republic's capital. Thus "on the ruins of the ancient community of Turkistan which was more religious than national, rose nations in the modern sense."¹⁸⁷ The creation of Tajikistan, as a separate state, was a political move both nationally and internationally and served as a frontier between USSR, Afghanistan and China. Stalin considered it as an exemplary communist state for the countries in the East¹⁸⁸ The international significance of the formation of Tajikistan was expressed in 1964 in official Tajik history.¹⁸⁹

Due to the famine Basmachi movement once again became active. The government and Communist Party of Tajikistan organized repression campaign. As a result people lost faith in their victory and withheld their support.¹⁹⁰ By the end of 1926 in Central and southern Tajikistan the movement was liquidated.¹⁹¹ The base of the new community was the concept of "New Soviet Man" and "a Soviet Society"¹⁹² Every nationality will be loyal to the Soviet State – believing in the same ideology, adhere to the same leaders and the same Soviet identity.¹⁹³ New concepts were to be introduced in education, economy, politics and culture. Out of all these the best method was educational institutions. The religious institutions were banned and government schools started to gain more importance. From now onward the religious education was prohibited.¹⁹⁴ Strong emphasis was placed over the education of local cadres but still the Russians held the control. It has been observed that from 1920-1921, within one year, 400 Russian officials to work in the government sector arrived in Central Asia.¹⁹⁵ Russian influx changed the ethnic composition of Tajik party organization.¹⁹⁶ To overcome the problem,, short courses in the field of education,

internal affairs and health, some personal were sent to Uzbekistan for training.¹⁹⁷ Still the key posts of the party's were retained by Russians.

2.5.3 Assault Period (1927-1941)

Korenisatsila policy was adopted during the early years of Soviet rule, but that was tactical and temporary. New period considered Islam as a danger for the regime¹⁹⁸ and offensive was mounted on three fronts. The frontal attack began on Islam as a religion and traditional beliefs. Islam was a whimsical, erroneous and anti scientific faith.¹⁹⁹ Ulema and Islamic scholars were kept in prison or detained on the charges of corruption, bribery, theft and in a nutshell were labeled as bad shepherds²⁰⁰. Shariat and Adat courts were closed down. Mosques were desecrated and turned commercial areas²⁰¹. This was followed by the closure of 15,000 madrassahs across Central Asia²⁰². In 1934 government prohibited Muslims from performing Haj and ban was imposed on Zakat and printing of Holy Quran. Islam was considered as against women for it forced them to stay at home, without any right. Family structure had to face the brunt As a result out of all the campaigns Khudzhun campaign was the most irritating for the Muslims. In order to employ Muslim women in economic and social field, they were forced to unveil.²⁰³ As a result of Khudzhun campaign many women were murdered by their relatives as unveiling was considered as against Islam and their social value. The campaign was also resented by the Muslim Communists.²⁰⁴ Tajik strongly showed antipathy towards the anti religious policies.

The second assault policy was the change in the traditional economic structure, and patterns of livelihood. This began with collectivization of agriculture. South of

Tajikistan was considered suitable for cotton cultivation. To meet the cotton cultivation requirements, mountain Tajiks were forced to settle in south without giving any consideration to the cultural life pattern of mountain Tajiks. By the end of 1929, in south of Tajikistan, fifty new villages were established. Government assisted Afghan, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Russians for resettlement.²⁰⁵ In Tajikistan by 1939 the Russians rose from 1 percent to 9 percent of total population.²⁰⁶ Emphasis on cotton cultivation also reduced food production in Tajikistan.²⁰⁷ Policy of collectivization met with resistance which revived Basmachi movement once again but it was suppressed by the well-organized Soviet army.²⁰⁸ The collectivization, in spite of its drawbacks had two- important future implications. The new settlers farmed their own nationally homogenous land, thus the concept of we vs rthey physically implemented and their arrival resulted in industrialization of the area along with administrative skills for the natives.²⁰⁹

Assault on Muslims communists loyal to their people, culture and religion began with the process of collectivization. Many local leaders were against the collectivization they were basically well-educated Central Asian leaders, like Jadids, who occupied prominent position in their respective republics. The process of eliminating of these leaders and any one supporting them was launched by the government.²¹⁰ As a result of assault policy, the membership of Tajikistan Communist part from 1933 to 1935 fell from 14,329 to 791.²¹¹ The second period of assaults began in 1937.²¹² Tajik victims included the Muslim communists of top positions.²¹³ Thus the purges liquidated 66 percent of the local cadres and were replaced by the Russians. There were 15 percent of Russians in Tajikistan party which

rose to 25 percent in 1938 and 26 percent in 1941. Muslims, who were willing to learn advance Russian methods of organization, were in the first line of promotion.²¹⁴ Tajikistan adopted its constitution in March 1937, women rights was an important articles in the constitution.²¹⁵ Many Muslim clergy protested against the law. Schools for girls were burned and teachers were murdered. As a result many unofficial and private Mullahs were disappeared during the 1938 purges.

Tajik language script was changed twice in pre war period. First Latin alphabet were replaced with the Arabicones and in 1940 Cyrillic alphabets took over the Latin script. The reason given for the change was that the Arabic letters were too difficult to learn and made it difficult for the Russians to monitor the printed material. For the Muslims it was loss of the impact that Islam made over the life of the people.²¹⁶ Schools were opened with the view of raising the future citizens of a transformed and modern Central Asia. In 1926 Tajikistan's literacy rate was 2.2 percent which rose to 52.3 percent in 1956.²¹⁷

Although the period under review had disasterous effects, on Muslim republics, but it led to future progress in the field of education, industry, agriculture, social sciences, and politics.²¹⁸

2.5.4 The Great Patriotic War and Its Aftermaths (1941-1956)

The German invasion of Russia in 1941 brought the era of liberalism. For survival Russia stopped anti religious propaganda. The major advance was the, "official Islam" that is sanctioning of the following four spiritual Directorates:

1. The Directorate for the Sunni Muslims of European Russia and Siberia.
2. The Directorate for the Sunni Muslim of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
3. The Directorate for the Sunni Muslims of the Northern Caucasus and Dagestan.
4. The Directorate for the Sunni and Shia Muslims of the Transcaucasia.²¹⁹

Spiritual Directorate, increased religious observance and supervision of the religious publications and their printing. Collecting of Zakat and Fitr from Muslim was also the work assigned to the Directorate.²²⁰

The war strengthened the position of Islam by raising the prestige of imams and fixing the income for their religious duties and also they took patriotic position and assisted in the struggle for peace.²²¹ While the normalization between Muslims and the Soviet State was going on, all Soviet theoreticians' anti islam campaign continued²²² and was designed to be mitigated on account of two arguments.

- 1: All religions, including Islam, are instrumental in the hands of exploiting classes.
- 2: Islam is the most reactionary religion in the world,²²³

In 1953 Khrushchev revived Lenin policy. An Association for the Spread of Political and Scientific Knowledge was made for anti-religious campaign. All means were considered proper: anti-religious films, pamphlets, mobile exhibitions and all lectures and the press. The Association seems to be particularly active in the field of press. ²²⁴ Still the Moscow considered such drastic measures as insufficient.

Economic development was the part of post-war period of struggle for communism in Central Asia. Khojend, Kaniabadan, Dushanbe, Isfara Kayrakim and Gissar Valley became important industrial centers. Agriculture remained the main occupation of the people of Tajikistan.²²⁵ While in mountain areas, live stock breeding was the major occupation.

For patriotic reasons pro-Russian and anti-German propaganda was emphasized during the II world war. Mobilization was carried on for Tajik men to join the army.²²⁶ 1,500,000 men from Turkistan were called up for military services.²²⁷ Out of these 50,000 Tajik soldiers participated in war and 30 became heroes of the Soviet Union.²²⁸ The end of II world war witnessed the rise of natives in politics.²²⁹ This gave confidence to the native on one hand and on the other deepened the feelings of national consciousness. The Elder Brother of the family of the Soviet Nationalities, was the role assigned to the Russian.²³⁰ In 1951, lesser evil theory²³¹ was converted into absolute good theory by M.V. Nechkina. This theory proposed that as the people suffered under Tsarist operation, the conquest gave them opportunity of contact with the Russian people, culture and revolutionary movement. Thus without conquest there would have been no revolution in the borderlands and no advancement to socialism.²³² All prominent native scholars were forced to condemn their own previously held views and to adjust their new opinion. In 1955 in Tajikistan, a historian and first secretary of the Tajik Party Gafarouf, revised his book on history of Tajikistan. He de-emphasized the oppressive aspects of Russian rule and glorified the Russian conquest as progressive in the fields of economy, culture and politics.²³³ By 1954, the press was full of articles, poems, editorials, praising the achievements of

Tajikistan under the Soviet rule.²³⁴ Under the cultural transformation all nationalist movements in Central Asia were re-evaluated.²³⁵ Education during the period under review had shown progress in Tajikistan. In these schools, Tajik, Russian and Uzbeks were the language of instruction. Russian is the only medium of instruction for higher education and for technical training.²³⁶ In Dushanbe, Tajik State University and Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan SSR was founded in 1951.²³⁷

This period, despite the cultural, social and educational persecutions, was the period of economic developments. This period is also associated with the normalization process between the Russians and the Central Asians along with re-emergence of Muslims in the political and cultural arena of their respective republics.

2.5.5 Sblizhene (Drawing Together) And Sliyane (Merger) Period (1956-85)

During this period, flexible nationality policy was adopted though anti-Islamic propaganda continued. The anti-Islamic movement closed down mosques and Islamic schools, revived atheistic propaganda²³⁸ banned Islamic weddings and funerals and restricted women from wearing veil.²³⁹ Moreover in Tajikistan alone, Association for the Propaganda of Scientific and Political Knowledge organized 40,500 lectures from 1948 to 1970 and 70 anti-Islamic books and pamphlets were published in Tajikistan.²⁴⁰ The anti-Islamic propaganda was at its peak.

However, major shift in domestic policy of SU took place on account of its foreign policy. Press stopped its anti-religious propaganda. New mosques and schools were built. Students were sent for higher education in Middle Eastern Universities.²⁴¹

Government appointed Muslim official leaders as ambassadors and representatives. Foreign Muslim delegates came to Central Asia to attend International Conferences. All these measures were taken to produce the impression that Islam was free and prosper and that Soviet Islamic leaders were treated by Soviet authorities as equal partners and not as tools of government.²⁴² Another reason for these reforms was the geographical location of the region that multiplied its relations with the third world.²⁴³ They wanted to communicate to the world that the Soviet experiment was more successful and rewarding than western capitalism. Another reason was to prove SU as the best friend and partner of the Islamic world.²⁴⁴

In economic field, industrialization gained impetus.²⁴⁵ However under Brezhnev era cotton industry was given more importance. 95 percent of USSR's raw cotton and cotton fibers were produced in Central Asia.²⁴⁶ The indigenous cadres were not satisfied with the official statistics which depicted the region's contribution to Soviet national income and also the price setting methods by the central government.²⁴⁷ During Brezhnev era poor management and shortage of skilled workers also plagued the growth of Central Asian Industry and worsened the economic situation. To quote an example, in 1975, population of Central Asia was 9.2 percent with 5.5 percent as fixed capital but in 1984 population was 10.7 percent with only 5.9 percent (increase of only 0.4 percent) of fixed capital.²⁴⁸ Throughout 60s and 70s, the total population of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan grew at least three times faster than it was during the previous two decades.²⁴⁹ The educational system of Central Asian was unable to cater the economic need and requirement of

respective republics. There were vacant jobs owing to non with no skilled personnel. Moreover, for rural population technical education was considered irrelevant.

In postwar periods, Muslims in political fields increased from one-fourth to three-fourth. Each departmental head was provided with Russian and other Europeans as assistance.²⁵⁰ In early and mid 60s the union republics were granted autonomy in internal affairs. To keep a check, all-Turkistan Party Bureau was created in 1961 which was a kind of organizational umbrella over the party organizations of the Central Asian republics.²⁵¹ In late Brezhnev era Moscow's control over the region began to weaken. As the native elite's' number and power increased, they appointed their relatives, friends, colleagues and political allies to important institutions of the republic. They also coped with the foreign deputies. This resulted in corruption, mismanagement and economic problems. By the end of 1985, all First Secretaries of Central Asian Republics were removed from their positions on the above-mentioned charges.²⁵²

Efforts were made for integration. Two aspects were selected – drive for linguistic Russification and Soviet customs and tradition. These were backfired and resulted in the growing phenomenon of nationalism. Russian was promoted as the second native language. In May 1979, in a conference Russian was recommended to be taught to the children (age from 5) in technical and educational schools.²⁵³ In 1970, Life cycle and religious rituals were observed throughout the Central Asia especially in rural areas.²⁵⁴ Even intelligentsia, scholars, party members educated individuals participated in these rituals.

Throughout the period, nationalism was a growing phenomenon with its major ingredients of language and culture adored by the natives. People wanted to purify their language from the process of Russification. Local cultural traditions and rituals were transferred from one generation to another.²⁵⁵

It further widened the gap of We Vs They.

2.5.6 Glasnost And Perestroika Period (1985-1990)

Robert G. Kaisa termed glasnost and perestroika as the period of tragedy.²⁵⁶ However Gorbachev policies were welcomed by the people of Central Asia. They formed political parties with manifesto based on Islam and democracy to asserted the identity of people in terms of nationalism and religion.

Alexander Bennigsen identified double evolution of Islamic revivalism and radicalization of local nationalism.²⁵⁷ in central Asia. Both developments were influenced by the failed Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, Iranian Revolution and nativisation of Central Asia. In particular Iranian revolution made profound impact over the Tajiki Islam. To internationalise Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini established broadcast stations on the Soviet-Iranian borders.²⁵⁸ These stations broadcasted programs to spread religious information for the youth.²⁵⁹ Later, a survey conducted showed that Tajiks preferred to take note of programs broadcasted from Asian rather than western nations.²⁶⁰ The exposure to Iranian revolution through media can be viewed from the fact that in some areas, parents started naming their newborns Ayatollah.²⁶¹ Director of Tajikistan's House of Atheism, M. Safrov, revealed that, fighters for the revival of Islam, sometimes call themselves wahhabis or

partisans of Khomeini.²⁶² While Chairman of the Tajik SSR KGB, Petkel, complained that some of the unofficial Mullahs called upon the believers to create an Islamic government of the Iranian type.²⁶³

Tajiks also contributed in Afghan resistance. A. Bennigsen stated that turning point was in 1985-86 when it became visible that Afghan resistance was unconquerable.²⁶⁴ In December 1979, 30-40 percent of Soviet army was composed of Central Asian soldiers. Within the couple of months, Central Asian soldiers were replaced by the entire Russian divisions.²⁶⁵ simply because Tajik soldiers refused to fight against their religious brothers and in 1980, all of them were sent back home.²⁶⁶ In Dushanbe numerous people were arrested in 1982 on the charge of provoking discontent among the population.²⁶⁷ They were distributing pamphlets against the Soviet occupation and announcement of the death of Soviet soldiers who were buried in Afghanistan. Tajikistan's countryside became the breeding ground for anti government activities.²⁶⁸ Deputy Chairman of the Tajik Republic's KGB, A. Belousov in 1991 reported training camps for youth, near Afghan Tajik boarder.²⁶⁹

A survey conducted at Khalton province, disclosed that 81 percent of the respondents were under the influence of Islam.²⁷⁰ The area was under the commanding influence of wahhabism.²⁷¹ One of the Tajik Wahhabi leader Abdullo Saidov publicly proposed the establishment of an Islamic state.²⁷² In 1986 he was arrested for presenting his licit demand. The people of Kurgan Tyube protested and demanded his release. This incident illustrated the assertion of Tajiks as strong believers of Islam, their fervent religious sentiments, formidable popularity of their

religious leaders and the well organized network that conveyed the news of his arrest, can also be viewed as another testimony of Sufism prevailing in Central Asia.²⁷³

A report delivered at 8th plenum in December 1987 revealed that Politicization of Islam²⁷⁴ had become the core of Tajik nationalism. Dozens of trials were held for unofficial Muslim clerics called for a Jihad against the existing system.²⁷⁵ Religious belief remained potent and convincing in Tajikistan. Not only retired or old people but also women,²⁷⁶ youth as well as children were urged to practice Islam in its uncontaminated form.²⁷⁷ Politicization of Islam was blended with nationalism for it was required to find a religious covering. We all know that nationalism does not exist by itself but we must not underestimate the blinding of religious and nationalistic ideas.²⁷⁸ Gorbachev accused the party bureaucrats and trusted officials to be under the influence of Islam²⁷⁹ and called for uncompromising struggle against religious revivals and setup mass atheistic propaganda.²⁸⁰ This campaign followed the same old methods and techniques used by Khrushchev and Brezhnev.²⁸¹ Still religiosity and freedom of conscience were at higher level.²⁸² Freedom of conscience, law of 1 Oct 1988, was to follow the era of tolerance towards Islam.²⁸³ that once again witness the opening of new mosques, publication of religious material, press publication of articles on science and religion and life of Holy Prophet, Quran, sunnah etc.

The economic situation deteriorated during the period due to many reasons.²⁸⁴ The average industrial production in Tajikistan declined from 10.8 to 4.9 percent and from 9.1 to 3 percent. Similarly agricultural production fell from 7.3 percent to 3.7

percent.²⁸⁵ Fuel was added when the grants from the Union budget was cut down, the living standard of the people deteriorated and give rise to the social tension.²⁸⁶

Demographic processes and nativization trend also aggravated problems of Tajikistan. The Muslim had high population growth rate as compared to that of Russians and other nationalities. From 1979 to 89, Central Asian nationalities grew by 32.7 to 45.4 percent whereas Russians in the USSR grew by 5.9 percent.²⁸⁷ In Tajikistan the Tajik share of population was 53.1 percent in 1959.²⁸⁸ In 1987 the birth rate grew by 37 per thousand. In 1987 it reached to 42 per thousand. Thirty percent of Tajik families had five or more, while 15 percent owned 10 or more children.²⁸⁹

Russians and other non Muslim nationalities started leaving the republics because of hatred of natives for outsider.²⁹⁰ Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee published a report in 1990, which revealed that from January to July 1990, 23,000 skilled Russians left Tajikistan.²⁹¹ due to riots in Dushanbe in February 1990 after the declaration of Tajik as official language. With nativization came the religious revivalism in Tajikistan, which was colored by the nationalism. Now for Tajiks, Tajikistan meant their motherland -- a place where they can progress their religion and can live according to their customs and traditions.

As for national language, very few Central Asians knew Russian language, whereas, 98 percent of Tajik, Uzbeks etc claimed their own national languages.²⁹² On 22 July 1989, the Tajik Supreme Soviet gave Tajik the status of state language of republic. Article 24 of the draft law on the Tajik states that, "*the Tajik SSR shall*

promote the study for Tajik writings using the Arabic script and the publication of literature using this script".²⁹³ For the communication purposes, between the nationalities within Tajikistan, Russian was to remain the official language for communication. With the adoption of Tajik as the state language one aspect of nationalism had been achieved in consolidated for the Tajikistan.

2.5.7 Disunity of the Union

Nationalist riots erupted in Central Asia, Trans Caucasus and Baltic states.²⁹⁴ As the authorities were trying to restore order in the disturbed areas, the nationalist riots also broke out in Tajikistan. On 11th February 1990, 3,000 people became violent and clashed with militia units. On 12th February, the Tajik Communist Party's headquarter was besieged and set on fire. Next day almost 50,000 demonstrators outside the communist party's headquarters called for the deportation of refugees from Dushanbe, dismissal of the republic leaders and better job prospects in addition to housing and environmental protection.²⁹⁶ The rioting mob even began intervening in the supply of bread and butter and dairy products and forced the shopkeepers to close their shops.²⁹⁷ For the first time in the history of Soviet Union that multi party basis elections were held on 25 February 1990. The Communist Party's candidates won the election and K. Makhkamor was elected as the chairman.²⁹⁸ However, the president had to resign after the vote of no confidence was passed against him and the communism came to an end.²⁹⁹ The communists hangover resulted in civil war. Tajikistan parliament proclaimed independence for the republic on 9th September 1991. The state was officially named as the Republic of Tajikistan with Dushanbe its capital.

After independence, the process of building a new Tajik national identity has already started. The situation is confused as on the one hand Tajikistan didn't seem to go through any of the natural process of state building and independence and on the other Islamic aspirations gave colour and flavour to national ambitions. For people there is no clear distinction between national, cultural and religious fervour. Tajikistan is now engaged in search of its modern democratic base, with several instable factors.

NOTES

1. Javaid Mansouri, "New Central Asian Republics", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol.46, No. 2, April 1993, p. 16.
2. Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, Bloomington: Indiana University publications, 1962, p. 1.
3. Javaid Mansouri, *op.cit*, p. 16.
4. Ahmad Hasin Dani, "Central Asia:Emergence of Modern States _ I", *The Muslim*, 24 July 1992.
5. Javaid Mansouri, *op.cit*, p. 16.
6. D.Banerjee, "Recent Developments in Central Asia and their Security Implications", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. xv, No. 6, September 1992, p.3. For minimalist, the Muslim majority area between the Caspian and Tien Shan Mountain is the explanation for the region. For maximalist Inner Asia is the appropriate term for the region because area is without outlet by water to the sea; it includes frontiers of Russia and China, the Middle East as well as the north-western portion of India
7. Lawrence Krader, *op.cit.*, pp. 10-18.
8. *The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, The University of Chicago: Hemingway Benton press, 1973-74, p. 762.

-
9. Mukhamed Asimov, *Tajikistan*, Moscow: Movosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987, pp. 19-23.
 10. Ibid.
 11. *USSR Tajikistan*, Moscow: Movosh Press Agency Publishing House, pp 12-13.
 12. D. A. Girling, ed., *Everyman's Encyclopedia, Vol 11*, London: J. M. Dent and sons ltd, 1978, p. 526.
 13. *Tajikistan: Country Economic Memorandum, Country Operation Report, No 12692-TJ*, Washington DC: Document of the World Bank, 1994, pp. 187-188.
 14. Ibid., p.23.
 15. Ibid. The agricultural production dropped and its main agricultural product cotton was sown on only 38,852 hectares – which was 13% of the total area under cotton crop.
 16. Ibid., p. 1.
 17. Shirin Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*, Lahore: Army Education Press, 1990, pp. 367-368.
 18. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, "Impact of Central Asian Changes on S and W Asia", *Regional Studies*, Vol.x, No.2, spring 1992, p.40.
 19. Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 160.
 20. Lawrence Krader, op.cit., pp. 33-34.

-
21. Ibid., p.40.
 22. Ibid.
 23. Teresa Rakowska- Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan under Soviet Rule", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.2, No.1, September 1986, p. 17.
 24. The population of Central Asia upon conversion to Islam, took up Persian, the language of their Iranian kin, coming with Arabs to Central Asia. Lawrence Krader, *op.cit.*, p.41.
 25. Ibid., pp. 42 -43.
 26. Ibid.
 27. Ibid., p. 54.
 28. Richard V. Weekes, *Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey*, London: Green Wood Press, 1978, p.389.
 29. Shirin Akiner., *op.cit.*, pp. 303-304.
 30. Lawrence Krader., *op.cit.*, p. 160.
 31. Ibid.
 32. Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p. 19.

-
- 33.. Lawrence Krader, op. cit., p. 74.
 34. Sogdiana extended along the Amu Darya, Bactrians on the upper and khorezums on the lower bank of the Amu Darya.
 35. Lawrence Krader, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
 36. He incorporated the provinces of Margiana, Khorezmia, Soghdia, Balkh and Bactria. Ibid., p. 75.
 37. Kushan ruled Bactria, eastern Turkistan, Soghdiana, Afghanistan and present day Pakistan. Fasahat H. Syed and Nadeem siddique, "Central Asia - A Historical Retrospective", *National Development and Security*, Vol. II, No. 1, August 1993, p. 40.
 38. For detail see, Ahmad Hasan Dani, *New Light On Central Asia*, Lahore: sange-Meel Publications, 1993.
 39. Geoffrey Wheeler, op.cit., p. 5.
 40. Ahmad Hasan Dani, op.cit.
 41. Geoffrey Wheeler, op.cit., pp. 5 and 20.
 42. Lawrence Krader, op. cit., p. 76.
 43. Ibid., pp. 118-138.
 44. M. Nazif Shahrani, "From Tribe to Umma: Comments on the Dynamics of Identity in Muslim Soviet Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.3, No. 3, 1984, pp. 28-29.

-
45. Kemal H. Karpat, "Introduction: Opening Remarks: The Geographical Scope of Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1984, pp.5- 8.
- 46.. Fasahat H. Syed and Nadeem Siddique, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
47. *The Encyclopedia of Religion: Vol. 7*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, p367.
48. Mohd Illy Khan, "Tajik Crisis", (Urdu), *Muslims of Central Asia*, Vol. 7, No.8, July-August 1995, p. 4.
49. Agha Shaukat Ali, *Modernization of Soviet Central Asia (An Example of Socialist Construction)*, London: Punjab University Press, 1964, p. 6.
50. *The Encyclopedia of Religion: Vol. 7*, op.cit., p. 567.
51. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*, London: The John Hopkins Press, 1970, p.11.
52. Richard N. Frey, *Islamic Iran and Central Asia (7th - 12th Centuries)*, London: Variorum Reprints, 1979, p. xi.
53. Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, London: C.Hust and Company, 1985, pp.6-7.
54. *The Encyclopedia of Religion: Vol. 7*, op.cit., p. 389.
55. Lawrence Krader, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
56. Richard N. Frey, op.cit., pp. xi and 370-371.

-
57. *The Encyclopedia of Religion: Vol. 7, op.cit., p. 389*
58. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan, op.cit., p.13.*
59. Ahmad hasan Dani, *New Light on Central Asia, op.cit., p. 150.*
60. Richard N. Frey, *op.cit., pp. xxiii and 69-71.*
61. Pavel Niyazov, *Tajikistan, Moscow: Movosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1982, p. 12.*
62. Richard N. Frey, *op.cit., pp. xxiii and 69-71.*
63. Geoffery Wheeler, *op.cit., p. 182.*
64. *Ibid.*
65. *The Encyclopedia of Religion: Vol. 7, op.cit., p. 370.*
66. V.V.Barthold, *Four Studies on The History of Central Asia: Vol.3, Leiden: 1956-1962, p. 19.*
67. *Ibid.*
68. For detail see, *The Encyclopedia of Islam: Vol.x, op.cit.*
69. Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and the Stalinism, London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd, 1954, pp. 50-55 and 42.*

-
70. Ibid.
 71. Ibid., p.53.
 72. *The Encyclopedia of Islam: Vol.x*, op.cit., p.690.
 73. Lawrence Krader, op. cit., pp. 123-124. He discussed Hunfiya, the Jahriya, the Kadriya, the Chistiya and the Al Tsani.
 74. Ibid., p. 53.
 75. *The Encyclopedia of Religion: Vol. 7*, op.cit., p. 372.
 76. Valentine I Bushkov, "The Population Of northern tajikistan Between 1870-1990" in Vitaliy Naumkin, ed., *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia*, UK: Ithka Press, 1993, p,221.
 77. The uprising was by peasants and artisans against the taxes. It was an armed resistance. *USSR 1917-1967: Tajikistan*, Moscow: Movosti Press Agency Publishing House, p.7.
 78. Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, op.cit., p.7.
 79. Valentine I Bushkov , op.cit.
 80. Geoffery Wheeler, op.cit., p. 24. Also see Lawrence Krader, op. cit., pp. 87-90.
 81. He selected Samarkand as his capital city and established foreign relations. Samarkand became the center of major cultural activity and there began the period of patronage of architecture, calligraphy miniature painting, metal work etc

82. Ibid. Also see Ahmad Hasan Dani, *New Light on Central Asia*, op.cit., pp. 39-40.
83. Lawrence Krader, op. cit., pp. 123
84. Ahmad Hasan Dani, *New Light on Central Asia*, op.cit., p. 42.
85. Olaf Caroe, op.cit., pp. 64-67.
86. Ahmad Hasan Dani, "Central Asia: Emergence of Modern states", *The Muslims*, 24 July 1992.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. In the North of Central Asia, Kazakhs occupied the range lands of north of Caspian see. The Uzbek occupied the former territories of Maverannahar, farghana valley and Tashkent. To the east were Kirgiz in the Tien Shan and Pamir ranges. South were the Tajiks. South west was occupied by the Turkmens. Lawrence Krader, op. cit., p. 90.
90. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*, op.cit., p.13
91. Geoffery Wheeler, op.cit., pp. 28-29.

-
92. Geoffery Wheeler, *Racial Problem In Soviet Muslim Asia*, London: Oxford University press, 1962, p.2.
 93. Geoffery Wheeler, *Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, op.cit., pp.40-41.
 94. Ibid., p.42.
 95. P .M. Holt, Annk S. Lambton, Bernad Lewis, ed., *The Cambridge History of Islam - Vol 1*, Cambridge: University Press, 1970, pp. 476 - 481.
 96. Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia*, London: C.Hurst and Company, 1982, p.10.
 97. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*, op.cit., pp.13-14.
 98. Michael Rywkin, op.cit., p.10.
 99. Helene Carrer d'Encausse, "Systemic Conquest - 1865 to 1884", in Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967., pp. 143-145.
 100. Geoffery Wheeler, *Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, op.cit., pp.45.
 101. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*, op.cit., p.4.
 102. Helene Carrer d'Encausse., op.cit., p.149.
 103. Helene Carrer d'Encausse, "Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories", in Edward Allworth, op.cit., p. 158.

-
104. Ibid.
105. Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan Turkism and Pan Islam in Russia*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 75.
106. Helene Carrer d'Encausse, "Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories", in Edward Allworth, op.cit., p. 162.
107. Ibid., pp. 160-167.
108. Michael Rywkin, op.cit., p.18. Also see Olaf Caroe, op.cit., p. 85.
109. Geoffery Wheeler, *Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, op.cit., pp.65-91.
110. Olaf Caroe, op.cit., p. 85-86. Also see Michael Rywkin, op.cit., p.15. Serge A. Zenkovsky, op.cit., p. 80.
111. P.M. Holt, Annk S. Lambton, Bernad Lewis, ed., op.cit., 517 and 520.
112. Helene Carrer d'Encausse, "Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories", in
Edward Allworth, op.cit.,p p. 162-167.
113. Ibid., pp. 168-169.
114. Ibid., 169-171.
115. Abdujabbar A. Abduvakhitov, " The Jadid Movement and its Impact on Contemporary Central Asia", in Hafeez Malik., ed., *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*, New York: St. Martins Press, 1994, p.68.

-
116. Serge A. Zenkovsky, *op.cit.*, pp. 80 -81.
117. *Ibid.*
118. Ahmad Hasan Dani, *New Light on Central Asia*, *op.cit.*, p. 86.
119. Serge A. Zenkovsky, *op.cit.*, pp. 35, 80 and 81.
120. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
121. *Ibid.*
122. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelque-Jay, *Islam In the Soviet Union*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1967, p35.
123. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-38.
124. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
126. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-48. First Congress was called in August 1905, second in January 1906, third in August 1906.
127. Helene Carrer d'Encausse, " " Social and Political Reforms", in Edward All worth, *op.cit.*, pp 189-193.
128. Serge A. Zenkovsky, *op.cit.*, p. 296, footnote 42.

-
129. Helene Carrer d'Encausse, "Social and Political Reforms", in Edward All worth, op.cit., pp. 194-204.
130. Ibid.
131. S.Ain fled to Russia, Abdul Rehman Fitrat, Muqiwat-Din Usman Khawaja fled to Istanbul. See Serge A. Zenkovsky, op.cit., p. 88. P .M. Holt, Annk S. Lambton, Bernad Lewis, op.cit., p. 52.
132. In 1908 the Young Turk Movement was formed against the autocratic rule of the Turkish Sultanate.
133. Ahmed Rashid., op.cit., p. 87.
134. Charles Bettelheim, "Class struggle in The USSR", Monthly Review Press, 1976. <http://www.marxx2mao.org/other/cssui.7.6i.html>. Also see, Valdimir Shlapentokh, A Normal System? False And True Explanation For The Collapse Of The USSR. <http://www.Msu.Edu/-shlapent/soc collapse.htm>.
135. Muslims were willing to fight against their co-religiousts. Tatars of Crimean Peninsula were leading intense agitation for the unification of Crimean Muslims and for helping Turkey. In fergana" to act now Muslims never will free themselves from the infiedle Russians", see Serge A. Zenkovsky, op.cit
136. According to decree between the age of 19 and 45 should be called for labour in the army. Before that confirmed by law, the locals were exempted from the military service. It was cotton season harvesting time.
137. Serge A. Zenkovsky, op.cit., pp. 130-134.
138. For detail see Walther Kirchner, *A History Of Russia*, New York: Barnes on Noble Inc.

-
139. Locals were attracted by the slogans of self-determination anti-colonial policy, confiscations of all lands for the local peasants etc.
140. Helene Carrere d'Encansse, "The fall of the Czarist Empire", in Edward Allworth ed., *op.cit.* ,pp.216.
141. *Ibid.*, pp.208-223. Also see Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, *op.cit.*
142. Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.* , p.167.
143. Young Bukhara, dominated by Jadids in order to remove the Emir, called Soviets Tashkent Government. But attempt was failed because of clergy.. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*, *op.cit.* , p.20.
144. Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, *The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia: A study in Political development*, Peshawar: Enjay Books International 1983, p.3.
145. Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.167.
146. To fulfill the cotton requirement of Russia, the cultivators were forced to grow cotton instead of grain. During 1917 crisis, Russians were unable to send cereals to the region. Helene Aymen De Lageard, "The Revolt of the Basmachi According to Red Army Journals (1920-1922)", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.6, No.3, 1987. pp.2-3.

-
147. Ibid.
148. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quellejay, *op.cit.* , p. 140.
149. Geoffrey Wheeler, *op.cit.* , pp.108-111.
150. Fazal-ur-Rehim Khan Marwat, *op.cit.* , pp.43-47.
151. Muslims were offered Communist Party membership and were recruited in Red Army units, food was distributed among natives, and native's right to trade was restored. This policy was quite successful. *Ibid.*, pp.47-51.
152. Ibid.
153. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelle-Jay, *op.cit.* , p. 140.
154. Itelene Carrere d'Encansse, "Civil War and New Government", Edward Allworth, ed., *op.cit.* , pp.244-248.
155. Serg A. Zenkovasky, *op.cit.* , pp.249.
156. Helene Carrere d'Encansse, *op.cit.* ,pp.246-248.
157. Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, *op.cit.* , pp.68-70.
158. *Ibid.* , p. 72.
159. *Ibid.*, p.74-75.

-
160. For detail see Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1954, pp.114-130.
161. Enver Pasha wanted to pressurize Allies to prevent them from division of Turkey. He wanted the support of Turks for Turkey.
162. The Young Bukharan party. Khivan Basmchis. Basmachis of Samarkand District. Fargana's Basmachis. Ibrahim Bek's authority in Eastern Bukhara . Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, op.cit. ,p.91.
163. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit. , p.168.
164. Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, op.cit. , p.91.
165. Agha Shaukat Ali, *Modernization of Soviet Central Asia (An example of Socialist construction)*, Lahore: Punjab university press, 1964, p.32.
166. Hellen Carrer d'Encausse, "Civil war and New Government", op.cit.
167. Ibid., p.252.
168. Ibid., p.252.
169. Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, op.cit. , p.99.
170. Olaf Caroe, op.cit. , p.124.
171. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit. , p.170.

-
172. Stephen Blank, "Soviet Re-conquest of Central Asia", Hafeez Malik, ed., op.cit. , p.39.
 173. Ibid, , p.41.
 174. Helen Carrere d'Encausse, "Civil War and New Government", op.cit . , p.253.
 175. Glenda Fraser, "An Enforced" "New Deal and the End of Basmahi", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.6, No.2, 1987. p.15.
 176. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelque jay, op.cit. ,p.144.
 177. Ibid. ,p.147.
 178. Ibid . , p.11, also see Geoffery Wheeler, op.cit . , p.158.
 179. Helen Carrere d'Encausse, "Civil war and New Government," op.cit. ,255.
 180. Agha Shaukat Ali, op.cit, p.33.
 181. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, op.cit, p.26.
 182. The constitution was rejected because Moscow refused to provide autonomy to the federated republics.
 183. In 1920 constitution Federal government was given foreign, defense and trade affairs.
 184. Geoffery Wheeler, op.cit. , pp.117-119.
 185. Lawrence Krader, op.cit. , pp.181-182.

-
186. Ibid. Also see Mukhamed Asomov, *Tajikistan*, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987, pp.16-18.
187. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerquier-Quelque Jay, *op.cit.* , p.132.
188. Agha Shaukat Ali, *op.cit.*, 36.
189. It becomes a model of how the Soviet government has resolved the national problem and proof of the triumph of Leninist nationality policy. It demonstrated the great care which the communist party and the Soviet government have taken in the creation and development of national statehood of the previously oppressed backward colonial people. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *op.cit.*, p.73.
190. Ibid, , p.19-30.
191. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan under Soviet Rule, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.2, No.7, Sept 1986. pp.25-29.
192. Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Brouxup, *The Islamic Threat to Soviet State*, London: Groom Helm, 1983, p.3.
193. Ibid.
194. Alexander Bennigsen and Quelque Jay, *op. cit.*, pp.148-149.
195. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *op.cit.* , pp.27-29.
196. Ibid. , pp.34-35.

-
197. Ibid.
198. Alexander Bennigsen and Chanital Lemerrier-Quelque Jay, *op.cit.*, p. 139.
199. Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *op.cit.*, p.45.
200. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Leucricier-Quelque Jay, *op.cit.*, p.151.
201. Ibid.
202. Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *op. cit.*,p.49.
203. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
204. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The cause of Tadzhikistan*, *op.cit.* , pp.278-280.
205. Ibid, pp.33-38.
206. Ibid. Also see Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia*, London: C. Hust and Company, 1982.
207. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *op.cit.* , pp.56-59.
208. Ibid, pp. 37-38.
209. Teresa Rakowska Harsstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan under Soviet Rule,"*op.cit.* , p.31.

-
210. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The case of Tadzhikistan*, op.cit. , pp.39-40.
211. Ibid.
212. . Akmal Ikramov was accused on the charge at saying that only a change of sign board differentiate Tsarist Turkistan from Soviet Turkistan – as both were run by the Russians. Ibid. See chapter three
213. The chairman of the council of the People's Commissars, the chairman of the presidium of the supreme Soviet, members of the council, minister of public education, ministry of industry, secretaries of Tadzhik Communist Party, were among the victims. Ibid.
214. Ibid, pp.101-103.
215. Lawrence Krader, op.cit, p.113. Also see last part of Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and nationalism in Central Asia: The case of Tazhikistan*, op.cit. ,pp.43-44.
216. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, “Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan under Soviet Rule, op.cit., pp.26.
217. Edward Allworth, “The Changing Intellectual and Literacy Community”, Edward Allworth, ed., op.cit., p.376.
218. Michael Rywkin, op.cit, pp.160-112.
219. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelque Jay, op.cit. , p.172.
220. Ibid. , pp.172-174.

-
221. Mufti Abdul Rehman Rasul issued a manifesto, "To rise in the defence of the fatherland against the enemy threatening destruction and misfortune to all Muslims, Children, brothers and sisters in our religion...."
- Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakistan under Soviet Rule ", op. cit, p.34.
222. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier Quelquejay, op. cit., 175.
223. Ibid . , pp. 175-176.
224. Anti-religious propagandists try to convince Muslims in their homes during private conversation. In 1985, Association organized 13,800 lectures on anti-Islamic themes in Tajikistan. In 1951,10,000 anti-Islamic lectures were organized in Kazakhstan, 5000 in Turkmenistan. From January 1, 1955 to August 1, 1957, 84 works were published in Muslim regions of USSR. From January 1, 1962 to December 31, 1964, 210 anti-religious books were published. 12 anti-Muslim books were published in Tajikistan. Ibid., p.176
225. For detail, see *USSR: Tajikistan*, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, pp.62-36.
226. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*, op.cit. , pp.45-50.
227. Geoffery Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, op. cit, p. 141.
228. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*, op.cit., pp.46.
229. For detail see Ibid., Chapter-4.

-
230. Ibid., p. 87.
231. Absolute Evil Theory was developed by Russian Historian Pokrovsky. This theory was attacked in 1937. It was replaced by lesser Evil Theory. For detail see Geoffery Wheeler, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954, pp.231-233.
232. Michael Rywkin, op. cit., pp.100-101.
233. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhistan*, op.cit, pp.80-82
234. In 1962, a new doctrine, "friendship of the people" was formulated. Ibid. See Chap.3 and 7.
235. Ibid.
236. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
237. Shirin Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*, London: KPL Ltd. 1986, p.31.
238. To wipe out Islam Union of Godless was set up by Stalin in 1925.
239. Ahmad Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*, op. cit., p.34.

-
240. Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-103.
241. *Ibid.*
242. *Ibid.* One such conference was convened in Dushanbe in 1979. 30-Muslim countries participated. It denounce USA, Israel and South African Imperialism and stressed loyalty of Soviet Muslims to their country.
243. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan under Soviet Rule", *op. cit.* , p.68.
244. Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-103.
245. Michael Rywkin, *op. cit.*, pp.131-133.
246. Boris Z. Rumes, "Central Asia's Cotton Economy and Its Costs", in William Fierman, ed., *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 63.
247. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
248. The South Tajikistan Territorial Production Complex planned in mid 60^s, but it could not be operated as planned. Tajik aluminum plant and Iavan Electrochemical plant caused serious environmental problems. *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 64 and 65.
249. Nancy Lubin, "Implications of Ethnic and Demographic Trends" in William Fierman, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 32 and 37.

-
250. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan under Soviet Rule", op. cit., p.36. Also see Michael Rywkin, op. cit pp. 127-129.
251. Michael Rywkin, op. cit, pp. 129-130.
252. William Fierman, "The Soviet Transformation of Central Asia", in William Fierman, ed., op. cit., pp.25-26.
253. Ibid., pp.95-95.
254. Life style, rituals marriage, circumcision, death and burial rites etc. prevails. While religious Friday prayer, Eid celebration, Pilgrimes to holy places etc. increased. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan under Soviet Rule", op. cit., pp.38, 39, 45 and 53.
255. Teresa Rawowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan*, op.cit, pp.66
256. Robert G. Kaiser, op.cit., p. 160.
257. Alexander Bennigsen, "Islam in Retrospect", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 1 1989, pp. 89-90.
258. K. Warikoo, "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment" in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed, *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers (Pvt.) Ltd., 1992, p. 67.
259. Ibid.

-
260. Allen Hetmanek "The Political Face of Islam in Tajikistan: The Review of Muriel Atkin's "The Subtest Battle," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 3 1990, pp.105.
261. Ibid.
262. *Kommunist Tadzhikistan*, 12th March 1988, cited in Ibid.
263. Ibid. , p.68.
264. Alexander Bennigsen, "Islam in Retrospect", op. cit., p. 93.
265. Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, op. cit., pp. 113-114.
266. Taras Kuzro, "Opposition in the USSR to the Occupation of Afghanistan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 1 1987, pp.112-113.
267. Ibid.
268. The main reason was geographical proximity, common ethnic, tribal and religious background.
269. K. Warikoo, op. cit., pp.68-69.
270. Allen Hetmanek, op. cit. , pp. 106 and 108.
271. Ibid.
272. Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "Islam and Atheism: Dynamic Tension in Soviet Central Asia" in William Fierman, ed., op. cit., pp. 208-209.

-
273. Ibid.
274. The term means that Islam no longer remained a spiritual private matter but became a political trend. The leaders they use Islam for their political purposes.
275. Alexandre Bennigsen, "Islam in Retrospect", op.cit. , p.103.
276. Muriel Atkin, *The Subtest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan*, Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989, p. 9.
277. *The Economist*, 8-14, September 1989, p. 67.
278. Muriel Atkin's, op. cit., p. 25.
279. Alexander Bennigsen "Unrest in the World of Soviet Islam" in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2 April, 1988, p.771.
280. Alexander Bennigsen, "Islam in Retrospect", op.cit ., p.103.
281. In Khalton Province, tea houses used as mosques or for other religious observances were closed down 75 out of 90 unofficial mosques were transformed into secular institutions. The holy places were bulldozed and pilgrimages to these places were denied. Arabic script books were banned. Allen Hetmanek , op. cit., p. 110
282. Educated people joined the ranks of Mullahs. In Dushanbe graduates of the Faculty of Oriental Languages joined the Mullahs. Communist party official also did not carry out atheist propaganda.
283. Azade-Ayse Rorich, op. cit. , p. 188.

-
284. Nepotism opportunism, corruption, wastage of funds, favoritism in selection of personnel, inefficiency etc.
285. K. Warikoo, "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment" op. cit. , p.73.
286. Ibid, p.74.
287. Nanly Lubin, "Implication of Ethnic and Demographic Trends" in William Fierman, ed., op. cit., p.42.
- 288.. K. Warikoo, "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment" op. cit., pp. 70-71. Also see William Fierman, op. cit. , chap .2.
289. Alexander Bennigsen "Islam in Retrospect", op. cit., pp. 89-90.
290. Ibid.
291. K. Warikoo, op. cit., pp. 71.
292. Ibid., p.66.
293. Devendra Kanshk, "Central Aspects of Soviet Nationalities Party in Central Asia" in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., p. 129. Also see *Kessing's Record of World Events*, vol. 35, No. 7-8, July 1989, pp.3825-26.
294. In December 1986, riots starts in Kazakhstan capital Alam Ata; in February 1988, violence erupted in Armenia; In May 1989, pro-independent movement started in Georgia.
295. O.K Dash, "Ethnic Tussles in the Soviet Muslim Republics", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., op. cit., pp.115-117.

296. *Kessing's Record of World Events*, Vol. 35, No. 2, February 1989, pp. 37384.

297. *Ibid.*

298. *Kessing's Record of World Events*, vol. 35, No. 4, July 1990, p.37384.

299. *Kessing's Record of World Events*, vol. 35, No. 4, July 1990, p.37373.

The War in Tajikistan Three Years On. Washington, DC : United States Institute of Peace Special Report, November 1995.

LITERATURE IN OTHER LANGUAGES:

PERSIAN BOOKS

Abuunasr, Anvarbeki, *Umed-i-Sabz*.(New Hope), Dushambe: Arnedal, 1994

Arfana, Abshkhor, *Shahnama-i-Firdousi* (Noble Poetry of Firdausi), Tehran: Islamic Cultural Press, 1989.

Khannary, Dr Pervaiz Nateel, *Tarekh-e- Zabane Farsi*, (History of Persian Language), Tehran, 1987.

Muhajeri, Al Sheikh Maseh, *Mujahlat Al Wahdat Al Islamia* (Aspects of Islamic Unity), Rawalpindi: Khana-i-Farhang, 1990.

Yussef, Shadman, *Tajikistan, Bahay-e Azadi* (Tajikistan on the Road of Freedom), Tehran, Islamic Cultural Press, 1994

URDU:

Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.1, No.2, sept-oct, 1992.

Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.1, No.3 - 4, Nov - Dec, 1992.

Muslims of Central Asia . Vol.1, no. 5-6, Jan – Feb, 1993.

Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.1, no. 7-8, March-April, 1993.

Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.1, no. 9-10, May - June, 1993

Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.1, no. 11-12, July-August, 1993

Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.1, no. 13-14, sept - Oct, 1993

Muslims of Central Asia. Vol.1, no. 15-16, Nov -Dec, 1993

CHAPTER THREE

NATIONALISM IN TAJIKISTAN

As discussed in second chapter Soviet state encouraged republic based nationalism and Tajiks were officially identified and given a separate state. Tajiks also developed an administrative structure, which gives them a sense of nation state. Here state actually created the nation.

3.1 Emerging Signs of Nationalism

Moscow clamors its success as far as nationality issue was concerned. However one can witness the emerging signs of nationalism during the three decades between Stalin and Gorbachev. The Tajik society also epitomized by a current of derussification in such areas as language, economy, politics and history.¹ This represented a return to korenizatsiya by Tajiks.

Language was the first to show that Tajik nationalism was on its rise. Moscow considered Russian language as a mean to create Soviet men and society. This cannot be achieved. A very less percentage of Central Asian Muslims claimed to know Russian Language,² which was a sharp contrast to the 98% who claimed their own Tajik, Uzbek etc as national languages.³ It was preferred by Tajiks to speak their own language. Demand to adopt Tajik language as national language was made and a draft law was circulated for public approval in which the importance of Tajik language its use and its social functions

were stressed.⁴ In the draft law it was stated that Tajik SSR would promote Tajik writings by using Arabic script and printed literature in it.⁵ In 1989 Tajik language was given legal status by the government but Russian remained the official language.⁶ Before the language subject rose the public and the influential group wanted to replace the non-native names that had been attached to the Tajik cities and other geographical locations.⁷ It was through glasnost it became obvious that this colonial practice had enraged Tajik identity and national pride.

With perestroika began the campaign to make the Tajik language more refined. Scholars started to invent new words or borrow them from Farsi and Dari. In late 80s anti-Soviet poetry also make its inroad in Tajik literature. The event which triggered the anti Soviet sentiments was the shooting of Soviet army on the anti- Armenian demonstration in Tajikistan, which killed and injured the demonstrators. Bozor Sobir, a famous Tajik poet and politician, wrote a poem which had anti-Soviet sentiments and dedicated it to a Tajik youth killed during the demonstration.⁸ Thus raised the pride of Tajik people. The work of the Tajik intellectuals shows the roots and traditions of their communities and the Islamic and Persian influence on them, while downgraded the Russian contributions. The main objective behind such policy was the realization that the new generations of Soviet Tajiks were not aware of the literature in their language. Socialist realism had disrupted national literary traditions.⁹ The Soviet Tajik writers can be placed in to different categories¹⁰ who tried to contribute in their own way as far as the Tajik national consciousness was considered. After independence national identity was

adequately promoted by cultural revival. The most popular and successful was the most living writer of Tajikistan, Taimur Zulfikarov, whose ancient Persian style of writing inspired his readers with nationalist sentiments.¹¹ Along with Tajik intellectuals, cultural institutions¹² also played their role to promote the national pride of the country.

History is also considered as one of the important tool in the hand of government to raise the nationalist sentiments of the people. In the time of emergency to retain support of the public, governments use symbols related to culture, patriotism and historiography to explain and justify policies. This helps the emerging nations through the identity crisis. Similarly it became important for the leaders of independent Tajikistan to produce a nationalist version of history as a means of reinforcing common Tajik identity. Intellectuals, historians, politician set out to revive the Tajik history. Historians in 1980s and 1990s were mostly concerned with the following issues:

- 1: the establishment Tajik identity based on pre-history;
- 2: the identification of historical injustices on the Tajiks by external forces (Arabs, Turks, Mongols, Uzbeks, Russians and the Soviets);
- 3: the justification of claims to specific territories.¹³

People show their interest in books on Tajik history. Monument works were republished like Bobojon Ghafurov's monumental work *The Tajiks: Archaic, Ancient and Mediaeval History* (1970), It quickly became the Bible of every Tajik intellectual.¹⁴ Tajik interpreted the history according to their own perception; the image of the Uzbeks and

their ancestors has been constructed by the Tajik scholars which is the result of the history of tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is portrayed as the evil step father who has been trying to stop and deny Tajikistan's existence as a nation.¹⁵ According to the history Uzbeks retained the two cities of Samarqand and Bukhara, which Tajiks considered theirs. Both these cities became an essential theme in the Tajik literature and considered it as the national asserts. Bozor Sobir a Tajik poet wrote a poem called Mother Tongue that mourned the lost national values of the Tajiks,¹⁶ he claimed that Uzbeks had oppressed Tajiks for at least two centuries. Many poets and writers expressed their opinions on the conflict with Uzbek oppressors.¹⁷ and stressed discrimination against Tajik culture in Samarqand.¹⁸ Tajiks of Samarqand and Bukhara not only lost freedom but also their national identity, the idea was taken up by Loik Sherali.¹⁹ Tajik also considered themselves as leaders in the creation of Persian civilization and the work of civilization building in Central Asia was done by the Samanids,²⁰ this period is considered as one of the glories of the Tajik heritage.

If the people are economically satisfied they show their allegiance to the existing system. Otherwise the bad economy situation can forced the people to change their loyalties. During 70s and 80s, economic issues came to the limelight in Tajikistan. Soviet emphasis to the production of cotton, caused negative impact.²¹ Though Central Asia has an ideal climate for cotton production but scarcity of water became the major issue. Due to the cotton expansion there was a catastrophic impact on the region's water resources. The land used for cultivation in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan increased by 62 percent

in just 21 years, 1965 to 1985.²² But it also had caused enormous damage to the environment, food production, drinking water supplies, health of women and children were all affected. Economically cotton production did not have any positive impact for the Central Asians because Moscow sold the cotton to European countries and kept the revenue in its reserves. This also boosted environmental problems and converted into anti Soviet sentiments. T Tajik people felt that the Soviet agriculture and industrial policies damaged the land. Environmental problems are absorption of chemicals and salts in the soil, air pollution caused by industries and vehicles, water pollution from disposal of industrial waste and sewage, poor management of water resources, and soil erosion. Soviet mining operation left toxic wastes in Tajikistan.²³ The Kafarnihan, Zarafshan, and Vakhsh rivers were heavily polluted with industrial wastes, carrying pollutants into the Amu Darya and then to the Aral Sea. Ground water was also polluted in industrial areas. Tajikistan's use age of water for irrigation was a negative impact on the water resources of the region. Air pollution water erosion and forest degradation²⁴ aggravated the environmental problems.

The rise in Tajik population and the migration of Europeans and Russians was another indicator for the emerging nationalism in Tajikistan. In 1977, the birth rate in Tajikistan was 37 per thousand; in 1987 it reached 42 per thousand. 30 percent of Tajik families had five or six children, while 15 percent of families had ten or more children which was a sharp contrast to the average number of children in Russian families, which was only one per family.²⁵ During 1959 to 1979 percentage of Russian population declined

from 13.3 percent to 10.4 percent in Tajikistan and according to 1989 census figures, the Russian population declined by 2.1 percent in Tajikistan.²⁶ Tajikistan Communist Party central committee reported in 1990 that about 23,000 skilled Russian workers had left Tajikistan from January to July alone in 1990.²⁷ This resulted in more inclusion of Tajiks in the government but still the most important positions were in the hands of Russians.²⁸ Besides this, in early 60s, the union republics were granted autonomy.²⁹ These processes began to weaken the Moscow's control in the region. The conspiracies e.g withheld information from center or avoids meeting demands, silence on serious economic problems resulted in law and order situation. This was echoed in complaints by regime spokesmen the details of "negative phenomenon" were made public. Because of this there was huge elimination of politicians from the republic party. The first sign of this was in 1983 when Rashidov, first secretary of Uzbek communist party, committed suicide because he realized that he was about to be disgraced by public revelation of his "Mafias" wide spread corruption.³⁰ By the end of 1985, all first secretaries of Central Asian republics were removed from their position on charges of corruption and mismanagement. Because of this all the departments were now being directed by Tajik cadres. The Russian were reduced to the traditional proconsular posts of second secretary, Central committee, and local military commands.

During the last decade of Soviet rule serious economic, social and political problems rose in Tajikistan, the conditions which lead to violent out bursts in such places as the Fargana and in Dushanbe. Through the history of Tajikistan it seems as if the national

identity in modern sense was going to take firm roots but the post independence events relate another story.

3.2 Post Independence Tajikistan: Unstable Factors For Tajik Nationalism

The development in political situation under Gorbachev provided a platform to the people of Tajikistan to raise their voice against Soviet rule. Tajik leaders considered the reforms of Moscow as a threat to their hold on power. In 1990 election K. Makhkamov became the president with 94 percent support of communists of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan.³¹ Oppositions, consisted of democrats and Islamists, were outlawed to contest election. Thus sending a signal to the opposition that Russian government would no longer cooperate.

Opposition pressurized the government and placed some demands.³² as a result, K. Makhkamov resigned and Kadriiddin Aslonov, chairman of Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, was elected as a new President. He banned the communist party and because of that, communists stood against him and removed him in September 1991. Rahman Nabiev, became the new president who had no experience to negotiate with opposition.³³ Under pressure elections were held. He had secured 58 percent votes, mostly from Khojend and Kulyab, while his opponent Davlat Khudanazrov, a candidate supported by United Block of Democratic Forces, had 30 percent of votes³⁴ However, this victory was challenged.³⁵ The newly elected president being a communist refused to place his hand on Quran. The ruling party was renamed as Communist, and it was claimed that the

process of restoring the USSR has started.³⁶ Situation got even worse when Dushanbe Mayor and Interior Minister, were accused of corruption. Dushanbe Mayor was removed from his rank because he had also ordered the removal of the Lenin Statue in September 1991. The Interior Minister was taken down from his position because he had refused to carry out instructions in September 1991 to disperse the demonstrators. Moreover, Safarali Kenjaev, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, publicly attacked interior minister and accused him as kafir.³⁷ Massive protest began in the capital city of Tajikistan³⁸ where 100,000 demonstrators³⁹ surrounded the parliament. On the other hand, opposition became well-established with the joining of Haji Turanjonzada, who had also occupied a seat in Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan. Under these circumstances, Nabiev was able to secure emergency powers. Utilizing these powers he created Presidential Guard on 2 May, 1991, which was not accountable to anyone. 700 men of criminal background were recruited from Kulyab. As a response, opposition formed their paramilitary forces⁴⁰. This resulted in a fight between both the groups. Due to the fear that opposition was gaining upper hand, Nabiev came to an agreement with them to create a coalition Government of National Reconciliation (GNR).⁴¹ However, neither north oblast nor southern oblast accepted the compromise. Khojend and Kulyab refused to recognize the new government.⁴²The opposition again raised the issue of the agreement being been violated. They had their strong holds in the Garm region east of Dushanbe, Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in the Pamirs and the plains of Southern Tajikistan. During all these days north remained calm while south plugged into an armed activism.

The most brutal fighting was reported in Kurgan Tyube and Kulyab Oblast. As Kurgan Tyube supported opposition, therefore, Kulyabi forces destroyed them completely.⁴³ Popular Front of Tajikistan, under the control of an armed group developed out of Nabeiv's Presidential Guard. The leader of this group was Sangak Safarov, a Kulyabi with criminal background. He launched an attack on Vakhsh valley⁴⁴ because he believed that solution to the problems of Tajikistan lies in the eradication of the opposition.⁴⁵ Opposition supported the Front for National Salvation and Youth of Tajikistan.⁴⁶ These groups obtained weapons from various sources

As the conflict grew, people from Kulyab, Bakhtav, Vakhsh and other parts began to migrate to safer places. Round about 100, 00 Russians and 326,000 Tajiks left Tajikistan by the end of 1992. ⁴⁷ Times International reported that more than 20,000 Tajiks were killed with in the few months of the start of the civil war. ⁴⁸ Lots of refugees migrated to Dushanbe for protection . These migrants brought hatred with themselves for Kulyabis and Khojendis. They had a desire for revenge that further increased the conflict among Kulyabis, Garms, and Pamiris. Opposition was not satisfied with the practical implication of the May agreement. So decided to retaliate. Students belonging to "Youth of Tajikistan" caught the president at airport and forced him to resign. Akbar Shoh Iskandarov, a Pamiri and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, became acting President, he was the first Badakhshani to hold such a high position in Tajik politics.⁴⁹ However,

widespread fighting throughout the country followed Nabiev's removal. Now the ideological underpinning of the conflict lost its validity and it became a clan warfare.

Acting President and Coalition cabinet resigned and was replaced by Imamali Rakhmanov a Kulyabi⁵⁰ and Abdul Malik Abdullojonov a Khojendi. To make this decision a special session of parliament was held in Khojend.⁵¹ Sanga Safarov accused Haji Turanjonzada and Shodmon Yusuf and other opposition leaders for creating disorder in Feb 1990 due to which the civil war started in 1992.⁵² The Tajik civil war had obtained outside involvement. This can be seen through the fact that when opposition groups came to power in Dushanbe, they accused Russians and Uzbeks armed forces of assisting Popular Front Forces. It was a valid accusation because Uzbek air force bombed Kafarnihan , Haji Turanjonzada's native town as well as Garm in Dec 1992 and Jan 1993.⁵³ Russian military had played a major role in the victory of popular front. (See next chapter).

After coming to Dushanbe Imamali Rakhmanov made it clear that survival of democracy in Tajikistan was not possible and nor could Islam offer anything without bloodshed. Therefore, he asserted the need of reinforcing the previous system.⁵⁴ The new government was exclusively based on ministers from Kulyab and Khojend. Imamali's government used repressive measures to confront the situation. Opposition was accused of creating disarray and the government forces continued to raid areas where members of the opposition had taken refuge.⁵⁵ Anti government persons were arrested.⁵⁶ and anti

government publications were completely banned. Four opposition political parties, Islamic Renaissance Party, Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Rostakhez and Lal-i-Badakhhsan were banned. They were accused of being engaged in unlawful actions and violating the government charters.⁵⁷ Many prominent leaders, due to government policies, had taken refuge in other countries or had gone underground.⁵⁸ Not only that nearly 195,000 Tajik people moved to Russia, Ukrain, Belaurus and neighboring Central Asian states.⁵⁹ People were displaced internally also.

The conflict turned out to be a severe threat to the stability of the Tajikistan and to the entire region. The President was pressurized to accommodate the opposition. Thus, in order to make certain reforms, the president allowed the opposition to participate in elections.⁶⁰ The President elections were held in November 1994 and 1999, where Imamali received 60 percent votes. The remaining 40 percent were divided between the opposition candidate Abdul Malik and Mizro Kabirov.⁶¹ In 1999 elections President won 97 percent of votes, whereas his competitor Davlat Usmanov, an opposition candidate got just 2 percent of votes.⁶² The opposition rejected the results⁶³ and elections to parliament were held on 26 February, 1995. Foreign observers criticized the elections as rigged with psychological pressure.⁶⁴ Later, the process of political negotiations between the Government and the UTO⁶⁵ was held. There were eight rounds of inter-Tajik negotiations under the UN patronage that lasted for four years.⁶⁶ In the process of negotiation the meetings of the heads played an important role. In 27 June, 1997 the President Imamali Rakhmanov and the UTO Leader Sayeed Abdullo Nuri signed a

“General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Reconciliation in Tajikistan” in Moscow, which is known as the General Agreement.⁶⁷ The agreement put an end to the armed conflict in Tajikistan. However situation did not improve.

3.2.1 *Factors for Weak Tajik Nationalism*

The identity of Tajik population is divided on the basis of tribal, ethnic, religious, linguistic context. Therefore, Tajikistan faced problems in creating a national structure and a complete socio political domestic system. These identities also turned out to be a hurdle in the process of nationalism and minimized the process of state building in Tajikistan.

The very first obstacle in the development of Tajik nationality is the very term Tajik itself. Who is a Tajik? This question has different explanations. The original inhabitants of Central Asia before the Muslims rule and the Turkish invasion were known as Tajik.⁶⁸ Answer to this has been given in term of language also. Tajik is someone who speaks Tajiki or Persian.⁶⁹ Another explanation widely used by the Soviets is any Sunni Muslim Persian speaker is a Tajik.⁷⁰ In the 20th century Soviets divided the Tajiks into valley and mountain groups. Valleys Tajik was the term used for the people of cities like Bukhara, Samarkand, Khojend, Penjikent, Chust. The term mountain Tajik is used by researchers for the people of eastern Bukhara, southern parts of Hissar region, and mountain villages of Zarafshan and the Pamir.⁷¹ Dihkani or agriculturists are known as Plain Tajiks. While mountain Tajiks were known as Galchans. Shugnani. The largest

group is further sub divided into Rushani, Bartangi, Shugni and Oroshori. These names were derived from places of residence.⁷² Thus Tajiks does not have one common name for themselves.

Closely associated this is the language problem in Tajikistan. Tajiks, in pre soviet Central Asia meant a well settled inhabitant who speaks Persian. It did not include the mountain population who had different dialects of Tajik language (see 2nd chapter). Thus Tajiks always created problem for the soviet nationality policy. Stalin also omitted Tajiks from the list of Central Asian nationalities and that is why Tajiks were included in Uzbekistan.⁷³ For five years, Tajikstan remained a part of republic of Uzbekistan. Government discussed the idea to separate Tajikistan from Uzbekistan. This was hotly debated. Kazakhs were of the view that this segregation would strengthen Uzbekistan.⁷⁴ Whereas, the aim of the government was to weaken the pan-Turkic ideas in Uzbekistan and extend the republics of Tajikistan till Afghanistan border. By doing this they wanted to promote the idea of a bigger Tajikistan for Tajiks on the other side of the Panj river.⁷⁵ The Uzbeks, meanwhile, claimed that Tajiks had always been Uzbeks who only became Tajik-Persian speakers under the influence of Persian literature and language.⁷⁶ Uzbeks have done a favor to Tajiks by returning them their homeland with progress and development. External events also pushed Stalin to create a separte Persian state on the border of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan King Amanullah was over thrown and was replaced by a Nadir Shah, who was supported by British. Stalin emphasized the needed of a Persian speaking Tajikistan to influence the large areas of Persian culture from Iran to

India. A Khojend district from Uzbekistan was moved to Tajikistan. This decision was not appreciated by the Khojendis who always tried to maintain their links with Uzbekistan. They always remembered the time when their area was not a part of Tajikistan, and they considered other parts of Tajikistan as backward.⁷⁷

Geographically, Tajik nationals are settled in such a way that mountains have divided them into four regions with hardly any connection between them. After independence, these areas became the provinces. This division arose to such an extent that it divided the positions of Tajik leaders into clans and thus resulted in the civil war.

Table 1. Major General Indicators of Tajikistan Regions

<i>Region</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Area (km.2)</i>	<i>Area (mi.2)</i>	<i>Capital</i>
Badakhshan	206,000	63,700	24,600	Khorog
Dushanbe	562,000	300	100	Dushanbe
Regions of Republican Subordination	1,338,000	28,400	11,000	
Khatlon	2,151,000	24,600	9,500	Qurghonteppa
Sugd	1,870,000	26,100	10,100	Khujand
Total:	6,127,000	143,100	55,300	

Source: Gwillim Law, 'Raions of Tajikistan', *Administrative Subdivisions of Countries*, (1999), <http://www.statoids.com/ytj.html>.

The creation of new republic give the name Tajikistan to a group of regions that are geographically and historically separate from each other. These regions mark differences in ethnicity, language, religion, and culture. However, the geography of the country also contributed to this separation among the population of these regions. The most distinct region in terms of ethnicity is Goron Badakhshan. It is located in South east of Dushanbe and contains 44percent of the total area with 3percent population of Tajikistan.⁷⁸ The area is occupied by seven different Pamiri ethnic groups that mostly belong to the Ismaili sect. While majority of Tajiks are Sunnis. Pamirs speak six different dialects of eastern Iranian languages,⁷⁹ distinct from Tajiks. Geographically, culturally and ethnically they resemble northern Afghanistan. This is the least developed region and has been reputed as the center for the production of narcotics-opium.⁸⁰ Geo-strategically the mountainous region are important for Tajikistan and other common wealth members of the CIS because it is situated near China, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Under Soviet rule this region faced problems economically as well as it was excluded from the party and administrative system. After independence, the main issue for the Badkshshanis was the issue of their autonomy. They had two options. Either to compromise with Kulyabis, letting themselves to be ruled by Russia or create an independent state with the help of Agha Khan, which would be the only exclusive Ismaili

state of the world.⁸¹ Though the local leadership claimed autonomy but the spiritual leaders of Agha Khan supported the idea of establishing "close and mutual ties with Russia."⁸² People of Gorna-Badkshshan have their own demands; therefore, they joined hands with the Islamic cum democratic opposition in Dushanbe. Badkshshan's branch of opposition is based on field commanders and is in coalition with the National Islamic Movement of Tajikistan.⁸³

The regions of Kurgan Tyube and Kulyab joined to form Khalton Oblast. Kurgan Tyube was a desert land, populated by masses who migrated in response to Stalin's policy to increase the cotton production. By 1991, 11 percent of the Soviet Union's long staple cotton was produced in Tajikistan.⁸⁴ Massive irrigation projects transformed the area into a closely populated cotton cultivated area. In this situation, conflicts over land, water and government services emerged. By the end of 1929, fifty new villages in south of Tajikistan had been established.⁸⁵ This phenomenon is unique in Tajikistan in a sense that Tajiks were relocated within national republic. The new settlers instead of integrating with the local population became a separate sub ethnic group known as Garnis by their neighbours.⁸⁶ The resettlement was not welcomed by the mountaineers as they were not prepared to work in the heat of steamy valleys. Moreover they thought of themselves as foreigner in their own country as they brought their own culture, tradition, and customs, with them. And they did not want to change themselves. Until the present day, it is common in Tajikistan that each community hardly knows about its neighbours.⁸⁷ There was migration on massive scale to the capital city of Dushanbe. Half of the growth of the

city came from the European part of the population of USSR while the remaining half was from Hissar and Garm. The Garm valley is mainly agricultural. It is considered as one of the most religious places in Tajikistan. Kulyabis under the banner of joined hands of communism and secularism with Khojendis There are economic and clan rivalries between Kulyab and Kurgan Tyube. Kulyabis are secular and communists .⁸⁸ Thus ideology became the most irritant factors between the residents of the two areas.

The north oblast, Sogd, is located at the entrance of Fergana valley, and separated by mountain range from the rest of Tajikistan. Khojend the capital city is traditionally the base of Communist Party elites.⁸⁹ This resulted in resentment from the south and increased inter regional tension. Khatlon one of the poorest republics took an initiative to react against this system. In the beginning of the 1970s, Kasimov, a Khojendi, was appointed first secretary of the regional Party committee of Khatlon. A few days after his arrival in Kulyab, his body was found hanging on a rope in one of the city hotel.⁹⁰ The next secretary appointed to Khatlon was of Kulyab origin. In the seventies, the CP leaders encouraged the people from Kulyab. One reason given behind the investment in Kulyab was the fact that cotton grown in Kulyab was processed in Khojend. All the major industries were situated in north. Khojend. The area is totally dependent on Uzbekistan for trade, energy and other supplies⁹¹ due to the fact that the civil war had destroyed the economic out put of the south.

Beside this north south division, Ludmila Chvyr⁹² has pointed out five levels of ethnic stratification and self-identification among Tajiks. Such ethnic stratification proved hindrances in the way of building Tajik nationalism and binding Tajiks into a whole nation. The first level of ethnic stratification is based on the Tajik perception that they are divided into northern flatland Tajiks and southern-mountain Tajiks. Each groups referred themselves as the real Tajiks and the original guardian of the Tajik historical and cultural heritage. For example, the southern Tajiks believed that they retained the pure bloodline while the people from the north had lost it due to their contact with the Uzbeks. Both the groups have different language patterns.⁹³ The second level of stratification is based on the further division of northern and southern Tajiks into several local groups with their own names for identity. In the south, they are called Tajiks of Darvaz, Karategin, Hissar, Kulyab and others. While in the North they are known as Tajiks of Khojend, Ura-Tyube, Samarkand, Bukhara and Fergana. Each local community has its own traditions, culture and specific language as well as small groups of migrants. Who retained their customs and traditions and refused to amalgamate themselves into the main stream. The third level is based on some cultural communities of regional status and smaller entities. For example Hissari Tajiks of Varzob valley called themselves Varzobis, Ramit as Ramitis and Faizabad as Faizabadis. Each entity spoke different dialects of Tajik language. They knew about their own history, rituals, customs, tradition, area, but had no knowledge about their neighboring communities. For them their own customs and traditions were important. The fourth level of ethnic stratification comes from the local cultural groups. This can be found among Tajiks of Fargana valley that had their own

inner structure. For instance the Tajiks of Chust considered themselves as the direct descendants of the people of the ancient city of Tusa, while Varzyk, Tajik village near Chust, claimed to be direct descendent from the Sogdians. They spoke different dialects of Tajik language and had different rituals, for instance, they opposed intermarriages. The fifth level is of local micro groups among the Tajik. Each city or village had Mohallah or Guzar with their own distinct names. They were usually named after the founder (real or legendary) of the village or town or after the occupations of its residents (Mulloyen for Mullahs, Ustayen for Artisans).⁹⁴ A guzar usually comprises of several families or some clans. All the levels of stratifications formed the ethnic features of Tajik nationals and played a central role in the self-awareness of Tajiks in their traditional, local and cultural groups.

The correlated fact is that Tajikistan is the least urbanized country. In rural areas traditional way of life has survived.⁹⁵ By the 1980s, the republic had more than 3,000 inhabited villages, of which about one-quarter had 200 inhabitants. Observers estimated that 75 to 89 percent⁹⁶ of all Tajikistanis were villagers in 1990. People living in villages perceived identity in terms of dynasty, tribe, religion etc and not by the criteria of the nation state. Majority of the villages were inhabited by a single nationality. The concept of nationalism in a modern political sense did not penetrate in the rural set up because it is isolated and focused inwardly.⁹⁷ As Tajikistan is 93 percent mountainous, the county side is divided into separate areas with each area having its own culture, tradition, dialect etc. North and south are linked by a single road, which is often blocked in winter. This

lack of communication hindered the spread of new ideas and to merge the existing realities.⁹⁸ Similarly education in the county side of Tajikstan was also less developed as compared to the cities. Under such circumstances it is difficult for the Tajik people to accept new identity that is alien to them.

Under these circumstances, it was difficult to classify Tajiks in terms of their class and religion.⁹⁹ Soviet Sociologist discovered that when he went to Central Asia on a research in Tajikistan, the research turned out to be impossible. The reason was that everytime a Tajik was asked if he was Muslim, his reply would be "off course I am a Tajik"¹⁰⁰ The sole reason of this was that majority of Tajiks believed in Islam. (see next chapter .Analysis shows that Tajik politics is built on regionalism. The membership of the parties did not depend on ideology but on the origin of the leader. Every party had a different political agenda. The draw back of the political scenario was that none of the political party played its role during the liberation movements of Tajikistan. Parties like CPT and Rastakheze tried to support the soviet system while others were not in favor of independence. Thus, there was not a single party to support Muslim League or Congress, who played their role during the freedom struggle of Muslims and Hindus from British.

101

Democratic Party of Tajikistan (an anti communist) had support from Dushanbe intelligentsia and some industrial towns.¹⁰² Rastokhez, commonly known as the National Front; DPT had secular cum democratic character and they supported political and legal

sources to achieve their objectives. However, these parties realized the lack of secular and democratic culture in Tajikistan. The only source to strengthen their shaky position was to get the support of Islamic parties. Islamic Renaissance party (IRP) emerged from an underground youth organization that started in 1978 in kurgan tube. IRP was established in June 1990. It recruited Garmis youth through the net work of unofficial mullahs.¹⁰³ It declared the establishment of legal and democratic state¹⁰⁴ based on Islamic principals.¹⁰⁵ However, the Party had to tone down its demand because “creation of an Islamic State” was not the aim of Rastokhez and the DPT.¹⁰⁶ The IRP was the backbone of the UTO and participated in the negotiations that led to the General Agreement. Movement for National Unity and Revival in Tajikistan (MNURT) was established in 1997 with the aim to unify the different forces of the country and to establish stable civil society. The aim of the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDP) was to establish rule of law, sovereignty, democracy and parliamentary politics, however, its original structure resembled the formal CPT organizational structure.¹⁰⁷ Both these parties has been chaired by the president, with its following in north and Kulyab region of the country.

Beside the main stream political parties, there are local parties local parties like Lali Badakhshan party represented the people of GBAO.¹⁰⁸ According to the President of the Party Atabak Amir Beig “*Parliamentary system of the government is the only solution for economic, political and cultural crisis in Tajikistan.*”¹⁰⁹ However, he ruled out any possibility of an Islamic state because he was of the view that politics and religion were

two different things.¹¹⁰ It was a regional organization, whose main aim was to safeguard the interest of GBOA.

Besides these, several other organizations, parties and political clubs active in Tajikistan include Ehya-i-Khojent; the socio-cultural association al Samarkand; Oftab-i-Sugdian; Wahdat; a Popular Front of supporters of reconstruction; Oshkovo, Society Maihan;¹¹¹ Peoples Congress, National Liberation Front People's Party of Hissar Valley, Nasir Khusru.¹¹² All these political parties encouraged the polarization of Tajik politics through which the issue of Tajik leadership emerged.

None of the Tajik leader, K. Makhmanaov, Nabiev, Iskanderov, could claim the support of the majority of the Tajik population. Even the president Imnam ali had no control over t Tajikistan. It was said that he rose to power due to the patronage of Popular Front leader Sanga Safarov.¹¹³ Those who supported the government or were the member of PF during the civil war, were rewarded by the government with the top positions in the country. Safarov, attended high-ranking government officials' ceremonies and even appeared on television to address the public.¹¹² Other PF fighters like Yaqub Salimov was given the key of the ministry of internal affair, Mohamad Said ubaiduloev was appointed as Mayor of Dushanbe.¹¹⁴ Colonel Mahmud Khudioberdiev, who left Russian 201st Rifle Division and joined PF in 1992, was rewarded with the command of First Rifle brigade of Tajikistan's new army. He became so powerful that he forced the key government officials to resign.¹¹⁵ Thus, the government was heavily

dependent on the PF fighters whom people hated due to their brutalities during the civil war. In addition, the opposition did not have a charismatic leader, like Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, or Quaid – e- Azam who could unite the different regions of the country.

Khojend and Kulyab are the basis of power for the Tajik leaders. The Khojendi took control by encouraging people of Kulyab. The Khojendis allocated more funds for the development of their own province.¹¹⁶ As a result, Khojend's region prospered economically and politically. Khojend is surrounded by Uzbekistan with considerably large Uzbek population who dominated the Tajik Communist Party. During the Soviet rule, Tajikistan's economy was integrated with the Uzbekistan and after independence Khojend preserved their economic relations with Uzbekistan.¹¹⁷ This added hurdles in the formation of Tajikistan's integrated national economy and increased the regional tension. The Khojendis succeeded in breaking up the emerging unity of the country's other region with the failure of National Reconciliation. Kulyabis Popular Front of Tajikistan (PFT) provided force to Khojendi.¹¹⁸ Another kulyabi, Safadrili Kenjayev attacked Dushanbe in October 1992 and seized the president building, radio, television and railway stations.¹¹⁹ After collaborating with Kulyabis, the Khojendis had to share power with them. Thus, Imamali Rakhmanov a Kulyabi was elected as head of State. With the selection of Imamali, Leninobadi felt that this candidate will work in their interest. 14 ministers in the new cabinet were also from Kulyab.¹²⁰

Soon tensions started to emerge between pro-Kulyabi and pro-Leninabadi forces. The Khojendis wanted the Kulyabi forces to eliminate the opposition and then restore Khojendi as a head of the state. This did not happen because Russia also supported a Kulyabi as head of the state. This created a new imbalance of power in Tajikistan. Abdumajid Dostiev¹²¹ formed a pro-Kulyabi People's Party of Tajikistan. To counter this former governor of Sogd province, Abduljalil Khanidov formed Leninabadi People's Democratic Party. In December 1992, Khanidov tried to overthrow Rakhmanov, but failed and had to face the consequences.¹²² The Presidential elections of November 1994 provoked tensions and proved fatal for Khojendis power. Rakhmanov won the election and started removing Abdullojonov supporters from local government. In Sogd province, 13 out of the 16 district governors were replaced by Rakhmanov's appointees.¹²³ Government had formed new election laws due to which Abdullojonov Party boycotted the elections.

This is one side of the story Rakhmanov appointed majority of ministers in the cabinet from Kulyab-Baljuvon promoting localism even within the Kulyabi's group.¹²⁴ This can be traced out from the fact that Dostiev, a Kulyabi Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, was not reelected as the speaker of the parliament. Similarly, a gap took place among Kulyabis; Laqais and Hissari groups, in the PFT.¹²⁵

Ethnic element came in to the picture when chief players played their role and the ethnic groups had to decide which side they would support. The Uzbek minority sided

with the ruling group and the Russian minority kept a low profile. The opposition was eager to show that they had the minority support and that their struggle for democratic reforms would safeguard the minority interests and rights.¹²⁶ But the policies adopted by the opposition crushed the confidence of the minorities and they got suspicious about them. Tajik-Uzbek enmity can be traced back to the early history of Tajikistan. This ended by the national delimitation policy of Stalin. Tajik scholars criticized the role of Uzbekistan's in partition of Central Asian, which scattered Tajik-speaking communities. In Kurgan Tyube, Uzbeks are the significant population; they make up 22.9%¹²⁷ which is quarter of the republic population and are settled in relatively developed areas of the country.¹²⁸ Russians make up 32.3 percent, Uzbeks 39.1 percent and Tajiks 10.4 percent of Dushanbe.¹²⁹ Tajiks and Uzbeks settled in Sogd oblast had strong historical and cultural links with each other, but Uzbeks who settled in Garm and Kurgan Tyube had no relations with each others.¹³⁰ Similarly Tajiks who migrated to North of Tajikistan were not on good terms with the Uzbek population of the area. Thus, there was a lack of internal unity within the largest Iranian and Turkic group. Tajik people claimed that the two historical cities of Samarkand and Bukhara were a part of their region before getting occupied by Uzbeks. Whereas, Uzbeks claim for all parts of Fargana valley, including some parts of Khojend.¹³¹ Tajiks feel inferior when compared with Uzbeks. The Uzbek population in Tajikistan encourages Uzbekistan to interfere in Tajikistan's internal affairs. During civil war, Tajik Uzbeks supported the communist forces and Safadrili Kenjayev launched an attack on Dushanbe when opposition was ruling the country. The Uzbeks of Hissar and Regar region supported him and were blamed for looting the

houses of the Garmis of the Kurgan Tyube. The opposition forces controlled the center of Kurgan Tyube oblast and attacked the Uzbek supporters of the Communist rule. Similarly, Imarnali Rakhmanov received the votes of Uzbeks during the presidential election.¹³² The Uzbeks support for the communists and their interest in pro- regime regions merged the ethnic and regional element together.

Russians are another important minority group in Tajikistan and make up 10.4% of the population¹³³ they mostly live in urban areas like Dushanbe, which was considered as a "Russian city". They were 47.6% of the total population of Dushanbe in 1956 with only 18.9% Tajiks¹³⁴ Although Russians were not directly involved in the Tajikistan's civil war but raised the issue of their protection and thus the involvement of Russia¹³⁵ which resulted in the deployment of 21st Division of the Russian army in the Tajikistan (see next chapter). Ethnic Russians in Tajikistan were caught in the war. The bulk of Russian- speaking population in Tajikistan had taken an extremely negative position towards the "Demo-Islamists" and favored the communists not because Russia supported them, but also because they were perceived as a lesser evil. They had to choose between stability and violence, and the Russians supported the forces of stability, namely the so-called neo-communists. With the start of civil war, Russians started migrating. It was reported that in 1992 above 90,000 Russians had left Tajikistan.¹³⁶ The migration of Russians damaged the Tajik economy and stopped various other projects of economic development. While Russians continued to emigrate, the Tajik government tried to make them stay back in Tajikistan. A law was designed to encourage Russians to stay by

allowing them dual citizenship, however, due to the economic conditions, Russian migration continued. The small number of Russians that remained in Tajikistan did not have any political representation. There were a small number of organizations promoting cultural interests; therefore, protest was virtually nonexistent.¹³⁷ Now that Tajikistan had granted Russians the option of attaining dual citizenship to continue with Russian language education (for both Russians and Tajiks), and inclusion of Russians in government and business, there were no demands or complaints made by the Russians against the government.¹³⁸

The nature of power in Tajikistan blurred the boundaries between state and society. Institutions such as parliament and the judiciary lack genuine authority. The government tries to prove its legitimacy by holding elections, but real power at all levels of the state rests with informal clan networks. The country's 1994 Constitution does outline a political system based on pluralism and separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers but in practice, this is not implemented. Despite constitutional guarantees of transparency and access to information, the national legislature often drafts and discusses laws behind closed doors. Despite the collapse of communism, the party running Tajikistan has not really changed. To get in to civil service, favoritism still plays a vital role, and public administration is shaped by regionalism and clan politics. Large parts of the country, for example, are run by influential local people, who tax the country's cotton, metals, and narcotics trades.¹³⁹ The Constitution provides a variety of individual rights, including the freedom of privacy, assembly, speech, press, association,

and religion. It also bans discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, gender, and religion. However, government still suppresses the voice of opposition and bans independent media. During the height of the civil war in 1992 and 1993, there were thousands of extra judicial killings, the majority of which were done by government forces and their armed militant allies. Although much of the horror of the civil war ended with the signing of the 1997 Moscow Peace Accord, the government continues to violate human rights in a variety of ways; through the imprisonment of political activists and suspected radical Islamists belonging to opposition. Tajikistan's criminal code continues from the Soviet era. Though amended, it contains many of the flaws inherited from that period, including a basic assumption of one's guilt until proven innocent.¹⁴⁰ The government clearly uses the power of the police to arrest and harass opposition political party members, often by framing them for possession and smuggling of narcotics. In 2002, the government gave death sentences at an alarming rate of at least five per month.¹⁴¹ Even after ten years of independence, corruption, crime, and insecurity remain a hurdle in the smooth transition of post-Communism in Tajikistan. Drug trafficking is one of the most significant areas of crime in Tajikistan. Tajik government made some efforts to respond to Western criticism of human rights violations in the country.¹²⁸ but the repression continues in Tajikistan, and the government appears to be using the U.S.-led war on terrorism as a pretext for the systematic persecution of its political opponents. This kind of situation failed to create sense of security and belonging to a nation state among its citizens.

NOTES

1. The idea was taken from James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty*, Oxford: Westview press, 1991.
2. As low as 25.4 percent among Turkmen, 29.7 percent among Kirghiz, 29.6 percent among Tajiks, 49.3 percent among Uzbeks and 52.3 percent among the Kazakhs during 1979 census. See K. Warikoo, "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia*, New Delhi: South Asian publishers (pvt) ltd, 1992, p. 66. A 1969 comparative study of selected periodicals in Muslim areas shows that those printed in the vernacular languages had been exceeding their Russian language counterparts in circulation growth rates, reversing the earlier Russifying trends. By 1970 the Uzbek, Tajik, Kazakh, Azerbaijan, Kirgiz, and Turkmen SSRs alone were publishing 132 journals and 477 newspapers in their own languages with combined circulation of 6.6 and 7.5 million respectively. See James Critchlow, op.cit.
3. Ibid.
4. Devendra Kaushk, "Cultural Aspects of Soviet Nationalities Policy in Central Asia", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., Ibid., p. 129.
5. Ibid.
6. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, Vol. 35, No. 7-8, July 1989, pp. 3825 - 26.
7. Leninabad reverted to its old name of Khojend, Stalinabad to Dushanbe. Highest mountain is no longer called Communism Peak but Qullai Ismoili Somoní, after a Tajik hero. Idea was taken from, James Critchlow, op.cit.

8. Anaita Khudonazar, *The Other*,
<http://www.google.com.pk/search?hl=en&q=Anaita+khudonazar%3A+The+others&meta=>
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. first are the writers of 1920 who laid foundation of the Tajik history and were still linked with the pre- revolutionary period (such as Sadriddin Aini and Abulkosym Lohuti). Other were more nationalist writers such as Fitrat, Sadri Ziye, and Rashid Abdullo they were considered enemies of the state by the government. Third category is of those writers and poets who came during the Soviet period and acted as representative of the state.
11. Ibid.
12. By the mid-1980s, more than 1,600 libraries were operating in Tajikistan. In 1990 Tajikistan had twenty-seven museums and fourteen theaters in 1990. There are theaters for music, musical comedy, and drama in several other Tajik cities as well. Films are shown in theaters in Tajikistan's cities and in villages on an irregular basis. By 1990's, video and audiocassettes became increasingly popular sources of entertainment, as well as a means of disseminating information outside government control.
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/tajikistan/SOCIETY.html
13. Kirill Nourzhanov, 'The politics of history in Tajikistan: reinventing the Samanids', *Harvard Asia. Quarterly*, Vol 5, No 1, Winter 2001,
<http://www.google.com.pk/search?hl=en&q=The+politics+of++history+in+Tajikistan%3A+Reinventing+the+samanids&meta=>

14. Ibid.
15. Anaita Khudonazar, *op.cit.*
16. Ibid. Sobir uses the heroic warriors of Iranian epic, Rustam and Suhrob (from Abulkhosim Firdousi *Shahname*, written at the end of 9th and beginning of 10th century), to remind contemporary Tajiks about the unbreakable links with their famous predecessors.
17. Ibid. He was a member of political club Darafshi Kovien as well as the national patriotic movement Rastokhez
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Muriel Atkin, "Religious, National and Other Identities in Central Asia", in Jo-Ann Gross, *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity*, London: Duke University Press, 1992, p.53.
21. The indigenous cadres believed that their region makes a much greater contribution to Soviet national income than that had been depicted in the official statistics. Also price-setting methods were not favorable for Central Asia. In their view, Moscow's methods of calculating national income and inter regional economic relations place Central Asia at a disadvantage and the significant role that Central Asia played in the economy of the USSR was not admitted. Rahid Rakhimov, director of the Institute of Economies at the Tajik Academy of Sciences, said that. Boris Z Rumer, "Central Asia's Cotton Economy and Its Costs", in William Fierman, ed., *Soviet Central Asia: The failed Transformation*,

- boulder: Westview press, 1991. K. warikoo, "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., op.cit., p. 74.
22. James Critchlow, op.cit., p. 66.
23. TajikistanSociety,
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/tajikistan/SOCIETY.html
24. Ibid.
25. Alexandre Bennigsen, "Islam in Retrospect", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1989, p. 90.
26. K. Warikoo, "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., op. cit. p.71
27. Ibid., pp. 70 – 71.
28. Internal affairs and 7 economic ministries were shifted to the republic level. In 1965, 8 more ministries e.g education, social security, public order and 5 economic ministries were classified as republican. But to have a check, in administrative sphere, an all - Turkistan party Bureau was created in 1961 as a kind of organizational umbrella over the party organization of the Central Asian republics. See Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakistan under Soviet Rule", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 2, No.1, September 1986, p. 36. Also see Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia*, London: C.Hurst and Company, 1982, pp. 127 – 129.
29. Ibid., pp. 129 – 130.

30. The first sign of this was in 1983 when Rashidov, first secretary of Uzbek communist party, committed suicide because he realized that he was about to be disgraced by public revelation of his "Mafias" wide spread corruption. Ibid., pp. 95 – 96.
31. Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, "Civil War in Tajikistan: Genesis and Impacts on the Region", in K.M. Asaf and Abul Barakat, *Central Asia, Internal and External Dynamics*, Islamabad Pan Graphics (Pvt.) Ltd. 1997. Also see Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*, Karachi; Oxford University press, 1994, see chapter 7.
32. Opposition demanded the removal of the President, dissolution of parliament and fresh elections, banning of the CPT, nationalization of it's asserts.
33. K. Warikoo, "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., op. cit. p.78.
34. Barnet R. Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan", *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Winter 1993-94, p.77.
35. Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, op.cit., p.159. Also see Ahmed Rashid, op.cit. Soyuz nado sokhrani, Pravada, 12 December 1991, p1. cited in Shahram Akbarzadeh, " why Did Nationalism Fail In Tajikistan?", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 7, 1996. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3955/is_n7_v48/ai_19226485/.
37. Ibid.

38. Allen Hetmanek, "Islamic Revolution and Jihad came to the Former Soviet Central Asia: The case of Tajikistan" *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1993, pp.361-368. Also see *Central Asian Brief*, No.2, 1992.
39. . The Demonstrators were mainly from the Gorno-Badakhshan home region of M. Navzhuvanov. It was charged that he was removed because he was a minority Pamiri from Gorno-Badakhistan. Supporter of Rastokhez, Democratic Party and IRP joined the demonstrators. *Central Asian Brief*, No.2, 1992
40. Ahmed Rashid, op. cit., p.175.
41. This was interim till the new constitution was adopted and fresh elections held. Opposition were given half the seats in the parliament, Davlat Usman an official of the IRP, was named as Deputy Prime Minister and Nabiev as President. *Central Asia Brief, No. 2, 1992* and Allen Hetmanek, op. cit., p.368.
42. Opposition accepted Nabiev as president. Ahmed Rashid, op. cit., p.176.
43. Barnet R. Rubin, op.cit., p.78.
44. Bess A. Brown, "The Civil War in Tajikistan 1992-1993" in Mohammad Reza Djalili, Mohammad , Frederic Grare and Shrin Akiner, ed. , *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence*, Great Britain: TJ International, 1998, p.91.
45. Shahram Akbarzadeh, op.cit.
46. Barnet R. Rubin, op. cit., p.78.

47. Ghulam Sarwar "Civil War in Tajikistan", *Pakistan Observer*, 17 December 1992.
48. Yuri Zarakhovich, "We are all scared", *Times International*, 22 February 1993, p.27.
49. Bess A. Brown, op. cit., p.92.
50. Imamali Rakhmanov main supporter came from People's Front Forces, Uzbeks of Hissar and leaders of the north.
51. Dr. Samina Ahmad, "The Political Implications of Ethnicity in Central Asia", *Regional Studies*, Vol. xiii, No.2 Spring 1995, p.34.
52. Narodnaya gazeta, 28 March 1992, p1.cited in Shahram Akbarzadeh, op.cit.
53. B.Brown, "Tajik Opposition To Be Banned ", RFE/RL, Research Report, 2,33,20 August 1993., p23. Cited in Keith Martin, "Regional and Religious Politics in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan: Some Preliminary Notes, www.demokratizatsiya.org/Dem%20Archives/DEM%2005-03%20martin.pdf
54. Central Asia Brief, No. 3, 1993, p.5.
55. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol.39, No.1 January 1993, p.39272.
56. Steven Levine, "Tajik Civil War May Convulse Central Asia", *Dawn*, 7 February 1993.

57. Central Asia Brief, No. 5, 1993. Also see M. Ilyas Khan, "Tajikistan: The Centre Stage of Regional Conflict", *The News*, 29 July 1993.
58. Democratic leaders fled to Moscow and the Baltic republics, while IRP leadership including Haji Akbar Turanjonzoda, Davlat Usman and Mohammed Sharif Himatzada took refuge in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. See Dr. Samina Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p.346.
59. Rashid Rakhimov, et.al., *Republic of Tajikistan: Human Development Report 1995*, (Istanbul 1995), p., 51. Cited in Keith Martin, "Regional and Religious Politics in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan: Some Preliminary Notes, *op.cit.*
60. Moonis Ahmar "Tajikistan's Transition to Stability" *The News*, 28 September 1994.
61. Ahmad Rashid, "Central Asia Struggle to Create New Political Culture", *Dawn*, 11 March 1995.
62. Devendra Kanshik, "The Central Asian Republics: The Balance Sheet of a Decade of Ozodi" *Eurasian Studies*, 20 Summer 2001, p.17.
63. *The Nation*, 27 February 1995.
64. *Daily Digest*, 10nov 1994 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 February 1995., cited in Shahram Akbarzadeh., *op.cit.*
65. UTO consisted of Rastokhez, DPT, Lal-e-Badakhshan, and IRP

66. First round (5-15 April in Moscow), Second round (18 – 25 June 1994 in Tehran), Third round (20 October – 1 November 1994 in Islamabad), Fourth round (22 May – 1 June 1995 in Alma-Ata), Fifth round (3-24 November 1995, 26 January - 18 February, 8 - 21 July 1996 in Ashkhabad); Sixth round (5 January – 19 February 1997 in Mashhad and Tehran); Seventh round (26 February - 9 March 1997 in Moscow); Eighth round (9 April - 28 May in Tehran).

Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Tajikistan,
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/tajikistan/tajik_gen_agree_19970627.html

67. Protocol on main principles of establishment of peace and national accord; Protocol on political issues; Protocol “On the main functions and authorities of the National Reconciliation Committee; Provision “On the National Reconciliation Committee; Protocol On the main functions and authorities of the National Reconciliation Committee; Protocol on military issues; Protocol on the refugees; Protocol on the guarantees of the implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Reconciliation in Tajikistan. Main mechanism of the implementation of the General Agreement was National Reconciliation Committee (NRC), which consisted of 26 members – Government of the RT and UTO represented 13 members each. The Chairman of NRC became the UTO Leader Sayeed Abullo Nuri and Deputy Chairman Abdulmajid Dostiev, Deputy Speaker of Majlisi Oli. The NRC consisted of four sub-committees: on military, political, juridical and refugee issues. Ibid.

68. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9970997/Tajik>
<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Tajik>. See Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1962, pp. 42-43. Oliver Roy, *Tajikistan*, Report for US Institute of Peace, 1993.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid. Also see <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Tajik>
71. Davlat Khudonazar, The Conflict in Tajikistan: Question of Regionalism, in Roland Z.Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, *Central Asia Conflict, Resolution And Change*, Maryland: CPSS Press, 1995, p.249.
72. Ibid. Also see Lawrence Krader, *op.cit.*, p. 162.
73. Persian speaking areas of eastern Bukhara along with the district of Kurgan Tyube were amalgamated with Uzbekistan in 1924. Anaita Khudonazar, *op.cit.*
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/53/index-f.html>. Also based on discussion with Dr. Ahmed Hassan Dani.
78. Ahmed Rashid, *op. cit.*
79. Lawrence Krader, *op.cit.*
80. Sergei Gretskey, *op. cit.*, p.230.
81. Shahrbanu Tadjbakhsh, "National Reconciliation: The Imperfect Whim", *Central Asia Survey*, Vol.15, No.3/4, 1996, p.336.

82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. *International monetary Fund Economic review: Tajikistan*, Washington DC: IMF, May 1992, p. 2.
85. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadjikistan*, London: The John Hopkin Press, 1970, p. 33.
86. Ibid., p. 57.
87. As they were not prepared to work in the heat of tropical valleys also they thought of themselves as foreigner in their own country as they brought their own culture, tradition, customs, with them and kept them unchanged. Based on discussion with Dr. Dani.
88. Shahrano Tadjbakhsh, op. cit., p.336.
89. Since 1946 all the general secretaries of the CP were from north. (Bobojon Gafour 1946-56, Tursunbai Uljabaiev 1956-61, Jabar Rasulq 1961-81, Rahman Nabiev 1981-85, and K Makhamov 1985-1991).
90. Anaita Khudonazar, op.cit.
91. Kozim Abdurahmanov, "socio economic Situation in Khojend", in *Asia Plus Bulletin*, 10 Dec 1996. Cited in Keith Martin, op.cit. Ludmila Chuyr, "Central Asia's Tajiks: Self identification and Ethnic Identity", in Vitaly Naumkin, *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia*, UK Ithaca Press Reading,

1993,p.246.<http://www.international-relations.com/wbeurasia/WBEA-2003-Lec4.htm>. Also see also <http://www.international-relations.com/wbeurasia/WBEA-2003-Lec4.htm>

93. Valentin I.Bushkov, "The population of Northern Tajikistan Between 1870 and 1990", in Vital Naumkin, ed., *Ibid.*, pp. 224.
94. *Ibid.*, pp. 252 – 257
95. Muriel Atkin, "Religious, National and Other Identities in Central Asia" in Jo Ann Gross, *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions and Identity and Change*, London: Duke University Press, 1992, pp. 59-60.
96. TajikistanSociety,
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/tajikistan/SOCIETY.html
97. As dynasty, tribe, religion etc but not by the criteria of the nation state. Muriel Atkin, *op.cit.*
98. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
99. Ludmila Chvyr, *op.cit.*
100. Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Islamic Awakening" *Current History*, Vol. 93, No.582, April 1994, p. 151.
101. Matthias Siegfried, Country Risk Profile 2001: Precarious Peace in Tajikistan,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/research/pub/public_house/fast/corp/2001/siegfried_01.htm.

102. In 1992 the DPT and its allies held 52 days anti govt rally in Dushanbe. When the party was formed, it called for the Tajik Sovereignty. After independence party aims at protecting the freedom of the people. The party keeps in touch with other democratic reformists and seeks cooperation with all the sections of society who favour reforms. Thus DPT decided to get the support of ulemas who favoured the democratic reforms. *Central Asian Muslims (Urdu)*, March-April 1993, pp.18-19.
103. Mavlon Makhamov, "Islam and the Political Development of Tajikistan After 1985" in Hafeez Malik, ed., *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*, York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, p.197.
104. Ibid.
105. Ahmad Hassan Dani, *New Light on Central Asia*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1993, p.120.
106. Mavlon Makhamov, op. cit., p.202.
107. Matthias siegfried, Country Risk Profile 2001: Precarious Peace in Tajikistan, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/research/pub/public/house/fast/corp/2001/siegfried_01.htm).
108. Formed in 1991 by Pamir Akber Sikandarov, a party leader became the speaker of the Tajik parliament and then acting president after the removal of Rahman Nabiev.
109. *Central Asian Muslims*, March-April 1993, pp.18-19.

110. Ibid.
111. Mavlon Makhamov, op. cit., p.202.
112. Waheed Ahmad Siddiqui, *Muslims of Central Asia* (Urdu), March-April 1993, pp.20-21.
113. Sally N. Cummings, *Power and Change in Central Asia*, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 100-102.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Sergei Gretsky "Civil war in Tajikistan Causes, Developments and Prospects for Peace", in Roald Z. Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, ed, *Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change*, New York: CPSS Press, 1995, p.219.
117. Ibid., p. 220.
118. Barnet R. Rubin, op. cit., p.77.
119. Shameem Akhtar "Tajikistan on the Brink", *Dawn*, 11 November, 1992.
120. Sergei Gretsky, op. cit., p.225.
121. He is a Kulyabi and Rakhmanov's first Deputy.

122. Sergei Gretskey, op. cit., p.226. Abdumalik Abdullojuver, a Khojendi Prime Minister was removed. Mayor of Khojendi heads of provincial KGB and Interior Departments, Provincial Prosecutor were sacked. Kulyabs replaced all of them
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. When Kulyabis came to power in 1993, Hissaris were excluded from the power sharing process. Their demand of Hissar province has been not materialized. Similarly a Kulyabi killed Laqais leader Faizali Saodov. Association of Laqais of Tajikistan demanded recognition as separate ethnic group and a share in power cake. These demands were not met

[126http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/nit/inc_country_detail.cfm?page=47
&nit=284&year=2003&pf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/nit/inc_country_detail.cfm?page=47&nit=284&year=2003&pf)

127. Ahmed Rashid, op. cit.
128. Uzzbek mostly settled in Leninabad Oblast, Hissar Valley, Kurgan Tyube, Regar
129. Shahram Akbarzadeh, op.cit.
130. Charles Underland and Nicolas Piaff, *The Central Asia: Fragments of Empire: Magnets of Wealth*, New York: The Asian Society, 1994, p.58.
131. Martha Brill Olcott, op. cit.
132. Shahrano Tadjbakhsh, op. cit.

133. Moonis Ahmar, "The New Political Order in Central Asia" *Third World*, January 1994.
134. Shahrbanu Tadjbakhsh, op. cit. p.336
135. Rajan Menon and Henri J. Barkey, "The Transformation of Central Asia: Implication for Regional and International Security", *Survival*, Vol. 34, No.4, Winter 1992-93, p.71.
136. *Ibid.*
137. <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=70201>
138. *Ibid.*
139. *Ibid.*
140. .A seminal case in Tajikistan was that of the 1999 arrest, detention, and death of Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, the brother of exiled opposition member Abdumalik Abdullojonov, on trumped-up narcotics possession charges. http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/nit/inc_country_detail.cfm?page=47&nit=284&year=2003&pf
141. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER FOUR

ISLAM IN TAJIKISTAN

As discussed in second chapter, the early history of Tajikistan reveals two issues: their ethnic composition and acceptance of present name. Tajiks are the descendants of earlier Persian speaking people. It was in the 19th century that a geographer Ujfly differentiated Persians from Khorasan and people from other origins sold as slaves in Khiva, Bukhara and Samarkand.¹ The main identities were based on family, kinship and religious and language affiliations were the weakest one. It was after the Arab invasion and introduction to Islam that the scenario started to change and religion became the main source of identity. While discussing the identity issue in Central Asia V. Barthold divided the Tajik identities on religion, geography and tribe.² In the beginning the general population did not take religion as an identity and also according to the modern theory Ummah was not considered as a nation. Muslims differentiated from others by referring to them selves as 'we Muslims' and others by 'Those Christians'. It was after the revolution that Islam was considered as a national identity.

The Russian government took decisive and calculated measures so that a strong Soviet state with a firm structure of society could be formed.³ Due to this religion became a target of all the anti- religious campaigns. The total cutoff of Central Asia from the Muslim Ummah resulted in review of Islam within the Muslims of Central Asia. Despite the Government claims that all the tribal and religious groups were eradicated or were on the

verge of extinction, still strong signs of existence of these groups were felt in late 1980s and early 1990s. According to Hickson⁴ historically speaking Tajik identity is Islamic identity and it plays a vital role in not only defining Tajiks to themselves but also how outsiders identify them.

4.1 *Manifestation of Islamic Resurgence*

As discussed before Islamic revivalism doesn't mean that Islam had completely disappeared and had now emerged. It meant that after going through different phases i.e. various theories, ideologies and systems the Muslims turned back to Islam, which proved the fact that Islam is the reality in today's world. Islam is a part of Tajik culture and is practiced in all the aspects of everyday life i.e. from birth to marriage to the funerals. Islamic resurgence in Tajikistan manifested at three levels.

It is observed that in Tajikistan among grass roots level awareness regarding religion is increasing. Masses preferred wearing religious clothes, have a beard or any other external attribute of Islam which showed their identity as Muslims. It is the same for the traditional rituals. Nikah is preferred over registration same is the case for divorce.⁵ During Soviet rule lot of young people's interest turned towards religious education, since there was no formal religious education the students invited clerics or scholars them selves to learn about religion. Such initiatives prevailed throughout the country but its impact was different in each area. Especially in Isfara, Mastchah, Dushanbe, Kofarnikhon, Karategin, Fayzabad, Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube presence of

religious education was more. Mosques were built by donations and were managed by a prominent religious figure and other followers who were wealthy.⁶ One of the important sources of Islamic resurgence was the publication of literature and religious programs by the government. The demand of terminating un-Islamic law and implementation of Shariat by opposition and some government officials is also an important factor of Islamic resurgence. The government through such steps tried to calm down the opposition⁷. Because for the opposition religion was the main source of nation building⁸. An opposition leader Abdullo Saidov not only gave the proposal for a separate Muslim state but also called for a fight in the name of a separate Muslim establishment. He also presented his demand to the CPSU 27 congress in 1986 for which he was arrested, his arrest cause huge wave of unrest and demonstrations were held. Such incidents showed the support of masses towards their leaders⁹. After independence there is no Muftiate in Tajikistan but an Islamic Center which is not a part of the government structure but is still controlled by them. It is led by a Council of Ulema which consists of 27 official Muslim leaders who are elected after every three years. One of the key roles of the Islamic Council is to control and manage all the Islamic organizations in Tajikistan¹⁰. This is how government help people to understand Islam. Even though the Council existed but the Muslim leaders demanded for a Muftiate so that there would be a more powerful institution through which Muslim rights would be asserted. But the government was hesitant as this would create another power to stand against them¹¹. The policy of the government to encourage the growth of other religious leaders in any way they could and to put restrictions on the Islamic clerics is not plausible. But many officials cleric aree happy with the present system because it gave

them freedom to practice their own religion and its custom's. In return all they have to do is to show loyalty to the state. They have more freedom than the Imams of Uzbekistan for instance they are not instructed to what to talk about at the Friday Sermons¹².

After the resurgence of Islam and the removal of the Soviet control that the Tajik leaders were able to question the authority of the state. The Islamists have given their own point of view of the situation; it is during the anti government demonstrations in 1992 that the opposition used Islam as their ideology throughout their campaign. The green flag, the usage of Arabic alphabets, quotation from Quran, slogans borrowed from the Islamic revolution in Iran all pointed out the main philosophy of the conflict¹³. It was in March 1991 that a prominent religious leader Haji Akbar Turanzhonzoda Suggested some changes to support the Tajik's Islamic character¹⁴ but the parliament refused to recognize the Islamic identity with in Tajikistan and his suggestions were not considered he was defeated by 110 to 84 votes¹⁵. Due to this incident he left the parliament and joined the opposition group. Government supporters also carried out demonstrations at Azadi Sqaure which soon became a permanent compound for the government supporters¹⁶. Joining of Haji Turanjonzada gave the opposition a boost in the political scenario and it became more stabilized. Most of the parties used Islam to gain more power¹⁷ which resulted in unpredictable consequences. To maintain its power and control over the state Nabiev's government exploited religion, because Nabiev thought that if the current government was exterminated and the fundamentalists came in power then Tajikistan development in all fields of life would decline. He made efforts in convincing everyone

that Islamic radicals were responsible for the political crisis and they are the ones who want to create an Islamic state like Iran¹⁸. He had already cautioned other parties that his dismissal would be a threat to all the nearby states¹⁹. But still he lost which took Tajikistan in to a state of decline. After five years of dispute among the communist and the Islamists a peace agreement was signed according to which the communists had to share power with the Islamists.

4.2 Survival Of Islam In Tajikistan

4.2.1 *Internal Factors*

The question that arises is that how has Islam been able to survive under the Soviet rule? This can be answered by two factors; Internal and external factors. In 1943 when Islam was established officially it had an indirect effect on the Islam which had survived the rule of Soviet Union. According to some scholars Islam and Marxist-Leninist ideology can coexist i.e., it is possible to be a loyal Soviet citizen and a good Muslim. Formally the official job of Islam was to print Quran, religious literature, calendars, hadiths, etc. The government had its own, Soviet East, magazine, published in Uzbek, Arabic, Persian, English, and French.²⁰ The head of the spiritual administration; the mufti of Tashkent frequently talked about the misunderstanding of the religion Islam in Russia but the Muslims who were a part of the Russian system did not see any difference between Islam and communism. So most of the masses in Tajikistan as elsewhere in Central Asia followed the Mullahs who belonged to the government.

One of the important parts of survival of Islam is the unofficial Islam which is based on Sufism and Mullahs who have appointed them selves as leaders they do not focus on the Mosques but are found in other holy places shrines etc. In 1987 it was reported that against the 130 official registered mosques there were not less than 1000 illegal mosques ²¹. An official estimate of late 80s also showed that there were nearly 150 unofficial Islamic practitioners in Kulyab, of Southern Tajikistan ²². These followers consisted of peasants, rural and urban populations, communist party members, youth intellectuals etc. The branch of Sufism which is popular in Tajikistan is Naqshbandi with followers like Domullo Mukhammadi, Domullo Hikmatullo, Maksumi Ismoil etc. But Qadiri order is also popular in some areas. Prominent religious figures such as Ishani Turajan, Ishani Abdulhaliljon, Ishani Nuriddin and others are followers of Qadiriya. Since the Sufi movements did not have many disputes with the government they were able to survive the Soviet rule. Sufism was popular among the masses and had a huge following this was because people had little respect and believe in the government appointed clerics and took Sufism as the true representatives of Islam. Sufis played a major role in safeguarding the rituals and practices of Islam. All modern Islamic leaders like Nuri and Turanjonsada agree that Sufis were able to keep Islam alive and pass it on to the contemporary leaders.²³ They played a vital role in preserving Islam and even today, they have a very big influence.

Cultural practices such as birth, marriages, deaths fasting Eids etc are also one of the reasons of survival of Islam in Tajikistan. In 1987 during the month of Ramzan in

Tajikistan majority of the students of Dushanbe Secondary Schools observed fast, in school No. 88, the vast majority of children observed fast. In school No. 89 more than 50 percent in every class were fasting. In secondary school No. 46, two fifty of the pupils in the 5th class stopped attending schools from the first day of Ramzan and were absent for two weeks.²⁴ According to Ashirov a soviet ethnographer "he who is not circumcised is not an Uzbek (or a Turkeman or a Tajik)".²⁵ Same is the case in death and burial rituals, such rituals have influenced the social awareness and increased support for religious and nationalist prejudices.²⁶ Similarly the Eid holidays have had positive influence on the youth and have helped in keeping the religious spirit alive. The important source of information about Islam can be obtained from the family. According to a scholar Muriel Atkin it is the family which is a major source of information about religion for the child. It has been observed that in Tajikistan also family is the major source of a child's religious upbringing²⁷. They pass the religious education further to their children and are determined to see their next generation as true followers of Islam²⁸. This makes the government work to suppress the religious education of youth even more challenging. It was observed that following of Islamic traditions interfered in the government policy and was a hindrance in building a Soviet society in Tajikistan. According to some surveys conducted in 1988 45 percent population considered themselves as believers.²⁹

Increase in local population of Central Asia is also another reason for the survival of Islam. Due to the rise in fertility rate of the native Muslims and the migration of Europeans and Russians from Central Asia Muslim population started to increase. During 1959 to 1979

percentage of Russian population reduced from 13.3 percent to 10.4 percent in Tajikistan and according to the census figures of 1989, the Russian population reduced by 2.1 percent in Tajikistan. Due to this the local population increased from 53.1 percent in 1959 and then to 62.3 percent in 1989.³⁰ One of the other factors was the differences in annual average of population growth. The birth rate in 1977 in Tajikistan was 37 per thousand; in 1987, it reached to 42 per thousand. 30 percent of Tajik families had five or six children, while 15 percent of families had ten or more children. These figures should be compared with the average number of children in Russian families, which was only one per family.³¹

Apart from all these factors Islam itself is the major cause of its survival, it is a complete code of life for the Muslims covering all the aspects. It is not only for this world but also for the world after death. It is the faith in the religion which keeps the soul of Islam alive in its believers. Its Iman, faith that keep Muslim a firm believer, told Saadi, a Pamiri Tajik. Beside these important internal indicators for the survival of Islam in Tajikistan, there are also some external dimensions.

4.2.2 *External Factors*

Beside internal there are external factors that help Islam to retain its following in Tajikistan. Islamic revival was particularly strongly felt in the southern areas of Tajikistan due to the spill over effects of Khomeini's revolution and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.(see Islamic radicalism in Tajikistan) Foreigners, especially those from Muslim countries played an important role in the survival of Islam in the country. As told

by Dr Dani that during his visit to Tajikistan, he met a person while offering his prayer in a local mosque, at Karategin. When that person came to know that Dr Dani was from Pakistan, he requested a copy of holy Quran from him. He also asked him questions related to Islam and the way of living in Pakistan. He took Dr. Dani to his home and showed him the secret underground room where Quran and religious education was taught to the children.

4.3 *Islamic Radicalism In Tajikistan*

As discussed earlier Islamic resurgence is not a new phenomenon. It has different forms that have engrossed the Muslim world and has the same impact on the Muslims of Central Asia. The first wave of Islamic resurgence manifested itself in the form of revival. In 1898 one of the most important revivalist movement by Sufi brotherhood of Naqshbandi emerged in Turkistan in which jihad was declared against the opposition. The main aim behind this revolt was to keep religion alive in the area; one of the other reasons given was the foreign element i.e. due to the revivalist movement and rebels the Islamic resurgence accelerated. Naqshbandi and other Sufis also played an important role in it.³² Mohammad Ali also started advocating against Russia after he returned from Saudi Arabia under the influence of wahhabism³³. This movement did not continue for long and was crushed by the Russians.

In the mid of 19th century some unsuccessful attempts to revive the struggle was made which was followed by a reformists campaign. It was noticed that Muslims took

scientific knowledge from the Russians.³⁴ The end of the 19th century in Tajikistan can also be taken as the time period when cultural thinking was restored. It was at this time that the school of enlightenment was founded in Boukhara by Ahmad Donish a Tajik thinker (1826-1897). This was the start of the revival of national, religious and political thinking.³⁵ A renowned historical scholar and a politician Ahmad Donish also known as Tajik Muslim reformer based most of his work on Islam thinking he used a lot of references from the Quran, hadith in his writings. Secondly he took a lot of inspiration from Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980-1037), al-Farabi (870-950), al-Biruni(973-1048), al-Ghazali(1058-1111).³⁶ His third inspiration was the Western influence. Since he was sent to Russian thrice as a member of the Bukharian Embassy he has quoted many examples of development there in his work. The fourth reason was the difficult socio economic situation faced by the country. Therefore most of the Islamic ideology of the Tajik people at the end of the 19th and early 20th is associated with Ahmad Donish.³⁷ In the start of the 20th century, the Jadid School of thinking was born it was considered as the second generation of Tajik enlighteners and reformers. The Jadid movement was a systematic movement and was based on organizational forms, programs, and modern approaches to the solution of social and political problems. Some of the prominent representatives of the movement were Mahmudkhoja Behbudi (killed 1918), Abdurrauf Fitrat (killed in 1938), Sadriddin Ayni (1878-1954), Munzim, Fayzullo Khjayev (killed in 1938), Abduqadir Muhiddinov (killed in 1938), and others.³⁸

The end term of the Soviet Union rule is also termed as the time period of Islamic revivalism, which can be seen in all the aspects of life. It was at this time that development in the educational sector regarding religion was seen and in Dushanbe alone dozens of private religious schools appeared.³⁹ The role of the schools can be explained with a help of an example; in the Silk Factory quarter of Dushanbe, there was a private school run by Haji Muhammadjan Hindustani (1895-1989). When he faced repression from the Russians he went to India for education and came in 1950s with education in religion from a Masrassa in Deobandi. His school mostly catered those people who already had some religious back ground.⁴⁰

Due to Gorbachov's policy of perestroika there was sudden interest in Islam in Central Asia this was the time period when Islam was reviving. The revival of Islam was due to various factors; Islam reemerged in a new shape in Central Asia and was labeled as radical Islam, extreme Islam, militant Islam or fundamentalists. This new dimension of Islam was not the outcome of Islam in Central Asia but was due to the external factors. According to Alexandre Bennigsen the mid 1980s was marked "in Central Asia by a double evolution".⁴¹ At first an extensive religious revival emerged on three levels: the grass root level, the middle level and the higher level. The second trend was an important radicalization of local nationalism. In late 80s, the Alma-Ata uprising in December 1986 and the Kurgan Tyube riots in February 1987, were the sign of development of nationalist movement. Thus native Muslims started conflicting with the government resulting in inter cultural struggle.⁴² Both these trends were due to two external factors and

their origin goes back to early 1980s. According to A. Bennigsen, Islamic resurgence in Tajikistan and in the whole Central Asia is the after effects of the Iranian revolution and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.⁴³ Ayatollah Khomeini adopted two strategies for the Islamic revolution:

1. Usage of mass media to spread Islam.
2. To provoke religious sentiments in vulnerable areas.

In 1984 Iran started its religious campaign in Central Asia and powerful broadcast stations were established along the borders which broadcasted religious and anti Soviet programs. The programs mainly constituted of religious information regarding Islamic customs, ideology and anti soviet programs regarding political nature.⁴⁴ In 1984 - 85 a survey was conducted among the radio listeners and it was discovered that Tajik listeners preferred the Asian broadcast rather than that from the West. It was also observed that religious programs were more in demand than the regular programs.⁴⁵ The impact of Iran in Tajikistan was so much that people had started to name their newborns 'Ayatollah'. The religious audio video literature smuggled from across the border was in high demand among the public. According to the Director of Tajikistan's House of Atheism, M. Safarov, "fighters for the purity of Islam, which he assess as the most acute and vital... of all our problems, some times call themselves Wahhabis and some times partisans of Khomeini".⁴⁶ The Iranian influence on masses changed their perception regarding Islam and Mullahs not working for the government started campaigning for an Iranian type

government in Tajikistan.⁴⁷ Due to this public started demanding religious rights and also activated demonstrations in cities, particularly in Dushanbe and Alma-Ata.⁴⁸

Though Iranian influence had an impact on the Central Asian but it was the Afghan Mujhahideen who had greater impact this was because the Afghan Mujhaeedin practically proved it that Soviet army could be confronted and defeated. It was in 80s when the Russian rule sent the Central Asian Muslims, including Tajiks, to fight with Afghan Mujahiddens. This was a golden opportunity for them because it gave them a reason to get to know the rest of the Muslim countries because more Muslim states like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran had joined the Afghan forces. Apart from this many Tajik and Uzbek Muslims traveled to Pakistan and Saudia Arabia to get war training and joined the Islamic forces. It's not only that Muslims were active in taking part in Jihad but USA also supported Muslims to fight with Afghan Mujahiddens.⁴⁹ It was after three generation of isolation that Central Asians came in contact with the Muslim Ummah. Tajikistan was more affected by the happenings in Afghanistan because it shares the largest border with Afghanistan which results in more political and religious exposure. Also in 1970 Mujhaideen started to come across the border in Tajikistan which resulted in more contact between the Muslims of both the sides. This is one of the reason that Islamists arrested in 1986 were youth like Asghar Sha, Nematullah Inayatov, of Kulyab, Abdul rahim karimov, of khojend, Rajab Ali of Dushanbe.⁵⁰ Soon the Soviet government realized that radical Islam was gaining more power day by day in Tajikistan. So it decided to hold an International Conference and Thirty Muslim delegations came for it. In addition to this

the Soviet Media also increased programs on religion Islam. But all these efforts by the state failed as it reminded people of the Basmachi Movement, which their predecessors had tried to avoid. Soon the public started comparing the Basmachi and Afghan resistance. In addition, the cruelties committed by Soviets on Afghans were also the reason for changing the Liberal Islam into militant Islam,⁵¹ in Afghanistan. It was the militant Islam, which had an impact on Tajikistan. The relationship between the Tajikistan Islamists and the Afghani Mujahideen. The contacts between the Tajikistan Islamists and Afghan Mujahideen flourished during jihad and the struggle against the Najibullah and Soviet Union continued. Most of the support to the Islamists came from the areas near Afghanistan. Thus Afghanistan became the main point for the Islamic revolutionist especially for the Central Asians.⁵² The fall of the government in Afghanistan gave hope to the opposition in Tajikistan. Soon after the collapse in Afghanistan the government in Tajikistan agreed to give in to the demands of the opposition that is of elections and new constitutions, this situation helped the opposition to strengthen their stance..⁵³ Most of the support of Islamic opposition had come from the areas contiguous to Afghanistan.

The collapse of the Afghani government to the Taliban was a big shock to the Central Asia and the states there decided to support the anti Taliban alliance. Taliban's capture of Mizare Sharif was so great that one western diplomat remarked, "Taliban might be attempted to pursue Massoud inside Tajikistan- that is the danger"⁵⁴ The anti Taliban alliance in order to get support of the Tajik government held talks with them. The

Tajik government responded positively because they too were threatened by the Taliban control in north of Afghanistan which would also strengthen the Tajik government opposition since they received military trainings and arms support from there. This support helped in strengthening the Tajikistan's Islamic movement. The dispute opened opportunities for more militant groups such as the Hizbul-Tahrir and the IMU, to gain hold among Tajikistan's Muslims. Deobandism and Wahbaism also ceased the opportunity to strengthen their foothold in Tajikistan.

Deobandi an important Sunni sect emerged in India in the 19th century and one of its important contribution was the reintroduction of Jihad in the Sunni Islam. The Deobandhi training camps in Pakistan trained the Taliban for Jihad in the 90s. Mullah Muhammad Rustamov a student of Deoband had innovate ideads and opened madrassah at Dushanbe.⁵⁵ All the Tajik political and religious leaders like Said Abdullo Nouri, Muhammadsharif Himattsoda, Domullo Hikmatullo, Ishani Nuriddin, and Makhsumi Ismoil where his students and were trained there.⁵⁶ Said Abdullah Nuri and Muhammad Sharif Himattsoda, formed Islamic Renaissance Party branch in Tajikistan in 1991. The Tatar scholars who organized Muslims within the Soviet Union had established the all-Union IRP in June 1990 in Astrakhan, Russia. Under Gorbachev's glasnost the IRP registered as a political party. However, it was banned in the Central Asian republics and only the Tajik IRP continued to operate.⁵⁷

In the early days of civil war the IRP were considered the main opposition movement, this prompted Rashid to state that it was only Tajikistan IRP movement which was given a high stature.⁵⁸ The main aim of the party was to spread Islam and to establish an Islamic state. The leaders of the party traveled through out the world to look for support and this support gave the party an authenticity.⁵⁹ According to Rashid the Tajik Islamists are an exceptional group amongst militants groups in Central Asia because they are combination of various elements which represent the Central Asian Islam giving the group more legitimacy than 'other extreme radical groups.'⁶⁰ IRP attacked the government forces and Kulyabi militia from its bases in Karategin, Kurgan Tyube Tavildara valleys and Afghanistan turning the civil war in to a guerilla war.⁶¹ The defeat of Islamists in Tajikistan in 1992 led to a number of consequences. Firstly 2000000 Tajiks migrated to Afghanistan and the party established bases in north of Afghanistan, Kunduz and Talogan. Thirdly the tajik refugees were trained and sent back to fight, now Afghanistan was directly involved in the power struggle going on in Tajkistan. The leaders of the party traveled to various countries seeking support and the Tajik dispute soon became an international issue. In 1997 a peace settlement was made and soon after that the influence of IRP declined. The losses acquired during the civil war were too great for the party and these caused disagreement and disputes amongst the party leaders. Many IRP commanders refused to join government and preferred to join Juma Namangani, an Uzbek leader.⁶²

The main reason behind the decline of the party was the general feeling about the party among the masses. People thought that the party was no longer working for the Islamic cause nor were interested in solving the problems faced by the Muslims. The disillusioned members of IRP formed Adolat with Islamic revolution being its main aim. Militant underground groups like, Tauba (Repentance), Islam Lashkarlary (Fighters for Islam), Hizb-I-Islami (Party of Islam)⁶³ decreased the popularity of IRP. Another popular radical movement in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT). Even though this movement belonged to the Middle East it had the largest support of any Central Asian Islamist movement. As stated by Rashid its main aim are obscure and outdated in nature as compared to the other radical Islamic movements in the world today.⁶⁴ HT was founded in Saudi Arabia and Jordan in 1953, with the aim to establish the caliphate. The leaders of the party stressed that the methods used by the party were non violent and their main objective was to win the support of the public through sincerity and education. This group denies any links with Taliban, Al Qaeda or IMU.⁶⁵ and believes in peaceful jihad instead of war.⁶⁶ But due to the repressive polices used by the the Central Asian regimes HT leaders were forced to counter them.⁶⁷ HT not only influenced the north of Tajikistan and the southern end of the Fergana valley, but its control could also be felt in Dushanbe. The youth was not only interested in its policies but also joined the party. These circumstances not only alarmed the government it also took certain steps like preaching of Islam and Islamic activities by the moderator and IRP leaders who had joined the government. But it was a known fact that IRP was not very popular in the north of Tajikistan.⁶⁸ HT was unfamiliar of this region due to its denial of

Sufism, which was popular in Central Asia and its anti-Shia stance. Party magnetism (especially in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) is perceived as unable to deliver socioeconomic stability and welfare.⁶⁹

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was one movement which shared the same aim with HT. But IMU opted a different way to achieve their aim, this party emerged in a small town of Namangan in the heart of the Fergana Valley was led by two men in their early twenties, Tohir Abdouhalilovitch Yuldeshev and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev, who later took up the name of their hometown and became Juma Namangani. Their main aim was to overthrow the Uzbek government, and like HT it had no value for the official Islam nor had any patience and fear of the political regime.⁷⁰ Unlike HT it used violence as its primary method, it was the crack down by the Uzbek government which led to the migration of the militants like Yuldeshev and Namangani from the Fergana Valley. When the civil war started, Yuldeshev migrated to Afghanistan with Tajik leaders and set up IRP base in exile, in Tabogan.⁷¹ The IRP attached Tajik guerrillas to Namangani's group and he moved in to Tavildara valley. This Valley remains the IMU's most important base in Central Asia. They also fought with government troops.⁷² IMU links with international terrorist organizations increased, and U.S. officials then stated that Osama bin Laden was a primary financier behind the establishment of the IMU. Soon after Tajikistan signed the peace treaty it was no longer safe for IMU to operate from there.⁷³ The only option for them was Afghanistan and soon the IMU bases in Mazare-I-Sharif and in Kunduz, north of Afghanistan became a pan-

Islamic force. IMU drew fighters from Tajikistan, Kyrzyistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Chechnya, and Caucasus, China's Muslim majority province, Xingjiang. The crack down on Islamic militants picked up speed when there was an assassination attempt on Uzbekistani president Islam Karimov on 16 February 1999 in Tashkent, in which 13 were killed and 128 injured.⁷⁴

All the happenings in Central Asia proved that militarism is not unavoidable. Islam and politics enjoy a diverse relationship, because all the heads of states use Islam to make their rule more genuine one of its examples is that all the Muslim festivals have become state holidays.⁷⁵ The main aim behind legal regulation, however, has been to restrict or prevent 'political organization on the basis of Islam.'⁷⁶ Uzbekistan and Dagestan are the most repressed regions. In order to prevent emergence of other groups such as IMU the government had to allow pluralism.

The real and the imaginary threats from the Islamic extremism have led to repressing the democratic freedom and in some cases the authorities have also adopted harsh measures against non-militant and even non-political Muslims.⁷⁷ Due to the Islamic extremism repression has increased even in liberal countries like Kyrgyzstan. Between Central Asian nations, the threat of Islamic extremism has increased both tension and greater cooperation in order to resist and combat the extremists' challenge.⁷⁸ Since so much conflict already exists among the Central Asian countries, the tensions have overshadowed the cooperation

4.4 *Causes Of Islamic Radicalism*

There has been a lot of research and analysis done in identifying the main force behind the rise of Islamic militancy and its popularity among the masses. However there has been a general agreement among the analysts regarding the basic essentials of the militant movements. One is the ideological factors like interpretation of Islam is very vital. Similarly the drafting of the fighters in the militant group is very much dependant on the socio economic condition of the country because the more the unfavourable circumstances are more innovative ideas would be possible. Support from external sources and financial support are also added advantages.

After independence Tajikistan faced 50 percent loss in its state revenue which it used to receive from Russia, in addition to this Tajikistan also lost the barter arrangement with other countries in which it got food in return of cotton and aluminum. The civil war had disrupted both agricultural and industrial production of Tajikistan. Mainly it was the cotton industry one of the major industry in the Soviet time which was the worst hit.⁷⁹ The overall economy of Tajikistan suffered badly and the national revenue, living standard, availability of housing, education, health and culture facilities were very poor.⁸⁰ At the same time, a rise in the population of Tajikistan was observed, with an increase in the unemployment level poverty also increased.⁸¹

Due to all these conditions corruption was high in every department⁸² and drug trafficking was common.⁸³ For example, most of Afghanistan's drug exports to Europe in 2002 passed through the Tajik-Afghan border. This drug export was financial beneficial for regional leaders on both sides of the Tajik-Afghan border.⁸⁴ The increase in the poverty and unemployment rate drug trafficking became a tempting source of income. The drug trade also affected the political process by extending support to corrupt candidate.⁸⁵

The government to tried minimized the Islamists by pressurizing IRP. In July 2002, after three Tajik citizens were arrested by coalition forces in Afghanistan and sent to Guantanamo Bay, the President traveled to the northern town of Isfara, and made a significant speech, stressing on the change in the relationship of the government and Islam. He blamed IRP for training people and encouraging extremism and according to him this would lead in splitting the society in to pieces⁸⁶ He also claimed that "extremism" was being proliferated in mosques where IRP members were working as clergy.⁸⁷ After the President visit and speech there was a major crack down on the unregistered mosques and many were closed down. The Imams were discharged due to involvement in political activities.⁸⁸ This crackdown further deteriorated the relationship between the Muslims and the state. The security was given free hand to interrogate any suspicious religious person who they thought would be a security threat. Some prominent religious leaders claimed that they were called for interrogation and were given verbal warnings regarding their political activities.⁸⁹ While others were afraid to speak to

outsiders without official permission. The Ministry of Security (MS) infiltrated religious structures⁹⁰ and the Ministry of Internal Affairs Department No. 8 investigated old cases of wartime crimes, despite the peace agreement of 1997. Under such situation it is no surprise that people wanted a just social and economic order that existed during the time of the Prophet and the four caliphs.

NOTES

1. Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia, Bloomington: Indiana University publications, 1962, p. 54.*
2. Chantal Lamerchiev - Quelquejay, "From Tribe to Umma", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1984. p. 15.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 15 - 25.
4. Hickson Jill E, "Using Law to Create National Identity: The course to democracy in Tajikistan", *Texas International Law Journal*, Vol. 38 (Spr 2003), p. 358. Cited in Suhrobsho Davlatshoev , *The Formation And Consolidation Of Pamiri Ethnic Identity In Tajikistan*, etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12607111/index.pdf -
Also see Oliver Roy, "Is the conflict in Tajikistan a Model for Conflicts throughout Central Asia?" in Mohammad Reza Djalili, Frederic Grare and Shirin Akiner, *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence*, Great Britain: Curzon Press, 1998, p.113.
5. Central Asia: Islam And The State, *ICG Asia Report*, No. 59, Osh/Brussels, 10 July2003.www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/files2/03-07-10Report%20Islam%20and%20State.pdf

6. Abdullo Hakim Rahnamo, *From the end of the Bukhara Emirate to the post-Soviet times, an overview of the history and current situation of Islam in Tajikistan*, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/>
7. *Central Asia: Islam And The State*, op.cit.
8. Ibid.
9. Azade-Ayşe Rolich, "Islam And nationalism: Central Asia And Kazakhstan Under Soviet rule", in William Fierman,ed., *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*, Boulder: Westview press, 1991, p.208.
10. *Central Asia: Islam And The State*, op.cit.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Oliver Roy, op.cit., p. 113.
14. Islamic holidays as official holidays, Friday as weekly holiday, slaughtering of animals according to Islam, exemption of religious institutions from land taxes.
15. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17th March 1992., p 3, cited in Shahram Akbarzadeh, " why Did Nationalism Fail In Tajikistan?", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 7, 1996. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3955/is_n7_v48/ai_19226485
16. Barnet R. Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan", *Survival*, Vol.35, No. 4, winter 1993-94., p. 77.

17. Mavlon Makhamov, "Islam and the Political Development of Tajikistan After 1985", in Hafeez Malik., ed., *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*, New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 197.
18. Muriel Atkin, "The Politics of Polarization in Tajikistan", in *Ibid*, p. 212.
19. *Ibid*.
20. Muriel Atkin, "Survival of Islam in Soviet Tajikistan", *Middle East Journal*, Vol 43, No. 4, Autum, 1989, p. 607.
21. Yaacov Ro'i, "The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia", in *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1990, p. 52.
22. Muriel Atkin, *op. cit.*, p. 609.
23. Abdullo Hakim Rahnamo, *op.cit.*
24. Alexandre Bennigsen, "Islam in Retrospect", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1989, p. 96.
25. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan Under Soviet Rule", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.2, No.1, September, 1986, p. 49.
26. *Ibid*, p. 51.
27. Muriel Atkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 611 - 612.

28. Ibid.
29. Azade - Ayse Rorlich, op. cit., p. 190.
30. K. Warikoo, "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers (Pvt.) Ltd., 1992, p. 71.
31. Alexandre Bennigsen, op. cit., p. 90.
32. Beatrice Forbes Manz, Central Asian Uprisings in the Neighteenth Century: Fergana Under the Russians, *Russian Review*, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 1987.
[http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-0341\(198707\)46%3A3%3C267%3ACAUITN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C](http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-0341(198707)46%3A3%3C267%3ACAUITN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C)
33. Ibid.
34. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quejueja, *Islam in The Soviet Union*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1967, p. 33.
35. Abdullo Hakim Rahnamo, op.cit.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.
41. Alexandre Bennigsen, "Islam in Retrospect", op.cit., pp. 89 - 90.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. K. Warikoo, "Soviet Central Asia in Ferment", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., op.cit., p. 67.
45. Allen Hetmanek, "The Political Face of Islam in Tajikistan: The Review of Muriel Atkin's *The Subtlest Battle*", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1990. p. 105.
46. *Kommunist Tadzhikistan*, 12th March 1988, cited in Ibid.
47. Allen Hetmanek, op.cit.
48. Shireen T Hunter, "Religion, Politics, and Security in Central Asia", *SAIS Review* Vol.21, No.2(Summer/Fall2001), p.69. http://muse.jhu.edu/cgi-bin/access.cgi?uri=/journals/sais_review/v021/21.2hunter.html
49. Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, Lahore: Vanguard Books (pvt) ltd, 2002, pp. 43-44.
50. Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Mohammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994, p.190. Cited in Mukhtar Ahmed Ali, *Afghanistan-Tajikistan Relations: A Study of Impact of Transnational Influences*

of Afghan Jihad and Civil War on Tajikistan. QAU: Islamabad (Unpublished), 1997.

51. Alexandre bennigsen, "Afghanistan and The Muslims of the USSR", in Rosanne Klass, *Afghanistan The great game Revisited*, New York: Freedom House, 1987, p.292. Cited in Ibid.
52. Dilip Hiro, *op.cit.*, p.251. Cited in Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 205.
54. *Dawn*, 29March 1997.
55. Abdullo Hakim Rahnamo, *op.cit.*
56. Ibid.
57. *The Global Review of Ethno politics*, Vol. 3, No. 2, January 2004. http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_III/issue_2/cummings.pdf
58. Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 100. cited in Ibid.
59. Ibid. p.101.
60. Ibid., p. 95.
61. Ibid., p. 103

62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid, p115
65. Ibid., p132
66. Ibid., p 134.
67. Ibid., p. 134
68. Ibid., p 130.
69. Ibid.
70. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit, p.139. Cited in *The Global Review of Ethno politics*, op.cit.
71. Ahmed Rashid., op.cit., p. 140.
72. Ibid., p.142.
73. Ibid., p. 147.
74. Ibid., p. 149.
75. Yaacov Roi, *Islam In The CIS: a Threat To Stability*, The Royal Institute of International affairs, 2001, cited in *The Global Review of Ethno Politics*, op.cit.

76. Ibid.
77. Shireen T Hunter, op.cit.
78. Ibid.
79. Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Tajikistan, November 2005 <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/tjtoc.html>
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Shireen T Hunter, op.cit.
83. http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/nit/inc_country_detail.cfm?page=47&nit=284&year=2003&pf
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Central Asia: Islam And The State, op.cit., p.14
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., p. 17.

90. Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE

RADICALISATION OF ISLAM IN TAJIKISTAN: EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS

The turmoil in Tajikistan gave outside powers an unprecedented opportunity to establish their influence and to safeguard their strategic, political and economic interests. These are, the Great Game, (played by the Russia, China and USA), role of important Muslim countries (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) and the immediate neighbors (Afghanistan, Uzbekistan). The policies these important countries have for Tajikistan, in one way or another, also gyrate around the religion, which is Islam.

5.1 The New Great Game: Is Islam the Target?

5.1.1 USA

The strategic conflict between the British Empire and the Tsarist Russian Empire for control in Central Asia is termed as the Great Game.¹ The powers involved in the game demarcated the border between Afghanistan and Central Asia in 1884.² The end of the

second world war supplanted the United States with Britain as the global power. Now the game started for the influence in the Middle East, containment of the Soviet Union, ideological conflict and access to resources of the region. This period is sometimes referred as "The New Great Game".³ Countries like India, Pakistan, Afghanistan etc all became the part of the new great game.

For USA the Central Asian region is strategically very important, as it is located close to Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf States. The post 9/11 event growing threat of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, narcotics, promoting democracy and protection of human rights, enhanced the importance of the region, not only for the countries of the region but also for the sole super power. A major area of concern for the US in Central Asia is the rise of radical Islamic groups. These groups threatened the endurance of the existing regimes (who supported USA war against terrorism) and aim to establish Islamic governments in their place. USA, Russia and China have complete convergence of views as far as radicalisation of Islam in Central Asia is concerned.⁴

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the most prominent radical Islamic group in the region. It has its bases in Tajikistan and Afghanistan and it has been estimated that the IMU is capable of recruiting and training a multi-national force of up to 5000 guerillas within a year.⁵ It is the most potent threat to the stability of the entire region. Apprehending the dangers of 'Islamic fundamentalist'; the US Congress passed the Freedom Support Act in October 1992. *aimed at propping up and consolidating the new states into viable democratic sovereign entities.*⁶ As a policy to counter the growing

influence of the fundamentalists, the USA supported the increasing Russian influence in the region. However, things changed, as the region attracted long-term investment of oil companies.⁷ So from this perspective, the containment of both Iran and Russia became the main concern for the US.

Iran feels threatened by the presence of US forces in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, while it viewed the USA involvement and physical presence in the Central Asian region to encircle the Iran. To counter this, Iran played a pivotal role in supporting the Northern Alliance against Taliban. This gave Iran to considerable influence in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan, with whom it shares ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties. However post-9/11 developments have changed the whole scenario.⁸ Tajikistan accepted US forces on its soil, Turkmen airspace to American over flights has been achieved and the creation of US bases in three Central Asian Republics have sent clear signal to the Iran that in a conflict with the US, it has to open its fronts not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the Central Asia and the Caucasus.⁹

Out of all the countries of the region, Tajikistan with its uranium enrichment facility at Chalovsky (established during 1940⁵ by Stalin and provided material for the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb) is important for the USA. The American concern is over the visits of Iranian intelligence delegations to Central Asian Republics in 1991¹⁰ As a consequence James Baker, USA Secretary of State, visited Tajikistan in February 1992 and sought assurance from its leaders that they will not supply enriched uranium to

Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Libya and Iraq.¹¹ Thus an agreement was signed between the two countries to limit the export of uranium. In exchange USA promised to invest in textile sector in Kulyab.¹² The importance of USA role in the Tajik conflict is clear from the fact that Haji Akbar Turandzonzoda toured the USA and exchanged views on the future of Tajikistan and its prospects of peace with USA officials.¹³

With the war against terrorism, Tajikistan became in limelight of world politics. Tajikistan, which shares a 750-mile border with Afghanistan, became a major ally of USA and provided its bases to USA forces.¹⁴ Tajikistan and the USA are establishing military and military-technical cooperation on such directions as information exchange within the international counter-terrorist operation Enduring Freedom, personnel training for the republic's Armed Forces, teaching English to servicemen, providing technical assistance for the Tajik army. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his trip to Tajikistan in 2005 said that the United States and Tajikistan are "solid partners" in the war against terrorism "and in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan."¹⁵ Some military analysts have suggested Tajikistan's Kulyab airbase, located roughly 60 miles from the Afghan border as the best potential base for US forces.¹⁶ Defense Official Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem said "We would hope to have a capability to get access to Afghanistan from the north and the south".¹⁷ In December 2001, Tajikistan also announced that it would provide air bases for US forces, with Kulyab, Khojend, and Kurgan-Tyube coming under consideration. In 2002, transport planes from the US, France, and Italy used the Kulyab airfield to move troops, munitions, and various other essential commodities to Afghanistan.¹⁸

5.1.2 *Russia*

Russia is considered as one of the major factor in saving Tajikistan from disintegration.¹⁹ There are different stages of the Russian interest and involvement in Tajikistan. Initially it was limited in the initial stages of the crisis.²⁰ However, the escalation of violence in Tajikistan forced the Russian policy makers to change their policy. Islamic Fundamentalism²¹ is considered as the main threat defines for the Russia. It is said that if fundamentalism succeeded in Tajikistan, it would have spill over effects for Uzbekistan and Russia²² as 8 percent of Russia's own Muslim population lives in areas adjacent to Central Asia²³ there was fears that Islamist feelings will also effect them. The fear that the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was gaining the control, Russians forced the government in Dushanbe to accommodate the opposition. As a result coalition government was formed in 1992.²⁴ The mediation was through the commander of CIS forces stationed in Dushanbe.²⁵ However the conflict escalated, and as a consequence ethnic Russians started migrating towards their native land.²⁶ This created problem of refugees, unemployment, housing, food, etc. for Russia. Also Russia was concerned about the growing influence of China, Afghanistan and Iran in the region. As the main source of weapons for opposition is Afghanistan, Russia took a serious notice of the situation and decided to seal off the Tajik-Afghan border on the plea that drugs, terrorism, extremism and subversive activities will pour into Central Asia and through it into Russia.²⁷ In May 1992 Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan signed a Treaty on Collective Security in Tashkent. The treaty committed the signatory states to undertake co-operative military action under article-4 of the treaty.²⁸

The Tajik Cabinet of Ministers ordered CIS troops to protect strategic sites in Tajikistan.²⁹ The treaty was further expanded, when it was decided to setup a blue helmet force for rapid deployment in any area of conflict within the CIS. Russia, Kirghizistan and Tajikistan signed an agreement in January 1993 to consider the external border of the CIS as the border of Russia.³⁰ Russia signed important agreements with Tajikistan.³¹ Similarly a bilateral treaty of friendship and security was signed. Russia agreed to protect Tajik-Afghan and Tajik-Chinese borders and take the CIS troops under its jurisdiction.³² The decision was condemned by Tajik opposition and called it as interference in the internal affairs of Tajikistan and were charged of supplying arms and fuel to the anti-Islamic forces. Tajik former Deputy Premier Davlat Usman compared the conflict in Tajikistan to the Russian intervention in Afghanistan and called it “a war between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, a war between Islam and non-believers”.³³

Russia interference added fuel to the fire. Rallies against the Russian presence were held in pro-Islamic regions and Dushanbe and was addressed by the leaders like Haji Akbar Turandzonzoda.³⁴ IRP leaders showed no faith or confidence on CIS forces.³⁵ On the other hand pro-government elements like Kulyab and Khojend regions, along with Uzbek and Russian minorities welcomed the Yeltsin decision.³⁶ Russia launched its “Near Abroad Policy”. The policy aimed as “Russia’s tasks are to end and regulate armed conflicts around Russia’s territory, to prevent them spreading and to ensure the strict application of human rights, especially those of the Russians in the near abroad”.³⁷ With the policy Russia recognized as a key player in Central Asia. In order to be active and reasserting its influence in Tajikistan Russia supported President Imamali. It is a new

development in Tajikistan's politics. Previously Khojendis had the support of Russia, while Kulyabis had no external support. Thus realizing the importance of Russian support Kulyabis tried to get maximum out of the situation and consolidated their power.³⁸ The Kulyabis with the Russian consent, began to gradually drive the Khojendis and Tajikistanis Uzbeks out of the Central government and local administrations throughout Tajikistan.³⁹

However Russia have to pay for its involvement. On 13th July 1993, Russian border guards were attacked by 200 Mujahideens and 200 Tajik militants, killing 25 Russian guards.⁴⁰ This incident raised the question of real involvement of the Russia in Tajikistan's affair and for the first time a comprehensive Russian policy at normalizing the situation in Tajikistan was worked out. It was decided that Russia had special responsibility to end all conflicts in the former Soviet Union, that its armed forces have a special mission to protect the 25 million Russians living outside Russia.⁴¹ Yetlsin declared that "withdrawing the Russian army from Tajikistan would mean leaving a whole nation to perish, something Russia would never allow".⁴² It also decided to seek political and diplomatic solution of the crisis and pressurized the Tajik government to held talks with the opposition leaders. Russian President convened a Russian-Central Asian Summit in Moscow, on the Tajikistan issue. Four important documents are signed which provided the legal basis to legitimize direct Russian role in Tajikistan.⁴³ It was the under Russian pressure, that Tajik government allowed opposition parties to contest elections.⁴⁴ Tajik opposition candidates were allowed to contest election with a predicted result. In February-2000 parliamentary elections, several political parties took part. Also

at the January 1996, CIS Summit, Imamali's government was warned that the peace-keeping forces⁴⁵ mandate would not be extended indefinitely unless Imamali find a compromise with the opposition leaders during the peace talks.⁴⁶ According to the peace agreement IRP members/guerrillas were inducted in Tajikistan's regular army. But still the army has 9000 Russian men⁴⁷ thus the key to Tajikistan's Security is Russian forces that stationed in the country. With the rise of Taliban threat of extremist Islamic ideology infiltrating in Tajikistan has emerged. This gave Russia a chance to increase its presence in the country and has formalized the presence of Russian army forces.⁴⁸ The Russian government supplied arms to General Ahmad Shah Masood, to assist him in his battles against the Taliban. There is evidence that the Tajik city of Kulyab is being used for this purpose.⁴⁹ Russia has not been happy with the establishment of close links between Central Asian states and the West; the threat of Islamic extremism is one way it can bring Central Asian states under its own protective umbrella.

5.1.3 *China*

Although for Beijing Central Asia has enormous economic potential for China, it's policy is driven by its national concern. China's Muslim majority province Xingiang has borders with Kazakhstan, Kryzhistan and Tajikistan. The province faced rebellion in 1990 when the Kazakh, Tajik, Kirghiz population of the province tried to join their brethren across border with whom they have religious, social, cultural, linguistic and historical relations.⁵⁰ Also IMU and Taliban recruited Islamic militants and separatists from the Xinjiang province and attacked the Chinese security forces. CARs closed

Uighur publications, export of arms, propaganda or funds for Uighur separatists in Xinjiang.⁵¹ In return China provided military help and assistance to the governments of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and kyrgyztan to fight militant Islam. Thus China realized the trans-national threat for its territorial integrity. Thus for Tajikistan, as like other Central Asian Republics major economic partner is China.⁵² China called summit meeting, of China, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Russia and kyrgyzstan in 1996. Demilitarization, demarcation of boarders, and joint military patrol were the main decisions of the summit. But the creation of Shanghai Five was the most significant of all. The summit of 1999, in Bishkek, became the forum to discuss the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, drug and weapons smuggling from Afghanistan.⁵³ Thus radical and extreme Islam became the focal point around which the major powers of the world formulate their policies. These policies, unlike the past, are based on cooperation and coordination.

5.2 *Radicalization of Islam from Neighbors*

5.2.1 *Uzbekistan*

When opposition groups came to power in Dushanbe, Uzbek President, Islam Karimov was threatened and was alarmed by the opposition at home. He is fearful about the "Islamism" extending to Uzbekistan. Moreover, with a large Tajik population in Samarkand and Bukhara, government in Taskhent could not risk a new regime in Tajikistan, which could demand the return of these regions. Approximately one million⁵⁴ each Tajiks and Uzbeks live in each other borders territory. Any man migration of

Tajikistan's Uzbeks could invite a backlash from Uzbekistan against Tajik nationals in that country. Thus fostering unrest in Uzbekistan. In this backdrop, the most important threat for Uzbekistan is the radicalization of Islam in Uzbekistan is started in the town of Namangan by Tohir Abdouhaililovitch Yuldeshev and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev (Juma Namangani). He participated in war against Afghanistan. He admired Mujahedeen and traveled Saudi Arabia for religious instruction, came under the influence of Wahhabism and received funds from Saudi Wahhabi foundations.⁵⁵ Yuldeshev and his men wanted to declare Uzbekistan as an Islamic state.⁵⁶ Uzbek government cracked down in Namangan. Yuldeshev and his men flee to Tajikistan and joined IRP. He also traveled to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia Turkey, Caucasus, where he meet with many Islamic fundamentalist groups to raise funds for his aim. Namangani moved to Tavildara valley and IRP attached Tajik guerrillas to Namangani's group. He frequently visited IRP headquarters in Talogan in Afghanistan to plan strategies to receive supplies and to meet the IRP political leaders.⁵⁷ When civil war ended in Tajikistan Namangani was not happy. As Tajikistan could not be considered as a safe place for Namangani so he moved to Afghanistan where Taliban provided him refuge.⁵⁸ All this gave president Islam Karimov an excuse to crush Islamic opposition. The opposition leaders are imprisoned. The border with Afghanistan and Tajikistan had been sealed. Air traffic between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan had been stopped⁵⁹ Uzbekistan's political organizations are prohibited from receiving financial or any other support from outside the republic.⁶⁰ On 16th July 1992, at a meeting of CIS Foreign and Defence Minister in Tashkent, he requested the CIS border troops deployment along Tajik-Afghan border. He also warned

Russia about the emerging Islamic threat not only for the region but for the Russia also.⁶¹ Thus played a significant role in ousting of the Islamists and democratic forces from Dushanbe into the Pamir Mountains and Afghanistan.⁶² Opposition also accused Uzbekistan.⁶³ Uzbekistan became the regional ally of Russia.

This resulted in interstate conflict. In 2000 winter Tashkent cut gas supplies to Dushanbe and Bishkek in order to pressurize the Tajik governments to stamp out IMU. Tashkent also started expelling the Tajikistan refugees from Uzbekistan who came during the civil war in Tajikistan.⁶⁴ While Tajik government had its own resentment against Uzbekistan as it provided sanctuary to several dissents from Tajikistan.⁶⁵ However a shift can be seen in Uzbekistan's policy. On 7th August 1993 at Moscow, President Islam Karimov declared that there was "no military solution to the Tajik Conflict".⁶⁶ He appealed to the UN Secretary General Botris Gali to help in the search of political settlement and requested UN observer to be sent to Tajikistan.⁶⁷ He called on the leaders of Tajikistan to resume talks with opposition and announce election. A major shift can be seen when Islam Karimov invited Haji Akbar Turandzonzoda at the UN-mediated intra-Tajik peace talks, for consultation.⁶⁸ Islam Karimov also held intra-Tajik peace talks in Tashkent. A natural consequence of such a move is to forge alliance between the Tajik opposition and Khojendis and to minimize the influence of Kulyabis and Russians. When opposition were invited a number of Khojendis also came. With such a move Karimov won the regional support for his Tajik policy. Karimov convened a Summit meeting of Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan. At the meeting "common approach to resolve

the Tajik civil war⁶⁹ was discussed. This started a tug of war between Russia and Uzbekistan.

Although Karimov tried to convince Russian leadership that Uzbekistan is the only principal ally⁷⁰ of Russia in the region, on the other hand 30,000⁷¹ Russian troops in Tajikistan, make Karimov apprehensive about Moscow. Also Russia backed Rakhmanov, a Kulyabi, to counter the Khojendis and the Uzbekistan's influence. Then he accuses Russia of neo-imperialism in the region.⁷² However, cross-border invasion by armed insurgents is a sensitive issue between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Anti-Rakhmanov forces attacked from Uzbekistan in 1998, while Military group of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) launched attacks from Tajikistan into Uzbekistan territory in 2000 and 2001. In 2000, Uzbekistan also questioned Uzbek-Tajik border.

5.2.2 Afghanistan

Many scholars believed that emergence of fundamentalism and eruption of civil war in Tajikistan is the extension of what is happening in Afghanistan. There are ethnic, cultural and religious continuity between the population of Afghanistan and Tajikistan. After Pashtuns, Tajiks are the second large nationality in Afghanistan. Uzbeks and Turkmen ranks third and fourth respectively. Dushanbe is just 100 Km from the Afghanistan. Most of the present settlers in northern Afghanistan had left Central Asia as refugees during anti-Soviet Basmachi Movement (1917-1927) and the Collectivization campaigns in early 1930⁵. Leaders of basmachi in Afghanistan launched guerilla

operations against communist forces from north of Afghanistan. Thus their relations cannot be explained through state controlled approach. They have multiple channels.

From mid 80^s the link was established between religious parties in Afghanistan and southern and central Tajikistan. Dr Dani told that it was during Afghan jihad that Islam was politicized and fundamentalist movement in Tajikistan started. The reason he gave was the Tajiks of Afghanistan are more religious than Uzbeks and had the greater potential and capacity to exert Islamist influence on their ethnic cousins across the boarder. The fundamentalist parties of Afghanistan had a strong presence along the Tajik boarder. The Afghan Mujahideen established contacts with the Tajiks and started crossing the border into Tajikistan. They used to smuggle anti-Soviet Islamic and fundamentalist ideology literature into Soviet Central Asia via Afghanistan. The Mujahideen have been the source of inspiration to the Tajiks. A Tajik intellectual told an American Iran Specialist:... *in 1904-5 the Japanese showed an earlier generation of Central Asians that Russia was not invincible, the Afghan Mujahideen have demonstrated this to the present generation.*⁷³ The Soviet intervention re-established links between the Tajiks and their brethren in Afghanistan.⁷⁴ These links were fostered by "*same language, same culture, same religion and same ancestors in common*".⁷⁵ Reports about the active involvement of Afghan Mujahideen in propagating Jihad in Tajikistan began to appear in the Soviet Press since 1986.⁷⁶ It was the Dushanbe anti-Armenia riots of February 1990 that both Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani, both Tajiks and belonging to Jama-i-Islami factions, reacted strongly and characterized it as "*freedom movement*", "*internal revolt*" against the "*Soviet subjugation*"⁷⁷ As a consequence the Islamic cum

Democratic opposition have the main support from Afghanistan. As the civil war started, the opposition from Kurgan, Tyube, Dushanbe and Gorno-Badakhistan crossed regularly into Afghanistan to secure arms, training and safe heaven.⁷⁸

In order to cut the main support of the opposition, the CIS decided to seal off the Tajik-Afghan border in a CIS Treaty of Collective Security of July 1992. Imamali Rakhmanov welcomed the decision⁷⁹ The decision added more fuel in the situation. Shadmon Yusupov Chairman of DPT issued a public appeal to Afghanistan asking for aid in the ongoing conflict and also against the “interference” of the CIS forces in “Tajikistan’s internal crisis.”⁸⁰ This created panic among the CIS, Russia and Uzbekistan and situation on the Tajik-Afghan border became tense.

The first armed attacks from outside Tajik territory occurred from Afghanistan. Incidents of border violation and armed clashes on Tajik-Afghan border were escalated. By the end of 1992, about 50,000 were reported to have been killed in these armed clashes, where as more than 6 lacks became refugees⁸¹ these were mostly the opposition supporters who fled to northern Afghanistan. These refugees lived in three distinct areas of or around the city of Mazar-i-Sharif in Balkh province, Tashqurghan and in the province of Kunduz borders directly on Kurgan Tyube⁸². However Tajik government estimated that by June 1993, 5, 90,000 refugees had returned.⁸³ While Afghan Mujahideen leaders provided training to Tajik extremists.⁸⁴

Tajik government in exile in Taloqau, Afghanistan was set up by the Tajik opposition groups included of IRP, DPT and Lal-e-Badakhshan. Voice of Free Tajikistan, a new radio-station had been also working in Afghanistan,⁸⁵ which propagated the opposition propaganda and Jihad. Not only that the Tajik opposition has been radicalized but also they received military and political support from the difference forces in Afghanistan. The main Afghan Lords Ahmed Shah Masood, Burhanuddin Rabbani the Tajik, Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek and Hikmat Yar, the Pashtun not only shared the refugees among themselves but also provided military and diplomatic helps to their ethnic brethren across the border.

Abdul Rashid Dostum with his Junbish-i-Milli-yi-Islami-yi-Afghanistan became the regional ally of President Karimov⁸⁶ and visited Tashkent several times. He helped to evacuate Uzbek refugees from Kurgan Tyube during the civil war. There have been reports that General Dostum and Uzbek President, Karimov have been trying with the idea of creating a "Secular buffer state" in northern Afghanistan to cover the southern borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan which would act as a wedge against the spirit of radical Islam...⁸⁷

President Islam Karimov took the initiative to pursue Russia to control Tajik-Afghan border and helped the Tajikistan's government to reassert its control over rebel strong holds within Tajikistan. Still thousands of IRP guerrillas are regrouped and received training in Afghanistan. Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's, he is from a town near

Afghan-Tajik border, Party Hezb-i-Islami supplied weapons to pro-Islamic forces and trained the Tajik fighters in Kunduz⁸⁸ while Masood's Supervisory Council of the North (SCN) provided training facilities to the pro-Islamic forces in Tajikistan. These forces used to wear the uniforms of Masood's SCN.⁸⁹ Burhanuddin Rabbani's, he is from Badakhshan, Jamiat-i-Islam-Yi-Afghanistan (JIA) also provided help to pro-Islamic forces.⁹⁰ Khanabad was the headquarter of the Saudi Arabia backed Ittehad-I-Islami (wahabi part) in Kunduz. It must be remembered that the first disturbance that broke out in Kurgan tyube was on the arrest of Wahhabi leader, A. saidov.

With the rise of Taliban phenomenon the threat of rise of Islamic fundamentalism, Taliban favoured the Deobandi interpretation of islam, and suspected inroads by the Taliban militia into the Central Asian main land has forced the Central Asian leaders and Russia to take a concrete steps.⁹¹ Taliban threat provides a justification for Russia to maintain an armed presence along with political and economic interference in Tajikistan. No only that it also justified the – Imamali's policies against opposition, but the positive repercussion is that the Taliban factor encouraged the Tajik opposition and government to enter into negotiation. Ahmed Rashid mentioned that it was not the Islamic zeal that made Taliban popular in Afghanistan, rather it was the rise of Pashtun nationalism against the tajik control over Kabul, beside other factors, that gave Taliban a chance to control the area.⁹² It was only after the thousands of Pakistani, Central Asian, Arabs, Africans and East Asians who fought for the Taliban that Islamic radicalism with global perspective became the leading goal for the Taliban. Thus now top leaders of Taliban

wanted to expand their goals beyond Afghanistan into Central Asia.⁹³ The first enemy to be singled out would be Tajikistan because of Russian forces in Tajikistan.

President Rabbani also encouraged Tajik peace process and in the first meeting between Rakhmanov and Nuri took place in Kabul. But when Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996, it forced the government and opposition to intensify the reconciliation process and when Taliban captured northeast Afghanistan in 1997, it forced the Tajiks in exile in Afghanistan to leave for Tajikistan. Beside the military, political channels are used by Afghanistan government⁹⁴ to solve the Tajikistan's problem. However their reconciliatory move did not solve the problem and did not defuse the tension on the Tajik-Afghan border.

5.3 *Muslim Countries: Spreading Islamic Ideology or Radicalization?*

The disintegration of Soviet Union not only provided opportunity to the people of the Central Asia to reestablish their ethnic, cultural identity but also to reconnect themselves with the Ummah. Islamic missionaries from Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey were the first visitors in the region. These visitors build new mosques, provided copies of Holy Quran, and support to Islamic parties.

5.3.1 *Iran*

Tajikistan, geographically seems very remote from Iranian territory – still due to cultural linguistic, historic and economic interests, both countries have co-operated in various fields. That is why when pro-Islamic government failed and Russia's influence increased in Tajikistan was not regarded with pleasure in Iran. Iranian newspapers accused Russia and Uzbekistan for interfering in internal affairs of Tajikistan and supporting Communists in Dushanbe.⁹⁵

Tajikistan is the most fertile ground for Iranian influence in the region. Iran became the first country to open an Embassy in Dushanbe. Much of the Iran's interest is in Persian culture. Even before independence in 1989 Tajikistan government opted for Tajik as a state language and openly recognized the importance of Persian culture.⁹⁶ Iran welcomed the decision and played a major role in providing teachers, text-books, printing manual and publications. However, the change of alphabets and reliance on and from Iran has created problems for Tajik speakers. Tajik language belongs to the Eastern branch of the Persian language family is not identical to standard Iranian Persian.

Secondly, there are vocabulary differences between Tajik and Iranian Persian because Tajik language besides the Russian loan-words also have the survival of the old Persian terminology.⁹⁷ As a remedy Iran setup a Association of Persian language on 19 February 1992 with Tajikistan, Afghan Mujahideen and any state wished to join it.⁹⁸ Besides linguistic both countries have cooperated in various cultural spheres since 1989.

Religion Islam is also a source of friendly relations between the two countries. Iranian revolution and its spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini had great impact on Tajikistan (see previous chapter). With independence Iranian electronic media emphasized Islamic solidarity and warn against western imperialism. The Iranian government gave publicity to the rise of Islamic forces, praising the decision of the then President Rakhman Nabiev in 1992 to include members of the opposition in his government and hailing it as a "triumph of the Muslim people of Tajikistan"⁹⁹ Iran supported the government of President Iskandarov with money and goods. At the headquarter of the Tajikistan TDP military wing; Commander Nazaruddin Zuberdulla admitted Iran is helping TDP with funding, food and other supplies.¹⁰⁰

With the exit of Islamists from Tajikistan, start of civil war and the arrival of Russian troops ended the influence, which Iran had acquired earlier in the country. Some analysts believe that there cannot be compatibility between Shiit Iran and Sunni Tajikistan . Muriel Atkin supported the opposite idea.¹⁰¹ Akbar Turandzonzoda, repeatedly stated that most inhabitants of the republic do not want to emulate Iran's Islamic Republic.¹⁰² Similarly IRPT leaders asserted that the country would find its own gradual path to an Islamic state rather than follow the Iranian example.¹⁰³

Beside cultural and religious relations the two countries are also involved in economic affairs. Two countries discussed joint ventures e.g. in shipping, cotton

weaving, transportation, rail, roads and airlines, cattle breeding etc. The most important is that Iran provided technical and skilled persons and modern technology for Tajikistan for its economic uplift.¹⁰⁴ Tehran and Dushanbe governments have encouraged increased political and diplomatic relations. June 1990 was the turning point when Otakhon Latifi, Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers, headed a delegation to Tehran to attend the death anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini.¹⁰⁵ Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati as part of his visit to Soviet republics stopped in Dushanbe and met with Tajikistan's President R. Nabiev and other officials.¹⁰⁶ President Nabiev also visited Iran and emphasized how much they and Iranians have in common¹⁰⁷.

However, when in September 1992, Nabiev resigned, Iran had shown its keen interest to mediate in Tajikistan internal dispute. But Iran was suspected of being not neutral. Indeed, there were reports that Iran supplied arms to pro-Islamic rebels in Tajikistan¹⁰⁸ and hosted Tajik opposition leaders from 1993 to 1998. But Iran cannot rely on its Shia ideology, which is not welcomed in Sunni majority Central Asia. Under the influence of Wahhabism and Deobandi, modern Sunni radicals considered Shias as kafir. Thus the major aim the Iran has is to curb the growth of Sunni Islamic radicalism in Central Asia. Despite its cultural, economic and political undertaking in Tajikistan, Tehran could not play a major role in Tajikistan because Iranian's attention is to its northern border. Furthermore, feeling politically isolated (by USA) the Iranians are keen to build its relations with the Russia. It depends on Russia for its arms supplies and cannot afford to give support to the Tajik pro-Islamic forces.¹⁰⁹

Iran can outstrip the obstacles by its long coastline in the Persian Gulf, which can be used by the CARS for their economic activities. Further Iran also offered closest platform for airline connections to the rest of the world that could also reduce the reliance on Russian. Similarly reviving of the Silk Road by building a highway from Turkey through Central Asia to Western China and creating a rail link by connecting the railway at the Iranian city of Mashhad to the Turkmenistan railway could also be quite tempting for most of the CARS.¹¹⁰

5.3.2 *Turkey*

Turkey is considered a natural model for rest of the CARS.¹¹¹ Ankara moved swiftly to build its influence in the region. In Marcy 1991, Turkish President invited the Presidents of all five republics and Azerbaijan to Ankara for future cooperation.¹¹² It was the first major international gathering of the CARS leaders. Turkey is seen by the CARS as a bridge to the west, a possible solution of their economic needs. Turkey is also trying its best that CARS leaders choose the Turkish model in preference to others.¹¹³ West also preferred Turkish model to counter Iran. However, it will be wrong to assume that Tajikistan is of no importance to Turkey. Tajikistan being a Persian speaking state can threat the Turkey's interest of Pan-Turkism cooperation. Thus Turkey is playing its religious (Sunni) card. Numbers of bilateral agreement.¹¹⁴ were signed by Turkey and Tajikistan's government. Turkey provided economic and political support to Tajikistan. Initially Turkey has been successful in extending its influence in Central Asia.

Turkish Muslim leaders built Islamic madrassahs in Central Asia to teach moderate Islam and rejected radicalism in Islam. However Turkish intelligence keeps in touch with the opposition movements in Central Asia. As a consequence Uzbekistan government shut down chain of Turkish schools, accusing that they support radical Islamic groups.¹¹⁵ Turkey also funded IMU and anti Taliban forces in Afghanistan. However it stopped its support to IMU when IMU linked itself with Taliban.¹¹⁶

5.3.4 *Pakistan*

Pakistan has its own set of designs in Central Asia, which is determined by its Indian rivalry. The idea to set up an “Islamic Crescent”, from Caspian to Arabian Sea, came with the disintegration of Soviet Union and came at a time when Pakistan lost its frontline status. Also Pakistan was facing the consequences of a new American doctrine of containing Islamic fundamentalism and its nuclear programme. Pakistan hoped that it could revive its new geo-strategic importance as the gateway to Central Asia. Pakistan also seeks support of the CARS on Kashmir and Afghanistan issues. Pakistan, taking the timely action, became the first country to recognize all Central Asian states. Of all the CARS, Tajikistan is geographically most proximate to Pakistan, with its eastern autonomous region of Badakhshan separated from Pakistan by the Afghan Wakhan corridor. To enter international trade through shipping Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan can use Karachi port, which is about 1500 miles away from these states.¹¹⁷

Thus Pakistan offers the Central Asian States the shortest access to the port facilities at Karachi.

In this geographical setting, Afghanistan occupies the pivotal position in respect to transit trade due to network of roads linking Kabul with border towns of Central Asian States. It is, therefore, considered important that Afghanistan should returned to normalcy in the shortest possible time, otherwise most of the agreements between Pakistan and Central Asia will remain unimplemented. At the end of 1991, Pakistan's Economic Affairs Minister led a delegation of businessmen, industrialist, economists, scholars, and journalists to CARS and met their counterparts and signed memoranda of understanding with all five CARS.¹¹⁸ With Tajikistan, Pakistan signed a number of economic agreements¹¹⁹

Thus Pakistani religious scholars have made deep inroads in Tajik Muslim Society in rural area. The newly formed Tajik Hezb-i-Ayay-e-Islami is developing along Pakistan Jama'at-i-Islami pattern.¹²⁰ It has made a strong base among the rural population where Islamic revivalism is strong. The Jama'at Chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed called on the government *"to confront US imperialism and the New World Order by using the Central Asian Republics for a combined fight saying that, Pakistan must provide Central Asia with Islamic guidance rather than economic aid"*.¹²¹ In March 1993, the Foreign Ministers of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan directly accused the Jama'at of aiming and training radicals from their republics. The Jama'at also helped IRP to establish links with

the Muslims especially the Arab world.¹²² Russia also accused Pakistan for its support to pro-Islamic forces and aiming to throw the neo-Communist regime in Dushanbe.¹²³ Initially Rakhmanov's government was suspicious of Pakistan's role because of the strong support rendered by the Pakistan to different Mujahideen groups fighting during Soviet war with Afghanistan in 1979. In this war Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence, ISI, gave preference to radical afghan Islamic parties and put aside moderate Afghan nationalist parties. Thus Central Asian leaders believed that ISI has been supporting the radical Islamic groups in the region.¹²⁴

After the death of General Zia ul Haq, the successive governments promised the Central Asian leaders that they would curb the support the ISI gave to the Islamic parties , Taliban and other militant groups in the region and would not allow the Central Asian militants to study in Pakistani madrassahs. But all this cannot be materialized. The IMU, HT and Chechen rebels have sent many of their young men to study in Pakistan¹²⁵, and this has been confirmed by Tajik ambassador that many Tajik students are getting religious education in Pakistani madrassahs. However in 1994, Pakistani government supported Taliban in order to get security for Turkmenistan, southern Afghanistan, Pakistan, gas pipeline. Thus any advance by Taliban in northward antagonized the Central Asian leaders and they blamed ISI and Pakistan military.¹²⁶ Ahmed Rashid argues that Islamabad believes that the present generation of Central asian leaders must be replaced by more Islamic – oriented leaders who would look to Pakistan, rather India and Russia, for support.¹²⁷

However, Pakistan's privilege was enhanced when Pakistan played its positive role in Inter Tajik Peace Talks (see next section). At the inaugurating meeting of 3rd round of Inter Tajik Peace Talks, Foreign Minister of Pakistan said "*Pakistan wished to build relations with Tajikistan on the basis of non-interference*".¹²⁸ The efforts bear fruits and President Rakhmanov paid a state visit to Pakistan in March 1994. Both countries signed number of agreements.

5.3.5 Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is not territorially contiguous to the Central Asian region, but growing Iran's presence in Central Asia seems to be stimulating the growing Saudi presence in the area. Initially Saudi funded few mosques, provided religious literature, and donation to the religious institutions, which promoted its Wahabism in the region. Historically Wahhabism arrived in Central Asia in 1912. As a result, Sayed Sharif Muhammad from Madina established Wahhabi cell in Fergana valley.¹²⁹ This ideology was not so popular in the region because of its opposition to the Sufism in the region. It was only in the wake of afghan jihad against the Soviet invasion that Wahhabism began to play its role in the region. IMU and HT Islam derive largely from Saudi's Wahhabism.¹³⁰ Not only that there are evidences that religious groups in Central Asia receive funds, donations from big business community Islamic charities and influential leaders of Saudi Arabia, who profess wahhabism. IRP leaders also traveled Saudi Arabia to seek funds.

These funds were provided to the IRP during the civil war in Tajikistan, to keep them from joining Iran, ¹³¹ Thus Saudi Arabia did not prefer to build state to state relation in Central Asia. ¹³² This policy backfired and all the Central Asian government considered Saudis as threat to their region.

The events of September 11 have changed the whole world scenario. The great rivals, Russia, China and USA, joined their efforts to fight against terrorism and Islamic extremism in the world. They developed a cooperative defensive policy to eliminate the Islamic extremism in Tajikistan, without giving due consideration to the underline causes of such extremism. Definitely these powers have their own ends to safeguard. While the important and effective neighbors, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, have fed the extremists in Tajikistan by providing weapons, funds, sanctuary to the militants and rival groups. Same is the situation for the other Muslim countries that provided funds, arms, ideology and militants.

In order to curb the extremists the world community in general and the Muslim countries principally have to think in wider perspective and abandon investment in the economic development and institution building of Tajikistan. This will help Tajikistan to became an effective member of international community.

NOTES

1. The classic Great Game period is generally regarded as running from approximately 1813 to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 a second, less intensive phase followed. The Great Game, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Game.
2. Jed C. Snyder, *Unexpected Claim, After Empires – The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia*, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995, pp.13-16.
3. The Great Game, op.cit. Also see Dr. Aerial Cohen “The New "Great Game": Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia”*The Heritage Foundation*, January 25, 1996, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm>
4. Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002, p.5.
5. Martin McCauley, *Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Modern History*, London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002, p.110.
6. Brig. Jamal Zia, “Presence Of The USA In Central Asia and its Implications on the Region”, National defense College Journal, (2004), <http://www.ndc.edu.pk/publications/Journals/NDC%20JOURNAL%202004%20WINTER/04%20Presence%20of%20the%20USA%20in%20Central%20Asia%20By%20Brig%20Jamal.DOC>
7. Ibid.

8. Eugene B. Rumer, "Flashman's Revenge: Central Asia after September 11", <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/sf195.pdf>
9. Ibid.
10. P. Stobdan "Islamic Reawakening in Central Asia Towards Stability or Conflict" *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XV, No. 6, September 1992, p. 511.
11. Sahmeem Akhtar "Structure Significance of Central Asia," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.45, No.3, July 1992, p.52.
12. Ibid.
13. Anjum Niazi "Tajik Leaders Warns of New Hostilities", *Dawn* ,7 March 1995.
14. "United States, Tajikistan To Continue Active Military Cooperation", <http://www.newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=220>
15. Ibid.
16. Raffi Khatchadourian, "US Eyes Bases in Tajikistan", <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110501a.shtml>
17. Gao Fuqiu, "The Real Purpose of the American March into Central Asia", <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/62/>

18. USA Wants to "Identify Future Partners" In Turkmenistan,
<http://www.newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=22>
Q
19. Catherine Poujol, "Some Reflections on Russian Involvement in the Tajik Conflict, 1992-1993", in Muhammad Reza Djalili, Frederic Grave and Shirin Akner, ed., *Tajikistan: The Trails of Independence*, Great Britain: Curzon, 1995, p. 99.
20. Russian felt that they had no vital interest at stake; still Afghan war memories are fresh.
21. Barnet R. Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan", *Survival*, Vol. 35, No.4, winter 1993-94, p.86.
22. *The Frontier Post*, 22 July 1993.
23. Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, "Civil War in Tajikistan: Genesis and Impact on the Region", in K.M. Asaf and Abdul Barakal, ed., *Central Asia: Internal and External Dynamics*, Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1997, p.166.
24. The agreement was signed by Nabiev, Muhammad Sharif, Himatzada (Chairmen of IRP), Shodmon Yousuf (Chairman of DPT), Tahir Abdujabborov (Chairman of Rastokhez), Daulat Khudonazarov (Chairman of the Union of Cinematographers of Tajikistan) and Amirbek (Chairman of Lal-e-Badakhshan Organization) Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.178.
25. Catherine Poujol, op. cit., p.111.

26. Since 1985, 800,000 Russians left Uzbekistan, 185,000 Kirghizistan and 90,000 left Tajikistan.
27. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) USR-94-088 15 August 1994, p.66 cited in Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, op. cit ., p.166.
28. An act of aggression committed... against any of the participating state will be regarded as aggression against every participating state. States that came under attack will receive "all necessary assistance includes military assistance" from other signatories. Syed Rifaat Hussain, "Tajik-Afghan Border Clashes Bode Ill for Regional Peace", *The News*, 24 July 1993.
29. The Nurek Hydroelectric Power Station, the Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant in Vakhsh, the electrochemical complex in Yavav, the Chormagzak and Fakharabad Passes, the roads to Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube and munitions dumps, Catherine Poujol, op. cit., p.111.
30. Nirmala Joshi, "Russia and Central Asia: The Strategic Dimension", *Strategic Analysis*, IDSA, New Delhi, Vol. xviii, No.9 December 1995, pp.1280-1281, cited in Dr. Maqsuddul Hasan Nuri, op. cit., p.167.
31. K. Warikoo, "Cockpit of Central Asia: Afghanistan Factor in Tajikistan's Crisis" in K. Warikoo, ed., *Central Asia Emerging New Order*, New Delhi: Har-anand Publications, 1996, p.211.
32. Syed Rifaat Hussain, op. cit.
33. K. Warikoo, op. cit., pp.212-213.

34. Ibid.
35. Ahmed Rashid, op. cit., p.179.
36. K. Warikoo, op. cit., pp.212-213.
37. Catherine Poujal, op.cit. , p.114.
38. Sergei Gretsly, "Civil war in Tajikistan: Causes, Development and Prospects for Peace", in Roald Z. Sagdeer and Susan Eisenhower, ed., *Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change*, New York; CPSS Press 1995, p.233.
39. Ibid.
40. Catherine Poujal, op. cit., p.104.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., pp.104-105.
43. K. Warikoo, op. cit., p.215.
44. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia and the Cancans" *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.12, No.2, 1993, p.204.
45. In 24th August 1993 CIA Foreign and Defence Ministers held meeting in Moscow agreed to set up a Joint Peace-Keeping Force with the Mission of Stablising the situation in Tajikistan and Supporting Peace.

46. Michael Orr, "The Russian Army and the war in Tajikistan", Mohammad Reza, atal , ed., op. cit. , p.p.155-159.
47. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit., p.235.
48. David Straub, The Tajikistan Update, <http://www.angelfire.com/sd/tajikistanupdate/>
49. Ibid.
50. Rajan Menon and Henri J. Barkey, "The Transformation of Central Asia, Implications for Regional and International Security", *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 4, Winter 1992-93, p.81.
51. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit., p 202.
52. *Central Asia and CIS Tajikistan July 1992 – May 1993, Special Report No.9.A*, Islamabad: Prime Minister Secretariat, July 1993, p.53.
53. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit.,p. 203.
54. Dr. Maqsuddul Hasan Nuri, op. cit., p164.
55. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit.,p 138
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p 142.

58. Ibid., p 148.
59. Allen Hetmanek, "The Islamic Revolution and Jihad came to the Former Soviet Central Asia: The case of Tajikistan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.12, No.2, 1993, p.374.
60. Ibid.
61. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, op. cit. p., 204.
62. Yuri Zarakhovich, "We are all scared", *Time International*, 22 February 1993, p.27.
63. Ibid
64. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit., p177.
65. Ibid., pp 177-178.
66. Barnet R. Rubin, op. cit. , p.87.
67. Ibid.
68. Sergei Gretsly, op. cit. , p.235.
69. Ibid. Tajik government was pressurized for political reconciliation.

70. In March 1994 Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik Foreign Ministers in Dushanbe appealed UN to grant Russian Troops the status of a UN Peace-Keeping Force. Also Karimov signed a Military Cooperation Treaty with Russia.
71. Sergei Gretsly, op. cit.
72. Ibid . , p.234.
73. Allen Hetmanek, op. cit. p.372.
74. K. Warikoo, op. cit. , p.197. Cited in Muhiyter Ahmad Ali,
op. Cit .
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid. , p.198.
77. Ibid. , p.199.
78. Ibid.
79. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, Vol. 39, No.1, 1993, p.39272.
80. K. Warikoo, op. cit . , p.200.
81. Ibid., p.202.
82. Barnet R. Rubin, op. cit. , p.83.
83. K. Warikoo, op. cit.

84. Ibid., pp.203-204.
85. Ibid.
86. Barnet R. Rubin, op. cit ., p.83.
87. K. Warikoo, op. cit.
88. Chris Bird, "Tajikistan", *Middle East Review*, 1993/1994, pp.111-112
89. Barnet R. Rubin, op. cit. , pp.83-84.
90. Ibid.
91. Ralph H. Mognus and Eden Naby, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, Pakistan: Pak Book Corporation, 1998, pp.158-192.
92. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit., p 210.
93. Ibid.
94. Different high-level officials visited the each others' country – for detail see K. Warikoo, op. cit .
95. Muhammad Reza Djalili and Frederic Grave, "Regional Ambitious and Interests in Tajikistan: The Role of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran" in Muhammad Reza Djalili, Frederic Grave and Shirin Akner, ed. , op.cit., p.127.

96. Muriel Atkin, "Tajikistan's Relations with Iran and Afghanistan", in Ali Bannazizi and Myron Weiner, ed., *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994, p.93.
97. Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism.*, op.cit. , see Chapter-7
98. Ibid.
99. *Financial Times*, London, 23 June 1992.
100. Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994.
101. Muriel Atkin, op. cit. , p.100.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. *Central Asian Significant*, No. 105, July 1993.
105. Muriel Atkin, op. cit. , p.96.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*,op. cit.

109. "Tajikistan in the 1990^s" *Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, Vol. XV, No.9, Sept 1996.
110. Rajan Menon and Henri J. Barkey, *op.cit.*, pp.75-76.
111. Turkey is pro-west Muslim, Secular, expanding market economy and motherland of Turkistan.
112. Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*, *op.cit.*
113. Central Asian students are studying at Turkish Universities provided technical support to the region.
114. *Asian Central Significants*, No. 91, April 1993.
115. Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* *op.cit.*,p 222.
116. *Ibid.*
117. Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism* ,*op. cit.*, p.214.
118. S. Amjad Ali, "Prospects of Co-operation with Central Asian States" *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 96, No.2, April 1993, pp.60-65. Also see Tahir Amin, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asia States" in Ali Bannazizi and Myron Weiner, ed. *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, New York: I.B. Tanris, 1994, p.221.

119. K.N. Pandit, "Central Asia in Quest of New Directions", in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, ed., *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers (Pvt.) Ltd, 1992, pp.99-100.
120. Ibid.
121. Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism* , op. cit., p.215.
122. Ibid.
123. "Tajikistan in the 1990^s", op. cit., p.
124. Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, op.cit., p.210.
125. Ibid., p 213.
126. Ibid., p 215-216.
127. Ibid., p217.
128. *The Frontier Post*, 21 October 1994.
129. Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, op.cit.,p 138.
130. Ibid., pp. 138 and 118.
131. Ibid., p. 224.
132. Ibid., pp. 223-224.

CONCLUSION

The global phenomenon of Islamic reawakening in the 20th and 21st centuries attracted number of researchers and guide them to explore the underpinnings of renewed interest in Islamic culture, history, symbols, ideas etc. Islam as a religion and as a form of cultural and political identity has acquired a new meaning not only among the Muslim countries as well as countries with Muslim minority. It also piercingly challenged the nation state identity of the modern world. Tajikistan is one of such countries which is undergoing such experience. After independence Tajikistan entered in the club of international community. The membership of this is based on the concept of nation-state. However, Tajikistan faced lot of problems related to its new identity. Islam and nationalism has been recurred and came in conflict with each other in Tajikistan as both forces are powerful and reality of the present age.

Islamic resurgence is not a new phenomenon. Islam has a deep rooted history of tradition revival (Tajdid) and reform (Islah), which started from the early Islamic centuries and still exist to the present day. It had different forms that gripped the entire Muslim world in one way or the other. Three different periods have been identified in this research work that are, resurgence in the history of Islam, Pre Modern or Islamic Revivalism, Modern or Islamic Reformism and Neo-Modern or Islamic Radicalism . However, there has been more emphasis on the third period in this research. Its during

this phase that two ideologies, Nationalism and Islam are at a conflicting stage in Tajikistan.

The early history of Tajikistan showed that two separate issues existed one was the cultural composition and the second was the acknowledgment of present name. One of the major sources for group identities among the Tajiks was the Family kinship. Religion and language were the weak connections but after the Arab conquest and introduction of Islam the situation drastically changed and religion was soon considered as the major source of identity. The general population did not associate religious identity with politics and also in the modern sense Ummah did not mean nation. Still the Tajiks shared common faith, history and civilization with the rest of the Muslim world. When the Russians came they soon found out that in Tajikistan there were different feudal groups and tribal areas with complexed national composition and cultural systems. The division of Central Asian natives was a totally new phenomenon since these people had no national feelings, sentiments and they believed in their rulers. The distinction was not between Turkic and Iranian groups, but between nomad and sedentary people.

Russian thought that since they were the representative of the European civilization therefore they were superior to the natives. But on the other hand they were considered as foreigners and intruders by the local population. The feeling of resentment between the local people and the Russians gave rise to the feeling of nationalism which did not exist previously. The repression of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kazaks etc by the Russians resulted in

negative impact on the Russian rule and resulted in the growth of national awareness. Still modern nation state norms cannot be applied on such feelings. Muslims identified themselves as Muslims and them as Christians. The Russians tried to repress the Muslims which resulted in disputes, revolts of religious nature. There was hostility towards the Russians by the religious leaders and conservatives. It was during this time when Islamic world entered a phase of relative decline in economic, political, cultural realm and witnessed the Dark Age.

It was during this time period that Modern or Islamic Revivalist movements started with their main focus on religious decline, its survival and revival. Andizhan by Muhammad Ali; Sufi brotherhood of Naqshbandid was one of the most important and prominent revivalist movement in Turkistan. It started in 1898 with the main aim to keep the religion alive. Most observers found the primary motivation for this uprising to the zealous religiosity of the area. The view that foreign element played a vital role was highlighted by lot of scholars, this observation was supported by the emergence of revivalist movements, religiously motivated rebellions in the Islamic world and by the role that the Naqshbandi and other Sufi orders played in many of them.¹ For instance Mohammad Ali preaching against Russia began after his return from Saudi Arabia and was influenced by the Wahhabism.² Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier³ argued on same lines. Russians crushed down the revolt that resulted in various aspects. First of all it indicated that the natives had questioned the Russian policy in Central Asia. Secondly the strategy of ignoring Islam which was supported by Von Kaufman came to

an end. Thirdly the supporters of the rebels were punished and several villages were destroyed. The Russians who had migrated to Central Asia were given the fertile lands were as the natives were forced to go to barren lands to start new villages. Fourthly more military command was placed on the local leadership. Fifth was the state control over the Muslim educational institutions. Sixth, it was decided to introduce Russian language and culture, at least to the local elites. This would shift their focus away from the religious leaders and would help them in learning about the modern world i.e. Russia. ⁴ All these opportunities provided the Islamic reformists to fill the gap between tradition and modernity.

This work substantiated the facts that in the mid of the 19th century the ineffective efforts made to revive Islam resulted in a campaign by the reformists, this movement started due to the European dominancy in the region. Soon the Islamic reformists of Tajikistan started to realize that their religion and society were declining as compared to Russia. Academia and scholars who were educated realized this. For these intellectuals the importance of issues changed and they started to focus more on issues of women rights, scientific education, political reforms, constitutional and representative forms of government, etc. To overcome these problems, they drew scientific spirit, positivism and faith in progress from Russian reformers.⁵ It was in this time period that Nationalism emerged the Islamic reformist not only took advantage of knowledge from the Russians but also adopted the ideology and structure setups from Turkey. This movement was more long lasting and had a greater impact than the previous ones.⁶

The school of enlightenment was founded by Ahmad Donish (1826-1897), a follower of the modern trends like Jamal-ud-din Afghani and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. He was known as Tajik Muslim reformer and his school as Tajik enlightenment. This school was the start of the revival of national, religious and political thought.⁷ He had a lot of outside world exposure since he was sent to Russia thrice as a member of the Bukhara Embassy there. Thus most of his work was on the lines of Islam, the state political policies, western influence and the socio economic conditions of the state itself. The result of his work was that by the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th century all the Islamic thinking of the general masses was aligned with the thoughts of Ahmad Donish.⁸ It was in the early 20th century; the Jadid School of thinking also started to emerge and was known to produce the second generation of Tajik enlighteners and reformers. The Jadid movement through its modern forms and approaches came up with different solutions for the social political problems. The reformists believed that standing up to Russian and challenging them would not bring any results in the revival of Islam rather a peaceful treaty and cooperation between both Russia and the Muslim world would have a greater impact in the resurgence of Islam.⁹ In the start the movement's more focus was on the education field but as the movement grew stronger its demands also increased. They started to demand more educational reforms, cultural and political representation and condemned the existing feudal and government systems.¹⁰ Soon arguments and conflicts started between Jadids and the supporter of Usul Kadim.¹¹ who thought that there could be no changes made in the Islamic structure and any modernization would prove fatal and dangerous for their religion. There are four stages identified in the development of the

reformist movement of the Muslims of Russia.¹² The first development was the Religious reforms in which the old traditionalist thoughts and ideas were modified without making any drastic changes within the Islamic structure. It was to show that Islamic teaching matched the modern science and education. Cultural reform was the second development which was an attempt to change the literary culture and by the mid of the 19th century Arabic, Persian and Chagatay Turkish¹³ were three common languages in the region. This amalgamation of language was considered as the starting point of cultural unity by the reformists. So a common Turkish language, free of possible Arabic and Persian accrual, was popularized. Third development was the educational reform which as considered as an important mile stone in the rebirth of Islam one of the example is of the Jadid School which played an important role in revival of Islam. The last stage is identified with political nationalism, in this stage the Muslim prepared to stand against the Western pressure.¹⁴ The Muslim leaders and Scholars were not only trying to revive the Muslim society politically, which they thought could only be made if the society follows the modern trends. At this stage pan Turkism and Pan Islamism remained united to each other and encouraged the revival of Islam.¹⁵ Jadids dominated the political stage in the Central Asia up to the Revolution of 1917 and after that it played an active role in the Soviet government of the region.

In the start of the 20th century, the Basmachi movement confronted the Soviet rule in Central Asia. Though the movement officially came to an end in 1924 but still its activities continued for several more years. Thousands of the Basmachi supporters went

in to hiding or migrated to Afghanistan. Thousands of Tajik Basmachis either went underground or took refuge in Afghanistan. This movement though ended but is still considered as a landmark for the radicals in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. With time due to the conflicts among the leaders of the movement it lost its energy and strength but still provided a sense of unity amongst the Muslims and gave them confidence and strength to stand against the authority. It was through this movement that a lot of leaders came in to the lime light and later became the symbols of nationalism and independence. Due to this movement the Russian government never trusted the communist part of Tajikistan and always accused its leaders of ultra-nationalism and betrayal.¹⁶ This can be seen in the process of national delimitation, when Tajiks were intentionally divided by the Russian government. It was a start of a new era in the history of Tajikistan.

It has been discussed that in order to increase national consciousness amongst people it is necessary to create awareness first. To create a nation state it is necessary to form a nation first after which it can be transformed in to an independent state. In case of Tajikistan it was a state before it became a nation. Tajikistan was given the status of state by the new Bolshevik regime due to some political reasons, it as afterwards that it developed as a nation. Hickson asserted that national identity is never created in a vacuum.¹⁷ It is a fact that Tajik people existed in Central Asia for hundreds or maybe thousands of years. This ethnic or genealogical concept can be used for the formation of a Tajik nation. In Russia the term nationality was used instead of nations this was due to some political reason. Because according to their ideology nations was linked with

nationalism which meant different states and independent identities. Where as nationalities were expected to have predominantly cultural aspirations.¹⁸ Still Tajikistan did not achieve the status of nation and then that of a state until the establishment of the Tajik independent region of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan in 1925. Though the awareness of nation hood existed in Tajikistan before the Russian rule but the modern theory of nation hood in Tajikistan was mainly under the influence of Marxist ideology.¹⁹ According to Atkin, the Soviet rule purpose of handling the Tajik national identity issue was not only to weaken the attempt of uniting Turkistan as a state but also to reduce the attraction, the Tajiks might have felt for the Persian speaking communities in Iran or Afghanistan.²⁰ The ethnic affiliation of Tajiks to Iranian origin communities, not to Turcomans was enough to be distinguished from other Central Asian republics. This division has two sides firstly that it should divide one nation from the other and second that it should unite a nation internally²¹

Though the Moscow claimed that they were successful in resolving the nationality issue but the three decades between Stalin and Gorbachev made way for nationalism that was to push forth under glasnost. The evolution of Tajik society reached on its peak in 80s and was differentiated through division in areas like language, economy, politics, history.²² It also became a strong force in consolidating nationalism. Nationalist policy was based on the lines of modern ideas and historical glories.²³ which represented a kind of return to korenizatsiya, not by Russians but by Tajiks themselves. However, the civil war

in Tajikistan portrayed the weak nationalist feelings along with strong regional affiliations. This proved to be a reliable ground for future political action and decisions.

When the Soviet rule ended there two possible paths along which Tajik nationalism could have developed. First was that it could have taken a form of national liberation movement standing against the Russian rule and encouraging the new political setup in the state. Secondly it could have given authenticity to the ideology provided by the elites and acted as a brake against political transformation for the old order.²⁴ It was the first part along which nationalism in Tajikistan moved and soon after the collapse of Soviet rule Tajik leaders viewed nationalism as a negative philosophy against their own beliefs. Unlike other Central Asian leaders who used nationalism for their own advantage by bringing legitimacy and stability in their rule through it²⁵ Tajik leaders were reluctant to deal with such a new and changed ideology. Above all, it shows, there was no solid set of objectives, no moral or ideological foundation, and or frame of reference for the Tajik nation.

The Tajik opposition movement was satisfied with the restructuring carried out by the Soviet government. Soon these movements obtained the nationalist flavour when they were linked with the need to reestablish Tajik identity, but the leaders remained resolute.²⁶ Their lack of political perception and staunch commitment to the status quo contributed to the deterioration of the past independence situation in the country. As far as the issue of religion was concerned the Soviet government issued a series of changes

like the continuous rejection in accepting Islam as a reality in Central Asia. The destruction caused by these changes in the seventy years of Soviet rule are as follow: First, the government based anti-religious campaigns weakened the Islamic structure in Central Asia's, thus making it exposed to influences coming from the Arab world and South Asia. The closure of Islamic institution by the government also created a shortage of religious teachers. Second, was the creation of government appointed clerics which followed the state agenda. Due to this instead of getting guidance from well learned Islamic scholar's people started to follow ignorant and conservative rural mullahs. These state dependant clerics damaged the credibility of Islam and gave rise to "parallel Islam." In the 1970s, elements of this parallel Islam became politicized.²⁷ Third, was the policy of the Soviet government to oppose other Islamic countries by using its own Muslim population like its official religious leaders etc. This policy led to interaction of the Soviet Muslims with other Muslim countries and they were exposed to the politicized versions of Islam as well as with a variety of militant nationalist and anti-colonial ideas.

28

All this provided opportunity for the resurgence of new Islam and other radical movements to grow. Since there was no proper reinterpretation of Islam people started to criticize the Islamic modernist in following the west by adopting models presented by them and for adding the western element in the Muslim societies. Thus new Islamic resurgence, radicalism movements started.

This research emphasised the third phase of the Islamic resurgence that is Islamic radicalism. Those parts of the Muslim world where the Islamic reformists were already based became the foundation for Islamic Radicalism or Neo-Modernism. The end of the 2nd world war is considered an important time for the reformists because soon after getting independence Muslim countries started to restructure their societies for which they followed two models that were capitalism and socialism. From 1950- 1970 all the Islamic countries changed their political, social, economical and cultural systems. It was during this time that the idea of nation state became popular and the idea of transformation in religion was subordinated to nationalism, socialism, popular democracy and a plethora of novel goals.”²⁹ But all these ideologies proved to be rejected by the Muslims who were demanding stronger ties with their Islamic identity.

With the revival of Islam in Tajikistan, two issues were identified that were Islamic survival and Islamic revivalism. The Soviet period can be termed as Islamic survival; because even with all the efforts made by the government to suppress religion it remained the major identity of the Tajik people. They believed that religion controls all the aspects of life i.e. from birth to marriage till death. Plus under the Soviet rule Muslims could not find any model or ideology which they could compare with Islam making their belief in their own religion stronger. The last ten years of the Soviet rule can be termed as the Islam revival period. This revival can be seen at three levels, grass roots level, upper level and middle level. At grass roots level people have more awareness regarding their religion. People preferred wearing religious clothes, beard or any other

external Islamic attributes through which they can easily be identified as Muslims. Even Islamic traditions were given more importance like Nikha was preferred over registration of a marriage and same case is with divorce.³⁰ It was also observed that there was more tendency in the younger generation to turn towards religion and its impact was different in each region. Mastchah, Dushanbe, Kofarnikhon, Karategin, Fayzabad, Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube all these areas had traditional forms of religious education and Mosques were built with private donations.³¹

The publication of Islamic literature and religious program by the government is also a cause of Islamic resurgence. The active members of opposition and government also demanded elimination of unIslamic laws and implementation of Islamic Shariat. The government, stressing on its legitimacy also tried to calm down the religious leaders about their demand of implementing Islam completely.³² They considered religion as a source of nation building.³³ Abdullo Saidov, an opposition leader, suggested the idea of an Islamic state and called for Jihad in order to achieve the establishment of an Islamic state in Tajikistan. He also presented this demand to the CPSU 27 congress in 1986 due to which, he was arrested. His arrest aggravated a big demonstration in the town of Kurgan Tyube. This showed the passion of Islam and Islamic leaders among its believers and the spread the news of his imprisonment through their well organized network.³⁴ After independence Tajikistan had no Muftiate; but an Islamic Center which though was not a part of the state but was still controlled by the government. This center is run by a Council of Ulemas

which comprises of 27 official Muslim leaders. These Ulemas are elected after every three years, the center controls and regulates all Islamic organizations in Tajikistan.³⁵

Tajik Muslim leaders demanded the creation of a Muftiate along with a powerful leader who could assert the rights of the Muslim community. However, Tajik government seriously condemned the idea with the apprehension that this would create an alternative centre of power within the country.³⁶ This policy was not successful because government gave space to religious leaders of other religions who had different ideology, ambitions and financial power. But there were many government appointed clergy, who were happy with the current system because due to this they were able to freely follow their religious rights, beliefs and rituals. In return all they had to do was to be loyal to the government. They had more rights and freedom than the Imams in Uzbekistan because they were not given instructions as what to talk about during the Friday sermon's.³⁷

Along with internal factors, there were certain external factors that gave a new shape to Islam in Tajikistan. As a result of these factors labels like radical Islam, extreme Islam, militant Islam or fundamentalists were associated with Islam. This was an external dimension and not the result of the traditional Islam that existed in Central Asia. The internal factors for the revival of Islam in Tajikistan resulted in the acceptance of the external influence.

In external influences, Russian federation is an important factor. After losing Afghanistan, Russia could not afford to lose another state. The danger of fundamentalism was the best policy adopted by the Russians to keep the Tajiks and the other Central Asian states under its influence. Plus it used its Russian minority present in Tajikistan to stay their. The failure of Russian army in Afghanistan and Chechnya lowered down its self-esteem. Tajikistan supported Russian armed forces to recover in the struggle against Islamic extremists. President of Uzbekistan highlighted the Russian policy about Tajikistan. He identified the opposition as a threat to stability of Central Asia and Muslim parts of Russia. He accused Russia for creating disorder in Central Asia and further attributing the term fundamentalism with Muslims. The Russian support for the Rakhmanov really confused the opposition.³⁸ The real reason behind all this was that the Uzbek president could not afford an Islamic government in Tajikistan because of Islamic activist in his own region. These activists could take the Islamic government as a model and create problems for him. That is why he allowed pro nabiev Popular Front forces in 1992 to use its territory for military training and to launch attack on Dushanbe. Gharm and Badakhshan, were bombard from Uzbekistan, where opposition held strong hold. This shows how karimov perceived Islamic radicals as a threat. Due to these attacks, Shodmon Yusuf called him Ghengiz of the twentieth century.³⁹ Further Iran was accused of being far behind the Islamisation of Tajikistan. Whereas, the truth was that Iran carried natural similarity between the Persian speaking people of Tajikistan. Therefore, it did not need to establish its own government in Tajikistan.⁴⁰

The arrival of funds, Korans, literature and mullahs from Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan all promoted Islam in Tajikistan in their own ways. The absence of any official Islamic leadership gave an opportunity to fundamentalist groups to remerge. The government of Tajikstan refused to allow religious education in official schools resulted in formation of unofficial Islamic Schools.⁴¹ Masses found their own way to spread Islam by forming mosques and other Islamic centers on their own.

The war against terrorism was the only issue on which China, Russia and USA agreed on. It was decided that there was a dire need to eliminate terrorism in the region, to safeguard their own interests. However, Tajik government like other central Asian governments also tried to make the opposition agree to work with them on the issue of terrorism.

This study supports the view that out of all external influences, the impact of Afghanistan jihad on Tajikistan has been the strongest. There are certain other transnational influences that have played a major role in the growth of religiosity and radicalization of Islam in Tajikistan. Situation in Afghanistan has always affected Tajikstan and its population; reason being that Tajikistan shares the largest boarder with Afghanistan. Therefore, it is more exposed to political developments and religious movements in Afghanistan. Red Army in 80s sent Central Asian Muslims, including Tajiks, to fight with Afghan Mujahiddens. However, this turned out to be a blessing in disguise, because Tajiks got an opportunity to interact with Muslim leaders and Ummah.

The scope of this interaction further increased when Muslims from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran reached Afghanistan. They shared Islamic knowledge with Tajiks and Uzbeks Muslims. To seek more information of religion Tajiks and Uzbeks started to travel secretly to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They also received education in Madrassahas as well as training in guerrilla warfare. Recently it has been observed that Muslims throughout the world have been obsessed with the spirit of jihad. Consequently, USA has encountered dilemma of cold war, supporting the radical Muslims to fight with Afghan Mujahiddens.⁴² so it can be said that Muslims rediscovered the Ummah, after three generation of isolation.

The relationship developed between Tajikistan's Islamists and Afghanistan's mujahideen during Jihad continued to thrive. Thus Afghanistan became a facilitator to export Islamic revolution to the central Asian republics of Soviet Union.⁴³ Most of the support of Islamic opposition had come from the areas near the Afghanistan border. The war and Rahkmanov's victory provided more chances for new and more militant Islamists, such as the Hizbul-Tahrir and the IMU, to gain more power among Tajikistan's Muslims. As a result of Afghan Jihad, Deobandism and Washbasin the two important Sunni Islamic sects held control in Tajikistan. IMU, HT and IRP are the examples to quote.

Facts verify that Islamic radicalists were successful among the urban educated middle and lower classes like students, teachers, government employees, unemployed

youth, etc and were considered as "strength" of the radicalisms. However, it was during this time of Islamic resurgence the west tagged the Islamic revivalism as Fundamentalism. Muslims carrying the flag of Islam were termed as terrorists. The term fundamentalist has been associated with; struggle against western political and economic control, rejection of modernity and western way of life⁴⁵ and the problem associated with retire states.⁴⁶

Elements of Islamic fundamentalism are present and some radically minded activists wanted an Islamic state. These activists were very few in number and were under the leadership of unofficial Mullahs. They were trained in far flung areas away from any official clergies. The roots of radicalization started in Tajikistan at the time when Haji Akbar included Imams, Peers and Mullahs within the prominent official positions.⁴⁷ These people established the core of Islamic Renaissance Party. If we analyze the situation it seems that the IRP became the focal opposition movement in the early days of the civil war, prompting Rashid to conclude that no other Islamic movement in Central Asia had ever been given such a chance as Tajikistan's IRP had received .⁴⁸ The main purpose of the party was to promote Islamic spiritual revival and not to establish an Islamic state. Tajikistan had gone a long way on the path of secularization; therefore, Badakhshanis were of the view that secular Tajikistan would be more prospering and flourishing. In that situation even if Islamic radicals wanted to have an Islamic state, the public would not accept it. Whereas, the opposition held the view that Islam was

important to regain the identity of Tajiks that they had lost during the Soviet rule.⁴⁹ Thus, none of the opposition proposals ever put the secular basis of the state in danger.

After the peace treaty of 1997, the popularity of the IRP declined dramatically, this was due to the losses acquired by the party during the civil war were great and thus the party lost its credibility and appeal in the masses. There were several other reasons for this deterioration, for instance, joining of Haji Akbar Turajonzoda in the government, membership of Sharif Himatzoda in the parliament, inclusion of IRP rebels into the army. Along with some other concessions made to the public by the state the Tajik refugees in Afghanistan were also allowed to come back. The conflicts and disputes between the party leaders was also one the reason of decline of the party. Many IRP commanders refused to join government and preferred Juma Namangani, an Uzbek leader.⁵⁰ IRP leadership changed with the death of Abdullha Nuri and Mohin-ud-din Kabiri was given charge in his place. He was known as liberal and modernist and believed in political structure that would help in spreading Islam.⁵¹ He also asserted the need for constitutional frame work.

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, wanted to reestablish the caliphate system with one single state over the entire Muslim world.⁵² This concept was popular in north of Tajikistan and increased its influence to the southern end of the Fergana valley and Dushanbe. The younger generation was more interested in the policies of HT and they started joining the party. This situation alarmed the government and the President asked

the moderate and the IRP leaders who had joined the government to preach Islam and Islamic educational activities. IRP was not so popular in north of Tajikistan.⁵³ The government of Tajikistan accused HT of working against Islam and banned it.⁵⁴ Because HT had rejected Sufism that was very popular in Central Asia and due to its anti-Shia campaign, the Shia communities in southern Uzbekistan and eastern Tajikistan remained at a distance from this movement.⁵⁵ HT also opposed Jews and Israel openly and had ignored the fact that a large Jewish community lived in Central Asia.⁵⁶ The movement was concerned more with international issues rather than daily life problems. It also wanted to take over each country and transform it in to an Islamic political state without giving any thought to sensitive economic, social and political problems of the region.⁵⁷

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan shared HT's aims; however, their way of achieving targets was different. The primary aim of IMU was to overthrow the Uzbek government and they started to accomplish their objective through violence. The crackdown by the Uzbek government resulted in migration of the Uzbek militants from the Fergana Valley to Tajikistan. When civil war started, they moved to Afghanistan with Tajik leaders and set up IRP base in Talogan.⁵⁸ IMU also started to make more international contacts with terrorist organizations and U.S. officials claimed that Osama bin Laden was a primary financier behind the establishment of the IMU. With the signing of peace treaty in 1997, Tajikistan was no longer considered as a consistent base for

Namangani operations.⁵⁹ For them the only option available was Afghanistan. The Namangani did not show any political flexibility and were against the peace treaty.⁶⁰

The facts are substantiated that Islamic ideology was gaining popularity among the people of the region. Quarries regarding the supporting factors that provoked Islamic militancy and its appeal to the population have been the subject of extensive research and analysis. Different analysts have different views over this subject. It is said that interpretation of Islam is the core element of militant movements. It was also observed that recruiting of the followers and fighters in the militant groups depend on the social and economic conditions of the countries in which they operate. Generally, unfavorable social and economic conditions of a country are an ideal environment for such groups. While support from external sources, ideological and financial, is considered as an added advantage.

After independence, Tajikistan lost nearly 50 percent of its state revenue which was transferred from Moscow, the barter system that brought food from other countries in exchange for cotton and aluminum was also severely damaged. The civil war had disrupted both agricultural and industrial production. It was the cotton industry that faced major loss.⁶¹ Ever since then, economic reforms has been uneven, privatization has occurred mainly in the services sector, and the overall economy remains in the state of decline. National revenue, housing, education, health and culture facilities issues were no longer significant.⁶² Eighty percent of the population lived below the poverty line.⁶³

Roger Bracke, head of International Federation of Red Cross mission to Tajikistan told that “we have seen children digging among rat holes in wheat fields, searching for the grain hoarded by the rodents for the winter. Competition with rats for food was a horrific illustration of the people’s battle to survive”⁶⁴ At the same time, population growth in Tajikistan increased, especially in rural area.⁶⁵ The poverty increased reason being unemployment particularly for youth.⁶⁶

Internally, the threats of Islamic extremism have further strengthened state measures towards it. This has led to restriction on democratic freedoms and adoption of harsh measures against non-militant and even non-political Muslims.⁶⁷ Repression has increased even in relatively liberal countries like Kyrgyzstan. The threat of Islamic extremism has increased tension as well as cooperation among central Asian nations in order to resist and combat the extremists.⁶⁸ However the level of tension is more than the efforts for cooperation due to increased disorder in Central Asian countries.

In July 2002, three Tajik citizens were arrested by coalition forces in Afghanistan and sent to Guantanamo Bay. Rakhmonov traveled to the northern town of Isfara, and made a significant speech in which he criticized the IRP in training people to become extremists which would result in splitting the society.⁶⁹ He claimed that “extremism” was being proliferated in mosques where IRP members were working as clergy.⁷⁰ After the speech there was a major crack down on unregistered mosques. Some of them very closed down and in some, number of imams were dismissed for “political activities”.⁷¹

This crackdown created more gap between the state and religious figures and has increased dissatisfaction among Muslims. It has been seen that population of Tajikistan supported the movements that are similar to the time of Prophet (PBUH) and four caliphs. Paula Newberg⁷² argued that across the region, weak economies are failing and the rule of strongmen has become well-established. Armed militancy has grown, not as ideology but as a way to express disagreement when other means are unavailable.

Although there is no common formal definition on the concept of nation, many scholars agree on some of its main features. For example, according to Kellas nation is a group of people who form a community on the basis of similar history, culture and common ancestry.⁷³ He stated that nations have a purpose which may include a territory, a language, a religion, or common descent. For some it is 'the supreme loyalty' for people who are prepared to die for their nation.⁷⁴ Tajiks as a nation do have objective and subjective characteristics, but what is missing is the soul of nationalism. The nation state system adopted, after independence, did not provide a sense of identity. The nationalist elites also were unable to establish their legitimacy and meet the hopes of people. In such situation, a heritage, grievances against other nationalities,⁷⁵ and most important common destiny for the future⁷⁶ can play a key role in building a national consciousness. Tajik national identity with the passage of time will take a firm roots but for that again the leaders have to adopt such policies which will help to develop a sense of common future for its citizens. The post 9/11 developments are indicators of resurgence of nationalism in Tajikistan but again in this scenario, Islamic forces seem to have brighter prospects. To

provide Tajiks their complete identity, only Islam can play a role by emerging as the only stabilizing factor.

The Islamist movement throughout remained the major opposition against the Tajik government. It is seen that Tajikistan will turn in to a secular state with some tolerance for religious activism.⁷⁷ The possibility that Islamic forces will be able to carry out their agenda for a religious state remains remote due to the following facts: One of the facts being that most of the religious leaders have received education under the Soviet system instead of Madrassahs due to which they easily accept the modern ideas. Even the mullahs are following this trend. Such groups of people who are influenced by the West beliefs it seems difficult that they would accept the mullah's concept of Islam. Furthermore Tajikistan's population are far better educated, their exposure to science and technology is greater, they have been greatly exposed to secular world view, than the population of any other Muslim country. The Soviet controlled educational system has changed the conceptual environment of the masses; it has transformed the intellectual multi-faceted opposition and presented different factions, and ideas.

Out of all the three Islamic opposition movements, IRP joined the parliament and the new leadership consisted of liberals and moderates. HT and IMU drew its ideology that is extremist Islam, from the external sources which were foreign to the region and did not mention the real problems of the region. With the passage of time they lost their popularity and following. This happened due to the policies adopted by the government,

because the policies of Tajik government would determine the political future as well as the nature and extent of the Islamic revival in the country. Authoritarianism reigned supreme, democracy was suppressed, and the Islamic revival curtailed, often through the use of force. The government response to the Islamists were crackdowns in which not only militants but also thousands of ordinary practicing Muslims were tortured and imprisoned for long periods.⁷⁸ The draconian measures enforced by the government forced even moderates and liberal reformers to join the rapidly swelling ranks of the militants. Due to this there was a decline in the economy and drug trafficking, ethnic unrest and terrorism increased.⁷⁹ The best way to eliminate the extremist elements from the country is to allow the Islamic practices, which would result in better economic and social conditions.

Tajikistan is dependent on Russia for economic and military support, and Russia cannot tolerate an Islamic government in Tajikistan. Rakhmanov's government supported anti Taliban coalition in order to get military, economic and political support from Russia. In addition, Uzbekistan's leaders are afraid of religious revolutionaries and will do everything possible to isolate Tajikistan as long as they consider them a threat.⁸⁰ There are different ways through which Afghanistan can influence the Tajik population. Therefore, peace and economic developments are the prerequisite for the better and normal relations between the two governments. In war against terrorism, Tajikistan joined the international community. Aid from the West and support in rebuilding the state

apparatus, rehabilitating agriculture and reconstructing of economy could play huge share not only in stabilizing Tajikistan but also in showing its neighbors the advantages of joining the global community and adhering to international standards of behavior and nation building.³¹

Tajikistan's government is at a critical crossroads. It can either consider the rise of Islam as terrorism, extremism or radicalism or as a part of reviving civil society and an emerging civil culture. For this, it has to make a distinction between Islamic activists, extremists, and terrorists. It seems in the future the Tajik government has to opt for the second option and for this; it has to provide a room for the supporter of Islam to express them selves in a democratic manner. As far as nationalism in Tajikistan is considered with the passage of time it will going to take firm roots because being the member of international community Tajikistan has to depend on nationalism for its survival.

NOTES

1. Beatrice Forbes Manz, *Asian Uprisings in the Nineteenth Century: Ferghana Under the Russians*, *Russian Review*, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 1987. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-0341\(198707\)46%3A3%3C267%3ACAUITN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C](http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-0341(198707)46%3A3%3C267%3ACAUITN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C)
2. Ibid.
3. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier- Quelqueja, *Islam In The Soviet Union*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1967, pp.32.
4. Helen Carrere' Encausses, " Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories, in Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, pp. 169-171.
5. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier- Quelqueja, op.cit., p. 32.
6. Ibid.
7. Abdullo Hakim Rahnamo, *From the end of the Bukhara Emirate to the post-Soviet times, an overview of the history and current situation of Islam in Tajikistan*, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/>
8. Ibid.
9. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier- Quelqueja, op.cit., p. 32.

10. Ahmad Hasan Dani, *New Light On Central Asia*, Lahore Senge- Meel Publications, 1993, p86.
11. Serge A. Zenkovasky, *Pan Turkism and Pan Islam in Russia*, Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1967, pp. 35, 80 and 81.
12. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier- Quelqueja, op.cit., p. 35
13. Arabic was the language of religion, Persian and Turkish were the languages of Literature and scholarship.
14. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier- Quelqueja, op.cit., p. 40.
15. Ibid.
16. Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.171.
17. Hickson Jill E, "Using Law to Create National Identity: The course to democracy in Tajikistan", *Texas International Law Journal*, Vol. 38, Spring 2003, p. 349. Cited in Suhrobsho Davlatshoev , *The Formation And Consolidation Of Pamiri Ethnic Identity In Tajikistan*, etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12607111/index.pdf -
18. James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* , Second Edition, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998, p. 3. cited in Ibid.
19. Hickson Jill E, op.cit., p. 354.

20. Muriel Atkin, "Religious, National, and Other Identities in Central Asia", in Jo-Ann Gross, (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia*, Duke University Press, London, 1992, p. 55.
21. Ibid.
22. The idea was taken from James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty*, Oxford: Westview press, 1991.
23. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Why did Nationalism fail in Tajikistan, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 7, 1996, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3955/is_n7_v48/ai_19226485/.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Shireen T Hunter, "Religion, Politics, and Security in Central Asia", *SAIS Review* Vol. 21, No.2 (Summer/Fall 2001), p. 69. http://muse.jhu.edu/cgi-bin/access.cgi?url=/journals/sais_review/v021/21.2hunter.html
28. Ibid.
29. Yousef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, London: Pinter, 1997, p. 57.

30. Central Asia: Islam And The State, *ICG Asia Report*, No. 59, Osh/Brussels, 10 July 2003. www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/files2/03-07-10Report%20Islam%20and%20State.pdf
31. Abdullo Hakim Rahnamo, op.cit.
32. *Central Asia: Islam And The State*, op.cit.
33. Ibid.
34. Azade-Ayse Rolic, "Islam And nationalism: Central asia And kazakhstan Under Soviet rule", in William Fierman, ed., *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*, Boulder: Westview press, 1991, p.208
35. *Central Asia: Islam And The State*, op.cit.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Why did Nationalism fail in Tajikistan, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 7, 1996, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3955/is_n7_v48/ai_19226485/.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.

41. Poonam Mann, Religious Extremism In Central Asia, *Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA*, Vol. XXV No. 9, December 2001
http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_dec01map01.html

42. Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, Lahore: Vanguard Books (pvt) Ltd, 2002, p 43-44.

43. Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Mohammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994, p. 251. Cited in Mukhtar Ahmed Ali, *Afghanistan-Tajikistan Relations: A Study of Impact of Transnational Influences of Afghan Jihad and Civil War on Tajikistan*. QAU: Islamabad (Unpublished), 1997.

44. Ernest Gellner, *Post Modernism: Reason and Religion*, London: Routhledge, 1992.

45. John L Esposito, *The Islamic Threat Myth or Reality*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

46. Ira M Lapidus, " Islamic Political Movements: Pattern of Historical Change", in Edmund Burke II and Ira M Lapidus, ed., *Islam: Political and Social Movements*, Berkely: University of California Press, 1988.

47. Shahram Akbarzadeh , op.cit.

48. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit., p. 100. cited in *The Global Review of Ethno politics*, Vol. 3, No. 2, January 2004,

http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_III/issue_2/cummings.pdf

49. Shahram Akbarzadeh , op.cit
50. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid, p. 116-117.
53. Ibid., p 130
54. Based on discussion with ambassador of Tajikistan in Islamabad.
55. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit.
56. Ibid., pp. 122-123.
57. Ibid., p122.
58. Ibid., p. 140.
59. Ibid., p. 147.
60. Ibid.

61. Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Tajikistan, November 2005 <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/tjtoc.html>
62. Ibid.
63. *The News*, 30 July 2004
64. *The News*, 3 September, 2001.
65. Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Tajikistan, November 2005 <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/tjtoc.html>
66. Shireen T Hunter, op.cit.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Central Asia: Islam And The State, ICG Asia Report №59, Osh/Brussels, 10 July 2003.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Paula Newberg, “Central Asia and Democracy” *Los Angeles Times*, 19 November, 2000.cited in Ahmed Rashid, op.cit., pp136-137.
73. James G. Kellas, op.cit.

74. Ibid.
75. A. D. Smith, *National Identity*, op. cit., p. 14.
76. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nations*, Cambridge: M. A. Harvard University Press, 1959, p. 91.
77. Shirin T Hunter, op.cit.
78. Ibid.
79. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit.
80. Shirin T Hunter, op.cit.
81. Ahmed Rashid, op.cit.

ENVER PASHA'S REBELION IN TURKESTAN

In the latter part of March, 1922, Enver Pasha with 200 sowars and Machine-guns left Bokhara for Kizil Tappa to fight the Bokharan rebels. The following day news was received in Bokhara that Enver Pasha and his men joined the rebels. The rebels at that time were said to exceed 20,000 divided into 3 main bodies, at Baisun, Termez and Shahr-I-Sabz respectively. Enver Pasha was appointed leader. The object of the rebel was stated to be the occupation of the whole Bokhara and reinstatement of the Amir of Bokhara. The available Bolshevik troops were inadequate to meet this threat and every effort was made to bring up reinforcements. On the 20th April 15,000 well – equipped troops from Samarkand and Charjui were collected at Kagan, 8,000 of these being subsequently sent to Karshi, which place the rebels from Shahr-I-Sabz endeavored to surround. Heavy fighting is reported to have ensued and the Bolsheviks claimed that they had defeated the rebels and driven them towards Samarkand. A report dated the 2nd May stated that heavy fighting was in progress around Termez which place had been isolated from Kilif by the rebel occupation of Chushk Guzar

The Bolsheviks at this period were hard put to it to hold the towns on the railway whilst the rebels were reported to be in great strength and to command the province. On

the 10th May the rebels attacked and captured the town of Shahr-I-Sabz after fierce fighting. The Bolsheviks continued to concentrate troops at Karshi. The Ex Amir at this juncture distributed notices throughout the province calling for a Holy war against the Bolsheviks. These notices stated that Ex Amir did not desire to become king again but wished to help clear the foreigners from Islamic territory. A rebel attack on Kerminch on the 11th May failed after 6 hours fighting and the rebel withdrew unpursued. On the 19th May Enver Pasha was reported to be proceeding from Baisun to Shirabad, the rebel at his command were estimated at 30,000, and the immediate object was the capture of Termez, which was still holding out, and for the relief of which Bolshevik troops were advancing from Kerki.

The rebel forces entered Termez on the 8th June but were eventually driven off and the river route opened to Termez. fighting was continued six miles north and east of the town. In the mean time Enver Bey, personally commanding a rebel detachment had captured Shirabad inflicting heavy losses on the Bolsheviks. During June Bolsheviks continued to bring reinforcements almost daily into Charjui, Karshi, Guzar and Kerki. In the middle of June heavy fighting took place round Shahr-I-Sabz which the Bolsheviks occupied. Further fighting in the neighbourhood of Derbend resulted in a reverse for the Bolsheviks, who decided to concentrate a sufficient force at Karshi to defeat Enver. In the middle of July Enver was reported to be between Guzar and Shahr-I-Sabz; the rebel forces 25,000 having captured the latter on July 9th and advanced to within six miles of the former place. The Russian troops in that area were estimated to be not more than 15,000.

A battle was fought near Guzar lasting 24 hours, the Russians losing one fort and the town being practically surrounded by rebels. Casualties on both sides were said to be heavy. At the same time the rebels attacked the Russian outposts at Bokhara and after three days fighting were driven back, with heavy loss, by troops arriving from Kagan. The rebels were also reported to have renewed their attacks on Termez during this period, their number in this area being estimated at 20,000 under Ali Beg Effendi.

On the 10th August the Bolsheviks announced that they had defeated the rebel forces of Enver Pasha and had occupied Baisun. Subsequently reports stated that Enver Pasha had been killed, these have been repeated and denied frequently, though the weight of evidences is in favour of his death. x

The back of the rebellion appears to have been broken by this defeat, but the rebels have taken up a guerilla warfare in the Eastern mountains of Bokhara which seems likely to continue for months, if not for years.

x "The Times" dated 10.11.22 states their Meshed correspondent reports Enver to be certainly living.

(It'd). P.M.R.

Source: OIOC Catalogue No.L/P&S/10/837, Accession No, 987, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

INTERVIEW WITH
TAJIKISTAN AMBASSADOR

Q: There were emerging signs of Tajik nationalism under Gorbachove, then why civil war started in Tajikistan, which shows that nationalism fails in the country?

Ans: Up till 20th century, there was no word as nationalism for the Tajiks. Nationalism had been taken in a negative sense. After independence, there were economic and some other problems that were exploited by some segments/ leaders of Tajikistan. So coalition government was formed and that even cannot solve the economic problems. That government was a failure. Peace agreement was signed, and leadership has been changed. Mr Nuri is dead, he was 59 year of age and his deputy Mohinuddin Kabiri, is a liberal and moderate and is a PhD in politics and was my ex student. Tajik people are more patriotic than nationalist.

Q: In Tajikistan, do you agree that Islamic resurgence is more at society level than among the upper level that is government?

Ans: 99 percent to 97 percent Tajiks are Muslims. Tajikistan, still is a secular democratic state. Government level has Shura-e-Ulma, who advises Mufti. Mufti in Tajikistan gave fatwas. Regions have their own Muftis. A leader of Muftis is Imam Iman Ullah khan. Mosques are registered with committee of Religious Affairs. In this way government helps to understand Islam and there is no confusion among masses related to any religious issues.

Q: After independence how you see Islam in Tajikistan?

Ans: From 1991 to 1997, religious groups like Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, they are active in Tajikistan. Out of these only 10% to 15% are the Muslim groups, like Agha Khan Group. They came to help poor people. All of them were active at different regional levels with no net work for whole of the country. Peace agreement was signed between opposition and government. That was remarkable. It was signed not because of some conciliation between different ideologies but due to the fact that there was realization among the leaders that war is of no use and they have to work together for the development of the country. Now the whole country is under the government control. President Imam Ali Rakhmanov, gave emphasis on education. Modern technology has been preferred.

Two schools are built for orphans; quotas are for the girls in universities. The point to emphasis is that we pay more attention to the development of Tajikistan.

Q: It has been said that radicalism in Islam in Tajikistan has external dimension, like jihad in Afghanistan. Do you agree that Islam in your country has been radicalized?

Ans: No. I don't agree that Islam in Tajikistan has been radicalized. Hizbul-Nizhat-i-Islam, IRP, is working with the government. Hizbul-Tahrir is banned in the country on the plea that its against Islam and it has been formed by the Jews. Its lost its following in Tajikistan.

Q: How you see future of Islam in Tajikistan?

Ans: More preference is given to the education rather than religious education. Students in Tajikistan are more civilized. This civilized the religion which is good. Even in Kulyab region, a Mullah established a school; it's a school on modern lines with modern education.

It, religion, also depends on important factor and that is in those places where people don't have modern facilities or clubs or schools or inns or theaters people definitely go to the mosques. But in places like Dushanbe, where there are theaters, clubs, entertainment facilities people hardly go to mosques. Its all about

facilities. People of Tajikistan are as patriotic as people of Pakistan.

Q: After 9/11, Russia and USA pressurized Tajik government to control Islamic Militancy? How government responded to the public criticism? As in Pakistan president Musharaf has to pacify the opposition and the public.

Ans: The war against terrorism is not a war against Islam. Its against narcotics, terrorism and rule of Talibans'. Even president told in a conference in Kazakhstan that Islam is a clean religion. But terrorist have no religion. Its not Islam who are targeted its terrorists who will be dealt with iron hands and Tajikistan is with the international community in war against terrorism.

INTERVIEW / DISCUSSION WITH

DR AHMED HASSAN DANI

Q How you see a Tajik society?

Ans. I have been visiting Tajikistan since 1964 and I have been given the citizenship of Tajikistan also. So I can say that it's some what like Pakistan. Their culture, customs, way of living all resembles Pakistan, even the food. Except that Pakistani has more spicy food than Tajiki, even Tajik people eat bariyani, which is the most favorite food in Pakistan. Even Dholl, drums, which Tajiks beat on their marriage ceremonies, just like the same we use in Pakistan. North is more developed, industrialized and with political consciousness. South of Tajikistan resembles Pakistan. More villages are in south; their way of living is just as in Pakistan. If some one goes from Pakistan to south of Tajikistan one cannot find any difficulty over their. You feel at home in Tajikistan.

Q. Its mean in Tajik society there is clear demarcation for the male and female roles, like Pakistan?

Ans. Yes. Male are preferred to do work in the fields, outside jobs and females they stay at home and take care of their family. Like Pakistan rural areas, Tajik in the rural areas preferred to have large family. More children are considered an assert.

Q. Its mean Tajik have more influence on Pakistan or it's the other way round?

Ans. Its both the way. 60 percent of blood of people of Pakistan came from Central Asia. Tajik Farsi came to Pakistan. Urdu is derived from the Tajik Farsi and not from the Iranian language. Kashmiri language resembles the Tajik language. Islam in the region came from Central Asia. Same is the case related to dress, sari, shalwar kameez, kelash caps all came from Central Asia. Even the system of government came from Bukhara and Samarkand in the sub continent. As Taxila is the important place between Central and South Asia so from Pakistan it's the Buddhism that penetrated to Central Asia.

Q. What impact Russians have on Tajik society?

Ans. The same British had on our society. Strong Russian influence can be seen in the major cities of Tajikistan. Almost all the important cities have all the recreation facilities, theaters, cinemas, modern schools, universities, hospitals and even the modern educated elites. In the rural areas strong Tajik customs and way of living are still survived.

Q. How much it has its impact on the religion of the Tajik people?

Ans. Strong religious way of living can be seen in rural areas. As Soviet government cannot penetrate in the far flung areas of Tajikistan, still people observe religious festivals and majority of the people preferred to offer pray, five times, in the mosques. Even in majority houses of the villages, had underground rooms. In those rooms they gave religious education, like teaching of Holy Quran, to the children and they covered the top of the room with rugs or furniture. One cannot guess that they had such a room under their house. Also the rural community was so much knitted together that if some Soviet officials came to their village, they immediately spread this news to their fellow villager and it's a signal to take precautionary measures and hide all the religious or Islamic literature.

In urban areas one can find hardly few people go the mosques and offer ray. Still majority of the Communist party Of Tajikistan members have a preference to observe a religious life cycle rituals.

Q. This means, faith that is religion was stronger under soviet rule?

Ans. Yes. Main reason for this was the realization that Communists are anti Islamic and trying to make people Kafir, unbeliever. That was more related to way of living. Even for example Communist Party members registered for their

marriages but when they came home they go for nikkah, and they tried to follow all the rituals related to religion. In rural areas also people follow their religious traditions.

Q. Beside faith, what are the other means which helped the Islam to survive under the Soviet rule?

Ans. There are different ways to keep your faith alive. Family structure, as in a joint family system grand father, grand mother tell children about their religion. Than strong sense of community also helps to keep the religious feelings intact.

Your eating habits also are the one way to make you remember that you are a Muslim.

External influence is also important. People in Tajikistan, for instance were keen to know about the Iranian revolution and also the afghan jihad was considered as a part of the revival of that Tajik religion. For me the important source was the Muslim foreigners who visited Tajikistan. Once I was offering a namaz in a mosque that a man came to me and when he knew that I am from Pakistan he asked me so many question related to religion and also he asked me a gift of Quran. I had only small holy Quran so I gave it to him.

Q. Do you think Tajik language was more influenced by the Iranian language?

Ans. No. Iranian Farsi is modernized, while Tajik language is the old Persian. It's more difficult to learn and understand than the Iranian language. Shah-e-name-e-Firdousi is also a sacred for the Tajiks and almost every house in the country has this book. Also they considered prestigious to read Allama Iqbal. In rural areas where people cannot read and write, still majority of them do memorize the Shahnama.

Q. What you think are the main problems in building a strong tajik nation?

Ans. Regionalism and the way Tajikistan was carved by Stalin. A Khojend district from Uzbekistan was moved to Tajikistan. Decision never liked by the Khojendis who always tried to maintain their links with Uzbekistan. Still the older generation remembers the period when their area was not a part of Tajikistan, and they considered their distinctness from Tajikistan, south of Tajikistan, as backward. To Gorono badakhsahan, most of Tajiks considered them not as a true Tajiks

Also stalin's campaign of mass migration had a negative impact on the Tajik nationality. The new settlers instead of integrating with the local population became a separate sub ethnic group known as Garmis by their neighbours.

The resettlement was not welcomed by the mountaineers. It is common in Tajikistan that each community hardly knows about its neighbours.

Q. On what pyramid Tajik can build their nationalism?

Ans. Islam. Religion is the important aspiration for them to forge a sense of nationalism among their people. Also they have an enriched history, historical figures, plus all the ingredients of a nation state. Then present government has to give a sense of belonging to all Tajiks, irrespective of their ethnicity or area of residence.

Q. How you see the future of Islam in Tajikistan?

Ans. Tajik society is conservative, you can say that. The positive point is that Tajik have 97 percent educated and even their Mullahs they are educated. Also people do not listen to those who are against their religion for instance wahhabis. Wahhabis considered going to holy shrines as biddat. While Tajiks they preferred to go to the shirines of their pirs.

The Islam and Tajikistan are interwoven. You cannot separate them. By nature tajik people are peace loving and future of Islam is going to be liberal and moderate, As far as extremisms is considered its not going to stay for long.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Documents

Bokharan Affairs: 1924-1934, Local/ NWFP, Accession No, 1401, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Bolshevik and pan-Islamic Movement and Connected Information, L/MIL/17/14/9, Accession No, 4338, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Bolshevik Propaganda in Central Asia, L/P&S/11/ 159, Accession No, 7033, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Central Asia: Final Collapse of Anti-Bolshevik Forces in Farghana 30 Dec 1919 – Mar 1925, L/P&S/11/ 66 Accession No, 7043, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

The Pamir Commission, OIOC Catalogue No. R/12/1075/215-216, Accession No, 3866, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Pan Islamism: Movements in Farghana, OIOC Catalogue No. L/P&S/18 A, Accession No, 259, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Rebellion in Turkestan Against Russian Formations, OIOC Catalogue No. L/P&S/10/837, Accession No, 987, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Reports on Afghanistan, Kashmir, Gilgit and Central Asia, Local/ NWFP, Accession No, 1447, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Russian Advance in Asia: Capturing of Different Parts of Central Asia, OIOC Catalogue No. L/P&S/18, Accession No, 258, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Russian Advance in Central Asia, L/P&S/20/Memo, Accession No, 6875, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Some Indications of the Economic Policy of the Soviet in Afghanistan, L/PO/5/ 23, Accession No, 8102, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Soviet Afghan Frontier Agreement, OIOC Catalogue No. L/P&S/12/1672, Accession No, 3692, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Who's Who in Central Asia, L/P&S/20/A122, Accession No, 6565, National Documentation Center, Islamabad.

Personal interviews

Saidbeg Saidov. Ambassador of Republic of Tajikistan.

Dr. Ahmed Hassan Dani. Honorary citizen of Republic of Tajikistan.

Unpublished Thesis

Ahmad, Irum, *Political and economic Development in Uzbekistan 1991-1997*. Quaid-e-Azam University: Islamabad, 2005.

Ali, Lubna Abid, *Foreign Policy Behaviour of a Post Revolutionary State: A Case Study Of Iran 1979-2002*. Quaid-e-Azam University: Islamabad, 2003.

Ali, Mukhtar Ahmed Ali, *Afghanistan-Tajikistan Relations: A Study of Impact of Transnational Influences of Afghan Jihad and Civil War on Tajikistan*. QAU: Islamabad, 1997.

Qureshi, Z.A, *Islam Vs Nationalism: A Case Study Of Uzbekistan*. Quaid-e-Azam University: Islamabad, 2004.

PUBLISHED SOURCES

Books

Adsheal. S.A.M, *Central Asia in World Politics*. London: The Macmillan Press, 1993.

Ahmad, Mumtaz, ed., *State and Politics in Islam*. Indiana Polis: American Trust Publications, 1987.

Ahmar, Moonis, *Contemporary Central Asia*. Karachi: Agha Jee Printers, 1995.

Ahmed, Akbar S, *From Samarkand to Stornoway: Living Islam*. London: B.B.C. Books,

1993.

Ahmed, Ishtiaq, *The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan*. Lahore: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987,

Ahmed, Manzooruddin, *Islamic Political System in the Modern Age: Theory and Practices*. Karachi: Saad Publication, 1983.

Ahmed, Mohammad Aziz, *The Nature of Islamic Political Theory*. Karachi: Ma'aref Ltd, 1975.

Ahmed, Oeyamuddin, *The Wahhabi Movement in India*. New Dehli: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 1994

Ahmed, Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Akiner, Shirin, ed. *Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia*. London: Kegan Paul International, 1990.

Akiner, Shirin, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*. London: KPL Ltd, 1986.

Akiner Shirin, Sardar Jideman and Jon Hay, ed, *Sustainable Development in Central Asia*. Great Britain: Curzon Press, 1998.

Akiner, Shirin, ed., *Economic and Political Trends in Central Asia*. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1992.

Akiner, Shirin, ed. *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, an Historical Overview*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994.

Ali, Agha Shaukat, *Modernization of Soviet Central Asia: An Example of Socialist Construction*. Lahore: Punjab University Press, 1964.

Ali, Mahmud, *Nation and Nationality*. Lahore: Zulfiqar & Co., 1976

Ali, Shaukat, *Intellectual Foundation of Muslim Civilization*. Lahore: Publishers United, 1977.

Ali, Tariq, ed, *The Stalinist Legacy*. Harmondsworty: Penguin, 1984.

Allworth, Edward A, *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present – A Cultural History*. Stanford, Stanford University, 1990.

- Allworth, Edward, ed, *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.
- Allworth, Edward, ed, *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994.
- Amalrik, A, *Will The Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*. UK: Penguin Books, 1980.
- Amin, Tahir, *Nationalism and Internationalism in Liberalism, Marxism and Islam*. Islamabad: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1991.
- Amin, Tahir, *Ethno – National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factor*. Islamabad: IPS, 1988.
- Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London and New York, 1999.
- Anderson, John, *The international politics of Central Asia*. Manchester University Press, 1997.
- Asaf, K.M. and Abul Barakat, *Central Asia: Internal and External Dynamics*. Islamabad: Pan Graphics (Pvt.) Ltd., 1997.
- Asimov, Makhamed, *Tajikistan*. Moscow: Movosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987
- Atabaki, Tonraj and John O’Kane, *Post-Soviet Central Asia*. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998.
- Atkin, Muriel, *The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan*. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989.
- Ayoob, Mohammad, ed, *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*. New York: St. Martin Press, 1981.
- Ayubi, Nazih, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. London: Routledge, 1991
- Aziz, K. K., *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*. National Book Foundation, 1977.
- Bacon, Elizabeth E, *Central Asians Under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change*.

USA: Cornell University, 1980.

Baldick Julian. *Imaginary Muslims: The Uwaysi Sufis of Central Asia*. Irvington: New York University Press, 1994.

Banuazizi, Ali & Weiner, Myron eds., *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics:*

Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1986

Banuazizi, Ali and Myron Weiner, eds., *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Becker, Seymour, *Russian's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva (1865-1924)*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press Cambridge, 1968.

Beningsen, Alexandre and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide*. London: C. Hurst & Co., 1985.

Benningsen, Alexandre, and Broxup, Marie, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet state*. London: Croom Helm, 1983.

Benningsen, Alexandre, and Qrelquejay, Chantal, *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR and Their Linguistic Problem.*, Oxford: St. Antodny College.

Benningsen, Alexandre, and Wimbush, S Enders, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979.

Benningsen, Alexandre; Henze, Paul B.; Tanham, George K.; and Wimbush, S Enders, *Soviet Strategy and Islam*. London: Macmillan Press, 1989.

Bialer, Sewery, ed, *The Domestic Contest of Soviet Foreign Policy*. London: Croom Helm, 1981.

Birch, Anthony H., *Nationalism and National Integration*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989.

Blaut, James M., *The National Question: Decolorizing the Theory of Nationalism*. London: Zeb Books Ltd, 1987.

Bremmer, Ian and Ray Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Bremmer, Ian and Ray Taras, eds., *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

- Brass, Paul R., *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991.
- Bremmer, Ian and Ray Taras, ed., *New States, New Politics: Building the Post Soviet Nation*., London: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Brohi, A. K., *Islam in the Modern world*. Lahore: Publishers United, 1975.
- Bushkov,Valentin, *Anatomy of the civil war in Tajikistan*. Moscow: Russian Academy of Science, 1997.
- Buzan, B. *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1983.
- Buzan,Barry, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London, Lynne Rienner,1998.
- Camilleri, Joseph & FALK, Jim *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*. England, Edward Elgar, 1992
- Cantwell, Wilfred, *Islam in Modern History*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Canfield, Robert L., ed. *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Caroe, Olaf, *Soviet Empire: the Turks of Central Asia and Stalinims*. London: Macmillan Press, 1967.
- Central Asian Books. Tajikistan 1994*. Benson, VT: Chalidze Publications, 1994.
- Carter, Stephen K., *Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1990.
- Chipman, John (Dir.), *The Military Balance 1995-1996*, London, IISS, October 1995.
- Chipman, John (Dir.), *The Military Balance 1998/99*, London, IISS, 1998.
- Choueiri, Yousef M, *Islamic Fundamentalism*. London: Printers, 1997.

- Choudhry, G. W, *Islam and the Contemporary World*. London: Indus Thames Publishers Limited, 1990.
- Clark, Graham, *The Identity of Man*. London: Mathuen & co. Ltd., 1983.
- Coates, Z. K., and W. P., *Soviets in Central Asia*. London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd, 1951.
- Cobban, Alfred, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination*. London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1969.
- Cohen, P. Stephen, ed., *The Soviet Union Since Stalin*. London: Macmillan, 1980.
- Cole, J.L.R and N.R. Keddie ,ed., *Shi'ism and Social Protes*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
- Congest, Robert, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment*. London: Pimlico Press, 1990.
- Conquest, Robert, ed., *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.
- Cooley, K. John, *Unholy Wars Afghanistan America and International Terrorism*. London: Pluto Press, 2000.
- Cumnigs, Sally N, ed., *Power and Change in Central Asia*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Daftary,Farhad, *A Short History of the Ismailis*. Edinburgh University Press, 1998.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan, *New Light on Central Asia*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1993.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan, *Central Asia Today*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1996.
- Dannreuther,Roland, *Creating New States in Central Asia*. Halstan & Co. Ltd, 994.
- Davis, Horace B., ed., *The National Question*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.
- Davutoglo, Dr. Ahmet, *Civilization Transformation and the Muslim World*. Kuala Lumpur: Mahir Publications, 1994.
- Dawisha, A., ed., *Islam in Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

- Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce. *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics Upheaval*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce, *Conflict, cleavage, and change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*. Cambridge University Press 1997.
- Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce, *The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective*. New York: 1997.
- Dentsch Karl W, *National and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality*, Cambridge: Mass MIT Press, 1966.
- Deweese, Devin, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994.
- Diller, Daniel C., ed, *Russia and the Independent States*. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1993.
- Din ,Shanms-ud- and Bhashwati Sarkar, *Afghanistan and Central Asia in the New Great Game*, New Delhi: Lancer's Books, 2003.
- Diuk, Nadia, and Adrian Karatnycky, *The Hidden Nations: The People Challenge the Soviet Union*. New Jersey: William Morrow, 1990.
- Djalili, Mohammed Reza, Frederic Grare and Shirin Akiner, ed., *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence*. Great Britain: T.J. International, 1998.
- Donald, W. Treadgold, ed., *Twentieth Century Russia*. London: Westview Press, 1987.
- Donohue, John J, and Esposito, John L., ed., *Islam in Transition*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Duchacek, Ivo D, *The Territorial Dimension of Politics Within, Among and Across Nations*. London: Westview Press, 1986.
- Dunn, Dennis J., ed., *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union*. London: WestView Press, 1977.

Dyker, David A., ed., *The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Prospect for Reforms*. London: Croom Helm, 1987.

E.J.Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Eickelman, Dale F., ed., *Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.

Embree, Ainslie T., *Encyclopedia of Asian History*. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1988.

Emerson, Rupter, *From Empire to Nations*. Cambridge: M. A. Harvard University Press, 1959.

Enayat, Hamid, *Islamic Political Thought*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982.

Encausse, Helene Carrere d', *Islam and Russian Empire: Reforms and Revolution in Central Asia*, London: I. B. Tauris and Co, 1988.

Enginees, Ashgar Ali, *Theory and Practise of Islamic State*. Lahore Vanguard Books Ltd, 1985.

Esposito, John L., *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Esposito, John L., *Voices of Resurgent Islam*. Oxford: University Press, 1991.

Esposito, John L., ed., *Islam and Development: Religion and Socio-political Change*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980.

Esposito, John, *Islam and Politics*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991.

Fadin, Andrey, Yuri Kulchik, and Victor Sergeev. *Central Asia after the Empire*. London : Pluto Press, 1996.

Fainsod, Merle, *How Russia is Ruled?* London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Ferdinand, Peter, *The New Central Asia and Its Neighbours*. London: Printer Publisher Ltd, 1994.

- Fierman, William, ed., *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
- Fishman Joshua, ed., *Language and Ethnic Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Franck, Irene and Brownstone, David, *The Silk Road: A History*. New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986.
- Frye, Richard N, *Islamic Iran and Central Asia (7th – 12th Centuries)*. London: Variorum Reprints, 1979.
- Fuller, Graham E, *Central Asia: The New Geopolitics*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1992.
- Fyzee, Asaf A. A., *A Modern Approach to Islam*. New York: Asian Publishing House, 1963.
- Gall, Carlotta and De Waal, Thomas et al. *Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus*. New York: New University Press, 1998.
- Gans, c., *The Limits of Nationalism*. UK: Cambridge University press, 2003.
- Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1983.
- Ghani, Abdul, *A Review of the Political Situation in Central Asia*. Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1980.
- Giampaolo R. Capisani, *The Handbook of Central Asia-A Comprehensive Survey of the New Republics*. London: Tauris Publishers, 2000.
- Girling, D. A., *Everyman's Encyclopedia, Vol. II*. London: JM Dent and Sons Ltd, 1978.
- Gleason, Greoge, *Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR*. London: Westview Press, 1990.
- Goddard, Hugh, *Christians and Muslims: From Double Standards to Mutual Understanding*. Great Britain: T.J. Press (Pad Slow) Ltd., 1995.
- Gohan, M.J., *The Taliban: Ascent to Power*. UK: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Goron, Leonard, and Alex Pravda, eds. *Who's Who in Russia and the New States*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1993.

- Gross, Jo-Ann, ed., *Muslims in Central Asia*. London: Duke University Press, 1992.
- Grunebaum, G. E. Bon, *Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity*. Los Angeles: The Near Eastern Centre (University of California), 1962.
- Haghighyeghi, Mehrdad, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- Hajda, Lubomyr, and Beissinger, Mark, ed., *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
- Haq, Mazhar-ul-Din, *Principles of Political Science*. Lahore: Bookland Publishers, 1985.
- Harmstone, Teresa Rakowska, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadjikistan*. London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.
- Hasan, Zoya; Jha, S. N.; and Khan, Rasheeduddin, *The State, Political Process and Identity: Reflection on Modern India*, New Delhi: Sage Publication.
- Hauner, Milan, *What is Asia to us? Russia's Heartland Yesterday and Today*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.
- Held, David, *Central Perspectives on the Modern State*. The Open University Press, 1983.
- Helmut, Sonnenfeld, *Soviet Politics in the 1980's*. London: Westview Replica Edition, 1985.
- Henry, Huttenbach, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies*, London, 1990.
- Hippler, Jochen and Andrea Lueg, *The Next Threat: Western Perception of Islam*. London: Pluto Press, 1995.
- Hiro, Dilip, *Between Marx and Mohammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994
- Holdich, T. Hungerford, *Through Central Asia*. Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt.) Ltd., 1996.
- Holloway, John and Picciotto, Sol, ed., *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate*. London: Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd, 1978.

Holt, P. M., Lambton, Ann S.; and Lewis, Bernard, ed., *The Cambridge History of Islam Vol. I*. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970.

Horseman, Matthew and Marshall, Andrew. *After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder*, Harper Collins, 1994.

Hoskins, G., *History of the Soviet Union*, UK: Fontana Press, 1985.

Hostler, Charles Warren, *The Turks of Central Asia*. Westport: Praeger, 1993.

Hostler, Charles Warren, *Turkism and the Soviet: The Turks of the World and their Objective.*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1957.

Hunter, Shireen T. *Central Asia Since Independence*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996.

Hunter, Brian, ed., *The Statesman's Year-Book 1992-1993*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

Hunter, Brian, ed. *The Statesman's Year-Book 1993-1994*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Hunter, Brian, ed. *The Statesman's Year-Book 1994-1995*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

Hunter, Brian, ed. *The Statesman's Year-Book 1995-1996*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

Inoyatv, Khamid, *Central Asia and Kazakistan Before and After the October Revolution*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966.

Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan. Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982.

Ituttenback, Itenry R, *Soviet Nationality Policy: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR*. New York: Mansell, 1990.

Jackson, Robert J and Michael B. Stein, *Issues in Comparative Politic.*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971.

Jalalzai, Musa Khan, *International Relations and Current Affairs*. Lahore: Prince Book Depot, 1992.

Jalalzai,, Musa Khan, *The Pipeline War in Afghanistan*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003.

Jalalzai,, Musa Khan, *Central Asia: Political Situation and Economic Opportunities*,Lahore: The Frontier Post Publication, 1994.

Jed: C. Synder, *After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia*. Washington: National Defense University Press.1995.

Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg e., *The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of Islam*, London: Pluto Press

Kaiser, Robert J. *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Kaker, M. Massan. *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995.

Kalyuzhnova, Yalena and Dov Lynch,ed, *The Euro-Asian World-A Period ofTransition*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

Karasik, Theodore, *Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Future Persian Gulf Security*. California: Rand, 1993.

Kaul, T. N., *The Future of Commonwealth of Independent States: Will it Survive?* New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1992.

Kedourie, Elie, ed., *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*. New York: The World Publishing Company, 1970.

Kedourie, Elie , *Nationalism*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960.

Keebles, Curtis, ed., *The Soviet State: The Comistic Roots of Soviet Foreign policy*. England: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985.

Kellas, James G. *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

- Kelley, D.R., *Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era*. New York: Praeger, 1980.
- Kelly, Marjorie, ed., *Islam: The Religion and Political Life of the World Community*. New York: Praeger, 1984.
- Kellas, James G., *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*. New York: St.Martin's Press, 1998.
- Kettani, M. Ali, *Muslims Minorities in the World Today*. Rawalpindi: Services Books Club, 1990.
- Khadduri, Majid, *The Islamic Law of Nations*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.
- Khalil, Jahanzeb, *Mujahideen Movement in Malakand and Mohmand Agencies (1900-1940)*. Islamabad: Pan Graphics Pvt. Ltd., 2000
- Khan, M. Rafiq, *Islam and Muslims in Red Regime*. Lahore: Darulfikir, 1970.
- Khan, Quamaruddin, *The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyah*. Lahore: Islamic Book foundation, 1983.
- Khilji, Jalaluddin, ed., *Muslim Celebrities and Central Asia*. Peshawar: Area Study Centre University of Peshawar, 200.
- Klass, Rosanne, *Afghanistan The great game Revisited*. New York: Freedom House, 1987,
- Kleveman, Lutz C., *The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia*. London: Yale University press, 2003.
- Kohn, Hans, *The Idea of Nationalism*. New York: Macmillan, 1967.
- Kozolov, Victor, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*. Bloomington: Indiana University press, 1988.
- Krader, Lawrence, *Peoples of Central Asia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1962.
- Kulichenko, M., *Nations and Social Progress*. Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1984.
- Kunitz, Joshna, *Dawn over Sammarkand: Rebirth of Central Asia*, Calcutta, 1943.

- Kurzman, Charles, *Liberal Islam: A Source Book*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Landau, Jacob M, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- Latin, D., *Identity in Formation: The Russian speaking population in the Near Abroad*. New York: Cornell university Press, 2000.
- Lewis, Robert A., ed, *Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia*, London, Routledge, 1992.
- Lohbeck, Kurt *Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA's Secret War in Afghanistan*, Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1993.
- Lubin, Nancy. *Central Asians Take Stock*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995.
- Luong, Pauline Jones, *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia. Power, Perceptions, and Facts*, Cambridge: University Press, 2002.
- Magnus, Ralph H., and Eden Naby, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, Pakistan: Westview Press, 1998.
- Mahmood, Safdar, *International Affairs*, Lahore: Prince Books Depot, 1992.
- Maier, Frith. *Trekking in Russia and Central Asia: A Traveler's Guide*. Seattle: Mountaineers Books, 1994.
- Malik, Hafeez, ed., *Central Asia, Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*, New York: St. Martin Press, 1994
- Maley, William ed., *Fundamentalism Reborn*, New York: New York University Press, 1999.
- Mandelbaum, Michael, ed, *Central Asia and The World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994.
- Manz, Beatrice F., ed. *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994

- Marsden, Peter, *The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*, London: Zed Books, 1998.
- Marwat, Fazal-urRahim, *The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia: A Study in Political Development*, Peshawar: Emjay Books International, 1985.
- Massell, Gregory, *The Surrogate Protestant: Muslim Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974
- Maudoodi, Sayyed Abdul Ala, *Political Theory of Islam*. Lahore, 1960.
- McKim, R. and McMahan, J. eds, *The Morality of Nationalism*. Oxford; Oxford University press, 1997.
- McCauley, Martin, *Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Modern History*. London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002.
- Mccagg, Jr William and Silver, Brain D., *Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1979.
- Mellor, Roy E. h., *The Soviet Union and its Geographical Problems*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982.
- Memon, R., *Soviet Power and the Third World*. USA: Yale University Press, 1986.
- Mesbahi, Mohiaddin ed., *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamic.*, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1994.
- The Military Balance 1993-1994*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993.
- The Military Balance 1994-1995*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994.
- The Military Balance 1995-1996*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995.

- Miscevic, N. eds., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Philosophical Perspective*, Chicago: Open Court, 2000.
- Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Political Thought*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1987.
- Motyl, A., eds., *Encyclopedia of Nationalism, Vol I*. New York: Academic Press, 2001.
- Munteanu, Igor, and Victor Popa, eds., *Developing New Rules in the Old Environment*. Hungary: Open Society Institute, 2001.
- Nahaylo, B., and Swoboda, V., *Decline of an Empire: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990.
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, *Islam and the plight of Modern Man*. London: Longman Group Ltd, 1975.
- Naumkin Vilaly, ed., *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia*. UK: Ithaca Press, 1993.
- Niyazov, Pavel, *Tajikistan*. Moscow: Movosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1982
- Nuseibeh, Hazem Zaki, *The Idea of Arab Nationalism*. New York, 1956.
- Olcott, Martha B., ed., *The Soviet Multinational Sta.*, Sharpe, New York, 1990.
- Olcott, Martha B., ed., *The Soviet Multinational State: Readings and Documents*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990.
- Olcott, Martha B. *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.
- Paksoy, H.B, ed., *Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History*, London: M.E.sharpe, 1994.
- Palmer, Norman D. and Howard C. Pencins, *International Relations: The World Community in Transitio*. Lahore: National Book Foundation, 1988.

- PlanEcon. *Review and Outlook for the Former Soviet Republics*. Washington: 1995.
- Park, Alexander G., *Bolshevism in Turkistan 1917–1927*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957.
- Pipes, Richard, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917 – 1923*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.
- PlanEcon. *Review and Outlook for the Former Soviet Republics*. Washington: 1995.
- Pogge, T., *World Poverty and Human Rights*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.
- Polumbo, Michael, *Nationalism*, Connecticut: Green Wood Press, 1981.
- Pomfret, Richard. *The Economies of Central Asia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Proctor, Harris, ed., *Islam and International Relations*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.
- Rahman, Fazlur, *Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
- Ram, Rahul, *Modern Central Asia*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1979.
- Ram, Rahul, *Central Asia: Major Perspectives*. New Delhi: Bikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1993.
- Rashid, Ahmed, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. London: Yale University press, 2001.
- Rashid, Ahmed, *Jihad: The Rise and Militant Islam in Central Asia*. Lahore: Vanguard, 2002.
- Rashid, Ahmed, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Rashid, Asma, *Islam in History and Society*, Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1988.

Rehman, H, *Beginners Civic.*, Lahore: Aziz publishers, 1984.

Rizvi, Hasan Askari, *Muslim World: The Natural and Direction of Change.* Lahore Progressive Publishers, 1987.

Ro'i, Yaacov, ed., *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting legacies.* London: Frank Cass, 1995

Ro'i, Yaacov, *The USSR and the Muslims World: Issues in Domestic and Foreign Policy.* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984.

Rosenthal E.I.T., *Islam in the Modern National Stat.*, Cambridge: At the University Press, 1965.

Roy ,Allison and Lena Jonson,*Central Asian Security: The New International Context.* Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.

Roy, Olivier, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Roy, Olivier, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations.* London: I.B.Taurus, 2000.

Roy, Olivier, *The Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes and Implications.* Washington: US institute of Peace, 1993.

Roy, Olivier, *The Iranian Policy Toward the Central Asia.* Soros Organization Open Society Institute, 1999.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z., and Oles M. Smolansky, eds. *Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran.* Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

Rumer, Boris Z. *Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment."* Winchester, Massachusetts: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

Rywkin, Michael, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia,* London: C. Hurst and Company, 1982.

- S. Ahmed, Akbar, *Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988.
- Sagdeev, Rould Z and Susan Eisenhower, ed, *Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change*. New York: CPSS Press, 1995.
- Sagdeev, Roald and Susan Eisenhower, eds., *Islam and Central Asia: An Enduring Legacy or An Evolving Threat*. Washington: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2000.
- Saigal Robina, *Knowledge and Identity*, Lahore: ASR Publications, 1995.
- Sakwa, Rechar, *Soviet Politics: An Introduction*. London: Routledge, 1989.
- Sarkar, Bhashwati, and Shanms-ud-Din, *Afghanistan and Central Asia in the New Great Game*. New Dehli: Lancer's Books, 2003.
- Sayyid, Booby S., *A Fundamental Fear: Enrocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*. London: Zed Brooks Ltd., 1997
- Schendel, Willem Van and Erik J. Zürcher, ed., *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century*. London: I B Tauris Publishers, 2001.
- Schulze, Reinhard, *A Modern History of The Islamic World*. London: I.B. Tranris Publishers, 2000.
- Sehmi, Anwaral-Hag, *Nationalism: Islam and Pakistan*. Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1983.
- Shah Zahid, *Muslim Freedom Fighters of India Based in Central Asia*. Islamabad Pan Graphics Pvt. Ltd., 2000.
- Sharp and Kinc, *Contemporary International Policies*. New York: Reinhant, 1940.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir, Munir Sendich, and Emil Payin, eds. *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994.
- Sievers, Eric W, *The Post-Soviet Decline of Central Asia. Sustainable Development and comprehensive Capital*. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

Stepaniants, M. T., *Islamic Philosophy and Social Thought (XIX – XX Centuries)*. Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1989.

Synder, Louis L., *The New Nationalism*, New York: Cornen University Press, 1968.

Szporluk, Roman, *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, New York: E. Sharpe, 1994.

Taheir, A., *Crescent in a Red Sky: The Future of Islam in the Soviet Union*. London: Hutchinson, 1989.

Taylor, David and Malcolm Yapp, *Political Identity in South Asia*. London: Curzon Press Ltd., 1979.

Taylor, Peter J., *Political Geography: World Economy, Nation, State and Locality*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1989.

Thomas, Caraline, *In-search of Security: The World in International Relations*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1987.

Thompson, John M., *Russia and The Soviet Union*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

Tishkov, Valeri, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. London, Sage, 1997.

Tokes, Rudolf I., ed., *Dissent in the USSR: Politics, Ideology and People*. London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1976.

Tolz, Vera and Iain Elliotts, ed., *The Demise of the USSR: From Communism to Independence*. London: Macmillan Press, 1995.

Trimingham, J.S., *The Sufi Orders in Islam*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971

Tuzmuhamedov, R., *How the National Question was solved in Soviet Central Asia*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973.

Twelch Alford and Pierre Cachiated, *Islam: past Influence and Present Challenge*. USA: State University of New York Press, 1979.

Twining, David T. *The New Eurasia: A Guide to the Republics of the Former Soviet Union*. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993.

- Tyler, W. K. Frazer, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia*. London, 1967.
- Undeland, Charles and Nicolas Platt, *The Central Asia: Fragments of Empire, Magnets of Wealth*. New York: The Asia Society, 1994.
- Vassiliev, Alexei, ed., *Central Asia: Political and Economic Challenges in the Post-Soviet Era*. London: Saqi Books, 2001.
- Walker, Edward W, *Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Break up of the Soviet Union*. Berkeley: Public Policy Press, 2003.
- Warikoo, k., and Norbu, Dawa, ed., *Ethnicity and Politics in central Asia*. New Delhi: South Asian publishers (Pvt.) Ltd, 1992.
- Weeks, Richard V., *Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey*, London: Green Wood Press, 1978.
- Weinbaum, Marvin G. *Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction*., Boulder, Westview Press, 1994.
- Wheeler, Geoffrey, *Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia*. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.
- Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964.
- White, Stephen et al, eds, *Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics*. London, Macmillan, 1994.
- Whittell, Giles, *Central Asia*., London: The Globe Beqnot Press, 1993.
- Wimbush, S. Enders, ed., *Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective*. London: Croon Helm, 1985.
- World Bank. *Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the Former USSR*. Washington: 1995.
- Zaman, Waheed-uz and Dr. M. Saleem Akhtar, *Islam in South Asia*. Islarnabad, National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, 1993

Zenkovsky, Serge A., *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia.*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

Zhang, Yougjin and Robess Aziziaw, ed., *Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum*, Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998

ARTICLES

Research Articles

Atkin, Muriel, "Islamic Assertiveness and the Waning of the Old Soviet Order." *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 20, No. 1, Spring 1992.

Abbasi, Abdurrazzaq Khan, "Central Asia Today". *Central Asia Journal*, No.32, Summer 1993.

Abbas, Najam, "Present unrest in the soviet Central Asia". *Central Asia Journal*, No. 28, Summer 1991.

Ahmar, Moonis, "The New Political Order in Central Asia". *Third World*, January 1994.

Ahmar, Moonis "Implication of Perestroika for the Soviet Asian Republics". *Central Asian Journal*, No. 29, Winter 1991.

Ahmar, Moonis, "India and its Role in the New Central Asia". *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 45, No.3, July 1992.

Ahmed, Mutahir, "Prospects of Fundamentalism in Central Asia". *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.45, No. 3, July 1992.

Aini, Kamal S., and Maltsev, yuri S., "Oriental Studies in Tajikistan". *Journal of CentralAsia*, Vol. X, No. 1, July 1987.

Akchurin, Marat. "Soviet Muslims: Seeking Reform, Not Revolution," *World and I*, No. 6, October 1991.

Akhtar, Shameem, " Implications of Current Developments in Afghanistan". *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 45, No. 3, July 1992.

- Akhtar, Shameem, "Strategic Significance of Central Asia". *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 45, No. 3, July 1992.
- Ali, S. Amjad, "Prospects of Cooperation with Central Asian State". *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 46, No. 2, April 1993.
- Anderson, John, "Islam in the soviet Archives: A Research Note". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1994.
- Aron, Leon, "The Soviet Union's Soft Underbelly: Muslim Central Asia". *Global Affairs*, Vol. V, No. 4, 1990.
- Asimov, M. S, "Ethnic History of Central Asia in the 2nd Millenium B.C Soviet Studies". *Journal of Central Asia*, Vol. 1, No, 1 July 1978.
- Aslam, Muhammad, "Textile Industry in central Asia During the Middle Ages". *Central Asian Journal*, No. 32, Summer, 1993.
- Atkin, Muriel, "The Survival of Islam in Soviet Tajikistan". *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 4, Autumn 1989.
- Bakshi,G.D., " The Central Asian Cauldron: Conflict Prognostication". *Journal of Strategic analysis*, Vol. XIX, NO 3, June 1996.
- Bakshi, Jyotsna, " Russia India and the Central Asian Republics: Geo-Political Convergence". *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XIX, No 5, August 1996.
- Bakshi, Jyotsna, "No Single Power or power center Can Have Exclusive Away Over central Asia: A Geo-Political Analysis". *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. No. XXI, April 1998.
- Banerjee, D, "Recent Development in Central Asia and Their Security Implications". *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XV, No.6, September 1992.
- Belokrenitsky, Vyacheslav Ya, " Central Asia in the New Eurasian Geopolitics: Implications for paksitan and Russia". *Pakistan Institute of International Affairs*, Vol.48, No 3, July 1995.
- Bennigen, Marie, "Chechnia: Political Developments and Strategic Implication for the North Caucasus". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 1999.

- Bennigsen, Alexandre, "Islam In Retrospect", *Central Asian Survey*. Vol. 8, No. 1, 1989.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre, "Soviet Islam since the Invasion of Afghanistan". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.1, Spring 1985.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre, "Traditional Islam in the Customs of the Turkic Peoples of Central Asia". *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 12, No 1, Spring 1985.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre, "Pan Turkism and Pan Islamism in History and Today". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1984.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre, "Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam". *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1980.
- Bennigsen, Alexandre, "Marxism or Pan-Islamism: Russian Bolsheviks and Tatar National Communists at the Beginning of the Civil War July 1918". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1987.
- Bhatty, Maqbool Ahmed, "Impact of Central Asian Changes on S and W Asia". *Regional Studies*, Vol. x, No.2, Spring 1992.
- Bird, Chris, "Tajikistan". *Middle East Review*, 1993/1994.
- Blank, Stephen, "Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals." *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1995.
- Bonner, Elena, "Looking to the Future". *Current History*, October 1992.
- Bregel, Yuriy, "The Peoples of Southern Turkmenistan and Khorasan in the 17th and 18th Centuries." *Central Asian Review*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1960.
- Brown, B., "The Public Role in Perestroika in Central Asia". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No.1, 1990.
- Brezinski, Zbigniew, "Post – Communist Nationalism". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 5, Winter 1989/90.
- Burg, Steve L, "Central Asian Elite Mobility and Political Change in the SU". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 5, No. 3 - 4, 1986.
- Burg, Steve L, "The Soviet Union's Nationalities Question". *Current History*, October 1989.

Burg, Steve L, "Central Asia: Current Situation and Future Prospects". *Strategic Digest*, Vol. xxiii, No, 8, August 1993.

Centlivres, Pierre, "State, National Awareness and Levels of Identity in Afghanistan from Monarchy to Islamic State". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 3-4, September-December 2000.

"Civil War in Tajikistan: Diary of Events." *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 5, 1992.

Chandler, Andrea, "Ethnicity, Emigration and the state: The Revival of Soviet Jewish Nationalism After Khrushchev". *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, Vol. xix, No. 1-2, 1992.

Crisostomo, Rosemairie, "The Muslims of the Soviet Union". *Current History*, October 1992.

Connor, Walker, "Nation Building and Nation Destroy", *World Politics*, April 1972.

Dani, Ahmad Hasan, "Centre of the World", *Third World*, January 1994.

Dannreuther, Roland. "Russia, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf." *Survival* , Vol. 35. No. 4, 1993.

Daulet, Shafiq, "The First All Muslim Congress of Russia Moscow, 1 – 11 May 1917". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No, 1, 1989.

Dixit, Aabha, "Tajikistan: Engulfed by Flames of Afghan Civil war". *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. xv, No. 9, December 1992.

Dunn, Michael Collins. "Central Asian Islam: Fundamentalist Threat or Communist Bogeyman?" *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1993.

Eberstadt, Nicholas, "Population change and National Security". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.70, No. 3, Summer 1991.

Effendi, M. Y, "Politico-Economic Conditions in Central Asia: An Empirical View". *Central Asia Journal*, No. 32, Summer 1993.

Efendi, Yahya, "The Awakening of Titans: The Collapse of USSR". *Central Asia Journal*, No 30, Summer 1992.

E,Hickson Jill "Using Law to Create National Identity: The course to Democracy in Tajikistan". *Texas International Law Journal*, Vol. 38, Spring 2003.

Emadi ,Hafizullah, "Tajikistan's Transition to the World Economy". *Contemporary Review*, vol. 227 issue 1615, Aug 2000.

Esposito, John L., "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace". *Current History*, January 1994.

Feifer, Gregory "Uzbekistan's Eternal Realities: A Report from Tashkent". *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 19 No. 1, Spring 2002.

Fierman, William, "Religion and Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia". *Problems of Communism*, July-August, 1989.

Fierman, William "An enforced " New Deal" and the End of Basmachi". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.6, No. 2, 1987.

Fraser, Glenda, "Basmachi – I". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1987.

Fraser, Glenda "Basmachi – II". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1987.

Fredholm, Michael, "The Prospects for Genocide in Chechnya and Extremist Retaliation against the West". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 19, No.3-4, September-December 2000.

Friedman, L, "Ethnic and National Composition of Population in Newly Independent Countries of the Middle East and Caucasus." *Central Asia Today*, No. 1, 1993.

Fuller, Graham, "Central Asia: The Quest for Identity." *Current History*, No. 93, April 1994,

Fuller, Graham, "The Emergence of Central Asia." *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1990.

Gardezee, Nazeer, "The Ephthalites or White Huns of Central Asia". *Central Asia Journal*, No. 31, Winter 1992.

Geiss, Paul G., Mahallah and Kinship Relations, "A study on residential communal commitment structures in Central Asia of the Nineteenth Century". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.20, 2000/1.

- Ghorban, Narsi. "The Role of the Multinational Oil Companies in the Development of Oil and Gas Resources in Central Asia and the Caucasus." *Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, No. 5, Spring 1993.
- Gitelman, Zvi, "Glasnost, Perestroika and Antisemitism". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No.2, Spring 1991.
- Gleason, Gregory, "Educating for Underdevelopment: The Soviet Vocational Education System and its Central Asian Critics". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1984.
- Gleason, Gregory, "On The Bureaucratic Reinforcement of Nationalism in the USSR". *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, Vol. xix, No.1/2, 1992.
- Gleason, Gregory, "Why Russia is in Tajikistan." *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 20, No. 1 January 2001.
- Goble, Paul, "Ethnic Politics in the USSR". *Problems of Communism*, July – August 1989.
- Goodson, Larry P, "Perverting Islam: Taliban Social Policy Toward Women". *Central Asia Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2001.
- Gretsky, Sergei, "Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda." *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 1, 1994.
- Gretsky, Sergei. "Civil War in Tajikistan and Its International Repercussions," *Critique*, Spring 1995.
- Gretzky, Sergei . "Tajikistan: The Latest Gamble." *Focus*, 1995
- Gupta, Rakesh, "Tajikistan: Locked Horns for Power". *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. xv, No. 6, September 1992.
- Guzman, Roberto Marin, "The Abbasid Revolution in Central Asia and Khurasan: An Analytical Study of the Role of Taxation, Conversion, and Religious Groups in its Genesis". *Islamic Studies*, Vol.33, No. 2-3, Summer-Autumn 1415/1994.
- Haidar,Ejaz, "Pakistan's Afghan Policy and its Fall Out." *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 5, 1998.
- Hamdani, Abbas, "An Overview of the Current Status of the Muslim Countries of the Former Soviet Union". *Islamic Studies*, Vol.33, No.2-3, Summer-Autumn 1415-1994.

- Hanks, Reuel R, "Emerging Spatial Patterns of the Demographics, Labour Force and FDI in Uzbekistan". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 19, Nos. 3-4, September-December 2000.
- Harmstone, Teresa Rakowska, "Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan Under Soviet Rule". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.2, No. 1, September 1986.
- Hasan, Rubab, "Role of Turkey in the Central Asian Republics". *Journal of European Studies*, Vol.9, No.1, January 1993.
- Hashim, Fatch Ali, "The Future of Central Asia". *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 45, No. 3, July 1992.
- Hayit, Baymirza, Western Turkistan: The Russian Dilemma". *Journal: Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol.6, No.1, January 1985.
- Henze, Paul B., "The Central Asian Muslims and their Brethren Abroad – Marxist Solidarity or Muslim Brotherhood?". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.3, No. 3, 1984.
- Henze, Paul B., "Marx on Russians and Muslims". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No.4, 1984.
- Hetmanek, Allen, Islamic Revolution and Jihad Come to the Former soviet central Asia: The Case of Tajikistan". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1993.
- Hetmanek, Allen, The Political face Islam in Tajikistan: A Review of Muriel Atkin's The Subtlest Battle". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1990.
- Hilali, A. Z, "The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire". *Pakistan Defence Review*, Vol. 4, June 1992.
- Hirsch, Francine, "Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities". *The Russian Review*, Vol. 59. No. 2, Blackwell, April 2000.
- Hough, Jerry F, "Assessing the Coup", *Current History*, October 1993.
- Hough, Jerry F , "The Soviet Union Adrift". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No.1, 1990/91.
- Hunter, Shireen T, "Nationalist Movements in Soviet Asia". *Current History*, October 1990.
- Hyman, Anthony , "The Outlook for Central Asia". *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 2, April 1993.

Imart, Guy G., "A Unique Empire". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.6, No. 4, 1987.

Irfani, Suroosh, "Islamic revival: Quest for Identity and Legitimacy: Implications for Pakistan". *Strategic Studies*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, August 1989.

Janabel, Jiger. "When National Ambition Conflicts with Reality: Studies on Kazakhstan's Ethnic Relations" *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.15, No. 1, March 1996.

Joane,Nagel, "Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture". *Social Problems*, Vol. 41, No.1, February, 1994.

Karpat, Kemal H, "The Old and New Central Asia". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1993.

Karpat, Kemal H,Introduction: Opening remarks: The Geographic Scope of Central Asia". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, 1984.

Moohammad Hashi, "Characteristics of the Islamic State". *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1993.

Kaiser, Robert G, "Gorbachev: Triumph and failure". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 1991.

Khan, Mohammad Anwar, "Signals from Central Asia". *Central Asia Journal*, No. 30, Summer 1992.

Khan, Mohammad Anwar , "Some footnotes on Central Asia ". *Central Asia Journal*, No. 32, Summer 1993.

Khan, Mohammad Anwar , "The Internal Political Situation and Mutual Interaction in the Central Asian states". *Central Asia Journal*, No. 31, Winter 1992.

Khan, Azmat Hayat, "Islam and Muslims in Eastern Turkistan". *Central Asia Journal*, No. 30, Summer 1992.

Kozyrev, Andrea, "Russia: A Chance for Survival". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2, Spring1992.

Kunzweilaer,William R. "The New Central Asian Great Game". *Strategic Review* Vol. No. 43, Summer 1998.

Kuzio, Taras, "Opposition in the USSR to the Occupation of Afghanistan". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No.1, 1987.

Lapidus, Gail W, "Gorbachev's Nationalities Problem". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 4, Fall 1989.

Lageard, Helene Aymen De, "The Revolt of the Basmachi According to Red Army Journals (1920- 1922)". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1987.

Laitin, David, "The National Uprising in the Soviet Union". *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 1, October 1991.

Leping Gwell, John W.R. "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad'". *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 3, Autumn 1994.

Lih, Lars T, "Gorbachev and the Reform Movement". *Current History*, October 1987.

Malik, J. Mohan, "Central Asia Astir". *Pacific Research*, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 1992.

Malik, Nadeem Shafiq, "The All India Muslim League and Central Asia". *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2-3, Summer-Autumn 1415/1994.

Malik, Iftikhar, H., "Issues in Contemporary South and Central Asian Polities: Islam, Ethnicity and the State". *Asian Survey*, Vol.xxxii, No. 10, October 1992.

Malik, Iftikhar, "Islam the West, and Ethno Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis of Contemporary Central and South Asia". *The American Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol.9 No.1 September 1991.

Mandelbaum, Michael, "Coup De Grace: The End of the Soviet Union". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1991/1992.

Mann,Poonam, "Fighting Terrorism: India and Central Asia." *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. xxiv, No. 11, February 2001.

Mansouri, Javad, "New Central Asian Republics". *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 46, No. 2 April 1993.

Makareko ,Tamara, "Crime and Terrorism in Central Asia." *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 12, No. 7, July 2000.

- Makarenko ,Tamara, "Friendly Co-operation Brings Mutual Benefit". *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2, February 2001
- Maskhadov, Aslan, "Open Letter to the French Philosopher André Glucksman". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 19, Nos. 3-4, September-December 2000.
- Menon, Rajan and Henri J. Barkey, "The Transformation of Central Asia: Implications of Regional and International Security", *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 4, Winter 1992-3.
- Mesbahi, Mohiaddin, "Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia and Caucasus". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1990.
- Mesbahi, Mohiaddin, "Russia and the New Muslims States: Change or Continuity?". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1990.
- Menon, Rajan and Barkey, Henri J., "The Transformation of Central Asia: Implication for regional and International Security". *Survival*, Vol.34, No. 4, Winter 1992-93.
- Marsky, George I., " Central Asia's Emergence". *Current History*, October 1992.
- Moussalli, Ahmad, "Sayyid Qutab's View of Knowledge". *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1990.
- Naby, Eden, "Ethnicity and Islam in Central Asia". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.12, No. 2, 1993.
- Naby, Eden , "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations". *Asian Survey*, Vol. XX, No.3, 1980.
- Noorza, M. Siddieq, "Soviet Economic Interests In Afghanistan". *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1987.
- Naib, R. M, "The Collapse of the USSR". *Central Asia Journal*, No. 31, Winter 1992.
- Nalle, David, "Change and Continuity in Central Asia". *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 4, Autumn 1989.
- Newman, Saul, "Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Polittical Conflict". *World Political*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 1991.

- Olcott, Martha Brill, "The Soviet (Dis) Union", *Foreign Policy*, No. 82, Spring 1991.
- Olcott, Martha Brill, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, No.3, summer 1992.
- Olcott, Martha Brill, "Central Asia's Post-Empire Politics", *Orbis*, Spring 1992.
- Olcott, Martha Brill, "The Slide into Disunion", *Current History*, October 1991.
- Olcott, Martha Brill, "National Consolidation". *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 22 Issue.1, Winter/Spring 2000.
- Olcott, Martha Brill. "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918-1924." *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, July 1981.
- Olcott, Martha Brill. "Central Asia's Islamic Awakening." *Current History*, Vol. 93, No. 582, April 1994.
- Panarin, Sergei, "Muslims of the Former USSR: Dynamics of Survival". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.12, No. 2, 1993.
- Pfeffer, K.H., "Age of Nationalism or Post-Nationalist Age?". *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. xiii. No.1, 1960.
- Piacentini, V. F., "Disintegration of the Soviet Empire: Problems of National and Collective Security in Central Asia". *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2-3, Summer-Autumn 1415/1994.
- Platt, Nicholas, "Central Asia: Evaporating Euphoria". *Third World*, May 1994.
- Pipes, R., "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia". *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 9, Nos. 2-3, Spring-Summer 1995.
- Powell, David E, "The Revival of Religion". *Current History*, October 1991.
- Popp, Gary E and Anwar, Syed Tariz, "From Perestroika to Ethnic Nationalism", *International Perspectives*, Vol. xvii, No. 2, March/April 1989.
- Qrelquejay, Chantal Lamercoiev, "From Tribe to Umma". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.3, No. 3, 1984.
- Rahman, Fazal-ur-, "Evolution of Soviet Policy Towards Muslims in Russia 1917 – 1965". *Journal Institute of Muslims Minority Affairs*, Vol. 2, 1980.

- Rahman, Fazal-ur-, "Changes in Central Asia and Afghanistan". *Strategic Perspectives*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Autumn 1991.
- Rashid, Ahmed, "The New Struggle in Central Asia: A Primer for the Baffled". *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Winter 2000.
- Rashid, Ahmed, "The Fires of Faith in Central Asia.", *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 2001.
- Razako, T.J. "Religious Extremism in Central Asia." *The Times of Central Asia*, Vol. 3, No. 44, November, 2001.
- Richter, Anthony, "Springtime in Tajikistan". *World Policy Journal*, Summer 1994.
- Rizvi, Deedar Hussain Shah, "Anticipations and Prognosis of Perestroika in the Soviet Union". *Central Asia Journal*, No. 28, Summer 1991.
- Roeder, Philip, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization". *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 2, January 1991.
- Ro'i, Yaacov, "The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia". *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1990.
- Rubin, Barnett R, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan". *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 4, winter 1993-94.
- Rumer, Boris Z, "The Gathering Storm in Central Asia," *Orbis*, Vol. 37, No. 1, Winter 1993.
- Rumer, B., "The Gathering Storm in Central Asia". *Orbis*, Winter 1993.
- Rywkin, Michael, "The Impact of Socio-Economic Change and Demographic Growth on National Identity and Socialisation". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1984.
- Rywkin, Michael, "Islam and the New Soviet Man: 70 Years of Evolution". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1987.
- Safi, Louay, "Nationalism and the Multinational State". *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Fall 1992.

Safi, Louay M., "The Islamic State: A Conceptual Frame Work" .*The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 8, No. 2, September 1991.

Saikal, Amin, "How the West is Betraying Afghanistan". *Pacific Research* , Vol. 7, No. 2, May 1994.

Saray, Mehmet, "The Russian Conguest of Central Asia". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 1, No.2-3, October 1982, January 1983.

Scarr, Godie Blankoff, "Possible Way to Defuse Inter-Ethnic Tension in the USSR".*Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 9 No.3, 1990.

Schriek, Daan van der "The Central Asian Taliban". *The Times of Central Asia*, Vol. 3, No. 42, 18 October, 2001.

Schroeder, Gertrude E, "A Critical Time of Perestroika". *Current History*, October 1991.

Seljuq, Affan, "Reflections on Recent Developments in Eastern Europe and Central Asia". *Journal of European Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1992.

Sen, Rajiv, "Growth of Ethnic Nationalism within the Russian Republic". *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. xiv, No.10, January 1992.

Shalinsky, Audrey C., "Islam and Ethnicity: The Nothern Afghanistan Perspective".*Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 1, No 2/3, October 1982-January 1983.

Shaheedi, Munira, "On The Socio – Philological Epilogue on Today's Crisis in Tajikistan". *Islamica*, Vol. 1 No. 1, January 1993.

Sharhani, M. Nazif, "From Tribe to Umma: Comments on the Dynamics of identity in Muslim Soviet Central Asia". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1984.

Sharhani, M. Nazif , "Islam and the Political Culture of "Scientific Atheism" in Post Soviet Central Asia: Future Predicaments". *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2-3, Summer-Autumn 1415-1994.

Sharhani, M. Nazif , "Central Asia and the Challenges of the Soviet Legacy". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.12, No. 2, 1993.

Shah, Shafaat Ullah, "Disintegration of Soviet Union – Its Causes and Lessons for Pakistan". *Pakistan Defence Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 1993-94.

- Shujaat, Uzma, "Soviet Union on the Eve of Change: An Over View". *Journal of European Studies*, Vol. 71, No. 2, July 1991.
- Shorish, M. Mobin, "Back to Jadidism: The Future of Education in Central Asia". *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2-3 Summer Autumn 1415/1994.
- Simes, Dimitri, "Gorbachev's Time of Trouble". *Foreign Policy*, No. 82, Spring 1991.
- Smith, Anthony D., "Ethnic Election and Cultural Identity". *Ethnic Studies*, Vol. 10, January 1993.
- Spechler, Martin C, " Hunting for the Central Asian Tiger". *Comparative Economic Studies*, Vol. 42, No.3, Fall 2000.
- Snyder, jack, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State". *Survival*, Vol. 35, No.1, Spring 1993.
- Sorenson, Theodore C, "Rethinking National Security". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3, 1990.
- Sreedhar, "Is the Taliban Being Converted into a Jihadi Army". *Aakrosh*, Vol. 3, No. 7, April 2000.
- Stobdon, P., "Islamic Reawakening in Central Asia: Towards Stability or Conflict?". *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. xv, No. 6, September 1992.
- Stobdon, P., "Central Asian Regional Security". *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. xv, No. 5, August 1992.
- Subtelny, Maria Eva, "The Cult of Holy Places: Religious Practices Among Soviet Muslims". *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 4, Autumn 1989.
- Sulaiman ,Sadia, "Geo Political patterns in Central Asia after September 11". *Institute of Strategic Studies*, Vol. xxii, No 3, Autumn 2002.
- Sulaiman,Sadia," Role of Central Asia in War against Global terrorism: Futuristic Appraisal". *Institute of Strategic Studies*, Vol. xxii, No 2, Summer 2002.
- Syed, Fasahat H., and Siddique, Nadeem, "Central Asia Seventy-Four Years of Soviet Rule". *National Development and Security*, Vol. 11, No, 2, November 1993.

- Syed, Fasahat H., and Siddique, Naddem, "Central Asia: A Historical Retrospective". *National Development and Security*, Vol.11, No. 1 August 1993.
- Szporluk, Roman, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism". *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1989.
- Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. "Causes and Consequences of the Civil War." *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 1, 1993.
- Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. "The 'Tajik Spring' of 1992." *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 2, 1993.
- Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, "Tajikistan: From Freedom to War." *Current History*, Vol. 93, No. 582, April 1994.
- Tarock, Adam "Iran's Policy in Central Asia". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 16, No.2, June 1997.
- Tareen, Pervaz Iqbal Khan, "The Dilemma of Tajikistan". *Central Asia Journal*, No. 32, Summer 1993.
- Teimourian, Hazhir, "Turkey and Iran for Friendly Competition: Problems of Planning for the future". *Pakistan and Gulf Economist*, May 29 – June 4, 1993.
- Tolmacheva, Marina, "The Muslim Woman and Atheism in Central Asia", *IslamicStudies*, Vol. 33, No. 2-3, Summer-Autumn 1415/1994.
- Ulam, Adam B., "Looking to the Past: The Unraveling of the SU. *Current History*, October 1992.
- Walters, K., "The Current Family Planing Debate in Soviet central Asia". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1990.
- Warikoo, K, "The Resurgence of Central Asia". *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. xv, No. 6, September 1992.
- Warikoo, K., "Dynamics of Change in Soviet Central Asia". *World Affairs*, Vol. 3, December 1991.

Weisbrode, Kenneth, "Uzbekistan: In the Shadow of Tamerlane". *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 1997.

Weryho, Jan W., "Tajiki Persian as an Europeanised Oriental Language". *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 33, Nos. 2-3, Summer-Autumn 1415/1994.

Weryho, Jan W, "The Politics of Identity Change in Central Asia". *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 3. 1984.

Wimbush, S. Enders, "Soviet Muslims in 1980S". *Journal Institute of Muslims Minority Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1985.

News Paper Articles

Abbas, Najam, "Central Asia's Political Order: Role of Ethnicity and Religion". *The Muslim*, 20 August 1993.

Ahmar, Moonis, "Promoting Peace in central Asia". *The News*, 19 November 1993.

Ahmed, Eqbal, "Prospects in central Asia". *Dawn*, 6 December 1992

Ahmed, Khurshid, "A Creative Response to western Ideology". *The Guardian*, 3 December 1979.

Ajmal, Asir, "Wither Central Asia?". *The News*, 1 October 1991.

Akhtar, Shameem, "Tajikistan on the Brink". *Dawn*, 11 November 1992.

Annika, Savill, "What Role for Republics?". *The Muslim*, 29 September 1991.

Artykova, Nadra, "Tragic Tajik Civil War". *The Muslims*, 11 July 1993.

Aron, Leon, "Central Asian's Stand up to Moscow Challenge". *Dawn*, 25 January 1994.

Balchin, Cassandra, "Perestroika Makes Perfect". *The Muslims*, 29 November 1987.

Balchin, Cassandra, "Conflict Resolution in Central Asia". *Dawn*, 30 May 1995.

Bhatty, Maqbool Ahmed, "Russia Asserting Primacy in central Asia". *Pakistan Observer*, 2 January 1993.

Bokhari, Imtiaz H, "Thinking Beyond Central Asia". *The News*, 25 October 1991

- Butt, Qaiser, "Tajik Leader Vows to Topple Dushanbe Government". *Frontier Post*, 26 July 1993.
- Ciensi, Jan, "Tajik Tinderbox could set Central Asia A light". *Dawn*, 5 January 1993.
- Cockburn, Patric, "Central Asian Republics Look to Islam". *The Muslim*, 8 October 1991.
- Coll, Steve, "The Distant Dream on Russia's Rim". *Dawn*, 15 May 1993.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan, "West Sowing Seeds of Conflict in Central Asia". *The Muslim*, 12 April 1993.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan , "Tajikistan Today". *The Muslim*, 3 October 1992.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan, "Central Asia and the New Union". *The Muslim*, 18 October 1991.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan, "The Year of Hope for Tajikistan". *The News*, 20 February s 1994.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan, "Central Asia Perspective in the Post – Independence Era". *The Muslim*, 24 January 1993.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan , "Central Asia: Emergence of Modern state – I". *The Muslim*, 24 July 1992.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan , "Central Asia: Emergence of Modern state – II. *The Muslim*, 31 July 1992.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan , "Recent Political Developments in Central Asia – I". *The Muslim*, 8 April 1993.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan, "Recent Political Development in central Asia –II". *The Muslim*, 9 April 1993.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan , "Central Asia Advance into Modern World". *The Muslim*, 22 April 1993.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan , "Pakistan: Gateway to Central Asia". *Pakistan Observer*, 22 October 1993.
- Dahlburg, John Thor, "Nationalism Replacing communism in Soviet Union". *The News*, 9 October 1991.

- Dao ,James and Eric Schmitt, "US is building up its military base in Afghan region". *New York Times*, 9 January 2002.
- Dorsey, James, "Iran Moves to Offset Turkish Influence". *Dawn*, 28 March 1993.
- Erlanger, Steven, "Moscow Alarmed over Tajik Civil War". *Times of India*, 8 October 1992.
- Fierman, Ken,"Russian Edgy About Events in Tajikistan ". *Dawn*, 27 July 1993.
- Frankland, Mark, "Tajikistan Civil War is far from Over". *Dawn*, 13 February 1993.
- Frankland, Mark , "Tajikistan's Transition to Stability". *The News*, 28 September 1994.
- Freedman, Lawrence, "Where Moscow's Old Elite Struggles for Survival". *The News*, 24 July 1992.
- Fuller, G.E., "The Emergence of Central Asia-I". *The Frontier Post*, 15 April 1990.
- Fuller, G.E., "The Emergence of Central Asia-II", *The Frontier Post*, 16 April 1990.
- Fuller, G.E., "The Emergence of Central Asia-III", *The Frontier Post*, 17 April 1990.
- Gauhar, Altaf, "The Old Order changeth: Facts Behind the August Coup in USSR". *The Muslims*, 14 November 1991.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, "Thank God Stalin Socialism is Dead". *The Frontier Post*, 26 February 1992.
- Haque, Inamul, "The History of CIS and Islamic Resurgence –I". *The Frontier Post*, 21 April 1993.
- Higgins, Andrew, "Russian PM Seeks to Regulate Reforms". *The News*, 11 January 1993.
- Hussain, Fahd, Arsala, "Sattar Discuss Tajik Border Situation". *The Nation*, 1 August 1993.
- Hussain, Fahd, Arsala, "The Struggle for Tajikistan". *The Frontier Post*, 24 October 1992.
- Hussain, Fahd, Arsala , "The Struggle for Central Asia". *The Nation*, 16 February 1992.

- Hussain, Syed Rifaat, "Tajik - Afghan Border Clashes Bode Ill for Regional Peace". *The News*, 24 July 1993.
- Hussain, Syed Rifaat, "Colonization of central Asia". *The News*, 16 January 1993.
- Hyman, Anthony, "Muslim Republics Look Outwork Again". *Dawn*, 24 October 1991.
- Hussain, Syed Rifaat, "Soviet Central Asia Inches Towards Confederation", *Dawn*, 3 December 1991.
- Iqbal, Afzal, "Islam in Central Asia". *The Muslim*, 11 October 1991.
- Irfani, Suroosh, "A Test Case for Persstroika". *Dawn*, 20 February 1990.
- Jamal, Arif, "Pakistan Ready to Play its Role in Tajiks Dispute". *The Muslim*, 2 August 1993.
- Joshi, D.K., "Indo-Soviet ties: Tough times Ahead". *The News*, 30 October 1991
- Khan, Abdul Majid, "Barter Trade with Central Asia –Sugar for Cotton". *The Muslim*, 26 February 1994.
- Khan, Hussain, "Central Asia: Anxiety Among the Modernists". *The Frontier Post*, 24 April 1993.
- Khan, M. Llyas, "Tajikistan: The Centre – Stage of Regional Conflict". *The News*, 29 July 1993.
- Khan, M. Llyas , "Tajikistan: Scene of Human Suffering and Neglect- II". *The Muslim*, 16 August 1993.
- Khan, Rashid Ahmad, "Crisis in Russia". *The Nation*, 22 April. 1993.
- Khatak, Afrasiab, "Central Asia – Transition Amid Turmoil". *The Frontier Post*, 12 April 1993.
- Kostokov, V. Y., "Islam Ascendancy in Soviet Region". *Times of India*, 22 October 1991.
- Koreshi, S. M., "Reviving Relations with Central Asia". *Pakistan Observer*, 12 December 1992.
- Kuklinski, Mariusz, "A New "Great Game in Central Asia". *The News*, 27 February 1992.

- Kunin, Valentin, "Kabul to be Centre for War against all Infidels". *National Herald*, 17 September, 2000
- Lally, Kathy, "Will There be a Muslim Revolution in Central Asia". *Dawn*, 7 October 1991.
- Lloyd, John, "Small Wars are a Big Problem for Russia". *Times of India*, 9 October 1992.
- Malik, Hafiz, "Muslim Resurgence in Central Asia- II". *The Nation*, 19 April 1991.
- Mathwes, Neelam, "Islam in The Soviet Union". *Hindustan Times*, 12 November 1989.
- Masud, Mahdi, "Press in Central Asia". *Dawn*, 29 October 1994.
- Masud, Mahdi, "Two Years of CIS". *Dawn*, 3 December 1993.
- Mazari, Shireen M., "The International Fallout of the Soviet Demise". *The Muslim*, 17 December 1991.
- Mehmood, Afzal "The new 'Great Game' is on", *Dawn*, 21 December 1998.
- Moore, Molly, "Tajik Refugees Even Worse in Afghanistan". *Dawn*, 21 January 1993.
- Niaz, Anjum, "Pakistan, UN help Extend Tajik Truce". *Dawn*, 2 November 1994.
- Niaz, Anjum, "Tajik Talks Deadlocked". *Dawn*, 30 October 1994
- Niaz, Anjum, "Tajik Leaders Warns of New Hostilities", *Dawn*, 7 March 1995.
- Peel, Quintin, "Gorbachev's Bid To Hold Union". *Dawn*, 23 January 1990
- Pons, Philippe, "The Emergence of the New Political Force". *Morning News*, 13 October 1991.
- Radyuhin, Vladimir, "Russia resigned to US presence in Caucasus". *Hindu*, 3 March 2002.
- Rashid, Ahmad, "The Disintegration of Soviet Union". *The Nation*, 21 December 1991.
- Rashid, Ahmad, "The Crescent of Islam Rises in Tajikistan". *The Nation*, 25 December 1991.
- Rashid, Ahmad, "The Tajik Time Bomb". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 15 October 1992.

- Rashid, Ahmad, "Stocking the Furnance ". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 November 1992.
- Rashid, Ahmad , "Revival of Sufism". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 December 1992.
- Rashid, Ahmad, "Outside Powers Destabilising Tajikistan". *The Nation*, 8 November 1992.
- Rashid, Ahmad, "Linking up for Trade". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 February 1993.
- Rashid, Ahmad, "Central Asia Struggles to Creat New Political Culture. *Dawn*, 11 March, 1995.
- "Russia Returns to Central Asia as Fears of Jihad Rise." *Daily Telegraph*, 14 April 2001
- Roberts, John, "Central Asia: Where East meets West". *The Muslim*, 31 October 1992.
- Sarwar, Ghulam, "Civil War in Tajikistan". *Pakistan Observer*, 17 December 1992.
- Sarwar, Ghulam , "Tajikistan:Reaction and Responses". *The Muslim*, 19 March 1994.
- Sarwar, Ghulam, "Situation in Commonwealth of Independent State". *The Muslim*, 5 June 1994.
- Schmitt,Eric and James Dao, "US is building up its military base in Afghan region", *New York Times*, 9 January 2002.
- Sherr, James, "The Russian Military's Strategic Inertia". *The Muslim*, 20 March 1993.
- Sheik, Shaharyar, "Indian Efforts to Achieve ingress in Central Asia-I".*The Muslim*, 5 March 1994.
- Sheik, Shaharyar , "Indian Efforts to Achieve Ingress in Central Asia-II". *The Muslim*, 6 March 1994.
- Singh, S. Nihal, "Can Boris Yeltsin Evolve A New Soviet Union". *Pakistan Times*, 12 September 1994.
- Sneider, Daniel, "Tajikistan: A Case of Russian Reassertion". *Dawn*, 13 May 1994.

- Srepanyants, Marietta, "Islam and Central Asia After the Collapse of the USSR". *TheNews*, 23 December 1992.
- Tahsin, Hussan, "Tajikistan in an Abyss of Regional Conflict". *The Muslim*, 2 September 1993.
- Teimourian, Hazhir, "Why Muslims Soviet Republics Are in Turmoil". *The Khaleej Times*, Reproduced in *Morning News*, 24 January 1990.
- Telang, G. M., "Tajikistan in Turmoil". *Indian Express*, 6 October 1992.
- Vine, Steve Le, "Tajik's Civil War Gives Jitter to Central Asia's Old Guard". *The Muslim*, 12 February 1993.
- Vine, Steve Le, "Tajik civil War May Convulsie Central Asia. *The Muslim*, 7 February 1993.
- Yang, John, "US, Turkey to Expand Aid to Central Asia". *Dawn*, 13 February 1992.
- Zareef, Adil, "Central Asia: Nationalism or Islamic Revival". *The News*, 16 November 1991.
- Zarakhovich, Yuri, "We are All Scared ". *Time International*, 22 February 1993.
- Zehra, Nasim, "Tajikistan: Transition and Turmoil". *The News*, 31 January 1993.
- Pope, Hugh, "Rudderless Tajikistan Heads for Rocks". *The News*, 2 July 1992.
- Hudson, Hugh, "Tajik refugees Dig In ". *Pakistan Times*, 5 January 1993.
- William, Ian Mac, "Russians Years to Leave Tajikistan", *Dawn*, 6 September 1993.
- William, Ian Mac, "Forced to Flee". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 November 1992.
- William, Ian Mac, "Out of Steppe". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 June 1993.
- Wilson. Andrew, "How Gorbachev Lost Power". *Dawn*, 1 February 1994.

WEBSITES

- Blagov, Sergei "Central Asian Nations Choose their Sides." *Asia Times*, 19 January 2002, <http://atimes.com/c-asia/DA19Ag01.html>

Blank, Stephen, "China Joins the Great Central Asian Base Race." 9 November 2005, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111605.shtml>

Butler, Kenley, "Internal Conflicts and Security Concerns in Central Asia and Afghanistan". 26 September 2001, <http://www.cns.miis.edu>.

Central Asia: Islam And The State, *ICG Asia Report*, No. 59, Osh/Brussels, 10 July 2003. www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/files2/03-07-10Report%20Islam%20and%20State.pdf

Chan, John "China Pushes into Central Asia for Oil and Gas". <http://wsws.org/articles/2001/jan2001/oil-j03.shtml>

Cohen, Dr. Aerial, "Central Asia to Play Prominent Role in US-Russian Cooperation". <http://www.eurasianet.org>

Cohen, Dr. Aerial, "The New "Great Game": Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia." <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm>

Davlatshoev, Suhrobsho , The Formation And Consolidation Of Pamiri Ethnic Identity In Tajikistan, January 2006 etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12607111/index.pdf

Diamond, Todd, "Central Asian States Advance Multinational Fight Against Terrorism". 10 October 2001, <http://www.eurasianet.org>

Dixon, "Norm Central Asia: US war machine digs in for long stay". 23 January 2002, <http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2002/477/477p11.htm>

Dodykhudoeva, Leila "*The Socio Linguistic Situation and Language Policy of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Badakhshan: The Case of the Tajik Language*". <http://www.linguapax.org/congres/taller/taller2/Dodykhudoeva.html>].

Eesfendiari, Golnaz, "Central Asia: Iran, Turkey Struggle To Influence Region.", 25 October 2005, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/b974274f-ce72-4859-b2c4-605ce58ebfe8.html>

Efegil, Ertan and Leonard A Stone, "Iran and Turkey in Central Asia: Opportunities for rapprochement in the post-cold war era". *Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol. 20, Spring 2003,

http://www.caspianstudies.com/Foreignpolicy/iran%20central%20asia/iran_and_turkey_in_central_asia.htm

Encyclopedia 21 April 2006. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asia

Encyclopedia Britannica <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9070997/Tajik>

Escobar, Pepe "The Roving Eye Pipeline Stan, Part 1: The Rules of the Game". 25 January 2002, <http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/DA26Ag01.html>

Foroughi, Payam, "Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Socio-economic Disparities-Sources and Solutions". *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 22, No.1,2002, <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/9BGKWLWTMKWHA4K2UX4G/Contributions/0/0/W/T/0DWTMWGKNUGXGMJ3.pdf>

Fuqiu, "The Real Purpose of the American March into Central Asia". 10 May 2002, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/62/>

The Global Review of Ethno politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, January 2004. http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_III/issue_2/cummings.pdf

The Great Game, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Game

Hunter, Shireen T, "Religion, Politics, and Security in Central Asia". *SAIS Review* Vol., 21, No.2 (Summer/Fall 2001), p. 69. http://muse.jhu.edu/cgi-bin/access.cgi?url=/journals/sais_review/v021/21.2hunter.html

Keith, Martin, "Welcome to the Republic of Leninabad", *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No 4, 1997. http://www.cac.org/dataeng/st_06_martin.shtml

Khan, Mehmood-Ul-Hassan, "Geo-political and Geo-strategic Designs of China and Russia in Central Asia: Implications for USA and rest of the region". 15 August 2005, <http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/17788>

Khudonaza, Anaitar, *The Other*, <http://www.google.com.pk/search?hl=en&q=Anaita+khudonazar%3A+The+others&meta=>

Khudonazarov, Davlat *The Conflict in Tajikistan: Question of Regionalism*.

<http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/securityandterrorism/coalition/regionalrelations/ConflictBook/Khudonazar.htm>.

Kipling, Lesley, "The war on drugs, Heroine Trafficking in south west Asia".
<http://www.eagle2.american.edu/~lk1205a/Drugs/Tajikistan.htm>

Lapidus, Gail, "Central Asia in Russian and American Foreign Policy after 11 September 2001". Presentation at "Central Asia and Russia: Responses to the 'War on Terrorism'. a panel discussion held at the University of California, 29 October 2001,
<http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~iseees/>

Law, Gwillim, 'Raions of Tajikistan', *Administrative Subdivisions of Countries*.
1999, <http://www.statoids.com/ytj.html>

Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Tajikistan, November 2005
<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/tjtoc.html>

Loeb, Vernon, "Footprints In Steppes Of Central Asia". 9 February 2002,
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020209attack01.htm>

Mann, Poonam, Religious Extremism In Central Asia, *Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA*, Vol. XXV No. 9, December 2001
http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_dec01map01.html

Manz ,Beatrice Forbes, CAsian Uprisings in the Neighnteenth Century: Ferghana Under the Russians, *Russian Review*, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 1987.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3955/is_n7_v49/aj_20588398

Martin, Keith, "Regional and Religious Politics in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan: Some Preliminary Notes",
www.demokratizatsiya.org/Dem%20Archives/DEM%2005-03%20martin.pdf

Martin,Keith Whither Central Asia's Islamic Radicals? A Comparative Framework for Examining Political Islam in Central Asia,
http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/m_martin.shtml

Martin, Keith, Whither Central Asia's Islamic Radicals? A Comparative Framework for Examining Political Islam in Central Asia,
http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/m_martin.shtml

Martin, Patrick, "US bases pave the way for long-term intervention in Central Asia". 11 January 2002, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/jan2002/base-j11.shtml>

Marquardt, Erich, "Iran's Race for Nuclear Weapons". 29 September 2003, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=96&language_id=1

Naby, Eden Nowroz, "The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War?". Fort Leavenworth, United States Army Foreign Military Studies Office, 1996 <http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/opart/pubs/waraf.htm>

Nourzhanov, Kirill 'The Politics of History in Tajikistan: Reinventing the Samanids', *Harvard Asia Quarterly*, Vol 5, No 1, Winter 2001, <http://www.google.com.pk/search?hl=en&q=The+politics+of++history+in+Tajikistan%3A+Reinventing+the+samanids&meta>

Olimova, Saodat, Igor Bosc, "*Labour Migration from Tajikistan*". International Organization for Migration, July 2003, http://tcc.iom.int/iom/images/uploads/tajikistan_1071229382.pdf.

Parsons, Robert, "Central Asia: China-Russia Bloc Challenges U.S. In Region". 25 October 2005, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/faa99a3f-fe3b-4e8b-95ac-b05d232340f0.html>

Peimani, Hooman, "Abusing The 'War On Terrorism' In Central Asia". *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 14 August 2002, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=21&SMSESSION=NO

Poverty, Terror Sparks Exodus of Ethnic Russians From Kyrgyzstan." *Russia Today*, 28 February 2001, <http://www.russiatoday.com>

Rahnamo ,Abdullo Hakim, From the end of the Bukhara Emirate to the post-Soviet Times, an Overview of the History and Current Situation of Islam in Tajikistan, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/>

Relief Web "Updated Donor Alert on Urgent Humanitarian Affairs, October Needs in Tajikistan". UN Department of Humanitarian 1997, <http://www.reliefweb.int>

Rybakovsky, Leonid and Sergey Ryazantsev, "International Migration in the Russian Federation".

http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmigdev2005/P11_Rybakovsky&Ryazantsev.pdf

Sahgal, Dr. Arun, "Growing Russian Influence in Central Asia". 5 November 2004, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=232&language_id=1

Sergei, Gretskey, "*Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments and Prospects for Peace*."

<http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/securityandterrorism/coalition/regionalrelations/ConflictBook/Gretskey.htm>

Shabram, Akbarzadeh, "Why did nationalism fail in Tajikistan". *Europe-Asia Studies* Nov 1996,

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3955/is_n7_v48/ai_19226485/pg_

Shah, Syed Adnan Ali, "Factors of Competition Between Russia and The US in Central Asia"., *Institute of strategic studies*, Vol. XXV, No.4, Winter 2005. http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2005_files/no_4/article/a6.html

Siegfried, Matthias Country Risk Profile 2001: Precarious Peace in Tajikistan, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/research/pub/public_house/fast/corp/2001/siegfried_01.htm

Straub, David, The Tajikistan Update, <http://www.angelfire.com/sd/tajikistanupdate>

Tajikistan Society,

http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/tajikistan/SOCIETY.html

Trakhachev, Vadim, "Central Asia still remains a highly important region for Russia without which it cannot exist". 28 November 2005, http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/16538_asia.html

"United States, Tajikistan To Continue Active Military Cooperation". 26 July 2005, <http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/Jul/26-341697.html>

Zakirov, Nargiz, " OSCE Effort to Rid Tajikistan of Deadly Mines". *Institute for War & Peace Reporting*, 5 February 2003 <http://www.iwpr.net>

Zia Brig. Jamal, "Presence Of The USA In Central Asia and its Implications on the Region". *National defense College Journal*, 2004 <http://www.ndc.edu.pk/publications/Journals/NDC%20JOURNAL%202004%20WINTER/04%20Presence%20of%20the%20USA%20in%20Central%20Asia%20By%20Brig%20Jamal.DOC>

http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/tajikistan/SOCIETY.html

[http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00360341\(198707\)46%3A3%3C267%3ACAUITN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C](http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00360341(198707)46%3A3%3C267%3ACAUITN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C)

<http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/53/index-f.html>.

<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=70201>

http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/nit/inc_country_detail.cfm?page=47&nit=284&year=2003&pf

REPORTS:

Central Asia: What Role for the European Union? ICG Asia Report N°113 April 2006
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4065&l=1>

Conflict in the Soviet Union, Helsinki Watch. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991.

Human Rights in Tajikistan: In the Wake of Civil War. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993.

International Narcotics Strategy Report March 1996, United States: Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics Matters., 1996

Tajikistan. International Monetary Fund (IMF). Washington: IMF, 1992.

Tajikistan. Human Development Report 2000, Dushanbe, Tajikistan: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2000.