

US Policy Toward Central Asia:

A Study of Power Politics and Post – Communist Transition



By

M. Abdul Mateen Khan

**Area Study Center for
Africa, North and South Americas
Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad
2009**

US Policy Toward Central Asia:

A Study of Power Politics and Post – Communist Transition

By

M. Abdul Mateen Khan

**A dissertation submitted to the Area Study
Center in the Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy**

AREA STUDY CENTRE FOR AFRICA, NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA
QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY
ISLAMABAD

Final Approval of Thesis

This is to certify that we have read the dissertation submitted by Mr. Muhammad Abdul Mateen Khan under the title “US Policy Toward Central Asia: A Study of Power Politics and Post – Communist Transition” and in our opinion, it is up to the standard of acceptance by Quaid-i-Azam University for granting the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in American Studies.

Supervisor: _____
Prof. Dr. Muhammad Islam

External Examiner: _____
Prof. Dr. Amna Mahmood

External Examiner: _____
Dr. Asma Shakir Khawaja

Chairman, BoG/Director: _____
Prof. Dr. Muhammad Ali

CONTENTS

<u>No</u>		<u>Page</u>
	Abstract	i
	Acknowledgement	ii
1.	Introduction (Hypothesis and Methodology)	01
2.	Literature Review and Framework for Analysis	11
3.	Geopolitics of the CAR and the Evolution of the US Policy	45
4.	US- CAR Strategic Relations	68
5.	US and CAR Economic Relations	94
6.	US-CAR Socio Political Relations	122
7.	Conclusion	149
	Bibliography	168
	Abbreviations	179

ABSTRACT

The period between the Soviet disintegration in 1990's and 2005 has a well marked character of its own. In these years US foreign policy rapidly moved towards closer engagements with the five Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with the ostensible object of promoting its influence beyond Europe and in the region that is contiguous to China, the Middle East, and Russia.

The US foreign policy in this region moved along many separate but convergent paths. Firstly, the US succeeded in entering for the first time into normal diplomatic relations with the states that were previously part of that Soviet Union. Secondly, the US started military, political and economic engagements that strengthened its relations and influence with the region. Third, it attempted to make up for the regions apparent weaknesses by supplementing the engagement with mutual and coordinated liaison with Russia the former colonial power of the region in which the US successfully moved the states towards nuclear proliferation. In the next phase it entered the region with military bases, investment ventures, projects at the private grass root level, projects in economic transition, relations with NGO's, regional alliance and so on.

This study puts forward security, political and economic linkages of the US policy toward CAR states – in the light of theoretical framework of the power play of realists, and the tools of foreign policy intending influence in a region.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I thank Area Study Center, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad which made possible my studies on the US policy vis a vis the Central Asian States. I would like to thank Professor Dr. Mohammad Islam for his guidance, patience and encouraging me to complete research on this topic and complete the work. Furthermore, I would also like to thank the Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences, Russia that supported my intellectual endeavor in Moscow something that deepened my understanding of the politics of the Central Asian region. In this respect I owe my gratitude to Dr. Vyacheslav Blokrenitsky, Dr. Irina D. Zvayagelskaya, and Dr. Maleshova Jina Parisovna who during my stay in Moscow helped me in overcoming the obstacles of the shortage of material in English language in Russia, by offering views and responding to my questions. Finally, I would like to thank many others who helped me to complete this thesis.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union transformed the international system and led to the emergence of many new states on the world map. The new states in the Central Asian Region (CAR): Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were distinct given their geopolitical and economic importance and evoked scholarly interest in the discussion of their interstate relations in the global and regional politics.¹ The region had been occupied by Russia since the 17th century and ruled by communists who demarcated the present borders of the states and left their traces on society and the system of governance.

The end of the Cold War also brought a tangible shift in the international system that transformed the pattern of interaction among states. The new international system required the states to revisit their foreign policies to adjust to the new realities. At the time, the foreign policy of the United States (the US) was also stated to be “at a crossroad” to deal with the transition of the global system and the “generational conflict based on the memories” of the Cold War experiences.² The US, which believed in the management of global politics according to its interests, standards and needs, did revisit its policy to deal with the transforming international system to retain its global role.³

The US found itself at new strategic and political heights with no real challenger to its maneuvers for global domination.⁴ The US promoted a New World Order, that it said should meet the new global realities and the challenges arising out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states, a transformation of Europe, emerging civil wars in many third world countries, the rise of new middle-order powers replacing the old ones and

new globalization in which economic issues were prominent.⁵ With its newfound preponderance in global politics, the US would now manipulate the global events at the international level and strive to remake the international order on its terms as pointed out by Haas:

the principal aim of the US foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with its interests and values and thereby promote peace, prosperity, and justice as widely as possible.⁶

In the US post-Cold War global policy, the relationship with the new states of Central Asia attains significance as policy advisors called the CAR and the surrounding regions, a “grand chessboard”, where the US role “should be the dominant one.”⁷ Moreover, the success of the “New World Order” required that a “preponderant power could not leave any region unattended.”⁸ The CAR was also crucial for the US policy since it was earlier part of the former Soviet Union, a Cold War adversary. In the post-Cold War period the region has been in transition with apprehensions on its stability that would have an impact on regional and global security and stability.⁹

The US recognized the states at their independence in 1991 and soon deepened its strategic, military, economic, and social interaction. In this relationship, the US military in coordination with NATO extended training programs for police forces, border troops, and military units of the CAR states. The US interacted with the transition process of the CAR states in their endeavor to transform the system of governance. The US facilitated the entry of the CAR states into global economic and financial institutions and negotiated and concluded with them

massive investment projects and aid programs to exploit economic resources, including oil and its supplies, and for societal transformation.

The growing relations and the influence of the US in the CAR states aroused significant geopolitical and economic discussion.¹⁰ The multifaceted interaction of the US that ranged from internal security and economic policies to the external defense and security policies of the CAR states has been noticed by other regional and international powers and they adjusted their policies in response to the contours of the US moves. With it came the observations that the “Great Game” was reemerging in the CAR and the region would soon become a battleground for influence by superpowers.¹¹

This study aims to examine the US Policy toward Central Asia in the post-communist transition period (1991-2005). It will examine the foreign policy and its tools that were applied by the US in pursuance of its interests in the CAR states, be they strategic, political, social, or economic. It will look into the US policy toward the CAR from the perspective of the power politics and how they interfaced with the CAR states and region’s politics and led to regional and global implications.

Significance and rationale of the Study

When the CAR is referred to in studies, articles, and media, the issues related to stability, terrorism, and the future of democracy, energy, and oil are discussed. The scholars focus on the security and stability of the CAR region and internal structures of the states’ politics, economy, society, democracy, and social services.¹² Prominence is also given to geopolitical and economic transformation and the building up of the CAR states into viable nation-states and their behavior as independent actors in the international system.¹³ However, some studies

also note that the existing research “lacks adequate and strong scientific approaches” in which the CAR has been “marginalized as a vaguely defined region.”¹⁴

In respect to the US policy toward the CAR states, studies note that it emphasizes the aspects of security, oil and energy, and democracy, and these issues are discussed as part of the strategic policy concerning the regional security dynamics.¹⁵ The explanation of the power-driven policy of the US that attempts to enhance its long-term influence and deepen engagement to establish an ascendancy in the CAR is only briefly mentioned by some studies and reports without detailed analysis.

In this background, this study attempts to fill the knowledge gap by exploring the details of the US policy toward Central Asia in the post-Cold War period in promoting its strategic, economic, and social interests and examine its implications. The knowledge would be valuable and important for scholars and policymakers in particular from the medium and small countries that need to get an insight into the policies of a superpower toward a region so as to learn from the relationship among unequal state actors and to draw lessons from the power politics of a superpower.¹⁶

Hypothesis and the Research Question

The thesis of the study is that the US policy toward the CAR from 1991-2005 followed realpolitik and used the tools of liberalism to its advantage. The US policy was aimed to gain influence, exploit opportunities and develop a meaningful long-term "engagement" with the CAR states and the region.¹⁷ The thesis is developed on the power politics framework and takes the stand that the US policy was offensive and encompassed not only security and military tools but also included socioeconomic tools to promote its interests.¹⁸

With the assistance of the realpolitik theoretical explanations and the theory of foreign policy, the study discusses the details of the US policy during the period 1991-2005. The global system was in transition in the early 1990s and it provided a space to each nation to enhance interaction and influence in an emerging region. It is also to note that the study of any country's policy towards a region requires an identification of the global and regional dynamics that play a dominant role and bring in changes in the power structure.

To examine the formulation and conduct of the US policy toward the CAR states, the questions that have been explored in the following sections of the study are:

1. What were the major premises on which the US built its policy toward CAR in the post-Cold War period?
2. What events in CAR and at the global level shaped the US responses?
3. What were the strategic, political, and economic policy measures? and
4. How successful was the US policy in securing its objectives and interests?

The study finds the logic of the use of realpolitik for this work in the observation that the tools could be modified, but "the substance of American foreign policy will remain roughly the same" [...] whatever the US administration or policy professionals.¹⁹ For the US foreign policy, it has also been observed that realism has been a dominant paradigm in its decision making during the Cold War period and many argued that the same influence of realism would continue in the post-Cold War period.²⁰

Realism suggests activism in strategic and economic interaction abroad in its policy tools that align with the interests and goals of a superpower of the magnitude of the US that aims to

gain influence and expand its values in the emerging regions and at the global level.²¹ The domestic opposition to realism in the foreign policy is countered by the decision-makers with the argument that the global order is a direct by-product of the primacy of the US and hence its active engagement with any region would serve global stability, peace, and prosperity.²²

A cursory look at the US policy toward the CAR suggests that most of its tools are the replication of the usual characteristics of *realpolitik*. The policy tools are multifaceted covering military interaction, political engagements, humanitarian and societal support, aid and assistance programs, energy cooperation, investments, etc. paving the way for the US to assume a role and influence in the states and the region.²³ The US policy aimed to influence the decision-making apparatus of the CAR states and prevent other states to gain influence in the region. It intended to move affairs in the region in a preferred direction be it the internal affairs or the regional resolution of issues.

Methodology

To evaluate a conceptual framework, a scientific mode of inquiry is adopted to focus on the recurring patterns in the foreign policy analysis. Primary sources for the study include documents of the US government, reports and testimonies presented in the US Congress and the US Senate and their committees, the reports of international organizations and groups, documents issued by the CAR states, and the declassified information available in the libraries and the internet. Secondary sources include books, newspapers, reports, studies, and articles by scholars and experts dealing with international issues of strategy, security, political economy, society, and the geopolitics of the CAR.²⁴

To augment the discussion and the argument, interviews, and discussions with scholars and diplomats from the US, Russia, and Central Asia were held.²⁵ Search engines and official websites were used for official viewpoints, news reports, statements of officials, and commentaries of analysts and journalists. The reports and literature from Russia, Central Asia, East Asia and South Asia published in the newspapers and journals and placed on the websites are relevant and useful and hence used in the discussion.

Outline of the study

The study contains seven chapters including the introduction. The introductory chapter contains the research question and hypotheses and methodology. Chapter two brings in the theoretical parameters of realism, literature review of the relevant theories, and the US global and regional policy after the Cold War in the light of the views expressed by analysts. Its second part discusses the relevant theoretical framework that has been used in the examination of this study. Chapter three is on the geopolitics of the CAR and the evolution of the US policy toward the CAR. It provides information on the emerging Central Asian Region in the 1990s, the five states, and their transition process, and the roles and interests of the neighboring states in the region. The second part of it discusses the development of US-CAR relations and the evolution of the US policy toward the CAR.

The fourth chapter is a discussion on the US policy and relations with the CAR states in the strategic and military sphere. The discussion also includes the presence and interests of neighboring countries that have strategic interests and relations with the CAR states and become part of the emerging regional processes. The fifth chapter examines the US-CAR economic relations and how these relations progressed and were related to the strategic interests of the US.

The fifth chapter brings in the interaction of the US with the internal structures of the CAR states in which the prominent issues discussed are internal security, democracy, and interaction with social issues. The last chapter concluding the study examines the outcome of the US policy toward the CAR states, the degree of engagement, and its implications. The conclusion focuses that the assumption made by the study and corroborating ideas of many contemporary writers suggests that the US goal is a long-term geopolitical ascendancy in the CAR. A handful of suggestions for a meaningful relationship of the US with the CAR are also presented.

As for the limitations of the study, it is stated that the method of analysis, geopolitical and geo-economics approaches, and the theoretical framework limit the analysis of plausible things that “might happen” in the future. However, an implicit conclusion of this study – one that has emerged into clearer focus is that the only way for the US to obtain a lasting influence in Central Asia is through cooperation and power-sharing with Russia, China, and other regional states.

End Notes

¹ The significance of the CAR was noted as historical, cultural, location is in the vicinity of Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and South Asia, natural resources, economy, trade and markets and Political Islam etc. See inter alia Jan Kalicki, "Caspian Energy at the Crossroads", *Foreign Affairs* 80: 5, Sept.– Oct. 2001, pp. 120-124; Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, "New friends, new fears in Central Asia", *Foreign Affairs* 81: 2, March–April 2002, pp. 61, 69, 70; Charles William Maynes, "America discovers Central Asia", *Foreign Affairs* 82: 2, April–May 2003, pp. 125, 130, 131; Martha Brill Olcott, "The war on terrorism in Central Asia and the cause of democratic reform", *Demokratizatsiya* 11: 1, Winter 2003, p. 94, and "Taking stock of Central Asia", *Journal of International Affairs* 56: 2, Spring 2003, p. 4, and Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, "Central Asia: developments and the administration's policy", *Testimony of House International Relations Committee*, 29 Oct. 2003, posted at <http://usinfo.state.gov.dhr/Archive/2003/Nov/04-122493.html>, (accessed 16 May, 2006)

² Joan Hoff, "American diplomacy : retrospect and prospect, in *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered 1890-1993*, ed. Gordon Martel, Routledge, N.Y. 1994, p - 229

³ The US had built and endured a global system revolving around international political and economic regimes during the Cold War period that created interdependence within the US-led bloc. Any disturbance to it at the end of the Cold War would cause upheavals in politics and markets. The required changes in the US Foreign Policy after the Cold War are discussed by. Ole R. Holtsi, *Making American Foreign Policy*, Routledge, N.Y. 2006

⁴ Tom Barry, The U.S. Power Complex: What's New, *Special Report*, November 2002, <http://www.fpi.org/papers/02power/index.html>, (accessed 23 July, 2005)

⁵ Brad Roberts, "1995 and the End of the Post-Cold War Era," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 18, no. 1 Winter, 1995; The role of the US is noted by a Russian newspaper Pravda by commenting that the end of bipolarity presented the US a dilemma to get its power acknowledged and take responsibility of the global peace and security or find another way out, *Russia and regional associations of the former USSR stand up against USA's supremacy*, http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/16467_Uzbekistan.html, (accessed 26 May 2007)

⁶ Richard N. Haass, *Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World*, Remarks at the Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 22, 2002 <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632.htm>, (accessed 26 May 2005)

⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, Basic Books, 2004, <http://www.aspeninstitute.org/index.asp?bid=14292&i=53>, (accessed 12 March, 2005), it refers the book *The Grand Chessboard*, 1997 stating that Central Asia (and Caucus) are of strategic interests for the US

⁸ The New World Order required that no region be unattended by the US so that it gets "freedom to impose the US will on a new world order," Henry C K Liu, Middle East: Realpolitik of Democratic Revolution, Part 2: The Bush vision in, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EK20Ak05.html, (accessed 12 May 2005)

⁹ Elizabeth Jones, *United States House of Representatives'* subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia on 29 October 200, <http://usinfo.state.gov.dhr/Archive/2003/Nov/04-122493.html>.

¹⁰ Stephen Blank, "American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region", *World Affairs*, 9/22/2000, Blank writes that the US "had become the arbiter or leader of virtually every interstate and international issue in the area (CAR) and also the main center of international adjudication and influence for local issues."

¹¹ Dosym Satpayev, Assessment Risk Group in Almaty, cited in Kathy Gannon, *Replay of the Great Game in Central Asia*, The Moscowtimes, Thursday, August 18, 2005. Page 4, "The Great Game refers to the rivalries and ambitions of 19th century Russia and Britain in the CAR. It now applies to a new competition that is pitting Russia and China against the US." For scholars it is due to oil and mineral wealth as in World, during his campaign against Russia, Hitler sought to capture CAR for fuel supplies. After the war, the Soviets exploited CAR oil and gas instead of developing their reserves.

¹² Pauline Jones Loung, "The Transformation of Central Asia", Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2005, p.3; Also found in various Conference reports, www.csis.org, (accessed 15 May 2005)

¹³ James L. Richardson, "The End of Geopolitics," in *Charting the Post-Cold War Order*, ed. Richard Leaver & James L. Richardson, Westview Press, 1993, p-39, It points out that the structure of the region is looked in the light of "the end of geopolitics" that is giving way to a "security community."

¹⁴ Farkhod Tolipov, *Central Asia as Space, Polity, Peoples, and Fate*, observes that "not only current scholarly works on Central Asia, after 11 September 2001, but also post-independence studies of the region lack adequate and strong scientific approaches." http://www.ca-c.org/cgi-bin/search/show.pl?url=http://www.ca-c.org/online/2005/journal_eng/cac-02/12.toleng.shtml&words=pluralism, (accessed 14 May 2005)

¹⁵ Lena Jonson & Roy Allison, (eds) (2000), "Central Asian Security: Internal and External Dynamics", *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p 10-12, The book discusses security dynamics in Central Asia and observes that "realism's premise and the future security options can differ." "Co-operation or conflict is affected by internal and external factors."

¹⁶ For an understanding of the necessity to include this aspect one could find good discussion by Federico Bordonaro, "Great and Medium Powers in the Age of Unipolarity": <http://www.pinr.com>, (accessed 16 May, 2006)

¹⁷ Richard N Haass & Meghan L. O'sullivan, "Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies", *Survival*, vol 42, no 2, 2000, p 114, stresses that "Engagement" is more than interaction with other states. It is termed as a: "[...]foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to archive its objectives".

¹⁸ The theoretical framework is discussed in the next chapter.

¹⁹ Selden, Z. 2004. "What Europe Doesn't Understand," *Wall Street Journal Online*, May 26, 2004. At <http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110005126>, (accessed 20 August 2006)

²⁰ "For over half a century, realism has been the dominant paradigm in international relations," Political Realism: A Culprit for the 9/11 Attacks, From *Europe*, Vol. 26 (3) - Fall 2004 <http://www.harvardir.org/articles/print.php?article=1252>, (accessed 14 May 2005)

²¹ Ref. Howard Williams, David Sullivan and E. Gwynn in *Mathews Francis Fukuyama and the End of History*, Cardiff, 1997, pp 120, and in "Rebuilding America's Defense: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century", *A Report of The Project for the New American Century September 2000*, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>, (accessed 12 May 2005), it is cited that Fukuyama argues "for exporting liberal values to non-democratic societies, since these values are superior to the values of other societies."

²² www.brookings.edu/views/papers/daalder/20030814.pdf, (accessed 14 May 2005), based on this premise the US gets domestic support to use its power as it sees fit for its ability to dissuade potential challengers.

²³ It was important for the US that a three-pronged strategy was evolved containing three elements, (1) security, (2) politics, and (3) economics, suggested by S. Frederick Starr, Testimony at the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, 13 December 2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm, (accessed 3 January, 2007); foreign policy tools are discussed in, Roy E Jones, *Principles of Foreign Policy: The Civil State in the World Setting*, Martin Robertson, 1979

²⁴ A selection of the journals examined is found in the references. As no empirical piece of work has a particularly central role, a discussion on such a topic, is out of context.

²⁵ I spent the period from 2003 to 2006 in Moscow and later visited Kazakhstan twice. During the period I held discussions with many scholars and diplomats and asked questions relevant to the study. A selection of literature is reviewed in the next Chapter.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDY

Introduction

This section discusses the literature and theories related to Power politics, US foreign policy, its formation, and its global interests, and the US policy on Central Asia. The second part of this chapter will examine the theoretical framework which has been made a basis for this study and found relevant to the US policy on Central Asia.

Theoretical Literature

Theories of international relations are used to understand the complexities arising out of the foreign policy decisions of states. They help to “bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomenon without which it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.”¹ During the transitive phase of world politics, at the end of the Cold War, policymakers and analysts use various theoretical paradigms to understand the emerging behavior of states which would redefine their interests to take care of new environments.² This chapter develops a conceptual framework relating theory and foreign policy of the US in the post-Cold War period and toward Central Asia.

Realism and Idealism are traditional theories that seek to explain a state's foreign policy behavior. Realism has been "the dominant model of international relations" that provided a "useful framework during the last six decades" on the global developments before and after

the Cold War.³ Realism has many complementary variants and "each purports to explain the certain phenomenon."⁴ Realism is based on three beliefs for its explanation of foreign policy, the state, anarchic global system, and the pursuit of power by states.⁵ The state is a primary and autonomous actor pursuing power in the interests of its society. The global environment is anarchic and it compels states to respond by maximizing security. It drives statesmen to think and act in terms of power that constrains the range of rational choices for states and they to strive to obtain as many resources as possible.

Classical realism is a system-level theory arguing that states seek as much political power as possible because they are social institutions, and therefore follow the drive of human nature. In competing for power, states face a conflict of interest and set their goal as to achieve the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good. This lesser evil is the 'Balance of Power' in which they try to maintain an existing equilibrium or constructing a new equilibrium.⁶ The US and the USSR were the most powerful states after the 2nd World War, remained rivals and wary of each other's power during the Cold War. Balance of power prevented war between them.

Neo-realism developed classical realism but its focus is on the anarchic structure of the international system. According to neo-realism, 'structural constraints are more important than agents' (states) strategies and motivations. Power struggle and rivalries among states are not a function of the nature of states, but a function of the nature of the international system.⁷ The international structure is a separate and anarchic domain with its features and modes of operation which compel states to act in the realist mode to determine their interests and powers. A state's freedom of choices and behavior is the function of absolute and relative power capabilities, though the "international structure provides opportunities and constraints to shape state behavior even if it does not determine it entirely."⁸

Another variant, neo-classical realism revives classical realism and emphasizes that power rivalries seek to explain both international outcomes and the foreign policies of individual states.⁹ State characteristics (state-level variables) play a larger role in the behavior of states in seeking power and enhance defense capabilities. Seeking power by states is based on rationality and their fear of other states is also a rational behavior. It is a sort of combination of classical and neo-realism that factors in both system-level and state-level variables. Neo-classical realists use structure to explain recurrence in international politics despite different actors.

In the wake of transforming international politics in the post-Cold War period when states were adjusting their policies to the new realities, the realists asserted that power remained a reality and their theories best explained the global politics and provide policy guidelines for the future. However, “one theory of international politics is not sufficient, and cannot be made sufficient, for the making unambiguous foreign-policy predictions.”¹⁰

Neo-realism dominated the International Relations theory and the foreign policy explanations of the US during the Cold War.¹¹ For realists, seeking security is the foremost object for states to ensure survival through military capabilities and make alliances to preserve the balance of power and prevent other's dominance. It is criticized for its emphasis on the system structure instead of the states, power-driven foreign policies, and the limitations in predicting international events such as the end of the Cold War.

Offensive realism, associated with Mearsheimer, is another approach under the rubric of structural realism. It draws different conclusions about state behavior and international outcome. Relevant to post-Cold War global politics, Offensive realism views that it is the anarchy that provides strong incentives to states to seek power and influence. States continue to follow the usual tenets of realism and their need to survive compels them to improve their

relative power positions through arms build-ups, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile (or even autarkic) foreign economic policies, and opportunistic expansion.¹² For offensive realism, major powers ensure their survival and a role in world politics, seek to "control and manage various regions of the world to become a hegemonic power" and pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.¹³

Offensive realism helps in explaining the great power's policies toward regions and reasons that the "pinnacle of power" for a great power is hegemony and once it is achieved a state will become a status quo power.¹⁴ The hegemony is a strategy to enter a contested geopolitical domain termed "offshore balancing" as a state will always be power-hungry until it dominates all other states and become a "global hegemon." A great power builds regional powers to check the influence of potentially hostile powers to seek an influence in a region to promote military and economic interests without the costs of large military deployments.¹⁵

While offensive realism is mostly considered as explaining post-Cold War politics, many scholars express divergent views that are termed defensive realism. They argue that the international system provides incentives for expansion only under certain conditions, anarchy creates a zero-sum situation and security dilemma for states that cause them to worry about one another's future intentions and relative power.¹⁶ Alliances generate spirals of mutual hostility or conflict and state often pursue expansionist policies because their leaders mistakenly believe that aggression is the only way to security. For durable security, the states ought to pursue moderate military, diplomatic, and foreign economic policies that communicate restraint.¹⁷

All the variants of realism emphasize the security and military power and view that the states rely on hard power in their foreign policies. Realism, however, does not fully explain the states' pursuit of the values, promotion of human rights, democracy, free trade, and culture. Realists faced criticism in explaining the post-Cold War transition since the states adopted "the elements and principles of strategic interaction and conflicts other than military power."¹⁸ Similarly, realism lacks theoretical rigor and predictive power because it eschews a mono-causal focus on either domestic or systemic variables.¹⁹ The emphasis of realists on shifting alliances to increase power creates a security dilemma that in fluid situations makes states amenable to miscalculations in uncertainties.²⁰

Alternate to realism are variants of idealism such as Global Society, Complex Interdependence, and Liberal Institutionalism. These paradigms assert that the undue attention to the war and peace issue and nation-state renders realism as an increasingly anachronistic model of global relations.²¹ Idealism is a state-level theory and focuses on international law, morality, and international organization, rather than power alone, as key influences on international events.²² For it "all states, in their dealings with one another, are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form."²³

Liberals argue that states prefer cooperation over rivalry and try to build just world order, enforceable international law, and international organizations.²⁴ States derive interests from the underlying preferences of societal actors mediated by political institutions since institution-building reduces uncertainty and communication ameliorates fear and antagonism. States are not merely sovereign self-interested agents but are progressive forces for social justice and have learned that cooperation is a better strategy than conflict. For Liberals, the 'repressive and murderous nature of the Soviet state was the key to the US and USSR animosity though they have been cooperating on issue of interest even during the Cold War.

Neo-liberalism an offshoot of liberalism is a system-level version of the theory and focuses on how institutions can influence the behavior of states by spreading values or creating rule-based behavior. Neo-liberals focus on the United Nations, and other global institutions in shaping the foreign policy behavior of states. Liberal theories support the pluralist model of foreign policymaking that predicts more variations in the conflict over policy and underestimates the importance of allegiance to nationalism.²⁵ They neglect loyalties to nationalism in most of the post-Cold War events and civil wars in many regions. Their focus on domestic institutions and interest groups cannot explain shifts in US policy priorities that are not linked with changes in the relative political power of social groups.

Institutionalism, a variant of liberalism, argues that development, welfare, environment, communication, narcotics, and other issues are crucial in interstate relations and need global structures for cooperation which could not be done within the national agendas. Institutionalism is criticized that at its core it is structural realism as "it starts with a structural theory, applies it to the origins and operations of institutions," and "ends with realists conclusions."²⁶ Here the realists agree with the contention of the liberals that the economic and social aspects and international cooperation are important elements. However, they stress that states would not behave in ways consistent with liberalism since the neglect of security would be ruinous.²⁷

Other theories explaining the policies of states in the international realm include Cognitive and Constructivism. Cognitive theories are based on psychological processes – perception and belief systems on the foreign policy behavior of states. The application of this theory is limited in the case of the US policy toward the CAR states that were new international actors and the US had no history of relations and interaction with them.²⁸ Therefore, sufficient

information on the states and the region was not available which is necessary to develop workable perceptions.

Constructivism examines state behavior in the context of state characteristics and rejects the assumption of neo-realism that anarchy is a structural condition in the international system. It asserts that all states are unique and have a set of political, cultural, economic, social, or religious characteristics that influence their foreign policy.²⁹ Constructivism emerged in the discussion of international politics after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as it was a process without a significant shift in the distribution of capabilities in the international system and largely through domestic political transformation enabled by strategic actors. It was a period when the traditional theories got challenged due to their inability to predict such a revolutionary transformation.

Constructivists view the world as socially constructed in which agents and structures are mutually constitutive. (Wendt 1987) The US and the USSR both had separate foreign policy characters and the Cold War was due to their clash of identities and ended because of the changes in Russian identity. The application of this theory is limited in international relations as it is a considered social theory, has problematic assumptions of the possibility for strategic action by political agents, and risks to downplay material factors and hard power in the dynamics of world politics. Wendt himself states that once a certain level of stability is reached, change is difficult to come by since even weaker members may act in the interest of preserving whatever is the current status quo.³⁰ Moreover, for the period of this study from 1991-2005 the CAR states were in political, economic, and social transition making it difficult to express their identities.

The study of the US foreign policy is incomplete if the structure of international security is not given due weight, since the US has developed global security institutions, unilateral and multilateral.³¹ Barry Buzan and Ole Woever map methodological tools to explain the behavior of states on the territorial aspects of security structures and regional security dynamics. They observe a phenomenon of "securitization" by great powers that are described as an extreme version of politicization and the use of extraordinary tools of foreign policy in the name of security to protect valuable interests in a region.³²

Buzan and Woever argue that regionalization is directly related to global dynamics and the great powers that are ranked in order of strength "penetrate" and "overlay" into the regions for security.³³ The argument is extended in another work on the US foreign policy at regional and global levels in competition with other powers.³⁴ The factors that compel shifts in the policy of great power are power projections of others in a region or in a conflict, overextension of its power at the global level, and domestic politics. Buzan and Woever relate liberalism with the foreign policy application of great power by saying that the operational autonomy of regions is triggered by the advent of "non-military actors" but does not give enough weight to economic and social dimensions. Analysts also find weaknesses in the applicability of their theory and their gradation of "powers."³⁵

Literature on US Foreign Policy

Moving from theory of International Relations to the conduct of the US foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, the readjustments in policy tools and national interests are noted by scholars. The US emerged as the only superpower which left its foreign policy without any "legacy with no anti-communist core, no political sector...left, liberal, centrist, conservative,

right...and no new vision for global engagement.”³⁶ The policy advises to the US got at the time were that the balance of power was in its favor therefore it should attempt to perpetuate a preponderant global role and “contain the power of others and spread its values all over the world” to seek security.³⁷ Realists and hawks argued for a hegemonic US foreign policy that should seek coalitions, control of the WMD, rebuilding of relations with the NIS and the Arab and Islamic world to counter instability and extremism, and intervene in the troubled nations that mattered.³⁸

In the post-Cold War period, the US pursued a “new world order” implying economic interdependence, the balance of power, fragmentation and the rise of nationalism, and technology advancement and integration.³⁹ The US leadership recognized that “even the new world order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace” meaning that global conflicts would continue and security will be the major issue.⁴⁰ It was looked by scholars as an order intended to create a global system based on the rules of "free market" interpreted following the economic needs and interests of the US capital, and policed by its military and the military forces of its allies.⁴¹

At the change of government in the US in 1993, liberals hoped that their views would make imprints in the global politics as president Clinton under pressure to restore the weak economy of the country stressed to “elevate economics in foreign policy (to) create an economic security council and to give domestic prosperity a key goal of the US policy that included boosting exports and enhancing access to foreign markets.”⁴²

The rationale for such a policy was that a strong domestic economy depended on active global engagement and should be the basis of US diplomacy.⁴³ In the early 1990s therefore,

the US policy emphasized security, non-proliferation, trade liberalization, open markets, assistance to developing countries in coordination with the World Bank and the IMF, and the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which it had ditched in 1945 for the sake of bilateralism in trade and economics.⁴⁴ For realists, however, such a policy is the pursuance of national interests in which the use of interdependence is an "ideology to camouflage the international politics."⁴⁵

The hopes of the liberals to transform the structure of international relations, however, remained unfulfilled.⁴⁶ The US National security strategy (1994) called for aggressive foreign policy and the use of power for "common interests" stressing that the US forces must be forward deployed or stationed in key overseas regions in peacetime to deter aggression. Such overseas presence (...) underwrites regional stability (...) and provides timely initial response capabilities."⁴⁷ The US committed its forces to the peacekeeping efforts of the UN and also expanded its military deployment abroad. The policy was justified by saying that "enhancing security, prosperity, and promoting democracy were mutually supportive," and the security policy was integrated with economic goals.⁴⁸

President Bush (2000-2008) did not have the compulsion of a weak economy and the emphasis of the US foreign policy moved to pursue hegemonic policies.⁴⁹ The US intervened in regional and global affairs with or without the authority of the UN on the pretexts of national interests, terrorism, weapons control, and human rights.⁵⁰ The US moved to upgrade armed forces by inducting scientific innovations to create an agile and lethal expeditionary force.⁵¹ It reduced the salience of nuclear weapons in military strategy to minimize incentives for others to acquire equalizers and contain WMD.⁵² It went for unilateralism as in case of attacks on Panama and alliance politics as in cases of Iraq and Afghanistan adventures.⁵³

The events of 9/11 led to the induction of “preemption in the US policy” that changed the Cold War period's strategic defense doctrines.⁵⁴ The US declared terrorists as new threats to its security who could have access to weapons of mass destruction. Following it, the National Security Strategy (2002) announced that the US reserved the option to wage preventive wars and opened the possibility for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states transforming the policy to be proactive and aggressive.⁵⁵ It was also explicitly stated in the official statements such as:

America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge ... thereby, making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.⁵⁶

The US foreign policy in the post 9/11 period is noted by scholars as an extreme expression of realism in which there were efforts to expand the US influence as a “desirable feature of the international system to manage trade-offs inherent in the war on terrorism and to augment America’s economic foundations to sustain political hegemony.”⁵⁷

In concluding the discussion on the post-Cold War policy of the US, it is important to note the observations such as that the "end of history" was for the adjustment of resources and patterns of engagement with other international actors to avoid the zero-sum foreign policy.⁵⁸

In the emerging globalization, the US expanded its economic influence in conjunction with the military might that is called a strategy of dominance and Pax Americana.⁵⁹ The US premised that global politics is cyclical and its preponderance allows it to set rules on other

states, shape issues and agendas at bilateral and multilateral levels, influence the terms of interaction between states, and to reward cooperation and penalize opposition.

The US thus manipulated global politics and projected that its national interests were correlated with global peace, stability, security, and prosperity.⁶⁰ As defined by realists, the US pursued the strategy by acting as an “offshore balancer” in a multi-polar regional balance of power and investing effort to strengthen regional indigenous economic and security institutions.⁶¹ The US promoted the restructuring of the global institutions under its leadership and managed the interdependence with military strength and multilateral means to advance its influence.⁶²

In pursuance to security through coalition and allies politics, the US-supported right-wing authoritarian regimes in the developing countries to maintain a regional balance and curb radical movements by supporting its partners internally and externally and through collective security systems by enhancing their leadership ability and in return ensured global political, military and economic role.⁶³ The US used economic and political linkages, aid programs, and trade concessions. The US promoted bilateral and multilateral cooperation in managing regions and eschewed power rivalries by engaging the EU, Russia, and China to manage the third world countries through direct and indirect influence.

The pursuit of economic and social dimensions is embedded in the US policy in which it promotes a liberal economic global system, calls for democracy, and engages with and promotes the regional systems that are established on the rules of the free market economy and in doing so interaction with military and the military forces of its allies is enhanced.⁶⁴ In the post-Cold War period, the need for interdependence is prominent in the US officials’

statements which stress that enhancing security, prosperity, and promoting democracy are mutually supportive and security policy is integrated with economic goals.⁶⁵ Its rationale was linked with the needs of the domestic economy by stressing that the strong domestic economy depends on active global engagement which should be the basis of US diplomacy.⁶⁶

Moving from the US global policy to the US policy toward the CAR, it is observed that the scholars have examined it in the framework of various theoretical explanations such as offensive realism, regional complex theory, strategic theory, strategic geography as a geopolitical concept, and strategic interests of the regional powers.⁶⁷ The studies note that the US policy on the CAR is articulated in a coherent way to pursue military and economic interests. The US policy concerns for the CAR are identified as stability, security, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, energy, and promotion of western values related to democracy, economy, and human rights.

Literature related to US Foreign Policy and the CAR

Steffen Schwarz examines the US interest and the policy on the CAR in the light of Francis Fukuyama's hypothesis of the "End of History" through the framework of realism. He concludes that it should not be expected that the US policy would be followed with moral values rather it is the national interest that is pursued. For him, the US engaged the CAR in the pursuance of stability, security, oil, and promotion of democracy in the early 1990s.⁶⁸

In the progression of relations, the scholars note an upward shift in the US policy from 1994 to 1996 that many attributed to the oil and energy potential, a rise of militancy, the fears of Russian reemergence, and the power competition in the regional relationship.⁶⁹ The US

engagement with the CAR is deepened by the mid-1990s moving to an active interaction with the CAR states on the issues such as Islam, military reforms, oil and its supply routes, regional identity, economic development, environment, corruption, crime, and drugs.⁷⁰

Fiona Hill observes the developing US relations with the CAR states that “crept from obscurity onto the US foreign policy agenda” with the concerns growing on security and stability in a region that was “rapidly becoming a base for extremism and terrorism,” and the US efforts to avert its “Afghanization.”⁷¹ Hill views that realism was dominant in the US policy in which coordination with Europe and regional powers and a link between security and political developments, energy, human rights, and drugs control is found.

Russia and perceptions over its expansion to regain influence in the new states remained a notable factor in the US policy toward the CAR.⁷² The US is advised that the region is prone to power rivalry and Russian influence (and also of China and Iran) and the US should limit the ingress and influence of other regional neighbors and the notion of “Russian sphere of influence” should be countered.⁷³ The US broadened the strategic engagement with the CAR states in response to the expansion of military and economic influence by the regional neighboring powers and directed its policy to prevent regional hegemony, access by others on the energy resources, conflict prevention, and control over militancy and terrorism.

Many scholars examine the possibilities of the conflict of interests and competition among great powers and validate the concept of a New Great Game.⁷⁴ Their views are linked with the observations that the US emphasis on security, economy, and democracy in the CAR has implications on its Asia policy.⁷⁵ The US thus adopted an offensive policy to make room for itself in the CAR in the shortest possible time to secure the “potential objective of containing

both China and Russia in geostrategic terms” for example, by the “military presence in Central Asia,” that was declared as deployed to combat terrorism but the real objectives were long term influence.⁷⁶

Linkages of the US policy toward the CAR with its global policy have also been examined by scholars with the observations that the instability, energy resources, and the existence of nuclear weapons and production facilities in the CAR had "direct implications on the US created security structures around the CAR including the Middle Eastern states."⁷⁷ Lena Jonson and Roy Allison discuss security and the CAR states' relations with regional and international powers and the policies of Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey which in their view are related to the US policy.⁷⁸ After analyzing the internal and external dynamics of the region, they note that the US policy toward the CAR is driven by security concerns, rivalry with regional powers, the existence of inter-regional and intra-regional conflictual dynamics, geo-economics, energy, and regional structures.

Engagement on the security issues in the US policy toward the CAR is observed by Frederick Starr in which a balance of power to fill a forced vacuum to prevent regional hegemony of other powers is needed.⁷⁹ On the US strategic engagement toward the CAR, Starr observes success on the issue of nuclear proliferation and WMD and later a three-pronged strategy about security, politics, and economics. Starr terms the US engagement with the CAR as a "partnership" in which the US extended extensive support to them to enhance their international interaction to reduce their dependence on Russia. However, in the interaction in the realm of internal security, Starr notes that it should not be linked with the promotion of democracy since a hegemonic relationship of the US with the CAR states or a forced transformation of the states is not sustainable.⁸⁰

The US interaction with the CAR states aimed at the establishment of military bases in the early 21st century after it attacks Afghanistan to engage the states as allies not only for the war on terror but also for strategic reasons and to curb the influence of Russia and China is a major event in the US policy. It is viewed that the “US relations with the CAR states developed in an unpredictable manner” and depended on the degree of interest the US had “for a particular military facility, and not least, the host’s readiness for cooperation.”⁸¹ This means that the US was promoting strategic relations with the CAR states in its engagement.

Transition process in the region and US Policy

After independence from the Soviet rule, Central Asian States adopted the transition process in the realm of politics, economic and social sectors as independent nation states. One could observe the nature of the processes in a way that the transformation was a movement of socio-political and economic sectors towards Western civilization: Democracy in politics and capitalist markets in economics.⁸² The process was simultaneously encompassing the economy, political system with its ideology, the legal system, and the social structure. The process was non-violent except in the case of Tajikistan where it faced little resistance from Islamists. Many observers were surprised over the extraordinary speed that was a sign and eagerness of society to accept it.⁸³

For the Central Asian states, like other low-income developing economies transition was in part, from an agrarian to an industrialized economy and to catch industrialized countries. It needed different strategies, and reforms. There was also a need for an efficient state to

provide basic public goods, social services, and infrastructure. An environment to promote investment through a better rule of law and order was crucial for the success of the transformation. Adjustments in systemic political and economic reforms depended on the efficiency or inefficiency of governments.⁸⁴ Mainly theories of Political Economy and Constructivism are relevant to examine the process of transition. Since the transition of States is not the main focus of the study, rather US policy with the states in transition, a discussion of internal structures and transformation process is avoided. However, it has been examined in the establishment of the State's relations with the US and political, economic, and social engagements of the States, wherever, it was relevant.

The US relations with the CAR states also witnessed a cooperative relationship with Russia and other regional powers on the issues of security, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. While this process of cooperation was going on, the military deployment of the US in the CAR in the aftermath of 9/11 events and the consequent military and strategic cooperation with the security establishments of the CAR states accompanied destabilizing rivalry and interstate enmity of the US with Russia and other regional states.⁸⁵ It led to the increased interaction of Russia and China with the CAR states under a regional organization SCO leading to competitive processes in the region.

Scholars have also noted the promotion of the liberal economic system, democracy, and human rights in the US policy toward the CAR. The US policy was directed to transform the structures of the states based on liberal economic and political values to promote democracy, foreign investments, and the access of multinationals.⁸⁶ In its relations with the region, the US interaction included the establishment of free-market economies, democracy, integration of the states into the world community of political and financial institutions, engaging in the

Euro-Atlantic security dialogue and cooperative programs, and the promotion of regional cooperation.

The explanation of the US policy toward the CAR has been examined by Fisher in the framework of offensive and defensive realism. He concludes that offensive realism better explains the US policy as it seeks no colonial empire and did try increased power and influence in the region in the 1990s.⁸⁷ The work observes that the US was not overly ambitious in its policy toward the CAR, rather “it looked for opportunities to expand its influence in the power vacuum left after Soviet disintegration.”⁸⁸

The literature presented above on the US policy toward the CAR covers interstate relations in which scholars have attempted to examine the objectives of the US in the CAR states covering security, economic, and democracy promotion. There is an emphasis in the US policy on security and military relations the factors that are embedded in realism. The economic interests of the US were also promoted as part of power politics. The studies note the conflictual situation arising out of great power competition and the need for the US to cooperate or compete. In addition, scholars have noted efforts of the US to manage the internal transition in the politics, economy, and governance of the CAR states in a way that they transform to a system that is conducive for the West.

Framework for the study of US Foreign Policy

After having outlined the main tenets of theories and literature, a framework to study the US relations toward Central Asia is presented.

There is a wide view among scholars that each theory has limitations in explaining the foreign policy behavior of states and shifting priorities and interests in an ever-changing international system. In the study of the US foreign policy toward Central Asia more than one theory is required for adequate explanation. Before 1991, the US engagement with the Soviet Union of which the CAR was a part, revolved around bipolarity as central in all events in international relations. In the post-cold war period, the five states were engaged in political, social, economic, and foreign relations transformations. It had attracted an enormous amount of interest in the US and other Western countries since the fundamental change would now be the adoption of the Western model of systems.

Many scholars have emphasized that the US follows realism and power politics in global relations with other states.⁸⁹ For the post-Cold War period, realists argued that survival and security would remain dominant issues for the state and the insight of the use of power would remain a factor in the "general framework for understanding international relations" since the states would pursue a "balance of power and remain to worry about the possibility of major conflict."⁹⁰ Realists defend the criticism in failing to predict the future and being shy of specific policy prescriptions in the new environment of system change, by saying that others have also "failed to define policy lines of the US in the post-Cold War environments."⁹¹

Despite the claims of realists, the US foreign policy "has always fused the realist and liberal strands of statecraft."⁹² The US follows the tenets of realism which negates the "interference in the state structure of other countries," but the tools of its foreign policy such as the promotion of market economic system and democracy" do not go well with this logic.⁹³ Moreover, the logic of using more than one theory is also found in the statements of US policymakers, as Condoleezza Rice reminds the scholars that to "draw a sharp line between

power politics and a principled foreign policy based on values” is a polarized view which “may be just fine in academic debate, but it is a disaster for American foreign policy.”⁹⁴

Similarly, former Secretary of State Colin Powell describes the US foreign policy in the post-Cold War period as based on "enlightened self-interest." For him, the US is guided by “a strategy of partnerships, which affirms the vital role of international alliances while advancing...its...interests and principles.”⁹⁵ He views that the US foreign policy does pursue strategic goals along with others but sometimes the emphasis on some issues, for example, the war on terror, but other pursuits in the background and the media and literature concentrate military maneuvers only.

Scholars also view that the effective strategy for the US to promote foreign policy interests is the use of soft power in combination with hard power and making it a "smart power.”⁹⁶ Richard Haass in an analysis dividing the US foreign policy in the post-Cold War period in two phases; from 1990 to 2001 and then post 2001, observes that the US foreign engagements were determined by its power mainly because of its primacy and unchallenged status in the first phase. In the second phase, he notes that the events of 9/11 forced the US to reconsider its global engagements with “coherent approach in foreign policy,” but in general, the explanation of policy by realists and idealists are blurred.⁹⁷

Haass also examines if the principal purpose of the US foreign policy should be to influence the external behavior of other states or if it should be to shape the internal structure as a dividing but dissipating line.⁹⁸ He notes that in the 21st century, republican government becomes "idealist" making democracy promotion the main priority for the US foreign policy when Bush (2001-2008) talks of "democratic peace" theory, which holds that democracies

not only treat their citizens better but also act better toward their neighbors and others. Haass views the US policy as an alternative, "realist" that for example, attempted "regime change" in Baghdad in the 2003 war, "to a democratic Iraq, a development that would transform the region," a strategy closer to democratic realism.

There was a wide consensus in the US that the transition should be encouraged to proceed as rapidly as possible. None of the five states had prior experience of being independent nation-states and all adopted different kinds of transition strategies.⁹⁹ The US engagements with these states would thus be taking care of the transition mode of the states while following the ascendancy in global politics and in particular after the 2nd World War. In the interaction, the US was to take care of these states' behavior in global politics and entering into a relationship whereby core principles of the US are not altered.

This line of reasoning that the US foreign policy analysis should be made based on more than one theory is also found in other studies. Walt says that the analysts and policymakers should remain cognizant of realism's emphasis on the role of power, keep liberalism's awareness of domestic forces in mind, and reflect on constructivism's vision of change.¹⁰⁰ Some other scholars' views on the US foreign policy are that it pursues both goals military and economic with the observation that "the Cold War was not primarily the security concerns but the primary motive was hegemonic economic domination resulting in a clash of interests."¹⁰¹ In short, the application of a single theory to explain US foreign policy is fraught with misleading conclusions.

In the study of the US policy toward the CAR, the security emphasis brings in the relevance of realism which aims at gaining influence and managing relations by adopting a strategy that

assures a power to “retain the flexibility to choose when and where to use its power and influence, at what time.”¹⁰² Third-world states and regions are sometimes secondary and less critical for the security policy objectives and compulsions of a superpower like the US. However, the US in the actual pursuit of the policy does not overlook any region including the CAR, since it “deprives the US society, corporations, and financial institutions a role” in many issues that have relevance with global security and stability.”¹⁰³

The pursuance of security issues in third world regions always includes the pursuance of economic goals as found out in the observation that “the actual course of American foreign policy has beenseeking ... as much space as possible for capitalist expansion” with “the consistent...US anti-nationalist intervention in the Third World.”¹⁰⁴ In this respect the offensive realism and its explanation of the US as an "offshore balancer" that intervenes to prevent the rise of hegemons in other regions and in the case of the CAR, the US perceives Russia (and possibly China) as another hegemon, is relevant for this study.¹⁰⁵

Realism has some limitations when it is applied to real situations and problems are found in defining the regions and the predictions it makes on regional competition. For example, it ignores the cooperation the US got in the shape of G-8 and Europe, China and Russia siding with the US on the issues of global security and stability and nuclear proliferation in particular in the third world regions.¹⁰⁶ It implies that a great power uses the “persuasion” in addition to material means and payoffs to achieve a long term primacy in a region.”¹⁰⁷ Self-interest and self-restraint also guide the foreign policy which some analysts call "prudent realism," the situation that avoids a multitude of issues that require resolution and persuasion with humane global governance.¹⁰⁸

In the debate on the role of soft power, the liberals contend that the foreign policies of democracies are more peaceful because people can play a constructive role in constraining policymakers to move to war-making adventures. Realists admit a role of soft power to enhance influence for various strategic and economic interests but reject the strategy based on idealistic impulses to restructure other societies to make them serve the US interests.¹⁰⁹ For realists, an undue role of soft power impedes coherent and effective diplomacy hindering efforts to promote national interests since it brings in emotions and passions.¹¹⁰ Realists also disagree on the extent of such interaction and emphasize that the pursuits of rights and democracy abroad are not feasible goals and it constrains the foreign policy decision-making.¹¹¹

This line of reasoning is epitomized by Roy Jones arguing that the states apply military and economic tools to pursue their interests, however, to establish credibility to the promotion of specific goals, states also proclaim "values;" international order, collective security, self-determination, and peace.¹¹² In the overall policy of states, "foreign economic policies often serve non-economic goals" and national interests "denotes anything that is held desirable in particular circumstances."¹¹³ Jones adds that in today's nation-state system war as an instrument of foreign policy and for the acquisition of lands is no more practiced, but states employ foreign policy "operations that are intended to move affairs in a preferred direction" and maybe "called interventions."

Roy Jones views that the objectives of a realistic foreign policy of great powers are intervention to maintain a congenial leadership in power or replacing the uncongenial leadership, encouraging or resisting social and political changes of a structural kind, forestalling or resisting the policies of intervention by another state or states and encouraging existing leadership to pursue specific policies of an agreeable kind.¹¹⁴ Jones finds difficulty in

examining the foreign policy in the liberal tradition (democratic society and social order) and offers a model of foreign policy that is based on realism.

The tools of the US foreign policy in the post-Cold War transition period remain the same as defined by Roy Jones for the great powers to achieve their foreign policy objectives including the payoffs to the individual leader or leading groups, economic assistance (aid, gifts, cheap loans, preferential trading agreements) or economic punishment (cessation of loans or gifts, an embargo on trade), clandestine violence, overt violence in the form of direct military operations, diplomatic pressure, etc. Great powers also intervene in regional conflicts to influence the outcome and to prevent such efforts by competitor states.

There are others also who put forward such a framework and contend that realism concedes the pursuit of both economic and security interests to expand influence since “economic ties induce domestic economic interests and enhance state’s ability to mobilize resources against hostile powers.”¹¹⁵ States pursue discriminatory foreign economic policies to gain the support of domestic entities and make a useful target country an ally to balance interests in the short and long term and to maintain or advance the position of the state in the international system.¹¹⁶

Framework of Analysis for this study

In concluding the discussion on the need for more than one theoretical tradition to explain the post-Cold War foreign policy toward the CAR, the thesis of the study is that the US pursued power politics in conjunctions with military might and economic power and pursued multifaceted goals, to enhance and expand “influence” in regions of the world. Influence is a relational concept of power which is "the ability to assert one's interests in the international

system" or a "control a state has over the international environment" by pursuing both economics and security."¹¹⁷

In addition, to expand its influence, the US also has a history of engagements with all the other states in which a unique undertaking is expressed that is linked with the promotion of western values. This issue is important given the history of communism that was opposed by the US since it negated the masses' voices, the democracy. It was associated with the US values during the Cold War and linked with security, stability, and prosperity to justify the containment of the areas of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Secondly, the role of the military alliances (like NATO) and trade pacts (like the GATT and later the WTO), and international organizations (like the UN and World Bank) that were raised by the capitalist under the US leadership are to be sustained after the Cold War.¹¹⁸ The US has to get all the Newly Independent States, including that of the CAR states to be engaged with these institutions in which the US wields significant power and through these gets indirect influence in the affairs of other states.

Thirdly, the US has a history of over-emphasizing the use of force, the option that needed a threat of a dramatic nature for legitimizing extreme actions.¹¹⁹ The US would thus attempt to evolve a coherent policy or an effective mix of coercion and diplomacy and for it, influence is needed in a far-off region that aligns with offensive realism.

As policy tools, official documents of the US admit that diplomatic and economic pressure would be ineffective in the CAR, to bring in a democracy especially if other states (regional) did not cooperate, implying that the issues are interrelated with regional dynamics and the role of neighboring states. It brings in the factor of cooperation with other regional powers as

a fourth element. To gain influence in the state structures of the CAR, the US managed relations in the new region through policy tools that assured flexibility.¹²⁰ In this, the US recognizes that its preponderance in the post-Cold War period did not eliminate competitive politics or suspend "the general law of the dynamics of international relations," namely, "the uneven growth of power among states."¹²¹

Fifthly, the transition process in the CAR states brought some extraneous reasons as well for the US to emphasize on democracy and economic reforms of the states that were adopting the agenda of liberalism. It required certain prerequisites to be fulfilled, for example, the IMF and the World Bank demand economic reforms before giving financial support to the states and the US efforts to get the CAR states engaged with these entities could be blocked if their advises are not complied.¹²²

Available literature thus, on the US-CAR interactions is full of observations that the US policy aimed that its engagements with the CAR states bring desired results in line with its national interests. The US has attempted all the tools that are termed as a policy of realism. Its overtures to accommodate liberals' suggestions that the social dilemmas within the states needed to engage through foreign policy tools were also to attain its national interests. Theoretical explanations of Realism and mainly offensive realism are applicable in this study. The *realpolitik* was relevant in interaction with the expanded spheres of domestic institutions of the CAR states. The transformation and development of these institutions were equally important for the US policymakers to constructively engage the states. The US interaction was extended into the variables such as stability and security, oil and mineral resources, political economy, political culture, and regional cooperation to achieve goals in US policy.

With these assumptions and parameters, the next chapter sketches the Geopolitics of Central Asia and its place in the definition of American interests in the post-Cold War world with an examination of the evolution of the US policy.

End Notes

¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power And Peace*, (1991 p-361)

² David J. Singer. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1961), pp. 77-92 and Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, Columbia University Press, (New York, 1959); Sean M. Lynn Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *America's Strategy in a Changing World* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1993) and Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995)

³ Ole R. Holsti, N.Y. (2006, p.315)

⁴ Shibley Telhami, "Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy", *Security Studies 11(3)*, (Spring 2002, p. 158), and Gideon Rose states "Neo realism ascribed to Waltz is the most prominent and effective version" in "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics 51*, (October, 1998)

⁵ Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and US Foreign Policy*, (Princeton, 1978, p.33); Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics 51*, (October, 1998); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power And Peace*, quoted in *Classic Readings of International Relations*, ed. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz, (Harcourt Brace College Publisher, New York, 1994, 35).

⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed., brief edition, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1993)

⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 1979)

⁸ Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4, (Spring 1997, pp. 51-52)

⁹ Rose, 1998, p.146

¹⁰ Kenneth Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," *Security Studies*, (Autumn 1996)

¹¹ Rawdon Dalrymple, *Looking for theory in Australian foreign policy, Symposium: Advancing the National Interest?* (University of Sydney, 2003), Australian Review of Public Affairs, observes that the "governments of the US justified their policies in the Cold War," through the explanations of the neo-realism, <http://www.australianreview.net/>, (accessed 7 December 2008)

¹² John J. Mearsheimer, "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", *International Security*, (15 (1), 1995), it has been discussed in detail by Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security-Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered," *International Security*, 25, 3,(Winter 2000/2001: 152-86)

¹³ John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security 15*, (Summer 1990, p 5-55), This theory is related to the Realist and the Neo-Realist/Structuralist expounded by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. www.demokratizatsiya.org/Dem%20Archives/DEM%2006-02%20mcfaul.pdf, (accessed 9 Jan. 2006); David A. Lake describes a "hegemonic state as the one that aims at global management to establish control over strategic affairs in crucial regions and bears the cost of maintaining the status quo to perpetuate its preponderance", David A. Lake, "British and American Hegemony Compared: Lessons for the Current Era of Decline", in *International Political Economy*, ed. Lake and Frieden, (Routledge, N York, 1995)

¹⁴ Mearsheimer, 1995, tested the US foreign policy from the period from 1800 to 1990 and deducted that the US intervened in other regions as an "offshore balancer" to prevent the rise of hegemons. The US, an outsider force intervened in Europe (region) due to the initiation of wars by Germany and the Soviet ingress.

¹⁵ Mearsheimer, 1995, states that Military bases, rapid deployment forces, and proxy allies having big armies are developed. Hegemony is disregarded by saying that there never has been a global hegemon because great powers cannot project power across oceans onto the territory of a rival great power.

¹⁶ The theories are offense-defense theory (Robert Jervis), Balance of power theory (Michael Mastanduno), Balance of threat theory (Stephen Walt), Domestic mobilization theory (Jack Snyder), for ref. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 2000,(p.152-86)

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York. 1996, Huntington talked about culture and religion, Michael Doyle talked about democracy in “Ways of War and Peace”, chapter 8, *Liberal Internationalism*, Princeton, 1997

¹⁹ Ref. Stephen M. Walt, "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition," in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, W. W. Norton, New York, 2002, 211; and Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" <http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/anybody.pdf>, (accessed, 12 July 2008)

²⁰ Stephen M. Walt’s “balance of threat” theory addresses this question, but only by delving into state threat perceptions, in *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987

²¹ Rober O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1977; James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence*, London, 1980; Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony*, Princeton, 1984

²² Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations* (New York: HarperCollins College, Publishers, 1994), 47.

²³ Hedley Bull, “The Anarchical Society: A Study of World Politics,” quoted in *Classic Readings of International Relations*, ed. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz, Harcourt Brace College Publisher, New York, 1994, p. 22

²⁴ Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn 1997

²⁵ As pointed out by Rosenau, 1980, p.39

²⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, in *Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 Summer 2000, pp. 5–41, Waltz asserts institutions are dependent variables on the realities of power and interest.

²⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W. W. Norton, 2001, N.Y. p. 15.

²⁸ Report of an Atlantic Council delegation visit to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan & Kazakstan, May 1997, <http://www.acus.org/InternationalSecurity/CentralEurasia.htm>, Studies also note that the perceptions of Western powers on the region remained questioning the future of the CAR states as modern nation-states.

²⁹ Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” *International Organization* 46(2): 391–425.

³⁰ Wendt, 1992, p. 413; Wendt, 1999, p. 343

³¹ For example, NATO, the CENTCOM, etc.

³² Barry Buzan and Ole Whoever. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press – 2003, the discussion refers to pages-17, 25, 28, 29,49 & 352-74

³³ For the analysis, Buzan and Woever developed a hierarchy of powers: one superpower – the US, four great powers – Japan, China, Russia, and Europe and a multitude of regional powers. "A region, however, does not possess the quality of an actor" Barry Buzan and Ole Woever, 2003.

³⁴ Barry Buzan, *The United States, and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2004

³⁵ Emilian Kavalski, <http://www.in-spire.org/reviews/ek01062004.pdf>, (accessed 15 Jan. 2005)

³⁶ Tom Barry, The U.S. Power Complex: What’s New, *Special Report*, November 2002, <http://www.fpiif.org/papers/02power/index.html>, (accessed 15 Jan. 2005)

³⁷ Harry Kreisler interviews Joseph S. Nye on theory and practice in international ... and History; Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power; Power and Interdependence: World Politics in ... www.globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Nye, (accessed 15 Jan. 2005); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, Basic Books, 2004; and Fukuyama argues "for exporting liberal democratic values to non-democratic societies, as he assumes that these values as superior" cit. by Howard Williams, David Sullivan and E. Gwynn Mathews Francis Fukuyama and the End of History. pp 120, <http://www.aspeninstitute.org/index.asp?bid=14292&i=53>, (accessed 16 March 2007)

³⁸ Layne Christopher, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why Great Powers Will Arise," *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–51

³⁹ Bart R. Kessler, Bush's New World Order: The Meaning Behind the Words, <http://www.apfn.org/pdf/BushsNewWorldOrder.pdf>, (accessed, 27 April, 2008)

⁴⁰ President Bush's speech to Congress, March 6, 1991, <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm>, (accessed, 27 April, 2008)

⁴¹ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html> (Accessed 19 March, 2006)

⁴² President Clinton cit. by Nick Beams, *The Political Economy of American Militarism*, 2003, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jul2003/nb1-j10.shtml>, (accessed 10 June 2007), Clinton stated to "make trade a priority element of US security" and "to seek to open other nations" markets and to establish clear and enforceable rules on which to expand trade." He also called for the reciprocal access to US firms in foreign markets and the resolve to pursue measures to increase access for US companies-through bilateral, regional and multilateral arrangements", NYT, 14 August 1992, p-A-11

⁴³ Nick Beams, 2003

⁴⁴ Judith Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy," *International Political Economy*, ed. Frieden and Lake, Routledge, 1996.

⁴⁵ Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 2000, For Waltz's NATO is an instrument for maintaining America's domination of the foreign and military policies of [other] states."

⁴⁶ Kenneth Waltz offered a perspective on US preponderance in his article "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 2000, and stated "liberal interventionism ... again on the march" with Clinton, the containment strategy of the Cold War was replaced by a strategy of actively promoting democracy abroad. He cautioned that democratic fervor would lead to excessive military intervention, and subsequently, overextension.

⁴⁷ National Security Strategy of the US, The White House, Washington, D.C. July 1994

⁴⁸ Robert Rubin, former secretary of the US Treasury, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/>, (accessed 10 June 2007), (This reference has been untraceable now), however, a similar approach is found in A National Security Strategy for A New Century, May 1997, <https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/>

⁴⁹ Immediately before 9/11, the administration of US President George W. Bush was operating in a more or less realist framework. Political Realism: A Culprit for the 9/11 Attacks, From *Europe, Vol. 26 (3) - Fall 2004* <http://www.harvardir.org/articles/print.php?article=1252>; There were also observations that by the end of the century the US was seen promoting free trade, human rights, and humanitarian interventions and fighting for the independence of states like Bosnia, Kuwait, and Somalia, etc. Bush administration's approach toward the US primacy is reviewed in James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, New York: Viking, 2004. Buzan (2004: 186) terms it as unilateralism. Also in Assessing America's War on Terror: Confronting Insurgency, Cementing Primacy, by Ashley J. Tellis, Vol. 15, No 4, December 2004, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/NBRAnalysis-Tellis_December2004.pdf, (accessed 25-1-2006)

⁵⁰ A national security strategy of the United States, The White House, Washington, D.C. July 1994; also in See *Humanitarian Military Intervention*, Vol 5, Number 1, 2000 from Foreign Policy in Focus, <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Empire/Clinton.asp> (accessed on 5 January 2006)

-
- ⁵¹ Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2003.
- ⁵² J.D. Crouch, "Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review," January 9, 2002, available at <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/2002/us-020109-dod01.htm>; Remarks by Bush at National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. May 1, 2001. (accessed 5 Jan 2005)
- ⁵³ Walt, Stephen M., "Beyond bin Laden, Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy", *International Security*, 26(3), 2001, p. 65.
- ⁵⁴ *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century*, *The Project for the New American Century*, September 2000, written in September 2000 by the neo-conservative think-tank Project for the New American Century (PNAC). <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>. (Accessed 25 January 2006)
- ⁵⁵ Neil Mackay, *Bush planned Iraq "regime change" before becoming President*, *Sunday Herald*, September 2002, <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Empire/Bush.asp>, (Accessed January 2006); also William Rivers Pitt, *Of Gods and Mortals and Empire*, *Truthout.org*, February 21, 2003, <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast/Iraq/BuildingTheCase.asp>.
- ⁵⁶ Bush in a speech at West Point in June 2002, from the official website. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html> (Accessed 13 March, 2006)
- ⁵⁷ Assessing America's War on Terror: Confronting Insurgency, Cementing Primacy, by Ashley J. Tellis Vol.15, No. 4, December 2004, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/NBRAnalysis-Tellis_December2004.pdf, (accessed 25 January 2006)
- ⁵⁸ Rober E. Hunter, "Starting at Zero: U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1990s." *American Foreign Policy Reader*, American University-Central Asia, Bishkek, 2005
- ⁵⁹ A.F.K Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd ed. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1968; and Robert Gilpin, *War, and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For a review of cyclical theories of world politics, see Joshua Goldstein, *Long Cycles and War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988)
- ⁶⁰ The US interventions in events like first Gulf war of 1991, Balkans in Europe, Somalia in Africa and Cambodia in Asia are given as examples in the early 1990s."
- ⁶¹ Mearsheimer, 1995
- ⁶² Will Marshall, *Democratic Realism: the Third Way*, *DLC*, *Blueprint Magazine*, January 1, 2000, http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=1123&kaid=124&subid=158, (Accessed on 29 Jan. 2006), also in Chandra Muzaffar Dr. *The Empire: What It Is and What It Means for All of Us*, *A Global Empire Is in the Making: The First Global Empire in History*, *Centre for Research on Globalization*, December 30, 2005
- ⁶³ For discussion on the need for strong defense and emphasis on non-proliferation, pl. see Brad Roberts, "1995 and the End of the Post-Cold War Era," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995) <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/roberts.htm>. (Accessed on 25 January 2006)
- ⁶⁴ After World War II, the US promoted Bretton Woods-based economic systems and institutions. In the Post Cold War period, the US supported and interacted with regional institutions such as ASEAN, ARF, NAFTA, EU, GCC, etc. which were dealing with security and economic issues and the US ensured that it engages with these to exert influence.
- ⁶⁵ Former Secretary of the US Treasury, Robert Rubin, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/>,
- ⁶⁶ Clinton in a speech stresses to make trade a priority element of US security and asserts that America had to "seek to open other nations" markets and to establish clear and enforceable rules on which to expand trade," American

University Centenary Celebration, February 26, 1993, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jul2003/nb1-j10.shtml>, (accessed 20 November 2007)

⁶⁷ Some relevant studies are by Lena Jonson, "The New Geopolitical Situation in the Caspian Region", *The Security of the Caspian Sea Region*, Chufirin, Gennady (ed), New York: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 2001; Svante Cornell, *Beyond Oil: US Engagement in the Caspian Region*, Working paper no 52, Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2000; Uri J. Fisher *U.S. Post-Cold War Foreign Policy in Central Asia: Offensive and Defensive Realism Considered*, Boulder, CO 80302, uri.fisher@colorado.edu; Farrukh Irnazarov, Strategic Importance of Central Asia: The New Great Game between the United States and Russia, URL, <http://www.ep.liu.se/exjobb/eki/2005/impier/014/>, (accessed 29 September 2007)

⁶⁸Steffen Schwarz, US Foreign Policy on Central Asia, Seminar in US Foreign Policy, DeMontfort University, Leicester, 15 April 2002, <http://www.grin.de>, (accessed 15 Sep. 2006)

⁶⁹ Svante Cornell, 2000, p13-18

⁷⁰ Gen. Anthony Zinni, "A US Strategic Perspective on Central Asia," Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (accessed also on 29 Jan. 2006); Dick Cheney, former vice-president of the US was quoted in the Guardian 23/10/01 as saying "I can not think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian" <http://www.struggle.ws/freearth/war/profitOCT01.html>, (Accessed Dec. 2005)

⁷¹ Fiona Hill: 6/8/01, The Caucasus and Central Asia in U.S Foreign Policy, A EurasiaNet Partner Post from The Brookings Institution, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav060801.shtml>

⁷² Richard Sakalsky & Tanya Charlick-Paley, *NATO and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far?* RAND Report MR-1074-AF, 1999, p 7; and Olga Oliker, David A. Shlapak, *U.S. Interests in Central Asia: Policy Priorities and Military Roles*, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG338.pdf, (accessed 7 July, 2007); Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics, *Conference Report*, October 2000, http://www.cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (accessed on 29 Jan. 2006)

⁷³ Kathleen T O'Halloran, (1999), "A New U.S. regional Strategy Toward Russia", *Strategic Review*, vol. 27, no 3, p 58, Steven Sestanovich US State Department spokesman on FSU issues testified in congress in 1998 that the US "absolutely rejects the idea of a Russian sphere of influence."

⁷⁴ Farrukh Irnazarov, 2005; and articles in the Asiatimes online

⁷⁵ Jin Canrong, "The US Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for China–United States Relations: a Chinese perspective", *Journal of Contemporary China* (2001), 10(27), 309–315; Menon, Rajan (1995), Central Asia's Foreign Policy and Security Challenges: Implications for the United States, *The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)*, vol 6, no 4, pp 13-15

⁷⁶ Ren Dongfeng, The Central Asia policies of China, Russia, and the USA and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization process: a view from China, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Oct.–Dec. 2003, This aspect brings in the discussion on SCO and the US policy that is discussed in the next chapters.

⁷⁷ Christopher, 1994a:403, and In testimony in April 1998, Ambassador Sestanovich stated that the United States has a "big stake" in assisting the peaceful and historic integration of Central Asia and the South Caucasus into the world community, interests that are "strategic" and "vital."

⁷⁸ Roy Allison & Lena Jonson, *Central Asian Security*, ed. Brookings Institution Press, 2001

⁷⁹ This point has been stressed by S. Frederick Starr, Testimony at the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, 13 December 2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm, (accessed January, 2007)

⁸⁰ As Starr (2001) states "we are only gradually coming to appreciate the seriousness of the birth defects present in all the post-Soviet states. It is important that we recognize this, and apply the same standards and extend the same patience to all, rather than selectively, according to who happens to be in favor in Washington at the moment. Bluntly, we cannot nod at authoritarianism in Moscow and preach against it in Central Asia."

http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm. It is also observed in the situation of Iraq, where views are expressed if the US would go for the division of the country; the tactics used by colonial powers.

⁸¹ Yevgeny Vassilyev, "Central Asia at the Crossroads: The US has come to Central Asia to stay," *Russia in Global Affairs*, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/2/466.html>, (accessed 23 September 2006)

⁸² Libman, Alexander (2008): *Economic role of public administration in Central Asia: Decentralization and hybrid political regime*. <https://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10940/>

⁸³ Bakhtior Islamov, STATE-LED TRANSFORMATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CENTRAL ASIA: FROM PLAN TO INDUSTRIAL POLICY, *Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics* 39 (1998) 101-125.

⁸⁴ *ibid*

⁸⁵ Stephen J. Blank, "US and Central Asia", in Roy Allison & Lena Jonson, *Central Asian Security*, ed. Brookings Institution Press, 2001; and Stephen J. Blank, *After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia*, July 2005, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi> (accessed 24 September 2006)

⁸⁶ _____, Conference Reports, www.csis.org, and _____, A FOREIGN POLICY EVENT, *United States Foreign Policy in the States of Central Asia*, <http://www.brookings.edu/events/2002/1112asia.aspx>

⁸⁷ Uri J. Fisher uri.fisher@colorado.edu

⁸⁸ *ibid*

⁸⁹ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 16th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2004), pp. 246–251; For a neo-isolationist argument see Eric A. Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century*, Princeton University Press, 1995; and as former National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski states: "[W]e have to demonstrate that we are still the decisive force in determining the political outcomes...and that we will not permit others to intervene," http://www.mediamonitors.net/mosaddeq13.html#_edn19#_edn19 (Accessed 6 March 2007)

⁹⁰ Stephen M. Walt, *International Relations: One World Many Theories*, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/1110/relations.pdf>

⁹¹ Charles Krauthammer, *The Neoconservative Convergence*, *Opinion Journal*, July 21, 2005, argues that Isolationism is defunct in a globalized world, Liberal internationalism, is naïve and incapable, in the presence of US preponderance and Democrats are overambitious. For him, the US should pursue Democratic Realism in its foreign policy to achieve strategic objectives and avoid overextension.

⁹² Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*, Cornell University, Ithaca, 2003; and Charles Krauthammer (2005)

⁹³ Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics A Review Essay", *International Security* 17 (1), Summer 1992; and Ole R. Holsti, 2006, p.181-183

⁹⁴ Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2000, p. 49; In her remarks later as National Security Advisor, she stated "as a professor, I recognize that these debates enliven our conferences and our classrooms...But as a policymaker, I can tell you that they obscure reality," and stressed, "in real life, power and values are married completely." Rice, Remarks on Terrorism and Foreign Policy," Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, April 29, 2002. Available at www.whitehouse.gov, and Rice, "A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom," The 2002 Wriston Lecture, The Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, New York City, October 1, 2002. Available at <http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/wl2002.htm>, (accessed 23 November 2008)

⁹⁵ Colin L. Powell, "A Strategy of Partnership", *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2004

⁹⁶ Soft power is the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than using the carrots and sticks of payment or coercion. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Nye, however, states that we should not aim for hard or soft power, but to combine the two as a "smart power." Joseph Nye, Hard, and

Soft Power, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/hard-and-soft-power_b_2321.html, (accessed 25 November 2008)

⁹⁷ Richard N. Haass, *Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World*, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 22, 2002

⁹⁸ Richard N. Haass, "The Return of American Realism", <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/76187/the-return-of-american-realism-by-richard-n-haass-.html>, (accessed 25 November 2008)

⁹⁹ Pomfret, R. (2003). *Central Asia Since 1991: The Experience of New Independent States. OECD Development Center Working Paper No. 212.*

¹⁰⁰ Walt, op. cit.

¹⁰¹ Referred to Mark Curtis by Falk, Richard, "Forward" in Bodenheimer, Thomas and Gould, Robert, *Rollback: Right-wing power in US foreign policy*, South End Press, Boston, 1989; Also discussion by Michael Kraig (2004), Alex Callinicos (2005) is relevant to have an understanding of the idea.

¹⁰² Kathleen T O'Halloran, (1999), "A New US Regional Strategy Toward Russia", *Strategic Review*, vol 27, no 3, p 65

¹⁰³ *International Crime Control Strategy*, 1997 <http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/iccs-frm.html>, (Accessed on 29 Jan. 2006)

¹⁰⁴ Falk (1989)

¹⁰⁵ Theoretical relevance of this theory to the US policy on regions is discussed by Glenn H. Snyder, Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security, *International Security* 27.1, 2002 149-173, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v027/27.1snyder.html, (accessed 8 May 2008); Lynn-Jones, Sean & Steven Miller, "Preface", in Brown, Michael, Sean Lynn Jones, & Steven Miller, ed. *The Perils of Anarchy: Neo-realism and International Security*. Cambridge: MIT Press. 1995, P ix-xii

¹⁰⁶ The US got the support of Russia and China to control nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

¹⁰⁷ Stephen M. Walt, "In the National Interest: A new grand strategy for American foreign policy," *Boston Review*, February March 2005, <http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html>, (Accessed 5 June 2007)

¹⁰⁸ Cit. "Walt's obsolescent foreign policy is deeply rooted in the statism of a bygone era," Richard Falk, <http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/falk.html>, Falk calls it an "outlook perhaps most clearly formulated by..., realist opposition to the Vietnam War" and self-restraint means to forego opportunities for expansion beyond existing contours of control. (Accessed 5 June 2007)

¹⁰⁹ Robert Dahl, *On Democracy*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999

¹¹⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (1995), Kissinger joins the long line of American writers, from Walter Lippmann, George Kennan, Charles Krauthammer, Dimitri Simes et al, who call on the US to restrict the promotion of idealism and accept the necessity of a more sober (self-interest) pursuit of national interests, see Dimitri Simes, "America's Imperial Dilemma," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 6 (November/December 2003): he states that "Pursuit of a universal utopia is damaging American interests." They argued the US to abandon the ideological mission of democracy promotion, both in Iraq and throughout the world, and instead follow a pragmatic, realist foreign policy if it is to regain its respect abroad and more effectively defend its national interests.

¹¹¹ Holsti, 2006, p.183; and Roy E. Jones (1979) P-105-117" and Carter asserts democracy and the use of power and influence for humane purposes, by saying that, "Our policy is based on a historical vision of America's role... is derived from a larger view of global change... is rooted in our moral values, which never change. Our policy is reinforced by our material wealth and by our military power. Our policy is designed to serve mankind" Jimmy Carter, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter*, Vol. 1, No. 954, 1977.

¹¹² Roy E Jones, *Principles of Foreign Policy: The Civil State in the World Setting*, Martin Robertson, 1979, p 37-41

¹¹³ Roy E. Jones, 1979, p 41-42

¹¹⁴ Roy E Jones, 1979, p-57

¹¹⁵ Paul A. Papayoanou. *Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999; Moreover, as Holsti (2006, p-337) states the study of foreign policy is described as an "eclectic undertaking" in which the role of other disciplines is needed

¹¹⁶ *ibid*

¹¹⁷ Kalevi j. Holsti, "International Politics: A Framework for Analysis", Prentice Hall International, London, 2nd. Ed. 1972. p.118, the "influence" is used "to achieve or defend goals, including prestige, territory, souls, raw materials, security, or alliances"; and Rainer Baumann et al., "Neorealist foreign policy theory", in V. Rittberger, ed., *German foreign policy since unification Theories and case studies*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001, p. 40. It asserts that the link between capabilities and influence is not direct and influence may take different forms under different circumstances.

¹¹⁸ Martin Walker, *American World Order*, A Review of the Book "The Case for Goliath" by Michael Mandelbaum, *New York Times*, March 5, 2006

¹¹⁹ While the phenomenon has been explained by theorists including Buzan, the threat of WMD from Iraq which never existed was projected as a real one for extreme action.

¹²⁰ O'Halloran, (1999), "A New US Regional Strategy Toward Russia", *Strategic Review*, vol 27, no 3, p 65

¹²¹ Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. 18, no. 4 Spring 1988, p. 591; and <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/>, *Challenges of Statecraft: Organizing for National Security Policy*, 6 May, 2008, accessed 6 March 2007)

¹²² Neil MacFarlane, *Western Engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1999. The US has significant influence in international economic institutions, but it needs the support of other developed countries in the decision-making of these bodies.

GEOPOLITICS OF THE CAR AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE US POLICY

This chapter briefly discusses the relevant characteristics of the region and its geopolitics that are relevant to the US policy. It would then present the evolution of the US policy toward the CAR.

Central Asia Region (CAR)

Central Asia today is described as a region not only in geographic terms but also looked at as a unitary strategic, political and cultural concept.¹ Five states of Central Asia are divided along ethnic and political lines and find their origin from a place of concentration of steppe hordes capable of sweeping over the main centers of human civilization. From the eighth to the twelfth centuries, the population of the CAR embraced Islam in which, Turkey was the regions' conduit for outside relations. Migrations, and Mongol invasions during in 13th -14th centuries, drifting Turkic peoples and their sporadic intermingling with Chinese and subsequently, Russian expansion and the consolidation of its rule left impressions on the states' cultures, governance, systems, and economic and social developments.

Russia conquered the CAR from 1717 – 1876 A.D. Afterwards; the region witnessed usual colonial provocative abuses. The competition from other colonial powers in the 19th century between Russia and Britain made Central Asia the ground of “The Great Game,” which shaped the political events in it and the surrounding regions.² The Communist revolution of the 1920s did change the colonial and tribal structures and subjected people to cultural and

social assimilation. During their rule, communists suppressed the conflicts based on boundaries and tribal identities and as a result, the states witnessed a transformation of societies into coherent nationalities, though some pockets of ethnic groups remained maintaining their distinctiveness.³

Five states as the present geographic units emerged from 1924 and 1936 under the Soviet's policy of "national Delimitation" in which self-determination was given to tribes in the regions and borders were demarcated for administrative control.⁴ During the communist period, the CAR witnessed significant economic and social uplift and the development of infrastructure and institutions.⁵ Russian occupation and communist rule have left a significant influence on the modern-day CAR states.

The population of the CAR is about 60 million people that include various ethnic groups. The largest of these include Turkic-speaking (Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Karakalpak, Tatar, Uyghur) and Farsi-speaking (Tajik) ethnicities; in addition, many other nationalities populate the area including Russians, Koreans, and tens of other peoples. Sunni Muslims are around 90 percent of the population and the others are mainly Orthodox Christians. The region has high natural population growth with the majority of the population under 15 years old. The level of literacy and education is above 90 percent.

The total gross national income (GNI) of the CAR exceeded 42 billion USD in 2002. Two states, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have relatively more economic potential and diversified industries. In terms of natural resources, the CAR economy is based on mining, agriculture, and raw materials production. Kazakhstan possesses the region's largest and most diversified mining and extracting industry (oil, coal, base (non-ferrous) metals) while Uzbekistan leads in mechanical engineering, chemical industry, and light industry. In other states, oil, gas, and cotton processing are in Turkmenistan, energy and gold extraction in Kyrgyzstan, and

aluminum smelting, light industry, and energy in Tajikistan. The regions' agriculture is dominated by the production of grain, cotton and silk, fruit and vegetables.

States as Independent Actors in Global Politics

Today the CAR states have a distinct notion of state sovereignty while enjoying memberships of various international organizations and emerging players in international politics. At their independence in December 1991, the CAR states got immediate global recognition and moved toward the development of interstate relations. The region had been known to the researchers through the theory of a British geographer Halford Mackinder who had called the region a key to the domination of the World Island and therefore the world at large.⁶ The CAR states' new role as independent actors in world politics generated significant interest of other states in developing relations with them.

The political leadership of the CAR states that emerged after the independence constituted the elements installed as government officials from Moscow during the communist rule. They had sufficient experience of governance and were able to manage internal stabilization albeit authoritarianism. During the period 1991-2005, the CAR states faced several pressures to attain stability from infancy toward viable nation-states with implications on internal transformation, security, and stability, the economy in which energy resources were crucial and external relations in particular with the great powers.⁷

The birth of the CAR states coincided with the demise of communism and the triumph of capitalism and thus they followed a process of transition toward a liberal political and economic system. However, influence from Russia kept playing a crucial role in their state policies and foreign relations because of their history and the continuation of the political and economic linkages and processes in which the infrastructure of many sectors remained linked

with Moscow.⁸ Russian influence is noted on the behavior of the CAR states on the governance, cold attitude toward Western culture, and norms for rights of the people since it is "rooted in common history and passed to successive generations."⁹

In their internal as well as foreign affairs, political and economic transition from the communist-built centralized governance has been one of the foremost concerns. In this respect, the CAR states were to take decisions on the governance models, social and cultural constructions, structures of power, economic system, investments, infrastructure, and environments. Scholars have viewed that the impact of the Asian culture, history, and ethnic traits shared by them with eastern neighbors has led them to adopt the "norms that are different from the European style nation-state behavior" in their transition process.¹⁰ In this respect, the CAR states followed the social and economic models closer to the ones followed by Russia, Korea, Japan, and China in which political freedom could wait until economies are stabilized.¹¹

Central Asian States and International Politics

The international environment was in transition in the early 1990s, global politics was transforming from a bipolar world to a new order with a single superpower, multitudes of great powers with many middle-order powers emerging to make their mark on the global issues.¹² Interdependence was taking its roots and globalization was transforming the handling of issues in which the definitions of zero-sum game, realism, and nation-state became modified concepts.¹³ It shifted the consolidation of the CAR governments and their economic and political transition from the issues of internal security to the issues of regional security and geopolitical stability. Foreign powers in the promotion of their relations, expect the other country in the hand of a stable and able government that could manage the country,

exploit resources and markets and possesses responsible orientations on foreign policies and regional arrangements.¹⁴

In this background, the vulnerabilities of the CAR states in their interstate relations are derived from the internal political transition that results in "fears of revolutions and change of governments" and the heightened expectations of the newly independent populations. The internal developments and concerns have a significant impact on the strategic environment, regional rivalries, and the use of natural resources.¹⁵ The CAR states were aware of their strategic and economic importance and the opportunities and challenges of the new world order and their being "at the center of a new great game of power politics."¹⁶ With these factors' insight, the states started their external relations with all the world powers including the US, China, Russia, and Europe.

Regional Geopolitics

It has been observed by scholars that without understanding the regional geopolitics one cannot understand how external influences will proceed in a region.¹⁷ In the regional geopolitics and to understand the evolving interstate behavior and the interaction of the outside powers with the CAR states, the roles and influence of Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran and the emerging regional organizations and processes are relevant. Some background discussion on the roles and relations of the neighboring states with the CAR states is as follows.¹⁸

Russia and its Interests

Russia having a long history of occupation of the CAR states remains the most important power that matters in the US engagement since it offered opportunities, as well as threats due to its weaknesses of a political and economic system that could revive the desire to retake the region.¹⁹ Russia succeeded the Soviet Union, withdrew from the region but the issues of the division of assets and liabilities remained unsettled for some time. Unable to develop independent institutions to deal with many non-political but significant affairs like finance, currency, banking, railroad and oil, and gas supply mechanism until 1998, the CAR states remained dependent on Russia. In addition, the economy, defense structure and equipment, and the internal security structures of the CAR states remained interlinked with Russia.

In the 1990s, Russian interests in the CAR were stable adjoining regions, secure borders, and the internal stability of the states so that the ethnic Russian minorities remained intermingled in the new states. Russian interests in the CAR region also covered security, terrorism, economic cooperation, and energy. Throughout the 1990s, Russia faced enormous economic, political, and strategic problems and remained busy with the transition of its system that restricted its capabilities to engineer regional and global affairs. It had to deal with the transition challenges that included movements to the pluralistic government system, capitalist economic system, adopting globalization and the international economic system based on the Bretton Woods principles, military reforms, and secessionist wars in Chechnya and the threats of the same in other regions.²⁰

Being aware of its vulnerabilities in the 1990s, Russia kept a low profile in the affairs of the CAR in the 1990s.²¹ By the turn of the century, Russia had reorganized its industrial base,

restructured its economic system, and its energy and mineral resources wealth had spurred economic growth. With regained power, geographical and technological edge, and the linkages available from the colonial period, Russia enhanced its strategic, military, political, and economic role to reestablish long-term relations with the CAR.²²

China

China has historic linkages and multiple common interests with the CAR states. Its political concerns are linked with ethnic relations, the presence of Muslims, and the fears of separatist movements in its far west regions. China's economic interests in the CAR are energy and mineral imports and markets for its exports. In the development of China-CAR relations, geographic vicinity played a major role in cooperation in border security, culture, communications (Trans Chinese highways), railways, and energy.²³

The importance of China (and Russia) in the CAR has always been recognized by the US policymakers and scholars who viewed that the new Great Game would not be fought militarily but economically in which China would be a major player.²⁴ Russia and China maintained strategic and pragmatic cooperation after the Cold War to coordinate their global moves and to resolve border issues.²⁵ Their rapprochement had an impact on their relations with the CAR that resulted in the conclusion of agreements under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

China is an influential actor in the CAR and its cooperation with Russia has implications for the US policy toward the region. However, China maintained its policy of passiveness –

Low-level diplomatic maneuvers -- over the regions' growing engagement with other states during the period 1991-2005.

Iran

Iran was a US ally until the 1979 Iranian revolution that limited the US engagement and influence in the region.²⁶ Afterward, Iran's relations with the Soviet Union also remained at a lower level due to past acrimonies and the revolutionary character of its government. The emergence of the CAR states brought a buffer zone of Muslim states for Iran (from Russia) that it hoped would be friendly with it due to similarities of religion. Iran developed relations with the CAR states; however, Iran kept itself out of the race of expanding influence in the CAR and worked to securing minimum interests.²⁷ It coordinated with Russia to balance out the West and Turkey, joined the SCO as an observer, and extended its commercial, economic and cultural interests with the CAR.²⁸

Turkey

Turkey has historical relations with the CAR states except, Tajikistan, share linguistic and cultural values which led to the development of trade, commercial and economic relations with the states. Scholars observe the cooperation of Turkey and the US in a regional policy due to its membership of NATO and advised in the initial phase of the US engagement with the CAR to use Turkey as a conduit for the growth of relations.²⁹ In the interaction with the CAR, Turkey and the US coordinated on economic, trade, political, and strategic engagement and it was a partner in the military cooperation.³⁰

Benefitting from its historic linkages, Turkey expanded its trade and investments with the CAR in a short period and got a major share of contracts from the regional infrastructural

development budgetary outlays. Multinationals from the US with their partners in Turkey joined in many investment ventures in the CAR states in which historical affinities played a major role.³¹

Afghanistan

The role of Afghanistan in the geopolitics of the CAR has been in two phases. In the first phase (1991-2001) Afghanistan as an independent country was a source of instability due to its internal civil war and the policy of the Taliban to export their value system. In the 2nd phase, Afghanistan becomes relevant in the US policy toward the region due to the war on terror. The US viewed that the origins and links of terrorism were interlinked in Afghanistan and the CAR.³² In the aftermath of 9/11, terrorist attacks in New York, the US attacked Afghanistan and deployed its forces along with that of NATO and other allies over there. It led to the deepening of the US military and strategic engagement with the CAR states which were neighboring Afghanistan.

Regional Processes

Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, its newly independent states (NIS) decided to establish a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for the resolution of issues arising out of the division of the Union and to chalk out systems on the liabilities and assets e.g. in defense, economics, and communications and financial infrastructures. It developed from a loose-knit organization to an umbrella framework of some other processes. CIS is relevant to the US policy since it emerged from the beginning and secondly, it had an impact on the CAR States' relations with Russia and other NIS. CIS also pursued the issues related to global security, disarmament and arms control, building up arms services, and provision of internal security.³³

Under the framework of the CIS, the former states of the Soviet Union developed diverse multilateral arrangements such as Collective Security Treaty (CST) in 1992 that was transformed into Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002. The processes were attractive for the CAR states that were looking for identity and security in transforming the world and their rulers were getting international attention through diplomatic gatherings and media coverage.³⁴ The states joined almost all the regional initiatives with varying objectives prominent among them were stability, survival, and economic interdependence.

Initially, these organizations, CIS, CST, and Economic Community remained fragile and lacked decision making due to Russian attempts for hegemonic roles and claims that its positions should be accepted as the final word in negotiating policy and agenda. However, with time their effectiveness, functioning and role stabilized and enhanced. These regional processes in and around the CAR became relevant to the US policy and are discussed at relevant places in the study.

Evolution of the US Policy toward the CAR

Development of US-CAR Relations

Immediately at their independence in December 1991, the US extended recognition to all five CAR states and started the process of establishing diplomatic relations and representation in the individual countries.³⁵

Kazakhstan, the largest of the five states, was more important to the US since it possessed Nuclear Weapons and facilities of the USSR and vast energy resources. The establishment of

bilateral relations with Kazakhstan was followed by many other high-level visits between the states.³⁶ The US engaged Kazakhstan in strategic arms talks and the control of nuclear proliferation in which Russia was also engaged. In the process, the US-Kazakh political and economic cooperation started and the US provided technical assistance to the development of the energy sector.

After the establishment of relations, former Kyrgyz President Asker Akayev visited the US in May 1993 and held meetings with President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The meetings culminated in the signing of economic assistance agreements to facilitating US aid and investments for Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were ahead of others in the opening up of their economies and societies for the West and the US relations with them grew faster than others.³⁷

The Secretary of State James Baker visited Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in early 1992 and held discussions with their leaders on the political, economic, and security issues of importance to the US. The relations with these two states remained patchy as the US criticized their governments for making less progress toward democracy and a free-market economy. The US statements stressed that the “depth, extent, and richness” of the relations with “each of these countries will depend on their commitment to these principles.”³⁸ Later around 1995, the relations progressed as the US recognized the strategic importance of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and expressed its resolve to engage the two states for the stability of the region.³⁹

The level of the US relations with Tajikistan remained at a lower level due to civil war and instability in the country that started immediately after its independence. In the Tajik civil

war and the ensuing conflict, the US engaged with the peace process, extended humanitarian aid through the peacekeeping missions, and sent observers to the UN mission in Tajikistan.

The US interests and objectives in the newly independent states of the CAR emanate from the policy briefs that were prepared for the administrations. Jim Nichole in such a policy brief stated:

The major goals of U.S. policy toward the NIS, including Central Asia, entail fostering stability, democratization, free-market economies and trade, denuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to international human rights standards...In the Central Asian context, the general goal of U.S. policy is integrating these states into the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and discouraging xenophobic and anti-Western orientations that threaten regional and international peace and stability.⁴⁰

In the early period, the official policy toward the CAR was proclaimed as “to promote (in Central Asia) modern, tolerant states and societies which can work productively with” the US “in support of shared interests.”⁴¹ The initial concerns in the US policy were the inherited elements of the vast Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and production complex in which the activities included uranium mining, plutonium production, the fabrication and testing of biological and chemical weapons, and the storage and testing of nuclear weapons.⁴² In the US policy toward the CAR, the following were declared as its core objectives:⁴³

- Assistance to the CAR states in the establishment of free-market economies and democratic governments committed to equal opportunity and human rights;

- Integration of the CAR states with international political and financial institutions and their participation in the Euro-Atlantic security dialogue and cooperative programs;
- Encouragement of these states to pursue peaceful relations among themselves and with their neighbors, to seek new avenues for regional cooperation, and to resolve local conflicts with international mediation;
- Prevention of any trafficking in weapons of mass destruction or their elements across this region or its borders and cooperation on other transnational threats of terrorism, narcotics, and environmental degradation;
- Enhancement of US commercial interests and the expansion and diversification of global energy supplies.

In 1993 the US announced to enhance the level of interaction with the CAR states and pursue political, strategic, and economic relations with the individual states and focus on the region and intraregional issues.⁴⁴ Going through the literature in the realm of strategy and military policy of the US toward the CAR states, one notes the “extraordinary power projection” in which the US expanded the scope of relations from safeguarding the earlier sated “basic interests that included nuclear proliferation, containment of terrorism and the access to energy supplies” and extended it to “the rule of law to combat crime and corruption, creating a stable environment for energy exports, reducing regional threats (nonproliferation, terrorism), and developing regional cooperation to counter instability or threats to peace.”⁴⁵

The Process of the Evolution of the US Policy

On the formulation of a US policy toward the CAR, many studies observe that during the initial period the US policymakers did not consider the CAR as of vital interest and talked more on “relations towards Russia.”⁴⁶ The US welcomed the emergence of the newly

independent states (NIS) with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and expressed “if we can support and help consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia (and in the NIS), we can turn a former threat into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partners.”⁴⁷

In its initial policy statements on the CAR, the US expressed to support the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the new states established diplomatic relations, and started consultations with the CAR leaders.⁴⁸ During the visit of the US Secretary of State James Baker to the region in January 1992, the interests and priorities on strengthening the bilateral political, strategic, and economic relations were conveyed to the leaders of the states. As the relations progressed, the policymakers chalked out a policy toward Central Asia and in doing so examined the factors that could lead to instability in the surrounding regions of Russia which had attained importance due to the presence of nuclear facilities and significant energy reserves due to military and economic transition the role of Islam and ethnicity.⁴⁹

To interact with the CAR states on the stability, the states were made part of the US strategy on the NIS under which the Freedom Support Act was signed into law in 1992.⁵⁰ It aimed to support the NIS to develop them as “democratic and market-oriented nations with liberal economic and social values,” with the hope that with “democracy and market economies ... the states would deny any one country's permanent sphere of influence in the region.”⁵¹ No specific policy was expressed for the CAR states with the perceptions that their “future was unsettled and the region was relevant only in the context of legacies of the former Soviet Union and the Russian expansionary threats persisted.”⁵²

The Freedom Support program and the ensuing activities under it provided opportunities for interaction and collaboration of the US officials with the CAR states. The realization and concerns on regional and international security and non-proliferation led to the initiation of talks under which the aid, assistance, and financial interaction started. At the time it was

observed that the US was cautious in enhancing engagement with the CAR states since “the region was not very well known by even the most informed foreign policy experts.”⁵³ For example, it was pointed out that “there was not a single map in the US Government that placed Central Asia at the center of anything.”⁵⁴

The initial engagement with the CAR under the Freedom Support and talks on the nuclear proliferation with Kazakhstan and Russia were useful in which the US policymakers learned the importance of the CAR states in particular there being rich in natural resources and large markets that would be relevant to the US economy.⁵⁵ It led to the initiation of enhanced interaction of the US with the CAR states with foreign aid and technical assistance programs targeted to the transition process to develop “competitive and market-based economies, property rights, good governance, and citizens’ empowerment.”⁵⁶

The National Security Strategy of Clinton (1992) raised the importance of the CAR and other NIS by saying that in the region the US policy would follow long-term interests spanning political and military reforms, security policies, control of militancy and terrorism, and drug trafficking.⁵⁷ However, the “Clinton administration’s approach to the regions was termed as ad hoc” that tackled initiatives in response to crises and shifting policy priorities in which the important issues “such as oil and gas pipelines, conflict resolution, and human rights were targeted at different junctures, but an overall strategy—which was essential given limited government resources for the regions—was never fully articulated.”⁵⁸

Divergent views on the importance of the CAR for the US, expressed by scholars, and the visits by many leaders to the region and from the region stimulated a debate in the US policymakers on the importance of a coherent policy.⁵⁹ As the interaction enhanced, the US officials who visited the CAR for talks on wider cooperation and to redesign its policy emphasized: “to limit the ingress and influence of other regional neighbors in the CAR.”⁶⁰

Many scholars and policymakers in the government advised that the US needed to broaden its agenda for the CAR from regional and internal stability and the abolition of nuclear weapons to the exploitation of energy and mineral resources. The US should lead these countries in their transition toward a free market economy, check Islam and its role in the society, military reforms, economic development, environment, corruption, crime, and drugs.⁶¹ Various studies viewed that the engagement with the CAR states should be linked with the US-created security structures around the region including the Caucuses and the Middle East.⁶²

Accordingly, the US enhanced strategic engagement with the CAR states by the mid-1990s and shifted the passive policy toward an active one.⁶³ In this shift, the views of the scholars that the CAR states were positively disposed toward close relations with the US which was an alternate power to Russia and the region was a source of opportunities in the wake of globalization and the market needs to be played a crucial role. Russian dimension remained pivotal since the US was opposed to the notion of “Russian sphere of influence” in Central Asia and Caucuses.⁶⁴ Besides, the Russian threat of regaining influence, in mid-1990s also coupled with the coming in of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the fears that the elements related to militancy and terrorism would enter the CAR which in the early 1990s had led to civil war in Tajikistan.

The late 1990s official pronouncements indicated that the US policy toward the CAR enlarged to a higher level of engagements that included the efforts to “integrate the states into western economies, political and military institutions and practices.”⁶⁵ The US Permanent Representative to NATO declared Central Asia and the Caucasus as NATO’s zone of interest that led to military and security interaction at a higher level.⁶⁶ The US companies started to participate in economic activities in the CAR. And for this, the US induced the CAR states to move towards the system of Western values of governance and the strategy expanded to use

the multipronged tools in the realm of security, politics, and economy and target political transition, governance, development, human rights, and economic reforms.⁶⁷

Events of the September 2001, war on terror and the Afghan invasion brought new dimensions to the US policy on the CAR. The US official statements declared the CAR states as partners in the War on terror and stressed on developing the bilateral relations in the realm of security, regional conflicts, transition, economic development, and investments with an emphasis on "stable, independent, and peaceful region."⁶⁸ The National Security Strategy (2002) declared using all means when handling security issues after the nine-eleven experiences.⁶⁹ In addition to other interests, the CAR became crucial for the US-led War on Terror for "the access to airspace and territory and the alternative sources of energy."⁷⁰

In 2004, the US announced a consolidated policy on the CAR region in which it announced that the primary strategic goal for Central Asia is to see the development of independent, democratic, and stable states. The US announced that it would follow security, democracy, and free-market economic reforms with foreign direct investment.⁷¹ The US strategy was outlined by Frederick Starr as "Partnership for Central Asia," the hallmark of which was a military presence in the CAR region with long-term economic links.⁷²

Concluding the Chapter

In the early 1990s, the region remained at a relatively low priority in strategic thinking when the US was preoccupied with Russia and Eastern Europe. In this period, it could have been said without the risk of misrepresentation that the US had no more than series of policies relating to each of the CAR states and that also with the cooperation of Russia and Turkey. For Example, the US engaged with Kazakhstan for control of nuclear proliferation and with Tajikistan to curb the civil war. Even in both of these engagements, the US adopted a

cautious stance and involved Russia and other regional states in the search for stability and security. The US and Turkey cooperated on the development of economic linkages with the CAR states.

After the initial establishment of relations in early 1993, the US decided to enhance the level of interaction with the CAR and the pursued political and economic relations with the individual states, and focused on the region and intraregional issues. Many events triggered a change in the US attitude that gave birth to a single policy thrust toward the CAR region and raised its importance in US policy-making. The perceived threats were the extremism, terrorism, and instability in the CAR and Afghanistan and the associated fears of civil wars in the region while the one happening in Tajikistan, the economic collapse of the Soviet Union and the rising power of China, and the growing interests of regional countries Turkey and Iran. The opportunities were economic, commercial trade, and investments. The thrust came in the shape of US involvement with the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, its attack on Iraq, and the need for energy resources.⁷³

The US policy toward the CAR moved to a stage of active engagement in the 21st century with the increased military, counterterrorism, and economic cooperation. The US engagement in the transition process ranged from political and economic transformation to the support for non-governmental groups engaged with human rights and societal reforms.⁷⁴ In the regional context expanding influence became a priority to block the spread of radical elements and to prevent the emergence of militant movements.⁷⁵ In the transition process and to make it amenable to the US interest, economic and political linkages were strengthened and inroads in the internal power centers of the countries were developed. In the evolution of the policy, the US developed relations with the CAR states in the political, strategic, economic, social spheres that are discussed in the next chapter.

End Notes

¹ For the history of the region and its present characteristics ref. *Central Asia: Geostrategic Survey*, <http://ca-c.org/dataeng/parakhonsk.shtml>, and Farkhod Tolipov, *Central Asia as a Space, Polity, Peoples, and Fate*, http://www.ca-c.org/cgi-bin/search/show.pl?url=http://www.ca-c.org/online/2005/journal_eng/cac-02/12.toleng.shtml&words=pluralism, (accessed 24 November, 2004)

² Adam Wolfe, *The "Great Game" Heats Up in Central Asia*, <http://www.pinr.com>, (accessed 15 September, 2005); Dosym Satpayev, Assessment Risk Group in Almaty, cited in Kathy Gannon, "Replay of the Great Game in Central Asia", *The Moscowtimes*, Thursday, August 18, 2005. Issue 3233, Page 4, "The Great Game" is a term to define the rivalries and ambitions of 19th century Russia and Britain. It is now referred to a new struggle for influence that is pitting Russia and China against the US." <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/08/18/016.html>,

³ Ref. Alpamysh, "*Central Asian Identity under Russian Rule*", Hartford, Conn: Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research (AACAR), 1989.

⁴ These aspects are discussed by Robert J. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, p.135, Also in Roman Szporluk, "History and Russian Ethnocentrism," in *Ethnic Russia in the USSR*, ed. Edward Allworth, New York: Pergamon, 1980, p-45

⁵ Azmat Hayat Khan, "*Central Asia*" Area Study Center, Peshawar, volume 52, 2003

⁶ Michael Hess, "Central Asia: Mackinder Revisited?" *Columbia International Affairs Online* 3, No 1(2004): p.95, www.ciaonet.org/olj/co/co_mar04/co_mar04h.pdf, (accessed 9 September 2005)

⁷ For detail reference: Survey: Central Asia: At the crossroads, *The Economist*, Jul 24th, 2003; Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1994; and Also listed by V. Nagendra Rao, in "Introduction" of "*Central Asia: Present Challenges and Future Prospects*", ed. V. Nagendra Rao and Monir Alam, Knowledge World, N. Delhi, 2005

⁸ Ref. for political and economic linkages, David A. Lake, "British and American Hegemony Compared: Lessons for the Current Era of Decline," in *International Political Economy*, ed. Frieden and Lake, St. Martin, 1995, 120-134

⁹ Askar Akayev, "Whither Central Asia", *Russia in Global Affairs*, 4(2003) p.107

¹⁰ This issue comes up when a comparison of the NIS in eastern Europe and the CAR states are made by saying that both the region were colonies of Russia but the path of transition was different. For reference "The Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics", *Conference Report*, October 2000, http://www.cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (accessed 9 November, 2006)

¹¹ Economic systems were transformed based on market economy principles, but politics, press, and media remain under restrictions and managed by the governments.

¹² The phenomenon has been explained by many scholars. For example, Barry Buzan and Ole Woever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003

¹³ As discussed in the last chapter.

¹⁴ Conference Report, Oct. 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, new states had "inherent instabilities and lack of control by authoritarian rulers." (accessed 9 November, 2006)

¹⁵ Matha Brill Olcot, *Central Asia: Common Legacies and Conflicts*, in *Central Asian Security*, ed. By Roy Allison & Lena Jonson, Brookings Institution Press, 2001; and Nodia, Ghia, "A New Cycle of Instability in Georgia: New troubles and Old Problems", *Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, Bertsch, Gary K. et al (eds), Routledge, N.Y., 2000

¹⁶ Sean Yom, *Power Politics in Central Asia*, <http://www.fpfif.org/indices/regions/russia/index.php>, (accessed 7 December, 2006)

¹⁷ Gustavo Diaz Matey and Antonio Alonso Marcos, *Changing the Rules of the Game: The Use of Intelligence Liaison in Central Asia*, research paper, no. 128, CEU-San Pablo University, Spain, 2009, p-7

¹⁸ The survey is relevant to understand many of the issues discussed in the section. Borys Parakhonsky, *Central Asia: Geostrategic Survey*, <http://ca-c.org/dataeng/parakhonsk.shtml>, (accessed 5 December, 2006)

¹⁹ Allen C. Lynch, "Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol 53, no 1, 2001, p 24; Also Abashidze, Medea, "The Caucasus: Historical Background", *Caucasica: The Journal of Caucasian Studies*, no 2, 1998, p 12

²⁰ Alexander Konovalov, & Segei Oznobishev, *Russian Armed Forces: Perspectives of Military Reform and Evolution of the Military Doctrine*, Institute for Strategic Assessments, Moscow, 1999, p 24-35

²¹ Jae-Nam Ko, *Russia's Revival and Its Great Power Diplomacy*, *East Asian Review*, Vol. 20, No. 4, Winter 2008, Seoul, p.93

²² In the Conference in 2000, on *Russia's strategy on Central Asia and South Caucasus*, some panelists argued that western cooperation with South Caucasian states "made sense" for Russia to curb quagmire in the North with stability in the South. But several panelists saw such a shift in Russian policy to be unrealistic with Moscow more likely to foment separatist activism, its effective lever over these states. Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (Accessed on 9 Feb. 2005)

²³ Shigematsu Kondo, (ed.) (1999), *East Asian Strategic Review*, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 1998-1999, pp 201-209 also Philip Andrews-Speed & Sergei Vinogradov, "China's Involvement in Central Asian Petroleum: Convergent or Divergent Interests", *Asian Survey*, vol. XL, no 2, March/April 2000, pp 377-397

²⁴ Ref. Dianne L. Smith, *Central Asia: A New Great Game?* 1996, It observes that "great game is emerging, but the analogies with the old game are not the guide to understand the new one. In the 19th century, British and Russian interests were more imagined than real. Today the interests are real and the number of players is large." <http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm>, (Accessed 12 February, 2005)

²⁵ Wang Haiyun, Continuity of Putin's Line and his China Policy after the Presidential Election, in *Foreign Affairs Journal*, The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, Spring 2008, p-75 (China and Russia resolved their border dispute that led to skirmishes in 1960s by signing an accord in 2004 and developed military weaponry supplies program, transfer of space technology and pipeline to deliver oil to China)

²⁶ It was after 1979 that the US moved to enhance its influence in the Gulf and raised CENTCOM.

²⁷ Barhram Amir Ahmadian, "Caucasus: Geopolitical Buffer Region – a New Concept for Development", *Caucasica: The Journal of Caucasian Studies*, no 2, 1998, pp 27-35

²⁸ Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russia and Asia: Challenges and Opportunities for National and International Security", *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda*, Gennady Chufirin, (ed), SIPRI/Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p 23

²⁹ <http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2007/05/11/turkey-central-asia-best-laid-plans/>; Federico Bordonaro, *Turkey stakes a Central Asian claim*, 12 May 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/IE12Ag01.html,

³⁰ "Turkey stakes a Central Asian claim", http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/, 12 May, 2007

³¹ Saban Kardas, *Turkey Pushes for Closer Political Ties Within the Turkic-speaking World* Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 5 Issue 225, November 24, 2008

³² Svante Cornell and Maria Sultan, *AFGHANISTAN AS CENTER: CENTRAL ASIA'S NEW GEOPOLITICS*, Published on Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, <http://www.cacianalyst.org>, 2000, (accessed 21 May 2006)

³³ Ref. <http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm>, (accessed 21 June, 2005)

³⁴ Elaine Sciolino, "Kazakh Uses America to enhance Stature", *The New York Times*, October 25, 1993, observes that the Kazakh President was eager to look like a first rank leader, both and home and abroad, and "No second fiddle to Russia", and many have observed similar tendencies in all of the CAR leaders.

³⁵ A brief description of early days is mostly taken from fact sheets on the web, for example, the "Fact Sheets: Central Asian Republics," (1994): *Dispatch* 5, (9/5)

³⁶ Kazakh President Nazarbayev visited the USA in May 1992. The US Vice President Al Gore visited in 1993 and it was followed by a visit of the then Secretary of State Warren Christopher in October 1994.

³⁷ Martha B. Olcott (1989): "Gorbachev's National Dilemma," *Journal of International Affairs*, no.42 Spring, 1993, p. 92-103, Kazakhstan had got the praise of US since it abrogated nuclear weapons in the early stages of its independence and is rich in oil and gas resources. Kirgizstan, most poor nation allowed US aid programs in the country.

³⁸ Christopher Panico, "Turkmenistan Unaffected by Winds of Democratic Change," RFE/RL Research Report, 1993; the statement of the US Press Secretary Fitzwater on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, With Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 1992-02-19, accessed 11 January 2005, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=3965&year=1992&month=2,

³⁹ Jim Nichole, (1996): *Central Asia's the New States: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests*, CRS Issue Brief. Washington: Library of Congress.

⁴⁰ Jim Nichol, 93108: Central Asia's the New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, Updated, 1996, CRS Issue Brief, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/93-108.htm>, (accessed 7 March 2008)

⁴¹ "US Policy Toward the Central Asian States", Remarks by Ambassador James Collins, Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary for the NIS, at the inauguration of the Central Asia Institute, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, October 21, 1996, www.state.gov

⁴² Togzhan Kassenova, *Central Asia: regional security and WMD proliferation threats*, <http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art2684.pdf>

⁴³ *ibid*

⁴⁴ Elizabeth Wishnick, *Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia*, Monograph, 2002 <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=907>, referring to *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999, released, January 5, 2000, <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil>.

⁴⁵ For detailed reference pl. see Blank (2000), p 15

⁴⁶ Svante E. Cornell, "Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in Caucasus and Central Asia," *Perceptions*, 4, No.2, 1999, p.123; and Rajan Menon, "Central Asia's Foreign Policy and Security Challenges: Implications for the United States," *The National Bureau of Asian Research* (NBR), vol 6, no 4, 1995, pp 13-15, <http://www.nbar.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol6no4.pdf>, (accessed 11 January, 2007)

⁴⁷ Cit. by Blank, 2001, from US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Rep.: Foreign Assistance 1999, p-10, also Andre Gunder Frank, *The "Great Game" for Caspian Sea Oil*, <http://rojasdatabank.info/agfrank/caspian.html>, (accessed September, 2007)

⁴⁸ Stephen Sestanovich, former NIS Ambassador-at-Large, "Testimony to Congress", RFE/RL, March 18, 1999, <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999>, (Accessed on 29 June. 2006)

-
- ⁴⁹ Robert M. Cutler, "The West's Irreducible Interests in Central Asia," policy commentary, first published in the monthly opinion newsletter of the Center for Post-Soviet Studies, Focus 3, no. 11 (November 1996), pp. 1–2. <http://www.robertcutler.org/op96foc.htm>, (accessed September, 2006)
- ⁵⁰ Freedom Support Act of 1992, Fact Sheet, <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/b920401.htm>, (accessed June 2005)
- ⁵¹ W. J. Clinton, "Feeding the Fragile Dove of Peace", in *The Moscow Times*, 25 Nov. 2005, referring to The Wall Street Journal. In the article outside power is taken as Russia and Clinton justifies his policies in NIS and the Balkans, and also pointed out the end of Russia's hegemonic role from the region,
- ⁵² Report of an Atlantic Council delegation visit to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan & Kazakstan, May 1997, <http://www.acus.org/InternationalSecurity/CentralEurasia.htm>; and Charles Faribanks, "Bases of Debate: American in Central Asia. Being There," *The National Interest*, 68, 2002, p.42
- ⁵³ Charles William Maynes, "America Discovers Central Asia", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2003; also in "New Priorities for the United States in Central Asia and the Tran Caucasus", Report of Atlantic Council delegation to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan & Kazakhstan, May 1997, <http://www.acus.org/InternationalSecurity/CentralEurasia.htm>. (accessed 24 December 2005); cautious policy of the US in early 1992 is also noted by Fabrizio Vielmini, in the *US deployment in Former Soviet Heartland*, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, (Special Issue) No. 4(34), 2005, http://www.ca-c.org/online/2005/journal_eng/cac-04/A00.PDF,
- ⁵⁴ S. Frederick Starr, "The War against terrorism and US bilateral relations with the nations of Central Asia", http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm, (accessed December 2005) in the US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, Dec. 2001
- ⁵⁵ Steve Sestanovich, 1999, mentions that the US gained experience of the region in the process of conflict resolution in Tajikistan, negotiations with Kazakhstan over control of nuclear material and facilities, and terrorism-related security issues.
- ⁵⁶ Ref. CRS Report RL30148 (pdf), "U.S. Assistance to the Soviet Union and its Successor States 1991-1998", taken from the CRS website, (accessed February 2006)
- ⁵⁷ Official website of the US White House, the strategy was prepared in 1992 and issued in 1993, <http://www.allbusiness.com/government/3493252-1.html>, (accessed 6 July, 2005)
- ⁵⁸ Fiona Hill (2001) "the decisions before 1996-7 were ad hoc responses to increasing US engagement in Caspian Oil development" A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia since 1991, <http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/fhill/2001politique.htm> ; (accessed on 29 Jan. 2006); see also Svante E. Cornell & Maria Sultan, state the record of U.S. policy towards the region in the 1990s shows a mixed picture. Its policy displays no coherent strategy and seems to be mostly based on short-term, ad hoc decisions, being tactical rather than strategic. Caspian Brief, Marco Polo Magazine, Venice, no. 6, 2000
- ⁵⁹ The high-level visits included Vice President Al Gore in September 1993 and Secretary of State Warren Christopher in October 1994, reports of Christopher on the region are widely referred by researchers on the US relations with Central Asia.
- ⁶⁰ Strobe Talbott, (1994) Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in Central Asia. US Department of State Dispatch 5 (19): 280 282.
- ⁶¹ Gen. Anthony Zinni, "A US Strategic Perspective on Central Asia, Keynote Address", *Conference Report*, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (accessed also on 29 Jan. 2006); Dick Cheney, The CEO of a supplier to the oil industry in 1998, Haliburton, Inc., Vice-president of America, is quoted in the Guardian 23/10/01, as saying "I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian" <http://www.struggle.ws/freearth/war/profitOCT01.html>, (Accessed Dec. 2005)

-
- ⁶² Warren Christopher, "Toward a Secure, Free, and Fully Integrated Europe," *Dispatch* 5, no.25 (20/6), 1994, also in testimony in April 1998, Ambassador Sestanovich stated that the US has a "big stake" in assisting the integration of Central Asia (and the South Caucasus) into the world community; interests that are "strategic" and "vital."
- ⁶³ Fiona Hill, 200, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/silencing-central-asia-the-voice-of-dissidents/>
- ⁶⁴ Kathleen O'Halloran, "A New U.S. regional Strategy toward Russia", *Strategic Review*, vol. 27, no 3, p 58, 1999; and Steven Sestanovich, Testimony, 1998, refers that the US "absolutely rejects the idea of a Russian sphere of influence." Russia was in itself in the phase of transition and the US was aware of its military and other weaknesses. The US as a global power was to fill the security vacuum.
- ⁶⁵ Stephen Blank, 2001 refers statements of Stephen Sestanovich, 1998 and Strobe Talbot, "A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia", *Address at the Johns Hopkins SAIS*, Washington D.C. 21 July 1997.
- ⁶⁶ Nicholas Burns, "NATO Admits in Public Caucasus and Central Asia are Within Sphere of its Interests", *RIA Novosti*, from CDI Russia Weekly #205, 10 May, 2002;
- ⁶⁷ S. Frederick Starr, Testimony at the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, 13 December 2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm, (accessed 15 January, 2007), and Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Briefing to the Press, Washington, DC, February 11, 2002 <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2003/31021.htm> (accessed 8 July, 2005)
- ⁶⁸ Elizabeth Jones, US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs and US president's special envoy on Caspian Sea issues said at the Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus of the US Senate Committee on International Relations that "we will not leave Central Asia and support the countries to reform their societies as they supported us in the war against terrorism", BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, December 19, 2001, taken from the web.
- ⁶⁹ National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> , 2002-09-23
- ⁷⁰ Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanstrom, "The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security," *Problems of Post-Communism*, 53, July/August 2006, pp 24-25.
- ⁷¹ Federal News Service, "U.S. Representative Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) Holds Hearing on Uzbekistan," 24 June 2004, in LexisNexis.
- ⁷² S. Frederick Starr, "A Partnership for Central Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2005
- ⁷³ Articles on Great Game, Pipeline politics, <http://www.atimes.com/>; and "Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region" edited by Michael P. Croissant and Bulent Aras, Praeger, London, 1999.
- ⁷⁴ U.S. Policy in Central Asia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, First Session, June 6, 2001, Serial No. 107-21, <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees>. (Accessed Dec 2005)
- ⁷⁵ B. Lynn Pascoe, "The U.S. Role in Central Asia," Testimony for the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, June 27, 2002, <http://20012009.state.gov/p/eur/ris/rm/2002/11535.htm>.

US CAR STRATEGIC RELATIONS

Strategic and military engagement as a tool of foreign policy is included by the US “in the big picture of national security and is the essential part of interaction” at the state and regional level.¹ In the context of the CAR, it is stressed in many studies that strategic relations with the region are relevant to the US global strategic policy and the military bases and operations in the neighboring regions of the CAR.²

This section deals with the strategic (defense, military, and security) aspects of the US engagements with the Central Asian states and the region.

US Strategic Concerns

As discussed earlier, stability and security concerns were paramount in the US policy toward the CAR states. The need for strategic management of the region flows from the historic Soviet legacies, nuclear proliferation, militancy and the rise of separatists’ movements, domestic disorder from ethnic and religious divisions, transition leading to economic hardships, and failure of the social services and general discontentment in the society.³ Strategic concerns of the US are also linked with the possibility of assertive reappearance of Russia as a hegemon in the CAR, China as a decisive regional and global actor, Iran's influence, both in this region, and the Middle East and Afghanistan’s future and challenges of international terrorism.⁴

The deepening of the strategic engagement of the US with the CAR is traced by the scholars to the Clinton administration's national security strategy that elaborated on the security interests.⁵ Over time, when the relations of the US expanded with the CAR states, the scope of the strategic concerns was extended to internal structures of the states for their transition and the rule of law, energy exports, regional threats from ethnic disturbances, and counter instability or threats to peace mechanisms.

In the beginning of 21st century, strategic concerns of the US with the Central Asian states heightened due to the growth of terrorism and the militancy associated with religion and the separatist movements. These issues involved the role of the US military and became "a factor to count" when it was "tied closely to the states" and non-states entities got involved in it.⁶ For US policy observers, the US military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan were closely related to the developments in the CAR. Scholars who expand the scope of the US strategic concerns also relate with it the energy and mineral resources of the CAR states, supply disruptions of which could lead to economic problems for many allies like Europe and Japan.⁷

With multiple concerns, the US emphasis on strategic interaction steadily increased with the CAR states with growing engagement at various levels of government. Issue-wise details of the military and strategic interaction are discussed in the following section.

Nuclear Weapons and Programs

The USSR had established sensitive defense facilities and stores of weapons including nuclear, in its former republics. The US engaged Russia that had succeeded the USSR with

the status of a Permanent Member in the UN and through bilateral and multilateral forums to take stock of the presence of nuclear weapons and related facilities in the NIS for non-proliferation. The US concerns were that the nuclear and missile arsenal could lead to the emergence of new nuclear-weapon states and also its presence could become a tool in the hands of new and possibly unstable governments that would have repercussions on the global and regional balance of power. Few incidences of the smuggling of fissile material and the attempts by scientists from the CAR to seek jobs abroad pushed the issue higher on agenda.

The US, therefore, attended to the issue on an urgent basis in the early 1990s intending to control nuclear proliferation, the removal of weapons from the NIS, and to bring their nuclear and weapons of mass production programs under international controls. From the CAR states, Kazakhstan was most important since it had inherited several nuclear facilities, missile launching pads, some nuclear weapons, and scores of scientists and technologists.⁸ The US immediately engaged Kazakhstan in coordination with Russia and persuaded its leaders to give up nuclear arms and facilities and ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Lisbon protocol on 22 May 1992.

Protracted negotiations on the nuclear issue led to the signing of various accords between 1992-99 extending the US aid and technical cooperation to Kazakhstan in energy sectors and the transfer of 1040 SS-18 missile warheads to Russia.⁹ The departure of the last nuclear warhead from Kazakhstan in 1995 was described as a significant achievement in support of non-proliferation.¹⁰ Kazakhstan agreed to give up nuclear arms despite unfavorable domestic public opinion that called for the retention of the capability. Kazakhstan also pledged to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the removal of weapons-grade plutonium from its soil.¹¹

In addition, Kazakhstan agreed to cooperate on the curbs on the transfer of nuclear material and weapons and exchange of intelligence on the issue.¹²

The US engagement in collaboration with Russia and the EU in the field of nuclear technology initiated the non-proliferation process in the CAR. The region witnessed a gradual increase in the sharing of intelligence on nuclear proliferation and the removal of fissionable material. After long deliberations, Central Asian states agreed on the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in 1997.¹³ The efforts culminated in a treaty establishing a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) in September 2006.¹⁴ It has been joined by all five states of the CAR.

Overall the US and the West contend that the work on reducing proliferation risks in the region was almost completed from 1990 to 2005. The CAR states have joined many arrangements in the Export Controls and nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it is, however, viewed that sustained political and financial support is necessary for effective and durable non-proliferation measures in the region and it becomes a reason for the US to interact with other issues.¹⁵

Defense and Military Interaction

Military interaction between the US and the CAR was first built up in the multilateral arena and later at the bilateral level.

Interaction through Multilateralism

At the break up of the Soviet Union, the role of NATO, a strategic organization on which the US depends for European security was also to be re-assigned given the observations that its utility would become marginal at the "end of history."¹⁶ However, the US in collaboration with its European allies, found a new sphere of activities for NATO and extended its role towards the CAR (along with eastern Europe and Caucasus), and in doing so the scope of the activities of NATO was expanded to include humanitarian aid, military reform, military training and supply of equipment to new states.¹⁷

The CAR states were engaged in the NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs that included military training (in Germany) and the extension of technical assistance to the CAR military forces of the CAR that had the background of Soviet Army traditions.¹⁸ In the training programs, the interaction of the Western militaries with that of the CAR states was given priority to develop interoperability among armed forces.¹⁹ The US also engaged the CAR countries with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) that was signed in 1990 with Warsaw Treaty Organization.²⁰

In the strategic engagement with the CAR, the US engaged its allies from Europe to develop military and security relations. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was pursued to engage the CAR states on security issues. The inclusion of Europe in the US strategic programs in the CAR expanded its scope in which its objectives were extended to include "security cooperation, promote democracy and economic and social development and support efforts to counter-terrorism, crime prevention, and border control."²¹ The US and EU

talks also reveal that the EU that was more interested in South Caucasus than the CAR was persuaded to coordinate in the overall US strategy toward the latter.²²

For analysts, multilateral engagement built the confidence between the US and the CAR states to develop broader and integrated cooperation and helped the US to know the “Soviet-style military institutions and their behaviors.”²³ It “laid the foundation for a growing network of cooperative political and military ties between the US and the CAR states to enhance the military relationship by the end of the century.”²⁴ Since the US was not directly taking lead in military interaction and the cooperation was built at a multilateral level through NATO and the OSCE, it is viewed as "helped in mitigating the regional concerns" if expressed from Russia, etc. and later it was “useful to the US for its war on terrorism.”²⁵

Bilateral Interaction

Initial bilateral engagement of the US with the CAR was on non-proliferation and military advice. However, the confidence gained after multilateral interaction “steadily paved the way for developing bilateral ties” of the US in the region.²⁶ By 1996, the US had signed agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to start structural talks on defense, training, and modernization of the defense industry.²⁷ As a consequence, Uzbekistan was supplied with military equipment under the US Foreign Military Financing program and its air force and Navy got supplies including sixteen military transport vehicles to enhance interoperability with NATO forces. Cooperation was also extended at the naval level and the US supplied coast guard vessels to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan under various agreements.

Tajikistan was in the grip of civil war and the US had sent its observers in the conflict in the early 1990s while recognizing the role of Russia for effective peacekeeping. Active military interaction of the US with Tajikistan was later started with NATO's PfP program that was also designed to curb instability and militancy in the country. Bilateral military relations started a little late once Tajikistan had got stabilized government in 2001 and recovered from the internal conflict. Official US military aid to Tajikistan in 2003 accounted for \$1.1 million out of a total aid budget of \$43 million and there were reports that the US would rebuild Tajik airfields.²⁸

By the end of the century, military engagement of the US with the CAR states had been strengthened. It was the time when terrorism had been declared as a major concern of the US foreign policy around the globe and also in the CAR. The US military cooperation with the CAR was also adjusted with the anti-terrorism campaign. In the US budgets, emergency supplemental appropriations to facilitate and aid the participation of the CAR states in anti-terrorism activities were made to "improve the interoperability" of the US military with that of the defense institutions of the CAR states under which training of military personnel related to terrorism was also extended.²⁹

In the war against terror, all the CAR states supported the US strategy and military operations in Afghanistan. The US obtained a supply corridor for Afghan operations and in return, it increased its economic and security assistance to the CAR states to restructure their defense forces, domestic security forces, counter-narcotics, border security forces, and customs controls.³⁰ The US-CAR cooperation in Afghanistan resulted in the enhanced level of relations between the militaries in which CAR also joined in Operations Enduring Freedom.³¹

US Moves Institutions to the Region

The US restructured its global military deployments to cater to the developing security relations with the CAR states and to associate them with global security cooperation. In doing so, the strategic responsibility of the CAR was shifted in 1999 from the purview of the US forces' European Command to the Central Command (CENTCOM).³² The CENTCOM was originally raised for the Gulf region and is now made in charge to conduct the PfP with the CAR and International Military Exchanges and Training programs.

While transferring the responsibility of the CAR, the CENTCOM was also assigned to carry out routine military operations in the CAR and to check transnational threats, drugs, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).³³ The cooperation level of the CENTCOM with the CAR varied with different states and in the aftermath of 2001 events, it was significantly enhanced. The US also initiated programs of intelligence cooperation with the CAR states under which the CENTCOM was able to extend its influence in the region.³⁴

US Military Bases in the Region

In the post 9/11 period, the US military engagement with the CAR states was significantly enhanced from the 1990s with the recognition by the US and the NATO that the “engagement in the region long seemed to bear a daunting price tag, the neglect has proved even more costly that indicated the preference for increased cooperation.”³⁵ The US moved “to negotiate agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to use the existing military bases and deploy troops in support of the war in Afghanistan.”³⁶ On approach by the US for support to its operations in Afghanistan, all states of the CAR provided necessary support that included

permissions to flight operations to the facilities to use military bases in return, the US enhanced its economic assistance to the states.³⁷

Turkmenistan permitted flyover operations and refueling for the US and NATO air forces. Tajikistan agreed to allow the airbases for potential use. The US negotiated agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to use existing bases and deploy troops in support of the war in Afghanistan. In Uzbekistan, Special Forces were allowed to be stationed in a base called Khanabad. In Kyrgyzstan, a base at Manas Airport near Bishkek accommodated US troops and several aircraft. Kazakhstan allowed the use of infrastructure for military overflights, refueling, and landing rights in emergencies.

With the increasing interaction, the US formalized arrangements over the use of military bases in the CAR that provided it the exclusive use of assigned bases. The bases were to support the US forces for air-to-air refueling tankers, and some attack aircraft. The US officials proclaimed that these bases were temporary and only for Afghan operations. However, it was pointed out from the beginning that the military presence in the CAR would be for a long time to come since the establishment of military bases as part of a dynamic strategy of the US to get hold of a permanent footing and deployment of forces in far off regions.³⁸

This view was strengthened with the expansion of the infrastructure that the US developed through long-term agreements with the CAR governments to use the military bases. In return, the US economic and financial support to the CAR states was extended to defense reforms, modernization of militaries that allowed their downsizing as well and training for border security, anti-narcotics, and law enforcement. The US government announced that such

cooperation programs were a necessary part of the engagement with the CAR states and for the continued support to counter their internal stability problems.³⁹

The US Military and Strategic policy and the Regional Processes

The US in general did not support the emergence of regional cooperative arrangements since such processes may "encourage competitive regionalist agendas on the part of other interesting major powers" that in the case of CAR would be Russia and China.⁴⁰ Following this policy, the US did not promote significant regional activities in the CAR that could be termed or developed as a regional organization. However, because of the specific needs of the CAR that were felt in the domains of proliferation, confidence-building, and research promotion, the US (and the West) associated themselves with many regional conferences and processes that were task-oriented and not being developed as permanent structures.

For example, a Conference on prevention and countering terrorism was organized at the invitation of Kyrgyzstan by the OSCE and the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in December 2001. It aimed at strengthening the capacities of the CAR states to address the issue of terrorism and the underlying political conflicts, and social and economic problems. The holding of the conference is a regular feature with emphasis on collective security and work to be carried out by academics.⁴¹

In 1992, by taking the OSCE as a model, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) was created.⁴² It was promoted by Kazakhstan under the patronage of the US and the West. It is aimed to discuss the issues related to nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and the elimination of transnational threats: terrorism, separatism, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, and transnational crimes. Russia also joined in 2002. Its Asian members include China, Pakistan, India, and Israel.

Kazakhstan being the host country continues to make effort to expand its scope from security to the issues related to economics and finance.

Evolving regional processes and the impact of the US Strategic and Military interaction

Increasing US strategic engagements had bearings on the strategic security structures of the CAR states and the region. During the period 1991-2005, many regional processes and institutions emerged in the CAR partly as a natural growth arising out of the needs for cooperation and some in reaction to the outside influence as of the US. Both had relevance and impact from the US strategic and military interaction with the CAR.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established in 1991 by Russia and other NIS to consolidate the relations related to the division of assets and liabilities of the former Soviet Union and its republics. CIS extended its agenda with the time to tackle the issues relating to security, stability, and transition. As such, the CIS started deliberations on global security, disarmament, arms race and arms control, and internal security.⁴³ Under the CIS, a framework for security was created in 1992 namely the Collective Security Treaty (CST) by Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia.⁴⁴

The CIS remained an unsettled entity "with limited impact on the power politics of the region" despite Russian patronage and the common colonial linkages and processes.⁴⁵ Despite its ineffectiveness, the CIS provided a forum to Russia and other NIS to influence the CAR states. Russia maintained that the CAR being in its neighborhood with former linkages was to be in its sphere of influence.⁴⁶ In the game of power politics, Russia knew that it had the ability and the advantage to counter the US and NATO influence and the CAR would remain dependent on it.⁴⁷ Russia thus, vigorously pursued bilateral and multilateral engagement with the neighboring states to associate them into regional alliances.⁴⁸

The CIS also distracted the entry of the CAR states into any other security structure in particular the NATO and restricted the outside powers (the US) from deepening institutional relationships with the region. Rather new regional entities were considered by the CAR states to tackle security issues. In 2000 A.D. Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formed an Antiterrorist Center under which a Collective Rapid Reaction Force was established in 2001 to deal with security crises and border controls against terrorism and incursions and later it was transformed into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002 to deepen military and military-technical cooperation among members.⁴⁹

In the US strategic relations with the CAR, the Russia element is crucial since it becomes linked with global politics in which Russia and other large powers look these as relevant with the situation in Europe and Asia.⁵⁰ Russian position to outside influence in the CIS that includes the CAR could be deducted from the policy advice it gets from scholars such as:

Russia should retain its freedom to determine and implement its foreign and domestic policies. The development of partnership with the EU should contribute to consolidating Russia's role as the leading power in shaping a new system of interstate political and economic relations in the CIS area...[Russia] would oppose any attempts to hamper economic integration in the CIS [by the EU], including through "special relations" with individual CIS member states to the detriment of Russia's interests.⁵¹

Russian policy during the period 1991-2005 could be seen in the background of its transition process in the 1990s that brought economic hardships, restructuring of defense and military organizations, and domestic ethnic issues.⁵² Overall it is observed that Russia accepted growing US influence in the CAR region as long as it matched its interests in the sphere of stability, security, and terrorism.⁵³ However, Russian policy was amended by the turn of the century when Russia completed the process of internal restructuring, gained economic and

political stability in which incomes from energy and minerals exports played a crucial role, reorganized its military power, and was ready to regain influence in its surrounding regions by expressing in official statements that it was ready to counter the zero-sum realpolitik in neighboring regions.⁵⁴

When Russia cooperated with the US in the 1990s, it had found similarities of interests on strategic issues including nuclear proliferation, internal civil wars, militancy, a rise of Islam, and stability. The US supported the deployment of Russian forces as peacekeepers in the Tajikistan civil war in 1992.⁵⁵ While cooperating with the US on the CAR, Russia expressed that its cooperation with the OSCE and NATO is disregarded despite an understanding with NATO (and the US) that it would avoid covert operations in the CAR and (the CIS).⁵⁶ Many other events at the global and European level, in particular, the Kosovo crisis and Balkan disputes, caused differences in the US/NATO understanding with Russia.⁵⁷

For Russian observers, many events in the region, uprising, and revolutions in the region, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, showed that "certain forces in the West were trying to weaken Russia's influence" over its neighbors.⁵⁸ Some observers mainly Russian scholars view that the US policy is designed to oust Russia has been created due to a history of confrontation and do not accept the notion that the US presence in the region is due to other factors. They also observe that the CAR states share Russian concerns that the US "generosity and protection does not work always" and its aid be accepted with caution and in the long run, the US would lose its allies in the region.⁵⁹

In the 21st century, the US and Russian interests converged on terrorism in which the introduction of military bases in the CAR to counter-terrorism was welcomed by Russia since they did not threaten its security interests, however, in the wake of the US designs to make

these bases as permanent facilities created the notion that it could weaken Russian strategic influence.⁶⁰ Russia started enhancing its influence in the CAR states in which the supplying of weapons at subsidized prices providing them an alternate military partner and the military exercises in the Caspian region focusing on terrorism were the main activities.⁶¹

Looking at China's view on the US policy on the CAR, it is relevant to mention that China's strategic interests in the CAR are related to stability, fears of ethnic unrest on its western borders, and resolution of border arrangements with the states. China's gradual development of multifaceted relations with the CAR included ventures in energy and its supplies with the building of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to its territory.⁶² While Chinese scholars expressed some apprehensions over the growing engagements of other powers like the US, Russia and NATO converting the CAR into a competition ground of superpowers, its officials eschewed from making negative comments.⁶³

China's role becomes active at the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 1996 that culminated as a result of the Russia-China consultative process with the CAR states. The SCO was formed by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to solve border disputes by promoting confidence-building measures. Soon its agenda was to other areas including terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and immigration intending to strengthen regional stability.⁶⁴ Later, its goals were further expanded to include trade relations and cooperation on economic issues, as well as infrastructure and environmental projects, like the restoration of the ancient "Silk Road."⁶⁵

The SCO has developed as an organization with a permanent secretariat in Beijing and holds regular leader-level meetings. It had expanded to other regions by allowing observer status to India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan. Member countries have held joint military exercises to fight terrorism that has helped their militaries to develop institutional relations. The SCO has

engaged with the US on counterterrorism cooperation and military presence in the CAR. Many observers have viewed the SCO as an effort to check the US military ingress in the CAR pointing out to the beginning of a new Great Game in which Russia and China are competitors to the US in a global race for power.⁶⁶

However, such views are disregarded by some scholars who point out that the SCO has not developed an integrated military-political structure and permanent operational headquarters.⁶⁷ It has no rapid-reaction force and does not engage in regular political deliberations. If compared, NATO's focus is on external security risks, while the SCO's members target security issues within their territories. Its role as a counterweight to the US surfaced in 2005 when it asked the foreign forces (the US) to withdraw from the CAR. By doing so the SCO challenged the US and Western interests in the CAR, but not as a military alliance rather, it “undermines the influence and authority of Western international organizations that...have performed regional functions such as monitoring elections, promoting human rights, funding large developmental projects and providing humanitarian assistance.”⁶⁸

Many US policymakers understood that any effort to "gain military and political bridgehead in the CAR are fraught with the risk of getting between the Russian hammer and the Chinese evil.”⁶⁹ The US adopted different strategies to deal with regional players other than Russia. With China, it maintained economic cooperation and rapprochement on the global and regional issues that mitigated any tensions caused by the presence of the US military and political influence in the CAR. Besides security and the economic sphere, the US and China had similar concerns in particular, with the rise of Islamic and separatist groups in Central Asia.⁷⁰

For Iran, with which the US considers that no near-term rapprochement is probable, it maintained a strong containment policy. It blocked pipelines opening through Iran and promoted alternative routes through Afghanistan and Pakistan and Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey. Iran however, engaged with Russia and China and promoted with Russia North-South trade corridor. With Turkey, another important player in the CAR, the US had shared interests and a high level of cooperation under which both country's establishments coordinate to pave the way for strategic and economic influence.

From the CAR states, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan expressed reservations on the US military bases in the region due to the perceived threat of regional isolation and competition.⁷¹ Later in 2006 Uzbekistan announced to end the US military presence on its territory and signed a treaty of allied relations with Russia.⁷² Tajikistan realized that the redeployment of the US bases to its territory would result in a negative reaction from Russia, which may subsequently aggravate the social situation in the republic.⁷³ In the SCO proceedings, these states joined others to call the return of foreign forces from the region.⁷⁴

Looking in the context of Asia, the analysts point out that military and security contents are always part of a US policy toward a region which may vary with the security risks.⁷⁵ The rationale for such a policy is described in the policy prescriptions ingrained in the realism of power competition and prescribes to contain other's powers to enable a hegemon to globally spread its values.⁷⁶ As discussed earlier, the US Post Cold War foreign policy concerns and goals were related to its Cold War politics. In the containment policy of the Cold War the CAR was included in the zone of interest by the US in which it was encircled through two zones Western Europe at one end of Eurasia, and Japan and South Korea at the other.

In the post-Cold War global military and security arrangement, the US continued its Asian policies.⁷⁷ The Central Asian region that during the Cold War was covered through the European military establishments was brought under the CENTCOM with strengthened engagement which culminated into the establishment of military bases in the region. It enabled the US “to acquire strength in a state or region and served as a tool of power for zero-sum game.”⁷⁸

Strategic Relations Assessed

The US started its military and strategic engagement with the CAR cautiously due to its being a former colony of Russia.⁷⁹ In the early 1990s, the US strategic interaction with the CAR helped to prevent the arms race and the development and production of weapons of mass destruction and their exports to other regimes or entities.⁸⁰ On the issue of nuclear and WMD threats in the CAR, considering the risk as "medium-high" in Kazakhstan and non-existent in other states, the US dealt with it by supporting the “strengthening of borders and sovereignty, something that can be seen as an end in several aspects of security” and got the issue of proliferation contained.⁸¹

The US preferred bilateral engagement with individual CAR states in the long run however, it used multilateralism and engaged OSCE, and NATO to pave the way for the integration of the region’s defense institutions to get integrated with Western institutions.⁸² It expanded NATO programs for the CAR and brought the states into the net of OSCE obligations. Later the US widened the strategic mission with the CAR states which were amenable to US aid and started close military cooperation.⁸³ With time, the US attempted deeper engagements with the military structures of the CAR states and made significant investments.⁸⁴ The strategic global development in 2001 facilitated an alliance of the US with the CAR states sharing its strategy in facilitating regional anti-terrorism initiatives.⁸⁵

In the regional context, the US promoted the integration of states' militaries with Western institutions while dissuading other regional powers—especially Russia, China, and Iran—from seeking to dominate the region.⁸⁶ Referring to a NATO report, Stephen Blank states that the efficacy of the strategic interaction with the CAR is noted as the CAR states were “attracting far greater international attention” but the internal structures of the states was marred “to varying degrees, poverty, political instability, ethnic rivalry, authoritarianism, corruption, the lack of openness, terrorism, the harsh legacy of Soviet domination, and geographical isolation... all complicating...a transition process that is still in its early phases.”

While looking at the official policy statements of the US on military engagement with the CAR one finds some unanswered questions.⁸⁷ It is mainly because the US has a broad agenda on the CAR that includes the shaping up of their transition and development in a preferred direction that entails the engagement with internal structures. The US policy is part of its global agenda that includes long-term military existence in the CAR and containing the influence of Russia and also handling relations with Iran.⁸⁸ It is also related to economic issues since the region possesses very rich oil and natural gas resources.⁸⁹

While the US is trying its best to consolidate its military existence in the region, the leaders of the CAR states are unclear on the US agenda which calls for the deepening of the strategic cooperation and also criticizes their governments on the issue of democracy. The increasing engagement of the US also alarms the neighbors and results in the adjustments of their policies. Military ties of the US are sharply noticed by Russia that regards the five states as part of its sphere of influence. The US military buildup in the CAR gives Russia the reason to enhance its military ties with the states.⁹⁰

There has been a disparate response expressed by the US on the renewed Russian influence in the CAR region. For some scholars, the US viewed Russia as attempting to reemerge as an influential power from the CIS forum to dominate regional politics. The CIS was not only an organization of the CAR states and thus it was looked at under a broad spectrum by the US. In respect to the CAR, the initial security and stability concerns were to some extent met by the activism of the CIS that helped in their international interaction and stabilization towards nation-states.

On the other hand, some officials downplayed the Russian activism by saying that the Russian growing relations with the CAR would not affect US relations with Moscow since each state has the right to decide its external relations to promote its interests.⁹¹ In addition to Russia, there have been military interactions of other states like India and China with the CAR states in which the exchange of arms, the building of military infrastructure including the airbases have taken place.⁹² The US thus does not have sufficient influence and power that could restrict the increasing engagement of other powers in the CAR.

To further understand the US policy toward the CAR, the next chapter brings in the political-economic aspects of the US interaction.

End Notes

¹ H. Faringdon, *Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Superpowers*, London & NY: Routledge, 1989, pp. 7-14

² Eric miller discusses security prospects, Russian influence and power rivalry in CAR, *And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Central Asia and Security, Past, Present, and Future*, <http://www.virginia.edu/crees/symposium/comped.html>, (through MSN. Search)

³ Peter A. Clausen, *Nonproliferation and the National Interest*, Harper Collins College, Publishers, New York, 1993, xiii; Togzhan Kassenova, *Central Asia: regional security and WMD proliferation threats*, at <http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art2684.pdf>, Will U.S. Policy Backfire in Central Asia? By: *IWPR staff and contributors in Central Asia and London*, *IWPR.Net*, and, Matthew Bassford and Nick Mabey, *Countries at Risk of Instability: Future Risks of Instability*, 2005, at http://www.strategy.gov.uk/downloads/work_areas/countries_at_risk/3future.pdf, (accessed 5 June 2007)

⁴ Gustavo Diaz Matey and Antonio Alonso Marcos, *Changing the Rules of the Game: The Use of Intelligence Liaison in Central Asia*, research paper, no. 128, February 2009, CEU-San Pablo University, Spain, p.23

⁵ Elizabeth Wishnick, *Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia*, Monograph, 2002 <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=907>, referring to *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999, released, January 5, 2000, <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil>, (accessed 8 Jan. 2006)

⁶ Ref. Anatol Lieven, (1999), *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power*, NY: Yale University Press

⁷ Andre Gunder Blank, "The Great Game for Caspian Sea Oil," in *Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region* edited by Michael P. Croissant and Bulent Aras, Westport, Conn. & London: Praeger 1999, <http://rrojasdatabank.info/agfrank/caspian.html>, (accessed 4 June 2007)

⁸ Fifteen percent of world supplies of uranium comes from Kazakhstan, *Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan*, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf89.html>, (accessed 8 Jan. 2006)

⁹ Togzhan O. Kassenova, "Cooperative Security in the Post-Cold War International System: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Process", University of Leeds School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) March, 2004

¹⁰ "US Policy Toward the Central Asian States", Remarks by Ambassador James Collins, Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary for the NIS, at the inauguration of the Central Asia Institute, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, October 21, 1996, www.state.gov. He stated that "we all owe a debt of gratitude to the Government of Kazakhstan for their removal." (accessed 10 Feb. 2006)

¹¹ Sergei Blagov, *Asia Times*, *Proliferation: All it takes is thugs with clubs*, January 15, 2003, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/240-8.cfm>, (accessed 17 Nov. 2006)

¹² There are reports that the region's nuclear technology experts remain under watch by the intelligence agencies, Ehteshami and Murphy, 1994: 103

¹³ Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/nwftutorial/chapter05_06.html, and <http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=7163>, (accessed 11 Oct. 2008)

¹⁴ <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060905.htm>, (accessed 11 Oct. 2008)

¹⁵ Togzhan Kassenova, *Central Asia: regional security and WMD proliferation threats*, <http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art2684.pdf>, and for export controls, NTI, *Working for a Safer World*, <http://www.nuclearthreatinitiative.org/db/nisprofs/tajikis/excon.htm>, (accessed 18 Oct. 2007)

¹⁶ Celeste A. Wallander, Institutional Assets, and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War, "What happens to alliances when their precipitating threats disappear? Understood in realist terms, alliances should not outlive the threats they were created to address", http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/Inor/pdf/inor_54_4_705_0.pdf, (accessed 9 June, 2008)

¹⁷ Jim Nichol, "Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests," Congressional Research Service, May 18, 2001, <http://www.cnie.org/nle/inter-76.html>. (accessed 4 June, 2006); While the role of NATO, for Waltz is that the US administration considers it an instrument for maintaining domination on the foreign and military policies of European states, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", International Security 25, No. 1, (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.

¹⁸ Ninan Koshy, NATO's transformation and Asia, 13 December 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/DL13Ag01.html, and Ron Martz, "War on Terrorism: U.S. Allies: Initiative Laid Foundation for Central Asian Cooperation," The Atlanta Constitution, January 12, 2002, p. 9A

¹⁹ PfP was part of the NATO enlargement and tailored to partner country's circumstances. It assisted CAR militaries to become interoperable with NATO, offering them participation in NATO operations such as joint exercises for peacekeeping, officer training, reform of establishments, awareness for natural disasters and calamities, conversion of military industry to civil use, language training and the NATO-funded Virtual Silk Highway. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=10018>, (accessed 9 July, 2007)

²⁰ Bhatti, Robin & Bronson, Rachel (2000), "NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia", Survival, vol 42, no 3, Autumn 2000, p 129f.

²¹ An international conference was held in Bishkek in December 2001; OSCE website. "US Statement on Terrorism," <http://usinfo.state.gov>, (accessed 11 Oct. 2006)

²² "EU remained more concerned with South Caucasus", observed Roy Allison, Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (accessed 11 Oct. 2006)

²³ William E. Odom, US policy toward Central Asia and the South Caucasus, <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/HOME/PAGES/USAZERB/311.htm>, (accessed 27 January 2005)

²⁴ Kenley Butler, "U.S. Military Cooperation with the Central Asian States," September 17, 2001, p. 2, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/>, (accessed 22 Feb. 2006)

²⁵ Elizabeth Jones, "Anti-Terror Cooperation a New Foreign Policy Standard, Jones Says," Speech to the German Studies Association annual conference, October 5, 2001, <http://www.usinfo.state.gov>. (accessed 11 Oct. 2006), The US attempted to mitigate the Russian concerns since its cooperation was needed in many strategic activities in the region for example, in the nonproliferation, the role of Russia was important.

²⁶ "Chirchik to Host Military Exercises," Uzbek Information Directory, September, 1998, http://uzland.narod.ru/09_26_98.htm#ABL, ; Douglas J. Gillert, "After Jumping, Battalion Learns to Crawl," U.S. Department of Defense http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1997/n10011997_9710011.html,; Stephen J. Blank,(2000), p.2. ; <http://www.dtic.mil/soldiers/feb1999/features/>, and "Centrazbat '98," "Fact Sheet," U.S. Embassy, Tashkent Web Site, <http://www.usembassy.uz/centcom/military.htm>. (Accessed 21 Feb. 2006)

²⁷ Blank, S. (2001). A Sacred place is never Empty: the external Geopolitics of the Trans-Caspian. In Colbert, Jim (Ed.), Natural resources and national Security: Sources of conflict & the U.S. Interest (pp. 123-142). Washington, D.C: Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs. Stephen J. Blank, (2000)

²⁸ Zafar Abdullayev, TAJIKISTAN, RUSSIA PROBE MILITARY PARTNERSHIP, 3/04/04, EURASIA INSIGHT <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030404.shtml>, (accessed 27 January 2005)

²⁹ Linda Sluder, "NATO exercise fosters junior officer teamwork," May 15, 2000, US Army European Headquarters, "Uzbekistan was main supply corridor and gained US funding, receiving \$25 million in foreign military financing (FMF), \$18 million in nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, de-mining, and related programs (NADR), and \$40.5 million in Freedom Support Act (FSA) funds in 2001-02" http://www.hqusareur.army.mil/htmlinks/Press_Releases/2K/March/20000328-2.htm. (Accessed 21 Feb. 2006)

³⁰ Buyers L.M. ed. (2003), "Central Asia in Focus: Political and Economic Issues", NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc, p. 227; also in A. Elizabeth Jones, "U.S.-Central Asian Cooperation," Testimony to the Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Caucasus, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, December 13, 2001, p. 9. And in Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, Report of the National Commission on Terrorism Pursuant to Public Law 277, 105th Congress, Federation of American Scientists: <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>, 2002-08-02 (Accessed 22 Feb. 2006), The US aid was also increased for democratization, free-market reforms, and development of energy resources and supply routes.

³¹ "Operation Enduring Freedom" was held at global level and included all US allies in the war against terror, see Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #6, 30 January 2002, <http://www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.html>

³² Anthony Zinni, 2002, "Command in the News—U.S. Central Command," p. 8. CENTCOM looks after the Middle East and West Asia. <http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/arweb/>, (accessed 20 Oct. 2006)

³³ Scott R. Gourley, "USCENTCOM Expands AOR," Jane's Intelligence Review, Pointer, June 1998, p. 8. Its peacetime commitments would include "the activities designed to strengthen ties with regional militaries, bilateral interactions, interpersonal relationships, security assistance, training, and humanitarian assistance operations.

³⁴ Gustavo Diaz Matey and Antonio Alonso Marcos, Changing the Rules of the Game: The Use of Intelligence Liaison in Central Asia, research paper, no. 128, February, 2009, CEU-San Pablo University, Spain, p.24

³⁵ Harry Cohen, Report of the Sub-Committee on East-West Economic Co-operation and Convergence. "Economic and political challenges in Central Asia", 2002, www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?, (Accessed 22 Feb. 2006)

³⁶ www.brookings.edu/events/2002/1112asia.aspx, (Accessed 22 Feb. 2006)

³⁷ David Isenberg, The ever-growing US military footprint, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EF10Ak01.html, (accessed 7 July, 2008)

³⁸ The US declared policy remained that it may not keep bases permanently but intended to have long-term security relationships with the states. But the same form of words was used to justify the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia from 1991 to 2003. It is pointed out that the moves of the regional states (Russia and China) to pressurize the US through calls from the SCO to military pullout were dealt with with abrupt diplomatic moves. As a result, the majority of the CAR states agreed to the demands of the US and delayed the pullout request. <http://www.russiaprofile.org/politics/article.wbp?article-id=EF56F66F-AE31-4F1F-9C20-C81E0ADD4FA1>, On the other hand, Blank (2004) asserts that "US strategic priorities are shifting in Central Asia, raising the likelihood that the United States will establish a long-term presence in the region", <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2004/0325centralasia.htm>, (accessed on 7 Feb. 2006).

³⁹ Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, 2002 https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20080806_RL33458_d5bfae44b5646dc6bad7f567e7c0b2464807003f.pdf

⁴⁰ Anna Matveeva, The Regionalist Project in Central Asia: UNWILLING PLAYMATES, Working Paper no. 13, Crisis States Research Centre, March 2007, LSE, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/58067/wp13.2.pdf> and also March 2007 S. Neil Macfarlane, *The United States and regionalism in Central Asia*, Blackwell Publishers, 2004

⁴¹ <http://h-net.org/announce/show.cgi?ID=134338>, (accessed 24 July, 2007)

⁴² <https://www.s-cica.org/>

⁴³ <http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm>, (accessed 7 July, 2008),

⁴⁴ It was later joined by Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia. Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan withdrew in 1999, citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness.

⁴⁵ Richard Sakwa & Mark Webber, Mark, "The Commonwealth of Independent States", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol 51, no 3, 1999, pp 379-415 and also Olcott, Åslund & Garnett, *Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1999, pp 77-107

⁴⁶ Lena Jonson, *Vladimir Putin, and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian foreign Policy*, I.B. Tauris, 2004

⁴⁷ http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2001/1213terrorism_hill.aspx. It is observed that the realpolitik forced Russia, like colonial power's practices of neo-colonization and following the theory of benefits of conflicts, to ensure that the conflicts in the region are kept alive to keep a role and influence in the region, Pataraiia, 2000, p. 59, (accessed 17 July, 2007)

⁴⁸ The security arrangement under the CIS remained a cause of concern for the US since it gave Russia the influence through the joint defense of the CIS borders and the creation of a common air defense system and that such a cooperative approach to security was evolving. For some observers, it delayed the development of effective national armies by the CAR states since they relied on Russian forces to monitor their borders. However, it also created a wedge between Russia and the CAR states with Russia being accused of intervention in internal affairs. Ko, Jae-Nam, 2008

⁴⁹ Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Armenia are now united in a military coalition – the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Its aim – to protect the sovereignty of the states, which includes countering terrorism and drug trafficking. CSTO members regularly conduct military exercises. <http://www.russiatoday.com/Business/2007-10-04>, (accessed 12 March 2008)

⁵⁰ *The United States, Russia, and Central Asia: New Cooperation or the Old Divide? 2003* <http://www.harriman.columbia.edu>, It provides useful insight on the issue. (accessed 17 July, 2007)

⁵¹ *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, November, 1999, http://www.ln.mis.ru/website/dip_vest.nsf (mid-ru), the official website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁵² Such as Chechnya and other flashpoints

⁵³ For Russia Islamic resurgence was a threat to cooperates with the US, Thrassy Marketos, *Theory and Strategic Security in the Russian Muslim South*, 2005, <http://www.cacianalyst.org>, (accessed 24 July, 2007)

⁵⁴ Stephen Blank quoted by Svante E. Cornell, *Small Nations, and Great Powers: A Study of the Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Press, Surrey, 2001, p 380

⁵⁵ Barnett R. Rubin, "Tajikistan: From Soviet Republic to Russian-Uzbek Protectorate," in *Central Asia and the World*, ed. Mandelbaum, p. 207-224. This is another issue that how much the operation succeeded in establishing a role for Russia; "The deployment of Russian troops remained ineffective in the region and contributed instability (Tajikistan) and made the CAR states apprehensive of Russian political leverage"; Also in Clark, "Defining Security," p. 191-92

⁵⁶ "Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov", Colin L. Powell, Reykjavik, Iceland, 14 May, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/10141.htm>, (Accessed 27 March 2006) and Dannreuther, Roland (2000), "Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations", *Survival*, vol 41, no 4, 1999-2000, p 152; John Diedrich, (2002), "US Faces Tough Training Mission in the Caucasus", *Christian Science Monitor*, from CDI Weekly # 208, 31 May, 2002

⁵⁷ Selbi Hanova, *Shifting Role of the US foreign policy in Central Asia: Greater Central Asia Partnership Doctrine*, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=4264> (accessed 30 Jan. 2007)

⁵⁸ Nikolai Patrushev, Federal Security Service director, Moscow, www.themoscowtimes.com, (accessed 30 Jan. 2007), Nikolai comments that "IRI (International Research Institute) had earmarked \$5 million to finance opposition groups in Belarus. But an IRI spokeswoman said the organization spent about \$500,000 annually on programs in Belarus and that none of it went to political parties."

⁵⁹ Pravda wrote, "Russia and China have reasons to be concerned about US policies, (which) did not conceal their activities to export color revolutions, whereas in Russia and China such revolutions could occur. Neither Moscow nor Beijing may thank the USA for it especially when the latter takes efforts to increase the number of military bases in Central Asia." For Pravda, the US is losing allies in the world. http://english.pravda.ru/world/20/91/368/16178_USA.html, and "Russia and regional associations of the former

USSR stand up against USA's supremacy", http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/16467_Uzbekistan.html, (accessed 30 Jan. 2007) It observes that "Washington follows the English principle in its foreign policy (there are no permanent allies, but there are permanent interests), making it even more grotesque, though: a person, whom the USA views as a "good old chap" today may become a bloody dictator and international terrorist tomorrow. Such a perspective is not good for everyone, of course. However, there is one more highly important aspect in the notion of the "American world:" the status of the global stronghold of democracy should not raise doubts with anyone. Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in one of his articles that policies under "Bush undermined the seemingly guaranteed American predominance on the international arena during the recent four years. Those states, which used to be in very warm and friendly relations with the USA, started criticizing it openly. As a result, a lot of states in many regions of the world - East Asia, Europe, and Latin America - are trying to set up their regional alliances that would be less connected with traditional schemes of cooperation with the US. The current trend may therefore become a peculiar feature of the future organization of the world."

⁶⁰ Barry Buzan, *The post-Soviet space: a regional security complex around Russia*, Cambridge University Press, 2003. He also stated firstly Russia would not appreciate having US soldiers positioned along its southern tier, and secondly, by this, the US could extend influence to Middle Eastern, South Asia, and China. They were also overextended by the US.

⁶¹ Roger N McDermott, *Shanghai Cooperation Organization takes a significant step towards viability*, 9/05/03, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav090503b.shtml>, (accessed 16 Feb. 2006); Robert Legvold, before that "Russia has no strategy toward either the South Caucasus or Central Asia." Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (accessed 16 Feb. 2006); and "Russia Flexes Muscles in the Caspian with Large-scale Military Exercises", *AFP*, 1 August, 2002, from *CDI Weekly* # 217, 2 August, 2002

⁶² Vladimir Radyuhin, *Central Asian oil flows to China*, site accessed August 2006, <http://feeds.bignewsnetwork.com/redir.php?jid=54065480ec18100d&cat=929bcf2071e81801>,

⁶³ Ria Novosty report: "In August of 2002 China held its first military exercise since the 1970s with Kyrgyzstan"; and China turns West: Beijing's contemporary strategy towards Central Asia. <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/China+turns+West%3a+Beijing%27s+contemporary+strategy+towards+Central+Asia-a0155789810>, and Economist Intelligence Unit's 2005-06 country profile of China

⁶⁴ <http://www.sectso.org/home.asp?LanguageID=2>, (accessed 17 July, 2007)

⁶⁵ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia.html, (accessed 12 March 2008)

⁶⁶ Carin Zissis, *Crafting a U.S. Policy on Asia*, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13022/> and Jefferson E. Turner, *Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Paper Tiger or Regional Powerhouse*, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2005, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/turner05.pdf>, (Accessed 21 Feb. 2008)

⁶⁷ Marcel de Haas, *Central Asia's waking giant*, guardian.co.uk, 5 January 2009

⁶⁸ Alexander Cooley, "The Rise of the SCO in Central Asia: Western Foreign Policy Reactions," <http://src.auca.kg/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=313>, (accessed 2nd Feb. 2009)

⁶⁹ Askar Akayev, *Whither Central Asia, Russia in Global Affairs*, 4(2003) p.109

⁷⁰ Matthew Oresman, *Central Asia as the new arena in U.S.-Sino relations* <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2068.html>. (Accessed 9 Feb. 2006)

⁷¹ Andrey Grozin Chairman of the department for Central Asia of the CIS Institute, in "Rice tries to win Central Asia's sympathies for USA's purposes" http://english.pravda.ru/world/20/92/373/16294_Rice.html, (Accessed 18 June, 2006)

⁷² Uzbekistan called the US a forgetful patron. Given the allegations of Western sponsorship in the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the US looked dangerous. It is stated Russia is assured of its patronage. Was this alternative patron Russia? http://english.pravda.ru/world/20/92/373/16294_Rice.html, and http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/16467_Uzbekistan.html, (Accessed 18 June, 2006)

⁷³ Ibid. Russian policy of immigration and visa regime that enables thousands of their people to work is a strong tool with Russia. Russia openly announced such policies in the event the Tajik president changes the foreign political priorities of the republic.

⁷⁴ SCO decision in July 2005, the deployment of US troops in CAR, known as Russia's "Near Abroad", raised speculation about a permanent western military presence, despite a declaration to the contrary in a joint statement by the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan in February and a statement in April 2002. <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/Central%20Asia/afghanistan.html> , (Accessed 29 May 2006); and statement by Kazakh Vice-Premier Sauat Mynbayev, *Itar Tass*, May 25, 2005

⁷⁵ Nick Beams "not force held in abeyance but force expanded became a hallmark of US policy in the 1990s" with Clinton's two terms producing an "unprecedented level of military activism", *The Political Economy of American Militarism* http://www.glovesoff.org/features/beams_0703.html, (accessed 21 Oct. 2006)

⁷⁶ Fukuyama argues "for exporting liberal democratic values to non-democratic societies", and he assumes that these are superior values than of other societies" cit. by Howard Williams, David Sullivan and E. Gwynn Mathews Francis Fukuyama and the End of History, 1997, University of Wales Press, p 120

⁷⁷ US global policy interests are Asia's security and oil flow. It is pointed out that the CENTCOM's basic mission was enunciated in the Carter Doctrine (1980) to secure the flow of Persian Gulf oil as a "vital interest" of the US. Threatened by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (December 1979) and the rise of a radical Islamic regime in Iran, Carter told Congress that the US would use "any means, including military force," to keep the Oil flowing." <http://www.ambi-partisan.com/>, (Accessed September 2006), It is also discussed by Daniel Twining, "America's Grand Design in Asia", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2007

⁷⁸ Ivan Eland, *The Empire Has No Clothes*, U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed, states that the US maintains more than 700 military bases worldwide. http://www.independent.org/aboutus/person_detail.asp?id=487, (accessed 21 Oct. 2006)

⁷⁹ Jonson, Lena (2001), "The New Geopolitical Situation in the Caspian Region", *The Security of the Caspian Sea Region*, Chufirin, Gennady (ed), New York: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, p 18ff, also the fact that the US Central Command (CENTCOM) entered the region long after the demise of the Soviet Union that is in 1998 when the Department of Defense decided to grant it the responsibility, as stated by Anthony Zinni, "A US Strategic Perspective on Central Asia", Keynote Address, Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (accessed on 29 Jan. 2005)

⁸⁰ Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Cong., in 1998

⁸¹ Cassidy B. Craft (2000), <http://www.nuclearthreatinitiative.org/db/nisprofs/tajikis/excon.htm>, (accessed 7 March 2006)

⁸² Philip H. Gordon and James B. Steinberg, NATO Enlargement: Moving Forward; Expanding the Alliance and Completing Europe's Integration, Brookings Institution Policy Brief, no. 90, 2001, and President Bush on the Enlargement of NATO, South Lawn, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040329-4.html, (Accessed January 2006)

⁸³ Robin Bhatti & Rachel Bronson, (2000), "NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia", *Survival*, vol 42, no 3, Autumn 2000, p 129f 181 Bhatti & Bronson (2000), p 132

⁸⁴ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, September 29-09-03, Moscow

⁸⁵ Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff, "Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World," The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY, April 22, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632pf.htm>, (accessed 7 October 2006)

⁸⁶ Stephen J. Blank, PN 2000, p.2.

⁸⁷ Colin Powell, “Partnership and Principle,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 1 (January/February 2004), pp. 22–34; and as one analyst put it, “The reshuffling of world alliances may be one of Bush’s main geopolitical legacies”, ref. Bruno Tertrais, “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,” *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 135–150.

⁸⁸ “Long-term military existence in Central Asia US strategic goal,” *Xinhua*, http://english.people.com.cn/200507/28/eng20050728_198800.html

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Zafar Abdullayev, TAJIKISTAN, RUSSIA PROBE MILITARY PARTNERSHIP, 3/04/04, EURASIA INSIGHT <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030404.shtml>,

⁹¹ *Ibid.*,

⁹² “India’s first overseas ‘military base’ taking shape in Tajikistan,” 24 July, 2007, <http://www.newscentralasia.net/Articles-and-Reports/137.html>

US AND CAR ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The end of communist rule renewed the contention of the theories of political economy suggesting that a powerful state prioritizes the maintenance of liberal global economic order along with stability and security since the “welfare (and security) of anyone state depends on the welfare of its largest financial and trading partners.”¹ The US as a powerful state strives for stability in the world order to maintain a status quo that enables it to enforce norms of behavior and rules to regulate global monetary and trade transactions by the liberal economic order.²

In the pursuance of economic goals of foreign policy, the tools that a state adopts are trade preferences, foreign aid, economic and military assistance, loans and grants, and investments.³ These tools help the powerful state to integrate and give access to new markets, give advantage to Multinationals and shift the global production possibility frontiers.⁴ Relating these tools with power politics, the scholars have found a positive correlation between power and influence of a state that enables it to expand liberal global economic order, to gain influence over other states’ economic framework and policies, and dictate the terms of trade in its favor and to maintain unequal relationships.⁵

Globalization at the end of the 20th century had paved the way for Transnational Corporations (TNCs) to gain economic power, but they require the political and military support of a state, just as traders needed it in colonial and imperial times. They need political stability and security to promote and maintain global trade and investments and national armies and alliances of superpowers assure that their interests are met.⁶ The argument is mostly used by

socialist writers by stressing that “the internationalization of capitalism, fuller integration, and interdependence on the one hand, and toward the growth and consolidation of national states on the other--have been the constant features of capitalism.”⁷

Those who have examined the US economic policies and its foreign policy observe that it attempts to manage economic growth and resources even in lands that appear relatively insignificant.⁸ The logic of it is that if real socio-economic progress can take place in poor and resource-empty areas, it will spread in neighboring regions and establishing stability and security for the TNCs, investments, and trade. Similarly, it is observed that the objective of the deployment of the American forces abroad and the provision of aid to other countries is to bring “regional markets available and stable for the US with a positive impact on the economy.”⁹ In pursuance of such objectives, it is also observed that the US global interventions in the name of self-defense, many times lead to the installation of Western-friendly regimes to gain economic influence.¹⁰

As will also be focused on at the end of this section, in its policy toward the CAR, the US pursued stability and security to ensure a peaceful environment for a smooth transition toward economic liberalism in the states. The rationale is that US influence in the economy of a state is needed to avoid the “failures of economic and political developments in a region can lead to socioeconomic chaos and political turmoil, which could lead to Afghanistan style (Taliban-led) cases of failed states” with global implications.¹¹ In this objective, a link with the economic interests and the enhancement of influence is ingrained in which the US attempted to transform the transition of the CAR states into a preferred direction.

With this rationale of the US policy, this section examines the issues relevant to the US economic policy toward the CAR in which the transition, trade, aid, energy and investment policies, and relations and the interaction of international economic and financial institutions are prominent.

Post-independence economic governance and transition in the CAR

The CAR states were the poorest with weak polities in the Soviet Union and after independence, they are, "albeit different degrees over personalized" and "under institutionalized."¹² At the time of independence, they faced the burdens of nation-state identity, consolidation, the transition, and the readjustments in social and economic sectors.¹³

The authoritarian control over politics and economic resources and the governance followed the old communist patterns in which rulers maintain power and proclaim that soft authoritarianism mixed with a technocratic approach was good for stability.

The transition process in the economy led to a process of legislation on property rights, commercial laws, privatization, and foreign investment regulations. The process had the support of people in general since the "masses that had experienced Marxism were determined to resist its resurgence."¹⁴ Under the authoritarian rules, the economic system remained the ossification of the post-Soviet ruling regimes; "primitivization", natural resources based growth, slow industrial growth, deficient domestic investments, limitations on foreign investment, the worsening balance of payments, foreign indebtedness, incomplete reforms in the agrarian sector, use of agriculture as a donor to support other sectors of the economy and import-substitution.¹⁵

The CAR rulers remained reluctant to do away with the communist practices in which the economy was run like a government hierarchy and not on the market-based incentives system since it was tantamount to lose power. In their scheme of things in which economic control is maintained through authoritarianism, the economic managers are political loyalists unaware of market principles. The lack of market incentives coupled with corruption by the authoritarian elite causes the development of a parallel economy that results in the lack of quality of goods and services, high costs of production with limited transparency or legitimacy, and the nonexistence of competitiveness. People under communism were used to full employment and cheap utilities and had no incentive for hard work and would charge their habits with time.¹⁶

Scholars have consensus that the strategies to successfully move from a centrally planned economy to a market economic system are “privatization” and “shock therapy” and it makes the transition a process of realignment in income possession and societal change with economic turmoil and hardships for the people.¹⁷ The transition process started in the CAR states in which pursuing privatization, private business houses, and multinationals, non-existent earlier, were developed overnight and given controls of small and large industrial units and businesses.¹⁸

In the past, communism had ensured a system with social equity, quality education (particularly in basic science and mathematics), and industrialization with fragments of superior military force and space programs. However, these positives did not transform into the power of a state that could exhibit its control over the bargaining process while negotiating with the ruling elites or foreign economic entities¹⁹. The region was at a disadvantage to adjust to the shocks and opportunities of emerging globalization. The

economic observers point out the absence of human resource development and resource constraints dependency that would perpetuate for some time in the CAR region.

As a result of transition and financial difficulties in the 1990s, cuts in public expenditures and subsidies and the ensuing reduced public expenditure on health, education, and social welfare programs caused unemployment, poverty, a factor for brain drain, and dislocation of people to West and Russia. In the transition, the economies of the CAR states witnessed steep declines in economic output in the initial years with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and average per capita income becoming less than \$1,500 in 1998.²⁰ Plummeting standards of living with income disparities, poverty, and unemployment caused people to wonder about personal security since the process was also affected by rapid globalization processes.²¹

The process of economic transition allowed huge power to the ruling elite, involving bureaucratic corruption in which the politicians became allies of special interests and exhibited little interest to promote policies for the welfare of the state and masses. Misuse of power and corruption by the rulers and the legacies of communism remained prevalent distorting the process of transition to the market economy mechanism.²²

The economy of the CAR States and the Region

The peoples of Central Asia have historically maintained close trade and economic relations among themselves. In ancient times, the Great Silk roads connected the East with the West and played a role of cultural, trade, and transport artery. Russia and later, the Soviet Union maintained domination in the region, with a guided economy, a common tool of colonial powers. After its withdrawal, Russia prevailed to maintain its influence in certain economic

sectors during the initial period (1991-1998).²³ Russia signed mutual trade agreements with the CAR, kept the Ruble as the single currency, and demanding that as the settlement of assets and liabilities the republics should share in the payment of the foreign debt of the old center. The historical legacies and the Russian influence kept the transition in the CAR states on a patchy path as the Russian policies were inconsistent due to their transition process and unstable politics.

The negotiations continued at the regional level with the NIS remained divided over regional cooperation to resolve the emerging economic issues. Realizing that massive transaction costs in economic and social sectors were involved to deal with the issues individually, the CAR states maintained their association with the CIS. In its deliberations, the CIS leaders expressed the interdependence as a legacy of the colonial past and discussed common strategies in energy, pipelines and export routes, electricity, water distribution, migration, law and order, border control, and drug trafficking.²⁴

With efforts for economic coordination at the CIS level being elusive, the CAR states and Russia were working on their transition leading to independent economic policies to handle their natural resources and to develop markets. In their efforts, a customs union was formed by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1994 which was later joined by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.²⁵ However, such efforts could not succeed and the economic disputes among the states remained unresolved and potential threats to security. Overall, the CAR remained dependent on the political decisions among rulers of the CAR and Russia.

The CAR states went for the issuance of their currencies in 1998 when the Russian and the CAR economies collapsed due to financial crisis as a result of poor management, crime and

corruption, inflation, budget deficits, and dipping world prices for raw materials. Russia agreed with the IMF to restructure the financial institutions and lessened its leverage as well as financial linkages with the CAR. The delinking of currency and the financial structures from Russia led the CAR states to the opening up their economies and moving towards market economy rules, free-floating currencies, free trade, and foreign investment. By 2003 the economies of the CAR states stabilized and many infrastructure and development activities started generating employment and income for people.²⁶

The international organizations in their reports on the economy and transition of the CAR states express optimism in the development, human security, and the economy gradually moving to liberalization but a continuation of political repression.²⁷ The states' eagerness to adopt liberal economic practices is in line with the WTO and other international institutions but their own pace and style are noted. For some other studies, the 'progress towards liberalism was not effective and productive and the market reforms would take some time to take root.'²⁸ However, the transition to the market economy systems opened up the CAR states to the world and provided opportunities to foreign entities in trade and investments in oil, gas, minerals, and textile sectors.²⁹

Evolution of the US Economic Policy for the CAR

The US looked at the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to expand liberal economic and free-market reforms at a global level that "served its national interests by opening new markets for US goods and services, and sources of energy and minerals."³⁰ In respect of the CAR, the US viewed that their economic dependence on Russia or elsewhere would lead to instability for politics and internal reforms toward free-market economic systems.³¹ The US thus decided to enhance its influence in the economies of the states along with the security

structures. The initial economic interaction of the US started in energy production, development, and supply routes in Kazakhstan.³²

In the official interaction with the CAR governments in the early 1990s, the US extended support in their processes of economic liberalization, privatization, democratization, and development of open societies in the CAR states.³³ The official policy asserted that its primary aim was to “strengthen economic links among the region’s five nations and to extend trade and investment ties from Central Asia to the rapidly growing economies of South and East Asia.”³⁴ It emphasized that the US goal was “the restoration of traditional continental trade” in Asia and to “help Central Asians forge some new connections: to trade and investment opportunities, cross-border energy projects, additional deep-water ports”, and reach out to the global markets.³⁵

In the economic strategy, the US also engaged Russia and accepted its role in regional cooperation, and influences from China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.³⁶ The US prioritized the development of energy reserves and other natural resources and their access to the market which earlier were dependent on the Russian infrastructure.³⁷ An examination of studies reveals that energy concerns were linked with issues related to regional politics of the Caspian Sea area, East-West transport and economic corridors, known as the Silk Road, and the construction of pipelines in the region.

The policy to pursue economic interests and the enhancement of economic relations with the CAR continued even after the events of 9/11, 2001 that had brought a new shift in the overall US global and regional policy. The National Security Strategy (2002) announced that the resources of the world were to be subordinated to the US economic interests and that military power would be used to establish and maintain dominance, indicating a trend for an active

political economy drive in its foreign policy.³⁸ Under these parameters of the US economic policy engagements in trade, aid, investments, and energy started.

US Trade with the CAR

Immediately after independence the markets of the CAR states expanded with huge demands of consumer and capital goods.³⁹ The US government and trade bodies established contacts and offices in the region and signed various agreements. The US government allowed the status of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to the CAR states that are given to the friends. An agreement was signed by the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) that provides Insurance services to private investors overseas to extend its services to the CAR states.⁴⁰ The US Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) earmarked funds for short-term insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment and bulk agricultural commodities.

The US Commerce Department set up a Business Development Committee to facilitate official discussions on trade and economic issues with the CAR states. The US official policy on the states outlined its objectives as to promote trade ties and to help establish a legal and regulatory climate favorable to trade and investment.⁴¹ The Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) opened offices from 1993 onwards and American Business Centers were opened in the CAR states in 1994. The US extended advisory services to the CAR states to support their institutions to restructure their economy for the needs of the WTO accession.

The data on the US trade with the CAR states (tables 1 and 2) reflect the dimensions of the developing relations. As the data indicate, trade growth with the CAR states has been steadily upward but not high enough to express their full potential.⁴² Bilateral trade increased from USD 235 million in 1992 to USD 2.485 billion in 2005. It could be said as a positive outcome

of the US efforts and expresses the enhanced level of interaction. The items that were traded most were oil and its products and auto parts in addition to machinery and equipment for the energy sector. US experts believe that the trade could be enhanced manifold.

TABLE 1: US Annual Trade with the Central Asian Republics 1992-94 (\$Million)

COUNTRY	EXPORTS			IMPORTS			TRADE BALANCE		
	1992	1993	1994	1992	1993	1994	1992	1993	1994
Year									
Kazakhstan	15	68	131	21	41	60	-6	27	71
Uzbekistan	51	73	90	a	7	3	51	66	87
Kirgizstan	2	18	6	1	2	8	1	16	-2
Tajikistan	9	12	15	2	18	60	7	-6	-44
Turkmenistan	35	46	137	1	2	2	34	44	136

a: Less than 500 thousand \$.; Source: US Census Bureau

TABLE 2: US Annual Trade with the Central Asian Republics 2003-05 (\$Million)

Country	Exports from the US			Imports to the US			Trade Balance		
	2003	2004	2005	2003	2004	2005	2003	2004	2005
Kazakhstan	168	320	538	392	538	1,101	-224	-218	-563
Uzbekistan	256	229	73	83	88	95	173	141	-22
Kirgizstan	39	29	31	11	11	5	28	18	26
Tajikistan	49	55	28	7	7	242	39	48	-213
Turkmenistan	34	294	237	76	80	135	-42	214	102

Source: US Census Bureau

US Aid to the CAR States

The provision of aid to nations that are experiencing political instability, dismal human and social conditions, or economic stagnation, is linked by the policymakers to limit the volatility

in the international system which serves US national security interests.⁴³ During the period under study, the US engaged the CAR states and “extended its strategically-motivated foreign aid giving policies” and justified it for a region that provided markets for US goods and services.⁴⁴ In the initial period, US aid targeted “the agriculture, transport, and industrialization in the CAR states.”⁴⁵

By the turn of the century, the US proclaimed that the aid was provided to the CAR states to accelerate social, political, and economic development in various areas including health care, basic hygiene, technical aid and training programs, literacy, and civic participation.⁴⁶ The US policy objectives of the aid were then stated as democracy building, transition to market economies, regional cooperation, and integration of the CAR states into the global economic system. The US also provided support to the private sector of the CAR states for ventures in agriculture, communications, and banking.⁴⁷

In the early 1990s, the CAR faced food shortages and the US provided them the food aid in which official and private US institutions gave \$24.3 million in 1992 and \$30 million in 1994.⁴⁸ In 1994, the US gave \$10 million to Turkmenistan for buying agricultural goods. Uzbekistan received \$500,000 in food and \$5.5 million in medical assistance under OPH. NGOs gave \$4.8 million in medical aid.⁴⁹ Tajikistan gripped with civil war received humanitarian aid through bilateral and multilateral programs.⁵⁰ The amount given to it was small but effective.

Subsequent salient aid agreements between the US and the CAR states included the setting up of a Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund in 1994, with \$150 million funds. It disbursed \$73 million in loans to over 400 small- and medium-sized private enterprises of the CAR states by the mid-1990s. Kazakhstan in return for its agreement on non-proliferation was the first major recipient of US aid in the CAR, largely within the framework of Operation

Provide Hope (OPH) or Department of Agriculture food programs. The memorandum on US advice for defense industrial conversion into civilian enterprise was signed in 1994 and later joint committees for defense were set up with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to convert state enterprises to privately held, non-defense firms. Similar operations were later extended to other states and private donors were associated with the projects.

Foreign aid as an instrument in the foreign policy was enhanced for the CAR states in the post-9/11 period, with the argument that for the US to control future terrorist attacks, it must promote higher living standards in states that are most likely to harbor potential terrorist activity.⁵¹ Subsequently, the US assistance to the CAR states significantly increased, facilitating many new initiatives in support of economic development. In 2001, the US earmarked \$230 million for the five Central Asian states; and in 2002 the amount more than doubled to \$595 million. However, the aid declined in 2004 and 2005 since the CAR became wealthy in the wake of growing oil prices and the need for assistance lessened.

TABLE 3: 1996, 1997, 2004 and 2005 Fiscal Years (FY) Aid Program (\$ million)

COUNTRY	1996	1997	2001	2002	2004	2005
Kazakhstan	29.9	39			33.34	26.69
Uzbekistan	18.1	20			36.24	31.00
Kyrgyzstan	17.6	20			24.45	27.00
Tajikistan	3	5			05.70	06.50
Turkmenistan	3.3	5			35.88	33.50
<u>TOTAL US \$</u>	<u>72.4</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>230</u>	<u>595</u>	<u>135.61</u>	<u>125.69</u>

Source: Jim Nichol, Central Asia's the New States: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests, CRS Issue Brief, Washington: Library of Congress, 1996, 16 and USAID website

Table 3 shows the total aid given to the Central Asian republics in 1996, 1997, 2004, and 2005 witnessing a steady growth.⁵² It provides figures in 1996, 1997 and 2004, and 2005 showing consistency in the US policy.

The US economic aid to the CAR states served the US global and regional interests. It is observed that the provision of the USAID to the CAR states aimed to disengage them from Russia's sphere of influence, encourage their private sector, and promote a liberal economic system.⁵³ Through the aid programs, the economic needs of the CAR states that included deteriorating infrastructure, unemployment, and poverty were addressed and the projects related to oil pipelines and the development of markets were funded. In the strategy of the use of the aid as a tool, initially, it was disbursed through the rulers of the states, however, the rulers came under criticism due to being authoritarians, and the US distanced itself from them and started giving aid at the grass-root level through local NGO's and international organizations that were active in the region.

US Investment in the CAR

Securing investment opportunities and the promotion of the trade and business ventures of the Multinational Corporations (MNC) are always high on the agenda of the US policy in any region.⁵⁴ Income from businesses abroad fills the trade gap of the US to maintain the balance of payments equilibrium. The expansion of the investment by US multinationals abroad indicates a level of interaction of the US with a region. The CAR was looked at in the same vein and multiple steps were taken to promote investments of the US companies in the five states.

Following the successful completion of the talks between the US and Kazakhstan in 1992 in which agreements on the control of nuclear proliferation were concluded in return for the US investments in the oil and energy sector, the US companies entered into billions of dollars of ventures in the region.⁵⁵ Kazakhstan was the first state to receive the US investment in the energy sector and later agreements on the promotion of investment were signed with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. The US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) signed agreements with all the five states separately.⁵⁶

The US government assisted the MNCs through the Central Asia-America Initiative Fund with a five-year budget of over \$150 million.⁵⁷ The USAID and other agencies, the US Information Agency, the Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund, government-sponsored non-governmental Eurasia Foundation, initiated work in the region and opened offices to provide data and advice for use by investors.⁵⁸ In addition to the financial resource from the US banking system, the investments of the MNCs were also supported through international institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank's Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation program and the World Bank.⁵⁹

The promotion of investment by the US enterprises in the region is considered as one of the successful elements of the US policy. The engagement was extended by the signing of agreements with the CAR states in 2004 such as the US-Central Asia Trade and Investment Agreement (TIFA) to support market reforms and reduce barriers to trade and investment to enhance the confidence of investors and pave the way for the US companies to get contracts in various sectors.⁶⁰ Consequently, the US private investment in the CAR states exceeded that in Russia or most other states around the region except Azerbaijan. Energy being the most important sector is discussed separately.

US Support the CAR States to Interact with the International Economics Institutions

As discussed earlier, the US facilitated the entry of the CAR states into the international economic institutions. The US also encouraged these institutions to support the investments of multinationals in the CAR states. IMF and the World Bank also supported the CAR states in their transition to bring their economies in line with the values of capitalism.⁶¹ The IMF worked on basic economic reform packages with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and staff-monitored programs in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and assisted in the promotion of trade of the states with the world.⁶²

The US and the Energy Sector of the CAR States

In the geopolitics of the region, energy resources, pipelines, supply routes, and related investment are the most debated and crucial issues of the CAR.⁶³ Their energy and mineral resources are of strategic interest for foreign powers in which countries compete "for the right to develop oil and gas reserves, jockeying for a share of a potentially lucrative market."⁶⁴ The energy resources if fully controlled by the CAR states would bring economic and political independence and leverage in the bargaining in their interstate relations. However, the states being landlocked are dependent on their neighbors mainly Russia, for supplying the oil and gas output to global markets.⁶⁵

The issues of concern for the US in the energy politics of the CAR have been:

- The oil and gas buyers, mainly the European countries, are dependent on supplies from Russia or on the supply routes that go through it and are to pay extra cost and transit fees and in many cases middleman" profits.⁶⁶

- East European countries in particular that were eager to join NATO complained of Russian antagonist policies in supplying the oil and gas through its pipelines.⁶⁷
- The energy politics of the CAR is also related to the efforts of the US to diversify and lessen dependence on the Middle East and end OPEC monopoly.⁶⁸
- In the power rivalry, the supply routes control gives an edge to Russia and other regional neighbors over the energy politics. There are perceptions on the re-emergence of Russia as power and competing with the US for influence in the Caucasus and East Europe.
- Iran and China are also important which could develop relations and influence in the **CAR through the development of energy supply routes.**

Since the establishment of relations in the early 1990s, the US engagement with the CAR states on the development of energy reserves and supplies' routes has significantly progressed.⁶⁹ The US companies purchased stakes in the Kazakh oil field and signed a share transfer agreement for the Caspian Pipeline Consortium that paved the way for the construction of alternative routes bypassing Russia for oil from Kazakhstan.⁷⁰ A US-Kazakhstan Business Development Committee was set up to address oil and gas insurance laws and pipeline access. The US energy policy encompassed the whole region and not only Kazakhstan and a similar pattern of interaction is found with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.⁷¹ The USAID organized training programs on “maintaining favorable investment climate and on international contracting for Turkmen oil and gas industry officials.”⁷²

The US multinationals claim that their investment in the energy sector has facilitated and offered the CAR states to earn more profits from competitive global market prices in which the efficient and independent pipelines' networks were crucial. The MNCs from the US

helped the CAR states to develop commercially viable transportation routes for oil and gas through loans and credits.⁷³ The US oil company, UNOCAL announced gas pipeline projects from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan and the Southern oceans.⁷⁴ The US policymakers have also floated the proposal to develop the historical trade route “Silk Road” to link the East and West as a policy of infrastructure development in Central Asia.⁷⁵

Active engagement of the US in the energy market of the CAR evoked responses from regional neighbors. Russia in particular was perturbed for losing its monopoly over the supply routes of energy from the CAR to other countries, and thus engaged the states in energy exploration and transport projects bilaterally and through regional arrangements inviting them to use new and alternate energy supply routes.⁷⁶ Russia enhanced investments in the energy sector to increase its capacity to transporting oil to European and Japanese markets via new pipelines.⁷⁷ It also offered alternate economic support to the CAR states under which Kazakhstan was provided \$115 million per year to play host to the Russian space program.⁷⁸ Kazakhstan was also pursued to join a free-trade zone with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

China was another regional player that developed alternate energy routes with the CAR states. It invested in the energy sector of Kazakhstan and constructed a pipeline from Kazakhstan to China along with many transport links with the region.⁷⁹ Russia and China increased interaction on the energy issues with the CAR states and its impact on the US energy policy have been widely discussed by their scholars with the comments that “for each country wrestling control of the Central Asian oil and gas is necessarily a vital part of its grand (geo-political) strategy.”⁸⁰

Regional Developments on Economic Issues and the US

As mentioned earlier, after their independence, the CAR states were needed to develop some collaborative mechanisms for political and economic cooperation. Certain economic mechanisms evolved during the consultative process among the CAR states. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan agreed to establish the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) in April 1994 as a single economic space. This organization developed linkages with the US and the Western countries and expanded its mandate in 1995 and included security issues in its agenda by forming a joint Council of Defense Ministers.

In the non-economic spheres, the CAEC created the tripartite peacekeeping battalion (Centrasbat) in 1996 to coordinate military exercises, air defense, and defense supplies. In 1998 Tajikistan joined the CAEC. The agenda of the CAEC was further expanded in 2000 A.D. with an agreement on cooperation to fight terrorism, extremism, and trans-border crime. At the end of 2001, CAEC was transformed into the Central Asian Economic Organization (CAEO) at a meeting of the presidents of the four-member states in Tashkent. The USAID provided technical support to the CAEC to build regional water and energy organizations and to reach a consensus on transboundary natural resource issues.⁸¹

Russia became active in CAR politics and economic matters. Russia used its old linkages and asked the CAR states to create Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) in 2001 to harmonize the customs, tax, trade, and labor policies. Besides, Russia was joined by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in 2001. The organization was later joined by Moldova and Ukraine as observers. The EEC asked other regional groups of the CIS to join

in and the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC) merged with it in October 2005 that had Belarus as its member as well.⁸²

The regional economic processes assumed a greater role in the 21st century with the CAR states actively involved in finalizing specific agreements on sectoral strategies, institutions, and investments. The US in this background got the advice from scholars that the security and strategic issues had gone lower in priority for the CAR states and the economic issues assumed a bigger role.⁸³ It was also suggested that the US should assure greater cooperation and coordination with all of them to ensure the effective integration of Central Asia into the dynamic Eurasian economy and thus provide the key conditions for the stable and prosperous development of this key region.

Assessment of US-CAR Political-Economic Relations

US interaction with the five states of the CAR, on the issues related to political economy, has special significance during the period 1991-2005. The states were to transform their economic, social, and political systems, initiate interstate relations on market principles, and become members of international economic institutions. In the transition process, all five states chose their roads and encountered success and failure in varying degrees.⁸⁴ People of the CAR states faced severe economic hardships during the transition but accepted the new system of governance and remained peaceful.

Multinational oil companies started pursuing production-sharing projects in Central Asia to tap the oil potential despite the political instability and widespread corruption in the region. Kazakhstan became the most attractive places to invest. Exploration of the Kashagan West oil field in Kazakhstan was led by a consortium of multinational companies including BG, Eni,

ExxonMobil, Shell, TOTAL, BP and Phillips. According to US Energy Department officials Kazakhstan required \$50 billion to \$70 billion in investment. Due to cautious approach CAR states adopted production-sharing contracts, as opposed to licensing agreements as preferred legal framework for multinationals operating in Central Asia. Licensing agreements have proven to make a venture vulnerable to changes in taxation policies and other complications⁸⁵.

With the globalization as marked after the Cold War, Central Asia assumed a new role by becoming the ‘hub of the economic integration of the super-continent of Eurasia and home to the most rapidly growing economies of the globe.’⁸⁶ The US from the beginning was clear in its policy that it would emphasize the establishment of bilateral and multilateral economic relations with the CAR states in a structured fashion.⁸⁷ For it, the US would drive their transition in a preferred direction and target their macroeconomic policies with the inclusion of private sector, market reforms perpetuation, investment by multinational and the provision of aid to internal market reforms and use the IMF and the World Bank.⁸⁸

In the engagement, the US participated in infrastructure development projects related to oil and gas pipelines, railroads, highways, ports, airports, and telecommunications.⁸⁹ The US aid programs focused on the transformation of the economy toward liberal systems, encouraging industrial and agricultural privatization, property rights and creating functioning legal systems, boosting educational exchanges, and civic society that would include “grass-roots level engagement, to make resources accessible in addition to closer military ties” that are always included in the overall US policy.⁹⁰ The US linked the role in economic activities with energy making it the crucial element in major agreements with the CAR states.⁹¹

US engagement in economy, trade, and investment lessened Russian control over the energy exports of the CAR states and incited competition. The observers view that the US policy in energy, multiple pipeline, and economic engagement was fruitful.⁹² The US has attained a status of a leading foreign investor in the energy sector with the proclamations that political and economic stability of the area was necessary to safeguard its energy imports and to combat international terrorism and arms trafficking.⁹³ While the US planned and enacted multiple pipelines and external trade routes bypassing Russian territory, Russia and China also enhanced their economic engagement in particular in the energy sector of the CAR.

Though it is difficult to talk parallels, the US economic engagement is termed as at a high level of activism in the CAR region in which the US used its power that included the use of military and strategic tools.⁹⁴ While globalization is considered good for all states of the world, it incites large powers to use military power to back up their global goals to maximize the economic benefits.⁹⁵ The military and strategic tools that are used to achieve influence for economic gains include conflict management of a region related to ethnic issues, border conflicts, resource conflicts, etc. and the US applied the same in the CAR.⁹⁶ In this, the US engaged with almost all the issues in the CAR, be it the civil war in Tajikistan or the water disputes between the states and it helped it to enhance its influence and interaction.

The CAR states with their economic potential offer space in economic interests for the outside powers like the US and it drives some analysts to bring in the role of hegemony in the relationship.⁹⁷ Such observations find their reasoning in the US post-Cold War global policy that endeavored for deepening engagement with other states in political, economic, and social spheres and view that the tools of the US policy are found similar to those adopted by the British and other colonial powers of the past, and hence such expressions find their way in

the analysis.⁹⁸ For some observers, "the CAR states remained entangled in a dependency system that had no relation with market realities" and it places limitations on the deepening engagement for outside power.⁹⁹

While the observation of "contradiction between what the US does in the "security sphere and what it does in the economic sphere - between a mercantilist security strategy and a laissez-faire economic strategy" holds ground, it is acknowledged that in dealing with the CAR states, the US interaction to promote the practices of free trade and investment by the individual states with the adoption of liberal economic policies and systems witnessed positive movement.¹⁰⁰ It also helped the opening of the CAR states with other powers to establish engagement and strengthen relations that are a limitation on the US policy which is in line with the "realpolitik" model that power creates influence but has limits in a globalized world of growing interdependence.

End Notes

¹ Michael Kraig (2004), more discussion on this aspects is in the works of Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-39*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973; Keohane (1984); David A. Lake, (1988); Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, (1989); and Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade", *World Politics*, 28.3, April 1976

² Cit. by Michael Parenti, in *Against Empire*, op. cit., Ch. 3 Intervention: Whose gain? Whose pain, saying that the Barnett's book *Intervention and Revolution* point to business, not the security bureaucracies, as the primary motive of US intervention." <http://members.aol.com/bblum6/parenti.htm>, (Accessed 12 June, 2006), It is observed that the transition of the international system at the end of the Cold War demanded a revision in the functioning of the international monetary and financial organizations that were created under the Bretton Woods system after the Second World War and allowed a permanent role to the US.

³ Roy E. Jones, *Principles of Foreign Policy: The Civil State in the World Setting*, Martin Robertson, 1979

⁴ Robert B. Zoellick, (2001) and (2002), Statemenets before the committee of SUS Senate, <https://www.finance.senate.gov/download/the-honorable-robert-b-zoellick>

⁵ J.W. Smith, *The World's Wasted Wealth 2*, *Institute for Economic Democracy*, 1994, p. 90. It is observed that "except for religious conflicts and the petty wars of feudal lords, wars are primarily fought over resources and trade." On the cause of World War I, Smith quotes Wilson as saying that: "Is there any man, is there any woman, let me say any child here that does not know that the seed of war in the modern world is an industrial and commercial rivalry?"; also in J.W. Smith, *Economic Democracy: The Political Struggle for the Twenty-First Century*, (M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p.58 <http://www.ied.info/>, (Accessed 12 June, 2006)

⁶ Barbara Lochbihler, *Militarism a Facilitator for Globalization*, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, <http://www.wilpf.int.ch/economicjustice/lochbihler.htm>, (accessed on 8 Feb. 2006)

⁷ International Socialist Review Issue 17, April-May 2001, Paul D'Amato, http://www.isreview.org/issues/17/state_and_imperialism.shtml, (Accessed on 8 Feb. 2006)

⁸ A discussion on these aspects is by Jonathan Clarke, in "The Conceptual Poverty of the US Foreign Policy, 1993, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/clarke.htm>, (accessed 21 Nov. 2005); and John Dumbrell, Vietnam: American Involvement at Home and Abroad, BAAS Pamphlet No. 22 (First Published 1992), <http://www.baas.ac.uk/resources/pamphlets/pamphdets.asp?id=22>, (accessed 21 Nov. 2005)

⁹ William Cohen, Associated Press dispatch reporting on Cohen's Seattle speech at Microsoft Corporation in Seattle, February 18, 1999. He also said "[T]he prosperity that companies like Microsoft now enjoy could not occur without having the strong military that we have." for example, in conflicts such as Bosnia, Korea, Iraq and CAR, Cit in <http://www.globalissues.org/print/issue/124>, (accessed 16 May, 2007)

¹⁰ Ref. The US report of the Special Ad Hoc Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 21 April 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. III, p. 209. It is important to maintain in friendly hands areas that contain or protect sources of metals, oil, and other national resources, which contain strategic objectives, or areas strategically located, which contain a substantial industrial potential, which possesses manpower and organized military forces in important quantities.

¹¹ Ref. Payam Foroughi, *Political Economy of Transitional Societies: An Analysis of Democracy and Inequality in Post-Communist Central Asia*, University of Utah, Also Michael Kraig (2004), Falk (1989) and Alex Callinicos (2005)

¹² Rajan Menon, *Globalization, Economics, and Communications*, Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (Accessed 6 May, 2006)

¹³ Waltz observes that such states fell apart since the internal economic interests were too weak to hold the country together, *Structural Realism after the Cold War*, (2001) *International Security* 25, no. 1 (summer)

¹⁴ “Marx after Communism,” *The Economist*, Dec. 19, 2002. Though slow restructuring process sometimes took the analysts to revise such a conclusion and such arguments were sometimes augmented by the expression of people in some opinion polls. An All-Russia Public Opinion Center poll in December 2002 indicated that 68% of Russians regretted the disassembly of the USSR. Interfax News Agency, *Most Russians regret USSR’s disintegration, say it could have been avoided – poll*, Dec. 30, 2002. Also see USAID, *USAID’s Assistance Strategy for Central Asia 2001-2005* (2000), p. 2; available at http://www.usaid.gov/regions/europe_eurasia/car/PDABS400.pdf, (accessed 12 Jan. 2007)

¹⁵ Boris Rumer, *Economic Change and Modernization: Central Asia*, Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (Accessed 5 May, 2006),

¹⁶ Marie Lavigne, *The Economics of Transition: From Socialist Economy to Market Economy*, Second Edition. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.

¹⁷ The experience shows that the gradual process needs a strong pluralistic society with a strong will to transition otherwise it fails. The useful analysis is found in *Challenges Facing the Transition Economies of Central Asia*, Address by Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF at a conference on “Challenges to Economies in Transition”, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic - 1998, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/052798.htm>, (accessed 8 Jan. 2006); also in *Transition in Central Asia and Human Security* on April 22-24, 2002, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/ashgabad_bgpaper.html, (accessed 8 Jan. 2006); World Bank, report 1998, *Europe and Central Asia*, <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/annrep98/euro.htm>; (accessed 8 Jan. 2006) and For a discussion on Transition: Thomas E. Weisskopf, *Russia in Transition: Perils of Fast Track to capitalism*, 1992, from ed. Frieden and Lake (1996)

¹⁸ The parallel or black economy flourishes in centrally planned economies since central pricing generates shortages and inadequate supplies with wasting and stealing public resources.

¹⁹ Ref. Shah M. Tarzi, “Third World Governments and Multinational Corporations: Dynamics of Host’s bargaining Power”, in Frieden and Lahre, ed. *International Political Economy*, Routledge, N.Y. 1995

²⁰ Data has been taken from the World Bank, which shows that per capita was higher in Kazakhstan due to its incomes from oil and the lowest per capita was in Tajikistan in the 1990s.

²¹ Gregory Gleason *Modernizing State Institutions in Central Asia and the South Caucasus* Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html ; (accessed 10 Jan. 2006), It may, however, be noted that Measuring economic progress is a complex task. One could compare data on economic growth, income distribution, and poverty, and the degree to which each country has become integrated into the global economy.

²² Anders Aslund, *State and Governance in Transition Economies: Lessons for the Kyrgyz Republic*, www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=370&prog=zru, UNDP, 2000, (accessed 18 Jan. 2006)

²³ The phenomenon has been discussed by David A. Lake in *British and American Hegemony compared*, in *International Political Economy*, ed. Frieden and Lake, Routledge, N.Y. 1995

²⁴ “Stan v stan, A new sort of Great Game,” *The Economist*, May 17th 2007

²⁵ Meri Bekeshova, *CENTRAL ASIA: A Kyrgyz-Kazakh Step Towards Regional Union*, <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37887>, (accessed 24 July 2008)

²⁶ Alima Bissenova, *Construction Boom and Banking Crisis in Kazakhstan*, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5117>, (accessed 28 June 2009)

²⁷ Jeffrey Donovan, *Central Asia: New UN Human Development Report Asks, “What If?”*, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/5fbe5e26-97c9-4ae4-ad03-07d603faf28f.html>, (accessed 4 June 2007)

-
- ²⁸ Gregory Gleason, *Markets and Politics in Central Asia*, Routledge, London & N.Y. 2003
- ²⁹ S. Frederick Starr, “The Investment Climate In Central Asia and the Caucasus“ http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_invest.htm, (Accessed 8 September 2006)
- ³⁰ President Clinton in his policy, Clinton National Security Strategy, 2002
- ³¹ Rajan Menon, *Globalization, Economics, and Communications*, Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (Accessed on 29 Jan. 2006)
- ³² In the initial interaction on nuclear proliferation, US companies were got involved in multibillion dollars worth of projects with Kazakhstan
- ³³ "U.S. Interests in the Central Asian Republics," Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2nd session., February 12, 1998, at www.commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0f.htm (accessed 19 Jan. 2006)
- ³⁴ Evan Feigenbaum, Remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2007/February/20070215113449eaifas0.4868128.html>, (accessed 19 Jan. 2006)
- ³⁵ *ibid*
- ³⁶ Robert M. Cutler, Economics and Security in Central Asia, <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200101/0101a002.htm>, (accessed on 29 Jan. 2006)
- ³⁷ Richard Falk, *Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum, Nation*, July 14, 2003, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/2003/0714nation.htm>, (accessed 20 Jan. 2006)
- ³⁸ The National Security Strategy, of the Bush administration, was published in September 2002. It spelled out: "The US national security strategy will be based on American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests", The White House, Washington, D.C. July 1994
- ³⁹ The market expanded since the communist system had denied access of people to goods that were marketed globally.
- ⁴⁰ The institutional arrangements with Tajikistan were delayed due to civil war in the country.
- ⁴¹ US Government Assistance... Annual Report FY 1996. p57
- ⁴² <http://centralasia.usaid.gov/page.php?page=article-54>, (accessed 9 June 2008)
- ⁴³ The rationale for Aid in the US official documents, website USAID
- ⁴⁴ Ref. (1992), Paul Wolfowitz, Defense Planning Guidance document, objectives of U.S. post-Cold War political and military strategy that included: Preventing the emergence of a rival superpower, Safeguard U.S. interests and promote American values and, if necessary, the US must be prepared to take unilateral action <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html>. (accessed March 2006)
- ⁴⁵ S. Frederick Starr, A Partnership for Central Asia, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2005
- ⁴⁶ Richard A. Boucher, *South and Central Asia*, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0906/iipe/sca.htm>, also in *Central Asia: Aral Sea Problem*, Volume 5, Number 6, <http://www.fpiif.org/briefs/vol5/v5n06aral.html>, (accessed 22 Feb. 2006)
- ⁴⁷ <http://centralasia.usaid.gov/page.php?page=article-54>, (accessed 17 June 2008)
- ⁴⁸ Fact Sheets, *Dispatch* 5, 1994: 290; In unofficial programs, a joint US-Japan health project vaccinated 500.000 infants against infectious diseases and gave \$900,000 in medical equipment.

⁴⁹ Fact Sheets, *Dispatch 5*, 1994: 293-298

⁵⁰ Nichol, 1996: 14, In areas of conflicts, actual amounts spent by the US are not included in the economic dispensations rather become part of military expenditure.

⁵¹ Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security", *The National Interest*, Spring 2003: 17-28

⁵² Objectives of the USAID for these countries are at Annex. Taken from http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/car/index.html, (accessed 25 Jan. 2006)

⁵³ Nichol, 1996, 13

⁵⁴ David A. Lake (1996), 'Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations', *International Organization*, 50, pp. 1-33

⁵⁵ Fact Sheets, *Dispatch 5*, 1994: 282; The US and Kazakhstan, 1994: 97-99

⁵⁶ Jim Nichol, (1996): *Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests*, CRS Issue Brief. Washington: Library of Congress, 'the OPIC provided \$80 million dollars financing to the US companies for oil exploration in Kazakhstan.'

⁵⁷ Strobe Talbott, (1994a): "Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in *Central Asia*," *Dispatch 5*, no.19 (5/9): 280-282

⁵⁸ <http://www.usaid.kz/>, At the 1994 U.S.-Central Asia Business Conference Deputy Secretary of State Talbott said, "The American businessmen are investing in the region because it is an attractive business, not because of altruism."

⁵⁹ The US wields significant influence in the decision-making of the ADB, the World Bank, and the IMF.

⁶⁰ Evan Feigenbaum, Remarks of the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2007/February/20070215113449caifas0.4868128.html>, (accessed 8 July 2008), The TIFA created a US-Central Asia Council on Trade and Investment to take care of the intellectual property, labor, environmental issues, and enhancing the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in trade and investment. It established dialogue to increase commercial and investment opportunities.

⁶¹ Eastern Europe and Central Asia, for details on the role of these institutions this website, contains useful information, <http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/region/eeca/index.shtml> and more on <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/91384.htm>, (accessed 23 April, 2007)

⁶² IMF website

⁶³ Media and research journals discuss the issue frequently, Asia Times Online, discusses it regularly at www.atimes.com, and Ariel Cohen, *U.S. Interests and Central Asia Energy Security*, November 15, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/bg1984.cfm>, (accessed 16 July 2008)

⁶⁴ Mikhail A. Molchanov and Yuri Yevdokimov, *The Political Economy of the Energy Sector in the Central Asian-Caspian Sea Region: A Conceptual Framework*, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~scat1663/Berlin/Berlin-Draft_17.pdf, (accessed 15 July 2008)

⁶⁵ Rustam Makhmudov, *The Problem of Exporting Energy Resources from Central Asia*, http://www.centralasia-southcaucasus.com/pdf/2002/CA_and_SC_affairs_part2.pdf, (accessed 15 July 2008)

⁶⁶ Russia being the beneficiary since it developed all the pipelines through its territory and its state-owned oil and gas conglomerates would use influence in supply quantities and prices.

⁶⁷ Howorth Croft & Webber (2000), "NATO's Triple Challenge", *International Affairs*, no 3, 2000, pp 495-518 and Blank, Stephen (1999), "NATO Enlargement Between Rhetoric and Realism", *International Politics*, no 36

1999, pp 67-88, These countries joining the NATO is changing the strategic nature of the region in which Russia finds itself loosing influence that it had acquired as the USSR.

⁶⁸ Oil Diplomacy: *Facts and myths behind foreign oil dependency*, hearing before the committee on international relations, house of representatives, one hundred seventh congress, second session, June 20, 2002, serial no. 107-197, Statement of the Spencer Abraham, Secretary, U.S. Department of energy, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa80291.000/hfa80291_0.HTM, (Accessed 9 July, 2006)

⁶⁹ James Fishelson, *From the Silk Road to Chevron: The Geopolitics of Oil Pipelines in Central Asia*, 2007, http://www.sras.org/geopolitics_of_oil_pipelines_in_central_asia, (accessed 9 December 2008)

⁷⁰ Dekmejian, Hrair R. & Simonian, Hovann H. *Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region*, I.B.Tauris Paperback, 2003, Also referred on Asiatic website

⁷¹ Pierre Abramovid "US and the Taliban: A done deal" *Le Monde Diplomatique* (English ed.) January 2002, In 2001 the US energy secretary, Spencer Abraham, and a team from the US Energy Department went to Russia to facilitate the completion and opening of an oil pipeline built by a consortium of eight companies, including Chevron, Texaco, and Exxon-Mobil.

⁷² US Government Assistance... Annual report FY 1996. P. 46-47

⁷³ *ibid*

⁷⁴ George Monbiot "America's Pipedream" *The Guardian*, 23 October 2001, the pipeline project is yet to take off due to the law and order situation in Afghanistan.

⁷⁵ Historically, the Silk Road was a network of caravan routes in the 15-16th Century, running from China and India through Central Asia to Western Europe. Commerce along the Silk Road brought economic prosperity and a resulting cultural renaissance to Central Asian cities like Samarkand and Bukhara.

⁷⁶ Igor Tomberg, *Russian Analytica*, 2(2004)

⁷⁷ Russia has also announced to construct pipelines to Japan and South Korea to express its readiness to supply more oil to more markets.

⁷⁸ It was quid pro quo to keep Kazakhstan engaged.

⁷⁹ "Kazakhstan Oil Pours into China Through Crossborder Pipeline." *Xinhua*, 25 May 2005, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/...htm>, (accessed 13 July 2008)

⁸⁰ James Fishelson, 2007, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195213/cigi_paper_no.80_web_1.pdf

⁸¹ http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/ee/car_reg/, (accessed 16 July 2008)

⁸² At a summit of the Organization of Central-Asian Cooperation, in October 2005 in St.Petersburg, it was decided to amalgamate it with a similar structure, the Eurasian Economic Community. The organization of Central Asian Cooperation was originally established by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and then invited Russia to participate. The Eurasian Economic Community Organization had the same members, except for Uzbekistan http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/16467_Uzbekistan.html, Accessed on 9 Feb. 2006)

⁸³ Johannes F. Linn, *Central Asia: A New Hub of Global Integration*, Wolfensohn Center for Development, The Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1129_central_asia_linn.aspx, (accessed 22 December 2008)

⁸⁴ Gordon Feller, *Central Asian States Find Neither Privatization Nor Political Reforms Correlate Exactly With Economic Growth*, October/November 1998, pages 57-58, <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/1098/9810057.html>, (accessed on 29 Jan. 2006)

⁸⁵ <https://www.rferl.org/a/1099254.html>

⁸⁶ Johannes F. Linn, 2007, <https://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/07-Central-Asia-as-the-Hub-of-Eurasian-Economic-Integration-Implications-for-CAREC.pdf>

⁸⁷ Discussion on this aspect is contained in Alison Bailin, From Traditional to Institutionalized Hegemony, 2001, G8 Governance 6 <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/bailin/bailin2000.pdf>. (Accessed on 8 Feb. 2006) In this article, it is stated that the US was not a sole hegemon power and the institutional mechanism enables great powers to collectively manage the economic crises.

⁸⁸ Ariel Cohen, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav111402_pr.shtml, (accessed 18 July 2008)

⁸⁹ http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/IF30Ag01.html, (accessed 16 July 2008)

⁹⁰ Steffen Schwarz, US Foreign Policy on Central Asia, Seminar in US Foreign Policy, DeMonfort University, Leicester, 15 April 2002, www.hausarbeiten.de/faecher/vorschau/4050.html, Also noted by Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, at a conference on "Challenges to Economies in Transition", Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic - May 27, 1998, (accessed 9 January 2006) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/052798.htm>, it observed that The US policies in the interaction are said to influence law, order, security, simple and unbiased fiscal system, and reasonable and uniform tax structures.

⁹¹ Star, Testimony in the Congress, 1998, The US Energy and State Departments in its interaction “stressed on a level playing field in the economic policies of the CAR states allowing access to Western companies to energy, natural resources, and infrastructure development projects.” http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0.HTM, (accessed 16 July 2008)

⁹² There has been progressing with both the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipelines. Kazakhstan can now sell its energy on world markets for higher prices than before. But there are still opportunities in the energy sector.

⁹³ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EF19Ag01.html, (accessed 15 July 2008)

⁹⁴ For ref. see the Institute for Economic Democracy <http://www.ied.info/>, (accessed 15 July 2008)

⁹⁵ Karen Talbot, *Backing up Globalization with Military Might*, *Covert Action Quarterly*, Issue 68, Fall 1999, <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Articles/Backing.asp>, (accessed on 8 Feb. 2006)

⁹⁶ In a statement, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stressed conflict-resolution as "Job One" for US foreign policy in the region.

⁹⁷ Relevance of the CAR with the US economic interests being important, many studies and conferences have dealt the subject in detail, Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (accessed 8 May, 2006)

⁹⁸ The phenomenon of establishing and exerting economic and political linkages and processes has been explained by David A. Lake, “British and American Hegemony Compared: Lessons for the Current Era of Decline,” in *International Political Economy*, ed Frieden, and Lake, St. Martin, 1995, the framework of tools has been as stated by Roy E. Jones (1979).

⁹⁹ Jonathon K. Zartman, in Political Transitions in Central Asia, CA-PoliticalTransitions.com explains aspects of dependency of CA states. <http://www.ca-politicaltransitions.com/ResearchPapers/Thesis/ChapterThree.html>, (accessed 15 March 2007)

¹⁰⁰ Michael Kraig, Assessing Alternative Security Frameworks For the Persian Gulf, Middle East Policy Council, Journal, Volume XI, Fall 2004, Number 3, http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol11/0409_kraig.asp, (accessed 21 Sept. 2008)

US - CAR SOCIO-POLITICAL RELATIONS

Introduction

US policy and relations with other states include interaction on social issues, civil society, and civil institutions to establish useful linkages and make effective inroads in states or regions.¹ In the US-CAR relations, significant interaction is found during the period under study, with the internal institutions and social sectors of the states which is discussed in this section.

Internal Security and Stability

Internal stability and security of the CAR states were the initial concerns expressed by the US policymakers. Such concerns were not unfounded, as the newly independent states are highly vulnerable in their years of infancy. During the transition, the threats to the internal security and stability in the CAR were observed as the governments took time to develop the administrative and legal structures that could enable them to establish their writ in the states. Some states faced religious militancy (civil wars in Tajikistan, 1992-1997) and some other separatist movements by ethnic groups.² The expression of concerns of foreign powers with internal security and stability issues of a state is a delicate issue since it amounts to intervention in the internal affairs contrary to sovereignty.³

Many factors were discussed by scholars that cause threats to stability in the states after the Soviet withdrawal. The governance of Moscow included force and a centralized system.

After independence, the internal structures were in the transition from dictatorship to pluralism and the outcome remained a guess with fluid results and uncertain outcomes.⁴ The reasons for such fears were also ingrained in the view that the Muslim majority population was subjected to communism against its free will and the withdrawal of Russia was abrupt and not a smooth process. Another fear was the old communist elite that grabbed power in the CAR states and which might be opposed in the shape of armed conflicts.

The new leaders continued to use old techniques in administration: infiltrate, manipulate and discredit. They were accepted as rulers by the world in the name of stability but over time, their acceptance as democratic leaders remained questionable while some of them got elected for life.⁵ And at the independence of the CAR states, it was feared that if these states moved to instability, it could become an "emerging zone of no control."⁶

While the new leadership held power, the world was concerned that conflicts would emerge in the CAR due to border disputes among the states, migration, and settlement of various ethnic groups to and from other regions and states. The presence of a significant ratio of Russian-origin people in the administration and security forces of the CAR states could incite Russia to intervene in the region. Moreover, the transition brought economic difficulties for the masses. It was eroding public support for the new governments with the emergence of "disturbance in rural and distant areas where state legitimacy hardly reached" leaving the regions 'under the control of local militias and the possibility of foreign intervention.'⁷

Fears of instability were also attributed to some scholars' observations that the para-military forces of the states were out of political control of the center and tribal rivalries could compete with the nation state ideals and could politicize the "ordinary" issues.⁸ In the south of the CAR, Afghanistan was unsettled due to internal infighting in which armed militants, terrorists, rebels, and narcotics warlords were in control. The fear was that by sharing similar

religion; the Afghans would interact with the populations of the states and might create internal turmoil. Civil War Tajikistan and challenge to the Central government by Islamists established the involvement of Afghans in the conflict.

The US interaction with the CAR on internal security and stability

The US established bilateral and multilateral engagements with the five states of CAR at the beginning of the 1990s and expressed support for their stability and security. The US announced that it would ensure a minimum of structural continuity in a region that was transforming with an uncertain future so that major security disruptions could be checked.⁹

In dealing with the states, the US was aware of the observations of many Scholars that Russian and US cooperation was crucial for stability in Central Asia as renewal of competition of former superpowers would undermine security in the region.¹⁰

With time, the US moved to engage the states in their pursuit of internal and regional stability by securing influence over military and security affairs besides economic growth, political development including human rights, and the international integration of the states of Central Asia.¹¹ The US engagement with the internal security apparatus of the five states included assistance programs for the training of border security forces, police, law, and justice organizations, narcotics control mechanisms, etc. The assistance of the USAID programs included the training of police personnel, the development of communications, and the acquisition of essential equipment for the police and border control organizations. The US support helped the states' security structures including police and border control forces which were later used against the opposition and rebels involved in internal conflicts, militant Islamic factions, and in controlling civil war and/or interstate conflict.

Over time, concerns regarding internal security and instability in the CAR states faded and the states except Tajikistan were able to move towards stability despite pressures on the economy and the governance. Some attributed it to the continuation of the social structure that provided basic necessities and social services to the masses for the initial period along with the authoritarian rule.¹² The governments of the states negated the perceptions of instability by foreign observers and stressed that “they do not share any, or few, security threats that could justify a regional security constellation that would *de facto* infringe on the sovereignty of the states.”¹³

For the conflict in Tajikistan, the US supported the UN efforts to diffuse the conflict from the beginning and actively associated itself with the resolution of the civil war.¹⁴ The US played an effective role in the proceedings of the UN and the deployment of the multilateral forces mainly from Russia. For the US, such a policy was crucial to curb the spread of militant Islam and preventing the Islamic non-governmental forces from getting control of the CAR governments that would have implications over the regional and global security,

However, in support of the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan, the US did not agree to the suggestion of Nazarbayev the Kazakh President, to establish a regional peace force for Tajikistan and give it the status of a UN peacekeeping force.¹⁵ A regional force, if raised, would have limited the role of the outside powers (the US) in future conflicts in the region since the regional force would have an element of autonomy and a new setup while the US is always ‘capable to monitor and maneuver the UN agenda’ and through this strategy would maintain its role in the region.¹⁶

In other situations of regional security threats, Uzbekistan faced some uprisings from ethnic minorities and militants.¹⁷ The movements having relations with the Islamic militant forces were suppressed by the rulers through the use of internal security apparatus. Washington in its official documents pronounced that it had taken a series of initiatives to promote the transition of the governance of the states to democracy, and extended its support to exchange and educational programs in diplomacy, education, journalism, and elections.¹⁸ Overall, issues arising out of the internal conflicts remained contained in the region.

When the region and its security concerns are looked into, for the CAR observers, aspersions on security were raised by the West during the period 1992-1998, when Russia attempted to maintain its influence, presence and control over currency, border security, oil and gas transportations and continuation of communications infrastructure.¹⁹ In their view, the West was opposed to the Russian pushed regional processes for cooperation that included the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the apprehensions expressed about stability and security of the CAR were part of offensive propaganda.

The US interaction with the CAR states and the support to the internal security apparatus through the development assistance programs was an attempt to engage the states with the reasoning that the conflicts arising out of the internal instability are linked with the global stability.²⁰ The US interaction was expanded from cooperation with the internal security apparatus to the resolution of intra-regional conflicts with a view to “foster regional stability and economic interdependence.”²¹ When the US observed there could be movements towards democracy against "tyrannical governments", the strategic goals of the US were extended to include interventions in the crises resulting out of the movements along with the programs of development cooperation.²²

Radical Islam and Terrorism after 9/11

The situation in Afghanistan led the US security interaction on issues related to terrorism religion and militancy. Terrorism becoming a high priority the US foreign policy, it was necessary that all kinds of interaction with the CAR, be it strategic, economic or social, be shaped to curb it. It was also feared that the Islamist and radicalism would pose serious risks for potential investments by the US in energy and energy infrastructure.²³

Perceptions of the US political and academic circles over the association of Islam with radicalism and the security in the CAR are divergent.²⁴ Some viewed that the freedom in these societies would lead to the spread of Islam along with militancy, in and around the region. For others, the likelihood of instability and threats from the practiced Islam was unlikely in the popular political culture of the regional states which had more influence from ethnic nationalism.²⁵ Some analysts were unaware of the likely relationship and impact of Islam linking religion and society and thus the nature of the US policy on terrorism that could be followed in the CAR.²⁶

Two organizations are mostly discussed in the Western literature on the Islamic movements in the CAR states and the US policy on terrorism; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Hizbul Tahrir (HT).²⁷ Some incidents, such as the student demonstration in Tashkent in 1988 using Islam as slogans and later armed incursions by the IMU into Kyrgyzstan, aroused the concerns that the role of Islamic militancy needed to be made as an explicit component of the US policy.²⁸ Such incidents were later found linked with the situation in Afghanistan and the activities of the Islamic organizations in the CAR. The IMU is regarded as a militant entity and some observed that it fought against the US in

Afghanistan but was broken and had become insignificant.²⁹ The activities of the HT remained to disseminate leaflets and prayer sessions, and it pursued political objectives by peaceful means.³⁰

In its engagement with the government of the CAR, the US assisted its aid programs to the governments as well as NGOs working in the region to mitigate the impact of the Islamic movements. To strengthen the security agencies of the CAR governments, assistance and training were also provided under the NATO programs (PfP) and the USAID assistance. The issues that were military in character were dealt with in Chapter 4, and the discussion on Islam related to rights will appear in the next section of this chapter.

Narcotics

Immediately after their independence, the CAR states became a transit route for human and narcotics trafficking. The issue was linked with porous borders, lack of appropriate security structures, and poor governance. Europe was more concerned with these issues and NATO along with the international organizations supported the CAR states in their security policies to train militaries, to create safer state borders, and to reform security and law enforcement organs.³¹ The analysts are of the view that the narcotics trade is another reason for the US and the West to securitize the CAR since the role of the military to combat transnational clandestine activities and to secure borders remains limited.³²

The US coordinated its policy on narcotics with the UN and the EU which were more active in combating this issue. The US views that narcotics trafficking has an inbuilt relationship with international terrorist financing. The US signed bilateral agreements envisaging Drug

Control and Mutual Legal Assistance with the CAR states. Under the agreements, the US provided grant assistance to purchase equipment for border controls and the improvements of the relevant institutions of the states. The US opened liaison offices in the CAR states and provided significant volumes of aid both directly and indirectly, through the UN to control narcotics trafficking. The US strategy to deal with narcotics was for long-term institution-building rather than short-term projects and helped in the enhanced interaction with the states.³³

However, in post 9/11 Afghanistan, the poppy cultivation grew in which the US is considered as having failed to achieve tangible results of its engagement with the CAR on this issue and the surrounding regions on narcotics.

US – CAR Relations and Rights and Democracy

The situation of Rights in the CAR States

Discussion on human rights and democracy in the CAR is an intricate task as many observers examine the rights from their perspective-bending reality.³⁴ The rights situation varies from country to country in the CAR but in general, it is observed that the people of the CAR states are only "partly free" when it comes to political liberties and civic rights with some variations and positive trends in individual countries.³⁵ A brief discussion on the individual states in respect of human rights is as follows:

Kazakhstan

In Kazakhstan, a former member of the Communist Party Nazarbaev became president in December 1991 and rules to date. His style of government resembles that of the Soviets, with

control over the economy, media, and press through his family.³⁶ In the early 1990s, the government of Kazakhstan was successfully engaged by the US on the issues of disarmament and nuclear proliferation. The agreements that were concluded brought investments in the energy and other sectors of Kazakhstan.³⁷ The ensuing economic activities brought huge income disparities with wealth concentrating in the hands of the family and friends of the ruling elite since the social and economic system is controlled by oligopolies and families closer to the rulers.³⁸

The government of Kazakhstan is alleged to have suppressed opposition, independent journalists, and human rights activists who live under the threat of being thrown into jail, death, or physical violence. In 2005, an opposition presidential candidate was murdered and many opposition leaders left the country. General masses live under poverty in a society in which corruption is flagrant, and the benefits of any pockets of growth in the economy are reserved to specific clans and families.³⁹ In this way the country lack standards on civil economic and political rights.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has few natural resources and its economy remains dependent on foreign aid. It became relatively democratic of the five republics or least dictatorial but moved towards autocracy and authoritarianism by the early 2000s.⁴⁰ It had an active opposition; a limited free press and civic protests are allowed. The vibrant civil society led to some civil liberties with the government registering an opposition political party to participate in the elections in 2004. Economic problems and simmering criticism on the government corruption led to violent protests in 2004 in which president Askar Akaev had to flee the country that paved the way for new elections. The successor government came to power with the vote and

popular support, initiated many projects to open the economy, but could not adopt a fully modern approach to governance and human rights.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan suffered the most during its first decade of independence. Its agricultural, cotton-based economy was ravaged by a five-year-long civil war in which 150,000 died.⁴¹ The war between secularists in power and opposition Islamic parties was overlain by regional and ethnic disputes. In 1997, the UN-brokered a peace treaty which drew some of the opposition forces into the government. The government became somewhat stable afterward however, the presence of peacekeeping forces, unsettled Afghanistan, and narcotics trade have not only created instability but also created economic disparities in the country. The government keeps on blocking media coverage and in the 2005 parliamentary elections, many independent and opposition newspapers were closed. The government is accused of not allowing the Constitutional guarantees of a fair trial and torture against the detainees is common.⁴²

6.7.5 Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan presented the picture of political absolutism and personality cult during the rule of Saparmurat Niyazov (liked to be called "Turkmenbashi" or "father of all Turkmen") who ruled the country since independence until he died in 2006 and was called a brutal dictator and a rabid lunatic.⁴³ He sealed off the country with an iron curtain and as a totalitarian, controlled everything from politics to medicine and education, made parliament to rubber-stamping all of his eccentric decrees including he as president for life and proclaiming him a prophet. He abolished ballet, theatre, mathematics tuition below university level and university entrance for women.

Rich in natural gas and resources, the Turkmen government used the wealth to its advantage, provided a low-priced supply of oil and gas to Russia and Turkey in return for political support and international interaction.⁴⁴ The opposition movements in the country were suppressed with torture, imprisonment, and murders of political activists.⁴⁵ Niyazov died in 2006 and it brought one of his disciples in power with changes in rulers' behavior but hardly any chances of change in the system and improvements of human rights in the country.

Uzbekistan

Islam Karimov former Soviet head of the republic controlled power after the independence of Uzbekistan. He crushed his opposition and used repressive measures to deal with opponents that included the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut- Tahrir.⁴⁶ The presence of religious parties in the country and their opposition of the government helped Karimov to ally with the US in the War on terror. Uzbekistan played a central role in the US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that brought military and economic assistance to the country and helped in lowering the criticism of human rights violations.⁴⁷

Rights groups have been critical of the policies of repression in Uzbekistan and have appealed to the UN and other financial institutions to reconsider their projects in the country given abysmal human rights records.⁴⁸ Uzbekistan remained closed for investors leading to mounting debt despite its richness in oil, gas, gold, cotton, and cheap labor force. The US claims to have attained some betterment in the rights situation in the country as one opposition party has been able to hold regional party conferences and may be able to register officially for the next elections.⁴⁹ Official censorship in Uzbekistan has also ended, although the regime still encourages "self-censorship."

US Policy on the Democracy and Rights in the CAR

The pursuit of democracy and rights promotion in other countries originate from domestic politics of the US and it is “one of the continuities linking the foreign policies of the Democrats and the Republicans” stressing on expanding the “zone of democracy.”⁵⁰ The National Security Strategy of Clinton in 1992 emphasized that “to enhance America's security and to bolster America’s economic prosperity, promotion of democracy and human rights abroad” were needed.⁵¹ Later, President Bush stressed the issue by saying that:

decades of excusing and accommodating tyranny, in the pursuit of stability, has only led to injustice and instability, and tragedy. It should be clear that the advance of democracy leads to peace because governments that respect the rights of their people also respect the rights of their neighbors....for the sake of our long-term security, all free nations must stand with the forces of democracy and justice.⁵²

In the US policy toward the CAR, issues related to rights and democracy became important because of the states’ history of communism, Russian linkages, emerging rulers’ dictatorial policies, the post-Cold War global environment, and the prospects of economic interaction because of the possession of significant natural resources by the states.⁵³ For some observers, the US perceived that it would take decades to mold the behavior of people and states towards democracy and the countries would prefer to follow Russian political, economic, and social systems that were designed to take care of threats to the system instead of free development of societies. There were, however, views that the fears that the states could move back to communism were vague as the opinions expressed by the people of the CAR in the popular surveys showed that they supported the transition to democratic values and free-market economies.⁵⁴

For the US the issue of democracy and rights for the regions also assumed significance since it had propagated the rights and democracy in the Soviet Union during the Cold War strategy. The US had created a National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983 to support human rights activists and democratic organizations in the republics of the Soviet Union. The US policy was to support any organization that could make a political issue out of the situation of rights in the Soviet Union.⁵⁵ In the post-Cold War period, the US expressed that the former societies of the Soviet Union should now move towards democratization and should not concentrate on security.⁵⁶

After the establishment of relations with the CAR states, the US policy proclaimed that it aimed to divert the states' societies toward greater personal freedom, rule of law, and economic openness and linked these issues with international peace.⁵⁷ The objectives of the US aid to the CAR states have witnessed a steady expansion to achieve various targets including the promotion of democracy and rights, the development of media, political parties, voter education, and electoral laws to enact legal and constitutional reforms, to balance the powers of the governments and the parliaments, and the setting up of independent academic institutions.⁵⁸ The US encouraged enhancing the international interaction of the CAR states and supported their membership in multilateral institutions.⁵⁹

However, increased military and strategic interaction of the US with the states in post 9/11 period stirred a debate if the "enhanced engagement with the region's authoritarian leaders would bear fruit on human rights and democracy."⁶⁰ Relations of the US with Uzbekistan were in particular noted as its regime was cracking down more harshly on opponents than in the past and used the term 'war on terror' that was the preoccupation of the American engagements in the region. The US officials, however, called for patience in Central Asia, saying that any meaningful change towards democracy will take time to achieve.

US Policy on the Rights and Religion in the CAR

Islam and religion remained under discussion in the US interaction with the CAR states in their internal security issues. Historically, the practice of Islam in the CAR state was either limited or forcibly stopped under communism. The new rulers in the CAR kept religion out of the state affairs and knew full well that "for masses, the revival of Islam and its role in the state affairs is not a priority."⁶¹ In the wake of opposition protests, The CAR rulers linked religion as a potential threat to their security and stability and called its propagation as acts of terrorism to justify their excesses against protestors.⁶² For some scholars, however, Islam's perceived threat and links with terrorism are controversial notions.⁶³

Studies by western scholars have noted the dichotomy if the repressive regimes pose a great threat to stability by suppressing opposition or the Islamic groups that could play a role if disturbances are sparked by social and economic causes.⁶⁴ It is expressed that "harsh government repression of dissent is as much, if not more, of a threat to Central Asian stability today and in the immediate future as the radical Islamic movements."⁶⁵ On the other hand, some view that religion would bring conflict during the phase of transition where certain sections of the society would push to induct religious practices in the government policies.

It is observed that the US was not sensitive to the expansion of Islam and its linkages with Iran and the Middle East in the initial phase of its interaction with the CAR states but later, it started following the movements of Muslim missionaries and their activities.⁶⁶ The US policy on this issue is related to its Policy on the Muslim world that is to keep "strategic interests as paramount and support the authoritarian governments that suppress religious movements."⁶⁷

In the official statements, however, the US stresses to deter radical groups and Islamic fundamentalists to take root in the region and links the issues like terrorism, regional and international stability with necessary political and economic reforms, democracy, and good governance.⁶⁸

US and Socio-Political Reform in the CAR

US interaction with the states and issues linked with democracy, rights, and authoritarianism having an interface with the US policy has been examined at various levels.⁶⁹ In the official documents, it is claimed that the assistance to create a judicial system, legal defense groups, and human rights monitoring organizations in the CAR opened up the political space and promoted the development of civil society, including the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and independent media outlets. It is also claimed that in some cases the NGOs were able to limit the legislation to restrict political liberties and the US would not assist police and internal security forces of repressive states unless it was needed to ensure the ability to counter security and threats from the rise of nonstate actors.⁷⁰

The official view on the positive impact of the US interaction on the democratization in the CAR states is questioned by scholars.⁷¹ It is observed that the US official documents admit slow progress on political reforms and democracy in the region.⁷² There was some improvement in the social life of the people but it is debatable if it was due to the US support or economic prosperity. The US policy supported the ex-Communist party officials and their hold on power which "encouraged rulers" who massacred democracy and rights and suppressed politics, media, and the press in such a way that even the full disclosure of the history was withheld and only a selected version was presented before the masses.⁷³

It is observed that in pushing the policy of war on terror and seeking the support of the CAR regimes, the US knew that they would be natural allies in this campaign and, also being dictatorial, would suppress the opposition and Islamic parties terming them as terrorists.⁷⁴ The US did not pressurize the CAR states' rulers on the human rights violations rather claimed that the "military concessions given to the leaders would allow democratic and economic freedoms but the outcome of economic aid on human rights" was contrary.⁷⁵

Growing repression by the CAR rulers to curb opposition led to the growth of insurgency and extremist tendencies' in the states which tainted the US claims that "respect for human rights was one of its foremost policy priorities."⁷⁶ In the campaign against terror after 9/11, 2001, people of the CAR region were subjugated to brutal state repression in which the rulers got a free hand to suppress the masses. The US allies, for example, Turkmenistan showed little interest in democracy, human rights, and economic reform. The US policy continued emphasizing "redemption and strategic patience", for the sake of engagement on regional energy development, nonproliferation, and anti-narcotics goals and the hope that Turkmen someday might embrace democracy.⁷⁷

Similarly, the Uzbek government in 2005 brutally suppressed the protestors that made huge stories in the press. It did compel the US to revise its posture on Uzbekistan though earlier, the US State Department report on human rights (2001) had recognized Uzbekistan as an authoritarian state with limited civil rights.⁷⁸ The US never objected to the state repression in Uzbekistan since president Karimov had welcomed the US forces to use military airbases during the Afghan War. The US support and assistance continued despite the government's corruption and human rights abuses since "the goals of regional stability and political and economic transition became a matter of priority."⁷⁹

The observers who examine the US policy based on realism point out that the US support to such regimes was for "self-interest, in the form of closer economic ties to make economic systems accessible and closer military ties."⁸⁰ In the pursuance of strategic goals, developing relationships with dictatorial regimes and ignoring repression and rights is in line with US historical practices as the US overlooked the regional distortions on rights during the Cold War.⁸¹ The US developed institutional linkages with the CAR states that it had done with other Asian countries and extended support to the system of managed democracy.

The US policy to support the regimes in power in the CAR states in the initial phase of their independence was needed to ensure that they were not replaced by anti-Western radical regimes. The US policy included aid and development interaction to generate goodwill and pursue the states to not to adopt anti-western policies and the "US provided bilateral and multilateral cooperation after evaluating each nation's characteristics in building different types of links."⁸² The officials claim that off and on in their interaction with the CAR rulers the US stressed democratization and asked to adopt responsible policies on the rights in return for US support to their independence and stability.⁸³

In general, analysts expressed the view that the US engagement was helpful and justified since the fundamental, across-the-board change would not occur until there was a generational shift in leadership or dramatic expansion of prosperity in the CAR.⁸⁴ The problems facing the US policy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other regions figure out that democracy and human rights would never be high on the agenda without consistent domestic pressure.⁸⁵ The democratization process can be influenced by factors such as political pressure, economic assistance, and sanctions. However, "assistance is sometimes the only

available foot in the door to advance democratic reforms and accountability, however imperfect a mechanism it may be.”⁸⁶ It also allows monitoring human rights situations and intervening if needed.

Socio-Political Relations Assessed

In the post-Cold War period, the expectations grew that the US would include liberalism policy prescriptions in its global engagements. It was viewed as necessary not only to rectify its dwindling economy but from the spirit that it propagated against communism by leading a free and democratic world. At the time, the US policy reiterated “its commitment to spreading democracy, promoting market reforms, and improving human rights standards in the vast heartland of Eurasia.”⁸⁷ The US proclaimed to support the values that shaped its liberalism and prosperity but it “has not spread its values globally, it has been selective and securing its interests.”⁸⁸

In establishing the political and social relations, the US perceptions on the instability of the CAR states after the Russian withdrawal and they are being vulnerable to socio-political problems, shattered economies, unsettling domestic polities of states, dictatorial governance, the evolution of radical Islamic forces, their establishing training and bases of operations and attempts to subvert or take over the governments by force, drug trade were the leading considerations. These fears on the security and stability of the CAR states predicting a prolonged security vacuum in the region resulted in the prioritization of security over social issues.⁸⁹

The priority to security issues is also termed as the application of realpolitik since it involves tradeoffs under which the US supported authoritarian rulers taking the criticism that by providing security assistance to the police and internal security forces of repressive states, the US compromised its human rights standards. In the post 9/11 period, it is observed that if the security concerns were controlled the US could live with the low-level civil conflict which was bound to be due to the impoverishment, distribution injustices, and corruption.⁹⁰ Since the states were perceived as heading toward instability and internal conflicts, the rationale for an outside power to intervene in the issues of conflict is in the name of diffusing tensions to get leverage in the politics of the states and a region to promote foreign policy objectives.⁹¹

Some observers note that the US policy encouraged and pursued the dictatorial governments of the CAR to move to liberalization and to open societies.⁹² The lessening control of the US on the growth of narcotics production and trade from Afghanistan is also taken as a failure of its policy on social issues. The US rhetoric and actual policy to continue interaction serve a realpolitik objective, though the US policy creates a paradox in the eyes of people and media. The US and the CAR state's government sometimes in their statements differ over the issues of security, which sometimes, come up with the US declarations related to democracy as a catalyst for durable stability.

Many analysts question the US policy in neglecting democracy as the strategic, economic and energy interests took precedence over democracy and rights. The accessibility to energy resources and military strength is preferred to the promotion of civil freedoms and human rights.⁹³ The US did not push hard on human rights and democracy issues in the increasing engagement with the CAR irrespective of their system of governance.⁹⁴ Following realpolitik, the US accepted old communist dictators who gave a look of democracy to their rule and

ensured that the states did not replace their allegiance to Moscow and move into the orbit of Iran, Afghanistan and Islam.⁹⁵

There were opinions in the 1990s that the neglect of human rights would push the CAR towards conservatism and anti-Americanism with domestic upheavals leading to security threats.⁹⁶ In practice, it has been observed that the political deprivation did cause frustration but the masses did not revolt against the usurpers since “democracy is not the objective on which they would sacrifice their comfort that came in their way” through expanded economies and prosperity in particular after the oil boom of 2003.⁹⁷ In this respect, the societies are closer to Asian and Middle Eastern regions since Russian and Communist regimes replaced tribal control and people did never experience the important phase of societal development.⁹⁸

Justifying the policy on security and democracy, the US officials view that to blame on “the engagement with continuity of authoritarianism is a misconception since rulers even otherwise would have continued hold on power.”⁹⁹ Renewed Russian influence in the region and the spread of Islamic fundamentalist organizations and drug cartels would have been harmful to US long-term interests. The US policy thus deterred the establishment and expansion of such forces that may include citizen’s organizations, religious or secular, or the entities of other countries in the region.¹⁰⁰ The US assistance and support consolidated the CAR regimes since the objective was “to prevent a country, a group of countries, or a transnational movement or organization from gaining control of the states in transition.”¹⁰¹

Moreover, The US was not alone in neglecting the violation of rights in the CAR states. Despite the security vulnerabilities, and the question over the rights, it is not only the US, but

investors and governments in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Russia, China, and the Middle East attempted to invest in the hydrocarbon resources of the CAR, since its deposits have yet to be explored or developed, and the national governments rely on foreign investors to provide the capital to undertake costly projects.¹⁰²

As a policy, the US emphasizes the promotion of democracy and rights in developing countries since it leads to a legal and economic framework that enables the citizens to participate in the policymaking.¹⁰³ However, in practice, friendly states of the US in most of the cases are allowed to sidestep the emphasis on democracy with the reasoning that the experience of many emerging economies indicated that dictatorships and democracies economically grew at roughly the same pace.¹⁰⁴ Stability in many cases is priority and once it is achieved, the US interests are safeguarded.

By 2005, the US policy toward the CAR had “moved to less ambitious goals” however, “democracy promotion is not gone.”¹⁰⁵ Official rhetoric of the promotion of “independence and democracy” was maintained as an ideological construct with no necessary connection to reality.¹⁰⁶ Deep down, there was no significant shift of the historical realpolitik, for which the democratic impulse remains a distraction, which is needed for the US policy makers to dress up measures.

End Notes

¹ Joseph Nye, *Hard and Soft Power*. Soft power is the ability to achieve objectives through attraction rather than using the carrots and sticks of payment or coercion. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Nye, however, states that we should not aim for hard or soft power, but to combine the two as a "smart power." http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/hard-and-soft-power_b_2321.html; Richard Falk, "Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum", *Nation*, July 14, 2003, Falk observes 1990 as the age of humanitarian diplomacy", <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/2003/0714nation.htm>, (accessed 25 November 2005)

² Kenley Butler, *Internal Conflicts and Security Concerns in Central Asia and Afghanistan*, NIS Nonproliferation Program, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/caconf.htm>, (Accessed 27 June 2006)

³ While instability is attributed to many factors, some analysts view that there is no single definition of instability, Nick Donovan, Malcolm Smart, Magui Moreno-Torres, Jan Ole Kiso, and George Zacharia. "Countries at Risk of Instability: Risk Factors and Dynamics of Instability", PMSU Background Paper February 2005, Nick.Mabey@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk, (Accessed 23 June, 2006)

⁴ Graham Fuller, "Russia and Central Asia: Federation or Fault Line?", in *Central Asia and the World*, ed. Michael Mandelbaum. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, p. 118

⁵ Eric M. McGlinchey, "In For Life: Leadership succession in Post-Soviet Central Asia", Policy Memo-312, http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponas/policymemos/pm_0312.pdf, and Audrey L. Altstadt, Legacies of the Past and New Directions in Leadership, Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (accessed 15 December 2006),

⁶ Central Asia Today: Rulers and Regimes April, 2002, "co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and vague national identities were threats", http://asiasource.org/news/at_mp_02.cfm?newsid=76569, (accessed 6 March 2005), the issue is also discussed in Transition in Central Asia and Human Security, (accessed May 2007), http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/ashgabat_report.html, A good discussion on it is found in the work of Susan Clark, "The Central Asian States: Defining Security Priorities and Developing Military Forces," in *Central Asia and the World*, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 181, 193, 196.

⁷ <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50470&SelectRegion=Asia>, and Peter Sinnott, <http://www.eurasianet.org>, (accessed 9 February, 2007)

⁸ Stephan Blank (2000), pp 17-22; Also Eric Miller in *And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Central Asia and Security, Past, Present, and Future*, <http://www.virginia.edu/crees/symposium/comped.html>, (accessed 30 June 2005)

⁹ Cit. by Stephan Blank, 2001, from US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Rep.: Foreign Assistance 1999, p-10, Also in *Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region* edited by Michael P. Croissant and Bulent Aras, Westport, Conn. & London: Praeger 1999, pp 253-257 also <http://rrojasdatabank.info/agfrank/caspian.html>, (accessed 30 June 2005)

¹⁰ Fiona Hill, The United States and Russia in Central Asia: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, 2002, <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-united-states-and-russia-in-central-asia-uzbekistan-tajikistan-afghanistan-pakistan-and-iran/>

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Azmat Hayat supports this contention and expressed his views in a meeting.

¹³ Nikolas M. Swanstro, The prospects for multilateral conflict prevention and regional cooperation in Central Asia, *Central Asian Survey* (March, 2004) 23(1), 41–53, Carfax Publishing

¹⁴ Rajan Menon, & Henri J. Barkey, "The Transformation of Central Asia: Implications of Regional and International Security", *Survival*, 34 no. 4, Winter 1992-3, pp68-89

¹⁵ Nichol, Jim. (1996): *Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests*, CRS Issue Brief. P-6, Washington: Library of Congress.

¹⁶ Details on such a strategy can be found in *Knowledge is Power*, by Ernst B. Haas, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, *Berkeley · Los Angeles · Oxford*, 1990.

¹⁷ The Ferghana Valley, between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan is one region where Uzbekistan faces an uprising.

¹⁸ Stephen Blank, "Democratic Prospects in Central Asia", in *World Affairs*, vol. 166:3 (2004), pp. 133-147,

¹⁹ Nodir Khudaiberganov, "Uzbekistan - The Emergence of a New Nation", *Contemporary Review*, 273, October 1998, pp187-192 [Internet Access via Infotrac SearchBank, September 2006]

²⁰ USAID website

²¹ Ariel Cohen, 2006, <https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/us-interests-and-central-asia-energy-security>

²² Cit. Adam Federman, from Lutz Klevevan, author of "The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia," in *The US Footprint in Central Asia*, Open Democracy, Web-site, 2003, "The US State Department announced its intentions to create an Active Response Corps by 2006 that would be on call to quickly deploy staff." White House website provides details that the US federal budget for 2006 requested \$24 million for this office and \$100 million for a new Conflict Response Fund.

²³ Ariel Cohen, U.S. Interests and Central Asia Energy Security, November 15, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/bg1984.cfm>, (the Islamic Movement of Turkestan, the global Hizb'ut Tahrir, Akramiyya of Uzbekistan, and other organizations), (accessed 9 September 2008)

²⁴ Ahmet, 1994: 55-61; Kangas, 1996: 19-23; Dave, 1996: 16-19; cit in U.S.-CA Relations: A View from Turkey Bulent Aras, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jv1n1a4.html>, It is noteworthy that the practice of Islamic tenets such as prayers and fasting by Muslims in the region is considered as radical acts both by US and Russia. See also Daniel Kimmage, *The growth of radical Islam in Central Asia* http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FC31Ag02.html, (accessed 29 Jan. 2006),

²⁵ A discussion on Islam as a social force provides an insight on the issue, in *The Transformation of Central Asia*, ed. Pauline Jones Luong, page 15; and Haghayeghi, 1994: 186-189, cit. in *U.S.-Central Asian Relations: A View From Turkey* by Bulent Aras, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jv1n1a4.html>, "Islam in the region was a diffusion of Sufism which denies revolutionary ideology." (accessed Dec. 2006)

²⁶ S. Frederick Starr, *The War Against Terrorism and US Bilateral Relations with the Nations of Central Asia*, US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, December 2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm, (accessed 16 October 2006)

²⁷ Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, DC November 27, 2002, states that US covert operations started in Afghanistan in 1979 after the Soviet occupation. It is viewed that the US disengagement from Afghanistan in the early 1990s left the country at the mercy of fighter movements to run independent policies and led to the growth of militant Islam. Authoritarian rulers' practices in the CAR states that suppress opposition and call the usual religious practices as militancy have also led to the growth of militancy by otherwise peaceful organizations. IMU and HT are both included in the US State Department's list of terrorist organizations. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/eur/rls>

²⁸ Martha Brill Olcott. *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security*, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., 1989: 399

²⁹ <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/imu.htm>, (Accessed Dec. 2005)

-
- ³⁰ <http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/05/06052002095702.asp>, (Accessed Dec. 2005)
- ³¹ Nicole Jackson, *International Organizations and the "Securitisation" of Human and Narcotic Trafficking in Post-Soviet Central Asia*, Research Workshop on Illegal Migration and Non-Traditional Security, 10-11 October 2004, Beijing.
- ³² Kairat Osmonaliev, *Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy in Central Asia: Legal and Political Dimensions*, Silk Road Studies Program and Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI-SRSP), 2005, Washington. D.C.
- ³³ *ibid*
- ³⁴ Joshua Foust, *Human Rights in Central Asia*, *World Politics Review*, 22 Dec 2008 <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3068>, A good article is written by Amina Afzal, *HUMAN RIGHTS IN CENTRAL ASIA*, http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2004_files/no_1/article/7a.htm.
- ³⁵ Joshua Foust, *Human Rights in Central Asia*, *World Politics Review*, 22 Dec 2008 <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3068>, and also in Freedomhouse, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/table6.htm>, (Accessed 3 Feb, 2006)
- ³⁶ The Economist's award, Dec 5th 2002, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1480424
- ³⁷ Details are discussed in earlier sections.
- ³⁸ The president and his family are the wealthiest people while the living standards of people plunge below the poverty line. Fields of dreams, *The Economist Global Agenda*, Jan 9th 2003, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1500432, (accessed 7 march 2006)
- ³⁹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Kazakhstan, (accessed 7 July 2007)
- ⁴⁰ http://www.asiasource.org/news/special_reports/rubin.cfm, and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Kyrgyzstan, (accessed 29 Jan. 2006)
- ⁴¹ http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200306_208_1_eng.txt, (accessed also on 29 Jan. 2006)
- ⁴² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Tajikistan, (accessed 8 July 2007)
- ⁴³ <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/europe14.html>, a website of Human Rights Watch, and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Turkmenistan, (accessed 8 July 2007)
- ⁴⁴ <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tx.html>, (accessed also on 29 Jan. 2006)
- ⁴⁵ http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200303_200_2_eng.txt, (Accessed on 9 Jan. 2005)
- ⁴⁶ UN special rapporteur, report 2002
- ⁴⁷ <http://hrw.org/background/eca/uzbek060303-bck.htm>, a site of HRW.
- ⁴⁸ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2999635.stm>
- ⁴⁹ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Foreign Aid in the National Interest*, USAID, Washington, D.C. 2002, chap. 1, "Promoting Democratic Governance".
- ⁵⁰ Ole R. Holtzi, *Making American Foreign Policy*, Routledge, 2006, p-179
- ⁵¹ National Security Strategy of President Clinton 1992, <https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/>
- ⁵² President Bush, Speech to National Defense University, 8 March 2005, www.ndu.edu/ndu_speeches/, (accessed 12 September, 2007)
- ⁵³ Jeff Goldstein, "The Human Rights Situation in Central Asia" Testimony prepared for Asia, Pacific and Global Environment Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Freedom House, 2008, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/centralasia040908.pdf>, (accessed May, 2008)
- ⁵⁴ Eric W. Sievers, *Modern Regression, Central Asian Markets, Democracy and Spoils Systems*, <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200301/0301a003.htm>, (Accessed 3 Feb, 2006) and "Marx after Communism", *The Economist*, Dec. 19, 2002, "people who experienced Marxist will resist its resurgence."
- ⁵⁵ Such as: International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, OSCE, Radio Free Europe
- ⁵⁶ Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives*, Carnegie Corporation, N.Y, 1995; Peter Burnell, "Democracy Assistance: The State of the Art," in *Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization*, ed. Peter Burnell, Frank Cass, London, 2000.
- ⁵⁷ B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, *Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus*, Washington, DC, June 27, 2002, : www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/11535.htm, (Accessed June, 2006)
- ⁵⁸ Richard A. Boucher, in a policy statement on USAID, Boucher placed social issues as the strongest foreign policy tool. *South and Central Asia*, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0906/ijpe/sca.htm>, and

<http://eurasia.org.ru/cgi-bin/datacgi/database.cgi?file=News&report=SingleArticle2005&ArticleID=0001929>, Central Asia Democracy and Human Rights Act, 2005, (accessed, 20 November, 2007)

⁵⁹ CRS Reports RL30294, *Central Asia's Security*; and *Iran and Central Asia*. From website (accessed, 21 November, 2007)

⁶⁰ Jeffrey Donovan, *ENDURING FREEDOM: One year on Central Asia: Jury still out*, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/DK26Ag01.html

⁶¹ Ayaz Malikov, "The Question of the Turk: The Way out of the Crisis" Central Asia Reader, as cit. in *Political Legitimacy trends in Central Asia*, H. B. Paksoy, "Firibgarlar: Suddan Keyingi Mulahazalar." Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 9, N. 2, 1988; as one of the success stories of the Soviet legacy

⁶² Martha Brill Olcott, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace stated "The Central Asian elites are exaggerating the threat to the state that is posed by those advocating radical Islamic ideologies..." <https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/23>

⁶³ Olivier Roy, *Islam and Other Ideologies*, Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, ; and Daniel Kimmage, The growth of radical Islam in Central Asia http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FC31Ag02.html, (Accessed on 9 Jan. 2005)

⁶⁴ Constructing Militant Opposition: Authoritarian Rule and Political Islam in Central Asia, Paper Prepared for the Yale Lecture Series on Central Asia, April 6, 2004, http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/centralasia/mcglin_yale.pdf, (Accessed on 17 March 2006)

⁶⁵ Fiona Hill, *Civil Society: Grassroots Organizations in Central Asia*, Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html; (accessed on 12 Jan. 2006)

⁶⁶ Sean L. Yom, The United States and Islam, *Fundamentalism and the Future*, He points out that US policy on Muslim World is based on the experiences of the incidents like Iranian Revolution and extremism cum terrorism. It creates a negative image of the US but is relevant to this study. Accessed May 2006 http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2002_07-09/yom_usislam/yom_usislam.html,

⁶⁷ *ibid*

⁶⁸ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Foreign Aid in the National Interest* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2002), chap. 1 ("Promoting Democratic Governance").

⁶⁹ Policy Brief, Democratization and Human Rights in Central Asia: Problems, Development Prospects and the Role of the International Community, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=35453&lng=en>

⁷⁰ USAID official website

⁷¹ Ross Wilson , State Department official, Testimony before the Congressional Helsinki Commission (CSCE) on May 6, 1999, web source

⁷² Anatoly Medetsky, Staff Writer, "Bush Foresees Changes in the Caucasus, Central Asia", , 25 May 2005, states "Bush predicted more democratic changes across the Caucasus and Central Asia and pledged help to new democratic governments", site accessed 27 November 2006, <http://feeds.bignewsnetwork.com/redir.php?jid=70f15bcc0ca26c1f&cat=929bcf2071e81801>

⁷³ H. B. Paksoy, "M. Ali--Let us Learn our Inheritance: Get to Know Yourself." Cahiers d'Etudes sur la Mediterranee orientale et le monde turco-iranien No.11, 1991

⁷⁴ S. Frederick Starr, The war against terrorism and US. Bilateral Relations with the Nations of Central Asia, 2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm

⁷⁵ Human Rights and Wrongs in Central Asia, July 01, 2002, http://www.asiasource.org/news/at_mp_02.cfm?newsid=82955, (accessed 16 May, 2006)

⁷⁶ <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/15561.htm>, (accessed 27 November 2006), it states that human rights in the CAR are a subject of concern for the US, US Department of State also lists achievements of its assistance program for promoting long-term stability.

⁷⁷ Beyrle, testimony before the Congressional Commission on March 21, 2000, <https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/JB.pdf>

⁷⁸ Don Van Natta, "Washington recruits a Rough Ally to Be a Jailer", *The Moscow Times*, May 4, 2005.

⁷⁹ http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200209_143_5_eng.txt, in the war against terrorism, the US has been accused of sending suspected terrorists to Uzbekistan for detentions and interrogation and in return provided 500 million dollars worth of aid to be used for border control and other security measures. Uzbek government took some steps including the conviction of few police officers for torture, freed 900 political prisoners, and abolished exit visas for its population. (accessed 25 May, 2006)

⁸⁰ Steffen Schwarz, US Foreign Policy on Central Asia, Seminar in US Foreign Policy, DeMonfort University, Leicester, 15 April 2002, www.hausarbeiten.de/faecher/vorschau/4050.html, (procured 22 December 2006)

⁸¹ Pravda News, *American capillary vision and inventions of democracy*, http://english.pravda.ru/mailbox/22/101/399/16528_democracy.html, (Accessed May 2006), Pravda mentions the US attack on Iraq and writes, "People who value democracy freedom, justice, and human rights rejoice with the downfall of any regime that rules by manipulation of fear." But the initial "justification" of the US for the Iraq war, was not a "change of Saddam's regime", Saddam's regime found its nourishment in the lavish and friendly relationship it enjoyed with the US for a long time until the Gulf war 1991.

⁸² Strobe Talbott, 1994, "Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in *Central Asia*," Dispatch 5, no.19 (5/9).

⁸³ Jim Nichol, Central Asia's New States: Political Development and Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, May 2001, <http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/international> , (accessed 9 Dec. 2005)

⁸⁴ Starr, 2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm, (accessed 26 October 2007)

⁸⁵ Roger McDermott, *U.S. Foreign Policy in Central Asia: Time for Change?* http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=414&issue_id=3929&article_id=2371661

⁸⁶ Seth G. Jones, Olga Oliker, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Rollie Lal, and James Dobbins, *Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes*, www.rand.org, (accessed 12 December, 2008)

⁸⁷ Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia, by Ariel Cohen, Backgrounder #1656, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm>, (accessed May, 2006)

⁸⁸ G. John Ikenberry, "Why Export Democracy?: The "Hidden Grand Strategy" of American Foreign Policy"" *The Wilson Quarterly* (Vol. 23, no.2 (Spring 1999) <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/exdem.htm>, (Accessed 12 June 2006)

⁸⁹ Azmat Hayat, *The Game of Oil and Security in Central Asia*, Central Asia no.52, 2003 Peshawar

⁹⁰ Hélène Perrin Wagner, Harvard Asia Quarterly, It is a matter of regional security also not only for the CAR to work out consultative and cooperative solutions because uncontrolled and violent expressions of collective identities could spread out. <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/199904/9904a007.htm>, (Accessed 9 February, 2006), also good discussion is in Conference Report, Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics-C, October 2000, http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/central_asia.html, (accessed 3 March 2007)

⁹¹ Roy E. Jones, *Principles of Foreign Policy* Martin Robertson, 1979, p-57-62

⁹² Ariel Cohen, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav111402_pr.shtml, for internal reform, security, and energy assistance to the states were more than doubled in 2002 from the year 2001 – from \$230 million to \$595 million.

⁹³ Steffen Schwarz, US Foreign Policy on Central Asia, Seminar in US Foreign Policy, DeMonfort University, Leicester, 15 April 2002, www.hausarbeiten.de/faecher/vorschau/4050.html

⁹⁴ Starr, 2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm, (accessed 26 October 2007)

⁹⁵ The issue has been discussed by Jim Lobe, *POLITICS-US: Bush Democracy Doctrine, 2003(?)–2006, R.I.P.* <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33339>

⁹⁶ Amina Afzal, *Human Rights in Central Asia* http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2004_files/no_1/article/7a.htm,

⁹⁷ Starr, 2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm, (accessed 26 October 2007)

⁹⁸ Fiona Hill, 2000, and The Economist print edition, *What is the rush*, Jul 24th 2003,

⁹⁹ Cassidy B. Craft (2000), <http://www.nuclearthreatinitiative.org/db/nisprofs/tajikis/excon.htm>

¹⁰⁰ Islamic organizations would be termed as terrorists if they threaten the regimes. Business entities of other competing countries would be made to face tough competition to force them out of the market.

¹⁰¹ Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia, Ariel Cohen, Backgrounder #1656, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm> (accessed January, 2006)

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Stephen Jones, *Civil Society: Grassroots Organizations in the South Caucasus*, Conference Report, October 2000, http://cia.gov/nic/confreports_asiacaucasus.html, (Accessed 21 March, 2006)

¹⁰⁴ Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and the Well Being in the World, 1950–1990*, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2000; Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post communist Transitions,” *World Politics* 50 (January 1998): 203–234; In post Communist Europe, democracy and growth were positively correlated, East Asia was also an exception that challenged this model and advocated development first, democracy second.

¹⁰⁵ C.J. Chivers, *US policy shifts in Central Asia*, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/03/asia/uzbek.php>, (Accessed 19 March, 2006)

¹⁰⁶ Anatol Lieven, *Western Policy in Central Asia: Values or Geopolitics?* http://www.eurasianet.org/osn/Western_Policy.html, (Accessed 22 June, 2006)

CONCLUSION

The study focuses on the US Policy toward Central Asia in the post communist transition period (1991-2005). What has been discussed in the preceding chapters provides a prism through which one can note various facets of the US policy toward Central Asia. It provides the objectives, the premises, and rationale on which the US built and implemented its policy toward the region. This section concludes the study with the thesis that mainly the realism impulses and power tools were predominant for the US policy toward Central Asia.

In 1991, the five states of the CAR incited global interest for other states to engage with them given their strategic importance, economic potential, and they being old centers of civilizations. As stated in Chapter one (Introduction), the study finds its basis in the thesis that the US policy toward the CAR from 1991-2005 followed realpolitik and used the tools of liberalism to its advantage. Chapter two, brings in review of literature on theories, the US foreign policy and its basis, and the theoretical framework that has been used in the conduct of this study.

Geo-politics of the CAR and the evolution of the US policy were discussed in Chapter 3. The US relations with the CAR in a few years encompassed all spheres including trade, foreign aid, military-military interaction, and investments in energy and minerals. The interaction of the US with the CAR was extended to their internal systems and institutions. The relationship moved to an integrated relationship that in the words of Haass, it lead “into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with US interests and values.”¹ On the surfacing of US policy toward the region, it was observed that analysts expressed varying opinions concerning the

region and its future in international politics. Since the US post-Cold-War policy aimed to expand global influence, the strategic, political, and economic importance of the CAR required the expanded engagements of the US.

US policy gradually evolved after the establishment of relations with the CAR states in 1991. Soon their strategic, economic, and political importance started appearing in the policy briefs, media, and academic circles. A Russian factor was prominent in the initial engagement since it became the principal successor of the former Soviet Union although its internal politics remained unstable in the 1990s. Russia had initially colonized the Central Asian Region and it was feared that the old communist and conservative elements in Russia might have retaken the power and attempted to re-colonize the new CAR states.

Due to Russian concerns, the US policy statements in the 1990s expressed support for the independent character, sovereignty, and stability of the new CAR states. In the evolution of the US policy in the early 1990s, some scholars have argued that the US had little knowledge regarding the CAR countries at the time of the Soviet withdrawal. The initial policy of the US was cautious and limited to the usual establishment of relations and the expression of its concerns on the stability and security of the region. Prominent US interests focused on the need to protect resources and the supply chain routes of hydrocarbon: especially oil, the rise in religious militancy in the region, and also to contain the influence of the regional powers most especially Russia, China, and Iran. Initial United States' interests in the region also included though to a lesser extent concerns about narcotics, and the cross-border movements of weapons and terrorists.

Many observers in the 1990s argued that the US needed to rapidly engage with the Central Asian states at both governmental and nongovernmental levels so that the United States as a superpower could seize the opportunity to expand its global influence and engage the region in multifaceted relations. By the late 1990s, the views of some alarmists both inside and outside the government had intensified, suggesting that the CAR was engulfed in a wave of militancy and terrorism crises emanating from Afghanistan and Iran, and also including the expansion of Islamic militancy and various issues related to ethnic disturbances. The region was in transition and this would have repercussions on global security and stability. And, into this mix, the US engages the instabilities and potential future instabilities that were erupting or which might erupt in the region. And, there was real concern within some sections of the United States government that unrest in the CAR would spread into the neighboring areas of the Middle East and South Asia: two regions of major interest for the US.

With the turn of events in 2001, the US decided to actively engage the states of Central Asia and, in this way, its policy moved into the realm of realpolitik. The subsequent action in the region revolved around its primacy, the primacy of realpolitik. The elements within the US government decided for a more offensive approach in its dealings with the states, as global events had brought CAR into the limelight. By 2004, the US had reached a stage when it announced that its primary strategic goals now and into the future would be to see the development of the CAR states as independent, democratic, and stable.

By the early twenty-first century, US policy concerning the Central Asian states had progressed. It was by then, to actively seeking influence in the region. It is also important to point out that its relationship with the CAR states remains a part of its global foreign policy. The end of the Cold War did not mean the “end of history.” Rather the end of the Cold War

allowed the US to evaluate and redesign the economic and military institutions that served its goals during that conflict. Political, military, and economic alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank served US global interests. They were moved to ensure regional security and ingress in the regional markets both during the Cold War and in the post-cold war international environment. US engagement with regions around the world would also be linked with the transformation and future evolution of these institutions.

In pursuance of its global agenda, the US would bring the CAR states to interact with the international institutions (of NATO, the IMF, and the World Bank) and also at the bilateral level. The US would establish relations with the regimes in power in individual states and express interest in enhancing relationships on issues related to stability and security, as well as on issues of military, economic and social cooperation. In the diplomatic exchanges with the leaders of Central Asian states, the US declared that the regions' stability was crucial for its political and economic reforms for transition. The US offered economic and other aid for the development of political and economic advancement in the region so that regions' economic potential, including its extensive natural resources, could be developed, and that the regional states could develop their international economic and financial institutions, both in terms of each countries internal growth, and also in terms of each countries growing relationship with US institutions both private and public.

Strategic; Military and Security Relations

The National Security strategies issued by the United States during the period under study in the dissertation stress security and stability in the Central Asian nations and the surrounding region. The US judged the security and stability of the region as crucial for the US national

interests. US interaction on strategic issues has been discussed in Chapter 4. The US policy followed from the concerns that CAR states were part of the former Soviet Union's sphere which had been fleshed out in the Warsaw Pact to counter the United States cold war grand strategy of containment. From the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, there was now a security vacuum in the region, after the Russian withdrawal. That regional power vacuum threatened regional (and global) security and stability. It was also a region at risk of weapons proliferation, as well as a region of important energy and natural resource supplies for the West with implications for international private and public investments and the global economy. The US would thus have to engage the CAR states at both strategic and military levels.

In pursuance of its military and strategic objectives, the United States government moved into the region through a variety of multilateral institutions and it also promoted the partnership programs of NATO with the CAR states. Programs initiated by the US were effective. US-sponsored initiatives - - initiatives to make the militaries of the CAR states malleable institutions for the West by promoting links between the defense institutions of the United States and each of the Central Asian countries individually. From an international system's perspective, the US was able to induce a nuclear-free regime in the CAR and in particular, to achieve nuclear disarmament of Kazakhstan and established links with its militaries and of the other states.

Multilateral interactions along with various bilateral military and strategic relationships were developed (as set out by Roy Jones). After the mid-1990s, the US had established direct military relations with almost all five states. And importantly, the US shifted the strategic affairs of the Central Asian Region from its European military command to CENTCOM--linking it with the Middle East. And, later after 9/11, in the wake of the US campaign against

terrorism and its attacks on Afghanistan this venue would prove to be important. CENTCOM brought bilateralism to the United States' strategic dealings with the CAR states. With time and in the wake of the post 9/11 war on terror, the US was -- crucially-- able to establish military bases in the CAR states. The events of 9/11 brought the Central Asian Region into the center of US attention and spread strategic partnerships most notably, the establishment of military bases in the region. As some scholars argue, because of this strategic interest, the U.S. is not critical enough of Central Asian regimes. Those regimes have become increasingly authoritarian and the United States had, these scholars argue, not pushed back against them.

During the 1991-2005 period, many regional processes emerged to deal with security and stability issues in which Russia and China were also active. In its statements, the US supported the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other regional processes that addressed regional security and stability. The US also established diplomatic links with the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO). The US did actively support some initiatives like the Conference on Interaction & Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) which served as a confidence-building forum for Asia, and the US encouraged the CAR leaders to develop it as a collaborative framework. The US also started participating in major initiatives in the region ranging from nonproliferation confidence-building measures in Asia (for security and stability) to economic projects, pipelines, energy development, and social and cultural development.

Economic Interaction

Economic relations of the US with the CAR states -- these new states were transforming toward free-market economic systems and decentralized governance -- were crucial from the beginning. This issue was examined in Chapter 5. In the initial period of interaction

beginning in 1991, US policymakers' views were mostly that the CAR states were peripheral to US interests (with little economic transactions with the US) but later following 9/11 it came to be understood by members of the Department of State that their energy reserves, markets for consumer and capital goods and opportunities for investment were of enormous potential. The US government's policy supported the CAR states in adopting liberal economic policies in external and internal matters and emphasized that these steps were crucial for them to develop relations with the West and for the promotion of investments and prosperity.

The transition of the CAR states toward a market economic system was also important for the US since its failure would pose a threat to the success and prosperity of the US-led global economic system built on the Bretton Woods agreements. Through its aid and investment policies, the US extended necessary support to the CAR states in their transition toward liberal economic systems and persuaded them to adopt free trade practices, open their markets for investments and become members of international regimes. The US aid aimed to develop the social infrastructure of the states besides the provision of support to the governments.

Through its active engagement in the transition and development process the US secured business and investment opportunities in the CAR states. The US companies got hold of the markets related to consumer and capital goods and for supplies to the oil and gas development fields. The US multinationals flourished in the region and engaged in many ventures that are spread for a longer time. The US advanced the construction of new pipelines bypassing the Russian territory and allowing the CAR states extra revenues and lessening of

dependency on Russia. It aroused moves from Russia and China to compete in the region for trade, investments, and energy development.

The enhancement of economic relations is attributed to the fact that the CAR states had realized the value to get closer to the US, a global economic power, for trade, investment, and development aid as well as its being an important player in international economic institutions. By 2005, the alternatives were coming along and getting in their way. Russia and China had attained economic and material resources to play the economic game of competition in CAR -- for trade, investments, and military interaction. CAR states had also developed their resources and were able to enhance revenues, in consequence of escalating energy prices, and the enhanced revenues that the CAR states collected from those oil and gas profits allowed them to initiate many economic development programs.

Social and Political Relations

The US also moved to try to transform internal political and social structures of the CAR states. This effort has been discussed in Chapter 6. The policy statements of the US emphasized the need for democracy and the protection of the rights of the people. This aspect relates to the promotion of liberal values -- with which the record of the US is critically discussed by analysts. The US supported the internal transition of the institutions of law and order, the judicial system, the electoral process, and NGOs. However, the US evaded criticism of the dictatorial practices of the CAR governments -- which were made evident in US State Department reports on human rights. US criticism of the CAR states' human rights practices was positively correlated to CAR states' for US strategic ambitions in the region.

In terms of human rights and freedom: Islam, the religion of majority people in the CAR states, has important relevance in understanding their external relations with the United States. After their independence, the role of Islam was pictured by some members of the US state department as a radical force and a threat especially with the expansion of Salafi Islam from the Middle East into the region. The US worked to ensure that the linkages of the CAR states with hard-line Islamic entities of other states were checked. The CAR regimes also suppressed religious freedom to keep the societies away from Islamic movements-- and in this effort, they had the full support of the United States.

Besides strategic issues, the US also focused on peripheral issues to build trust and confidence to assure private corporate investors of its protection. Issues included the environment, water resources, the Aral Sea's environment issues, transboundary Rivers, and regional cooperation on the Caspian Sea, the latter, of which has significant oil and gas potential. The US also provided assistance to the Central Asian states in projects for water supply and public health; it constructed chlorination facilities in several cities along the Amu Darya delta in the CAR.

The US has not objected to the managed democracy model being practiced by Russia, the region's past colonial master, and adopted by the CAR states. Such a system of pluralistic governance with authoritarianism suits the US since its record on human liberties for other nations and regions shows that it would trade off rights and freedom for stability, security, and institution building. In the case of the CAR, the US as a liberal hegemon prioritized a military and a security agenda - - an approach that is in line with the policy of realpolitik. The US however, expressed vocal support to the movements for democracy in the region. It

supported the movements of the NGO's in the process of educating people in the election processes and the establishment of political parties.

US influence in the CAR

By the end of 2005, the US achieved a certain level of influence and strength in the Central Asian Region. The US engagement with CAR intensified to the extent that the region became one of the largest recipients of US military, economic aid, and investment in the world outside Europe. The US promised global security and prosperity in the region through the exploitation of resources via huge investments. With this active engagement, it attained enormous influence and a certain level of leverage over the affairs of the region's states. The US expected that its power could transform the CAR states and their systems to become conducive to the needs of capitalist economies.²

In the process to gain influence in the region and enhance engagement, the US policies targeted strategic alliances. It was done with the support of local regimes, military deployments, the use of aid for political gains, and the strengthening of multinationals into the region. The underlying assumption of US policies, therefore, hinged in the period from 1991-2005, as it did during the cold war era, on the internal stability of its allies and the degree of convergence of their vital interests with those of the US and the disregard of CAR states' systems of governance. The realpolitik policy of the US toward the CAR intended to oust competitors and to deny other states and non-state actors, the ability to establish a sphere of influence in the region. The US did not impede the processes, even if these involved Russia and China since it would have placed an unnecessary burden on resources.

US promotion of the inter-Tajik peace talks under the auspices of the UN to ease tensions and its support for the deployment of UN observers in Tajikistan, as well as its pushing Russian-CIS "peacekeeping" forces to cooperate, paved the way for a role for the US in the region. It became a major humanitarian and developmental donor with its interactive role in the Tajik civil war. The US engagement with Kazakhstan in the early 1990s not only successfully ended nuclear proliferation but also provided huge investment opportunities of investment for its Multinational Corporations. Kazakhstan agreed to US investments happily, since it needed to develop its energy sector and diversify its energy supply markets. The US continues, to this day to regularly interact with the regional processes in the CAR.

However, policy paradoxes -- between the US global policy of idealistic enthusiasm behind its campaign for democracy and its commitments to the hard geopolitical realities -- are visible in the Central Asian Region as well. US's interactions in the region and its maneuvers to enhance its influence -- and talks of the promotion of its value system -- are looked upon with suspicion by the CAR's rulers and peoples. The intensification of relations -- in the presence of such paradoxes in which the US continues to develop relations with the authoritarian regimes -- is termed by Idealists and EU think tanks as having continuity with its Cold War hegemonic behavior.³

In pursuing its economic interests US policy has some distinct characteristics. For realists, the increasing role of economic forces and the economic needs shape the US policy. On this view, the goal is to seek global influence and maintain economic and political preponderance for the pursuit of US national interests.⁴ US foreign policy contains a wide range of tools including aid, payoffs, sanctions, economic incentives, and more. But "military engagements remain its integral part."⁵ In the context of the US policy toward the CAR states, the US

supported the entry of the states into international organizations in pursuance of a set of global policy objectives of the US, a set of global policies under which the new states were to be brought under the international economic system built and supported by the West.⁶

In the period 1991 to 2005, the US moved into adventurism -- both economic and military-linked with its strategic maneuvering in the region. In this way, the US attempted to create a stable political and economic climate favorable to American business interests. It involved itself in the resolution of conflicts and peace in the region. The US interacted with the internal structures of the states and was not perturbed by the states' dictatorial rule, since its behavior assured control for effective pro-US policy in its interaction with these foreign powers, without much regard for those foreign powers' domestic constituencies. Such CAR rulers do not put restrictions on the model of economic development favored by donors and international financial institutions. They easily conform to an external model of aid and investment programs to grow their economies -- so that both they (as rulers) and their citizens can live in more prosperous countries.

Challenges to the US

While, the points of salience discussed above, in which the US can promote its interests in the CAR with something of a guarded hegemonic role, one is taken as the success of its policies in the region, at the end of 2005 some scholars including myself have observed that a future reversal of US expansion of influence is possible. The reversal would be the natural outcome of structural elements in international politics that describe the temporary withdrawal of power from a region as part of an aggressive strategy of realism in the wake of strong opponents.

In this regard the phenomena that are observed flow from the fact that the initial support of stability and security in the CAR states did allow the US to deepen its engagement and confidence at a point where it was able to get military bases established when needed in its Afghan operations. However, the issues that cause instability in the CAR remain simmering. Rulers in the region continue to suppress oppositional militants, which continue their activities. And too, and of course, at a much lesser scale, control over narcotics and drug trafficking is loosening and the rulers' powers in the region -- and this has resulted, at times, to ask the US to reduce its physical presence in the region.

The regional players are also a contributing factor. The CAR states were driven away from the US in 2003 when Russia promised military equipment support and joint ventured investments without making aspersions on the democratic record of the rulers as the US does in its policy statements. The CAR witnessed the emergence of many sub-regional mechanisms with varying objectives and almost all of these included Russia in the center and had limited linkages with the US. The US in its policy maintained a level of understanding with Russia since the cooperation was considered as rewarding, however, "traditional geopolitical struggle was evident."⁷

This thesis has observed that the US undertakings in the CAR are the derivatives of regional instability, natural resources, extremism, and market opportunities which brought the support of the regional states in the initial period. However, the support and understanding of the regional actors converted into concerns when the US brought in military bases and also, if to a lesser extent with the alternate routes for pipelines. This resulted in competition and

introduced new alliances. If Russia openly opposes the US presence in the CAR it would renew the Cold War tactics of covert and overt operations in intelligence. Russia would cooperate with anti-American elements leading to new threats to regional instability and in the zero-sum game, the element of competition would be enhanced and not reduced.

The US economic cooperation that allowed Multinationals to expand their businesses and investments in the energy sector and pipelines projects, and the Silk Road transport corridor to lessen the dependence of energy exports of the CAR through Russia, was being checked by the Russian maneuvers in which the institutional arrangements like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Russian and Chinese joint ventures with the CAR states were being developed.

Limitations of the Study

No study is without limitations. As was mentioned in the chapter one, that in selecting the method of analysis based on geopolitical and geo-economic approaches, and the theoretical framework of International Relations Foreign Policies limit the analysis of plausible things that “might happen” in the future. The limitations of the study are also spread over the availability of the relevant material, fluid internal politics in states, and intricacies of the transition process which would lead to sudden change of stances by the leaders of the states. On the US side there were also evolving engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan with repercussions on the neighboring regions, and the ensuing policies that varied from time to time. The evolution in the region emphasized a widening scope of events that had the chances of losing focus. There was also competition from regional powers China and Russia, which required the inclusion of many other variables leading the study unmanageable.

Concluding remarks

In the power politics of the CAR, the US is in a situation of relative preeminence; greater ability than others to shape issues and agenda of the international regimes and to influence the terms of interaction between states and the distribution of resulting pay-off remains to pursue its national interests in the Post Cold War period. Its policy of realpolitik did not change in the post-Cold War period and hence the policy tools also did not change. The post-Cold War transformation brought concerns for the US global policy due to the precipitous decline of Russia, emerging new states in Eastern Europe and Asia, changing patterns of power with the increasing ability of lesser order powers to expand influence in world politics.

At the same time, in the transformed post-Cold War world order, the problems of the CAR states were similar as well as distinguishable from those of other states. They are and will remain in transition for some time to come. Unlike many other former Soviet states that are geographically positioned near Europe, these states are not pulled or pushed by Europe toward the western economic and social system. Their transition remains slow and has been a mix of Asian (Chinese and Japanese model), the old centralized (communist) system of governance, and injections of market economic principles with which the US would have to deal.

It is also important to note that political power is situational; the US remains a power in many other regions such as the Middle East but is less influential in the CAR. The US was facing challenges in its policy toward the CAR in 2005 which is explained in degrees as a result of systemic changes in international politics. The US followed the realists' prescriptions that strategic, economic, and social interaction would allow it the necessary leverages with the

CAR states. However, the US and the CAR state's relations have seen ups and down under the convergence of interests that changed with time and situations.

At times, the US has been more concerned with instability in the CAR coming out of militancy. Sometimes, the US's views on the nature of governance and rights in the CAR states find disagreements with those states themselves. In the early 1990s, the CAR states were eager to interact with the US since they viewed it as offering opportunities and potential for businesses and investments and the same was the case with the US and this was a convergence of interests in the post-Cold War environment that was conducive to the use of soft power along with hard power -- given increased interdependence.

The perceived US policy, in the early Clinton period that it was moving toward international cooperation led many third world states to get closer to the US. This impression was however short-lived and by the mid-1990s -- when the WTO was signed -- US policy turned back to realpolitik. It slowed down the pace of the development of US relations with the CAR, but these relations again accelerated after 9/11 -- during the time the interests in the shape of the fight against terror converged at the turn of the century. Such fluctuations and the question about the purpose of the use of power and the conduct of US policy towards these developing countries remains a dilemma -- and many third world countries find ambiguities in the US foreign policy.

At times, Russia and China offered to cooperate with the US in its relations with the CAR, particularly in the beginning. But later they turned into competitors. It happened after US policy moved to military deployment, use of force (in neighboring Afghanistan), seeking allies in the war against terror, support of revolutions against undesirable regimes in the CIS,

and isolation of states from their joining the global economic system; the realpolitik tools. This brings in the fact that competition breeds competition and the relations of the US and regional neighboring powers get unstable due to power politics since these are the instruments to pursue the goal through military hard power that heats the realpolitik in the Central Asian Region.

The US behavior that was not found vague in many of the writings of the scholars as discussed in the previous sections is explained with Waltz's explanations that in the structural theory the "unipolarity appears as the least durable of international configurations." It is due to two reasons the first one that too many tasks beyond ones' borders diminishes the power and the second one is that even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior.⁸

The economic interests of the US are stressed in many National Security Strategies; the purpose of the US foreign policy is to create favorable conditions for the economy. Moreover, Energy is crucial for US politics. Notwithstanding, the difficulties and the linkages of CAR states with Russia, the US continued to invest in the energy sector and that sector's pipelines in the CAR. This certainly favors the US in the region since it allows openness of the CAR region that brings in more confidence of the people who benefit from the resources.

Researchers, in general, advise the US to principally focus its energies against other great powers and to take a more relaxed attitude toward smaller powers -- except in the case where a small state is in a strategic location, in which case it would require engagement. It is similar to those that fall under the rubric of "offshore balancing," a grand strategy.⁹ People and rulers of the third world regions are more sensitive to the paradoxes of the policies of the big powers and consider it a threat as pointed out by Waltz. The CAR states offer good incentives

to investors, and multinationals have flourished in the region. However, it is expected by the people in the CAR states that this activity will bring prosperity for the general populace in the CAR. The people expect investments in the social sectors of society will be forthcoming.

As long as the economic partnership of the US with the CAR in the form of investments and trade does not bring in the securitization of economic issues that would enhance military and strategic engagement for the protection of economic interests leading to limiting the rights of the people and restricting democracy, the relations would develop to the benefit of the US. It entails that the US needs to develop an understanding with the rulers of the CAR states as well as with the peoples of those states instead of attempts to develop military engagements only. Interaction in the social, welfare, and education functions of the Central Asian governments should be enlarged.

One could say that the US policy contains all the tools of *realpolitik* necessary to prescriptions for power politics. The United States aimed at the development of influence in the CAR through military, economic, and social tools. However, the observations of Colin Powell need to be reiterated: that the US foreign policy does pursue strategic goals but sometimes the emphasis on some issues, for example, the war on terror, put other pursuits in the background while the media and scholarly literature concentrate on military maneuvers only.

End Notes

¹ As stated by Haass, http://www.glovesoff.org/features/beams_0703.html

² President George W. Bush predicted more democratic changes across the Caucasus and Central Asia and pledged Washington would help newly democratic governments. "Bush Foresees Changes in the Caucasus, Central Asia", Anatoly Medetsky, STAFF WRITER, 25 May 2005, <http://feeds.bignewsnetwork.com/redir.php?jid=70f15bcc0ca26c1f&cat=929bcf2071e81801>

³ Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, American Hegemony: Without an Enemy, *Foreign Policy*, No. 92 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 5-23

⁴ Emily S. Rosenberg, Economic Interests and the United States Foreign Policy, in Martel, Gordon, ed. *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered 1890-1993*, Routledge, 1994, p-37, the US articulates the national interests and include economic goals since it is needed due to recovering from the economic depression of the 1980s;

⁵ Nick Beams "not force held in abeyance but force expanded became a hallmark of US policy in the 1990s" with Clinton's two terms producing an "unprecedented level of military activism", *The Political Economy of American Militarism* http://www.glovesoff.org/features/beams_0703.html, (accessed 24 Oct. 2006)

⁶ Kenneth Waltz, 2000, Waltz's in the examination of NATO observes that international institutions are "instrument[s] for maintaining America's domination of the foreign and military policies of [other] states."

⁷ Olcott, Åslund & Garnett (1999), *Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp 77-107

⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Structural Realism after the Cold War*, *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer, 2000), pp. 5-41

⁹ On offshore balancing, see Layne 2006, Posen 2007, Walt 2005b

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Allison, Roy and Chritoph Bluth, eds. *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1998.

_____, eds. *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001.

Alyson J. K. Bailes, Björn Hagelin, Zdzislaw Lachowski, Sam Perlo-Freeman, Petter Stålenheim, and Dmitri Trofimov, *Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, SIPRI, 2003.

Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. In *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David Baldwin, 85-115. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Bremmer, I and Taras R. (eds) *New States, New Politics; Building the Post-Soviet Nations*. Cambridge University Press, 1997

Bull, Hedley, "The Anarchical Society: A Study of World Politics," *Classic Readings of International Relations*, ed. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz, Harcourt Brace College Publisher, New York, 1994

Chomsky, N. *World Orders, Old and New*, Pluto Press, London, 1994

Craig, Timothy G. "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Origins and Implications." *MA thesis*, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003; Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School; Springfield, Va. National Technical Information Service, 2003. Available from <http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/03sep%5FCraig.pdf>.

David A. Lake, "British and American Hegemony Compared: Lessons for the Current Era of Decline," *International Political Economy*, ed. Frieden and Lake, St. Martin, 1995

Fukuyama, F. *The End of History and the Last Man*, Penguin, London, 1992

Goldgeier, James and Michael McFaul. *Power and Purpose*, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2004.

Gleason, G. *The Central Asian States; Discovering Independence* Oxford: Westview 1997

Glenn Palmer and T. Clifton Morgan, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, Princeton, 2006.

Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation." In *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David Baldwin, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.

Haas, Ernst B. *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990

Hobson, J.A. *Imperialism: A Study*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988.

Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power And Peace*, 1991

- Holtsi, Ole R., *Making American Foreign Policy*, Routledge, 2006
- Hunter, Shireen T. *Central Asia since Independence*, Praeger, New York, 1996
- Ikenberry, G. John, (ed), *America Unrivaled*, Cornell University Press (2002)
- Ivanov, Igor S. *The New Russian Diplomacy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2002
- Jackson, Nicole J. *Russian foreign policy and the CIS: theories, debates and actions*. Routledge, London and New York, 2003
- James H. Lebovic, *Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States*, Routledge, London, 2007.
- Mearsheimer, John, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. 1995. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," in *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, Ed. Brown, Lynn-Jones, Miller, MIT, 1995
- Jones, Roy E., *Principles of Foreign Policy: The Civil State in the World Setting*, Martin Robertson, 1979
- Jonson, Lena. *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia The Shaping of Russian Policy*, I. B. Tauris, 2004
- Kalevi j. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 6th edition, Prentice Hall International, London, 2004
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.Y. 1984.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1977
- Kleveman, Lutz. *The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia*. Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2003.
- Kortunov, Andrei and Sergei Lounev. "Russia and Russians in Central Asia." In *Ethnic Challenges beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perceptions of the Central Asian Conundrum*, eds. Yongjin Zhong and Rouben Azizian, 93-111. London: Macmillian, 1998.
- Light, Margot. "Foreign Policy Thinking." In *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, eds., Neil Malcom and others, 33-100. Oxford University Press, U.K. 1996.
- Liu, Qingjian "Sino-Central Asian Trade and Economic Relations: Progress, Problems, and Prospects." In *Ethnic Challenges beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perceptions of the Central Asian Conundrum*, eds. Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian, Macmillian, London, 1998.
- Lounev, Sergei and Gleryi Shirokov. "Central Asia and the World: Foreign Policy and Strategic Issues." In *Ethnic Challenges beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perceptions of the Central Asian Conundrum*, eds. Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian, 218-233, Macmillian, London, 1998.

- Loung, Pauline Jones. *"The Transformation of Central Asia"*, Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2005
- Malcom, Neil, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light, eds., *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.
- Martel, Gordon, ed. *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered 1890-1993*, Routledge, New York, 1994
- Michael Pugh & Neil Cooper, "War Economies in a Regional Context Challenges of Transformation", Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 2004
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power And Peace*, in *Classic Readings of International Relations*, ed. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz, Harcourt Brace College Publisher, New York, 1994
- Olcott, Martha Brill. *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security*, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C. 1996.
- Paul A. Papayoanou. *Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999
- Seth G. Jones, Olga Oliker, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Rollie Lal, James Dobbins, *Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform?* Published 2006 by the RAND Corporation,
- Spruyt, Hendrik & Ruseckas, Laurent, "Economics and Energy in the South: Liberal Expectations Versus Likely Realities", *Russia, The Caucasus and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, Menon, Fedorov & Nodia (eds), ME Sharpe/ EastWest Institute, New York, 1999
- Stein, Arthur. "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World." In *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A Baldwin, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.
- Sun, Zhuangzhi. "Central Asia's Transition to a Market Economy: An Analytical Comparison with China." In *Ethnic Challenges beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perceptions of the Central Asian Conundrum*, eds. Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian, 147-165. Macmillian, London, 1998.
- Telhami, Shibley, *The Stakes: America in the Middle East*, Basic Books, N.Y. 2003
- Trenin, Dmitri. *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C. 2001
- Walt, Stephen M. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, New York, 1987
- Walt, Stephen, M. Brooks, *As Others See Us*. Broadview Press, 2006
- _____, *Taming American Power*. WW Norton, 2006
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, 1979
- Brzezinsky, Zbigniew, *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. Basic Books, New York, 1997

Zhang, Yongjin and Rouben Azizian, eds. *Ethnic Challenges beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum*. St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1998

Articles

Alex Callinicos, Imperialism and global political economy, *Issue: 108*, October 2005
<http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=140&issue=108>

Allison, Roy. "Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia," *International Affairs* 80, no. 3, May 2004: 463-483.

Allison, Roy. "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy," *International Affairs* 80, no. 2, March 2004: 277-293.

Askar Akayev, Wither Central Asia, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 4(2003) p.107

Blank, Stephen, American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, *World Affairs*, 9/22/2000

Bohr, Annette. "Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order," *International Affairs* 80, no. 3, May 2004: 485-502.

Brad Roberts, "1995 and the End of the Post-Cold War Era," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995)

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "A Geostrategy for Eurasia," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997): 50-64.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Hegemonic Quicksand," *The National Interest* 74 (Winter 2003/2004): 5-16.

Charles William Maynes, "America Discovers Central Asia", 'Foreign Affairs, March-April 2003

Cross, Sharly, "The Questions of NATO Expansion: Searching for the Optimal Solution," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 7, no.1 (Winter, 1996).

David, Stephen R. "Explaining Third World Alignment." *World Politics*. 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 233-256.

Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics A Review Essay", *International Security* 17 (1), Summer 1992

Farkhod Tolipov, *CENTRAL ASIA AS A SPACE, POLITY, PEOPLES, AND FATE*,
http://www.ca-c.org/cgi-bin/search/show.pl?url=http://www.ca-c.org/online/2005/journal_eng/cac-02/12.toleng.shtml&words=pluralism,

Federico Bordonaro, 'Great and Medium Powers in the Age of Unipolarity',
<http://www.pinr.com>

G. John Ikenberry "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos", *Foreign Affairs* 75:3 (May/June 1996), pp. 63-78.

Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics* 51, October, 1998

Gleason, Gregory. "Inter-state Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum," *Europe - Asia Studies* 53, no. 7 (November 2001): 1077-1096.

Hoff, Joan, "American diplomacy : retrospect and prospect, in *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered 1890-1993*, ed. Gordon Martel, Routledge, N.Y. 1994, p - 229

- Igor Tomberg, "Russia in Global Oil Politics," *Russian Analytica*, 2, 2004
- Jan Kalicki, 'Caspian energy at the crossroads', *Foreign Affairs* 80: 5, Sept.– Oct. 2001, pp. 120-4
- Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy. Defensive Realism Revisited", *International Security* 25 (3), Winter 2000/01, 132
- Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, n. 2 (1978): 167-214.
- Jonson, Lena. "Russia and Central Asia: post-11 Sept. 2001, *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 19 no. 1 (2003): 89-94.
- Karayianni, Marika. "Russia's Foreign Policy for Central Asia Passes Through Energy Agreements," *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 22, no. 4 (2003): 90-96
- Keohane, Robert O. "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organizations* 40, no. 1 (1986): 1-27.
- Khoo, Nichols and Michael L. Smith. "The future of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific: a Concert of Asia or a clear pecking order?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 56, no. 1 (April 2002): 65-81.
- Krasner, Stephen D. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." *International Organization* 36, no. 2, International Regimes Spring, 1982, 185-205.
- Krasner Stephen D., "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics*, 28 (1976)
- Kubicek, Paul. "Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik in Central Asia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 4, June 1997, 637-655.
- Lake, David A. 'Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations', *International Organization*, 50, 1996, pp. 1-33
- Layne, Christopher. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): 5-51.
- Layne, Christopher and Swarz, Benjamin. American Hegemony: Without an Enemy, *Foreign Policy*, No. 92 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 5-23
- Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC DISGOVERNANCE, Paper presented to the conference "The Political Economy of Governance", Centre d'Etudes Monétaires et Financières - LATEC (Umr Cnrs), Dijon, December, 2005. <http://www.networkideas.org/featart/oct2008/Disgovernance.pdf>
- Luong, Pauline Jones and Weinthal, Erika, "New friends, new fears in Central Asia", *Foreign Affairs* 81: 2, March–April 2002, pp. 61, 69, 70;
- Macfarlane, Neil. "The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia," *International Affairs* 80, no. 3 (May 2004): 447-461.
- Maynes, Charles William, "America discovers Central Asia", *Foreign Affairs* 82: 2, April–May 2003, pp. 125, 130, 131;
- Mearsheimer, John J. "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", *International Security*, 15 (1), 1995.

Michael Kraig, US Attempt at Domination Hobbled by Contradiction, *Yale Global*, April 2004, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3727>

Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment," *Review of International Studies* 15 (1989), pp. 183-198.

Mingshan, Chen and He Xiquan. "Features and Prospects of the Situation in the Central Asian Region," *Foreign Affairs Journal* (Beijing), 1995, no.37

Moravcsik, Andrew, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn 1997

Myers, Dee Dee, White House Press Secretary, "Statement: Washington, DC, July 15, 1994." (1994): *Dispatch* 5, no.30 (25/7).

Nichol, Jim. Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests, CRS Issue Brief. 1996, Washington: Library of Congress.

Oye, Kenneth A. "Explaining cooperation under anarchy: hypotheses and strategies." *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (1985): 1-24.

Rosenberg, Emily S., "Economic Interests and the United States Foreign Policy," in Martel, Gordon, ed. *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered 1890-1993*, Routledge, 1994,

Schweizer, Peter. "Who Broke the Evil Empire?" *National Review* 46, no.10 (30/5), 1994

Schmitt, Gary, Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century, *A Report of The Project for the New American Century September 2000*, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>

Selden, Z. 2004. "What Europe Doesn't Understand". *Wall Street Journal Online*, May 26, 2004. At <http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110005126>,

Shibley Telhami, "Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy", *Security Studies* 11(3), Spring 2002, 158,

Sloan, Stanley R. (1995): "US Perspectives on NATO's Future," *International Affairs* 71, no.2. "Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, May 10, 1994" (1994): *Dispatch* 5, no.21 (23/5).

Slutskaya, Yevgenia. "Simulation and reality." *The Current Digest of the Post – Soviet Press* 55, no. 21, June 2003

Spechler, M.C. Central Asia on the Edge of Globalization. *Challenge*, 47(3). 62-77, 2004

Strange, Susan. "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," *International Organization* 36, no. 2, International Regimes, Spring 1982, 479-496.

Talbott, Strobe. (1994): "An Address by US Deputy Secretary at the US-Central Asia Business Conference Washington, DC, USA, May 3, 1994," *Presidents & Prime Ministers* 3, no.5, September/October.

Talbott, Strobe. (1994a): "Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in Central Asia," *Dispatch* 5, no.19 (5/9).

Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security-Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered," *International Security*, 25, 3, Winter 2000/2001: 152-86

“The US and Kazakhstan: A Strategic Economic and Political Relationship,” (1994): *Dispatch* 5, no.8, 21/2.

Trofimov, Dmitry. “Russia and the United States in Central Asia: Problems, Prospects and Interests,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 19, no. 1, 2003, 72-82.

Walt, Stephen M. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy* no. 110, Spring 1998, 29-46.

Waltz, Kenneth, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” *Security Studies*, Autumn 1996,

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 Summer 2000, 5–41,

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” *International Organization* 46(2): 391–425.

Wendt, Alexander. “Social Theory of International Politics.” *Cambridge Core*. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Wendt, Alexander. “The State as Person in International Theory.” *Review of International Studies* 30(2), 2004, 289–316.

Xuecheng, Liu. “New Approaches to Asia-Pacific Security,” *Beijing Review* 45, no. 44, 31 October 2002, 7-9.

Zviagelskaia, Irina D. *The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995.

Reports and Document

Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs’, House International Relations Committee, 29 Oct. 2003, pp. 5–6, posted at <http://usinfo.state.gov.dhr/Archive/2003/Nov/04-122493.html>.

Atlantic Council delegation Report on the visit to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan & Kazakhstan, May 1997, <http://www.acus.org/InternationalSecurity/CentralEurasia.htm>,

B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Washington, DC, June 27, 2002, : www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/11535.htm

Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. (1993): CSCE Report. Washington, DC: GPO.

Blank, 2001, from US General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Rep.: Foreign Assistance 1999,

S. Frederick Starr, Testimony at the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, 13 December 2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm,

Conference Reports, www.csis.org,

Michael Parenti, A Foreign Policy Event, United States Foreign policy in the states of Central Asia <http://www.brookings.edu/events/2002/1112asia.aspx> Against Empire (excerpts), <http://members.aol.com/bblum6/parenti.htm>

ADB, Central Asia after Fifteen Years of Transition: Growth, Regional Cooperation, and Policy Choices, Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 3, by Malcolm Dowling and Ganeshan Wignaraja

July 2006

Electronic journals

Bigg, Claire. "Russia/China: Joint Military Exercise A Result Of New Strategic Partnership," (18 August 2005). Available from *Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Online* <<http://www.rferl.org/>>

Bin, Yu. "China-Russia Relations: Geoeconomics for Geo-politics," *Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* 6, no. 2 (July 2004): 145-154. [e-journal] <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sites/cpc.html>

Charles Krauthammer, *The Neoconservative Convergence*, ***Opinion Journal***, July 21, 2005

Dekmejian, Hrair R. & Simonian, Hovann H. (2001), *Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region*, New York: I.B. Tauris, <http://www.atabaki.net/pu.htm>, (through MSN. Search)

Deng, Yong. "China Views Globalization: Toward a New Great-Power Politics?" *The Washington Quarterly* 27 no. 3 (Summer 2004): 117-136. [e-journal] <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/> (8 March 2005).

Haass, Richard N, *Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World*, Remarks at the Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 22, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632.htm>,

Kaplan, Robert D., *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos*, Random House, 2001, p. 145-146. <http://www.financialsense.com/Experts/2002/Kaplan.htm>

Kaplan and James Der Derian, 'Virtuous war' and the banality of terror, <http://www.globalagendamagazine.com/2005/jamesderderian.asp>

Karin, Erlan. "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Implications for Central Asia," 21st Century COE Program Slavic Eurasian Studies 2 (2004): 315-326. [ejournal] http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no2_ses/4-3_Erlan.pdf

Kimmage, Daniel. "Central Asia: Is Regional Turbulence Return of the Great Game?" (19 July 2005). Available from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Online <<http://www.rferl.org/>> (accessed 26 July 2005).

Kimmage, Daniel. "Central Asia: SCO – Shoring Up the Post-Soviet Status Quo." (8 July 2005). Available from *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Online* <<http://www.rferl.org/>> (accessed 26 July 2005).

Liu, Henry C K, Middle East: Realpolitik of Democratic Revolution, Part 2: The Bush vision in, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EK20Ak05.html,

Marquand, Robert. "Central Asians Group to Counterweigh US Russia, China, and Four Republics Meet to Expand Solidarity and Oppose Separatism." *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 June 2001, 8. At <http://www.proquest.com/>;

Robert B. Zoellick, "The WTO and New Global Trade Negotiations: What's at Stake," speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., October 30, 2001, available at www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/zoellick_10.pdf, (accessed June 2006); Robert B. Zoellick, "Globalization, Trade, and Economic Security," Remarks at the National Press Club, October 1, 2002, available at www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/zoellick_26-npc.PDF, (accessed June 2006)

Saidazimova, Gulnoza. "Central Asia: What Does Closure of U.S. Military Base in Uzbekistan Mean?" (1 August 2005). Available from *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Online* <<http://www.rferl.org/>> (accessed 2 August 2005).

Wilhelm, Kathy. "Hello WTO," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 164, no. 24 (21 June 2001): 20. Available from <http://www.proquest.com/>

Wohlforth, William. "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999): 5-41. Available from http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/pdf/isec_24_01_5_0.pdf;

Printed Resources

Central Asia: Journal of Area Study Center (Russia and Central Asia) University of Peshawar, 45(1999), 45(2000), 52(2003),
Foreign Affairs Journal, 87th issue, The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs
Financial Times
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy,
Russia in Global Affairs: 4(2003)
Russian Analytica: 2(2004)
Strategic Studies: A Quarterly Journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 4(2001), 2(2002), 3(2002), 2(2003), 3(2003), 1(2004), 3(2004), 3(2005), 4(2005)
The Economist
The Guardian and The Guardian Weekly
The Observer

Electronic Resources

Via Infotrac:
The Middle East Journal
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy
The Economist
Le Monde Diplomatique, English edition

Web sites:

www.amnesty.org
www.atimes.com
www.bbc.co.uk
www.ca-c.org
www.cacianalyst.org
www.cess.harvard.fas.edu
www.cfr.org
www.cia.gov
www.crisisweb.org
www.csis.org

www.economist.com
www.eurasia.org
www.FAZ.net
www.foreignpolicy.com
www.FT.com
www.ifpa.org
www.iwpr.net
www.NYTimes.com
www.oecd.org
www.osce.org
www.pentagon.mil
www.pravda.ru
www.rferl.org
www.state.gov
www.theguardian.co.uk
www.themoscowtimes.com

List of important abbreviations used in the Thesis

CAR	Central Asian Region
CAREC	Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program
CC	Customs Code
CES	Common Economic Space
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTSC	Council on Technical Standardization in the Construction Field
CU	Customs Union
CUC	Customs Union Commission
EADB	Eurasian Development Bank
AEU	Eurasian Economic Union EU European Union
EurAsEC	EuroAsian Economic Community
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FTZ	Free Trade Zone
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross domestic product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MFN	Most Favored Nation
RAID	Russian Agency for International Development RF Russian Federation
SCO	The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNICEF	The United Nations Children's Fund
USA	United States of America
USAID	US Agency of International Development
WTO	World Trade Organization