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SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ: AN EVALUATION OF AMERICAN POLICY

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INTRODUCTION

The Gulf War was an important event at the end of the Cold War. US foreign policy changed in the context of new world order. Sanctions as an instrument of American policy used against Iraq and other countries were some signs of this change. Before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait it was friend of the U.S. But after it invaded Kuwait this friendship changed into hostility. The study tells what factors brought about changes in American policy.

Sanctions were imposed to force Saddam Hussain to abide by the resolutions. But their purpose was more than that; to further weaken the Iraqi regime

The goals that the U.S. set before itself were:

1. Punish Saddam as an aggressor.
2. Liberate Kuwait; contain Iraq and destroy its military power.
3. Eliminate Iraq's capacity to produce Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The aim of this research work is to evaluate the costs and benefits of sanctions imposed on Iraq. It will help us to know how the sanctions increase the troubles of a nation and fail to achieve the goals as.

For containing Saddam regime, Saddam Hussein's long record of aggression against his neighbors and suppression of Kurds were given as the reasons. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait on 2 August, 1990 were provoked U.S. and other major powers to get the Iraqi aggression vacated. They formed a coalition under the concept of collective security as envisioned in the U.N. charter. The U.S. response to Saddam Hussain's aggression was central, but it could not have done the job alone. A stronger international coalition was needed. Before the coalition to took military action the U.N. imposed strict economic sanction on Iraq on 2 August 1990. It was

declared that sanctions will remain until UNSC requirements were fully met. Sanctions were further tightened. After the war no-fly zones were established.

Key actors within the UN community continued to portray sanctions as a necessary and important policy instrument. The argument in this respect is that sanctions occupy a middle ground between comparatively benign diplomatic action on one side and coercive paramilitary or overt military intervention on the other.

Action against Iraq was the first case of collective action under American prodding in post-cold war period. This study will focus on how the United States handled this crisis, we raise the question could it create a precedent for similar crises in future? The containment policy against Iraq allowed humanitarian relief to reduce the sufferings of the Iraqi people. Oil-for-food program was introduced, for this purpose.

By deploying military forces in the gulf, the United States also intended to protect Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. The sanctions were tightened with the military support to impose substantial economic pain on Iraq to urge the Iraqis to rise up against Saddam. President Bush and many of his senior advisors calculated that economic sanctions alone could not persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait unless military action was taken.

This research would explain how many times the U.S. attempted to overthrow Saddam by applying so many different methods. It encouraged the Iraqi people if there would be a new Government in Baghdad, the United States will take the led to faster economic development; restore Iraqi civil society, rebuild the middle class and restore Iraq's health and education sector. The work will evaluate that at what extant U.S. was able to achieve its goals.

Important Research Questions

To deal with the hypothesis; sanctions hurt innocent civilizations more than they do any significant harm to the sitting regime. Following are the research questions, which have been addressed in the dissertation:

Why sanctions are an instrument of foreign policy?

What has been the focus of sanctions?

How the sanction could not remove Saddam Hussain from the regime? If sanctions as a tool is a successful instrument then why Saddam is still in power.

Have the sanctions as a tool increased the misery of the people.

What has the cost of sanctions been paid?

What has the benefits that America been achieved?

How did the sanctions create revolutionary germs in a nation and how did this instrument promote terrorism.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is that sanctions as an instrument of American foreign policy has totally been failed to achieve its objectives. It only harms the innocent civilians. The study of pro and anti analysis shows how much the revolt dements work in it. As the bombing of PAF 103 over Lockerbie, (an example). The focus is on strengthening controls to prevent Iraq from rebuilding military capability and weapons of mass destruction. While facilitating a broader flow of goods to the civilian population of Iraq.

The study focuses on sanctions regime to analyze the impacts of it. The study helps us to investigate whether U.S has succeeded or failed to achieve its goals. Through this investigation

it will help us to judge what America is depicting its role in this Global village. This study further help us to know what are the measures would be taken to solve the problems in this Global village, instead of sanction. And that are

- a. Nagociations and
- b. Political solutions.

Methodology:

The research work reviews the comprehensive study of articles from Washington post form 1991-2000. Articles show the top class scholar's different point of view in details. It also evaluates American policy towards the sanctions used as an instrument. Further, the controversial views from senate floor helps to understand the nature of the problem.

This study has primarily relied on the extensive use of available primary and secondary sources: books, scholarly articles, magazine articles, U.S. State Department Annual Reports on sanctions, U.S. Resolutions, foreign policy deliberations of different think tanks and institutions involved in foreign policy recommendations. An intensive study of such works has significantly helped in comprehending and determining the nature and direction of flow of ideas and influences from U.S., U.N.O. and Iraq.

Structure of the Study

The study has been divided in six chapters. In the first chapter, an attempt has been made to provide a historical overview of Gulf War. This chapter deals with the detailed description of war objectives and American development in foreign policy. It also describes the successful war strategy played in the Gulf. The second chapter specifically deals with the terms of war termination which expended the war objectives. The third chapter deals with the WMD capability of Iraq which was contained at proper time.

The fourth chapter deals with the three phases of sanctions to contain Iraq. The division of two phases: the period from August 1990 to March 1991 – and April 1991 to Dec. 1998, evaluates the “success” or “failure” of American policy. The third phase of sanctions calculates that the sanction did not harm the president Saddam Hussein but harmed the Iraqi people. Because Saddam is still in power. So, with the passage of time there are indications that sanctions “fatigue” has begun to set. The fifth chapter deals with the impacts of sanctions on Iraq, Arabian States non Arabian Muslim States, and the Western countries. And call for uplifting the sanctions has been spread more forcefully then ever before. The sixth chapter has been attempted to analysis sanctions as an instrument of this American policy. The successes and failures of this instrument are discussed. It endeavors also to analyze the uplifting of sanctions will be successful or not.

Chapter-1

Gulf War

The common interests of nations led to globalization and internationalism. In this globalization America is ambitious to play a world leadership role in 21st century. Her role as “Unipolar Power” was camouflaged in Gulf War. Although the United States does possess the world’s most advanced military force, it is dependent upon other nations for political legitimacy, logistical support and economic backing. “Indeed, “multilateralism could see the U.S. working through the United Nations to establish international talks.

At domestic level, the need for a wise defense investment strategy was more apparent than ever in July 1990 (because of loan crisis, savings and not to raise taxes, a little money was left for defense). According to Thomas Mann, War is only a cowardly escape from the problems of peace. As so it was for Saddam Hussein, an attempt to solve his economic and political problems with one bold, stroke. And America was not different by using multilateral policy to solve its own economic problems for the future line. She had used sanctions an instrument of foreign policy under the umbrella of UNO.

“As the U.S. foreign policy was formulated for the U.S. interests in the Middle East include regional stability, reliable access to oil, strategic access to sea lines of communications, military access to the region, and the prevention of direct threats to the territory of the U.S.”¹

Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait

Iraq had a territorial conflict with Kuwait since 1958. Succeeding Iraqi regimes, however continued to raise questions over border issues. After the return of the Ba’thists to power in Iraq in 1968 (they had been ousted by a second military coup late in 1963), the regime began to press

territorial claims against Kuwait more actively. In 1973, a contingent of Iraqi troops briefly occupied a Kuwait border post, and subsequently Iraq began to seek control over the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, which command the approaches to Umm Qasr, one of Iraq's two ports on its narrow Persia Gulf frontage. In 1975, Kuwait rejected an Iraqi proposal that Kuwait cede Warbah Island and lease half of Bubiyan Island to Iraq for 99 years. Kuwait refused a similar Iraqi request in 1980 after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, and again in 1989, after the war ended. In September 1989, Kuwait's ruler, Shaikh Jabir Al-Sabah, visited Baghdad to reopen the question of a definitive border determination.

But the major point of continual conflict has been the large Rumaila oil, which straddled the Iraq-Kuwait border, "There were financial, territorial, and oil related disputes ..."² In 1990, Iraq demanded that Kuwait would cede its portion of Rumaila field to Iraq and demanded 2.5 billion dollars in reparations for the oil removed from it illegally, as well as another 14 billion dollars in lost Iraqi revenue due to quota violations. Iraq also demanded cancellation of 12 billion dollars in loans made by Kuwait to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. The Kuwaitis refused and Iraq begin massing troops in July to pressurize Kuwait.

President Saddam's political survival hinged on financial resources for the reconstruction of Iraq which had been devastated economically by the decade long war with Iran. In addition Iraq owed some 80 billion dollars in foreign debts. This was a critical factor because defaulting on debts means foreign governments would no longer be willing to extend credit to Iraq, which in turn mean halting economic reconstruction. About half of his debt was owed to Arab States, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.³

Due to these setbacks, Saddam "accused Kuwait and U.A.E. of ignoring quotas by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) by over producing oil and consequently

driving down the price of oil on international markets. He threatened to take action if productions were not cut voluntarily.”⁴

Apart from that, Saddam escalated tensions in the region by demanding the raising of oil prices to over 25 dollars a barrel: Stopping Kuwait from stealing oil from Iraqi-Al-Rumaila oil fields and the formation of an “Arab Plan” similar to the Marshal Plan to compensate Iraq for some of the losses during the war.”⁵

By invading Kuwait, Iraq would erase its war debts, control Kuwait’s oil wealth, and increase world oil prices. Iraq did attempt to justify the invasion partly in economic terms. Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, claimed shortly after the invasion that Iraq had to resort to this method because its economic situation had deteriorated and if he had no alternative. In fact, Iran-Iraq war had destroyed Iraqi economy. Estimates suggest that Iraq began the Gulf War with U.S. \$35 billion in reserve and ended the war \$80-100 billion in debt. Adding its Iran-Iraq war reconstruction and debt repayment costs and its basic yearly expenditures, it would have taken Iraq nearly two decades to recover under optimal conditions.⁶

Kuwait and U.A.E. rejected Saddam’s demands. Kuwait remained unmoved even after President Saddam made a direct scathing attack on its policy as a “conspiracy against the region’s economy which serves Israel directly.”⁷ As Saddam Hussein warned earlier on May 30 1990, and claimed that Kuwait and other quota-busters were “virtually waging an economic war against my country.... War does not mean just tanks, artillery, or ships, ... It would take subtler and more insidious forms, such as the overproduction of oil, economic damage, and pressure to enslave a nation. Lest anyone doubt his seriousness. Saddam issued a direct threat, “one day,” he said earlier in speech, “the reckoning will come.” According to participants at the meeting,

the Kuwaiti response was one of contempt.⁸ President Saddam also needed more money to persuade his plans for the requirement of WMD capability.

The economic factor is very interconnected with Iran-Iraq War as well as political factor. Steve A. Vetire wrote in his research work that “ the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 contributed to the Gulf Cooperation Council” (GCC) development and to an increase in Saudi influence. It was added incentive for Riyadh to develop military facilities to handle the type of massive threat posed by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. It helped reverse Egypt’s isolation from Gulf security, political and strategic coordination and trust between Arab-Gulf states and Washington, and push America to accelerate the development of Gulf-related military capabilities. In addition, it helped develop transatlantic security and political ties for Gulf contingencies. Together, these factors laid part of the foundation for Operation Desert Shield and Storm.”⁹

Yeltive’s above mentioned calculation and many other arguments prove that the atmosphere of Persian Gulf provided America a golden chance to enter in this region. Two emerging powers were Iran and Iraq. American policy was to contain both. As Richardson addressed in his interview.

Mr. Sarman: The U.S. would like to see Iraq have some military defense against Iran at the same time that the U.S. do wants to destabilize the war-producing capability of Iraq. When do you find the balance.

Mr. Richardson: Well, we have a dual containment policy. I don’t think we want to balance anything.¹⁰

Saddam Hussein had envisaged American policy towards Iraq. “ On July 25 April Glaspie (U.S. Ambassador to Iraq) was called to the Foreign Ministry to meet directly with Saddam Hussein He charged that the U.S. was supporting Kuwait in an economic war against Iraq, but he was conciliatory and “flummoxed” that the U.S. might oppose him.¹¹ Washington continued to try better relations with Baghdad; Glaspie’s message to Saddam – as explained that the U.S. would not countenance violence.... We would support our friends in the Gulf, we would defend their sovereignty and integrity. Yet the same time Glaspie admitted that the U.S. had no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.¹²

Glaspie told the Iraqi President that his fears of an American conspiracy were completely unfounded and that President Bush is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.”¹³

The above discussion unfolds two facts: (i) President Saddam was assured that America would not move against Iraq in the event of an Iraqi-Kuwait war, (ii) And Washington may have actually encouraged Iraq to attack and capture Kuwait. The reassured of the U.S. neutrality thus, President Saddam, would proceed with his plans.

“The CIA reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraqi-Kuwait border. On the twentieth the deployments were reported in Baghdad daily newspapers in addition to increasingly vituperative denunciations of the U.S.¹⁴ Washington therefore took no sanctions and no military action, and the effect on Saddam Hussein’s thinking seemed understandable in retrospect. “Iraq continued to build up its force on the Kuwait border, and the U.S. on July 24 announced it was conducting joint Maneuvers with Arab naval and air forces in the area. The UAE announced that it, too, was taking part in the joint exercise with U.S. military forces, and apparently this was a sufficient surprise to get Saddam Hussein’s attention.”¹⁵ The political objective of American silence was buying time to assess further Saddam’s intentions and to design additional strategies were necessary such as deploying military forces to the Gulf.

U.S. policy towards Arab-Israel conflict also escalated the tension in the Persian Gulf. Barry Robin pointed out another severe problem of ambitious, aggressive, radical states that could try to dominate the region, subvert an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, oppose U.S. interests, sponsor terrorism, and overthrow U.S. allies. The most important of these is Iraq, with its victory over Iran, huge oil resources large army and ruthless leadership.” The U.S., Robin argued, “must deter and counter threatening and destabilizing actions by these states.”¹⁶ To contain Saddam Hussein, U.S. “double standard policy emerged in the region, which bitterly

rejected Saddam Hussein, proceeded his plans. By pointing out the economic war against him, he made detailed, specific charges against Kuwait and UAE, presented to the Arab League in a lengthy memorandum. He made a flaming speech in which he charged that Kuwait and the UAE were part of a "Zionist plot aided by the imperialists against the Arab nations." AS ABC journalist John Cooley has written, Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi "felt that the memorandum and the speech were an Iraqi declaration of war against Kuwait."¹⁷ A key signal was a July 17, 1990, speech by Saddam Hussein, later broadcast on Iraqi radio, low oil prices, he charged, were a "poisoned dagger" pointed at Iraq. This political and economic U.S. policy towards Gulf region enraged Saddam Hussein, and motivated him to attack on Kuwait.

UN and Arab League Resolutions

When the guns began to roar in the Gulf, UNSC members huddled for less than an hour before deciding some with anguish, others with relief that there was nothing further they could do for the present.¹⁸ Arab negotiations failed on July 31, 1990, and the U.S. had failed to deter President Saddam from seizing Kuwait. There was certainly reason to believe an invasion was imminent. On August 2, at roughly 0100 hours Kuwait time, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The reaction of the U.S. and indeed the world was swift. Within a day both President Bush and the U.S. had condemned the invasion and demanded an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal. Arab League (AL) also condemned the Iraqi action and demanded unconditional withdrawal.

The Arab League did pass a number of resolutions condemning the invasion and reaffirming Kuwait's sovereignty. The (AL) foreign ministers in their Cairo meeting of August 4, 1990 with a 14-4 vote resolution called for an immediate pull out of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Later on a summit meeting of AL was held August 10, 1990, in which a majority of 12 against 3 with six abstentions decided to send troops for the defense of Saudi Arabia, Similarly the GCC

held a ministerial meeting on August 7 and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from their brother nation Kuwait. On the whole to the Arab Leaders “from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, President Saddam’s offence was above all his flouting of the principles, proclaimed by himself in 1980, that no Arab State should attack another and that all issues in the Arab World should be settled by the Arabs themselves without seeking or provoking non-Arab intervention.

The U.S. responded to the invasion with diplomacy, and the preventative deployment of military forces, operation Desert Shield and defensive forces to Saudi Arabia. With Saudi Arabia safe from Iraqi invasion, the U.S. allowed the Arab nations to pursue their own diplomatic solution. The Soviet Union’s cooperation was key in establishing Desert Shield, and Soviets engaged in their own diplomatic efforts to secure Iraqi withdrawal. France also had an active diplomatic presence.

International diplomatic measures were complemented by a series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions condemning Iraq’s action, reaffirming the sovereignty of Kuwait, and calling for humane treatment of Kuwaitis. The 15-members United Nations Security Council adopted 12 resolutions between Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2 and November 29 when it endorsed the use of force. (See the details in appendixes No. 1)

The main objectives of the economic sanctions program were to prevent Iraq benefiting from Kuwait’s substantial oil and financial resources and to provide Saddam Hussein a strong incentive to withdraw from Kuwait by attempting to impose substantial economic pain on Iraq. It was the first test of how States would behave in the post-Cold War era following the collapse of Communism. Kuwait became the first case study.

The most important feature of first phase of sanctions was that the Soviet Union did not use its veto in Security Council to shelter Iraq, a long time ally and arms purchaser. Moscow did not want to create the doubts with new developing friendship U.S.

The U.N. resolutions on Iraq have been the most important, with significant implications for the future of sanction policy. The sanctions that were imposed in response to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, (UNSC Resolution 661 1990) were the most comprehensive economic measures ever devised by the U.N.

<u>Resolution</u>	<u>Action</u>
Number 661	6 August 1990: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Imposed comprehensive, mandatory sanctions. ➤ Created Sanctions Committee. ➤ Banned all trade. ➤ Imposed oil embargo and arms embargo. ➤ Suspended international flights. ➤ Froze Iraqi government financial assets/prohibited. ➤ Financial transactions.¹⁹

Resolutions 660, 661, 622, and 665 adopted on August 2 – August 25. During this period U.S. officials traveled the globe promoting opposition to the Iraqi invasion and building a coalition for the use of force. “President Bush also took three major foreign trips during the crisis, one to the Helsinki Summit in September, one to the Middle East during Thanksgiving followed by a swing through Latin America. His efforts paid off with twelve Security Council resolutions basically legitimizing the U.S. approach to the crisis.”²⁰ The U.N., by pulling together a coalition sanctioned by the U.N. and acting in support of U.N. resolutions, was promoting a renewal of international institutions.

The U.N. resolutions were introduced in both houses of the legislature of U.S., and debate was set to begin on January 10. The debate was set to discuss whether sanctions were effective to solve the problems of the region. The vote in the Senate was very close with Senator Sam Nunn leading the democratic majority against the President in the hopes that sanctions would eventually do the job. But in the House of Representatives, where the Democratic Party had an even stronger hold on the majority, dozens of Democrats voted with the President.²¹

Senator John Heinz argued that “history and common sense tell us that embargoes and sanctions work only where the leaders have some semblance of consciousness. The other calculated that sanctions means to wait. “As we wait, the Kuwaiti people are being wiped out as a nation”, further he envisaged that “the loss of sanctions and the elevation of Saddam Hussein to the leaders of all Arabs in this world.” He supported to back the President to go to war. John McCain said, “The embargo means the loss of life of human dignity and human rights.”

Bill Green said, “If the Congress now undercuts Resolution 678, it will likely destroy forever this initiative to reconstitute the United Nations.” He further calculated that “this unhappy situation can be the start of a progress by which we develop a workable system for collective security backed by the world’s major powers.”²²

By contrast, Senator Richard A. Gerhard argued that “the use of sanctions is the use of force, he further stressed and said, “Sanctions can squeeze even the most intransigent regimes into making change.” He quoted the examples of the UN embargo against Rhodesia. Sanctions helped to bring down dictators like Rafeel Trujillo and Idi Amin. But his argument was not supported and after the deadline of 15 Jan 1991 U.S led coalition started war in the Gulf. The Desert Shield led to Operation Desert Storm. Cartright and Lopez summed up the sanction

regime and believed that “the failing of sanctions were not due to the limitations of instrument itself but to the flaws of in the overall U.S. and UN policy towards Iraq.”²³

According to many of western scholars that the net result was overwhelming, timely, and made an essential contribution to the achievement of Washington’s objective.

This development may possible signify the revival in the fortunes of the UN as an effective peacekeeping agency. By contrast many of eastern scholars; it was partial role of UN as played “double standard” policy in the Middle East.

Why Saddam rejected Resolutions and demands:

Four months had passed since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and there was no sign that Saddam intended to withdraw. Iraq continued to ignore the series of UN resolutions and seemed unruffled even by the Nov. 29 Resolution authorizing force.

There were the reasons not to comply with the UN resolutions and demands, President Saddam Hussain rejected the UN resolutions and preferred to go to war. He was conscious about the sensitivity and seriousness of the prevailing situation. That’s why he had adopted a strategy of attrition. “This form of warfare is adopted by the general who knows he does not have the means to achieve a decisive defeat of his opponent’s force but seek to wear him out instead. It is the pursuit of the exhaustion of the enemy’s means or will to fight rather than their destruction and can be aimed at the logistics support for a force in the field or even at the national willpower behind an army.”²⁴

President Saddam emerged as victorious after Iran-Iraq war and wanted to play an historic role in Arab World. During Iran-Iraq war, Iraq could rely upon many other Arab States, again here in Gulf War, President Saddam’s misperceptions caused not to comply the U.N. resolutions. The Iraqi leadership over estimated their ability of amass popular Arab support, and

overestimated Arab unwillingness to accept U.S. intervention and troops where Israel's part of coalition indirectly.

No doubt Palestinians and Jordanians welcomed Saddam Hussain's action against the rich Arab States, which they believed did not sufficiently share their oil wealth. President Saddam "made repeated reference to the Palestinian question, trying to link his cause to theirs. He talked of the greatness of the Iraqi people and urged his followers to remain steadfast."²⁵

To urge the Muslim world, Iraq launched nine of the missiles, eight of them at Israel as part of its announced intention to widen the conflict. Immediately the scuds provoked new mini crises: Israel seemed ready to enter the war. That was US's best policy that it pressured Israel to keep quiet and allow U.S. coalition building diplomacy with moderate Arab states to win.

Another misperception of President Saddam appeared to believe that relations with the US could quickly return to normal. He pledged that he would not invade Saudi Arabia and hinted that a powerful Iraq could become a major US ally in the Middle East. He also believed that US would not start war. If started, it would lose. Iraq had the fourth largest army in the world which after years of war with Iran was battle tested and hardened. The Iraqi had also demonstrated their capability to use chemical weapons and were believed to possess capability to use even biological weapons with the help of their scud missile fleet. In a way it was, after Israel, the most powerful military force in the Persian Gulf region. President Saddam had deployed half a million force on Kuwaiti border.

In addition, President Saddam had some political cards, at least initially, such as release of hostages, efforts to split the coalition and partial withdrawal from Kuwait. But Iraq could not use these cards due to its poor strategy used during war. On the other hand U.S. diplomatic successful tact enabled it to reverse the Iraqi aggression.

Regardless, President Saddam was conscious about the seriousness of the situation, and he had recognized that war might be inevitable. In one of his meetings with Soviet envoy Primakov, Saddam discussed the possibility of war. If you do not withdraw, Primakov warned him, the United States will attack, and Moscow would not try to prevent it. President Saddam said he knew this. Primakov replied bluntly, "But you will lose" he told Saddam. The Iraqi leader thought for sometime "perhaps" he replied.

Cultural distinctions can also play a large role in the rejection of resolutions and demands. Arabs "tend to feel that their honor is at stake, and that to give in, even as little as an inch, would diminish their self-respect and dignity. Even to take the first step toward ending a conflict would be regarded as sign of weakness, which, in turn, would greatly damage one's honor."²⁶ For these reasons, it is nearly impossible for an Arab to come to an agreement in direct confrontation with an opponent.

Even the prospect of actual war did not cause president Saddam to back down, in his infamous July 25 interview with U.S. ambassador Glaspie, Saddam suggested that even the prospect of war would not deter him. The U.S. could attack Iraq, he said, but "do not push us to the point at which we cease to care. When we feel that you want to injure our pride and destroy the Iraqi's chance of high standard of living, we will cease to care, and death will be our choice. Then we would not care if you fire a hundred missiles for each one we fired because, without pride, life would have no value."²⁷

As columnist Charles Kruthammar wrote the day after the war began, if Saddam could become "the first Arab ever to stand up to super power in war, he could be in a position to demand parts of Kuwait, a lifting of the embargo and retention of his military power. For Saddam capitulation meant humiliation and quite positive.

Regardless, the sanctions regime from August 2, 1990 had strangled Iraqi economy. Iraq depended on imports for 60 to 80 percent of its food; oil revenues amounted to 95 percent of foreign exchange receipts Iraqi industry depended largely on imports for new materials and spare parts. Foreign debt was high, partly as a result of the obligations incurred during the 1980-88 war with Iran. The local economy was in difficult straits with inflation high and Iraqi dinar heavily discounted on the black market.

Thus Iraq's economic situation was unlikely to convince president Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, specially given the role he had defined for Iraq in the Arab world.

But, as often follows in Arab world-death. War meant a chance for victory."²⁸ President Saddam did not hope to win but expected to gain political advantage even in military defeat.

By summing up the debate on President's rejection of resolutions and demands, in an interview conducted in Jaddah, Gen. Nakib (the former chairman of the Iraqi chiefs of staff) said Saddam's proposals for unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait was intended to achieve three major objectives: to create dissension; to put Arabs and Islamic states participating in this coalition in an embarrassing position; and to further split Arab and Islamic states."²⁹

As Baghdad Radio in a commentary said that the allied air raids were making Iraqis more determined to fight. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Saddam Hammadi said in Amman that Baghdad was willing to enter into talks with Arab --- with no prior condition.

In the mid of December, Iraq attempted to delay the meeting with Baker as long as possible, perhaps hoping to create a glimmer of hope just before the UN deadline and thereby postpone condition military action.³⁰ But all in vain.

Formation of Broad Coalition

A major lesson of the Vietnam war was the idea that, in any new major commitment of U.S. armed forces abroad, the nation must work in close concert with its friends and allies. Secretary of State James Baker was particularly outspoken in urging President Bush to gain the support of the UN in opposing Iraq.

While President Saddam delayed, the Bush administration was methodically assembling a powerful international coalition of 28 nations. Some like the Arab States, France and Britain were major players. Others like Soviet Union and China were important because they did not oppose U.S. policy. Together the Coalition gave the U.S. effort political legitimacy and economic, military and logistical support.

The first and most important object of U.S. Arabian diplomacy was king Fahd of Saudi Arabia. The King sat at the apex of a complicated pyramid of Saudi Royal family politics that would make it difficult for him to accede to immediate U.S. military deployments. In the past, the Saudi had always been helpful to the U.S. But insisted on keeping its military cooperation efforts quiet. The other Arab states would be likely to follow the Kings lead. On August 6, the king gave his approval to deployment.

Syrian leader Hafezz-al-Assad demonstrated a willingness, to support the U.S. This was a most unusual coalition with Syria at the time still on the State Department's list of governments supporting international terrorism.

Iran was the most critical Middle Eastern wild card in the crisis. Iran's position was constant worry for U.S. leaders. Saddam recognized this and tried a number of gambits to persuade Iran to take arms against the U.S. led coalition, the most important was the return of all

the territory he had won from Iran during the 1980s war. Iran responded by taking delivery of oil from Iraq and by promising to send food and medical supplies to Iraq in spite embargo.

By the end of the August Egypt alone had dispatched over 5,000 troops. Later they would be joined by units from Syria, Morocco, Pakistan and other Arab State as well as GCC. As a matter of fact, it was clear to the main Arab military powers that they, too, must stop president Saddam or they would risk becoming his next target.

By the end of the September, the risk of war was palpable. Iraq was strangled by the embargo; Baghdad warned on the twenty-second, it would lash out at Saudi Arabia and Israel. In the meanwhile, Soviet foreign minister Edward Shevrdnadze spoke before the U.N. General Assembly and suggested that Moscow would support-sanctioned military action against Iraq. The Security Council also voted to expand the embargo against Iraq to include aircraft, raising the potential of a midair confrontation.

The American's most important allies in the crisis were the British. Britain was the first to announce troop deployments to Saudi Arabia in support of the U.S. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher played a pivotal role in persuading president Bush that Iraqi expansionism must be opposed decisively. In sum up, this coalition could be described as the "warring tribes of Pentagon". Other industrialized countries were not as eager to come to the U.S. side. Germany was slow to come around, eventually pledging financial support and claiming that its constitution prevented it from deploying military personnel beyond its borders. French President Francios Mitterand had troubles of his own with a divided cabinet.... Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu pledged to send noncom bat military personnel and financial support for allied efforts and plus and initial contingent of medical personnel, for the coalition.³¹ In the end,

when offensive operations were opened against Iraq, about one-half of the coalition's combat forces had come from the allies.

The domestic coalition that Bush put together in support of his war effort was in many ways, even more remarkable than the international coalition.

Bush and Baker toured the world to build support for the U.S. Bush was laying the final groundwork for a U.N. resolutions authorizing the use of force. Arab monarchies assisted Bush for their own regional security interest. As Saddam was a political military and economic threat for the region.

While the building up was taking place, coalition naval and air forces were denoting Iraq any supplies at all through the economic embargo. On August 17, U.S. Central Command headquarters ordered U.S. and coalition vessels to intercept oil or supply ships heading for Iraq.

On November 29, after weeks of Bush administration prodding and persuasion the U.N. Security Council voted 12 to 2 (with Cuba and Yeman opposed and China abstaining) to authorize member states cooperating with Kuwait "to use all means necessary" to bring about an immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal. The resolution 687 also set a deadline, a specific challenge. Iraq must withdraw by Jan 15, 1991.

"In late December, the London office of the human rights group Amnesty International released a scathing report on Iraqi human rights violation occupied Kuwait this document would become an important justification for coalition action."³²

In Gulf war the ground work for the coalition was laid in part by a critical element of U.S. foreign and defense policy: Security assistance; both political and military, U.S. Military assistance and sales arm had created a strong foundation for the joint effort required by Iraq's aggression.

At political level, when the GCC firm ally requested U.S. intercession to respond to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it did so against a background of trust based in part upon long standing military cooperation. Many members of the coalition have received large U.S grants or military sales since the 1950s. Many officers and listed men of the Arab forces, especially in the Saudi military, had received U.S. training.

Apart from Syria, most of the Arab coalition members depended upon U.S. security assistance and arms sales for a significant element of their defense posture. Coalition forces were able to avail themselves of extensive Saudi basing facilities, many of which were designed and built under the supervision of the U.S. Army corps of Engineers in cultivations well suited for U.S. weapons in the Saudi arsenal. If this suitable logistical base had not been available the nature of the war would have been very different

Desert Storm

In an interim report to the congress by the department of defense on the "conduct of the Persian Gulf conflict: the U.S. military objective during the operation "Desert Shield" was "to establish a defensive capability in theater to deter Saddam Hussain from continued aggression, to build and integrate coalition forces, to enforce sanctions, to defend Saudi Arabia, and to defeat further Iraqi advances, if required."³³

As the deadline fixed by the Security Council for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait expired on January 15, 1991, the operation "Desert shield" transformed into Desert Storm" at zero hours on January 16, 1991. The U.S. wasted no time and opened air strikes on Iraqi military largest and cities during the night of January 15-16. The air attacks continued for about five weeks incessantly. It is reported that about 1000 sorties were carried out each day and thousands of tones of explosive material was dropped on Iraqi installations. A participant of

Desert Storm, colonel Ray Devisé said, “this is history in the making……It is absolutely awesome.”³⁴

Air Campaign

Originally the air campaign was meant to consist of three phases. The first would gain air superiority, interrupt Iraqi command and control, and hit such sites as chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons manufacturing plants and scud missile sites. In the second phase, coalition aircraft would suppress air defenses in the Kuwaiti theater of operations and gain air supremacy. In the third phase, the focus of coalition attacks would shift to Iraqi ground forces in preparation for the coalition ground offensive.

By January 16, when Desert Shield was transformed into a raging Desert Storm. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), had already flown 230 missions and logged 650 hours over enemy territory. By the end of the war the drones had flown 530 missions and spend 1,700 hours aloft.³⁵

January 17 saw the highest number of air-to- air engagements in the war as U.S. F-15s and FA-18s shot down 8 Iraqi aircraft. The Iraqi pilots were afraid of taking to skies filled with highly capable enemy aircraft. The disruption of Iraqi command and control, combined with the effects of direct attacks on Iraqi air bases, many have kept the Iraqis from flying (trained largely by Soviet advisers, Iraqi pilots were probably highly dependent upon ground radar control for conducting interceptions of attacking aircraft. As with most third world air force, too, they were not proficient at flying at night) Iraqi air force orders might have been to save their aircraft strength for the ground war. Regardless, the Iraqi lack of activity was a welcome, if extremely puzzling, surprise to the coalition forces.

On the 11th day of coalition attack, 27 Iraqi fighters aircraft escaped to their neighbor Iran’s airspace Forth-eight more were to flee in the next three days. The commander of the U.S.

fleet in the Gulf said that despite Iranian assurances of neutrality he was worried that the Iraqi planes could fly south over Iranian territory and then swing west to attack his ships.³⁶ This escape route was later sealed when the coalition moved their combat air patrols into Iraqi airspace itself, regarding the Iraqi's reaction time.

Regardless, by the second week of campaign the allied air forces had turned their attention increasingly in interdicting Iraqi supply routes. By this time the Iraqi "strategic" targets, such as the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons production facilities, as well as Iraqi command and-control centers, had been bombed. The Iraqi air force had become irrelevant. By January 24, radar activity had fallen by 90 percent.

On January 25, and 236 tomahawk missiles had been launched. On the same day, coalition forces discovered a vast oil spill contaminating the northern Gulf. The source of the spill was soon identified as Kuwait's Mina al-ahmadi ... terminal facility, occupied by the Iraqis. On the 27th, U.S. FB-111, halted the flow of oil by dropping laser-guided bombs on pipeline manifolds. The attempt was made to burn as much of oil as possible before it caused even greater environmental damage.

The air attacks continued for about five weeks incessantly. It is reported that about 1000 sorties were carried out each day and thousands of tons of explosive material was dropped on Iraqi installations. "Coalition aircraft flew 109,876 sorties, dropped 88,500 tons of bombs (6,520 tons of the precision weapons), and shot down 35 Iraqi planes in air-to-air combat. Of 549 Iraqi aircraft shelters identified at the outset of the conflict 375, were destroyed."³⁷

Naval Campaign

The air campaign would not be completed without a consideration of the contribution made by naval aircraft as the confrontation in the Gulf began, naval forces on the scene

demonstrated U.S. resolve by establishing a preliminary air defense screen between Iran and the Arabian peninsula, keeping watch on Tehran's neutrality in the conflict, because the Iraqi naval threat was minimal, coalition naval forces secured the Kuwaiti theater of operation (KTO) on three sides without serious opposition. The U.S. naval forces of the Middle East task force formed the early core around which allied nations could tangibly and visibly join the growing coalition effort to isolate Saddam Hussain throughout the war, the coalition naval blockade clearly demonstrated the political and military effectiveness of building on such long standing military relationship.

Ground Campaign

On Feb. 24, a half-million-strong coalition forces were ready for the final phase of Desert Storm. Many coalition groups ground officers also feared that Saddam Hussain would use chemical weapons during the decisive ground battles to come. Iraqi forces could deliver them with artillery, aircraft, or Scud missiles and had chemical mines as well. They feared that cost might be high.

Iraqi artillery was in some cases longer-ranged than that of U.S. 155 millimeter weapons. Regardless, U.S. artillery units used radars capable of tracking individual Iraqi shells and following them back to their points of origin to pinpoint enemy artillery position; a heavy destruction was made before the ground campaign ever began. Night-flying helicopters flew up and down the Iraqi lines, attacking the positions with rocket and machinegun fires in final phase.

On the night of January 29, 30 dozens of Iraqi tanks and thousand of troops crossed the boarder into Saudi Arabia into the deserted town of Khafji. The Iraqi tanks approached Saudi Arabian positions with their turrets reversed, but soon they had engaged the Saudi forces in combat,³⁸ and were killed. Saudi and Qatari troops expelled the Iraqis from Khafji.

By Feb 1, Saddam Hussain's desultory little ground offensive was over. Iraq had lost several dozen tanks-42 in the battle for Khafji alone and hundreds of prisoners. It was a previous what would come "More than three weeks before the ground offensive, vast number of coalition forces had shifted west, (along the Iraq Saudi Arabia boarder) to get outside the main Iraqi defensive lines, VII Corps moved over 150 miles west and XVIII Airborne corps moved 250 miles west."³⁹ Iraq was ignorant about this move. Coalition forces did their best to deceive the Iraqis, aggressively patrolling and conducting feints all along the border to create confusion about where the attack would originate. At sea, thousands of marines embarked for an amphibious invasion.

Task force troy, (TFT) deceived the Iraqis by other means: Broadcasting tank noises over loudspeakers and deploying dummy tanks and artillery pieces, (TFT) sought to convince its opponents that an entire marine division was preparing to attack in a place where in fact no marine division existed.

During the first two days of the ground war, resistance had generally been light. By the afternoon of the 26th, however, occasionally sharp conflicts became much more frequent, particularly as units of VII corps began to make contact with the republican Guard. The weather also had again deteriorated. It was in such environment that the coalition-armed formations were to meet Saddam's elite forces.

During the night of February 26, 27 General Franks of VII corps launched his major attack against three mechanized divisions of the republican Guard. Five divisions of VII corps and the 24th mechanized from XVII corps fell on the republican guard. On the 27, VII corps, attack progressively ginned momentums its systematically destroyed Iraqi armored formations. Across a two-mile wide front, five-division formation moved eastward, destroying everything in

its path. Most Iraqi forces simply abandoned their cause, surrendering fleeing before or during the ground war. Some Iraqi units did mount counterattacks but they were uncoordinated. Coalition strategy established the context in which its high-tech weapons would have the greatest effect, in which coalition advantage would be leveraged to best advantage against Iraqi liabilities.

When notified that the cease-fire order was imminent (at 5 P.M. on the 27) the 1st armored planned an artillery attack for a final assault on elements of the Medina republican Guard Division. "This attack began at 5:30 A.M. on the 28th, with a simultaneous employment of MLRS (multiple launch rocket system) rockets and 203mm ARTILLERY ROUNDS. It was immediately followed up with an Apache helicopter attack."⁴⁰

"Elsewhere, JFC_E + JFC_N coordinated their linkup and liberated Kuwait city from the south and west respectively. A 24 years-old gunner of a Bradley in the 1st Armored described the scene in his vehicle: We wiped the sweat from our eyes, shook each other's hands and then we made some coffee."⁴¹ For four straight days and nights (without sleep) in chemical weapons suits, the coalition forces had battled the Iraqi army into submission while traveling hundreds of miles. They destroyed thousands of Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces in perhaps the most fast-paced blitzkrieg in history.

"The coalition forces provided as much help as they could. For the Americans, policing and caring for refugees was temporary and wearisome task to be completed prior to their ultimate goal deployment home."⁴² Many writers proclaimed not only the American military's total recovery from the Vietnam war but also contended that Desert Storm heralded the advent of military technological warfare production capabilities. Regardless, the "Desert Storm" was an

operation of not “decisive” victory, but it was a demonstration of modern technology. No doubt it contained Iraq and saved Saudi Arabia, but this operation could not remove Saddam Hussain.

The success of operation “Desert Storm” was the result of coalition-led America’s planning and strategy, with the proper help of modern weapons. While President Saddam began a conflict in a largely flat and featureless terrain easily scanned for activity by U.S. Satellites and Aircrafts.

By August 1990, Iraq had built the forth-largest army in the world: and one of the most well equipped air forces and was in reach of deploying nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, Iraq’s military strength was potentially over whelming, and its strategic reach threatened the entire region from Israel, Syria, and Egypt in the West to Iran in the East, to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf in the South and to the Soviet Union and Turkey in the north. That’s why this broad coalition was formed easily. But this military strength was decreased at lowest level and crippled due to Iraq’s lack of warfare planning and strategy.

Iraqi forces were in a barren land and President Saddam “set back, waited for coalition to initiate the war and crippled his air defenses, and then allowed coalition to conduct a devastating month-long air campaign from the invulnerable sanctuary of Saudi Arabia and other surrounding nations. He did not feed supply his troops adequately. It proved captain Tate’s (1st tactical fighters wing) motto, “it earned after securing the first aerial kills of world war I and II: The first is first.” Coalition with heavy air campaign incited the war and got victory over Iraq.

The significant element of victory was found in the means by which the coalition forces were employed: military strategy. President Saddam played directly into coalition’s hands. He filled Kuwait with his best troops and turned it into a bulging salient of military equipment virtually begging to be smashed from the air and surrounded on the ground. He was isolated and

deprived his forces of supplies through a naval blockade. His decisions undercut his command and demoralized his troops and they had very little to fight.

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Chapter -2

THE TERMS OF WAR TERMINATION

The Gulf War was over; a complicated and frustrating period of postwar diplomacy had begun. President Bush and Secretary to State Baker hoped to use the newfound U.S. regional leverage and the cooperative attitude of the moderate Arab states to promote new agreements. British Foreign Minister Secretary Douglas Hard after visiting Saudi Arabia and Egypt said that “after the war the world would have to turn its attention to the search for a comprehensive settlement of the peace settlement. Palestinian question and Arab Israeli dispute.”¹

First Effort of Cease-fire: President Saddam’s Proposals and Soviet Union Peace Plan

A. Iraq’s seven conditions:

1. Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and implementation of U.N. resolutions relating to that problem.
2. Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.
3. Territorial guarantees for Iraq and withdrawal of allied forces.
4. Cancellation of 12 U.N. Resolutions (see Appendix No.1) against Iraq since August 2 invasion
5. Security measures, which must include Iran to be set up in Gulf.
6. War reparations to be paid to Iraq
7. Cancellation of Iraq’s debts to Gulf states involved in War.

President bush rejected it and called it a cruel hoax”. It is said that the conditions included in the Iraqi offer were unacceptable and they were dashing the hopes of the people in

Iraq and indeed around the World. The Pentagon announced that military operation would continue. Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia also rejected the proposals.

Iraq's conditional offer to cease-fire was seen by experts and diplomats as a sign of weakness. An analyst Marvin Fairwater said that the offer was designed to split the 28, nation coalition seeking to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. "It could be a sign of potential greater weakness," said the State Department official. Several US lawmakers however said it might be a significant diplomatic opening that could lead to an end to the Gulf War. While some of them rejected the cease-fire Bob Dole, the minority leader in the senate said that the Iraqi proposal might be a slight crack in Baghdad's defeat stance. But he added: "these should not be pause, no cease-fire, no time outs. Representative Ron Dellums, a liberal from California, urged president Bush to test Saddam's sincerity. But British Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine said, "That Iraq's offer could be the opening shot in a push to find a way out of the Gulf war."² Apart from that, some diplomats noticed the offer, a faint ray of hope. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev expressed "Satisfaction and hope" at Iraq's offer, which the Iraqi News Agency said was a response to Soviet diplomatic offers to find a peaceful settlement to the month-old war. Indian Ambassador expressed his view in the UN Security Council meeting for a second day of closed-door debate on the Gulf war. He said that the Iraqi plan deserved to be studied. The representatives of Yemen, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Iran, shared that view. The Iranian envoy said that Baghdad's announcement provided the ground for the security Council to double its diplomatic efforts to encourage Iraq to comply with its resolutions. The Cuban Ambassador presented three draft resolutions to end the War, diplomats present at the session said, "The first draft called for an immediate halt to the allied bombing of Iraq; the second invited UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to continue his efforts to end the

Gulf crisis peace fully; the third aims to create a Panel to negotiate a cease-fire and eventually an end to the War. None of the resolutions had much chance of passage because of the veto power wielded by the US and its allies. While France, Germany and Canada stressed on unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

Iraq's announcement of withdrawal from Kuwait was linked to the Palestinian question and a pullout of foreign troops from the Gulf was a critical situation. Oil prices slumped on the news. But share prices fluctuated as it became clear that President Saddam was still trying to link a way out of the crisis to wider Middle East problems, such as the Arab, Israeli dispute. No doubt he had succeeded to fuel the problem, but the problem was solved by the American diplomats, avoiding Israel to enter into war.

The Iraqi New Agency (INA) said the ruling revolutionary command council (RCC) had called for a "comprehensive ceasefire." It also linked to the scrapping of all 12-security council resolutions, such as economic sanctions, adopted against Baghdad and Israel's withdrawal from Palestine and the Arab territories it is occupying." Baghdad made its conditions offer of withdrawal as the US-led coalition lightened the military screw on Iraq's armed forces.

B. Moscow's Eight-Point Peace Plan:

1. Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
2. Withdrawal of forces to begin day after ceasefire.
3. A deadline for withdrawal of forces.
4. Economic sanctions to end of the withdrawal of two-thirds of forces.
5. UN security council resolutions to be dropped after Iraqi forces complete withdrawal from Kuwait.
6. After ceasefire all POWs to be set free.

7. Neutral countries to monitor withdrawal under Security Council mandate.
8. Final point still under discussion.

Bush's ultimatum

President Bush rejected Soviet Peace Plan and demanded Iraq starts Quitting Kuwait by 1900 GMT Saturday”³ Iraq’s ruling RCC described Mr. Bush’s ultimatum as “Don Quixotic.”

C. New six-point peace plan:

Meanwhile, a new six-point peace plan was discussed between Baghdad and Moscow. Soviet spokesman V. Ignatenko Said” This was a comprehensive, deep analysis of the present situation in the Gulf region. They had discussed the tactical and strategic tasks. The six points as listed by Mr. Ignatenko were:

1. Iraq agrees to carry out resolutions 660 (see appendix No.1) of the UN Security Council allying on it to withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally form Kuwait to Positions they occupied before invading the emirate on August 2.
2. The troops withdrawal would begin the day after a ceasefire in all military operations in the area, on land, sea and in the air.
3. The troops withdrawal will be completed within 21 days, including a pull out from Kuwait city within 4 days.
4. Once withdrawal has been completed, all UN Security Council resolutions on the crisis will lose their force because the reasons for them will have been removed.
5. All war Prisoners will be freed and repatriated within three days after a ceasefire and the end of military operations.



6. Monitoring of the ceasefire and withdrawal will be carried out by observer or peace-keeping forces as determined by the Security Council.⁴

Iraqi response to the Soviet peace plan indicated that president Saddam had finally decided to withdraw from Kuwait but with conditions some of which the U.S. could not and would not accept.

Iraq's diplomatic shuttle policy

1. On Monday , Feb 18, soviet peace plan delivered to Iraqi Foreign Minister Triq Aziz and Iraqi Deputy Prim Minister Saddam Hammadi.
2. On Tue, Feb 19, Aziz holds talks with Iranian President Rafsanjani, and
3. Aziz briefs Iraqi President Saddam on Soviet peace plan.
4. On Wed, Feb 20, Hammadi holds talks in Beijing with Chinese leaders.
5. 5-On Thur, Feb 21, Aziz expected in Moscow to give Saddam's response to Soviet peace plan...

This shuttle diplomacy created serious problems for U.S diplomats. The effective cancellation of the UN sanctions, offered tantalizing possibilities, including a pullout without Saddam's earlier demands for linkage to broader middle East issue. The plan made it very difficult for the coalition to launch its planned ground assault while both the Soviet Union and Iraq were appealing for a ceasefire and promising a pullout. The U.S.-led coalition almost certainly had come under new pressure from around the world to wait for additional diplomacy. "In dismissing the latest soviet- Iraqi plan, Bush runs the risk of promoting protests at home and abroad that he is passing up an opportunity to settle the conflict without large-scale casualties that would result from a ground campaign..... He is pressing too hard for a military triumph over Saddam. It added, "the new Soviet-Iraqi offering is bound to be seen around the

world as more temperate and reasonable. Bush's dismissal of the Moscow plan may be designed to pressure the Soviet leadership to modify the plan to meet Bush's objections. "Saddam's intransigence...brought increasingly stiff penalties. But the Soviet Union, in effect, is offering him immunity from prosecution."⁵ U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney Said" If they (Soviet Union) can persuade Saddam Hussain to comply with the UN resolutions and get out of Kuwait by reiterating once again that is the only acceptable outcome that obviously would be a service." In response, a deputy spokesman for Gorbachev, Serge Grigoryer also denied that the Soviet Union was looking at cross-purposes to the U.S."⁶ Although the other multi-National alliance stated that it was not a soviet Iraqi joint plan. In fact, the Soviet Union was eager to ester international prestige damaged by its domestic situational to prove independence from the U.S.

Iraq's Reasons for Acceptance of U.N. Resolutions Concerning Withdrawal

After the ceasefire, on 3 April 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 687 (the mother of all resolutions) (see appendix No.2). It established the terms of the War termination, and laying out an extensive set of conditions for the lifting of sanctions. The Resolution 687 set out eight specific conditions that the Iraqi government needed meet for sanctions to be lifted. A week later the government of Iraq announced its acceptance of Resolutions. (See appendix No.2)

Baghdad harshly criticized the resolution, however, labeling it an unjust assault on Iraqi sovereignty. Most of the controversy in confrontation between Iraq and the UN had centered on the disarmament provisions of resolution 687. It demanded the full declaration of all Iraq's nuclear, ballistic missile, chemical, and biological weapons materials and capabilities. The resolution established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was to carry out immediate on-site inspections and assure the dismantling of all materials, systems, and capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction. In the implementing letters Iraq agreed to

grant UNSCOM unrestricted freedom of entry and exit and freedom of movement throughout Iraq.

The point to be considered is what has compelled Baghdad to offer a withdrawal now? Why could not this gesture be made at Geneva, in which case Iraq would have averted the war, kept its military and economic capability intact and saved perhaps hundreds of lives that have been lost? The Middle East analysts calculated that the punishment the Iraqis had received at the hands of the Allied forces and the prospect of humiliation they faced on the battlefield have forced Saddam Hussein to sue for peace. If this is true, then the allies are not so naïve as to ease the pressure by agreeing to a truce in return for a foggy peace plan. A ceasefire can be exploited by Baghdad to reorganize its forces and hit back. Tareq Aziz had the formidable task of debunking this contention and convincing the international community that his country indeed had intended to faith with the outside world, the only way to-do it is start pulling out of Kuwait in full view of everyone.

The sources said that Iraq had said it would accept Security Council resolutions that require Iraq to relinquish all claims on Kuwait and make Baghdad liable for reparations, if the United Nations agreed to a ceasefire and lifted economic sanctions. On the other hand, White house said that Iraq's acceptance of just these three resolutions was "still a conditional offer and falls for short of what's necessary."⁷ It is noted that "President Bush held out the promise of an end to fighting if Baghdad accepted all resolutions imposed against it by the council."⁸ White House spokesman Marlin Fit Water said that the resolutions call for stability in the region that would require to continue the effort to degrade Saddam's military structure. British Prime Minister John Major also favored to continue war.

The Baghdad move came when 800 US tanks moved in on 250 to 300 Iraqi tanks west of the southern Iraqi port city of Basra in the fiercest tank battle since world warII. “The allies reported about 90 dead on their side since the ground war began. Up to 60,000 Iraqis had given up. French Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maurice Schmitt said that Iraqi forces could be described as in collapse. At least 57 top-line Iraqi T-72 tanks had been destroyed .” It is added, “the Guard Started the War with 150,000 men ground in eight divisions, earlier most of one mechanized division had been wiped out and a second was trying to escape.”⁹ “But Saddam’s decisions to withdraw, thus fulfilling the main but not the only demand of 12 UN resolutions on the crisis, puts the allies in a dilemma.”¹⁰

However, president Saddam and his government had noted that there were still obstacles to quick cease-fire resolution. One was uncertainly about whether the US. Which widely believed to want Saddam toppled from power, favored with holding a formal cease-fire in an attempt to help achieve that goal. Another is whether the council members would agree that Iraq was making a good faith effort to return thousands of Kuwaitis allegedly taken to Iraq by retreating Iraqi troops. On the other hand, Major General Hussan Al-Nkib, (a former chairman of the Iraqi Chiefs of Staff) said that Iraqi decision to withdraw form Kuwait was “a manicure staged by Saddam Hussain’s to save himself and his ruling colique.”¹¹ Same was calculated by the Middle East analysts they said, “After a string of miscalculation about the strength of allied resolve to drive him out Kuwait, Saddam’s last gamble to claim “moral victory” surrounded himself with trusted troops and dared the allies to come and get him.

The western allies said that one of Saddam’s mistakes had been to fail to see that Washington would gain UN support. That made it tougher for him to see point it as a battle

between the West and Islam. President Saddam had fulfilled to drag Iraq into the War, hoping to split the coalition and had scored no significant military victory.

Militarily, his position appeared desperate. His much-vaunted million-man army was in retreat and his every attempt to negotiate his way out of the crisis had been turned down by President Bush. “While the Bush administration has not formulated specific proposals, Baker will collect the ideas of coalition members on his current Middle East trip, and these will be translated into terms that Washington will seek to have endorsed by the Security Council.”¹² It is also observed by the western diplomats that the Iraqi troops had not surrendered but refused to wage Saddam’s war in Kuwait after being coerced by their rules to fight, for no cause, no target, no aim, and without any identity. Regardless, U.S. led coalition’s strategic methodology and high technology defeated Iraqi army as explained in previous chapter. Otherwise, there was a cause, aim and target but poor strategy.

An Assessment of War

The Persian Gulf War represented of the few unambiguously successful uses of large-scale, military force by the U.S. since world war II. The success of Operation Desert Storm was in large measure a result of American administration’s management style in making political diplomatic, strategic decisions, and the use of advanced military arsenals. It is also reported that Gulf War was a military victory over Iraq but not the political one. Indeed, the “victory” in the Gulf had not been won, only a lasting peace can be considered true victory. As the study of Arab-Israeli wars show: “Israel won a major victory on the battlefield,..... But no the kind of victory that decisively altered the politics of the region.”¹³

Western powers faced problems in following up their military victory with political one; American Middle East analyst Christine Helms Said, “this a story of with no winners, only losers.

He added "Even if this crisis quickly fades, its shadow will loom in the years head."¹⁴ According to Hallion's thesis, "The Persian Gulf War confirmed a major transformation in the nature of Warfare: The dominance of air power."¹⁵ By contrast, Record said "It can be argued that the Gulf War provided no genuine test of U.S fighting power.....it was the mother of all military anomalies."¹⁶ From Record's perspective, success is not in weapons performance, but in whether or to political and military objectives are achieved. He claimed that since Saddam Hussain is still in power, since much of his military machine is still intact, and since the extent to which his chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare production capabilities were depleted is largely unknown, their campaign failed.

Hilsman contends that the Persian Gulf war was largely a struggle between Saddam Hussain and George Bush.....and that Saddam may have won. Like Record, he argues that while the coalition forces were out of Kuwait, but Sadam Hussain "not only remained in power, but his position seemed to have been strengthened."¹⁷ Like Record, Hilsman underscores the survival of a largely intact Republican Guard, He asserts that because Iraq's scientists and engineers survived, in a few years Saddam Hussain will have rebuilt his chemical, biological, and nuclear production capabilities. As, Iraq's rebuilding of weapons of mass destruction is a hot issue of today. Another rostrum over Iraq is planned by US and his strong ally Britain at the end of 2002.

The decimation of Iraq in the Gulf War brought about an intense popular resentment against the US among the Arab people as Jim Hoagland noted, "There are signs that the Arab political establishment has come to feel that at a minimum there is no penalty for helping America's declared enemies in the Arab World."¹⁸ Washington was, however, hopeful that by brokering an accelerated peace process among the Arabs and Israelis it could attenuate Arab

states with the U.S. Washington did seem to succeed initially, but the peace process has stalled since the recent emergence of a right wing government in Israel. With the U.S. seen as incapable of reining in the new Israeli Government, the Arab anger against Washington has become acute as Henry Kissinger noted earlier, dual containment is under pressure from all directions. The core of the American strategy toward the Gulf, "dual containment" the simultaneous isolation of Iran and Iraq has increasingly become untenable. While at the global level, the support for the "dual containment" strategy is beginning to decline. The other great powers are increasingly uneasy at having to forego political and commercial opportunities in both Iraq and Iran. Russia and France, with long standing cooperation with Baghdad have been keen on renewing economic ties with Iraq.

On the other hand despite the American efforts to contain Iran. Tehran has emerged as the political gainer from the Gulf War Iran gave a positive reply of Iraqi diplomatic efforts to discuss the easing of border tensions and the return of prisoner of War remaining from the 1980-1988 as well as the Western Allies were concerned the American efforts at lightening the economic sanctions against Iran has outraged almost all the other powers including the American allies in Western Europe, China and Russia have found it advantageous to go beyond normal economic interaction with Tehran and engage in strategic cooperation, including the sale of nuclear technology, missiles and advanced conventional arms.

The Gulf War also promoted terrorism and American society became a prey of "a complex terrorism, that threatens modern, high-tech societies in the World's most developed nations."¹⁹ Reduced revenues from oil exports, pressures from population growth, growing economic and social demands, and the stirring for political change are beginning to tax the current capabilities for governance within the Gulf States. That's why Arab leadership is now

under pressure of public opinion. Messianic religious movements that espouse anti-Western themes are gaining ground.

The American efforts to build a regional security system in the Gulf have largely failed. The collapse of the six-plus two formula aimed uniting Egypt and Syria with the six Nations of the GCC is symptomatic of the problems in establishing a stable framework for regional security cooperation in the Gulf. The GCC is itself deeply divided on a number of issues and does not have the strategic coherence to serve as the bedrock of security in the region.

Expanding of War Objectives

“In effect, the Bush administration waged a limited war for unlimited ends, and thus was doomed to disappointment once the heady euphoria of military victory passed.” Robert A. Divine, said in his research paper “The Persian Gulf War Revisited: Tactical Victory, Strategic Failure. The sanctions couldn’t achieve American goals while War had brought about the diplomacy. The War had weakened Iraqi forces and ejected Iraqi army form Kuwait. This first stage of War had raised the possibility of achieving other ends, such as drastically reducing Iraq’s military might, destroying its capacity develop weapons of mass destruction and bringing a new , less threatening leadership to Baghdad under a chastened President Saddam or a new leadership. As some analysts said the aims of the War had inevitably-expanded as the conflict’s financial and emotional costs increased.

The main objective of the establishment of peace and stability was included in the final Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. This goal included neutralizing Saddam’s chemical and biological weapons, thwarting his drive for nuclear arms drastically reducing the size of his military and preserving the free flow of oil from the Gulf. This main

objective could only be achieved by defaming Saddam Hussain and leaving the Iraqi military in such a degraded state that a permanent American presence is not necessary in the Gulf.

The security structure issue

The build up a "Security structure" in the region, James A. Baker III advised global arms embargo on Iraq might have to be retained and efforts made to inspect and dismantle Saddam's chemical weapons stockpile. The US also had made clear its view that some of the trade sanctions should be maintained to control Iraq's ability to buy new conventional weapons. For that purpose Iraq's nuclear reach facilities and his poison gas stockpiles were an early allied targets. The republican Guard, his elite military unit, had also been targeted.

U.S. used the leverage through sanctions to induce Iraq to accept certain limitations. The war raised security structure" issues. There right be a pressures for removal of American and other non-Arab forces from the gulf region. The two areas; the boarder between Iraq and Kuwait and between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were to be safeguarded. The American leadership had envisioned establishing a demilitarized zone along these frontiers. No-fly zones were aimed at to prevent president Saddam from using his air force and helicopters to slaughter his people as he had repeatedly had done in the past. The zones also contained Saddam Hussain's ability to threaten his neighbors (see Appendix No.3). U.S. also threatened to use force if Saddam Hussain threatened Iraq's neighbors or coalition forces, reconstituted or deplored WMD, or moves against the Kurds. (See appendix No. 3)

The U.S. conditioned the uplifting of sanctions with compliance. UN sanctions will be relaxed to allow immediate entry into Iraq of foodstuffs; medical supplies and other urgently needed equipment such as electrical generators. The Security Council will review the situation every 60 days to decide whether further relaxation of sanctions is warranted.

All UN member states must bar the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related equipment, “specifically including conventional military equipment,” and technology used in arms production. There also would be a ban on other countries giving Iraq military.”²⁰

Humanitarian relief programme

When the Persian Gulf War ended, the Security Council voted to keep the sanctions in place until Iraq complied completely with terms of an April cease-fire, including a requirement that it disclose and destroy all its biological, chemical and nuclear weapons actions not fully carried out yet. On the other hand, Iraq requested to have economic sanctions lifted. Washington also noted that Iraq was trying to appeal to get some relief on the oil. The U.N. Security Council sanctions committee met to consider Iraq’s request to see about 1 billion in oil to pay for emergency imports of food and medical supplies. Giving comments on oil-for-food programme Bush stated, “we are not going to let people starve.”²¹

The pressure of sanctions under U.N. resolutions 687, which formally ended the Persian Gulf War, the sanctions committee was empowered to consider exceptions. To the economic embargo of Iraq imposed before the War, However, any exceptions must be solely for the purpose of allowing Iraq to earn money for basics humanitarian and civilian needs. But the U.S position had been remained as “skeptical” since the Gulf War. Whether Iraq would spend this money to help Iraqi people.

The humanitarian relief work was for:

- * Expanding Iraqi oil sales making more money available for oil-for –food.
- * Expediting approval of contracts under oil for-food.
- * To show that the international community, not Saddam Hussain was caring for the Iraqi people.

Regime change

The U.S. led coalition had favored continuing the sanctions to pressure Iraq into dumping Saddam Hussain. Saddam's previous record, demonstrated that he would never comply with UN resolutions completely. According to American diplomats Saddam would continue to repress his own people and threaten his neighbors. That's why the only way to address the security needs of the international community and the needs of the people of Iraq was through a new government in Iraq. The US believed that the regime would be changed, it must come from within Iraq, led by Iraqis. That's why Bush urged the Iraqi people against Saddam. "Bush's," veild suggestions that the Iraqi people take matters into their own hands ended disastrously when Saddam was able to crush the uprisings by the Shi'ites in the South and the Kurds in the North."²²

Since the Gulf War, Bush administration had ruled out normal relations with Iraq as long as Saddam remained in power. In May 1991 U.S. had been trying to keep as many UN sanctions in place as possible until Saddam stepped down or was removed. Bush suggested that the sanctions might be lifted if Iraq complied with "every provision" of the U.N. resolutions. British Prime Minister John Major said the sanctions should not be lifted as long as Saddam remained in power. Since the end of World War-II, America policy has been to encourage a balance of power in the Gulf. The U.S. led coalition had a difficult political as well as military task: to reduce Iraq's huge standing army military might, eliminate its WMD, but not weaken Iraq to the point that a new power vacuum would tempt other regional such as Syrian and Iran to capitalize on Iran's defeat.

But Saddam it had made himself intolerable not only to the west but to most of his neighbour. That's why the policy was changed was isolated. Otherwise in previous examples, for instance, UN forces could not conquer North Korea because of Chinese intervention, and

Soviet support for North Vietnam restricted any effort to destroy Hanalei. In Gulf War, President Saddam's isolation provide safe ground for the coalition to extend its War aims to include the abolition of Saddam regime.

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Chapter-3

THE ISSUE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The clear lesson of Iran- Iraq War was that every thing possible must done to contain the violence in the Gulf and to fight the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The growth of nuclear, chemical, or biological arsenals in the Middle East would aggravate existing instabilities, nourish the ambitions or regional hegemony and, could produce horrendous casualties if used.

A multilateral diplomatic strategy to reduce or eliminate such unconventional arsenals is in the U.S. national interest, especially because of uncertainties associated with deterrence and compliance with such weapons in regional contingencies. The acquisition of a nuclear capability by Iraq may hurl the Middle East into an era of great strategic instability.

Iraq's WMD Capability

President Saddam's nuclear-weapon program was perhaps the most threatening aspect of the Iraqi military build-up. His previous efforts at developing a nuclear device included the purchase of a research reactor installed at Osirak, its purpose was the production of enriched uranium. The Israelis launched a preemptive air strike on the reactor site on June 7, 1981, successfully destroying the facility but not eliminating the enriched uranium itself.

When War came, the prevention of an Iraqi bomb became a durable war aim, one roundly endorsed by the UN Security Council. President Bush provoked publicly the danger of Saddam with a bomb. The destruction of Iraqi installations related to nuclear weapons became a specific American military objective of high priority.

By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, many analysts had concluded that Iraq could have been within a year of deploying a crude nuclear device. When the Gulf War broke out, President Bush claimed that the Iraqis were within months of deploying a crude nuclear device.

PERSIAN GULF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN THE 1990S					
(\$BILLION)					
	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999
Iran	4.3	2.0	3.0	4.7	5.7
Iraq	7.5	2.6	1.3	1.3	1.5
S. Ar.	35.4	16.5	17.2	18.2	21.9

Iraq got nuclear power plants from France and Soviet Union. It had technical help from several European corporations. Iraq spent more money on the supply of farm technology. “From 1947 to 1989, ... for more than 75 percent of the estimated total of \$ 220 billion to \$250 billion oil-for-arms trade in the Middle East, with Iraq being the biggest single buyer.”¹ The table shows the high rate of Iraqi defense expenditure in Gulf in 1991.

In the mid-1980s Iraq purchased nuclear fuel on the legitimate and controlled international market, but it also tried smuggling additional fuel from other sources “Moreover, in the late 1970s. China sold Iraq 1.8 metric tons of reprocessed uranium, enriched to a level of 2.6 percent uranium 235 atoms.”² Ironically, by early 1990 some U.S. firms had also been involved in Iraqi attempts to develop nuclear devices. As late as July 1990, the Iraqis almost succeeded in legally importing from the U.S. a high performance furnace (can melt most modern metals, including lithium, plutonium, and uranium) from the New Jersey, based Consare Corporation. Iraq also developed its nuclear research capability.

Iraq also by obtaining from European firms the specialized components and machinery for assembling high performance centrifuges that would allow Saddam to produce weapons

grade nuclear fuel without reliance on the type of research reactor that had been destroyed at Osirak.

The evidence available does not tell how close the Iraq was to the nuclear weapons delivery capability. “As far as we know, Iraq was never able to deploy nuclear or biological agents in any delivery weapons. We know for a fact, however, that the Iraqi military had an extensive chemical weapons delivery capability Iraqi forces used chemical weapons against the Iranians.”³

While another point of view is that Iraq had acquired a substantial arsenal of medium-range ballistic missiles, potentially armed with unconventional war heads. Iraq was on the verge of becoming the owner of a rudimentary nuclear arsenal at the time Saddam made the threats the possible use of WMD during Gulf-strongly suggested that he does not view WMD merely as a means of deterring an enemy from attacking Iraq with WMD. The Appendix No.4 provides the details of Iraqi chemical agents.

Was the Weight of Bomb as a General Threat?

The destruction of Iraqi installations related to nuclear weapons became a specific American military objective of high priority. The president undoubtedly had this objective in mind from very early in the crisis: the Saddam Hussein so starkly revealed on August 2, 1990, was not at all the sort of opponent whose pursuit of nuclear weapons would be a matter of indifference. When Mr Bush learned from the polls that the American public shared his view, he turned his spotlight publicly on the danger of Saddam-with-a-bomb, and he may have stretched the evidence then available in presenting the possibility of an Iraqi bomb as both real and imminent.

Starting in early February 1991, Western newspapers reported that Saddam had authorized his field commanders to use WMD on the battlefield, relying on their judgment. It did not mean that Iraq had “the bomb in the basement” While Israeli Chief of staff, lieutenant General Dan Shomrom, announced during the second half of the Gulf War that Israel would not be the first state to use nuclear weapons in the conflict. In this statement Israel admitted that it was already in possession of nuclear weapons.

To date there is no evidence that Iraq used WMD in Gulf War. While it is said Iraq was near to complete its nuclear weapons, with in one year. Israel was fully aware, of course, that chemical weapons were no comparable to nuclear ones, but some Israel officials feared that Iraq had a few missiles armed with biological weapons.

The weight of the “bomb” was used as a general threat. All the warnings of possible Iraqi WMD use issued in the west during the Gulf War were the result of deliberate Iraqi --- designed to deter the Allied forces from launching a ground offensive and to split in the coalition. For that purpose, the Iraqi supreme command also threatened to make use of a new and secret kind of weapon that would decide the outcome of the war. There were some additional indications that Iraq was considering the use of CW (Chemical Weapons) against allied forces once the ground offensive had begun. Because Iraq was having (CW) capability (A appendix No.4 provides details of Iraqi chemical agents).

Regardless, the WMD were not used. The Iraqi leader had to consider the possibility that WMD strike on Israel could lead to the destruction of Baghdad. While there was no immediate danger that Baghdad would be occupied and the regime toppled. As long as there was a good chance that the Allied ground offensive would end once Kuwait was liberated, not all was lost, and thus there was no point in employing doomsday weapons. While, a letter from President

Bush to President Saddam delivered to Tariq Aziz by Secretary of State Baker on January 9, 1991, warned that any attack of the WMD against members of the allied coalition would entail “a terrible price.” President Saddam was aware of it and, once noted that he knew about threats made against Iraq by Baker in Geneva, and that he knew of the “declared and undeclared objectives” of the U.S. The declared objectives were to liberate Kuwait and undeclared objectives were to overthrow the Iraqi regime, and destruction of Iraqi military might. In these circumstances, President Saddam only used the threat of WMD to deter allied coalition from taking certain actions. He was also convinced. If Israel had planned any raid on Iraqi nuclear facilities, it was called off.

It was a great mistake on President Saddam’s part that he jumped the gun before becoming an overt nuclear power and tried to create a MAD (mutually assured destruction) deterrence system with Israel. In fact President Saddam used weight of bomb as a general threat. While President Bush used it to exploit the Americans.

Why was President Saddam Willing to Acquire WMD Capability

The reason for acquiring Iraq’s nuclear capabilities were: First, Iraq and Iran had been locked in a major conflict over sovereignty and control of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway, a key access route to the Persian Gulf. President Saddam and his strategic planners probably suspected that Iran has nuclear ambitions. Iraqi nuclear arsenal may have simply been an equalizer. Second, some analysts argued that it was necessary to secure the survival of regime, Saddam’s solution was to initiate a military nuclear program, while simultaneously making major concessions to both the Soviet Union and Iran.

Dr. Hussain Shahrastani, the nuclear program’s chief of chemical development, had little doubt that President Saddam’s nuclear program included both the territorial expansion and pan-

Arab ambitions. It is observed that Saddam Hussain also had envisaged the emerging threat of Israel's nuclear capability. Saddam argued that in the absence of an Arab nuclear capability, Israel would use nuclear threats to force the Arabs not only to withdraw from territories acquired in past wars, but also to introduce major changes in their education and culture. On the other hand, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's announced in his speech that Israel would not allow any Arab country to produce nuclear weapons.

As well as Iraq's own nuclear deterrent is concerned, the Arabs could stabilize the Middle Eastern arena just as the U.S. and Soviet Union has stabilized their relationship. Even though the Iraqi leader spoke in terms of an Arab bomb, President Saddam implied that Iraq had achieved the necessary scientific level to become a responsible nuclear power. He also implied that his nuclear program would continue, telling his technicians that the responsibility for the defense of Iraq and the Arabs laid upon their shoulders. The Arab "nation" he announced would continue... to charge forward towards its goals.... "in science and technology."⁴ Indeed, President Saddam intended to begin legitimizing an Iraqi/Arab nuclear arsenal. In fact, President Saddam presented himself and his country as the defender of all Arabs, offering them and Iraq no conventional umbrella. To strengthen Pan-Arab ties, he strongly supported the Palestinian issue and demanded that Arafat would not make any political concessions to Israel. "We shall not accept any more concessions or political efforts because I know they are useless; they only increase the enemies' haughtiness, from now on no place, no recognition and no negotiation.... We shall support it [the Palestinian Intifada] by our air force and accurate missiles in order to deal a blow on the enemy and defeat it even without ground fighting... we have not cut down our military forces [after the Iraq-Iran War] and we have even beefed them up."⁵

This promise could have been interpreted as a leap from deterring Israel to an attempt to withdraw from Jerusalem, the west Bank and the Gaza Strip under the threat of WMD use. He called upon the Arabs to unify and build their “power factor.”

Why President Saddam did not Comply to UNSCOM and IAEA

Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait shows President Saddam’s intentions in future. In response to a school child’s question, he says:

“Saddam: If you fail your class, What Will you do?”

Pupil: “I take the class again.”

Saddam: “And that’s what we will do too.”⁶

This conversation to the student shows President Saddam was convinced about his victory as he did not comply however his military power was fully to be destroyed and U.N. inspection team keeping his hold on the government, he was convinced “that the gulf war was not a defeat-because he is still alive. He thinks he’s victorious.” That’s why the Baath Party machinery claimed it “splendid victory.”

It is said, in late 1995, Iraq continued to work on its WMD in violation of a stack of UN resolutions. UNSCOM remained fail to find proves of it many feared that Iraq once again ma not be far from producing an atom bomb. The question is how it’s possible. It is argued that Iraq retained the most important assets required to restart its nuclear efforts: a cadre of experienced scientists and technicians, a relatively advanced military industrial base, a viable nuclear weapon design, having bomb-design team and thousands of sophisticated machine tools. Iraqi nuclear scientists probably could create the infrastructure to build a ‘bomb’ from purloined fissile material. (and the Iraqis have boasted to inspectors that they could build whatever equipment they night now lack for such an effort). Moreover, weapons development and testing could be carried out at temporary or makeshift.

To get rid of such problems, it was suggested that Iraq's weapons design team must be dispersed in such a way as to make it difficult for them to continue with clandestine weapon work. US must stand on firm on this issue in spite of Iraqi's resistance.

“As long as President Saddam remained in power the U.S. would face a potential nuclear threat.”⁷

U.S. Policy again shifted from sanctions to air strikes. Iraq was really to discuss documents.

As the U.S. strike force moved into position and the air strikes became imminent from 1st November, to 16th November tension mounted in the area. On 17 November 1998 Iraq announced its willingness to discuss weapons documents that UN arms inspectors want Baghdad to hand over.

As well as the UNSCOM concerns, it was not able to carry out its inspection activities in connection with the proscribed chemical biological and missile program in Iraq, and at the end of the year Security council established a new body-UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission) to carry out the mandate entrusted to UNSCOM by relevant Security council resolutions.⁸ Thus UNSCOM achieved its target, destroyed large quantities of Chemical Weapons (CW). (See appendix No.5).

There are legitimate reasons also why President Saddam did not comply to UNSCOM and IAEA:

- a. “The former head of the inspection team, David Kay, was rebuked in the fall of 1991 for handing over 25,000 Iraqi documents directly to the US, without even consulting the U.N. [The Scourging of Iraq, Geoff Simons, 1996]
- b. The current head of the inspection team, Richard Butler, has made racist statements about Arabs having a different standard for truth than Westerners do.

- c. Iraq sees a double-standard: seldom have resolutions by the UN been enforced in the past (in particular, resolutions critical of Israel have been blocked by the US).
- d. Inspection activities included, according to Voices in the wilderness, such dubious activities as ransacking a Baghdad convent and burning high school chemistry books.”⁹

President Saddam charged UNSCOM interfering in country’s domestic affairs. He announced these activities as an attack on Iraq’s sovereignty.

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Chapter-4

THE SANCTION REGIME

Early in the “Desert Shield” crisis, it became evident to President Bush and many other senior advisers that economic Sanctions alone would not persuade President Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. And how long it might take for the sanctions to have sufficient impact to convince Saddam to give up. If it took this long, it was highly doubtful would be a Kuwait left to save. The passage of time also would make it harder to hold the multinational sanction regime together. Over time, there would be more leakage in the sanctions.

The sanction program could not, and did not, operate in a vacuum. There were numerous diplomatic efforts. Principally by the U.S but also by the Soviet Union, France and China, to achieve the U.N Security Council’s objectives. The Soviet Union and China supported these measures and also suspended all military aid to Iraq(although it took some time before all Soviet military advisers left Iraq). Turkey and Saudi Arabia played critical roles by closing oil pipelines crossing their territories. The U.N provided an umbrella for the war waged by the U.S and its allies against Iraq, is expected to play a similar role in formally ending the Persian Gulf conflict and making the political arrangements that would Iraq’s post war relations with its neighbors.

According to U.S and diplomatic officials. As Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney Said, “ I would think that the world clearly has an interest in seeing to it that Saddam Hussain does not again, in the near future, threaten its neighbors the way this government has.”¹

Iraq Security Council Resolutions

Resolution Number	Action
660	August 1990 condemned Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded Baghdad withdraw its forces.
661	August 1990. Imposed comprehensive, mandatory sanctions Created sanctions committee Banned all trade Imposed oil embargo and arms embargo and arms embargo Suspended international flights Froze Iraqi government financial assets/prohibited financial transactions.
678	November 1990. Authorized member states to liberate Kuwait Gave Iraq "pause of goodwill" to comply with U.N. demands.

The sanctions not only bought the time necessary to deploy the forces, they also persuaded most people that military action would be undertaken only as a last resort, after nonmilitary options had run their course.

Economic embargo

On August 6, the individual efforts of U.S and other countries were transformed into a multilateral embargo by a vote of the Security Council in Resolution 661. On August 25, the SC adopted Resolution to enforce Resolution 661. this was a critical vote as it put teeth in the Blockage of Iraq and Kuwait. Moreover, UN sanctions were covered by four key executive orders signed by the President Bush. The first two were issued on the day of the invasion; the others were designed to confirm with UN resolution 661.

The Executive Orders (EO) of President Bush:

- 1- EO 12722, issued August 2, 1990 blocked the property and interests of Iraq held in the U.S; prohibited the import and export of any Iraqi and U.S goods and service; the re-

export of Iraqi goods to any country; and the grant or extension of credits, loans, or guarantees to the government of Iraq.

- 2- EO 12721, issued August 2, blocked all assets of the government of Kuwait held in U.S or by a U.S person worldwide.
- 3- EO 12724, issued August 9, prohibited the performance of any contracts, in support of industrial, commercial, public utility or Iraqi government contracts.
- 4- EO 12725, issued August 9, prohibited any import of Kuwait origin; any export of goods, service, or technology to Kuwait; any financial transaction with Kuwait, and any travel to Kuwait (with Exception for Humanitarian, official and media travel).

In addition, on September 1 the U.S denied developing country status to Iraq; ended and foreign aid, Exim bank Guarantees, and the sale of items on the Munitions list. The U.S executive directors at multilateral financial institutions were directed to vote against any loan or program for Iraq. The executive orders and other actions were strengthened by the Iraqi Sanctions Act of 1990, (Public Law 101-513) which continued the sweeping embargo against trade, economic, or financial transactions with Iraq or Iraqi-occupied Kuwait and strengthened enforcement by increasing civil and criminal penalties.

At first glance, sanctions could be expected to have the desired impact on Iraqi conduct. Turkey closed pip line carrying Iraqi crude across Turkey to the Mediterranean; Saudi Arabia is also closed the pipeline bringing Iraqi crude across Saudi Arabia to Yanbu. With the closure of these two pipelines (Iraq's only outlets) and the naval blockade of the Persian Gulf, Iraq lost over 95% of its oil exports. A small amount of oil was shipped overland to Jordan, which depend on Iraqi oil for most of its supply.

As the SC progressively tightened the sanctions, the U.S and other countries began to deploy substantial military forces the region. Various attempts to mediate the dispute and negotiate an Iraqi withdrawal failed, and pressure increased for a military solution to the crisis. Some argued that sanctions were economically effective and should have given more time to produce political compliance. Others particularly the U.S and British government, dismissed the prospects for sanctions success and pressed for prompt military action. On 29 November 1990 the SC adopted Resolution 678 authorizing member states to use all necessary means” to liberate Kuwait and giving Iraq “ a pause of goodwill” until 15 January 1991.

In the prewar period the goal was to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The evidence from past episodes suggests that sanctions almost never succeed in achieving such major objectives as reversing an act of military aggression. Given these inherent limitations, it was probably unrealistic to expect in the initial stages of the Gulf crisis that sanctions alone would have been sufficient to force a complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. As John C. Danforth concludes, “ to accomplish our objectives without war is to maintain sanctions accompanied by a credible military threat. Without a credible military threat, our alternative is sanctions followed by nothing at all.”²

Another point is, “that over a long period, rapidly enforced and universally supported sanction program could have convinced Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait.”³ It is thought to convince, he further says, “ the economic sanctions remained in place seven years after Saddam’s defeat and he still refused to comply with relevant U.N. resolutions.”⁴

The sanctions thus served an important political purpose in first regime of sanctions. They were a key element in the overall strategy of ejecting Iraq from Kuwait. Congress supported the use of force in the Gulf. Key allies also wanted to see if sanctions had a reasonable chance of

succeeding in the short term. When it was clear that they did not, most allied were fully supportive of military action. The 1st regime of sanctions met to an end with the successes of liberating Kuwait and with the destruction of Iraqi military might.

II Regime of Sanctions

Iraq Security Council Resolutions

Resolution Number	Action
687	3 April 1991. Established terms of cease-fire Established set of eight specific conditions for the lifting of sanctions.
706	15 August 1991 Authorized oil for food program Permitted sale of up to \$ 1.6 billion in Iraqi oil over six-month period. Directed that proceeds be deposited in UN escrow account to finance humanitarian imports, war reparations.
712	19 September 1991. Established basic structure for oil for food program implementation Iraq rejected Resolutions 706 and 712.
778	2 October 1992. Called on member states to transfer Iraqi oil funds from pre-Gulf crisis to UN escrow account.
986	14 April 1995. Established new formula for oil for food Permitted sale of up to \$1 billion in Iraqi oil every three months. Gave Baghdad primary responsibility for distribution of humanitarian goods. Came into force December 1996. Escrow writer agreement III person.
1111	4 June 1997 Extended oil for food program Baghdad withheld distribution plans and oil sales

By the cease-fire in April 3, 1991, marked the end of one phase and start of another. The objective changed from getting Saddam to withdrawal from Kuwait to getting Iraq to comply

with provisions of U.N SC Resolution 686 adopted March 2, 1991, and 687 adopted April 3; which set the terms for a formed end to the hostilities. The sanctions imposed on Kuwait by Resolution 661 were lifted, while those imposed on Iraq had remained with certain important exceptions.

In post-Desert Storm Sanctions regime the U.S, led coalition's objective was to prevent Iraq from once again becoming a military threat to the region. Although, Iraq's military, power destroyed in Desert Strom, as a former U.S. ambassador to Jordan Said, "or Sanctions regime has contain his military capabilities and restrained his neighbors as he did in the past."⁵

Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was a great threat for the region. Under resolution 687, the U.N. Special Commission was created to destroy the WMD and for carry out on-site inspection. Iraq further was in dreadful situation in April 1991. The air campaign and ground campaign resulted in destruction of Iraqi military might; destruction of infrastructure and industrial capability (estimated \$ 20 billion to \$ 30 billion).Economic discomfort among the Iraqi peoples was observed. As a result of these factors, some observers thought if reasonable that a popular uprising, led or supported by elements within the Iraqi military, would result in Saddam Hussain's removal from power. Even this were not materialize, the general feeling was that Saddam would be willing to comply with Resolution 687, as stated. " After the Gulf war, some hoped that Iraq might do what was necessary for sanctions to be removed," in order to get permission to resume exporting oil was required not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would monitor it.

Iraq agreed to return all seized Kuwait property, return prisoners of war, nor its international debts and obligations which it had renounced in August 1990), and pay compensation for various claims lodged against it. The sanction regime from April 3, 1991 to

June 4, 1997, is observed as an international uprising demands on humanitarian basis (see Appendix No. 6). That's why Resolution 687 was loosened to permit the sale or supply of food stuffs.

Oil for food program.

By reviewing the table of second regime of sanctions, it is noted that resolution 706 permitted sale of up to \$ 1.6 billion in Iraqi oil over six month period. Iraq was directed that proceeds to deposit in UN account to finance humanitarian imports, war reparations. It was insufficient aid to be used for humanitarian purposes.

Resolution 712 passed a month later, established a basic structure for the implementation of the oil-for-food program. The Iraqi leadership refused to accept Resolutions 706 and 712, asserting the proposed procedures for providing humanitarian relief were a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. On the other hand, Iraqi rejection of oil-for-food program was propagated as “Saddam does not simply refuse to alleviate his people's suffering; he holds them hostage for political proposes.”⁶ This oil-for-food program could not stop the sufferings of Iraqi people. While the sanction could not bring and significant change in the Iraqi leadership.

Resolution 778 passed, calling on member states to transfer Iraqi aid funds from pre-war Gulf crisis to UN escrow account. “These funds were used to implement provisions of Resolution 687 and to provide humanitarian assistance.”⁷

Resolution 986, establishing a new formula for the oil for food, permitted sale up to \$ 1 Billion in Iraqi oil every three months. Gave Baghdad primary responsibility for distribution of humanitarian goods. After months of negotiations. Baghdad finally accepted program.

“Baghdad finally accepted that economy sanctions would not be lifted prematurely and that its only chance to ease the growing economic distress in Iraq was this humanitarian plan.”⁸

But UN officials has been remained skeptical towards this humanitarian program. “meanwhile, UN inspectors found proof that the regime continued to divert Iraq’s scare resources to building the country’s military infrastructure.”⁹ UNSCOM and UN agencies in Iraq would monitor Iraq and prevent with Iraq I from rebuilding the country’s military infrastructure. US and UN’s this preventive policy achieve much success, enforcing the sever economic sanctions that could contain Iraq and monitoring the humanitarian program.

Reports show that continuing weight of sanctions had at lest some impact in pressuring Baghdad to accept some of the weapons inspections provisions of Resolution 687 (see appendix No.2). According to a U.S official quoted in the Washington Post, “ We have seen no evidence of reconstruction of WMD. Then question is why were sanctions not lifted to relief the Iraqi people. As many times Iraqi leaders argued that they had compiled to U.N. resolutions and still the sanctions were there. Many countries including members of Security Council called for a lifting of sanctions to retrieve human confrontation sufferings’ resume trade rehashes and endless.

The III Regime of Sanctions

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1153 | 20 February 1998
Extended oil for food program again raised oil sales to \$5.25 billion every six months Permitted revenues to finance urgent development needs (electricity sector) |
| 1284 | 17 December 1999
Established new UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Outlined procedures for the completion of weapons verification process Expanded humanitarian provisions Declared council’s intention to suspend sanction for renewable 120-day periods if Iraq cooperated with UNMOVIC and IAEA. |

As President Saddam is still in power pursuing his own agendas. He had moved his troops into positions threatening Kuwait, while he had recognized its independence on Oct 1994. He is also still threaten to his neighbors and had continued to suppress the Kurds in northern Iraq and Shiites in southern Iraq. It is stated that “if the sanctions are relaxed. The evidence suggests that he will continue to hold the Baghdad population hostage and step up his internal war on the Kurds in the north and Shiites in the South.”¹⁰

His actions forced allied coalition to devote substantial resources to operations Northern Watch in the north and Southern Watch in the South as well as to keep substantial military assets in the Persian Gulf region. Saddam Hussein gave little indication that the economic suffering of the Iraqi people any impact on his policies or objectives.

Nevertheless, in an effort to calm Arab concerns over the humanitarian impact of the sanctions amidst U.S. preparations to strike Iraq. In early 1998, the Security Council at U.S. instigation approved Resolution 1153, endorsing the agreement signed by Kofi Annan and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, and warned Iraq of the Severest consequences if Baghdad failed to head the agreement.

This new resolution which superceded Resolution 986, increased the value of Iraqi oil exports from \$ 2 billion to \$ 5.256 billion every months, it also expanded permissible imports beyond food and humanitarian relief to include rehabilitation of basic services (e.g. water, electricity, education).

Are the Sanctions Caused More Sufferings

A controversy had developed in 1996, “when the New York Times published an article asserting that ‘Iraq sanctions kill children’ and the popular CBS television documentary program 60 minutes broadcast an episode depicting sanctions as a murderous assault on children”¹¹

Moreover, according to estimates by U.N agencies, more than 500,000 Iraqi children have died from hunger and disease, greater than the combined toll of two atomic bombs on Japan and recent scourge at ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia.”¹² It is noted, “Economic Sanctions is deployed frequently, by large states rather than small states, and may contributed to more deaths during the past cold war era than all weapons of Mass destruction throughout history.”¹³

Roger Normand adds, that the U.N. and U.S., appeared to hope that the oil-for-food deal will defuse international criticism of the impact of sanctions. But the deal is simply not fears to Iraqi people.”¹⁴

As a result of these factors, there were indications that the international support for the sanctions had. Started to weaken. There were increasing calls for easing up on aggressive implementation of the economic sanctions. Some Arab countries had become concerned that their impact was falling mainly on the average Iraqi and not on Saddam or his key supporters. The U.S. analysts believed that “it is true that our Arab allies have largely failed to cooperate with our previous attempts to undertake political or military action against Saddam Hussain. The reason for that is that they judge (correctly) that the cost of outweighs the potential benefits.”¹⁵ This concern was shared by others, in Europe and the U.S., as reports of malnutrition and poor health among Iraqis, particularly children, were effected more by the sanctions.

Roger Normand provided proves to bring the facts into light, and he said:

“Prior to sanctions, oil revenues accounted for more than 90 percent of Iraq’s foreign earnings. These funds were used to import food, medicine and equipment for the country’s modern health infrastructure. Without oil or hard currency, Iraq’s economy has collapsed. Runaway inflation has caused the average public-sector wage to fall to \$ 4 per month, enough to purchase a few meals for a family of six. Skilled workers such as doctors and engineers desert their jobs.... Families have been forced to sell of household... for food. Ordinary Iraqis now depend for their survival on the government rationing system, which provide only 1/3 of caloric needs.”¹⁶

He criticized UN's role and said, "Saddam Hussain's crimes do not give the license to violate the human rights of 21 million Iraqis through a devastating, even if unintended, form of collective punishment." He argued that "the laws of war require states to distinguish between military and civilian targets at all times...."¹⁷

These indications raised difficult issues about whether the sanctions be modified on humanitarian grounds. The literature review shows that sanctions are more responsible of Iraqi miseries than the President Saddam.

Why was International Support Weakened

One factor of weakening of the international support against sanctions is the humanitarian issue that has stated in above discussions. The other main factor is the vast oil resources of Iraq were interest to oil companies and oil service companies. There were reports that some oil companies (possibly supported by their governments) were seeing special arrangements with Iraq, in preparation for the day when the sanctions may be lifted. Some members of the security Council favored a phased lifting of sanctions as UNSCOM certified Iraqi compliance with elements of Resolution 687. (See appendix No.2).

President Saddam Hussain believed that the oil sanctions, which had been eroding, would eventually be lifted. Plainly, his belief is shared by the French, Russian and Chinese oil companies that were signing contracts with Saddam Hussein.

Iraq compiled the Resolution 687, when there was no other choice. Because for Saddam Hussein to comply with all the resolutions would be suicidal. While Bill Richardson stressed on U.S.'s clear policy, he stated in an interview, "that Saddam should comply with all the Security Council resolution." He gave his comments on weakening of international support, he said, "a lot of people that said Saddam Hussein is better off. He's not better pariah; he has effectively

contained a regime that in terms of international support is very weak.” He added, American’s robust military presence in the Gulf continue to be deterrent to many of his activities.”¹⁸ On the other hand, American analyst suggested to slow down Iraq’s acquisition of WMD, because of internal and external demand of up lifting of the sanctions. Arab leaders charged the sanctions caused to starve Iraqi children, and had drove their mothers into prostitutions. Religious leader including the pope had attached sanctions on Iraq as immoral.

In the III Regime of sanction it seemed difficult to use force. the consequences of failure in Iraq were terrifying. Because Iraq proved to be a critical test case of implementing workable anti-proliferation policy.

American leadership faced challenge over three vital issues: how Baghdad spent its oil revenues, future Iraqi acquisitions of dual-use technology and an open-ended weapons monitoring. While the Clinton administration’s options in this crisis were withering rapidly as the world accommodated itself to the illusion that the presence of U.N inspectors inside Iraq meant that all was well. Richard Murphy (a former assistant secretary of State for Near Easter and South Asian affairs concludes that “Saddam Hussein views his possession of WMD as more valuable than money and too precious to surrender any circumstances. He also may have been tempted by French and Russian game playing. This may have led him to think that he could drive a wedge between the U.S and Britain and the rest of the council on the issue of Iraqi sanctions.” Richard Murphy also suggested to find a common ground with France and Russia. He supported a major increase in the amount of Iraqi oil in Resolution 986 for food and medicine. He also proposed that, “ we must drop our position that Iraq must comply with “all relevant Security Council resolutions” before the oil embargo is lifted.”¹⁹

While some members of the Security Council favored a phased lifting of sanctions on UNSCOM certified Iraqi compliance with elements of Resolution 687 (e.g., nuclear and missile program).

Saddam Hussein also had set his own deadline for the world to agree that Iraq no longer possesses WMD. He ordered the U.N.'s Special Observation Mission to finish its work within six months on January 1998. He said SC the must lift all sanctions on Iraq. The Clinton administration preferred diplomacy but did not rule out the use of force. as Jim Hoagland noted earlier, he said, "Saddam Hussein and the French seem to have read this president accurately: diplomacy and delay making are the only tools available to U.S policy at this stage of the confrontation."²⁰

On February 23, 1998, Kofi Annan's deal was presented: Annan gave up UNSCOM's independence in Baghdad, and he gave up also the principle that Saddam Hussein could not dictate the terms of the inspectors to which he was required to submit. Iraqi leadership called it a great victory and the Clinton administration considered it a sort of bluster was just a bit of face saving.

End of the Sanctions Regime

On the eve of operation Desert fox president Clinton gave a message to President Saddam that as long as he refused to cooperate with inspections, refused to comply with U.N. resolutions and refused to stop illegally smuggling out oil, he would be rewarded by the de facto ending of economic sanctions.

That message was sent by the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Peter Bur Leigh on Jan 14, 1999, when he offered a plan to eliminate the ceiling on how much oil Iraq can sell abroad. This

proposal was in reaction to a proposal made by France and supported by Russia and China, to end the Iraq oil embargo. The distinctions between the U.S. plan and the French plan were meaningless. This was the end of the U.N. sanction regime. Iraq refused to accept this plan.

In December 1999, the Security Council attempted to break the deadlock and established a new weapons inspection system. The council offered to suspend all nonmilitary sanctions if Baghdad accepted the return of weapons inspections. SCR 1284 established a new UN Monitoring, verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM and outlined procedures for the completion of the weapons verification process. Resolution 1284 eased some of the restrictions on medical and agricultural import, and exempted Hajj pilgrimage pilgrims.

The Council declared its intention to suspend sanctions for reviewable periods of 120 days if Iraq cooperated with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. If Iraq did not cooperate or was found importing prohibited military goods, the suspension would automatically cease.

On the eve of final vote on SCR 1284 case, after weeks of delicate negotiations, Russia, France and China abstained. U.S and U.K voted for the resolution. Some analysts believed that this new development encouraged Iraqi and resistance to the plan. Iraq rejected the resolution, reiterating its previous.

Refusal to permit the return of U.N inspectors and demanding a complete lifting of sanctions. The problem is still there. The sanctions regime ended with its failure of fundamental goals to achieve. And stronger hints are coming from Washington that Iraq would be the target of another American military strikes to remove President Saddam from the seat.

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Chapter-5

IMPACT OF SANCTION

Sanctions caused most of the humanitarian hardships. Air campaign during Gulf War also caused Iraqi hardships. More than 90,000 tons of explosive were dropped on Iraq and Kuwait, which targeted vital electrical water, and sanitation system. "The combination of war and years of comprehensive sanctions magnified Iraq's misery. The result has been an appalling humanitarian tragedy."¹

Impact on Iraq

Reports at the time confined that sanctions were having a devastating impact on Iraq's economy. Oil exports, accounting for more than 95% of Iraq's foreign currency earning and 60% of its GDP fell by nearly two-third in 1991. Due to these huge impacts, many believed that continuation of sanctions, especially in combination with more creative and flexible diplomacy, might have sufficient to achieve U.N. goals. Iraqi economy was dependent on the export of oil, because the effects of sanctions have been enhanced by the destruction of much Iraqi infrastructure during the Gulf War. The oil embargo cost Iraq more than \$ 18 billion per year in lost oil revenues, with the culminate loss over the nine years of the sanctions reaching more than \$ 130 billion.

U.S. estimate at the time were that 90% of Iraq's imports and more than 97% of its exports (principally oil) were cut off. Iraq's borders were tightly controlled by the participation of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran in the sanctions effort. The main uncertainty was the border with Jordan, the naval blockade of Jordan's ports (which was aimed at Iraq, not Jordan)

and intense pressure from the U.S. ensured that relatively little merchandise reached Iraq through Jordan. That's why Iraq's access to the sea, through Umm Qasr on the Persian Gulf became value able to the naval blockade instituted by the coalition forces.

According to UNICEF report, 30 April 1998. "Health-increase of approximately 90,000 deaths yearly due to the sanctions 9more than 250 people die every day The increase in mortality reported in public hospitals for children under five years of age an excess of some 40,000 deaths yearly compared with 1989. Over five years of age, the increase can excess of some 50,000 deaths yearly compared with 1989 is associated with heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, cancer, liver or kidney diseases.

Malnutrition was not a public health problem in Iraq prior to embargo. It has increased greatly since then, 18% in 1991 to 31% in 1996 of children under five with chronic malnutrition. By 1997, it was estimated about one million children under five were chronically malnourished. The oil-for-food plan has not resulted in adequate protection of Iraq's children from malnutrition/diseases. Those children spared from death continue to remain deprived of essential rights addressed in convention of right of the child.

Economy Economic collapse broke down of Socio-cultural fabric of the society. By September 1995, the U.N.'s department of Humanitarian Affairs estimated about 4 million Iraqis (about 20%) lived in extreme poverty. The purchasing power of the local currency has been greatly reduced, from U.S.\$3=1Iraqi Dinar in 1990... to about U.S.\$1=1,500 Dinar in 1997.

Gulf war and sanctions resulting in limited access to and poor quality of **education**: Historically, Iraq has given education a high priority. However, the protracted economic hardship on Iraqi population has seriously affected every level of formal and informal education. The extent of destruction of the education sector as a result of the Gulf War was extensive. Iraq,

once honoured by UNESCO for its active promotion of education, after the Gulf War and imposition of sanctions, is experiencing of poor standard of education. Including lack of the most basic school supplies such as black boards, chalks, pencils, notebooks and papers. These items were designated as “non-essential” by the Sanctions Committee. However 84% of all schools were needed rehabilitation, while oil-for-food program could not provide a rather limited contribution to the improvement of these conditions.

What has become clear that no significant movement towards good security can be achieved so long as the embargo remains in place. As long as the embargo remains in place. All vital contributors to food availability agricultural production importation of foodstuffs, economic stability Iraq’s ability to purchase and import those items vital to the survival of the civilian population remained inadequate.

Therefore, no sign of any improvement since SCR 986/1111, (oil-for-food program) has come out.

“Children will continue to die in Iraq even after the oil-for-food deal is implemented, because the deal fails to address the economic and legal injustice at the root of sanctions. Prior to sanctions, oil revenues accounted for more than 90% of Iraq’s foreign earnings. These funds were used to import food, medicine and equipment for the country’s modern health infrastructure. Without oil or hard currency, Iraq’s economy has collapsed. Runway inflation has caused the average public sector wage to fall to \$ 4 per month, enough to purchase a few meals for a family of six.”²

By contrast, some analysts argued in favor of sanctions. They stressed on the point that the Iraqi children did not die ‘as a consequence’ of the U.N. sanctions. They argued “children’s nutrition has deteriorated as the result of policy choices by the Iraqi government in the intervening year rather than by the sanctions directly.”³

Furthermore, Mark R. Brandford argued in support of sanctions and said,

“The deteriorating situation in Iraq is facilitated by a “leader” who does not comprehend the importance of social responsibility, either in his state or in the global arena. Allowing the government of Iraq to purchase, without restrictions and delays, what it needs to rebuild its country “would only provide Saddam with an ample opportunity for unprecedented and unchecked growth in his weapons program.”⁴

These analysts are of the opinion that the sanctions could not be ended without complying. Iraq with U.N. weapons inspectors.

“The report of the Ahtisaari mission described “war apocalyptic” destruction and observed that war damaged had relegated Iraq to “pre industrial age” in which the means of modern life had been destroyed or rendered tenuous.”⁵ Furthermore, it is observed that pre-war and sanctions prosperity was disappeared from everywhere in Nov., 1997, report, to the Security Council by Secretary-General Kofi Annan tells. “U.N. observers regularly report an exceptionally serious deterioration in the health services: a high infant mortality rate and high rates of morbidity and mortality in general, poor and inadequate storage conditions for supplies, an unreliable supply of electric air conditioning, defective cold storage, interrupted water supplies, broken/leaking sewage systems and non-functioning hospital waste disposal system.”⁶

Impact on Other Countries

Since 1986, people have worried about the price of oil soaring too high or falling too low, In 1996, the price of oil was lower than it was in 1986. When oil production declines with accompanying price increases. As it is observed: Based on geology, analysts share a broad consensus that the world’s ultimately recoverable oil amounts to about 2,000 billion barrels. Analysis by James Mackenzie of the world Resources Institute, using generally accepted projections of demand growth, finds that global production is likely to peak between 2007 and 2016. L.F. Ivanhoe, a noted petroleum geologist, predicts that the “permanent global oil shortage, “a time of tight markets when small disruptions could trigger large price increases, “will begin,

sometime between 2002-2010. Though these two different figures, they identify the importance of oil in the global village. "Thus a major cut in oil demand in this one sector would mean a major cut in overall use, means in all mobiles."⁷

Iraq has the second world's largest proven oil reserves. Some 115 of the world's oil is under Iraq. The oil consuming governments and oil companies have their interests with Iraq. Trade embargo due to sanction regimes has blocked the oil resources.

On the other hand, the U.S. interest in Middle East oil was deeper. U.S. planners have long understood that Middle East oil is of unparalleled geo-strategic importance. The Bush administration had recognized that control over the region's oil (where Iraq was a sub-imperialism) would give it strategic leverage over competing states, especially Japan and Germany.

As concerned to Iraq, oil is President Saddam's lifeline; it fuels his ability to finance his factories of death and rebuilt his weapons of mass destruction. Revenue from oil exports historically has represented nearly all of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings.

Turkey was an important trading partner of Iraq and a key transit partner for Iraq's oil, which provide Turkey with \$ 400 million in annual transit fees and 60% of its imported oil. Before the embargo, Turkey's export trade with Iraq amounted to \$ 8 billion; all of which payment was suspended.

In the second regime of sanctions, "the increase in illegal sales of petroleum products coincided with implementation of the oil-for-food program in 1995. Part of this illegally gold oil is moving by truck across the Turkish- Iraqi border."⁸ **Russia** has lost 30 billion dollars as a result of ten years of sanctions against dollars since the soviet times.

In January 1999, U.N. had released more than \$ 81 million under the expanded oil-for-food program to enable Iraq to buy electrical generating equipment. That's why Russia coupled with China and France had wanted to lift the Iraq embargo. In fact they were willing to put economic gain before international security, because they stood to earn billions in a post sanctions world. China and France were also big technology supplier to Iraq. The supply of electrical generating equipment early \$ 74.9 million out of \$ 81 million would come from China.

Henry Kissinger had envisaged and said clearly, "Iraq's sponsors in the U.N have a good chance of obtaining the necessary Security Council majority. Though we no doubt would exercise our veto, such an outcome would advertise our growing isolation and probably lead other countries to relax with the sanctions . and it would render even more precarious any attempt to obtain Security Council support for strong retaliatory action."⁹

Why Arab World Supported Saddam Against Sanctions

Arab resentment has risen in part because the U.S. demanded strict enforcement of U.N. resolutions by Iraq, while seeming reluctant to press Israel on peace process issue. no doubt, the Arabs were deeply resentful about the Binyamin Netanyahu (Israeli prime minister) government's failure to move forward in the peace process. This had created a widespread Arab view of a U.S. double standard policy. Whereby the U.S. punished president Saddam for flouting U.N. resolutions but not Israel. The result was an Arab world seething with bitterness and deeply concerned about stories of the sanctions – induced impoverishment of the Iraqi people.

The U.S. has constantly employed a double standard when it comes to U.N. resolutions and international law. For decades the U.S. has vetoed U.N. resolutions condemning Israel's occupation of Arab territories. The U.S. is in technical violation of a global treaty to dismantle chemical weapons. (CW) on February 27, 1998. A senate bill passed in 1997 allowed the

President to deny international inspections of U.S. weapons sites on grounds of national security. While in the case of inspections of weapons sites on the ground of national security, Iraqi demand was unaccepted. That's why President Saddam has remained uncooperative with UNSCOM.

U.N. sanctions against Iraq, which have been continued to be imposed at the insistence of the U.S. (with the U.S. following) suit) are a gross violation of the Geneva Protocol 1, Article 54; starvation of civilians as a method of Warfare is prohibited. It is significant that the U.S. that has yet to ratify the comprehensive test Ban Treaty (CTBT), considered using nuclear weapons against Iraq February 1998.

The impact of "double standard" has sabotage the peace process in the Middle East also. The Arab State's emergency Summit in Cairo on October 2000, (the first meeting in a decade to which both Iraq and Kuwait have been invited, meaning that renewed animosity toward Israel has led Arab governments to put aside their bitterest quarrels for a display of unity."¹⁰

"What Arabs see, as unbalanced U.S. support for the Jewish State at the expense of the Palestinians, has registered deeply in the Persian Gulf, where Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright was greeted... with headlines showing skepticism about the U.S. regional role: "Washington is" the enemy and the judge at the same time," wrote the Saudi Newspaper Al-Madina."¹¹

U.S. "double standard" policy represents on the one hand unlimited American support for Israeli aggression, and on the other, America's insistence that Iraq comply with all UNSCOM resolutions. This policy has escalated enmity between Arab nations. "The Americans forgot the dangerous weapons of the Zionist entity despite repeated Arab appeals... what does it mean to maintain Iraq in such a weak position in a jungle full of wild monsters? Such a vicious policy

has only one goal: the U.S wants to appear to be the sole protector of the GCC countries in facing international challenges.”¹²

Now, which is unacceptable for Arab States, because their own economic interests are at stake. They suffered because of trade embargo and economic sanctions on Iraq. “Increased OPEC production accounted for approximately (75%) of the output lost from Iraq and Kuwait.”

Egypt Estimated that its losses from all these sources amounted to \$9 billion annually.

Yemen was also hard hit by sanction regime, because of its decision to maintain friendly relations with Iraq. Saudi Arabia canceled working and residence privileges for over 1 million Yemenis and halted financial assistance of over \$ 600 million per year. Worker remittances were estimated at \$ 2 billion per year.

Lebanon lost access to about \$ 500 million in bank deposits in Kuwait in addition to the loss of over \$ 150 million worker remittances.

The economic deterioration of Arab World forced to incline towards Saddam Hussain. The firm political will and the steadfastness of Iraq has achieved victory and shattered the Anglo Americans smart sanctions project , which aimed to impose a mandate On Iraq and its neighboring countries, at the expense of their interests, security and salability .as Jordanian parliamentary deputy man sour Seif Eddin Murad stated;”if we develop an Arab decision to defend our interest and regain our rights. This is the most important lesson of the victory.”¹³

The Arab World’s worse repercussions have come out due to the economic and political impacts on them. Likewise, Jordan announced it will remove independent Lloyds of London inspectors from their posts overseeing Iraq-bound shipments arriving at the port of Aqaba. The inspectors had been placed there by the U.N. to enforce international sanctions. Meanwhile, in the Yemeni port of Aden, at the fringes of the Arab World, “a billion dollar destroyer sits

crippled with a hole in its side, an example of what retired marine corps gen. Anthony Zinni told congress is evidence of the "intense and concentrated" risk in the middle east..."¹⁴

Economic, political as well as religious ties of Arab World caused the inclination of Arab World towards President Saddam. Jerusalem , has been a sacred place for both Muslims and Jews. "The sensitivity of that issue became apparent in the violence that followed a visit to the spot on September 28 by former Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon; it is one reason the current fighting may be more difficult to patch them in the past."¹⁵ The following development of suicidal attacks on Israelis are fresh example of today.

The current policy of economic sanctions combined with military threats has mainly harmed Iraqi civilians without weakening Saddam Hussain,s hold on power. Moreover, it has threatened the stability of U.S. Arab allies and dramatically diminished the goodwill the U.S. enjoyed during Desert Storm. On humanitarian basis, due to impact of economic sanctions on Iraq , the strong allies of the U.S. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other key nations have opposed any American role in the Middle East. The possibility of a U.S. Campaign against Iraq could undermine the coalition assembled by Bush since September 11 last year. Arab leaders are increasingly reluctant to join such a military campaign, particularly since public opinion has focused on the impact of the economic sanctions on the Iraqi people, as well as the U.S.'s blind support for Israel and its consequences for the Palestinians. Even Saudi ground invasion of Iraq has expressed its opposition. Of the international trade embargo, the country would be forced to continue its wartime economic austerity inflation.

It was the time when Iraq was allowed to sell its only major export, oil. As U.N. humanitarian representative Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan criticized the U.N embargo on Iraq

and Said, "The Iraqis have the wherewithal and human resources and confidence and ability to sort out their problems it only can some how restore a modicum of economic process."¹⁶

A severe reaction of imposition sanctions came out in 1998, Mr. Halliday resigned to protest the U.N.'s continued use of sanctions, which he denounced as a totally bankrupt policy. Continuing sanctions have produced widespread poverty and unemployment, the flight of Iraq's profession unemployment, the flight of Iraq's professional class and a dramatic increase in prostitution, street children and delinquency.

Alarming statement by Anupama Rao Sing, country director for the UN. Children's fund in Baghdad, came out. He said," that at least 500,000 children have died due to sanctions.

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Chapter-6

SANCTION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY: AN EVALUATION

At the end of Cold War, military intervention became more difficult to justify on the ground of sacrifices in life and expenditures. Then, the threat to American security were said to be different in nature. In 21st century, on the international level economic competitiveness has become more important. That's why the political experts have argued for the United States to reduce international commitments and focus on domestic issues. Indeed, the United States was required to turn its attention to its domestic issues, that had threatened American competitiveness.

In the wake of the Cold War, the search for new instruments of foreign policy were needed. That have characterized by limited support for military options. So that sanctions are considered as alternative of military force to inflict economic deprivation on a target state or society. Through the cessation of customary economic relations and to change the behaviour of the target state. Thus the sanctions occupy a middle ground between comparatively benign diplomatic action, on one hand, and coercive paramilitary or overt military intervention on the other hand.

In Iraq case, it is observed that the sanctions have inflicted economic deprivation on Iraq and may have contributed to more deaths during the Post Cold War era than all WMD through history. Following Cuban case the U.S. placed sanctions on Castro regime. Shortly after it

assumed power in 1960. And later extended the sanctions to a full ban on all trade with Cuba. The U.S. then pressured other countries to follow suit.

The leaders or their particular offensive policies has been the focus of sanctions. Ultimately the civilian are effected by the sanctions. The sanctions aimed at: to over throw the leaders and contain their offensive policies. As in Cuban case the sanctions were placed on Cuba to over throw Castro and further containing the Castro revolution and Cuban interventionism in Central and South America and Africa.

The same was happened in Iraq. The sanctions were placed to contain Iraq to become a mini-superpower in the Middle East. The sanctions remained in place after the Gulf War to ensure its compliance with U.N. mandate, requiring postwar inspection of its weapons programs.

However, the leader has been the focus of sanctions directly, but the innocent civilian also become victim of the sanctions indirectly. Because sanctions are insidious from of warfare that have claimed hundreds of thousands of innocent civilian lives. The reason is that they are inhibiting the importation of spare parts chemical, agent, and the means of transportation required to provide water and sanitation services to the civilian population of Iraq. While the leaders are charged for the deteriorating situation in their countries.

The use of sanctions as a tool, aimed to urge the people against their leaders, and the civilian hardships are propagated for that purpose that children's nutrition has deteriorated as the result of policy choices by Iraqi government in the intervening years rather than by the sanctions directly.

In Post-Cold War, American foreign policy means military intervention is more difficult to justify, with regard to its costs. And all conflicts that arise are not necessarily suited to military intervention. As noted "Observes from all ends of the political spectrum have argued

for the United States to reduce its international military commitments and focus on domestic issues..... to maintain harmonious relations with its allies at its own peril.”¹ Economic sanctions as an instrument is more popular in recent years. The U.S. used it 25 times during the 1980s alone to influence the actions of other states. By reviewing the Gulf conflict, it is noted that sanctions “have become virtually the default option in American foreign policy and are imposed to correct everything from human rights violations to nuclear proliferation.”² As explained in previous chapters, the impact of sanctions shows that embargos and trade harm the international a country from selling its products in the world market place should not have any such benefits.

Most economists are of the view, that the sanctions do not impose a serious economic burden on the leadership, that’s why they fail to cause the desired political changes. President Saddam could not be changed with the in position of economic sanctions. While the sanctions provide the chance to unite the population of the targeted country and the leader becomes more popular. Because public consider that their leadership is true that’s why they are targeted. The anger many Iraqis express toward the United States, helps Saddam in his attempt to rally support for his government. “For him its better when the people are suffering – to show how bad American imperialism is....”³ William Raspberry also expressed same: “You suppose they love us for it (sanctions) and hate their leader? The leader President Saddam surly is not suffering because of sanctions.”⁴ Only the people suffer, while other Iraqis of the opinion that such a move (to topple President Saddam) would only lead to more Iraqi bloodshed. According to analyst’s and Iraqis point of view, the sanctions benefited the group of gainers. As noted: Some wealthy Iraqis are becoming richer through lucrative private-sector trade that is keeping shops full of liquor, cigarettes and food, brought from Turkey, Iran and Jordan. While poor and middle class Iraqis are exhausting their saving, selling jewelry and hawking household goods to put food on

their tables conversely, the sanctions also harm the interest of groups that rely on imports or exports. Iraq depends on imports and exports. On the other hand, due to poverty they became unconcerned about any change in the country.

The sanctions create groups of gainers who benefit from sanctions. But they could not expand their financial resources, “the groups that lose from sanctions will find themselves in a financially diminished position which may reduce their political influence.”⁵

Apart from that on humanitarian basis, “economic sanctions – is deployed frequently, by large states rather than small once, and may have contributed to more deaths during the post-cold war era than all weapons of mass destruction throughout history.”⁶ So the instrument as foreign policy it has lost its popularity.

Successes of Sanctions as an Instrument of American Policy

The sanctions were the best tool available on August 2, 1990, to signal outrage and determination to resist President Saddam and also to preserve Kuwait as an entity by protecting its assets abroad while preventing sale of its oil. They bought the time necessary military forces in the region and deployed forces in the Gulf. As such, the Sanctions during first regime of sanctions should not be considered a complete failure even though they did not achieve the fundamental goal to overthrow President Saddam Hussain.

Moreover, sanctions have prevented President Saddam from significantly rebuilding his military machine, which he doubtless would have done otherwise. Sanctions established UNSCOM to pursue its mission in Iraq. Without the sanctions, President Saddam probably would cease permanently any cooperation with UNSCOM. It was expected that he would be acting worse in the absence of sanctions. President Saddam has publicly recognized the

legitimacy of Kuwait as a state. From these perspectives, the economic sanctions continue to be a success.

During first and second regime of sanctions, broad multilateral, preferably endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, significantly improves the chances for success from the beginning. Bush administration was determined to use the U.N. Security Council to gather international support. Through skillful diplomacy and a common assessment of the problem among its permanent members, the Security Council for the first time functioned as its founders had envisioned in dealing with a major threat to global peace. American diplomacy worked here to achieve the American goals. Multilateral support was obtained, the sanctions helped to mitigate the impact of sanctions. The Economic Assistance Program (EAP) for the front-line states was provided to help them. The EAP proved to be very useful in preventing significant leakage through countries that had strong economic ties with Iraq.

This plan was designed to encourage support of the sanctions regime by those most effected-Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. The EAP provided about \$ 20 billion in financial assistance (contributed by the U.S., the European Community, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait). To ensure solid Egyptian support, the U.S. forgave \$ 7.1 billion in Egyptian debt to the U.S. While the front-line states were the main concern, the Soviet Union was also benefited. Saudi Arabia gave the soviets an unprecedented \$ 4 billion line of credit in response to an urgent request for help from President Mikhail Gorbachev.”⁷

Sanctions enforcement is greatly facilitated through the use of military force, such as the multilateral interception force in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean sea. The U.S. proposed “Aqaba Plus” (AP), plan for enforcing U.N. sanctions against Iraq that would replace a U.S. naval force off Jordan with U.N. monitors on Jordanian soil. This (AP) plan tightened

enforcement of U.N. sanctions against Iraq in August 1990, the U.S., led naval force has intercepted 14, 025 ships. Of these, 4, 554 were boarded and 287 were diverted from Jordan.”⁸

America is a big gainer of the Persian Gulf conflict. Professor Dr. Ayad Al-Qazzaz (Sacramento State University) noted that “Before the Gulf war, the Saudi exported less than five million barrels of oil a day. Today, as a result of sanctions against Iraq, the Saudi export more than nine million barrels a day. Since the imposition of sanctiona against Iraq in 1990, Saudi Arabia has made more than 200 billion dollars. Most of this money is spent in the U.S. by buying billions of dollars of military equipment.”⁹

U.S. arms merchants have sold a whole new generation of high-tech weaponry not only to Saudi Arabia but also to Turkey, Egypt, Kuwait, the UAE, Jordan and Israel. These sales actually prop up the U.S. economy. The U.S. government is protecting the interests of oil barons and war profiteer. The interest of the majority of U.S. people lie in developing just and equitable relations with people in the Middle East. Our interest lies in cutting the \$ 300 billion pentagon budget and suing those funds for better schools, jobs and health care.”¹⁰

Some scholars like Lopez and Cortright believe that sanctions as an instrument of American policy proves successful only in limited goals to achieve. In the postwar phase of conflict, “the vast scope of the ceasefire resolutions became a problem however, for it mandated Iraqi compliance across every broad range of requirements. An alternative approach would have been to place the different mandates in separate resolutions and thereby allow a partial easing of sanctions pressure in response to progress in each area of concern. This approach would have allowed sanctions to be combined with incentives,” which were not provided. “As a result, the bargaining leverage gained through sanctions was not effectively utilized to achieve the U.N.’s cease-fire objectives.”¹¹

The sanctions decade has proved policy and contributed more failure as an instrument of American foreign policy. The major achievement of the sanctions regime is considered that Iraq was contained by it. In fact Iraq was contained by the military power of the U.S. and others, not by the economic sanctions. The sanctions prevented President Saddam from obtaining economic resources to improve his military position and brought time while the coalition put it forces together in the Gulf. It can be said that sanctions supported coalition's forces to achieve their limited goals.

Failure of Sanctions as an Instrument of American Policy

The collapse of the American plot (to overthrow the regime) is a victory for Iraq and also a victory for the will of the countries, which voiced rejection of smart sanctions such as Jordan, Syria, and Egypt as well as Russia. The said countries argued that any overhaul of sanctions must address the lifting of sanctions responsible for human suffering in Iraq. Along the past 11 years U.S. and U.K. tried all their best to urge Iraqis against their leader, but any of these attempts had not succeeded in achieving their aims. President Saddam is still president of Iraq and is strengthening his position day by day. Little by little the U.S. policy entered into a crisis and the crisis reached its peak when the U.S. administration discovered that the sanctions imposed on Iraq for 11 years were not smart and they will discover that the new sanctions are more stupid than the previous one. Regardless, the U.N. Security Council rejected the Washington and London "smart sanctions", on humanitarian grounds and for their own economic interests in the Middle East.

Day by day, the international support for sanctions weakened. As Lebanese paper said "the smart sanctions project collapsed because it lacked minimum intelligence/smartness. It also lacked the logic that would have made it acceptable to Iraq's enemies."¹²

Saudi Arabian papers analyzed that “Eloquent political ironies” was that Washington had not found a single Iraqi opposition party that regretted the collapse of the smart sanctions.”¹³

The rejection of smart sanctions by Russia, China and France provide a off disintegration among the Security Council members. “Russian resistance is a painful blow to Bush, and even more so to power, whose, smart sanctions proposal had countered resistance even inside the Bush administration. Conservative Republicans are now likely to intensify their calls for a new strategy against Iraq and to feed confirmed in their anti-Russian and anti-UN sentiments. Saddam’s opponents are a heterogeneous collection without much how of success.”¹⁴

Will the Smart Sanctions be Successful?

According to the Arab, European and American diplomats and analysts, American policy in the Middle East facing its most difficult challenges in the decade since the Persian Gulf War. To get rid of these problems, America, with the help of U.K came up with new “smart” plans for replacing the decade’s old sanctions.

After the expulsion of U.N.’s weapons inspections from Iraq, sanctions have lost their original purpose of ensuring that the country was declared of its WMD. The fundamental objective to gain, a change was felled for. “Iraq Liberation Act, passed by Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton, has set aside ninety-seven million dollars for the alleged Iraqi opposition, a badly divided group based in London and entirely lacking any social base in Iraq.”¹⁵ The sanctions were an attempt to overthrow the current regime and install an American agent to rule Baghdad.

The new smart sanctions are a more flexible and, it has to be presumed more effective version of the oil-for-food arrangement which allows Iraq to import food and medicine and some

humanitarian goods in exchange for its oil. Under the new proposals, Iraq would be able to import all the goods to wants, except for weapons and dual-use-stuff.

After Bush administration's failure to lighten the sanctions against Iraq. "They had to accept a plan extending the oil-for-food program. There are two main reasons that made the U.S. accept the extension plan. First is the issue of U.S. prestige! Washington understands Russia will veto the new sanctions if the issue is brought up in the Security Council. Second the U.S. thinks it will have more time to persuade Russia into accepting its next plan."¹⁶

The sanctions committee has retied almost one in five of Iraqi orders on security grounds: Iraq can buy vaccines, for instance, but may not be allowed to import refrigerator trucks need to transport them. Some \$ 9 billion-worth of approved orders lingers in the pipeline and \$ 3.5 billion-worth have been vetoed. The changes, or so America and Britain hope, will shift the blame for Iraqi deprivation from the cruelty of sanctions to President Saddam Hussain's misrule. Moreover the U.S. and U.K. governments "assumed that ten years of unjust embargo were enough to exhaust Iraq or push it to accept the proposals"¹⁷

The smart sanctions at first glance seemed to be resulting from humanitarian concerns, but in fact they would both put more controls on Iraq and tighten further the sanctions against the country. In the face of increasing pressure from the international community to totally lift the embargo, which has tangled the country. So the proposals were rejected by Iraq.

According to new sanctions, financial control of Iraq would remain firmly in U.N. control: all money from oil sales would go to the U.N. escrow account to stop President Saddam spending it on weapons. This means that although the country would be able to import more, it would still be denied the free movement of labour and capital that it desperately need if it is at last to start picking itself up.

As Peter Muench stated in his article, "Saddam's victory, Iraq's Defeat", he calculated, that "indeed, in a tough struggle, Iraq succeeded in inflicting a serious defeat on the West in the U.N. Security Council. But the price for this defeat is being paid not by hostile diplomats but once again by the ordinary people in the streets of Baghdad and Basra, who will again be thrown back into depression after a cynical propaganda storm."¹⁸

Sitting on the World's second-largest oil reserves, Iraq was once, politics aside, an advanced country. Now its living standards are on a par with Ethiopia's; UNICEF confirms a 160% rise in Iraq's infant mortality rate since 1991; and the middle classes have disappeared. Iraq needs massive investment to rebuild its industry, its power grids and its schools, and needs cash in hand to pay its engineers, doctors and teachers. None of this looks likely to happen under smart sanctions.

Easing the effects of the economic sanctions on the Iraqi people, could not come through lightening the grip around Iraq and imposing new sanctions that depend on the participation of Iraq's neighbors in this crime. Economic sanctions would benefit Iraq's neighbors, as well as the semi-autonomous Kurds under U.N. protection in Northern Iraq, who have earned billions of dollars from tolls, transit fees and smuggling. As an extra indirect reward, Turkey, Syria and Jordan were each getting around 150,000 barrels a day of oil sold by Iraq at bargain prices, just as they could get their hands on some cash outside U.N. supervision. The result came out in smuggling and hidden oil trade between Iraq and its neighbors and that those same neighbors agreed to police their borders to prevent forbidden goods getting into Iraq. American diplomats had proposed a range of possible rewards, in exchange for which Iraq's neighbors would place all their oil imports under U.N. umbrella. "It will also threaten the countries that are in support of smart sanctions by stopping the flow of oil. The ruling regime in Iraq is hoping that the sanctions can

be prolonged for many years, so that it can continue to blame Kuwait, America and Britain.”¹⁹

Tariq Aziz also envisaged that any country that dealt with the new American plan would lose its trade dealing with Iraq.

Several analysts contended that smart sanctions not only lightened the grip on the Iraqi people, but also forced Iraq’s neighbors to participate in this crime, through border crossing inspection regimes. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia warned that absent controls the Iraqi regime would rebuilt its WMD.

Egypt: “A stand on Iraq”, Ihsan Baker asserted in pro-government Al Ahram:

“The American-British smart sanctions mean that the American administration has failed the geography exam, as it has failed of the history test. The sanctions on Iraq, which coincided with the foolishness of American administrations, reinforced the Iraqi president’s power and mobilized the Iraqi people against the U.S. Secretary Powell’s speech before admitted that the previous sanctions were unwise. International inspections should not return to Baghdad after they.. Violated their U.N. assignment and became spies for the U.N.. The smart sanctions imply a deception about the easing of the blockade unprecedented way of tightening the sanctions, a flagrant American attempt to strangle the Iraqi economy, and an outrageous American violation of the sovereignty of Iraq and neighboring countries.”²⁰

Issue of President Saddam’s removal

For the U.S. the purpose of the continuing confrontation with Iraq was no longer to enforce Resolution 687. The political goalposts were moved. Resolution 687 states explicitly that the ban on Iraqi exports will be lifted when Iraq complies with UNSCOM, but secretary of state Albright declared in March 1997 that the U.S. would not accept this view. The large objective became the permanent containment of the regime of President Saddam. In November 1997 President Bill Clinton remarked that sanctions will be there until the end of time, or as long as [President Saddam Hussain] lasts.”²¹

Furthermore, giving comments on Albright’s statement (we do not agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning WMD, sanctions will be lifted),

National Security Adviser Samuel Berger was asked; “you don’t see how your, continuously moving the goalposts under-mines the potential for compliance?” He answered, “We have moved the goalposts. We have said all along that we believe that Iraq should comply with the U.N. resolutions for their to be sanctions relief.”²² James Foley added: “it’s based on a fundamental lack of trust in the intentions and in the performance of the Iraqi regime.”²³ By reviewing these statements, it has cleared that the U.S. has no option except the imposition of sanctions and wants to place it at any cost. All there diplomatic efforts could not relieve the Iraqi people and also could not solve the economic problems of the nations, are suffering since 1991 due to sanctions on Iraq.

Although many U.N. member states strongly criticized this approach. Later on, the three Security Council permanent members: Russia, China and France did not support the “Desert Fox” in 1998. However they have been unable to prevent the U.S. from using its position on the Security Council to block an easing of sanctions pressure. Under these circumstances, sanctions have lost the bargaining leverage so critical to their effectiveness. On the other hand, “the U.S. seems to cling to the forlorn hope that the sanctions will provoke an uprising among the Iraqi people, or within Saddam’s military establishment, that will eliminate him, thereby solving our problem with that woeful man.”²⁴

Moreover a tougher policy was suggested consider adopting a policy similar to the air blockade we enforcement in the no fly zone. “A strictly enforced “no-oil-export” policy is what is called for. Only then will Saddam Hussain realize that cooperation with U.N. inspectors is the only way to rebuild his economy”²⁵

But the teeth in Resolution 687 have effectively been pulled, one , with the introduction and then continued expansion of the so-called oil-for-food exception to the sanctions. Although

the humanitarian goals of the oil-for-food program are worthy, President Saddam already has subverted the program to his own benefit by using increased oil capacity to smuggle oil for hard cash and by freeing up resources he might have been forced to use for food and medicine for his own people.

Further, smart sanctions policy was formulated, not easing the sanctions but exercising vigilance over the oil-for-food program these sanctions should be directed against the regime, not the people, and they must therefore open the way for all commodities that do not have dual usage however, “the list prepared by the U.S. of such commodities is longer than the milky-way and more complicated than modern mathematical puzzles.”²⁶

Was oil-for-food for Humanitarian Purposes?

Oil-for-food-program was provided to restrain on President Saddam, while relieving the suffering of ordinary Iraqis, to show that starving Iraq is Saddam’s strategy. It could help to deepen President Saddam’s isolation. But America is failing. President Saddam successfully is handling the issue and has become able to gain sympathy for his cause and to create a rift in the international coalition arrayed against him. Reviewing President Saddam’s successes, Henry Kissinger stated that “Saddam Hussain seems to have had four objectives: (1) to focus the World’s attention on Iraq’s grievances, (2) to force into the open the latent split between the permanent members of the security council, (3) to involve the Secretary General as a mediator, thus putting Saddam Hussein on the same level as his adversaries and (4) to shift the focus of the debate from inspection to lifting the sanctions Saddam Hussain is well on the way to achieving each of these objectives.”²⁷

Iraq was allowed to sell oil to be the humanitarian supplies oil for food means no oil for tanks. To generate hundreds of millions of dollars to compensate victims of the gulf war, was

provided for the repair of the Iraq- Turkey oil pipeline, thus easing the impact of sanctions on Turkey, and substantially improve the lives of Kurds.

The international community needs to keep two overriding goals in its sights concerning Iraq: preserving financial control over its revenues and an effective long-term monitoring program of its weapons. The U.N. currently controls the bulk of Iraq's oil revenues and through the food for-oil program. "Iraq detests this program and is working hard to discredit it. Saddam already has won support for his position on this in the Arab World."²⁸

No doubt president Saddam emerged from the crisis successfully. He has changed the topic from inspection to the lifting of sanctions creating a multilateral coalition against it. If the prediction comes true "the global oil shortage," and prices rise, the policy may be entered into a new phase; to soften the sanctions or uplifting the sanctions.

Who is responsible for the Suffering of Iraqi People: President Saddam or Sanctions.

The heart of the dispute is whether the suffering of the ordinary Iraqi people is the result of the sanctions themselves or of President Saddam Hussain's refusal to comply the U.S. Resolutions. Furthermore, the UNSCOM was established to monitor Iraqi military sites and to destroy Iraq's WMD. "President Saddam Hussein affected compliance, then defiance. He complied when there was not choice. The inspectors were allowed back in-but without producing much sense that anything useful was being accomplished. Whenever Saddam agreed to comply, "but isn't at all clear that even compliance would result in a complete lifting of sanctions." As many American diplomats along with Medline Albright were also not assured about it.

However, sanction would add problems for Iraqi people and would increase the miseries. 'And even if he caved completely in order to get rid of sanctions and the U.N. presence in his

land, what's to keep him from resuming his deadly work afterward? "Surely we aren't insisting that we have the right to thoroughgoing inspection of every inch of Iraqi soil in perpetuity." The experience with President Saddam tells that only threats would not work. Then William Raspberry adds, "So we continue the sanctions, cozy up to (and funding) dissident Iraqi expatriates and hope to get lucky."²⁹

The above arguments show that there is no logic for the continuing the sanctions. It only increases the suffering of innocents and did not harm the regime. "So we argue over who is responsible for the plight of the little people of Iraq. While Iraqi children, are dying at twice the rate they were before sanctions were imposed. William Raspberry further criticized and the sanctions and said, "We argue over whether Iraq should be allowed to rebuilt its petroleum-producing capacity, over whether the Iraqis are illegally exporting foodstuffs while many of their own people go undernourished-about everything except the obvious senselessness and futility of our approach."³⁰

Under the U.S. proposal, Iraq could pump as much oil as is needed to meet humanitarian needs. But this proposal did not meet the needs of Iraqi people. J. Daryl Byler, (a visitor) visited Iraq with a delegation in fall 1998. He learned through the conversation with U.N. officials in Baghdad "that under the U.N. oil-for-food program, some 13% of revenues go to the Kurdish. Only 53% of revenues go to remaining 85% of Iraqis. In addition, international agencies responsible for distributing oil-for-food-goods in northern Iraq are given a generous "cash component" to cover the expenses of transporting food and medicine from central storage facilities to local distribution points. No similar cash component is given to the Iraqi government, which is responsible for distributing food and medicine a generous "cash component" to cover the expenses of transporting food and medicine from central storage

facilities to local distribution points. No similar cash component is given to the Iraqi government, which is responsible for distributing food and medicine in the heavily populated central and southern sections of the country.”³¹

It shows that the deal was woefully inadequate to build Iraq’s infrastructure. Eleven years of broad economic sanctions have mounted to a slow war against innocent children and civilians. So the U.S. and the Security Council need to assess the moral and legal basis of sanctions and stop punishing Iraq’s most innocent and vulnerable citizens.

The reaction against sanctions had come in the second sanctions regime, within and outside of country. An U.N/ official said, “The allies want to push Iraq into a dark hole.” Iraqi news agency reported that “Iraqi Prime Minister Saadoun Hammadi told that because of the international trade embargo, the country would be forced to continue its wartime economic austerity measures in order to cope with high inflation.”

It was the time when Iraq was allowed to sell its only major export, oil. As U.N. humanitarian representative Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan criticized the U.N. embargo on Iraq and said. “The Iraqis have the wherewithal and human resources and confidence and ability to set out their problems if only can some how restore a modicum of economic process.”³²

A severe reaction of imposition sanctions came out in 1998, Mr. Halliday resigned to protest the U.N.’s continued use of sanctions, which he denounced as a totally bankrupt policy. Continuing Sanctions have produced widespread poverty and unemployment, the flight of Iraq’s professional class and a dramatic increase in prostitution, street children and delinquency.

Is Uplifting of Sanctions is a Risky Business?

The experience of the last decade had demonstrated, that effective oil embargo against Iraq is an easily manageable operation when it is enforced by major powers and backed by a

broad international consensus. Iraq has also been vulnerable to the effects of a well-enforced arms embargo. From a purely economic and military perspective, therefore, Iraq was a highly susceptible to sanctions pressures. Continuously, this pressure sustained Iraq not to comply with UNSCOM and IAEA. But the U.S and the international community could not be freed from blame the Iraqi hardships caused by the sanctions. The terrible human costs of the sanctions program might be justified if sanctions could be expected to bring down President Saddam and could prevent him from maintaining and expanding his WMD.

The impact of sanctions and the economic interests of the international community have forced to debate on uplifting of sanctions. But there some risks uplifting of sections, which the U.S and U.K have realized. First of all it would increase the reverenced at President Saddam's disposal, by lifting of the direct control of Iraq's trade. The reverences would be used for military infrastructure and dual use technology.

Uplifting of sanctions would be resulted in the resumption of economic and international relations of Iraq. Which Jaddah-based conservative Al-Madina declared: if the economic and international relations of Iraq could be normalized again, then it would rebuilt its means of WMD, which Iraq's resume has never hesitated to use against anyone it could reach, both inside and outside Iraq."³³

Some analysts are of the view that Iraq is actually producing as much oil as it physically can, even if sanctions were lifted there would be little rise in Iraqi oil productions for some time, until sufficient infrastructure investment had been made and would demand for oil increased. How can it be justified while the petroleum geologist about the" permanent global oil shortage has envisaged." According to Western analysts, another problem of uplifting of sanctions is that it would help to extent Saddam rule. He would undoubtedly claim it as his victory and try to turn

it to his benefits, by uplifting of sanctions, somewhat more money would come into the country, and the Iraq regime would no longer be able to shrink responsibility for the country's improvement. President Saddam would have an incentive to try to show his people that he could, in fact, improve their lives. A slight improvement might even lead to a revolution of rising expectations that would undermine the stronghold of the Iraqi regime.

Many billions of dollars are needed to rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure; the funds would be inadequate after lifting sanctions. Because funding to Iraq or the full compliance with all relevant U.S. resolutions. Which President Saddam has made it clear that full compliance is something he cannot, or will not, provide. U.S has lost international support on sanctions, by uplifting the sanctions; it would enable the U.S to reconstruct the crumbling international consensus surrounding the containment of Iraq. It can not regain international support to contain Iraq. As Russia China, France have demanded uplifting of sanctions. Criticism on smart sanctions on Iraq shows alarming situation in future, Russian analyst commented. " The suspension of oil supplies is a move determine designed to induce businessmen to bring pressure on their own governments and ultimately determine the outcome of the vote at the U.N Security Council. This applies not only to the Russian, but also to the France, Chinese and other companies working in Iraq."³⁴

The Arab States would also support the uplifting sanction's support proposal. Because they have a great pressure of Arab Public, due to sanctions impact on Iraqi people. It would also make it easier for the leaders to support American initiatives on Iraq and other regional issues, by relieving the innocent civilians in Iraq. Turkey is indispensable for the policy's continuation. It is an important ally of the U.S. her support is very important. By lifting the sanctions, the U.S can revive international support to continue pressure its military pressure on president Saddam.

The final benefit of lifting of sanctions would be an end to indirect U.S complicity in the pauperization of Iraqi society, a humanitarian calamity that has long since lost whatever justification it might once have had. The uplifting of sanctions, is the need of today. The above mentioned literature review tells that continuation of imposition of sanctions not only harm the Iraqi, but also would undermine the American interests in the region. American will loose the support of Arab leaders. America has weakened its international support on sanctions as well as attack on Iraq.

The possibility of a U.S campaign against Iraq would also undermine the coalition assembled by Bush since September 11,2001. France Russian and China have long disagreed with Washington's policy towards Iraq, Arab leader are also under pressure of their public opinion (resulted in a humanitarian calamity in Iraqi society). Then how its possible for America to set the option that the it might have to do it alone. While American public opinion is also against an further war in the Gulf.

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CONCLUSION

American policy makers need to recognize that the only “box” into which sanctions put Iraqis is coffins. The whole responsibility for this tragedy (genocide in Iraq) could not be rested upon Iraqi leadership. The U.S and international community along with Iraqi leadership are responsible for this tragedy. Sanctions regime’s impacts show that Iraqi social and economic condition have deteriorated. The prosperity could be seen everywhere in Iraq, after Gulf War and imposition of sanctions, it has disappear from everywhere.

Sanctions were having a devastating impact on Iraqi economy. Oil exports on Iraq’s foreign currency earning and 60% of its GDP fell by nearly two third in 1991. On the other hand, oil embargo cost Iraq more than 18 billion per year in lost oil revenues, which reach more than 4130 billion in 2000. Due to sanctions, 90% of Iraq’s imports and more than 97% of its exports were cut off. Moreover due to the freeze to international financial markets, thus virtually eliminating its ability to do business anywhere in the World.

Sanctions policy is to punish the leadership, but it only harmed the citizens. The U.S., U.K. and U.N. have been charged for Iraqi’s hardship. The disastrous effects of the sanctions on the most vulnerable sections of society, and on children in particular is observed. The most conservative reports of the World Health Organization (WHO) say between 5,000 and 7,000 people die each month, because of sanctions alone. This high death fall can only be understood in light of the inhuman living conditions. The water is not clean, the food is not adequate, mothers are very weak. The mothers almost are incapable of lifting young children because they themselves are under-nourished. As the Noam Chomsky Archive noted:

“Since the end of the Gulf War, at least hundreds of thousands on Iraq, which are a direct result of U.S. policy. This is not foreign policy it is sanctioned mass-murder that is nearing holocaust proportions. If we remain silent, we are condoning a genocide that is

being perpetrated in the name of peace in the Middle East, a mass slaughter that is being perpetrated in our name....we need a national campaign to lift the sanctions....such a campaign is not equivalent to support for the regime of Saddam Hussain. To oppose the sanctions is to support the Iraqi people.”¹

Eleven years sanctions have produced widespread poverty and unemployment, the flight of Iraq’s professional class and a dramatic increase in prostitution, street children and delinquency. While eight thousand schools need renovation, and more than 6,000 new schools need to build. As well as the deaths rate is concern, according to UNICEF report on April 1998: 90,000 deaths yearly due to the sanctions, more than 250 people die every day.

The sanctions regime in place does not seem on balance to have advanced American foreign policy goals. The first regime deals with stated objectives while the second and third regime of sanctions deal with the un-stated objectives. Iraq is contained by the military power of the U.S, led coalition, not by economic sanctions. American deans to Iraq of not abandoning the course of developing WMD capability. And sanctions have become a rallying point for all who oppose the general thrust of U.S policy toward Iraq. Then what is the use of it, if this instrument of American policy has failed in Iraq. why the innocent civilian are suffering in Iraq.

By reviewing the social and economic condition of Iraq, we come to the conclusion that sanctions as an instrument of American foreign policy has failed to achieve its mission in Iraq, as it failed in Cuba.

No doubt, economic condition has deteriorated and social life also at an alarming state. As well as political condition is concern, the country is having a strong status. President Saddam is still in power and successfully came out from isolation. As he stated once: As long as he’s alive, he is victorious. Victorious in what sense? Obviously, the sanctions could not harm the leader as the sanction policy was formulated to punish the leaders and their offensive policies. On the other hand, President Saddam is strengthening his position dad by day, and has

successfully weaken the international support against the sanctions. So sanctions as a tool of American foreign policy has met to the failure.

The failure of sanctions are more than the successes. No doubt three phases of sanctions and further smart sanctions have deteriorated Iraqi economy policy.

1. Sanctions as an instrument could not urge the Iraqis against their leadership.
2. The Issue of WMD is still there.
3. The Iraqi military might is still keep in tact. These were the main large objectives of U.S. policy, were not achieved.

Regardless, the sanctions as an instrument has limited success. Iraq was contained timely, it could become a great threat, must be faced with a nuclear-armed-Iraq in control of 1/5 of the World's oil supply. In such circumstances, President Saddam would be acting worse in the absence of sanctions. It also preserved Kuwait as an entity by protecting its assets abroad, while preventing sale of its oil. Due to sanctions, the U.S. led coalition was able to deploy the forces in the Middle East timely; that assured tactical strategy military victory in the Gulf War.

In post-sanction regime, America emerged as a big gainer of the conflict. It got fully support of Saudi Arabia an import ally. Saudi Arabia exports more than 200 billion dollars. Most of this money is spent in the U.S. buying billions of dollars of military equipment. These American sales propped up the U.S. economy and was used in education and health section in America.

The above stated successes of American policy are more less than its failures. So it is calculated by the political experts in and out of America that the sanctions as an instrument has failed.

Enforcement of sanctions and its impact on Iraq what has been described as "genocide" in Iraq, is a true tragedy of modern world Denis Halliday,(the former humanitarian coordinator)

and Jutta Brughardt's (the director of the U.N world Food Program operations in Iraq) resignation's represent the example of humanitarian calamity in Iraq closely. Then why the innocent civilian are suffering in Iraq. And American approach to Iraq has met a serious defeat in the Middle East. It has also tarnished the image of American leadership in global village.

If the U.S is so concerned about the WMD, how can it justify the killing of 250 people every day in Iraq from the sanctions themselves? Are not the sanctions then a WMD? Isn't not an economic violence?

The international community along with the American public has rejected the American policy: sanctions as an instrument did impose a significant economic burden on the economy but still failed to have the desired political effect. The organizations like the National Gulf War Resource Center (NGWRC), religious groups and the American have criticized the impact of sanctions on Iraq. Such activism was critical to ending the Vietnam war and became closely connected to a broader struggle in America for women's liberation civil rights and socialism. American policymaker should also remember the lesson from American independence. American independence was the result of an economic embargo in 1812.

Notes

1. "Actions and Statements by Groups Opposing Sanctions" ,
<http://www.worldmedia.com/archive>

APPENDIX-1

Brief summary of 12-Security Council Resolutions:

1. August 2 – In resolution 660, the Council condemned Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded Baghdad withdraw its forces.
2. August 6 – In resolution 661, the Council imposed stringent sanctions on all trade to and from Iraq except for medicine and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs;
3. August 9 – In resolution 662, the Council unanimously declared Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void and demanded Iraq rescind the annexation.
4. August 18 – In resolution 664, the Council unanimously demanded Iraq allow foreign nationals to leave Iraq and Kuwait and rescind its order to close diplomatic missions in Kuwait.
5. August 25 – In resolution 665, the Council permitted states to use limited naval forces to ensure compliance with the economic sanctions, including the right to inspect cargoes.
6. September 13 – In resolution 666, the Council approved food shipments to Iraq and Kuwait for humanitarian purposes but only if distributed by approved international groups.
7. September 16 – In resolution 667, the Council unanimously condemned raids by Iraqi troops on French and other diplomatic missions in occupied Kuwait.
8. September 24 – In resolution 669, the Council unanimously adopted a proceeding procedural measures entrusting its sanctions committee to evaluate requests for assistance from countries suffering because of trade embargo.
9. September 25 – In resolution 670, Council prohibited air traffic with Iraq and occupied Kuwait except in humanitarian circumstances.
10. October 29 – In resolution 674, the Council “reminded” Iraq it was liable under international law for any loss, damage or injuries arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, their nationals and corporations. States were “invited” to collect information on their claims.
11. November 28 – In resolution 677, the Council unanimously asked the UN Secretary General to safeguard a smuggled copy of Kuwait's pre-invasion population register.
12. November 29 – In resolution 678, the Council authorized States “to use all necessary means” against Iraq unless it withdrew from Kuwait on or before Jan 15.

Source: “U.N. 12 Resolutions”, Khalij Times, February 28, 1991, p. 2.

APPENDIX-2
Scorecard of Iraqi Compliance with Resolution 687

Conditions of Resolution 687	Compliance Status	Comments
Recognition of Kuwaiti territorial integrity and newly demarcated	Yes	November 1994 recognition of Kuwaiti sovereignty and borders
Acceptance of demilitarized zone	Yes	Established soon after end of Gulf War
Ongoing monitoring and dismantlement of ballistic missile, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction	Partly yes	Acceptance of permanent monitoring in November 1993; much progress by UNSCOM on ballistic missiles and chemical weapons; unanswered questions remain on biological capabilities and other issues
Elimination of nuclear weapons capabilities	Yes	IAEA certifies that no nuclear weapons capabilities remain
Return of stolen property	Partly yes	Some state property returned; military equipment and private assets stolen
Acceptance of war damage liability	Partly yes	No formal admission of responsibility, but acceptance of Resolution 986 provides for compensation fund, which has paid war damages
Repatriation of missing persons	Partly yes	Many prisoners returned, but several hundred Kuwaitis remain missing
Renunciation of terrorism	No	No formal pledge, but no evidence of actual Iraqi support for international terrorist acts

Source: David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanction Decade, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2000), p.55.

APPENDIX-3

The main provisions were:

- Recognizing the boundaries agreed to by Iraq and Kuwait on Oct 4, 1963, as the border between the two countries. That would leave in Kuwaiti hands all of the contested territory, including oil fields and islands, that Iraq cited as a pretext for its invasion of Kuwait last Aug.2.
- Deployment by U.N Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar of an observer force to monitor the boarder within a zone extending six miles into Iraq and three miles into Kuwait.
- Unconditional agreement by Iraq to accept destruction or removal, under international supervision, of all of its ballistic missile systems, Weapons of mass destruction including those of a chemical or nuclear nature, and all related research, development and manufacturing facilities. The missiles include virtually all systems possessed by Iraq, including scuds. Which Baghdad launched at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the War.
- The Secretary General would propose a plan to achieve this requirement, and it would be carried out under on-site inspection and supervision of an international commissions.
- Iraq assumes responsibility for "any loss, damage or injury to foreign government, nationals and corporations as a result of its aggression. "Nations with Iraqi assets under their control can seize them to satisfy claims, and a percentage of Iraq's future earnings from petroleum exports must be set aside for reparations claims

Source: John M. Goshko, "U.S. Offers Strict Terms to End War", Washington Post, March 22, 1991, p. A1.

APPENDIX-4

IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS				
Type	Delivery Means	Symptoms	Effects	Rate of Action
Nerve Agent	Missile, artillery, bomb, aerial spray, landmine	Difficult breathing, drooling, nausea, vomiting, convulsions	Incapacitates or kills when delivered in high concentrations	Seconds
Blistering Agent	Missile, artillery, bomb, aerial spray, landmine	No early symptoms for mustard types; searing of eyes, stinging of skin	Blisters skin, destroys respiratory tract, causes temporary blindness	Minutes
Blood-Affecting Agent	Missile, artillery, bomb	Convulsions and coma	Incapacitates or kills when delivered in high concentrations	Minutes
Choking Agent	Missile, artillery, bomb	Coughing, choking, Nausea, headache	Damages and Floods lungs	Hours

Source: James Blackwell, The Thunder In The Desert, (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), p. 35.

APPENDIX-5

UN Security Council Resolutions relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction:

UNSCRE 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, “the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision” of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programmes, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.

UNSCRE 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its programmes for weapons of mass destruction and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. For over a decade Iraq has been in breach of this resolution. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.

UNSCRE 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) arrangements to implement UNSCR 687. Iraq did not accede to this until November 1993. OMV was conducted from April 1995 to 15 December 1998, when the UN left Iraq.

UNSCRE 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use goods which could be used for mass destruction weaponry programmes.

Source: Iraq’s weapons of Mass Destruction An Assessment of the British Government September 24, 2002, <http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/page6117.asp>

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