

DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF
THE EMOTIONAL EMPATHY SCALE (EES)
AND
THE DISPOSITIONAL PREDICTOR AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF
EMOTIONAL EMPATHY



By

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Islamabad – Pakistan
2004

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that Ph.D. Dissertation, "**Development and Validation of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and the Dispositional Predictor and Potential Outcomes of Emotional Empathy,**" prepared by Shazia Ashraf has been approved for submission to Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.


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To my parents

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ABSTRACT

*The primary purpose of the present study was to develop an indigenous self-report measure of emotional empathy, named as Emotional Empathy Scale (EES). It was based on the model of emotional empathy as proposed by Mehrabian (1996). The factorial validity of the scale was determined on a sample of 331 postgraduate students (166 men and 165 women) belonging to various educational institutes of Rawalpindi and Islamabad. The 30 items of the EES were subjected to principal components analysis. The eigenvalues and associated scree plot provided evidence for a three factor solution. The three factors were examined using varimax rotation. A total of 26 items loaded at .30 and above on the first three factors, which collectively accounted for 42% of the items variance. The three factors were labeled (a) Tendency to be moved by others' positive and negative emotional experiences, (b) Emotional responsiveness, and (c) Susceptibility to emotional contagion. The reliability estimate of alpha coefficient ($\alpha = .85$), item-total correlation (ranging from $r = .31$ to $.60$, $p < .000$), and split half-reliability (.83) supported the high internal consistency of the 26-item EES. The present study also assessed gender differences in emotional empathy. Results from *t*-test analyses yielded a significant difference between men and women on the trait of emotional empathy, $t(279) = 3.94$, $p < .000$. A sample of 331 university students provided the following norms for the EES: Mean = 143; Standard deviation = 20.1. The percentile scores were also computed, which might be used as group norms.*

The construct validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) was determined by examining the convergent and discriminant validities. In this regard, four studies were

conducted. Using a sample of 101 postgraduate students (57 men and 44 women), the convergent validity of the EES was assessed by correlating it with the affective measure of emotional empathy—the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) (Mehrabian, 1996). A high correlation of .65 ($p < .000$) was obtained between the two scales.

As a discriminant validity check, the second study examined the relation of the EES with Urdu translated version of Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF), originally developed by Mehrabian (1994). This study was conducted on a sample of 150 postgraduate students (75 men and 75 women). Hypotheses tested were: (a) Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) will be positively correlated with Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF), and (b) individuals higher in emotional empathy will be more affiliative, as compared to individuals lower in emotional empathy. As expected, the EES yielded a significant and positive correlation coefficient of .48 ($p < .000$) with affiliative tendency. Moreover, *t*-test analyses exhibited that the low scorers and the high scorers on the EES significantly differed on the variable of affiliative tendency, $t(148) = 5.48, p < .000$.

The third study assessed the relation of EES with translated version of Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG), which was originally developed by Gibson (1971). The study was conducted on a sample of 125 adolescent boys, with an average age of 16.9 years, *S.D.* = 1.8. Following hypotheses were tested: (a) Emotional empathy will be negatively correlated with delinquency, and (b) individuals higher in emotional empathy will score lower on the measure of delinquency as compared to individuals lower in emotional empathy. A significant negative correlation coefficient of $-.28$ ($p < .001$) was obtained between the scales of EES and SRDSG.

Results from the *t*-test analyses indicated that the mean difference of the high and low groups on EES was significant on SRDSG, $t(124) = 2.95, p < .004$.

The fourth study examined the relationship of EES with Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS), as a discriminant validity check. This study took place in two parts. Part 1 dealt with the development of an indigenous measure of trait emotional awareness, named as Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS). Part 2 concerned itself with assessing the discriminant validity of the EES, by examining its relation with TEAS. In Part 1, the development of Trait Emotional Awareness Scale was guided by the trait meta-mood model of Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, and Palfai (1995). The factorial validity of the TEAS was determined on a sample of 182 postgraduate students (91 men and 91 women). The 36-item TEAS was subjected to principal components analysis. On the basis of eigenvalues and scree discontinuity test, the three factors solution was favored. Varimax rotation was performed to obtain a simple factor solution, which yielded 25 items loading at .40 and above on the first three factors. The three factors jointly explained 38.5% of total items variance. The three factors were labeled as (a) Attention to feelings, (b) Regulation, and (c) Clarity of feelings. The data on 25-item TEAS yielded an alpha coefficient of .76, item-total correlation ranging from .28 to .55 ($p < .000$), and a split-half reliability coefficient of .72. Thus, indicating that the 25-item measure has good internal consistency and split-half reliability. Part 2 of this investigation was conducted on a sample of 150 postgraduate students (75 men and 75 women). Following hypotheses were tested: (a) trait emotional awareness will be positively correlated with emotional empathy, and (b) individuals high in trait emotional awareness will score high on the measure of emotional empathy as compared to individuals lower in trait emotional awareness. Results indicated that trait

emotional awareness was significantly and positively associated with emotional empathy ($r = .41, p < .000$). The results of an independent groups t -test revealed that individuals in the high trait emotional awareness group attained significantly greater scores on the EES ($M = 98.6, S.D. = 10.0$) than individuals in the low trait emotional awareness group ($M = 92.2, S.D. = 11.1$), $t(148) = 3.70, p < .000$.

Results from the convergent and discriminant validity studies provided a strong evidence for the construct validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES).

The present investigation was also designed to examine the role of trait emotional awareness as a dispositional predictor of emotional empathy, and its potential outcomes, such as affiliative tendency and aggression. This study was conducted on a sample of 200 postgraduate students (100 men and 100 women), who were administered the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS), Urdu translated version of Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) (Mehrabian, 1994), and Urdu translated version of Aggression Questionnaire (AQ) (Buss & Perry, 1992). In order to assess the extent of prediction of emotional empathy from its dispositional predictor, the relation of trait emotional awareness with emotional empathy was examined. Results from correlational analysis and linear regression analysis yielded that trait emotional awareness explained a significant proportion of variance in emotional empathy ($R^2 = .18, F = 44.26, p < .000$). As regards the potential outcome variables of emotional empathy, results from linear regression analyses indicated that emotional empathy significantly predicted affiliative tendency ($R^2 = .26, F = 70.13, p < .000$) and aggression ($R^2 = .18, F = 43.25, p < .000$).

The present study also examined the role of emotional empathy as a mediator between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency. Results from path analysis clearly indicated that affiliative tendency was better predicted by the combination of trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy ($R^2 = .28$, $F = 38.3$, $p < .000$) than by either separately. Similarly, the role of emotional empathy as a mediator between trait emotional awareness and aggression was examined using path analysis. It was found that the combined effect of trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy on aggression ($R^2 = .27$, $F = 35.79$, $p < .000$) was greater as compared to the individual effects. These results verified the mediational role of emotional empathy.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The heart has its reasons which reason knows not of.

Pascal

Empathy means feeling what the other person feels. It is the unique capacity of the human beings to recognize emotions in others. It is sensitivity to the needs, expectations and values of others, whereby the emotional expressions of another do not go by unnoted. Empathy is a capacity, which allows an appreciation of separateness of human beings, and at the same time permits an emotional connection among them. That is, it is an understanding that though people are different from one another, yet they can capture how another feels by experiencing vicariously the emotions of another. In other words, empathy is an appreciation of human differences. It is certainly a very special way of being with another person. In Rogers (1967) words, empathy means:

to sense a person's confusion or his timidity or his anger or his feeling of being treated unfairly as if it were your own...but without ever losing the 'as if' quality
(p.93).

This rather broad definition of empathy establishes this phenomenon as the very opposite of rigid egocentricity; certainly empathy is the other extreme of insensitivity. Empathy is the

capacity of an individual to feel the needs, the aspirations, the frustrations, joys, sorrows, the anxieties, the hurt, indeed, the hunger of others as if they were his or her own without losing the separateness of one's own identity. Empathy is so powerful because it gives one accurate data to work with so that one fully, deeply understands the other, emotionally as well as intellectually. Salovey and Mayer (1997) described empathy as:

the ability to identify emotions in other people, designs, artworks, etc., through language, sound, appearance, and behavior; ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate, or honest versus dishonest expressions of feelings
(p.11).

The study of empathy is fascinating. It is fascinating because "the tendency of humans to experience the emotional states of others" probably has enormous implications for social interaction. Empathy certainly plays a role in the survival of a group and in bonding (Hoffman, 1981; Plutchik, 1987) and serves to inhibit aggressive behavior and promote prosocial behavior toward others (Batson, 1987; Blum 1980; Eisenberg, Zhou, & Koller, 2001; Feshbach, 1978; Staub, 1978). Empathy is regarded as the fundamental "*people skill*." People who are empathic are more attuned to the subtle social signals that indicate what others need or want. Covey (1989) regarded empathy as the single most important principle in the field of interpersonal relations.

Poets, playwrights, and philosophers have also for long regarded empathy as an important phenomenon. Like their counterparts in the literary world, psychologists from various research disciplines have focused attention on the role of empathy in mediating culturally valued social

behaviors (e.g., Deutch & Madle, 1975; Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1978; Hoffman, 1977; O’Keefe & Sypher, 1981; Rogers, 1957, 1975; Selmon, 1980). Interest in the empathy construct has been most evident in the interrelated fields of clinical, counseling, and educational psychology (e.g., Egan, 1976; Feldstein & Gladstein, 1980; Marks & Tolsma, 1986; Rogers, 1975, 1989). However, Ickes (1993) noted that this construct is central to the interests of personality and social psychologists as well. In fact, because of its wide ranging application, the notion of empathy has always been a broad, somewhat slippery concept—one that has provoked considerable speculation, excitement and confusion.

Indeed, the concept of empathy has meant different things to different psychologists. Some take the term *empathy* to refer to a cognitive process analogous to cognitive role taking or perspective taking (e.g., Deutsch & Madle, 1975); others take it to mean a primarily affective process (e.g., Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1984; Mehrabian, 1996). Broadly speaking, empathy is an emotional response resulting from the recognition of another’s emotional state or condition, which is very similar or identical to what the other individual is perceived to experience (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Losoya, 1997).

The roots of empathy can be traced to infancy. It has been found that behaviors suggesting an empathic sensitivity to others appear very early, perhaps as early as twelve to eighteen months of age (Hoffman, 1984; Radke-Yarrow & Zahn-Waxler, 1984). Virtually from the day they are born, infants are upset when they hear another infant crying—a response some see as the earliest precursor of empathy. A series of studies by Rushton, Fulker, Neale, Nias, and Eysenck (1986) have also suggested a very strong genetic base to empathy. More recently,

however, psychologists are trying to understand the dispositional mechanisms underlying emotional empathy. In the last decade, there has been increasing recognition of the role of emotions in empathy. According to Goleman (1995), empathy builds on emotional awareness. He argues that the more a person attends to his own feelings, the more he is likely to be adept at experiencing another's feeling experiences.

Empathy has been conceptually linked to positive behaviors. Theorists argue that people who experience others' negative emotions should be motivated to alleviate their distress and cease aggression directed towards others (e.g., Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Hoffman, 1982; Staub, 1984). In addition, the way individuals experience and manage their emotions has also been found to be related with the quality of empathy-related reactions such as sympathy and personal distress (Hubbard & Coie, 1994; Parke, 1994). Some theorists contend that empathy sometimes may result in a self-focused, egoistic reaction (referred to as *personal distress*) instead of sympathy (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). It has been suggested that individual differences in the tendency to experience sympathy or personal distress are due to the typical level of emotions one experiences. People who can maintain their emotional reactions within a tolerable range (i.e., not so arousing as to be highly aversive) are likely to experience sympathy: Such individuals experience how needy or distressed others feel but are relatively unlikely to become overwhelmed by their emotion and self-focused. Consistent with such theorizing, sympathy generally has been positively related to prosocial behavior, especially behavior that is likely to be based on other-oriented emotions and values (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Penner, in press). Therefore, where an access to one's own emotions is the keystone of

empathy, regulation of emotions is also highly important for positive social functioning, and reduction of negative acts.

As noted above empathy serves profoundly important functions. There is overwhelming evidence that it contributes to *mental health and adjustment* (Bryant, 1984); to *caring and morality* (Hoffman, 1984, 1987); to *prosocial and altruistic orientations* (Batson & Coke, 1981; Hoffman, 1984; Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981); to *emotional intelligence* (Salovey & Mayer, 1997) and *social intelligence* (Saarni, 1997). Greenspan (1997), regarded empathy as an important component of *conflict resolution*. Indeed, empathy comes into play in a vast array of life arenas, from sales and management to romance and parenting, to compassion and political action. The absence of empathy is also telling. Its lack is seen in criminal psychopaths, delinquents, rapists and child molesters.

Most importantly, empathy has been found to be a major contributor to healthy growing relationships. It has been found to relate to generally healthy and adjusted personality functioning and to reflect affiliative tendency, interpersonal positiveness and skills (Mehrabian, 1997; Mehrabian & Ksionzky, 1970). Without empathy one could conceivably demonstrate all the other skills of emotional competence in a very sociopathic fashion. It has also been suggested that empathic reactions play an important function in the reduction or inhibition of *aggressive or antisocial actions* (Feshbach, 1978, 1987; Parke & Slaby, 1983); *disruptive behavior disorders* (American Psychiatric Association, 1994); and, *delinquent behaviors* (Chandler, 1973). Individuals who can vicariously experience the negative reactions of others tend to be less aggressive in their interactions. Infact, owing to the marked stability of externalizing problems

over the life span (Mealey, 1995; Olweus, 1979), lowered empathy has been suggested as an inherent part of antisocial individuals (Schacter & Latane, 1964).

Empathy—the ability to know how another feels—is a correct principle evident in all areas of life. It is a generic, common denominator principle, but it has its greatest power in the area of interpersonal relations. Empathy is a source of connection and of affiliation among people. It is indeed our most thoroughgoing way of apprehending the world of another and establishing emotional connections with them.

In our society among the many self-evident problems are the lack of understanding between individuals and groups and the frequent occurrence of inhumane and uncaring behavior. Crimes are on the rise. There is increasing number of juveniles charged with murder, robbery, and forcible rape. Automatic weaponry is easily available to the teenagers. We are faced with innumerable social problems, having their roots in lack of empathy, which in turn affect a person's behavior, his interpersonal relationships, his job, his family life, but also the society at large. As a society we have not bothered to make sure that every child is taught empathy, impulse control, or any of the fundamentals of emotional competence. Our society has turned into a creed of "subjectivism." This kind of subjectivism ignores the fact that human beings are interrelated and interdependent social beings.

But more profoundly, this subjectivism ignores one of the deepest truths of human existence: "*For a person to be with others.*" Being able to put aside one's self-centered focus and impulses has social benefits: it opens the way to empathy, to real listening, to taking another

person's perspective. Empathy, as we have seen, leads to caring, altruism, and compassion. Seeing things from another's perspective breaks down biased stereotypes, and so breeds tolerance and acceptance of differences. These capacities are ever more called on in our increasingly pluralistic society, allowing people to live together in mutual respect and creating the possibility of productive public discourse. According to Rogers (1980):

Empathy indeed is an extremely important human characteristic both for the understanding of personality dynamics and for effecting change in personality and behavior. It is one of the most delicate and powerful ways we have of using ourselves. It is a way of being that is rarely seen in full bloom in a relationship.

Thus, empathy indeed is essential for a true human fulfillment, which is in turn, as established by Rogers, vital to the process of becoming a person. No matter what role one plays in life empathy remains the primary tool by which one comes to understand and communicate effectively with others. The profound importance of the phenomenon of empathy makes it ever more crucial to study it in Pakistani culture.

Therefore, the development of a reliable and valid self-report measure of emotional empathy—the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) was the primary purpose of this investigation. The development of the EES was guided by the model of emotional empathy as proposed by Mehrabian (1996). Moreover, the study also examined the role of trait emotional awareness as a dispositional predictor of emotional empathy among University students. The individual

differences in emotional empathy in predicting affiliative tendency and aggression were also explored. Finally, the mediational role of emotional empathy between trait emotional awareness and its outcome variables such as affiliative tendency and aggression was also investigated.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Empathy: Definitional Issues

The concept of empathy has been of interest to theorists and researchers across the spectrum of psychological thinking. The term empathy is of comparatively recent origin, having been coined by Titchner (1909) as a translation of the German word "Einfühlung," which had its origin in German aesthetics. Titchner initially thought that one could know about the consciousness of another person by inner imitation, as he said "in the mind's muscle." In 1924, he defined empathy rather succinctly as a "*process of humanizing objects, of reading or feeling ourselves into them*" (p.417).

Empathy has been utilized by personality theorists extensively. The term *ejective consciousness* was used by Baldwin (1897) to mean that "other people's bodies, says the child to himself, have experiences *in them* such as mine has" (p.8). Clearly ejective consciousness is similar to the idea of empathy. Piaget and Inhelder (1963) wrote about the development of *perspective taking* among children, and some psychologists (Underwood & Moore, 1982) have utilized this term, including affect in empathy.

Mead (1934) saw empathy as role taking and as constituting the essence of social and moral development. According to Mead, "*the exercise of what is often called social intelligence*

depends upon the given individual's ability to take the roles of or put himself in the place of the other individuals implicated with him in a given social situation" (p. 218). Fenichel (1945) observes that empathy involves both the identification with another person and an awareness of the feelings that accompany that identification.

Freud (1905/1960) used *Einfühlung* to mean that "we take the producing person's psychological state into consideration, put ourselves into it and try to understand it by comparing it with our own" (p.186). In his *Group Psychology* (1921/1949), however, Freud introduced a new idea, "*that we are faced by the process which psychology calls empathy (Einfühlung) and plays the largest part in our understanding of what is inherently foreign to our ego in other people*" (p. 66). He wrote that empathy enabled us "to take up any attitude at all toward another's mental life" (1921/1949, p. 70).

Allport (1937) noted that the "*imitative assumption of the postures and facial expressions of other people plays a greater part in ordinary life than is commonly realized*" (p. 530). Thus, he used motor imitation in part, along with inference and intuition, to explain personality. In a later revision of his book, Allport (1961) defined empathy as the "*imaginative transposing of oneself into the thinking, feeling and acting of another*" (p. 536). He believed that empathy stands midway between inference, on the one hand, and intuition, on the other. But many personality theorists disagreed. To Kohut (1959), empathy seems to be the process whereby "we think ourselves into his place" and take by "vicarious introspection" or empathy, the experience of another "as if it were our own and thus revive inner experiences" in order to arrive at "an appreciation of the meaning" (p.461). He reaffirmed his position later (1980), noting that

empathy is for the “*acquisition of objective knowledge about the inner life of another person*” (p. 485).

Perhaps the most important recent work on empathy, in therapy, has been that of Carl Rogers (1942, 1951, 1957, 1975), who borrowed, cherished and revitalized the concept of empathy. He offered two definitions of empathy. Earlier, he had written that empathy meant “to perceive the internal frame of reference of another with accuracy and with emotional components and meanings which pertain thereto as if one were the person, but without ever losing the “as if” condition (1959, p.210-211). Later (1975), he wrote that empathy was a “process,” and that it involved:

entering the private perceptual world of the other and becoming thoroughly at home in it. It involves being sensitive...to the changing felt meanings which flow in this other person.... It means temporarily living in his/her life, moving about in it delicately without making judgments, sensing meanings of which he/she is scarcely aware.... It includes communicating your sensings of his/her world as you look with fresh and unfrightened eyes at element of which the individual is fearful.... To be with another in this way means that for the time being you lay aside the views and values you hold for yourself in order to enter another world without prejudice (p. 4).

This is perhaps the most complete and insightful description of empathy to date.

Despite the widespread recognition of empathy as an important human characteristic, there has been little consensus among theorists on its formal definition. Some people take the term empathy to refer to a **cognitive process** analogous to cognitive role taking or perspective taking (e.g., Deutsch & Madle, 1975; Hogan, 1969); others take it to mean a primary **affective process** analogous to vicarious affective response to the perceived emotional experiences of others (having some cognitive component) (e.g., Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1984; Mehrabian, 1996; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972); still others, primarily clinicians view empathy as a process that serves a communicating and/or information gathering function in therapy (e.g., Goldstein & Michaels, 1985).

Empathy frequently has been defined as an emotional reaction elicited by and congruent with another's emotional state or condition (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Hoffman, 1982). In work on empathy, it is essential to differentiate among various emotional reactions that have been labeled "empathy." Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy, Karbon, Maszk, Smith, O'Boyle, and Suh (1994) and Hoffman (2000) have argued that empathic responding often results in *sympathy*, although it also can lead to *personal distress*. Sympathy often is defined as feelings of sorrow for another or concern for another based on the perception of another's emotional state or condition. In contrast, personal distress is an aversive emotional reaction such as discomfort or anxiety resulting from exposure to another's emotional state or condition (Batson, 1991; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). Both of these emotional responses are viewed as stemming from *empathy* (an emotional response resulting from the recognition of another's emotional state, which is very similar or identical to what the other individual is perceived to experience). Sympathy is defined as involving other-oriented, altruistic motivation, whereas personal distress is viewed as

reflecting the self-focused, egoistic motivation of alleviating one's own distress (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990).

Thus recently, several investigators (Batson, 1987; Clark, 1980; Hoffman, 1984, 2000; Mehrabian, 1996; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) have identified empathy as an involuntary vicarious experience of another's emotional state. Most of them define empathy as an emotional response that stems from another's emotional state or condition and that is congruent with the other's emotional state or situation. They believe that such a vicarious emotional response qualifies as empathy if the focus of attention is the other person rather than the self.

Operational Definitions of Emotional Empathy

The concept of empathy has been debated for centuries by philosophers as well as psychologists (e.g., Allport, 1937; Blum, 1980; Hume, 1777/1966; Titchner, 1924). Empathy has been an important concept in contemporary developmental, social, personality, and clinical psychology (e.g., Batson & Coke, 1981; Dymond, 1949; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Lasoya, 1997; Goldstein & Michaels, 1985; Hoffman, 1984; Mehrabian, 1996). Different psychologists have diverse perspectives, regarding empathy. Recently, for most contributors, empathizing involves the **vicarious sharing of affect**—which is a critical similarity in the following operational definitions of empathy.

Hoffman (1976, 1977) gave the model of empathy, which provides a framework for conceptualizing and investigating this concept. Hoffman (1977) defined empathy as,

the arousal of affect in the observer that is not a reaction to his or her own situation but a vicarious response to another person (p. 175).

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971) has given the following definition of empathy,

the capacity for participating in, or a vicarious experiencing of another's feelings, volitions, or ideas and sometimes another's movements to the point of executing bodily movements resembling his.

Bryant (1987) maintained that social perspective taking entails cognitive understanding of the feelings and motives of others and, as such, is an instrumental skill. Empathy, on the other hand, entails emotional responsiveness to the feelings experienced by others. Barnett (1987) also regarded sharing of affect as the primary component of empathy, and defined empathy as:

empathy denotes the vicarious experiencing of an emotion that is congruent with, but not necessarily identical to the emotion of another individual (p. 4).

Similarly, Batson, Fultz, and Schoenrade (1987) defined empathy in terms of vicarious sharing of affect. They gave the following definition of empathy:

empathy is other-oriented feelings of concern, compassion, and tenderness experienced as a result of witnessing another person's suffering (p. 3).

According to Mehrabian (1996), when used as a description of a trait or personality characteristic, emotional empathy describes individual differences in the tendency to feel and vicariously experience the emotional experiences of others. Mehrabian (1996) defined “emotional empathy” as,

the tendency to feel and experience vicariously the (positive and negative) emotional experiences and/or expressions of others—feeling what the other person feels (p. 1).

In developmental and social psychology, researchers recently have differentiated among various types of empathy-related responding. For example, Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) and Hoffman (2000) maintained that empathy often may lead to other vicarious responses and it is important to differentiate among these various empathy-related reactions. They argued that empathy might lead to either sympathy or another emotional reaction which is labeled personal distress. Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) defined empathy as,

an affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another's emotional state or condition, and which is identical or very similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel.

Theories of Emotional Empathy

By about the first part of the twentieth century, the idea of *Einfühlung*/empathy was, intellectually speaking, everywhere. Although it was called by different names and utilized in different contexts and in different fields of social sciences, the question of empathy—how one knows the consciousness of another—was current. There are several variations, with subtle differences of emphasis among them, regarding the development of empathy. In fact, the term empathy found its new life in the field of personality. And within the area of personality, it was used by personality theorists and psychotherapists of widely different persuasions.

Psychoanalytic Perspective

Psychoanalytic and neoanalytic theories portray the emergence of empathy in the context of the emotional intimacy shared by mother and infant (e.g., Burlingham, 1967; Freud, 1964; Kaplan, 1977; Stern, Barnett, & Speiker, 1983; Sullivan, 1953).

Empathy is central in Sullivan's (1953) interpersonal theory. He sees mother and infant bound together in a mutually empathic relationship. It is by means of primitive empathy, described as prototaxically experienced flow of feeling between mother and infant, that the mother's anxiety is, "prehended" (sensed below the level of awareness) by the infant. It is this inescapable anxiety that occasions the infant's development of a *self* (to avoid anxiety) and of different personifications of the self ("good me," "bad me," "not me") and others ("good mother," "bad mother," etc.). Personality itself, according to Sullivan, consists solely of

interpersonal interactions with internal and external personifications. Moreover, for Sullivan, empathy is fundamental to human development; it is an important ingredient in perception of therapy as a *relationship* based upon *participant* observation.

Object-relation theorists (Winnicott, 1965,1970) attribute a similar importance to maternal empathy during the early infancy period. Whereas Winnicott (1965) proposes that the mother is regressively relying on her own early childhood experience as a basis for empathy with her baby, Kaplan (1983) has argued that parental empathy can and should reflect maturity and competence in differentiation from the infant, rather than psychological regression, projection, and dependency.

Perhaps the most extensive treatment of empathy by a psychoanalytic writer is that of Heinz Kohut (1959, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984). Kohut maintained that empathy was a basic human endowment. He argued that empathy provides people with capacity to know about the psychological states of other human beings, and that this capacity is innate. He believed that empathy is curative. According to him, the maternal empathic response functions as a “mirror” for the child’s manifestations of narcissistic grandiosity. This mirroring enables the child to identify with the validating parent, thus facilitating the vicarious acceptance assimilation of feelings of grandiosity, and leads to heightened self-esteem in the child. The therapist, when treating patients with fragmented self, the so-called narcissistic personality, responds to the patient’s feelings of vulnerability and grandiosity with empathy. This process is referred to as “mirror transference” and is believed to provide a mechanism by which the patient learns to accept formerly rejected narcissistic impulses and to develop internalized controls. In his last

published work, Kohut (1984) noted that "*empathy per se, the mere presence of empathy, has also a beneficial, in a broad sense, a therapeutic effect—both in the clinical setting and in human life in general*" (p. 85).

Behavioristic Perspective

Behaviorist theorists, in addition to psychoanalytic, object-relational, and person-centered theorists, have been concerned with the conditions of childhood. However, until the more recent work of Bandura (1977, 1978) on social learning, the notions of relationship and empathy did not seem important within their approaches. With the introduction of concepts of learning by imitation and modeling, Bandura approaches the possibility of a relationship-oriented stance; and with the concept of efficacy, a descriptive, if not a structural, notion of self is introduced into the theory. Now that more attention is paid to cognitive factors in behavior modification, and to the concept of self, it seems that behaviorism can move in the direction of internalized and relationship-oriented position.

The roles of learning and cognitive development in the emergence of empathy have received some, although insufficient, attention. For example, Aronfreed (1970) suggests that empathy is learned via conditioning process in childhood. In his view, empathy develops by the repeated pairing of the child's own feelings of pleasure or distress (elicited by external stimuli) with cues of corresponding emotions in others. As a consequence, cues of others' emotions acquire the capacity to elicit corresponding emotions in the child. Moreover, because the child's emotional responses to affective cues in another become a conditioned response, the child learns

that behaviors that make others happy or relieve another's distress are pleasurable for the child himself or herself. Thus, prosocial behaviors become self-reinforcing.

Aronfreed's (1970) theory focused more on the development of personal distress and prosocial action than on the development of sympathetic concern. Moreover, his theory concerns only one possible mechanism for the development of empathy.

Humanistic Perspective

The concept of empathy was important to Rogers's theory of personality and crucial to the kind of psychotherapy in which he became involved (1957, 1975). Rogers believed that humans are born with a tendency to actualize their organism which is essentially good. And, that it is endowed with various potentials including empathy, which flourishes in an atmosphere marked by unconditional positive regard and empathy. The development of these potentials, however, goes off course when the human child fails to receive empathic care from his parents. Empathy plays a key role in person-centered therapy. If the therapists were allowed to do only one thing, Rogerians would likely choose to communicate empathic understanding. The rationale for this is clear from their theory of the development of psychopathology. Individuals get into emotional trouble because they constrict their experience to conform to internalized conditions of worth. In order to suspend conditions of worth and to restore the organismic valuing tendency, the therapist must establish an atmosphere of positive regard, free of conditions. Hence, he/she must attend to the client, permit the client's recognized and unrecognized feelings to enter the therapist's awareness, gain some sense of the client's internal world, and then reflect this

knowledge back to the client accurately and in an emotionally understandable way. This empathic process encourages the client to regard previously shunned experiences positively, and become less defensive and more real. So that he is able to grow and moves in the direction natural to his organism.

Without doubt, the present popularity of empathy as a construct comes from Roger's emphasis on it, and his definition put it squarely into an objective, researchable, personality framework. As a result of the extensive experimental and experiential evidence that has been accumulated to support the centrality of empathy in effective interpersonal interaction, empathy training programs have been undertaken, not only for therapists, but also for parents and teachers. It appears that Rogerians have realized, to some extent, their social vision. Empathy has infiltrated the home and the school.

Hoffman's Theory of Affective Empathy

For the ontogenic development of empathy, the only detailed theoretical account in the literature is given by Martin L. Hoffman (1977, 1984). Hoffman (1981) suggested that empathic arousal based on motor mimicry and classical conditioning may be a species-wide response and that early displays of empathy suggest a biological root to the development of empathy. According to him, affective empathy is a match between observer's and model's feelings. Empathy is conceived more in terms of the *processes* underlying the match i.e., the processes responsible for one's having a feeling more appropriate to *another's situation* than to one's own situation. According to Hoffman, though empathy is an affective response, it has cognitive as

well as affective components (1984). In the theoretical model, he proposes that there is an interaction of affect and cognition in the various modes of empathic arousal as well as in the transformations and developmental levels of empathic experience.

Modes of Empathic Arousal

There are at least six distinct modes of empathic arousal. They vary in the type of eliciting stimulus (e.g., facial, situational, symbolic, imaginal), the depth of processing involved and the amount and kind of past experience required. They are presented here briefly in order of their development (Hoffman, 1984).

1. Primary Circular Reaction: There is evidence that one and two day old infants will cry in response to the sound of another infant's cry (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Simner, 1971). Further, it was established that the cry was not simply a response to a noxious physical stimulus, because the infant did not cry as much to equally loud and intense non human sounds. It has also been found that the subject's cry is not a simple imitative vocal response lacking an affective component. Rather, it is vigorous, intense, and indistinguishable from the spontaneous cry of an infant who is in actual discomfort. The reason for this reactive cry may be a primary circular reaction: the sound of another's cry, evokes a cry response in the infant through an innate releasing mechanism; the infant then cries to the sound of its own cry. This reactive cry must therefore be considered as a possible early, rudimentary precursor of empathy, though obviously not a full empathic response. The reactive cry may also actually contribute to the development of empathic distress. This leads directly to the next mode of arousal.

2. *Classical Conditioning*: A type of direct classical empathic conditioning results from observing the cues of another's affective experience and experiencing simultaneously the same affect directly. Thus the affective cues from others become conditioned stimuli that evoke the same feelings in the self. The mother's affective state (facial and verbal expressions while anxious) may be transferred to the infant through physical handling. Furthermore, through stimulus generalization, similar expressions by other persons may evoke distress feelings in the child.

3. *Direct Association*: When we observe people experiencing an emotion, their facial expression, voice, posture or any other cue in the situation that reminds us of past situations associated with our experience of that emotion may evoke the emotion in us e.g., the child who sees another child cut himself starts crying. According to Hoffman (1984), the only requirement is the observer's 'past' experiences of pain and discomfort.

4. *Mimicry*: A fourth mode of empathic arousal was described more than 90 years ago by Lipps (1906). According to him, it involves two steps: The observer automatically imitates the other with slight movements in facial expression and posture ("motor mimicry"). This then creates internal kinesthetic cues in the observer that contribute (through afferent feedback) to the observer's understanding and feeling the same emotion.

5. *Language-Mediated Association*: The fifth mode, like the third, is based on the association between the victim's distress cues and the observer's past pain or discomfort. The victim's distress cues, however, do not communicate feeling directly but through language.

Further, the victim needs not be present. One might respond empathically to a letter describing what happened to someone or describing how they feel.

6. *Role taking*: The sixth mode, according to Hoffman, usually involves the cognitive act of imagining oneself in another's place. Stotland (1969) found that imagining oneself in the other's place is more empathy arousing than observing another's movements. The second finding by Stotland suggests, more specifically, that empathic affect is more likely to be generated when the focus of attention is not on the model's feeling but on the model's situation and how one would feel if the stimuli impinging on the model were impinging on oneself.

Development of Cognitive Sense of Others

Hoffman (1984) suggests that there are four stages in the development of a cognitive sense of others: For most of the first year, children probably experience a fusion between self and others. By the end of first year, they attain person permanence and become aware of others as physical entities distinct from the self. By two years of age, they acquire a rudimentary sense of others not only as physically distinct but also as having internal states independent of their own. This is the initial step in role taking, and with further development they become able to discern other people's internal states in increasingly complex situations. By late childhood or early adolescence, they become aware of others as having personal identities and life experiences beyond immediate situation.

Developmental Levels of Empathy: Affective-Cognitive Synthesis

Hoffman (1977) maintains that once aroused, the empathized affect is cognitively processed, with increasingly subtle and accurate responses at least possible as the child's cognitive abilities develop. Vicariously aroused affect and cognitive processing of the affect combine to produce an empathic response. He observes:

Since empathy is a response to another person's feeling or situation, mature empathizers know that the source of their own affect is something happening to another person and that person's affective response to these events, and they have a sense of what the other is feeling. Young children who lack a self-other distinction may be empathically aroused without these cognitions. Thus, how people experience empathy depends on the level at which they cognize others (p. 181).

Hoffman (1977) outlines the following four levels or stages of empathic feeling that result from this coalescence of vicarious affect and the cognitive sense of others:

1. *Global Empathy:* During the earliest months of life, empathy is viewed as being affective contagion, primarily an involuntary and perhaps biologically inherent experience of another's affect with no self-other distinction as to source. Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, and King (1979) found a similar pattern to be characteristic of 10-to-14 month old infants, who cannot yet differentiate themselves from others and may at times behave as though what is

happening to others is happening to them. This first level of empathic distress is obviously primitive. It is called empathy although the child does not really put himself in the other's place and imagine what the other is feeling (perhaps it is more correct to call it the precursor of empathy).

2. *"Egocentric" Empathy*: The second level (prevalent at roughly 1-3 years of age) is clearly established when the child is fully aware that the other is a physical entity, distinct from the self and thus able for the first time to experience empathic distress, while also being aware that another person, and not the self, is the victim. Children at this level, however, cannot yet fully distinguish between their own and other person's internal states (Hoffman, 1984). In labeling this empathic level, Hoffman used quotations because it is not purely "egocentric." Although child's attempt to help indicate confusion between what comforts self and what comforts the other, these same attempts to help, also indicate that the child is responding with appropriate empathic affect.

3. *Empathy for Another's Feelings*: With the beginning of role-taking capability, at about 2 to 3 years, children become aware that other people's feelings may sometimes differ from their own, and that other people's perspectives are based on their own needs and interpretation of events. More important, because children now know that the real world and their perceptions of it are not the same thing, and that the feelings of others are independent of their own, they become more responsive to cues about what the other is feeling. By three or four years of age, children can recognize and respond empathically to happiness or sadness in others in simple situations (e.g., Feshbach & Roe, 1968; Strayer, 1980).

4. *Empathy for Another's General Condition*: By late childhood, owing to the emerging conception of self and other as continuous persons with separate histories and identities, one becomes aware that others feel pleasure and pain not only in the immediate situation but also in their larger life experience. Consequently, although one may continue to be empathically aroused by another's immediate distress, one's empathic response may be intensified when one realizes that the other's distress is not transitory but chronic. This fourth level, then, consists of empathically aroused affect combined with an image of another's general life condition (e.g., general level of distress or deprivation, opportunities available or denied, future prospects). If this image is the only information available (no immediate distress cues), empathy may result from imagining oneself as having the experiences and feelings associated with that life condition. As an extension of the fourth level, with the ability to group people into categories, children eventually can be empathically aroused by the plight of an entire group or class of people (e.g., poor, oppressed, outcast or retarded).

According to Hoffman, the transition from global to "egocentric" empathy may involve an important qualitative shift in feeling: Once children are aware that others are distinct from themselves, their own empathic distress may be transformed at least in part, into reciprocal concern for the victim i.e., they may continue to respond in a purely empathic manner—feeling uncomfortable or highly distressed themselves—but they may also experience a feeling of compassion or "sympathetic distress," for the victim, along with conscious desire to help, because they feel sorry for the victim, not just to relieve their own empathic distress.

The last three empathy development levels may, therefore, describe the development of an emotional/affective response that has both an empathic distress and a sympathetic distress component.

The Hoffman model does not suggest that as one level becomes evident or possible the other drops out. Thus, the two years old, in Hoffman's view, could be aware of the distress experience as belonging to the "other" would perhaps experience some blurring of the distinction (typical of level two response), and may be beginning to be aware that other people are not only distinct but have different feelings and needs than the child (level three response) (1977, p. 182-183).

The Hoffman theory of empathy is essentially a theory of a naturally evolving process. Nevertheless, socialization experiences, Hoffman suggests, play an important role in either strengthening or weakening empathic tendencies. To summarize, one can empathize with someone who processes information in the same way, or with someone who processes information differently if one has the code for the person's processing and the necessary affective range. And, one's vicarious affective response qualifies as empathy, despite its idiosyncratic component, if one's attention is focused on the other and the other's situation rather than on the self.

Measures of Emotional Empathy

Although there are a variety of formal definitions of empathy, the underlying meanings are not as divergent. Most of the disagreement appears to be on whether or not empathy involves *actual vicarious experience* of another's emotions or simply the willingness and the ability to put oneself in another's place (role-taking). The measures of empathy are based on these two basic definitions. In the following are described briefly the various measures of emotional empathy.

Picture/Story Techniques

The most commonly used method of assessing affective empathy in children has been picture/story procedures. In this technique, the children typically are told brief stories while being shown pictures and/or visual stimuli depicting a story, and then are asked how they feel. Children are considered to have responded empathically if they report an emotion identical to or similar to that of the story protagonist.

In most researches involving picture/story procedures, investigators have used the story stimuli developed by Norma Feshbach and Kiki Roe (1968). This instrument, called the Feshbach and Roe Affective Situations Test for Empathy (FASTE), was designed to assess empathy in preschoolers and young, school-aged children. The FASTE consists of eight stories, each accompanied by three slides, depicting (two of each) the emotions of sadness, anger, fear, and happiness. After exposure to each scenario, the child is asked "How do you feel?"; "Tell me how you feel"; or "How did that story make you feel?"

Many investigators have modified the FASTE for use in their own research. For instance, sometimes only a subset of emotions (e.g., only happiness and sadness) has been used (Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1980).

Although picture/story procedures were an important first step in the study of affective empathy, there has been considerable concern about the psychometric properties of these indices. Picture/story measures usually consist of short narratives about hypothetical events that may not evoke sufficient affect for empathizing, especially over repeated trials. Moreover, some researchers have suggested that the procedure of repeatedly asking the child how he or she feels creates strong demand characteristics (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). Others have been concerned that empathy with one emotion (e.g., happiness) may not be equivalent to empathy with another emotion (e.g., sadness; Hoffman, 1982). Finally, it appears that children score higher on the FASTE when interviewed by same sex rather than other sex experimenters (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983).

Self Report on Questionnaires

Questionnaire measures of empathy frequently have been used in many studies of the relation between empathy and prosocial behavior. These questionnaires are believed to assess the trait of empathy. Most of these studies have been conducted with adults. Following is the description of some of the questionnaire measures most widely used by psychologists.

Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS): The most widely used questionnaire measure is Mehrabian and Epstein's (1972) scale of emotional empathic tendency, (EETS) which has been used solely with older adolescents and adults. According to Mehrabian and Epstein, this 33-item scale contains items that tap susceptibility to emotional contagion, appreciation of the feelings of unfamiliar and distant others, extreme emotional responsiveness, the tendency to be moved by others positive emotional experiences, sympathetic tendency, and willingness to have contact with others who have problems. The respondent answers each item on a scale ranging from *very strong disagreement* (-4) to *very strong agreement* (+4). The mean score for males is 23, $SD = 22$. The mean score for females is 44, $SD = 21$.

Among the initial validation studies of the Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS), Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) investigated individual differences in empathic tendency and aggression in relation to aggressive behavior. The second study was conducted to investigate the relation between empathy and helping behavior. The sample consisted of university students in both the studies. The results showed that the relation of empathy with aggression and helping was in the expected direction. The internal consistency of the EETS has been documented to be .79 among adults (Kalliopuska, 1983) and .48 among seventh graders (Bryant, 1982). Consistent with the relatively high internal consistency obtained for adults, split-half reliability for the adult measure has been reported to be .84 (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972).

Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES): Mehrabian (1996) developed the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES), which is a new scale and is based on a substantial amount of research evidence derived from the earlier Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale EETS,

(Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). Mehrabian noted that the 30-item BEES incorporated the most important components of emotional empathy and, thereby, provided a more up-to-date and *balanced* assessment of this trait.

An interesting and important feature of the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) is that it is negatively correlated ($r = -.50$) to interpersonal violence and, thus, may be useful (as an indirect and subtle measure) for identifying persons who may have a potential to behave in highly aggressive or violent ways (Mehrabian, 1996). The appropriate population with which BEES can be used is ages 15 and older. Subjects report the degree of their agreement and disagreement with each of its 30 items using a 9-point agreement-disagreement scale.

The coefficient alpha internal consistency of the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) is .87 (Mehrabian, 1996). This compares favorably with the coefficient alpha of .84 for the original Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS). Evidence on the validity of the BEES is available indirectly through its high positive correlation of .77 with the original Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS) (Mehrabian, 1996). Representative findings with the EETS, identified in the reviews (Choplan et al., 1985; Mehrabian, Young, & Sato, 1988) showed that high-empathy, compared with low-empathy, persons were more likely to:

- (a) have higher skin conductance and heart rate to emotional stimuli,
- (b) be emotional, as evidenced by their tendency to weep,
- (c) have had parents who had spent more time with them, had displayed more affection, and had been more explicit verbally about their feelings,

- (d) be tolerant of infant crying and less abusive toward children (only mothers tested),
- (e) be altruistic in their behavior toward others and volunteer to help others,
- (f) be affiliative,
- (g) be non-aggressive,
- (h) rate positive social traits as important,
- (i) score higher on measures of moral judgment,
- (j) have arousable and pleasant temperaments.

Mehrabian suggested that the high positive correlation between the BEES and the original EETS implied that much of the validation data for the original scale could be attributed as well to the present BEES. Mehrabian (1997b) found that both the BEES and the EETS related significantly and negatively ($r = -.31$ and $r = -.22$, respectively) to the Maiuro, Vitaliano, and Cahn (1987) Aggression Scale and also both related significantly and negatively ($r = -.50$ and $r = -.43$, respectively) to the Risk of Eruptive Violence Scale (Mehrabian, 1996a). Finally, although the BEES related significantly and positively to the Revised Optimism-Pessimism Scale (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), the EETS did not. These correlations show that, compared with EETS, the BEES consistently exhibited stronger relationships with measures of aggression, violence, and optimism, thus, indicating superior construct validity of the BEES.

Empathy Scale (ET): Among the other questionnaire measures used with some frequency are Bryant's (1982) Empathy Scale (ET) for children, a modification of Mehrabian and Epstein's scale (1972). Her scale contains items, which seem to assess a variety of factors, including sympathy, personal distress, emotional arousability, and perspective taking. Bryant adapted 18 of

the original 33 items from the Mehrabian and Epstein's scale as a way of accommodating a wide age range of children and adolescents and, at the same time, yielding a measure comparable to one already available for use with adults.

In an attempt to differentiate among components of empathy, Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hansson, and Richardson (1978) constructed adult-oriented five questionnaire scales: Denial-Avoidance (i.e., refusal to empathize), Involvement-Concern (including primarily concerning role-taking), Hostility-Empathy, Friend-Empathy, and Fantasy-Empathy (concerning involvement with characters in stories, play, or movies). From initial validation studies, Stotland et al. concluded that the Fantasy-Empathy Scale was the most valid and used this scale in nearly all subsequent work.

Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI): Davis (1980, 1983) has attempted to differentiate between personal distress and empathic concern (i.e., sympathy). His questionnaire, IRI, contains four 7-item subscales: empathic concern, personal distress, fantasy, and perspective taking. Empathic concern and personal distress are affective subscales and fantasy and perspective taking are cognitive subscales. Interestingly, the fantasy scale correlates more highly with the affectivity subscales than with perspective taking and perhaps suggests that willingness to become imaginably involved in affective events is more related to adult empathic concern, for example, than is perspective taking scale. Davis (1983) explored the validity of his empathy measure by administering it together with EETS to 225 males and 235 female undergraduates. The EETS correlated positively and significantly with all four subscales of the Davis measure.

Hogan Empathy Scale: Hogan (1969) constructed the empathy (EM) scale, which was designed to measure cognitive role-taking ability. Before constructing the empathy scale, Hogan set out to discover if the concept of empathy was meaningful. Convinced that empathy was a recognizable attribute, the researcher began construction of the EM scale. First, he developed a criterion for rating empathy. Given the standard dictionary definition of empathy, four faculty and research psychologists and three advanced graduate students were asked to describe a highly empathic man using the full 100-item California Q-sort. A composite description was obtained which had a reliability of .94. This composite was used as the criterion. The validity of the criterion was made by correlating empathy scores for all subjects with their scores on the California Psychological Inventory (CPI), the Minnesota MultiPhasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), and Chapin Social Insight Test (CSIT). In general, the empathy scores correlated positively with CPI and Chapin Social Insight Test and negatively with the MMPI.

Following the validity check, Hogan (1969) began selecting items for the EM scale. Item analysis was conducted, and 64 items were selected for the final scale, mainly for their ability to distinguish high from low empathy subjects. The test-retest reliability of the 64-item scale was .84.

Self-report of Reactions in Experimental Settings

The set of studies included in this grouping generally differs from studies involving picture/story indices in several ways. First, the emotion-evoking stimuli are presented via videotapes, audiotapes, or realistic enactments, not narratives or pictures. And then asked to rate

or otherwise report their affective reactions (prior to being provided the opportunity to assist the needy other). Second, in these studies participants were led to believe that the events and people involved in the stimuli were real, not hypothetical. Third, participants frequently were asked to report sympathetic reactions instead of, or in addition to, affective reactions that matched (or did not match) those of the other. Finally, participants usually reported their reactions by means of pencil and paper measures, not by a verbal or nonverbal (pointing) report given directly to the experimenter; that is because the participants in most of these studies were adults. Many of these studies were conducted by Batson and his colleagues and therefore involved self-report of both sympathy and personal distress. Very little of this research has involved child participants.

In a number of these studies, self-report sympathy (Batson, Cowles, & Coke, 1979; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978), general upset or anxiety (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977), or both (Shelton & Rogers, 1981), have been positively associated with prosocial behavior. But, the data is not entirely consistent; in some studies, no significant relation between sympathy and helping has been obtained (Batson et al., 1983; Coke, 1980). Moreover, in studies with children, self-report to others emotional reactions tend to be unrelated (Brehm, Powell, & Coke, 1984; Zahn-Waxler, Friedman, & Cummings, 1983). According to Eisenberg and Miller (1987), it may be due to children's difficulty in asserting and/or reporting their emotional states or to a weaker link between affect and behavior among the young.

In summary, there appears to be a moderate positive association between adults' reports of experiencing sympathy, and their subsequent assisting the distressed other. The data for children are considerably weaker. Thus, it is unclear whether discrepancy in findings between

adults' and children's self-reports of sympathy/empathy is due to the strength of sympathy and prosocial behavior.

Physiological Indices

Physiological measures have been used for several decades to assess empathic and related reactions (e.g., Berger, 1962; Craig & Lowery, 1969; Craig & Wood, 1969). In general investigators have found that emotional arousal tends to be associated with changes in physiological responses as assessed by skin conductance, heart rate, palmer sweating, skin temperature, vasoconstriction, and electromyographic (EMG) procedures (see Buck, 1984; Cacioppo & Petty, 1983).

Thus, there is good reason to assume that physiological measures can be used to tap the autonomic changes in the nervous system associated with emotional reactions. Given that most people do not consciously control physiological responses in their normal functioning, it is also reasonable to assume that such responding usually is relatively uncontaminated by an individual's desire to present a socially desirable image to the world or to the self. Until recently, physiological indices were thought to measure generally undifferentiated states of arousal. However, in recent research there is some evidence that certain physiological indices may be useful for differentiating between the discrete emotions. For example, Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen (1983) found different patterns of heart rate, temperature, and skin conductance for adults experiencing a variety of emotions. More relevant to the study of empathy and sympathy is the evidence that one can differentiate between personal distress reactions (anxiety related to one's

own well being) and vicarious sympathetic empathic reactions. Whereas adults, children, and infants have been found to exhibit heart acceleration in situations that create anxiety (e.g., Craig, 1968; Darley & Katz, 1973), heart rate decelerations have been noted when adults view others receiving, or about to receive, noxious stimulation (Campos, Butterfield, & Klinnert, 1985; Craig, 1968; Craig & Lowery, 1969). Thus, it is likely that heart rate, and perhaps some other physiological indices (e.g., temperature; see Ekman et al., 1983), can be useful for differentiating among various emotions that have been labeled empathy. If so, physiological data may be extremely valuable in studying the development and elicitation of empathy. Today, in addition to the self-report measures of emotional empathy, psychologists are depending more and more on the physiological measures in their studies of emotional empathy (e.g., Eisenberg, Fabes, Schaller, Miller, Carlo, Poulin, Shea, & Shell, 1991; Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy et al., 1994).

The major disadvantages of physiological measures are, for the most part, ones of practicality. One drawback is that it is as yet unclear to what degree physiological indices can be used to differentiate between various emotional states. Moreover, given that people can experience more than one emotion at a time, there may be problems in interpreting data reflecting multiple simultaneous emotional reactions. Another methodological problem is that study participants may react to the physiological equipment being used. Some physiological equipment not only constrains the participants' movements, but also is uncomfortable and even frightening (especially when the participants are young children). However, if physiological data are combined with facial/gestural and/or self-report indices, the possibilities of differentiating and assessing the emotions accurately should increase.

Correlates of Emotional Empathy

The concept of emotional empathy has been of interest to the developmental, clinical, educational, social, and personality psychologists. It has been found to be related with important psychological attributes, such as mental health, better interpersonal relationships, prosocial orientations, and moral behaviors. Emotional empathy has also been the focus of investigation for psychologists who want to understand the mechanisms underlying the reduction of antisocial and aggressive behaviors. Central to the present investigation are the personality variables discussed below.

Emotional Empathy and Trait Emotional Awareness

Emotions provide humans with the basic data to make sense out of their life. In differing ways, emotions have been regarded by philosophers and investigators as having positive consequences for individuals. It might be suggested that feelings and passions, are the essential guides that the human specie has inherited. Rogers (1957) regarded emotions as the criteria for evaluating things and providing guidance in making personal choices. For better or for worse, the individual's appraisal of every personal encounter and one's responses to it are shaped not just by rational judgments or past experiences, but also by emotions. Therefore, the purpose and potency of emotions in man's life can never be overstated.

However, emotions have long been viewed as disorganized interruptions of mental activity, so potentially disruptive that they must be controlled. For example, the psychologists

who first studied human intelligence contrasted rational thought with emotional experience (Schaffer, Gilmer, & Schoen, 1940; Young, 1936). Young defined emotions as “*acute disturbance(s) of the individual as a whole* (p. 263). This idea is prevalent even today. For psychologists, the 1990s were best known as the “Decade of the Brain.” In recent years, however, there has been a backlash against the view that reason and passion are incompatible. Psychologists believe that the ability to utilize information provided by emotions can be adaptive, and relationship between thought and emotion need not be antagonistic (e.g., Averill & Nunley, 1992; Buck, 1984; Goleman, 1995; Lane, Sechrest, Reidel, Weldon, Kaszniak, & Dchwartz 1996; Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1997; Salovey, Mayer, & Caruso, 2000). Even cognitively oriented investigators recognize the purpose and potency of emotions (Schwarz, 1990).

In a relative dearth of empirical research on emotional empathy, investigators often assumed that empathy is an aspect of emotional competence (Saarni, 1990) and is intimately related to the quality of social functioning (Feshbach & Feshbach, 1986; Shure, 1982), including prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991; Hoffman, 1982), and negatively associated with problem behaviors (aggression and disruptive behaviors) (see for example, Cohen & Strayer, 1996; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). However, since emotional empathy, by definition involves emotions, researchers have more recently begun to examine the emotional dispositional variables of emotional empathy. Among many variables—how one experiences one’s emotions (Mayer & Stevens, 1994; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995) and emotional regulation—have been found to be theoretically and empirically linked with emotional empathy (Eisenberg,

Fabes, Murphy et al., 1994; Eisenberg, Fabes, Shepard, Murphy, Jones, & Guthrie, 1998; Mayer & Stevens, 1994; Salovey et al., 1995).

Emotional awareness has been referred to as attending to one's own emotions. Where emotional awareness is an experience of one's *own* emotions (intrapersonal), emotional empathy reflects the tendency to vicariously experience *another's* emotional experiences (interpersonal). Although there is a logical difference between experiencing one's own feelings and experiencing another's emotions, it is believed that for all practical purposes the two usually go hand in hand (Mayer & Stevens, 1994). According to Mayer and Stevens, one's empathy for another may depend on how one *experiences one's own mood*. Emotional awareness perhaps, speaks to this keystone of emotional empathy. Goleman (1995) maintained that empathy builds on emotional awareness. The more one can experience one's own emotions, the more one is skilled at reading feelings in others (Mayer & Kirkpatrick, 1994).

Emotional awareness is a central concept in several divergent approaches to behavior and life. In psychoanalysis, increased awareness of the self and emotions is both a tool and a goal. Self-examination enables the person to recognize his unconscious thoughts, motives and defenses; one result of the therapy is increased insight i.e., greater self-awareness. Rogerian therapy, existential analysis, and a variety of other insight therapies have also emphasized the importance of attending to and understanding one's inner thoughts and feelings. Relatively newer traditions, such as transactional analysis, encounter groups, and sensitivity training, have stressed the value of "getting in touch with oneself" and recognizing how one's behavior affects others through empathy.

Emotional awareness has meant differently to different psychologists. Among important contributions in awareness of emotions is the work of Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975). They proposed the concept of *self-consciousness*, which deals on one hand with a cognitive, private mulling over the self and on the other hand emphasizes an awareness and concern over the self as a social stimulus. They constructed the Self-Consciousness Scale, which is conceptualized to measure a tendency to attend to self, including one's mood. According to them, the consistent tendency of persons to direct attention inward or outward is the trait of self-consciousness. In contrast, self-awareness refers to a state: the existence of self-directed attention, as a result of transient situational variables, chronic disposition or both. For Fenigstein et al., self-consciousness has three major components—one private and one public. The *private self-consciousness* component is concerned with attending to one's inner thoughts and feelings. The *public self-consciousness* is defined by a general awareness of the self as a social object that has an effect on others. The third factor, *social anxiety*, was defined by a discomfort in the presence of others. Self-consciousness has been found to relate with one's capacity to empathize with another. One important study in this regard, examined the evidence for stability and change during adolescence in two sets of theoretically important traits: self-consciousness and empathy (Davis & Franzoi, 1991). Two hundred and five high school students (103 boys and 102 girls) were surveyed at 1-year intervals for 3 successive years, completing the Self-Consciousness Scale and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (a measure of empathy) at each time point. Results indicated a considerable degree of year-to-year stability in scores on both the scales.

However, other psychologists conceptualize emotional awareness as specifically the manner in which individuals experience emotions. Goleman (1995) defined it *as an ongoing*

attention to one's internal states (p. 46). Some psychologists differentiate between the internal states. They use the term *metacognition* to refer to an awareness of thought process, and *metamood* to mean awareness of one's own emotions. In short, emotional awareness means *aware of both our mood and our thoughts about that mood* (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; Mayer & Stevens, 1994). According to Mayer and Gaschke (1988), mood or emotion can be experienced on both a direct and a reflective level. They demonstrated that there is an ongoing process associated with moods whereby individuals continually reflect upon their feelings, monitoring, evaluating and regulating them. They termed this process the state *meta-mood experience* and developed the State Meta-Mood Experience Scale that measures an individual's moment-by-moment changes in reflections about ongoing mood states. Later, in 1995, a more comprehensive definition of the concept emerged, which defined it in terms of the trait i.e., *trait meta-mood*, to refer to,

people's tendency to attend to their moods and emotions, discriminate among them, and regulate them (p. 128; Salovey et al., 1995).

Thus, according to Salovey and colleagues, meta-mood is not an attention that gets carried away by emotions, overreacting and amplifying what is perceived. Rather, it is a neutral mode that maintains self-reflectiveness even amidst turbulent emotions. It manifests itself simply as slight stepping-back from experience, a parallel stream of consciousness that is "*meta*": hovering above or beside the main flow, aware of what is happening rather than being immersed and lost in it. According to Mayer and Stevens (1994), aware of feelings and acting to change them are related. Mayer finds that people who are aware of their moods have some sophistication

about their emotional lives. Their clarity about emotions may undergird other personality traits: they are autonomous and sure of their own boundaries, are in good psychological health, and tend to have positive outlook on life. When they get into a bad mood, they do not ruminate or obsess about it, and are able to get out of it sooner. In short, their mindfulness helps them manage their emotions (Mayer & Stevens, 1994).

An awareness of one's own emotions is theoretically linked with the tendency to experience emotions of another person. It has been suggested that the processes underlying emotional empathy are initiated when affect laden information first enters the perceptual system. Salovey and Mayer (1990) maintained that from an evolutionary standpoint, it was important that people be able to perceive emotions in themselves, which in turn enabled them to perceive emotions in those around them. Such perceptual abilities insure smoother interpersonal cooperation. A particularly exciting communality among emotional appraisal and expression is that they appear to be related to empathy—feeling what the other person feels.

Developmental perspectives on empathy suggest that appraisal of one's own feelings and those of others are highly related, and that, in fact, one may not exist without the other. For example, according to Hoffman's perspective, contributors to empathy include: a) *primary circular reactions* in which an infant cries in response to another infants crying and b) *classical empathic conditioning* in which one views another's emotional reaction (through facial expression or body posture) to the same situation one is in oneself, thereby learning situational determinants of an affect. Individuals, however, differ in the extent to which they attend to and integrate the subtle affective cues into their awareness and such differences may be related to

their ability to attend to their own internal states. Thus, empathy depends not only on one's ability to feel toward others, but general access to one's own feelings as well. For example, one might expect that individuals who are well practiced at attending to their emotional inclinations are more empathic, whereas those without ready access to their feelings may be unaware of them and expected to be lacking in their capacity to empathize with others.

A bulk of research work has focused on the role played by socialization patterns in the development of emotional empathy. Few researchers, however, have addressed the issue of how empathy depends upon how one experiences one's emotions. One important study, in this regard, was conducted by Mayer and Stevens (1994). In their study the Meta-Mood Experience Scale and the Emotional Empathy Index (Davis, 1983) were administered to 226 undergraduates. It was found that the perspective taking and the empathic concern dimensions were positively correlated ($p < .01$) with Meta-Mood Experience Scale, thus indicating that people who are empathic tend to attend to their feeling states. Moreover, highest correlation was observed with '*clarity*' and '*attention*' dimensions of Meta-Mood Experience Scale. Attention to feelings assesses the extent to which individuals attend to their emotions and clarity of feelings reflects how much they can discriminate among feelings. It follows that people who are empathic would not only be clear about their emotions but would also value their emotional experiences. Moreover, Mayer and Stevens argued that people, who attend to and are clear about their emotions, are the ones who are capable of regulating them. It might suggested that in addition to being able to attend to one's emotions; clear about one's emotions; how one regulates ones emotions might be of critical importance to the experience of empathy for another.

In order to understand the relation of emotional empathy with regulation it is important to understand the empathy-related constructs. As noted earlier, psychologists have differentiated among several empathy-related reactions namely, *sympathy* and *personal distress*. Empathy often has been defined as an emotional response stemming from recognition of another's emotional state—a response that is very similar or identical to what the other person is feeling. *Sympathy* frequently is defined as an affective response that frequently is evoked by empathy, and which consists of feelings of concern and sorrow for the distressed or needy other (Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy, Karbon, Smith, & Maszk, 1996). Moreover, empathy may produce a self-focused, aversive emotional reaction labeled *personal distress* (Batson, 1991). This distinction among empathy related reactions is important here, because of their theoretical and empirical links to different motivational and behavioral outcomes. Sympathy is viewed as involving an orientation toward others' needs, whereas personal distress is seen as associated with self-oriented motive of alleviating one's own distress (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990).

Eisenberg and Fabes (1991) have extensively studied the role of regulation in determining emotional empathy. They proposed that empathy could either lead to sympathy or personal distress depending upon the role of individual differences in regulation, i.e., individuals' abilities to regulate or modulate their emotional reactions and cope behaviorally with the emotion and the evocative situation (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Rothbart, Ziaie, & O'Boyle, 1992). In research on the association between vicarious emotional responding and prosocial behavior, researchers generally have found that people who report relatively high levels of dispositional empathy and sympathy frequently try to assist others in distress even if they can escape from the distressed person (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg & Miller,

1987). In contrast, people who become anxious or distressed in reactions to other's negative emotions often avoid dealing with the distressing situations (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990) or may even respond aggressively (Radke-Yarrow & Zahn-Waxler, 1984). Eisenberg and Fabes (1991) have argued that these individual differences are due in part to differences among people in their typical level of emotional regulation. Individuals who tend to become emotionally overaroused when exposed to others' negative emotions or conditions are likely to experience their emotions as aversive, and consequently to focus on themselves rather than others (Batson, 1991; Davis, 1994; Hoffman, 1982). Clearly, such people have difficulty *regulating* their emotional arousal. It follows that well regulated people would be expected to be relatively sympathetic even if they are emotionally intense in regard to many kinds of emotion because they can modulate their vicarious emotion and maintain an optimal level of arousal—one that makes a person prosocial and has emotional force but does not induce self-focused concern. In contrast, people who are unable to regulate an overarousal of emotions are not only likely to experience personal distress (egoistic motivation to alleviate one's own aversive state) but may behave in ways which are harmful to others. These findings are consistent with what Mayer and Steven's have found in their explorations.

The construct of emotional regulation has been conceptualized and operationalized in many ways. According to Eisenberg, Fabes, and Losoya (1997), at least three types of regulation processes are relevant to the quality of social functioning, which are *regulation of emotion, regulation of the context itself, and regulation of emotionally driven behavior*. They believe that emotional regulation includes neurophysiological regulation and control of attentional processes, as well as coping by modifying one's cognitive interpretation of emotionally arousing events and

information (Eisenberg, 1997; Thomson, 1994). Temperament theorists define regulation in terms of modulating internal reactivity (Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). In temperament literature, emotional regulation frequently is operationalized as involving attentional processes such as the ability to shift and focus attention as needed. Emotion-related behavioral regulation traditionally did not play a major role in the systems of temperament (Prior, 1992). However, more recently, some temperament theorists have assessed behavioral inhibition as part of temperament (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994). Regulation is viewed by these theorists as involving several mechanisms for the regulation or modulation of stimuli impinging from outside the individual and an individual's internal states (Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). These mechanisms include shifting attention away from an arousing or unpleasant stimulus (attentional shifting), sustaining attention (attentional focus), voluntarily initiating or continuing action (activation control), and inhibiting action (inhibition control). Of these, 'attentional control' has been the focus of much of the research on emotional regulation. The abilities to shift and focus attention seem to be related with the management of negative emotion (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Eisenberg, Fabes, Nyman, Bernzweig, & Pinuelas, 1994; Rothbart, Ziaie, & O'Boyle, 1992). It has been suggested that shifting attention can modulate negative emotion by cutting it off. Focusing attention on positive aspects of a situation, such as on means by which to cope or on distracting ideas and objects, may also decrease negative emotion. The ability to regulate *behavior* is also likely to contribute to sympathy, especially when combined with the ability to regulate attention. The combination of attentional and behavioral regulation is the essence of a factor of temperament labeled *effortful control* (Ahadi & Rothbart, 1994), which has been defined as,

the individual differences in the ability to voluntarily sustain focus on a task, to voluntarily shift attention from one task to another, to voluntarily initiate action, and to voluntarily inhibit action (p. 196).

The concept of effortful control was extended by Rothbart, Ahadi, and Evans (2000), who defined it as,

the capacity to focus attention as well as to shift attention when desired (attentional control); capacity to suppress inappropriate approach behavior (inhibitory control); and the capacity to perform an action when there is a strong tendency to avoid it (activation control).

Eisenberg (2002) has argued that effortful control reflects true emotion-related regulation, defined as the process of voluntarily initiating, avoiding, inhibiting, maintaining, or modulating the occurrence, form, intensity, or duration of internal feeling states, emotion-related physiological processes, emotion-related goals, and/or behavioral concomitants of emotion, generally in the service of accomplishing one's goals.

It has also been suggested that coping can also be viewed as a type of regulation—specifically, effortful regulation in stressful contexts. Coping is defined as *changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the individual*. Coping theorists focus primarily on the regulation of emotional distress (i.e., emotion-focused coping) and efforts to regulate the source

of the problem (i.e., the problem context; problem focused coping). In the literature on stress and coping, investigators have discussed attentional processes such as cognitive distraction and positive cognitive restructuring of a situation, that modify the individual's internal psychological, emotional, or physiological reactions. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) argued that in most situations people might first need to regulate emotional distress in order to facilitate problem-solving coping. Research on regulation of emotionally driven behavior has also been discussed under the rubric of ego or impulse control (Block & Block, 1980), disinhibition, in the adult personality literature (Watson & Clark, 1993), and temperamental inhibition control and impulsivity (Caspi, Henry, McGee, Moffitt, & Silva, 1995; Goldsmith & Rothbart, 1991).

Salovey and his colleagues (1995) conceptualized emotional regulation as the degree to which individuals moderate their moods. However, they proposed that emotional clarity (tendency to be able to distinguish among feelings) is a required precondition for effective mood management. They investigated individual differences in the persistence of negative mood and ruminative thought, and found that individuals who report being very clear about their feelings experienced a significant decline in ruminative thought over time as compared to individuals who report being unclear about their feelings. It follows that individuals who experience affect clearly—who know what they feel—may be able to terminate aversive ruminative processes quickly simply because their feelings are clear. They know how they feel; they do not need to engage in prolonged rumination in order to figure it out. Salovey et al. argued that such people can turn their attentional resources toward coping and minimizing the impact of the stressful event. Moreover, as noted earlier, empathic concern has been found to be highly correlated with

the clarity and attention dimensions. Understandably, people who are empathic can attend to their feelings; are clear about them; and perhaps are capable of managing them.

It may be argued that the way individuals experience or deal with their feelings has important motivational and behavioral outcomes—they predispose a person either to prosocial acts or self-focused distress. Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy et al. (1994) suggested that people who can maintain their emotional reactions within a moderate tolerable range are more likely to experience sympathy, evoked by empathy inducing situations. Such individuals are likely to experience how needy or distressed others feel, but are relatively unlikely to become overwhelmed by their negative emotion and self-focus. There is substantial empirical support for this line of reasoning. In two studies, Eisenberg and her colleagues have found that adults who report low attentional or behavioral regulation were found to be high in dispositional personal distress (Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy et al., 1994; Eisenberg & Okun, 1996). The measures of self-reported emotional regulation were positively related to dispositional sympathy (Eisenberg & Okun, 1996). In addition, adults' self-reported perspective taking was consistently associated with a variety of measures of regulation (Eisenberg et al., 1996; Eisenberg & Okun, 1996). Moreover, people who viewed themselves as high in the tendency to take others' perspectives were viewed by their friends as well regulated (Eisenberg et al., 1996).

In studies with children, Eisenberg and Fabes (1995) found that children who displayed concerned facial reactions to a sympathy inducing film were high in attentional control and low in unregulated coping behaviors. Children high on sympathy were rated by their mothers as well regulated concurrently and two years earlier. When they were two years older, the same

children's sympathy was predicted by concurrent and prior reports of regulation. Specifically, children's reports of sympathy were consistently related to parent's reports of regulation and tended to be marginally related to teachers' reports of regulation (Eisenberg, Fabes, Shepard, Murphy, Guthrie, Jones, Friedman, Poulin, & Maszk, 1997). In another study, the relation of empathy-related responding such as sympathy was assessed with emotional regulation. In this study, the relation of 8-to-10 years-olds' teachers reported dispositional sympathy to regulation was examined with a longitudinal sample. In general, sympathy was found to be correlated with adults' reports of regulation (Eisenberg et al., 1998). Thus, there is mounting evidence that sympathetic preschoolers and elementary school children are well regulated.

Further empirical findings also support the view that effortful regulation (emotion-related regulation) is associated with empathy (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994), compliance and conscience (Kochanska, Murray, & Coy, 1997; Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegest, 1996), and adjustment (Gilliom, Shaw, Beck, Schonberg, & Lukon, 2002; Olson, Schilling, & Bates, 1999; Oosterlaan & Sergeant, 1996; see Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000, and Rothbart & Bates, 1998, for reviews). In addition, other investigators have found relations of measures of effortful regulation to higher resiliency and social competence in children (Eisenberg et al., 2000; Eisenberg, Guthrie, Fabes, Reiser, Murphy, Holgren, Maszk, & Losoya, 1997).

More recently, Eisenberg, Valiente, Fabes, Smith, Reiser, Shepard, Losoya, Guthrie, Murphy, and Cumberland (2003) investigated the relations of effortful control to children's social competence. Specifically, the relations of effortful control and ego control to children's

(mean age = 137 months) resiliency, social status, and social competence were examined concurrently (Time 3) and over time. Adults reported on the constructs, and a behavioral measure of persistence was obtained. At Time 3, resiliency mediated the unique relations of both effortful and reactive control to social status, and effortful control directly predicted socially appropriate behavior. When levels of the variables two years prior were accounted for, all relations held at Time 3 except that effortful control did not predict resiliency (even though it was the stronger predictor at Time 3) and ego control directly predicted socially appropriate behavior. However, in the concurrent model, the direct positive relation of high effortful control to socially appropriate behavior suggested that regulated youths are viewed as well behaved and socially appropriate.

Emotional regulation has also been found to be related to the development and maintenance of psychopathology. For instance, externalizing disorders, which often involve aggression and hostile behavior suggest underregulation of the experience and expression of anger, a diminished ability to inhibit socially prohibited behavior, and perhaps a lack of fear, which would also serve to inhibit behavior in some situations (see for example, Rothbart, Posner, & Hershey, 1995). In a longitudinal study, Sanson, Smart, Prior, and Oberklaid (1993) obtained parent, nurse and then teacher ratings of temperament and behavior of children who were followed from infancy to 8 years of age. Three groups of children were targeted for study: hyperactive but not aggressive (H); aggressive but not hyperactive (A); hyperactive and aggressive (H+A); matched control children were also studied. Compared to the normal control group, all three diagnosed groups evidenced poor emotional regulation, even from infancy. Those infants who developed one or more problems with aggression (particularly H+A groups) were rated as particularly unregulated and temperamentally difficult in childhood. In another series of

studies, Caspi, Henry, McGee, Moffitt, and Silva (1995) have demonstrated the predictive power of deficits in emotional regulation to antisocial behaviors at ages 9, 11, and 13. At ages 18, individuals' reports of low regulation were related to delinquency (Krueger, Schmutte, Caspi, Moffitt, Campbell, & Silva, 1994).

Therefore, clearly emotional empathy and emotional awareness—although separate constructs—are interrelated, and may in turn predict whether they predispose a person to personal distress or sympathy. Based on this line of reasoning it is proposed that where experiencing emotions is fundamental to experiencing emotional empathy, both constructs are important components for interpersonal relationships, which are expected to promote affiliative tendency and inhibit aggression in a person.

Emotional Empathy and Affiliative Tendency

The concept of emotional empathy plays an important role in theories and research on interpersonal relationships. It has been found to be associated with high quality social functioning. There is mounting evidence that links emotional empathy to prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991; Eisenberg, Guthrie, Cumberland, Murphy, Shepard, Zhou, & Carlo, 2002) altruism (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Underwood & Moore, 1982) and social competence (Saarni, 1990). According to Goleman (1995), emotional empathy being a “people skill” lies at the core of art of handling relationships. It has been found to relate to generally healthy and adjusted personality functioning and to reflect affiliative tendency, and interpersonal positiveness and skills (Mehrabian, 1997a).

Several studies have found empathy as a focal construct in the quality of social relationships (Ickes & Blackstone, 1995; Knudson, Sommers, & Golding, 1980; Noller & Ruzzene, 1991; Sillars & Scott, 1983). For example, Noller and Ruzzene (1991) suggest that empathic understanding and relationship quality are positively related. In a study, they found that happily married couples tend to be more accurate at identifying both the kind of affect experienced by their partners during conflict episodes and their specific goals and intentions. Ruzzene (1990) also found that people in relatively happy marriages are more accurate in judging the emotions of their spouses. Kahn (1970) points out that satisfied married couples have less discrepant interpretation of non verbal communication during interactions. There is also evidence from clinical observations that a high level of empathic inaccuracy often characterizes unhappy, dysfunctional relationships (Gottman, 1979).

According to Redmond (1989), emotional empathy plays the primary function in human relations. He discussed empathy in terms of how it might serve the receiver and sender of the empathic response. Further, he reported that empathy enhances a person's understanding of others and the ability to make predictions about others. It affects decision-making about others and attributions; acts to reflect what has been perceived, and creates a supportive, confirming atmosphere.

Crandall and Harris (1976) investigated correlates of Crandall's Social Interest Scale, which measured the degree to which subjects valued personality traits relevant to social interest. Subjects were required to choose from pairs of traits they valued more. Total number of social interest traits chosen was the score. For a sample of 60 subjects, the social interest correlated

positively ($r = .40, p < 0.01$) with the Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS) of Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). Still in another study, Elizur and Rosenheim (1982) examined the empathic tendency of medical students in comparison to that of students in psychosocial professions (e.g., Psychology, Psychiatry, and Social Work) and undergraduates in other sciences (e.g., Economics, Physics, and Chemistry) in two Israeli universities. Medical students scored higher in empathic tendency than undergraduates in the other sciences, but they scored lower than students in psychosocial areas. Elizur and Rosenheim asserted that higher-empathy individuals self-selected disciplines with greater interpersonal and emotional interactions.

In yet another study, results clearly supported a view of empathy as a combination of basic interpersonal skills. In this research, the Social Skills Inventory (SSI) and three standardized empathy scales were administered to 96 female and male undergraduates. There were positive correlations between empathy measures and empathy indexes derived from the SSI scales. It was also found that females scored higher on measures of “emotional empathy.” However there were no significant sex differences on measures of cognitive perspective-taking empathy (Riggio, Tucker, & Coffar, 1989).

More recently, emotional empathy has been regarded as the keystone of emotional intelligence. Salovey and his colleague Mayer, in 1990, coined the term “emotional intelligence” as a challenge to the belief that intelligence is not based on processing emotion-laden information. Reasoning that takes emotions into account is part of what Salovey and Mayer have referred to as emotional intelligence. Salovey (1997) regarded empathy as related to emotional intelligence. According to him, lack of this ability explains why people of high IQ can be such

disastrous pilots of their personal lives. In one of their studies, Salovey and Mayer (1997) found emotional empathy to be closely related with the *social skills* component of emotional intelligence. Goleman (1995) also proposed that the more empathic one is, the more skilled one will be in experiencing another's feelings. And the failure to register another's feelings is a major deficit in emotional intelligence, and a tragic failing in what it means to be human. For all rapport, the root of caring, is believed to stem from the capacity for empathy.

Empathy is believed to motivate other-oriented behavior (Batson, 1991). Thus, the idea that empathy is a major determinant of prosocial orientation, and plays a critical role in human bonding has been widely empirically accepted among psychologists (e.g., Eisenberg, Guthrie, Cumberland et al., 2002; Eisenberg, Zhou, & Koller, 2001; Underwood & Moore, 1982). With the help of empathic responsiveness one can understand and communicate effectively with other fellow beings. One psychologically based term that has been consistently found to be related with emotional empathy is affiliative tendency (Crouse & Mehrabian, 1977; Mehrabian, 1997; Mehrabian & O'Reilly, 1980). It has been suggested that empathic people tend to be more aware and sensitive to the needs and values of other people and are, therefore, expected to be better adept at understanding other people. They have a positive interpersonal orientation. According to Mehrabian (1994a), affiliative persons are friendly, sociable, helpful, skillful in dealing with people, and open about their feelings. They make good companions because they are pleasant and agreeable. Others feel comfortable with them and like them. It is, thus, reasonable to expect that emotional empathy, being a people's skill should be positively related with affiliative tendency. One interesting finding of empathy and affiliative tendency theory is that both the phenomena are at odds with a need for dominance, which has clearly been demonstrated by Mehrabian (1978,

1987, 1991). Thus, emotional empathy and affiliative tendency may be viewed as capacities that inhibit aggression.

Individual differences in affiliation and related characteristics of extroversion, friendliness and sociability have been of central interest in studies of personality. Human need to associate with others is so powerful that some psychologists have proposed that the need to affiliate is not only a social motive but also an innate biological need. As is evidenced from the prolonged dependency of human children on parents and other caregivers. Murray (1938, 1959) proposed the need for affiliation as a basic aspect of individual differences. A TAT-based measure of need-affiliation (Heyns, Veroff, & Atkinson, 1958) and questionnaire measures of affiliation (Edwards, 1954; Jackson, 1967) and extroversion (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968) have been widely used to investigate the individual differences in affiliation. Murray in his book, *Explorations in Personality* (1938) compiled a list of twenty needs that motivate human behavior. He defined the need for affiliation as,

the need to friendships and associations; to greet, join and live with others; to cooperate and converse sociably with others; to love; to join groups (p. 144).

Murray in his personology theory assumed that needs are often activated by situational press (forces arising from objects and people that can alter our chances of achieving personal goals), such as danger, rejection, and succorance. He distinguished between two types of press: *Alpha* press—objective pressure of the environment, and *Beta* press—subjective assessment of

environmental pressure. When a need meets a press, behavior occurs, and over time a theme (consistent pattern of behavior) may develop. Murray maintained that affiliation motivated people are oriented toward other people and at any given moment, they are more likely to be found interacting with others, and these interactions give them more pleasure. Similarly, Edwards (1959) defined affiliation as to be loyal to friends, to participate in friendly groups, to do things for friends, to form new friendships, to make as many friends as possible, to share things with friends, and to form strong attachments.

Although it may seem that humans have a natural drive to affiliate, research suggests that learning and early experiences strongly affect our tendency to seek out others (Harlow, 1971). Studies show that people develop tendencies to trust or distrust others based on experiences during infancy (Ainsworth, 1975; Ainsworth & Eichberg, 1991). It has been found that caretakers who are sensitive and responsive to infant's needs foster feelings of trust and comfortableness with others. In contrast, individuals, who as infants had unresponsive caretakers, develop distrust and experience anxiety in interpersonal relationships. Thus, it seems that early experience of social comfort and interaction is crucial to the development of the desire to affiliate.

In addition to childhood experiences, the emotional states also appear to influence an individual's tendency to be with other people. Such emotional factors, which influence the need to affiliate, have been extensively studied by Schachter (1959). Schachter reasoned that if being alone produced anxiety, anxiety might produce a desire to affiliate with others. This idea is supported by research on affiliation. Two more specific findings from his research were that: First, the anxiety-aroused desire was directed only toward those who were presumably awaiting

painful shocks and thus in the same boat. Second, the fear-affiliation relationship was found only for subjects who were firstborn or only children. Schachter speculated that in childhood, only children and firstborn receive more attention from their mothers than later-born children. As a result, they had learned to seek their mother's companionship in fearful situations and to rely on their response to reduce ambiguity in a way that later-born had not. Another explanation has also been suggested recently to explain affiliation (Rofe, 1984). According to Rofe's *utility affiliation theory*, people seek out others who they think can help them reduce anxiety or fear. Further, they would avoid people who may increase fear or anxiety.

Another line of reasoning regarding affiliation maintains that affiliation motive seems to require a sense of security and reciprocity for its full expression in behavior (e.g., Atkinson, Heyns, & Veroff, 1954; Fishman, 1966). For most people there is a reciprocal relationship between *liking* or *interaction*, on the one hand, and *similarity*, on the other; but for the affiliation motivated people, this relationship is much stronger. Thus, they are more likely to cooperate or go along with other people's requests, at least as long as they feel safe and in a friendly setting (Walker & Heyns, 1962). To make the final connection, Byrne (1962) found that the stronger people's affiliation motives, the more they like others who express beliefs and values similar to their own. Atkinson, Heyns, and Veroff (1954), therefore, defined affiliation as,

reflecting concern over establishing, maintaining, or restoring warm, friendly relationships with others.

Atkinson (1958) postulates that n (need for) Affiliation is related to affiliative behavior under conditions of high affiliative *expectancy*, that is, when it is anticipated that this behavior will be instrumental in attaining affiliative satisfaction. This assumption makes theoretical sense: the motive to establish and maintain a positive affective relationship with another person is satisfied by a *mutual* positive interaction; that is, it is satisfied when the individual initiates positive behavior toward another and receives a positive response in return. Thus, Atkinson's (1958) and Rotter's (1955) theories explicitly state that needs are not directly translatable into overt behavior. Rather, needs are latent dispositions, which eventuate in behavior when the subject has a high expectancy that this behavior will be instrumental in attainment of need for satisfaction. In line with Atkinson's motivational theory, Fishman (1966) maintained that high expectancy of affiliative satisfaction involves the expectancy that the initiation of positive behavior will be reciprocated in kind and such an expectancy seems largely a function of the degree to which an individual perceives others to be friendly, likable, and liking him, and the degree to which others actually like him in return.

Mehrabian and Ksionzky (1970) attempted to conceptualize a variety of affiliation related phenomena within a single framework. Their efforts to distinguish and interrelate personality and behavioral components of affiliation, dependency, and conformity led to the postulation of two individual-difference factors: affiliative tendency and sensitivity to rejection. Mehrabian (1970, 1994) defined affiliative tendency as,

generalized positive expectations in social relationships: expecting social exchanges to be generally positive, pleasant, and rewarding and behaving in ways that are consistent with such generalized expectations (p.97-98).

Clearly, Mehrabian also defined affiliative tendency primarily in terms of generalized positive interpersonal expectations and associated positive behaviors in social interactions with others (e.g., liking people, enjoying companionship, and being pleasant and agreeable with others). Sensitivity to rejection was defined as a generalized apprehension regarding social contacts with others (Mehrabian, 1970, 1994b). He proposed that the tendency to affiliate is stabilized when reciprocated by positive reactions of other people. Data from a large number of studies also show that affiliative tendency is related with positive interpersonal behaviors and reciprocated positive reactions from others. Mehrabian (1970) found that positive (pleasant, desirable satisfying, and rewarding) actions of subjects correlated .72 with positive reactions from familiar targets and .73 with positive evaluations from those targets. Thus, the stability of generalized positive interpersonal expectations of affiliative tendency is explained in terms of the following cycle: positive expectations leading to positive interpersonal behaviors toward others, positive reactions from others, and confirmations of the generalized positive expectations.

Based on his theoretical formulations, the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) has been developed by Mehrabian (1970, 1994a). From a series of studies, it was found that the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) correlated positively with liking of others (Steers & Braunstein, 1976), judged similarity and compatibility with others (Mehrabian & Ksionzky, 1971, 1985) favorable impressions of strangers (Solar & Mehrabian, 1973), superior adjustments to high social density (Miller, Rossbach, & Munson, 1981), self-disclosure (Morris, Harris, & Rovins, 1981), confidence about social skills, positiveness and amount of conversation in interactions with strangers (Ksionzky & Mehrabian, 1980). It correlated negatively with social anhedonia (inability

to derive pleasure from social exchanges) (Leak, 1991) and loneliness, social avoidance and distress (Morris, Harris, & Rovins, 1981).

Mehrabian (1978, 1987, 1991) consistently found positive relationship between emotional empathy and affiliative tendency. He analysed affiliative tendency and emotional empathy in terms of a temperament model. He proposed a three-dimensional temperament model for the analysis of these personality traits. According to him, an individual's emotional traits are inferred from averages of his or her emotional states across representative samples of everyday situations. Thus, Mehrabian (1978) proposed that emotional traits could also be described in terms of pleasure-displeasure (P), arousal-nonarousal (A), and dominance-submissiveness (D) dimensions. Trait Pleasure-displeasure (Mehrabian, 1978), defined as the balance, across situations and over time, of positive affective states over negative ones; Trait Arousability (Mehrabian, 1977, 1995), defined as larger arousal response and slower habituation of arousal to unusual, complex, or changing stimuli; and Trait Dominance (Mehrabian & Hines, 1978), defined as habitual feelings of control (rather than lack of control) over life situations, events, or others. Also, the Big Five Personality Factors (Goldberg, 1992) exhibited the following pleasant-unpleasant, arousable-unarousable, and dominant-submissive temperament attributes: Extroversion (pleasant and dominant); agreeableness (pleasant and submissive); conscientiousness (pleasant); emotional stability (pleasant and unarousable); and sophistication (pleasant, arousable and dominant) (Mehrabian, 1995). Similarly, Mehrabian proposed his *Three-Dimensional PAD Temperament Space*. A three-dimensional PAD temperament space was defined by the three nearly independent temperament traits. Various personality dimensions or measures represented straight lines passing through the intersection point of the three axes. The

three axes were dichotomized to describe various temperament types: pleasant (+P) versus unpleasant (-P), arousable (+A) versus unarousable (-A), and dominant (+D) versus submissive (-D). The eight resulting personality types (and corresponding octant in temperament space) were labeled as follows (Mehrabian, 1987, 1991):

(+P+A+D) = exuberant	versus	(-P-A-D) = bored
(+P+A-D) = dependent	versus	(-P-A+D) = disdainful
(+P-A+D) = relaxed	versus	(-P+A-D) = anxious
(+P-A-D) = docile	versus	(-P+A+D) = hostile

Mehrabian (1997) explored affiliation and emotional empathy-related traits on the basis of his 3 dimensional PAD Temperament Model; trait pleasure-displeasure (P), trait arousability (A), and trait dominance-submissiveness (D). Affiliative persons were found to be exuberant (pleasant, arousable, dominant) (Mehrabian & O'Reilly, 1980). Mehrabian and O'Reilly also analysed Jackson's (1967) Affiliation Scale and Mehrabian's (1970) Affiliative Tendency Scale in terms of trait pleasure (P), trait arousability (A) and trait dominance (D). The following regression equation was obtained:

$$\text{Affiliation (Jackson)} = .44P + .20A + .26D. \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Affiliation (Mehrabian)} = .46P + .24A + .03D. \quad (2)$$

The above equations show that Jackson's (1967) and Mehrabian's (1970) affiliation measures were very similar in their weightings of trait pleasure and trait arousability. However,

Jackson's scale also included a dominance component. In contrast, Mehrabian constructed his scale to be an almost exclusive measure of positive interpersonal orientation (i.e., generalized expectations, behaviors, and attitudes) and to be free of interpersonal control or dominance elements. Accordingly, the coefficient for trait dominance in the above equation was nearly zero and not significant. Within the present theoretical perspective, then, it is important to conceptualize affiliative tendency as "*pure*" generalized interpersonal positiveness without either an inclination to want to dominate and control others or to be dominated and controlled by others. A summary equation for affiliative tendency was computed, using the ratio of the significant coefficients in equation 2, which is as follows:

$$\text{Affiliative tendency, MAFF (summary)} = .66P + .34A \quad (3)$$

Emotional empathy has been demonstrated to be positively correlated with affiliative tendency. The emotional components of empathy have also been explained in terms of PAD Temperament Model. Emotional empathic tendency was defined as the inclination to experience vicariously the (positive and negative) emotional experiences and/or expressions of others. A corresponding Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS) was developed by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). Later, Mehrabian and O'Reilly (1980) administered the three basic temperament measures of trait pleasure-displeasure, trait arousability-unarousability, and trait dominance-submissiveness together with the EETS to 211 subjects. The following regression equation for emotional empathy was obtained:

$$\text{Emotional empathy} = .25P + .58A - .09D. \quad (4)$$

Because the coefficient for trait dominance did not attain significance, a summary equation can be written for emotional empathy to reflect the ratio of the two significant (P and A) coefficients in the above equation.

$$\text{Emotional empathy} = .30P + .70A. \quad (5)$$

Comparison of equation 5 with equation 3 (Affiliative Tendency (MAFF) = .66P + .34A) shows that both affiliative tendency and emotional empathy are positive and significant functions of trait pleasure and trait arousability. Understandably, the same study also yielded a positive and significant correlation of .54 ($p < .01$) between emotional empathy and affiliative tendency (Mehrabian & O'Reilly, 1980). Although they are positively related, they do incorporate considerably different emphases within the PAD Temperament Model. Emotional empathy weighted more (70% vs. 30%) by trait arousability, whereas affiliative tendency is weighted more (66% vs. 34%) by trait pleasure. Emotional empathy, then, highlights the inclination to respond with higher arousal to complex, varied, unexpected, or novel situations (trait arousability). In contrast, affiliative tendency highlights positive interpersonal expectations (trait pleasure). The positive association between emotional empathy and affiliative tendency clearly suggests that high scorers on both these traits are found readily and may be especially suited for situations requiring interpersonal skills and sensitivity.

Some earlier researches have also investigated the relation between emotional empathy and affiliative tendency. For example, Mehrabian (1976) found that for a sample of 202 participants, emotional empathy correlated positively ($r = .44, p < .01$) with affiliative tendency,

indicating that empathic persons are more likely to affiliate with others. Sensitivity to rejection did not correlate significantly with emotional empathy. Subsequently, it was shown that sensitivity to rejection primarily indexes an individual's submissiveness (Mehrabian & O'Reilly, 1980). Since trait dominance-submissiveness is orthogonal to trait pleasure-displeasure and arousability (Mehrabian, 1980), an insignificant relation with emotional empathy is expected. In a subsequent study, Mehrabian and O'Reilly (1980) found that Jackson's affiliation scale correlated .39 ($p < .01$) with the construct of emotional empathy. In addition, in the same study, the EETS correlated .33 ($p < .01$) with Jackson's nurturance scale and correlated .36 ($p < .01$) with Jackson's succorance scale. Thus, insofar as more emotionally empathic individuals are more affiliative and interpersonally oriented, they are also more nurturing toward others and more dependent on interpersonal relationships.

In another study of affiliation of opposite-sexed strangers, Crouse and Mehrabian (1977) examined the effects of subject personality and physical attractiveness of a stranger in a cross-sexual initial encounter. Subjects were administered a series of questionnaire measures, including the EETS. In a controlled situation, subjects encountered a stranger of the opposite sex who actually was a confederate of the experimenters and had been selected to serve as the physically attractive or unattractive target. Subjects then rated the target's physical attractiveness, likability, desirability as a coworker, and hypothetical acceptability as a dating and marriage partner. High, compared with low, empathy males were significantly less influenced by target attractiveness in their liking of the target and reported greater desire for targets as coworkers. Thus, more empathic males were more aware of how an unattractive female might feel and were less prone to base their liking of her on her physical appearance.

Thus, the preceding review of the literature shows that emotional empathy is associated with prosocial orientation and that an important characteristic of more empathic persons is that they tend to be more interpersonally positive and affiliative.

Emotional Empathy and Externalizing Behaviors

Human beings are considered to have a biological preparedness to attend to and recognize the emotional needs of others (Hoffman, 1975). Empathy plays a role of social emotion, which effectively bridges the affective states of one individual with another (Levenson & Ruef, 1992). Evolutionary perspectives suggest that this empathic awareness has been adaptive for allowing humans to predict each other's behaviors, in the case of prosocial, altruistic, helpful, moral or cooperative acts, for encouraging lasting bonds of trust and reciprocity within their social groups (Nesse, 1991; Sober & Wilson, 1998). There is a considerable body of research in which empathy, defined primarily in affective terms, has been found to be positively associated with moral and positive social functioning (e.g., Batson & Coke, 1981; Eisenberg et al., 1996; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Hoffman, 1987). It has been found to be positively associated with moral *development* (see Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). As expected, it has also been found that emotional empathy plays an important function in the reduction and/or inhibition of aggressive and antisocial actions toward others (Chandler & Moran, 1990; Cohen & Strayer, 1996; Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, Usher, & Bridges, 2000; N. D. Feshbach, 1978, 1987; N.D. Feshbach & S. Feshbach, 1982; Parke & Slaby, 1983; S. Feshbach, 1970).

Empathy has been defined as an emotional response resulting from the recognition of another's emotional state or condition, a response that is very similar to what the other individual is perceived to experience. Therefore, individuals who vicariously experience the negative reactions of others that occur because of their own aggressive behavior may be less inclined to continue their harmful behavior or to aggress in future interactions. If empathy inhibits negative social behavior, lower levels of individual's empathic capacity may be associated with delays, arrests, or other dysfunctions of sociomoral development. These may include greater incidence of antisocial behaviors and other forms of externalizing psychopathology. Thus, one might expect individuals from normal as well as clinical populations who express aggressive, delinquent, and antisocial behavior to exhibit less empathic responsiveness toward others than do other people (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). Indeed, a deficiency in the capacity of emotional empathy contributes to dysfunctions in social interaction that attain clinical levels (Gibbs, 1987).

Over the years psychologists have debated the mechanisms underlying or mediating aggression and violence. A review of research concerning the relation of emotional empathy with antisocial behaviors, preceded by definitional and theoretical issues regarding aggression and delinquency, is given below.

Emotional Empathy and Aggression

There exist a number of systems for classifying psychopathological behaviors, including antisocial behavior. An especially promising approach to aggression has grown out of efforts to develop behaviorally based classification systems for psychopathology (Achenbach, 1978;

Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1979; Quay & Parson, 1971; Spivak, Swift & Prewitt, 1971). In factor analytic research of relevant behaviors, investigators identified two clinical groups (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1984). These groups were labeled “internalizing versus externalizing.” Internalizing problems include behaviors that are inner-directed such as anxiety, tendencies to behave in a withdrawn fashion, depressed behaviors and somatic complaints. The category of externalizing behavior is relevant to the issue of antisocial behaviors such as delinquency and aggression. According to Achenbach and Edelbrock (1979), *the negative behaviors of externalizing individuals tend to be expressed outwardly and are likely to directly affect other people and society at large*. Externalizing behaviors range from threatening, attacking and fighting with others to general disobedience and serious conduct disorders, behaviors that seemingly reflect less awareness of or concern for the consequences of one’s behaviors for others.

A number of definitional issues are related to the concept of aggression and negative externalizing behaviors (Attili, 1985; Parke & Slaby, 1983). Early research focused more on the injurious and hostile intent of the aggressive act wherein the goal was harmful or destructive consequences to the other person or object (Berkowitz, 1962; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). Many researchers currently draw distinctions among aggressive behaviors on the basis of intent, for example, distinctions among *instrumental aggression* used to claim an object or to gain status in a group (e.g., Campbell, Muncer, & Bibel, 1985; Parke & Slaby, 1983; S. Feshbach, 1970), *retaliatory aggression* in response to provocation (see Attili, 1985). Aggression is often accompanied by strong negative emotional states. The emotion of “anger” is usually aroused by some provocation. Anger is most often thought of as an intervening condition, which

instigates and then guides aggressive behavior. This type of aggression is therefore called affective or angry aggression and its main goal is injury or harm to the provocateur (Feshbach, 1964). Hartup (1974) termed it as *hostile aggression*, meaning violent actions that are aimed directly at harming or injuring another person. Some researchers have included other social-cognitive criteria, in which the characteristics of the aggressor, social context, nature of the recipient's response to the act, and observer's perceptions determine whether a behavior is aggressive (e.g., Bandura, 1973; Dodge, 1980; Perry, Perry, & Rasmussen, 1986). Moreover, the types of aggression included in empirical studies have varied considerably (e.g., from verbal to physical aggression). More recently, psychologists have focused on what exactly constitutes aggression. Buss and Perry (1992) defined aggression in terms of its individual components—*physical aggression, verbal aggression, anger, and hostility*. Anger was found to be the bridge between both physical and verbal aggression and hostility.

Psychologists have debated the causes of aggression for many years. Seventeenth century political philosopher Hobbes (1588-1679) argued that man is a self-centered brute, who if left to his own devices, will seek his own gain regardless of the cost to others. According to him, in such a state of nature, men would inevitably be in an eternal 'war of all against all.' For this reason they need government to prevent constant conflict and mutual destruction. Freud's theories echoed Hobbes pessimistic view of human nature. For many years Freud's writings emphasized eros, the human drive for pleasure. However, after witnessing the unprecedented carnage of World War I, Freud postulated a second drive thanatos, directed toward self-destruction and death. Freud felt that this drive to return to an inanimate, lifeless state, conflicted with the pleasure drive and was satisfied by being turned outward. The result was aggression

toward others. Thus, Freud implied that people need to express hostile and destructive impulses periodically, just as they need to eat, drink, and express sexual needs. Similarly, Lorenz (1966) proposed that aggression in all animals, human beings included is instinctive.

Influenced by Freudian thinking, Dollard and his colleagues (1939) proposed that 'frustration always leads to aggression' and that 'aggression is always a consequence of frustration.' Thus, they argued that while aggression was an innate response, it would be elicited only in specific situations. Whenever an important need is thwarted, the resulting frustration produces an aggressive response. Later, Berkowitz (1983) suggested that while frustration produces anger and a readiness to aggress, certain cues are needed to convert this readiness to actual aggression. These cues are environmental stimuli associated either with aggressive behavior or with the frustrating object or person. In addition to external factors in the environment, depression and pain are also found to be associated with increased aggression (Berkowitz, 1998). These unpleasant experiences have in common the ability to predispose people to making negative appraisal of an ambiguous or even neutral stimulus, referred as the hostile attribution bias (Dodge & Newman, 1981; Nasby, Hayden, & DePaulo, 1979).

Berkowitz (1998) argued that while most stressors lead to an unpleasant internal state and increased negative mood, whether a person responds to this internal state with aggression is determined in part by a person's biology; in part by his or her thoughts, beliefs, feelings and expectations; in part by his or her history of reinforcement and observational learning; and in part by the culture's expectations of appropriate behavior. And all these factors interact. Berkowitz further theorized that an individual's initial response of either fear or anger to a threat is then

tempered by further cognitive processing about the desired goals and expectations of punishment, reward, or harm, allowing people to make a final determination of a feeling of anger or fear, although some people fight or flee without further appraisal. Earlier, Zillman (1984) in his theory of *excitation transfer* maintained that aggression can be fueled or magnified by the arousal generated from sources in the environment such as exercise, competitive games, etc. Thus, this transferred arousal may increase the probability that an individual's anger will cause him to act aggressively or it may magnify whatever aggressive response he or she makes. Not surprisingly, research shows that hostile people are more likely than others to behave aggressively (Anderson & Bushman, 1997).

Deficits in empathic capacity have also been held as the hallmark of aggressive and antisocial actions. As noted above, social and developmental psychologists have used empathy to refer to the tendency to be vicariously aroused by another person's affective state. According to some theorists (e.g., Hoffman, 1984; N.D. Feshbach, 1982), observation of others' expression of pain or distress often results in the observer's experiencing emotions by means of vicarious emotional responding. When the observers themselves are the instigators of aggression, they may vicariously experience the negative arousal induced by their own actions. Reduction of aggressive behavior in interactions with others would therefore be reinforcing for the aggressor because it would result in less vicarious negative arousal (N. D. Feshbach, 1978; N.D. Feshbach & S. Feshbach, 1982). Some theorists (e.g., Hoffman, 1984) further suggest that feelings of (or anticipation of) such distress will inhibit immoral behavior primarily when the individual feels responsible for the distress state of the other person.

Furthermore, those who experience sympathy, as a result of empathy, would engage in less negative behavior because of the desire to improve the other's condition and to rectify any harm. Staub (1986) maintains that sympathy may evolve from a sense of connectedness with others and a positive valuing of others, both of which should preclude harming others. Moreover, role-taking activities that often are a part of sympathizing and mature empathy should result in a reduction of misunderstandings, accompanied by a lessening of conflict and aggression (S. Feshbach & N.D. Feshbach, 1986).

Consistent with the above theorizing, such situational factors as the immediacy and intensity of pain cues have been associated with lower levels of aggression (e.g., Baron, 1971; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). These cues should evoke aversive personal distress reactions or sympathetic concern, either of which could inhibit aggression. It has also been found that the presence of cues indicative of pain appears to be associated with higher levels of aggression in people with established histories of aggressiveness and delinquency (Perry & Perry, 1974). Thus, aggressive individuals may not respond vicariously to others' emotions or interpret others' pain cues in the way that less aggressive individuals do.

Part of the reason for aggressive children's relative indifference to pain cues may lie in the fact that aggressive children may make interpretations of others' behaviors in social interactions that differ from those made by less aggressive children (Dodge, 1980; Gouze, Rayais, & Beiber-Schneider, 1983). That is, aggressive children appear to interpret social cues in ways that are relatively likely to elicit feelings of personal distress, threat, or anger, resulting in behavior consistent with their interpretation of the situation rather than the affective state of the

other person. Consistent with this view, Gough (1948) and Hare (1970) suggested that a history of antisocial behavior is the result of a deficiency in perspective taking, which would be expected to be associated with lower levels of sympathy (Hoffman, 1984; S. Feshbach & N.D. Feshbach, 1986). Thus, the relation between empathy and aggressive/antisocial behavior may occur for a variety of reasons, reasons that are quite clearly linked with deficits in emotional empathy.

It is also noteworthy that a type of aggression is serious aggression toward family members. Research shows that abusive parents, in comparison with other parents, tend to engage in more negative, coercive interactions with their children (Burgess & Conger, 1978; Reid, 1986); respond less appropriately to their children (Fontana & Robison, 1984); express more negative affect, and use more punitive rearing strategies (Howes & Feshbach, 1986; Trickett & Kuczynski, 1983). Miller and Eisenberg (1988) suggest that such abusive parents are less sympathetically or vicariously aroused by their children's pain cues and negative emotional reactions i.e., they provide little empathic caregiving. Moreover, to the extent that abused children's needs and feelings are not recognized or responded to appropriately. Thus, such children might have little experience of empathic responding themselves or opportunity to learn to identify and experience the affective cues and states of others. Consistent with this view, the development of empathy in children appears to be enhanced by supportive parenting (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979). Squires (1979) argued that the abused child, because of exposure to the strong negative emotions of the abusive parent, might become acutely sensitive to emotional cues signifying punishment or stress. In such cases, the abused child might show awareness of others' negative affect but express inappropriate social responses to them, for example, defensiveness, rejection, or aggression as opposed to nurturant, positive social responses. This may be because

parents do not provide models of appropriate behavioral and emotional responding to others in need and are likely to use child-rearing strategies that do not promote empathic or prosocial responsiveness (Feshbach, 1987; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979).

Several studies show that emotional empathy, an other-oriented phenomenon, is found to be lacking in those who engage in aggressive and delinquent acts (Chandler, 1973; Feshbach, 1978; Gibbs, 1987; Ohbuchi, Ohno, & Mukai, 1992). Hare (1994) found that psychopaths have a shallow understanding of emotional words, a reflection of their more general shallowness in the affective realm. The callousness of psychopaths, Hare believes, is based in part on physiological pattern he discovered in an earlier research, one that also suggests an irregularity in the workings of amygdala and related circuits: psychopaths about to receive an electric shock show no sign of the fear response that is normal in people about to experience pain. Because the prospect of pain does not trigger a surge of anxiety, Hare contends that psychopaths lack concern about future punishment for what they do. And because they themselves do not feel fear, they have no empathy or compassion for the fear and pain of their victims.

Among the initial validation studies of the Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS), Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) investigated individual differences in empathic tendency and aggression in relation to aggressive behavior. Subjects of both sexes were administered EETS and Jackson's (1967) aggression measure one week before their behavioral aggressiveness was assessed. In the experimental situation, subjects acted as teachers who could use differing levels of shock to punish students (who actually were trained experimental confederates). Average intensity of shock delivered by a subject served as the dependent measure of aggression.

There were two levels of immediacy of pain feedback from the student-victim. In the immediate pain feedback condition, the student was in the same room with the subject; in the nonimmediacy condition, the student was in an adjacent room. Both replications of the same experiment yielded an Empathic Tendency Immediacy of Pain Feedback Effect: Low-empathy subjects aggressed with equal intensity against immediate and nonimmediate victims, but high-empathy subjects aggressed with significantly less intensity when the victim was more immediate. Thus, moderately negative emotional cues from the victim inhibited only empathic persons' aggressive behaviors.

Later, Mehrabian (1997) in a series of studies, explored relations of emotional empathy (two scales of EETS and Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale, BEES) with aggression and violence (three scales). An initial study investigated validity of one of the violence scales, the Risk of Eruptive Violence Scale (REV), by comparing individual REV scores with individual histories of criminal violence for a sample of incarcerated juveniles. A strong correlation was found between the two. The follow-up, study 2 provided estimates of relations between empathy and aggression scales, which were based on a broad theoretical perspective, rather than simply in terms of their intercorrelations. The study yielded negative correlations (ranging from $-.22$ to $-.50$, $p < .05$) of measures of aggression and violence with measures of emotional empathy.

In a major review that focused on relations of emotional empathy with aggression, Miller and Eisenberg (1988) also found generally low, though significant, negative relations between the Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) and its variants with measures of aggressive and externalizing/antisocial behaviors. Results using picture/story

methods of empathy assessment for children were not as consistent and were nonsignificant for preschoolers. However, questionnaire measures of emotional empathy related negatively to enactment and receipt of physical abuse. Feshbach (1978) also found that the fourth grade school children who scored high in empathy were rated low in aggression by their teachers, whereas classmates who tested very low in empathy tended to be very aggressive.

In view of the theoretical and empirical work above, it was hypothesized that emotional empathy would be negatively related with aggression.

Emotional Empathy and Delinquency

Another form of antisocial behavior is delinquency, which is somewhat different or more inclusive than aggression, and has also been found to be negatively related with emotional empathy. Delinquent behaviors have negative consequences for others, consequences which are similar to, if not often more serious than, those for aggression in general. Psychologists continue to define delinquency in legal rather than psychological terms (Quay, 1987). According to Trojanowicz and Morash (1987), delinquent behavior is prohibited by law and is carried out by youths approximately up to the age of eighteen. State laws legally prohibited two types of behaviors for juveniles. The first included behavior, which is criminal for adults, such as the serious offenses of murder, rape, fraud, burglary, and robbery. Offenses, which are criminal for adults but do not involve serious harm to other people, such as the offenses of trespassing and drug abuse, are also included in this category. Status offenses are the second type of delinquent behavior, and they are not legally prohibited for adults. Running away from home, being out of

the control of your parents (“unruly” or “ungovernable”), and being truant from school are the common status offenses (Trojanowicz & Morash, 1987).

In their study of personality and delinquency, psychologists have tried to understand the developmental trajectories leading to an antisocial youth. The empirical research in this area is perhaps some of the oldest and most extensive in psychological literature. Investigators in this area, who have been struggling with the differentiation of offenders and nonoffenders, criminal or delinquent personality, believe that delinquents are not a homogeneous group. It is sometimes assumed that delinquents are highly present-oriented, since the behavior of some appears to be nonreflective, impulsive expressions of a desire for immediate gratification with apparently little consideration of future consequences (Mischel & Gilligan, 1964; Stein, Sarbin, & Kulik, 1968; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). However, Rosenquist and Megargee (1969) found this relationship to be inconsistent, varying over groups. Impulsivity and delay of gratification, no doubt have some degree of overlap with time orientation. Shapiro (1965) suggested that impulsivity is associated with a lack of ‘abiding, long-range personal plans or ambitions, not to mention more abstract aims, purposes, or values.’ Lavik (1969) found that disturbances in future time perspectives of delinquents were associated with inability to delay gratification. Indeed, numerous studies seem to indicate the greater impulsivity of delinquents (Curtiss, Feczko, & Marohn, 1979; Gibson, 1964; Marohn, Offer, & Ostrov, 1971). Still, Farley and Sewell (1976) posited the delinquent as having an exaggerated need for stimulation, a need that is at least to some extent attributable to a physiologically based arousal deficit. This deficit is thought to be in part inherited, and to interact with environmental opportunities for stimulation. In this view, the delinquent is seen as having a higher-than-normal optimal level of stimulation. However,

research on the sensation-seeking dimension (as measured by Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS), Zuckerman, Kolin, Price, & Zoob, 1964) between delinquents and nondelinquents lacks consistency (Farley & Sewell, 1976; Karoly, 1975).

Another interesting line of theorizing has been along how delinquents perceive the causes or origins of their behavioral outcomes. Rotter (1966) proposed that individuals who perceive events as largely caused by luck, fate, chance, or powerful others are characterized as 'externals,' whereas those who perceive personal control over their life events are characterized as 'internals.' It has been suggested that delinquents should score as significantly more external in locus of control, reflecting perceptions that the forces which shape their lives, and/or block legitimate achievement are largely beyond their own personal control (Beck & Ollendick, 1976; Duke & Fenhagen, 1975). Such beliefs forge their delinquent behaviors, since they do not hold themselves responsible for the negative and harmful consequences of their behaviors toward others.

Some psychologists (e.g., Loeber & Hay, 1997) have identified childhood aggressive behavior as the most significant antecedent of antisocial behavior. Yet empirical evidence also suggests that a substantial proportion of those children who display high levels of aggressive behavior in childhood do not manifest antisocial behavior in adolescence or adulthood (Maughan & Rutter, 1998). McCord (1983) contends that there appear to be "desisters" as well as "persisters." Moreover, a considerable number of children appear to be "late starters" (Moffitt, 1993), engaging in average levels of aggressive behavior in the early childhood years but proceeding to engage in serious antisocial behavior in adolescence and adulthood.

There are several models of antisocial behavior (i.e., Loeber, Wung, Keenan, Giroux, Stouthamer-Loeber, Van Kammen, & Maughan, 1993; Moffitt, 1993; Patterson, DeBaryshe, & Ramsey, 1989), which have identified distinct developmental trajectories toward later antisocial outcomes. Loeber et al. (1993) outlined three pathways leading to different types of delinquency and criminal involvement: *overt* (i.e., high levels of aggression in childhood and violence in adolescence and adulthood), *covert* (i.e., covert antisocial acts in childhood and nonviolent, property crimes later in development), and *authority conflict* (i.e., a progression from stubborn behavior, deviance, and authority avoidance to later status offending). Patterson et al.'s (1989) model argues for two distinct pathways toward adult criminality: those of *early starters* (i.e., involving coercive parenting, school failure, and antisocial behavior problems starting in childhood) and *late starters* (i.e., involving poor parental monitoring, oppositionality, and deviant peer involvement in early adolescence). Moffitt (1993) also proposed a model of two mutually exclusive subgroups of antisocial youth: *life-course persistent offenders*, who show high levels of aggression throughout development and continue to be violent as adults, and *adolescence-limited offenders*, who engage in nonviolent forms of antisocial behavior only during the teen years.

More recently, Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber (1998) advanced a model of five distinct subtypes to account for research suggesting a high degree of heterogeneity in antisocial behavior development. They proposed two types of life-course-persistent aggressive youths, one with a preschool onset of aggression and comorbid attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and one with a middle childhood onset of aggression without ADHD. They also proposed two limited-duration aggression groups, one whose initially high level of aggression desists in

elementary school and another whose aggression desists in late adolescence or early adulthood. The final group, late-onset offenders, are the youths who show no antecedent problems in late adolescence or early adulthood.

It is noteworthy that each of the above mentioned models propose one or two chronic groups whose early and persistent aggression is likely to be related to a genetic vulnerability that is exacerbated by poor parenting and early school failure. Each model also identifies one or two less severe groups (i.e., Moffit's adolescent-limited group, Patterson et al.'s late starters, and Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber's limited duration pathways) whose antisocial behavior starts later, is less aggressive, is more sporadic, and originates from later socialization experiences such as deviant peer affiliations in early adolescence. Each model also assumes that there is at least one other group of youths who do not exhibit problems with antisocial behaviors. These model have helped to shift the study of youth antisocial behavior away from a variable-centered focus on describing broad predictors of behavior toward a more person centered focus emphasizing individual differences in development (Magnusson, 1998; Schaeffer, Petras, Ialongo, Poduska, & Kellam, 2003).

Social agents' (particularly parents') practices and behaviors have been found to be linked with deficits in socioemotional responding. Attachment theory has long been used to provide a framework for understanding the origins of early conduct problems (see Greenberg, Speltz, & DeKlyen, 1993). Psychoanalysts such as Anna Freud and Spitz were among the first to point out the importance of the social role played by the mother in socioemotional development. The mother's interaction with the infant was seen as leading the infant to perceive her as accessible

and supportive, thus promoting ego development and movement through the normative stages of socioemotional development. Bowlby (1969) specified the characteristics of the caregiver, such as contingent and appropriate responsiveness, that are presumed to produce secure versus anxious attachments. Attachment security is thought to reflect the infant's internal working schema or model. This model lays the groundwork for patterns of social information processing in early childhood, which in turn underlie the child's social and antisocial behavior (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). Securely attached infants would also be expected to function more harmoniously with their mothers in compliance situations because they are motivated to please the mothers, and attend to what she approves or disapproves (Stayton, Hogan, & Ainsworth, 1971). Moving into the preschool period, Greenberg and Speltz (1988) contend that disruptive behavior is an attempt to get attention or control the behavior of unresponsive or unpredictable caregivers in the absence of a goal-corrected partnership. Accordingly, secure preschoolers and their parents should be working together effectively in household work and problem situations as the child becomes more adept at managing his own emotions, and at enlisting the help of caregivers when emotions threaten to become disorganizing (Martin, 1981).

In the cognitive-developmental model of delinquency, the focus is on one's reasoning about moral or ethical 'oughts' in various situations. Kohlberg (1958) proposed his stages of moral development and maintained that each stage is characterized by a hierarchically more abstract mode of reasoning. Progress through the stages is a constructive process, and is the result of individual's interaction with the larger social environment. For example, a barrage of research literature suggests that dysfunctional families contribute in large part to high risk of delinquency. Such highly power assertive-assertive, disharmonious home situations largely preclude empathy,

role-taking and decision making opportunities, and are characterized by high levels of conflict, dominance, hostility, lack of warmth, and disciplinary styles which are authoritarian and lacking in the inductive technique which would foster the child's understanding of how his/her behavior has resulted in harm or hurt for others (see for example, Jurkovic & Prentice, 1974). This would preclude advance from preconventional stages of moral reasoning (characterized by physicality, egocentric concerns, pragmatic exchanges, and instrumental motives) to conventional stages (reasoning based on mutual interpersonal expectations, prosocial intentions, maintenance of the social system for its own sake, motives as duties and respect).

In fact, several studies of parenting styles and moral reasoning development have shown higher moral reasoning in children whose parents utilize higher moral reasoning, who encourage participation in collective problem solving, who use induction versus power assertion in discipline, give and receive more support, and use less love-withdrawal (Holstein, 1972, 1976; Olejnik, 1980; Peterson, Hey, & Peterson, 1979). The potential role of inadequate moral atmosphere of the dysfunctional family in contributing to delinquency is also well documented (Daum & Bieliauskas, 1983; Hudgins & Prentice, 1973). Delinquency, then, in cognitive-developmental view, is seen as associated with immature moral worldviews in a developmental sense.

As noted above, research literature seems to be quite clear in indicating a general developmental delay in moral reasoning abilities on the part of delinquents (Quay, 1965). Emotional empathy has been found to be an underlying mechanism that engenders moral behavior. It has been suggested that perspective taking and affective arousal in response to others

in distress can promote interpersonal responsibility and inhibit harmful acts (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989; Feshbach, 1975; Hoffman, 1982). It follows that deficits in the capacity to empathize would be related with delinquent acts, which have harmful consequences for others. Moreover, owing to the marked stability of externalizing problems over the life span (Mealey, 1995; Olweus, 1979), it has been suggested that lowered empathy is an inherent part of antisocial individuals (Schacter & Latane, 1964). Quay (1987) maintained that *delinquency should come as no surprise if a youth cannot take the perspective of others and empathize with others' circumstances, if he or she cannot see the value of conforming to certain behavioral expectations or rules to ensure order and protect civility, if property has no meaning beyond possession, and if friendship (or even life) has no value beyond utility* (p.162).

Chandler (1973) has pointed out that a sizable body of literature links prosocial behavior to the development of age-appropriate role-taking and/or perspective-taking abilities, and that a variety of antisocial behaviors have been linked with the persistence of egocentric thought. Individuals characterized by developmental delays in these capacities “.....*have been shown to systematically misread societal expectations, to misinterpret the actions and intentions of others, and to act in ways which were judged to be callous and disrespectful of others*” (p. 326). Chandler compared the social egocentrism of serious and chronic delinquent and nondelinquent youth. Marked and significant differences were observed, with almost no overlap between the distributions of the two samples. Moreover, in another study, Chandler (1973) found that highly aggressive 11-to-13 year old delinquents who participated in a ten week program designed to make them more aware of other people's feelings subsequently became less hostile and aggressive, compared with a second group of delinquents who had not participated in the

program. N.D. Feshbach and S. Feshbach (1982) reported similar results in an empathy-training program with 9-to-11 year-olds. Although this effect was also found for a group of children who received training in social-problem solving strategies, it is consistent with the previous research to expect aggressive behavior to be mediated by social-cognitive factors as well as empathy (see Dodge, 1980; Park & Slaby, 1983; Perry, Perry, & Rasmussen, 1986).

Little and Kendall (1979), in one of their studies, administered Chandler's measure to 37 female delinquents in a state learning centre and found role taking deficits in 73% of the sample. It has also been reported that efficacy of role-taking training with delinquents has been minimal (Chandler, 1973). Other studies (Gough, 1948; Sarbin, 1954) also attributed the deviant behavior and thinking of delinquents and psychopaths to role-taking deficiencies.

Other studies, however, which compared the relative deficits of delinquents and nondelinquents on both cognitive and affective role-taking abilities found only the latter to be lacking (e.g., Rottenberg, 1974). Kaplan and Arbuthnot (1985) found no differences in cognitive role taking, and no significant differences in affective empathy, for 13- to-15 year old male and female delinquents and nondelinquents. However, significant differences did favor the nondelinquent group on a production measure of affective empathy. Taken together, these studies suggest that while cognitive role taking may play an enabling role in preventing delinquency, it appears not to be a sufficient factor by itself. Affective empathy—that is, not only seeing the situation from other's perspective but caring at an emotional level about other's plight—appears to play a significant role in moderating aggressive and delinquent behaviors.

More recently, Hastings et al. (2000) tracked the development of concern for others/empathy from preschool age to the elementary early school years in children at varying levels of risk for disruptive behavior disorders (normative, subclinical or clinical levels). There were no group differences in observable concern for others at 4-5 years of age. However, it was found that children with clinical behavioral problems decreased significantly in their concern by 6-7 years of age and were reported to have less concern at 6-7 years by mothers, teachers and the children themselves, as compared to other groups. Boys with clinical problems were more callous to others' distress at both time points. The study also found that greater concern or empathy at 4-5 years predicted decreases in the stability and severity of externalizing problems by 6-7 years, and greater concern at 6-7 years predicted decreases in the stability of problems by 9-10 years.

Thus, deficits in emotional empathy may be held as one of the hallmarks of antisocial behaviors. On the basis of the preceding theoretical considerations and overwhelming research evidence, it was hypothesized that emotional empathy would be negatively related with delinquency and aggressive behavior.

Gender Differences in Emotional Empathy

It is interesting to note that the relevant theorizing in the literature is in essential agreement with the stereotype that women are more empathic than men. Included are theorists as diverse as Freud and Parson, one heavily biological, and the other social structural in emphasis. According to Parson and Bales (1955) and Johnson (1963), the family requires someone to perform (a) the expressive role—being responsive to the needs and feelings of others, so as to

maintain the family as an intact, harmonious entity, and (b) the instrumental role—acting as the liaison between the family and other social institutions, related to occupational sphere. Females are traditionally socialized to acquire expressive traits such as empathy, compassion, and giving and receiving affect. Males are initially socialized expressively, but with age they acquire instrumental traits, such as mastery and problem solving.

Psychoanalytic conceptualizations are also consistent with the assumed gender differences in empathy. Freud (1925/1961) asserted that because females do not fear castration, they do not resolve the Oedipal complex quickly, and therefore, do not identify with the parent as completely as males. As a result, they acquire weaker egos and super egos, and their social interactions are guided more by affect than reality considerations. Still, other psychoanalytic theorists regard females as more “intuitive” (Deutsch, 1944) and “allocentric” (Gutman, 1965).

Several studies have found significant differences between males and females in emotional empathic tendency, where women are more empathic than men (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978; Hoffman, 1977; Kalliopuska, 1983; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Mehrabian & O'Reilly, 1980). For example, in a research review, Hoffman (1977) differentiated between studies in which empathy was defined as an emotional response and studies in which researchers measured role taking. Eleven studies were included in his review (including sixteen samples). Females scored higher in all studies, and in six samples this finding was significant or marginally significant. Therefore, Hoffman concluded that there was ample evidence to suggest that girls were more empathic than boys.

In another study (Eisenberg et al., 1988), preschoolers four to five year olds and second graders were exposed to three short video tapes designed to elicit personal distress or sympathy and empathic sadness. In the distress tapes, the children viewed a boy frightened in a thunderstorm; this tape was expected to elicit mild anxiety and apprehension akin to personal distress. In the second tape, a young girl facially and vocally exhibited sadness because her pet had died; this tape was expected to elicit empathic sadness. In the third tape, a girl with spina bifida who exhibited neutral to positive affect was shown having difficulty walking. This tape was expected to elicit empathic sadness, but only for children who could use more than the child's vocal and facial cues to make inferences about the child's situation. For the young children in this study there were few gender and age differences in facial reactions. However, preschool boys exhibited more facial sadness in reaction to film containing overt cues of sadness than did second-grade boys, and girls exhibited more sadness than boys. In contrast, there were numerous age-and gender-related effects for the children's self report of how they felt while viewing the tapes. Girls were more likely than boys to report being afraid during the distress tape, whereas boys reported more happiness. Thus, in this study involving young children, there were facial and self-report data consistent with the conclusion that boys experienced less vicarious emotional responsiveness than did girls.

Eisenberg et al. (1988) used a mood induction procedure to induce personal distress and sympathetic reactions, in third and sixth graders and adults. Participants reminisced about two situations, one in which they had felt anxious about their own welfare and one in which they had been concerned about someone else's welfare. It was found that during the sympathy induction, females exhibited more sympathetic facial expressions than males.

According to Eisenberg and Lennon (1983), self-report questionnaire measures have been the most widely employed index of empathy in studies of school age children and adults. The Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) scale has been the most frequently used measure of this type. It is used to measure the trait (rather than state) of empathy. In a 1983 research review, in all 16 studies covered, females scored higher than males (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). In six studies (Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplus, & Isen, 1983; Craig & Lowery, 1969; Davis, 1983; Murray, 1978; Stotland, 1969; Wispe, Kiecolt, & Long, 1977) employing the self-report measures of empathy, females reported more on empathy than males.

In another study, Buri (1991) compared two large high school student samples to evaluate possible sex differences. The male sample consisted of 544 subjects, and the female sample included 355. The males were significantly higher in Defense of Rights, Directiveness, and Confidence. On the other hand, the female students scored higher on Expression of Positive Feeling, Approval Need, Empathy, and somewhat surprisingly, on Perceived Social Approval. The two sexes did not differ on Social Assertiveness. These findings are in keeping with studies of masculinity and femininity. Men usually express more self-confidence and dominance (i.e., directiveness). Women, on the other hand, are more nurturant and empathic. Thus, the preceding review of research concerning gender differences in empathy support the prevailing gender-role stereotype that the females are more empathic than males.

Emotional Empathy and Emotional Intelligence

A growing number of psychologists today believe that much of human intelligence measured by IQ revolved around limited band of linguistic and math skills. These psychologists—Sternberg, Gardner, Salovey, and Goleman—have taken a wider view of intelligence. For example, Salovey, described emotional intelligence consisting of the following domains:

1. *Knowing one's emotions*: Self-awareness—recognizing a feeling *as it happens*—is the keystone of emotional intelligence. Goleman believed that the ability to monitor feelings from moment to moment is crucial to psychological insight and self-understanding. An inability to notice one's true feelings leaves one at their mercy.

2. *Managing Emotions*: Handling feelings so they are appropriate is an ability that builds on self-awareness. According to Goleman, people who are poor in this ability are constantly battling feelings of distress, while those who excel in it can bounce back far more quickly from life's setbacks and upsets.

3. *Motivating oneself*: Goleman argued that marshalling emotions in the service of a goal is essential for paying attention, for self-motivation and mastery, and for creativity.

4. *Recognizing emotions in others*: Goleman maintained that empathy that builds on self-awareness, is the basic people skill. Empathy in a person kindles altruism, by making him more aware of others needs and wants.

5. *Handling Relationships*. Goleman regarded the art of relationships as, in large part, a skill in managing emotion in others. Such capacities undergird popularity, leadership, and interpersonal effectiveness. Thus, emotional empathy is an integral part of emotional intelligence.

Purpose of the Present Study

Emotional empathy is of considerable interest to clinical, social, personality, and developmental psychologists. The construct has been regarded as one of an enormous importance. Emotional empathy is a capacity, which allows an appreciation of separateness of human beings, and at the same time allows them to connect by attending to and feeling the emotional experiences of others. Empathy—the capacity to feel the experiences, needs, aspirations, frustrations, sorrows, joys, anxieties, hurt, or hunger of others as if they were his or her own—lies at the core of healthy growing relationships. It bespeaks a talent for rapport, an emotional skill essential for the preservation of close relationships, whether in marriage, friendship, or parenting.

On a larger scale, even society recognizes the importance of empathy, for without it, we would have no sense of mercy or clemency when dispensing justice. In our society, there is rising crime, violence, flagrant or subtle social injustices, cruelties, and sustained terrorism. Our society seems to be proceeding in a direction which ignores all empathic concern for others, and where people are busy in pursuing their self-oriented goals. Majority of the population lives in utter deprivation and abject poverty, and yet we have become so callous that such sights have ceased to move us. But, empathy is one step beyond this insensitivity and egocentricity. It seems that the roots of all social tensions and conflict resides in the lack of empathy, as it is the fundamental part of the social fabric of emotion, which provides a bridge between the feelings of one person and those of another. Empathy has long been the focus of investigation and research in the West. However, it has been a neglected topic of research in Pakistan. Thus, there has been felt need for

a research exploring the phenomenon of emotional empathy in our culture, and how it could be related with various outcomes. This necessitated the development of a reliable and valid measure of the construct of emotional empathy usable in Pakistan. Therefore, the primary concern of the present study has been to develop an indigenous measure of emotional empathy—the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), for use with people of different age groups.

Emotional empathy performs enormously important functions. There is considerable body of research in which the role of empathy, defined primarily in affective terms, has been examined in relation to moral and positive social behavior (e.g., Batson & Coke, 1981; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). Emotional empathic people are characterized by a tendency to be adept at recognizing the feelings of others and making rapid, smooth connections with them (Noller & Ruzzene, 1991; Ickes & Blackstone, 1995). Therefore, emotional empathy functions as a social emotion and may predict prosocial orientations such as affiliative tendency (Crouse & Mehrabian, 1977; Mehrabian, 1997). Emotional empathy allows humans to experience others' feelings (Hoffman, 1984) and predict each other's behaviors and encourages enduring human ties (Sober & Wilson, 1998), whereas affiliative tendency is a generalized positive interpersonal expectation and is found to be associated with positive behaviors in interaction with others (Mehrabian, 1970, 1994). Both the constructs represent positive interpersonal orientation and are particularly relevant to success in interpersonal relationships. Thus, it may be suggested that empathic responsiveness is one of the most significant components for promoting affiliation among people. There is also evidence from studies of twins—both children and adults—that empathy and prosocial acts have genetic components (Mathew, Batson, Horn, & Rosenman, 1981; Rushton, Fulker, Neale, Nias, & Eysenck, 1986; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, Emde, 1992;

Zahn-Waxler, Schiro, Robinson, Emde, & Schmitz, in press). In line with these empirical findings, the present study hypothesizes a positive relation between emotional empathy and affiliative tendency.

Emotional empathy may also function as a protective factor against the stability of externalizing problems, involving aggression and hostile acts. It should provide immediate, proximal feedback that discourages aggressive acts by making the perpetrator of the aggression aware of, and possibly sympathetic, toward the pain suffered by the victim. There is substantial research evidence for this line of reasoning, where empathic reactions have been found to play an important function in the reduction or inhibition of aggressive or antisocial actions (Feshbach, 1978, 1987; Hamalainen & Pulkkinen, 1995; Mehrabian, 1997b; Parke & Slaby, 1983) and delinquent behaviors (Chandler, 1973; Little & Kendall, 1979). Researchers widely recognize that deficits in empathy are also common in children with disruptive behavior disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Since the affective arousal characterized by emotional empathy, in response to others in emotional upsets can promote interpersonal responsibility and inhibit harmful acts (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989; Hoffman, 1982), it has been suggested that lowered empathy is an inherent part of antisocial individuals and responsible for the marked stability of externalizing problems. The present study predicts that individual differences in the capacity of emotional empathy will determine differences among individuals in delinquency and aggression.

The relation of emotional empathy with positive social behavior is well documented. Moreover, it has also been widely recognized as an important factor inhibiting an increased risk

towards antisocial acts. More recently, however, researchers are exploring the mechanisms that underlie emotional empathy. Emotional empathy has been theoretically and empirically found to be linked with awareness of one's own emotions (Hoffman, 1984; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Salovey and Mayer (1990) maintained that empathy is initiated when emotion-laden information first enters the perceptual system. According to them, from an evolutionary perspective, it was essential for people to first experience their own feelings, in order to feel the emotions of other people. Therefore, emotional awareness and emotional empathy are viewed as abilities that promote smoother social relationships. While the two sets of traits are clearly distinct from one another, they fall into the same general domain—that of constructs concerned with one's tendency to attend to psychological states of the self and others. The assumption, however, is that emotional empathy has its basis in the degree to which one attends to one's internal emotional experiences.

Goleman (1995) referred to emotional awareness as fundamental to psychological insight. According to him, "those who have a natural attunement to their own heart's voice—the language of emotions—are sure to be more adept at articulating its messages" (p.54). According to Goleman, an inability to register one's own feelings leads to a major deficit in emotional empathy. It may be suggested that people who are emotionally clear are more skilled at understanding other people's feelings. Rogers (1989) regarded emotional awareness as the hallmark of psychological health. He maintained that human beings are inherently evaluative and the criterion for such evaluation is provided by affective responses (emotions). People who depend upon their physiological wisdom of feelings have the capacity to make personally and socially satisfactory responses. Rogers believed that as a result of conditions of worth, a person

may gradually desert the wisdom of his own organism, and try to behave in terms of values set by another, which leads to the development of disordered behavior. He argued that psychological health depends upon the degree to which an individual is open to his experience of emotions. The more the individual is able to attend to, think about and accept the whole range of emotions, the better adjusted he is likely to be. Furthermore, it has been argued that being able to attend to and understand one's own feelings help understand the feelings of other people, which is in turn expected to promote positive social functioning. Such theoretical formulations hold important implications for counseling.

There is substantial research evidence which suggests that people who are aware of their own feelings are better adept at understanding other people's feelings (Davis & Franzoi, 1991; Mayer & Stevens, 1994). There are, however, individual differences in the degree to which people are aware of their emotions, which in turn influences their capacity to empathize with others. Stern (1987) argued that when a parent fails to show empathy with a particular range of emotions in the child, the child begins to avoid expressing and perhaps even feeling, those emotions. In this way, a whole range of emotions can begin to be obliterated, especially if throughout childhood those feelings are discouraged. The lifetime emotional cost of lack of emotional awareness can be great—it may dull the capacity to empathize with emotional states or conditions of others, and consequently, may lead one to commit the cruelest and the most violent crimes (Block, 1995). There is considerable empirical evidence along this line of reasoning. Hare (1994) contended that psychopaths have a shallow understanding of their own emotional words, a reflection of their more general shallowness on the affective realm. In one of his studies, Hare found that psychopaths about to receive an electric shock showed no sign of the fear response

that is normal in people about to experience pain. They had little concern about the future punishment. And, because they themselves do not feel fear, they have no empathy—compassion—for the fear and pain of the victim. They are not only deficient at experiencing their own feelings but the immediate proximal feedback from the victim does not affect them. Therefore, people deficient in emotional awareness tend not to respond with emotional arousal in response to another's plight, which is believed to be important for inhibiting harmful acts towards others (Hoffman, 1984; N.D. Feshbach, 1978).

Further evidence about how differences in the *way* people experience or deal with their own emotions may determine differences among individuals in empathy emerged from the studies concerning the role of regulation in empathy related constructs—such as sympathy and personal distress. Eisenberg and Fabes (1992, 1998) have proposed that people who have difficulty regulating their emotional arousal are dispositionally prone to personal distress. Well-regulated people are expected to be relatively sympathetic. A series of studies have shown that emotional regulation is positively related to sympathy (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Eisenberg & Okun, 1996) and perspective taking (Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy et al., 1996; Eisenberg & Okun, 1996) and, negatively related to externalizing disorders, which often involve aggression and hostile behavior (see Rothbart, Posner, & Hershey, 1995; Sanson, Smart, Prior, & Oberklaid, 1993). In view of these theoretical and empirical findings, it has been proposed that the dispositional differences among people in trait emotional awareness, defined as the tendency to attend to one's moods and emotions; capacity to discriminate clearly among them; and ability to regulate emotions and behavior (Salovey et al., 1995) would be related to differences in emotional empathy. Furthermore, by definition, people who experience vicarious empathy should be

expected to be concerned about others and, consequently, to behave benignly and sensitively toward them. Emotional empathy, thus, is hypothesized to mediate the effect of trait emotional awareness on affiliative tendency and aggression.

Thus, the present study proposes that emotional empathy builds on one's tendency of emotional awareness. People who are characterized by trait emotional awareness, that is, a tendency to attend to their own emotions, experience them clearly and are able to regulate them, are expected to be more emotionally empathic. Consequently, a lack in the tendency towards emotional awareness is expected to reduce the overall sensitivity to other people's emotions, whether the emotions are of positive or negative quality. It has further been proposed that individual differences in trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy would have important motivational and behavioral outcomes. Such people would be dispositionally prone to positive social behaviors such as affiliative tendency and less inclined towards harmful acts such as aggression towards others. Moreover, the present study proposes that emotional empathy will mediate the link between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency. It is also proposed that the relation between trait emotional awareness and aggression will be mediated by emotional empathy.

Precisely, in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, the present research work planned following studies:

Study 1

The major focus of the present study was to develop an indigenous self-report measure of emotional empathy—the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES). The development of the scale

followed the conceptual model of emotional empathy as proposed by Mehrabian (1996). In addition, gender differences in emotional empathy were also explored.

Study 2

An important step for the development of a reliable and valid measure is to establish its construct validity. In order to determine the construct validity of the scale, convergent and discriminant validities were required. Thus, Study 2, comprising of four independent investigations, concerned itself with the validation of the scale of emotional empathy. Study I dealt with establishing the convergent validity of the EES. The convergent validity of the EES was assessed by testing the relation of the EES with the already established affective measure of emotional empathy—the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES, Mehrabian, 1996). In order to determine the discriminant validity of the EES, the direction of relation of emotional empathy with its theoretically related constructs such as affiliative tendency, delinquency, and trait emotional awareness was examined in Studies II, III, and IV, respectively. As part of Study IV, an indigenous measure of Trait Emotional Awareness (TEAS) was also developed.

Study 3

Finally, Study 3 was conducted to achieve the following objectives: (a) to explore the extent to which the dispositional underlying mechanism, namely, trait emotional awareness predicted emotional empathy, (b) to examine the predictability of affiliative tendency and aggression from emotional empathy, (c) to test the role of emotional empathy as a mediator between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency, and (d) to explore the mediational role of emotional empathy between trait emotional awareness and aggression.

STUDY 1

Development of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

Objectives of the Study

The present study was designed with the following objectives (a) to develop an indigenous self-report measure of emotional empathy—the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), (b) to determine its psychometric properties, and (c) to assess gender differences in emotional empathy.

The study took place in two phases. In Phase I, items for the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) were empirically generated. In Phase II, the selected items were administered to a sample of university students, whereby, the data were analysed statistically to establish the psychometric properties of the scale. Factorial validity of the scale was assessed. The item-total correlation, alpha internal consistency, and split-half reliability were determined. Moreover, gender differences in emotional empathy were examined, with the assumption, based on theoretical grounds, that women will be more empathic than men.

Phase I: Generation of Initial Pool of Items for the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

This measure has been based on the model of emotional empathy developed by Mehrabian (1996). In the present investigation, emotional empathy has been referred to as the

tendency to feel vicariously an affective response that stems from viewing another's emotional state or condition, and which is identical or very similar to what the other person is feeling. The scale would, therefore, measure differences among individuals on the trait of emotional empathy. As evident from relevant research, traditionally the study of empathy has followed two fairly distinct paths based upon its two different definitions. Some take the term *empathy* to refer to a cognitive process, analogous to cognitive role taking or perspective taking (e.g., Deutsch & Madle, 1975; Hogan, 1969); others take it to mean a primarily affective process (e.g., Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1984; Mehrabian, 1996; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). For the present study the more encompassing *affective* definition of empathy was employed, as far as the construction of scale was the objective at hand. This definition was propounded by Mehrabian (1996), which is as follows:

Emotional empathy is the tendency to feel and experience vicariously the (positive and negative) emotional experiences and/or expressions of others—feeling what the other person feels (p.1).

Method

Procedure

A pool of items was generated for the measure of emotional empathy, which were based on the theoretical model of emotional empathy given by Mehrabian (1996). The construction of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) proceeded in the following manner:

Step I

To explore, as the first necessary step, certain social situations (representing positive and negative emotional experiences of others), in which one could feel emotional empathy for another were empirically generated. For this purpose, indepth interviews were conducted with 30 participants who were selected from a variety of settings. Participants included 10 M.Sc. psychology students (6 men and 4 women, age ranging from 20 to 22 years) of Quaid-i-Azam University and 10 psychologists (National Institute of Psychology). They were provided the operational definition of emotional empathy, as proposed by Mehrabian (1996), and were briefly explained what entails emotional empathy. They were then asked to contribute a description of such social situations in which they vicariously experienced the feelings (negative or positive) of another individual, during the past one week or so. To cover a wide range of emotional empathy evoking situations, indepth interviews were also conducted with 10 individuals from diverse community settings, belonging to low, middle, and high socioeconomic class. They were also given the operational definition of emotional empathy, and were also told the objective of the study. They were then asked to narrate a description of such social situations, that they came across in the previous week or so, in which they vicariously experienced an affective response at witnessing the emotional experience and/or expression of another. The social situations, thus obtained, were pooled together in the form of a List (see Annexure A).

Step II

In order to retain the most prevalent emotional empathy evoking situations, the situations obtained in the previous step, were rated for frequency, on a three-point response format, ranging from 0 for “rarely” to 2 for “frequently” (Annexure B). These situations were administered to 30 participants (students of Quaid-i-Azam University), asking them to *specify how frequently they come across the given situations, in which they felt vicariously the emotional state or condition of others, in their daily lives*. The most frequently occurring situations (with the criteria of having received an endorsement of 20% and above) were retained (see Annexure C). These situations were closely scrutinized for their content as well. From these situations thus obtained, the overlapping and peculiar/unusual situations were eliminated. And, some of the situations with low frequency, but pertinent to the construct of emotional empathy were included (see Annexure D).

Step III

In the next step, the emotional empathy evoking situations finally selected, having high frequency and being pertinent to the construct of emotional empathy, were further supplemented by selecting some emotional empathic situations from the established measures of emotional empathy e.g., Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS, Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972); and Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES, Mehrabian, 1996). Those situations were included which were relevant to Pakistani cultural context. These situations were translated into Urdu language by the researchers of the present study.

Step IV

In the next step, adjectives that reflect vicarious reactions to the negative and positive social situations were generated. In order to invoke the emotional empathic reactions to each situation obtained in the preceding step, the situations were then presented to 10 psychologists and 10 M.Sc. students of Quaid-i-Azam University, in the form of a Performa (see Annexure E). They were provided the definition of emotional empathy and were specifically asked to:

Specify your own reactions (e.g., happiness, sorrow, excitement, an urge to help, pain, etc.) if you come across these situations. Also, specify the degree of your reaction (1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest).

Participants were not only required to specify an adjective representing their reactions but also to indicate the extent to which they will experience a particular emotion in response to an empathy evoking situation (i.e., degree of their reactions) on a 5-point scale, on which “1” represented “very weak” and a “5” represented “very strong.” The frequency of adjectives specified for each situation was computed. Those adjectives were retained which received an endorsement of 20% and beyond (see Annexure F). The average intensity of each response was also calculated. The situations and the reactions were combined together in the form of self-report statements. They were worded in accordance with the average intensity of each reaction specified. That is, the empathy evoking situations with reactions of low, moderate and high mean intensities were worded mildly, moderately, and extremely, respectively. Once again, before the inclusion of the items in the scale for pilot testing, the content of the scale items was very closely reviewed by four judges (Psychologists, National Institute of Psychology). Each of the four

judges independently evaluated each item for (a) fidelity to the construct, (b) clarity, (c) comprehensibility/readability, and (d) redundancy. Several items were deleted and some were revised (see Annexure G).

Step V

The 30 items were presented in the form of a seven-point likert-type scale, which required the participants of the study to report the degree of their agreement or disagreement with each item. To reduce response bias, 19 items were *worded positively*, such that agreement showed higher emotional empathy. The remaining 11 items were *negatively worded* in such a way that disagreement showed higher emotional empathy. Items of this scale were measured using a 7-point response format that ranged from “strong agreement” (7) to “strong disagreement” (1).

Step VI

The scale was pilot tested by asking several individuals to complete the scale and note any unclear elements. The process resulted in the pilot-tested pool of the same 30 items (see Annexure H).

Results

The process of generation of items for the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) yielded the following results for each step:

Step I

In the first step, the social situations, which could evoke emotional empathy, were explored. In-depth interviews were conducted with 30 participants. It was made sure that the situations generated should include both the positive and negative emotional experiences of people. These interviews yielded 63 social situations having relevance to the construct of emotional empathy (see Annexure A).

Step II

In order to retain the most representative of one's daily life social situations, the unusual situations were eliminated from the sample of 63 situations. For this purpose, the frequency of the 63 obtained situations in which people reported having felt emotional empathy, was calculated, on a 3-point response format, ranging from 0 for "rarely" to 2 for "frequently" (Annexure B). A total of 32 social situations relevant to the construct of emotional empathy and having received an endorsement of 20% and above were retained (see Annexure C).

Step III

The 32 emotional empathic situations generated empirically, were pooled with potential situations from the existing measures of emotional empathy i.e., Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS) (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972); and Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) (Mehrabian, 1996). Only those situations were retained which were not overlapping with the already selected situations. Moreover, situations not relevant to our culture were not considered. This resulted in an accumulation of 41 situations.

Step IV

In the fourth step, the adjectives representing reactions to the 41 emotional empathic situations were generated. Therefore, the situations retained in the preceding step were presented to 20 participants. They were required to specify their reactions to each situation in the form of an adjective, and the degree to which they experienced those reactions on a 5-point scale. The adjectives reflecting the reactions to each situation were examined for their frequency. Any reaction, which was specified by 20% and more of the participants, was retained (see Annexure F). The statements were worded in keeping with the reactions specified and the average intensity of each reaction. The scale items were examined in detail by four judges. The items were analysed on the basis of (a) fidelity to the relevant construct, (b) clarity, (c) comprehensibility/readability, (d) face validity, and (e) redundancy. The following items were removed: items no. 6, 7, 8, 10, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, 35, and 38 (see Annexure G). This exercise resulted in 28 items. The chosen items were checked for their wording and few were

improved by rephrasing, before presenting them in the final form of the scale for the pilot study. Two positively worded items i.e., 5 and 17 were further worded negatively, resulting in 30 items.

Step V

Once potential items were identified, they were presented in the form of a scale, which required the participants to report the degree of their agreement or disagreement with each item. To reduce response bias, 19 items were *worded positively*, such that agreement showed higher emotional empathy. The remaining 11 items were *negatively worded* in such a way that disagreement showed higher emotional empathy. Items of this scale were measured using a 7-point response format that ranged from “strong agreement” (7) to “strong disagreement”(1).

Step VI

The process of pilot testing yielded the same pool of 30 items. All items were reported to be clear and comprehensible, and were retained for the final format of the questionnaire (see Annexure H).

Phase II: Dimensionality and Internal Consistency of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

In Phase II, the factorial validity of the 30-item Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) was analyzed, so that the factor structure of the items could be assessed and the final items for the scale could be selected. Moreover, the scale items were analyzed for item-total correlation, alpha

internal consistency, and split-half reliability. The norms for the participants of the present investigation were also developed.

Method

Sample

The sample consisted of 331 M.Sc. students (165 women and 166 men). The age range of the students was 20 to 24 years, with an average age of 21.9, S.D. = 2.5. The size of the sample was selected in accordance with the notion that a factor analysis of participants: variables ratio of at least 10:1 ought to be sound in respect of statistical error (Nunnally, 1978). In order to gain a representative data, the sample was drawn from different educational institutes, including universities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi, such as Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Hamdard University, Islamabad; Arid Agricultural University, Rawalpindi; and, Post-Graduate Government College for Women, Rawalpindi. Of the participants who reported their area of study, 51% belonged to Natural Sciences, and 31% to Social Sciences. The proportions belonging to the urban and rural areas of Pakistan were 78% and 22%, respectively.

Procedure

The 331 participants rated themselves on each of the 30-item EES using the seven-point response scale. The participants from various universities were approached in the central library, where the students from all fields of study could be found. They were given the EES either individually or in small groups. Each participant was explained how to fill out the Questionnaire,

with special instructions not to skip any item. They were told to select a response to each item which best described them. They were also encouraged to be candid in their responses and were assured that the data would only be used for research purposes. All data were collected anonymously; no names were requested.

In order to assess the factorial validity, a principal components analysis, followed by orthogonal rotation of the responses of 331 participants to the 30 items was carried out. The psychometric properties of the scale such as the item to total correlation, alpha internal consistency, and split-half reliability were also determined.

Results

Factorial Validity

The 30 items of the Emotional Empathy Scale were factor analysed and a principal components solution was obtained to determine the underlying factor structure of the personality construct of emotional empathy and to retain items for inclusion into the final format of the scale. Initial analysis revealed a factor solution that converged after 25 iterations. A principal components analysis yielded 9 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. However, the eigenvalue plot was used for a scree test (Cattell, 1988; Nunnally, 1978). Eigenvalue for Factor 1 was 7.46, whereas eigenvalues for Factors 2, 3, and 4 were 2.69, 2.65, and 1.35, respectively, showing the first elbow at the second eigenvalue, thus suggesting that a one-factor solution would be appropriate. However, the difference between the third and fourth factor of 1.35 is another discontinuity in eigenvalues between pairs of adjacent factors, although smaller than the

first. Therefore, because valid measurement is so crucial, a three-factor model was examined in detail. The three-factor solution was examined using varimax rotation.

Items for the scale were selected on the criteria of having factor loadings of .30 and beyond (Kline, 1993). Four items (i.e., items no. 5, 17, 19, and 28), having factor loadings less than .30 were eliminated from the scale. All the remaining 26 items had high factor loadings (ranging from .33 to .71) on the three factors, which formed the multidimensional 26-item Emotional Empathy Scale (EES). The factor loadings of the 30 items of EES, on the first three factors using varimax rotation are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

The Factor Loadings of the 30 Items of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) on First Three Factors in the Factor Solution Obtained Through Varimax Rotation (N=331)

No. of Items	Factor Loadings			<i>h</i>
	F1	F2	F3	
1	.34	.10	.00	.36
2	.45	.25	.00	.42
3	.44	.00	.20	.35
4	.47	.20	.00	.27
5	.00	.00	.23	.14
6	.12	.71	.00	.41
7	.17	-.11	.49	.28
8	.21	.33	.22	.21

9	.50	.00	.00	.27
10	.67	.24	-.11	.52
11	.11	.44	.24	.26
12	.66	.00	.13	.46
13	.41	.00	.20	.21
14	.11	.27	.41	.27
15	.60	.00	.16	.39
16	.18	.00	.44	.48
17	.14	-.18	-.25	.39
18	.63	.12	.12	.43
19	.20	.24	-.13	.13
20	.21	.24	.51	.42
21	.15	.13	.55	.16
22	.23	.49	.22	.45
23	.62	.25	.00	.57
24	.37	.25	.21	.22
25	.20	.62	.00	.42
26	.45	.17	.16	.25
27	.40	.51	.00	.42
28	-.10	.21	.00	.41
29	.54	.23	.15	.36
30	.41	.46	.00	.38

The eigenvalues given in Table 2 show that the first five factors accounted for 51% of the variance. The first factor had an eigenvalue of 7.46. The second through third factors in the solution had eigenvalues of 2.69, and 2.65, respectively. Factor 1 explained 24.8% of the variance, whereas Factors 2 and 3 accounted for 8.9% and 8.8% of the variance, respectively. Overall, the three factors explained 42.7% of the total item variance.

Table 2

Eigenvalues and Percentages of Variances Explained by Three Factors in the Factor Solution Obtained Through Principal Components Analysis (N=331)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Percentages of Variances	Cumulative Percentages
1	7.46	24.89	24.89
2	2.69	8.98	33.8
3	2.65	8.86	42.7
4	1.3	4.5	47.2
5	1.2	4.0	51.3

A principal components analysis with varimax rotation conducted on the 30-item EES yielded a three-factor solution. These factors were closely analyzed in terms of item content and underlying theme. The three factors were clearly interpretable in the light of Mehrabian and Epstein's (1972) model of emotional empathy. A total of 14 items loaded on the first factor, which included items typically conceptualized as tendency to experience other's positive and

negative emotional expressions and states. The capacity to be emotionally moved by both the positive and the negative emotional states of another person, combined to form a single dimension. It was labeled "*Tendency to be Moved by Others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences*," as proposed by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). Seven items loading on the second factor reflected the tendency to respond to one's vicarious emotional experience by a need to assist others. The items characterized an inclination to respond at behavioral level to the emotional expression and/or experience of another person. It was labeled "*Emotional Responsiveness*." This label was also taken from Mehrabian and Epstein's model. The third factor was conceptualized as "*Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion*." It consisted of 5 items, characterized by a sensitivity to experience vicariously an affect that matches the emotion of another. The model of emotional empathy as developed by Mehrabian and Epstein again provided the basis for interpreting the conceptual quality of the items of the third dimension.

The total 26 items (Annexure I), representing the three dimensions, collectively accounted for 42.7% of the scale variance. The factor loadings of 26 items with their respective dimensions are presented in descending order in Table 3.

Table 3

The Factor Loadings of the 26 Items of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) on First Three Factors in the Factor Solution Obtained Through Varimax Rotation (N=331)

S. No.	No. of Items	Factors		
		I Tendency to be Moved by Others' Emotional Experiences	II Emotional Responsiveness	III Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion
1	10	.67		
2	12	.66		
3	18	.63		
4	23	.62		
5	15	.60		
6	29	.54		
7	9	.50		
8	4	.47		
9	2	.45		
10	26	.45		
11	3	.44		
12	13	.41		
13	24	.37		
14	1	.34		

15	6	.71	
16	25	.62	
17	27	.51	
18	22	.49	
19	30	.46	
20	11	.44	
21	8	.33	
22	21		.55
23	20		.51
24	7		.49
25	16		.44
26	14		.41

It is noteworthy that some of the items loaded at .30 and above on more than one factors (as shown in Table 1). For example, items no. 27 and 30 loaded on factor 1 as well as on factor 2. A close examination of the content led to the decision of including them in a factor to which they were more conceptually related.

Item-Total Correlations of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

The 30 items of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) were subjected to the item to total correlation analysis. The criterion for the selection of an item was that it should correlate .30 and beyond with the total (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). It was observed that the same four items,

which had low factor loadings on the three factors (see Table 1), failed to achieve significance on item-total correlation analysis. This strongly supports the prior decision (based on factor analysis) of eliminating these items from the final scale. The item-total correlations for the 30-item EES are given in Table 4.

Table 4

Item-Total Score Correlations for the 30-item Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) (N=331)

Item No.	Correlation with Total Score	Item No.	Correlation with Total Score
1	.32***	16	.53***
2	.47***	17	-.10(<i>ns</i>)
3	.34***	18	.55***
4	.43***	19	.21(<i>ns</i>)
5	.18(<i>ns</i>)	20	.53***
6	.56***	21	.30***
7	.31***	22	.59***
8	.42***	23	.54***
9	.48***	24	.43***
10	.55***	25	.46***
11	.41***	26	.45***
12	.50***	27	.56***
13	.40***	28	.24(<i>ns</i>)

14	.42***	29	.56***
15	.50***	30	.59***

***($p < .000$), *ns*=not significant

The selected 26 items of the scale were again analysed for the item to total correlations. Item-total correlations for the 26 items ranged from .31 to .60 and were significant ($p < .000$). The results are given in the Table 5.

Table 5

Item-Total Score Correlations for the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) With the Selected 26 Items (N=331)

S. No.	Item No.	Item to Total Score Correlation	S. No.	Item No.	Item to Total Score Correlation
1	1	.31***	14	15	.52***
2	2	.47***	15	16	.54***
3	3	.37***	16	18	.55***
4	4	.44***	17	20	.52***
5	6	.58***	18	21	.31***
6	7	.33***	19	22	.60***
7	8	.44***	20	23	.54***
8	9	.49***	21	24	.43***
9	10	.55***	22	25	.45***

10	11	.42***	23	26	.47***
11	12	.50***	24	27	.56***
12	13	.39***	25	29	.56***
13	14	.43***	26	30	.58***

*** ($p < .000$)

Internal Consistency of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

Alpha internal consistency of the 30-item EES was computed, which was .83. This value increased when the four items, having very low item-total correlations, were eliminated from the scale. Alpha internal consistency reliability estimate of the 26-item EES was considerably high i.e., .85, indicating that the degree of homogeneity among the items is consistent with degree of homogeneity theoretically expected for the construct of emotional empathy.

Table 6

Alpha Coefficient of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) With 30 Items and With Reduced 26 Items (N=331)

No. of Items	Alpha Coefficient
30	.83
26	.85

As can be seen in Table 7, a split-half estimate of reliability for the 30-item EES yielded .66 corrected to .79 by the Spearman-Brown formula. And, for the retained 26 items, split-half correlation was .70, which was corrected to .82 by the Spearman-Brown formula.

Table 7

The Correlation Coefficients for Split-Half Reliability of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) With 30 Items and With the Reduced 26 Items (N=331)

No. of Items	Split-half Correlation	Spearman Brown Correction
30	.66	.79
26	.70	.82

Internal Consistency of EES Subscales

For the estimation of the reliability of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), the internal consistency of the three subscales was evaluated by computing Cronbach's coefficient alpha for each scale. The alphas were as follows: Tendency to be Moved by others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences: $\alpha = .81$; Emotional Responsiveness: $\alpha = .70$; and, Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion: $\alpha = .61$. The alphas for the individual scales were lower as compared to the total score ($\alpha = .85$), but adequate for scales with fewer items. The results are presented in Table 8.

Table 8*Alpha Reliability of the EES Subscales (N = 331)*

S. No.	Subscales	No. of Items	Reliability Coefficients
I	Tendency to be Moved by Others'		
	Emotional Experiences	14	.81
II	Emotional Responsiveness	7	.70
III	Susceptibility to Emotional	5	.61
	Contagion		

Correlations Among EES Subscales and With the Total 26-item EES

Intercorrelations among the three factors and with the total EES were also computed. It was found that there was positive and significant ($p < .000$) interscale correlations among "Tendency to be Moved by others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences," "Emotional Responsiveness," and "Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion." The strongest correlation existed between Tendency to be Moved by others' Emotional Experiences and Emotional Responsiveness ($r = .56, p < .000$). Thus, suggesting that people who respond affectively to the positive or negative emotional conditions of another are also likely to respond instrumentally. The degree of intercorrelations among subscales indicate that they are relatively moderate as compared to the high correlations with the total score on the EES, which provides evidence that the three subscales represent conceptually distinct dimensions. There is high positive and significant ($p < .000$) correlation between the subscales and the total EES. All subscales contributed to the total score, which suggests that the 26-item EES measures the personality trait

of emotional empathy, which consists of three subtraits of Tendency to be Moved by others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences, Emotional Responsiveness, and Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion. The intercorrelations among the three factors are provided in Table 9.

Table 9

Intercorrelations Among the Subscales of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and Correlations With the Total Scale Items (N=331)

S. No.	Subscales	No. of Items	I	II	III	Total Score on the EES
I	Tendency to be Moved by Others' Emotional Experiences	14	--			.89 <i>p</i> <.000
II	Emotional Responsiveness	7	.56 <i>p</i> <.000	--		.82 <i>p</i> <.000
III	Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion	5	.47 <i>p</i> <.000	.45 <i>p</i> <.000	--	.72 <i>p</i> <.000

Norms and Gender Differences

Table 10 contains mean scores and standard deviations of the scores on the EES for the student population.

Table 10

Means and Standard Deviations for the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) with 30 Items and With the Reduced 26 Items (N=331)

No. of Items	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
30	161.0	20.8
26	143.2	20.1

Means and standard deviations for the EES subscales were also computed, which are reported in Table 11.

Table 11

Means and Standard Deviations for the EES Subscales (N=331)

S. No.	Subscales of the EES	No. of Items	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
I	Tendency to be Moved by Others'			
	Emotional Experiences	14	81.1	10.6
II	Emotional Responsiveness	7	38.8	7.5
III	Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion	5	23.3	6.0

Additional analyses were conducted to examine the differences between men and women on the construct of emotional empathy. It was found that women participants scored significantly higher, as compared to men participants, on the EES, $t(279) = 3.94$, $p < .000$. Results are displayed in Table 12.

Table 12

Gender Differences on the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) (N= 331)

Gender	N	Mean Scores on the		<i>t</i> -value	df
		Emotional Empathy	SD		
Scale (EES)					
Men	166	139.10	22.17	3.94	
				$p < .000$	279
Women	165	148.49	16.9		

In addition, *t*-test was computed for each of the dimension, to assess gender differences on each dimension. The results yielded a significant difference between men and women on all the dimensions of the EES. Thus, indicating that women tend to be more emotionally empathic than men. Therefore, in order to create norms for men and women, mean scores and standard deviations for the EES subscales were obtained. Means, standard deviations, and *t*-test values for the EES subscales for men and women are presented in Table 13.

Table 13*Means, Standard Deviations, and t-values for the EES Subscales (N=331)*

S. No.	Subscales	Items	Men		Women		<i>t-values</i>
			<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
I	Tendency to be Moved by Others' Emotional Experiences	14	79.0	12.2	83.5	8.3	3.5 <i>p</i> <.001
II	Emotional Responsiveness	7	37.4	8.2	40.7	6.1	3.7 <i>p</i> <.000
III	Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion	5	22.6	6.1	24.3	6.1	2.23 <i>p</i> <.02

Finally, percentile scores for the EES were computed, to create a normative profile for the participants of the study. The results are displayed in the following Table.

Table 14*Percentile Scores for the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) (N=331)*

Percentiles	Scores on the EES
10	119
20	129
30	136
40	141
50	145

60	150
70	154
80	159
90	167

Discussion

The present study was designed to develop an indigenous self-report measure of the trait of emotional empathy. The model of emotional empathy of Mehrabian (1996) provided the conceptual foundation for the items used in the scale.

The study of empathy has focused mainly on two distinct paths based upon its two different definitions. Some psychologists focused mainly on the cognitive processes, analogous to cognitive role taking or perspective taking (e.g., Deutsch & Madle, 1975; Hogan, 1969); others take it to mean a primarily affective process (e.g., Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1984; Mehrabian, 1972, 1996; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), and have developed corresponding measures. In this study, the affective definition has been utilized to develop the measure of emotional empathy, because we believe that it is richer and more comprehensive. Whereas the cognitive role taking definition is the recognition of another's feelings, the emotional responsiveness also includes sharing of those feelings. Besides being characterized by its emotional component, it involves some cognition as well, which to most theorists, is a prerequisite for experiencing empathy (Batson, 1987; Feshbach, 1978). However, Hoffman

(1984) argued that less advanced cognitive processes, such as classical conditioning, may be all that are necessary for some modes of empathic responding.

For the purpose of this study, emotional empathy has been used as a description of a trait or personality characteristic, which describes individual differences in the tendency to feel and vicariously experience the emotional experiences of others (Mehrabian, 1996). The items representing the trait of emotional empathy, therefore, help distinguish persons who typically experience more of others' feelings from those who are generally less responsive to the emotional expressions and experiences of others.

Some of the already existing self-report measures used to study the development of empathy (Bryant, 1982; Mehrabian, 1996; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) over a wide age range have focused on empathy as a vicarious emotional response to the perceived emotional experiences of the others. Initially, Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) developed the Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS), which was designed, then, to be global in its consideration of empathy as a general disposition of perceived emotional responsiveness to others' emotional experiences. The selection of items for this scale was based on factor analysis. Mehrabian and Epstein divided the EETS into seven intercorrelated subscales, which they labeled: (a) susceptibility to emotional contagion, (b) appreciation of the feelings of the unfamiliar and distant others, (c) extreme emotional responsiveness, (d) tendency to be moved by others' positive emotional experiences, (e) tendency to be moved by others' negative emotional experiences, (f) sympathetic tendency, and (g) willingness to be in contact with others who have problems.

Later, Mehrabian (1996) developed the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES), which was based on the research evidence with the earlier Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS, Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). In his study, the responses of 101 participants to the 30 items Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) were factor analysed. On the basis of principal components solution obtained, Mehrabian concluded that BEES, despite its multifaceted approach to the measurement of emotional empathy, constituted a unitary dimension. However, Mehrabian noted that if a multifactor solution had been obtained, the sample size ($n=101$) of the study would have been insufficient for adequate interpretation of results.

In the present study, a principal components analysis was applied to 30-item Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) to determine the factor structure of the personality construct of emotional empathy in Pakistani cultural context, and to ascertain whether the creation of a unidimensional scale can be justified as proposed by Mehrabian (1996). The intercorrelation matrix among the 30 items of the EES was factor analysed and a principal components solution was obtained. The results of the scree test using eigenvalue plot suggested that a three-factor solution would be appropriate. The eigenvalue for factor 1 was 7.46, whereas the eigenvalues for factors 2, 3, and 4 were 2.69, 2.65 and 1.35, respectively. Following the logic of the scree test, the most obvious break in eigenvalues is the difference of 4.5 between the first and the second factor, compared to 0.03 between the second and third. Another substantial break in the eigenvalues is a difference of 1.35 between the third and fourth factor. This strongly suggests that a three-factor solution would be more appropriate. Moreover, compared to 24.8% of the variance accounted for by the first factor, the three factors jointly explained 42.7% of the total item variance. Therefore, the three-factor solution was preferred and was examined using varimax rotation.

Items, which had factor loadings of .30 and beyond on the three factors, were selected for the final format of the scale. This criterion was selected in accordance with Kline's (1993) notion that the items with a factor loading of .30 and greater should be considered. Following this criterion, four items were dropped. All the remaining items loaded highly on the three factors. Another criterion, for the selection of items was that each item should have an item-total correlation of .30 and beyond with the total (Kline, 1993; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). All items except the same four items, which failed to achieve significant loadings on the three factors, were found to be significantly correlated with total (ranging from $r = .31$ to $.60$, $p < .000$).

An examination of the three factors which emerged as a result of varimax orthogonal rotation revealed that they were quite comparable with the dimensions of the Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS, Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), on the basis of which the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES, Mehrabian, 1996) was later developed.

The content of the items loading on the three factors was interpreted in the light of conceptual model of emotional empathy as proposed by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). An examination of the items defining the three factors showed that they were relatively conceptually distinct from each other. The first factor, consisting of 14 items, explained maximum variance of 24.8%. Items loading on the first factor typically represented the tendency to be moved by the affective state or situation of another person. This dimension included items representing the inclination to respond to both the positive and negative emotional expressions and experiences of others. It may be suggested that emotionally empathic people who are moved by negative states or experiences of another person are exactly the ones who are emotionally evoked by the positive

states or experiences of others. In other words, the capacity for empathy enables the individual to equally share distress (negative) as well as the happiness (positive) of another person. The dimension was labeled "*Tendency to be Moved by others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences*," as given by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). However, Mehrabian and Epstein obtained two separate factors with items characterized by the tendency to be moved by others' positive emotional experiences and negative emotional experiences, respectively. In the present study, items representing vicariously experiencing others' positive and negative emotional expressions, and conditions coalesced to form a single dimension. The strength of this factor ($\alpha = .81$) and the conceptual parsimony of the 14 items that loaded on it led us to retain it as such for the final scale.

A total of 7 items loaded on the second factor, which explained 8.9% of the items variance. Out of these 7 items, 2 items also loaded on the first factor. These items were examined closely for their content and relative strength of loading on the two factors. An examination of the underlying theme and relatively stronger loading of these 2 items on second factor resulted in a decision to include them in factor 2. The 7 items loading on this factor were interpreted as representing the underlying theme of a tendency to react to the vicarious emotion by attempting to assist others in need. The items reflected the likelihood of responding emotionally and a motivation to intervene on behalf of the other. The growing body of research on emotions does reveal that young children are not only capable of identifying other persons' distressed states and the situations that produce those states (Fabes, Eisenberg, McCormick, & Wilson, 1988; Michaelson & Lewis, 1985) but are also responsive to the emotions produced by others (Hoffman, 1981; Iannotti, 1985; Strayer, 1989). The items of the second dimension reflected a

tendency to respond emotionally and a heightened readiness to propose an intervention. It was, therefore, conceptualized as heightened affective responsiveness to witnessing others' affective events. The second factor was labeled "*Emotional Responsiveness*," in accordance with the proposition of Mehrabian and Epstein, because of the identical items content.

A close examination of the items of the third factor led to conceptualizing it as "*Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion*." Items loading on this factor were highly comparable to the items loading on the dimension of "Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion," as identified by Mehrabian and Epstein. This dimension included items, which reflected a sensitivity to catch moods from each other or from general emotional atmosphere (e.g., people in bad mood around me, excitement around me). This exchange is believed to be typically at a subtle, almost imperceptible level (Goleman, 1995, Sullins, 1991). Cacioppo (1995) observes that just seeing someone express an emotion can evoke that mood, whether one realizes one is mimicking the facial expression or not. He believed that there is a synchrony—a transmission of emotions. People who are particularly susceptible to emotional contagion; their innate sensitivity makes their autonomic nervous system more easily triggered. Bernieri (1991) believes that this synchrony facilitates the sending and receiving of moods, even if the moods are negative. According to Hoffman (1984), this subtle emotional exchange seems to represent an important aspect of emotional empathy, because it allows vicarious responsiveness to another's emotional state. In part, Hoffman's outlook is consistent with that of emotion specificity theorists and those who propose evolutionarily programmed biological feedback systems for emotional recognition and responsiveness (e.g., Ekman, 1973). Given this view, emotional contagion noted in newborns' reactive crying to another infant's cries would understandably be included as

precursory evidence for empathy in Hoffman's developmental model. The third factor labeled susceptibility to emotional contagion accounted for 8.8% of the variance. Overall, the three factors together explained 42.7% of items variance.

An estimation of item to total correlation yielded that all the 26 items with high factor loadings were positively and significantly correlated with the total score (ranging from $r = .31$ to $.60$). The 26-item Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) was also found to exhibit high internal consistency and high split-half reliability. The multifactor EES yielded a high alpha internal consistency coefficient of $.85$. A split-half reliability coefficient (using the Spearman-Brown correction) of $.82$ for the EES was also obtained, which was a further reason to believe that the EES was highly consistent. Moreover, the alphas of the three factors were also found to be reasonably high (Tendency to be Moved by others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences: $\alpha = .81$; Emotional Responsiveness: $\alpha = .70$; Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion: $\alpha = .61$).

The factors of the Emotional Empathy Scale were expected to intercorrelate and they did, but not highly so (see Table 9). Tendency to be Moved by others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences correlated strongly with the Extreme Emotional Responsiveness ($r = .56$, $p < .000$). Thus, indicating that people who are vicariously aroused by others' affective states or expressions are likely to be drawn in by a need to help out the other person. The correlation of Tendency to be Moved by others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences with Susceptibility of Emotional Contagion ($r = .47$, $p < .000$) was also reasonably high, suggesting that the experience of another's emotional state perhaps requires a vicarious match between a

person's response and the emotion of another. In addition, Emotional Responsiveness was also found to be significantly and positively correlated with Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion ($r = .45, p < .000$). It might be suggested that an inclination to respond with heightened arousal may require one to be in sync with the moods of people around.

The present results not only offer specific information about the relationships among subscales, but also provide evidence for the robustness of the findings from the factor analysis that the construct of emotional empathy is a multidimensional personality attribute. In a sample of 331, the factorial structure recommended three equally viable subscales. The subscales have been found to correlate at $p < .000$ with the total (Tendency to be moved by others' positive and negative emotional experiences $r = .89$; Extreme emotional expressiveness $r = .82$; and, susceptibility to emotional contagion $r = .72$) but in comparison are moderately intercorrelated. This implies that each dimension is explaining variance specific to its own factor. And, therefore, may be recognized as conceptually distinct from each other.

In general, the results of the present investigation support the theoretical model of emotional empathy, described earlier by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). It may be concluded that the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) constitutes three dimensions, which measure related aspects of emotional empathy. However, it is noteworthy that though the three dimensions are conceptually distinct, they share the underlying theme of responding with heightened arousal to others' emotional experiences. The affective focus on empathic content and process is clearly conveyed by Hoffman (1976), who stated that "empathy refers to the involuntary, at times forceful, experiencing of another person's emotional state. It is elicited either by expressive cues

which directly reflect the other's feelings or by other cues which convey the impact of external events on him" (p.126). Thus, affective response is the sine qua non of empathy, and this response can be situational as well as expressive cues. That the affect experienced is "more appropriate to someone else's situation than to one's own situation" (Hoffman, 1982, p.282) is a major distinction between empathy and direct emotional arousal. Furthermore, Hoffman believed that empathy can operate without role taking. The critical point is that role taking, when part of the empathic process, operates in the service of affect. In concordance with Hoffman's notion, this study explicates the personality construct of emotional empathy as the capacity to respond to others' emotional experiences with heightened affective responsiveness.

Therefore, the 26-item measure of emotional empathy may be treated as consisting of three sub traits, which extend into a single trait of emotional empathy representing the tendency to vicariously experience the emotional expressions and experiences of others—feeling what the other person feels.

The norms for the EES were also determined in the present study. Data were analysed to find out the distribution of scores of the study participants. The combined male and female norms for the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), given in Table 10, are applicable and appropriate most of the time especially when cross-gender comparisons are being made.

However, it is noteworthy that research shows that women tend to be generally more emotionally empathic than men (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Mehrabian, Young, & Sato, 1988; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). The gender differences in emotional

empathy were explored in the present study, to test the widely held view that females are more empathic than males, a stereotype that is consistent with both sociological and psychological theory. For example, sociologists have attributed to differences in behavior of males and females to variations in the traditional social roles, in which males are expected to be concerned with tasks that allow the family and society to function, whereas females are concerned with harmony within the family unit (Parsons & Bales, 1955). From this perspective, nurturance and empathy are viewed as important characteristics for women because they enable women to carry out their role successfully. There are also some empirical data to support the notion that girls are socialized to be more attuned to others' emotions than are boys (e.g., Grief, Alvarez, & Ulman, 1981; Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987). In the present study, the stereotype seems to hold. The results demonstrated that women obtained significantly higher scores on the EES as compared to men, $t(279) = 3.94, p < .000$.

However, from a review of studies on gender differences in empathy, it appears that gender differences depend on how empathy is operationalized (see for example Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). For some measures of empathy (e.g., paper-and-pencil self reports), large gender differences were found; for other measures (e.g., picture/story indices), small differences were found; for still other measures (e.g., facial/gestural and physiological measures), no gender differences were found. These results were interpreted in the following way. The gender differences favoring females may be biases in the self-report. That is, because women are expected to be more concerned for others as well as more emotional than males, both males and females might have responded in ways consistent with sex-role stereotypes (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983).

Note, that in the present study, women scored significantly higher on all the subscales of EES, in comparison with men. They not only reported more tendency to be moved by others' emotional experiences, $t(276) = 3.5, p < .001$, more emotional responding, $t(276) = 3.7, p < .000$, but also reported more susceptibility to emotional contagion, $t(276) = 2.23, p < .02$. Thus, owing to different patterns of socialization, females are more likely to respond emotionally in reaction to another's affect than are boys, as is also evident from the results. It is of course possible that socialization may not provide a full explanation. There is evidence that humans have an innate empathic disposition (Hoffman, 1975). Furthermore, newborn female infants appear to be more likely to cry than are males in response to another infant's cry (Hoffman & Levine, 1976). Such crying is not true empathy, but does suggest the possibility of a dispositional precursor that together with later socialization differences account for later gender differences in men and women. In addition, Zahn-Waxler (1993, 2000) has described social and biological contributors to the widely recognized gender differences in empathic responding. Compared with boys, girls might have greater orientation toward empathic responding. For the present study, on the basis of results obtained, separate male and female norms were also developed (see Table 13). The percentile scores were also calculated which might be used to compare the individual scores with the group. Thus, percentile scores might help to interpret raw scores relative to the group.

Clearly, the EES is a highly reliable tool for measuring the personality trait of emotional empathy. This newer scale retains the major virtue of the measures of empathy, based on the affective definition (e.g., BEES, Mehrabian, 1996; EETS, Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) and meets current psychometric standards.

STUDY 2

Validation of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

Objectives of the Study

For the justification of novel trait measures, for the validation of test interpretation, or for the establishment of construct validity, *convergent* validation as well as *discriminant* validation is required (Campbell & Fiske, 1957). This part of the research was designed to validate the measure of emotional empathy—the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), by determining its convergent and discriminant validity.

The present investigation included four studies. As one would expect a valid measure of emotional empathy to be related to measures that assess affective empathy, therefore, in Study I, the convergent validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) was determined by evaluating its correlation with the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES, Mehrabian, 1996). Having explored the convergent validity of the EES, the relation of emotional empathy with its theoretically related constructs was examined in studies II, III and IV, in order to determine the discriminant validity of the scale. Study II was based on exploring the relation of emotional empathy with affiliative tendency as measured by the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF, Mehrabian 1994). Study III assessed the association between emotional empathy and delinquency as measured by the Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG, Gibson, 1971). Finally, the relation of emotional empathy with trait emotional awareness, employing the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) was explored in study IV. Following are the details of the four studies.

Study I: Convergent Validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

In this research, the convergent validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) was established by evaluating its relation with the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES, Mehrabian, 1996). It was expected that 26-item Emotional Empathy Scale would be positively associated with 30-item Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale.

Hypotheses

Following hypotheses were devised to test the relation of EES with BEES:

1. There will be positive correlation between Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES).
2. The EES subscales will be positively related with Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale.

Method

Sample

Fifty seven men and forty four women (N =101) M.Sc. students from Quaid-i-Azam University, with an average age of 21.6, S.D. = 2.5 (ages ranging from 20 to 24 years) participated in the present study. The proportions belonging to the urban and rural areas of Pakistan were 70% and 30%, respectively. While 69% were from the natural sciences and 31% were from the social sciences departments. The same sample as used in the previous study was employed for the present study.

Instruments

A detail of the instruments used in the present study is as follows.

Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

The Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) is a 26-item self-report measure of the tendency to experience vicariously the (positive and negative) emotional experiences of others (Annexure I). The theoretical model of emotional empathy proposed by Mehrabian (1996) was used as a basis for the development of the EES. The scale measures individual differences in the trait of emotional empathy. Respondents use a 7-point scale, on which “1” represents “strong disagreement” and “7” represents “strong agreement” to indicate the extent to which each item described them. To reduce response bias, 17 items were *worded positively*, and 9 items were *worded negatively*. The EES is intended for use with adolescents and general adult population. The norms for the EES are as follows:

Mean = 143; Standard Deviation = 20

Factorial Validity & Internal Consistency (Reliability): The 30 items of the EES were factor analysed using principal components as the extraction procedure and varimax rotation was used to obtain a simple structure. The eigenvalues and the resulting scree plot provided evidence for a three factor solution. The eigenvalue of the first factor was 7.46, whereas the eigenvalues for factors 2, 3, and 4 were 2.69, 2.65, and 1.35, respectively, showing a clear difference at the fourth eigenvalue. The three factors collectively explained 42.7% of the total variance. These

results suggest that the scale is a multidimensional measure of the trait of emotional empathy. The three subscales were labeled (a) Tendency to be Moved by Others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences, (b) Emotional Responsiveness, and (c) Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion. The alpha coefficient of .85, and split-half reliability coefficient of .82, was obtained for the EES. The alphas for the EES subscales are as follows: Tendency to be Moved by Others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences: $\alpha = .81$; Emotional Responsiveness: $\alpha = .70$; and Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion: $\alpha = .61$.

Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES)

Mehrabian (1996) developed the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES), which is comparatively a newer scale and is based on a substantial amount of research evidence derived with the earlier Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS, Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). Mehrabian noted that the 30-item BEES incorporated the most important components of emotional empathy and, thereby, provided a more up-to-date and *balanced* assessment of this trait. The appropriate population with which BEES can be used is ages 15 and older. Subjects report the degree of their agreement and disagreement with each of its 30-items using a 9-point agreement—disagreement scale. The BEES is designed to reduce “response bias.” One-half of the items were positively worded and the remaining 15 items were negatively worded. A total score is computed for each subject by algebraically summing his/her responses to all 15 of the positively worded items and by subtracting from this quantity the algebraic sum of his/her responses to all the negatively worded items, i.e., Total score = (positively worded sum) – (negatively worded sum). The norms for the BEES are as follows:

Mean = 45; Standard Deviation = 24.

Unidimensionality of the BEES & its Internal Consistency (Reliability): The intercorrelation matrix among the 30 items of BEES was factor analysed and a principal components analysis was obtained. The eigenvalue plot and the associated scree test showed evidence for a one factor solution: Eigenvalues for the first three factors were 7.3, 2.4, and 1.9, respectively, showing clear difference at the second eigenvalue. As a result, Mehrabian concluded that the BEES consisted of a unitary dimension. This result is also consistent with the high coefficient alpha internal consistency of the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES), which is .87. This compares favorably with the coefficient alpha of .84 for the original Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS) (Mehrabian, 1996).

Validity Data: Evidence on the validity of the BEES is available indirectly through its high positive correlation of .77 with the original Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS) (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). The high positive correlation between the BEES and the original EETS suggests that much of the validation data for the original scale can be attributed as well to the present BEES (Mehrabian, 1996).

Correlations with Measures of Aggression, Violence, and Optimism: Mehrabian (1997b) found that both the BEES and the EETS related significantly and negatively ($r = -.31$ and $r = -.22$, respectively) to the Maiuro, Vitaliano, and Cahn (1987) Aggression Scale and also both related significantly and negatively ($r = -.50$ and $r = -.43$, respectively) to the Risk of Eruptive Violence Scale (Mehrabian, 1996a). Finally, although the BEES related significantly and

positively to the Revised Optimism-Pessimism Scale (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), the EETS did not. These correlations show that, compared with EETS, the BEES consistently exhibited stronger relationships with measures of aggression, violence, and optimism, thus, indicating superior construct validity of the BEES.

Procedure

The 25-item Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), along with the 30-item Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) were administered to 101 M.Sc. students of Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Data were collected from the students in the central library of the university. The participants were administered the two scales, with special instructions to go through each item carefully and to give their responses by selecting that response category which was closest to how they feel. The participants were requested not to skip any item on the two scales. The questionnaires were completed anonymously, and the participation in the study was voluntary.

To investigate the relation between the two measures of emotional empathy, correlation estimates were computed.

Results

The results of the present study provided support for the convergent validity of the EES. It was hypothesized that the two measures of affective empathy would be positively associated. As proposed, results showed a significant and positive correlation of .65 ($p < .000$) between the EES and BEES. Means and standard deviations were also obtained for each of the scale. Table 1 contains the results.

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Coefficient Between the EES and the BEES (N=101)

<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>Scales</i>	<i>2</i>
136.7	23.3	1.	Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)	.65***
38.12	29.1	2.	Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES)	

***($p < .000$)

The correlation of the EES subscales with the BEES was also computed. Significant positive correlations were yielded between the EES subscales and BEES (ranging from $r = .54$ to $.58$, $p < .000$). The results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Correlation Coefficient Between the Emotional Empathy Subscales and the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) (N= 101)

EES Subscales	BEES
Tendency to be Moved by Others' Emotional Experiences	.54***
Emotional Responsiveness	.57***
Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion	.58***

***($p < .000$).

Discussion

In order to establish the construct validity of a measure, it is of crucial importance to establish its *convergent* validity. The relationship of a test to independent measures or indices of the same trait is known as convergent validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). The present study aimed at testing the convergent validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES). Therefore, the association of EES with the affective measure of empathy—the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) was examined.

The evidence for the convergent validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) came from the high positive and significant correlation of .65 ($p < .000$) with the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES, Mehrabian, 1996). This finding is, on one hand, indicative of similar theoretical underpinnings of the two measures of emotional empathy, and on the other hand, implies that the EES does account for variance not measured by BEES. In addition, the subscales

of the EES were also found to be positively associated with the BEES (ranging from $r = .54$ to $.58$, $p < .000$). The magnitude of correlation between the BEES and *susceptibility to emotional contagion* was strongest ($r = .58$, $p < .000$), suggesting that an important aspect of the construct of affective empathy, as assessed by the two measures, is a subtle emotional exchange—that is, a sensitivity to be moved by someone else’s expression of feelings (e.g., people in bad mood around me). It has been suggested that people who are particularly susceptible to emotional contagion are more empathic, since they are highly sensitive to other’s feelings (Sullins, 1991). Therefore, the two measures of emotional empathy essentially have similar underlying affective content.

Thus, the present study provides sufficient evidence for the convergent validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES).

Study II: Discriminant Validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

The objective of Study II was to determine whether the measure of emotional empathy would perform in a fashion consistent with expectations based on theory. Therefore, the relation of emotional empathy with its theoretically linked variable of affiliative tendency was assessed, thereby, verifying the discriminant validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES). Positive correlation was expected between the two variables.

Hypotheses

For the above-mentioned purpose, the following hypotheses have been formulated:

1. Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) will be positively correlated with Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF).
2. EES subscales will be positively correlated with Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF).
3. Individuals higher in emotional empathy will be more affiliative, as compared to individuals lower in emotional empathy.

Method

Sample

A sample consisting of 150 (75 women and 75 men) postgraduate students of Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Arid Agricultural University, Rawalpindi; Hamdard University, Islamabad; and, Post-Graduate Government College for Women, Rawalpindi, was selected. The

age range was 20 to 24 years of age ($M = 22$, $S.D. = 1.52$). From the total sample, 75% participants belonged to the urban and 25% belonged to the rural area. Demographic information revealed that 72% and 28% of the participants were from the natural sciences and social sciences, respectively. The same sample as used in the previous study was employed for the present study.

Definitions of the Variables

The definitions of the variables under study are given below.

Emotional Empathy

For the present study the construct of emotional empathy has been defined as:

Emotional empathy is the tendency to feel and experience vicariously the (positive and negative) emotional experiences and/or expressions of others—feeling what the other person feels (p.1, Mehrabian, 1996).

Corresponding to the above definition, the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) has been developed (see Study 1). According to the EES, the construct of emotional empathy consists of the following dimensions: (a) Tendency to be Moved by Others' Negative and Positive Emotional Experiences, (b) Emotional Responsiveness, and (c) Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion.

Affiliative Tendency

Mehrabian (1994b) defined affiliative tendency as follows:

generalized positive expectations in social relationships: expecting social exchanges to be generally positive, pleasant, and rewarding and behaving in ways that are consistent with such generalized expectations (p. 97-98).

Based on the above given definition, the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) has been developed by Mehrabian (1994a).

Instruments

Following instruments were employed to study the relation of emotional empathy with affiliative tendency.

Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

The EES was used for the assessment of the trait of emotional empathy (Annexure I). Details of the scale appear in the instrument section of Study I.

Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF)

The Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF, Mehrabian, 1994) contains 26 items and participants report the degree of their agreement or disagreement with each item. The 26-item Affiliative Tendency Scale is balanced for “response bias.” One-half of the items are positively worded. A second half of the items are negatively worded. A total score is computed for each subject by algebraically summing his/her responses to all 13 of the positively worded items and by subtracting from this quantity the algebraic sum of his/her responses to all 13 of the negatively worded items. The norms for the MAFF are as follows: Mean = 28 ; Standard Deviation = 22 (Mehrabian, 1994).

Internal Consistency & Reliability: The Affiliative Tendency Scale has an internal consistency reliability of .80. It also has a high test-retest reliability of .89 (Mehrabian, 1976).

Validity: Experimental work (Mehrabian & O’Reilly, 1980) has yielded a positive and significant correlation of .54 ($p < .01$) between affiliative tendency and emotional empathy. Also, it was found that the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) correlated positively with liking of others (Steers & Braunstein, 1976), judged similarity and compatibility with others, favorable impressions of strangers (Solar & Mehrabian, 1973), superior adjustments to high social density (Miller, Rossbach, & Munson, 1981), self-disclosure (Morris, Harris, & Rovins, 1981), confidence about social skills, positiveness and amount of conversation in interactions with strangers (Ksionzky & Mehrabian, 1980). Affiliative tendency correlated negatively with social

anhedonia (inability to derive pleasure from social exchanges), and loneliness, social avoidance and distress (Morris et al., 1981).

Translation: For the present study, Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) was translated for use with the Pakistani population (Annexure J). Following procedure was used to translate the items of the (MAFF) into Urdu language:

1. The items of the MAFF were presented in the form of a Performa to 5 psychologists (teachers, National Institute of Psychology), who were familiar with test translation procedures and had good command over Urdu and English languages. They were given special instructions to translate the items in such a way that the translated items capture the same conceptual meaning contained in the items in English.
2. The translations, thus obtained, were closely scrutinized by the researchers of the present study for clarity of conceptual meaning. The translated items which best represented the items in English were retained.
3. Another Performa was prepared in order to check the cultural relevance of each item. The Performa was given to 10 individuals (5 teachers and 5 students) who evaluated each item for its relevance to Pakistani culture.
4. All items were examined for frequency of endorsement. Except 2 items (i.e., item no. 16 and 23), all items of the scale received 100% endorsement, and were thus retained for the final format of the scale. The content of the items indicated as not relevant to Pakistani culture was modified in the light of feedback obtained from the participants.

Procedure

The participants (N=150) were administered the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES). Respondents also completed the measure of affiliative tendency—the MAFF, selected for discriminant validity check. Data were collected from the students visiting the central libraries of the universities. The participants were briefed individually or in groups, with special instructions to go through each item very carefully and to give their responses by selecting that response category which is closest to what they feel. The participants were also requested not to skip any item on the two scales. The questionnaires were completed anonymously. After the respondents filled out the questionnaires, the researcher examined them in order to make sure that all the items were answered.

The data were analysed statistically to evaluate alpha reliability of the translated version of the MAFF and the EES, and to test the hypothesized relation between the two variables of emotional empathy and affiliative tendency, by computing correlation coefficients estimates and independent groups *t*-test.

Results

Descriptive Statistics and Reliability Estimates

Cronbach's alphas of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF), for the sample of 150 participants, were satisfactorily high i.e., .84 and .71, respectively. The means and standard deviations of scores on the two scales were also obtained. Table 1 presents the results.

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Alpha Coefficients of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) (N=150)

Scales	No. of Items	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Alpha Coefficient
Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)	26	143	19.3	.84
Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF)	26	152	20.1	.71

Hypotheses Testing

To test the hypothesis that emotional empathy will be positively associated with affiliative tendency, correlation coefficient was computed between EES and MAFF. Emotional empathy was found to be significantly and positively correlated with affiliative tendency ($r = .48$, $p < .000$), suggesting that people who can vicariously experience the emotional experiences of others tend to hold positive interpersonal expectations and behave in accordance with their expectations. The results are indicated in Table 2.

Table 2

Correlation Coefficient Between the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) (N= 150)

Scales	2
1. Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)	.48***
2. Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF)	

***($p < .000$)

As indicated in Table 3, all EES subscales exhibited positive relation with affiliative tendency (ranging from $r = .34$ to $.47$, $p < .000$). These moderate and significant correlations were expected and support the second hypothesis of the present study. *Tendency to be moved by others' positive and negative emotional experiences* was most strongly related with affiliative tendency. Thus, suggesting that people who are responsive to the different flavors of emotions occurring in other people, such as tears, joy, excitement, etc. are more likely to form a rapport while interacting.

Table 3

Correlation Coefficient Between the Emotional Empathy Subscales and the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) (N= 150)

EES Subscales	MAFF
Tendency to be Moved by Others' Emotional Experiences	.47***
Emotional Responsiveness	.34***
Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion	.34***

***($p < .000$)

The results of an independent groups *t*-test revealed that individuals in the high empathy group obtained significantly greater scores on the MAFF ($M = 160.5$, $SD = 18$) than individuals in the low empathy group ($M = 144$, $SD = 18.8$), $t(148) = 5.48$, $p < .000$, thereby verifying the third hypothesis, and providing evidence for validity of the EES. The results are presented in Table 4.

Table 4

The Difference of Mean Scores Between High and Low Emotional Empathy Groups on Affiliative Tendency (N= 150)

Emotional Empathy		Mean Scores on Affiliative			
Scale (EES)	N	Tendency Scale (MAFF)	SD	<i>t</i> -value	df
High Group	75	160.5	18.02	5.48	
				<i>p</i> < .000	148
Low Group	75	144.0	18.86		

Discussion

For any personality measure, it is of critical importance to establish its construct validity (Bagozzi, 1993). Pertinent to construct validity is discriminant validity. It is, therefore, necessary to demonstrate that our test is unrelated to variables that it is not postulated to reflect, which is known as *discriminant* validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). As a discriminant validity check, the present study related emotional empathy with affiliative tendency.

The concept of emotional empathy—the tendency to vicariously experience the emotions of another—is fundamental for understanding a broad range of social phenomena including, in particular, the interpersonal relations and the prosocial orientations (Batson & Coke, 1981; Blum, 1981; Eisenberg, Guthrie, Cumberland et al., 2002; Eisenberg, Zhou, & Koller, 2001; Hoffman, 1981). Within this latter context, an empathic disposition has been found to be related with the capacity to affiliate with other people (Crouse & Mehrabian, 1977; Mehrabian, 1997; Mehrabian

& O'Reilly, 1980). Therefore, the relation of emotional empathy to affiliative tendency was central to establishing the discriminant validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), in the present study.

Emotional empathy is the inclination to vicariously respond with higher arousal to others' emotional experiences, whereas affiliative tendency highlights generalized positive expectations, and associated positive behaviors in social interactions with others. It may be suggested that people who are sensitive to others' emotional states are more likely to respond with positive interpersonal behaviors towards others. As noted above, emotional empathy has been found to be positively associated with affiliative tendency, from a series of studies. Thus, the positive direction of the relation is an evidence of heightened emotional sensitivity together with a pattern of positive interpersonal orientations.

In addition, Mehrabian and O'Reilly (1980) found that the capacity for emotional empathy shares similar underlying components with tendency to affiliate with others. In one of their investigations, they explored affiliation and emotional empathy-related traits on the basis of 3 dimensional PAD Temperament Model. They reported that affiliative tendency and emotional empathy were positive and significant functions of trait pleasure (P) (the balance, across situations and over time, of positive affective states over negative ones) and trait arousability (A) (larger arousal response and slower habituation of arousal to unusual, complex, or changing stimuli). Thus, an important characteristic of empathic people could be that they tend to be not only sensitive but are more interpersonally positive and affiliative. The study also found emotionally empathy and affiliation at odds with trait Dominance (D) (habitual feelings of

control over life situations, events, or others people). Thus, implying that since such people are not motivated by a need to control or dominate others, they are expected to be purely prosocial. Since similar elements underlie the two attributes, it seems reasonable to predict linear positive relation between emotional empathy and affiliative tendency.

In order to obtain valid results, as a preliminary step, Cronbach's alphas for the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF, Mehrabian, 1994) were examined for the sample of 150 participants. EES exhibited high internal consistency of .84, whereas, MAFF showed comparatively low but adequate alpha reliability coefficient of .71.

The relation of emotional empathy to affiliative tendency was central to establishing the discriminant validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), in the present study. Based on the above mentioned theoretical foundations, it was hypothesized that emotional empathy would be positively correlated with affiliative tendency. As predicted, a significant positive correlation ($r = .48, p < .000$) between the EES and MAFF was found. Thus, the findings of the study supported the notion that people characterized by heightened sensitivity to others' emotional experiences tend to hold positive expectations in social relationships and behave in accordance with their expectations. It might be suggested that an empathic disposition is likely to engender a basic faith in human relationships and effectively implement associated positive behaviors in one's social interactions. Such people tend to be friendly, enjoy other people's companionship and are able to form close relationships. The study also provided support for the second hypothesis that all EES subscales would be positively associated with affiliative tendency ($r = .34$ to $.47, p < .000$). The *tendency to be moved by others' positive and negative emotional experiences* was, however, most

strongly associated with affiliative tendency ($r = .47, p < .000$), suggesting that people who are sensitively responsive to others' emotions of happiness, excitement, pain, and distress are more likely to be friendly, warm, and pleasant in their social interactions. Thus, it is likely that an understanding of others' emotions predispose the individual towards positive interpersonal orientations.

These results were further confirmed by computing means and t -test indices. It was hypothesized that emotionally empathic individuals would be more affiliative, as compared to individuals lower in emotional empathy. In consonance with the hypothesis, t -test analyses yielded that the low and high scorers on the EES significantly differed on the variable of affiliative tendency, $t(148) = 5.48, p < .000$. These results confirm the third hypothesis of the study.

Findings of the present study show that the trait of emotional empathy helps explain some of the variance in social behavior, thus, indicating its promise for understanding a broad range of social phenomena including interpersonal relations and prosocial orientations. Emotional empathy, therefore, is not any of these behaviors, but may pertain to all of them.

Study III: Discriminant Validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

Study III was conducted to examine the relation of emotional empathy with delinquency. Consistent with research on emotional empathy and delinquency (e.g., Chandler, 1973; Cohen & Strayer, 1996; Feshbach & Feshbach, 1982; Little & Kendall, 1979), the relationship between the two variables was expected to be negative. This investigation was the second discriminant validity check, which related emotional empathy to delinquency. In addition, the psychometric characteristics of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and the Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG, Gibson, 1971) such as, means, standard deviations, and Cronbach's alphas were analysed.

Hypotheses

Based on the above-mentioned objective, the following hypotheses were formulated:

1. Emotional empathy will be negatively correlated with delinquency.
2. EES subscales will be negatively correlated with Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG).
3. Individuals higher in emotional empathy will score lower on the measure of delinquency as compared to individuals lower in emotional empathy.

Method

Sample

A sample of 125 adolescent boy students from the Gordon College for Boys, Rawalpindi; Asghar Mall College for Boys, Rawalpindi; and, F. G. College for Boys, H-9, Islamabad, was used for the present study. The average age of the participants was 16.9 years, S.D. = 1.8 (ages ranging from 16 to 18 years). Of the 125 participants, 70% were from natural sciences and 30% were from the social sciences as regards the areas of study. The same sample as used in the previous study was employed for the present study.

Definitions of the Variables

Definitions of the variables of interest to the present study are presented below.

Emotional Empathy

For the present study the construct of emotional empathy has been defined as:

the tendency to feel and experience vicariously the (positive and negative) emotional experiences and/or expressions of others—feeling what the other person feels (p.1, Mehrabian, 1996).

Corresponding to the above definition, the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) has been developed (see Study 1). According to the EES, the construct of emotional empathy consists of

the following dimensions: (a) Tendency to be Moved by Others' Negative and Positive Emotional Experiences, (b) Emotional Responsiveness, and (c) Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion.

Delinquency

Psychologists continue to define the construct of delinquency in legal terms rather than psychological terms (Quay, 1987). The present research employs the standard legal definition of delinquency used by most researchers across cultures, which was put forward by Trajanowicz and Morash (1987), which is as follows: "delinquent behavior is prohibited by law and is carried out by youths approximately up to the age of eighteen. State laws in United States legally prohibit two types of behaviors for juveniles. The first included behaviors, which are criminal for adults, such as the serious offenses of murder, rape, fraud, burglary, and robbery. Offenses, which are criminal for adults but do not involve serious harm to other people, such as the offenses of trespassing and drug abuse, are also included in this category. Status offenses are the second type of delinquent behavior, and they are not legally prohibited for adults. Running away from home, being out of the control of ones' parents ("unruly" or "ungovernable"), and being truant from school are the common status offenses."

Similarly, for Yoshikawa (1994), juvenile delinquency is a legal concept that includes chronic truancy, vandalism, stealing, or otherwise breaking the law, and is also subsumed under conduct disorders. Whereby, conduct disorder is a persistent pattern of repeatedly violating the

rights of others or age-appropriate social norms. Children, who chronically lie, cheat, run away from home, or show disregard for others, fall into this category.

Instruments

The details of the instruments employed in the present study are as follows:

Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

The EES was used for the assessment of the trait of emotional empathy (Annexure I). Details of the scale appear in the instrument section of Study I.

Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG)

In order to explore the relationship between emotional empathy and delinquency, the Urdu version of 37 items Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG) was used. This scale was developed by Gibson (1971). Rifai and Tariq (1999) translated SRDSG into Urdu language, and examined its psychometric properties. The SRDSG consists of 37 items and uses a dichotomous response format (1 = No; 2 = Yes). Rifai and Tariq reported that the alpha coefficient for the scale was .90. The item to total score correlations ranged from .32 to .64 with an average of .43, thus indicating high internal consistency among items of the scale. Factor analysis of the scale items revealed one major factor that explained 26% of the total variance.

For the present study, the Self- Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG) was further refined. The yes-no format of the scale was changed. The yes-no response format has been regarded as too simplistic which makes it difficult to capture the full subtlety of human behavior with such items (Heim, 1975). Respondents often have trouble with yes-no items, preferring to say whether an item applies to them more or less rather than yes or no. Such a response-format is not highly informative, with the result that the questionnaire will not be as accurate as it should be. Accordingly, current psychometric practice favors a Likert format of at least a 4-point scale. Consequently, a 4-point response format that ranged from “never” (1) to “often” (4) was used for the SRDSG in the present study (Annexure K).

Procedure

For testing the hypotheses of the present study, the EES and the Urdu version of Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG) were administered together to the students. The students were approached individually or in groups. They were not informed about the exact purpose of the study. The participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to gather information anonymously about their personal experiences. It was observed that some of the respondents were initially hesitant about revealing information that could mar their reputation. Therefore, participants were assured that their responses were important only for psychological research, and would not be revealed to any of their teachers/authority figures. All participation was anonymous. They were given a choice to participate or not. Those who agreed were asked to complete EES and SRDSG. They were encouraged to be candid and open in their responses.

After having collected the data, it were subjected to *t*-test analyses and correlation coefficient was computed to test the hypotheses of the present study. Descriptive statistics and Cronbach alphas for the EES and the SRDSG were also determined.

Results

Descriptive Statistics and Reliability Estimates

In order to evaluate the internal consistency of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and the Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG), Cronbach's alpha coefficients were computed. The alpha reliability of the EES and SRDSG was found to be considerably high. Means and standard deviations were also computed for the scores on the EES and SRDSG. The results are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Alpha Coefficients of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and the Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG) (N=125)

Scales	No. of Items	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Alpha Coefficient
Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)	26	140	18.0	.84
Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG)	37	56.6	21.5	.93

Hypotheses Testing

A correlation coefficient between the scores on the Emotional Empathy Scale and the Self-Reported Delinquency Scale was obtained to assess the proposition that the two scales would be negatively related. The negative correlation found between the two scales supports the notion that affective empathy inhibits delinquent actions towards others. The results are indicated in Table 2.

Table 2

Correlation Coefficient Between the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and the Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG) (N= 125)

Scales	2
1. Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)	-.28**
2. Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG)	

**($p < .001$)

In addition, all EES subscales were found to be significantly and negatively correlated with delinquency (ranging from $r = -.21$ to $-.29$, $p < .001$). Thereby, confirming the second hypothesis of the study. Table 3 presents the results.

Table 3

Correlation Coefficient Between Emotional Empathy Subscales and Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG) (N= 125)

EES Subscales	SRDSG
Tendency to be Moved by Others' Emotional Experiences	-.26**
Emotional Responsiveness	-.29**
Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion	-.21**

**($p < .001$)

Table 4 shows the results of the *t*-test analyses. Individuals high in emotional empathy were found to be significantly low on SRDSG as compared to individuals low in emotional empathy, $t(124) = 2.95, p < .004$. These results are consistent with previous research and support the third hypothesis of the present study.

Table 4

The Difference of Mean Scores Between High and Low Emotional Empathy Groups on Delinquency (N= 125)

Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)	N	Mean Scores on the			
		Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG)	SD	<i>t</i> -value	df
High Group	62	52.3	13.46	2.95	
Low Group	63	63.7	19.17		
				$p < .004$	124

Discussion

The present study presents discriminant validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES). To evaluate the discriminant validity, relation between emotional empathy and delinquency was assessed on a sample of 125 adolescent boys. Emotional empathy was expected to be negatively related with delinquency.

There is a general consensus that empathy itself is a good thing—both intrinsically and in terms of its empirical relation to other desired states of being, such as mental health (Bryant, 1987). A particularly exciting aspect of emotional empathy is that it relates with socially adaptive behavior, which lies at the heart of all healthy growing relationships. There is considerable body of research in which emotional empathy has been found to be related with moral and positive social behaviors (Batson & Coke, 1981; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). Consequently, emotional empathy typically and tragically lacks in those who commit the most mean-spirited of crimes. It has been postulated that feedback from the victim of aggression elicits an emotionally aversive response in the observer. Thus, an empathic individual is discouraged from using harmful instrumental behavior, which has the goal response of injury to another (Hoffman, 1984; N. D. Feshbach, 1978; N.D. Feshbach & S. Feshbach, 1982). In a classic study, Chandler (1973) found that highly aggressive delinquents who participated in a ten week program designed to make them more aware of other people's feelings subsequently became less hostile and aggressive, compared with a second group of delinquents who had not participated in the program (see for example, Feshbach & Feshbach, 1982). Thus, deficits in empathy certainly lead to a breakdown of moral sense and character, thus, leading to persons frequently engage in

aggressive and delinquent acts (Feshbach, 1978, 1987; Feshbach, & Feshbach, 1982; Gibbs, 1987; Mehrabian, 1997b; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Park & Slaby, 1983). Moreover, various researches have also shown that it is the affective component of empathy, which promotes the reduction of negative social behaviors, such as delinquency (Kaplan & Arbuthnot, 1985; Rottenberg, 1974).

In the present study, discriminant validity of the EES (based on the affective definition of empathy) was established by exploring the relation of emotional empathy with delinquency. As a preliminary step, psychometric properties of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) and Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG) were examined. The Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the EES and SRDSG were found to be reportedly high for the given sample.

In order to test the hypothesis that the two variables would be negatively associated with each other, correlation coefficient between the EES and SRDSG was computed. A significant negative correlation of $-.28$ ($p < .001$) was found between the two scales. Thus, implying that an empathic disposition tends to discourage the development of delinquency. Delinquent behaviors are predominantly marked by high cruelty, disrespect, and disregard for the consequences of one's own actions toward another, which include; using dangerous weapons in fighting, being insolent and arguing with people on the streets, destroying other people's things, running away from school, carrying out planned robbery into a house or apartment, and engaging in petty crimes such as shoplifting, theft, and drug use; to name a few. As is evident from the present study, it would be reasonable to suggest that such a sweeping drop in emotional and interpersonal competence might be due to lack of social capacity to vicariously experience feelings of another.

A person with an empathic bent is likely to experience aversive arousal in response to witnessing another's negative state and is, therefore, discouraged from severely hurting another and seizing for himself. The EES subscales were also found to be negatively associated with delinquency (ranging from $r = -.21$ to $-.29$, $p < .001$). The highest negative correlation was observed between *emotional responsiveness* and delinquency. Emotional responsiveness represents inclination towards experiencing vicariously the emotions of others and a need to assist others. According to Hoffman (1981), an individual's assistance is motivated by a concern for another as well as by the desire to relieve his distress. A high negative association of emotional responsiveness with delinquent behavior signifies that individuals who experience compassion and are motivated to behaviorally respond to another's emotional states and are less likely to engage in behaviors that cause serious harm to another. These findings not only verified the hypothesis, but, were in turn consistent with the existing theory and research suggesting that affective empathy plays an important role in inhibiting antisocial actions toward others (Chandler, 1973; Chandler & Moran, 1990; Cohen & Strayer, 1996; Gibbs, 1987; Hastings et al., 2000; Mehrabian, 1997b; Park & Slaby, 1983) and may in turn promote prosocial and other-related positive social behaviors (see Batson & Coke, 1981; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hoffman, 1984). The negative direction of correlation suggests that the two traits may be viewed as opposite ends of a single continuum.

However, it is noteworthy that the magnitude of relation between the two scales is modest. This relatively weak correlation could be interpreted in two ways: First, some of the behaviors tapped by the SRDSG, though delinquent, but may not be *perceived* by youth as leading to serious damage/harm to another person (e.g., "*riding a bicycle without lights after dark*," "*absence or running away from school*"). Second, the concept of delinquency needs to be

explored more elaborately within the context of Pakistani culture. This society, as much as many other developing societies, unfortunately, is marked by poverty, crime, and social injustices. Due to the deterioration of social values, many delinquent behaviors have become an accepted mode of behaving. Some items in the SDRSG tap behaviors, which are no longer considered as against the law by people (e.g., "*driving car, motor bike, or motor scooter under the age of 18*"), and have become a part of daily enjoyment (e.g., "*setting off fireworks in the street*"). As far as these indicators are concerned, empathy is not the issue. Thus, a culturally specific operationalization of delinquency is needed.

An independent groups *t*-test analyses indicated that adolescents high in emotional empathy scored significantly lower on delinquency ($M = 52.3, SD = 13.5$) as compared to adolescents low in emotional empathy ($M = 63.7, SD = 19.1$), $t(124) = 2.95, p < .004$. These results lend support to the hypothesis of the study; thus, indicating that the ability to know another person's feelings is an important factor protecting one against the development of hurtful and damaging acts towards others.

The present study not only validated the EES for use with adolescents, but holds important implications about the nature of emotional empathy. The findings suggest that highly empathic individuals, who care at an emotional level about the plight of others, tend also to engage less in behaviors, which might have harmful consequences for others.

Study IV: Discriminant Validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

Objectives of the Study

The present study was designed for a two fold objective, namely (a) to determine the discriminant validity of Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), by studying its relation with trait emotional awareness, and (b) to develop an indigenous measure of the trait of emotional awareness, which was named Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS).

This investigation was carried out in two parts. Part 1 dealt with the development of the TEAS, whereas, Part 2 was concerned with determining the discriminant validity of EES. Part 1 was further divided into two phases. Phase I concerned itself with the empirical generation of items for the TEAS. Phase II dealt with exploring the psychometric properties of the scale, whereby the factor structure, item to total correlation, Cronbach's alpha reliability, and split-half reliability were assessed.

Part 1: Development of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

Phase I: Item Generation

The measure of trait emotional awareness is based on a theoretically cohesive and comprehensive model of trait meta-mood, developed by Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, and Palfai (1995). Trait meta-mood refers to,

people's tendency to attend to their moods and emotions, discriminate among them, and regulate them (p. 128, Salovey et al., 1995).

Trait meta-mood is based on three dimensions of (1) attention to feelings, (2) clarity of feelings, and (3) mood repair. *Attention to feelings* has been defined as the degree to which an individual notices and thinks about his/her feelings. *Clarity of feelings* refers to the ability to discriminate among feelings, and *mood repair* refers to the tendency to repair unpleasant moods or maintain pleasant ones. The original model of Salovey et al. lends itself to conceptualizing mood repair as essentially an attentional process in regulating emotions. For the present investigation, in the light of theoretical arguments of temperament psychologists (e.g., Ahadi & Rothbart, 1994; Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000), the model has been modified and additional dimensions from other models were integrated into this framework, as part of the dimension of mood repair. The definition of mood repair has been extended to include emotion-related *behavior* regulation, like *inhibitory control* and *activation control*. Inhibitory control has been defined as the capacity to inhibit inappropriate approach behavior, and activation control refers to the capacity to perform an action when there is a strong tendency to avoid it (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). Therefore, mood repair has been operationalized to include both the attentional as well as the behavioral regulation, in the present study. This dimension has been defined as the tendency to repair unpleasant moods or maintain pleasant ones; capacity to inhibit inappropriate approach behavior; and, capacity to initiate action when there is a strong tendency to avoid it.

Thus, the original model of trait meta-mood by Salovey and his colleagues (1995) with the above mentioned modification was used as a basis for the development of a self-report measure of trait emotional awareness in hopes that this encompassing model would provide a solid foundation for a measure of individual's current level of trait emotional awareness.

Method

Procedure

The indicators of emotional awareness were generated empirically in the following manner:

Step I

The first step involved generating an initial item pool to represent the trait of emotional awareness. Participants in the item generation part were 13 M.Sc. students and 7 psychologists (National Institute of Psychology). In-depth interviews were conducted with the M.Sc. students. They were provided with the operational definition of the construct under investigation and were explained what it entails. Self report items were generated with three dimensions of "attention to feelings," "clarity of feelings," and "regulation." A Performa was also developed to collect indicators for each dimension from psychologists. The Performa contained a description of the construct and its dimensions (see Annexure L). Psychologists were provided with the Performa and were asked to list at least five indicators representing each dimension. The self-report items

generated from the students and psychologists were pooled together in the form of a List (see Annexure M).

Step II

In the second step, research literature was reviewed and some items for the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) were selected from the existing measure of Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS, Salovey et al., 1995). For the dimension of regulation, some items judged to assess inhibitory control and activation control were included from the measure of Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ, Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). Only those items were included which did not overlap with items generated in the first step, and were in accordance with our social cultural milieu. These items were translated into Urdu language by 4 psychologists (National Institute of Psychology).

Step III

The items accumulated in the first two steps were randomly presented in the form of a list to 4 psychologists (National Institute of Psychology) to classify them into their conceptual dimensions, keeping in view the definition of each dimension. For this purpose, a Performa was prepared which contained instructions to categorize each item to a dimension, which conceptually approximated the relevant dimension (see Annexure N).

Step IV

In order to select items most representative of each dimension, they were again examined by 12 psychologists (National Institute of Psychology). For this purpose, the items categorized into their respective dimensions of attention to feelings, clarity of feelings and regulation were presented in the form of a questionnaire to the psychologists (see Annexure O). They used a 5-point scale, on which “1” represented “strongly disagree” and a “5” represented “strongly agree,” to indicate to what extent each item described each dimension. On the basis of the feedback, items with an agreement of 80% and above were retained (see Annexure P).

Step V

The authors of this research and a psychologist (National Institute of Psychology) evaluated the items again for (a) clarity, (b) comprehensibility, and (c) redundancy. A number of items were revised and a few with redundant content were eliminated. Following this, the items selected for the final form of the scale were presented using the five-point response scale, anchored at “strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (5). To reduce acquiescence bias, 9 items were worded negatively and the rest were positively worded (see Annexure Q).

Results

Step I

In the first step a pool of 80 items were generated based on the theoretical model of trait meta-mood developed by Salovey et al. (1995). In-depth interviews were conducted with M.Sc. students and psychologists. Each item selected for the initial pool of 80 items reflected a tendency to attend to ones' moods and emotions, discriminate clearly among them, and regulate them, within the framework of the model.

Step II

Potential items for the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) were culled from self-report measures of Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS, Salovey et al., 1995) and the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ, Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). Four statements were initially selected. They were translated into Urdu language and were included in the list of 80 items, resulting in 84 items (see Annexure M).

Step III

Four psychologists (National Institute of Psychology) categorized each of the 84 items into their respective dimensions. They used a Performa to place each item in its corresponding dimension, in line with the definitions of the dimensions provided (see Annexure N).

Step IV

In order to select items most representative of each dimension they were again evaluated by 12 psychologists on a questionnaire (see Annexure O) for the degree to which they measured a tendency towards trait emotional experience. 40 items were retained on the basis of having received an endorsement of 80% and above (see Annexure P).

Step V

The researchers examined each of the 40 statements, and redundant, unclear, and confusing items were deleted. Thirty six remaining items were randomly ordered along a five-point Likert-type scale, anchored by 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly agree. 27 items were worded positively and remaining 9 items were worded negatively to control for response bias (see Annexure Q).

Phase II: Factorial Validity and Internal Consistency of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

In this phase, exploratory factor analysis was conducted to analyze the factor structure of the 36-item Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS). It was expected that the factor structure would map onto the three primary domains of attending to feelings, discriminating among them, and regulation. In addition, item-total correlation, alpha internal consistency and split-half reliability were determined in order to arrive at a psychometrically sound measure.

Method

Sample

The sample consisted of 182 post graduate students (91 females and 91 males) from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Arid Agricultural University, Rawalpindi; Hamdard University, Islamabad; and, Post-Graduate Government College for Women, Rawalpindi. The mean age of the participants was 22 years, S.D. = 1.2 (range = 20 to 24 years). They were primarily from the middle class families. Demographic information showed that the proportion of participants belonging to the urban and rural areas was 75% and 25%, respectively. The area of study of 68% and 32% of the participants was natural sciences and social sciences, respectively.

Procedure

The 36-item Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) was administered to the participants from different educational institutes of Rawalpindi and Islamabad. The participants were tested individually. They were given general instructions about how to fill out the questionnaire. They were explained that it was necessary that they should read instructions given on the questionnaire, before filling it out. They were also assured that their responses would only be used for research purposes. The respondents indicated their responses to each item by encircling the appropriate number on a 5-point continuum. After they had completed the questionnaire, the researcher carefully examined the questionnaire to ensure that all the items had been answered.

A principal components, orthogonal rotation, factor analysis of the responses of 182 participants to the 36 items was carried out. Item analyses procedures were applied to the data in order to assess the item to total correlation, alpha internal consistency, and split-half reliability of the scale.

Results

Factorial Validity

Initially, the 36 items of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) were submitted to principal components analysis. Guided by the recommendations of Cattell (1988) and Nunnally, (1967), the Scree Discontinuity Test is proposed as a preferable strategy for determining the number of factors. Eigenvalues of first through fifth factors were 5.3, 3.2, 3.0, 1.7, and 1.5, respectively. Following the logic of the scree test, the most obvious break in eigenvalues is the difference of 1.30 between the third and fourth factor, compared to .13 between the fourth and fifth factor, suggesting that a three-factor solution would be appropriate. The first three factors explained 38.5% of the total variance. On the basis of both the scree discontinuity test and the theoretical judgment, the three components emerging from the factor analysis were favored. Therefore, three-factor solution was examined using varimax rotation. The three-factor solution was clearly interpretable, and it presented the most optimal solution from the standpoint of the usual factor extraction criteria. The factor loadings following varimax rotation are illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1

The Factor Loadings, Eigenvalue, Percentages of Variances, Cumulative Percentages of Variance by First Three Factors of the 36 Items of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) in the Factor Solution Obtained Through Varimax Rotation (N=182)

No. of Items	Factor Loadings			<i>h</i>
	F1	F2	F3	
1	.51	-.18	.14	.42
2	.52	.17	.22	.35
3	.27	.49	-.01	.32
4	.53	.14	.34	.41
5	.20	.15	.57	.37
6	.00	.47	-.35	.36
7	.37	-.14	.00	.26
8	.43	.29	.00	.20
9	-.11	.35	.14	.26
10	.17	.50	-.00	.28
11	.00	.41	.15	.39
12	.10	.40	-.21	.30
13	.13	.62	-.00	.50
14	.29	.18	.16	.24
15	-.00	.43	.20	.26
16	.00	-.01	-.32	.11
17	.27	.00	.56	.48

18	.28	.01	.48	.41
19	-.01	.46	.01	.22
20	.41	.24	-.00	.32
21	.27	.22	.00	.12
22	-.00	.14	.50	.37
23	.60	.15	.01	.42
24	-.00	.00	-.27	.01
25	.49	.01	-.00	.24
26	-.00	-.21	-.11	.01
27	.17	.00	-.00	.00
28	.21	-.01	-.36	.24
29	.18	-.14	.43	.32
30	-.17	.26	-.27	.17
31	.23	-.15	-.21	.12
32	.47	.13	-.11	.25
33	.67	.13	-.01	.47
34	.27	.47	-.36	.34
35	.17	.40	-.27	.37
36	.49	00	-.00	.34
Eigenvalue	5.36	3.20	3.0	
Percentages of Variances	17.89	10.69	10.0	
Cumulative Percentages	17.89	28.58	38.5	

The content of the items was carefully examined in the light of theoretical model of trait meta-mood developed by Salovey et al. (1995). Absolute values of .40 or higher were considered significant in interpretation. The 25 items loading at .40 and beyond on the first three factors represented the conceptual three factor model proposed by Salovey and colleagues.

The three TEAS subdimensions defined the three different factors. The first factor was labeled "*Attention to Feelings*," because the items loading on it primarily concerned the tendency to attend to one's feelings. The highest positively loaded item was "When I am feeling something I attend to what I feel." A total of 10 items loaded on this factor, which accounted for 17.89% of the scale variance. Factor II explained 10.69% of variance and included 10 items. This factor was labeled "*Regulation*," because its highest loaded item was "Although I am sometimes sad, but I have a mostly optimistic outlook on life." Additional items concerned not only descriptions of active strategies to improve mood but also of capacities to suppress inappropriate behaviors and perform actions when there is a strong tendency to avoid them. Thus, confirming the decision of extending the dimension of regulation to include sub dimensions of inhibitory control and activation control, and not introducing them as separate domains. "*Clarity of Feelings*" defined the final factor. This factor accounted for 10.0% of scale variance and 5 items with loadings .40 and above loaded on it. The items loading on this factor reflected the tendency to be clear about one's feeling experiences, and a propensity to be able to distinguish clearly among various emotions. The item with the highest loading was "I am usually very clear about my feelings." The three factors collectively accounted for 38.5% of the total items variance. Thus, results from factor analysis suggest that the TEAS taps into three fundamental domains of trait meta mood, as

proposed by Salovey et al. (Annexure R). Factor loadings of items on the first three factors of 25-item Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

The Factor Loadings of the First Three Factors of the 25 Items of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) in the Factor Solution Obtained Through Varimax Rotation (N=182)

S. No.	No. of Items	Factors		
		I Attention to Feelings	II Regulation	III Clarity of Feelings
1	33	.67		
2	23	.60		
3	4	.53		
4	2	.52		
5	1	.51		
6	25	.49		
7	36	.49		
8	32	.47		
9	8	.43		
10	20	.41		
11	13		.62	

12	10	.50	
13	3	.49	
14	6	.47	
15	34	.47	
16	19	.46	
17	15	.43	
18	11	.41	
19	12	.40	
20	35	.40	
21	5		.57
22	17		.56
23	22		.50
24	18		.48
25	29		.43

Item-Total Correlations of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

Item analysis of the scores on the 36 items of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) was performed by correlating the scores on individual items with total score on the TEAS. Using the guidelines provided by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), an item was considered “weak” if it had item-total correlation less than .30. A total of 14 items failed to meet the item-total correlation criterion. All the rest of the items on the scale had item-total correlations that exceeded .30. These items were able to achieve significance on all the three factors revealed

through factor analysis. However, a few items (e.g., 17, 22, and 29), which had item-total correlation less than .30 but were significantly correlated ($p < .000$) with the total, were also retained, because they were able to achieve significant loadings of .40 and above on the three factors revealed through factor analysis. Results are given in Table 3.

Table 3

Item-Total Score Correlations for the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) (36 Items, $N=182$)

Item No.	Correlation with Total Score	Item No.	Correlation with Total Score
1	.31***	19	.30***
2	.46***	20	.46***
3	.40***	21	.22 (ns)
4	.44***	22	.29***
5	.32***	23	.52***
6	.38***	24	.15(ns)
7	.22**	25	.37***
8	.44***	26	.03(ns)
9	.23**	27	.19(ns)
10	.39***	28	.24**
11	.34***	29	.26***
12	.31***	30	.12(ns)

13	.46***	31	.18(<i>ns</i>)
14	.21**	32	.40***
15	.30***	33	.53***
16	.06(<i>ns</i>)	34	.43***
17	.27***	35	.40***
18	.35***	36	.32***

($p < .001$) *($p < .000$), *ns*=not significant

Item to total correlation analysis was generated for the 25 items selected for the final format of the TEAS. All the 25 items highly and significantly ($p < .000$) correlated with the total. The correlations ranged from .28 to .55. The results are given in Table 4.

Table 4

Item-Total Score Correlations for the 25-Item Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

($N=182$)

S. No.	Item No.	Item to Total Score Correlation	S. No.	Item No.	Item to Total Score Correlation
1	1	.32***	14	18	.41***
2	2	.50***	15	19	.31***
3	3	.48***	16	20	.45***
4	4	.50***	17	22	.30***
5	5	.33***	18	23	.52***
6	6	.37***	19	25	.38***

7	8	.45***	20	29	.28***
8	10	.40***	21	32	.43***
9	11	.38***	22	33	.55***
10	12	.32***	23	34	.42***
11	13	.47***	24	35	.37***
12	15	.34***	25	36	.39***
13	17	.29***			

*** ($p < .000$)

Internal Consistency of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

The internal consistency of the multidimensional Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) was evaluated by computing Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the total scale. Alpha internal consistency of the 36-item TEAS was found to be .72. This value increased to .76 by dropping items with factor loadings falling below .40. Results are presented in the following Table.

Table 5

Means, Standard Deviations, and Alpha Coefficient of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) With 36 Items and With Reduced 25 Items (N=182)

No. of Items	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Alpha Coefficient
36	90.6	10.7	.72
25	95.3	11.0	.76

A split-half estimate of reliability, for the 36-item TEAS, yielded .48 corrected to .65 by the Spearman-Brown formula. For the retained 25-items, correlation between the two half scores was .57, which was corrected to .72 by the Spearman-Brown formula. Table 6 shows the results.

Table 6

The Correlation Coefficients for Split-Half Reliability of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) With 36 Items and With Reduced 25 Items (N=182)

No. of Items	Split-half Correlation	Spearman Brown Correction
36	.48	.65
25	.57	.72

A Cronbach's alpha coefficient was also computed for scores on each subscale as a measure of its internal consistency reliability. Cronbach's alphas of .70, .63, and .61 for Attention to Feelings, Regulation, and Clarity of Feelings, respectively, were obtained. The internal consistency of all the subscales is satisfactory. In addition, the mean scores and the standard deviations of the scores for each of the TEAS subscales were also computed. The results are given in Table 7.

Table 7*Means, Standard Deviations, and Alpha Reliability of the TEAS Subscales (N = 182)*

Subscales	No. of Items	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Alpha Coefficient
Attention to Feelings	10	39.0	5.7	.70
Regulation	10	36.2	5.9	.63
Clarity of Feelings	5	20.4	3.0	.61

Interscale Correlations of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

Intercorrelations among the scales are depicted in Table 8. The pattern of correlations was in the expected direction. All the subscales were positively (ranging from $r = .57$ to $.86$) and significantly ($p < .000$) related with total scores on the TEAS. Attention to feelings was positively correlated with regulation and clarity of feelings. Clarity was positively associated with regulation. Furthermore, although significant relationships exist among the subscales, the pattern of correlations suggests relative conceptual independence among the three scales.

Table 8

Intercorrelations Among the Subscales of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) and Correlations With the Total Scale Items (N=182)

S. No.	Subscales	No. of Items	I	II	III	Total Score on TEAS
I	Attention to Feelings	10	--			.86 <i>p</i> <.000
II	Regulation	10	.46 <i>p</i> <.000	--		.78 <i>p</i> <.000
II	Clarity of Feelings	5	.30 <i>p</i> <.000	.34 <i>p</i> <.000	--	.57 <i>p</i> <.000

Discussion

In order to test the hypothesized relationship between emotional empathy and trait emotional awareness, a valid and reliable indigenous measure of trait emotional awareness was absolutely necessary. Therefore, the present investigation aimed at developing an indigenous measure of trait emotional awareness for use with Pakistani population, which was named Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS).

The development of the TEAS was guided by the conceptual model of trait meta-mood as proposed by Salovey et al. (1995). They proposed that the ability to utilize information provided by emotions can be adaptive, and the relation between emotion and thought need not be

antagonistic. They believe that individuals differ in their ability to attend to their feelings, feelings of others, regulate these feelings, and use the information provided by their feelings to motivate, plan, and achieve in life. Salovey et al., therefore, developed a measure of trait meta-mood, called Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS), which describes individual differences in the ability to reflect upon and manage one's emotions. Trait meta-mood has been defined as,

people's tendency to attend to their moods and emotions, discriminate among them, and regulate them (p. 128, Salovey et al., 1995).

Trait meta-mood is based on three dimensions of (a) attention to feelings (b) clarity of feelings, and (c) mood repair. Attention to feelings has been defined as the degree to which an individual notices and thinks about his/her feelings. Clarity of feelings refers to the ability to discriminate among feelings, and mood repair refers to the tendency to repair unpleasant moods or maintain pleasant ones.

In the present investigation, Salovey et al.'s model (1995) of trait meta-mood was used as the conceptual foundation for the items generated for the scale. It was expected that the factor structure of the measure would map onto the three primary domains as described by Salovey and colleagues. To test the theoretical structure of the TEAS, we performed principal components factor analysis of the responses of 182 participants to the 36 items TEAS. The initial unrotated factor analysis yielded 14 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. Evaluation of Cattell's scree plot led to a decision to retain three factors. The three factor solution was then subjected to a varimax rotation. The first factor had an eigenvalue of 5.36. The second through fourth factors in

the solution had eigenvalues of 3.2, 3.0, and 1.7, respectively. The first three factors explained 38.59% of the total variance in responses.

To achieve conceptual precision of the factors, items that had a loading lower than .40 were deleted. In addition, the item to total correlations were generated for the 36 items TEAS. Items that had item-total correlation of .30 and above were considered for the final format of the scale. This criterion was used in accordance with recommendations of Kline (1993) and Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). However, some items (i.e., items no. 17, 22, and 29) with item-total correlation less than .30 ($p < .000$) were considered, because they achieved loadings greater than .40 on the three factor solution. Moreover, these items loaded on the third factor, which contained a total of 5 items, and explained 10.0% of the variance. Deletion of these items would result in the loss of considerable variance. Examining the factor structure and the content of these items, led us to retain them for the final format of the scale.

Indeed, the three factor solution was clearly interpretable. A total of 10 items with loadings .40 and above loaded on the first factor, which explained 17.89% of the variance. An examination of the items indicated that they assessed the extent to which one tends to attend to one's emotions. Items on this factor reflected the tendency to focus on and value one's feeling experiences. It was labeled "Attention to Feelings," as hypothesized. Attention to feelings has been studied in several investigations. In one of the studies, Salovey et al. (1995) found that attention to feelings was positively correlated with private and public self-consciousness. As expected, it was not associated with ambivalence over expressing emotion and depression. Emmons and Colby (1994) found attention to be correlated with openness, affect intensity, and

belief that negative moods can be repaired. They also found attention to be unrelated to social desirability and repressive-defensiveness. In addition, attention was found to be positively associated with the frequency of experiencing positive affect but inversely associated with the frequency of negative affect (Emmons & Colby, 1994). In essence, attention to feelings indicates a tendency to be inner directed. Based on empirical evidence, it might be concluded that a predisposition to attend to one's feeling experiences has related psychological health outcomes.

The second factor, which explained 10.69% of the items variance, represented 10 items, which described emotional as well as emotion-related behavioral regulation. It was named "Regulation." As predicted, it combined items from mood repair, activation control and inhibitory control. The dimension of mood repair (Salovey et al., 1995) is primarily related with repairing unpleasant moods and maintaining pleasant ones i.e., sustaining attention and focusing attention away from aversive stimuli. However, temperament psychologists are focusing on the role of emotion-related behavioral regulation as well in the system of temperament. Behaviors aimed at regulating stressful situations have been discussed extensively by coping theorists in work on problem-focused and instrumental coping (e.g., Kliever, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Sandler et al., 1994)). Moreover, some temperament theorists have assessed *behavioral* inhibition and impulsivity as part of temperament (e.g., Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994). Furthermore, theorists and researchers in the clinical, developmental, and personality psychology frequently have discussed constructs such as inhibition of behavior, self-regulation, constraint or ego control, all of which involve the ability to modulate the behavioral expression of impulses and feelings (Block & Block, 1980; Fox, 1989; Kochanska, 1993; Tellegen, 1985). In line with these views, we proposed that the ability to modulate

behaviors would be very closely associated with and may depend on skills related to the modification of feelings.

Therefore, regulation was viewed as involving not only modulation of internal states (attentional control), but also modification of one's behaviors. As expected the items describing emotion-related behavioral regulation like inhibitory control and activation control also loaded on the second factor. Inhibitory control was defined as the capacity to suppress inappropriate approach behavior, whereas activation was defined as the capacity to initiate action when there is a strong tendency to avoid it (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). In the present study, the combination of attentional and behavioral regulation was the essence of the second factor. Thus, confirming the assertion that the abilities to modulate internal feeling states and behaviors represent a single factor. This makes it an all-inclusive dimension, which would measure a more enduring quality of regulating experience of emotion, i.e., the ability to regulate both internal feeling or physiological reactions and behavior driven by or associated with aroused internal states. There is considerable research evidence, which demonstrates that people who can regulate their emotions in social or nonsocial contexts through allocating attention appear to respond relatively positively to stressful events. For example, the abilities to shift and focus attention have been associated with lower levels of distress, frustration, and other negative emotions (Bridges & Grolnick, 1995; Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Rothbart et al., 1992).

The 5 items that loaded on the final factor were related to the ability to discriminate clearly among feelings and were labeled "Clarity of Feelings," in accordance with propositions of Salovey et al. Items in the clarity dimension inquire about insight into feeling experiences. The

ability to identify and distinguish emotions has been found to be negatively associated with vulnerability to distress. Salovey et al. (1995) reported that people who are clear about their feelings tend not to be depressed and are less likely to experience ambivalence over the amount and quality of the emotions they display to others. Indeed, Salovey et al. contended that clarity and ambivalence are opposite ends of the same dimension. This belief is also shared by Emmons (1992, cited in Salovey et al., 1995). Low clarity is also associated with neuroticism, indicating that greater mood liability is associated with a lack of clarity about mood (Salovey et al., 1995). This factor accounted for 10.0% of the item variance. The three factors together accounted for 38.5% of the total variance.

The next important step in scale construction was to assess its reliability. Estimates of the internal consistency reliability of scores on 25-item TEAS were obtained. The Cronbach alpha coefficient was .76. A split half reliability coefficient of .72 was also obtained for the TEAS. A Cronbach's alpha coefficient was also computed for scores on each subscale as a measure of its internal consistency reliability. For Attention to Feelings, Regulation, and Clarity of Feelings subscales, alpha coefficients were .70, .63, and .61, respectively.

Intercorrelations among the three subscales of the TEAS were also computed, which yielded some interesting results. All subscales were positively and significantly correlated with the total scores on the TEAS (ranging from $r = .57$ to $.86$, $p < .000$). In addition, intercorrelations among the TEAS subscales were positive and significant. The magnitude of correlation between attention to feelings and regulation was the strongest ($r = .46$, $p < .000$), implying that the individuals who focus on their feelings can act to change them. Attention to feelings was also

found to be closely associated with clarity of feelings ($r = .30, p < .000$). Thus, suggesting that people who focus on their feelings are likely to be clear about them. Clarity in discriminating emotions was also strongly correlated with the ability to regulate one's emotions and behavior ($r = .34, p < .00$), suggesting that individuals who are usually clear about their feelings are more likely to rebound from induced negative mood.

The strong correlation of clarity and attention with regulation ascertains Salovey et al.'s (1995) assertion that clarity and attention to emotions is a prerequisite to regulation. They proposed that people who attend to and are clear about their feelings terminate negative rumination processes and are able to regulate quickly, as they are clear about their feelings. It is worth mentioning that the quality of awareness TEAS measures, is not only a direct perception of feelings that may overwhelm an individual, but a more enduring quality of attending and valuing emotions; capacity to discriminate clearly among feelings; and, regulate emotions and emotion-related behaviors. It is the difference between, for example, being murderously enraged at someone and having reflective thoughts about it. In short, it represents an integration of direct experience of mood and reflective experience of mood. According to Mayer and Gaschke (1988), the reflective experience is potentially important because, unlike mood, it may be directly under the individual's control and may directly modulate mood and behavior itself.

Thus, the creation of the scale of trait emotional awareness was based on the belief that emotional awareness could be understood as falling in three primary domains: attending to moods, clarity in discrimination of feelings, and regulation of moods and behaviors. The results of the present study are in consonance with the theoretical foundations hypothesized a priori. The

measure of TEAS is a considerably reliable tool, which indexes individual differences in the degree of attention individuals devote to their feelings, clarity of their experience of these feelings, and their ability to regulate feelings and feelings-related behaviors.

Part 2: Relationship of Emotional Empathy and Trait Emotional Awareness

In order to assess the construct validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), it was important to establish the discriminant validity of the scale. The main intent of Part 2 of this study was to assess the relation of emotional empathy with trait emotional awareness, and determine the discriminant validity of the EES.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were formulated to test the relation between trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy:

1. Trait emotional awareness will be positively correlated with emotional empathy.
2. TEAS subscales will be positively correlated with EES subscales.
3. Individuals higher in trait emotional awareness will score higher on the measure of emotional empathy as compared to individuals lower in trait emotional awareness.

Method

Sample

Participants of the study were 150 M.Sc. students (75 men and 75 women) with a mean age of 22 years (range: 20 to 24 years). They belonged to various educational institutes, such as Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Hamdard University, Islamabad; Arid Agricultural University, Rawalpindi; and, Post-Graduate Government College for Women, Rawalpindi. The participants belonging to the urban and rural areas were 72% and 28%, respectively. In addition, 72% were from the natural sciences and 28% were from the social sciences departments. The same sample as used in the previous study was employed for the present study.

Definitions of the Variables

The definitions of the variables of emotional empathy and trait emotional awareness are given as follows.

Emotional Empathy

For the present study the construct of emotional empathy has been defined as,

the tendency to feel and experience vicariously the (positive and negative) emotional experiences and/or expressions of others—feeling what the other person feels (p.1, Mehrabian, 1996).

Corresponding to the above definition, the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) has been developed (see Study 1). According to the EES, the construct of emotional empathy consists of the following dimensions: (a) Tendency to be Moved by Others' Negative and Positive Emotional Experiences, (b) Emotional Responsiveness, and (c) Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion.

Trait Emotional Awareness

The trait emotional awareness has been conceptualized as,

people's tendency to attend to their moods and emotions, discriminate among them, and regulate emotions and emotion-related behaviors.

On the basis of the above given definition, the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) was developed (see Study IV). According to the TEAS, trait emotional awareness consists of the following three dimensions: (a) Attention to Feelings, (b) Regulation, and (c) Clarity of Feelings.

Instruments

Following is the detail of the instruments utilized in the present study.

Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

The Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) is a 26-item self-report measure of the tendency to experience vicariously the (positive and negative) emotional experiences of others (Annexure I). It measures individual differences in the trait of emotional empathy. The theoretical model of emotional empathy proposed by Mehrabian (1996) was used as a basis for the development of the EES. Respondents use a 7-point scale, on which “1” represents “strong disagreement” and “7” represents “strong agreement” to indicate the extent to which each item described them. To reduce response bias, 17 items were *worded positively*, and 9 items were *worded negatively*. The EES is intended for use with adolescents and general adult population. The norms for the EES are as follows:

Mean = 143; Standard Deviation = 20

Factorial Validity & Internal Consistency (Reliability): The 30 items of the EES were factor analysed using principal components as the extraction procedure and varimax rotation was used to obtain a simple structure. The eigenvalues and the resulting scree plot provided evidence for a three factor solution. The eigenvalue of the first factor was 7.46, whereas the eigenvalues for factors 2, 3, and 4 were 2.69, 2.65, and 1.35, respectively, showing a clear difference at the fourth eigenvalue. The three factors collectively explained 42.7% of the total variance. These results suggest that the scale is a multidimensional measure of the trait of emotional empathy. The three subscales were labeled (a) Tendency to be Moved by Others’ Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences, (b) Emotional Responsiveness, and (c) Susceptibility to Emotional

Contagion. The alpha coefficient of .85, and split-half reliability coefficient of .82, was obtained for the EES. The alphas for the EES subscales are as follows: Tendency to be Moved by Others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences: $\alpha = .81$; Emotional Responsiveness: $\alpha = .70$; and Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion: $\alpha = .61$.

Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

The TEAS is a multifactor 25-item self-report measure, which indexes the degree of attention that individuals devote to their feelings, the clarity of their experience of these feelings, and their capacity to regulate feelings and emotion-related behavior (Annexure R). The development of the scale was guided by the theoretical model of trait meta-mood proposed by Salovey et al. (1995). It is a five-point Likert type scale, anchored by 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree.

Factorial Validity and Internal Consistency: The factor structure of the TEAS mapped onto three primary domains of attending to feelings, discriminating among feelings, and regulating them. The three factors jointly explained 38.59% of the item variance. The 25-item scale exhibited adequate alpha reliability of .76 and split half reliability coefficient of .72. The alphas for each dimension are as follows: Attention to Feelings: $\alpha = .70$; Regulation: $\alpha = .63$; and Clarity of Feelings: $\alpha = .61$.

Procedure

Participants were given the two measures of Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) and the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES). They were asked to rate how well each item described them. Each participant completed his or her questionnaires independently. All participation was anonymous. Complete data on the items were only included for the analyses. In addition to descriptive statistics, correlation coefficients were computed and *t*-test analyses were carried out.

Results

Descriptive Statistics and Reliability Estimates

Reliability analysis of the EES and TEAS were carried out for the sample of present study. Cronbach's alphas for the two measures were found to be reportedly high. Table 1 contains the results.

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Alpha Coefficients of the EES and TEAS (N=150)

Scales	No. of Items	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Alpha Coefficient
Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)	26	143.2	19.3	.85
Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)	25	95.6	11.0	.76

Hypotheses Testing

As hypothesized, EES was found to be positively correlated with the TEAS ($r = .41, p < .000$), suggesting that individuals who focus on and are clear about their feeling experiences and have some sophistication as regards the regulation of affect and behavior tend to be emotionally empathic. The results are displayed in Table 2.

Table 2

Correlation Coefficient Between the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) and the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) (N= 150)

Scales	2
1. Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)	.41***
2. Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)	

*** ($p < .000$)

Table 3 presents the results of the intercorrelations among the subscales of the TEAS and the EES and with the total scores on the two scales. The pattern of correlations was in the anticipated direction. All TEAS subscales were found to be positively and significantly associated with the EES subscales (ranging from $r = .11$ to $.42, p < .000$). The highest correlation was observed between *attention to feelings* and *tendency to be moved by positive and negative emotional experiences of others*.

Moreover, the TEAS subscales exhibited positive relation with total score on EES (ranging from $r = .21$ to $.36$, $p < .000$). Significant and positive correlations were also obtained between the EES subscales and total score on TEAS (ranging from $r = .22$ to $.41$, $p < .000$).

Table 3

Intercorrelations Between TEAS Subscales and EES Subscales (N= 150)

TEAS Subscales	Tendency to be Moved by Others' Emotional Experiences	Emotional Responsiveness	Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion	Total EES
Attention to Feelings	.42***	.21***	.22***	.36***
Regulation	.26***	.24***	.11***	.21***
Clarity of Feelings	.17***	.14***	.20***	.26***
Total TEAS	.41***	.25***	.22***	.41***

*** ($p < .000$)

The results of an independent groups *t*-test revealed that individuals in the high trait emotional awareness group attained significantly greater scores on the EES ($M = 98.6$, $S.D. = 10.0$) than individuals in the low trait emotional awareness group ($M = 92.2$, $S.D. = 11.1$), $t(148) = 3.70$, $p < .000$. The results confirm the hypothesis that individuals higher in trait emotional awareness will score higher on the measure of emotional empathy as compared to individuals lower in trait emotional awareness. These results are presented in Table 4.

Table 4

The Difference of Mean Scores Between High and Low Trait Emotional Awareness Groups on Emotional Empathy (N= 150)

Trait Emotional Awareness Scale		Mean Scores on the Emotional Empathy Scale			
(TEAS)	N	(EES)	SD	t-value	df
High Group	75	98.6	10.0	3.70	148
Low Group	75	92.2	11.1		

p < .000

Discussion

The main purpose of this study was to determine the discriminant validity of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) by testing the relation of trait emotional awareness with emotional empathy. The study hypothesized that a predisposition towards emotional awareness would be positively related to the capacity to emotionally empathize with others. As anticipated, the study yielded a significant positive correlation ($r = .41$, $p < .000$) between trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy, indicating that individuals who are emotionally aware have the capacity to vicariously experience the feelings of other persons. The alpha coefficients for the measures of trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy were also computed for the 150 participants of the present study, which were satisfactorily high (i.e., .76 and .85, respectively).

Increasing interest in the individual differences related to emotion is evident from the great deal of research that has addressed mood and emotion (see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994, for a review). Psychologists believe that the information conveyed by emotions could be highly adaptive. Gardner (1983) described what he called personal intelligence in part as “access to one’s own feeling life.” Salovey et al. (1995) argued that individuals differ in their understanding of and the ability to articulate their affective states. And they vary in their ability to regulate such feelings and use them adaptively. Salovey et al. regard attention to, clarity, and repair of feelings fundamental to certain aspects of emotional intelligence. Moreover, in one of their investigations, Mayer and Stevens (1994) found the ability to reflect on one’s emotional experience to be highly related with the capacity to empathize with another.

Empathy builds on emotional awareness. The more one is able to reflect on and experience one’s own feelings clearly, the more skilled one would be at reading other’s feelings (Goleman, 1995; Larsen et al., 1987). Developmental perspective on empathy also suggests that an access to one’s own feelings is highly linked to experiencing others’ emotional states. Hoffman (1984), for example, proposed that the process of *primary circular reaction* (i.e., an infant cries in response to another infant’s crying through an innate releasing mechanism) is indicative of the fact that the human infant is equipped with certain mechanism, which is activated when the sound of cry is heard and he starts crying himself. That is, when the affect-laden information is registered by the system, empathy is initiated. Hoffman also proposed the process of *classical empathic conditioning* as a contributor to empathy. In this process one views another’s affective cues to the same situation one finds oneself in, and learns situational determinants of an affect. However, he elaborated that people differ in their capacity to attend to

and integrate the affective cues of another into their awareness and this capacity in turn depends on one's inclination of being aware of one's own internal states. Therefore, it might be suggested that a general access to one's own emotions promotes the capacity of experiencing other people's emotions. Similarly, the evolutionary perspective maintains that feelings for another are evoked when the emotion-laden information first enters the perceptual system. From their standpoint, it was important for human species to be aware of its own affects, in order to respond at an emotional level to witnessing emotional state or condition of another. Evolutionary theorists believe that the ability to experience emotions in oneself and in others evolved because it was highly socially adaptive. Evidently, confused about their own feelings, alexithymics are equally bewildered when other people express their feelings to them. This failure to register another's feelings is a major deficit in interpersonal relations (Lane, Sechrest, Reidel et al., 1996; Larsen et al., 1987; Mayer & Kirkpatrick, 1994). Therefore, a predisposition toward emotional awareness is expected to be highly related with empathic responsiveness.

According to Rogers (1989), the goal of life is "to be that self which one truly is." This means that the individual should move toward living in an open, friendly, and close relationship to his own feeling experiences. This greater openness to what goes on within is associated with a similar openness to experiences of external reality, as *they are* without distorting them to fit a pattern which the person already holds. Awareness of feelings had a great deal of meaning for Rogers, which he regarded as opposite to defensiveness. Due to conditions of worth, Rogers argued that humans may restrict their awareness to experiences that are positively regarded and deny or distort negatively regarded experiences. As a result, the boundaries of the province of self get limited. With a narrow awareness of visceral sensations, human organism is unlikely to

feel outside reality as it is. Healthy humans, on the other hand, freely grow in the direction natural to their organism. They tend to openly receive communications from within, no matter how terrifying, unique and personal they might be. Rogers believed that individuals who are sensitively aware of and acceptant toward their own feeling experiences can better extend that same empathic listening to another person's feelings.

Empirical work pertaining to the role of emotions in empathy-related responding—such as sympathy and personal distress—has shown that empathy generally is better predicted by emotionality and regulation (Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy et al., 1994; Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990). In general, sympathy has been found to be linked to high regulation (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Eisenberg & Okun, 1996). Whereas, people prone to personal distress tend to be low in regulation and prone to intense and frequent negative emotions (Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy et al., 1994; Eisenberg & Okun, 1996). These findings hold important implications for the present study. It might be expected that a mature vicarious experience of another's emotional experience, which is other-oriented rather than a self-focused aversive response, as measured by the EES would not only require clarity, attention, but also regulation of emotions and emotion-related behaviors.

Consistent with theoretical formulations, and as hypothesized, results from the present study yielded a significant positive relationship between trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy. Thus, suggesting that a predisposition toward attending to one's own feelings, being clear about them and regulating feelings and feelings-related behaviors is likely to be related with one's capacity to emotionally empathize with another. All TEAS subscales were also positively

and significantly associated with total score on the measure of emotional empathy (ranging from $r = .21$ to $.36$, $p < .000$). The magnitude of correlations was, however, varied. In consonance, with previous findings (Mayer & Stevens, 1994), the highest correlation was observed with *attention* ($r = .36$, $p < .000$) and *clarity* ($r = .26$, $p < .000$) dimensions, followed by *regulation* ($r = .21$, $p < .000$) dimension of trait emotional awareness. Thus, suggesting that inner directed people tend to be emotionally empathic. A high positive correlation with *attention* signifies that individuals who listen to and value their feeling experiences tend to have the required range of emotions within themselves to vicariously experience feelings of another. In other words, the more an individual is openly aware of his feelings at an organic level, the more would he be able to experience the feelings of another. Moreover, *clarity* was also quite strongly correlated with emotional empathy, thus implying that individuals who can precisely tell “what” they are feeling are likely to experience accurately “what” another is feeling. The clinical features of alexithemia as described by Taylor (1986) not only include having difficulty describing feelings, but also having trouble discriminating among emotions. It is noteworthy that the strength of correlation with *regulation* was relatively weak. Perhaps, because emotional empathy indicates the capacity to be vicariously aroused by another’s emotional state or condition, whereas, regulation represents having reflective thoughts about it. Nonetheless, this association signifies that the ability to regulate emotions and behavior is of considerable importance to emotional empathy. The findings are consistent with the theoretical view that well regulated people, who can bring reason to their feeling experiences are expected to be characterized by the capacity for empathic responding, which is a social quality—that of an other-oriented emotional responding. The results of the study imply that trait emotional awareness coupled with emotional empathy may predispose a person to focus on another’s internal states and is likely to assist the object of

empathy, rather than focus on the self in response to an empathy evoking situation. Moreover, the EES subscales were also positively and significantly associated with total score on the measure of trait emotional awareness (ranging from $r = .22$ to $.41$, $p < .000$). The highest correlation was observed with the *tendency to be moved by others' positive and negative emotional experiences* ($r = .41$, $p < .000$).

The findings for the intercorrelations among the subscales of TEAS and EES were also consistent with expectations. All TEAS subscales were significantly and positively related to EES subscales (ranging from $r = .11$ to $.42$, $p < .000$). A cross examination of the correlations revealed that *attention to feelings* was most strongly correlated ($r = .42$, $p < .000$) with *tendency to be moved by others' positive and negative emotional experiences*. People who are in touch with their feelings tend to value their feeling experiences. Moreover, Emmons and Colby (1994) found attention to be unrelated to the frequency of negative affect and repressive-defensiveness. It might be suggested that people who focus on and value their own feeling experiences tend to hold other's emotional experiences worthy of attention. Thus, they are more likely to be emotionally moved by the anguish and happiness of another. *Regulation* was also found to be strongly correlated with *tendency to be moved by others' positive and negative emotional experiences* ($r = .26$, $p < .000$). It is reasonable to suggest that people who can maintain their vicarious emotional arousal within a tolerable range would be expected to respond with compassion for the others emotional state and may not focus on their own needs. In addition, *regulation*, also being the capacity to initiate an action when there is a strong tendency to avoid it, and *empathic responsiveness*, being the tendency to respond instrumentally, were also significantly and positively related ($r = .24$, $p < .000$). Thus, implying that such capacities render

people not to shy away from the emotional upsets of others but may predispose them to join in. The weakest correlation was observed between *regulation* and *susceptibility to emotional contagion* ($r = .11, p < .000$). This is because emotional contagion is conceptualized as a spontaneous transmission of mood. Hoffman (1984) viewed empathy, during the earliest months of life of an infant, as emotional contagion, primarily an involuntary and an innate experience of another's affect with no self-other distinction as to source. It represents a readiness to be infected by expression of emotions that stir in people around or general atmosphere, without one realizing that he or she is mimicking the expressions of emotions occurring in another. Whereas, regulation defined primarily as regulating emotions and emotion-related behaviors, requires higher faculties of reflecting on one's feelings and thereby modulating them and not to act on them. Understandably, the two factors are not strongly related. Interestingly, however, a significant and positive relation of *attention* ($r = .22, p < .000$) and *clarity* ($r = .20, p < .000$) to *susceptibility to emotional contagion*, indicates that the spontaneity with which moods are transmitted from other people or from general atmosphere around requires one to easily feel one's own feelings and experience them with clarity.

In keeping with the hypothesis that individuals obtaining high scores on the measure of trait emotional awareness will be more emotionally empathic as compared to those scoring low on TEAS, a significant difference between the mean scores of the two groups was observed $t(148) = 3.70, p < .000$. The pattern of findings in the present study support the notion that individual differences in trait emotional awareness are related to differences in vicarious emotional responding to others' emotional conditions. In addition, these results provide evidence for the discriminant validity of the EES.

Thus, on the basis of results from the present study, it is suggested that in order to emotionally respond to affective states of another, people need to be aware of the affective range within themselves necessary for such a processing. Moreover, it might be suggested that a disposition toward experiencing one's own feelings directly and also at a reflective level makes one to respond to an emotional encounter with an appropriate arousal suitable for another's emotional state and not beneficial for one's own self-interest. Therefore, an awareness of one's own feeling experiences may be regarded as having critical importance for a genuine awareness of another's feeling experiences.

In conclusion to the above mentioned four studies, based on establishing the convergent and discriminant validity of the EES, it might be stated that the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) is indeed a highly reliable and valid personality inventory, for the assessment of individual differences in the trait of emotional empathy.

STUDY 3**Dispositional Predictor of Emotional Empathy;****The Role of Emotional Empathy Mediating the Relation Between Trait Emotional****Awareness and Two Potential Outcomes—Affiliative Tendency and Aggression****Objectives of the Study**

The present study was conducted to determine the role of trait emotional awareness as a dispositional predictor of emotional empathy among University students, and to examine the role of emotional empathy in predicting affiliative tendency and aggression.

Another major objective of this investigation was to examine the role of emotional empathy as a mediator between trait emotional awareness and two potential outcomes—affiliative tendency and aggression. For this purpose, two models were tested simultaneously. The first model assumed that the link between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency will be mediated by emotional empathy. The second model proposed that emotional empathy would mediate the relation between trait emotional awareness and aggression.

Hypotheses

The objectives of the present study were achieved by testing the following hypotheses:

Objective 1

The first objective of the study was to examine the extent to which dispositional variable of trait emotional awareness predicted emotional empathy. Thus, to determine the role of trait emotional awareness as a dispositional predictor of emotional empathy, it was hypothesized that:

1. Trait emotional awareness will be positively correlated with emotional empathy.
2. Trait emotional awareness will predict emotional empathy.

Objective 2

The role of emotional empathy in predicting affiliative tendency and aggression was examined as the second objective of the study. Specifically, the following hypotheses were tested:

1. There will be positive correlation between emotional empathy and affiliative tendency.
2. There will be positive correlation between emotional empathy and aggression.
3. Emotional empathy will predict affiliative tendency and aggression.

Objective 3

The present study, as its third objective, examined the mediational role of emotional empathy. For this purpose, two models were proposed. The first model aimed at exploring the mediational role of emotional empathy between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency. Whereas, the second model examined the role of emotional empathy as a mediator between trait emotional awareness and aggression. Following hypotheses were devised to achieve the third objective of the study:

1. Trait emotional awareness will predict affiliative tendency and aggression.
2. Trait emotional awareness will be positively correlated with affiliative tendency.
3. Trait emotional awareness will be negatively correlated with aggression.
4. Emotional empathy will mediate the relation between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency.
5. Emotional empathy will mediate the relation between trait emotional awareness and aggression.

Method

Sample

The sample of the study consisted of 200 M.Sc. students (100 men and 100 women) from the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Hamdard University, Islamabad; Arid Agricultural University, Rawalpindi; and, Post-Graduate Government College for Women, Rawalpindi. Their

ages ranged from 20 to 24 years ($M = 21.5$, $S.D. = 2.1$). Demographic information revealed that 80% of the participants belonged to the urban areas, whereas 20% belonged to the rural areas. And, 72% were from the natural sciences and 28% were from the social sciences. The same sample as used in the previous study was employed for the present study.

Definitions of the Variables

Definitions of the study variables appear in the following.

Emotional Empathy

The affective definition of emotional empathy as proposed by Mehrabian (1996) is given as follows:

Emotional empathy is the tendency to feel and vicariously experience the (positive and negative) emotional experience of others—feeling what the other person feels (p.1).

Corresponding to the above definition, the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) has been developed (see Study 1). According to the EES, the construct of emotional empathy consists of the following dimensions: (a) Tendency to be Moved by Others' Negative and Positive Emotional Experiences, (b) Emotional Responsiveness, and (c) Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion.

Trait Emotional Awareness

Trait emotional awareness refers to:

people's tendency to attend to their moods and emotions, discriminate among them, and regulate emotions and emotion-related behaviors.

It is based on three dimensions of (1) Attention to Feelings (2) Regulation, and (3) Clarity of Feelings. Attention to feelings has been defined as the degree to which an individual notices and thinks about his/her feelings. Clarity of feelings refers to the ability to discriminate among feelings. Regulation refers to the tendency to repair unpleasant moods or maintain pleasant ones; capacity to inhibit approach behavior; and capacity to initiate action.

Affiliative Tendency

Mehrabian (1994b) defined affiliative tendency as follows:

generalized positive expectations in social relationships: expecting social exchanges to be generally positive, pleasant, and rewarding and behaving in ways that are consistent with such generalized expectations (p. 97-98).

Aggression

For the present study, the definition of trait aggression as proposed by Buss and Perry (1992) was employed. Buss and Perry defined trait aggression in terms of its four subtraits such as *physical aggression, verbal aggression, anger, and hostility*. Physical and verbal aggression, which involves hurting or harming others, represent the instrumental or motor component of behavior. Anger, which involves physiological arousal and preparation for aggression, represents the emotional or affective component of the behavior. Hostility, which consists of feelings of ill will and injustice, represents the cognitive component of behavior. According to Buss and Perry, this tripartite division extends to the personality trait of aggression.

Instruments

In the present investigation, the following instruments were used.

Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

The Emotional Empathy Scale (EES) is a 26-item self-report measure of the tendency to experience vicariously the (positive and negative) emotional experiences of others (Annexure I). It measures individual differences in the trait of emotional empathy. The theoretical model of emotional empathy proposed by Mehrabian (1996) was used as a basis for the development of the EES. Respondents use a 7-point scale, on which “1” represents “strong disagreement” and “7” represents “strong agreement” to indicate the extent to which each item described them. To

reduce response bias, 17 items were *worded positively*, and 9 items were *worded negatively*. The EES is intended for use with adolescents and general adult population. The norms for the EES are as follows:

Mean = 143; Standard Deviation = 20

Factorial Validity & Internal Consistency (Reliability): The 30 items of the EES were factor analysed using principal components as the extraction procedure and varimax rotation was used to obtain a simple structure. The eigenvalues and the resulting scree plot provided evidence for a three factor solution. The eigenvalue of the first factor was 7.46, whereas the eigenvalues for factors 2, 3, and 4 were 2.69, 2.65, and 1.35, respectively, showing a clear difference at the fourth eigenvalue. The three factors collectively explained 42.7% of the total variance. These results suggest that the scale is a multidimensional measure of the trait of emotional empathy. The three subscales were labeled (a) Tendency to be Moved by Others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences, (b) Emotional Responsiveness, and (c) Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion. The alpha coefficient of .85, and split-half reliability coefficient of .82, was obtained for the EES. The alphas for the EES subscales are as follows: Tendency to be Moved by others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences: $\alpha = .81$; Emotional Responsiveness: $\alpha = .70$; and Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion: $\alpha = .61$.

Validity of the EES: Evidence for the convergent validity of the EES has been demonstrated through its significant positive correlation with the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES, Mehrabian, 1996), $r = .65$, $p < .000$. Discriminant-related validity studies showed

that emotional empathy was positively related with affiliative tendency ($r = .48, p < .000$), and trait emotional awareness ($r = .41, p < .000$), and negatively related with delinquency ($r = -.28, p < .001$).

Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

The TEAS is a multifactor 25-item self-report scale, which indexes the degree of attention that individuals devote to their feelings, the clarity of their experience of these feelings, and their capacity to regulate feelings and emotion-related behavior (Annexure R). The development of the scale was guided by the theoretical model of trait meta-mood proposed by Salovey et al. (1995). It is a five-point Likert type scale, anchored by 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree.

Factorial Validity and Internal Consistency: The factor structure of the TEAS mapped onto three primary domains of attending to feelings, discriminating among feelings, and regulating them. The three factors jointly explained 38.59% of the item variance. The 25-item scale exhibited adequate alpha reliability of .76 and split half reliability coefficient of .72. The alphas for each dimension are as follows: Attention to Feelings: $\alpha = .70$; Regulation: $\alpha = .63$; and Clarity of Feelings: $\alpha = .61$.

Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF)

For the present study the Urdu translated version of the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) was used (Annexure J). The MAFF was developed by Mehrabian (1994). It contains 26 items and subjects report the degree of their agreement or disagreement with each item. The 26-item Affiliative Tendency Scale is balanced for “response bias.” One-half of the items are positively worded. A second half of the items are negatively worded. A total score is computed for each subject by algebraically summing his/her responses to all 13 of the positively worded items and by subtracting from this quantity the algebraic sum of his/her responses to all 13 of the negatively worded items. The norms for the MAFF are as follows: Mean = 28 ; Standard Deviation = 22 (Mehrabian, 1994).

Internal Consistency & Reliability: The Affiliative Tendency Scale has an internal consistency reliability of .80. It also has a high test-retest reliability of .89 (Mehrabian, 1976).

Validity: Experimental work (Mehrabian & O’Reilly, 1980) has yielded a positive and significant correlation of .54 ($p < .01$) between affiliative tendency and emotional empathy. Also, it was found that the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) correlated positively with liking of others (Steers & Braunstein, 1976), judged similarity and compatibility with others, favorable impressions of strangers (Solar & Mehrabian, 1973), superior adjustments to high social density (Miller, Rossbach, & Munson, 1981), self-disclosure (Morris, Harris, & Rovins, 1981), confidence about social skills, positiveness and amount of conversation in interactions with strangers (Ksionzky & Mehrabian, 1980). Affiliative tendency correlated negatively with social

anhedonia (inability to derive pleasure from social exchanges) and loneliness, social avoidance and distress (Morris et al., 1981).

The Aggression Questionnaire (AQ)

The Aggression Questionnaire (AQ) was developed by Buss and Perry (1992). The scale is the revised version of the original "Hostility Inventory" (Buss & Durkee, 1957). The result of this revision now called the Aggression Questionnaire (AQ), contains 29 items divided by factor analyses into four correlated subscales: Physical Aggression (9 items), Verbal Aggression (5 items), Anger (7 items) and Hostility (8 items). Participants rate themselves on a scale of 1 (extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me). These four subscales, according to Buss and Perry, offer more differentiated coverage of the tripartite model of aggression than did the Buss and Durkee Hostility Inventory. The two aggression scales represent the behavioral component, and the Anger and hostility subscales represent the affective and cognitive components, respectively.

Correlation among factors: Buss and Perry (1992) reported that all the factors were intercorrelated beyond chance. Verbal and Physical Aggression were closely related but only moderately correlated with Hostility. Anger correlated strongly with the other three factors.

Internal Consistency and Reliability: The internal consistency of the four factors and the total score was evaluated by the alpha coefficient. The alphas were as follows: Physical Aggression, .85; Verbal Aggression, .72; Anger, .83; and Hostility, .77 (total score = .89). The

alpha for the total score indicated considerable internal consistency. The test-retest correlations were as follows: Physical Aggression, .80; Verbal Aggression, .76; Anger, .72; and Hostility, .72 (total score = .80). These coefficients suggest adequate stability over time (Buss & Perry, 1992).

Validity of the Aggression Questionnaire: Initial validation efforts found the scales to converge with the personality traits of impulsiveness and emotionality. In a series of validity studies Buss and Perry (1992) have found that Assertiveness correlated with Verbal Aggression and Anger but only moderately with Physical Aggression and Hostility. Competitiveness correlated with all four Aggression Scales. Public Self-consciousness, Private Self-consciousness and Self-esteem did not correlate with Physical or Verbal Aggressiveness.

Translation: For the present study, the Aggression Questionnaire (AQ) was translated into Urdu language. Following procedure was adopted to translate the AQ into Urdu language:

1. The items of the AQ were presented to 5 psychologists (National Institute of Psychology) in the form of a Performa, carrying instructions to translate each item in such a way that the conceptual meaning contained in each item was adequately conveyed through the items in Urdu.
2. The translations thus obtained were closely scrutinized by the researchers of the present study for clarity of conceptual meaning. The translated Urdu items which best represented the items in English were retained.
3. Another Performa was prepared in order to check the cultural relevance of each item. The Performa was given to 10 individuals (5 teachers and 5 students) who checked each item for its relevance to Pakistani culture.

4. All items were examined for frequency of endorsement. All items received 100% endorsement, and were thus retained for the final format of the scale.

The translated version of the 29-item Aggression Questionnaire (AQ) was used for the purpose of the present study (Annexure S).

Procedure

The 200 participants of the study were administered the set of questionnaires, consisting of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS), the Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF) and, the Aggression Questionnaire (AQ); the EES was the first instrument in the set of questionnaires. The rest of the questionnaires were randomly ordered. Participants were approached individually or in the form of groups. They were briefed about how to fill out the questionnaires. All participants completed the questionnaires independently without any input from others.

In order to achieve the goals of the present study, a series of analyses were conducted. As a preliminary step, descriptive statistics, means and standard deviations, and estimates of the internal consistency reliability of the instruments were obtained for the sample of 200 participants. The data obtained were then analyzed to test the hypotheses stated above. Zero-order correlational analyses were performed, to assess the relation among the variables of the study. Following the correlational analyses, multiple regression analyses were used to identify the relative contributions of independent variables on effect variables. Then, the model as a

whole was examined with path analysis to assess the mediational role of emotional empathy between emotional awareness and dispositional outcomes such as, affiliative tendency and aggression.

Results

Descriptive Analyses and Reliability Estimates of the Scales

Table 1 presents the reliability estimates for scores on each questionnaire. The internal consistency coefficients were .87 for the EES, .78 for the TEAS, .70 for the MAFF, and .86 for the AQ. These alphas are adequate, and support the instruments' use in the present study. In addition, means and standard deviations for each scale were also computed, which are indicated in Table 1.

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Alpha Coefficients of the Study Measures (N= 200)

Scales	No. of			Alpha
	Items	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Coefficients
Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)	26	147.5	20.6	.87
Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)	25	96.8	11.6	.78
Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF)	26	156.2	21	.70
Aggression Questionnaire (AQ)	29	71.3	18.8	.86

Zero-Order Correlations Among the Study Measures

As a preliminary step, the relationship between the personality measures of emotional empathy, trait emotional awareness, affiliative tendency, and aggression were examined with correlational analyses. Zero-order correlations were computed. As can be seen in Table 2, a fairly clear pattern of results emerged. Emotional empathy, which assesses the dispositional tendency to vicariously experience the feelings of others, was positively associated in the expected direction with trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency. On the other hand, it was negatively related to aggression. Trait emotional awareness was found to positively correlate with affiliative tendency. However, the pattern of relations for aggression was reversed; trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency, like emotional empathy were negatively associated with aggression. Thus, the findings were consistent with expectations.

An examination of the magnitude of zero-order correlations suggested that emotional empathy was most strongly and positively correlated with affiliative tendency, thus, suggesting that emotional empathy has a more powerful association with positive interpersonal relations. However, the magnitude of negative correlation between trait emotional awareness and aggression was the strongest, implying that trait emotional awareness plays a significantly important role in controlling aggressive behaviors, by making one aware of and successfully regulating strong negative arousal which precludes one from verbally or physically attacking another.

Table 2*Zero-Order Correlations Among the EES, TEAS, MAFF, and the AQ (N=200)*

Scales	2	3	4
1. Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)	.43***	.51***	-.42***
2. Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)		.34***	-.45***
3. Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF)			-.39***
4. Aggression Questionnaire (AQ)			-

***($p < .000$)*Regression Analyses*

In the next set of analyses, multiple correlations were computed in order to achieve the first two objectives of the study.

Effect of Dispositional Predictor

First, direct effect of trait emotional awareness on emotional empathy was assessed to examine the extent to which emotional empathy was predicted by trait emotional awareness. The regression equation computed for the TEAS and the EES indicated that trait emotional awareness accounted for a significant proportion of variance in emotional empathy ($R^2 = .18$, $F = 44.26$, $p < .000$). Moreover, an examination of beta coefficient suggested that trait emotional awareness is a significant predictor of emotional empathy ($\beta = .43$, $p < .000$). These results support the theoretical view that trait emotional awareness is a determinant of emotional empathy. Thus, it

might be suggested that individual differences in people's vicarious empathic responding is linked to aspects of their functioning that reflect enduring (e.g., personality) qualities, particularly high attention to one's own feelings, clarity of feelings, and high regulation. It is reasonable to suggest that people who are able to bring intelligence to their emotions are expected to respond to others emotions with heightened sensitivity. The results are displayed in Table 3.

Table 3

Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Emotional Empathy from Trait Emotional Awareness

(*N* = 200)

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	R ²	R	SE Estm.
Regression	1	15571.32	15571.32	44.26	.18	.43	18.75
Error	198	69647.39	351.75	<i>p</i> < .000			
Total	199	85218.72					

Parameter	Estimate	STD ERR	STD β	T	Sig
Intercept	74.07	11.12		6.65	.000
Trait Emotional Awareness	.76	.11	.43	6.65	.000

Prediction of Affiliative Tendency and Aggression from Emotional Empathy

In further analyses, predictability of affiliative tendency and aggression from the measure of emotional empathy was assessed, by computing separate regression equations for the two measures. First, the role of emotional empathy in predicting affiliative tendency was investigated. According to the results shown in Table 4, emotional empathy accounted for 26% of the variance in affiliative tendency ($F= 70.1, p<.000$), and significantly predicted its development ($\beta = .51, p< .000$). Thus, suggesting that people high in emotional empathy tend to hold stable positive social expectations, which guide their interpersonal behaviors.

Table 4

Linear Regression Analysis for Predicting Affiliative Tendency from Emotional Empathy
($N=200$)

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	R ²	R	SE Estm.
Regression	1	24424.55	24424.55	70.13	.26	.51	18.66
Error	198	68958.86	348.28	$p< .000$			
Total	199	93383.42					
Parameter	Estimate	STD ERR	STD β	T	Sig		
Intercept	77.26	9.53		8.11	.000		
Emotional Empathy	.54	.06	.51	8.37	.000		

Next, the prediction of aggression from emotional empathy was assessed. As can be seen in Table 5, emotional empathy was found to account for a significant proportion of variance in aggression ($R^2 = .18$, $F = 43.25$, $p < .000$). Moreover, the magnitude of beta coefficient for emotional empathy was also significantly strong ($\beta = -.42$, $p < .000$). Thus, suggesting that individuals who respond emotionally by vicariously feeling others' emotional experiences of fear, sadness, pain, distress, etc. are likely to refrain themselves from engaging in harmful acts directed at hurting another. Thus, empathic responsiveness is likely to act as a buffer against the development of aggression.

Table 5

Linear Regression Analysis for Predicting Aggression from Emotional Empathy (N=200)

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	R^2	R	SE Estm.
Regression	1	12632.49	12632.49	43.25	.18	.42	17.09
Error	198	57846.39	292.15	$p < .000$			
Total	199	70478.88					
Parameter	Estimate	STD ERR	STD β	T	Sig		
Intercept	128.16	8.73		14.69	.000		
Emotional Empathy	-.39	.06	-.42	-6.58	.000		

Prediction of Affiliative Tendency and Aggression from Trait Emotional Awareness

In order to achieve objective 3, linear regression analyses were conducted to assess the predictability of affiliative tendency and aggression from the measure of trait emotional awareness. Results presented in Table 6 indicated that trait emotional awareness explained 12% of variance in affiliative tendency and significantly predicted it ($F = 26.13, p < .000$). Examination of the magnitude of beta coefficient also suggested that trait emotional awareness made a significant contribution to affiliative tendency ($\beta = .34, p < .000$). These results indicate that people who are emotionally aware are likely to be adept at social interactions.

Table 6

Linear Regression Analysis for Predicting Affiliative Tendency from Trait Emotional Awareness (N=200)

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	R ²	R	SE Estm.
Regression	1	10887.34	10887.34	26.13	.12	.34	20.41
Error	198	82496.18	416.65	$p < .000$			
Total	199	93383.42					

Parameter	Estimate	STD ERR	STD β	T	Sig
Intercept	94.81	12.11		7.83	.000
Trait Emotional Awareness	.64	.12	.34	5.11	.000

As can be seen in Table 7, trait emotional awareness also accounted for a considerable proportion of variance in the criterion variable of aggression ($R^2 = .20$, $F= 49.73$, $p < .000$), and the beta coefficient was also significant ($\beta = -.45$, $p < .000$). These results suggest that people who are aware of their own feeling experiences and tend to regulate them are less likely to engage in hurtful and aggressive behaviors towards others.

Table 7

Linear Regression Analysis for Predicting Aggression from Trait Emotional Awareness (N=200)

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	R ²	R	SE Estm.
Regression	1	14147.54	14147.54	49.73	.20	.45	16.87
Error	198	56331.34	284.50	$p < .000$			
Total	199	70478.88					

Parameter	Estimate	STD ERR	STD β	T	Sig
Intercept	141.40	10.01		14.13	.000
Trait Emotional Awareness	-.72	.10	-.45	-7.05	.000

Path Analysis

Path analyses were used to test the two models proposed earlier. First, the model, hypothesizing that the relationship between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency will be mediated by emotional empathy was examined. Second, the model, proposing that emotional empathy mediates the link between trait emotional awareness and aggression was investigated. Figure 1 depicts the two models.




Figure 1: Path model representing the mediational role of emotional empathy between trait emotional awareness as a predictor variable and affiliative tendency and aggression as dependent variables

Path analysis could be a very useful analytical technique. Path analysis is an extension of regression model, used to test the causal model based on previous research findings and theoretical considerations (Olweus, 1980). The causal model depicts an approximation of the hypothetical causal relations among the variables included in the model. The model is written as a set of structural equations and is generally represented by a path diagram, with unidirectional

arrows indicating causation. A path model is a diagram relating independent, intermediary, and dependent variables. Exogenous variables in a path model include independent variables, with no explicit causes, whereas endogenous variables include intervening causal variables and dependents. Causal paths to a given variable include (1) the direct paths from arrows leading to it, and (2) indirect/correlated paths from exogenous or intervening endogenous variables with arrows leading to the given variable.

Path analysis requires the usual assumptions of regression. It is particularly sensitive to model specification because failure to include relevant causal variables or exclusion of extraneous variables often substantially affects the path coefficients, which are used to assess the relative importance of various direct and indirect causal paths to the dependent variable. In the present study, results obtained through regression analyses yielded that all exogenous and intervening variables significantly predicted the endogenous variables. Thus, all predictor and effect variables were included in further analyses.

Based on theoretical grounds, the models hypothesizing that the relationship between independent variable, namely, trait emotional awareness and the effect variables, namely, affiliative tendency and aggression would be mediated by emotional empathy were tested. For this purpose, Baron and Kenny's (1986) guidelines for detecting mediation were followed. Baron and Kenny outlined three requirements for mediation. First, there must be a relation between the independent variable and the mediator variable. Second, the mediator variable and the dependent variable must be related when analyses adjust for the independent variable. Third, the direct relation between the independent variable and dependent must be reduced when analyses adjust for the mediator variable.

Emotional Empathy Mediating the Link Between Trait Emotional Awareness and Affiliative Tendency

The proposal that the emotional empathy would mediate the relation between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency was investigated first. For this model, trait emotional awareness was taken as the independent and affiliative tendency as the dependent variable. All three criteria for detecting mediation as specified by Baron and Kenny were fulfilled. As required by the first criterion, trait emotional awareness was found to be significantly associated with emotional empathy, so that it predicted the tendency towards emotional empathy. These relations are reported in Table 3. The second criterion required the mediator and dependent variable to be associated when analyses adjust for the independent variable. Accordingly, it was found that the strength of the path coefficients remained significant between emotional empathy and affiliative tendency ($\beta = .45, p < .000$), when trait emotional awareness was entered into the equation. The results are presented in Table 8.

Table 8

Multiple Regression Analyses for Predicting Affiliative Tendency from Emotional Empathy and Trait Emotional Awareness (N=200)

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	R ²	R	SE Estm.
Regression	2	26148.60	13074.30	38.31	.28	.53	18.47
Error	197	67234.82	341.29	<i>p</i> < .000			
Total	199	93383.42					

Parameter	Estimate	STD ERR	STD β	T	Sig
Intercept	60.13	12.13		4.96	.000
Emotional Empathy	.47	.07	.45	6.69	.000
Trait Emotional Awareness	.28	.12	.15	2.25	.026

The third criterion required that direct causal effect between the independent and dependent variable would be reduced once analyses adjust for the mediator variable. In order to test this requirement, path coefficients were used to decompose correlations in the model into direct and indirect effects. In addition, the measure of total causal effect on affiliative tendency was obtained by summing direct and indirect effects. It was assumed that if total causal effect is greater than the direct effect of the independent variable, it would be concluded that independent as well as intervening variable both interact to predict variance in the dependent variable.

As is evident from the Table 8, the direct causal effect of trait emotional awareness on affiliative tendency ($\beta = .15, p < .02$) was much reduced when emotional empathy was entered into the equation. Indirect effect of trait emotional awareness via emotional empathy was also found to be considerable on affiliative tendency ($.15 \times .45 = .067$). Thus, total causal effect of trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy on affiliative tendency (i.e., .41) was greater than the direct effect of the trait emotional awareness alone. These results are given in Table 9. Moreover, the goodness of fit of model also provided additional support to this conclusion. The two variables, namely trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy, in combination accounted for a substantial proportion of 28% of the variance ($F = 38.31, p < .000$). It suggests that affiliative tendency is better predicted by an interaction of independent and mediator variable, in comparison with independent variable, separately. Thus, emotional empathy evidently mediates the relation between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency.

Table 9

Direct, Indirect, and Total Causal Effects of Different Causal Variables on Affiliative Tendency (N= 200)

Variables	Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Effect
Trait Emotional Awareness	.34	.067	.41
Emotional Empathy	.15		

Examinations of the changes in the magnitude of the beta coefficients showed that the effect of trait emotional awareness was comparatively less significant ($\beta = .15, p < .02$), whereas emotional empathy significantly contributed to affiliative tendency ($\beta = .45, p < .000$). Thus, the

effect on affiliative tendency was more attributable to emotional empathy as compared to trait emotional awareness.

Emotional Empathy Mediating the Link Between Trait Emotional Awareness and Aggression

Next, the proposal that the link between trait emotional awareness and aggression would be mediated by emotional empathy was investigated. This proposal was examined in terms of trait emotional awareness as the independent and aggressive behavior as the dependent variable. All three criteria given by Baron and Kenny's (1986) for detecting mediation were met. As required by the first criterion that the independent variable must be related with the mediator variable, trait emotional awareness had a direct causal effect on emotional empathy, and was significantly associated with it. This has been reported in Table 3. In accordance with the second criterion, which required the mediator variable to be related with dependent when analyses adjust for the independent variable, emotional empathy was found to be associated with aggression, when analyses adjusted for trait emotional awareness ($\beta = -.28, p < .000$). The results are given in Table 10.

Table 10

Multiple Regression Analyses for Predicting Aggression from Trait Emotional Awareness and Emotional Empathy (N=200)

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	R ²	R	SE Estm.
Regression	2	18783.06	9391.53	35.79	.27	.52	16.20
Error	197	51695.83	262.42	$p < .000$			
Total	199	70478.88					

Parameter	Estimate	STD ERR	STD β	T	Sig
Intercept	160.51	10.63		15.10	.000
Trait Emotional Awareness	-.53	.11	-.33	-4.84	.000
Emotional Empathy	-.26	.06	-.28	-4.20	.000

It was also observed that the direct causal path between trait emotional awareness and aggression was much reduced ($\beta = -.33, p < .000$) when analyses were adjusted for emotional empathy. For the third criterion, the path coefficients were used to decompose correlations in the model into direct and indirect effects. As can be seen in Table 11, there was also a substantial indirect effect of trait emotional awareness via emotional empathy ($-.327 \times -.284 = -.093$). Total causal effect was also computed to further test the third requirement. When the total causal effect (i.e., .54) was compared with the direct effect of trait emotional awareness, total causal effect was

found to be much larger as compared to the direct causal effect. Trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy, in combination, accounted for 27% of variance in aggression ($F = 35.79, p < .000$). These findings strongly confirm the model that emotional empathy plays an important role as a mediator between trait emotional awareness and aggression. Examination of relative weights of partial coefficients suggested that aggression was more predicted by trait emotional awareness ($\beta = -.33, p < .000$) as compared to emotional empathy ($\beta = -.28, p < .000$).

Table 11

Direct, Indirect, and Total Causal Effects of Different Causal Variables on Aggression (N=200)

Variables	Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Effect
Trait Emotional Awareness	-.45	-.093	.54
Emotional Empathy	-.33		

Discussion

The focus of the present study was to determine the role of trait emotional awareness as a dispositional predictor implicated in the development of emotional empathy. Emotional empathy has also been associated with different motivational states and behavioral outcomes. Therefore, the present study also proposed that individual differences in the tendency to affiliate with others and engage in aggressive acts would vary as a function of dispositional differences in typical level of emotional empathy. Thus, the predictability of affiliative tendency and aggression from emotional empathy was investigated. Moreover, the mediational role of emotional empathy

between trait emotional awareness as a predictor, and affiliative tendency and aggression as outcome variables was examined, which has not previously been explored.

Emotional empathy refers to an affective response that stems from the apprehension of positive and negative emotional state or condition of another person and which is identical or very similar to what the other person is feeling. Since, emotional empathy by definition involves emotions, increasingly, the investigators have started examining the role of dispositional emotions in empathy (Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy et al., 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Eisenberg, Wentzel, & Harris, 2001). Within this context, there is substantial empirical evidence that the ability to be aware of one's own emotional life is related with empathy (Mayer & Kirkpatrick, 1994; Mayer & Stevens, 1994).

Trait emotional awareness refers to people's tendency to attend to their emotions, discriminate clearly among them, and regulate feelings and behaviors. The individual's ability to attend to feelings and to experience these feelings clearly, is taken as the starting point of psychological health by many psychologists (Gardner, 1983; Rogers, 1980; Schwarz, 1990). Salovey et al. (1995) believed that individuals differ in the skill with which they identify their feelings and the feelings of others, regulate these feelings, and use the information provided by their feelings to motivate adaptive social behavior. Where trait emotional awareness measures enduring qualities of reflective experience of one's *own* emotions, emotional empathy reflects the tendency to vicariously experience *another's* emotional experience. It would be reasonable to suggest that the capacity to feel another's feelings would largely depend upon greater awareness of one's own feeling impulses. Emotional awareness has in fact been regarded as the keystone of

emotional empathy by Goleman (1995). This link has very clearly been conveyed by Rogers. According to Rogers (1989), people who are open to and accept the whole range of feelings tend to be real. They do not need to operate from behind a façade and are more openly that self that they truly are. They are not defensive and are in closer contact with their instinctive emotional life. Feelings flowing within themselves are available to them at any given moment, which in turn helps them better understand feelings of others. Other people tend to trust and reveal themselves deeply to such souls, because they are genuine and do not say things which they do not feel. While deserting one's own physiological wisdom of emotions may dull empathy, emotionally aware individuals are expected not only to embrace their own feeling experiences easily, but are also more likely to accurately feel emotions of others. In short, they are expected to be highly empathic.

Lessons in emotional skills begin with good parent-child interaction. However, children who receive little empathic care and responsiveness miss out the chapter from their life, of learning to identify, label, respect or even "feel" their own feelings. Consequently, they tend to respond to others feelings with insensitivity and indifference. While, their ambivalence at experiencing their own internal states retards the development of the genetic potential to vicariously feel what another feels, it has also been found that abused children, of parents who display excessive negative emotions in their interactions with their children, tend to be hyper vigilant to other people's emotional cues. Due to severe psychological limitation of their parents, these children learn incorrect lessons about emotions. They might have the gift to recognize feelings in others, but tend to respond inappropriately, that is, with rejection, defensiveness, and even aggression, instead of offering empathic responsiveness. Their emotional ups and downs

also imply that they are perhaps unable to regulate their emotions. Therefore, it might be reasonable to propose that individuals who can easily penetrate into their own feeling experiences and regulate them to some degree are more likely to respond to others feelings with empathy—one that advances an authentic prosocial orientation as opposed to being defensive, rejecting and aggressive. The present study further proposed that emotional empathy would predispose a person toward affiliative tendency and protect him against the development of aggression.

The pattern of findings in the present study supports the hypothesis that trait emotional awareness would be positively related to emotional empathy. As anticipated, trait emotional awareness was found to be significantly and positively related with emotional empathy ($r = .43$, $p < .000$), suggesting that individuals who attend to their feelings, experience them clearly, and try to regulate them tend to respond empathically to witnessing another's emotional state. Regression analyses were conducted to examine the extent to which trait emotional awareness predicted emotional empathy. Consistent with correlational results, the results from regression analysis indicated that a substantial amount of variance was accounted for by trait emotional awareness in emotional empathy ($R^2 = .18$, $F = 44.26$, $p < .000$). This study provided evidence that one's capacity to vicariously experience feelings of another might have its fundamental basis in the degree of ease with which one attends to, discriminate among and regulates one's own emotions. That is, the more one is aware of one's own internal states, the more one is expected to be proficient at reading internal states of others. Thus, trait emotional awareness may be regarded as an important antecedent variable of emotional empathy. These results might be interpreted as pointing toward two essential aspects of the trait of emotional empathy. First, people who attend

to and are able to discriminate among their emotions and regulate them tend to be inclined toward a vicarious experiencing of feelings of others. Second, they respond to others feelings, especially negative expressions of pain, sadness, and distress, in a balanced way by not letting themselves become overly anxious or sink into self-focused rumination. Whereas, attention and clarity serve one to vicariously feel another's feelings, regulation operates to keep that vicarious arousal under one's control. Therefore, it might be suggested that a predisposition toward emotional awareness enhances the likelihood of people to vicariously feel the emotional expressions or experiences of others and might also ensure the possibility of people attending to others' needs with compassion. It is the intrapersonal intelligence of a person which disposes him toward interpersonal intelligence. Emotional awareness enables a person to respond with *appropriate* emotional arousal to another's emotional experiences. Too little an arousal could create indifference and distance, whereas, out of control emotions could lead to anxiety, depression, and extreme impulsive behaviors such as aggression.

One of the primary reasons that psychologists have been interested in the concept of emotional empathy is that it plays an important role in theories concerning quality of social functioning. Specifically, many psychologists have suggested that empathy mediates high quality social functioning and prosocial orientations (e.g., Blum, 1980; Hoffman, 1981; Staub, 1978). Despite a relative dearth of empirical research in the past, investigators often assumed that empathy is an aspect of emotional competence (Saarni, 1990) and is intimately related to the quality of social functioning (Feshbach & Feshbach, 1986; Shure, 1982), including prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991; Hoffman, 1982). In recent work, the relation of empathy to measures of social competence has been supported (Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy et al., 1996; Zahn-

Waxler et al., 1995). Emotional empathy has also been found to be related with the capacity to affiliate with other people (Crouse & Mehrabian, 1977; Mehrabian, 1997), whereas, affiliative tendency refers to a generalized positive expectations in social relationships; expecting social exchanges to be generally positive, pleasant, and rewarding and behaving in ways that are consistent with such generalized expectations (Mehrabian, 1994). Evolutionary psychologists believe that an empathic awareness allows humans to predict each other's behaviors, and foster lasting relationships of trust and reciprocity within their social groups (Sober & Wilson, 1998). It has also been suggested that an understanding of another's emotional state can enable one to make use of this information to interact more positively and perhaps skillfully with another individual. As expected on the basis of theoretical considerations, emotional empathy was found to be positively associated with affiliative tendency ($r = .51, p < .000$) in the present study. Regression analysis was also used to examine the predictability of affiliative tendency from emotional empathy. The results suggested that emotional empathy accounted for 26% of variance in affiliative tendency ($F = 70.1, p < .000$). The positive association between the two variables is evidence of the fact that a predisposition toward responding with heightened sensitivity to others' emotional states engenders positive interpersonal beliefs and corresponding positive behaviors towards others.

In addition, emotional empathy was also expected to negatively correlate with aggression. There is considerable empirical support from research for this prediction (Hoffman, 1984; Mehrabian, 1997; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; N.D. Feshbach, 1978; Parke & Slaby, 1983). Some theorists (Hoffman, 1984; N.D. Feshbach, 1978) proposed that observation of others' expressions of pain and anguish often results in the observer's experiencing emotions by means

of vicarious emotional responding. The instigator of aggressive behavior may experience negative arousal induced by his actions. Therefore, reduction of aggression would be reinforcing for the instigator because it leads to reduced vicarious negative arousal. In line with these theoretical formulations, emotional empathy was expected to be negatively related with aggression. Aggression, for the present study, has been defined as comprising of four subtraits, such as physical aggression, verbal aggression, anger, and hostility (Buss & Perry, 1992). The four aspects of aggression jointly represent the personality trait of aggression, which is motivated by a desire to hurt someone. Results showed a significant negative association between emotional empathy and aggression ($r = -.42, p < .000$). Moreover, aggression was found to be significantly predicted from emotional empathy, as it accounted for a considerable proportion of variance in aggression ($R^2 = .18, F = 43.23, p < .000$). The findings for emotional empathy suggest that people who can vicariously experience the emotions of others when they are exposed to others' expressions of negative emotions or conditions that may serve as negative physiological feedback, such that aggression or harmful acts are not continued or increased. Since emotionally empathic individuals tend to readily make emotional connections with another's expressions of pain, fear, panic, disgust, etc., such a pattern of responding is expected to effectively limit aggression, by possibly making one aware of and feel uncomfortable about the impact his negative behavior would have on another. It is further argued that where the happiness of another feels pleasing, sadness of another feels painful to an empathic person. Such empathic experiences are likely to engender a stable mode of socially appropriate ways of behaving, so that one tends to be careful not to use behaviors which could cause serious pain to another. Thus, the current investigation indicates that deficits in vicariously experiencing others'

emotional states may result in the development of full expression of aggression, that is, both physical and verbal aggression as well as anger and hostility.

In order to examine the mediational role of emotional empathy between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency, it was important to examine the direct relation of trait emotional awareness with affiliative tendency. It is believed that the ability to utilize information provided by emotions can be socially adaptive (Rime, 1995; Rogers, 1975). Since most emotional experiences are socially shared, they can serve social goals such as clear communication and effective interpersonal relations. Gardner (1983) proposed that an access to one's emotional life is a means of understanding and guiding one's behavior in socially adaptive manner. According to Goleman (1995), being emotionally tone deaf has a social cost. He contended that people who are deficient in the capacity of emotional awareness can be disastrous pilots of their personal lives, because sounder personal decision making in human relations depends upon the capacity to be attuned to be to one's own feelings and the capacity to regulate them. Empirical findings support the notion that regulation is associated with higher resiliency and social competence (Eisenberg et al., 2000; Eisenberg, Valiente et al., 2003). In view of these theoretical propositions, the present study expected trait emotional awareness to be associated with affiliative tendency. The positive relation of trait emotional awareness with affiliative tendency has been supported in the present study. Results yielded a significant positive correlation coefficient of .34 ($p < .000$) between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency. Moreover, regression analysis revealed that trait emotional awareness contributed a significant proportion of 12% of variance in affiliative tendency ($F = 26.13, p < .000$). Thus, it could be suggested that an individual's capacity to be emotionally aware reflects his underlying

trust in his own organism, which serves as a reference for his interpersonal life. Guided by a faith and a greater acceptance of his own being, he tends to relate with others in the same manner, thereby, expecting social encounters also to be generally positive and trustworthy. Therefore, people who attend to, are clear about their feelings and can reflect on them are likely to be relatively high in the quality of their social functioning.

The relationship of trait emotional awareness with aggression was also examined. It has been suggested that the way individuals experience or deal with their feelings has important motivational and behavioral outcomes—they predispose a person either to prosocial acts (Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy, et. al., 1994; Eisenberg & Okun, 1996) or self-focused distress. People who become anxious or distressed in reactions to other's negative emotions often avoid dealing with the distressing situations (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990) or may even respond aggressively (Radke-Yarrow & Zahn-Waxler, 1984). On the other hand, Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy et al. (1994) suggested that people who can maintain their emotional reactions within a moderate tolerable range are more likely to experience sympathy, evoked by empathy inducing situations. In line with these empirical findings, the present study proposed that since trait emotional awareness by definition measures the enduring quality of attending to, being clear about one's emotional experiences and dealing with them effectively, it would be negatively associated with aggression. Consistent with expectations, the results from the correlational analyses yielded a significant inverse relation ($r = -.45, p < .000$) between trait emotional awareness and aggression. In addition, the amount of variance accounted for by trait emotional awareness in aggression was also substantial ($R^2 = .20, F = 49.73, p < .000$). On the basis of these results it might be suggested that individual differences in aggression are due in part to

differences among people in their typical level of attending to feelings, clearly discriminating among them and the ability to modulate their emotions and emotion-related behaviors. Arguably, an inability to sense and regulate bad mood could result in strong emotion of anger and hostile impulses, which are believed to activate and lead to instrumental aggression. It could, therefore, be suggested that when in the grip of rage, people who are aware of their feelings, are at an advantage, because they can effectively reason with them and are prevented from resorting to aggressive acts towards others. It is the difference between being swept away by strong negative emotions and becoming aware that one is caught up in it. Emotionally aware people tend to easily shake off a foul mood because they have the capacity to know exactly what they feel. A greater awareness of feelings allows them to manage their emotions effectively by directing their attention away from negative stimuli and focusing on positive aspects of life. Their capacity to regulate emotionally driven behavior further tends to inhibit them from translating their bad moods into acts of serious brutality toward others. In short, trait emotional awareness predicts reduction of harmful acts towards others.

The study also provided evidence for the mediational role of emotional empathy between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency. The direct causal effect of trait emotional awareness on affiliative tendency was much lower as compared to the combined effect of both the variables. Thus, affiliative tendency was better predicted by the combination of trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy ($R^2 = .28$, $F = 38.31$, $p < .000$) than by either separately. This pattern of findings supports the view that emotional empathy plays an important role in mediating the link between trait emotional awareness and affiliative tendency. These findings are consistent with evolutionary perspective, which holds that the understanding of one's own

feelings is crucial to understanding other people's feelings, which in turn promotes better social orientations. Thus, affiliative tendency may be regarded as an important function of trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy. These capacities together ensure better human interactions. Certainly, issues of relatedness are also of central importance to developmental psychologists, who regard them essential for the very survival of the human organism. Thus, the predisposition toward emotional awareness and emotional empathy is expected to smooth the way to positive interpersonal orientations—that is affiliative tendency.

Notably, an examination of the relative weights of partial coefficients indicated that emotional empathy ($\beta = .45, p < .000$) accounted for greater proportion of variance in affiliative tendency than trait emotional awareness ($\beta = .15, p < .02$). These results suggest that people with an empathic disposition enduringly believe that social exchanges are mostly pleasant and psychologically rewarding and are more likely to base their behaviors in their interactions with others on their belief. Moreover, in view of these results it might be contended that awareness of one's own feelings is also important for positive interactions but, perhaps it is the interpersonal intelligence of an emotionally empathic individual, which more powerfully sets the stage for him to have generalized positive expectations from all human contacts, leading to civil and genial ways of interacting. People who are incapable of empathic sharing tend to respond with insensitivity, dispassionately, and even with intolerance to the emotional needs of others. However, vicarious emotional responsiveness engenders better understanding of others emotional lives by making one conscious that others have many different feelings, values, and needs, which are based on their own perceptions and interpretations of reality. Empathic people tend to understand and tolerate individual differences and try not to change, mold, or manipulate

others, to their own advantage. They are expected to generally hold a positive and confident view of man, which is also manifested in their behavior. Thus, they not only tend to seek and enjoy companionship but are also friendly, affectionate, and nurturant in their social interactions. In short, they tend to be affiliative. Staub (1984) argued that empathic people tend to be less self-focused and respond to others' emotions in a productive manner. Therefore, empathic disposition might be regarded as the basis for positive social and emotional bonds. It might be implied that as compared to emotional awareness, the tendency to feel what the other feels contributes in a more meaningful way to make human group life viable.

The study also provided support for the model, which hypothesized that the relation between trait emotional awareness and aggression would be mediated by emotional empathy. Aggression was better predicted by a combination of individual differences in trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy. The two variables accounted for a substantial proportion of 27% of variance in aggression ($F = 35.79, p < .000$). These findings suggest that a predisposition toward emotional awareness enhances the likelihood of people to vicariously feel the emotional states of others. Consequently, the enhanced tendency towards emotional empathy is expected to inhibit aggression. The presence of trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy may function as protective factors against the development of aggression.

It is noteworthy that trait emotional awareness was a stronger predictor of aggression. It contributed more to aggression ($\beta = -.33, p < .000$) as compared to emotional empathy ($\beta = -.28, p < .000$). These findings suggest that it is likely that reduction in aggression requires a reflective experience of emotions, and, in particular the use of appropriate strategies of attentional control

and behavioral control may play a critical role in reducing aggressive behavior towards others, by inhibiting people from readily acting on their impulses to strike out.

In conclusion, the present research suggests that people differ in their capacity for emotional empathy depending upon their tendency towards emotional awareness. Emotional empathy has been found to play pivotal role in the development of affiliative tendency and inhibition of aggression. Furthermore, it could also be expected that affiliative tendency and reduced aggressive behaviors are partially an outcome of individuals' abilities to attend to one's emotions, experience them clearly and manage them. Thus, it is suggested that individual differences in trait emotional awareness and emotional empathy probably contribute to multiple aspects of individuals' socioemotional functioning—they predispose a person towards positive social behaviors on one hand, and inhibit problem behaviors, on the other hand. These differences are important to understand if psychologists hope to create civilized and caring communities.

CONCLUSION & IMPLICATIONS

The present study yielded a reliable and valid measure of emotional empathy, which was based on the affective definition of empathy. The reason for constructing a scale of emotional empathy was the need for an instrument that could assess the trait or personality characteristic of emotional empathy, defined as the tendency to feel and vicariously experience the emotional experiences of others, in Pakistani population. There already exist several measures of emotional empathy in the West. However, emotional empathy has not, previously, been explored in our cultural context and there was no indigenous instrument available for its assessment. A major reason that the present investigation was initiated was the observation that the concept of emotional empathy is central for understanding a broad range of social phenomena, and has vital consequences for personality. This observation was based on considerable empirical support from research in the West that links emotional empathy to different motivational states as well as quality of individual's social functioning. Emotionally empathic people are found to be less aggressive, more prosocial, and higher in social competence. Thus, the concept of emotional empathy could have far reaching implications for personality assessment, theory and therapy.

Given this argument, there was a need for a questionnaire on emotional empathy, which could adequately assess individual differences in emotional empathy and could be used for further explorations into the phenomenon. To that end, we devised a scale. It was named as the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES). The development of the scale was guided by the model of emotional empathy, as proposed by Mehrabian (1996). So far, the Emotional Empathic

Tendency Scale (EETS) by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) remains the most frequently used questionnaire on emotional empathy. On the basis of theorizing of EETS, Mehrabian (1996) later developed the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES). In the present investigation, a principal components factor analysis was performed on the data to evaluate the factor structure of the 30-item EES in Pakistan. In concordance with the factorial results, regarding the dimensionality of the EETS (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), the EES was also found to be multidimensional. Three factors emerged which accounted for a large proportion of variance (42.7%). These included: Tendency to be Moved by others' Positive and Negative Emotional Experiences, Emotional Responsiveness, and Susceptibility to Emotional Contagion. Moreover, the 26-item scale developed through factor analysis showed high alpha internal consistency coefficient of .85, and good split-half reliability coefficient of .82.

The presence of gender differences in emotional empathy was expected. Everyday stereotypes, and social and biological theorizing pertaining to this concept suggest that women are more emotionally empathic than men. Moreover, self-report measures as compared to other measures of emotional empathy (for example, picture/story indices, facial/gestural physiological measures) have consistently shown gender differences favoring women (see Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). The data indicated gender differences on all of the three dimensions of the EES. Perhaps the stereotypes are up to date. To better assess gender differences, perhaps other indigenous measures (for example, picture/story indices, facial/gestural physiological measures) could be devised, for use along with the paper-and-pencil self-report measures for assessing individual differences in emotional empathy. At the moment, there are none available.

The scale showed evidence of convergent validity. The convergent validity of the EES was established by examining the association between the EES and the affective measure of empathy—the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES, Mehrabian, 1996). The high positive and significant correlation of .65 ($p < .000$) between the EES and the BEES was verification for the convergent validity of the EES.

The scale also showed evidence of discriminant validity. Scores on the scale were related to three measures expected to be associated to emotional empathy, but not so highly as to be redundant. These three measures assessed theoretically related constructs, including affiliative tendency, delinquency and trait emotional awareness. The results from the study, which assessed the relation of emotional empathy with affiliative tendency, showed that individuals who were inclined to empathic responding tend to hold positive expectations in their social interactions and were predisposed to act according to their expectations. The relation of delinquency with emotional empathy was also examined as the second discriminant study. Emotional empathy was found to be negatively correlated with delinquency. These results were consistent with theory and research suggesting that affective empathy plays an important role in inhibiting antisocial actions such as delinquent behaviors toward others. In addition, the relation of trait emotional awareness to emotional empathy was central to establishing the validity of the EES. Results yielded positive association between the two constructs, suggesting that individual differences in the tendency to attend to, to be clear about, and to be able to regulate one's emotions and behaviors are linked to emotional empathy. Therefore, well-regulated individuals who are aware of their own feelings are likely to experience other-oriented concern.

In sum, the findings indicate that the 26-item scale holds promise as a reliable, valid measure of emotional empathy. This inventory can be used for individuals of ages 15 and older. The Emotional Empathy Scale (EES), developed in the present research, may help to measure individual differences in the tendency to have emotional empathy with others. Therefore, it could have several possible uses. The scale may be used to select individuals for professions that require understanding of the situation and/or emotions of other co-workers, subordinates or clients (e.g., psychotherapists, group leaders, project planners, government personnel who deal with the public). It may also be used for the selection of teachers, caregivers, nurses, salesmen, and managers. The scale may also be used as a diagnostic tool in counseling.

The present research stemmed from an interest in emotional responsiveness. Another important objective of the study was to understand the role of trait emotional awareness as a dispositional predictor of emotional empathy. Consistent with theoretical expectations, trait emotional awareness was found to be an antecedent dispositional variable of emotional empathy. The results supported the argument that tendency toward attending to emotions, being clear about them, and regulation of emotions may facilitate the likelihood of the people attending to other's feelings and needs. Thus, implying that interventions that enhance individual's emotional awareness may foster emotional empathy.

Emotional empathy is a personal characteristic that has considerable relevance for the quality of individual's social functioning. Consistent with theory and research, results showed that affiliative tendency was significantly predicted by emotional empathy. Thus, it may be suggested that people who can vicariously feel the feelings of others are likely to exhibit positive

social behaviors, which is a reflection of their positive expectations from social encounters. Moreover, as expected, results also showed that emotional empathy significantly predicted aggression. Thus, suggesting that one likely consequence of the presence of the tendency toward empathic responding is reduced aggression.

The present investigation also provided evidence for the predictive value of trait emotional awareness for affiliative tendency and aggression. However, the role of emotional empathy as mediating the link of trait emotional awareness to affiliative tendency and aggression has not been, previously, explored. The present study, therefore, proposed two theoretical models in order to examine the mediational role of emotional empathy between trait emotional awareness and two potential outcomes—affiliative tendency and aggression. Results from the first model suggested that people who attend to their feelings, distinguish clearly among them, and manage their feelings and feelings-related behaviors may be predisposed to experience vicarious emotion when witnessing another's emotional state or condition. The proclivity toward emotional empathy in turn encourages affiliative tendency. The second model demonstrated that people with high levels of emotional awareness showed greater orientation toward responding empathically to other's emotions and needs. As a result, people's enhanced capacity for emotional awareness and emotional empathy was found to be involved in their decreased risk for the development of aggressive behavior toward others.

In view of these findings, it might be suggested that trait emotional awareness and empathic responding promote affiliative tendency and play a protective role against the development of aggression toward others. In brief, individuals who are emotionally aware tend

to be empathic and are in turn relatively high in the quality of their social functioning. These are important findings, because fostering individual's attention, clarity, and regulation of emotions and empathic concern for the needs of others may be an effective avenue of intervention for enhancing positive social orientations and improving the developmental course of behavior problems, particularly aggression.

This pattern of findings holds important implications for interpersonal relationships, counseling, parent training, and teacher education. Emotional empathy has profound consequences for positive social behaviors. If one hopes to produce good people then trait such as emotional empathy should be of particular interest to society and educators. It is the most important factor for cultivating growthful relationships, whereby people come to understand, appreciate, and communicate meaningfully with one another. It breeds tolerance by enabling one gain insight into the feelings and behavior of another. Thus, the presence of empathy could indeed be beneficial in human life in general.

The findings of the present investigation are of particular importance to the process of counseling or therapy. The more sensitively understanding is the therapist, the more likely is constructive learning and change to take place. Empathy, when experienced by the therapist or the counselor for client's emotional condition may initiate a focused self-exploration in the client. Thus, emotional empathy is an important ingredient for any therapeutic effectiveness. Moreover, increased empathic capacity could be a goal in therapy. Fostering emotional empathy in a client could predispose him or her toward positive social orientation and reduces aggression in its various forms. Having established the role of trait emotional awareness as the antecedent of

emotional empathy, a counselor might employ the technique of sustained practice at attending to one's own emotions, gaining clarity into them, and regulating them as a means to increasing levels of emotional empathy in the client.

Similarly, the results of the present investigation have implications for parenting. If parents wish to produce children who are compassionate and less hostile toward others, they need to concentrate on promoting in their child the capacity to share in the affective life of another. Since tendency toward emotional awareness is found to be fundamental for the development of emotional empathy, parents should encourage children experience, express, identify, and value the whole range of emotions occurring within themselves.

On the basis of findings of the present investigation, interventions could be planned that target regular education. It might be suggested that when a teacher is empathic, it adds an extremely potent factor to the classroom climate, whereby learning is enhanced. Moreover, teachers could promote emotional empathy in their students by providing them with an empathic atmosphere, so that the feelings of the students are not only understood and appreciated, but their expression is encouraged. Such a teacher accepts the student as a whole with many feelings and many potentialities. When students find themselves understood they may come in closer touch with a wide range of their emotional experiences. This may give them a referent to which they could turn for guidance in understanding their own and other people's feelings. Thus, when seeking to increase empathic responding, it is most fruitful to have students focus on their own feelings. Fostering emotional empathy is likely to discourage the development of aggressive behavior and encourage positive interpersonal orientation in a student.

Certainly, the capacities for emotional awareness and emotional empathy are important factors for individuals' quality of socioemotional functioning. We also know that the issue of relatedness or affiliation is of central importance to development, beginning with the very survival of the human organism. The need for relatedness remains with us throughout the life cycle. Emotional empathy plays potent role in the enabling one to be affiliative and to develop deeper bonds with others. Thus, psychologists argue that being emotionally empathic is the basis of richest individual development.

We know very well that research generates even more questions than originally were posed. The present discussion elaborates on what has been done, but even more important is to suggest the direction for the future. Future research could focus on testing the above mentioned implications of the findings of the present study. As far as the scale of emotional empathy is concerned, an additional approach to factor analyses might explore how the scale items covary with one another is to determine the differential and overlapping meaning of particular items by what "outcomes" of interest individual items predict. Bryant (1984), for example, assessed which particular items of the children's index of empathy predicted the mental health variables already documented as relevant by analyses using "total" empathy scores.

In addition, the scale of emotional empathy can be truly life span in nature, if the older adults are included in the research samples. Relevant or uniquely sensitive content issues may become increasingly salient as a wider age range is considered in the examination of human development. Future research may also attempt to differentiate between adult's sympathy and personal distress.

Since empathy is of crucial importance to the positive psychological development in a person, potential uses of the scale in theoretical research involve exploring the nature of emotional empathy, including what type of parental treatment/style would help flourish empathy in children; and how this attribute could be enhanced in individuals. Moreover, the present investigation suggests for examination of other constitutional factors implicated in the development of emotional empathy.

It is hoped that the present research might serve as a platform from which researchers could guide future investigations of empathy.

Limitations of the study suggested by the External Examiner

This study was limited in scope and the findings could only be generalized to university students of ages ranging from 20 to 26 years. Moreover, the validation studies were not enough to adequately establish the validity of the EES. It was suggested that study III, concerned with the validation of the EES, should have been carried out using a sample of delinquents, which could firmly provide evidence for individual differences in emotional empathy as measured by EES on delinquency. The present study employed adolescent boys as sample. However, it was strongly suggested that gender differences in delinquency should have been tested to validate the scale, thus, the sample should have included girl delinquents also. It was further suggested that all studies were questionable in terms of use of foreign scales. Moreover, Study 3 should have essentially explored delinquency instead of introducing a new variable of aggression.

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ANNEXURES

ANNEXURE A

Social Situations Generated Empirically Through Indepth Interviews

- 1- کسی غریب شخص کے ساتھ براسلوک ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 2- کسی دوست کی دیرینہ یاد لی خواہش پوری ہوتے دیکھنا، ہونے پر اُسے خوش دیکھنا۔
- 3- کسی بچے کو روتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 4- کسی بچے کو اپنے والدین سے مارکھاتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 5- کسی شخص کو اپنے امتحانات کے اختتام پر خوش اور مزے کرتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 6- کسی شخص کو اُس کے اپنے قریبی عزیز کی موت پر غمگین دیکھنا۔
- 7- کسی معذور نو جوان کو دیکھ کر۔
- 8- کسی بچے کو شدید بیماری میں مبتلا دیکھنا۔
- 9- کسی غریب شخص سے رُ اسلوک ہوتے ہوئے دیکھ کر جو کہ اپنی غریبی کی وجہ سے بے بس ہو۔
- 10- کسی غریب بچے کو سخت سردی میں ننگے پاؤں دیکھ کر۔
- 11- کسی دوست کو پریشان دیکھ کر۔
- 12- کسی فلم کا غمگین انجام دیکھ کر۔
- 13- بے بس بوڑھے لوگ جو اپنی کمزوری کی وجہ سے چل پھر نہیں سکتے۔
- 14- کسی دوست کو خوش دیکھ کر۔
- 15- کسی بچے کو تھکے ملنے پر بہت خوش دیکھ کر۔
- 16- پیار بھرے گانوں کے بول سن کر۔
- 17- کسی دوست کو اپنی خواہش کے پورے ہونے پر بہت خوش دیکھ کر۔
- 18- کسی فٹبالر / عزیز کو اپنی شاپنگ پر بہت خوش دیکھ کر۔
- 19- کلاسک ٹریجڈی ناول پڑھ کر۔
- 20- پینٹنگ / تصویروں کی نمائش دیکھ کر۔
- 21- کسی شخص کو کسی حادثے میں شدید زخمی ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا یا اُس کے بارے میں سنا۔
- 22- کسی غریب بچے کو سخت سردی میں گرم کپڑوں کے بغیر دیکھنا۔
- 23- کسی جوڑے کو اپنی شادی کے دن خوش دیکھنا۔
- 24- افریقی ممالک میں قحط زدہ لوگوں اور بچوں کے بارے میں سنا یا پڑھنا۔
- 25- کسی لڑکے یا لڑکی کی زبردستی شادی کے بارے میں سُن کر۔
- 26- ایک دوسرے سے پیار کرنے والوں کو جدادیکھ کر۔
- 27- کسی بچے کو سکول کے پہلے دن روتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 28- کسی شخص کو اُداس اور بالکل اکیلا دیکھنا۔

- 29- کسی کو اپنے امتحانات کے دوران سخت پریشان دیکھ کر۔
- 30- کسی قریبی عزیز کے بچے کی فونٹگی کے بارے میں سن کر۔
- 31- کسی کتاب یا فلم کے پُر مسرت انجام کو پڑھ کر دیکھ کر۔
- 32- کسی قریبی عزیز کو اپنے بچے کی بیدائش پر خوش دیکھنا۔
- 33- کسی دوست کو ہوسٹل میں اکیلے اور بور ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 34- کسی قریبی دوست کو اپنی شادی شدہ زندگی میں خوش دیکھنا۔
- 35- کسی شخص کو اپنی ازدواجی زندگی کے مسائل سے پریشان دیکھ کر اس میں گھرے ہوئے دیکھ کر۔
- 36- کسی دوست کو کسی لڑکی سے مثبت جواب سن کر خوش دیکھنا۔
- 37- بے روزگار نو جوانوں کو پریشان دیکھ کر۔
- 38- کسی بچے کو سکول نہ جانے کی ضد کرنے پر مار پڑتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 39- بے گناہ لوگوں کے قتل و غارت کا اخبار میں پڑھنا یا اُس کے بارے میں سننا۔
- 40- اقلیتوں کے گھروں کو جلا دینے کی خبر سننا یا اخبار میں پڑھنا۔
- 41- ایڑپورٹ یا ریلوے اسٹیشن پر جدا ہونے والے لوگوں کے آنسو دیکھنا۔
- 42- کسی قریبی عزیز کو ایک طویل بیماری سے صحت یاب ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 43- کسی بچے کو روتے ہوئے دیکھنا جب اُس کے والدین آپس میں لڑ رہے ہوں۔
- 44- کسی عورت کو اپنے خاندان سے بے دردی سے پٹتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 45- کسی ایسی عورت کے بارے میں سننا جس کا بچہ معذور ہو۔
- 46- کسی نشئی کو دیکھ کر۔
- 47- کسی بچے کو اپنی سالگرہ پر تھکے کھولتے ہوئے خوش دیکھ کر۔
- 48- چھوٹے بچے جن کا سکول جانے کا خرچا اُن کے والدین برداشت نہیں کر سکتے کو سڑکوں پر اخبار بیچتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 49- کالج کی زندگی کے اختتام پر دوستوں کو جدا ہوتے ہوئے اداس دیکھ کر۔
- 50- کسی سے زیادتی / نا انصافی ہوتے دیکھنا۔
- 51- کسی سے دھوکا ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 52- کسی دوست کو کوئی بری خبر پہنچانا۔
- 53- کسی مجمع کے ابھرتے ہوئے جذبات دیکھنا۔
- 54- کسی کو روتے دیکھنا۔
- 55- اپنے ارد گرد خوش اور زندگی سے بھرپور لوگوں کو دیکھنا۔
- 56- کسی شخص کو کسی ناقابل علاج بیماری میں مبتلا دیکھنا۔
- 57- اجنبی لوگ جو اپنی بقاء کے لئے کوشاں ہوں کو دیکھ کر۔
- 58- اپنے ارد گرد لوگوں کو برے موڈ میں دیکھ کر۔
- 59- کسی کتاب یا فلم کے کردار کے جذبات پڑھ کر یا دیکھ کر۔
- 60- جانوروں کو جسمانی تکلیف میں دیکھ کر۔

- 61 کسی شخص کو پھانسی ہوتے ہوئے دیکھ کر۔
- 62 کسی شخص سے نا انصافی ہوتے دیکھنا۔
- 63 شادیوں پر خستی کے موقع پر لوگوں کو اُداس اور آبدیدہ دیکھ کر۔

ANNEXURE B

Performa for Assessing the Frequency of Emotional Empathic Situations

Instructions

Specify how frequently you come across the following situations, in which one could experience emotional empathy, in your daily life.

ہدایات:-

ذیل میں چند ایسی صورت احوال (situations) کا ذکر ہے، جن میں کوئی شخص دوسروں کے جذبات اور احساسات کو اسی طرح محسوس کر سکتا ہے جس طرح وہ خود محسوس کر رہے ہوں۔ برائے مہربانی یہ بتائیے کہ روزمرہ زندگی میں مندرجہ ذیل صورت احوال سے آپ کا سامنا کتنی مرتبہ ہوتا ہے۔ اکثر، کبھی کبھار یا بہت کم۔ صرف ایک پر نشان (✓) لگائیں۔

Frequently اکثر	Sometimes کبھی کبھار	Rarely بہت کم	Situations صورت احوال	S.No.
			کسی غریب شخص کے ساتھ براسلوک ہوتا ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-1
			کسی دوست کی دیرینہ یا دلی خواہش پوری کر پراے خوش دیکھنا۔	-2
			کسی بچے کو روتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-3
			کسی بچے کو اپنے والدین سے مارکھاتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-4
			کسی شخص کو اپنے امتحانات کے اختتام پر خوش اور مزے کرتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-5
			کسی معذور نوجوان کو دیکھ کر۔	-6
			کسی شخص کو اس کے اپنے قریبی عزیز کی موت پر غمگین دیکھنا۔	-7
			کسی بچے کو شدید بیماری میں مبتلا دیکھنا۔	-8
			کسی غریب شخص سے براسلوک ہوتے ہوئے دیکھ کر جو کے اپنی غریبی کی وجہ سے بے بس ہو۔	-9
			کسی غریب بچے کو سخت سردی میں ننگے پاؤں دیکھ کر۔	-10
			کسی دوست کو پریشان دیکھ کر۔	-11
			کسی فلم کا غمگین انجام دیکھ کر۔	-12
			بے بس بوڑھے لوگ جو اپنی کمزوری کی وجہ سے چل پھر نہیں سکتے۔	-13
			کسی دوست کو خوش دیکھ کر۔	-14
			کسی بچے کو تھنڈے پلٹے پر بہت خوش دیکھ کر۔	-15
			پیارے بھرنے گانوں کے بول سُن کر۔	-16

Frequently اکثر	Sometimes کبھی کبھار	Rarely بہت کم	Situations صورت احوال	S.No.
			کسی دوست کو اپنی خواہش کے پورے ہونے پر بہت خوش دیکھ کر۔	17-
			کسی فیملی ممبر / عزیز کو اپنی شاپنگ پر بہت خوش دیکھ کر۔	18-
			کلاسک ٹریڈی ناول پڑھ کر۔	19-
			پیٹنگ / تصویروں کی نمائش دیکھ کر۔	20-
			کسی شخص کو کسی حادثے میں شاید زخمی ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا یا اُس کے بارے میں سنا۔	21-
			کسی غریب بچے کو سخت سردی میں گرم کپڑوں کے بغیر دیکھنا۔	22-
			کسی جوڑے کو اپنی شادی کے دن خوش دیکھنا۔	23-
			افریقی ممالک میں قحط زدہ لوگوں اور بچوں کے بارے میں سنا یا پڑھنا۔	24-
			کسی لڑکے / لڑکی کی زبردستی شادی کے بارے میں سن کر۔	25-
			ایک دوسرے سے پیار کرنے والوں کو جدادیکھ کر۔	26-
			کسی بچے کو سکول کے پہلے دن روتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	27-
			کسی شخص کو اُداس اور بالکل اکیلا دیکھنا۔	28-
			کسی کو اپنے امتحانات کے دوران سخت پریشانی دیکھ کر۔	29-
			کسی قریبی عزیز کے بچے کی فونگی کے بارے میں سن کر۔	30-
			کسی کتاب یا فلم کے پُرسرت انجام پڑھ کر یا دیکھ کر۔	31-
			کسی قریبی عزیز کو اپنے بچے کی پیدائش پر خوش دیکھنا۔	32-
			کسی دوست کو ہوٹل میں اکیلے اور بورتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	33-
			کسی قریبی دوست کو اپنی شادی شدہ زندگی میں خوش دیکھنا۔	34-
			کسی شخص کو اپنی ازدواجی زندگی کے مسائل سے پریشان دیکھ کر۔	35-
			کسی دوست کو کسی لڑکی سے مثبت جواب سن کر خوش دیکھنا۔	36-
			بے روزگار نوجوانوں کو پریشان دیکھ کر۔	37-
			کسی بچے کو سکول نہ جانے کس ضد کرنے پر مار پڑتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	38-
			بے گناہ لوگوں کے قتل و غارت کا اخبار میں پڑھنا یا سنا۔	39-
			اقلیتوں کے گھروں کو جلا دینے کی خبر سنا یا اخبار میں پڑھنا۔	40-
			انزپورٹ یا ریلوے سٹیشن پر جدا ہونے والے لوگوں کے آنسو دیکھنا۔	41-
			کسی قریبی عزیز کو ایک طویل بیماری سے صحت یاب ہوتے دیکھنا۔	42-
			کسی بچے کو روتے ہوئے دیکھنا جب اُس کے والدین آپس میں لڑ رہے ہوں۔	43-
			کسی عورت کو اپنے خاوند سے بے دردی سے پتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	44-
			کسی ایسی عورت کے بارے میں سنا جس کا بچہ معذور ہو۔	45-
			کسی لڑکی کو دیکھ کر۔	46-

Frequently اکثر	Sometimes کبھی کبھار	Rarely بہت کم	Situations صورت احوال	S.No.
			کسی بچے کو اپنی سالگرہ پر تحفے کھولتے ہوئے خوش دیکھ کر۔	47-
			چھوٹے بچے جن کا سکول جانے کا خرچہ اُن کے والدین برداشت نہیں کر سکتے ان کو سڑکوں پر اخبار بیچتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	48-
			کالج کی زندگی کے اختتام پر دوستوں کو جدا ہوتے ہوئے اُداس دیکھ کر۔	49-
			کسی سے زیادتی ہوتے دیکھنا۔	50-
			کسی سے دھوکا ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	51-
			کسی شخص کو کوئی بری خبر پہنچانا۔	52-
			کسی مجمع کے اُبھرتے ہوئے جذبات دیکھنا۔	53-
			کسی کو روتے دیکھنا۔	54-
			اپنے ارد گرد خوش اور زندگی سے بھرپور لوگوں کو دیکھنا۔	55-
			کسی شخص کو کسی ناقابل علاج بیماری میں مبتلا دیکھنا۔	56-
			اجنبی لوگ جو اپنی بقاء کے لئے کوشاں ہوں کو دیکھ کر۔	57-
			اپنے ارد گرد لوگوں کو بڑے موڈ میں دیکھ کر۔	58-
			کسی کتاب یا فلم کے کردار کے جذبات پڑھ کر یا دیکھ کر۔	59-
			جانوروں کو جسمانی تکلیف میں دیکھ کر۔	60-
			کسی شخص کو پھانسی ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	61-
			کسی شخص سے نا انصافی ہوتے دیکھنا۔	62-
			شادیوں پر رخصتی کے موقع پر لوگوں کو اُداس اور آبدیدہ دیکھ کر۔	63-

ANNEXURE C

Observed Frequency and Percentage of Situations in which one
Feels Emotional Empathy

Percentage	Frequency	Situations	S.No.
8.3.33	25	بے گناہ لوگوں کے قتل و غارت کا اخبار میں پڑھنا یا سننا۔	-1
73.33	22	کسی بچے کو اپنی سالگرہ پر تحفے کھولتے ہوئے خوش دیکھ کر۔	-2
73.33	22	بے روزگار نو جوانوں کو پریشان دیکھ کر۔	-3
60.66	20	کسی دوست کو خوش دیکھ کر۔	-4
60.66	20	کسی کو اپنے امتحانات کے اختتام پر خوش اور مزے کرتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-5
60	18	کسی کو اپنے امتحانات کے دوران سخت پریشان دیکھ کر۔	-6
60	18	کسی بچے کو روتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-7
56.66	17	بے بس بوڑھے لوگ جو اپنی کمزوری کی وجہ سے چل پھر نہیں سکتے۔	-8
56.66	17	کسی عزیز کو اپنی شاپنگ پر بہت خوش دیکھ کر۔	-9
53.33	16	کسی غریب شخص سے براسلوک ہوتے ہوئے دیکھ کر۔	-10
50	15	کسی قریبی عزیز کی اپنے بچے کی پیدائش پر خوش دیکھنا۔	-11
46.66	14	پیارے گانوں کے بول سُن کر۔	-12
46.66	14	کسی جوڑے کو اپنی شادی کے دن خوش دیکھ کر۔	-13
46.66	14	چھوٹے بچے جن کا سکول کا خرچا اُن کے والدین برداشت نہیں کر سکتے کو سڑکوں پر اخبار بیچتے دیکھ کر۔	-14
46.66	14	کسی قریبی عزیز کو ایک طویل بیماری سے صحت یاب ہوتے دیکھنا۔	-15
33	10	کسی معذور نو جوان کو دیکھ کر۔	-16
33	10	کسی دوست کی دیرینہ یا دلی خواہش پوری ہونے پر اُسے خوش دیکھ کر	-17
33	10	کسی بچے کو سکول کے پہلے دن روتے ہوئے دیکھ کر۔	-18
33	10	کسی دوست کو ہوٹل میں اکیلے اور بوریات دیکھنا۔	-19
33	10	کسی لڑکے یا لڑکی کی زبردستی کی شادی کے بارے میں سُن کر۔	-20
30	9	کسی دوست کو پریشان دیکھنا۔	-21
30	9	افزونی ممالک میں قحط زدہ لوگوں اور بچوں کے بارے میں پڑھنا یا سننا۔	-22
30	9	کسی شخص کو اپنی ازدواجی زندگی کے مسائل سے پریشان دیکھ کر۔	-23
26.66	8	کسی غریب بچے کو سخت سردی میں ننگے پاؤں دیکھ کر۔	-24
26.66	8	اڑپورٹ یا ریلوے اسٹیشن پر جد اہونے والے لوگوں کے آنسو دیکھ کر۔	-25

Percentage	Frequency	Situations	S.No.
26.66	8	کسی فلم کا ٹمکین انجام دیکھ کر۔	-26
23.33	7	کسی شخص کو کسی ناقابل علاج بیماری میں مبتلا دیکھ کر۔	-27
20	6	کسی شخص کو اس کے اپنے قریبی عزیز کی موت پر ٹمکین دیکھ کر۔	-28
20	6	ایک دوسرے سے پیار کرنے والوں کو جدا دیکھ کر۔	-29
20	6	اپنے اردگرد خوش اور زندگی سے بھرپور لوگوں کو دیکھ کر۔	-30
20	6	اجنبی لوگ جو اپنی بقاء کے لئے کوشاں ہوں کو دیکھ کر۔	-31
20	6	کسی شخص کو اُداس اور بالکل اکیلا دیکھ کر۔	-32
20	6	کسی شخص سے نا انصافی ہوتے دیکھنا۔	-33
20	6	اقلیتوں کے گھروں کو جلا دینے کی خبر سن کر۔	-34
20	6	کسی شخص کو پھانسی ہوتے ہوئے دیکھ کر۔	-35
20	6	جانوروں کو جسمانی تکلیف میں دیکھ کر۔	-36
20	6	کسی کتاب یا فلم کے کردار کے جذبات پڑھ کر یا دیکھ کر۔	-37
20	6	اپنے اردگرد لوگوں کو بُرے موڈ میں دیکھ کر۔	-38

Situations Excluded

ANNEXURE D

Situations Included

- 1 کسی عورت کو اپنے خاوند سے بے دردی سے پٹتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 2 کسی شخص کو کوئی بُری خبر پہنچانا۔
- 3 کسی مجمع کے ابھرتے ہوئے جذبات دیکھنا۔
- 4 شادیوں پر خستی کے موقع پر لوگوں کو اداس اور آبدیدہ دیکھ کر۔
- 5 کسی کو روتے دیکھنا۔
- 6 کسی شخص کو کسی حادثے میں شدید زخمی ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔
- 7 کسی کتاب یا فلم کا پر مسرت انجام پڑھ کر یاد دیکھ کر۔
- 8 کسی جوڑے کو اپنی شادی کے دن خوش دیکھ کر۔

ANNEXURE E

Reactions to the Emotional Empathic Situations

Definition

"Emotional empathy is defined as one's vicarious experience of another's emotional experiences- feeling what the other person feels."

Instructions

Following are the situations in which one feels emotional empathy. Using the above definition, specify your own reactions (e.g., happiness, sorrow, excitement, an urge to help, painful, etc.) if you come across these situations. Also, specify the degree of your reaction (1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest). Please write your reactions in Urdu.

تعریف:-

" کسی دوسرے شخص کے جذبات اور احساسات کو ایسے محسوس کرنا جیسے کہ وہ خود محسوس کر رہا رہی ہو، اس صلاحیت کو Emotional Empathy کہتے ہیں۔"

ہدایات:-

ذیل میں کچھ ایسی صورتِ احوال (situations) دی گئی ہیں جن میں آپ دوسروں کے جذبات اور احساسات کو اسی طرح محسوس کر سکتے ہیں جس طرح کوئی شخص خود کرے۔ برائے مہربانی بیان کریں کہ اگر آپ کا سامنا ان صورتِ احوال سے ہو تو آپ کا ردِ عمل کیا ہوگا (مثلاً خوشی، پُر جوش، تکلیف، جذباتی، دکھ، مدد کرنے کا جذبہ، وغیرہ)۔ یہ بھی بتائیے کہ آپ کا ردِ عمل کس حد تک ہوگا۔ جبکہ "1" کا مطلب بہت کم اور "5" کا مطلب بہت زیادہ ہے۔

1	2	3	4	5	Reactions ردِ عمل	Situations صورتِ احوال	S.No.
						کسی بچے کو اپنی سالگرہ پر تھے کھولتے ہوئے خوش دیکھ کر۔	-1
						بے روزگار نو جوانوں کو پریشان دیکھ کر۔	-2
						بے بس بوڑھے لوگ جو اپنی کمزوری کی وجہ سے چل پھر نہیں سکتے۔	-3
						کسی غریب شخص کے ساتھ برا سلوک ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-4
						کسی قریبی عزیز کو اپنے بچے کی پیدائش پر خوش دیکھنا۔	-5
						کسی بچے کو روتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-6
						کسی جوڑے کو اپنی شادی کے دن خوش دیکھ کر۔	-7

1	2	3	4	5	Reactions رد عمل	Situations صورت احوال	S.No.
						چھوٹے بچے جن کا سکول کا خرچہ ان کے والدین برداشت نہیں کر سکتے کو سڑکوں پر اخبار بیچتے دیکھنا۔	-8
						کسی معذور نوجوان کو دیکھ کر۔	-9
						کسی لڑکے / لڑکی کی زبردستی کی شادی کے بارے میں سُن کر۔	-10
						افریقائی ممالک میں قحط زدہ لوگوں اور بچوں کے بارے میں پڑھنا یا سننا۔	-11
						کسی شخص کو اپنی ازدواجی زندگی کے مسائل پریشان دیکھ کر۔	-12
						کسی غریب بچے کو سخت سردی میں ننگے پاؤں دیکھ کر۔	-13
						ایزپورٹ یا ریلوے سٹیشن پر جُدا ہونے والے لوگوں کے آنسو دیکھ کر۔	-14
						کسی فلم کا ٹمگین انجام دیکھ کر۔	-15
						کسی شخص کو کسی ناقابل علاج بیماری میں مبتلا دیکھ کر۔	-16
						کسی شخص کو اُداس اور بالکل اکیلا دیکھ کر۔	-17
						کسی شخص کو اس کے اپنے قریبی عزیز کی موت پر ٹمگین دیکھ کر۔	-18
						ایک دوسرے سے پیار کرنے والوں کو جُدا دیکھ کر۔	-19
						اپنے ارد گرد خوش اور زندگی سے بھرپور لوگوں کو دیکھ کر۔	-20
						اجنبی لوگ جو اپنی بقاء کے لیے کوشاں ہوں کو دیکھ کر۔	-21
						کسی شخص کو کسی حادثے میں شدید زخمی ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-22
						کسی کو روتے دیکھنا۔	-23
						کسی عورت کو اپنے خاندان سے بے دردی سے پٹتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-24
						کسی شخص کو کوئی بُری خبر پہنچانا۔	-25
						کسی مجمع کے اُبھرتے ہوئے جذبات دیکھنا۔	-26
						بے گناہ لوگوں کے قتل و غارت کے بارے میں سننا یا پڑھنا۔	-27
						کسی دوست کی دیرینہ یا دلی خواہش پوری ہونے پر اُسے خوش دیکھ کر۔	-28
						کسی قریبی عزیز کو ایک طویل بیماری سے صحت یاب ہوتے دیکھنا۔	-29
						پیارے گانوں کے بول سن کر۔	-30
						کسی دوست کو پریشانی دیکھنا۔	-31
						جانوروں کو جسمانی تکلیف میں دیکھ کر۔	-32
						شادیوں پر رخصتی کے موقع پر لوگوں کو اُداس اور آبدیدہ دیکھ کر۔	-33
						کسی کتاب یا فلم کے کردار کے جذبات پڑھ کر یا دیکھ کر۔	-34
						کسی کتاب یا فلم کا پُر مسرت انجام پڑھ کر یا دیکھ کر۔	-35
						کسی سے دھوکا ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-36

1	2	3	4	5	Reactions رد عمل	Situations صورت احوال	S.No.
						کسی کو اپنے امتحانات کے اختتام پر خوش اور مزا کرتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-37
						کسی شخص سے نا انصافی ہوتے دیکھ کر۔	-38
						اقلیتوں کے گھروں کو جلادینے کی خبر سن کر۔	-39
						کسی شخص کو پھانسی ہوتے دیکھ کر۔	-40
						اپنے ارد گرد لوگوں کو برے موڈ میں دیکھ کر۔	-41

ANNEXURE F

Reported Reactions and their Average Intensity

Average	Reactions	Situations	S.No.
2.5	خوشی	کسی بچے کو اپنی سالگرہ پر تحفے کھلو لیتے ہوئے خوش دیکھ کر۔	-1
3.9	دُکھ / افسوس	کسی بچے کو روتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-2
3.0	ہمدردی	بے روزگاروں کو پریشان دیکھ کر۔	-3
4.1	تکلیف دہ	بے بس بوڑھے لوگ جو اپنی کمزوری کی وجہ سے چل پھر نہیں سکتے کو دیکھ کر۔	-4
4.9	دُکھ / افسوس	کسی غریب شخص کے ساتھ براسلوک ہوتے دیکھنا۔	-5
3.6	خوشی	کسی قریبی عزیز کو اپنے بچے کی پیدائش پر خوش دیکھنا۔	-6
3.1	خوشی / اُپر جوش	کسی جوڑے کو اپنی شادی کے دن خوش دیکھ کر۔	-7
3.7	افسوس / مدد	چھوٹے بچے جن کا سکول کا خرچا ان کے والدین برداشت نہیں کر سکتے کو سڑکوں پر اخبار بیچتے دیکھ کر۔	-8
4.5	شدید دکھ اور تکلیف	کسی معذور نو جوان کو دیکھ کر۔	-9
4.1	بے بسی	کسی شخص سے نا انصافی ہوتے دیکھ کر۔	-10
3.6	دُکھ	افریقائی ممالک میں قحط زدہ لوگوں اور بچوں کے بارے میں پڑھنا یا سنا۔	-11
3.8	گہرا دُکھ	کسی شخص کو اپنی ازدواجی زندگی کے مسائل سے پریشان دیکھ کر	-12
4.2	مدد / رونا آجاتا	کسی غریب بچے کو سخت سردی میں تنگے پاؤں دیکھ کر	-13
4.0	جذبات محسوس کرنا	ایئر پورٹ یا ریلوے اسٹیشن پر جُدا ہونے والوں کے آنسو دیکھ کر۔	-14
4.0	جذباتی / رونا آجاتا	کسی فلم کا ٹمگین انجام دیکھ کر۔	-15
3.8	غصہ	کسی سے دھوکا ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا	-16
3.7	غم بانٹنے کا دل چاہتا ہے	کسی شخص کو اُداس اور بالکل اکیلا دیکھ کر۔	-17
4.3	رنج	کسی شخص کو اُس کے اپنے قریبی عزیز کی موت پر غمگین دیکھ کر۔	-18
3.7	تکلیف دہ / اُداسی	ایک دوسرے سے پیار کرنے والوں کو جدا دیکھ کر۔	-19
3.7	افسوس / ہمدردی	اقلیتوں کو گھروں کو جلا دینے کی خبر سن کر۔	-20
4.2	مدد / شدید افسوس	کسی شخص کو کسی حادثے میں شدید زخمی ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا۔	-21
3.8	بے بسی محسوس کرنا	کسی لڑکے یا لڑکی کی زبردستی کی شادی کے بارے میں سن کر	-22
4.2	غصہ / اضطراب	کسی عورت کو اپنے خاندان سے بے ہمدردی سے پٹتے ہوئے دیکھنا	-23
4.3	شدید تکلیف دہ	کسی شخص کو کوئی بُری خبر پہنچانا۔	-24
3.3	جذباتی	کسی مجمع کے اُبھرتے ہوئے جذبات دیکھ کر	-25
3.4	افسوس / غصہ	بے گناہ لوگوں کے قتل و غارت کے بارے میں سننا یا پڑھنا۔	-26

Average	Reactions	Situations	S.No.
4.9	دلی خوشی	کسی دوست کی دیرینہ یاد لی خواہش پوری ہونے پر اُسے خوش دیکھ کر۔	-27
3.8	پرسکون	کسی کو اپنے امتحانات کے اختتام پر خوش اور مزے کرتے دیکھنا۔	-28
3.8	کھوجانا/ جذباتی	پیار بھرے گانوں کے بول سن کر۔	-29
4.2	مدد کرنے کو دل چاہتا ہے	کسی دوست کو پریشان دیکھنا۔	-30
3.9	ستائش	اجنبی لوگ جو اپنی بقاء کے لیے کوشاں ہوں کو دیکھ کر۔	-31
2.8	ڈکھ	شادیوں پر رخصتی کے موقع پر لوگوں کو اُداس اور آبدیدہ دیکھ کر۔	-32
3.9	ہمدردی/ افسوس	کسی شخص کو کسی ناقابل علاج بیماری میں مبتلا دیکھ کر۔	-33
4.0	کانپ جانا	کسی شخص کو پھانسی ہوتے ہوئے دیکھ کر۔	-34
3.9	اچھا محسوس کرنا	اپنے ارد گرد خوش اور زندگی سے بھرپور لوگوں کو دیکھ کر۔	-35
3.8	غصہ	جانوروں کو جسمانی تکلیف میں دیکھ کر۔	-36
4.5	جذبات محسوس کرنا/ لطف اندوز	کسی کتاب یا فلم کا پرمسرف انجام پڑھ کر یاد دیکھ کر	-37
4.0	بے چینی	کسی کو روتے دیکھنا۔	-38
4.4	اطمینان/ خوشی سے رونا	کسی قریبی عزیز کو ایک طویل بیماری سے صحت یاب ہوتے دیکھنا۔	-39
3.7	جذباتی	کسی کتاب یا فلم کے کردار کے جذبات پڑھ کر یاد دیکھ کر۔	-40
3.7	موڈ خراب	اپنے ارد گرد لوگوں کو بُرے موڈ میں دیکھ کر۔	-41

ANNEXURE G

List of Self-Report Statements for the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

- 1- کسی بچے کو اپنی سالگرہ پر تحفے کھولنے ہوئے خوش دیکھ کر مجھے خوشی ہوتی ہے۔
- 2- بے روزگار نو جوانوں کو پریشان دیکھ کر مجھے اُن سے ہمدردی محسوس ہوتی ہے۔
- 3- کسی بچے کو روتے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں بہت بے چین ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 4- میں بوڑھے لوگ جو اپنی کمزوری کی وجہ سے چل پھر نہیں سکتے کی تکلیف محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔
- 5- کسی غریب شخص سے بُرا سلوک ہوتے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں اُس کی بے بسی تقریباً اسی طرح محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں وہ خود کربا ہو۔
- 6- کسی عزیز کو اپنے بچے کی پیدائش پر بُر مسرت دیکھ کر مجھے بہت خوشی ہوتی ہے۔
- 7- کسی جوڑے کو اپنی شادی کے دن خوش دیکھ کر مجھے بہت خوشی محسوس ہوتی ہے۔
- 8- نو عمر فریب لڑکے جو اپنی تعلیم کا خرچہ برداشت نہ کر سکیں کو سڑک پر اخبار بیچتے ہوئے دیکھ کر مجھے افسوس ہوتا ہے۔
- 9- کسی معذور نو جوان کو دیکھ کر مجھے شدید دکھ اور تکلیف ہوتی ہے۔
- 10- میں کسی شخص سے نا انصافی برداشت نہیں کر سکتی / سکتا۔
- 11- مجھے افریقی ممالک میں قحط زدہ لوگوں اور بچوں کے بارے میں سُن کر بہت دکھ ہوتا ہے۔
- 12- کسی شخص کو اپنی ازدواجی زندگی کے مسائل سے پریشان دیکھ کر میں اُس کی پریشانی محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔
- 13- کسی غریب بچے کو سخت سردی میں ننگے پاؤں دیکھ کر مجھے اُس کی مدد کرنے کو شدت سے دل چاہتا ہے۔
- 14- ائر پورٹ یا ریلوے اسٹیشن پر جدا ہونے والے لوگوں کے آنسو دیکھ کر میں اُن کے جذبات محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔
- 15- کسی فلم کا دکھ بھرا / غمگین انجام دیکھ کر میں جذباتی ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 16- میرے لئے کسی سے دھوکا ہوتے ہوئے دیکھنا شدید تکلیف اور غصے کا باعث ہے۔
- 17- کسی شخص کو اُداس اور بالکل اکیلا دیکھ کر مجھے اُس کا دکھ بانٹنے کو دل چاہتا ہے۔
- 18- کسی شخص کو اپنے کسی قریبی عزیز کی موت پر غمگین دیکھ کر میں رنجیدہ ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 19- محبت کرنے والوں میں جدائی دیکھ کر میں اُداس ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 20- اپنے کسی قریبی عزیز کو طویل بیماری سے صحت یاب ہوتے دیکھ کر مجھے خوشی سے رونا آ جاتا ہے۔
- 21- میں اقلیتوں کے دکھ اور تکلیف کو آسانی سے محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں جب اُن کے گھروں کو جلا دیا جائے۔
- 22- کسی شخص کو حادثے میں شدید زخمی دیکھ کر میں اُس کی مدد کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 23- کسی لڑکے یا لڑکی کی زبردستی کی شادی کے بارے میں سُن کر میں اُن کی بے بسی محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔
- 24- کسی عورت کو اپنے شوہر سے ظالمانہ طریقے سے مار پڑتے ہوئے دیکھ کر مجھے غصہ اور اضطراب محسوس ہوتا ہے۔
- 25- کسی کو بری خبر پہنچانا میرے لیے بہت مشکل کام ہے۔
- 26- میں کسی مجمع کے پر جوش جذبات میں آسانی سے شامل ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 27- بے گناہ لوگوں کے قتل و عارت کے بارے میں سُن کر مجھے بہت دکھ ہوتا ہے۔
- 28- اگر میرے دوست کی دیرینہ یاد لی خواہش پوری ہو تو میں اُسکی خوشی اُسی طرح محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں جیسا کہ وہ خود محسوس کرے۔
- 29- کسی کو اپنے امتحانات کے اختتام پر خوش اور مزا کرتے ہوئے دیکھ کر مجھے بھی خوشی محسوس ہوتی ہے۔

- 30 پیار بھرے گانے سن کر میں اُن میں کھوجاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 31 میں اجنبی لوگ جو اپنی بقاء کے لیے کوشاں ہوں کی ستائش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 32 شادیوں پر رخصتی کے موقع پر لوگوں کو اُداس اور روتے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں اُداس ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 33 کسی شخص کو کسی ناقابلِ علاج بیماری میں مبتلا دیکھ کر میں بہت غمگین ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 34 * کسی شخص کو چھائی ہوتے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں کانپ جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 35 اپنے ارد گرد پر مسرت اور زندگی سے بھرپور لوگوں کو دیکھ کر میں بھی اچھا اور خوش محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 36 کسی کتاب یا فلم کے کردار کے جذبات پڑھ کر میں اُن کے جذبات کو شدت سے محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 37 * جانوروں کو جسمانی تکلیف میں دیکھ کر میں بہت زیادہ غصے میں آ جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 38 کسی کتاب، افسانے یا فلم کے پر مسرت انجام سے میں بہت خوش اور لطف اندوز ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
- 39 اپنے ارد گرد لوگوں کو بُرے موڈ میں دیکھ کر میرا موڈ بھی خراب ہو جاتا ہے۔
- 40 کسی کو روتے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں بے چین ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 41 کسی دوست کو پریشان دیکھتا۔

ANNEXURE H

Original Form of Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

سوالاتنامہ

ہدایات:

میرا تعلق قومی ادارہ نفسیات قائد اعظم یونیورسٹی اسلام آباد سے ہے۔ ایک تحقیق کے سلسلے میں یہ سوالنامہ آپ کو دیا جا رہا ہے۔ مندرجہ ذیل میں بہت سے بیانات دیئے گئے ہیں جو ہماری روزمرہ کی زندگی میں پیش آنے والی مختلف صورت حال کو بیان کر رہے ہیں۔

آپ سے درخواست ہے کہ ہر بیان کو غور سے پڑھیے اور اپنے خیال کے مطابق یہ بتائیے کہ اگر آپ اس صورت حال میں ہوں تو ہر بیان سے کس حد تک متفق ہونگے۔ ان بیانات کے سامنے دیئے گئے مختلف جوابات میں سے اپنے مطابق کسی ایک پر (✓) کا نشان لگائیں۔ ہر بیان کیلئے صرف ایک کالم پر نشان لگائیں۔ کوئی بیان خالی نہ چھوڑیں۔ آپ کے تعاون کا بہت شکریہ۔

نمبر شمار	بیانات	بالکل غیر متفق	کافی حد تک غیر متفق	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک متفق	کافی حد تک متفق	بالکل متفق
1-	کسی بچے کو اپنی سالگرہ پر تحفے کھولتے ہوئے خوش دیکھ کر مجھے خوشی ہوتی ہے۔							
2-	بے روزگار نو جوانوں کو پریشان دیکھ کر مجھے ان سے ہمدردی محسوس ہوتی ہے۔							
3-	کسی فلم کا ٹیگین اور دکھ بھرا انجام دیکھ کر مجھے شائد ہی کبھی رونا آیا ہو۔							
4-	میں بوڑھے لوگ جو اپنی کمزوری کی وجہ سے چل پھر بھی نہیں سکتے کی تکلیف محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔							
5-	میں کسی مجمع کے پرجوش جذبات میں آسانی سے شامل نہیں ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔							
6-	کسی شخص کو اداس اور بالکل اکیلا دیکھ کر مجھے اس کا دکھ / غم بانٹنے کو دل چاہتا ہے۔							
7-	پیارے بھروسے گانوں کے بول سن کر میں ان میں کھوجاتی / جاتا ہوں۔							

نمبر شمار	بیانات	بالکل غیر متفق	کانی حد تک غیر متفق	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک متفق	کانی حد تک متفق	بالکل متفق
8-	کسی بچے کو روتے ہوئے دیکھ کر ضروری نہیں کہ میں اس کی طرف متوجہ ہو جاؤں۔							
9-	کسی شخص کو اپنی ازدواجی زندگی کے مسائل میں گھرے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں اس کی پریشانی محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔							
10-	افریقائی ممالک میں قحط زدہ لوگوں کے بارے میں پڑھ کر مجھے بہت دکھ ہوتا ہے۔							
11-	کسی لڑکے / لڑکی کی زبردستی کی شادی کے بارے میں سن کر میں ان کی بے بسی زیادہ محسوس نہیں کر سکتی / سکتا۔							
12-	کسی غریب بچے کو سخت سردی میں ننگے پاؤں دیکھ کر مجھے رونا آجاتا ہے۔							
13-	اگر میرے دوست کی دیرینہ یاد لی خواہش پوری ہو تو میں اسکی خوشی اسی طرح محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں جیسا کہ وہ خود محسوس کرے۔							
14-	اپنے ارد گرد لوگوں کو برے موڈ میں دیکھ کر مجھ پر کوئی اثر نہیں ہوتا۔							
15-	کسی غریب شخص سے براسلوک ہوتے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں اس کی بے بسی تقریباً اسی طرح محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں جس طرح وہ خود کر رہا ہو۔							
16-	انزپورٹ یا ریلوے سٹیشن پر جدا ہونے والے لوگوں کے انسو دیکھ کر میں ان کے جذبات محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔							
17-	مجھے کسی کتاب یا فلم کے کردار کے جذبات کو شدت سے محسوس کرنے میں مشکل پیش آتی ہے							
18-	کسی معذور نو جوان کو دیکھ کر مجھے شدید دکھ اور تکلیف ہوتی ہے۔							
19-	میں اجنبی لوگ، جو اپنی بقاء کے لئے کوشاں ہوں کی ستائش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔							

نمبر شمار	بیانات	بالکل غیر متفق	کافی حد تک غیر متفق	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک متفق	کافی حد تک متفق	بالکل متفق
20-	شادیوں پر رخصتی کے موقع پر لوگوں کا اُداس اور آبدیدہ ہو جانا میرے لیے کوئی خاص معنی نہیں رکھتا۔							
21-	اپنے ارد گرد پر مسرت اور زندگی سے بھرپور لوگوں کو دیکھ کر میں بھی اچھا اور خوشی محسوس کرتی کرتا ہوں۔							
22-	کسی کو روتے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں بے چین ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔							
23-	بے بس بوڑھے لوگوں کو دیکھ کر مجھے رنج نہیں ہوتا۔							
24-	کسی کتاب، افسانے یا فلم کے پُرسرت انجام سے میں بہت خوش اور لطف اندوز ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔							
25-	کسی شخص کو کسی ناقابل علاج بیماری میں مبتلا دیکھ کر میں اس کے لئے زیادہ محسوس نہیں کرتی / کرتا۔							
26-	میرے لئے بہت مشکل اور تکلیف دہ ہے کہ میں کسی کو بہت بری خبر پہنچاؤں۔							
27-	بے گناہ لوگوں کے قتل و غارت کے بارے میں سن کر مجھ پر کوئی خاص اثر نہیں ہوتا۔							
28-	کسی دوست کو پریشان دیکھ کر میں اس کی پرالم سننے کی بجائے موضوع بدل دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔							
29-	کسی شخص کو اپنے قریبی عزیز کی موت پر غمگین دیکھ کر میں رنجیدہ ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔							
30-	مجھ پر کسی اجنبی شخص کے دکھ اور پریشانی کا کوئی خاص اثر نہیں ہوتا۔							

کوائف:

- 1- عمر: _____
- 2- جنس: _____
- 3- ڈیپارٹمنٹ: _____
- 4- ماہانہ آمدنی: _____
- 5- والد کی تعلیم: _____
- 6- والدہ کی تعلیم: _____
- 7- رہائشی علاقہ: _____

ANNEXURE I

Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

سوالنامہ

ہدایات:

میرا تعلق قومی ادارہ نفسیات قائد اعظم یونیورسٹی اسلام آباد سے ہے۔ ایک تحقیق کے سلسلے میں یہ سوالنامہ آپ کو دیا جا رہا ہے۔ مندرجہ ذیل میں بہت سے بیانات دیئے گئے ہیں جو ہماری روزمرہ کی زندگی میں پیش آنے والی مختلف صورت حال کو بیان کر رہے ہیں۔

آپ سے درخواست ہے کہ ہر بیان کو غور سے پڑھیے اور اپنے خیال کے مطابق یہ بتائیے کہ اگر آپ اس صورت حال میں ہوں تو ہر بیان سے کس حد تک متفق ہونگے۔ ان بیانات کے سامنے دیئے گئے مختلف جوابات میں سے اپنے مطابق کسی ایک پر (✓) کا نشان لگائیں۔ ہر بیان کیلئے صرف ایک کالم پر نشان لگائیں۔ کوئی بیان خالی نہ چھوڑیں۔ آپ کے تعاون کا بہت شکریہ۔

نمبر شمار	بیانات	بالکل غیر متفق	کافی حد تک غیر متفق	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک متفق	کافی حد تک متفق	بالکل متفق
1-	کسی بچے کو اپنی سالگرہ پر تحفے کھولتے ہوئے خوش دیکھ کر مجھے خوشی ہوتی ہے۔							
2-	بے روزگار نو جوانوں کو پریشان دیکھ کر مجھے اُن سے ہمدردی محسوس ہوتی ہے۔							
3-	کسی فلم کا ٹکین اور دکھ بھرا انجام دیکھ کر مجھے شائد ہی کبھی رونا آیا ہو۔							
4-	میں بوڑھے لوگ جو اپنی کمزوری کی وجہ سے چل پھر بھی نہیں سکتے کی تکلیف محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔							
5-	کسی شخص کو اُداس اور بالکل اکیلا دیکھ کر مجھے اس کا دکھ / غم بانٹنے کو دل چاہتا ہے۔							
6-	پیارے گانوں کے بول سن کر میں ان میں کھوجاتی / جاتا ہوں۔							
7-	کسی بچے کو روتے ہوئے دیکھ کر ضروری نہیں کہ میں اس کی طرف متوجہ ہو جاؤں۔							
8-	کسی شخص کو اپنی ازدواجی زندگی کے مسائل میں گھرے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں اس کی پریشانی محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔							

نمبر شمار	بیانات	بالکل غیر متفق	کافی حد تک غیر متفق	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک متفق	کافی حد تک متفق	بالکل متفق
9-	افریقائی ممالک میں قحط زدہ لوگوں کے بارے میں پڑھ کر مجھے بہت دکھ ہوتا ہے۔							
10-	کسی لڑکے / لڑکی کی زبردستی کی شادی کے بارے میں سن کر میں ان کی بے بسی زیادہ محسوس نہیں کر سکتی / سکتا۔							
11-	کسی غریب بچے کو سخت سردی میں ننگے پاؤں دیکھ کر مجھے رونا آجاتا ہے۔							
12-	اگر میرے دوست کی دیرینہ یاد لی خواہش پوری ہو تو میں اسکی خوشی اسی طرح محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں جیسا کہ وہ خود محسوس کرے۔							
13-	اپنے ارد گرد لوگوں کو برے موڈ میں دیکھ کر مجھ پر کوئی اثر نہیں ہوتا۔							
14-	کسی غریب شخص سے برا سلوک ہوتے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں اس کی بے بسی تقریباً اسی طرح محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں جس طرح وہ خود کر رہا ہو۔							
15-	اڑپورٹ یاریلوئے سٹیشن پر جدا ہونے والے لوگوں کے انسو دیکھ کر میں ان کے جذبات محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔							
16-	کسی معذور نو جوان کو دیکھ کر مجھے شدید دکھ اور تکلیف ہوتی ہے۔							
17-	شادیوں پر رخصتی کے موقع پر لوگوں کا اُداس اور آبدیدہ ہوجانا میرے لیے کوئی خاص معنی نہیں رکھتا۔							
18-	اپنے ارد گرد پر مسرت اور زندگی سے بھرپور لوگوں کو دیکھ کر میں بھی اچھا اور خوش محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔							
19-	کسی کو روتے ہوئے دیکھ کر میں بے چین ہوجاتی / جاتا ہوں۔							
20-	بے بس بوڑھے لوگوں کو دیکھ کر مجھے رنج نہیں ہوتا۔							

نمبر شمار	بیانات	بالکل غیر متفق	کافی حد تک غیر متفق	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک متفق	کافی حد تک متفق	بالکل متفق
21-	کسی کتاب، افسانے یا فلم کے پُرسرت انجام سے میں بہت خوش اور لطف اندوز ہوتی/ ہوتا ہوں۔							
22-	کسی شخص کو کسی ناقابل علاج بیماری میں مبتلا دیکھ کر میں اس کے لئے زیادہ محسوس نہیں کرتی/ کرتا۔							
23-	میرے لئے بہت مشکل اور تکلیف دہ ہے کہ میں کسی کو بہت بری خبر پہنچاؤں۔							
24-	بے گناہ لوگوں کے قتل و غارت کے بارے میں سن کر مجھ پر کوئی خاص اثر نہیں ہوتا۔							
25-	کسی شخص کو اپنے قریبی عزیز کی موت پر غمگین دیکھ کر میں رنجیدہ ہو جاتی/ جاتا ہوں۔							
26-	مجھ پر کسی اجنبی شخص کے دکھ اور پریشانی کا کوئی خاص اثر نہیں ہوتا۔							

کوائف:

- 1- عمر: _____
- 2- جنس: _____
- 3- ڈیپارٹمنٹ: _____
- 4- ماہانہ آمدنی: _____
- 5- والد کی تعلیم: _____
- 6- والدہ کی تعلیم: _____
- 7- رہائشی علاقہ: _____

ANNEXURE J

Affiliative Tendency Scale (MAFF)

سوالنامہ

ہدایات :-

نیچے دیئے گئے ہر بیان کو غور سے پڑھے اور اپنی شخصیت کو سامنے رکھتے ہوئے یہ بتائیے کہ ہر بیان سے آپ کس حد تک متفق ہیں۔ اگر بالکل متفق (very strong agreement) ہوں تو '9' پر دائرہ کا نشان لگائیں اور اگر بالکل غیر متفق (very strong disagreement) ہوں تو '1' پر دائرہ لگائیں۔ اسی طرح ہر بیان سے اپنی شخصیت کی مطابقت کو مد نظر رکھتے ہوئے نیچے دیئے گئے سکیل کی مدد سے ہر بیان کے لیے صرف ایک نمبر پر نشان لگائیں۔ کوئی بیان خالی نہ چھوڑیں۔ آپ کے تعاون کا شکریہ۔

سکیل:

9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
بالکل متفق	بہت زیادہ متفق	کافی حد تک متفق	کسی حد تک متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	کافی حد تک غیر متفق	بہت زیادہ غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق

نمبر شمار بیانات

- 1- جب مجھے کسی نئے شخص سے ملوایا جاتا ہے تو میں زیادہ کوشش نہیں کرتی / کرتا کہ مجھے پسند کیا جائے۔
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
- 2- میں ایک ایسے لیڈر کو ترجیح دیتی / دیتا ہوں جو دوستانہ مزاج کا ہو اور جس سے بات کرنا آسان ہو۔ جیسا ایسے لیڈر کے جو سب سے الگ رہتا ہو اور اس کے پیروکار اس کی عزت کرتے ہوں۔
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
- 3- جب میری طبیعت خراب ہو تو میں اکیلے رہنے کی بجائے دوسروں کے ساتھ رہنا پسند کروں گی / گا۔
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
- 4- اگر مجھے دو میں سے چننا ہو تو میں اپنے آپ کو ملنسار کی بجائے ذہین کہلوانا چاہوں گی / گا۔
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
- 5- دوستوں کا ہونا میرے لئے بہت اہم ہے۔
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
- 6- میں دوسروں کی تعریف اور حوصلہ افزائی کا اظہار کی خاص موقع تک روکے رکھنے کی بجائے اکثر کرنے کو ترجیح دوں گی / گا۔
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
- 7- میں ایک بڑی پارٹی کی بجائے ایک اچھی فلم سے زیادہ لطف اندوز ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
بالکل متفق	بہت زیادہ متفق	کافی حد تک متفق	کسی حد تک متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	کافی حد تک غیر متفق	بہت زیادہ غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق

نمبر شمار بیانات

- 8- میں جتنے زیادہ ممکن دوست ہو سکیں بنانا چاہتی/چاہتا ہوں۔
- 9- ملک سے باہر جاتے ہوئے میں اپنا سفر چند دوستوں کے بجائے اکیلے شروع کرنے کو ترجیح دیتی/دیتا ہوں۔
- 10- اگر میری کسی شخص سے ملاقات ہونے پر اس سے نہ بنے تو میں بعد ازاں سوچتی/سوچتا ہوں کہ اس سے ایک اور مزید خوشگوار ملاقات طے کرنی چاہیے۔
- 11- میرا خیال ہے کہ شہرت دوستی سے زیادہ فائدہ مند ہوتی ہے۔
- 12- میں اجتماعی مدد کی نسبت کسی کام کو انفرادی طور پر کرنے کو ترجیح دیتی/دیتا ہوں۔
- 13- میرا خیال ہے کہ اگر کوئی تجربہ (experience) کسی دوست کے ساتھ مل کر کیا جائے تو اس کی اہمیت بڑھ جاتی ہے۔
- 14- جب میں کسی جاننے والے کو سڑک پر آتے ہوئے دیکھتی/دیکھتا ہوں تو عموماً سلام کرنے میں میں پہل کرتی/کرتا ہوں۔
- 15- میں ایسی آزادی کو ترجیح دیتی/دیتا ہوں جس میں کسی قریبی بندھن سے منسلک اچھے اور پر تپاک احساسات موجود نہ ہوں۔
- 16- میں پارٹیوں پر اس لیے جاتی/جاتا ہوں کیونکہ یہ دوست بنانے کا ایک بہت اچھا ذریعہ ہے۔
- 17- میں کسی ایسے عہدہ پر کام کرنے کو ترجیح دیتی/دیتا ہوں جس کیلئے میرے دوستوں نے مجھے چنا ہو و نسبت کسی ایسے دفتر میں جس کے لیے مجھے قومی ہیڈ کوارٹرز نے فائز کیا ہو۔
- 18- میں اپنے دوستوں سے پیار کے کھلم کھلا اظہار پر یقین نہیں رکھتی/رکھتا۔
- 19- میں رات کے وقت کسی شخص سے دن بھر کی مصروفیات پر بات چیت کرنے کی بجائے نورا سو جانے کو ترجیح دیتی/دیتا ہوں۔
- 20- میرے قریبی دوست بہت کم ہیں۔
- 21- جب میں ایسے لوگوں کے ساتھ ہوں جنہیں میں جانتی/جانتا نہیں تو میرے لیے اہم نہیں ہے کہ وہ مجھے پسند کریں یا نہ کریں۔
- 22- اگر مجھے چنا ہوتا میں چاہوں گی/گا کہ میرے دوستوں سے بہت گہرے تعلقات ہوں بجائے اس کے کہ وہ مجھے ہوشیار اور خوش طبع سمجھیں۔

9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
بالکل متفق	بہت زیادہ متفق	کافی حد تک متفق	کسی حد تک متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	کافی حد تک غیر متفق	بہت زیادہ غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق

بیانات نمبر شمار

-23 میں اجتماعی کھیل کی بجائے انفرادی کھیل مثلاً کراس ورڈ پزل کو ترجیح دیتی

ادیتا ہوں۔

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

-24 مجھے مغزور لوگوں کی نسبت دوستانہ رویہ رکھنے والے اور صاف گو لوگ اچھے

لگتے ہیں۔

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

-25 میں دوستوں کے ساتھ وقت گزارنے کی بجائے کوئی اچھی کتاب پڑھنے یا کسی

فلم پر جانے کو ترجیح دوں گی / گا۔

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

-26 سفر کے دوران مناظر سے لطف اندوز ہونے یا کسی جگہ

اکیلے جانے کی نسبت میں لوگوں سے ملنے کو ترجیح دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

ANNEXURE K

Self-Reported Delinquency Scale (SRDSG)

سوالنامہ

ہدایات:

ہمارے معاشرے میں نوجوان افراد روزمرہ کی زندگی میں مختلف سماجی کردار کا مظاہرہ کرتے ہیں۔ اس سوالنامہ میں سماجی کردار کے ایک پہلو سے متعلق بیانات دیئے گئے ہیں۔ ان بیانات کو پڑھ کر سامنے دیئے ہوئے جوابات میں سے اس پر نشان لگائیں جو آپ کے مطابق ہو۔ آپ سے درخواست اور توقع کی جاتی ہے کہ آپ اپنے تجربہ کے مطابق ایمانداری سے جوابات دیں گے۔ آپ کے جوابات صرف تحقیق کے لیے استعمال کیے جائیں گے۔ آپ کے تعاون کا شکریہ۔

نمبر شمار	بیانات	کبھی نہیں	بہت کم	کبھی کبھار	اکثر
1-	رات کے اندھیرے میں لائٹ کے بغیر سائیکل، موٹر سائیکل یا موٹر کار چلانا۔				
2-	اٹھارہ سال کی عمر سے پہلے (بغیر لائسنس) موٹر سائیکل یا موٹر کار چلانا۔				
3-	لڑکوں کے ایسے گروپ سے تعلق ہونا جن کا کام شوہر شرابہ اور ہنگامہ آرائی وغیرہ کرنا ہو۔				
4-	سکول کالج سے غیر حاضر ہونا یا بھاگ نکلنا۔				
5-	جان بوجھ کر بغیر کرائے یا کرائے سے کم پیسے دے کر بس میں سفر کرنا۔				
6-	سڑک پر آتش بازی کرنا یا پٹانے چھوڑنا۔				
7-	گھر سے پیسے اٹھا لینا واپس نہ رکھنے کی نیت سے۔				
8-	کسی دوسرے کی سائیکل، موٹر سائیکل یا گاڑی محض تفریح کیلئے وقتی طور پر لے اڑنا۔				
9-	پبلک مقامات مثلاً مارکیٹ، سینما، ریلوے اسٹیشن، ٹرین یا بس سٹاپ پر لگی ہوئی چیزوں کی توڑ پھوڑ کرنا۔				
10-	مارکیٹ، بازار میں راہ چلتے لوگوں سے پنگا لینا، لڑائی جھگڑا کرنا یا ان کی بے عزتی کرنا۔				
11-	کسی سٹور، ورکشاپ یا آفس وغیرہ میں چوری کی نیت سے گھسنا۔				
12-	چھوٹی دوکانوں میں چوری چھپے گھسنا چاہے کچھ بھی نہ چرایا ہو۔				
13-	سڑک پر پارک ہوئی گاڑیوں میں سے چیزیں نکال لینا یا اتار لینا۔				

نمبر شمار	بیانات	کبھی نہیں	بہت کم	کبھی بکھار	اکثر
14-	اپنے ساتھ ہر وقت ہتھیار نما چیز مثلاً چاقو، آہنی مکا، چمڑے کی بیلٹ، وغیرہ یا اسلحہ رکھنا تاکہ لڑائی یا جھگڑے کی صورت میں کام آسکے۔				
15-	پبلک مقام پر اپنے مخالف گروپ کے کسی شخص پر بغیر ہتھیار کے حملہ کرنا				
16-	خالی گھروں کی کھڑکیوں کے شیشے توڑنا۔				
17-	لڑائی جھگڑے کے دوران کسی قسم کا ہتھیار استعمال کرنا جیسے کہ چاقو، آہنی مکا، نیز دھار والا آلہ مثلاً ریزر یا خنجر۔				
18-	شغل کے طور پر نشہ آور اشیاء کا استعمال کرنا۔				
19-	نیوٹریٹ منانے کے لیے بڑے ہولوں میں جانا۔				
20-	بڑی دوکانوں اور شاہینگ سٹورز سے سبز مین سے آنکھ بچا کر چیزیں اٹھا لینا۔				
21-	چھوٹی دوکانوں سے چپکے سے چیزیں چرا لینا۔				
22-	جان بوجھ کر بازار، فٹ پاتھ اور سڑک پر شیشے کی بوتلوں جوس کے ڈبوں اور کوڑے کے کنستروں کو توڑنا اور لٹنا۔				
23-	چوری شدہ چیزوں کو سستے داموں لینا یا تحفہ قبول کر لینا۔				
24-	باقاعدہ منصوبہ بنا کر کسی گھریا فلیٹ میں چوری کرنا۔				
25-	اتفاقہ موقع پا کر کسی گھریا فلیٹ میں گھس جانا اور جو ہاتھ لگے لے اڑنا۔				
26-	کسی کی سائیکل چرا لینا۔				
27-	کسی قانونی خلاف ورزی کے بعد پولیس سے چھپنے اور بچ نکلنے کی کوشش کرنا۔				
28-	پولیس مین اگر کسی کو پکڑ رہا ہو تو اس میں مداخلت کرنا اور اس سے الجھنا				
29-	سکول کالج سے کوئی چیز چرا لینا۔				
30-	اپنے آفس یا درکشاپ کے مالک کی کوئی چیز اٹھا لینا۔				
31-	ایسی ممنوعہ جگہوں مثلاً ریلوے لائنز، گودام، بجلی گھر، گارڈنریا شاہراہوں پر چلے جانا جہاں داخلہ منع ہو۔				
32-	گندی فلمیں (بلیو فلمز) دیکھنا۔				
33-	جو اٹھ لینا یا شرط لگا کر تاش کھیلنا۔				
34-	سگریٹ نوشی کرنا۔				
35-	پبلک مقام پر بڑی ہوئی چیزوں کو نظر بچا کر اٹھا لینا اور چھپا لینا۔				
36-	والدرین، دوستوں یا کسی کے لنگے ہوئے کپڑوں میں سے پیسے یا قیمتی اشیاء نکال لینا۔				
37-	شغل میں دوستوں کے ہمراہ شراب پینا۔				

ANNEXURE L

**Performa For Generating Indicators on Three
Dimensions of Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)**

Instructions

The present investigation is part of Ph.D. research, which aims at developing a measure of trait emotional awareness, called Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS). Trait emotional awareness is defined as the people's tendency to attend to their moods and emotions, the clarity of their experience of these feelings, and their ability to regulate emotions and emotion-related behaviors. The scale consists of the following three dimensions: (a) Attention to Feelings (b) Clarity of Feelings, and (c) Regulation.

List at least five indicators/descriptors in Urdu language for each dimension given below.

I. Attention to Feelings refers to the degree to which an individual notices and thinks about his/her feelings.

- 1- ایک شخص جس حد تک اپنے جذبات یا احساسات کی طرف دھیان دیتا ہے اور ان کے بارے میں سوچتا ہے، اسے "Attention to Feelings" کہتے ہیں۔
مثال نمبر 1:- میں اکثر اپنے احساسات پر دھیان دیتی/دیتا ہوں۔
مثال نمبر 2:- میں کسی بھی کام کو کرنے میں دل کی منتی/منتا ہوں۔

II. Clarity of Feelings refers to the ability to discriminate clearly among feelings.

2- اپنے احساسات میں واضح طور پر امتیاز کرنے کی صلاحیت کو "Clarity of Feelings" کہتے ہیں۔

مثال نمبر 1:- میں کبھی بھی نہیں بنا سکتی / سکتا کہ میں کیا محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں۔

مثال نمبر 2:- میں عموماً اپنے احساسات کے بارے میں بہت واضح ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔

III. Regulation refers to the tendency to repair unpleasant moods or maintain pleasant ones; capacity to inhibit inappropriate approach behavior; and capacity to perform an action when there is a strong tendency to avoid it.

3- ناخوشگوار موڈ کی اصلاح اور خوشگوار موڈ کو برقرار رکھنے، نامناسب کام سے اپنے آپ کو روکنے اور نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی نیا کام شروع کر دینے کی صلاحیت کو "Regulation" کہتے ہیں۔

مثال نمبر 1:- چاہے میرا موڈ کتنا ہی خراب ہو میں مثبت سوچ رکھنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔

مثال نمبر 2:- نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی میں ایک مشکل کام شروع کر دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔

ANNEXURE M

List of Empirically Generated Items for Each
Dimension of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

I. Attention to Feelings

- 1- میں اپنے احساسات کے مطابق کام کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 2- احساسات زندگی کا راستہ تعین کرتے ہیں۔
- 3- یہ لوگوں کے لئے بہتر ہو کہ وہ محسوس کرنے کی بجائے سوچیں زیادہ۔
- 4- مجھے معلوم ہے کہ میں کن باتوں سے پریشان ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
- 5- میں سوچ سمجھ کر کسی سے اپنی ناراضگی کا اظہار کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 6- میں اکثر اپنے احساسات پر توجہ دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔
- 7- میں سمجھتی / سمجھتا ہوں کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو جتنا جانتی ہوں دوسرے نہیں جانتے۔
- 8- مجھے یقین ہے کہ میرے جذبات اکثر مثبت ہوتے ہیں۔
- 9- میرا خیال ہے کہ ہر شخص کو اپنے جذبات کی طرف پوری توجہ دینی چاہیے۔
- 10- معاشرتی پابندیوں کی وجہ سے میں اپنے احساسات پر زیادہ دھیان نہیں دیتی / دیتا۔
- 11- میں اپنے احساسات کو سنتی / سنتا ہوں۔
- 12- جب میں خوش ہوں تو میرے رویے اور عمل سے اس کا اظہار ہوتا ہے۔
- 13- میرے جذبات میں کبھی کبھار افسردگی اور خوشی کی ملی جلی کیفیت ہوتی ہے۔
- 14- میرا نہیں خیال کہ اپنے موڈ یا جذبات کی طرف زیادہ توجہ دینی چاہیے۔
- 15- میں کوئی بھی کام کرنے میں اپنے دل کی سنتی / سنتا ہوں۔
- 16- میرے لئے اپنے جذبات کو قابو کرنے کا بہترین طریقہ انہیں مکمل طور پر محسوس کرنا ہے۔
- 17- میں اپنے جذبات کے سامنے کبھی بھی ہانپیں مانتی / مانتا۔
- 18- کسی شخص کو جذبات کو اپنا رہبر ہرگز نہیں بنانا چاہیے۔
- 19- احساسات زندگی کو با مقصد بنا دیتے ہیں۔
- 20- احساسات کا ہونا انسانوں کے لئے ایک کمزوری ہے۔
- 21- احساسات زندگی کا راستہ تعین کرتے ہیں۔
- 22- جب میں کچھ محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں تو اپنے جذبات سے باخوبی آگاہ ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
- 23- مجھے معلوم ہے کہ میرے جذبات کیوں بدل جاتے ہیں۔
- 24- میں اپنے احساسات پر بہت زیادہ توجہ نہیں دیتی / دیتا۔
- 25- میں خوش ہوں تو میرے رویے اور عمل سے اس کا اظہار ہوتا ہے۔

- 26 مجھے معلوم ہے کہ میں کن باتوں سے پریشان ہوتی/ ہوتا ہوں۔
 -27 میں جو محسوس کرتی/ کرتا ہوں اُس کے مطابق کام کرتی/ کرتا ہوں۔

II. Clarity of Feelings

- 1 میں عموماً اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں بہت واضح ہوتی/ ہوتا ہوں۔
 -2 مجھے تقریباً ہمیشہ معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں کیسا محسوس کر رہی/ رہا ہوں۔
 -3 میں اپنے احساسات کو سمجھ نہیں سکتی/ سکتا۔
 -4 مجھے واضح طور پر معلوم ہے کہ کوئی شخص مجھے کیسا لگتا ہے۔
 -5 مجھے خریداری کرتے وقت کسی چیز کا چناؤ کرنے میں وقت نہیں ہوتی۔
 -6 میں اکثر چیزوں اور لوگوں کے بارے میں فیصلہ کن رائے رکھتی/ رکھتا ہوں۔
 -7 میں ووٹ ڈالتے وقت کسی کشمکش کا شکار نہیں ہوتی/ ہوتا۔
 -8 جب میرا موڈ خراب ہو تو یہ بتانا مشکل ہوتا ہے کہ میں اُداس ہوں یا پریشان۔
 -9 کبھی کبھار مجھے نہیں پتا چلتا کہ میں کیسا محسوس کر رہی/ رہا ہوں۔
 -10 اگر مجھے غصہ آئے تو اے محسوس کر سکتی/ سکتا ہوں۔
 -11 میں اکثر اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں واضح ہوتی/ ہوتا ہوں۔
 -12 مجھے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں پریشان ہوں یا خوش ہوں۔
 -13 میں اپنے ہر طرح کے جذبات سے مطمئن ہوں۔
 -14 کسی بھی معاملے کے بارے میں مجھے اکثر اپنے احساسات کا علم ہوتا ہے۔
 -15 یہ بہت کم ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی/ پایا۔
 -16 میرے خیالات اور میری رائے میرے احساسات کے مطابق بدل جاتے ہیں۔
 -17 کبھی کبھار مجھے خود نہیں پتا چلتا کہ میں خوش ہوں یا افسردہ۔
 -18 جب میں پریشان ہوں تو مجھے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں افسردہ ہوں، خوفزدہ ہوں، یا غصے میں ہوں۔
 -19 یہ بہت دفعہ ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی/ پاتا۔
 -20 میں کبھی کبھار نہیں بتا سکتی/ سکتا کہ میں کیسا محسوس کر رہی/ رہا ہوں۔
 -21 میں کبھی بھی اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں کسی قسم کی کشمکش کا شکار نہیں ہوتی/ ہوتا۔
 -22 یہ بہت دفعہ ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی/ پایا۔

III. Regulation

- 1- اگر میرا موڈ خراب ہو جائے تو میں اچھی چیزوں کے بارے میں سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔
- 2- چاہے میں کتنا ہی برا محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں میں کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں کہ میں اچھے خیالات کے بارے میں سوچوں۔
- 3- جب میں پریشان ہوں تو مجھے لگتا ہے کہ زندگی کی اچھی چیزیں محض دھوکا ہیں۔
- 4- جب میں پریشان ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں تو زندگی کی لطف اندوز چیزوں کے بارے میں سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔
- 5- اگرچہ میں کبھی کبھار خوش ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں لیکن زندگی کے بارے میں میری سوچ زیادہ تر منفی ہے۔
- 6- اگر میرا موڈ خراب ہو جائے تو کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں کہ اسے ٹھیک کروں۔
- 7- جب میں خوش ہوں تو خوشی کے لمحات کو پوری طرح سے محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 8- مجھ میں اپنے غصے کو قابو کرنے کی صلاحیت موجود ہے۔
- 9- خراب موڈ ہونے کے باوجود میں حالات کی نزاکت دیکھتے ہوئے حالات کے مطابق چلتی / چلتا ہوں۔
- 10- چاہے میں کتنا ہی برا محسوس کروں، میں اچھی چیزوں کے بارے میں سوچنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 11- برے موڈ کی صورت میں ٹھنڈے دماغ سے سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔
- 12- میرا موڈ ایک دفعہ خراب ہو جائے تو کسی صورت ٹھیک نہیں ہوتا۔
- 13- میں پریشانی کی کیفیت میں کتا میں پڑھتی ہوں۔
- 14- جب میرا دل ڈانس کرنے کو چاہے تو میں اپنے آپ کو روک لیتی ہوں۔
- 15- میں شغل لگانے والے دوستوں کے ساتھ چاہتے ہوئے بھی نہیں بیٹھتی / بیٹھتا۔
- 16- غصے میں کسی کو مارنے یا گالی گلوچ کے استعمال سے اپنے آپ کو روکتی / روکتا ہوں۔
- 17- دوسروں کی موجودگی میں اپنے تہقے پر قابو رکھتی / رکھتا ہوں۔
- 18- میں اپنے والدین کے سامنے بے جا ہنسی مزاق نہیں کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 19- چاہتے ہوئے بھی میں کسی کو تنگ کرنے سے اپنے آپ کی روک لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔
- 20- نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی بہت سے لوگوں سے دوستی کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔
- 21- میں اپنا کام وقت پر مکمل کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔
- 22- اگر کوئی شخص پریشان ہو تو میں اپنی مصروفیت کے باوجود اس کی مدد کرنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 23- میں اکثر غصے میں گالی گلوچ یا مار کٹائی پر اتر آتی / آتا ہوں۔
- 24- ایک وقت میں دو مختلف کام کرنا میرے لئے اکثر مشکل ہوتا ہے۔
- 25- میں باآسانی نامناسب ہنسی مزاج سے اجتناب کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 26- جب میں دکان میں کوئی اچھی چیز دیکھوں تو اسے خریدے بغیر نہیں رہ سکتی / سکتا۔
- 27- اگر میں کسی کام کو کرنا ضروری سمجھوں تو وہ کام فوراً شروع کر دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔
- 28- اگر میں اپنی رائے کا اظہار کرنے کے لئے بہت بے چین بھی ہوں تو بھی باآسانی اپنی باری کا انتظار کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔
- 29- نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی ایک مشکل کام کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔
- 30- اگرچہ میں کبھی کبھار اُداس ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں لیکن زندگی کے بارے میں میری سوچ میری زیادہ تر مثبت ہے۔

- 31 میرے لئے ایسے موقعوں پر ہنسی روکنا مشکل نہیں ہے جہاں ہنسنا نامناسب ہو۔
- 32 جب میں پریشان ہوں تو سب حالات کو سامنے رکھ کر ان کا حل ڈھونڈنے کی کوشش کرتی کرتا ہوں۔
- 33 جب میں پریشان ہوں تو اپنی توجہ ایک چیز پر مرکوز نہیں رکھ سکتی / سکتا۔
- 34 ناچاہتے ہوئے بھی محلے میں ملنا ملنا رکھتی / رکھتا ہوں۔
- 35 میں اپنے کام وقت پر مکمل کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔

ANNEXURE N

**Performa for Categorizing the Indicators for Each Dimension of
Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS) to their Respective Dimensions**

Instructions

The purpose of this exercise is to categorize the indicators of trait emotional awareness to their conceptually relevant dimensions. Following are the items, which measure the construct of trait emotional awareness. Trait emotional awareness is defined as people's tendency to attend to their moods and emotions, discriminate clearly among them, and ability to regulate emotions and emotion-related behaviors. It consists of the following three dimensions: (a) Attention to Feelings (b) Clarity of Feelings, and (c) Regulation.

Keeping in view the following definitions of each dimension, please indicate for each item the name of the dimension that it conceptually represents. Record the name of the dimension in the space preceding the statement.

I. Attention to Feelings

Attention to feelings refers to the degree to which an individual notices and thinks about his/her feelings.

1- ایک شخص جس حد تک اپنے جذبات یا احساسات کی طرف دھیان دیتا ہے اور ان کے بارے میں سوچتا ہے، اسے "Attention to Feelings" کہتے ہیں۔

II. Clarity of Feelings

Clarity of feelings refers to the ability to discriminate clearly among feelings.

2- اپنے احساسات میں واضح طور پر امتیاز کرنے کی صلاحیت کو "Clarity of Feelings" کہتے ہیں۔

III. Regulation

Regulation refers to the tendency to repair unpleasant moods or maintain pleasant ones; capacity to inhibit inappropriate approach behavior; and capacity to perform an action when there is a strong tendency to avoid it.

3- ناخوشگوار موڈ کی اصلاح اور خوشگوار موڈ کو برقرار رکھنے، نامناسب کام سے اپنے آپ کو روکنے اور نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی نیا کام شروع کر دینے کی صلاحیت کو "Regulation" کہتے ہیں۔

- 1- ----- کبھی کبھار مجھے نہیں پتہ چلتا کہ میں کیسا محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں۔
- 2- ----- اگر مجھے غصہ آئے تو اسے محسوس کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔
- 3- ----- میں اکثر اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں واضح ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
- 4- ----- مجھے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں پریشان ہوں یا خوش ہوں۔
- 5- ----- میں اپنے ہر طرح کے جذبات سے مطمئن ہوں۔
- 6- ----- کسی بھی معاملے کے بارے میں مجھے اکثر اپنے احساسات کا علم ہوتا ہے۔
- 7- ----- میں اپنا کام وقت پر مکمل کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔
- 8- ----- اگر کوئی شخص پریشان ہو تو میں اپنی مصروفیت کے باوجود اس کی مدد کرنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 9- ----- میں سمجھتی / سمجھتا ہوں کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو جتنا جانتی / جانتا ہوں دوسرے نہیں جانتے۔
- 10- ----- مجھے یقین ہے کہ میرے جذبات اکثر مثبت ہوتے ہیں۔
- 11- ----- میرا خیال ہے کہ ہر شخص کو اپنے جذبات کی طرف پوری توجہ دینی چاہیے۔
- 12- ----- معاشرتی پابندیوں کی وجہ سے میں اپنے احساسات پر زیادہ دھیان نہیں دیتی / دیتا۔
- 13- ----- احساسات کا ہونا انسانوں کے لئے ایک کمزوری ہے۔
- 14- ----- میں اپنے احساسات کے مطابق کام کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 15- ----- احساسات زندگی کا راستہ تعین کرتے ہیں۔
- 16- ----- جب میں خوش ہوں تو میرے رویے اور عمل سے اس کا اظہار ہوتا ہے۔
- 17- ----- میرے خیالات اور میری رائے میرے احساسات کے مطابق بدل جاتے ہیں۔
- 18- ----- میں اکثر اپنے احساسات پر توجہ دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔
- 19- ----- یہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی بہت سے لوگوں سے دوستی کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔
- 20- ----- یہ لوگوں کے لئے بہتر ہو کہ وہ محسوس کرنے کی بجائے سوچیں زیادہ۔
- 21- ----- مجھے معلوم ہے کہ میں کن باتوں سے پریشان ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
- 22- ----- میں سوچ سمجھ کر کسی سے اپنی ناراضگی کا اظہار کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 23- ----- میں اپنے احساسات کو سنتی / سنتا ہوں۔
- 24- ----- میں اپنے جذبات کے سامنے کبھی بھی ہار نہیں مانتی / مانتا۔
- 25- ----- کسی شخص کو جذبات کو اپنا رہبر ہرگز نہیں بنانا چاہیے۔
- 26- ----- میں اپنے احساسات پر بہت توجہ دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔
- 27- ----- میرے جذبات میں کبھی کبھار افسردگی اور خوشی کی ملی جلی کیفیت ہوتی ہے۔
- 28- ----- میرا نہیں خیال کہ اپنے موڈ یا جذبات کی طرف زیادہ توجہ دینی چاہیے۔
- 29- ----- میں کوئی بھی کام کرنے میں اپنے دل کی سنتی / سنتا ہوں۔
- 30- ----- میرے لئے اپنے جذبات کو قابو کرنے کا بہترین طریقہ انہیں مکمل طور پر محسوس کرنا ہے۔
- 31- ----- میں خوش ہوں تو میرے رویے اور عمل سے اس کا اظہار ہوتا ہے۔
- 32- ----- میں اکثر اپنے احساسات کی طرف دھیان دیتی ہوں۔

- 33 ----- میں کبھی بھی اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں کسی قسم کی کشمکش کا شکار نہیں ہوتی / ہوتا۔
- 34 ----- مجھے تقریباً ہمیشہ معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں کیا محسوس کر رہی ہوں۔
- 35 ----- میں اپنے احساسات کو سمجھ نہیں سکتی / سکتا۔
- 36 ----- مجھے واضح طور پر معلوم ہے کہ کوئی شخص مجھے کیسا لگتا ہے۔
- 37 ----- مجھے خریداری کرتے وقت کسی چیز کا چناؤ کرنے میں وقت نہیں ہوتی۔
- 38 ----- میں کبھی کبھار نہیں بتا سکتی / سکتا کہ میں کیا محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں۔
- 39 ----- میں اکثر غصے میں گالی گلوچ یا مار کھائی پر آتی / آتا ہوں۔
- 40 ----- ایک وقت میں دو مختلف کام کرنا میرے لئے اکثر مشکل ہوتا ہے۔
- 41 ----- میں باآسانی نامناسب ہنسی مزاق سے اجتناب کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 42 ----- یہ بہت دفعہ ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی / پایا۔
- 43 ----- احساسات زندگی کو با مقصد بنادیتے ہیں
- 44 ----- میں عموماً اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں بہت واضح ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
- 45 ----- نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی ایک مشکل کام کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔
- 46 ----- اگرچہ میں کبھی کبھار اُداس ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں لیکن زندگی کے بارے میں میری سوچ میری زیادہ مثبت ہے۔
- 47 ----- میرے لئے ایسے موقعوں پر ہنسی روکنا مشکل نہیں ہے جہاں ہنسانا مناسب ہو۔
- 48 ----- جب میں پریشان ہوں تو سب حالات تو سامنے رکھ کر اُن کا حل ڈھونڈنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 49 ----- یہ بہت کم ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی / پایا۔
- 50 ----- کبھی کبھار مجھے خود نہیں پتا چلتا کہ میں خوش ہوں یا افسردہ۔
- 51 ----- جب میں پریشان ہوں تو مجھے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں افسردہ ہوں، خوفزدہ ہوں، یا غصے میں ہوں۔
- 52 ----- یہ بہت دفعہ ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی / پایا۔
- 53 ----- اگر میرا موڈ خراب ہو جائے تو میں اچھی چیزوں کے بارے میں سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔
- 53 ----- اگر میرا موڈ خراب ہو جائے تو میں اچھی چیزوں کے بارے میں سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔
- 54 ----- چاہے میں کتنا ہی بُرا محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں، میں کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں کہ میں اچھے خیالات کے بارے میں سوچوں۔
- 55 ----- جب دکان میں کوئی اچھی چیز دیکھوں تو اسے خریدے بغیر نہیں رہ سکتا۔
- 56 ----- اگر میں کسی کام کو کرنا ضروری سمجھوں تو وہ کام فوراً شروع کر دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔
- 57 ----- اگر میں اپنی رائے کا اظہار کرنے کے لئے بہت بے چین بھی ہوں تو بھی باآسانی اپنی باری کا انتظار کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔
- 58 ----- جب میں پریشان ہوں تو اپنی توجہ ایک چیز پر مرکوز نہیں رکھ سکتی / سکتا۔
- 59 ----- ناچاہتے ہوئے بھی محلے میں مانا ملا کر سکتی / رکھتا ہوں۔
- 60 ----- میں اکثر چیزوں اور لوگوں کے بارے میں فیصلہ کن رائے رکھتی / رکھتا ہوں۔
- 61 ----- میں ووٹ ڈالنے وقت کسی کشمکش کا شکار نہیں ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
- 62 ----- جب میرا موڈ خراب ہو تو یہ بتانا مشکل ہوتا ہے کہ میں اُداس ہوں یا پریشان۔
- 63 ----- میں اپنے کام وقت پر مکمل کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔

- 64 ----- جب میں کچھ محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں تو اپنے جذبات سے باخوبی آگاہ ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
- 65 ----- مجھے معلوم ہے کہ میرے جذبات کیوں بدل جاتے ہیں۔
- 66 ----- میں اپنے احساسات پر بہت زیادہ توجہ نہیں دیتی / دیتا۔
- 67 ----- برے موڈ کی صورت میں ٹھنڈے دماغ سے سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔
- 68 ----- میرا موڈ ایک دفعہ خراب ہو جائے تو کسی صورت ٹھیک نہیں ہوتا۔
- 69 ----- میں پریشانی کی کیفیت میں کتابیں پڑھتی ہوں۔
- 70 ----- جب میرا دل ڈانس کرنے کو چاہے تو میں اپنے آپ کو روک لیتی ہوں۔
- 71 ----- میں شغل لگانے والے دوستوں کے ساتھ چاہتے ہوئے بھی نہیں بیٹھتی / بیٹھتا۔
- 72 ----- غصے میں کسی کو مارنے یا گالی گلوچ کے استعمال سے اپنے آپ کو روکتی / روکتا ہوں۔
- 73 ----- مجھ میں اپنے غصے کو قابو کرنے کی صلاحیت موجود ہے۔
- 74 ----- خراب موڈ ہونے کے باوجود میں حالات کی نزاکت دیکھتے ہوئے حالات کے مطابق چلتی / چلتا ہوں۔
- 75 ----- چاہے میں کتنا ہی رُحمسوس کروں، میں اچھی چیزوں کے بارے میں سوچنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 76 ----- دوسروں کی موجودگی میں اپنے تہقہے پر قابو رکھتی / رکھتا ہوں۔
- 77 ----- میں اپنے والدین کے سامنے بے جا ہنسی مزاق نہیں کرتی / کرتا۔
- 78 ----- چاہتے ہوئے بھی میں کسی کو تنگ کرنے سے اپنے آپ کو روک لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔
- 79 ----- جب میں پریشان ہوں تو مجھے لگتا ہے کہ زندگی کی اچھی چیزیں محض دھوکا ہیں۔
- 80 ----- جب میں پریشان ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں تو زندگی کی لطف اندوز چیزوں کے بارے میں سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔
- 81 ----- اگرچہ میں کبھی کبھار خوش ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں لیکن زندگی کے بارے میں میری سوچ زیادہ تر منفی ہے۔
- 82 ----- اگر میرا موڈ خراب ہو جائے تو کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں کہ اسے ٹھیک کروں۔
- 83 ----- جب میں خوش ہوں تو خوشی کے لمحات کو پوری طرح سے محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 84 ----- میں جو محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں، اُس کے مطابق کام کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔

ANNEXURE O

**Performa to Select the Most Representative Items for Each
Dimension of Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)**

Instructions

The purpose of this exercise is to select the most representative items for each dimension of Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS). Trait emotional awareness is defined as people's tendency to attend to their moods and emotions, discriminate clearly among them, and ability to regulate emotions and emotion-related behaviors. It consists of the following three dimensions: (a) Attention to Feelings, (b) Clarity of Feelings, and (c) Regulation.

Following are the items, which measure the construct of trait emotional awareness. You are required to keep in consideration the definitions provided for each dimension, and specify for each item the extent to which it represents a given dimension. Record your answer by using a five-point scale, on which 1 represents "strongly disagree" and 5 represents "strongly agree."

I. Attention to Feelings

Attention to feelings refers to the degree to which an individual notices and thinks about his/her feelings.

1۔ ایک شخص جس حد تک اپنے جذبات یا احساسات کی طرف دھیان دیتا ہے اور ان کے بارے میں سوچتا ہے اسے "Attention to Feelings" کہتے ہیں۔

5 Strongly Agree بالکل متفق	4 Agree متفق	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree معلوم نہیں	2 Disagree غیر متفق	1 Strongly Disagree بالکل غیر متفق	Statements بیانات	S.No.
					میں اپنے احساسات کے مطابق کام کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔	-1
					احساسات زندگی کا راستہ تعین کرتے ہیں۔	-2
					یہ لوگوں کے لئے بہتر ہو کہ وہ محسوس کرنے کی بجائے سوچیں زیادہ۔	-3

5	4	3	2	1	Statements	S.No.
Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	بیانات	
بالکل متفق	متفق	معلوم نہیں	غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق		
					مجھے معلوم ہے کہ میں کن باتوں سے پریشان ہوتی/ ہوتا ہوں۔	-4
					میں سوچ سمجھ کر کسی سے اپنی ناراضگی کا اظہار کرتی/ کرتا ہوں۔	-5
					میں اکثر اپنے احساسات پر توجہ دیتی/ دیتا ہوں۔	-6
					میں سمجھتی/ سمجھتا ہوں کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو جتنا میں جانتی ہوں دوسرے نہیں جانتے۔	-7
					مجھے یقین ہے کہ میرے جذبات اکثر مثبت ہوتے ہیں۔	-8
					میرا خیال ہے کہ ہر شخص کو اپنے جذبات کی طرف پوری توجہ دینی چاہیے۔	-9
					معاشرتی پابندیوں کی وجہ سے میں اپنے احساسات پر زیادہ دھیان نہیں دیتی/ دیتا۔	-10
					میں اپنے احساسات کو سنتی/ سنتا ہوں۔	-11
					جب میں خوش ہوں تو میرے رویے اور عمل سے اس کا اظہار ہوتا ہے۔	-12
					میرے جذبات میں کبھی کبھار افسردگی اور خوشی کی ملی جلی کیفیت ہوتی ہے۔	-13
					میرا نہیں خیال کہ اپنے موڈ یا جذبات کی طرف زیادہ توجہ دینی چاہیے۔	-14
					میں کوئی بھی کام کرنے میں اپنے دل کی سنتی/ سنتا ہوں۔	-15
					میرے لئے اپنے جذبات کو قابو کرنے کا بہترین طریقہ انہیں مکمل طور پر محسوس کرنا ہے۔	-16
					میں اپنے جذبات کے سامنے کبھی بھی ہار نہیں مانتی/ مانتا۔	-17

5	4	3	2	1	Statements	S.No.
Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	بیانات	
بالکل متفق	متفق	معلوم نہیں	غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق		
					کسی شخص کو جذبات کو اپنا رہبر گز نہیں بنانا چاہیے۔	18-
					میں اپنے احساسات پر بہت زیادہ توجہ دیتی/دیتا۔	19-
					احساسات کا ہونا انسانوں کے لئے ایک کمزوری ہے۔	20-
					احساسات زندگی کو با مقصد بنادیتے ہیں۔	21-
					جب میں کچھ محسوس کر رہی/رہا ہوں تو اپنے جذبات سے باخوبی آگاہ ہوتی/ہوتا ہوں۔	22-
					مجھے معلوم ہے کہ میرے جذبات کیوں بدل جاتے ہیں۔	23-
					میں اپنے احساسات پر بہت زیادہ توجہ نہیں دیتی/دیتا۔	24-
					میں خوش ہوں تو میرے رویے اور عمل سے اس کا اظہار ہوتا ہے۔	25-
					مجھے معلوم ہے کہ میں کن باتوں سے پریشان ہوتی/ہوتا ہوں۔	26-
					میں جو محسوس کرتی/کرتا ہوں اُس کے مطابق کام کرتی/کرتا ہوں۔	27-

II. Clarity of Feelings

Clarity of feelings refers to the ability to discriminate clearly among feeling.

2- اپنے احساسات میں واضح طور پر امتیاز کرنے کی صلاحیت کو "Clarity of Feelings" کہتے ہیں۔

5	4	3	2	1	Statements	S.No.
Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	بیانات	
بالکل متفق	متفق	معلوم نہیں	غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق		
					میں عموماً اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں بہت واضح ہوتی/ ہوتا ہوں۔	1-
					مجھے تقریباً ہمیشہ معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں کیسا محسوس کر رہی/ رہا ہوں۔	2-
					میں اپنے احساسات کو سمجھ نہیں سکتی/ سکتا۔	3-
					مجھے واضح طور پر معلوم ہے کہ کوئی شخص مجھے کیسا لگتا ہے۔	4-
					مجھے خریداری کرتے وقت کسی چیز کا چناؤ کرنے میں وقت نہیں ہوتی۔	5-
					میں اکثر چیزوں اور لوگوں کے بارے میں فیصلہ کن رائے رکھتی/ رکھتا ہوں۔	6-
					میں ووٹ ڈالتے وقت کسی کشمکش کا شکار نہیں ہوتی/ ہوتا۔	7-
					جب میرا موڈ خراب ہو تو یہ بتانا مشکل ہوتا ہے کہ میں اُداس ہوں یا پریشان۔	8-
					کبھی کبھار مجھے نہیں پتہ چلتا کہ میں کیسا محسوس کر رہی/ رہا ہوں۔	9-
					اگر مجھے غصہ آئے تو اسے محسوس کر سکتی/ سکتا ہوں۔	10-
					میں اکثر اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں واضح ہوتی/ ہوتا ہوں۔	11-
					مجھے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں پریشان ہوں یا خوش ہوں۔	12-

5	4	3	2	1	Statements	S.No.
Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	بیانات	
بالکل متفق	متفق	معلوم نہیں	غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق		
					میں اپنے ہر طرح کے جذبات سے مطمئن ہوں۔	-13
					کسی بھی معاملے کے بارے میں مجھے اکثر اپنے احساسات کا علم ہوتا ہے۔	-14
					یہ بہت کم ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی / پایا۔	-15
					میرے خیالات اور میری رائے میرے احساسات کے مطابق بدل جاتے ہیں۔	-16
					کبھی کبھار مجھے خود نہیں پتا چلتا کہ میں خوش ہوں یا افسردہ۔	-17
					جب میں پریشان ہوں تو مجھے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں افسردہ ہوں، خوفزدہ ہوں، یا غصے میں ہوں۔	-18
					یہ بہت دفعہ ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی / پاتا۔	-19
					میں کبھی کبھار نہیں بتا سکتی / سکتا کہ میں کیسا محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں۔	-20
					میں کبھی بھی اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں کسی قسم کی کشش کا شکار نہیں ہوتی / ہوتا۔	-21
					یہ بہت دفعہ ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی / پایا۔	-22

III. Regulation

Regulation refers to the tendency to repair unpleasant moods or maintain pleasant ones, capacity to inhibit inappropriate approach behavior; and capacity to perform an action when there is a strong tendency to avoid it.

3- ناخوشگوار موڈ کی اصلاح اور خوشگوار موڈ کو برقرار رکھنے، نامناسب کام سے اپنے آپ کو روکنے اور نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی نیا کام شروع کر دینے کی صلاحیت کو "Regulation" کہتے ہیں۔

5	4	3	2	1	Statements	S.No.
Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	بیانات	
بالکل متفق	متفق	معلوم نہیں	غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق		
					اگر میرا موڈ خراب ہو جائے تو میں اچھی چیزوں کے بارے میں سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔	-1
					چاہے میں کتنا ہی بر محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں، میں کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں کہ میں	-2
					اچھے خیالات کے بارے میں سوچوں۔ جب میں پریشان ہوں تو مجھے لگتا ہے کہ زندگی کی اچھی چیزیں محض دھوکا ہیں۔	-3
					جب میں پریشان ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں تو زندگی کی لطف اندوز چیزوں کے بارے میں سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔	-4
					اگر چہ میں کبھی کبھار خوش ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں لیکن زندگی کے بارے میں میری سوچ زیادہ تر منفی ہے۔	-5
					اگر میرا موڈ خراب ہو جائے تو کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں کہ اسے ٹھیک کروں۔	-6
					جب میں خوش ہوں تو خوشی کے لمحات کو پوری طرح سے محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔	-7
					مجھ میں اپنے غصے کو قابو کرنے کی صلاحیت موجود ہے۔	-8

5	4	3	2	1	Statements	S.No.
Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	بیانات	
بالکل متفق	متفق	معلوم نہیں	غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق		
					خراب موڈ ہونے کے باوجود میں حالات کی نزاکت دیکھتے ہوئے حالات کے مطابق چلتی / چلتا ہوں۔	-9
					چاہے میں کتنا ہی برا محسوس کروں، میں اچھی چیزوں کے بارے میں سوچنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔	-10
					برے موڈ کی صورت میں ٹھنڈے دماغ سے سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔	-11
					میرا موڈ ایک دفعہ خراب ہو جائے تو کسی صورت ٹھیک نہیں ہوتا۔	-12
					میں پریشانی کی کیفیت میں کتابیں پڑھتی ہوں۔	-13
					جب میرا دل ڈانس کرنے کو چاہے تو میں اپنے آپ کو روک لیتی ہوں۔	-14
					میں شغل لگانے والے دوستوں کے ساتھ چاہتے ہوئے بھی نہیں بیٹھتی / بیٹھتا۔	-15
					غصے میں کسی کو مارنے یا گالی گلوچ کے استعمال سے اپنے آپ کو روکتی / روکتا ہوں۔	-16
					دوسروں کی موجودگی میں اپنے تہقہ پر قابو رکھتی / رکھتا ہوں۔	-17
					میں اپنے والدین کے سامنے بے جا ہنسی مزاں نہیں کرتی / کرتا۔	-18
					چاہتے ہوئے بھی میں کسی کو تنگ کرنے سے اپنے آپ کی روک لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔	-19
					ند چاہتے ہوئے بھی بہت سے لوگوں سے دوستی کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔	-20
					میں اپنا کام وقت پر مکمل کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔	-21

5	4	3	2	1	Statements	S.No.
Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	بیانات	
بالکل متفق	متفق	معلوم نہیں	غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق		
					اگر کوئی شخص پریشان ہو تو میں اپنی مصروفیت کے باوجود اُس کی مدد کرنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔	-22
					میں اکثر غصے میں گالی گلوچ یا مار کھانی پر اتر آتی / آتا ہوں۔	-23
					ایک وقت میں دو مختلف کام کرنا میرے لئے اکثر مشکل ہوتا ہے۔	-24
					میں باآسانی نامناسب ہنسی مزاح سے اجتناب کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔	-25
					جب میں دکان میں کوئی اچھی چیز دیکھوں تو اسے خریدے بغیر نہیں رہ سکتی / سکتا۔	-26
					اگر میں کسی کام کو کرنا ضروری سمجھوں تو وہ کام فوراً شروع کر دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔	-27
					اگر میں اپنی رائے کا اظہار کرنے کے لئے بہت بے چین بھی ہوں تو بھی باآسانی اپنی باری کا انتظار کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔	-28
					نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی ایک مشکل کام کر سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔	-29
					اگرچہ میں کبھی کبھار اُداس ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں لیکن زندگی کے بارے میں میری سوچ میری زیادہ تر مثبت ہے۔	-30
					میرے لئے ایسے موقعوں پر ہنسی روکنا مشکل نہیں ہے جہاں ہنسانا مناسب ہو۔	-31
					جب میں پریشان ہوں تو سب حالات کو سامنے رکھ کر ان کا حل ڈھونڈنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔	-32

5	4	3	2	1	Statements	S.No.
Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	بیانات	
بالکل متفق	متفق	معلوم نہیں	غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق		
					جب میں پریشان ہوں تو اپنی توجہ ایک چیز پر مرکوز نہیں رکھ سکتی / سکتا۔	-33
					نا چاہتے ہوئے بھی محلے میں ملنا ملنا رکھتی / رکھتا ہوں۔	-34
					میں اپنے کام وقت پر مکمل کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔	-35

ANNEXURE P

List of Most Representative Self-Report Statements
for the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

- 1- میں اکثر اپنے احساسات کے بارے میں سوچتی/سوچتا ہوں۔
- 2- مجھے تقریباً ہمیشہ معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں کیسا محسوس کر رہی/رہا ہوں۔
- 3- چاہے میں کتنا ہی برا محسوس کروں میں کوشش کرتی/کرتا ہوں کہ میں اچھے خیالات کے بارے میں سوچوں۔
- 4- میں اپنے احساسات کے مطابق کام کرتی/کرتا ہوں۔
- 5- مجھے واضح طور پر معلوم ہے کہ کوئی شخص مجھے کیسا لگتا ہے۔
- 6- میں اکثر ایسے منصوبے بناتی/بناتا ہوں جنہیں میں مکمل نہیں کرتی/کرتا۔
- 7- میرے لئے ایسے موقعوں پر ہنسی روکنا مشکل نہیں ہے جہاں ہنسانا مناسب ہو۔
- 8- میں سوچ سمجھ کر کسی سے اپنی ناراضگی کا اظہار کرتی/کرتا ہوں۔
- 9- مجھے خریداری کرتے وقت کسی چیز کا چناؤ کرنے میں دقت نہیں ہوتی۔
- 10- اگرچہ میں کبھی کبھارا اُداس ہوتی/ہوتا ہوں لیکن زندگی کے بارے میں میری سوچ زیادہ تر مثبت ہے۔
- 11- نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی ایک مشکل کام کر سکتی/سکتا ہوں۔
- 12- اگر میں اپنی رائے کا اظہار کرنے کے لئے بہت بے چین بھی ہوں۔ تو بھی باآسانی اپنی باری کا انتظار کر سکتی/سکتا ہوں۔
- 13- میں کبھی بھی اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں کسی قسم کی کشمکش کا شکار نہیں ہوتی/ہوتا۔
- 14- جب میں خوش ہوں تو خوشی کے لمحات کو پوری طرح سے محسوس کرتی/کرتا ہوں۔
- 15- اگر میں کسی کام کو کرنا ضروری سمجھوں تو عموماً وہ کام فوراً شروع کر دیتی/دیتا ہوں۔
- 16- جب ڈکان میں کوئی اچھی چیز دیکھوں تو میں اسے خریدے بغیر نہیں رہ سکتی/سکتا۔
- 17- جب میں خوش ہوں تو میرے رویے اور عمل سے اس کا اظہار ہوتا ہے۔
- 18- جب میں پریشان ہوں تو مجھے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں افسردہ ہوں، خوفزدہ ہوں، یا غصے میں ہوں۔
- 19- میں عام طور پر وقت سے پہلے کام ختم کر لیتی/لیتا ہوں۔
- 20- جب میں پریشان ہوں تو سب حالات کو سامنے رکھ کر ان کا حل ڈھونڈنے کی کوشش کرتی/کرتا ہوں۔
- 21- میں باآسانی نامناسب ہنسی مذاق سے اجتناب کرتی/کرتا ہوں۔
- 22- میں کوئی بھی کام کرنے میں اپنے دل کی سنتی/سنتا ہوں۔

ANNEXURE Q

Original Form of Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

سوالنامہ

ہدایات:

ذیل میں کچھ بیانات دیئے گئے ہیں جو آپ کے جذبات اور ان سے منسلک آپ کے ردِ عمل کے بارے میں ہیں۔ آپ سے گزارش ہے کہ ہر بیان کو غور سے پڑھیے اور اپنی شخصیت کو مد نظر رکھ کر یہ بتائیے کہ ہر بیان سے آپ کس حد تک متفق ہیں۔ نیچے 5-Point سکیل دیا گیا ہے۔ اس سکیل کی مدد سے ہر بیان کے سامنے دیئے گئے نمبروں میں سے اس نمبر پر دائرے کا نشان لگائیں جس سے آپ متفق ہوں۔ مثلاً اگر بالکل متفق ہوں تو '5' پر دائرے کا نشان لگائیں اور اگر بالکل غیر متفق ہوں تو '1' پر دائرہ لگائیں۔ کوئی بیان خالی نہ چھوڑیں۔

سکیل:

5	4	3	2	1
بالکل متفق	کسی حد تک متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق

بیانات	5	4	3	2	1
1- میں اکثر اپنے احساسات کے بارے میں سوچتی/سوچتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
2- میرے خیالات اور میری رائے میرے احساسات کے مطابق بدل جاتے ہیں۔	5	4	3	2	1
3- چاہے میں کتنا ہی برا محسوس کروں میں کوشش کرتی/کرتا ہوں کہ میں اچھے خیالات کے بارے میں سوچوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
4- میں اپنے احساسات کے مطابق کام کرتی/کرتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
5- میں عموماً اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں بہت واضح ہوتی/ہوتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
6- میں اکثر ایسے منصوبے بناتی/بناتا ہوں جنہیں میں مکمل نہیں کرتی/کرتا۔	5	4	3	2	1
7- جب میں خوش ہوں تو میرے رویے اور عمل سے اس کا اظہار ہوتا ہے۔	5	4	3	2	1
8- میں سمجھتی/سمجھتا ہوں کہ احساسات زندگی کا راستہ تعین کرتے ہیں۔	5	4	3	2	1
9- مجھے خریداری کرتے وقت کسی چیز کا چناؤ کرنے میں وقت نہیں ہوتی۔	5	4	3	2	1
10- کسی کو تنگ کرنے یا اس کا مزاق اڑانے کا میرا دل چاہ بھی رہا تو میں اپنے آپ کو روک لیتی/لیتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
11- نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی میں ایک مشکل کام کر لیتی/لیتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
12- اگر میں اپنی رائے کا اظہار کرنے کے لئے بہت بے چین بھی ہوں تو با آسانی اپنی باری کا انتظار کرتی/کرتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
13- اگر چہ میں کبھی کبھار اُداس ہوتی/ہوتا ہوں لیکن زندگی کے بارے میں میری سوچ زیادہ تر مثبت ہے۔	5	4	3	2	1

5	4	3	2	1
بالکل متفق	کسی حد تک متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق

- 14- میں کوئی بھی کام کرنے میں اپنے دل کی منتی استنا ہوں۔
- 15- میرا موڈ ایک دفعہ خراب ہو جائے تو کسی صورت ٹھیک نہیں ہوتا۔
- 16- جب دکان میں کوئی اچھی چیز دیکھوں تو اسے خریدے بغیر نہیں رہ سکتی / سکتا۔
- 17- میں کبھی بھی اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں کسی کشمکش کا شکار نہیں ہوتی / ہوتا۔
- 18- اگر میرا موڈ خراب ہو تو مجھے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں افسردہ ہوں، خوفزدہ ہوں یا غصے میں ہوں۔
- 19- اگر کوئی شخص پریشان ہو تو میں اپنی مصروفیت کے باوجود اس کی مدد کرنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 20- یہ لوگوں کے لئے بہتر ہو کہ وہ محسوس کرنے کی بجائے سوچیں زیادہ۔
- 21- میں باآسانی نامناسب ٹیسی مذاق سے اجتناب کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 22- یہ بہت دفعہ ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی / پایا۔
- 23- کسی بھی معاملے کے بارے میں مجھے اکثر اپنے احساسات کا علم ہوتا ہے۔
- 24- ایک وقت میں دو مختلف کام کرنا میرے لئے اکثر مشکل ہوتا ہے۔
- 25- میں نے زندگی میں کئی ایسے فیصلے کئے جس میں میں نے اپنے دل کی سنی اور وہ فیصلے صحیح ثابت ہوئے۔
- 26- جب میں پریشان ہوں تو سب حالات کو سامنے رکھ کر ان کا حل ڈھونڈنے کی کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 27- میں عام طور پر وقت سے پہلے کام ختم کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔
- 28- جب میرا موڈ خراب ہو تو یہ بتانا مشکل ہوتا ہے کہ میں اداس ہوں یا پریشان۔
- 29- مجھے تقریباً ہمیشہ معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں کیا محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں۔
- 30- جب میں پریشان ہوں تو اپنی توجہ ایک چیز پر مرکوز نہیں رکھ سکتی / سکتا۔
- 31- مجھے معلوم ہے کہ میں کن باتوں سے پریشان ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
- 32- میرے لئے اپنے جذبات کو قابو کرنے کا بہترین طریقہ انہیں مکمل طور پر محسوس کرنا ہے۔
- 33- جب میں کچھ محسوس کر رہی / رہا ہوں تو اپنے جذبات سے باخوبی آگاہ ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔
- 34- میں اکثر غصے میں گالی گلوچ یا مار کھانی پر اتر آتی / آتا ہوں۔
- 35- جب میں خوش ہوں تو خوشی کے لمحات کو پوری طرح سے محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 36- میں اپنے احساسات پر بہت زیادہ توجہ نہیں دیتی / دیتا۔

ANNEXURE R

Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

سوالات نامہ

ہدایات:

ذیل میں کچھ بیانات دیئے گئے ہیں جو آپ کے جذبات اور ان سے منسلک آپ کے رد عمل کے بارے میں ہیں۔ آپ سے گزارش ہے کہ ہر بیان کو غور سے پڑھیں اور اپنی شخصیت کو مد نظر رکھ کر یہ بتائیے کہ ہر بیان سے آپ کس حد تک متفق ہیں۔ نیچے 5-Point سکیل دیا گیا ہے۔ اس سکیل کی مدد سے ہر بیان کے سامنے دیئے گئے نمبروں میں سے اس نمبر پر دائرے کا نشان لگائیں جس سے آپ متفق ہوں۔ مثلاً اگر بالکل متفق ہوں تو '5' پر دائرے کا نشان لگائیں اور اگر بالکل غیر متفق ہوں تو '1' پر دائرہ لگائیں۔ کوئی بیان خالی نہ چھوڑیں۔

سکیل:

5	4	3	2	1
بالکل متفق	کسی حد تک متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق

نمبر شمار	بیانات	5	4	3	2	1
1-	میں اکثر اپنے احساسات کے بارے میں سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
2-	میرے خیالات اور میری رائے میرے احساسات کے مطابق بدل جاتے ہیں۔	5	4	3	2	1
3-	چاہے میں کتنا ہی برا محسوس کروں میں کوشش کرتی / کرتا ہوں کہ میں اچھے خیالات کے بارے میں سوچوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
4-	میں اپنے احساسات کے مطابق کام کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
5-	میں عموماً اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں بہت واضح ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
6-	میں اکثر ایسے منصوبے بناتی / بناتا ہوں جنہیں میں مکمل نہیں کرتی / کرتا۔	5	4	3	2	1
7-	میں سمجھتی / سمجھتا ہوں کہ احساسات زندگی کا راستہ تعین کرتے ہیں۔	5	4	3	2	1
8-	کسی کو تنگ کرنے یا اس کا مزاق اڑانے کا میرا دل چاہ بھی رہا تو میں اپنے آپ کو روک لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
9-	نہ چاہتے ہوئے بھی میں ایک مشکل کام کر لیتی / لیتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
10-	اگر میں اپنی رائے کا اظہار کرنے کے لئے بہت بے چین بھی ہوں تو با آسانی اپنی باری کا انتظار کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔	5	4	3	2	1
11-	اگرچہ میں کبھی کبھارا داس ہوتی / ہوتا ہوں لیکن زندگی کے بارے میں میری سوچ زیادہ تر مثبت ہے۔	5	4	3	2	1
12-	میرا موڈ ایک دفعہ خراب ہو جائے تو کسی صورت ٹھیک نہیں ہوتا۔	5	4	3	2	1

5	4	3	2	1
بالکل متفق	کسی حد تک متفق	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک غیر متفق	بالکل غیر متفق

- 13- میں کبھی بھی اپنے جذبات کے بارے میں کسی کشمکش کا شکار نہیں ہوتی/ ہوتا۔
- 14- اگر میرا موڈ خراب ہو تو مجھے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں افسردہ ہوں، خوفزدہ ہوں یا غصے میں ہوں۔
- 15- اگر کوئی شخص پریشان ہو تو میں اپنی مصروفیت کے باوجود اس کی مدد کرنے کی کوشش کرتی/ کرتا ہوں۔
- 16- یہ لوگوں کے لئے بہتر ہو کہ وہ محسوس کرنے کی بجائے سوچیں زیادہ۔
- 17- یہ بہت دفعہ ہوا کہ میں اپنے جذبات کو سمجھ نہیں پائی/ پایا۔
- 18- کسی بھی معاملے کے بارے میں مجھے اکثر اپنے احساسات کا علم ہوتا ہے۔
- 19- میں نے زندگی میں کئی ایسے فیصلے کئے جس میں میں نے اپنے دل کی سنی اور وہ فیصلے صحیح ثابت ہوئے۔
- 20- مجھے تقریباً ہمیشہ معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ میں کیا محسوس کر رہی/ رہا ہوں۔
- 21- میرے لئے اپنے جذبات کو قابو کرنے کا بہترین طریقہ انہیں مکمل طور پر محسوس کرنا ہے۔
- 22- جب میں کچھ محسوس کر رہی/ رہا ہوں تو اپنے جذبات سے باخوبی آگاہ ہوتی/ ہوتا ہوں۔
- 23- میں اکثر غصے میں گالی گلوچ یا مار کھائی پر اتر آتی/ آتا ہوں۔
- 24- جب میں خوش ہوں تو خوشی کے لمحات کو پوری طرح سے محسوس کرتی/ کرتا ہوں۔
- 25- میں اپنے احساسات پر بہت زیادہ توجہ نہیں دیتی/ دیتا۔

ANNEXURE S

Aggression Questionnaire

سوالنامہ

ہدایت:-

ذیل میں چند بیانات دیئے گئے ہیں۔ آپ سے گزارش ہے کہ ہر بیان کو غور سے پڑھ کر یہ بتائیے کہ یہ بیان آپ کی شخصیت کے بارے میں کس حد تک صحیح ہے۔ اگر بالکل صحیح ہے تو '5' کے گرد دائرے کا نشان لگائیں اور اگر بالکل غلط ہے تو '1' کے گرد دائرے کا نشان لگائیں۔ مہربانی فرما کر ہر بیان کے سامنے دیئے گئے سکیل کی مدد سے وہ جواب دیں جو آپ کی شخصیت کے قریب ترین ہو۔ آپ کے جوابات صرف تحقیق کے لئے استعمال کئے جائیں گے۔

سکیل:

5	4	3	2	1
بالکل صحیح	کسی حد تک صحیح	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک غلط	بالکل غلط

بیانات	نمبر شمار
1- کبھی کبھار میں کسی دوسرے شخص کو مارنے کی خواہش پر قابو نہیں رکھ سکتی / سکتا۔	1 2 3 4 5
2- بہت تنگ کرنے پر میں کسی شخص کو تپتپ بھی مار سکتی / سکتا ہوں۔	1 2 3 4 5
3- اگر کوئی شخص مجھے مارے تو میں بھی اُسے مارتی / مارتا ہوں۔	1 2 3 4 5
4- میں ایک عام شخص کی نسبت زیادہ لڑائی جھگڑا کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔	1 2 3 4 5
5- اپنے حق کیلئے اگر مجھے تشدد پر اترنا پڑے تو میں اتر آؤں گی / گا۔	1 2 3 4 5
6- کچھ لوگوں نے مجھے اتنا غصہ دلایا کہ میں اُن کے ساتھ مار کٹائی پر اتر آئی / آیا۔	1 2 3 4 5
7- میں کبھی بھی کسی کی پٹائی کرنے کو جائز نہیں سمجھ سکتی / سکتا۔	1 2 3 4 5
8- بعض اوقات میں غصے میں اتنا پاگل ہوئی / ہوا کہ میں نے چیزیں توڑ پھوڑ دیں۔	1 2 3 4 5
9- بعض اوقات میں نے اپنے جاننے والوں کو دھمکایا۔	1 2 3 4 5
10- جب میں اپنے دوستوں کی باتوں سے اتفاق نہیں کرتی / کرتا تو انہیں کھل کر بتا دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔	1 2 3 4 5
11- میں اکثر لوگوں کی باتوں سے اتفاق نہیں کرتی / کرتا۔	1 2 3 4 5
12- جب لوگ مجھے غصہ دلاتے ہیں تو میں انہیں بتا بھی سکتی / سکتا ہوں کہ میں اُن کے بارے میں کیا سوچتی / سوچتا ہوں۔	1 2 3 4 5
13- جب لوگ مجھ سے اختلاف کرتے ہیں تو میں بحث کرنے سے باز نہیں رہ سکتی / سکتا۔	1 2 3 4 5
14- میرے دوست کہتے ہیں کہ میں بحث کرنے کی / کا عادی ہوں۔	1 2 3 4 5
15- میں جلد غصے میں آجاتی / جاتا ہوں لیکن جلد ہی اس پر قابو پالیتی / لیتا ہوں۔	1 2 3 4 5

5	4	3	2	1
بالکل صحیح	کسی حد تک صحیح	معلوم نہیں	کسی حد تک غلط	بالکل غلط

بیانات نمبر شمار

- 16- جب میں مایوسی اور بے بسی کا سامنا کرتی / کرتا ہوں تو اپنی جھنجھلاہٹ کا اظہار کر دیتی / دیتا ہوں۔
- 17- مجھے کبھی کبھار محسوس ہوتا ہے کہ میں بارود ہوں جو کسی بھی وقت پھٹ سکتا ہے۔
- 18- میں ایک معتدل (درمیانے) مزاج کا شخص ہوں۔
- 19- میرے کچھ دوستوں کا خیال ہے کہ میں گرم مزاج ہوں۔
- 20- کبھی کبھار میں بغیر کسی وجہ کے آپے سے باہر ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 21- مجھے اپنے غصے کو قابو کرنے میں مشکل پیش آتی ہے۔
- 22- کبھی کبھار میں شدید حسد کا شکار ہو جاتی / جاتا ہوں۔
- 23- میں بعض اوقات محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں کہ زندگی میں مجھ سے زیادتی ہوئی ہے۔
- 24- میری نسبت دوسرے لوگ زیادہ خوش قسمت ہیں۔
- 25- بعض اوقات میں سوچتی ہوں کہ زندگی کے بارے میں، میں اتنا تلخ کیوں محسوس کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 26- مجھے معلوم ہے کہ میرے دوست میری پیٹھ پیچھے میرے بارے میں باتیں کرتے ہیں۔
- 27- میں حد سے زیادہ دوستانہ رویہ رکھنے والے اجنبیوں پر شک کرتی / کرتا ہوں۔
- 28- مجھے کبھی کبھار محسوس ہوتا ہے کہ لوگ پیٹھ پیچھے مجھ پر ہنس رہے ہیں۔
- 29- جب لوگ اچھا برتاؤ کرتے ہیں تو میں سوچتا ہوں کہ ان کو مجھ سے کیا کام ہے۔

ANNEXURE T

English Translation of the Emotional Empathy Scale (EES)

1. It makes me happy to see a child open gifts on his birthday.
2. I feel sympathy to see young adults upset over their unemployment.
3. I am hardly ever moved to tears to see the sad and tragic end of some movie.
4. I can feel the pain of old people who cannot even move about because of their weakness.
5. I feel the urge to share the grief of a sad and a lonely person.
6. I tend to get lost in the lyrics of love songs.
7. A crying child does not necessarily get my attention.
8. I can feel the worry of a person to see him caught up in domestic life problems.
9. It makes me very sad to read about or watch on TV the famine stricken people of African countries.
10. I cannot feel the helplessness of a boy or a girl to hear about their forced marriage.
11. I am moved to tears to see a poor child bare feet in extreme cold.
12. If my friend's long awaited or passionate desire is fulfilled I feel his/her happiness in the same way as he/she feels it.
13. It has no effect on me to see people in bad mood around me.
14. I can almost feel the helplessness of a poor person being mistreated as he/she is feeling it.
15. I can feel the emotions of tearful people departing at the airport or railway station.
16. It extremely hurts me to see a handicapped young person.
17. The tearfulness and sadness of people at the occasion of departure on weddings has no special meaning to me.

18. It makes me also feel good and happy to see joyous and lively people around me.
19. I get anxious to see someone crying.
20. It does not distress me to see helpless old people.
21. I really enjoy the happy ending of a book, love story, or movie.
22. I do not feel much for a person to see him suffering from an incurable disease.
23. It is very difficult and painful for me to convey a bad news to anyone.
24. It does not affect me very much to hear about the killings of innocent people.
25. I get depressed to see a person grieving the death of a close one.
26. The grief and distress of a stranger has no effect on me.

English Translation of the Trait Emotional Awareness Scale (TEAS)

1. I often think about my feelings.
2. My thoughts and my views change according to my feelings.
3. No matter how bad I feel I try to think about good thoughts.
4. I act according to my feelings.
5. I am mostly very clear about my emotions.
6. I often make plans which I do not complete.
7. I believe that feelings determine the direction of life.
8. I tend to resist the temptation of teasing or making fun of someone.
9. I perform a difficult task even if I don't want to.
10. I easily wait for my turn even if I am very anxious to express my view.
11. Even though I sometimes get sad but my outlook on life is mostly positive.
12. Once I get into foul mood it can never be repaired.
13. I am never confused about my emotions.
14. If I am in a bad mood, I know if I am sad, afraid, or angry.
15. If somebody is upset I try to help him despite my hectic schedule.
16. It would be better for people to think more rather than feel.
17. I frequently tend to misunderstand my emotions.
18. I often know my feelings about any matter.
19. The best way for me to control my feelings is to completely feel them.
20. I almost always know what I am feeling.