

**PAKISTAN'S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY:
CHALLENGES AND WAY FORWARD**



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FINAL APPROVAL LETTER

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Dedicated to

This paper is dedicated to my beloved Father who left me early, but I believe he is looking upon me always; to my wonderful Mother who has always been a constant support; to my respected teachers for guiding me in the best way possible; to my siblings for handling my stress and to my dear friends who kept me motivated all the way to the end.

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ABSTRACT

This paper will focus on the problem of terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan has been the primary victim and thereby the key player in Global War on Terror. The paper will discuss the historical realities and policies which have led to fermentation of terrorist and extremist tendencies in the country. The focus was drawn to this phenomenon after the 9/11 incident and the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Pakistan was highlighted. There is a detailed picturization of the strategies employed; be them military or nonmilitary. Pakistan with the help of the United States became a significant actor in the Global War on Terror. As the Pakistani population witnessed the firsthand experience of terrorism, Pakistan had to alleviate its security situation. Pakistan sacrificed many of its soldiers, policemen and civilian while fighting terrorism and bore heavy losses; in terms of both human and material resources. To combat terrorism, Pakistan devised elaborative mechanisms to contain terrorism. Further, the paper analyzes the outcomes of the strategies and their loopholes. Despite more than a decade of war against terrorism, the success index has not gone much high. Terrorism has no doubt been contained but complete cleansing of the country has not been achieved yet. There still are dormant entities which are working on the terrorist agenda clandestine. And this is owing to the shortcoming in the policies and strategies chalked out for the purpose.

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan emerged on the world map on August 14, 1947, as a result of Partition in the subcontinent. A very weak state by that time continuously strived for stability. Soon after the independence, Kashmir war 1948 awaited. Dangling and dwindling amidst frail, infant democracy, and steadfast dictatorship, Pakistan chose its way of alignment towards the US in the 50s. Pakistan had an option of two blocs; the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Considering the U.S., the beneficial ally, Pakistan signed SEATO and CENTO in 1954 and 1955 respectively. The U.S. extended its policy of maintaining peace and stability in the South Asian region under the aegis of preservation of the independence of Pakistan. It was reaffirmed to Pakistan that any threat from India will be tackled together and the threat of the spread of Communism will be averted hand in hand as well.¹

Simultaneously, the weak constitution was adding to the fragility of democratic consolidation in Pakistan. The constitutional crisis existed since the beginning as the state adopted the British government of India Act, 1935 as its interim constitution. The constitutional dilemma continued to persist and bolstered when on October 7, 1958, martial law was declared under Field Marshall Ayub Khan. Undergoing one martial law after the other seriously crippled the political stage for democracy. Absentia of political culture and democratic civility led to politically unaware masses.

¹ Farhat Mahmud, *A History of U.S.-Pakistan Relations* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991)

Despite all the gloomy factors, Pakistani society is an amalgam of many cultures, religions, traditions, values, norms, and rituals. By all means, it is a society with diverse and variable culture. Ranging from different ethnicities, we have multiple religious identities. Ethnic identities include Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, Balochis, Muhajirs, Afghan refugees, etc. On the religious scale, there is the existence of Muslims, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Parsees and other minorities. Within Muslims even, extensive diversification exists. The two major wings i.e. Shia and Sunni are further divided into sub-categories. The most important sects of Shia Islam include Asharites and Ismailis while the major factions of the Sunni wing are Barelvis, Deobandis, Ahl-e-Hadith and Wahabis. All this diversity does exist in Pakistan but the question here is that whether they recognize and affirm each other, and do they co-exist peacefully? To some extent, the ethnic and political plurality does exist, religious plurality is highly absent for that matter. Declaration of Ahmedi minority as non- Muslims reiterated the intolerance towards pluralism in the state. It had severe long-term repercussions which served as a fuel to the fire of sectarian violence. Pakistan has become the hub of the sectarian divide which is one of the root causes of terrorism.

Before delving into the counter-terrorism strategies of Pakistan and probing into the practical nitty-gritty of the phenomenon, it is important to understand terrorism theoretically. The real considerate factors in theorizing terrorism are the intent or motive and targets. However, the task is not as easy as it may seem. It is more so considered to be in its pre-theorizing state.

As defined by the Oxford dictionary, terrorism is

“The unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.”

Terrorism is defined by Merriam-Webster as:

“The systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion.”

Defining terrorism to absoluteness is quite a difficult task as it is more of a social concept. Academically, terrorism can be conceptualized based on following assumptions by *Richards Anthony*—that there is no such thing as an act of violence that is in and of itself inherently terrorist; that terrorism is best conceptualized as a method rather than defined as inherent to any particular ideology or cause; and that terrorism can be carried out against non-civilians and combatants as well as civilians and non-combatants.²

Anthony defines terrorism as:

“Terrorism is a method that entails the use of violence or force or the threat of violence or force with the primary purpose of generating a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a political motive.”³

Terrorism has now become a global issue that has efficiently disturbed world peace. Many counter-terrorism strategies have been adopted by state and non-state actors but still, this problem is not addressed enough and is continuously masking global peace. Post 9/11 era has witnessed a serious blow of terrorism throughout the world. The world

² Richards Anthony, *Conceptualizing Terrorism* (London: Oxford University Press, 2015), 81.

³ Ibid. 146.

has witnessed the uprising of many non-state terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, etc. And the whole world is striving to fight this leviathan of terrorism.

Problem Statement

Pakistan has been facing terrorism for a long time. The scope of this essay will be exploring the terrorism challenge of Pakistan, particularly post 9/11 and how Pakistan, as a sovereign state, responded to the issue. In addition to that, there will be an analysis of the strategies employed and their outcome. Further, it will be discussed whether Pakistan has succeeded in pursuing counter-terrorism or not. If not, then what are the potential reasons behind the failure.

Hypothesis

Hypothetically, Pakistan has responded to terrorism through both pro-active and defensive strategies. Despite the fact that many broad-spectrum strategies have been employed but Pakistan has failed to extinguish the fire of terrorism completely. The compelling reason for this partial success is that anti-narratives are much stronger, and they render the counter-terrorism narratives not sufficient enough for complete eradication of terrorism.

Terrorism was stirring up in the region since the Afghan War and Pakistan's direct involvement in the Afghan War rendered it easy prey. Post 9/11, Pakistan faced severe pressure from the United States to participate in the global war on terror. This participation led to terrorist response towards Pakistan in the form of target killings, mass bombings, suicide bombings, kidnapping and what not.

Numerous counter-terrorism ideologies have been adopted to put a curb to terrorism. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was formed under the NACTA Act

2013. In 2014, a broad-spectrum counterterrorism policy was adopted which brought The National Action Plan (NAP) to act. Before NAP, a full-fledged military operation was launched in North Waziristan named Operation Zarb-e-Azb. These policies and strategies have turned out to be very useful in mitigating the terrorist response however, several challenges stood in the way. Anti- narratives were much stronger thereby resulting in partial success of the counter-terrorism narratives.

Scope of the Research

The scope of this research is limited to terrorism challenges faced by Pakistan post 9/11 till date and the strategies adopted by Pakistan. Also, it entails the consequences of the policies espoused as a result of 9/11 and their shortcomings.

Organization of the Research

This thesis explains the terrorism challenge in case of Pakistan following 9/11. The first chapter deals with the historical happenings that have fostered the growth of terrorism in the country and the terrorism showdown in Pakistan in the event of 9/11.

The second chapter describes in detail the military strategies and non-military ventures opted by the state of Pakistan. Also, it discusses the outcomes of these means and describes in detail the success and failures of these endeavors.

The third chapter focusses on the assessment of these strategies on the whole and enlists the challenges faced in countering terrorism. Moreover, it predicts the future of Counter-terrorism keeping in mind the contemporary scenario. Following the third chapter, the thesis is concluded in the light of findings and analysis done in the aforementioned chapters.

CHAPTER 1

PAKISTAN'S TERRORISM CHALLENGE POST 9/11

Pakistan enjoys a strong strategic position in the region owing to its proximity to West Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia. This geopolitical and geostrategic edge proves to be simultaneously a benediction and a malediction. This paradoxical scenario has been visible in the historical realities of Pakistan. Terrorism was fermenting in the region for a long period of time but was seriously materialized in 9/11 attack.

Particularly, the Iranian Revolution and the Afghan War in the 1980s changed the political landscape of the region. However, the progression of terrorism accredited to Pakistan's involvement in Afghan War 1980. As aforementioned, Pakistan was the non-NATO ally of the United States of America. Therefore, the petrodollar economy was the result of huge inflow of aid from the U.S. via Saudi Arabia. A large number of *mujahideen* were trained to fight the curse of Soviet Communism.⁴

Historical Background

Pakistan has faced terrorism all over the country. Several suicide bombings, mass killings, shootings have been done on the part of these terrorist groups chiefly in Baluchistan, FATA, KPK and in Karachi. Pakistan has always been a politically unstable country and these terrorist activities have added to this instability. Terrorism has seriously weakened the political, religious and cultural roots of the state.

Terrorism stirred up in the region of Afghanistan and Pakistan owing to the direct involvement of Pakistan in the Afghan War. Pakistan was caught between the continuous

⁴ Dr. Hidayat Khan, 'Pakistan's Contribution to Global War on Terror after 9/11,' IPRI Journal XIII, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 37-56, accessed on March 18, 2019.

power- scuffle between two super-power aspirants. It became the front-line due to Afghan neighborhood. Rise of Al-Qaeda, creation, and training of mujahidin and the role of ISIS has been very significant in Pakistan's terrorism challenge.

Rise of the Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda (the Base) is a well- established militant Islamist organization. It was founded by Osama bin Laden in 1988. The organization was primarily orchestrated to provide logistical assistance to the Muslims who were engaged in fighting with the Soviet Union during the Afghan War⁵. After Soviet withdrawal, it continued to oppose their perceived corrupt Islamic regimes and foreign entities present in Muslim areas. Al-Qaeda recruited its members from all over the Islamic world. The Al-Qaeda, in its early years, was based in Pakistan from 1988-1991. Later on, it moved to Sudan (1991-1996), then to Afghanistan (1996-2002) and after the 9/11, the organization moved back to Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, the group was under the patronage of the Pashtun warlords and the clerics of Islamic Movement of the Taliban (Students) who tended to provide a safe haven for Al-Qaeda's leadership, organizational structure, and training camps. After the Afghan war, Al-Qaeda became dependent on the goodwill of state for its survival. However, the organization was able to develop ties with similar groups in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. In addition to that, the militants were very aware of the terrain and had a well-developed geographic sense of the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan which added to the sustainability and productivity of the organization.

⁵"Al-Qaeda," Britannica, accessed <https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda>

When the U.S. backed Northern Alliance moved to Southern Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda's significant structures split up into three wings i.e. they relocated to Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Mohamed Saleh and Abu Hafs were killed in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Saif Al Adel, Abu Kheyer al Masri, and Abu Hafs al-Mauritani relocated to Iran whereas Osama bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and Sheikh Saeed al Masri moved to Pakistan.⁶

Not ignoring the fact that Al-Qaeda underwent a merger with the Egyptian militant organization al-Jihad in 2001 and renamed itself as *Jama'at al-Qaeda al-Jihad (The Al Qaeda Organization/Group for Jihad)*. Al-Zawahiri was an Egyptian and deputy leader of Al-Qaeda. He moved to Bajaur Agency in FATA and composed ties with the top-notch leadership of Deobandi movement of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM). With the help of such acquaintances, he managed to evade arresting and continued regathering Al-Qaeda's scattered segments.

Concurrently, Osama bin Laden divided the group on the basis of operations into two factions; External and Internal. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was authorized to lead the External Operations i.e. outside the realm of Afghanistan and Pakistan while Abu Faraj al-Libi was empowered with the Internal Operations. The colossal 9/11 attack was planned under the administration of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. However, following the

⁶Rohan Gunaratna & Anders Nielsen, 'Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond,' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31, no.9 (2008): 779, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10576100802291568>

detention of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad by Pakistan in 2003, Abu Faraj al-Libi took the reins of external operations.

Another taxonomy was done when Al-Qaeda's main operational structure was divided into two blocs. The first group under the leadership of Sayf al-Adl and Abu Muhammad al-Masri was sent to Iran along with two sons of Osama bin Laden. However, the Iranian group was arrested in 2003 by the Iranian Intelligence Service. The other group was comprised of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad's network in Sindh and Baluchistan. He relayed orders from Osama bin Laden to broader Al-Qaeda network outside Pakistan while he himself was operating in Karachi.

Al-Qaeda declared war against Pakistan by conducting a double suicide attack on the then President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf. The attack was instructed by Abu Faraj who was operating and communicating from his base in Bajaur Agency, FATA. But, the planning and execution were done by certain Pakistani groups including Jamiat ul-Furqan, Harakat-ul-Jihad ul-Islami, and Jamiat ul-Ansar.⁷

Every organization bears the burden of certain loopholes and so did Al-Qaeda. The organization became vulnerable during its communication, both at home and overseas. The U.S. enjoys a high degree of technological advancement and was able to detect the communication. The organization with its massive tendency to evolve tried to learn. The core leadership tried to abstain from using detectable communication which enabled the

⁷ Ibid. 780.

organization to survive. Instead, they used a complexed system of couriers. To put it into Musharraf's words:

“Al-Qaeda’s courier system is four-tiered: “with distinct layers for administration, operations, media support, and the top hierarchy.”⁸

Following the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad in 2003, Al-Qaeda moves its center of operations to FATA. Meanwhile, ISI re-strengthened its foothold in major cities of Pakistan resulting in Al-Qaeda losing its limbs. While staying in FATA, the organization focused on reinforcing its network. Under the aegis of Mehsud and Wazir tribes, Al-Qaeda began healing and recuperating itself. The new operational structure was based in South Waziristan and was inclusive of Egyptians; Hamza Rabia and Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir.

Both of them were very proficient leaders but nowhere near the skill and capability of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. Despite the fact that they lacked communication from the outside world, they managed to create training opportunities in FATA. Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir headed Al Qaeda’s training structure in North Waziristan. In doing so, they relied on the homegrown jihadists of the West. And henceforth, they targeted the radicalized segments of Muslim migrants and other minorities in the West and managed to recruit them.⁹

⁸ Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A memoir* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 221.

⁹ Carlotta Gall and Ismail Khan, ‘Taliban and Allies tighten grip in North of Pakistan,’ *The New York Times*, Dec 11, 2006, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/world/asia/11pakistan.html>

However, a major development took place when on May 2, 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed by the U.S. military forces while he was residing in a secure compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The activity was completed by a little group that reached the compound in Abbottabad via helicopter. After bin Laden's passing was affirmed, it was declared by U.S. President Barack Obama, who hailed the activity as a noteworthy accomplishment in the battle against al-Qaeda. On June 16, 2011, al-Qaeda discharged an announcement reporting that Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's long-serving agent, had been named to supplant bin Laden as the organization's head.

The ascent of the Taliban

Afghanistan has been a turbulent region since ages. But when *Nur Mohammed Taraki* was assassinated, Moscow was fearful for their infant ties with the Afghan government. Internal resistance, as well as international pressure, led to a highly fluid situation. Hence, in the name of “fraternal aid”, the Soviet Union sent 4000 Soviet troops in Kabul to safeguard the pro-Soviet government.¹⁰ This further incited the resistance forces domestically. Moreover, it was a harsh blow to American bloc as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could result in falling off the other dominos as well.

In the wake of these international developments, Pakistan had another dilemma to see to. Afghan refugees were pouring into Pakistan which was gradually transforming into a huge refugee crisis. Zia-ul-Haq was governing Pakistan by that time and was in need of constant popular support. His domestic policies were extended to create a foreign policy that would avert the chances of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan on one hand and on the

¹⁰Peter A. Pentz, ‘The Mujahidin Middleman: Pakistan's Role in the Afghan Crisis and the International Rule of Nonintervention,’ *Dickinson Journal of International Law* 6, no.3 Article 4 (1988): 380.

other; he was trying to have a potential ally to support Pakistan against the Soviet expansionism.

Domestically, he introduced his policy of *Islamization*. In addition to that, Soviet expansionist ambitions were translated into the religious realm i.e. Communism as a threat to Islam. This move was really handy in mobilizing people for operating at policy, strategic and practical level. At that point of time, interests of Pakistan and the United States were vividly converging, and this convergence led to a long-term befitting alliance between the two.

Zia enforced his elucidation of Nizam-e-Mustafa in the establishment of an Islamic state and demonstrated his commitment to that enforcement. The Islamization process included Shariah laws and courts, Hudood ordinance (added offenses of adultery), Prohibition Order, Blasphemy laws, Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, Qisas and Diyat Ordinance and Madrassah expansions.

Zia's Islamization can be interpreted in two ways. Before Zia, in 1971, Pakistan has lost the war over Bangladesh and had lost its East Wing. The Pakistani army was very demoralized owing to the defeat and also many army men were captured by India as *prisoners of war*. So, it was part of his political agenda to institutionalize the radicalization of society. So, he inculcated religious passion in soldiers to make them fight better. He made use of judiciary, educational institutions, bureaucracy and of course, armed forces for the propagation of his agenda.

Another dimension of Islamization is that it might have been done to prolong and legitimize the otherwise unconstitutional military coup.¹¹ The Islam factor was successfully used by him to disseminate in the mind of the common man that Zia is a great leader because he is reinforcing the Islamic ideology. An illusion was created to display that Pakistan should be the fortress of Islam and Islamization is the only way to preserve Islam in the state.

During Afghan jihad, Pakistan was a third-party which was under the influence of the United States of America. It was not Pakistan's war to fight but Pakistanis were very intelligently manipulated in the name of religion. Pakistan was turned into a silo for American weaponry and ammunition. This weaponry was transported by the famous Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Israel¹² to Pakistan via sea route which was further transported to the mujahideen who were fighting the Communist Soviet Union for the cause of U.S. Muslims in Pakistan were blindfolded over the argument that Communism is synonymous to atheism and that they should not let atheism prevail.

Another key player was Saudi Arabia who was a proponent of Wahabi ideology which is totally contrary to the Barelvi Islam but is quite close to the Deobandi interpretation of Islam. The import of Wahabi thinking took place along with the dollars. Many Pakistanis got employment in Saudi Arabia, who then came back were influenced by the Wahabi doctrine which also aided the flow of the ideology.¹³ Deobandi proponents introduced *Madrassah* culture. Huge funding was done by Saudi Arabia to these *Madrassahs*. The

¹¹ Arslan Ahmed, A formal interview with the author, 14 May 2017.

¹² Arieb Azhar, formal interview with the author, 16 May 2017.

¹³ Arslan Ahmed, formal interview with the author, 14 May 2017.

madrassahs were actually the sites for prepping Mujahideen to take part in U.S.-Soviet war which was then given the name of Afghan Jihad.

The major concern for Saudi Arabia was the Iranian revolution which was the proponent of Shiite philosophy. On the other hand, Wahabi dogma is part of the Sunni doctrine. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. both were fearful of the expansion of the Iranian revolution as it would increase the anti- American Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf. So, both the U.S and Saudi Arabia were trying to contain Iran. To increase its influence over the Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia started to provide them with huge aid; specifically, Pakistan because Iran is the immediate neighbor of Pakistan. To serve the purpose efficiently, the sectarian genie was released in Pakistan. Muslims, in this part of the world, were deliberately divided into Shia and Sunni.

Considering participation of Pakistan at the operational level, one observes that Pakistan abridged the logistical gap between Afghanistan and the United States of America. Arms were shipped or sent by aircraft to Pakistan from where they were transported to the resisting forces; the then mujahideen, residing in the border areas of Pakistan. Soon, the arms supply became larger and depots started to set up in areas like FATA, Peshawar and even in military installations.¹⁴

Pakistan's contribution was not limited to the operational levels only. Pakistan provided intelligence assistance to the U.S. rendering CIA and ISI cohesive partners. ISI was considered to understand the Afghan resisting groups and was dutiful to provide

¹⁴ Marvin G. Weinbaum, 'War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role,' *Middle East Journal* 45, No. 1 (Winter, 1991): 71-85, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328240?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

information about such groups to the CIA. The collaborative efforts of the two were quite comprehensive. Pakistan, on one hand, wanted to save itself from Soviet expansionist agenda and on the other hand, it was a chance to crush the possibility of any antagonistic government to come to power in Afghanistan.

An encyclopedic organization named as *Afghan Interim Government* (AIG) was created in order to ensure a pro-Pakistan government as a substitute to Kabul government. At the time of Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, things started to change. General Zia-ul-Haq died in a plane crash and was replaced by PM Benazir Bhutto. The democratically elected government was considered to be a backlash for *mujahideen*. PM Benazir Bhutto dismissed the then ISI chief General Hamid Gul who was working hand in hand with the AIG. However, it did not lead to alteration of Pakistan's Afghan policies.

Nevertheless, AIG proved to be a great disappointment for Pakistan since there were inter-party conflicts which eventually materialized into Hizb-e-Islami leaving the AIG. The synthetically created government failed to hold ground owing to the absence of Shi'ite resistance groups. The failed coup to oust Najibullah's government in 1990 confirmed that a politically negotiable settlement was impossible if Soviet withdraws. Grabbing the opportunity by its neck, Pakistan tried to short circuit the situation. The orders were given to save the coup. This incident was a huge question mark over the intelligence reliability of Pakistan as it misread Najib's strength.

As soon as Bhutto's government was replaced by the Nawaz's government, the military was given a free hand. Plans for the conventional assault were made but ended up in failure. Even with high degree authority, military intelligence failed to put the traditionalists and Islamists on one table. Considering a skeptical viewpoint, Zia dreamt

of a muddled, unstable and decentralized Afghanistan. But, Pakistan was well aware of the fact that instability and disunification in Afghanistan would bring ripple in Pakistan as well. Moreover, extended volatility in Afghanistan meant an extended stay of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

It was highly unintelligent of Pakistan to think of creating a feeble, pro-Pakistan and kindred government in Afghanistan given their traditionalist independent history. The desire of self-determination for the Islamists and others was far more important than their commitment to Pakistan. Pakistan in its right mind made huge wrongs. Involvement in Afghan War, arming the resistive forces, maintaining intelligence communication with them, hosting them in its own territory and approving unchecked influx of Afghan refugees were all decisions that were to bring disastrous and unprecedented outcomes in the near future.

Role of ISIS

ISIS, an acronym for *Islamic State of Iraq and Syria* is an Islamic militant group operating in Iraq and Syria mainly. The relevance for the role of ISIS for terrorism in Pakistan is owing to its long-forgotten alliance with the Al-Qaeda. During the Syrian Civil War, two rebel factions came to the forefront; Jabhat-al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq.

The organization was commenced in 1999 under Al-Qaeda with great ideological estimations. By June 2014, Abu Bakr-Al-Baghdadi claimed ISIS to be a general Caliphate of Muslims throughout the world thereby renaming it as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Their ideological baseline is in accordance with the Salafi school of thought with an inclination towards Jihadism. ISIS progressed toward becoming on

account of the reduction of Al-Qaida in Iraq, where the Shia bigger part strived to outline an organization after the finish of Saddam Hussain. The US mediation and Saddam Hussain's liquidation pushed Iraq into a political vacuum that made prepared for the extreme social occasions to update their contact with help of factional segment to mount their capacity on various get-togethers.

Along these lines, regional convolutions overhauled after ISIS got critical northern areas of Iraq provoking extraordinary clashes between Shia-Iraqi and ISIS powers. ISIS pulled in much Sunni masses in Iraq and incorporated various pioneers who were in Saddam Hussain's military and warriors from Afghanistan and Chechnya. It is said that the group is militarily all around arranged. It has the latest mechanical weapons that may have been stolen from the Iraqi and Syrian equipped power and achieved by some extraordinary sources. The organization takes an interest in well-financed and dealt with dreadful attacks and they disgrace the accumulations of their shocking setbacks by showing them on web and electronic life, and by showing up and accounts of slaughtering under the name of Islamic Caliphate. ISIS's activities are sponsored by different strategies. These join overpowering installment, dull publicized oil, looted banks and antiquated pieces from chronicled goals, and worldwide help. It controls oil and gas fields in both Syria and Iraq despite neighboring phosphate mines that developed an advantageous trade.

In Pakistan, ISIS exists in form of disorganized traces, trying to stand ground continuously against Pakistan's security setting. The ISIS version in Pakistan consists mainly of marginalized entities like Tehreek-e-Khilafat-wa-Jihad, Jundallah, Shahidullah

Group and Jamat-ul-Ahrar¹⁵ who left the TTP owing to certain in-group differences and joined Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi. Following the modus operandi of TTP, these groups continued operating from Afghanistan for training, planning and plotting terrorist activities in Pakistan. Such entities managed to escape from Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) during Operation Zarb-e-Azb. The amalgamation of ISIS near Pakistan's border adjacent to the Afghan side is causing a grief concern for Pakistani think tanks, especially, after the recent terror attacks countrywide.

Presently, a few extremist tendencies still exist within the echelons of Pakistani society. ISIS has capitalized on astray entities and somehow managed to gain access to Pakistan, similar to the way it has secured the loyalty of marginalized Jihadi groups and TTP's outcasts. The latter was denied identity by the TTP leadership due to in-group conflicts which paved their way of joining ISIS. The ISIS attracted and appeased them by providing them with the opportunity to become part of the so-called Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP), primarily post-TTP defeat by the Pakistani military specifically in FATA.¹⁶

Terrorism post 9/11

Over the past years, terrorism took lives of around 63,000 people in Pakistan. Although the phenomenon is relatively declining due to numerous counter strategies employed, the

¹⁵ Maryam Nazir, 'Daesh in South Asia,' *Journal of Current Affairs* 1, no. 1 & 2 (2016):7 , http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Article1_Maryam-Nazir-17Nov2016.pdf.

¹⁶ Muhammad Nawaz Khan, 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS): A Threat to Pakistan?' *Journal of Current Affairs* 2, no.1 (2017): 13, <http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/art1nkj21.pdf>

fatalities persist presently. 62,096 people fell prey to terrorist attacks from 2003 to 2017 and 5,303 is the number of murdered people on the sectarian basis from 1989 to 2017.¹⁷

One of the major factors in harboring and steadfastness of terrorism and terrorists respectively is the increased radicalization in FATA and KPK. This has led to the staunch support of Al-Qaeda and Taliban in the aforementioned areas. Moreover, these areas are adjacent to the Pak-Afghan border which is nothing more than an imaginary boundary. It has enabled the terrorists to move back and forth with much ease.

Radicalization in FATA and KPK was provoked by domestic Pakistani politics. certain fragments of the Pakistani population were highly disgruntled with the military-led government of General Pervez Musharraf. They were highly critical of him and considered him to be a puppet leader in the hands of the United States. Increasing antagonism was further fueled by the *Lal Masjid* incident which proved to be a vivid and decisive stand-off between radical Islamic entities and the Pakistani security forces, and that too, within Pakistan. A major proportion of these radical Islamists were from KPK.

The sentiments were carefully tackled and intelligently manipulated by the Al-Qaeda leaders and other extremist agencies. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Al-Qaeda leader, exhorted Pakistanis to fight for the jihadist cause and to take vengeance of the blood of martyrs. In addition to that. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi under the leadership of Maulana Sufi Muhammad called for jihad against government of Pakistan (remembering the fact

¹⁷ Farid Sabri, '67,399 people killed in terror attacks during past 15 years,' *Pakistan Today*, May 20, 2017, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/05/20/67399-people-killed-in-terror-attacks-during-past-15-years/>

that TNSM was a pro-Taliban organization). Meanwhile, the U.S. pressurized Musharraf government to take harsh and rigorous initiatives against the terrorists which made Pakistan a battleground for the Global War on Terror.¹⁸

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
2000	45	0	0	45
2001	29	9	0	38
2002	88	7	44	139
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435

¹⁸ Gunaratna & Nielsen, 'Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond,' 778.

2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	3007	732	2472	6211
2013	3001	676	1702	5379
2014	1781	533	3182	5496
2015	940	339	2403	3682
2016	612	293	898	1803
2017	540	208	512	1260
2018	369	165	157	691
2019	67	45	27	139
Total *	22627	7097	34085	63809

*Data till April 28, 2019

Table 1: Fatalities in Terrorist violence in Pakistan 2000-2019.

Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2019




Figure 1: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2019

Year	Incidents	Killed	Injured
2002	1	15	34
2003	2	69	103
2004	7	89	321
2005	4	84	219
2006	7	161	352

2007	54	765	1677
2008	59	893	1846
2009	76	949	2356
2010	49	1167	2199
2011	41	628	1183
2012	39	365	607
2013	43	751	1411
2014	25	336	601
2015	20	188	410
2016	19	401	935+
2017	22	369	1052
2018	11	61	132
Total*	479	7291	15428+

*Data till June 17, 2018

Table 2: *Fidayeen* (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan¹⁹

¹⁹ "Suicide squad attacks in Pakistan," South Asia Terrorism Portal, last modified Jan.2019, <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm>




Figure 2: Suicide attacks in Pakistan: 2002-2018

CHAPTER 2

PAKISTAN'S COUNTERTERRORISM RESPONSE

Pakistan has been a dwelling place for various militant extremist and Jihadi factions, which have operationalized for quite a long time. With “close operational links with the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda as well as with each other”²⁰, these entities can be categorized into four classes: first, the domestic sectarian gatherings, for example, the Sunni-Deobandi Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which have customarily centered around focusing on the Shiites. The second classification includes the Pakistani Taliban commonly known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) situated in Pakistan's tribal areas. The TTP points “to uphold Shariah and to join against the NATO powers in Afghanistan and do guarded-Jihad against the Pakistan armed forces.”

The third arrangement of extremist factions comprises of the counter Indian militant Jihadi entities, which are generally known as the 'Kashmiri gatherings, for example, the Deobandi outfits of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen; the Ahl-e-Hadith gatherings, for example, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); and Jama'at-e-Islami-connected associations of Hizbul Mujahideen and Al-Badr.²¹ In addition to that, the fourth gathering includes the Afghan Taliban, for the most part, represented by the Haqqani web under the leadership of Jalaluddin Haqqani, situated in North Waziristan; and the Quetta Shura of Mullah Omar.

²⁰ Ayesha Siddiqi, 'Jihadism in Pakistan: The Expanding Frontier,' *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1(2009): 61.

²¹ Carol Christine Fair, 'Pakistan's own war on terror: What the Pakistani Public thinks,' *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no.1(winter 2009): 40, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24384171?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents

Pakistan's Military designated the initial two classifications as 'Bad Taliban', since they execute fear-based oppression inside Pakistan against the army bases, security forces and the civilian citizens. Then again, the last two classifications are considered as strategic assets and named as 'Good Taliban'. They fulfill Pakistan's geo-vital interests in Afghanistan and India. Regardless of extreme regional and global pressure, Pakistan has been hesitant to dispatch any military activity against these parties.²²

Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi has played a significant role in battling the Pakistani State with the purpose of implementing Shariah. The organization enjoyed patronage with Mehsud's TTP. In addition to these local groups, Pakistan had been likewise the home of a few outside militants as well, for example, Arabs, Uzbeks, Chinese Ughyurs, and Chechens. These activists inhabited FATA amid the Afghan war of 1979 and settled there. By and by, they are in partnership with the Pakistani Taliban and utilize the tribal regions as their havens.

After the 9/11 attack, the U.S. administration was furious and was trying everything to protect the fire from reaching their home. They needed Pakistan's support in waging Global War on Terror. To deal with the terrorist organizations and groups, Pakistan needed to codify a counterterrorism strategy after the 9/11 episode according to the necessity of its promise to the US-drove "war on terror". Pakistan provided the U.S. access to its air, land and naval bases. The increasing instability in Pakistan led to the fracture of ties between Pakistan and the Taliban Government and this was the final nail

²² Naeem Ahmed, 'Pakistan's Counter-terrorism strategy and its Implications for domestic, regional and international security' (Working Paper, *Foundation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme*, 2013). <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00937552>

in the coffin. President Musharraf ended diplomatic relations with the Taliban government and showed full-fledged support and assistance to the U.S. Pakistan's role was highly pivotal in doing so and was often appreciated. The recognition, if put into appropriate words, was that,

“Without the active and sincere participation of Pakistan, the desired results in terms of breaking the al Qaeda network could not have been achieved.”²³

Pak-US Alliance

Former Pakistani President Musharraf realized that America would react like a wounded bear and it will attack Afghanistan.²⁴ Pakistan was naturally dragged into the war because of three major reasons. The first and the foremost was its geographical proximity to Afghanistan. Pakistan shares a very long border with Afghanistan on the West; about 2640 km long. Moreover, the Af-Pak border, also known as the Durand line, was not materialized as such because of the fact that it is not an ethnic boundary. The ethnic majority living on both sides of the Durand line is the Pashtuns. In addition to this, Pakistan also has the long coastline which gave the US forces stationed in the Indian Ocean, a clear advantage if they wanted to enter Afghanistan. Although China was also geographically close to Afghanistan the mixed-motive relationship that existed between China and the United States of America was not trustworthy enough for both states.

²³Munawar Hussain, *Pak-US Cooperation in War against Terrorism: Causes and Implications* (Islamabad: Area Study Centre, Quaid-i-Azam University, 2005), 41.

²⁴Ahmed Rashid, *Decent into Chaos* (New York: Penguin Group, 2008), 120.

China had always been suspicious of the presence of the US in Central Asia. On the other hand, for the US, the loyalty of China had been under question since ages.

The second important reason for Pakistan's participation in the Global War on terror was that Pakistan has been the long-term ally of the US. The level of cooperation between the US and Pakistan was far deeper and longer as compared to India. In addition to that, the Indian military was equipped with Russian artillery and training. This factor made Pakistan more preferable ally in the eyes of the US administration.²⁵

The third factor in this regard was the cultural proximity between the Taliban regime and the people of Pakistan. The Taliban government in Afghanistan was led by Pashtuns primarily who shared their cultures and traditions with the Pashtuns of Pakistan living in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan province.²⁶ This could be a fruitful feature for better communication and comprehension of the ideologies and cognition. The US kept in mind both tangible and intangible considerations while choosing their regional partner in the Global War on Terror. Furthermore, the drive had been very strong from the States' side. Pakistan's decision to participate as a partner to the United States was based on four incentives i.e. the country's security; its economic revival; the security of its nuclear assets and the Kashmir cause.²⁷

The United States' administration considered Afghanistan and Pakistan as a common theater of operation and the objective was to defeat the Islamist Jihadist groups and

²⁵ Dr. Hidayat Khan, 'Pakistan's Contribution to Global War on Terror after 9/11,' *IPRI Journal* XIII, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 42.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 43.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

militant entities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. To serve the purpose, colossal financial support worth over \$2 billion per year was offered. Apart from this, security assistance and intelligence backing were also offered and provided. This included military aid, anti-narcotics programs, and aid in internal security and developmental ventures.²⁸ The Global War on Terror was initialized by Pakistan when it contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Al-Mizan was launched respectively in collaboration with the United States.

Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–02)

To topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as well as to capture or kill the senior individuals from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the U.S. initiated the **Operation Enduring Freedom**. Despite the fact that Pakistan had a lacking presentation or accomplishment in this regard and specifically in these areas. Pakistan made two significant inputs to Operation Enduring Freedom.

Primarily, Pakistan allowed the U.S. military and intelligence units to use some of its ports and bases, granted over-flight and landing rights, assisted in supplying logistics to military forces operating in Afghanistan, shared records of intelligence and immigration information and temporarily fractured diplomatic ties with the Taliban subsequently amputating logistical support to them.²⁹

²⁸ Carol Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, 'Pakistan's War Within,' *Survival* 51, no.6 (2009):161, doi 10.1080/00396330903465204

²⁹ Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 201–7.

Secondly, Pakistan began conducting operations along infiltration routes from Afghanistan. The responsibility laid with the regular army, Special Services Group, Frontier Corps and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. Two infantry brigades were meant for border and internal-security operations along with two quick-reaction forces from SSG which were deployed in Kohat and Wana. Additionally, approximately 4,000 Frontier Corps forces were used to conduct operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.³⁰

In December 2001, the U.S. began operating in Tora Bora which was assisted by Pakistan. Pakistan deployed an amalgam of forces in Khyber and Kurram Agency for that matter.³¹ Later in March 2002, the U.S. led **Operation Anaconda** in Shah-i-Kot Valley of Paktia province in Afghanistan. Pakistan played its part by multiplying force levels in North and South Waziristan to target militants. All through 2002, Frontier Corps forces struck weapons stores in South Waziristan; the regular armed force ambushed al-Qaeda agents amid **Operation Kazha Punga** in South Waziristan; regular army troops entered territories in Khyber and Kurram Agencies to seek after al-Qaeda warriors escaping Afghanistan; and Pakistani military, police and intelligence agencies led tasks against militants in Balochistan Province.³²

Pakistan played a vital role in incarcerating many senior Al-Qaeda operatives and foreign fighters. The detention of Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Sharib Ahmad is

³⁰ Carol Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 27.

³¹ Rahimullah Yusufzai, 'Fall of the Last Frontier?' *Newsline (Pakistan)*, June 2002, <https://newlinemagazine.com/magazine/fall-of-the-last-frontier/>

³² International Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants* (Brussels: ICG, December 2006), 14.

accredited to Pakistan.³³ Albeit there were certain limitations to Pakistan's role as Washington sought Pakistani support principally in catching or executing al-Qaeda and foreign fighters, but Pakistan saw as to its greatest advantage.³⁴ Operation Enduring Freedom was most fruitful in its essential destinations of ousting the Taliban regime and catching some al-Qaeda fighters crossing the Durand Line. However, the United States and Pakistan fell to catch some significant al-Qaeda figures, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who cruised into Pakistan.

Operation Al Mizan (2002–06)

After Operation Enduring Freedom, Pakistan launched **Operation Al-Mizan**. The operation included several small operations such as Operation Kalosha II and was directed at militants stationed in FATA. Following the crumbling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, many militants including Al-Qaeda leaders crossed into Pakistan. Many of them were involved in the 9/11 attacks. The terrorists along with their allies began attacking Pakistani military and paramilitary setups and U.S. bases along the Durand Line. Owing to these developments, Pakistan faced immense pressure from the U.S. to start an offensive program against the terrorists settled in FATA.

Pakistan conducted multiple operations as well as political means between 2002 and 2006. Around 70,000 forces were deployed in FATA. In addition, requests were made to the political administration, jirgas and tribal leaders of South Waziristan to identify locals providing safe havens to foreign fighters. Using the information from local informants,

³³ Naeem Ahmed, 'Pakistan's Counter-terrorism strategy and its Implications for domestic, regional and international security' (Working Paper, *Foundation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme*, 2013).
<https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00937552>

³⁴ Ashley J. Tellis, *Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 7.

many Ahmedzai Wazir tribesmen were identified who were guilty of supporting foreign fighters.

Amongst several critical, smaller operations was “Operation Kalosha II” launched in March 2004. It was a 13-day cordon-and-search operation across a 36km² area west of Wana as a consequence to the ambush of Frontier Corps personnel in that area. according to the intelligence reports, the Al-Qaeda was carrying out its activities rendering the area under the control of terrorists like Nek Mohammad Wazir, Noor-ul-Islam, Haji Mohammad Sharif, Maulvi Abbas, and Maulvi Abdul Aziz, who were presumed to be harboring foreign fighters.³⁵

Amid the operation, Pakistan deployed the Frontier Corps and XI Corps, based out of Peshawar, under the direction of Lieutenant-General Muhammad Safdar Hussain. Pakistani powers confronted intense opposition in the towns of Dzha Ghundai, Shin Warsak, and Karikot. The cordon around Kalosha and the encompassing towns failed to debilitate the versatility of the terrorists, some of whom scattered through a network of tunnels. The activity at first included 700 troops, however, by 19 March approximately 7,000 armed forces and Frontier Corps personnel were battling at a few areas south and west of Wana. Operation Kalosha II was fruitful in that it wiped out a few domestic and foreign fighters, disturbed a noteworthy al-Qaeda direction and control center, and caught a network of tunnels containing complex electronic hardware and supplies. Yet, it

³⁵ Amir Mohammad Khan. ‘Spiralling into Chaos,’ *Newsline (Pakistan)*, March 2004, <https://newlinemagazine.com/magazine/spiralling-into-chaos/>

additionally activated assaults against adjacent Pakistan armed forces and Frontier Corps bases.³⁶

In June 2004, an army of militants comprising of more than 200 Chechens and Uzbeks, few Arabs and many domestic cliques in the Shakai valley (25 km north of Wana) was reported. They were attacked by Frontier Corps Forces along with the U.S. trained Special Operations Task Force and some 10,000-regular army. The United States and Pakistan, in collaboration with each other, conducted multiple strikes against other terrorists; specifically, in North and South Waziristan throughout 2004 and 2005.

The Shakai Agreement

Many peace deals were pursued by the army as encouraged by the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). Owing to the increasing casualties, the Musharraf government expedited peace deals with the local militants. JUI had ties with the Taliban and other Deobandi extremist groups but additionally, it was also part of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). MMA performed well in 2002 parliamentary elections thereby JUI formed the provincial government in the then NWFP. Also, it formed a coalition government with PML-Q in Balochistan.

Amidst the peace deals, *the Shakai Agreement* was one of the prime initiatives. The agreement was brokered with the aid of Governor NWFP Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah and some leaders of JUI. It was a 50-membered jirga formed as a result of operations in Kalosha during 2004. The Pakistani government aimed at the unconditional surrender of foreign aggressors and their domestic patrons. Also, the release of Pakistani military

³⁶ Ibid.

personnel and administration staff who were abducted in the Kalosha region on 16 March was demanded. Amid ensuing exchanges, the jirga was given three counter-conditions by the militants: lifting the military's siege, reparation for 83 houses devastated amid the battling and freeing 163 individuals captured amid the operation.

The arrangement that was at long last achieved incorporated multiple arrangements: Pakistani armed force troops would not meddle in internal tribal issues and consented to remain in their cantonment regions; domestic insurgents would not assault Pakistani government staff or infrastructure, and all foreigners would need to enroll themselves with the government.

This deal, however, came with multiple problems. For the military, it was a 'reconciliation' which was interpreted by tribals as the military's implicit acknowledgment of their rivals as similarly ground-breaking and authentic. Nevertheless, this reconciliation deal enabled the terrorists to gain hold of the South Waziristan and earned them political legitimacy. The insurgents were compensated for their losses, but no compensation was offered for their victims. Moreover, they were not made to surrender their weapons, rather weapons were offered as a ceremonial gesture to the military.³⁷

However, the way the deal was prosecuted was the highest atrocity in the deal. Traditionally, jirgas are held in public places but in this case, final negotiations were held at a Deobandi madrassa nearby Wana between Nek Muhammad, Haji Mohammad Sharif

³⁷ Carol Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, 'Pakistan's War Within,' *Survival* 51, no.6 (2009):171, doi 10.1080/00396330903465204

and an 18-member group of the jirga. The jirga included some local ulema from JUI and a few leaders of Zalikhel tribe. Involvement of clerics and jirga in a madrassa was interpreted as a surrender by the army instead of the militants. This is evident from Nek Mohammad's statement that 'I did not go to them, they came to my place. That should make it clear who surrendered to whom.'³⁸

This agreement and such interpretation gave Nek Mohammad much confidence which led him to violate the agreement soon. However, he was killed in a U.S. missile strike in June 2004. November 2004 saw a new agreement between the Taliban leaders and the government, but it only lasted for six weeks. Subsequent deals forged in this regard had similar features to the Shakai Agreement.

In the case of Pakistan, Operation al-Mizan was primarily targeted at killing or capturing foreign fighters. However, the U.S. demanded Pakistan to eradicate al-Qaeda leaders. The operation met several successes. Many senior al-Qaeda leaders were either captured or killed including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Faraj al-Libi, Abu Zubeida, and Abu Talha al-Pakistani. On the other hand, there were many letdowns as well.

The local Taliban were able to undermine the authority of tribal leaders and became successful in creating a parallel government in the tribal areas. They brought into limelight the *mullahs* who reiterated Taliban perspectives. The tribal areas turned into sanctuaries for the militants who were either operating in Afghanistan or targeting Pakistan and India. The customary jirga was formally prohibited by the Taliban. In its

³⁸ Naeem Ahmed, 'Pakistan's Counter-terrorism strategy and its Implications for domestic, regional and international security' (Working Paper, *Foundation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme*, 2013).
<https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00937552>

place, a Taliban delegate mediated the rival parties. The Taliban prohibited music stores, recordings, and TVs, and issued decrees that men will grow a beard. They additionally kept on targeting pro-government tribal leaders, constraining numerous to escape.

In this way, the operation ultimately failed to wipe out the terrorists from North and South Waziristan. One of the reasons for this was that Pakistani operations were set apart by sweeps, searches, and frequent battles. None of these tasks utilized adequate powers to hold an area. moreover, the conservative religious partied hindered the process rendering anti-terrorist campaigns as an “American War”.³⁹

Year	Incidents	Killed	Injured
2005	1	1	0
2006	0	0	0
2007	1	20	15
2008	19	156	17
2009	46	536	75
2010	90	831	85+
2011	59	548	52
2012	46	344	37
2013	24	158	29

³⁹ Carol Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, ‘Pakistan’s War Within,’ *Survival* 51, no.6 (2009):172, doi 10.1080/00396330903465204

2014	19	122	26
2015	14	85	17
2016	3	7	1
2017	8	43	0
2018	3	6	1
Total*	333	2857	355+

Table 3: Drone attacks in Pakistan: 2005-2018⁴⁰

*Data till June 17, 2018




Figure 3: Drone attacks in Pakistan: 2005-2018

⁴⁰ "Drone attacks in Pakistan," South Asia Terrorism portal, last modified Jan 2019, <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Droneattack.htm>

Strategies in Action

Post 9/11 saw multiple military operations of varying degrees against the terrorist in tribal areas. However, major security operations began in Swat in May 2009 owing to deteriorating law and order situation in Swat. Later on, South Waziristan was targeted in October 2009 against the militants. Prior to this, in 2005, a peace deal named as *Sararogha Agreement* was signed between the military and Baitullah Mehsud (successor of Nek Mohammad). The deal was short-lived and ended in August 2007 owing to three prime reasons.

Firstly, around 200 Pakistani security forces personnel were abducted in South Waziristan in August 2007 by Baitullah group. Secondly, the military supported a Taliban commander, Maulvi Nazir clandestinely to relinquish foreign militants from South Waziristan. This move depreciated the trust between the military and Baitullah's group. Lastly, **Operation Silence** was the final nail in the coffin. Also known as the Red Mosque operation, this operation was launched in July 2007 in Islamabad which injured and killed hundreds of militants residing in the capital under the guise of religious pupils. It infuriated the Taliban.⁴¹

Consequently, under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, TTP was formed in 2007. In 2008, the terrorists took control of Sararogha Fort which further deteriorated the situation. As a result, **Operation Zalzala** was launched by the Pakistan Army in South

⁴¹ Carol Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 29.

Waziristan with a purpose to clear the area. eventually, in May 2008, most of the area got cleared and the Army began withdrawal.⁴²

Afterward, in June 2008, the Army began another operation named as **Sirat-e-Mustaqeem** in Khyber Agency. The operation was not successful as such as it failed to eliminate militants instead, the Army resorted to a deal in July 2008 which lasted for not even a year. This was partially due to the fact that the Agency was the major hub of the Taliban terrorism and partially because it was a victim of sectarian rivalry between Deobandi Lashkar-e-Islami and Barelvi Ansar-ul-Islam. On the parallel side, Hakimullah-led TTP gained access to the Agency.

Another endeavor taken by the military was **Operation Sher Dil**. It was launched in Bajaur Agency in September 2008. The operation was meant to target the terrorist groups under the leadership of Faqir Muhammad and Zia-ur-Rehman. Both of them were thought to have a relationship with Al-Qaeda.⁴³ This operation met a little success however, it could not completely eradicate the terrorists.⁴⁴ henceforth, the Military signed a clandestine deal with Faqir Mohammad not to attack Military personnel and civilians in return for not being arrested.

The next destination for the Military was the Mohmand Agency. In July 2007, militants attacked a mosque in Lakaro and took control over it. This led to the signing of various peace agreements with the tribal elders that they will not facilitate local as well as foreign

⁴² Ibid. 60

⁴³ Rahmanullah, 'The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Bajaur' (Policy paper, *New America Foundation*, 2010).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

militants.⁴⁵ The deals met failure when the militants fled and took refuge in Mohmand Agency from where they were targeted by the Military and drove them off in March 2009.

Another region where Military-launched operations took place was the Swat in Malakand Division. A series of security operations under the banner of **Operation Rah-e-Haq** (2007-2009) was launched against Sufi Mohammad and Maulvi Fazlullah who established a military and political foothold in the region and resorted to violent means to implement Islamic Shariah. However, in the midst of persistent assaults on security forces, the Military needed to pull back from the zone, yet in addition consent to terrorists' interest of executing the Shariah in Malakand Division, by marking the dubious *Nizam-e-Adl* Agreement with the obsolete TNSM in February 2009. The Agreement, as a result, surrendered authority over the region to the TNSM by forcing Shariah through Qazi courts.

Nevertheless, A major shift in direction occurred because locals were highly crestfallen with the TNSM led Shariah government and its harsh policies. Also, it brought about a major shift in people's attitude and behavior towards the terrorists countrywide. Therefore, the Military chose to dispatch a broad-based definitive security operation, the **Rah-e-Rast** in May 2009, to eliminate the Swat militants.

The Army met a great success in this operation and was able to gain control of the area and established the writ of the state. Maulvi Fazlullah, the TTP-Swat leader absconded to

⁴⁵ International Crisis Group (2009), 'Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA,' Report No. 178: 1-33.

Afghanistan.⁴⁶ This success bolstered the Military's morale and they were able to launch operations in South Waziristan and the rest of the FATA. Hence, in 2009, **Operation Rah-e-Nijat** was conducted against Hakimullah's TTP and other terrorists.⁴⁷ Eventually, by June 2013, the TTP faction was driven out from South Waziristan to North Waziristan and Military established its control over the area.

Furthermore, in July 2011, **Operation Koh-e-Sufaid** was conducted in Kurram Agency. This operation aimed at targeting the Taliban fighters who had occupied the Thall-Parachinar road. The militants choked this route to blockade the Shi'ite residents of the Agency. The operation was officially wound in June 2013 and after efforts of two years, the Military reclaimed the area.

After launching a full-fledged operation against a stronghold of TTP militants in Tirah Valley, the Military succeeded in clearing out the Khyber Agency by June 2013.

In curbing and curtailing terrorism, operations were not only conducted in tribal areas but also in many urban centers with the assistance of Police and Rangers. The goal was definitely to contain al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other supportive entities. The security forces and the law enforcement agencies managed to capture or kill their second and third-tier leadership but did not succeed in arresting the top-notch brainiacs.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb is the latest operation launched for that matter. The operation was meant to target and completely eliminate the militants and terrorists from the soil of

⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, 'Drones: Myth and Reality in Pakistan,' updated on May 2013, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/drones-myths-and-reality-pakistan>

⁴⁷Seth G. Jones G. and Carol Christine Fair. 'Counterinsurgency in Pakistan.' (Monograph, RAND Corporation, 2010), 67.

Pakistan. It was primarily conducted in FATA but also was extended to the whole country. It was this operation which caused massive retaliation from the terrorists when they attacked APS Peshawar in December 2014. Zarb-e-Azb has been quite a success in relevance to the previous operations conducted. Following this operation, there has been a massive decline in the acts of terrorism in Pakistan.

Notwithstanding military undertakings, Pakistan additionally utilized non-military intends to counter terrorism. Non-military choices involve both engagement and legislative facets. As of engagement strategy, Pakistan marked different peace agreements with militants. On the legislative side, since 9/11, several presidential acts were introduced by multiple governments. In various strata of time, different terrorist organizations and groups have been banned.

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 had already been existing. The ATA has undergone multiple amendments such as **Anti-Terrorism Ordinance 2002**. This amendment called for focusing on the whole terrorist network with severe punishment, including capital punishment, to the people associated with helping and abetting terrorism. The Ordinance ensured expedient trials by including the Military personnel, not below the cadre of Lieutenant Colonel as one of the three Anti- Terrorist Court members of the bench.

Another amendment was made in the same ordinance in 2002. According to this amendment, the police was enabled and authorized to hold a suspect for as long as a year without recording any criminal accusations. The blamed could only be discharged on giving at least one sureties to demonstrate his impeccability, otherwise to be presented before the court within twenty-four hours.

In November 2004, another alteration was made to the ATA 1997. It enabled the victims or the lawful beneficiaries of the victim to appeal against the jurisdiction of ATC in the High Court within 30 days of the decision.

Further modifications in ATA 1997 were done through the Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act 2004. The Act was disseminated in January 2005. Under this amendment, 'Special Benches' were set up in the High Courts with a purpose of hearing the appeals of victims or their beneficiaries. Also, concerning the maximum jail term for militants, the word '14-years' was substituted by 'imprisonment for life'. Authority of the ATCs was also increased under this Act.

However, the government revisited the Act owing to the horrendous reaction by the Pakistani Taliban. The backlash was caused by the Military operations against them and attacks were done on Armed forces, civil armed forces and law enforcement agencies. This called for more strict laws and stern punishments. Therefore, the **Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance** was issued by the Pakistani government in October 2009.

In the viewpoint of this modification, the remand time frame was reached out from 30 to 90 days, and the burden of proof was moved to the accused. The government stretched out the Ordinance to the PATA and set up new ATCs in Peshawar and the Malakand district owing to the special Presidential order.⁴⁸

In June 2011, **Regulations Action in Aid of Civil Powers – 2011** was promulgated by the government for both FATA and PATA which approved the military to detain a

⁴⁸ Huma Yusuf, 'Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Courts,' *CTC Sentinel* 3, no. 3(March 2010): 22-25

suspect until it helps the civil authorities. in addition, it authorized the military that an announcement or testimony by an individual from the military, or any officer approved for his sake, would be adequate for impeaching a blamed.

Under Section 14, a board was set up to audit cases of each person captive inside a timeframe not surpassing four months from the issuance of the order of imprisonment. This board was inclusive of two civilians and two military officers. Besides, this Act additionally gave an array of offenses, culpable with capital punishment or detainment forever or as long as 10 years alongside fine and relinquishment of property. Under this framework, many jails were set up on the Durand Line at Landi Kotal to detain the terrorists.

Investigation for Fair Trial Bill, 2012 was passed on 20 December 2012 by the National Assembly. The bill allowed the government to cut off private communications of an individual if one is suspected to be involved in any act of crime or terror by any means. Another bill was passed in 2013 titled as **Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2013**. This amendment prohibited the issuance of passport, arms license and credit cards to militants from banned organizations. Also, it restrained the leaders of these groups from traveling abroad.

The bill enabled the government to abduct the property of any individual who is engaged in financing terrorism. It gave the authority of detention for three months without court trials to the government. An amendment in section 6 redefined the threat of terrorism as “intimidating and terrorizing the public, social sectors, the business community and preparing or attacking the civilians, media persons,

government officials, installations, security forces or law enforcement agencies.”

One of the major developments in this regard was the **National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA)**. NACTA bill was passed in the Parliament in March 2013. NACTA was framed as an independent body and was responsible ‘to receive and collate data/information/intelligence and disseminate and coordinate between all relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessments; to formulate comprehensive counterterrorism and counter-extremism strategies; and to establish links with the international entities for facilitating cooperation in areas related to terrorism and extremism.’⁴⁹

The body was comprised of Chief Ministers of all the provinces including Gilgit-Baltistan, the Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the Minister for Law and Justice, one senator to be recommended by the Chairman of the Senate, one Member of National Assembly to be recommended by the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Secretary Ministry of Interior, the Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Director-General Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Director General Military Intelligence (MI), the National Co-coordinator, the Director General Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and the Inspector Generals of Police of all provinces, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan with the President chairing the authority.

Pakistan Protection Ordinance (2002) came into force on 20 October 2013 by President Mamnoon Hussain. Under the ordinance, it was permissible to the law

⁴⁹National Counter-Terrorism Authority Act 2013.

enforcement agencies to shoot-on-sight a terror suspect. Moreover, they could search for any area and make a non-bailable arrest without a warrant. It also enabled the law enforcement agencies to retain the accused under preventive detention as long as three months without presenting him before the court for trial.

To hasten the trial of terrorists, the PPO authorized the government to formulate a new batch of prosecutors and the parallel judiciary. The salient feature of the ordinance includes a definition of an “enemy alien” as a person whose identity is unascertainable and who is engaged in a war against Pakistan, either directly or indirectly.⁵⁰ This ordinance authorizes the government to decide the spot of custody, inquiry, investigation, and trial of a scheduled offense on the request of the prosecuting agency. A suspect who is charged with a scheduled offense would prove his innocence and the appeal of the final jurisdiction shall lie to the Supreme Court.⁵¹

16th December 2014 saw a major paradigmatic shift in the counterterrorism course of action when Army Public School, Peshawar was attacked. The incident transformed the social constructions about the terrorists. A National Action Plan was devised on a consensual basis. The 20-point agenda was highly specific and time-bound. It was mapped out under the supervision of NACTA and was approved in the Parliament on 24 December 2014. NACTA was responsible as the monitoring body of the National Action Plan.

⁵⁰ Irfan Haider, ‘Protection of Pakistan Bill 2014 approved in NA’, *The Dawn*, July 02, 2014, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1116529>

⁵¹ Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013, Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part-I, 31 October 2013.

The 20 agenda items of the National Action Plan included death penalty for terrorists, establishment of Military courts, strengthening of NACTA, scrutinizing literature to mitigate promotion of terrorism and extremism, choking terrorism financing, keeping an eye on proscribed organizations, establishment of Counter-terrorism force, regulation of religious seminaries, reformation of FATA, disrupting communication between terrorists, perusing cyber activity, political reconciliation in Balochistan, formulation of a policy to deal with Afghan refugees and reformation of criminal jurisdiction.⁵²

Following NAP, terrorism in the country declined to a considerable extent. Operation Zarb-e-Azb was going on in North Waziristan already which provoked the terrorists to go offensive. This resulted in APS attack and violence increased throughout the country, not to overlook Karachi. NAP and Operation Zarb-e-Azb contributed to the alleviation of the security situation in the country. According to statistics of NACTA, the incidents of terrorism were maximum in 2010. But as a consequence of Operation Zarb-e-Azb and National Action Plan, these incidents declined sharply.⁵³

⁵²“National Action Plan,” National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan, accessed June 1,2019, <https://nacta.gov.pk/nap-2014/>

⁵³ “Terrorism Decline in Pakistan,” National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan, accessed June 1, 2019, <https://nacta.gov.pk/terrorism-decline-in-pakistan/>

INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM




Figure 4: Incidents of terrorism.

In addition to the aforementioned legislative measures, a couple of *madaris* reforms took place as well. As many *madaris* were involved in nurturing terrorism and disseminating extremist ideologies, they were thought to be reformed in terms of curricula and education system. Under the umbrella of NAP and National Internal Security Policy (2014-2018), NACTA devised “Madaris Data and Registration Forms” with the help of *Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Pakistan* and revisited curricula along with the status of *Madaris Isnad*.⁵⁴

In addition to these legislations, Pakistan also banned around 45 organizations at different points of time. In January 2002, Musharraf barred JeM, LeT, SSP, Tehrik-e-Ja’afaria Pakistan (TJP), TNSM and Tehrik-e-Islami after the terrorist attack on the Indian

⁵⁴“Madaris Reforms,” National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan, accessed June 1, 2019, <https://nacta.gov.pk/madaris-reforms/>

Parliament in December 2001. In March 2003, Al-Qaeda was banned. Subsequently, Millat-i-Islamia Pakistan (former SSP), Khuddam-ul-Islam (former JeM) and Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan (former TJP) were outlawed in November of the same year.

Lashkar-e-Islami, Ansar-ul-Islam, Haji Namdar Group, and TTP were banned in 2008. Further, in 2012, Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jama'at (former SSP) was banned. Jam'aat-ud-Dawa (former LeT) was allegedly involved on Mumbai incident 2008 however, it has disguised itself as a welfare organization and henceforth has saved itself from the ban.⁵⁵

Even though the counter-terrorism enactment in Pakistan (since 1997) is a "bold departure from the normal legal system",⁵⁶ it has proved inconsequential to avoid terrorism and militancy. Not just has it neglected to attempt to expedite trials of the accused militants yet additionally, it stayed less fruitful to guarantee the authorization of the restriction on the terrorist organizations, which have re-emerged with new names time and again, exposing the shortcoming of the state to set up its writ.

⁵⁵ Naeem Ahmed, 'Pakistan's Counter-terrorism strategy and its Implications for domestic, regional and international security' (Working Paper, *Foundation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme*, 2013).
<https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00937552>

⁵⁶ Charles H. Kennedy, 'The creation and development of Pakistan's Anti-terrorism regime, 1997-2002,' *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia* (2002), 390.

CHAPTER 3

CHALLENGES AND WAY FORWARD

Before delving into the challenges and prospects for Counter-terrorism in Pakistan, it is necessary to analyze and assess the already employed strategies. There have been various factors which have hampered its efficiency. The counter-terrorism strategy adopted by Pakistan, despite its broadness and elusiveness, was very cliché. Even after the application of both military and non-military means, it turned out not so much of a success.

The influx of aid, training of mujahideen and participation of Pakistan in the Afghan war paved the way for terrorism in Pakistan. The fore coming repercussions were not visualized already and hence Pakistan maintained good ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the Iranian revolution was stirring in the Middle East and the ripple effect was felt in Pakistan as well. This added to the already brewing sectarianism in Pakistan. The sectarian divide and its realization deepened gradually and over time, it became one of the staunch factors in hindering counterterrorism practices. Moreover, Pakistan has become a hub of the sectarian divide which has proved as a fuel to the fire of terrorism.

Pakistan has been struggling with the menace of terrorism since long. Terrorism has played a vital role in destabilizing both its economy and domestic culture. It has been an active part of the Global War on Terror besides the United States of America. As described earlier, Pakistan has tried its best to cater counter-terrorism through a broad-based system of practical measures and legislative procedures. There have been many successes in this regard as much of the PATA and FATA has been cleansed and the

number of a terror attack have been reduced to a considerable extent. However, it has failed to do completely eradicate terrorism from its territory. This is because of many reasons, be them internal or external.

Internal Challenges

Internally, Pakistan has always been a volatile state. There have been many problems existing since its creation and many have arisen afterward. Pakistan, owing to lack of democratic consolidation and norms of federalism has been a feeble state. Minute social disruptions have reiterated this fact. Pakistani society is highly multi-cultured and multi-ethnic which makes it a highly diverse and versatile society. This diversity has led to a lack of consensus on the ownership of the War on Terror.

Also, a number of challenges have been presented by absence of national consensus on certain frameworks. In coherence with this, there are skewed civil-military relationships. Lately, with the rise of *Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement*, the situation has worsened. A couple of these challenges are discussed below to further dissect the inefficiency of Pakistan's counter-terrorism strategies.

1. Anti-Pluralism

Pakistan is an amalgam of many cultures and religions. Apparently, there are merely five provinces, but numerous cultures are residing here. Beginning from the North, there are Kashmiris, Baltis, Chitralis, Kelash people, Pashtuns, Punjabis, Hazaras, Saraikis, Sindhis, Balochs, Muhajirs, etc. These multiple cultures are merged in major urban centers of the country where they are exposed to cross-cultural norms. Fortunately, Pakistan has enjoyed this cultural diversity except for some areas where dissent voices started to rise. Balochistan Liberation Army is one of such examples. Although Baloch

insurgency is not a new phenomenon and it is also related to administrative issues rather than acceptance concerns. Similarly, Pashtun Tahafuz Movement is the latest phenomenon primarily based on anti-Punjabi and Pashtun nationalist sentiments.

On the other side of the picture, there are multiple religions being practiced in Pakistan. These religious communities are inclusive of Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Ahmadis, etc. Apart from this major taxonomy, there are multiple factions within Muslims primarily being Shia and Sunni. In addition to this, further diversification exists amid the Sunni faction. Deoband school of thought of Sunni bloc has always been very hardcore towards their bloc and active in armed conflicts. Their acceptance of religious differences is absent which has led to sectarian violence. Considering in the retrospect, the sectarian violence can be seen in 1974 anti-Ahmadiyya riots and many other incidents of Sunni-Shia conflict up till now.

There is a considerable degree of pluralism existing in case of ethnic multiplicity however, in the case of religion, peaceful coexistence is profoundly absent. This anti-pluralism leading to sectarianism has been a serious challenge in countering terrorism. This is due to the fact that much of the madrassah funds generated to finance terrorism comes from sectarian organizations.

2. The dilemma of ownership of WOT

There is a vivid dilemma on the ownership of the War on Terror. According to the Military, it is War on Terror and must be supported by the general public, but many political parties accredit as an American venture. The Military since 9/11 has always tried to build a public opinion but it has failed to do so for over a long period of time. It was only until December 2014, when a brute attack on Army Public School Peshawar was

conducted by the terrorists. This played a significant role in shaping the mindsets of people and turning their sympathies towards the Military.

Before that, most of the people were supporting and providing the funding to the barred organizations in the name of Jihad. The Global War on Terror was considered as an American war. In addition to this, mainstream political parties like PML-N, PTI, JUI-F maintained an explicit perspective that this is not Pakistan's war. The PTI and JUI-F particularly enjoyed mass support in KPK and people were outright anti-American in the province. They were influenced by the Shariah ideology of Al-Qaeda and were well manipulated in the name of religion.

This disbelief and lack of consensus seriously crippled the military by questioning its determination as well as by rendering its efforts as ineffective. Moreover, the counter-terrorism moves adopted until 2014 lost their efficacy owing to the fact that they were not backed by public support. Further, the mystification of Counter-terrorism realm incapacitated the state's institutional infrastructure to develop comprehensive legislation.⁵⁷

3. Disordered policy sphere

In relevance to the above-mentioned problems and challenges, there was a problem with the policy sphere. There has been immense fragmentation and confusion within the policy sphere. If one analyzes the policies made to counter-terrorism, it is quite clear that

⁵⁷ Naeem Ahmed, 'Pakistan's Counter-terrorism strategy and its Implications for domestic, regional and international security' (Working Paper, *Foundation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme*, 2013). <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00937552>

Pakistan has some serious issues regarding social, political and economic governance. The pre-requisites for good governance are missing.⁵⁸

The same fate is met with regard to counter-terrorism strategy. High levels of corruption and nepotism have resulted in the feeble economic base as well as incompetent authorities. A recent case of appointment of state minister and PTI leader Zartaj Gul's sister to NACTA is striking illustration of many such do's. Also, Pakistan is a weak economy with meager strategic depth. It cannot afford huge employment of its economic sources to the War on Terror. Despite the fact that the U.S. provided financial assistance to Pakistan, however, social disruption such as the creation of IDPs has affected the social fabric together with the economic setup of the state.

Pakistan has already its military deployed on the Eastern front. It cannot neglect the Indian threat.

4. Skewed civil-military relations

The aforementioned challenges have amplified because of deep-rooted civil-military inequity. Pakistan has suffered from dictatorship in its early years which continued for a very long time. These skewed civil-military relationships have by all means undermined the efficiency of counter-terrorism efforts. The Military has always been very active in the political landscape of Pakistan. And has been responsible for chalking out the National Security Policy in spite of the fact that it is a political endeavor and is meant to be formulated by the civilian forces. This constant tussle led to a civil-military standoff in

⁵⁸ Mubeen Adnan and Bushra Fatima, 'Political, Economic and Social Governance in Pakistan: Its Practices and Issues,' *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 55, no. 1(January - June 2018): 157-171.

cases of the Kerry-Lugar Bill in October 2009, the memo-gate scandal in 2012 and the formation of NACTA.

In a civilian perspective, in order to counter terrorism, administrative measures must be taken. Civilian government depends on legislation against the terrorist entities. Additionally, civilian forces connect the counterterrorism strategies to the law and order problem and primarily, sectarian violence. Au contraire, Military maintains an Indian-centric view and deems such strategies as a national security problem. Biases of the Military towards some Taliban and categorization of them as “Good” and “Bad” is an extension of Indo-centrism.

Similarly, on the matter of extension of security operations to North Waziristan, the Military and the civilian forces were bellicose to one another. The civilian forces always focus on building national consensus while the Military only seeks civilian support. For that matter, the civilian forces have proved quite indecisive. Likewise, concerning the talks with the Pakistani Taliban, the Military and the civilian forces maintained antagonistic views.

General Kayani’s statement in September 2013 vividly illustrates that it is too difficult to bridge the gulf between the two institutions. He said, “While reaffirming army’s support to the political process, unequivocally, the terrorists will not be allowed to take advantage of it. Army has the ability and the will to take the fight to the terrorists.”⁵⁹

⁵⁹ ‘Terrorists will not be allowed to dictate terms: General Kayani.’ *The News*, last modified September 2013, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/633103-terrorists-will-not-be-allowed-to-dictate-terms-general-kayani>

External Challenges

Pakistan has always been the focal point of the South Asia region. since long, the region has been an apple of the eyes of travelers, traders, and conquerors. Succeeding a long history of foreign conquerors and administrators, the subcontinent was partitioned in 1947. Even after, Pakistan played a vital role in deciding the fate of South Asia. This rendered it a staunch geostrategic and geographic focus of the region. this being the prime reason, Pakistan has always been under the scrutiny of external powers. The role of these external powers and their involvement in Pakistan's affairs has been a great challenge. Such states include the United States, Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan's strategic concerns in the region and the policies it opts to pursue them, also add to the incompetency of the counter-terrorism strategies as unbiased.

The United States being the global hegemon have always tried to maintain its presence in every nook and corner of the world. The geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics of South Asian region have always been of prime importance. Ensuring its primacy over the region, the U.S. tried to secure a substantive ally in South Asia since the Cold war. For the time being, Pakistan was considered to be a potential ally to fulfill the American cause. Once the Soviet threat thwarted, a leviathan of terrorism was unleashed. After the 9/11 episode, Pakistan again proved a useful ally to the U.S.

Despite this long-term relationship, Pakistan faced immense pressure from the U.S. throughout. Moreover, Pakistan for much of the time, faced repercussions and backlashes from American moves and strategies, terrorism being one of them. Also, Pakistan's alliance with the U.S. deems it a mandatory target in the eyes of the terrorists. In addition

to this, Pakistani public until 2014, was against the military ventures against the terrorists thinking of it an American War.

In the case of Afghanistan, Pakistan pursued the policy of establishing a Pakistan-friendly government in Kabul. In this way, it could secure the Durand Line, mitigate the issue of Pakhtunistan and most importantly, it could have been an effective way to oust Indian influence in Afghanistan. But Pakistan's *great expectations* ended as soon as India and Afghanistan signed 'Strategic Partnership Pact' in 2011. This instigated the notion within Pakistan's security agencies that the Indian

“influence can only be neutralized by building links with elements that encounter India friendly Kabul.”⁶⁰

After the scheduled withdrawal of American and NATO forces, Pakistan tried its maximum to secure its strategic interests in Afghanistan. For that matter, the Military avoided targeting the Afghan Taliban inclusive of the Haqqani Network during the cleaning of FATA. Pakistan's own India-centric policies caused a serious backlash to its counterterrorism strategies.⁶¹

India has been a traditional rival of Pakistan since partition. One of the seminal bone of contention between India and Pakistan is the Kashmir issue. Both the countries have failed to sort the matter out despite several negotiations and major wars. Consequently, both the states have tried engaging one another in a low-intensity conflict by employing

⁶⁰Ayesha Siddiq, 'Jihadism in Pakistan: The Expanding Frontier', *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no.1(2009): 69.

⁶¹Naeem Ahmed, 'Pakistan's Counter-terrorism strategy and its Implications for domestic, regional and international security' (Working Paper, *Foundation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme*, 2013). <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00937552>

proxies in adversarial states. At this point, it is important to understand that Pakistan faces a dual problem in this regard. First, India has continued proxies in Pakistan particularly Balochistan. Kulbhushan Yadav case is a living example of the fact. Second, several members of banned Deobandi organizations have disguised themselves as members of militant Jihadi groups backed by the Military. These leaders have fled the arrests and assassinations at the hands of the military and in the disguise of 'strategic assets', they continue to perpetrate terror.

CT in the Cards

Based on the current scenario, Counter-terrorism has no bright forthcoming in the near future. The meddling dynamics of West Asia are very crucial and significant in determining the growth of terrorism. Taking into consideration, the case of Pakistan, one can notice that there is a high degree of economic instability. This instability fosters poverty which is one of the favorable condition for fermentation of terrorism. Moreover, Pakistan has successfully contained terrorism for a while without an exception but when it comes to addressing the root causes, no viable success is met.

Terrorism has always been a volatile phenomenon; therefore, absolute counter-terrorism is difficult to achieve. Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are of prime importance in this setting. This relationship has a direct impact on the border conditions between the two which is prone to terrorist infiltration in Pakistan. Considering the present dynamics, there is not much hope for improvement of this relationship which makes the future of CT quite dubious.