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ISLAM VS NATIONALISM:  
THE CASE STUDY OF TAJIKISTAN

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
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
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## INTRODUCTION

This thesis owes its birth to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Central Asian states. More particularly it is the outcome of the debate which followed the end of the Soviet Union, both in the western media, academics and public personalities about the political resurgence of Islam and future role of Central Asian states in regional and international politics.

Having risen from the rubbles of the Soviet collapse, Central Asia is emerging for the first time as an independent actor in modern world politics. The region merits attention for a variety of reasons. Central Asian's five countries contain 50 million people distributed over a sprawling expanse. Kazakhstan alone, the largest of the republics in land area is bigger than all of the western Europe. The heart of the ancient silk road, Central Asia is located at the crossroads of the Europe and Asia and its shadow falls on the Persian Gulf. For geographic, historic and cultural reasons, the ripples of upheaval in Central Asia have the potential to touch Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Middle East 1. Furthermore these countries have all the ingredients, like religion (Islam), to make an Islamic block: a threat as perceived by the Western world, especially after the Iranian Revolution. One example of this view was the statement made by Reverend Alan Walker (in the context of the Iranian Revolution), Director of the World Evangelism for the World Methodist Council, in April 1979 at a news conference at a Sydney Airport:

1. "Christians must gather their strength for the "coming struggle" with Islam for the minds and allegiance of millions of people around the world, and they must do that for "the sake of humanity";
2. "Islam had become a new threat to the peace and progress of the world; and
3. The world is shocked by what is happening in Islamic states...." 2

Unfortunately, Central Asia is virtually certain to face a prolonged period of instability. Its source is a combination of system change (the collapse of the Soviet Union

and the end of the bipolar world order) and domestic change (the end of a Marx - Leninism as a ruling ideology, the weakening of Soviet - era politically and economic institutions, the rise of opposition forces and the emerging role of Islam and nationalism) within the Central Asian countries. 3

Tajikistan represents a unique example in Central Asia, where conflicts are at its peak. The descent of Tajikistan into a brutal civil war within the months of independence exemplified the kind of disaster that might befall Central Asia. The crisis in Tajikistan illustrates some salient facts about the emerging political system in Central Asia.

To begin with, a national awakening among the Muslims of the Central Asia started only in the later part of the 19th century. Before the Revolution of 1917, a Muslim and Iranic speaking Tajik was a member of the same social and cultural community as a Muslim Turk. This development was due to the fact that Muslims of Central Asia identified themselves with the religion and Islamic culture rather than with any national and racial group. Thus to eradicate Islamic bond of unity, around 1924, an iron curtain was pulled down on Soviet Islam and for more than half a century the Muslim world have been deprived of one of its most vital constituents. Central Asia and Caucasus, were cut off from rest of the Dar - ul - Islam and subjected to a complex process of modernization, social engineering and anti-religious propaganda.

Soviets, systematically and forcefully, tried to eradicate Islam and Islamic practices which had formed the oldest and most powerful bond of unity among the Central Asian people since the 9th century. The ensuing relative secularization led to the incorporation of many elements of the religious cultures into the emerging national cultures, thus giving the adherence to a sense of the historical continuity, strength and durability of their culture.

The Soviet policy of industrialization, the establishment of the national republics, urbanization, increased education and literacy rate and communication, stimulated the consequent emergence of a variety of professional and elite groups which supported by

Russian and Soviet governments, identified themselves consciously with a particular region and ethno-linguistic group and language. These elites were the architects of the forthcoming nations. The Soviet regime capped this development by allotting each major ethnolinguistic group in Central Asia a territory with well defined boundaries and a legal status as a union or autonomous republic, without any final authority in political decision making. The territory is the indispensable condition for state and provided the nation a concrete basis. 4

Thus the problem of nationalism doesn't arise for the stateless societies. If there is no state, one obviously cannot ask whether or not its boundaries are congruent with the limits of nation. If there are no rulers, their being no state, one cannot ask whether they are of same nation as the ruled. Nationalism emerges only in a milieu in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted.

Newly independent states face extraordinary challenges even under the best of circumstances. In the case of Central Asia, the circumstances however, are less than ideal. In the first place, nationhood was reluctantly accepted by these republics, all these republics supported the continuation of Soviet empire, The Minsk's agreement of December 8, 1991 joining together Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) destroyed any hope the Central Asian republics had for preserving the union. Central Asian leaders faced with no alternative, joined the new commonwealth on 21 December, 1991 thus creating a basis for transition to complete independence. Secondly, the leaders in these republics are neither democrats, nor nationalist, they came to power by championing Soviet internationalism 5. So the problem of nationalism is bound to arise.

All this means that there is no ideological or administrative structures in place for the new situation. The old leadership can no longer cope with the new reality. Its reflexes, its thinking and its values are embedded in times that are now suddenly irrelevant. It also means that sacrifices that forge new nations don't exist (as Central Asian countries, have arrived at independence without a freedom struggle). It means that the

leaders who have spent time in jails, under arrest and suffered, don't exist. For the nation in search of a hero, there is no Jinnah, Nehru or Gandhi, no venerated founding fathers tested on the anvil of the freedom struggle. The present leadership still dazed, are grey to and bureaucratic from their conditioning in the Soviet system. This creates the potential for sharp competition between traditionally dominant power and the new comers, as well as among the newcomers themselves, with unforeseeable consequences. Above all, it means there is no firm set of objectives, no moral or ideological underpinning, no coherent frame of reference for the new nations. 6

On the other hand, these elites held sway over a society that is predominantly Muslim. Of course, within atheistic Soviet ideology, Islam even, if not banned at least not encouraged. But people knew they were Muslim and observed religious practices such as those concerning circumcision, marriage, and funeral rituals. People had a rudimentary knowledge of the basic tenets of Islam. With independence came an inevitable religious revival, over night Islam became a common denominator, a power vehicle for asserting identity. People instinctively felt that it was Islam that made them different from the Russians, whose rule they had never alleged as legitimate. For the Central Asians, Islam now embodies the ideas of nationalism and sovereignty, it is a banner of liberation.

The Islamic revival, on the other hand, if not to compete, then to coexist and some how come to terms with another powerful trend accompanying the process of liberation and the assertion of identity the rise of ethnicism 7. For many observer ethnicity is a divisive rather than unifying force, only religion can bring Central Asian nations together and internal stability. The newly formed political parties in the region tend to play down identification with ethnic groups and nationality, stressing the irrelevance of these.

Now the situation in Central Asia is unique, since people look for and assert their identity in terms of ethnicity, religion and nation. Now we will be hearing much more of the resurgence in Central Asia, the quest for identity much will depend not only on the strength of Islamic feeling but also on the out come of the struggle for power, taking place in the new states. What forces will replace the old Soviet-created regimes now functioning



under new colours?

In the words of Martha Brill Olcott:

Three main groups are... competing for political control everywhere in the region. Representatives of the old Central Asian Partocracy - in most places split into competing groups - are struggling to remain in control. They are challenged by the new, so-called democratic groups, dominated by intellectuals who generally played only a peripheral role under the old political order. The partocracy is also opposed by revivalist Islamic groups composed of fundamentalist style clerics who were trained outside of the official establishment.

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This analysis applies chiefly to Tajikistan. It is in Tajikistan that Islamic and to a lesser extent, democratic forces are the strongest opposition groups. Moderate Muslim cum nationalist parties are trying to play two cards, Islam and ethnicity, simultaneously e.g Rastakhez party. While a democratic opposition made up largely of secular-oriented intellectuals is represented by Democratic Movement.

Thus specific questions this research work addresses are:

1. What are the competing notions of nationalism in Liberalism, Marxism and Islam?
2. Why did the Central Asian Muslims failed to develop into a new Soviet Man?
3. What kind of nationalism would prevail in Central Asia?
4. Is it going to be a state nationalism or ethnic nationalism?
5. What are the factors influencing nationalism?
6. How far religion has influenced political trends in Central Asia?
7. Has the nationalism of the Central Asians been meaningfully shaped by Islamic teachings and customs, or have nationalists adopted these in order to increase their own way and popularity with a population that has remained fundamentally Islamic in its own way of life?

8. Why has the connection between Islam and nationalism become a political issue in the region and among certain clearly defined interest groups in Central Asia?

To answer these questions, I chose Tajikistan for my investigation because after the formation of CIS, different states comprising CIS are going through a transitional period. The Central Asian states particularly, have as yet not fully comprehended the implications of the new setup. The stagnation of the past 75 years has led to the total social, economic and political collapse and Tajikistan's present turmoil is the direct result of the suppression of the past 75 years. Tajikistan's civil war within months of its independence exemplified the kind of disaster that might befall Central Asia. For the governments of Russia and Central Asian states, the flow of arms from Afghanistan showed the dangers of Islamic fundamentalist expansion into the territory of the CIS. For others it would be the crudest clan politics and invited foreign intervention to maintain its power and privilege.

But what is really at stake is whether Tajikistan can become a stable independent state. Like many post colonial states, Tajikistan gained independence without a clear national identity, viable economic and fiscal base for state power or genuine national security forces. The attempt by political forces excluded from the communist system of power to democratize this weak state soon degenerated into brutal civil war. As institutions broke down, an insecure population increasingly fell back on whatever resources it could find for collective action and self-defence, namely armed struggle based on ethnic and clan affiliations and aid from whatever external sources were willing to give it. The resulting disorder resembled Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia and the human disaster it produced rivalled any of these. Furthermore, civil war is also a clash between Soviet era's holdovers and the emerging opposition. The contest between old and new could well spread to other republics, particularly Tajikistan's northern neighbour, Uzbekistan.

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This issue, Islam vs nationalism, is significant because cohesive societies in new state enhance regional stability and security and thus produce an environment more conducive to economic development. Central Asian republics are new and for regional

and international stability and their own economic, political and cultural development, cohesive society is a must.

As far as Tajikistan's civil war is concerned, according to Barnet R. Rubin:

The conflict confronts the international community with many elements common to post-Cold war crisis: state breakdown aggravated by a proliferation of weapons and an expanding drug trade; post-communist nomenklatura fearful of disorder falling back on ethnic and nationalist appeals; an insecure Russia, no longer an empire, but not yet a nation state, groping for an appropriate role in the former Soviet territories; and a militant Islamic movement increasingly at odds with major powers and the world community. The conflict in Tajikistan thus faces the international community with the type of challenge it is most reluctant to meet right now: constructing a stable independent state out of the rubble of Somalia-like clan warfare, on the borderlands of Islam and the former Soviet Union. 10

Although this study is concerned with the Tajikistan, but its findings have broad validity. Information available on the area as a whole indicates that specific developments and changes in Tajikistan are accompanied by parallel developments and changes in other Central Asian states, and problems and tensions in Tajikistan are likely to be found in other Central Asian states. Furthermore, Tajikistan, being the member of the United Nations, the Economic Cooperation Organization, Organization of Islamic Countries and the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, is not isolated on international and regional front.

The present research work is divided into five chapters.

Chapter one explains the concepts of state, nation and nationalism in three

traditions Liberalism, Marxism and Islam, alongwith differences between nationalism and Islamic concept of community: Ummah. Chapter two traces the ethnic history of Tajiki people from 2nd millennium B.C till the 1917 revolution. Chapter three traces the establishment of Soviet power in Tajikistan, examine the pattern of ethnic stratification in the power structure and in the society at large, analysis of the composition, behaviour and attitudes of the Tajik elites. Here beside political, I would like to analyze the Tajik culture which combines the traditional and the Soviet elements and finally the evaluation of the findings. Chapter four deals with the power game from 1991 to 1994 in Tajikistan. Independent Tajikistan soon, after its independence, became the scene of an intense struggle for power. In September 1991, acting president banned the communist party, but communist parliamentary deputies overturned the ban, ousted the president and declared a state of emergency. Thus there emerge opposition, new political parties which came about not naturally but as the result of the struggle for political power, including various ideological currents. Chapter five include Tajikistan's relations with Turkey, Iran , Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, China, Saudi Arabia, USA, Uzbekistan etc. Finally, the whole mater and discussion is concluded.

## THEORETICAL FRAME WORK

Of all the collective identities e.g. race, class, religion, gender etc which human beings share today, national identity is perhaps the most fundamental and inclusive. Not only has nationalism, penetrated every corner of the globe, the world is divided first and foremost into nation state and national identity everywhere underpins the recurrent drive for popular sovereignty and democracy. 1

In pre modern times, men were generally inclined to view themselves as belonging primarily to the communities formed around cluster of religious beliefs and practices such as Islam and Christianity. The idea that one owes ones loyalty to ones fatherland, hardly existed. This idea which came to be termed as nationalism, arose sometime in the 18th Century and has been, since then, an extremely potent force in human history. During the 19th and 20th Centuries nationalism played a major role in redrawing the map of Europe first and then its influence gradually leads to major political developments in many parts of the world e.g. in Asia and Africa. 2

A product of Europe's historical experience, nationalism found its way to the Muslim World and gained many adherents and advocates in its ethnic and religious forms. During the 20th Century, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the gradual withering of the colonial system, Muslim people achieved the status of nationhood one after another. In the new phase of Muslim self assertion, marked the beginning of an ideological controversy among the Muslim intellectuals which is still continuing. It centered around the basic contradiction between nationalism as a time bound set of principles related to the qualities and needs of particular group of human beings, and Islam as an eternal universalist message, drawing no distinction between its adherents except on the criterion of their piety.3

Thus the term nationalism has been used in several ways. It can signify

1. The whole process of forming and maintaining nations or nation - states.
2. A consciousness of belonging to the nation, together with sentiments and aspirations for its security and prosperity.
3. A language and symbolism of the nation and its role.
4. An ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and the national will and prescription for the realization of national aspirations and the national will.
5. A social and political movements to achieve the goals of the nation and realize its national will. 4

The origins of the term nationalism are obscure. The first reference to it appears at Leipzig University, which was founded in 1409 after a religious and scholastic dispute at Prague involving Bohemian and non-Bohemian nations. The sense in which the term was used was restrict: a union to defend the common interests of the compatriots of one of the four nations among the Leipzig professors.

The next reference appears in a passage of Herder, distinguishing between advantageous and excessive national borrowings:

Mann nennts vorurtheil! Pobelei! Eingeschrانkten nationalism!

In France, nationalism seems to have been used first by Abbe Barnel in 1798, but in early 19th century it is rarely found. In England, in 1836, Oxford English Dictionary gives for nationalism the doctrine that certain are objects of divine election. In 1844, it is equated with collective egotism, but on the whole the terms nationality and natinalness, with the meanings of (a) national fevour (b) a sense of national individuality, are carried over from the 19th century.

On the whole, the English sense of term are fairly neutral. French and German uses, however, equate it with chauvinism and exaggerated xenophobia - ueberwertuneg der eigeneu Nation, as one dictionary puts it. 5

On the other hand, the precise date of nationalism's genesis is a matter of dispute: Kohn tends to favour 1642, Acton the 1772 Partion of Poland, Kedourie 1806, the date Fichtes famous address to the German nation in Berlin. Most, However, opt for 1789 - the Revolution served merely to bring together the elements of the nationalist idea, which were brewing up throughout the previous two centuries. 6

Clearly different definitions of the concept nationalism are being employed in this dispute. Yet common to all is the assumption of a specific European origin for an idea which has since been carried to other parts of the world.

Kedourie defines nationalism:

Nationalism is a doctrine invented in European at the beginning of the 19th century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proer to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state and for the right organization of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self government. 7

## THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF NATIONALIST THEORY OR GENESIS OF NATIONALISM:

Unlike most other political doctrines, nationalism lacks a founding father whose ideas have served as inspiration and model for his successors. There is no nationalist equivalent of liberalism's John Locke, conservativeism's Edmund Burke, or communism's Karl Marx. It is, however, possible to trace the intellectual origins of nationalist doctrine in the reactions of several late 18th century writers to the universalistic assumptions of the philosophers of the Enlightenment.

### J.J. ROUSSEAU

The first political theorist to give a theory that can be called nationalist was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He has this distinction because he was the first to suggest that a society whose members shared common customs was the best, and indeed the only satisfactory, foundation for a political society. In the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, he suggested that human being having evolved from a state of nature into communal living based on shared customs and a single way of life, could be expected to feel affection only for members of their own societies, not for the whole human race. In the later works he went on to suggest that such communal grouping could naturally be turned into political societies with their own institution of government. 8

The ideal system of government would derive its characters and its main lines of policy from the general will of its citizens. However Rousseau was not so optimistic as to believe that citizens would have the degree of unity necessary for this ideal polity without some kind of civic education or what he called "civil religion". In considerations on government of Poland he argued that it is education that must give souls national formation, and direct their opinions and tastes in such a way that they will be patriotic by



inclination, by passion, by necessity. When first he opens his eyes, an infant ought to see the fatherland, and upto the day of his death he ought never to see anything else ... At twenty, a Pole ought not to be a man of any other sort, he ought to be a Pole.... 9

Nationalism, however, as we know it today began to take shape not in France but in Germanic Prussia. German writers interested in united German State began to advocate nationalism as the only legitimate basis for statehood. Among the leading German nationalists, Herder and Fichte stand out as the most articulate proponents of united Germany and as the foremost advocates of nationalism in general.

### **J.G. HERDER**

Herder's greatest achievement was that he set German thought on path that distinguished it sharply from both French rationalism and British empiricism. His contribution to nationalist theory was essentially a by-product of his historicism and his romanticism, his beliefs in traditions custom and emotion rather than in the pure play of the rational mind. 10

As a German, Herder resented the French assumption that they were the leaders and bearers of a civilization that had universal validity for e.g. French was most powerful state, French intellectuals were the leaders of the Enlightenment, French upper class were the leaders of the fashion. In opposition to this he developed the view that humanity had its roots in and derived its values from a number of national cultures, each of which had its own virtues and no one of which could rightly lay claims to universality.

He insisted that every Volk (community) had its own culture, way of thinking, outlook, etc, which was shaped by the physical environment in which it developed by the language of its people and by the forms of education through which customs, traditions and values were passed on to the younger generation. 11

He concluded, it was the duty of the members of the various cultural groups (or nations) to preserve their unique national heritage and its purity. Since the preservation of the community's national character is possible only when the nation in question is ruled by a national government. 12

These views don't amount to a full theory of nationalism, but his main contribution was to have emphasized the emotional importance of human beings of their membership of distinct cultural group and the desirability of basic political authority upon such groups.

His ideas had a greater influence on later generations. Manual has said that:

As intellectuals in Central Europe read Herder, they found in his work a justification for the existence of the embryonic nations to which they belonged, and he became the chosen philosopher of the new cultural nationalism that destroyed the Habsburg empire. 13

He also influenced Mazzini's thought on the future unification of Italy.

## **J.G. FICHTE**

Fichte, following in Herder's foot steps, proclaimed that the German people constituted one nation and that the German nation had to be ruled by one sovereign state. In the play *Patriotism and its Opposite*, published in 1807, Fichte expressed his nationalist sentiments through one of the play's character "understand me rightly", the character says:

...separation of the Prussian from the rest of the Germans is purely artificial... the separation of the Germans from the other European nations is based on Nature. 14

In the same year, Fichte delivered a series of lectures in Berlin in which he called for the unification of the German speaking people into one independent state. He declared that:

Wherever a separate language is formed there a separate nation exists, which has the right to take independent charge of its affairs and to govern itself. The Germans therefore had the right to become a self governing nation. 15

The nationalist ideology advanced by Prussian political philosophers was almost completely alien to the majority of Europeans living around the turned of the 19th century. Of course these people were aware of their ethnic and linguistic differences, but only a tiny minority of them would go so far as to equate ethnic and linguistic divisions with political divisions. Subsequent nationalist thinkers bore the character of users and diffusers of nationalist theory rather than that of producers. Louis Kossuth's campaign to gain political autonomy for the Hungarians, Palacky's activities on behalf of Czechs, and Mazzini's endeavours to stimulate the Italians into creating a united Italy were all examples of nationalistic campaigns by intellectuals who had been deeply influenced by the nationalist doctrine generated by the theorists I have mentioned. There were other examples in 19th century Europe, and though it is always difficult to credit specific intellectuals with changing the course of history, there can be no doubt that the cumulative effect of nationalist ideas was to undermine the authority of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires.

Here question arises, how the national idea owes its universality? Answer to this can be traced in term of 3 waves across the globe.

1. The first wave began with the French Revolution and Napoleonic war and stretched upto the 2nd World War, transforming the face of the western world. A close link between nation and state arose in the course of European history, and with the rise of nationalism each nation demanded its own state. This let to the

creation of modern European states. The breakup of ottoman Empire, Austro-Hunarian Empire and the Czarist Empire (only the western borders of Czarist Empire) led to the creation of ethnic nation states.

2. The 2nd wave began with the end of Second World War to the early 1970 and led to the decolonization and independence of most of the developing countries. But most of these states formed were not nation state i.e. states representing a single ethnicity. These states are polyethnic and lack a single core ethnic community around which a state would be formed. These states are faced with the problem of becoming nations and the problem in each case is will older identities - religious, linguistic, racial, and caste-submerge themselves into a new national identity or will they become ethnic identities with some possible claim to their own kind of state existence. These countries faced the problem of national integration.
3. Third wave, it appeared in the form of the rise of ethno national movement during 1970 and continues to effect the whole of the world to this day. 16

There is a cluster of contemporary nationalist writers, but it is not a place and it is also difficult to discuss all of them, but I would like to mentioned only couple of them. This inturn would help us to understand nationalist idea of contemporary world. For our purposes, Dr. Tahir Amin in his book, Nationalism and Internationalism in Liberalism, Marxism and Islam, has mentioned traditional, modernization and post modernization writers of liberalism, Marxism and Islam and then evaluated their analysis.

A review of the literature on state, nation and nationalism in three traditions Liberalism, Marxism and Islam is attempted here with the hope that it may facilitate our understanding of the problem faced by Muslim nation states i.e. being a part of the Dar-ul-Islam on the one hand and International system on the other.

# CONCEPTS OF STATE, NATION AND NATIONALISM IN LIBERALISM, MARXISM AND ISLAM

## LIBERALISM:

### STATE

In modern Western political thought the idea of the state is often linked to the notion of an impersonal and privileged legal or constitutional order with the capability of administering and controlling a given territory. 17

According to professor Garner:

The state is community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of external control and possessing an organized government to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. 18

Harold J. Laski defines the state as:

A territorial society divided into government and subjects claiming, within its allotted physical area, supremacy over all other institutions. 19

If we analyze the definition of state we can easily find out that: Population, territory, Government and Sovereignty — these are the four features of the state. As these are absolutely essentials for forming a state they are called the Constituent Elements of a state. 20

According to George Sabine, "the word state was fixed as a generic term for a body politic by Machiavelli early in the 16th century" 21. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 - 1527) was the first political thinker to use the term state in its modern connotation, as a

sovereign political body and organized forced; he sought to provide its social and structural relevance by emancipating the term its original Latin meaning of status and rank.  
22

Liberalism, which became obsessed with the question of sovereignty, citizenship and political accountability. Liberalism envisages a world of private worlds, where individuals are free to engage or to disengage in trade or in any other form of social interaction, and the supreme social value is Liberty. Liberal state has no purpose and no value other than to facilitate and protect the individual pursuit of personal values and of private ends. The liberal state is a minimal state, it just has to protect the security and the property of the individual. The liberal state is a juridical state and its most important institution is judiciary. Through its judicial system, liberal state then manages its market and thus develops its market economy. The liberal state is almost opposite to the nationalistic state.

The vital relationship between the rights of state and duties of subjects representation and legitimacy were the theme developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679). John Locke (1632 - 1704) discussed the functions, rights and duties of the state, legitimacy of the government and also says that sovereign power remain ultimately with the people. 23

In Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes raised the question why is a great Leviathan or state is necessary? Through a theory of human nature, the sovereign authority and political obligation, he ought to prove that the state must be regarded as absolute and legitimate. He begin with "thought experiment" employing concepts of state of nature, right of nature, law of nature and social contract. He imagined that human beings were living in a state of nature without any "common power or state" to restrain behavior, enjoying "natural rights", - to do what ever they wish. The result was constant struggle for power and survival - "warre of every one against every one" - Thus in order to avoid harm and to ensure the conditions of comfort, the observation of certain natural laws or rules were required. This later thing provided the ground for social contract.

His argument is, if individuals surrender their rights the transferring them to a powerful authority which can force them to keep their promises and covenants, then an effective and legitimate private and public sphere, society and state, can be formed. Thus the social contract consist in individual handing over their rights of self Government to a single authority - thereafter authorized to act on their behalf. 24

In Hobbes opinion the sovereign must have absolute power. The sovereigns right of of command and subjects duty of obedience is the result of consent. Through sovereign the plurality of voices become "one will". Hobbes's argument recognizes the importance of public consent or government by consent. Hobbes was trying to persuade his contemporaries to acknowledge a full obligation to a sovereign state. As one commentator usefully put it:

Hobbes was not asking his contemporaries to make a contract, but only to acknowledge the same obligation they would have had if they had made such contract, He was speaking not to men in a state of nature, but to men in an imperfect political society, that is to say, in a society which did not guarantee security of life and commodious living (as witness its tendency to lapse into civil war). He was telling them that they must do to establish a more nearly perfect political society, one that would be permanently free from internal disturbance. 25

Talking about fundamental purpose of sovereignty, is to ensure the safety of the people - physical and mental, to education the people, to provide conditions under which they pursue their interests etc. Hobbes also suggests certain limits on sovereign actions like the sovereign should not injure individuals or basis of their well being.

John Locke (1632-1704) raised a fundamental objection to the Hobbesian argument and rejected the notion of a great Leviathan. For lock, the state should be conceived as an instrument for the defence of life, liberty and estate of its citizens. Legitimate Government,

for Locke, requires the consent of its citizens, and Government can be dissolved if the trust of the people is violated - sovereign power remains with the people.

The duties of the state are the maintenance of law and order at home and protection against aggression from abroad. The state should be regulator and protector of society. In the *Two Treatises of Government*, first published in 1690, Locke starts with the proposition that individuals are originally in a state of nature, a state of perfect freedom to order their action. However the natural rights of individuals are not always safeguarded i.e. not all individuals fully respect the rights of others. Thus the remedy is an agreement to create, first, an independent society and, second a political society or government 26. In Locke's opinion, the formation of the state does not signal the transfer of all subjects rights to the state. The rights of law making and enforcement (legislative and executive rights) are transferred. The legislative body make rules and executive power enforces the legal system, thus the idea of separation of powers was given by Locke.

In relation to Hobbes ideas this was a most significant and radical view. For it helped to inaugurate one of the most central tenets of European liberalism i.e., the state exists to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens; and that state must be restricted in scope and constrained in practice in order to ensure the maximum possible freedom of every citizen. It was Locke's views which helped to lay the foundation for development of liberalism and representative government, by emphasizing the rights of individuals, popular sovereignty, majority rule, division of powers within the state and representative system. 27

In 18th and 19th centuries a shift took place from liberalism to liberal democracy. J.J. Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and J. S. Mill, remains the leading classical articulators of the modern state systems. The idea that consent of the individuals, legitimate government and the state system was central from 18th to 20th centuries liberals.



Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and James Mill (1773-1836) argued about political apparatus that would ensure the accountability of the governors to the governed. Only through vote, secret ballot, competition between representative, election, separation of powers and the liberty of the press, speech and assembly could the "interest of the community in general" be sustained. Bentham and Mill provided the justifications for the liberal democratic state which ensure the conditions necessary for individuals to pursue their interests without risk of political interference, to participate freely in economic transactions, to exchange labour and goods on the market and to appropriate resources privately. These ideas became the basis of the 19th century English liberalism: the state was to have the role of the umpire, while individuals pursued their own interests. 28

J.S. Mill (1806-73) was a clear advocator of democracy and representative government because representative government was an important aspect of the free development of individuality: participation in political life was vital to create a direct interest in government and, consequently, a basis for an involved, informed and developing citizenry. For Mill social and political interference with individual liberty may be justified only when an act harms other. In those activities which are self-regarding, the individual is sovereign. Thus representative democracy, is the most suitable mode of government which is accountable to the citizenry and creates wiser citizens capable of pursuing the public interest.

Like J.S. Mill, Rousseau also favoured notion of active, involved citizenry in a developing process of government. Rousseau argued in favour of a political system in which the legislative and executive functions are clearly demarcated, legislating power belong to the people and executive belongs to the government. He saw individuals as involved in the direct creation of the laws by "general will". The government is legitimate only when it fulfils "the instructions of the general will", if it fails to do so it can be dissolved or changed. Rousseaus work had significant influence on the ideas in currency during the French revolution as well as on traditions of revolutionary thoughts. 29

## NATION

Rupert Emerson put forth what he called the "the sleeping beauty" theory of the nation, which assumes that a sense of nation is always there, but can be temporarily slumbering, waiting to be awakened<sup>30</sup>. But, although there are historical experiences that approximate the sleeping beauty or slumbering giant archetypes, there are other examples that show a slow or evolutionary emergence rather than a sudden surfacing a fully - formed pre-existing patterns.

For years, students of nationalism have debated the question what is a nation? Equally salient, but often ignored is the question when is a nation?

A.D. Smith defines nation as:

A named human population, sharing and historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members. 31

For Rupert Emerson:

A nation is a community of people who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have common destiny for the future. 32

The full extent of the nations claim found rich expression in Abba Eban's assertion to the General Assembly in 1955 of Israel's right:

To apply the elementary principle that those who enter Israel's gates shall be men and women the central passion of

whose lives shall be devotion to Israel's flag, loyalty to Israel's independence, zeal for Israel's welfare and security, and a readiness to defend her against all assaults from near or far. 33

The word nation is derived from the latin word "natio" or "natus" or "nastro" which means birth or race or to be born 34, and originally meant a group of people born in the same place, whether that place was thought of as a few dozen or many thousands of square miles. In the European Universities of late middle ages, "nation" were groups of students who came from the same region and country 35, for example, the university of Prague was divided into four nations. Bavarians, Bohemians, Poles and Saxons. 36

Some what later, a primary (Political Usage) and Secondary (Legal Usage) meaning evolved. To French radical writers in the 18th century a "nation" meant the people of a given territory, without distinction of rank and often in contrast to the ruling monarch. In 1789 - 1793 the three French estates emerged in the National Assembly, abolished the economic and political prerogatives of noble men and clergy and transform the monarchy into a republic. Nation was the slogan of champions of constitutionalism, secularism, equality and centralization- of those who wished to modernize society and to rationalize its administrative structure. Whatever the word nation had meant to earlier generations, its future meaning was profoundly affected by these revolutionary policies.

In its secondary usage nation meant a strange people. The king James Bible distinguished between the "the people" of Israel and the "nations" of gentiles (not of Jewish race). English colonists in North America spoke of the Sioux, Cherokee and other indigenous groups as "nations" of Indians, whereas the European of later era (when nation had become associated with modern nation - state) called correspondence African groups as "tribes". 37

The two meanings at first remain distinct enough. Nation for the political orators of the 18th century mean the people as supporters of popular government. To lawyers and diplomats, by contrast, a nation was any sovereign state, what ever its form of government. The victory of popular government in Europe in the period from 1789 to 1918 led to a blending of two meanings, for nations, now were proclaimed sovereign. 38

The formation of nations in the 19th and 20th centuries has been profoundly influenced by the examples of England, France and Spain. Being the great powers of 16th and 17th centuries, these states were seen as models for imitation by those less fortunate and their national formate was regraded as a key to their success. The relatively early development of their nations coincided with successive revolutions in the spheres of:

## **1. ADMINISTRATIVE REVOLUTION**

It has been argued that in these and other cases the state actually created the nation, that its activities of taxation, conscription and administration endowed the population within its jurisdiction with a sense of their corporate identity and civic loyalty. The extension of citizenship rights, the buildup of an infrastructure and the communication networks with the state borders drew more and more areas and classes into the national political arena and created the images of national community of England, France, Spain, that evoke such powerful feelings of commitment and belonging to this day. 39

## **2. ECONOMIC REVOLUTION**

The movement to a market economy that began in a few core states of the late medieval west and spread outward to other areas of Europe, Latin America, Asia, America and ultimately Africa. The capitalist revolution involved vastly increased trading networks in the west and then in selected peripheries, which inturn encouraged the accumulation of capital and the rise of wealthy urban centers and merchant capital. European states, often at war with one another, benefited from the activities of their bourgeoisies who

enable larger and better equipped armies to be raised and more efficient administrations staffed by experts to be built up.

### **3. CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION**

This revolution allowed the development of the secular studies, notably classical humanism and science, of university learning, and ultimately of popular modes of communication - novels, plays and journals. An important role in these processes was played by the intellectuals or intelligentsia. The creation of secular, mass nations was ultimately the out-come of a vigorous programme of political socialization through the public, mass education system. 40

### **4. MODERNIZATION REVOLUTION**

Most important revolution or process was the modernization began in Europe, produced, almost everywhere, a whole - sale realignment of borders and loyalties. Traditional feudal systems proved too cumbersome, dynastic and colonial empires too heterogeneous, and traditional tribes, principalities, town and villages too small. By contrast, nation-states of intermediate size provided a political framework for equality of opportunity, for comprehensive division of labour and hence for modern industry and scientific technology.

This modernization provided a net-work linking a number of nearby cities, each with its rural hinter - land. In short a new style of life resulted from a process of modernization. An outside challenge to that new way of life and the advent of a new generation then acted as catalysts in shaping a political consciousness of nationality. 41

Thus in the modern liberal world we find two overlapping concepts of the nation.

## 1. CIVIC OR TERRITORIAL

The civic conception treats nation as unit of population which inhabit a democratic territory, possess a common economy, common laws with identical legal rights and duties and public, mass education system, with a single civic ideology. Territory, economy, law and education constitute the four spheres in and through which nations, in this view, are formed. It is very much a western conception.

## 2. ETHNIC OR GENEALOGICAL

It sees nations as named human population claiming a common ancestry, a demotic solidarity, common customs and vernaculars and a common native history. Genealogy, demography, traditional culture and history, furnished the main resources for an ethnic view of the formation of nations. It is a conception of the nation that has found favour mainly outside the west, and often opposed civic conceptions. 42

This suggests that behind the rivals models of the nation stand certain common beliefs about what constitutes a nation as oppose to any other kind of collective, cultural identity. They include the idea that:

1. Nations are territorially bounded units of population that they must have their own home lands.
2. Their members share a common mass public culture,
3. Share common historical myths and memories.
4. Common legal rights and duties for all members.
5. A common economy with territorial mobility for members. 43

## NATIONALISM

The traditional liberal writers, emphasized the integration and disintegration effects of nationalism. Hans Kohn considered nationalism a positive force which would bring

greater participation of the people and would eventually lead to a new kind of integration of the world primarily based on the liberal values of the west. He defines nationalism as a:

A state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to premeat all its members, it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization, and nationality as the source of all creative and cultural energy and economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore due to his nationality , and his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare. 44

He observed:

With the transformation of social and economic life, with the growing interdependence of all nationalities on a shrinking earth, with a new direction to education, the circumference may widen to include supranational areas of common interest and common sympathy. 45

As Kohn emphasized the integrative aspects of nationalism, Carleton Hayes, Toynbee, E. H. Carr, stressed the disintegrative side of the doctrine. They saw the disintegration of the civilization as the central tendency and held nationalism responsible for it. They were particularly concerned about the consequences of nationalism for international relations which had led to hatred for others , international rivalries and two world wars.

Hayes distinguishes between the patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism is a natural sentimental but nationalism is an artificial construct, an ideology which initially came to dominate western Europe and later became a major "European export" to the constantly broadening market of the world 46. He defines nationalism as follows:

"The cultural bases of nationality are a common language and common historical traditions, when these, by some process of education, become the objects of popular emotional patriotism, the result is nationalism." 47

He notes:

... despite the progress made since the French revolution in redrawing the map of the Europe along lines of nationality and in creating unified national states, no European states as yet embraced or was confined to, a single nationality... National self determination gave way to determination by superior people. Nationalism became imperialistic not only overseas but with in Europe and America. 48

Modernization writers, Karl W. Deutsch, Ernst B. Haas, Ernest Gellner, in the 50s and 60s saw integration as the basic tendency. They concentrated on internationalism, integration and interdependence and largely neglected or showed little interest in the study of nationalism, disintegration and dependence. Karl Deutsch, for example, believed that the process of modernization would eventually lead to the global integration of the world. Focusing upon the European Economic Community, he believes that the established nation - state is in "full retreat" and integration is a historical fact in Europe. 49

Deutsch argues that modernization and nationalism go hand in hand. The concept of social modernization is central to his understanding of nationalism. The major thrust of his theory is towards integration , though he admits the possibility of secession as well. He writes:

If assimilation stays ahead of modernization or keeps abreast of it, the government is likely to remain stable, and eventually everybody will be integrated into one people... Where mobilization is fast and assimilation is slow, opposition happens. More and more highly mobilized and disgruntled people are held at an arm's length from



the politics and culture of their state, and they easily become alienated from the government, the state, and even the country to which they thus far had belonged. 50

In the early 70s, modernization paradigm came under general attack from two directions, The Dependencia school, uncovered the structures of neo - colonialism and stressed the inadequacy of nation - state as an appropriate unit of analysis, thus challenging the foundation of liberal international literature. Another attack came from within liberal tradition. Walker Connor led the attack by criticizing Deutsch thrust on integration and his discounting of the tendencies of disintegration. The primary theme of his literature was disintegration. Connor argues that a preponderant number of states are multi - ethnic. Citing a number of examples, he argued that, "ethnic consciousness has been definitely increasing, not decreasing, in recent years". His emphasis on ethnic groups brought into light the issue of multiple loyalties into sharp focus. An individual could hold several loyalties and loyalty to the nation - state was only one of them. The crucial question was: which of the identities gets politicized and under which circumstances?. 51

A. D. Smith's work has been a brave attempt to give nationalism a good face. He defined nationalism as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation" 52. Smith's ambitions and potentially encyclopedic treatment of nationalism is focused on newly independent nation - states and nationalism as a means towards independence and modernization.

He differentiates between ethno-centric nationalism and poly-centric nationalism, the former being of primitive variety i.e. movement of resistance of foreign rule in order to preserve the groups culture and freedom. The outsider was the barbarian latter, the modern one, see the world as divided into nations, or collective individualities, each with its own values, each requiring a state of its own to realize its communal potential and sovereign autonomy, and each seeking to join the "family of nations" by contributing its

peculiar experiences to the common fund of humanity. He notes three components of poly-centric nationalism: autonomy, individuality and pluralism.

Smith gave four reasons for the powerful continuation of nationalism:

1. The failure of the modern state to contain and minimize the ethnic revival.
2. The counter - productive pressure of the world state - system on the state elite to homogenize and integrate.
3. The continuing efforts of nationalist ideals and movements.
4. The revolt by the intelligentsia from peripheral areas against the inequitable system.

53

Why will nationalism continue to stay? Smith's answer is:

The real point is that the persistence of nationalism, even after its initial political demands have been met and even after modernization is attained, is a function of the international system itself. Nationalism may, initially have helped to create that system; now it is in turn maintained by that system, much as the industrial machine now maintains the capitalism that did so much to promote industrialism. 54

His basic argument is that nationalism is here to stay, as long as the world state system continues to exist.

## **MARXISM:**

### **STATE**

Marism rejected the terms of reference of both liberalism and liberal democracy and concentrated upon class structure and forces of political coercion. Karl Marx (1818

- 83) and Frederick Engels (1820 - 95) articulated the first systematic critique of the bourgeois - liberal state. Both in the Communist Manifesto and, the Critique of Political Economy, visualized the state as a superstructure which develops on the foundation economic and social relations.

Marx, in the Eighteenth Brumaire Louis Bonaparte, postulated that the state apparatus is both a parasitic body on civil society as well as an autonomous source of political action due to complex coalition and constitutional arrangements 55, or in other words, there are two (often interconnected) strands in Marx's account of the relation between classes and the state, the first conceives the state with a degree of power independent of class forces, the state generally and the bureaucratic institutions in particular may take a variety of forms and constitute a source of power which need not be directly linked to the interests, or be under the unambiguous control of the dominant class in the short term. By this account, the state retains a degree of power independent of this class, they are relatively autonomous.

The second strand, upholds the view that the state is merely a superstructure serving the interest of the dominant class. Throughout his political essays and especially in Communist Manifesto, Marx insisted on the direct dependence of the state on the economic, social and political power of the dominant class. "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie". 56

On the whole Lenin (1870 - 1924) followed the tenets of Marx's position 2nd. In the State and Revolution (1917), Lenin conceived of the state as a machine for the oppression of one class by another. The modern representative state was the instrument for the exploitation of wage labour by capital. Thus, the distinguishing feature of the state, a part of its grouping of people on a territorial basis, is its dependence on force, exercised through specialized bodies such as army, police, prison service etc.

The ruling classes maintain their grip on the state through alliances with government, created both by the government dependence on the stock exchange and by

the corruption of ministers and officials. Further, even democratic rights such as freedom of press, freedom of assembly etc, are a major benefit to the dominant class. For Lenin, the bureaucracy and the standing army direct products of class oppression, have to be smashed. The army would be replaced by armed workers and the bureaucrats by elected officials subject to recall. 57

There has been massive revival of interest in the analysis of state power among the contemporary Marxist writers. For instance Ralph Milliband in 1969 in, *The State in Capitalist Society*, noted the increasingly Central position of the state in western societies. He argued that in contemporary western societies is a dominant or ruling class which owes and controls the means of productions, the dominant class has close links to powerful institutions, political parties, the military, the media, etc. and it has disproportionate representation at all levels of the state apparatus. The capitalist class constitutes constraint on western government and state institutions. Thus in order to be politically effective, the state must be able to separate itself from ruling-class factions. Under exceptional circumstances the State can achieve a high order of independence from class interests, e.g. in national crisis or war.

Claus Offe and Jurgen Habermes, belongs to a quite different tradition of Marxist thought. Among their criticisms is the charge that Milliband regard capitalist states only from a negative perspective. They examine how the state sustains the institutional order in which capitalistic mechanisms occupy a prime place and how it mediates class antagonism. 58

Max Weber, in contrast to Marx, Engels and Lenin, developed one of the most significant definition of the modern state, placing emphasis upon two distinctive elements of its history, territory and violence. The modern state has a capability of monopolizing the legitimate use of violence within a given territory. However there is a third key term in Weber's definition of the state: legitimacy. Today, Weber argued, people no longer comply with the authority claimed by the powers on the grounds, of charisma, traditions, etc. Rather the legitimacy of the modern state is found predominantly on legal authority.

i.e. commitment to a code of the legal regulations (constitutional frame work). He extended the concept of bureaucracy: characterizing all forms of large - scale organization (civil service, political parties, universities, etc). 59

Thus there are many conceptual problems in surveying over four hundred years of writing on the modern state. Even if writers since the late 16th century have taken the state to mean all the institutions and relations associated with government, their terms of reference have been profoundly altered. Most of the writers dealt with have taken different position on what the state could, and indeed should, do.

The difficulties of coming to a judgement about the modern state are compounded when one examine it in relation to the system of nation - states and the international interconnections of the world economy. The more one explores this context, the more tenuous appears the abstract idea of the state.

## NATION

The Marxist tradition is explicitly internationalist. Marx himself wrote little on what was to be later termed as the national question in its orientation. The original position is outlined in *The communist manifesto*. It seemed to Marx and Engels, when they wrote *The Communist Manifesto*, that national differences were rapidly disappearing before the growth of international capitalism. The workers, the disinherited civilization, had no fatherland: to conduct their struggle against the bourgeois international successfully they must recognise this fact and form a strong worker's international. In so far as, at this early stage, Marx recognised the existence of nations. By 1872 he was prepared to admit that "special regard must be paid to the institutions, customs, and traditions of various lands."

60

Lenin was a truly international communitarian in the socialist tradition. But he did not deny that nationalism was normally associated with the rise of the middle classes to power, or that the nation state was the characteristic political form of the capitalist period.

He divided the nation of the world into three categories. In the west, he said are the advanced capitalist countries where the progressive national movements of the bourgeoisie long ago ended and where purely oppressive regimes prevail. In Eastern Europe and especially Russia, bourgeois democratic and nationalist movements were now in progress: those the party should support. Thirdly, in colonial areas, such as the whole of Asia, where bourgeois nationalism had as yet hardly begun its appearance should be encouraged. Lenin held that in modern times small nations had lost their significance and had become merely parasitical, fostering the imperialism of the great powers. Lenin argued more realistically that there was a democratic content in the nationalism of every oppressed nation, and that in this respect it should be supported, in spite of its bourgeois character. Lenin's support of national revolutionary movements was particularly relevant to the Russian situation. Under his influence the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, in 1903, adopted as a clause in its program, "The right of self determination for all nations following part of the state" 61. Thus by the right of self determination, he meant the "right of secession", in the absolute sense of the term. 62

Stalin begins with an attempt to decide what kind of thing a nation is. He rules out the racial or tribal conception of the nation of the outset, he does not identify the nation with the state. "A nation", he writes, "is not a racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people". "A nation", his definition runs, "is a historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological makeup, manifested in a community of culture". Understanding the nation in this sense, he proclaimed its right of self determination, "it has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter in to federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations are equal". 63

## **NATIONALISM**

The Marxist tradition is explicitly internationalist in its orientation. It tries to understand the phenomena of nationalism with a view to overcome its challenge to the emerging proletarian internationalism envisioned by its founders. Marx and Engels, the

founding father, did not have a coherent and well articulated theory on nationalism because they were internationalist in their outlook. They had accepted nationalism as a historical fact and a necessary stage in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Well aware of the integrative potential of nationalism at the national level, they had sought to exploit it for the advantage of the communist movement. They had predicted that integration would eventually be achieved at the international level under socialism.

Among the modernization theorists, Lenin was a truly international communitarian in the socialist tradition. He was convinced that eventually Marxism could not be reconcile with nationalism.

He was categorical:

The slogan of national culture is a bourgeois...fraud. Our slogan is: the international culture of democracy and of the world working class movement... the place of those who advocate the slogan of national culture is among the nationalist petty bourgeois not among the Marxists. 64

Why have national movements emerged? Lenin answer was:

Throughtout the world, the period of final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked with national movements. The economic basis of these movements is the fact that in order to achieve complete victory for commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, must have politically united territories with a population speaking the same language, and all obstacles to the development of this language and to its consolidation in literature must be removed. 65

He believed that nationalism as the universal characteristic of the early stage of capitalism and will disappear with the maturing of capitalism.

Developing capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of the national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the breakdown of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, sciences, etc. 66

He was convinced that nationalism was a transitional phenomenon:

In the same way as mankind can arrive at the abolition of classes only through a transition period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, so can mankind arrive at the inevitable fusion of nations only through a transition period of the complete emancipation of all oppressed nations i.e. their freedom to secede. 67

Post - modernization writers discovered that the world did not conform to their predecessors theorists. The world which had appeared to be heading towards integration of one kind or the other, was now seen faced with the possibility of disintegration. The rise of both ethno - nationalism and old - state nationalism and religious revivalism were the new realities, which were often ignored. Tom Nairn believes that the theory of nationalism represents Marxism's " great historical failure" 68. Nationalism is a crucial and fairly central feature of the modern capitalist development of world history. Marxism did not possess the power to foresee this development, or the eventual, overall shape which capitalist history would assume. In explaining the persistence of nationalism, Nairn



believes the cost would be great: the cost would be "Marxism" itself 69. Thus there was never any chance of an emerging universal proletarian class as predicted by Marx.

On the importance of the cultural factors, he notes:

Nationalism... actually did provided the masses with something real and important ... something that class consciousness could never had furnished, a culture which however deplorable, large, more accessible, and more relevant to mass realities than the rationalism of our Enlightenment inheritance. If this is so, then it cannot be true that nationalism is just false consciousness. It must have had a functionality in modern development, perhaps one more important than that of class consciousness. 70

## ISLAM:

### ISLAMIC STATE

There is tendency on the part of modern political theorists, including Islamists, to define the state in terms of the major components of the nation state, the basic political unit in the contemporary international system. This definition is of no help in distinguishing the Islamic state from other types of states because Islam differs from the prerequisites and conditions of the modern system of the nation states in many respects. The defining of the state in terms of population, sovereignty, territory and government are of little help in identifying the essential elements which distinguish the Islamic state from other types of states.

The word "state" (dawlah) was first used in the Quran. Uptil the late 15th century, one could hardly find any reference to state in Muslim literature, or in western literature for that matter. Other terms such as alamsar or daral Islam were employed whenever a

reference was made to the territories under Muslim control. Alternatively, the state as political body was identified by its political organs i.e., al Khilafah or al Imamah. Muslim scholars of 6th and 7th centuries began to employ "dawlah" in reference to the various Muslim dynasties which emerged when the institution of Khilafah lost its executive power. The term dawlah began to acquire a political connotation. 71

Islamic state is in theory, Allah's state or the kingdom of God on earth. In it there is only one supreme sovereign and that is Allah. The Islamic state is the demonstrator of this system where the concepts of Tawhid, Risalat, Caliphate, Jihad and Ijtihad are being practiced. Islamic state has practical objectives towards its citizens 72. An Islamic state coexists with a society at large. There is no division between private and public or between the state and society in Islam. The Islamic state is impossible without an Islamic society. Rather Islamic state evolves from an Islamic society. 73

Hassan-al-Turabi has outlined the ideological foundation of an Islamic state which lies in the doctrine of tawhid the unity of God and human life. The same principle gets followed by a number of concluding factors about the statutes of an Islamic state. He enumerates certain concepts in this regard. First, it is not secular, second, it is not a nationalistic state, third, it is not an absolute or sovereign entity, further, it is not a primordial entity rather it drives the Ummah at large. 74

The twin pillars of Islamic state and society, Iqbal says, are the Prophethood of Muhammad and most importantly, the doctrine of Tawhid. 75

Sayyid Abdul A'la Mawdudi, on this subject gives a precise account that the political system of Islam is based on three principles: Tawhid, Risalat and Khilafat. 76

Tawhid means that only God is the creator, sustainer and master of the Universe. The sovereignty of this kingdom is vested only in Him. The medium through which we receive the law of God is known as Risalat. We have received two things from this

source. The Quran and the authoritative interpretation and exemplification of Quran by the Prophet in his capacity as the representative of God. The Prophet has also, in accordance with the intention of Quran, given a model for the Islamic way of life by himself implementing the law and providing necessary details where required. The combination of these two elements is called the Shariah. Khilafat means the representation. Man according to Islam, is the representative of God on earth, His vicegerent. He is required to exercise his God given authority in this world within the limits prescribed by God. 77

The responsibility for the administration of the government in an Islamic state is entrusted to an Amir (leader). The basic qualifications for the election of an Amir are that he should command the confidence of the largest number of people in respect of his knowledge and grasp of the spirit of Islam, he should possess the Islamic attribute of the fear of God, he should be endowed with the quality of statesmanship. In short, he should be both able and virtuous. 78

Thus, the object of the selection process in the Islamic state is to find the best man for the task, and by best is meant not only the person most knowledgeable of affairs of state and most capable of running them but also the person of most upright character and greatest piety.

Legislation in an Islamic state should be within the limits prescribed by the Shariah. The injunctions of God and His Prophet are to be accepted and obeyed, and no legislative body can alter or modify them or make any new laws which are contrary to their spirit. The legislation in an Islamic state comprises of four sources.

## **1. THE QURAN (INTERPRETATION OF QURAN)**

Although the legislature cannot in any way go against what God has laid down, great deal that is presented in Quran and Sunnah requires to be understood more fully and to this the members of the Majlis-i-Shura should turn their attention.

Syed Amier Ali, in *The Spirit of Islam* writes that:

Islam gave to the people a code which, however, archaic in its simplicity, was capable of the greatest development in accordance with the progress of material civilization. It conferred on the state a flexible constitution .... 79

What is clear from above discussion is that Shariah is not something state and fixed for once and all. Wilfred Smith says

that:

the Shariah is not a static system but a dynamic development, a process in which the historical stages of the past are available for study and guidance, but in which present and future developments are matters of creative extrapolation. This interpretation accentuates continuity and revision. 80

So according to this interpretation of Islamic law, there is a definite scope for the legislature in an Islamic republic.

## 2. SUNNAH

The Sunnah is the saying and practices of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H). A proper study of the Prophet's traditions, if used as an indicator of the spirit in which the Prophet himself interpreted his revelation, is all great help in understanding the value of the legal principles enunciated in the Quran. The Prophet in his noble action and deeds, was the greatest embodiment of the true spirit of the Islamic message as laid down in the Quran. The Sunnah is therefore, the second important source of Islamic law.

### 3. IJMA (Consensus)

Ijma means, the system of independent legislation which in case of silence of Shariah, the people having religious understanding and clarity of concepts make certain rules to clarified the particular situation. It is accepted by Muslims that if there is consensus among the Muslims jurists of a particular generation on a point of view, this view should be accepted. The effectiveness of the Islamic order and the stability of the state, thus, require Ijma.

Islam does not recognize any particular group or priesthood who should have a monopoly on interpreting the will of Allah. In Islam, every believer has the right to interpret the Quranic injunctions. According to modern Muslim Scholars the only place where discussion can take place in connection with the reinterpretation and reorientation of the Islamic legal system, without violating the clear and unambiguous injunctions of the Quran, is the legislature. 81

### 4. IJTIHAD OR QIYAS:

The word ijthad means exerting one's power or ability in the prosecution of the affairs to one's utmost advantage. But as a technical term of Muslim jurisprudence it refers to the application of individual reasoning for discovering solutions of new legal problems 82, whereas Muslim Scholars used analogical reasoning, known as Qiyas, to achieve this end. It was argued that:

a freer use of human reasoning was necessary for developing an understanding of the ultimate principles and purposes of the Shariah.... The use of Qiyas is being widely discussed as Muslims seek to find answers to broad social, economic and political questions for which more innovative and flexible interpretive techniques seem to be required. 83

Beside, executive and legislature, judiciary is the third fundamental institution of and Islamic state. In Islamic judiciary is not placed under the control of the executive. It derives its authority directly from the Shariah and is answerable to God. Ruler and ruled are subject to the same law and there can be no discrimination on the basis of position, power and privilege.

### **PURPOSES OF THE ISLAMIC STATE**

The Islamic state is not a political community whose population is mainly composed of Muslim individuals, but rather one whose legal order is based on and derived from the principles of the Shariah. The Holy Quran clearly states that the aim and purposes of the Islamic state built on the foundation of Tawhid, Risalat and Khilafat, is the establishment, maintenance and development of those virtues by which the creator of the universe wishes human life to be enriched, and the prevention and eradication of those evils which are abhorrent to God 84. This should not, however, be interpreted to mean that the Islamic states purposes is to impose a narrowly defined code of behavior on society. Far from it toleration of differences in beliefs and doctrinal commitments is an established Islamic principle.

The aim is to encourage the qualities purity, beauty, goodness, virtue, success and prosperity which God wants to flourish in the life of His people and to suppress all kinds of exploitation and injustice. 85

The most important characteristics of Islamic states are justice, honesty and equality. Islam places its whole state structure upon its basic principle of justice:

It is not prepared, under any circumstances, to tolerate fraud, falsehood and injustice for the sake of political and administrative or national expediency. Whether it be relations between the rulers and the ruled within the state or relations of the state with other states,

precedence must always be given to justice, equality and honesty.

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In an Islamic state, the non Muslim minorities are given fundamental rights. Non muslims also have the right to regulate their private life, education, and family life by adopting their own family laws "there should be no interference with (the practice of) their faith or observance, nor any change in their rights or privileges" 38. Thus Islam pledged the security of the lives, religion and property of the non muslims.

It is the responsibility of an Islamic state to provide its citizens for example food, clothing, shelter, health etc, the basic human requirements and beside that Islamic state provide its citizens the basic economic rights which can be summarized in the following principles.

1. Islamic economic recognizes individuals as the rightful owner of the whatever is the result of their labour at both narrow and broad levels.
2. The material attachments and economic relations are characterized by laws and values.
3. Limits of ownership in an Islamic System are laid down for the individuals, laws and government.
4. Right of ownership be given to all the individuals of an Islamic state who play their part in running the economic system.
5. It emphasis on the principle that wealth should not be permitted to become concentrated in a few hands.
6. All the limitations and the rights regarding the natural resources are to be systematized.
7. There are certain rules in the Islamic economic, regarding the rights of possession and distribution of natural products.
8. The right of ownership aries from the right of holding natural resources and determined by Islamic laws in the context of transaction and exchanges. 87

The distinguishing feature of the Islamic concept of economic justice is based on the fundamental principle of the harmony between the material and spiritual aspects of human life "the synthesis of the material and spiritual is what is missing in the welfare concept of the other two systems, capitalism and socialism, as they are morally natural".

88

From the above discussion we can distinguish an Islamic political order from the Western democracy as follows:

1. Western democracy is based on the concept of popular sovereignty, an Islamic political order rests on the principle of popular Khilafa.
2. In Western democracy the people are sovereign, but in Islam sovereignty is vested in God and people are His representatives.
3. In Western democracy, the people make their own laws, in Islam they have to follow and obey the laws given by God through His Prophet.
4. In one the government undertakes to fulfil the will of the people, in the other the government and the people alike have to do the will of God.
5. Western democracy is a kind of absolute authority which exercises its power in a free and uncontrolled manner, where as Islamic democracy is subservient to the Divine law and exercises its authority in accordance with the injunctions of God and within the limits prescribed by Him. 89

Thus the Islamic state is universal and all - embracing in its character. Islam seeks to mould every aspect of life and activity in accordance with the moral norms and programs of social reforms. It grants the individual liberty to its citizens. The Islamic state is also an ideological state. The state is an instrument of reforms and its administration functions are based on ideals. Also, the administrators in Islamic state have to be necessarily the followers of the reformatory programs.



## THE UMMAH: THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSAL COMMUNITY

In the early period of Islam when Muslims appeared on the stage of history, they were a single political entity. This situation continued during the 1st century of Islam. But after the 16th century, the division of Islam into three entities, Ottoman, Safavid and Mughals, each of which in turn divided or sub-divided into others became permanent and the divisions were consolidated by the trends of political developments within Islam as well as by its relationship with the Christian World. The Islamic universal state became transformed into an Islamic state system<sup>90</sup>, and at present there are about more than fifty muslim nations, the number having being inflated by the six recently independent former soviet republics.<sup>91</sup>

In tracing the genesis of the Ummah in modern times, we discovered that it was seriously challenged by the growing impact of western political culture. By the end of the 19th century most of the Muslim lands had come under the colonial rule of the European powers. The thrust of European colonialism completely disrupted the traditional foundations of the Islamic Ummah. The rule of Shariah was substituted by European legal codes and finally Khilafah gave way to the emerging national states. During the last two world wars and thereafter, the political map of the Islamic world has completely changed. The introduction of western education in these countries created a new class of westernized elites who had been the champions of modernization, reforms, capitalism, socialism, secularism and nationalism.<sup>92</sup>

In Muslim world, though of late based on nationalistic lines, nationalism has been regarded as incompatible with Muslim polity. "As a creed" says Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, "Islam is unequivocally hostile to the sort of division contentions that are an endemic feature of nationalism"<sup>93</sup>. Islam believes in the basic unity of mankind and does not aim at the division of humanity into nations. Islam postulates faith in Allah and His last Prophet and it is this faith, which orders the loyalties of the believing Musalmans.<sup>94</sup>

Here we must understand the comprehensive meaning of Islam. Islam is not a religion in its western sense. In its western sense religion regulates the relation between God and man only, so it is simply a private or spiritual matter. But Islam is not so narrow in its jurisdiction. It regulates not only the relation of man with his creator, but also controls every aspect of a Muslim life, be it political, social or economic. Islami is a complete code of life. It does not believe in the separation of religion from society. Its polity is based on four fundamental assumptions.

1. The belief in the unity and sovereignty of Allah serves as the basis of the social and moral system propounded by the Prophet.
2. Man is his vicegerent and is not absolutely independent.
3. The right to rule belongs to the whole community of believers.
4. Islamic polity must conduct its affairs by mutual consultation (Shura) among all Muslims. 95

Islam also does not draw a line between religion and politics. Ayatullah Khomeini remarked that:

Islam is a religion in which prayer is combined with politics and politics is considered to be a kind of prayer. 96

The word Ummah is derived from the root amm, meaning aim at or intended "Ummah", therefore, carries many senses devoting this original meaning intending. Primarily, however, it means the people who intend to follow a leader (imam), a law (Shariah), a religion (Din) or a path (Minhaj) and also the thing intended. Hence two principle concepts denoted the term Ummah are community and religion. They are used separately and combined to denote a religious community. Quran used the word in different sense.

1. It is used in a sense of a nation without any qualification, as in the following verses:

- i) Those are an Ummah that have passed away: for them is what they earned and for you what you earn.
  - ii) And certainly we raised in every Ummah a messenger.
2. It is used in the sense of a party or group of people.
- i) And from among you their should be an Ummah who invite to good and enjoin the right and forbid the wrong.
3. It is used in the sense of religion.
- i) And thus, we sent not before thee a warner in a town, but its wealthy ones said: surely we found our fathers following an Ummah (religion), and we follow that foot steps.
4. It is used to denote period of time, that is, the duration for which a thing is intended.
- i) And if we delay for them the chastisement for a started period (Ummah ma'dudah), they will certainly say: what prevented it.
5. It is used to denote a religious community. It is especially this sense that the Quran speaks of the followers of Muhammad when it addressess them as an Ummah.
- i) You are the best Ummah raised up for men, you enjoin good and forbid evil and you believe in Allah. 97

Thus there is abundant evidence to show that Quran frequently uses the word Ummah in the absolute sense of a nation and described as the Ummah Muslimah and Ummah Wahidah. These expression clearly imply that Islam (submission, surrender) and wahidah (unity) are the two most important foundations for the Ummah. 98

According to Hadith:

Among the Ummats, the Ummat of Muhammad (P.B.U.H) is like the prayer of Asr, which is preferred to other prayers on account of its good. 99

The Ummah is based on the fundamental principles of the unity of the Divine Being, the finality of Prophethood and the brotherhood of man. 100

1. The Ummah is founded in a common faith in the oneness of Almighty Allah. In other words it is the faith in Tawhid and this belief creates a psychic cohesion in the Ummah and unites all its members into an indivisible unity of thought, of body and of will. Such a community is described in the Quran as Ummah Wahidah or single community.
2. There is no God but one God, and Muhammad (P.B.U.H) is His messenger. The loud pronouncement of the Kalmah is called Shahadah (affirmation). By such a pronouncement one becomes a full fledged member of the Ummah 101. Thus the institution of Prophethood unifies Ummah and complete its formation under an organized system of law and order. The extraordinary and remarkable personality of the Prophet of Islam provides a connecting link between the various loyalties characteristics of the fundamental polity of Islam. It is on the account of this concentration of loyalties that the Muslims are transformed into a well defined unified Ummah. The Prophet is the guider and unifier of the Muslim Ummah on the basis of the Din revealed to Him as the last Prophet. 102

A cursory survey of the great Hadith collections, indicates that the term Ummah is used to describe the body of believers. Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) used to refer to his followers as Ummah and emphasized the unity of his Ummat.

Who so ever takes up arms against my Ummah, kills good or bad people of my Ummah, and does not care for the believers, and does not fulfil his promise (with whom he made it) does not belong to me nor do I belong to him.

A believer is to another believer like an edifice all the parts for which reinforce one another, and he interlinked his fingers, (to demonstrate it).

By Him in whose hands is my soul, no one of you can be a believer unless he wishes for his brother the same that he wishes for his own self.

The Holy Prophet has also said: "The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim he will neither abandon him nor hurt him". 103

According to Mujaddid - Alf Thani:

The Muslims as a community is the best Ummat owing to the absolute loyalty to the person of the Prophet. The Musalmans have for their guidance the most perfect, chose and favorite Din - Islam, the most perfect revelation, best guides last word — the Quran and the last Prophet and an exemplar - Muhammad (P.B.U.H). 104

From the total surrender of one's being to Allah and His Messenger, there springs the doctrine of the unity of the human race.

The Ummah is not bound by race, colour or country, language or tradition, but is founded on the principle of the unity of mankind. The institution of Prophethood is a unifying factor in the evaluation of Ummah. The life of Ummah is lived according to its own distinct law - Shariah or the Divine code of ethical and social laws. Thus a Muslim, living in any part of the world, the descended from any race, colour, speaking any language, but professing Islam, is a number of Ummah. To a Muslim the entire world is his abode and place of worship, for it lies within the mulk of Allah. 105

To begin with, Islam provided a pool of symbols around which the body of believers organized into a social unity - one God, one Prophet, one Book and one center - Kabah. For this reason, Ummah is described in the Quran as Ummah Wahidah.

Islam prescribes a code of conduct which is called Shariah (Divine Law). The divides human obligations into huquq Allah and huquq al-ibad. Similarly distinction is made between fard ayan and fard al-kifayah (collective duties). In respect to matters falling with in the area of individual obligations man is ultimately responsible to God for

his own conduct, but in the sphere of collective responsibilities, the Ummah is collectively responsible to God. Therefore, we observe that both social and individuals responsibilities inhere in the process of community building. 106

This great concern for maintaining inner cohesion and unity is also reflected in the rituals of Islam in every day life. There is placed great emphasis on saying prayers in congregation rather than alone. The believers are called upon to say their prayers five times together at a mosque under the leadership of Imam. Once a week on Friday and twice in a year they get together for mass congregations on the occasion of Eid-al-Fitar and Eid-al-Adha. The pilgrimage to Macca once in life time has been enjoined for all Muslims who gather annually around Kaba for performing Haj. All this implies self-discipline on the part of the believers and goes a long way to ensure organized collective living within the framework of the Ummah. 107

Thus the Ummah founded in the concept of Tawhid, governed by the Shariah under the leadership of the Prophet Himself has been described by Watt as the "Charismatic Community". 108

Following results follow from the above discussion.

1. Islamic ideology aiming at generating a universal community, cuts deeply at the existing ideological roots of the society. Therefore, in the 7th century Holy Prophet directed his religious movement to demolish triable foundations of the Arabian social system. The triable pluralism, focused on kinship as the basis of integration etc were all abolished. 109
2. The ultimate object of the Ummah is to establish the fundamental unity of mankind on the basis of equality, liberty and fraternity. Islam is a message of human equality in social status and legal rights. Islam sets forth a basis of a vast brotherhood, in which all men and women, of what ever tribe or clan, have equal rights as if members of the same family. The Holy Quran says, "And surely this your Ummat is one Ummat." 110

3. It goes without saying that in the formation of the Ummat, Islam makes no distinction on account of birth or lineage but teaches a practical brotherhood. The universal spirit of Islam and its idea of fraternity cannot confine Muslim to a particular locality or territory. Islam as a world system broadens the outlook of man and frees him from geographical and materialistic conceptions. Thus Ummah is not defined by economic, linguistic, racial or territorial considerations but by spiritual values and inner consciousness, derive from a complete code of a revealed faith.
4. Muslim Ummah is extraordinary God conscious and is permeated by a control of the Din that extends to every sphere of its conduct. The influence of Din on politics cannot be ignored, although the modern tendency is in favour of the separation of religion from politics - the main cause of chaos and confusion in national and international affairs.
5. The organization of Ummah rests on the principles of loyalty, service and sacrifice. The Islamic Ummah constitute a harmonious whole in which the claims of the family, community, parents, women, orphans, slaves and unbelievers are duly recognized and the performance of any such service or sacrifice carries with it a Divine reward,

Be good to parents, near of kin, orphans, needy, the near neighbors, the distant neighbor, companion in journey, way farer and whom your right hands possess. 111

Thus we observe that the Islamic Ummah is in the words of Hegel, the March of God on earth. It has a mission to perform and a goal to achieve. This ideological community of Islam aims at restoring the ideological unity of mankind and it is in this sense that it is called Ummah Wahiddah in the Quran 112. Thus Islam believes in the basic unity of mankind and does not aim at the division of humanity into nations. Islam postulates faith in Allah and His last Prophet and it is this faith which orders the loyalties of the believing Muslims. The Islamic Ummah composed of the Muslims, is a group set apart from the rest of the humanity and charged with the duty of converting the rest

of the mankind to this faith so as to realize the ideal of a single community. Consequently, it is only faith that can divide humanity into believers and non-believers for the time being, till with the realization of the unity of the whole world into a single community of faith, the distinction between the believers and non-believers is lost. 113

## NATIONALISM

The thinkers in the Islamic tradition saw things differently. Traditional Islamic writers argued that while their ideal was a universal Ummah, the Muslims should for the moment adopt nationalism for liberating Muslim peoples from colonial rule and the creation of a new world order. Iqbal was the first modern Muslim philosopher who projected the international ideals of Islam at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nationalism, according to Iqbal, leads to national rivalries, wars among nations and the narrowing down of human outlook and sympathy. Above all it kills humanity. He warned the Muslims:

Liberalism has a tendency to act as a force of disintegration and the race idea which appears to be working in modern Islam with greater force than ever may ultimately wipe off the broad human outlook which Muslim people have imbibed from their religion. 114

He knew that nationalism was a double - edge sword which could also be used to overthrow the yoke of western imperialism. He adopted the concept of Muslim nationalism with the clear purpose of eventually creating a world Muslim community. He defines the concept of Muslim nationalism in the following terms:

It is not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the universe...that we are members of the society founded by the Prophet of Islam. Islam abhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea objectified in



a potentially expansive group of concrete personalities, It is not dependent for its life principle on the character and genius of a particular people. In its essence, it is non - temporal, non - spatial. 115

Modernization theorists, in the Islamic world, who belonged to the westernized educated classes, accepted the western nation - state system or liberal nationalism as the ultimate reality. Every thing traditional had to be rejected and modernization had to be realized. Modernizational theorists are primarily of two types:

1. Liberal nationalists of western variety such as Kamal Ataturk, Shah of Iran, Ayub Khan, etc.
2. National Socialist variety such as Jamal Abdal- Nasir, Saddam Hussain, Z. A. Bhutto, etc.

Following characteristics are common in the writings of the above leaders:

1. They were all nationalists, some of them paid lip service to internationalism, such as pan - Islamism. They were motivated primarily by the realpolitik considerations rooted in the domestic politics or foreign policy of their countries.
2. Their ideologies were of syncretised variety. They combined liberal or socialist variety of nationalism with the ethnic tradition. The goal in each case was modernization.
3. Nearly all of them included Islam as one of the factors in the composition of their ideologies. Faced with the legitimacy crises, most of them resorted to Islam and expounded and patronized their own version of official Islam.

Jamal Abdal Nasir, for instance, was primarily concerned with creating strong, cohesive and modern nation - state along national socialist lines. He reinterpreted the history of Egypt essentially in nationalist terms. Both his domestic and foreign policy agenda are drawn in the nationalist context with scant regard for Islamic internationalism.

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Post - modernization theorists, schooled in the indigenous educational system, were internationalists. They insisted on the rejection of nationalism completely, considering it an alien idea to the Islamic tradition, and a cultural form which Western imperialism had imposed on the Muslim world. Their major argument was that Islam is a complete scheme of life which should be understood in its own terms and that the genuine liberation was not possible without rejecting all alien ideologies and resurrecting the indigenous tradition in its purity.

Khomeini regards patriotism as natural sentiment but rejects nationalism on two grounds. Firstly, it is contrary to the Islamic teaching and secondly, it is an alien idea propagated by foreigners in order to divide the Muslim community. He notes:

To love one's father land and its people and to protect its frontiers are both quite unobjectionable, but nationalism, involving hostility to other Muslim nations, is something quite different. It is contrary to the noble Quran and the orders of the most Noble Messenger. Nationalism that results in the creation of enmity between Muslims and splits the ranks of the believers is against Islam and the interests of the Muslims. It is a stratagem concocted by the foreigners who are disturbed by the spread of Islam. 117

He blames that the imperialists have divided the Muslim community by establishing separate nation - states and urges the Muslims to overthrow the existing nation - states:

They have separated the various segments of the Islamic Ummah from each other and artificially created separate nations... In order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim people, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence the Islamic government of justice that will be in the service of the people. 118

For Sayyed Mawdudi, Islam is international and its message is universal. Nationalism is inconsistent with Islam because it divides the man from man on the basis of nationality. Nationalism simply means that the nationalist should give preference to his nationality over all other nationalities. 119

From the preceding discussion we can see, nationalism has proved to be the most successful political doctrine ever promoted. At the time of the French Revolution, there were only twenty of what we would now recognize as national states, the rest of the world consisting of sprawling empires, unexplored territories and a host of tiny independent principalities. Now the entire inhabitable surface of the globe is divided into more than 175 national or supposedly national states, each of them legally sovereign within its territory.

## ISLAM VS NATIONALISM THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISLAM AND NATIONALISM

From the above discussion we can analyze that Islam and nationalism are diametrically opposed to each other.

1. Islam deals with man as man. It presents to all mankind a social system of justice and piety based on creed and morality and invites all towards it. It provides with equal rights, be it in the spheres of economics or politics or civics or legal rights and duties or any thing else who so ever accept this system. Those who accept the principles of Islam are not divided by any distinction of nationality, race, class or country. The ultimate goal of Islam is a world state in which chains of racial and national prejudices would be dismantled and all mankind incorporated in a cultural and a political system 120. There is a general set of principles consisting of social, political, cultural, economic and legal aspects. Islam is rather persistent upon ensuring peace, justice and equality to the whole mankind. Thus to a Muslim, the entire world is his abode and place of worship, for it lies with in the

mulk of his Allah. It is presumed that the territory of the Islamic government will go on expanding till envelop the whole world and the universal organization come into being.<sup>121</sup>

As opposed to this, nationalism divides man from man on the basis of nationality. Nationalism, for that matter, differentiates people from people and specifies separate territories in which people determine their values, national interest etc. Nationalism inculcates in a particular people a sense of we - ness and they - ness, which promotes the separate nationalist identity. Nationalist is bound by certain principles to differentiate between his own national interests and others. He should dwell upon the notion of a separate nation hood. Nationalism encompasses the cultural, economic, political and legal aspects of a nation's life - while the nationalist acquires the benefits for his own nation, he should differentiate between national and non national and breed in him the sentiments of national pride. Thus his ultimate goal would be a nation state rather than a world - state.  
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2. Nationalism abolishes the Islamic frame work, aimed at bringing together mankind into one moral and spiritual circle and make them mutually assistance to one another on a universal scale, with instruments of racial and national distinction, by creating bitterness and hatred between nations, makes them fight rather than to help one another.
3. The fundamental principle of Shariah as of God is that the right of man are based on moral code and not on force. But in contrast to this, nationalism establish the principle that might is right.
4. Islam includes the whole humanity or mankind in its programme of providing justice, freedom, progress, equality and basic rights to the individuals. Where as, nationalism promises the benefits and advantages only in case of the fulfillment of the nationalistic goals and the achievement of welfare of the nation.
5. Islam and the sacred law, Shariah, is all encompassing and it invites the humanity at large to believe in its teaching. It does not specify any country or any nation to accept and follow its principles. In its universal message which it conveys to all with its considering the verity of languages diversity of cultures and multiplicity

of places, Islam voices a transnational rather than international factor. Its universal nature corresponds with the super character of international.

Contrarily, nationalism gives priority to the nationalist feeling of promoting the sanctity of certain cultural, linguistic and racial symbols which together form of nation. A nationalist would project his nationalist feelings explicitly. He should have knowledge of his national history and traditions and its evolution in different phases. A nationalist would be bound to possess prejudiced view in favour of his own nation and certain values of nation against all other nations.

6. Islam provide the highest opportunities of free contact between man and man because on this very contact depends the progress of human civilization and culture. But nationalism comes in the way of these contacts with a thousands hindrances, it makes the mere existence of foreign national country impossible.

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## CONCLUSION:

It is futile to expect that the western nationalism which started with the premises of the division of mankind and nation states, should be able to reunite humanity into a world community. Nationalism, though repugnant to Islam, found an easy way into the Muslim world and destroyed its inner unity based on Khilafat. The Muslim Ummah lost its vitality and oneness of purpose, the term nation has been adopted in the Muslim geographical regions, partly because it popularly excepted or more understandable in the world at large and partly because this technique helped them in the process of their emancipation. Through nationalism, the parts of the Muslim world regained their freedom, while losing the whole which could not survive as a unity. 124

As Muslims, along with the rest of the world, stand on the threshold of the 20th century, the problem of multiple identities continues to stare them in the face, demanding that their intellectual and political leaders engage in a serious attempt to come forth with the ideas that would enable every Muslim to adopt appropriate attitudes towards the

Muslim Ummah, the territorial and ethnic units to which he belongs, to all his compatriots including the non muslims and to mankind at large.

In dealing with the problem in question, therefore, it would be necessary for Muslim scholar and thinker of the present time to identify, first of all, the texts of the Quran and the Sunnah which bear relevance to the problem and to carefully examine how those texts have been interpreted by Muslim scholars and thinkers in different periods of history and to explore the extent of the consideration shown by them to the changing realities of life. It would also be useful to note the relationship between the ideas of the scholar and the efforts of the man of practical concerns in raising structure inspired by those ideas. Also, it would be necessary to become deeply acquainted with the realities of the modern age - the concepts and doctrine prevalent in the different parts of the world, the ground realities of modern life, and the dynamics of the institutions that have come into existence of achieve a variety of conflicting interests and purposes. 125

However, we can conclude that the existing political realities of the Ummah do not favour the application of the desired unity of the Ummah. Then what?

The fundamental pre-requisite for effective overall reform of the Ummah is the "Islamization of knowledge". which emphasis needs to be replaced upon eliminating the gulf between thought and action, between idealism and realism and between the ideological leadership on one hand and socio-political leadership on the other.

However, the "Islamization of knowleldge", signifies not just "norms and ideals" nor does it means individual meditations", nor is it just "a history and a legacy". The Islamization of knowledge" is scientific knowledge - the knowledge that originates from divine norms and ideas. It is rational in its outlook, its approach, its search, its critical examination of the problems of life, and its treatment of individual socieity, nature and the laws that govern its workings. Giving priority to "Islamization of knowledge" does not cancel other priorities nor does it belittle the significance of political, economic, social, academic and military efforts. It simply means that the "Islamization of

knowledge" Its urgent, a pre-requisite, a necessary condition in order to achieve perfection in provision, clarification of vision, revival of the power to build, and ability to withstand encounters. The process of the "Islamization of knowledge" pass through two elementary stages.

1. Mastery of modern sciences. That is to know the critical, analytical and objective aspects of those sciences in their western perspective and in the light of the true Islamic viewpoint.
2. Mastery of the Legacy. The purpose of gaining mastery over modern disciplines is to benefit from the common human heritage, to assimilate those disciplines and to represent them in their proper perspective so that they should serve Islamic Ideology, Islamic vision and Islamic ideals in their present age.

The Muslim intellect must develop alternative solutions and proper standards as defined Islam through its shariah, morals, education, objectives and ideals, otherwise Islamic thought may not be able to tackle problems or to face new challenges, and it may become out of touch with day-to-day life. 126

We hope that once streams of fresh thinking begin to flow, the Ummah will start with a new life characterized by clarity of vision and profusion of energy. Such a thinking will hopefully be at once authentically Islamic and contemporaneously relevant and meaningful. It will be both traditional and creative. Inspired by the Quran, such a thinking will exhibit a passion of innovate, to make ever new experiments to build ever new structure to actualize the Islamic vision of life and contribute to the overall well being of humanity. For as Iqbal believed a hundred fresh world and a multitude of epochs are latent in the verses of the Quran. If only Muslims are blessed with faith and vision, a whole new epoch might burst forth on the stage of history.

## CHAPTER TWO

### HISTORY OF PRE-SOVIET TAJIKISTAN


It may be useful to be clear regarding the geographical extent of Central Asia. There are varying perceptions depending on the viewer's orientation. Central Asia is a vast region of about four million square kilometers with a total population of more than fifty million. Its entire northern border is with Russia, with Iran and Afghanistan in the South, China in the east and the Caspian Sea in the west. 1

In ancient times Central Asia was called "Turan or Turkistan" 2. In the not so distant past it was called "beyond the river" or "Mavara-al-Nahre" (Ma-wara-n-Nahr). The cultural and historical sphere of influence of Mavara-al-Nahr, important centers of eastern civilization, encompassed an area far greater than the present geographical limits of Central Asia. The territories now forming Afghanistan, Baluchistan (Pakistan), Sinkiang (China), sectors in Tibet and Mongolia, and Southern Siberia were all formerly parts of great, Mavara-al-Nahre. The Russian renamed it Central Asia to serve their policy of distancing the non-Russian people from their historical past. 3

Central Asia should also be understood as Asia-i-Miana i.e. Middle Asia. It is the land that lies between China and South Asia on the east and Ural mountain and the Caspian sea on the west, and between the Siberian forest on the north and the Irano-Afghan Plateau on the South, i.e. the Southern Oxus river line and the Kopet Dagh range on the South. 4

A minimalist approach seeks to restrict the region to an area between the Caspian and Tien Shan mountains, encompassing mainly the ethnic Muslim majority areas. On the other hand, a maximalist interpretation attempts to include a region termed as "inner Asia", because the area is without outlet by water to the sea or it is an undrainable basin, which is a wider area of nomadic civilization that includes the frontiers of Russia and China, the Middle East as well as the north-western portion of India. But states on its periphery such as of west Asia, Central Europe and South Asia, have already come to acquire a distinct identity through long usage. What remains are the five Central Asian Republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizistan and Kazakhstan. 5





Source:

Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964

The term Central Asia actually refers to the four of the five republics i.e. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kirghizia. But in a cultural sense the term Central Asians includes Kazakhs along with Uzbeks, Tajikis, Turkmens, Kirgizs and some other indigenous groups in Central Asia. Kazakhstan despite its ethnic and cultural affinities, as a republic in many ways is best not considered part of Central Asia. Geography, demographic, natural resources and economic structures and history of Kazakhstan distinguish it from the four Central Asian republics 6. But here, however, the term Central Asia includes republic of Kazakhstan as well because it should be kept in mind that much of the analysis of social, economic, cultural, religious and political problems in Central Asia also applies to Kazakhstan.

Geographically Central Asia can be divided into four natural regions.

1. The steppe zone is a small segment of the great belt which extends from northern Mongolia across southern Siberia and northern Kazakhstan, across the Volga to the north Caucasus and the north littoral of the Black Sea or Virgin lands region.
2. The semi desert region lies almost entirely within the Kazakhstan. This lies to the south of the Steppe.
3. The desert zone lies to the south of the semi-desert region and extending upto the Persian frontier in the West and Chinese frontier region in the East.
4. Mountain region of the Pamirs and Tien-Shan chiefly in Tajikistan, Sinkiang (China) and Kirgizia. 7

Thus the total area of Central Asia is about 1,542,241 square miles. The territory is larger in area than India and Pakistan before partition and more than half the size of United States. 8

Of the five states, Tajikistan is the smallest one with an area of 143,100 square kilometers or 55,250 square miles. It is located in the north east corner of Central Asia, bordered by People's Republic of China (east), Afghanistan (South), Uzbekistan (west) and Kirgizistan (north). Its capital is Dushanbe. 9

It was formed as an autonomous Republic of former USSR in 1924 and acquired the status of a Union Republic in 1929. On 9 September 1991, Tajikistan's parliament, in an emergency session, proclaimed independence for the republic and announced 9 September, as Independence Day and a public holiday. 11

Tajikistan consists mainly of mountains, including parts of the Pamir range known as "the roof of the world",<sup>12</sup> and Turkestan, Zerafshan, and Gissar ranges. The Central and Eastern part of the Kopet-Dagh Pamir Mountain system includes the desert plateau of the eastern Pamir, lesser Balkhan, Kopet Dagh, Paropamisus, Hissar, Peter the Great, Darvaz, Trans-Alay ranges and the Pamirs Proper. Whereas the Central and Southern areas of the Tien Shan chain includes the Alay, Turkistan, Zerafshan, Ferghana, Khan-Tengri and the Dzungarian, Ala-Tan mountains. The Soviet Union's two highest mountains Communism Peak (Mount Stalin) 7,495 meters is in Tajikistan's Pamir chain. Whereas mount Lenin 7,134 meters is in Trans-Alay chain is on the border of Tajikistan and Kirgizistan. 13

These mountain ranges make difficult the passage between Central Asia and India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan to the South and China to the East. One's feet or backs of animals are the only means of travel. Motorable roads or railways do not extend beyond the USSR. But in recent years, some 6400 kilometers or (400 miles) of roads, often built over difficult mountains and wide use of air transport have reduced Tajikistan's previous inaccessibility. 14

Low lands are located in the north-west along the Syr-Darya River (known to the Greeks as the Jaxartes), at the entrance of the Farghana valley and in the south west Amu-Darya River (ancient Oxus and Jayhun of medieval Arab writers) along the Kafirnigan and the Vakhsh rivers 15. Tajikistan occupies the eastern most parts of the Transoxiana, including a part of the Farghana valley of the Syr-Darya, and the valleys of the tributaries of the Amu-Darya, the Vaksh, Kafirnigan, and Zerafshan. 16



Source: Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism, Karachi: Oxford University press, 1994.

The economy is mainly concerned with the growing (Vaksh valley) and processing of cotton. Food grains (wheat, Barley and Millet) are grown in the south east, and oil seeds (flowering flax) in the south west. There is also a cattle breeding industry. Other industries include silk weaving (Khojend), textiles (Dushanbe) and fruit canning. There is a large carpet factory at Kayrakkum. In its hydro-electric resources it occupies second place in the former USSR. 17

Iranian Tajiks, the indigenous people of the area, are considered to be the most ancient racial group in Central Asia. The Tajiks have a record of continuous residence in Central Asia over three millennia, possibly longer 18. The mountain Tajiks Iagnob, Iazgulem, Rushan, Shuguan, Vakhan and Vanch clans, of western Pamir represent an almost pure ancient Iranian stock and speak eastern Iranian dialects different from Farsi. Some non Iranian admixture is found among the Galcha - the Tajiks of the Darvaz and Karategin mountains. The Tajiks of the plains, Zerafshan, Farghana, Vakhsh, who mixed freely with numerous invaders have many Mongoloid racial features with dark straight hair, little beard, heavy cheek bones, and are frequently indistinguishable in physical type from the Turkic speaking Uzbeks, their Iranian language alone making them Tajiks. 19

Tajiks are Sunni Muslim (Hanafi School) but there are some Shi'it communities mainly amongst the Mountain Tajiks. The Pamir Tajiks are Ismailites, 20, followers of the Agha Khan. Among the Galcha and Pamir Tajiks traces of the ancient Iranian fire worship (Zoroastrianism) have survived. 21

The important national groups in Tajikistan are Tajiks 58.8%, Uzbeks 22.9%, Russians 10.4%, and others 7.9%. 22

## LANGUAGE

The people of Central Asia, by their language affiliation are classified into two groups, Altaic and Indo-European.



Source: Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964

1. Linguistically all Central Asian Muslims, except Tajiks, belong to the Turkic branch of Altaic languages. Altaic stock has had three families of languages: Turkic, Mongolic and Manchu- Tungusic. Out of these only Turkic is wide spread in Central Asia and has contributed the former name of Turkestan, country of Turks.

23

2. The Tajik language is an Indo-European language of south western group of Iranian languages. According to Barthold:

... the earlier languages of the Central Asian Iranians, including the Sogdian literary language, gave place to the language which is now called Tadjik, and which differs very little from Persian.

Freyman confirmed Barthold's view and regards Tadjik as:

A Central Asian Persian which arose on the basis of an eastern or Khorasan dialect of Persian among the Sogdian Iranians of Central Asia. Tadjik gradually thrust back the eastern Iranian tongues. 24

Although the origins of the Tajiks are not at all clear, the oldest the identifiable cultural stratum of Iranian family of Central Asia are Saka-Scyths, an Iranian speaking people who during 1 millennium B.C occupied parts of Central Asia and in first the century A.D. Sogdian, an Iranian language, has been identified in Eastern parts of Interior Asia 25. Sogdian spoken on ancient Iranian soil in outer Iran (Western Turkistan), expanded along the Silk Road all across the Asiatic continent right into Northern China, because Silk trade between China, Iran and the Roman Empire was in Sogdian hands. Sogdian was more closely related to Saka, the Pamir languages, Afghan, Balouchi and Osset (in the Caucasus) then to West, Iranian languages as Kurd, Tat etc. In Eastern Turkistan the Soghdians were absorbed by the Turks and in western Turkistan they could not resist Arabic pressure from the South West and Turkic invasion from North East. Thus the Soghdian nation and language disappeared.

From 711 A.D. after Arabs conquered the area, Persian speaking Muslims from Iran had come to ancient Soghdiana and superimposed upon natives their West Iranian language 26. In 9th and 10th centuries Persian was formed as a national language. It became the literary language of the Persian - Arabic Saffavids and Samanid Empires (874-999) used by great poets Abulhasan Rudaki (d.941), Abul Qasim Firdousi (934-1025), Omar Khayyam (1040-1123), Muslihuddin Sa'adi (1184-1292) and Shamsiddin Muhammad Hafiz (d.1389), whose works are seen as the Tajik literary heritage. 27

East Iranians have survived among the Ossets in the Caucasus and mountain Tajiks (Galcha and Pamir people). Of the well known Pamir languages Yaghnobi is spoken in the valley of the Yaghnob, a left tributary of the Zarafshan. From North to South, Shughni or Shighni in the valley of Shughnan: Vakhi South of it in the valley of Vakhan, and Ishkashimi in the town of Ishkashim on the upper Amu Darya, called Panj. Sarykali is spoken in South Eastern Pamir in the Taghdumbash and Sarykol valleys. Bartang and Khufi spoken in the valley of Murghab and Sarez and Aq Su in North Eastern Pamir. The Southern most people speak Yidakh. 28

According to Freyman:

Persian had absorbed other Iranic languages which had been spoken in ancient times in areas of Central Asia to North and North East of Iran. The population of Central Asia, especially its urban components, upon conversion to Islam, took up Persian, the language of their Iranian Kin, coming with Arabs to Central Asia. The Tajik language, Central Asian Persian, arose on the basis of the Khorasan dialect of Persian among the Soghdian Iranians of Central Asia. 29



The classification of Iranian language is the following:

1. Tajik:
  - North - North West dialects (Ura-Tyube, West Farghana, Samarkand, Bukhara, Khojend, Macha upper Zerafshan).
2. South - South West dialects (Mountain Tajiks-Kulyab, Karategin-Vakhia, Badakhshan-Goron, Darvaz-Vanch, Zerafshan- Hissar).
3. Persian (Farsi)
4. Other (Afghan, Balouchi, Dzhemshid). 30

The dividing line between the North and Southern dialects of Tajik is the Altay Mountain chain; The Southern dialect extended to North Afghanistan, north east Iran and west China. Southern dialects are referred by geographical localities in which they are found. The southern dialect's region is mountainous.

The Goron-Badakhshan and Darvaz-Vanch groups are distributed among Pyandzh and its tributaries. The Darvaz-Vanch group has sub-division, Rushan, Shugnan, Khuf and Wakhan. The north-northwest group of dialects is best known among the plains Tajiks 31. The central dialects are spoken in Zerafshan, Rishktan and Sokh. 32

The Soviet regime sought to establish standard literary and spoken languages among Central Asian natives. This reformed alphabet was used from 1923 to 1928, the Latinized from 1928 to 1940 with alternations between 1935 and 1940, Cyrillic script was adopted in 1940 with slight reforms around 1952 and 1953 33. On April 1989, a draft law on Tajik language was circulated for public discussion. The text of Tajik Law claimed the legislative recognition of the Tajik language's status as state language and that will lay the foundation for its broad use in all spheres of socio-political, economic and cultural life and for further development of Tajik's culture and language. Article 24 of the Draft law states that Tajik SSR shall promote the study of Tajik writing using the Arabic script and the publication of literature using this script. 34

Now the question is who is a Tajik?

Although the term Tajik has a centuries-long tradition of use in Central Asia, to differentiate Persian speakers from Turkic people, the use of that name to designate a nationality in a political sense is a 20th century creation of the Soviet regime. During 1920 and 1930, the sub division of Soviet Central Asia into republics, solution to the potential threat of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism, gave great weightage to ethnicity in political, cultural, social and economic concerns of the region. The phenomenon that had never existed in the past.

The first definition is to call Tajiks the original inhabitants of Central Asia, before the Muslim conquest and Turkish invasions. For most people a Tajik is somebody who speaks "Tajiki or Persian". 35

According to Barthold:

The name Tajik originally meant Arab, to whom the term was applied by Persians. Then by Turks and Chinese in the 7th century.

36

The term Tajik probably came from Taz or Taj 37. The earlier form of the term was Tazik, Tezik, Tohik or Tazi. Between the 8th and 9th centuries the term gradually changed its reference to include those of Islamic faith rather than the Arabic nationality.

38

According to Shirin Akiner:

...it is derived from the Arabic tribal name 7Taiy, originally form was Tazik or Tezik, term simply used for "Arab" in Central Asia. Later it was used for Iranian subjects of the Arabs in contrast to the Turks, in further broader sense, meaning all people of Muslim faith regardless

of nationality. For Russians in the 16th and 17th centuries, the term was used in much wider sense, simply a trader from Central Asia. Thus connection with trade and urban way of life was so strong that until the early the 20th century the Tajiks were known as Sart: an alternative term used for the sedentary population of Central Asia. 39

Or Tajiks of valleys were known as Sarts.

Sart was the term used for a merchant in Central Asian Turkic usage during the 11th Century. In the 13th Century, during Mongol rule of Central Asia, Sartaul came to mean Muslim in general. Under Timur, Sart and Tajik, and under Timurids of 14th and 15th centuries Sart and Persian are more or less the same. Babar the Mughal Emperor, a century later, differentiated Sart from Tajik. In his description of Kabul he listed Arabs, Aimaks and Turks living on the pasture land and in the cities and in some villages Sart lived, yet in other villages Tadhiks and Afghans.

In the 19th century, centered in the Farghana valley, in the Khanate of Khokand, three population were referred to: Uzbeks, Tajiks and Sarts. Whereas 19th century geographer, Kostenko, detected three reference of the term, Tadhiks, Sedentary Turks (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tatars, Kirgiz), and all Sedentary Muslims of Kulja, Eastern Turkistan. 40

Plain Tajiks sometimes referred to themselves as Dihkan or agriculturists. Closely related to them are the mountain Yagnobi. Mountain Tajiks were collectively known as Galchans by 19th century writers as Radloff and Ujfalvy. The Galchas are the Yazgulem, Ishkashim, Wakhan, Goron, Shugnan, names derived from place-names representing the mountain valleys where they lived. Shugnani, the largest group is further sub divided into Rushani, the Bartangi, Shugni and Oroshori. Names again derived from places of residence 41. Thus Tajiks had no common name for themselves until the Soviet period. In the second decade of present century the term Tajik has been associated mainly with

the citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan, a product of Stalin's nationality policy. Stalin's policy was based on the assumption that there are separate nationalities and ethnic groups, each of them defined by an ethnogenesis, common history, language and territory. Thus ethnicity, language and territory have become the basis of national identity. In pursuit of this policy, Tajikistan was first divided into the Soviet Republic of Turkistan created in 1918 and Soviet Republic of Bukhara (1920). In 1924 Tajikistan was established as an Autonomous Region of the Republic of Uzbekistan and then it was upgraded to a full soviet Socialist Republic in 1929 42, and finally on 9 September 1991, Tajikistan has become a full-fledged sovereign independent state.

Now the term is used for the citizens of Tajikistan i.e. Tajiks of the plains and Tajiks of the mountains.

## **PRE-SOVIET HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:**

### **PRE-ISLAMIC PERIOD**

Central Asia, since time immemorial has been inhabited by a variety of races and civilizations. But the original population was of the same stock as the persians. The most civilized part of the whole region Sogd or Soghdiana corresponding roughly with Transoxania, a literal translation of the Arabic Mavarannahr - the land beyond the river. This was the area lying between the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers, as well as the adjacent area east of the middle course of the Syr-Darya. The people of the Sogd were of Iranian origin. 43

Archaeological evidence records the existence of settled societies in Tajikistan over three millennia or, possibly longer. The Iranic speakers appear in the valleys of the Amu-Darya (ancient Oxus, medieval Sayhun) and Syr-Darya (ancient Jaxartes, medieval Jayhun) in the middle of 6th century B.C. Persian monarch, Cyrus, founded in the valley of the Syr-Darya a city known as "Cyropolis" and made the region of Khorezm, Soghdia and Ustrushana tributaries of his empire 44. The earlier populations were, thus, composed



PRE-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA.

Source: Agha Shoukat Ali, Modernization of Soviet Central Asia: An example of Socialist Construction, Lahore: Punjab University Press, 1964.

of the descendants of earlier Iranian-speaking peoples, Soghdians, Khorezmians, Bactrians, mixed with Tokharians. Sogdiana extended along the middle Oxus, Bactrians on the upper Oxus and Khorezmians inhabiting the lower bank of the Amu-Darya. 45

To the north of these early agricultural societies, was the best known Scythians empire. In the middle of the 1st millennium B.C., the Iranian people who occupied the Central Asiatic Steppes were known as Scythians from Greek and Saka from ancient Persian sources. Nomadic Saka of Central Asia were in contact with settled Persians and Sedentary Iranian peoples from the middle of the first millennium B.C. 46. The Scythians' empire consisted of four major settlements:

1. Sogdiana (including the oases of Bukhara and Samarkand).
2. Farghana (Farghana valley and adjoining areas).
3. Khorasmia (around the Khiva Oasis).
4. Bakhtar (around the Balkh Oasis). 47

This empire was in contact with Chinese and Greeks.

There is archaeological evidence of canal systems, irrigated agriculture, villages with walls of clay and trading crossroads of cultivated lands. Nomads and Sedentary farmers had many-faceted relations in the east and the west at that time. Identified languages in the west of Central Asia are two of the Indo-European language family, Iranian (Saka, Scythian) and Tocharic (Tocharian). Chinese, Greeks and Persians were active economically, militarily and culturally in Central Asia at that time. 48

In the 6th century B.C. the Soghdians of the Zeravshan valley and the Khorezmians of the Amu Darya became part of the empire of the Persian Cyrus I of the Achaemenian dynasty 49. Alexander the Great in 4th Century B.C. (334-1) conquered Central Asia. He destroyed the chief towns of Soghdiana-Markand (Samarkand). Khodjend was then called Alexandria Eschate-the Ultimate Alexandria, Margiana-Merv, Herat and Kandhar were renamed for him. The provinces of Margiana, Khorezmia, Soghdia and Bactria were incorporated in his empire known as Graeco-Macedonian.

Greeks merged with Bactrians, but Greek cultural legacy in cities like Khodjend and Kulyab 50. After the death of Alexander in 323 B.C. his empire was disintegrated and formed part of Greco-Bactrian state. In 159-139 B.C. Scythians (Saka- Massagete) tribes conquered important towns and strongholds of the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom 51. They in turn were driven southward by the greater Yueh-chih, identified with Tokharians or Tocharians by Strabo a Greek geographer, They took possession of the area, Bactria (now Balkh), so completely that it was thereafter called Tokharistan. One of the leader of the Tokharian clans, Kwei-Shuang, laid the foundation of Kushan Empire. From 1st to 3rd century A.D. it remained the foremost power in the Central Asia 52. Kushan ruled Bactria, eastern Turkestan, Soghdiana (territory now covered by the districts of Samarkand and Bukhara), Afghanistan and present day Pakistan 53. Thus forming the largest empire of the ancient world stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Bay of Bengal and from Aral Sea to the Arabian Sea with Kapisa (Bagran near modern Charikar in Afghanistan) as summer and Peshawar, known as Purnshapura, as winter capital. 54

The great Kushan period was one of cultural and economic expansion of Central Asia. The prosperity of the region was due to its location on the Great Silk route connecting China with Persia and the Roman world. Kushans must be given credit for joining this international trade route (that joined east and west by land routes) with the Arabian Sea route going towards the west. To meet the demands of international trade route, Kushans emperors issued gold coins with thirty five deities of different religions of the time. Kushans encouraged the development of iron industry, varieties of crafts in silver, gold, copper, precious stones etc. Luxury items such as mirrors scent bottles, combs, ornaments have been unearthed in the different urban areas.

Kushan emperors were also known to have built fire temples, Buddhist Stupas and monasteries. But Gandhara art is the finest gift of the Kushans, to world civilization, that spread from Gandhara to the whole of the Central Asia and its influence is noted in China, Korea and Japan 55. Their, civilization spread from Sinkiang, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Southern part of Uzbekistan to the whole of Pakistan 56: The historical period of great Kushans can be considered as "Golden Age" in ancient history of Central Asia.

At the end of the 2nd century A.D. Kushan rule began to weaken, but took nearly 250 years to fade away. In 425 their last ruler was expelled from Bactria by incoming White Huns (Ephtalites) 57. These White Huns, who conquered southern Turkistan, were of Iranian descent 58. They built a mighty empire in Central Asia from Kazakhstan to Iran and even spread out to Europe. White Huns were warriors and introduced many innovations in the art of warfare. They introduced a new system of land tenure, plus Hunish system of tribal ownership. They popularized new kind of lady's dresses and tall caps worn by ladies of Northern Areas of Pakistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the survivals from their time 59. They had trade connections with Khorasan (Northern Iran), and Transoxania (the country across the Oxes, between the Amu and Syr-Darya). The silk trade (along Silk Route) dealt in raw silks, fabrics, carpets, glass, drugs etc. During this period trade was promoted not only across the continent (with China in the East and Iran in the West) but also within Central Asia. 60

Unfortunately their lack in administrative skills resulted in decline of their power when they lost hold over the areas under their rule to the attacks of Turkic tribes from Semirechye. Between 563-567 A.D, the White Huns were annexed to the great Khaganate stretching from Manchuria to the Black Sea. During the 6th century the nomad empire of the Turks, according to Barthold as forming "the most extensive nomad empire ever known up to that date", held sway over the whole region of Central Asia. This empire was divided into two parts: the Eastern Turks possessed the territory between the Urals and Mongolia and the Western Turks were centered on the Semirechye. This Western part was conquered by the Muslim Arabs. Turkistan at this time was politically divided into a number of small states, Prince of Samarkand being the most powerful ruler who bore the title Ikhshid. The prevailing religions were Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Manichaeism, Judaism, Christianity, Mazdaism, etc. 61

## **THE ISLAMIC CONQUEST**

7th Century Arab conquests formed major landmark in Central Asian history. Arabs of the 7th and 8th century conquered Central Asia and formed a state Maveraneher.



Here they introduced Islam first to the farming or settled populations which were primarily Iranian and later, among the nomads. The introduction of Islam popularized new Arabic script, a new religious organization, classical learning, including that of the ancient Greeks, architectural changes, a new world view. Islam replaced or eradicated other faiths such as Nestorian Christianity, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism religion and molded diverse people into a uniform social pattern. People, however, continued to speak the local Iranian or Turkic dialects. 62

The major achievement of Islam, other than cultural, commercial, scientific, is in term of identity. The original source of identity among Central Asians fall into two major types:

1. Primordial ties, which individuals claim by virtue of their family, common blood and ancestry, language, age, sex and so forth.
2. Acquired identities, which are attained by individuals because of membership in an occupation, class affiliation and so on. 63

Thus before the advent of Islam several identities co-existed simultaneously. They varied according to areas, social structure and social status of the population, tribal, clan, urban, rural, agriculturalist, intellectual etc. Thus with Islam, the sense of tribal identity was fused with religious identity first and secular concept of nationality later on.

Eventually both the tribes and sedentary societies came to share in varying degrees a common law (Sharriat), customary practices (Aadat), common family system and common urban social organization, that were harmonized with pre-Islamic culture.

The major contribution of Islam to the Central Asians was of political identity, Ummah - a universalistic framework of brotherhood of all believers. A Muslim belongs to the Ummah, through the mere act of sharing the faith. This identity indirectly has proved tolerant of ethno linguistic differences, accepted, incorporated and integrated diverse people, cultures, traditions into an all-embracing cultural religious community.

In Central Asia this sense of political identity rooted in Islam was strengthened by the military encounter not only with non-Muslims from East and West but also with Shiit Iran. For instance, the strong sense of Uzbek identity was the result, in part, of their position in the vanguard of the Sunni defense against Shiism, that is, Persian domination. Thus Central Asians remained part and parcel of their region while sharing a common faith and civilization with Muslims in the rest of the world. 64

To begin with, during the reign of Hazrat Umar Farooq it was decided to crush anti-Islamic rebellions in order to spread Islam. One of such rebellion was drawing its strength from the Persian empire, ruled by Khusran Pervez, who held sway over the whole of modern Iran, Bactria (in Central Asia) Iraq and Mesopotamia. It was the battle of Nehamind (642A.D.) that the fate of Persian empire was sealed and was the beginning of Muslim domination in Asia. To summarize, during the first half of the 7th century Muslim defeated the mighty power of Byzantine and of Sassanian Persia and in 646 A.D. they occupied Merv 65. It was finally the last quarter of the 7th Century when Muslim marched towards the heart of Central Asia.

Central Asia at that time was divided into a number of small states. At first, Muslim Arabs were interested only in conquering the fertile valleys of the Amu Darya. The Arabs in 673 A.D. cross the Darya and laid siege to Bukhara and in 713 conquered Bukhara and Farghana 66. It was only in last decade of the 7th Century, under the reign of Umayyid Caliph Abdul Malik that Arabs conquered Transoxania as far as Syr Darya 67. Khorasan, stretching from the Caspian sea to the Murgab River, with its capital at Merv, was used by Arabs as base for their invasion of Transoxania and Tokharistan. From 704-715 under Emir Qutayba Ibn Muslim, governor of Khorasan, Transoxania, Tokharistan and Khorezm came under Arabs domination 68. From 717-719 Al-Jarrah Ibn Abdullah was the governor of Khorasan, there he sought to maintain status quo and uphold the hegemony of the Arabs. He was dissatisfied over the question of Tax collection from the newly converted Muslims, this became issue in Khurasan. He followed a tough Policy and sought to prevent conversion to Islam. He was removed a new governor of Khorasan was appointed. In 720 Suleman Ibn Abilsari was appointed as tax collector in Sohgdiana. At that time e.g.

Samarkand tributary, Zaravshan river, Panjikant, had been ruled by Divastic-Soghdian feudal lord, Soghdian king, ruler of Samarkhand or only Soghdian King. Sulemain laid siege to one of the castles of Soghdiana. This resulted in anti-Arab feelings. Fuel was added by governor general Said al-Harasi, new governor of Khorasan, who took up large punitive expeditions against Soghdians. Many Soghdians fearing repression because of their anti-Arab activities decided to migrate to districts further from Arab control, like Farghana and Khojend. Inhabitants and Derasti of Panjikant fortified themselves in the fortress of Abyar. In 722 Arabs attacked Soghdiana refugees. Said al-Harasi led the attack in Khojend district and Sulaiman in the Zaravshan valley. From here Arabs move successfully towards the town of Kish and Rabinjan. 69. By the middle of the 8th century, all lands in Central Asia, Bukhara, Samarkand, Khorasan, Tashkand, Farghana, up to the Tianshan were conquered by the Arabs. 70

But this cannot curtail resistance to Arab invasion or anti-Arabs revolts both on the part of Iranian population of Transoxania and Tokharistan and of Turks of Turgesh Tribes, from Semirechye. But "the proud national spirit of the Iranians ... was eventually to breakdown the supremacy of the Arabs and give birth to the first Persian dynasties in Islam" 71. The most important was a revolt of 776- 83. Its leader Mukanna or Muqanna, is now enshrined in Tajikistan, popularly known as "Fighter for popular freedom". 72

In 750 Nasr, last Umayyad governor of Khurasan, seeing the weakness of Umayyad cause, tried to win over local aristocracy, but it was too late. A mass movement had begun against Umayyads which was used by Abbasids to consolidate their own power. This marked the beginning of the end of the direct Arab rule in Khorezm and Transoxania. 73

Although the direct Arab rule came to an end in the middle of the 8th century, Islam, Islamic culture and civilization continued to flourish at the hands of Muslim traders, missionaries, officials, farmers etc who migrated to the land of Turkistan during Arab conquests. Of all these most important was the trading class who during the 8th century penetrated as far as Khorezm and to the banks of Volga. Between 9th and 13th centuries,

two medieval routes were of particular importance for the expanding of Islam, the north south route along the Volga known as the "Fur Road" and the west east route from Black sea to China, "Silk Road".

Muslim Central Asian Merchants, Arabs, Central Asian Iranians and Turks - brought Islam to the Kazakh steppes north of the Syr-Darya, to the Kirghiz mountains and finally to the regions of the eastern Turkistan (Xinjiang) 74. The main reason for the peaceful spread of Islam was the fact that these Arabs merchants exemplified or propagated Islam merely as a way of life than as a creed.

The history of the people of Central Asia from the 9th to the beginning of the 13th centuries was a period of the development of feudal conditions, the aggravation of class differences, and the formation of a series of feudal states, as well as prolonged struggle for independence. The formation of independent feudal Kingdoms of the Tahirids (821-73), Safavids (873-903) and Samanids (903-99) were in the historical phase characterized by Soviet authors as the victory of the local aristocracy over the Arabs and the Caliphate. 75

The Tahirids, with their center at Nishapur, fostered the first attempts of writing persian in the Arabic script. Followed by petty dynasties of Mazanderan and Gurgan. 76

Abbasid, governor-Ismail, in the last decade of the 9th century laid the foundation of Samanid dynasty declared Bukhara as his capital after successfully crushing all uprisings. He extended his domain from Turkistan to Rayy in Azerbaijan, South of the Caspian sea. 77

The Samanids played a great role in the economic, ethnic and cultural history of the area. They had highly centralized and efficient system of government. Agricultural products, fruits, cotton, cereals were produced by Shahrud (canal systems). Textiles, leather goods, arms, tools of this period achieved world fame. Arts developed rapidly and

Samanid capital of Bukhara with its grand library Savran-al-Hikmt became a great center of learning in the Muslim world. According to Ibn Sina:

I entered a building with many rooms. I saw there books which many people have never heard of. I have never seen such a collection of books. 78

During Samanids period there was "New Persian Renaissance" which was the reaction of Iranian nationalism against Arab Islam. Farsi language of 9th and 10th centuries was represented by such poets as Rodaki and Firdous. Farsi was formed by the impact of Arabic, greatly mixed with Arabic words, and on the Iranian Dari language. Arabic became language of Ulema, while Farsi of cultural activities, & Tajik-Persian language became wide spread because scholars and poets from Transoxiana went to Baghdad and Samarra, considered almost Central Asian cities. Whereas influx of scholars, pious men, Ulemas, Poets to Bukhara and Samarkand which began under Ismail continued after his death. Samarkand became the political capital of Zerafashan valley and of the region between the Amu Darya and the Syr-Darya. Arabic language, however, remained the language of science, philosophy, Judicial literature, religious subjects etc. 79

This period, 9th and 11th centuries, was of great importance as far as the development of ethnological history of the region is concerned. The period between 9th and 10th centuries gave rise to the formation of the Tajiks as a separate national group. Tajiks are the first among the Central Asian people to do so because of the fact that, they already possessed a definite territory, their language, culture had already developed within the Samanid state, they considered themselves different from Arabs and Turks. During Arab conquests Tajik population of Farghana, Zarafshan valley, Khojend and Panjikant were involved in anti Arab activities, and the most important was the fact that Soghdians and Bactrians were their old ancestors, who had their own history, culture, language, sedentary pattern of agriculture, social organization. Upto 5th and 6th centuries A.D. economic unit was the patriarchal joint family whose members possessed their lands

and herds in common 80. Thus they had all ingredients necessary for the rise of nationalism.

On the land adjacent to Tajik, there arose Uzbek narodnost or national group in the earlier period Turk tribes from the steppe to the valleys of Zerafshan, Ferghana, Khorezm and other regions of Maverannahr. As a result of intermingling with the local agricultural people, Khorazmians, Soghdians, Massagets, Saka, the Turks adopted their economic mode of life and agricultural habits, the local people who spoke Iranian language in turn adopted the language of the Turks. This ethnic intermixture was going on during the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries. It was during this period that Turkic speaking people, later known as Uzbeks, moved from north of Syr Darya to south and achieved a definite territory. 81

The formation of Kirghiz began on the territory outside Central Asia amongst the Turk tribes of the Eastern Tien-Shan. By the 9th century they had carved out their own state on upper-Yenisey. At the time of Mongol invasion the process of intermingling of the Kirghiz tribes with the indigenous population of Central Asia had begun. According to Radloff:

... they were in the Yenisez region down to the 17th century when pressure from the Russian Cossacks drew them South .... 82

The end of the 10th century witnessed the last phase of the Samanid empire's existence Provisional governors refused to obey the authority of the center, giving rise to divisive tendencies. The peasant unrest sparked off by heavy taxation and religious unrest due to enforcement of vigorous form of Hanafi Sunism, resulting in social crisis which enveloped Samanid empire. A decline which was witnessed after the death of Nasr Ibn-Ahmed (942 A.D.) was further accelerated by well organized nomadic attacks from the North. The Samanid rulers kept on losing important towns in the process and in 942 A.D. the Karakhanids (of Qarluq nomad Turkish stock, migrated from Mongolia to Artush during 8th century. Later moved towards west across the Syr- Darya, and south of Aral and Caspian sea for better pasture areas. In 10th century they formed a powerful

Karakhanid Confederacy in Undu-e-Kend) and other nomad tribes from Kashghar and Transoxiana, invaded Khorasan and defeated Samanid's army. This facilitated in the invasion of Bukhara by Turk leader Boghra Khan 83. Boghra Khan's grandson, Harun, succeeded in taking Bukhara and Samarkand from Samanids in year 999. Thus supplanting an Iranian by a Turkish power for the first time for at least three centuries 84. Thus from that time until the Russians, except the invasion by the Karakitays and Mongols Central Asia remained under the Turkic Muslim rulers.

The Karakhanid's rule in Transoxania and Semirechye, tried to carry their conquests further south but were defeated by Mahmud of Ghazni, with the result of maintaining Amu Darya as the line of bifurcation between the Karakhanid and the Ghaznavid realm 85. Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavid came to power in 997 A.D. and succeeded in unifying the various emirates of Khwarizm, Gharjistan and Khuttal. Thus dynasty founded by Alp Tegin reached its peak during the reign of Mahmud. But Ghaznavid rule ended abruptly in 1037 A.D. because his successor Masud was not capable enough to hold such a mighty empire together. 86

However, Ghaznavid's achievements in cultural field left a great impact on the socio-political and cultural life of Central Asia. They introduced a new Turko-Islamic culture, amalgamation of Turkic and Islamic components. New techniques of war and warfare were introduced in Central Asia. During this period, Samarkand and Bukhara became great centers of wealth, power, learning and influence. 87

Early in the 11th century began the famous thrust of the Ghuzz or Oghuz Turks from the regions north of the Syr-Darya. These Turkish tribes were divided into twenty-four clans, out of which three are most important and famous in Islamic history. First of these was Khalij or Khaliji, who gave dynasty to Delhi and adopted the Afghan language and customs and crushed the Safavid dynasty of Persia. The second was Seljuks (1038-1150) who succeeded Ghaznavids. Seljuks empire extended its sway over Anatolia, Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Khorezm and lands along the lower course of the Syr-Darya. They succeeded to the Samanid heritage of strictly orthodox Hanafi Sunnism

88. The Seljuks supported Sunnite Caliph of Baghdad. Thus sharpening the struggle between Shiites and Sunnites. Seljuks persecuted Shiah and crushed Ismailites, a Shiites branch in their domain, Ismailism originated as resistance movement against the Seljuk rulers 89. Seljuk empire could not survive the death of great war leaders and rulers like Tugul Bey, Alp Arslan and Malik Shah. After the death of Malik Shah, weak rulers, petty conspiracies, treachery, feudalism and crusades disintegrated the Seljuk empire 90. Seljuks in the west left Konia Sultanate in Anatolia and in the east governate of Khorezm (Khiva) known as "Shahs of Khorezm" as their important segments. The third offshoot of the Oghuz tribal confederacy was in Anatolian kingdom known as Ottomans. A small border Khan of Ottoman in 1326 obtained control of Busra and founded the Ottoman empire 91 (details are out of scope of this research work).

Round about 1140 the Karakhandis whose power was still paramount in Transoxania were overthrown by Kara-Kitays or Karakitai at Khojend. Established themselves in Transoxania and Semirechye 92. They were new ethnic elements in Central Asia. They were of Mongolian origin, Chinese in culture, traditions and were nomads. Although they were successful in securing submission of their Muslim Vassals, they never embraced Islam. Soon they came in conflict with rulers of Khorezm and were overrun by Mongols. By the end of 13th century Kara-Kitays had disappeared from history. 93

Khorezm Shahs (1097-1220) was a notable of Turkic dynasty who established its rule over the Iranians of southern Central Asia and all of Persia as far as India. By the time of Mongol invasion in 13th century, which brought its rule to an end they had adopted agriculture and Iranian patterns of rulership, continued to speak their Turkic language.94

## **THE MONGOL INVASION**

The Mongol invasion of 13th century was considered as second, after Arab conquests, milestone in the history of Central Asia.



Ghingiz Khan, lord of nomad Mongols rose to power in 1205 in Mongolia. He built a nomadic empire with a fast galloping war machine, thus able to impose his authority over the settled Turko-Tajik population in Central Asia. In 1220, Bukhara, Samarkand, Khodjent and other oasis cities fell and by 1221 Mongols had reached across the Oxus, to rule what is now north Afghanistan 95. Merv was destroyed and Neshapur, Herat, Rayy, Dinamer and Hamadan met the same fate 96.

The impact of the Mongols upon Central Asia was viewed as a disaster. The Mongols destroyed the cities of Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara, brought an end to the intellectual life of Central Asia, which never regained their previous intellectual glory. The greatest destruction of the Mongols was brought upon the Khorezmian irrigation system which turned Khorezm into a desert. Thousands of people including women and infants were slaughtered 97. For Central Asian "Dark Ages" began in the 13th century with no Renaissance.

After the death of Ghingiz Khan in 1227, his empire was divided among the four sons. Juchi, Chaghatai, Ogthai and Tului. The eldest son Juchi, controlled the western region from Irtysh to the Volga and from Siberia to Khwarizm, known as "Ulus of Juchi". On his death Juchi's Ulus was divided between Batu and Sabagan, his two sons. Batu extended his authority over Dashti-i-Kipchaq, north of the Caspian sea, right up to Crimea on the black sea and across Don river over the rulers of Moscow. Ulus of Batu was known as "Golden Horde" and Uzbeks was eighth in descent from Batu, who Islamized the Turko-Mongol people of his territory popularly known as Tatars.

Sabagan, established his control over Sibir known as later Siberia 98. This Sabagan's domain lay from the Syr-Darya and Chu-Rivers north to the Irtysh and west of the Ural River. The territory is identical with present day Kazakhstan, without the steppe between the Ural and Volga rivers. 99

The Ulus of Chaghatai embraced important land of Turkistan, which includes Mavar-an-Nahr, Farghana, Yedish, Alatan, Tienshan hilly region, south Jungar and

Kashgaria, Khorasan and Sinkiang. It thus comprised most of the settled population of the agricultural districts and all important flourishing cities of Samarkand, Bukhara, Tashkent, Khojent, Kashghar, Herat and Ghazni. 100

Third son, Ogthai, was the ruler of the home territory of Mongolia and neighboring conquered areas in north China and western grassy steppes. As power of Ogthai declined, most of his region was merged with territories of the Chaghatai's Ulus.

Tului, the fourth son inherited the Far-East conquest of Chingiz Khan in China. With Peking as its capital. Tului had three sons, Mangu, Kublai and Hulaqu. Mangu established himself in supreme Khakanates. Kublai laid the foundation of the Yun dynasty in China. Hulaqu captured Bughdad in 1258 and established II Khanid dynasty in Persia and west Asia. 101

In the last decade of the 13th century the position in Turkestan can be viewed in two aspects, Ulus of the steppe and Ulus of the settled.

1. Golden Horde were in control of steppe right into the heart of Russia. Russia was considered as distinct province. Russian princes went to Sarai, the Golden Horde capital, to offer tribute every year. The Golden Horde were able to develop their own policies: They became ancestors of the Turko-Tatar tribes of Euroasian steppe. Berk (1257-60) was the first prince of Golden Horde to embrace Islam, a new phase which lasted till the middle of the 16th century.
2. The position was not so simple in the settled areas of the two rivers. In the Oases Mongol needed flocks and herds for the substance of their armies. But due to mass slaughters of inhabitants faced problems. Secondly the flocks were let loose on the rich irrigated lands as spasture resulting in clashes between cultivators and herdsmen. Clavijo, a Spanish ambassador to Timur, explained this nomadic spirit as:

each band following its own Fancy, pasturing its herds where crops were finest, so that Timur in his time had to intervene to protect the Sedentary population. 102

The struggle between the rival Ulus led to the plundering of the cities not once but again and again. For instance Khorezm passed from Golden Horde to the Chaghtai Horde and back again. Due to strife between Halaqu dynasty and Chaghatai, Bukhara lay for ten years a ruin. Other cities suffered a similar fate. Commerce suffered terribly because Mongol ruler murdered the traders from his rival's domain who happened to be within his power. e.g. in 1262 Hulaqu ordered the slaughter of merchant from Berk's territory and Berk retaliated by issuing a similar order.

Yet behind the bloodiest chapter of human history there is:

1. The Mongol conquest changed the balance of power between the nomad and settle regions and the Turkic nomad element of the steppes began to some extent, encroach on the towns. 103
2. Chaghtai, gave his name to the literary Turkic language "Chaghatai" that was created in Central Asia at that time. While the descendent of Juchi provided new ethnic element of Islamised Turko-Mongol people popularly known as Tatar.
3. Mongols also supplied for subsequent Central Asian dynasties the ideological express of legitimacy. Thus the rules of inheritance within the family were applied to the rule of succession in the empire. The successors to Chingiz Khan were considered to be the legitimate heirs to the rulership and sovereignty. The proof of this lies in the career of Timur who did not claim himself to be the legitimate ruler of Central Asia. The descendants of Timur, however, ruled by virtue of Timur descent. 104

Timur proclaimed himself sovereign in Balkh in 1370 and made Samarkand his capital. He was not only empire builder but also civilization builder. He infused a new spirit of political domination among the settled Turkish population and opened a new

chapter of Irano-Islamic civilization. He built roads, canals, developed trade and encouraged the work of artisans, artists and scientists. 105


Timur's line ruled from the end of the 14th century until the decade of the 16th century as Timurid dynasty. 106

The end of the Timurid period was marked by the rise of new political forces. Politically three kingdoms rose over the ashes of the Timurid empire:

1. Shaibanid in Central Asia which incorporated Bukhara, Samarkand, Balkh, Tashkent and Farghana.
2. Babar laid the foundation of Mughal empire in Delhi and Agra. Thus South of the Hindu Kush and east of Herat spread the Mughal empire, incorporating Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.
3. Safavid dynasty in Iran and Khurasan, the Amu Darya was demarcated as border between Iran and Central Asia. 107

The break down of Golden Horde begun at the end of the 14th century influenced the ethnic development of the people of Central Asia. In the 15th century there developed powerful tribal unions among the Deshti Kypchak. This tribal confederation, included a tribe known as Uzbek Khanate, ruled by Abdul Khayr Khan of Shaibandi house in 1428. He united all nomadic tribes and extended southward to Mawar-an-Nahr, but his design was checked by Oirots, who succeeded Oghtai in Mongolia. By the end of 15th century, the grandson of Abul Kahyr Muhammad Shaibani Khan led these steppe tribes and conquered the deteriorating Timurid state. He led the nomadic Uzbeks into Mawar-an-Nahr and here began a new integration of population between old Turkic and Tajik population and new comers - combination of Turk and Mongol tribes. 108

Kazakhs, by the end of the 15th century, were merely parts of Uzbek confederation. According to M.Vyatkin, a Kazakh historian:



Source: Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964

... by the beginning of 16th century a distinction had already developed between the economic life of the Uzbeks and that of Kazakhs. The Uzbeks had begun to change over to a settled agricultural life, while the Kazakhs remained nomad cattle breeders.

109

In the second half of the 16th century Kazakh union or confederation was formed under the Khan Haqq Nazar. After the death of the Khan, Kazakhs were divided into three main division or Hordes. The little Horde, was the western most, occupying the steppes west of the Aral sea. The Middle Horde was in the center, occupying the steppes east of the Little Horde and north of the Aral sea. The Great Horde was the eastern most occupying the steppes east of the Aral sea to lake Badakhshan, the Chinese border and semireachye 110. In 1731 the Little Horde, in 1740 the Middle Horde and in 1742 part of the Great Horde had accepted Russian protectorate.

Coming back to our ongoing discussion, Shaibani defeated Babar and Hussain Baikara and took from them the whole of Transoxiana, Balkh and Khorasan. He challenged Ismail, founder of Safavid dynasty in Persia but defeated and killed in 1510 at Battle of Merv. The result was the loss of Khorasan and all land south of the Amu to the Safavids. Uzbeks were pushed to the north of that river, Kopet Dagh becoming the limit of Uzbek rule. A frontier was negotiated with next Shaibani along the Amu and the mountains not very different from that between former USSR and the Middle East. It also become religious frontier: Transoxiana and eastern persian settlement area that is now Afghanistan and Tajikistan remained Sunni, Persia became Shii. Shaibani's successor gained control of Mawar-an-Nahr, Khwarizm, Farghana, Balkh and Badakhshan. Nomadic Uzbek at that time started settling down in the fertile land of Mawar-an-Nahr and become settled agriculturist in Khawarzim, Farghana, Balkh and north of Syr-Darya, rather than nomadism. 111

Abdullah II (1583-98) greatest Khan of Shaibanid succeeded in uniting Khorezm with Transoxiana and conquered Herat, Meshed, and Badakhshan. After his death there

began a period of anarchy, constant wars with Persian Safavids for Khwarzizm and strained relation with Mughals weakened Shaibanid's strength. It gave way first to Janids and then to the Mangits 112. Through out 17th century and greater part of 18th century Janids continued to rule, but after Nadir Shah's invasion (1740-7) the administrative control passed into the hands of Mangit tribe.

It was the time when people of Central Asia had completed the process of their ethnic and political formation and came to occupy the area which they occupy today. In north of Central Asia, Kazakhs occupied range lands north of Caspian Sea, East to Dzungarian border, the former Kipchak steppe. The Uzbeks occupied the former territories of Maverrannahr, the Farghana valley, the Tashkent. The Uzbeks became urban and agricultural with Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent as their great cities. To the East were the Kirghiz in the Tien-Shan and Pamir ranges. To the South were the Tajiks. To the South West were the Turkmens. Emerging out of the break-up of Golden Horde, the Karakalpaks were first noted on the lower Syr-Darya in the 16th century. 113

At the opening of the 18th century the control over sedentary population was in the hands of three petty rulers, Emir of Bukhara, Khanate of Khokand and Khanate of Khiva. There were some common traits that transcended political frontiers:

1. Strict Sunni orthodoxy was acknowledged by all inhabitants - Turks, Tajiks, Settled nomads, rulers etc. This differentiated cultural development of this area from that of Shii Persia. The inclusion of the whole of Persia in the Shii orbit caused many Sunni scholars, poets, artists to go to Transoxania in order to preserve their faith. This caused theological rift between Sunni Transoxania and Shia Persia.
2. Considering the general state of development in Central Asia, it had hardly risen above the level of the Islamic Middle Ages. For instance school system, in the primary schools (Mekteb) children of 6 to 15 years of age learned to read Arabic or Persian religious work. Above Mektebs, Madreses, impart a thorough knowledge of Arabic, some fundamental operations of arithmetic. These Madreses were almost

entirely confined to the settled Uzbeks and Tajiks localities. The people from far flung areas stayed for 15 to 20 years.

3. As the population of Transoxania became more settled, the whole borderland extending northwards and eastward from the areas settled by Persians and Afghans passed into the Islamic sphere of settled urban and rural population.
4. The nomads remained disturbing elements in the three Khanates - Khiva, Bukhara and Khokand. The Khans tried to evolved methods of keeping order among Turkmens, Kazakhs and Kirghiz: the tribes were allowed to keep them after they had been subjected to a Khan.
5. Since the beginning of 10th century, Islamic traditions and practices and Islamic Shariat had taken firm hold throughout the oases and desert regions: all writing either written Arabic or Persian, was in Arabic character. All the Turkic languages adopted large Islamic, Arabic or Persian loan vocabulary. Art, literature, poetry, architecture etc all had Islamic touch.
6. The structure of aristocracy of tribal princes and religious leader was patriarchal.  
114
7. There were two basic groups, the sedentary farmers with well developed irrigation system and nomadic herdsmen. The farmers and city dwellers live by their produce and manufactures. Urban crafts in metals, tiles, wood, rugs, wool, silk etc. The nomads lived by their herds of horses, sheep, cattle, camels and goats. They trade with farmers and urban communities in their neighbourhood. Each was dependent on the other, a relation which has helped to give the area its unity. 115
8. Beside agriculture and cattle breeding there was miniature painting, silk production, metal working. Gold for this purpose came from Russia and Persia and silver from China.





Source: Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964

9. Bukhara, Samarkand, Merv and Tashkent were the important trading cities. Transoxania had trade links with India, China, Persia and Russia, while Bukhara had well supplied slave market. 116

Tajiks under Uzbek rule, dispersed throughout the many principalities in the area. They lived in the cities of Bukhara, Khokand Khanates and in the Farghana valley. Farsi became the court language of various Khans. Karategins, Shugan, Zervashan, Gissar, Rushan, Kulyab, Darvaz, Vakhan and other semi autonomous principalities were grouped in the mountains and paid tribute to Bukhara Emirate. Tajiks also lived in the Khiva and Kazakh Khanates, in Chinese Turkistan in northern India, Afghanistan and in Persian Khorrasan at that time. 117

## **RUSSIAN INVASION**

Russian penetration began in the late 18th century, the beginning of this can be traced when in 1328 Uzbek bestowed the title of Grand Duke on the Moscow prince Ivan I 118. Before that in the 3rd quarter of the 13th century, Russian princes paid regular tribute to Mongol rulers and their internal quarrels were settled by Khan. Saray, the capital, was the center for distributing power by the system of Yarlyks-permits to rule. Throughout the period of Mongols domination they were considered as national enemy and direct contact with the Mongols was limited. 119

The defeat of Golden Horde at the hands of Timur encouraged Grand Duke Ivan III to stop paying tribute. He reorganized state machinery and built a large army. Mongol's rule over Russia came to an end in 1480. Taking advantage of the new trends Ivan IV, the Terrible, assumed for the first time the title of Tsar in 1547. This was the age of Russian expansion. For the first time Russians had advanced towards the east when in 1552 the Khanate of Kazan and in 1556, at the mouth of Volga, Khanates of Astrakhan were occupied. These victories opened the gates of Asia for Russians. 120

Russian expansion into Asia falls into three phases.


- I. The first movement was due east from the Urals to the Pacific. At this phase only primitive tribes were encountered and soon were overrun and outnumbered by Russian settlers.
- II. The second phase covered most of what is now Kazakhstan. This was began by Peter the Great at the beginning of 18th century and continued until the middle of the 19th century. 121

Thus by the year 1840 whole of the Kazakh or steppe region was under the Russian rule 122. and the border of Russia had reached Turkistan - the region now occupied by the four Central Asian states. By the middle of the 19th century the Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand, deprived of the buffer of the Kazakh steppes, were in a direct face to face contact with Russia. The Russian defence lines, fortresses and patrol stations contributed towards the suitable conditions for attacks on these Khanates. Now it was the time for the advancement of the third phase.

- III. Russian conquest of Turkistan, the third phase, was achieved in a much shorter span of time, began from 1855 and ended with battle of Gok Tepe in 1881. 123

In Turkistan or Oasis region, Russians encountered scattered feudal principalities, tribal territories with complex national composition, heterogeneous ethnically states system. The area between Amu and Syr Darya and Farghana valley was inhabited by Tajiks, Uzbeks and remnants of older Turkic groups. These sedentary areas had been divided between three Khanates, numerous small vassal and independent despotisms. Amu and Syr Darya was surrounded by the tribal territories of Turkic nomads: Turkmens in the west, Kazakhs in the north and Kirghiz in the east with no ideas of nationality and frontier. 124

Division of the indigenous people of Central Asia into six main nationalities-Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Karakalpak and Tajik - is a modern phenomenon. These people had no national feelings, sentiments and their allegiance was



Source: Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964

with their rulers. The distinction was not between nationalities or even between Turkic and Iranian groups, but between nomad and sedentary people. But there existed religious and cultural distinction. The sedentary population observed Shariat, while nomads were nominal Muslims and preserved the Adat. There were religious minority of Shiite Muslims and Jews. Identification with religion and culture of Islamic world was strong among Uzbeks and Tajiks than among nomads.

Linguistically, many regions, those of Bukhara, Samarkand, Kattakurgan, Southern Bukhara, Western parts of Farghana valley were bilingual-both Iranian and Turkic languages were spoken. Although after the Turkic conquests of 11th to 15th centuries dislodged Iranian Tajik language, it continued to play an important role in cultural developments, e.g Emir of Bukhara and his administration preferred Tajik to Uzbek. This further complicated any national awakening among natives. The loyalty that did exist strongly was that to tribe, clan and family 125. The ideas of nationality plus frontier had no meaning for them. Even in the heydays of Khanates no one thought himself of Bukhara, a Khivan or a Kokandi. The adjoining countries, Persia, China and Afghanistan also had no firm frontiers. The absence of any recognized frontier means that Khanates were not only at war with each other but also with Afghanistan, China and Persia. Khiva disputed over Turkmen territory with Persia and Afghanistan, Bukhara and Afghanistan both claimed Balkh, Hissar, Kulyab, Badakshan and the Pamir. Afghanistan and Khokand often supported Muslim risings in Chinese Turkistan. Besides these there were areas of internal conflicts among the Khanate. The constant struggle between Khanates and their disunity ruled out any far reaching cultural and political developments and led to the weakening of the Central authority 126. Thus offered an easy prey to the Russians.

Here arises the question, what were the main reasons for rapid Russian advance in Central Asia?.

The Russians Tsar, Nicholas I (1796-1855), dreamed of becoming "gendarme of Europe". Russian armies crushed revolt in Poland and in Hungary and achieved victories over Persia, and Ottoman Turkey in the Caucasus but were defeated in Crimea (1855-56).

This defeat had destroyed Russian prestige. This spurred Russian drive into Turkistan to restore their prestige. Secondly Russian economy recovered from the Crimean war damages, but still it could not compete with Britain, France, Germany in the European markets. It was the Central Asian markets where Russian economy could compete with others. The situation was further complicated with the outbreak of American civil war. Russia was importing its raw cotton from the U.S, but the Russo-American cotton trade was interrupted by the outbreak of civil war. Result was the closing down of the Russian textile industry. If Russia occupied Turkistan they could get cotton abundantly and cheaply. Heavy pressure from Russian merchants and industrialists made Russian authorities more determined to control Central Asia by conquest.

Thirdly, Russians were anxious over British influence in Central Asia and their role in Russia's defeat in Crimean war. According to Colonel Ignatyev:

... in the event of a break with Britain, it is only in Asia that we can fight her with some chance of success.... 127

He added that:

Asia is the only area left to our trade and developing industry, which are too weak to complete successfully elsewhere with Britain, France and Belgium, America and other countries... Strengthening of our relations with Central Asia and of our influence there, and the weakening of British influence, correspond so closely with Russia's vital interests that it should not be difficult to meet the expense of an expedition. One can expect that many rich merchants and manufacturers will be ready to assist such an undertaking. 128

To begin with, it was decided to send mission to Khiva and Bukhara under Ignatev on 16 October 1857 to study:

1. The situation in Central Asia.
2. To strengthen Russian influence in Bukhara and Khiva as to get cooperation of these Khanates against the Khokand.
3. To improve commercial relations with these states. 129

Ignatyev's mission ended in complete failure in Khiva, but were able to gain some commercial privileges from Emir of Bukhara. On the other hand, they identified the military roads and places of strategic importance. In 1861, Governorate of Orenburg, General A.P. Bezak visited the Syr-Darya and formed the opinion that Tashkent should be captured as soon as possible 130. The Russians started a series of local operations at the Kokand. They took Tokmak and Pishpek in 1860, Djulek and Yany - Kurgan in 1861, Anlie Ata and Chimket in 1864. 131

In order to pacify the British anxiety, which had been watching the Russian advance in Central Asia, and to reassure them that Russia had no claims on India, and on the other hand to provide some justification before world opinion about its territorial achievements, Tsar chancellor, prince Gorchakov, provided his justification in 1864:

The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which come in to contact with half-savage wandering tribes possessing no fixed social organization. It invariably happens in such cases that the interests of security on the frontiers, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with. 132

In 1865 once again, General Cherniaev emphasized that without the conquest of Tashkent it was not possible to maintain Russian position in Central Asia, especially the existing frontier with Khokand. To justify his expedition, he argued that:

1. The Emir of Bukhara, Muzaffar-al-Din, was eager to take hold of the city.
2. Population was divided internally, Muslim dignitaries demanding the protection of Emir, commercial middle class was hoping to develop contacts with Russia and faction urging for independence.

General Cherniaev, decided to settle the matter once and for all and captured Tashkent on 17 June 1865. 133

Foreign Affairs Minister, at first denied any intention of including Tashkent in the Russian empire. But would consider it and surrounding territory as a separate Khanate under control of Tsarism and act as a buffer state between Russia and Bukhara. Kryzhanov, newly appointed Governor General of Orenburg declared that:

It was quite natural for the people of Tashkent to want to become part of a strong state, able to protect them from external enemies and to rid them of age-long internal disturbances and disputes. 134


Thus in August 1866, Tashkent was declared as part of Russia and its inhabitants as Russian subjects.

On 25 January 1865, on the territorial gains of Russia in Central Asia, the Russian administration was reorganized. The new Khokandian and Syr-Darya frontiers of Russia, from the west of Issky Kul to the Aral Sea, formed a single Turkestan Oblast within the jurisdiction of Orenburg. The new Oblast would be administered by a military governor. 135

In spite of this threatening situation the three Central Asian states failed to unite against the Russian invader as they were often in conflict with each other.

## **DEALING WITH BUKHARA**





lands under Khiva Khanate  
 lands periodically under Khiva Khanate  
 lands disputed by Bukhara & Kokand Khans.  
 lands disputed by Bukhara & Khiva Khanates  
 lands temporarily under Kokand Khanate  
 Khanate boundaries of Khanates

**CENTRAL ASIAN KHANATES**  
 In Mid. XIX Century  
 100 0 100 200 300  
 MILES

Source: Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964

The principality of Bukhara was founded by the Magnit dynasty in 1753-136. The 19th century witness the clashes with Khokand and Khiva because of the aim of Emir of Bukhara to held Sway of Transoxania over whole of Turkestan. There was war with Khiva in 1804 and then a long battle with Khanate of Khokand for Ura-Tyube and Khojend 137. The constant battles exhausted the county's strength which resulted in the independence of Shahr-i- Sabz and Balkh from Central Asia. 138

Population by the beginning of the 19th century was estimated 2 to 3 million 139, one half being Uzbeks, one third Tajiks and one tenth Turkmen. The population was Sunni Muslim with a small minority of Shiit among Tajiks and Tajik speaking Bukhara Jews 140. The Emir of Bukhara ruled the territory between Amu and Syr-Darya with Zarvashan as its capital. 141

For Russia, major political power in Central Asia was Bukhara. The occupation of Tashkent stopped ill feelings between Khokandians and Bukharians, and the Emir tried to help his co- religionists. But for Russia he was interfering in affairs of Russo-Khokandians.

Emir of Bukhara asked General Cherniaev to evacuate Tashkent or proposed a line of demarcation that the Russians were not to cross. But both proposals were turned down. The situation deteriorated as Bukharan merchants in Cherniaev jurisdiction were arrested and their goods were confiscated to force the Emir to drop his claim on Khokand. The Bukharan Mission, in June 1865, was halted at Kazaliusk, which tried to reach at St. Petersburg for peaceful settlement. As a reply, Emir detained the Russian mission in Bukhara 142. The complexity of the situation resulted in a clash between Russian and Bukhara forces at Irdjar in May 1866. Bukharian were defeated and Khojend and Nau were taken by Russians. General Romanovskii presented Russian's peace conditions to the Emir, which included:

1. Annexation of all occupied lands including Tashkent, Khojend and Nau.
2. Recognition of all Russian conquests.

3. Granting the same rights to Russians in Bukhara as those accorded Bukharian subjects in Russian empire.
4. Payment of war indemnity within ten days.

It was impossible for Emir to pay such a heavy price, using it as pretext on 11th day, 23 September 1866 the Russian crossed in to Bukhara and captured Dzhizak, Ura Tyube, and Yangi Qorghan. A governor general of Turkistan was established in 1867 143. Removing the southern part of western Turkistan from the authority of Orenburg governor general, the area was divided into two parts, Syr-Darya province with Tashkent as its capital, and Semirechiye province. 144

As the situation deteriorated, Bukharans proclaimed holy war and the Emir led his army out to the branches of river Zarafshan to meet his enemy. On 1 May 1868 Kaufman, governor general, crossed the river and entered Samarkand without any opposition and conquered Katta Qorghan on 16 May 1868. It was finally at Zirabulaq battle that fate of Bukhara was decided on 2 June 1868. 145

A peace treaty was signed on 30 June 1868 according to which:

1. Khojend, Ura-Tyube, Jizak, Samarkand and Katta Qorghan were given to the Russians.
2. Russia controlled the headwaters of the Zarafshan (all Bukahra's water). 146
3. Emir was to pay a war indemnity of 500,000 roubles.
4. Recognized full freedom of action for Russian merchants in Bukhara.
5. Ban the slave trade.

In 1873, five year later, a peace treaty was signed between Bukhara and Russia according to which:

1. Bukhara accepted Russian protection.
2. Bukhara was autonomous in internal affairs.

3. Foreign relations were forbidden. They were in Russian hands.
4. Russians were given many financial privileges. 147

Thus Bukhara became a state under Russian suzerainty. In the mountain region of Eastern Bukhara, Darvaz, Karategin, Gissar etc, rebelled against Emir and foreign rule. The Emir asked for Russian assistance against rebels like Abdul Malik Khan and Bababek, Russians came to the support of the Emir and annexed the areas where uprising had taken place. With the support of mountain Uzbek Chieftains and tribesmen, Emir was able to extend his sovereignty over mountain principalities of Eastern Bukhara who recognized his sovereignty only nominally.

### **DEALING WITH KHIVA**

Khanate of Khiva was located on the south of the Aral Sea, on both shores of Amu Darya, with the Oasis of Khiva in the center. Its old name was Khorezm 148. The main problem for rulers was the fact that Khanate bordered on desert lying to the north and south west, with Kazakh and Turkmen nomads 149. Throughout 18th century there was no well established dynasty. In 1804 Inaq Iltuzer an Uzbek established a dynasty which ruled till 1920. He had to establish his authority by organizing punitive expeditions against the nomads and Karakalpaks. 150

As Bukhara came under Russian sway, the Tsar's position in east and north vis-a-vis Khiva became threatening, whose strength was weakened by wars, rebellions and frequent changes of ruler. In 1869, Russian Caucasian troops crossed Caspian Sea into the Gulf of Krasnovodsk and established a fort there. At the same time they were establishing themselves on the southern frontiers of Caspian and in Turkmen territory, thus encircling Khiva on three sides-Caucasus, Orenburg and Turkistan. Seeing the situation favourable, general V. Kaufman entered Khiva from four different positions. The people of Khiva wanted to resist but failed in their attempts because their Khan, Muhammad Rahim Bahadur II, had fled and had been replaced by his brother Ata Jan on 12 August 1873, the

Khan of Khiva signed a peace treaty without arguing the conditions imposed by Russia.

151 According to this treaty:

1. The Khan of Khiva acknowledged himself as "the docile servant of the emperor of all the Russian" and had to proceed through the medium of the Russian administrative hierarchy. 152
2. Khan maintain its internal autonomy and Khiva became a protected state.
3. Relations with foreign counties were forbidden. 153

In this way Khiva also lost its independence.

### **DEALING WITH KHOKAND**

The Khanate of Khokand came into existence in 1798, with Farghana basin as its heartland 154. During the 15th century Turks and Sarts (Persians and Tajiks) shared the region. Turks were settled in the Andijan and Tajiks in areas around Margelan and Sokha. Uzbeks and Kirghiz appeared in the 16th century in the mountain chains in east and north east of the country. In the 18th century there was migration of Sarts from Samarkand and Bukhara, Uzbeks from the areas of Jungars, and other Turkish tribes. All these races excepted the political authority of Shah Rukh, on Farghana valley. While Khojend and mountain valleys south west of the Farghana remained in the hands of highlanders Tajiks. 155

Originally centered on the Farghana valley, its Khans aimed at expanding the territory of the Khanate into Tashkent, Ura- Tyube and Khojend and then into the steep region along the north bank of the Syr-Darya river. This led to the series of wars with Bukhara and Kazakh rulers. 156

The political unification of Farghana valley was achieved in 19th century under Khan Alim who raised the state power by supporting Ura-Tyube and Jizak against Bukhara. Muhammad Ali, grandson of Alim conquered the southern highlands, where Tajik population lived in patriarchal conditions as mountain shepereds and gold-washer.

Number of Tajik princes were allowed to retain their positions 157. From 1839 onward Khokhand could not retain internal peace because of rivalries between the Persianized population of the Farghana valley and the Kypchak Uzbek occupying northern part of the valley, over the control of the area.

In 1845 the control of Khokand was in the hands of nomad ruler, Musliman Qul, he transformed cultivated lands into pasture. Farmers were required to pay for irrigation and a fruitless attack on Ura-Tyub in 1851, resulted in the transfer of power to Khan Khudayar, who distributed pasture lands among settled inhabitants. In 1858 Kipchaks again became powerful and former Pasture-lands were returned to them. It was this rivalry and violent quarrels between the nomads of the steppe and town dwellers which resulted in the downfall of Khokand. 158

Khokand continued to survive even after the fall of Tashkent. At this time Khokand was ruled by Khan Khudayar who was disliked by everyone because of his policies. Khokandian seeking asylum in Turkistan requested General V. Kaufman for help. Meanwhile in 1875 Kipchaks rebelled against Khan's authority. This was beginning of the disintegration of authority. The troops, the aristocracy and local leaders joined the rebellion 159. The character of rebellion soon changed from popular revolt against cruel ruler to local Muslim resistance against Russians. As it was believed that Russians were involved in the uprising, a Jihad was declared against them. The uprising spread to Farghana and to the areas under Russian rule. With organized forces, Russians intervened in Khokand. After defeating natives at Makhraam, the main cities of Farghana-Namangas, Andijan, Khokand, Margelan came under Russian control 160. On 19 February 1876, the Khanate of Khokand was abolished and incorporated in the Russian Turkistan under the name of Farghana oblast, under the military governor rule. 161

Turkmenistan or Turkmen Tribes, was another conquest of imperial troops. In 1881 under General Skobelev's army Gok Tepe fortress was captured. This was the last large scale battle of the campaign.

In 1881 the Russians created the Transcaspian Province from the Turkmen territory. In 1886 Turkistan governorship-general was divided into three parts, Syr-Darya province, Farghana province and Zaravshan district (In 1887, Samarkand province). Thus the conquest of Central Asia was achieved and were subjected to "white Tsar". 162

Russia's Central Asian advance, which brought it practically up to the boundaries of Afghanistan and Persia, alarmed the bordering states of the region especially the British because it considered them as British spheres of influence. Afghanistan, China, India and Persia none was in a position, as Britain was, to take any effective action against Russia. Persia and Afghanistan, threatened by British supremacy, were pleased at the appearance of a rival power to the British.

In reply to British government protest on 29 February 1884, Russia proposed a joint delimitation of the Afghan frontier. The frontier was fixed for northern part - from the Amu Darya to Persian Khorasan-in 1887. However, England till 1895 retained access to Pamirs. The delimitation of Pamir frontier was decided in 1895. It left, Shughnan, Rushan, part of Vakhan or more specifically the Pamirs west of the Sarykal range and north of the river Panj, under Russian influence. All these areas were linked with Bukhara protectorate 163. This area was later known as Gorno-Badakhshan, inhabited by Tajiks.

The annexed region of Central Asia in 1898 was organized, into the two General Governorship, steppe region, and Turkistan, headed by military governor general responsible to ministry of war, in Tashkent. This inturn was composed of five regions, Syr-Darya, Farghana, Samarkand, Semirechye and Transcaspian. Khiva and Bukhara retained the status of protectorate. This territorial organization continued until 1917 revolution. 164

As far as the area of Tajikistan was concerned at the beginning of 20th century, it was divided between, the Khanate of Bukhara, Samarkand and Farghana provinces like other provinces it became a Russian dependency governed by military governors.





In these Russian provinces, Russians followed one definite principle "Manage the population without interfering in its affairs."<sup>165</sup>. This policy was followed between the conquest and revolution of 1905.

The system of administration established by Tsarist Government in Central Asia was of military dominant authoritarian regime. Considerable power was given to Governor General in order to deal with exceptional circumstances. Kaufman, Skobolev, Kurapatikin, some of the well known governor generals in Central Asian history exercised their unlimited authority in matters of taxes, dealing with neighbouring states, right to confirm death sentences on locals and to grant pardon etc. This military administration had one positive impact and that was military operations came to an end.

In Turkistan and steppe region local government, tradition, customs, laws, law courts, social organizations etc were left just as they were. But later on Russians began to interfere in native matters. The Russian government recognized the Islamic religion as the faith of the Central Asians. The Shariat and Adat were retained <sup>166</sup>. Later on judges and ak-sakals (village headmen) who were elected by natives without any limited term of office were chosen for three years and placed judges under the low ranking Tsarists official control. <sup>167</sup>

After the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861 investigation was made of the availability of steppe and oasis land for purposes of European colonization. As southern Central Asia was thickly populated oasis land, the attention was diverted towards Kazakh steppe. In 1891 Tsarist authorities issued an ordinance according to which surplus land in Kazakh and Kirghizia, suitable for agriculture were bought, seized or simply taken away by the Russians <sup>168</sup>. On this basis 14 million hectares on the steppes was confiscated and 2 million Russian and Ukranian immigrants were brought in. While natives were forced to move into less desirable areas <sup>169</sup>. The main areas of seized land were Western, Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan and after 1905 Semirechye and Syr-Darya <sup>170</sup>. The result was conflicts between Russian settlers and the locals. Although Russian settlers were few in number in Turkistan, they were enough to cause conflicts.

After Russian peasants or settlers were well settled in steppe and Turkistan region, Tsarist government began to engage in public works and urban developments to suit Russian requirements. The first achievement was in the field of town planning and urban development. They created new European cities adjoining or within few miles of native cities. Russian section with all its European appearance of broad streets, parks, theaters, roads and by 1914 most of the cities were equipped with electric current, were quite different from the native cities with narrow streets, houses of mud, bricks, with no planned roads or streets. 171

In order to avoid Russification and assimilation, Muslims under Russian subjugation had little contacts with Russian settlers. It was also the belief on the part of Russians that:

Muslim culture will eventually disintegrate and the population would turn of itself to the more advanced culture of Russia. 172

Russian arrogantly considered themselves as the representative of European civilization and superior to natives. Here one can ask a vital question. Did Russians ever make a sincere, peaceful approach to Central Asian natives to establish good relations? Did Russians ever attempted to transfer their culture, civilization, modernization to Central Asians? Secondly by half savage nomad population possessing no fixed social organization, did it mean only Kazakhs or Khokandians, Khivans and Bukharans? who were well settled with their own state and government.

On the other hand, Russians were considered as intruders by local people. Russians and members of indigenous nationalities did not mixed up. Local people were freed from military services as to preserve Russian's privileged status to avoid possibility of armed resistance. The Ulemam, religious leaders and conservatives were antagonistic towards the Russians and considered them as all enemies of religion. 173

This general antagonism of the people of Turkistan towards the Russians and vice-versa gave birth to nationalist feeling, which consciously did not exist previously. The supersession of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazaks etc by the Russian resulted in the resentment against the Russian rule and growth of national awareness which further highlight us vs they.

According to G. Wheeler:

... when the Russians arrived, the region was without communication of any kind and their first step was to create a system of post roads and then railway was built from Uzun Ada on the Caspian to Kizyl-Arvat in 1881. From there it extended to Amu-Darya in 1885 and to Samarkand in 1888. The line reached Tashkent in 1898 and finally from here to European Russia in 1906.... 174.

These railway networks contributed to the economic development in the region. But if we analyze the situation we came to know that the trans-Caspian railway line was built in 1881, that was the time when Russians wanted to conquer the Turkmen tribes and they needed rail roads for military supply. While the trans-Siberian railway was not undertaken until 1891 and did not reach Vladivostok until just before the outbreak of Russo - Japanese war in 1904 175. It was later that it stimulated trade.

Further more to support the Russian textile industry, Tsarist Government pressurized especially in the Farghana valley to cultivate cotton instead of grain - in the valley of cotton cultivation which was appealed by higher prices, required less water and labour-Russian sought to impose a measure of economic dependency 176. Cotton became the main product of Central Asian agriculturalist. From 1888 to 1916 cotton field in Russian Central Asia increased by 750%. 177,

Under Tsarist rule, Central Asian provinces became an integral part of the economic life of the empire and brought major economic changes to Central Asia. Central

Asian markets were opened for Russian goods, as Russian products couldn't compete with Europe, and by 1907 it had become an important buyer of grain, sugar, iron and steel products as well as manufactured goods 178. The Central Asian economy turned from an isolated self-sufficient rural economy into a market oriented. Plus the wealth and prestige of native middle class, cotton buyers, merchants, money lenders, skilled workers etc, also grew 179. Meanwhile the cultivation of wheat declined, making Turkistan dependent on Russian wheat. Export of wheat from Russia in 1908 was 33-00 tons which rose to 354,00 tons in 1916. 180

In educational sphere, Tsar followed the policy of non interference. The traditional Islamic schools system composed of Maktabs and Madrasas were not disturbed by Russians. According to 1911 statistics, there were 6000 Maktabs and 328 Madrasas in Central Asia. In Bukhara before revolution of 1917, the literacy rate was 2 per cent to 0.1per cent and in eastern parts (present Tajikistan) literacy rate was 1per cent. In these schools neither science nor any other modern subjects were offered. In 1914 a group of rich Tajik merchants from Bukhara wrote to Russian diplomate:

We studied in traditional schools for 7 or 8 years and still we remained illiterate. We did not benefit from having attended the school. 181

Russian administrators in order to propagate Russian culture and language had opened schools, where teaching would be in Russian language and graduates would proceed to Russian higher grade schools. But Russo-native schools did not achieve what was expected 182. However, change began to appear on surface with opening of bilingual schools. In which education was conducted in native languages in lower classes and in Russian in upper classes. By 1911 in 89 bilingual schools there were 2,552 Muslim students. According to conference in the Ministry of Education it was decided to introduce such subjects as Mathematics, history, geography in native Maktabs in native language and later on Russian language was to be taught in upper classes.

In order to popularize Russian culture and language in Central Asia, the name of N. Ostroumov, editor of a government newspaper was worth mentioning. Ostroumov for decade published translation of Russian writers and articles on Russian life, economy, culture etc. and won over a wide circle of liberal native writers. Articles of native writers who traveled in European part of Russia attracted a wide circle of readers. Impetus was added by exposure of Central Asians to ideological currents from Russia, Western Europe, Muslims in the Near Eastern countries. Russian, Tatar, Persian and Turkish books and journals made their way into Central Asian cities 183. These new ideas found fertile ground among Uzbek and Tajik middle class, supported by liberal Muslim students. Thus formed a new class, a new culture in Central Asian society.

Ahmed Mahdum Donish who spoke persian or Tajiki (1827-1897) was considered as "first herald of a new trend of thought in Central Asia" and also "a first westernizer" 184. He visited Petersburg and was impressed by Russian schools, books and periodicals, intelligentsia, high standard of living. He returned with new ideas and liberal thought. He also attacked ruling dynasty, the Emir, the vizirs, the clergy, kazi and other administrators, Donish's words later on in 19th and 20th centuries were taken up by Bukhariote liberals as their main arguments against corrupt and backward regime of Bukhara.

Ismail Bey Gasprinsky (1851-1914) brought new liberal ideas to Central Asia. He was in favour of modernization of education, like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in Sub-Continent, and changes in traditional way of life as only means of securing Muslim Society. The conservatives, considered such changes as danger to family life and Islamic civilization 185. With the passage of time liberal thoughts grew stronger. Gasprinsky founded new method-Usul Jadid schools. In these schools he taught students mathematics, history geography and secular ideas etc: a departure from conservative culture 186. As a result of his activities the number of Jadid schools reached 12 in Tashkent, 5 in Bukhara, 2 in Samarkand, 17 in province of Semirechye and 13 in Khokand area by 1913. 187

Side by side these, the resentment against Russian rule continued, to demonstrate in the form of clashes, riots, revolts, protests. The first revolt was led by Darwis Khan Tore in 1885 in Farghana valley which soon engulfed the district of Andijan, Osh and Marghilan and thus took in 1891 the form of a full scale rebellion 188. The Russian troops put down the rebellion and arrested rebels. But the most important was that of revolt of 1898. In 1898 under the leadership of Ismail Khan Tore a revolt broke out in Andijan which spread to the districts of Osh, Marghilan and Namangan as a holy war. Russian retaliated and routed the rebels. This was a religious revolt in which elite of former Khokand Khanate, hoped to be placed on Khokand throne, and poor people participated. This revolt also challenged Russian polices in Central Asia. As consequences, in Marghilan district several villages were destroyed and inhabitants were expelled for having taken part in the revolt and transplanted to barren lands 189. Failure of these revolutions, whose leadership was in the hands of religious figures, give rise to new leadership, most influenced by new western ideas of Usul Jaid movement. The nationalism that emerged at that time was of a sense of separateness from their foreign rulers in every aspect. That sense gradually and slowly began to replace the older loyalties to religion.

Coming back to Jadid movement, as the influence of liberal thought grew stronger, they started demanding more educational reforms, cultural autonomy and representative government and opposed the feudal and clerical system 190. There started a bone of contention between Jadids and supporters of Usul Kadim - the old methods 191. Meanwhile Gasprinsky placed the three principles of Muslim unity: unity of language, unity of mind and unity of action. He and his followers unconsciously laid the foundation of Pan Turkic and Pan-Islamic movement in Central Asia.

Here, we can point out, that out of three principles of unity, unity of language can be considered as impetus towards Tajik nationalism. Because by unity of language, Gasprinsky insisted on the need to study the Turkish language in Muslim schools and although he did not discarded Arabic language as Islamic cultural language, he recommended introducing Ottoman Turkish as common language in schools and the

press. He also tried to replace the old Persian textbooks of Arabic grammar by modern Turkish text books imported from Constantinople 192. Thus Tajik or Persian speaking people felt alienated. But still that Tajik nationalism or sense of separateness was a weak one. Because of their common historical developments and joint struggle against foreign invaders, their other bonds of unity were strong.

1904 Russian defeat at the hands of the Japanese provided reformists and liberals with a definite direction to end the colonial domination, because it was for the first time that they heard the news of the defeat of their conqueror 193. The revolution of 1905-1907, in which although Central Asians took little part-strikes and disturbances were entirely the work of Russian railway workers and soldiers. General Sakharov, Governor General of Central Asia, wrote "the natives are perfectly quiet..." In 1906 Governor of Farghana Pokotillo reported that "peace and quiet reigned among the usually violent population of Farghana" 194, further strengthen the national consciousness, condition of locals, low standard of living and need for social and political reforms.

In the revolutionary years, the political life of Muslims in the Russian empire was expressed through Islamic unification and participation in the Duma. Central Asian role in both of them was limited.

Three Muslim Congresses were called on the initiative of Kazan's Galimjan Ibragim - Oghli in 1905-1906 195. The representatives of Central Asia did not appear until the third congress. In the third congress it was decided to organize a new political party, to study religious affairs and school problems. The young generation of liberal thinkers, main speaker Akchurin, Muslim members of Duma gave their support for the formation of such a party:

... our aim is to unite the great majority of Russia's Muslims, to create a political party and to strengthen its action, influence, and authority among the other political parties of the Russian Empire...

we should follow the example of Poles and the Czechs of Austria, who organized their own national political parties. 196

Thus party of Muslim union (Ittifik) came into being with following programmes:

1. To improve the religious, cultural, social, economic and political conditions of Russia's Muslim.
2. Abolition of all kinds of discrimination.
3. Same access to professional careers and to civil and military service which the Christian subjects enjoyed.
4. Local self government in all matters including police, internal security.
5. Abolition of courts and tribunals created in the years of 1905-1906.
6. Primary education in native languages.
7. Demanding 8 hours of work, right to organize labour unions, labor inspection, and worker-employer courts.
8. Creation of Muslim's peoples party.

These Muslim Congresses plus the liberal thought of Jadid movement through press and publications slowly and gradually began to impart political consciousness among the natives.

The impetus to this political consciousness was given by the 1905 constitution which granted representation in Duma to Central Asians and then 1906 elections were also of great importance for Uzbek and Tajik political development. Although the parliamentary experience of Central Asians was short lived, it did aided liberal movement. Thirty six Muslim deputies were allotted to first Duma. Delegates from Turkistan were absent. The second Duma which met in March 1907, included 6 from Turkistan and 4 from Steppe with total of 31 Muslim delegates. Delegates from Central Asia supported Itiffaq party and allieded with constitutional Democrats. In third Duma, Muslim representatives number was restricted to 10 and no representation from Steppe region. 197



It is important to emphasize at this point that even the political rallies in Tashkent and Samarkand were confined to such matters as reorganization of Muslim administration, freedom of press, right to elect deputies, cessation of Russian agricultural colonization, freedom of religious teaching, more native representation on municipal boards. In these demands none can find a demand of self determination or political independence.

Taking advantage of the brief relaxation of governmental control during 1905 - 1907, the Jadids started publishing newspapers and periodicals in Central Asia, especially in Tashkent, Samarkand and Farghgan. Khurshid, Shorat, Tujjar, Asia, Sadai-i-Turkistan, Tarakki, Aina, Sada-i-Farghana, Yurt, etc were some important names that played an important role in the spread of reformist ideas. Most of them had been banned. By 1908, all southern Central Asian, Jadid newspapers ceased publishing. Russian authorities, in opposing Jadid influence gave their full support to conservatives Muslims, their schools and clergy. Thus they widened the gap between Jadid and Kadim. But still Kadimists represented majority of urban population and whole of rural districts. The Jadids controlled only some hundred schools with 600 to 800 students. Kadimists maintained over 600 schools with 100 thousands students. 199

The Bukharan reformist movement started much later, rather in 1908. The clergy's influence in Bukhara was unlimited and rulers were little inclined towards liberal thought. After several fruitless attempts 200, Gasprinsky himself visited Bukhara so as to get permission for Jadid schools for Uzbeks and one for Tatars. Finally on 8 October 1908 a school was opened in which instruction was given in Tajik-Literary language of Bukhara. By 1913 there were 10 such schools for sunnite and shiite inhabitants of Bukhara.

Facing the problem of text books, local intellectuals founded union of Holy Bukhara, to solve the problems of text books in Tajik language. Because in these schools neither Tatar texts nor Russo-native schools text can be used. S. Aini wrote first Tajik text book for this school 201. He later became president of Tajik Academy of sciences and founder of Soviet Tajik literature.

Meanwhile A.V. Samsonov, Governor General, declared that teachers were obliged to be of the same ethnic groups as their pupils. This decree paralyzed many institutions because many Kazan Tatar teachers were active in cities of Central Asia. The situation was further deteriorated by prohibiting Tatars from opening or teaching any reformed school. To find a solution to such a situation, Jadid like Abdalrauf Filrat, Usman Khoja and many others founded Jamiyat-i-Tarbiya-i-Atfal (society for the education of youth), Marifat and Barakat, secret societies in Bukhara. The main aim of these societies were, to send students abroad for education, to distribute books, newspapers among common men, organize political discussion groups. Within a few years their activities spread rapidly. People began to demand reforms in financial, political and administrative spheres. Fuel was added on the one hand by Tajik, Uzbek and Kazan news papers and on the other hand revolutionary ideas were brought to Central Asia in forms of newspapers from Turkey, India and Afghanistan. These ideas put an end to religious and ethnic partitioning and political unity was achieved 202. But still the idea of nation or nationality in modern sense did not penetrated among Central Asian natives.

At the beginning of first world war, Emir of Bukhara announced the closure of all Jadid schools. Many teachers were deported to Eastern Bukhara and some like S. Aini fled to Russia 203. Abdul Rehman Fitrat, Muqimal-Din, Usman Khoja and many others came to Istambul were very much impressed by Young Turk's political programme and ideology. Thus Young Bukharans was formed 204, with the programme for enlightenment and struggle over the despotic and lawless regime of the Emir. Plus anti Russian and Pan Islamic ideas. For Young Bukhariotes, Islamic faith and civilization and multinational cultural world of all Central Asia took precedence over all pan-Turkic feelings. Thus their programme before revolution was pan-Islamic rather than pan-Turkic.

In steppe region, political comprehension was more advanced than that of Turkistan. Kazakhs had well established literary language with Kazakh national awareness with their own psychological and cultural features. Still like Turkistan, Kazakah leaders never advocated separation from Russian empire.

## CONCLUSION:

Early history of Tajikistan reveals two separate issues, their ethnic composition and their attribution of present name. Tajiks as a member of Iranic language family have a record of residence in eastern Transoxiana over three millennia or even longer. They are composed of the descendants of earlier settled Iranian speaking people, Bactrians, Soghdians, Khorezmian and Tokharians. A 19th century geographer, Ujflvy, identified Persians from Khorasan, as well as Persians of other origins sold as slaves in Khiva, Bukhara and Samarkand, as part of Tajik ancestry. 205

The term Tajik has a centuries long tradition of use and the name by which they have come to be known has undergone several shifts of meanings. They had no common name for themselves until the second decade of present century. The mountain Tajik were known as Galchas and Tajiks of the plains as sart and Dihkan.

From the middle of the first millennium B.C to the Arab conquest, sedentary Iranians were predominant ethnic groups, with well established agricultural system and trade with Far and Middle East and South Asia. From 9th century onward different ethnic national groups began to appear on the ethnic composition of Central Asia. By 16th or 17th centuries they occupied the area which they occupy today.

Family, kinship, were the major source of group identities among Tajiks while weak affiliations were towards religion and language. With the Arab conquest and introduction of Islam, situation was changed. Religion, Islam, became the main source of identity which continued to exist strongly till 1917 revolution.

At the beginning of 20th century new rulers "White Tsars" divided the area of modern Tajikistan between the Khanate of Bukhara, Samarkand and Farghana provinces for administrative reasons. Here Uzbeks formed the aristocracy, especially in Bukhara, and dominant political group. It was at this stage that history of Tajikistan is bound with that of Uzbekistan. Because the two areas are contiguous and have been ruled by same

rulers and subject to same invasions. That's why it has been said that apart from their language and of sedentary traditions there is no real distinction between Tajiks and Uzbeks. Thus Tajikistan was established first as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within Uzbekistan.

Russians adopted typical colonial policy towards the Muslim population. Here the situation can be compared with that of British rule in the Indian Sub-Continent and Muslim struggle for their rights but with one difference, that is the Indian Muslims demanded their right of self-determination, whereas Tsarist government was never confronted with any nationalist movement demanding self-determination. Local disturbances, revolts or riots were the manifestation of opposition to Russian administrative measures or were of religious nature.

Before revolution the Central Asian were not effected by national consciousness or by nationalism. Although Jadid did contributed to their political development, still Islam was the real bond of unity. Here I would like to quote V. Barthold, about national identity of the Central Asian masses before revolution:

When you ask a Turkistani what is his identity he will answer that he is, first of all a Muslim, then an inhabitant of such and such city or village (a Bukharaly or a Samarkandi) or if, he is a nomad, a member of such and such a tribe - Mangyt, a Yomud, or a Nayman.... 206

According to Barthold, before revolution several identities co-existed simultaneously among Muslims of the Tsarist Empire.

The first identity was that of religion. It was important identity because nobody was opposed to Islamic identity. If someone abandoned Islam he would then become Kafir. For the masses religious identity had no political meaning and also in a modern sense Ummah was not a nation. Muslims identified themselves as "we Muslims "versus "Those

christians". On the eve of revolution (as we see in next chapter) Islam became a kind of "surrogate political national identity" among city dwellers and intellectuals.

The second traditional identity according to Barthold that had been disappearing on the eve of revolution was local and geographical. These local identities by virtue of communication, urbanization, mass mobilization, gave place to broader geographical identity, Turkistani. For intellectuals to save themselves from Russification and Russian invaders, Turkistani identity was the key to survival.

Third traditional identity was of clan and tribe. These identities were condemned by all Islamic philosophers. However clan/Tribal identities survived among Central Asian nomads. Broader tribal identity remained very strong among Turkmen, nomad Uzbeks, Kazakhs etc. Even today Central Asian nomads know their tribal affiliations perfectly well.

At the beginning of 20th century ethnic identity was making its way especially among Tatar intelligentsia. This is the fourth traditional identity. 207

Thus Tsarist administration did not care much about national awareness of its Muslim subjects as long as they remained peaceful. But after 1924 Soviets tried to destroy traditional identities and try to build modern identity, based on stalin's four criteria, unity of language, of territory, of economy and of historical cultural traditions.

## CHAPTER THREE


### HISTORY OF SOVIET TAJIKISTAN.

We are now moving towards that period of history which witnessed the downfall of Tsars and consolidation of Soviet power in Turkistan and finally the achievement of independence for Central Asian States.

Before proceeding it is important to grasp the essentials of unfavourable circumstances existing in Turkistan when Tsardom was overthrown. During the first world war Muslim subject of Tsars were united in their stand regarding the war with Germany and Austria 1. However this calm and united atmosphere was disrupted when Turkey declared war against Russia. Russia's Muslims were unwilling, like Indian Muslims, to fight against their coreligiousts. Tatars of Crimean Peninsula were leading "intense agitation for the unification of Crimean Muslims and for helping Turkey ". In Farghana "to act now or Muslim never will free themselves from the infield Russian" was gaining ground 2.

#### REVOLT OF 1916

Effected by heavy losses by Russian troops in 1914 - 1915, the Russian government was forced to mobilize the significant percentage of population of Transcaucasia, Kazakhistan and Central Asia in labour battalion behind the lines. According to the decree, signed on 25 June 1916, "between the ages of 19 and 45 should be called" 3. 250,000 workers from Turkistan and 243,000 from the four oblasts of the steppe region were the set quota. Uptill that time the population of the region had been exempted by the military draft and was confirmed by 1886 law from the military service. The population retaliated on this policy because when the decree was issued in June it was the most important period of the cotton season - harvesting. Further population felt humiliated that they were not required to fight but for labour 4. The Kazakh and Kirghiz leaders, for whom the government's land policy was a source of great dissatisfaction, tried to relate military service question with that of Kazakhs, Kirghiz representation in Duma and their land question. 5



Source: Serge A Zenkovky, Pan Turkism and Islam in Russia, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

The revolt first began in the Samarkand oblast at Khojend among urban population on 4 July and throughout July there were serious disturbances in Samarkand, Syr-Darya and Farghana oblasts and by the beginning of August, it had spread Semirechiye. An armed expedition from Samarkand and Tashkent under Governor General of Turkistan put down the rebellion on July 21. 6

In spite of Russian efforts, the rebellion spread beyond Uzbek territory to Kirghiz and Kazakh plains and steppe region on wide scale.

By the end of 1916 the rebellion had been suppressed. But the local had to face clashes with army, with settlers, hunger and cold when they fled, their lands were again confiscated and most important was the trial, by General Kuropatkin, for those who participated in the rebellion.

The important thing to mention was the limited role by political organizations and leaders. Russian political parties, who were active throughout Central Asia from 1905, did not supported either rebels or tried to comprehend local protests and their grievances. While Central Asian leaders, divided between Jadids and Kadims, participated only in a restricted sense in a meeting on May 1916 in Samarkand to consider "what policy should be followed" 7. In rural areas where clergy was strong, Mullahs played an important role by exploiting religious feeling by portraying Russian as outsider and Kafir. This revolt of 1916 can be comparable with Indian Mutiny of 1857 which was anti - British by Muslims, whereas 1916 revolt was anti-Russian.

Besides 1916 revolt there were, however other factors which contributed positively in Central Asian response to Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. A simple question can be asked why Revolution met favourably in Central Asia? In Bolshevik's favour were the facts:

1. Tsarist education had produced few among Turkish and Tajik population who were able to understand the modern concept of state and nationality. There were those



who move along the lines of western education and were the recipient of the modern western liberal ideas.

2. Under the impact of Jadid movement, Russian wars and governmental policies, the tribal authority system was disintegrating especially in urban centers where the largely the population was either Russian, Ukranian settlers or educated natives.
3. The Central Asian had been excluded from the Russian military services. Thus they were unskilled in the use of modern weapons and did not in fact possessed any. No they had any worth mentioning role in the working of communication services like Railway, Telephone, Telegraph. In industrial organization there were labours under rigid subordination of Russian foremen. Russian control was everywhere - civil, military, municipal, communications etc. 8
4. As mentioned earlier the idea of a nation or nationality had barely penetrated among the Central Asian natives. As a result there was no recognised national leader. The only real bond of union was Islam, which in turn was dependent for its effectiveness on the clergy who were themselves unorganized and hardly capable of exercising any sustain leadership. 9
5. The clash of two conflicting ideologies, liberal vs conservative, further deteriorated the situation.
6. In Turkistan atleast 40,000 German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war taken by the Russian from the eastern front were present. Their presence was irritating for natives on one hand and were a source of intrigue for the agents of Germany and Turkey.
7. The effective involvement of adjoining countries in the Central Asian affairs was out of question because of Turkish empire was on the point of collapsing, Persia was in a state of anarchy, Afghanistan was facing war threat from British, Manchu dynasty in China lost its power, British were trying to solve its Indian subcontinent problems. Thus during and after the revolution the involvement was impossible. 10
8. As 97 percent to 98 percent of the Central Asian population was illiterate and also they were without an intelligentsia which would be able to comprehend or use the term in same meaning as was used in Russia at that time - "an element aspired to

independent or radical thinking" 11. Thus political comprehension of term revolution of any kind was not existed among the Turkistani natives. For people the significance of revolution was a mean for the breakdown of Russian rules which would result in restoration of their land and water rights.

Now question is how did Lenin's attitude towards Asia developed? After 1905 revolution Lenin began to advocate Euro- Asian solidarity between the western working class and the exploited toilers of the Orient. In 1908 he gave his famous statement," the class - conscious European workers now has comrades in Asia and their number will grow by leaps and bounds". 12. Lenin came out with the radical programme for the nationalities and as early as 1913 and 1914 he in number of articles and declarations supported national aspiration of all people of Russia. In 1913 " Summer Meetings" of the Central Committee of the Russian of Social Democrat Labor Party (Bolshevik faction), announced that:

The right of all nationalities forming part of Russia freely to secede and form an independent state must be recognized. To deny them this right or to fail to take measures guaranteeing them its practical realization is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure and annexation. He further added, the right of nationalities to secede must not be confused with their expediency of secession of a given nation at a given moment. The party of the Proletariate must decide the later question independently in each particular case from the stand point of the interest of the Social democracy as a whole and the interest of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism. 13

For Lenin nationalities right of self determination must not be conditioned by nationalities themselves but by the communist party.

Before 1917 revolution, Lenin and other revolutionary architects had denounced Tsarist imperialism and treatment of subjected people. The slogans of self determination,

anti colonial policy, peace, transfer of power into the hands of the Soviets and confiscation of all land owners estates for the benefits of the peasants, received wide spread publicity 14. It seems that - that liberty, equality and fraternity - famous slogan of French Revolution of 1789 was once again inspiring humanity.

## REVOLUTION OF 1917

On the eve of Revolution of 1917 the Russian Central Asia consisted of, the Emirate of Bukhara, Khanate of Khiva and Govenner General of Turkistan. Here the news of Revolution had been received with mixed sentiments. For local the news was sigh of relief because the downfall of Tsar government was attached with new hopes. For Russian officials and settlers, the response was what had to be done to save the authority and position in Central Asia. The Russian settlers, railway workers in Tashkent and soldiers to suppress 1916 revolt, were of Bolshevik's support. From February to October 1917 and in the following months the Central Asian Muslims demonstrated very little concerned over political development 15.

According to Serge A.Zenkovsky:

... this attitude was conditioned by the oases psychology of the Central Asian sedentary population. The isolated and scattered oases had caused the settled dekhkans to become fragmented into little - connected and often self supporting districts, preventing the development of any national and regional unity... Innumerable nomadic invasion during the millenniums of Central Asian history had contributed the sedentary inhabitants to accept alien rule without any shame... There was lacking a clear concept of legal state and constitutional administration in the medieval regimes of Khans - and other feudal rulers who dominated Central Asia. 16

When the importance of revolution and changes that can accompany it become clear to Muslim leaders, the new regime was established with Russians as new master. The short drama of revolution in Turkistan came to an end in April 1917 and new political forces began to gain ground. The provisional government replaced the authority of former governor of Turkistan by a Provisional Executive Committee, while steppe was under Central Administration. The Turkistan Committee of the provisional government, established on 7 April 1917, had 5 Russian and 4 Muslim members - not all Central Asians. 17

Realizing the important role of Muslim organizations that they could play, Muslim organizations became active. Jadids demanding reforms met in Muslim Council (Shora-i-Islami) and clerical conservative character was represented by Ulema Jemyeti, under the Mullah Sher Ali Lapin, convened the First Regional Muslim Congress from 16 to 23 April 1917 in Tashkent. But congress failed to decide which course Central Asian should follow. Would it be autonomous or quasi-independent? Or would it take part in the formation of federation state or not? It demanded an end of Russian colonization, return of all confiscated lands and creation of Turkistan Musulman Merkezi Surasi (TMMS) popularly known as National Centre 18. National Centre remained engaged till the October revolution in presenting the Muslim case before Russian authorities. Branches were set up in provisional towns like Samarkand, Farghana, Ashkhabad and all of them were headed by Jadid leaders. In the early month of TMMS, leaders did not raised any question of Central Asian autonomy during its negotiation with Council of Russian Social Organization in Tashkent. However, in Andijan on the rejection of Muslims nomination on administrative posts resulted in friction between TMMS and council of Russian Social Organization. According to Russians:

If Muslims are given at the present time, the privilege of self determination, then the future presents the picture of struggle for power among individual tribes, which will amount to bloody carnage. 19

For the first time, national as distinct from the tribal consciousness began to take place when Muslim nationalists called Muslim congresses in May and September. The first "All Russian Moslem Congress" was held on 1 May in Moscow, in which 800 to 900 delegates from all social, political and national groups of Russian Muslims participated. Resolution passed by Muslim congress included the following subjects:

1. The type of state organization for Russian, cultural autonomy vs territorial autonomy, within a federated system.
2. The rights of peripheral peoples.
3. Religious, local, educational, cultural and judicial rights of Muslims and their political administration.
4. Women's rights especially right to vote.
5. Rights of labour, land reforms and distribution.
6. Political equality of sexes.
7. Procedures to be followed in the constituent assembly election and Muslim representation.

Nine committees were formed to study specific issues of immediate concern to the Muslims. 20

There were two main types of governmental structure debated upon and proposed by two opposing factions:

1. The Unionists or Centralists - proposing a unified single central government for all of Russia based on national cultural autonomy with basic freedoms and equal human rights guaranteed to all citizen of Russia regardless of religious or ethnic origins. This group was mainly formed of Tatars and lead by Lezgin Tsalikhov and Sadri Maksudov and were joined by Caucasian representatives.
2. The Federalists - wanted to form a loose people's federation, based on territorial autonomy - with separate and autonomous republics - under this system, people who formed a majority in a certain region would be accorded self rule with

authority to legislate their own laws pertaining to their own internal affairs. The central parliament in Moscow was to deal with more general issues that pertained to the entire nation. This was presented by Azerbaijanian, Mehmet Emin Resul Zadeh and Central Asian representatives upheld this federalists motion. 21

After a hot debate between two opposing factions, a federal structure of government was adopted by the majority votes 460 to 271. 22

At the second Moslem Central Asian conference held on 3 September 1917 a draft for local autonomy organizing Central Asia as a part of Russian republic was adopted. On the demand of Ulema, the local Diet would be headed by a Muslim clerical. Introduction of Zemstvo self determination in the Central Asian provinces 23. Union of all existing parties and groups in a coalition organization, Ittifaq-i-Muslimin and the congress opposed the cultivation of cotton and called for local production of grain so that Central Asia could supply its own food 24. Negotiation began between the Muslims, the administration and Russian organizations for setting up the new Central Asian Zemstvo. But all plans for autonomy were interrupted by Bolshevik's October coup.

As in Tashkent the news of conflict between Prime Minister Kerensky and commander in chief, General L.Kornilov reached, the Russian Bolsheviks decided that there hour had arrived. The Bolsheviks still very weak allied with left Socialists revolutionaries and left Mensheviks. They elected new executive committee for the Tashkent Soviet of soldiers and workers Deputies. This new body arrested the local administration and assumed power in the name of the revolution, the people's will and the Soviets 25. They forced the president of Executive Committee of the provisional government to recognized the new committee and called Petrograd for help. On 26 October Lenin and Soviets gained control of central administrative power in Petrograd or all over Russian Muslims.

Muslim reaction to the Bolshevik upheaval was not hostile because few educated Muslims were acquainted with the theories of Marx and Lenin. Whereas masses were

either illiterate or had no interest in the revolution. Secondly Central Asian Muslims were unorganized and lacking any political programme. While Jadids had cultural reforms and local autonomy but without any support. Thirdly for Muslims Soviets policy - equality of all people - would mean the re-birth of east and Islam. Finally Bolsheviks were considered as true friends of non-Russian people. The Central Asian liberal groups greeted the Bolsheviks seizure of power with hope. According to Chokaev, leader of Shura-i-Islam:

There was a time when we were ready to believe and actually did believe in the Moscow Bolsheviks. But Soviet practice destroyed our faith in the revolutionary slogans.... 26

After coming to power, on 15 November 1917, the provisional workers and peasants government issued its famous "Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia" which actually summarized the whole revolutionary approach:

1. Equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia.
2. The rights of nations of Russia to free self determination, including the right to secede and form independent states.
3. Abolition of all and sundry national and national religious privileges and restrictions.
4. The free development of the national minorities and ethno - graphical groups inhabiting the territory of Russia. 27

Stalin became the head of new commissariat for the "Affairs of the Nationalities" and on 28 November 1917, government published a manifesto to "all the toiling Muslims of Russia and the Orient":

...Under the blows of the Russian revolution, the old system of serfdom and slavery is cracking... a new world, a world of the toiling and newly freed peoples, is being born... Moslem of Russia... all

those whose mosques and prayer houses were destroyed, whose beliefs and customs were trampled under foot by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia... from now on your customs and beliefs your national and cultural institutions, are declared free and inviolable. Organized your national life freely... Know that your rights, like those of all the peoples of Russia will be protected by the might of the revolution and its organs... it is your government...our banners carry the liberation of all the oppressed people of the world. 28

Declaration of the Rights of people had important political consequences because movements started for autonomy and secession from the Soviet government. Finland was the first national group to proclaimed independence on 6 December 1917. Following the Finnish example Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine and Estonia also proclaimed independence. While the Muslim of Russian Empire also hurried to put right of self determination into practice. Bashkirs, Tatars, Kazakhs and Central Asian Muslims who meet in Khokand decided to follow the course.

Most of these states can not maintain their independent status and soon were re-incorporated in Soviet Empire. Realizing the negative impact of the Bolshevik's national programme, it was decided to suspend the self determination "in the interest of the class struggle of the proletariat for Socialism". 29

According to Trotsky:

We do not only recognized but also give full support to the principle of self determination, whenever it is directed against feudal, capitalist and imperialists states. But whenever the fiction of self determination, in the hands of bourgeoisie, becomes a weapons directed against the proletarian revolution, we have no occasion to treat this fiction differently from the other principles of democracy prevented by capitalism. 30



Stalin in November 1918 declared, "the old interpretation of the principle of self determination had become a fiction and lost its revolutionary significance" 31. The new interpretation of the principle of self determination led to the suppression of genuine forms of Muslim nationalism.

Ulema surprisingly decided to support the new Soviet power and collaborated with new regime. In November, The Third Regional Congress and The Third Muslim Central Asian Conference met simultaneously in Tashkent. Shir Ali Lapin suggested the formulation of coalition government in which 6 representatives from Ulemah, 3 from municipalities and 3 from Tashkent Soviet and Revkom. The congress of Soviet rejected this proposal alongwith the demand for local autonomy. They formed a Council of people's Commissars, all members were Russian or of European origin 32. The congress of Soviet stated:

It is impossible to lead the Muslims into the revolutionary government at this time, because the attitude of the local population towards the authority of the Soviet is doubtful and because the indigenous population has no proletarian organization which the group could well come into the highest organ 7of the regional government. 33

This resolution changed the Muslim attitude and gave unity to all Muslim political groups. While congress of Soviet was still in session, when the Third All Muslim Congress passed the resolution expressing hostility to the October revolution. Under circumstances Forth Muslim Central Asian Conference was convened in Khokand by Ulema and Shura-i-Islami. In the presence of 203 delegates from all the provinces of Turkistan, except Semirechye, announced the autonomy of Turkistan announcing "territorially autonomous within the union of Russian Democratic Republic". 34

Kolesov's Tashkent government, only Soviet power in Central Asia at that time, did not reacted immediately due to its weakness and vulnerable position. For more than two

months Khokand and Tashkent administration co-existed. Meanwhile Khokand tried to extend its authority through all southern Central Asia and demanded the recognition from Moscow as "the sole legal autonomous government in southern Central Asia" 35. Tashkent Soviet realizing the challenges that Khokand was posing to its existence - a vast demonstration of Muslims in Tashkent demanding autonomy - asked Moscow for help. At the Fourth Regional Congress of Soviet in Tashkent in 31 January 1918 passed a resolution to dissolve the Khokand government and pronounced the Khokand government as "counter revolutionary". On 18 February 1918 the government of autonomous Turkistan fell to Red Army Forces 36. The death of Khokand government became the birthday of Basmachi movement in Farghana.

Basmachi is derived from the Turkish verb "Basmak" meaning to "press, oppress or violate". In Uzbek language Basmachi means "bandit, robber or violator". This was due to the fact before collapsing, Khokand received help and support from the local Basmachi leader Irgash Bey 37. Soon the word lost its original meaning and became synonymous with nationalist rebel and Islam, as the term Mujahiddin was used by the Afghan rebels.

Despite the short duration of Khokand government, it was important because it was the reflection of the national consciousness of the indigenous people of Turkistan. It was first organized opposition to the Soviet power, to achieve by constitutional mean the right of self determination. The failure of Khokand government was due to internal rivalries, no military strength, bad organization and most important one was no external support. Thus the events after the collapse of Khokand government indicate the disillusionment of the Muslims with the colonial attitude of the new regime.

Although the brutal liquidation of the Khokand government and unhuman treatment by Red Army's soldiers, was the main cause for the Basmachi movement, but behind the curtain there were other causes which indirectly, slowly and gradually provided impetus for the movement. The most important cause was the economic crises and deepening famine. As discussed earlier, since conquest in order to make the region dependent on Russia for food and to meet the Russian cotton shortage, the Central Asian

cultivators were pushed towards cotton raising instead of grain. During 1917, Russian were unable to send cereals to Central Asia, the fuel was added by cattle plague which took away 60 percent of the live stock of Kirghiz which aggravated the poverty of the nomads and by 1921 all Farghana's land owners were bankrupt 38. According to P.Baranov:

...Turkistan had undergone a serious economic crisis. A mass of small owners had gone bankrupt, the economic way of life had been totally ruined and in 1918, on the top of this foundation of economic disintegration appeared the Basmachi movement. 39

Land policy of the Bolsheviks was another manifestation of imperialistic lines. According to policy the land was taken away from natives and divided among Russian and Ukrainian settlers which resulted in clashes between natives, deprived off their lands, and Russian peasants who were hostile to any demand for the land they occupied.

V.Kushinev, had appropriately noted three important causes:

1. The difficult living conditions, result of the imperialist war which had augmented the discontent amongst the workers.
2. The absence of individual security and the lack of political work, which indispensable during the first month of Revolution and which had led the population into thinking of the Basmachi movement as a natural phenomenon.
3. The lack of political tact and some times the absence of certain representatives of power.40

To protect the traditional way of life which was threatened by western civilization, to expel Russian rural and urban settlers, to defend Islam against the godless new regime and restoration of natural economy 41, were the main goals of the resistance. "Fight for all people rights" and "Muslims of the world unite" 42, Basmachis proclamation soon attracted a considerable portion of the population to fight for their cause.

Unfortune accompanied Basmachestvo in shape of its leaders who came from different horizon - thus never united: tribal chieftains like the Turkmen Junaid Khan and Ibrahim Bek, the head of the Lokay tribe, former highway robbers, Irgash, the village aqsaqal (elders) religious leaders and Shaikhs of sufi brotherhoods like Madamin Bek 43. The Basmachi regrouped themselves in bands which depended on the authority of military leader called as Kurbashi. Each bond only obeyed its own Kurbashi and they did not seized quarrelling and did not hesitate to betray each other for the large some of money. 44

At the beginning of 1919, Irgash a conservative and fanatic Muslim proclaimed himself as Amir-ul-Muslmin, came up against Madamin Bek who was liberal political in outlook. This rivalry weakened the cause of Basmachi movement. Irgash was defeated at the hands of Red Army in November 1919, made peace with the Soviet authorities and retained his rule of the Khokand district became neutral and did not interfere with Madamin. 45 Madamin in collaboration with Moustrov, former Tsarist officer, commander of Peasant Army, formed a Supreme Commander and their armed forces were united. The Peasant Army was re-named People Army and Madamin's band as Muslim White Army of Turkistan. The combined forces captured Bzhala Abad, Osh, penetrated into Pamir where they took Murghab, Kyzulrabort and Raghkul. They totally destroyed the entire railway line between Andijan and Namangan and established provisional government. They sought help from Great Britain, Afghanistan and Emir of Bukhara.

Threaten by the Basmachis achievements, central government decided to replace Tashkent Soviet by special "Turkistan Commission". The commission under Frunze command launched a new policy of co-operation, alongside brutal offensive in Farghana and Tajikistan, in order to gain support among Muslims and to paralyse their aspiration for independence:

1. Muslims were asked to joined communist party and government.
2. Marshal Frunze organized Soviet Basmachi detachments and made attempts to liquidate the rebellion.

3. In May 1920, 20,000 Muslims between the ages of 19 and 20 were recruited in Red Army units.
4. Food was distributed fairly between European and natives.
5. A natives right to trade was restored.
6. Abandoned all destructive tactics employed in 1918 - 1919. 46

The new policy was quite successful and the first of the Basmachi rebels to be won over was Monstrov's Peasant Army who join Red Army on conditions. Soviet authorities made peace offers to Basmachi leaders which included:

1. The right to retain their territory, arms and troops.
2. No Soviet institutions were set up in Basmachi territory.
3. Each Basmachi was to enjoy the status of Soviet Brigade Commander.

Mandamin on 7 March 1920, acknowledge Soviet rule. Other Basmachi leaders also accepted the offer, and by 1921 Soviet forces cleared the Farghana valley captured by Basmachis. 47

As the independent existence of Khiva and Bukhara, was a alarming threat to Soviet authority, the next step of Tashkent Soviet was to destroy them. In Khiva Khanate, the situation was becoming day by day more tense because Junaid Khan adopted a reign of terror against Uzbeks. Among Uzbek population Young Khivan Party advocated:

1. Political freedom.
2. Removal of hinderance to the development of capitalism .
3. Opposed the policies of Junaid Khan.

The party appealed to Soviet government for help which was accepted and captured Khiva on 23 January 1920 and Junaid Khan and his troops fled into the Karakum desert where he joined Basmachi in anti Soviet activities. In June 1920, Khiva was proclaimed as Khawarazmin People's Republic under Young Khivan Party. 48. In Bukhara,

Young Bukhariote dominated by Jadids wanted the removal of the Emir, persuaded Soviet Tashkent for military expedition against Emir, but military expedition failed. The Young Bukharan left Bukhara to Samarkand and Tashkent and co-operated with Communist Party (CP). The Tashkent Soviet regime signed a peace treaty with Emir 49. Emir declared holy war against Russians and concluded agreements with Afghanistan, Persia and Britain and made contacts with Basmachis. Alarmed by the situation, Moscow send an "extraordinary commissar" to Turkistan in April 1918 under P.A.Kobozev who convened Fifth Congress of Central Asian Soviets, which on April 30 declared the creation of Turkistan Autonomous Republic Federated with Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic. 50.

On 1 August 1920, Marshal Frunze in a telegram asked Lenin about Bukharan question: with two courses of action, either to hope and wait for the development of an internal revolutionary process or to organize revolution with outside help. The second course was decided to be followed. 51. Meanwhile, the internal situation seemed ripe for Soviet intervention. The economic situation was deteriorated due to heavy taxation and closing of trade since 1920 with Russia and Turkistan ASSR. 70 percent of the nation's herds were destroyed, land was no longer irrigated, the army was poorly equipped and trained. In country side peasant revolts flared up in several districts 52. Thus a revolt was staged in a Bukharan town by the Russian workers and on August 23, started a revolt in Bukhara by Young Bukharan revolutionaries. An appeal for help was sent to the Red Army by Bukharan revolutionaries. The help arrived under Marshal Frunze. After a five days battle the city of Bukhara was captured on 2 September 1920. Emir Said Ali escaped into the Eastern Bukharan mountains, then to Kabul, where he tried to re-grouped his troops. 53

A People's Soviet Republic was established in Bukhara. Bukharan government was made up of Jadids and Young Bukharans. The programme adopted by the new government was characterized by nationalist slogans rather than by communist doctrine. The programme included:

1. Authority of Quran and Shariat.

2. Native language to be taught in lower schools while native Turkic literary language at secondary level.
3. To confiscate the lands of the Emir and aristocracy and distribute among poor peasants.
4. To established equality between various nationalities.

Nothing was said either about the dictatorship of the proletariat or the liquidation of private property 54. People democracy was adopted in the constitution. For communists it was "transitional stage, leading the normal Soviet system outlined by Lenin". 55. The Soviet Russia in September 1920 recognized the absolute independence of the new state and on 3 November 1920, a treaty of military, political and economic cooperation was signed between Moscow and Bukharan government 56. Thus making new government dependent on the Soviet authorities in Turkistan.

The second period of the Basmachi movement started in Eastern Bukhara's area, where the Emir Said Alims flight transformed the area into center of Basmachis operation. Emir soon collected an army and named Ibrahim Bek as Commander-in-Chief of his troops with Dushanbe as Headquarter. But he was unable to remain in Dushanbe and take refuge in Afghanistan, from where he was inclose contact with rebels. Young Bukharan after consolidating their power in western Bukhara turned their attention towards Eastern Bukhara with Soviet help. In February 1921 a Red Army expedition to Gissar defeated the forces of Emir. On 16 February Dena, 21 February Dushanbe and 15 March 1921 Kulyab were occupied by Red forces 57. This was the first exposure of Tajiks of Bukhara had to the new ruler.

Situation quickly begin to change in Bukhara as Young Bukharan had split with the Central Committee of the Bukharan Communist Party who wanted the transformation of the Bukhara into a socialist society. Under leadership of Muhiuddin, a group took an anti Russian position. Thus chief Bukharan leaders joined rebel ranks along with their supporters and police. In Khiva also a mass demonstration against the government was staged, as a result Khivan leaders and other Young Khivan officials joined forces with

Junaid Khan in Karakum desert 58. On March 14, 1921, the Young Khivan government deposed and republic name was transformed from People's Republic to Soviet Republic, an important step towards integration.

The Khivan incident intensified Muslim nationalist resistance to the Soviets in Bukhara. The Lokay valley became a hot bed of new Basmachi revolt, under Ibrahim Bek leadership. Also in Tajik mountains and Farghana valley new Basmachi chieftains arose 59. In Eastern Bukhara, Basmachis from various places of Turkistan gathered and organized "United Committee for the National Liberation of Central Asia". 60

Meanwhile Young Bukharan government send Ata Khoja to negotiate with Basmachis. He concluded a treaty with Basmachi leaders for the recognition of the new government, in return assured them the non interference of the Bolsheviks in Eastern Bukharas affairs. Russian refused to ratify this treaty. In September 1921 Ibrahim Bek was able to oust the Russian troops from Dushanbe and Red Army was forced to retreat. Basmachi gained a new vitality in Farghana and Kurshirmat won control of towns of Namangan, Mergela and Andijan 61. After a defeat at the hands of Red Army, Kurshirmat fled to Eastern Bukhara.

Although Bashmachi were in effective control of Eastern Bukhara but, as mentioned earlier, lacked unity and coordination. This missing component was provided by Enver Pasha a young Turk who attended the Soviet sponsored "Congress of the People's of the East" at Baku with the title of "Delegate of the Revolutionaries of Libya, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco" and asked for communist support in the struggle against western imperialism. 62

Realizing the popularity of Enver among the Muslims, Soviet government decided to exploit it. Lenin by an agreement decided to send Enver to central Asia to pacify the Basmachi. For Enver by accepting Bolshevik's invitation, he could imposed himself on Turkey first by establishing himself as Turkic people's leader outside Turkey. On the other hand by organizing the movement he could pressurize the Allies to prevent them



from the division of Turkey. For Lenin the Bolshevik's sphere of influence would be widened by rising of eastern people, thus under mining the power of Britain.

In October 1921, Enver arrived in Bukhara on "a Mission of Peace" to the Basmachis. In Bukhara he learned of the situation in Eastern Bukhara, famine conditions, atrocities committed by Red Army, political disorder in Bukhara, decided to join the Basmachi. He arrived near Dushanbe where he linked up with the most important Basmachi leader, Ibrahim Bek. He began to mobilize various groups and factions of movement into common resistance against Soviet rule. In Central Asia he encountered:

1. The Young Bukharan party under Usman Khoja.
2. Khivan Basmachis lead by Junaid Khan.
3. Basmachis of samarkand district.
4. Farghana's Basmachis.
5. Ibrahim Bek's authority in Eastern Bukhara. 63

Enver met with Basmachi leaders and due to his kinship with Turkish Caliph, his sympathy with Afghan pan Islamists he was called " Savior of Islam" 64. " Muslim of the world unite" was the Enver's slogan against the communist slogan " workers of the world unite". He was appointed as commander in chief of the Basmachi forces 65. In the spring of 1922, the forces of Enver Pasha controlled the whole of the Eastern Bukhara, including Dushanbe, as well as the large parts of ex Emirate. 66

The relations between Enver, with headquarter near Dushanbe, and Ibrahim Bek, situated near Lokay, deteriorated. Enver's successful achievements began to over throw the Ibrahim Bek's achievements. Also Enver's strength put him as virtual ruler of Eastern Bukhara, Ibrahim began to fell jealous of Enver's popularity. The fuel was added by Enver who called himself as "commander in chief of all Muslim troops", "son in law of caliph"and" representative of the Prophet",resulted in an open clash between the two leaders 67. Thus disuniting once again the Basmachi movement.

Soviet troops taking full advantage of the situation advanced into East by seizure of Denan, Dushanbe, Kurgan Tyube, Kulyab and Bopldzhnan 68. In August Enver was forced to retire on Beljuvan in the Tajik hills. But he was killed on 8 August 1922 69. With the death of Enver ended the prospect of Muslim unity, political backbone of the movement was broken and Ibrahim Bek once again became the important leader in Tajikistan. Although Basmachi were wiped out in other regions, in Tajikistan it continued to survive for several years. Thousands of Tajik Basmachis, including Ibrahim Bek, sought refuge in Afghanistan rather than surrender.

Soviet authorities, took advantage of the situation and introduced series of important reforms. From 1921 to 1991 the history of SovietTajikistan can be divided into following periods:

#### **KORENISATSILA PERIOD (1921 - 1927)**

Soviet adopted a policy of Korenisation (nativization or more literally rooting), in order to generate good will towards the Soviet power, to disarm the Basmachis and to eliminate the legacy of colonialism which characterized relation between Russian and Central Asians at the time of revolution.

#### **RELIGION**

The Turkic Bureau of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee and the Turkic commission decided that confiscation of the Waqf lands should be returned to Muslims, religious schools were reopened, shariat courts were returned 70, political repression was ceased by including Muslims into political posts. The president of the Turkistan Central Committee and the President of the Farghana Revolutionary Committee were Muslims. The Turkistan Government was represented in Moscow by 3 Muslim deputies. 71


#### **ECONOMY**

Out of these reforms, most important was Lenin's New Economic Policy. This policy permitted a rapid recovery in the Central Asian's material situation. Food supplies were sent to the area, peasants were offered corn on condition that they used it as their own food and was not for sowing. By reducing sowing of wheats in the spring of 1923 the Russian succeeded in depriving Basmachis of their food supplies and Basmachis had to take corn by force from natives thus alienating the sympathies and support of the natives. Taxes were cut half in Farghana. Normal trade with Russia was resumed. State bank was opened. The damaged railway lines were rebuilt, telephone and telegraphs communications were reestablished, reconstruction work of irrigation canals was undertaken, cotton growing and cattle raising was stimulated. Land and water reforms were introduced. In March 1923, at First Conference of South Central Asians Republics -the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist republic (ASSR), Bukharan People's Republic and Khawarzam People's Republic, a common economic policy was adopted. In November Central Asiatic Economic Council was formed with function to integrate the whole economy, agriculture, irrigation, communication, transportation and monetary system in Russian system.

As a result of religious and economic concessions, the Basmachis lost its following which weakened its strength and popularity. In the Farghana valley alone the Basmachis lost 3500 men 72. But movement survived. In 1923 and 1924, Matcha, Darvaz and Karategin in the Eastern Bukhara remained three major basis of the movement.

## **POLITICS**

The Soviet administration in Central Asia was recognized with the adaptation of the first Soviet Federal Constitution in 1924. The history of the consolidation of Soviet power begins with the arrival of Turkistan Commission in Tashkent, with task to draft constitution for the Republic of Turkistan. The first draft constitution submitted to Moscow in 1918 was rejected because Moscow refused to grant the republic charter of autonomy within the R.S.F.R (Russian Soviet Federated Republics). In September 1920,



Source: Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia, London: C. Hurst & Company, 1982.

new constitution was adopted, according to which the foreign affairs, foreign trades and defence were under the control of federal government. Under the constitution the Turkistan ASSR comprised of the same territory as the former Turkistan Governorate - General - five oblasts of Syr-Darya, Semirechy, Farghana, Samarkand and Transcaspia and Amu-Darya Military Division 73. The constitution of the 1924 provided federal in form (due to multinational character) and socialist in character (to preserve the monopoly and centralized control of Communist Party) for a soviet state.

Stalin in his report to the 10th All Russian Congress of Soviet on the formation of Soviet Union announced:

Two independent Soviet Republics Khawarzm and Bukhara, being people Soviet, but not socialist republics... because they are not yet socialist. I have not doubt... that, in proportion of their internal development towards socialism, they like wise will enter the structure of the union state now being formed. After this, complete absorption became a foregone conclusion. 74

Meanwhile in Khiva Safonov, Soviet High Commissioner, well aware of the friction between settled Uzbek and nomads Turkmen population, convened an all - Turkmen congress and secured Turkmen support against government. Thus in March 1921, after serious disturbances, the Young Khivan government was overthrown. The stage was set for complete Soviet take over. In 1921 and 1922 those capable of offering resistance were executed or imprisoned on the charge of counter revolution. In October 1923, the constitution was modified depriving "all non-toiling elements" of the right to vote and a year later Khawarzm People's Republic was declared the Khawarzmian Soviet Socialist Republic. 75

In Bukhara the new government had been formed under Faizullah Khoja - Oghli, after a portion of government had joined Enver Pasha. In June 1923 Stalin denounced the government of Bukhara "which had nothing popular about it". The Bukharan

Council of Ministers was dissolved and governmental officials, leaders and administrative personnel were arrested. The constitution was amended and all the former officials, important merchants clerics, land owners or anyone likely to oppose Soviet Socialist regime was disfranchised and banned from the political community and on 19 September 1924 Bukhara was proclaimed a Soviet Socialist Republic. 76

The stage was set for the next step that was the so-called National Delimitation on the basis of Lenin's Nationalities policy. The Bukharan Soviet Socialist Republic, Khawarzm Soviet Socialist Republic and Turkistan ASSR were dissolved and new political units were established. Two socialist republics were established: Uzbekistan including central part of Bukhara, southern part of old Khiva and Syr Darya formerly included in the province of Turkistan, and Turkmenistan which regrouped the Turkmen region of western Bukhara, Khawarzm and former Transcaspian region. Three Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) were on a lower administrative levels, the Kazakh, Kirghiz and Tajik, were formed. Kazakh and Kirghiz ASSR were administered under the RSFSR, and the Tajikistan which included parts of the Samarkand, Farghana province, all of Eastern Bukhara and Pamirs, was part of Uzbekistan SSR. In 1925, the Pamirs gained formal autonomy as the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast with its capital at Khorog, inhabited by Ismaeli Muslims. On 15 October 1929, Tajikistan was changed from an Autonomous SSR to federal republic. Thus Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic was created. A part of lower Farghana valley was added to Tajikistan from Uzbekistan 77. Whereas Bukhara and Samarkand the main Persian speaking cities, remained in Uzbekistan, leaving the Tajiks with backward town of Dushanbe as republics capital.

The National Delimitation policy was criticized on the ground that policy was part of Bolshevik's solution to potential pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism or any anti Russian threat. It has been viewed in terms of Moscow's policy of divide and rule. Thus by this policy, Soviet desires to facilitate All Union Control, by establishing uniform territorial administrative structure that allowed centralized control from Moscow. Also by this policy Soviets tried to restore and preserve law and order. Significantly Bolsheviks did not divide Central Asia in such a way as to leave Bukhara and Khawarzm units because

Bolsheviks feared that such states would command genuine political loyalty and could provide grounds for resurgence of pan-Islamism because people's devotion to Islam was boundless . Moreover the units which were created were not ethnically and linguistically homogeneous, for example there were many Tajik speaking inhabitants in Uzbekistan's Samarkand its first capital. 78

According to Geoffrey Wheeler:

...the whole sale condemnation of the Soviet nationalities policy and the National Delimitation of 1924 is unjustified. As the self appointed heirs to the Tsarist Empire, the Soviet leaders felt some responsibility for Central Asia, or atleast for the two million Russians living there. Rightly or wrongly they thought that to leave the region to its own devices would entail deplorable consequences for all concerned and they adopted what seemed to them best way of restoring law and order within the frame work of the Russian state. Moreover if the Soviet government had ever entertained any idea of granting the peoples of Central Asia genuine independence based on ethnic and linguistic grouping, the national delimitation would have proved a useful interm measures. 79

According to Professor Ahmed Hasan Dani:

...this partition closed the chapter of inter-tribal and inter-regional warfare and gave statehood to newly created ethno-cultural units. For the first time people such as Kirghiz obtained their statehood. Similarly Tajiks could have their own national state. But at what cost? This was done by eroding all the historical - cultural links and restarting from clan and tried to form the newly evolved ethno - cultural nations. The new states have been based on a new concept of nationality while together they joined into a monolithic

politico-economic structure deriving all the dictates from Moscow... towards a common goal of communist achievement. 80

After the successful destruction of the Muslim unity, the Soviet government considered it necessary to built new community on novel foundations - socialist, proletarian and internationalist. "New Soviet man" and "a Soviet Society" will emerge where there will be no spiritual, intellectual or physical differences between Russians and Tajiks or Estonians and Kirghiz - they will share the same culture, believe in same ideology, adhere same leaders, same Soviet identity and express exclusive loyalty to soviet state. Thus for the achievement of Sovietization and Russification new concepts were given in fields of education, economy politics and culture. 81. These new republics national in form must be socialist in essence. For instance, the Tajik might have their own national flag, language, some of their national culture, traditions but their patriotism, military source and their productivity must due to Soviet state as a whole and not to the Tajik SSR.

Quite interestingly, it was believed that creation of Tajikistan as a separate state was a politically motivated plan because on the one hand, it was the frontier between the USSR, Afghanistan and China and on the other hand it served as "exemplary" communists state closest to Iran, British India and Afghanistan. Because 1917 - 1920, under the impact of Soviet example communist parties already emerged in Egypt, Indonesia and Iran. The same idea was expressed by Stalin in his congratulation message to the Tajiks on the occasion of the official proclamation of Tajik ASSR:

...greetings to Tajikistan, greeting to the new Toilers, Soviet Republic at the gates of Hindustan, I wish you every success in making your republic a model for the countries in the East... In Tajikistan raise the culture of your country, develop your country's economy, help the city and village toilers, draw to yourself the finest sons of your fatherland and show the entire East that you are the best off - spring





Source: Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The case of Tadjikistan, London: The Johns Hopkins, Press 1970.

of an ancestry which held steadily to the banner of the Revolution....

82

The international significance of the formation of Soviet Tajikistan was understood in an official 1964 Tajik history:

The establishment of the Tajik SSR at the border of colonial East was of great international importance. It became a model of how the Soviet government has resolved the national problem and proof of the triumph of Leninist nationality policy. It demonstrated the great care which the communist party and the Soviet government have taken in the creation and development of national statehood of the previously oppressed backward colonial people. 83

In Eastern Bukhara started his campaign for unity. But he had suffered, except few, continuous defeats by the Russian cavalry on one hand and fatal quarrel with Ibrahim Bek and other Basmachi groups which refused to accept his authority on the other hand. Due to internal rivalries of Basmachi and men and technical superiority of Red Army soon captured the three important holdings of Basmachis 84.. Haji Sami could not tolerate the situation and escaped towards River Panj where he before his final drive towards Afghanistan, addressed a vast Tajik gathering:

Oh, brave and good Tajik people... Allah has taken from you with the host of infidel Jadids and Bolsheviks. We were victorious when obeyed our call and followed the ways of Islam. We are being beaten, because your sons are being lured away by those evil people who scoff at our holy Shariat and at ancient right of property... and if you wish to join us in the heaven, bid your sons, respect the Holy law, fight for the Shariat against the Bolsheviks, the Jadids, the infidels. 85

After Salim Pasha, Ibrahim Bek became the commander of Basmachis in Tajikistan or Eastern Bukhara. Who was joined by Junaid Khan.

Basmachi bands still very strong had favourable conditions due to poor harvest and resulting famine. In fall 1925 Basmachis once again become active in Tajik's countryside, with the slogans "hunger is the punishment of God for cooperation with Bolsheviks". The government alongwith a communist party organized Revkon (revolutionary committee) of Tajik ASSR and Red stick (organized to help Red Army) started a campaign of repression - included purge and harsh punitive measures for Basmachi supporters. As a result people lost their faith in any victory and with held their support 86. By the spring of 1926 the 57 Basmachi groups with 1,370 warriors were reduced to 29 groups with 959 men and by the end of 1926 in central and southern Tajikistan the movement was liquidated. Their leaders Ibrahim Bek, Kuram Bek and other fled to Afghanistan. By 1927, the Basmachi forces in Tajikistan were reduced even further.

After the sucessful destruction of the Muslim unity, the Soviet government, inorder to strengthen their hold, considered it necessary to built a new community, a new "Soviet man" and a "Soviet society". But:

... the exceptional economic and cultural backwardness of Tajikistan, according to Teresa R.Harmston, made the task of the new Soviet government truly formidable. Even though the Basmachis were militarily defeated, the background and attitudes which had fostered and supported their movement remained. Five years of civil war had left destruction, desolation and bitterness. 87

Thus the policies adopted by the Soviet leaders were according to the requirements of the central government and from the point of view long range integration of the region into the new Soviet state or what they labelled as "needs of the time", without giving genuine consideration to native feelings and needs.

#### **ASSAULT PERIOD (1927 - 1941)**

In late twenties and early thirties, the situation in Central Asia as well as in Soviet Union as a whole began to deteriorate. In Central Asia the offensive was mounted on three fronts:

## RELIGION

1. The assault on system of traditional morality and beliefs held sacred by their identification with Islam. By 1928 frontal attack began on Islam as a religion and as a determinant of family and social relations 88. Anti religious propaganda was considered as the moral duty of all honest Soviet citizens, member of the communist party, youth organizations (Komsomol) trade unions and of entire state, soviet and government apparatus. All Soviet mass media talks on atheism which was based on Marxist doctrine:

Islam is the opium of the toiling masses, destructing them from the social struggle against the exploiting parasites. ...It is a fanciful, fallacious and anti scientific creed ...It has no place in a Marxist Socialist world, which is building paradise on this earth... Marxism-Leninism and religious ideology are therefore incompatible and irreconcilable... and the communist party can not remain in different or neutral towards religion... it must fight it and it must defeat it. 89

The same arguments constitute the basis of atheistic education of all soviet citizens and were fed to soviets children of all nationalities from the moment they entered educational institutions at the age of four.

This assault resulted in the expropriation of all clerical property waqf, completed by 1930. Eliminated Muslim clergy and institution's economic power leaving mosques and madrassas without independent means of support. The Islamic clergy and various holy men were denounced as criminals, corrupt and exploiters. All the Shariat and Adat

Courts were closed down in 1924. The brutal assault of 1928 was spear headed by an attack on the more extra vagant features of Muslims observances such as Muslim's fast during the month of Ramazan, Qurban or Ashnar Shia's ceremony. Mosques were desecrated. By 1917 revolution there existed 26000 mosques whose numbers were reduced to 1312 by 1942. This was followed by the closure of some 15,000 madrasahs across Central Asia. The Union of Godless set up in 1925 to wipe out Islam was given permission by Stalin to turn mosques into social centers. In 1934 a government ban was placed on people performing Haj and printing press was forbidden to publish the Qurran. The other aspects of the campaign included attacks on the traditional patriarchal frame work of the Muslims family. By 1928, polygamy, kalym were prohibited. But the most irritating for Muslims was attempt to force the Khudzhun campaign - emancipation of women that includes unveiling of women, to leave seclusion of their home, to participate in economic and social life and to facilitate mixed marriages between Russian and Muslims. 90

As the Islamic traditions were not deep rooted in Kazakhstan and Kirghiz they were least effected. But the back lash was strong in the tradition bound long settled Uzbek and Tajik areas. The Tajiks were among the most religious Central Asian nationalities and traditional customs constituting the Muslims way of life are more firmly practiced in their territory. Soviet anti religious activities in Tajikistan were directed first against the traditional ways of life e.g abolition of tradition of Kalym and secondly against holy places and parallel Islam. In Tajikistan parallel Islam based on sufi brotherhoods - Tariqa, the path leading to God, was represented by the Murids of Naqshbandiya who controlled number of holy places - which in the absence of working mosques become centers of religious life and activities 91. As Khudzhum campaign began, there were cases when women who discarded the veil were murdered by relatives due to shame. In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the campaign was also resented by Muslim communists "who were undoubtly secret believers", polygamy, childbrides, wife beating and parda wearing were frequently cites in criticism against political elites. This damaged whatever support soviet rule had managed to generate in the Muslim community. As the anti

religious propaganda intensified, large number of unofficial or private Mullahs were disappeared during the 1932 - 1938 purges. 92

## ECONOMY

2. The second assault was on the traditional economic structure, patterns of livelihood and relations of production.

According to Alexander Park:

... the early Bolshevnik leaders were confronted with two possible alternatives. Either they could extent and consolidate the system of Great Russian Political Administration in the border region under the guise of proletarian political tutelage and so establish an enlightened colonial system... or they could undertake a programme of accelerated industrialization which would transformed overwhelmingly rural national republics and region into centers of native proletarian strength. 93

The later course was adopted because the essence of Soviet Nationalities Policy was economic and its declared object was the liquidation of existing inequality among the nations making up the former Russian Empire. Once inequality had been eliminated in all Bourgeois nationalist and separatist tendencies would disappear. Thus in 1928 in the first five year plan, collectivization of agriculture was introduced throughout the Soviet Union. 94

Mass collectivization in Tajikistan began in the early 1930s and was basically completed by 1934. By December 1933, 50 percent of all agriculture had been collectivized. The new emphasis on cotton cultivation required the new settlement of the southern valleys. By the end of 1929, fifty new villages most of them in southern Tajikistan, had been established through resettlement. Beside Tajiks, members of other

ethnic groups like Uzbeks, Russians and Afghans were the new settlers who settled with governmental assistance. Of these groups, Russian were the most important who came either voluntarily to help with collectivization, while other brought with them modernization skills and techniques in exchange of economic gains. From 1926-1939, 1,700,000 Russian settlers came to Central Asia, most of them settled in cities and new industrial centers. In Tajikistan, Russian 1 percent of the total population raised to 9 percent in 1939. 95

Mass resistance to collectivization was as determine in Tajikistan as it was in other parts of Central Asia. The resistance reached the proportion of renewed civil war and in Tajikistan Basmachi movement once again became active. The resistance was desperate among mountain Tajiks who were forced to give up their centuries old traditions and pastoralism. Livestock breeding was also effected due to slaughtering of cattles. The Tajik's herds never recovered from the disastrous effects of collectivization. In 1928, there were 915,4 cattles which were reduced to 580,0 in 1941. Expansion of cotton production, resulted in failure to grow enough food in the new collective farms e.g grain crops in Tajikistan in 1940 was 72.0 percent which was reduced to 57.9 percent in 1953. 96

Many reluctant peasants joined the rebels in the mountains. Ibrahim Bek based in Mazar-e-sharif launched attacks into Tajikistan in 1929. He entered Tajikistan in 1931 and tried to organized the movement but on 23 June 1931 he was captured by Soviet troops and executed. With his death the title "Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of Islam" and the heroic era of the Mujahidin ended. 97

If we analyze the Tajik's support for Basmachis, we found several factors but can pinpoint only a major factor. That was, prior to 1920 - 21, there was no hard feeling towards Russian among Tajiks. But it was only during 1920 - 21 Red Army's pacification campaign that Tajiks of Eastern Bukhara came into contacts with Red Army. It was the brutality and disregard for local customs, religion and women by Red Army, that locals began to support the Basmachi movement. The strong support for Enver and escaped

Emir of Bukhara was due to their hatred for Red Army rather than their love for their leaders.

Further more the Soviet regime inherited a traditional system that had been destroyed due to revolution and civil war. As this irrigation system was essential for the beginning of collectivization, large scale projects were quickly taken up, but lack of resources, skilled personnel and equipment prevented any such projects from being undertaken until 1930s. In Tajikistan the first project of Vakhsh valley was completed in 1935 and total length of 13,000 km new canal system was constructed 98. In 1939, 49 more canal were built, all of them were by people construction. The most greatest digging was of the Great Farghana canal of 1939 by 160,000 Uzbeks, 20,000 Tajiks and 1,000 supervising Russian engineers and technicians who completed 168 mile long canal in 45 days. 99

After collectivization was completed other, building of socialism, aspects were stressed. It was after the world war -II that efforts were made for industrialization.

Although the collectivization period was chaotic, its two by - product had important future implications:

1. As new settlers farmed their own nationally homogeneous land, thus projecting uniethnic and unitribal character, without any European or Muslim mixing.
2. Massive influx of Europeans resulted in industrialization drive on one hand and help in running of administration on the other. 100

## **POLITICS**

3. Assault on " Muslim communists " loyalties to their people and their culture.



A "social revolution", along Stalin's lines that took place in Central Asia met with resistance, which centered around the so called "counter - revolutionary bourgeois nationalist element" e.g in Tajikistan communist party members who resented the ruthless implication of policies directed by Moscow were disloyal, and removed from their posts and finally purged.

There were two main waves of purges in the Central Asian Republics:

1. The first wave, began with collectivization campaign, affected the indigenous cadres. This began with the "Bourgeois nationalist" purge, carried out by the second Congress of the Tajik Communist Party in January 1934 on the command of the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Party which in 1964 quoted as:

...help the Tajik communists to unmask in the party and government apparatus a group of backsliders into nationalist deviation, who, with their conciliatory attitude towards the... anti Soviet elements, favoured the awakening of bourgeois - nationalists tendencies and thus were hostile to the national policy of the party. 101

The "nationalist deviationists" consists of those well educated Central Asian leaders who occupied prominent position in their republics. Most of them came from classes which Bolshevik mistrusted like Jadids. Two Tajik leaders, Nasartullah Maqsum, Chairman of Central Executive Committee, was accused for advocating "to get rid of the Russians in the government apparatus" while Abdurahim Khadzhibaev, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, advocated "Greater Tajikistan's" idea. Both denied the need for a class struggle in Tajikistan. Both men were tried in Moscow and executed after found guilty. Purges did not stoped at the political elites, writers and poets were also executed who joined hands with political leaders against the centralized policies and newly introduced Russification. Of 700 writers, many of them from Central Asia, who met at the First Congress of the Union of the Soviet Writers, in 1934, only 50 survived to see

the second congress in 1954. As a result, from January 1933 to January 1935, the membership of Tajik communist party fell from 14,329 to 791, a loss of almost 10,000 members. 102

2. Great purges, the second period began in 1937 which included both Muslim communists and as well as other "enemies of the people" such as Mullahs, ex officials etc.

This second period began with accusing Fayzulla Khodzhayev, Uzbek communist, the Prime Minister who buried his brother according to Islamic rites and Akmal Ikramov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party (both men supervised the Tajik party) was accused in a newspaper article being nationalist. Both were accused of saying that "only a change of a sign board differentiate Tsarist Turkistan from Soviet Turkistan - as both were run by the Russians". Both of them alongwith 21 others were executed. The Tajik victims included the chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, the chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, members of the council, minister of public education, minister of Industry and three secretaries of the Tadzhik Communist Party (TCP).

As the two purges liquidate the 66 percent of the local cadres from Tajik party, they were replaced by newly arrived Russian and other European party activists, who infact placed the republic under direct Russian rule. For instance the new secretary of the Tajik party was a Russian and the lower staff were also Russians - a colonial pattern. By the end of 1930s, ethnic Russian constituted one - fourth of the membership of the Tajik communist party. Whereas in 1925 Russian were 15 percent in 1938, 25 percent and in 1941, 26 percent . The native Muslims who joined the party were members of the socio-economic elites, e.g. factory directors, chairmen of the collective farms, administrators etc, who had higher stander of living. They showed their willingness to obey party's orders and to learn from the Russians the more advanced "western" methods of organization. Thus they were in first line of promotion. 103

The system of political organization was confirmed by the new Stalin constitution adopted by USSR in 1936. The Tajik SSR adopted a new constitution on 1 March 1937 104. The structure established by Tajik constitution was a carbon copy of the 1936 USSR constitution except with minor variations reflecting local peculiarities. According to the constitution priority was given to new schools, press, public media. But the most important one was the measure designed to improve the position of the women. Provided constitutional safeguards of women rights. Soviet government considered that old regional customs excluded women's participation in all economic, social and political life, thus deprived the valuable labour force. The women's rights was contained in all republics constitutions. The Tajik constitution declared polygamy, resistant to the drawing of women into agriculture and industrial production, or into social and political activities as punishable by law. 105

This was resisted by Muslim clergy. Many new schools for ladies were burned and teachers were murdered. But once such innovation were introduced it began to leave its mark on society.

## CULTURE

In the cultural field, in pre war period the Tajik language was changed twice. In 1929, the Arabic alphabets were replaced by Latin alphabets and in 1940 Latin script was replaced by the Cyrillic alphabets. The first change was justified on the grounds that Arabic alphabets were too difficult to learn and was too easily identified with "reactionary philosophy" of Islam. According to T.S.Saidbaev:

This was not just a change of the alphabets, it carried with it the loss of the influence that the religion and the clergy had over the life of the people. 106

While the Latin alphabets were considered more effective against illiteracy, facilitated the study of Central Asian languages as well as translation of foreign books into

these languages. The second change facilitated the influence of the Russian language. It was used as first state language and medium of primary and secondary instruction in education. The Russian language, as English language did in India during British period, penetrated in all walks of life. It was also used to consolidate the cultural unity between Russia and Central Asia. This change made obsolete millions of books printed in Latin charter and drove thousands of natives back to semi literacy.

Cultural offensive in thirties was directed in creating "Tajik Socialist Culture". The offensive against Tajik cultural heritage was met with resistance on the part of Tajik intellectuals and created the atmosphere of "cultural struggle with bourgeois nationalists", the nationalists intellectuals disappeared in the purges. 107

Prior to mid 1930s the theory of "absolute evil" by M.N.Pokrovskii was enforced. It condemned all colonial conquest and glorified all national liberation movements against Great Russian oppression. Thus all pre revolutionary Turkistan's struggle against Tsars colonization was officially praised. But after purges by the end of 1940s a new historical theory of "lesser evil" was developed by Nechkina according to which Russian conquests were less evil than that of Turkish, Iranian and British domination. Nationalists struggle against Tsarists regime was still praised but their nationalist outlook on their past was no longer tolerated. This resulted in alternation of all historical books and change of history. 108

Despite of all the disasters, which specifically fell on Muslim republics during this period, it also established imperfect foundation for further progress in field of education, industry, health etc. To began with, Stalin in order to make Central Asian republics "national in forms but socialist in content", proclaimed a line to be followed in that area by the Soviet regime:

1. To create industrial centers.
2. To advance agriculture and above all irrigation.

3. To improve and advance cooperative organization among the masses of the peasants and handicraftsmen - as to bring them into the general system of Soviet economic development.
4. To bring the Soviets into close touch with the masses.
5. To develop national culture, to build up a wide system of courses for general and vocational education and technical training in native language with the purpose of training Soviet party, trade union economic cadres among the native people. 109

For Bolshevik leaders the educational system was given priority because they hoped that the uniform educational system would play an important role in raising the future citizens of a transformed and modern Central Asia. In Tajikistan the first school was opened in 1926 - 27. The four year compulsory education was extended to seven years which resulted in the rise of literacy rate. In 1926 the Tajikistan's literacy rate was 2.2 percent which in 1959 rased to 52.3 percent 110. Besides general, the development of technical education was the first aim of the new Soviet regime. In 1925 and 1926 short courses were offered by the Tajik Commissariats of education, internal affairs and health and some Tajiks were sent to Uzbek schools. In 1925 at the invitation of the Tajik government, economic and cultural specialist, party workers mainly Russian came in Tajikistan for help. Training local cadres for party and government were continued during this period but with emphasis shifted from educating leaders to educating specialists and technicians. According to new policy:

The bulk of old national intelligentsia... is alien to the Soviet regime ... what we have to do now is to train not an intelligentsia in general but firstly, our own cadres of the proletarian intelligentsia from the various nationalities of the USSR and secondly, such cadres as would, above all, be the exponents of definite technical and industrial knowledge. 111

During this period the base was provided in the field of power including oil, coal and hydroelectric, light industry mainly cotton and silk textiles, irrigation and transportation, railway and water way.

## **THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR AND ITS AFTER MATH (1941 - 1956)**

Though the front of World War-II was far from the region, it had great impact on Central Asia. The war brought a relaxation in the treatment of Islam and easing of economic control in order to mobilize all resources for survival against the Germans.

### **RELIGION**

An era of relative liberalism began in 1941 and lasted throughout the hostilities. Mufti Abdurrahman Rasul, leader of the Soviet Muslims, issued a manifesto "to rise in defence of the fatherland against the enemy threatening destruction and misfortune to all Muslims, children, brothers and sisters in our religion..." Special prayers were offered for victory. Persecution of clergy and anti religious propaganda was stopped and other religious communities were granted the status of legal persons. The major advance was the official sanctioning of four Spiritual Directorates:

1. Tashkent, Central Asian and Kazakhstan.
2. Ufa, European Russia and Siberia.
3. Makhach-Qala, northern Caucasus and Daghestan.
4. Baku, Transcaucasia. 112

This had been known as "official Islam" or we can call it the secularization of Islam in former Soviet Union.

New mosques were opened, open religious observance increased, Haj was reallowed. The Mir-i-Arab Madrasah in Bukhara was reopened in 1945 and second Madrasah that of Barak Khan was reopened in 1958 at Tashkent 113. Thus the atheistic

propaganda was stopped and the Union of Militant Godless ceased its activities. The Central Asian Directorate started collecting Zakat and Fitr from Muslims. According to Saidbaebv:

The war not only increased the Muslim religiosity but strengthened the position of Islam by raising the prestige of clergy and providing the income for their activities especially because they took patriotic position and assisted in the struggle for peace. 114

However, administrative and psychological offensive against Islam was resumed by Khrushchev in 1953 under his policy "back to Lenin" and lasted more than 10 years 115. Initiated by the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee resolution of 1954, on the mistakes in atheistic propaganda, a new effort was made to check the revival of Islam and to reintroduce atheistic education and propaganda. Thus vigorous atheistic campaign curtailed the freedom of religious activities 116 e.g in Tajikistan in 1955 the Association for the Propagation of Scientific and Political Knowledge organized 13,800 lectures on anti Islamic themes. 117

## ECONOMY

The post war period in Tajikistan was officially designed the period of "struggle for communism" with the emphasis on economic development and cultural sovietization. 118 It was in the post war period that the main expansion of the Tajikistan economy took place. It showed spectacular development in comparison with the pre Soviet days and with other Asian countries. Significant industrial progress in light and heavy industry was made only in 1950 and 1960s. Khojend, Kaniabadan, Isfara and Gissar valleys became important industrial centers. 119

Despite the industrial development the occupation of the population remained farming and cattle breeding. In Tajikistan in 1957 there were 434 collective farms 34

state farms and 66 MTS (Machine and Tractor Stations), 10,600 tractors and 689 grain combine harvesters were working. In Darvaz and Karategin, the mountain areas, live stock breeding was the main occupation. The Pamirs economy besides livestock breeding was based on fruit and grain production. Darvaz and Karategin also produced 25 percent of the republic output of silk cocoons, grains and wheat as major agricultural crops. 120

## POLITICS

In Tajikistan during the war, because its a border republic, the influx of Russian party functionaries, security agents and military personnel of Red Army, internal Commissariats border guards and state security services increased. It also became a place for war refugees and deportation of politically unreliable elements. 1959 census listed 2,400 Koreans, 33,00 Germans, 57,000 Tatars in Tajikistan. Some were never returned to their homeland after war. Many Germans seem to live in Dushanbe. Most of Russian population was located in Urban and industrialized areas, thus heavily Russified the native cities, while ruler areas remained predominantly Tajik. 121

During war instead of "socialist Tajik culture" emphasis was towards "patriotic pro-Russian" and "anti - German" propaganda increased. Red Army's tank column was named as Tadzhik Kolkhozuik and air squadron as Soviet Tadzhikistan and also a cavalry division formed in Tajikistan. Tajik men were mobilized for the army and labour brigades and women were forced to take their places at work 122. It was estimated that 1,500,000 Turkistani called up for military services 123, out of these more than 50,000 Tajik soldiers participated in the war and 30 became heroes of Soviet Union. 124

With the end of world war - II, there were signs of a new indigenous political elite at higher level of the party and state apparatus. As Teresa R.Harmstone has noted:

Beginning in 1944 - 45 a new pattern emerged in the placement of Muslim and European cadres in Central Asian republics. Muslims



appeared in top "representative" positions, but with Russian and other representatives of the central apparat in all of the number two "control" positions immediate managerial and administrative posts in the hierarchy, as well as top positions in the internal security and the secret police agencies. 125

This was accompanied by an increase in the representation of the indigenous nationalities in republic party organization e.g from 1951 - 53, last years of Stalin rules, the Tajik constituted 39 percent and Russian 30 percent of the total TSSR party membership. After Stalin's death in 1953 there was a 24 percent decline in the members of the Russian members of the Communist Party of Tajikistan. In Central Committee, the Russian membership 37 percent in 1948 reduced to 21 percent in 1954. This was because after Stalin's death many high official Russian left the republic. Similarly local representatives in other governmental apparatus were also appointed. 126

## CULTURE

In cultural field the previous trends continued. Immediately after the war a new emphasis was laid on the role of Russian people as "the elder brother" of the family of the Soviet nationalities. 127

In 1949, in an article "Elder Brother and Friend of the Tadzhiks", the legendary hero qualities were ascribed to the Russian:

Russians were the leaders in culture, agriculture, crafts, education, law and architecture... Russian engineers, teachers, doctors and other made their way in to the new Republic Tajikistan to help in socialist construction and in educating the new intelligentsia... and

in the Great Patriotic war the Russians led the nationalities to victory.

128

In 1951 "lesser evil" a theory interpretation of the Russian conquest was further developed by M.V.Nechkina as "absolute good". According to the new theory:

As the people suffered under Tsarist oppression and conquest gave them opportunity of contact with the Russian people, culture and revolutionary movement. Thus without conquest there would have been no revolution in the border lands and no advancement to socialism. 129

Thus native scholars were compelled to condemn their own previously held views and to adjust their "new opinion" accordingly, and those who refused were perished in 1951 - 52 purges. In Tajikistan e.g a historian and first secretary of the Tajik party, Gafurov, in 1955 in a revision of his book de-emphasized the oppressive and colonial aspects of Russian rule and portrait the Russian conquest of Central Asia as progressive phenomenon in economic, cultural and political fields. In the new interpretation he listed five reasons why Russian conquest was progressive:

1. The conquest stimulated the change in Central Asia from feudalism to capitalism.
2. Region was after its incorporation, participated in world trade and to developed industry.
3. Benefited from Russian culture.
4. Law and order was imposed by Russians.
5. End of destructive wars and abolition of slavery.

While the nationalist movement in Central Asia required an extensive re-evaluation e.g 1885 and 1888 revolts in Boldzhuan and Kulyab led by peasants was judged as revolutionary and progressive with national liberating spirits. While 1898, attack on Russian garrison in Andijan was re-evaluated as "deeply feudal and bourgeois nationalist"

because directed by clergy, feudal lords with the help of Turkish and British agents. Also Basmachi revolt was profoundly feudal and reactionary in character - some progressive reactionary approach was also applied to the analysis of philosophical and literary thoughts.

A new doctrine "friendship of the people" in 1952 formulated. By 1954, the press was full of articles and poems praising economic, culture and political achievements in Tajikistan under the Soviet power and made comparison with the neighbouring countries. Thus to conclude, the new Tajik SSR faced many difficulties because of its economic and cultural backwardness. Who rushed in with assistance them? "the Great Russian People".  
130

Education, as elsewhere in Central Asia, had shown progress, especially when compared with other Asian and Middle Eastern countries. In the post war decade one important measure to improve the standard of education was the training of the teachers. In Tajikistan there were 20,000 trained teachers. The general education schools in Tajikistan in 1926-27 were 144 which in 1955 rose to 2,547, with 718 and 20,394 teachers respectively. The Tajiks schools were organized as a trilingual basis with Tajik, Russian, and Uzbek as the languages of instruction. Instruction in higher educational institutions and in specialized and technical schools was primarily in Russian. In 1957 there were 7 higher educational institutions and 29 technical colleges 131. One Tajik state university in Dushanbe and Academy of sciences of Tajikistan SSR was founded in 1951 . 132

This period, despite the cultural repression, was the period of normalization and the re-emergence of Muslims in the political and cultural arenas of their republic plus the economic developments.

#### **SBLIZHENIE (Drawing together) AND SLIYANIE (merger) PERIOD 1956 - 85**

The nationality policy towards Central Asia in this period began to be more flexible. In spite of attack on Islam, attempts had been made to minimize the irritant elements between the Russians and the local people. In theory, a new trend was to be expressed by a gradual, cooperation (sblizhenie) between Soviet nationalities, which would lead to their merger (sliyanie). In 1961 party programme, the new formula read as:

Full - scale communist constructions signifies a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together and their complete unity will be achieved. 133

The new and stronger emphasis was on the factors common to all Soviet nationalities, the Soviet content of education, culture, social relation, administration and economy and deemphasised the particular factors as national heritage.

## RELIGION

In spite of flexible nationality policy, a new offensive was launched against Islam by Khrushchev in 1957 that lasted when he was ousted from power in 1964. Number of mosques being closed and atheistic propaganda campaign gained impetus. Veil burning ceremonies were given widespread publicity and Khrushchev revived the former Bolsheviks "Union of Godless" in 1958, which shut down the few Islamic schools and mosque that were still open. Islamic wedding and the funerals were banned, and in 1959 the end of the era of the veil was officially announced, with the ceremonial burning of the last veil in Bukhara. 134 These anti religious activities were part of Khrushchev's attempt to eliminate religion through out the USSR and were not directed only at Muslims. Thus in Tajikistan alone from 1955 - 59 e.g Association for the Propaganda of Scientific and Political Knowledge organized 40,500 anti Islamic lectures. Between 1948 - 1975, 70 anti Islamic books and pamphlets were published in Tajikistan. 135

Despite the continuation of anti Islamic propaganda under Brezhnev era (1964 - 82), the regime also tolerated wide spread observance of many practices popularly associated with Islam. Direct attack on the official religious leadership disappeared completely from the Soviet press and Islam was considered as counter - productive and by 1978 new mosques were build. As for as religious education was considered during this period, in 1978 70 students from Mir-i-Arab religious educational institution, either become Imams or for higher education enrolled themselves in Ismail Al-Bukhari founded in 1971. From here students went for higher studies in Middle Eastern Universities, like Al Azhar of Cairo. 136

This shift in policy was followed to accommodate the Russian foreign policy because in 1968 Soviet Union reappeared on the Middle Eastern political scene, after supporting Arabs against Israel in 1967 war, with a new "Muslim Face". This policy had three objectives:

1. To demonstrate to the world and especially third world that the soviet experiment is more successful and rewarding than western capitalism by using Central Asia as example of communist economic achievements.
2. To testify to the freedom, welfare and general prosperity of Islam in the Soviet Union.
3. To demonstrate that the Soviet Union is the best friend and partner of the Islamic World.

Thus Muslim official leaders cooperated with Soviet regime and were sent as ambassador and spokesman to the Muslim world at large. Foreign Muslim delegations on "friendly visits" came Central Asia and various international congresses were organized by Spiritual Board of Tashkent. One such conference "Contribution to the Muslims of Central Asia, the Volga and the Caucasus, to the Development of Islamic Thought and to the Cause of Peace and Social Progress", was convened in Dushanbe in 1979 in which 30 Muslim countries participated. The conference denounced US, Israel and South African imperialism and stressed the loyalty of Soviet Muslims to their country and emphasized

the pride Central Asian took in the legacy of Al- Bukhari, Ibn Sina and Al Biruni. Between 1968 and 1979 Soviet religious leaders, visited Muslim countries especially to conservative and pro-western government. These visits, conferences, were intended to produce the impression that Islam was free and prosper and that Soviet Islamic leaders were treated by Soviet authorities as equal partners and not as tools of government. 137

According to T.R. Harmstone:

... the area is Muslim, it is strategically located at the gateways to the Middle East, to the Indian subcontinental, and to Chines Sinkiang, its people from sizeable minorities all across the borders. For all these reasons Central Asian's contacts with the Third World have multiplied, and Central Asian elites and "official" Muslim clergy readily show their support for foreign policy ventures which, while serving Soviet interests abroad enhance their importance at home.

138

However this period of cooperation between Moscow and Soviet Islam came to an end with invasion of Afghanistan and Islamic revolution in Iran.

In Central Asia, Iranian revolution and particularly invasion in Afghanistan led to an enormous rise in Islamic feelings and radicalization of Islam. Tajikistan, because besides geographical proximity, share tribal and ethnic kinship with Afghans and Iranians, were more receptive to the influence of the neighbouring countries. Tajiks being an Iranian people feel overwhelmed by the predominantly Turkic environment of Soviet Islam. Thus papers like *Islamskaia Pravada* in Tajikistan published the speeches of Khomeini, Al Maududi a Pakistani leader. 139

During the Afghan invasion, in December 1979, 30 percent to 40 percent of invading Soviet forces composed of Central Asian soldiers. By late 1980 February Soviet military authorities started removing units with Central Asian soldiers and replacing them

with entirely Russian divisions. At the same time the Soviet Muslims elite, mainly Uzbeks and Tajiks, controlling the Afghan administration were replaced by Russians. Main reason for this was that Soviet Muslims underwent religious and political "intoxication" at the hands of Afghans. Thus Central Asian soldiers deserted and went over to the Mujahideens 140. It was estimated that in 1980 there were 106 Tajiks in their units and all refused to fight and were sent home along with Uzbeks and Turkmen. An ethnic affinity with the Afghans, a common religion and dislike of Russians were given as reasons for refusing to fight. In 1982, people were arrested in Dushanbe and charged with circulating leaflets against the occupation and false announcements of the deaths of Soviet soldiers who were buried in Afghanistan. Thus provoking discontent among the population. 141

Under such situation Soviet intensified anti Islamic propaganda campaign by all Soviet mass media in 1980s. This campaign may be compared to the last anti Islamic drive under Khrushchev, using the same old methods. According to Alexander Bennigsen:

There are many similarities between the current (under Brezhnev) anti Islamic campaign and those of earlier years, but with one difference. The 1980 - 81 campaign has a harsh and brutal edge to it quite different from the "scientific" and relatively moderate propaganda of the post - Khrushchev period. All communists, all honest Soviet citizens, are now being reminded that it is their duty to engage in a merciless struggle against religion, which poisons minds, and against superstitions survival. 142

## **ECONOMY**

In economic field, although industrialization of Central Asia began in world war-II and continued with 1950s, it was under Khrushchev's Sovnarkhozes (councils of national economy) experiment that industrialization gained impetus. In this, the individual territorial units were given much greater control over development of their own

economies. Unfortunately the impact of sovnrkhozez experiment on industrial growth did not extended beyond the middle of the 1970s. 143

Under Brezhnev era much of Central Asia's Industry continued to revolve around agriculture with emphasis on cotton development because "cotton is king". A specialized infrastructure to serve the cotton industry was created e.g irrigation networks, branches of machine building, the chemical industry, the cotton processing plants, textile mills etc. Central Asia produces 95 percent of the USSR's raw cotton and cotton fibers, 65 percent of its vegetable oils, 100 percent of its machinery and equipment for cotton growing. 144

Behind the scene, the indigenous cadres believed that their region makes a much greater contribution to Soviet national income than that had been depicted in the official statistics. Also price setting methods were not favourable for Central Asia. In their view, Moscow's methods of calculating national income and inter regional economic relations place Central Asia at a disadvantage and the significant role that Central Asia played in the economy of the USSR was not admitted. Rahid Rakhimov, director of the institute of Economies at the Tajik Academy of Sciences, said that:

If the national income are computed on the basis of inter sector balances, it could turn out that dominant conceptions of the relative and absolute levels of the production of national income in the Tajik republic would be corrected, he added that the revised data could lead to changes in assessments of the region's level of development and in demands for the development and distribution of its productive forces. 145

The difficulties which plagued the growth of Central Asian industry during Brezhnev era was poor organization or management. For instance the region's largest industrial system the south Tajikistan Territorial Production Complex planned in the mid of the 60s, but long construction delays, prevented the project from begning operation according to plan. Instead of the fact that constructed in the region of Tajikistan rich in



Hydro-electric potential and national minerals, Tajik aluminum plant and the Irtys Electro Chemical Plant, the quality of construction caused serious environmental damage. Another problem was the shortage of skilled workers, which resulted in low labour productivity. Economic situation also deteriorated by disproportion between its share of population and its share of national income. For instance in 1975, population of Central Asia was 9.2 percent with fixed capital 5.5 percent, whereas in 1984 population was 10.7 percent with only 5.9 percent of fixed capital. 146

In educational field although illiteracy problem had been solved during Khrushchev and Brezhnev era, but educational system was going out of touch with the needs of the economy in Brezhnev era. The most important one was that children in Central Asian did not study or learn the technical specialties most needed by their republic's economies. In spite of facts that industrialization was taking place, very few Central Asian began to work in industrial jobs, resulting in growing labour surplus and vacant jobs. While the technical education for rural population was not strong enough to mobilize the population for industrial employment. Besides that quality, of education in Central Asia was very poor. Whereas fuel was added by demographic trends with all infrastructures ill prepared to absorb them e.g in Tajikistan Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan through out 60s and 70s, the total population grew at least three times faster than they had during the previous two decades. 147

## **POLITICS**

Although the proportion of the Muslim among functionaries of the party and state hierarchies increased from one - fourth to three - fourth in post war and in 70s, still the most important number two position was in the hands of Russian. Muslim secretaries and department heads usually provided with Russian and other European assistance, so as to provide each department with "Russian watch dogs" at decision making levels 148. Besides this, in early 60s, the union republics were granted autonomy e.g internal affairs and 7 economic ministries were shifted to the republic level. In 1965, 8 more ministries e.g education, social security, public order and 5 economic ministries were classified as

republican. But to have a check, in administrative sphere, an all - Turkistan party Bureau was created in 1961 as a kind of organizational umbrella over the party organization of the Central Asian republics. Simultaneously in 1965, 17 new mixed ministries and 11 all - union ministries were added to 8 mixed and 11 all union ministries respectively. 149

All these Khrushchev and post Khrushchev changes increased local autonomy in some fields and decreasing it in others. But constant shuffling of ministries, increasing and decreasing of ministries and creating new and renaming old one was confusing. In 70s there was a growing tendency to increase the number of mixed ministries that function both in Moscow and at the union republic's level reduced the purely republic ministries that function without Moscows counter parts. 150

These processes began to weaken the Moscow's control in the region and this was evident in the late Brezhnev era, because Central Asian political elite's power at the republic level increased. Republic political, economic, cultural and other institutions were packed with their friends, relatives, colleagues and other political allies, at the same time they succeeded in neutralizing or coopting with Russian or European deputies. Thus their collective conspiracies e.g withheld of information from center or avoid to meet its demands, resulted in law and order situation and silence on the increasingly serious economic problems. This turning of tables was echoed in complaints by regime spokesmen on the details of "negative phenomenon" were made public. This was accompanied by massive purge of the republic party apparatuses. The first sign of this was in 1983 when Rashidov, first secretary of Uzbek communist party, committed suicide because he realized that he was about to be disgraced by public revelation of his "Mafias" wide spread corruption. By the end of 1985, all first secretaries of Central Asian republics were removed from their position on charges of corruption and mismanagement. 151

## CULTURE

## RUSSIAN FLUENCY AMONG PRINCIPAL CENTRAL ASIAN NATIONALITIES

Nationality	Russian as First Language				Good knowledge of Russian	
	1970		1979		1970 in %	1979 in %
	in 1000s	in %	in 1000s	in %	in %	in %
Uzbeks	49	0.53	78	0.63	14.5	49.3
	42	0.47	67	0.54		
Kazakhs	87	1.64	131	2.0	41.8	52.3
	56	1.17	87	1.44		
Tadzhiks	13	0.62	23	0.78	15.4	29.6
	-	-	20	0.69		
Turkmen	12	0.81	19	0.96	15.4	25.4
	11	0.73	17	0.84		
Kirghiz	5	0.33	9	0.49	19.1	29.4
	-	-	8	0.42		

\*\*Source: Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia*. London: C. Hurst and Company, 1982.

It was on the cultural front that the new integration efforts have been concentrated. Two aspects are of great importance, the new drive for linguistic Russification and to introduce new "Soviet customs and traditions".

During this period the promotion of Russian as the "second native language" was important. The knowledge of Russian became necessary for any Asian who wanted to progress up the political, economic and cultural ladder. Tashkent conference of May 1979 recommended the teaching of Russians to non Russian children from the age of 5, in technical schools and in higher educational institutions. This had been done in the name of "Fraternal Unification" of Soviet people 151. Thus Russian language was introduced as Lingua Franca of the area.

Throughout this period, however, nationalism amongst the constituent republics was a growing phenomenon that could not be ignored. Adherence to their native language by major ethnic groups had been extremely high, also cultural elites in post war period tried to develop their culture and languages to purify the languages from Russicism. As a result the languages became the medium for the articulation of their new cultural self assertion 152. While in educational institutions, through out the Brezhnev era, the vast majority of Central Asian continued to attend their lessons in their native languages only a very small proportion of indigenous nationality parents sent their children to Russian - language schools, generally motivated by the view that the Russian language schools provided a better quality of education. 153

Campaign to introduce new Soviet customs and traditions accelerated in the 70s. It had been argued that customs, traditions and rituals which are integral and necessary parts of any groups are always identified with the class content of society. The development of new Soviet custom, therefore, was to be based on the progressive aspects of local heritage. On to which the new internationalist traditions of the "builders of communism" common to all Soviet nations had been grafted. Therefore most of the clans and patriarchal customs and family and religious rites were regarded as instruments of past class exploitation devised by clergy and feudal ruling class, to be rejected in favour

of new rituals. This policy, however, was backfired and performance of religious and life cycle rituals were performed by all Central Asian Muslims in rural areas as well as in the cities. Even in intelligentsia and party members in responsible positions observed the rituals. For instance circumcision was almost universally carried out, marriage customs also followed traditional patterns, ethnically mixed marriages were preferred. But most important was in death and burial rites tradition prevails without exception. Religious holidays were celebrated widely, pilgrimages to holy places increased, attendance at the mosque especially on Friday, Eid celebrations and so on. 154

Thus by early and mid 80s serious economic, social and political problems had accumulated in Central Asia, the conditions which lead to violent outbursts in such places as the Farghana valley and in Dushanbe, Andijan and Osh were already ripening.

## **GORBACHEV - GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA**

According to Robert.G.Kaiser:

In just over five years, M.Gorbachev transformed the world. He turned his own country upside down. He woke a sleeping giant, the people of SU, and gave them freedoms they had never dreamed of. He also gave them back their own horrific history, which his predecessors had hidden and distorted for 60 years. He tossed away the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe with no more than a fare thee - well...Then he discovered that he had started a revolution he could not control - discovery that led to chaos and tragedy. 155

- How all this happened?

- To begin the story, in 1985 when Gorbachev came into power he inherited a multi ethnic empire with a stagnating economy, an ambitious but self defeating foreign policy,

corrupt elites, socially, economically and politically frustrated masses. Glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were the two methods to solve the problems.

In his January 1987, Central Committee speech, Gorbachev said that:

...the activities of the state and public organizations should be more open to public scrutiny through the official media and more receptive to criticism. He further stated, what I have in view is an organic combination of democracy and discipline, of independence and responsibility, of the rights and duties of officials, of every citizens... Real democracy serves every person, protecting his political and social rights... we need democratization in order to move ahead, in order to ensure that legality grows stronger and justice triumphs in a society and that a moral atmosphere, in which man can live freely and work fruitfully, is asserted in it. 156

As far as perestroika is concerned, he stated:

...the purpose of perestroika is the full theoretical and practical reestablishment of Lenin's concept of socialism, in which indisputable priority belongs to the working man with his ideals and interests, to humanitarian values in the economy, in social and political relations and in culture. 157

Perestroika and Glasnost were received with favour in Soviet Central Asia, as in other parts of the USSR. The Central Asian press immediately reacted to the opportunity of freedom of thought by writing on democratic aspirations of people, new political parties with clear nationalists, pro-independence and Islamic manifestation came into being and people enrolled themselves in large number in them. Young activists of these political parties spoke of freedom, nationalism, economic and social reforms, religion, democracy etc. This gave them a new confidence to assert their national and religious

identity and to openly air their grievances and feelings than had remained suppressed for long due to press censorship and party - cum - bureaucratic control. While at the same time ethnic tension grew in some parts under peculiar circumstances as in Dushanbe and Farghana.

## RELIGION

According to Alexandre Bennigsen the mid 1980s was marked "in Central Asia by a double evolution". Firstly a wide spread religious revival manifesting itself on three levels:

1. At the lowest popular grass roots level by the renewed vitality of traditional rights and beliefs, pilgrimage to different holy places, religious marriage and burial, daily namaz and so on.
2. At middle level increased activities of sufi brotherhoods.
3. At a higher level, among the young intellectual, students and faculty members, new interests in national culture and history thoroughly penetrated by Islam: a greater symbiosis between nation awareness, nationalism and religion.

All three levels were intermingle.

The second evolutionary trend was a significant radicalization of local nationalism. In late 86 and 87, the Alma-Ata uprising in December 1986 and the Kurgan Tyube riots in February 1987, were the manifestation of development of nationalist movement. Thus native Muslim started opposing to their "Russian Elder Brother" resulting in inter ethnic struggle. 158

Both these developments were influenced by two factors, the origins of which go backs to early 1980s:

1. A backlash of the war in Afghanistan .

2. The nativisation of Central Asia. The Russian and other non Muslims started leaving the Muslim republics because of hatred of natives for outsiders. The movement in Central Asia started in the later half of 70s. Second was the fertility rate of Muslims in Central Asia e.g in 1977 the birth rate in Tajikistan was 37 per thousand. In 1987 it reached 42 per thousand, 30 percent of Tajik families have five or more, while 15 percent of families have 10 or more children.

According to K.Mahkamov, first secretary of the central committee of communist party of Tajikistan:

In Tajikistan, the undesirable process of the non-indigenous population leaving our republic goes on. The tendency to leave is particularly obvious among the Russian. Their number in our party is declining year after year... Young (Russian) experts who came to our republic are now leaving because of poor housing conditions and because of some other problems of every day life. 159

"The Islamic resurgence", according to A.Bennigsen, "in Tajikistan as elsewhere in Central Asia, is due to the spill over effects of Iranian revolution and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan" 160. The impetus was added by Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika e.g in 1987 alone the council for Religious Affairs received more than 3000 complaints from citizens who reported abuses and arbitrariness ranging from decision to keep mosques under lock and key to those prohibiting the ringing of the church bells in certain areas. 161

Export of Islamic revolution became the official policy of Ayatalluah Khomeini, for which he adopted two strategies:

1. To use mass media in order to propagate Islam.
2. To arouse religious passions in vulnerable areas.



Several reports had appeared in former Soviet press about religious propaganda launched by Iran in Central Asia. In 1984, powerful broadcast stations were established along with Soviet Iranian border which broadcast religious and anti Soviet programmes. Three types of programmes were more important:

1. Religious information about Islamic customs.
2. To train young receptive minds in Islamic ideology and pan-Islamic world view.
3. Anti Soviet propaganda of political nature. 162

In 1984 - 85 Soviet listeners survey was conducted among young Tajikistani which revealed that Tajiks preferred to listen broadcast from Asian rather than western nations of the various types of programmes mentioned, broadcasts of religion were more popular than those dealing with international affairs. 163

The extent of Iranian influence in Tajikistan can be gauged by the fact that in some area parents had started giving their new born babies the name Ayatollah. The religious video films, radio cassettes, literature smuggled from abroad were very popular with the local people. According to the Director of Tajikistan's House of Atheism, M.Safarov, "fighters for the purity of Islam, which he assess as the most acute and vital... of all our problems, some times call themselves Wahhabis and some times partisans of Khomeini" 164

Petkel, Chairman of the Tajik SSR KGB, had stated that "some of the unofficial Mullahs who referred to themselves as Wahhabis and Partisans of pure Islam in Tajikistan call upon the believers to create an Islamic government of the Iranian type". While the Tajikistan's Wahhabi leader was reported to be a regular listener of the voice of Islamic Republic of Iran. 165 In May 1987, a Tehran newspaper Jamhuri-ye-Islami claimed that the Soviet republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were originally Iran's territory. This claim was dismissed by Moscow. 166

If Iran has exerted a significant influence on Tajikistan that of Afghan Mujahideen has been even greater. This was because of the fact that Afghan Mujahideen demonstrated that the Soviet army could be challenged and even defeated and that open resistance was possible which paid off. According to A. Bennigsen:

Today the struggle between official atheism and Islam is no longer conducted at the higher philosophical level of the science vs obscurantism, but at the lower level of new secular rites vs traditional religious rites and that old Islamic rites are steadily winning the competition. It seems that the turning point happened in 1985 - 86 at a time when the Afghan resistance appeared to be definitely unconquerable. 167

The resurgence of Islam or revival of religious customs seems to be strongest in countryside of Tajikistan because of the geographical proximity alongwith ethnic and tribal affiliation with Afghanistan. According to K.Makhkamov:

Wahhabism has especially gained roots in rural areas of Tajikistan particularly alongwith Tajik - Afghan border. This is a fundamental religious - cum - political movement. 168

The cross border's smuggling of religious and political literature by Afghan Mujahideen and their agents in Soviet Central Asia had been facilitated by the common ethnic and tribal and religious background of the people inhabiting the Tajik Afghan Border areas. According to Deputy Chairman of the Tajik republic's KGB, A.Belousov in 1991:

About 150 groups of Afghan Mujahideen are operating near the Tajik border to establish channels of communication with the pan-Islamic activists in Tajikistan. Training centers are also reported to have been set up in Afghanistan settlements near the border to

give religious and military instruction to young Tajiks, Uzbeks and  
Turkmens. 169

The wahhabi literature that had been smuggled via Afghanistan, laid emphasis on religious absolutism and was opposed to sufism and holy shrines which represented the traditional and tolerant trend in Islam. There was a wahhabi presence among the mujahiddin and one of their center is Badakhshan province, immediately adjacent to Khalton province, one of the major concentration of wahhabism in Tajikistan. A survey was conducted in Khalton province in Tajikistan which revealed that 81 percent of the respondents were "under the influence of Islam, its tradition and rituals". 170

Tajikistan's wahhabi leader Abdullo Saidov publicly proposed the establishment of an Islamic state and called for an armed struggle in order to achieve the establishment of an Islamic state on territory of Tajikistan. He also legally presented this demand to the CPSU 27 congress in 1986. He was arrested and his arrest provoked a big demonstration in the town of Kurgan Tyube not far away from Afghan border. The people of Kurgan Tyube were joined by neighbouring areas who gathered near the office of Ministry of Internal Affairs to request Saidov's release. This incident revealed, the willingness of the believers to make a public statement regarding their religiosity, popularity of religious leaders, well organized network that conveyed the news of his arrest, in other words, it could be viewed as another testimony to the strength of Sufism in Central Asia. 171

One important consequence of the war in Afghanistan was the politisation of Islam. Islam no longer remained exclusively a spiritual private matter but became a political trend - the very basis of Tajik nationalism. The most revealing information concerning the political aspects of parallel Islam appears in the report delivered at the 8th plenum of the Tajik communist party Central Committee in December 1987 by Petkel:

Dozens of trials were held in 1986 - 87 of ring leaders, unofficial muslims clerics, who not only founded religious sentiment but also called for a Jihad against the existing system. They have set the goal

of infiltrating communist party, Soviet and law enforcement organs in order to facilitate hostile designs. 172

The above statement reveals one thing and that is anti Islamic attitude during mid 80s. On 25 November 1986, Gorbachev himself called on Central Asian communist party leaders in Tashkent to "wage a resolute and uncompromising struggle against religious revivals and to set up mass atheistic propaganda", 173 in Central Asia religion means Islam.

Gorbachev's report was the starting point of a new anti Islamic propaganda campaign. This campaign followed the same old methods, used by Khruchev and Brezhnev e.g in Tajikistan in Khatlon province and in Ordzhonikidzabad district, tea houses used as mosques or for other religious observances were close down in 1986 - 87. 75 of the 90 unofficial mosques located in clubs were liquidated and transformed in stores, moviehouses, medical clinics and other secular institutions or simply closed down. The bulldozing of a holy places, burning of books in the Arabic script and fining of or driving away of the pilgrimage were also carried out. 174

Despite the anti religious campaign of mid 80s, the level of religiosity was clearly higher than 10 or 20 years ago especially among young generations and among intellectuals. Throughout Central Asia the number of well educated mullahs increased. Makhamov, pointed out that "graduates of the Faculty of Oriental languages in Dushanbe join the ranks of Mullahs whereas atheist propagandist express social alarm about the growth of number of pseudo - Mullahs" 175. While ineffectiveness of anti Islamic propaganda and inadequacy of propagandists was also insisted e.g it was reported that party organization of 5 Tajik state farms carried out no atheistic propaganda for two years and their members protected those who observed religious rituals. Similarly other Tajik farms officials were alleged to had supported the adhoc transformation of their guest houses into prayer houses and permitted 9 tea shops to serve the same functions. 176

The emergence of new era of tolerance towards Islam started on 1 October 1988, when law on "Freedom of Conscience" and religious organizations marking a formal end to over 7 decades of state persecution of believers. The law denied to the state the right to propagate atheism or otherwise to interfere in religious affairs. Placing all religions on an equal legal footing. In Central Asia the new era began on March 1989 when Moscow, one of the six copies of the Holy Quran authorized by caliph Usman was transferred from the Tashkent museum to the library of the Religious Board. The emergence of new era was further attested by the opening of new mosques, or media campaign aimed at correcting some of the damage done by past biased representations of Islam. Press also published articles on science and religion, life of Holy Prophet, suras of Quran etc. But the most important reflection of new era was in the statement on religion which the Uzbek communist party included in its December 1989 election platform. The platform stated:

The republican party organization actively favours the freedom of religion and the legal rights of the believers as well as cooperation with religious organizations. 177

The first secretary of Tajik communist party Makhkamov admitted that in his republic:

Islam is still a great power and over the past few years, the number of believers has even increased. 178

## **ECONOMY**

The economic situation further deteriorated by a performance and existence of strong family bonds, old traditions, and open show of Intra-ethnic solidarity among the Central Asian, created a situation in which nepotism, opportunism, corruption, abuse of office, favouritism in selection of personnel, wastage of funds in non productive purposes, inefficiency grows, which left negative impact upon economy. The corrupt ruling elite

**1989 CENSUS POPLUTION OF SOVIET MUSLIM REPUBLICS (in thousand)**

Republics	Poplution			% of total poplution	
	Total	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
<b>AZERBAIJAN</b>	7038	3790	3248	54	46
Nakhichevan ASSR	295	89	206	30	70
Nagorno - karabakh AO	188	98	90	52	48
Baku city	1759	1759	-	100	-
Districts under republican control	4796	1844	2952	38	62
<b>KAZAKHISTAN</b>	16536	9465	7071	57	43
Aktyubin Oblast	738	399	339	54	46
Alma - Ata city	1132	1132	-	100	-
Alma - Ata Oblast	978	216	762	22	78
East Kazakhstan Oblast	933	607	326	65	35
Gurev Oblast	755	548	207	73	27
Dzhammbul Oblast	1040	497	551	47	53
Dzhezkazgan Oblast	496	388	108	78	22
Karagand Oblast	1352	1147	205	85	15
Kyzl Orda Oblast	651	422	229	65	35
Kokchetab Oblast	664	260	404	39	61
Kustanai Oblast	1221	616	605	50	50
Pabldar Oblast	944	605	339	64	36
North Kazakhstan Oblast	600	287	313	48	52
Semipalatinsk Oblast	838	429	409	51	49
Taldyi Kurgan Oblast	721	325	395	45	55
Ural Oblast	631	269	362	43	57
Tselinograd Oblast	1002	572	430	57	43
Ghimkent Oblast	1832	746	1086	41	59
<b>KIRGHIZIA</b>	4290	1641	2649	38	62
Frunze city	626	622	4	99	1
Issyik Kul Oblast	665	184	481	28	72
Osh Oblast	2010	577	1433	29	71
Districts under republican control	989	258	731	26	74

Contd.....

**1989 CENSUS POPLUTION OF SOVIET MUSLIM REPUBLICS (in thousand)**

Republics	Poplution			% of total poplution	
	Total	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
<b>TAJIKISTAN</b>	5109	1668	3441	33	67
Garno - Badakhsh AO	161	20	141	13	87
Dushanbe city	605	597	8	99	1
Leninabad Oblast	1558	528	1030	34	66
Katlon Oblast	1702	363	1339	21	79
Districts under repubican control	1083	160	923	15	85
<b>TURKMENIA</b>	3534	1603	1931	45	55
Ashkhabad city	405	403	2	100	-
Maryi Oblast	814	222	592	27	73
Tashauz Oblastt	698	220	478	32	68
Charzhou Oblast	735	322	413	44	56
Districts under republican control	882	436	446	49	51
<b>UZBEKISTAN</b>	19905	8111	11794	41	59
Karakalpak ASS	1215	585	630	48	52
Andizhan Oblast	1727	559	1168	32	68
Bukhara Oblast	1629	626	1003	38	62
Kaskadarya Oblast	1599	417	1182	26	74
Namangan Oblast	1477	550	927	37	63
Samarkand Oblast	2291	699	1592	30	70
Surkhandarya Oblast	1254	244	1010	19	81
Syrdarya Oblast	1307	407	900	31	69
Tashkant city	2079	2079	-	100	-
Tashkant Oblast	2158	961	1197	45	55
Fergana Oblast	2154	703	1451	33	67

Contd.....

Tashkant city	2079	2079	-	100	-
Tashkant Oblast	2158	961	1197	45	55
Fergana Oblast	2154	703	1451	33	67
Khorezm Oblast	1015	281	734	28	12

Source \*\*K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbon, ed, Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers (pvt) Ltd., 1992.



manipulated the industrial and agricultural production. The average industrial production in Tajikistan declined from 10.8 percent and 9.1 percent in 1961 - 65 to just 4.9 percent and 3 percent in 1986. Similarly agricultural production in Tajikistan fell down from 7.3 percent to 3.7 percent during the same period. 179

Soviet emphasis to the production of cotton, during this period also caused negative impact e.g the President of Tajikistan, Makhkamov, criticized on 18 July 1991 that 90 percent cotton was being exported from Tajikistan. He stressed the need to create infrastructure for processing atleast 30 percent of its cotton produce locally so that thousands of jobs could be created. Due to the disruption in the Soviet political and economic system Central Asian republic's grants from the union budget was cut down and this resulted in shortage and fall in standard of living of the people which led to social tension.180

The most serious problem of Soviet Central Asian economic, political and social were all shaped by the demographic processes. The Muslims of Central Asia had registered a high percentage of population growth as compared to the Russians. Between 1979 - 89, the Central Asian nationalities grew by 32.7 to 45.4 percent whereas Russians in the USSR grew only by 5.9 percent 181. The same trend was reflected in Central Asian republics, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmen continued to consolidate their leading positions within their respective republics - raising their share of population from 62.1 percent in 1959 to 84.7 percent in 1989, 53.1 percent in 1959 to 62.3 percent in 1989 and 60.9 percent in 1959 to 72 percent in 1989 respectively. Poor family planning, early marriages, high rate of natural growth, low employment of women in organized sectors of economy, low mobility among indigenous population are the major factors. Whereas the Russian percentage in total population in Central Asia had steadily declined e.g 1989 census figures the Russian population had declined by 4.2 percent in Turkmen, 2.1 percent in Tajikistan and 0.8 percent in Uzbekistan. The out migration of jews, Russian, Armenians, Germans gained momentum after the violent clashes in various Central Asian towns. Tajikistan communist party central committee reported in 1990 that about 23,000 skilled Russian worker had

left Tajikistan from January to July alone in 1990. This was due to riots in Dushanbe in February 1990 after the declaration of Tajik as official language. 182

The implications of demographic changes in Central Asia were dramatic on a local level e.g unemployment increased, put strains on local economies to meet both consumer and producer demand, beside unemployment there were many unfilled jobs, the vacant urban jobs had for skilled workers in factories, poor social conditions, widening development gap between all union mean and Central Asia so far as NIP and NIU, per capita commercial and industrial output balance of trade with other republics etc are concerned.

## **CULTURE**

The Soviet policy of promoting Russian as a link language had received a serious set back because instead of promoting Russian simply as channel which would facilitate communication it was used as "cultural integrator" to merge the diverse population of the USSR into the "new historical community - the soviet people". The percentage of Central Asian Muslims claiming to know the Russian language was as low as 25.4 percent among Turkmen, 29.7 percent among Kirghiz, 29.6 percent among Tajiks, 49.3 percent among Uzbeks and 52.3 percent among the Kazakhs during 1979 census. This was in sharp contrast to the average of 98 percent who claimed their own Tajik, Uzbek etc as national languages 183. The trend towards greatest stress on development of national language and culture received impetus after the 19th All Union Party Conference held in June 1988.

Since July 1988, the Central Committee of the party in the republic adopted two decisions on the question of improving and perfecting the study of Tajik language in the republic. Muhammad Jan Shakurov, Tajik academician, openly raised the demand for adoption of the Tajik language as the state language of the republic. A draft law on Tajik language was circulated for public approval in April 1989. According to the text:

The present status of the Tajik language and the curtailment of its social functions and the sphere of its use and application in oral and written communications had made it necessary to give it state protection. 184

Article 24 of the draft law on Tajik language states that "the Tajik SSR shall promote the study of Tajik writings using the Arabic script and the publication of literature using this script" 185. Thus finally on 22 July 1989, the Tajik Supreme Soviet, gave legal status to the Tajik language, whereas Russia was to remain as the official language for communication between nationalities within Tajikistan. 186

## **THE ERUPTION OF THE NATIONALITY ISSUE**

In order to complete the story of disunion of the union, let us put different events of the story in a complete set. To begin with Gorbachev like, Khrushchev, started the practice of appointing Russian as head of communist party organization in each republic on one hand and on the other like Andropov, he believed that economic reforms could not succeed without the removal of corrupt party cadres who were preventing the Soviet economy's modernization. Thus he launched an anti - corruption campaign against the powerful political bosses who ran the Soviet republics. The first unrest in Central Asia began with the removal, on 16 December 1986, of Dimmukhammad Kunayev, head of communist party of Kazakhstan since 1960. G.Kolbino, a Russian, was appointed in his place. This was followed by serious rioting in Alam Ata protesters demanding an explanation for Moscow's action. The riots spread throughout the whole country. They were shouting such nationalists slogans as "Kazakhstan is only for Kazakhs", "we want to join China", "America is with us", "Russians against us", "Kolbino go back to Russia". They also demand a separate seat for Kazakhstan in the UNO. 187

Similarly appointments were made in other republics also which had caused great resentment. An editorial in Pravda on 30 December 1986, used the occasion of the 64th anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union to defend the appointment of Russians

to senior office in other republics, asserting that nationalism should be subordinated to the interest of state 187.

The riots failed to make any real impact on the leadership's policies, which remained unsensitive to the problems of nationalities that erupted over the next two years.

The situation became serious in the Caucasus , where tension between the Armenian and Azerbaijani population were getting out of control in early 1988. In February the Politburo voted to allow the republic of Azerbaijan to retain control of Nagorno - Karabakh autonomous oblast, an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan. The Armenians believed they had been cheated by the politburo decision and morethan one million Armenian protested Moscows decision. The central government sent troops in early 1988 to quell the disturbances. The violence in the Caucasus helped in bringing home the message that political reforms were necessary to transform the stagnating Soviet political system.

Gorbachev called for the popular election of a Congress of People's Deputies, which would convene in May 1989. The party's electoral plan backfired in the three Baltic republics. About the time of election Moscow encountered unexpected problems in Georgia where pro-independence movement staged demonstration in capital of Tbilisi. It was decided to sent special forces which on 9 April 1989 used poisoned tear gas to disperse the nationalist demonstrators. Moscow considered these issues as the security problem for the Soviet Union rather than as a failure of CPSU policy on nationalities. The use of troops in Georgia was intended to warn nationalist throughout the Soviet Union that the communist party would not tolerate action that threatened its rule. According to M.B.Olcott:

For reformers nation wide, April 9 became a symbol of repressive underside of Glasnost and Perestroika, for Georgia the events of that date became a catalyts for declaring independence two years later on April 9, 1991. 187

As the Soviet authorities were trying to restore order in the Transcaucasus republics and Baltic states, nationalist rioting erupted in June 1989 in Uzbekistan and on 11 February 1990 in Dushanbe which has been largely, except few cases of minor clashes over economic and social condition, untouched by the nationalists or inter ethnic unrest which engulfed the southern soviet union. A variety of reasons could be sighted for bloody eve:

1. Immediate cause was rumor in Dushanbe that refugees from Farghana and Caucasus were to be resettled there. Taking priority over locals in the location of already scared homes and jobs. Lack of housing and job opportunities was an indicator of poor socio - economic conditions prevailing in the Tajik society.
2. The sufferers of the Farghana tragedy in Uzbekistan had fled to seek refuge in Dushanbe, renewed in the Tajik minds the traditional Uzbek - Tajik hostility. The new comers were treated as Uzbek origin speaking Uzbek or Russian, instead of Muslims. Thus Tajik never trusted them and this hostility ultimately turned violent.
3. Due to national territorial delimitation of Soviet Central Asia, Tajikistan once rendered to be in a lesser ranking autonomous republic within Uzbekistan. This injuring their national ego. Further, Samarkand and Bukhara were wrongly included in Uzbekistan, kept alive a potent source of border dispute between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The feelings that the Uzbeks were intruders on Tajik autonomy was the reason why the fear of fresh ethnic Uzbek refugees precipitated the anger of Iranian Tajiks against Turkish Uzbeks.
4. For several years Tajikistan was facing unemployment or under employment thus resulting in thousands of young men and women without jobs which further deteriorated their living conditions. In Dushanbe alone, 70,000 residents were jobless and about 117,000 were employed partially to do seasonal works. The new comers added fuel to the fire.
5. The continued involvement of Soviet in Afghanistan was another source of dissatisfaction. In "Bell of Hope" Viktor Panamarev, in Pravada on March 1990 revealed the Afghan connections when a messenger was captured on his way to Afghanistan, who was carrying a report on the Dushanbe riots which indicated that

on the other side of river, a large military bandit formation had appeared with additional weapons and was offering to overthrow the soviet regime.

6. But according to Panamarev's, external Afghan logic, internal logic of power hunger, corrupt ineffectual local officials who were manipulated by anti Soviet elements, leads to the Dushanbe disturbances. All these factors set the ball rolling and led the city witness an unputdownable conflict that it had never seen before.

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A protest rally around 3000 people on the evening of 11 February became violent as protesters clashed with Militia Units. On 12 February, the Tajik Communist Party's headquarter was besieged by rioters who succeeding in setting part of the building on fire. The Tajik Supreme Soviet presidium declared state of emergency and night time curfew in Dushanbe. On next day upto 50,000 demonstrators outside the Communist Party's headquarters called for the:

1. Deportation of refugees from Dushanbe.
2. For the dismissal of the republic leadership.
3. For better job prospects and housing and environmental protection.

On February 14, it was reported that the three most senior Tajik leaders had all offered their resignations at a meeting with the unofficial Vaadad (unity) peoples committee, formed shortly after the outbreak of the Dushanbe violence and uniting government representatives and activists from the popular front style Rastokhez organization. On the following day, however, the Tajik Communist Party's first secretary K.Makhkamov, Supreme Soviet presidium, president Gaibnazar Pallayev and Prime Minister Izatullo Khayeyev all announced that they would remain in office until the Tajik Communist Party and Supreme Soviet released them from their office 191. On February 15 and 16 the Tajik Communist Party's Central Committee criticized the Vaada for contributing to the de-stabilization of the situation of Tajikistan. A temporary committee of representatives of various public organization headed by the B.Karimov, Chairman of

Vaadad, was set up to investigate allegations that Tajik communists raised against Vaadad during the Dushanbe unrest.

The Kremlin intended to mediate in the situation and send Boris Pugo, candidate member of the Politburo, to Dushanbe. He after analyzing the situation delivered a speech to CP members but he could not stop the blood bath in Dushanbe. Meanwhile violence, robberies and paralysis of public life made things worse. The rioting mob even began intervening in the supply of bread and dairy products and forced the shopkeepers to close their shops. 192

Although the state of emergency remained enforced, election to the Tajik Supreme Soviet went ahead on 25 February 1990 as scheduled. In many parts of the country election proved to be the most open, multi party basis elections ever to take place under Soviet Union. Constitutional monopoly of CP was abolished. There were some notable victories for radical reformers, nationalists and candidates from the political opposition as in Baltic republics. But in Central Asia. Communist party's candidates remained in front line. On 12 April 1990 Tajik newly elected republican Supreme Soviets elected the K.Makhkamov to the post of chairman that was president of the republic 192. Tajik communist party central committee also expelled from the party B.Karimov Deputy Chairman of the Tajik council of ministers and Nur Tabarov Tajik Minister of culture for "compromised themselves" during nationalist unrest in the Dushanbe and were accused for an attempt to overthrow the Tajik government at the height of unrest. 193

In June 1990, new developments took place and the Russian Federation (RSFSR), Uzbekistan and Moldavia all issued sovereignty declarations. In July Ukraine and neighbouring Byelorussia joined the growing list of Soviet republics who declared sovereignty. Whereas Tajikistan on 22 August and Turkmenia on 25 August joined the list with the precedence of their own laws over those of the SU and supremacy, independence and indivisibility of the republic power on their territory. It provided the Republics with jurisdiction over domestic and foreign policy alongwith rights on their natural wealth. 194

Anxious about the collapse of central political authority, Supreme Soviet compelled Gorbachev to address an emergency debate on the state of the nation on 16 November 1990. Gorbachev in 80 minute speech admitted that there was a crisis of power, but denied that his administration was without of programme to overcome. He declared that:

The country's most pressing task was the signing of the new Union Treaty which would redefined the respective powers of the Central and republics. 195

Gorbachev succeeded on 23 April 1991 in signing with presidents of nine of the fifteen union republics, including five Central Asian republics, pact aimed at achieving stable relations between the central and republican government. Armenian, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lathuania and Moldavia did not signed the Treaty. The nine republics gave support for the anti crisis programme. 196

It was decided that a union Treaty would be signed in August 1991, a new constitution would be promulgated and fresh election to the Congress of People's Deputies in December 1992. In late June 1991, the new version of the Union Treaty was published which restricted the rights of republics to common financial, trade, defense and foreign policies and whose laws were suppressed by the central government. Rebellion Republics were warned that violations of Soviet financial trade and customs laws would no longer be tolerated and minority rights would be defended.

A coup was staged on August 1991 to prevent the signing of the Treaty which hard-liners in the Kremlin feared would dismantle the central government and lead to the unions eventual dissolution. Although the coup failed but during the coup the Central Asian republics were gripped by the dilemma of how to react to it 197. Almost all the presidents and governments of Soviet Central Asia, except Kazakhstan, neither welcomed nor condemned the coup. But their silence was interpreted as support for the coup. The coup's failure had dramatic consequences throughout the region. The collapse of the



Communist party of the Soviet Union meant that Central Asia's leaders had to dissolve their own communist parties. In Tajikistan, for two days and nights the Tajiks demonstrated before the office of the president of Tajikistan K.Mahkamov, forcing him to resign because of his pro-coup stand during the three days of the coup 198. On 1 September, it was reported that president had resigned after a vote of no confidence. The first casualty of the end of the communism in Central Asia. The communists hangover resulted in civil war. CPSU property in the republic was nationalized and the republic dropped "soviet socialist" from its name to become republic of Tajikistan. The Communist Party resolved to leave the Communist Party of Soviet Union. 199

The Minsk agreement of 8 December 1991, joining together Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in a Common wealth of Independent States (CIS), destroyed any hopes, the Central Asian republics had for preserving a union 200. Central Asia now had to cope on its own with the rising tide of Islam and nationalism.

Kazakhstan and Kirghiza were the first two Central Asian republics to declare their independence from Moscow. They were later on joined by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Tajikistan's parliament on 9 September 1991, at its emergency session proclaimed independence for the republic. It adopted declaration, that Tajikistan is a sovereign and democratic state ruled by law. 9 September is announced as independence day and public holiday. In connection with change status of the Republic, its parliament made amendments to the declaration of sovereignty adopted earlier. Accordingly state property, and organization, including those run by the central are Tajikistani property 201. Tajikistan also joined the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991, the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe in January 1992 and membership of United Nations Organization in March 1992.

Tajikistan after independence is seriously engaged in search of its modern democratic base but there are several instable factors of political turmoil and economic deprivation that stands in the way of peaceful progress. The fuel was added by ethnic

nationalism, inter - ethnic and inter - state rivalries and feared of fundamentalist Islam. The overall situation in Tajikistan can be categorized as following:

1. Struggle for power.
2. The economic developments.
3. The role of extra regional and regional actors.

Of all the former Soviet republics, Tajikistan is the poorest one with GNP of 12.4 billion dollars as compared to (GNP) Gross National Product of Kazakhstan which is 62.2 billion dollars, Uzbekistan 55.8 billion dollars, Kirghiztan 13.3 billion dollars and Turkmenistan 12.6 billion dollars. Whereas per capita income is highest in Kazakhstan (3.720 dollars) and lowest in Tajikistan (2.340 dollars). 202

Geographically, Tajikistan is 93 percent covered with mountains, and is divided into 3 distinct geographical regions. Stretching from the Oxus on the south having borders with Afghanistan, to the Syr Darya on the north, Khojend region is in the north, Badakhstan autonomous oblasts in the east - the Pamir region and southern region with the capital city of Dushanbe and Murgan Tepe and Kulyab sub regions.

The northern regions which, was formally part of the Khanate of Khokand, came under the Russian occupation in 19th Century, is more industrialized with higher literacy level than the areas in the south because most of the Russian settled in this region and governments in Moscow always gave importance to this region in terms of economies, social and political developments. In the south, the capital city is the mountain - ringed which was developed and industrialized during the Soviet period, in the surrounding districts one can find large tracts of agricultural farms and it is in the region of Kurgan - Tepe, where waters of Kafirnigan and Vaksh rivers irrigate the lands. In Kulyab new cotton fields have been developed outside these irrigated lands the southern and eastern parts are all hilly. The largest ranges emerged from Pamir, apart of Badakhstan, hence this south region is comparatively less developed 203. In the south there are longstanding economic and clan rivalries between the Kulyb district in the southeast and Kurgan Tyube

in the southwest. The Kulyab clans have always been closely linked with Khojend communists and is not at good terms with neighbouring clans from Kurgan Tyube, who are more overtly Islamic. 204

Besides this south vs north, Tajikistan internal disturbances greatly hampered its economical growth. There is a shortage of grain, sugar, milk, medicine, items of daily used and above all that of the currency notes. Price for grain and other items have risen everywhere and in Tajikistan a food prices commission has been set up to remedy the situation. The complex problems in Tajikistan has been listed by Kahar Movkam, a Tajik leader:

1. Rising unemployment among able bodied population particularly youth.
2. Shortage of food stuffs.
3. Housing problems coupled with restrictions imposed on obtaining plots for residential purposes.
4. Shortage of water supply. 205

Realizing the grave economic crisis, the former prime minister of Tajikistan Abdul Malik Abdullodzhanov, said in late November 1992 that:

We are planning to invite leading western specialists to the republic to work out specific programmes. Of course, there is no question of copying any model of economic development but we are willing to use positive experience of developed countries, taking into account our specifics. 206

He stressed that new government will give preference to private enterprise, small and medium size business. Tajikistan is for a gradual, or soft transition to market relations.

Tajik Government has began to reestablished its economy, carrying out necessary reforms and policies e.g sweeping price liberalization, step by step market reforms at

home on one hand and on the other it established bilateral and multilateral agreements within Central Asian Republics. The extra-regional economic pursuits besides Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in the framework of Economic Cooperation Organization, are many and multi-dimensional in nature. For instance International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Foreign Firms have shown interest in the development of the Tajik economy. United State has granted Tajikistan a credit of dollar 10 million to purchase grain. Ottawa base Canadian Bank Note Company has also shown interest in Tajikistan note printing plant.

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As Tajikistan need aid to rebuild its shattering economy, wherever they get it from, be it from religiously, geographically, historically contiguous countries like Pakistan, Iran or Turkey or from geographically, historically and religiously remote areas of Europe, America or west.

## CONCLUSION

Bolsheviks after the October Revolution, sought to achieve triple goals of building a Soviet state, Soviet Society and molding a Soviet men. Strong and systematic measures were taken to achieve these ends and implemented relentlessly throughout the Soviet period.

Religion became the target of a long series of anti-religious and atheistic campaigns and Central Asian isolation from the Muslim Ummah prompted the Muslims to engage in re-evaluation of their religious cum regional identity of which Islam comprises as its main attribute and thus retain a broad following. How it has been possible? To answer this let us examine some of the ways of Muslims had been able to sustain the teaching and practices of their faith in Tajikistan.

The establishment of official Islam on October 24, 1943, had a very important indirect effect on the survival of Islam in the former USSR. It had been insisted that Islam and Marxist-Leninist ideology can coexist i.e., it is possible to be a loyal Soviet citizen and a good Muslim. Official Islam was also responsible for printing of Quran, religious literature, religious callendars, hadiths, etc. It had its own, Soviet East, magazine, published in Uzbek, Arabic, Persian, English, Darr and French 208. The mufti of Tashkent, who heads the spiritual administration, often talked about the misunderstanding of Islam in Moscow. Thus even those Muslims who were integrated in Soviet system e.g. Communist party's members, observe Islamic practices as they saw no fundamental contradiction between communism and Islam. Thus in Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, people saw the administration's Mullahs as genuine servants of Islam because they spoke on behalf of the population.

A significant portion of survival of Islam is a by product of unofficial or parallel Islam. The unofficial Islam is based on sufi brother hoods and self appointed, unregistered Mullahs, who focused not on the mosque, but on the unofficial houses of worship, pilgrimages and holy places. The followers of sufi orders were not only mountain peasants, poor artisans, but also included retired teachers, communist party members, urban workers, members of collective and state farms, youth, intellectuals etc. In 1987, it was reported that against 130 registered mosques in Tajikistan, there were no less than 1000 illegal mosques 209. While one official's estimated in late 80s' put the number of unofficial Islamic practitioners in Kubyals, of Southern Tajikistan at 150. 210.

Another reason for survival of Islam in Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, is folk practices - the ceremonies connected with the life cycle rituals of marriage, death, circumcision, fasting during Ramzan, Eids celebration and other community rules.

In the month of Ramzan, the situation in Tajikistan in 1987 was described as follows: The majority of pupils of Dushanbe Secondary Schools observed fast. In school No. 88, the vast majority of children, including Komsomels, observed fast. In school No.

89 more than 50 percent in every class were fasting. In secondary school No. 46, two fifty of the pupils in the 5th class stopped attending schools from the first day of Ram,adhan and were absent for two weeks. 211

According to Ashirov a leading soviet ethnographer in all areas the statement that he who is not circumcised is not an Uzbek (or a Turkeman or a Tajik, etc as appropriate) is elders, but from educated young men. 212.

Same is the case in death and burral files. Ashrov noted:

Religious rituals and ceremonies connected with death are one of the most widely spread customs, which strongly influence social consciousness and generate support for religious and nationalist prejudices.213

Thus even Soviet sources complained that holidays of Eid-ul-Fitar and Eid-ul-Azha had significant influence on the younger generation and thus keep alive religious spirit.

Another source of fundamental information about Islam is family. According to Muriel Ahan:

Even in countries without the legal constraints, the family is usually a child's initial source of information about religion, the Soviet Unions efforts to thwart the religious education of the young make the familys role even more important. By all indications, family in Tajikistan are the principal source of a child religious up bringing. 214

Families pass on religious education rites and rituals to the nest generation. One Tajik woman portrayed 80 percent of her relatives as religious and determined to see the children of the family raised as Muslim. 215

Thus it had been noted that observance of community rites generate muslim national integration which interferes with a policy of shlizhenie and with the building of a new Soviet society. Results of sociological surveys in 1988 indicated that in Tajikistan as a whole 45 percent of the people considered themselves believers, while in some areas 22 percent of the adults, one third of the young people, as well as one third of the children in the sixth and seventh grades openly claimed to be believers of 216

Nativisation of Central Asia is another reason for the survival of Islam in Central Asia. Because of the tremendous fertility rate of the native Muslims and because of the migration of Europeans and Russians from Central Asian States, the nativisation of Central Asia started. During 1959 to 1979 percentage of Russian population declined from 13.3 percent to 10.4 percent in Tajikistan and according to 1989 census figures, the Russian population declined by 2.1 percent in Tajikistan. As a result Tajiks continued to consolidate their positions within their republic, raising their share of population from 53.1 percent in 1959 to 62.3 percent in 1989 . 217

Another factor was the differences in annual average of population growth. In 1977, the birth rate in Tajikistan was 37 per thousand, in 1987 it reached 42 per thousand. 30 percent of Tajik families have five or six children, while 15 percent of families have ten or more children. These figures should be compared with the average number of children in Russian families, which was only one per family. 218

Islamic revival, due to the spill over effects of khemeinis revolution and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, was particularly strongly felt in the southern areas of Tajikistan, area near the Iranian and Afghanistan borders.

However, it is not the survival of the old ways which had generated threat to the stability of Soviet rule in Tajikistan. It was also the combination of new identities new awarness, new pressures, provided by the process of Sovietization and the formation of a local leadership ground. Stalin implemented his nationality policy based on criteria of, language, territory, economic and historical/cultural traditions. New nation states had

their own administrative economic and political institutions and staff, with the hope that, these creations, would result in new national consciousness among soviet Muslims, which would inturn undermine existing allegiance to Pan-Turicism and Pan-Islamis. But the effectiveness of the intended national consciousness policy is provden by the emergence of five independent republics in former soviet Central Asia in 1991



## CHAPTER FOUR

### STRUGGLE FOR POWER

Independent Tajikistan, soon after its independence, became the scene of an intense struggle for power. According to Martha Brill Olcott:

Three main groups are... competing for political control everywhere in the region. Representatives of the old Central Asian partocracy - in most places split into competing groups - struggling to remain in control. They are challenged by the new so called democratic groups dominating by intellectuals who generally played only a peripheral role under the old political orders. The partocracy is also opposed to revivalist Islamic groups composed of fundamentalists - style clerics who were trained outside of the official establishment.

1

This analysis applies chiefly to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is in these two countries that Islamic and democratic forces are the strongest opposition groups. As far as Tajikistan is concerned, beside ideological controversy-Islam vs Communism- there is ethnic-cum-regional disputes, which is playing an important role in struggle for power in Dushanbe and which are helping push Tajikistan towards civil war and eventually to its disintegration. In the north around Khojend, where much of the population is Uzbek, communists are in majority. Khojend was formerly part of the Khanate of Khokand, and was incorporated into Russia as part of Farghana in 1876. After 1917 Khojend became a pro-communist region and was developed economically and politically. The leaders of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, such as Nabiev and Imamali, came from Khojend. 2

The southern region, which was a part of the Eastern Bukhara Emirates, was totally neglected until 1920. In the south there are longstanding economic and clan rivalries between the Kulyab district in the southeast and Kurgan Tyube in the southwest. The Kulyab clans have always been closely linked with the Khojend communists while



Source: Bernet R. Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan", *Survival*, Vol 36, No. 4, Winter, 1993-94.

neighbouring clans from Kurgan Tyube are more overtly Islamic. By the summer 1992 these rivalries, fueled by the political polarization in the republic, erupted into an all-out civil war.

Even greater ethnic complexities exist in the southeast. The Autonomous Region of Gorno-Badakhshan, which shares its terrain, people and culture with northern Afghanistan, contains 44 percent of the total land area of Tajikistan with only 3 percent of the population. It is inhabited by seven different Pamiri ethnic groups including Ismaeli Muslims who have been victimized by both communists and fundamentalists. The Ismaelis have built up strong links with fellow Ismaelis across the border in Afghanistan, and the most militant among them are demanding a separate Ismaeli state. Thus today these economic and political disparities have come to the surface with north sympathetic to communists and are anti-fundamentalist whereas south are anti-communist and pro-fundamentalist. 3

Before proceeding it would be helpful to know about different political parties that are active in Tajikistan. This information, although sketchy due to lack of information, would help us to understand the nature of the struggle for power, political affiliations of Tajik people, parties programmes and so on. Following political parties are most important and active in Tajikistan:

### **1. HIZB-I-NUZHAT-I-ISLAMI**

This party was a secret organization working underground for last 15 years. It has been officially recognized on 26 October 1991. Muhammad Sharif Himatzade is the leader of party, known by his followers as "Gulbaddin of Central Asia". Party has strong following in Kurgan Tyube, close to the Afghan border and in Karategin, close to the Osh region of southern Kirghizistan.

This is the most organized opposition party in Tajikistan, which is committed to advocate the following goals:

1. Spiritual revival of the citizens of the republic.
2. An independent economic and political system.
3. A complete political and legal awakening with the aim of applying to every day life of the Muslims of the republic, the principles of Islam.
4. The spread and advertising of Islamic thought among different nationalities of the republic.

As far as economic programme is concerned, party wanted to export manufacture goods instead of raw material as soon as possible. Secondly, expert training centers should be opened within the country. Thirdly, radical economic programme.

On foreign policy, party wanted to have good relations with all countries but particularly with Muslim world.

For regionalism they say:

We think that one sure way to the problem of regionalism is to resolve to Islam. No other regime can unite people. From the Quran's humanistic point of view we are all brothers, so there is no need for regional hostility. Our muslim grand parents lived in harmony for so many years, but the communist regime advertised separate nationalities of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Tatars. We have to returned to the Quran and to Islam 4, because for seventy five years the communists tried to wipe out the memory of Allah, but every Tajik today still remembers Allah and prays for the success of the party of Allah. 5

## **2. COMMUNIST PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN (CPT)**

Communist Party has been registered again on 22 January 1992. In September 1991, CPT was banned by the Supreme Soviet Union. Its first secretary Shadi Shahdollov

claims to have a large membership all over the state. But its membership from one lakh 25 thousands reduced to 70 thousand. However in Khojend, Badakhshan and Kulyab the party still continues to carry weight. It is said that one fourth of the members of the party in Tajikistan are Uzbeks. At the 22nd party congress following goals were included in party programme:

1. To create such a society which, protect the independence of Tajikistan, and democracy and social justice.
2. Good relations with other countries.
3. To achieve these goals constitutional means should be adopted alongwith democratic reforms in every field of life.

Party wanted parliamentary system of government with 130 to 141 membership. One house should be House of Republic and other House of Nationality. In House of republic each province must have representation. In House of Nationality each nationality have equal representation.

In economic field party supported independent, privatization and joined stock structure programmes, alongwith state, public and private property.

In Foreign policy, good relations with other countries are stressed, but:

We must have good relations with Switzerland, Holland, China, Singapore, Korea... we wish to have good relations with Iran but did not want to interfere in each others internal affairs. We should have good relations with Russia. In future it will be our good friend. 6

As far as regionalism is concerned it can be solved with parliamentary system of government in which each region have equal representation.

### **3. ROSTAKHEZ OR RENAISSANCE PARTY (NATIONAL FRONT)**

The party was formed in September 1989 by Tokhir Abdudzhabor who is an expert economists. The party was formed to:

1. To promote perestroika in Tajikistan.
2. Advanced Tajik interests.
3. Great political and economic autonomy from Moscow.
4. Restoration and strengthening of Tajik cultural identity and heritage through literature, arts and architecture.

According to Tokhair Abdudzhador:

... believes in people's movement for independence and freedom of thought and expression, belief and practices and therefore he would like to mobilize the entire people, including the old Russian who are settled in Tajikistan, and work for complete independence from Moscow. This is a not nationalist party against the Russian nor a regional party favouring one or the other area. 7

Rastokhez came to prominence during the February 1990 riots in Dushanbe by appealing for calm on television and negotiating with republican authority on behalf of the protestors.

After independence, party's aim shifted to:

1. To reach a parliamentary democratic government.
2. To destroy the remnants of the totalitarian regime.
3. To assure the economic and cultural progress of society.
4. Freedom of every individual.

The party does not believe in the use of force but desires to achieve the goals by legal and political ways.

In economy, party believes in privatization of peasants must have their own land to cultivate, and industrial labour must have a share in industry. But all economic and social progress can only be achieved if political stability remains in the country. If there is no political stability then all industrial and agricultural reforms are of no use.

Party advertised close and friendly relations with whole world but especially Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan - near by neighbours. But especial emphasis on relations with Iran.

As far as religion is concerned, it is private affair of a human being. Government must not interfere in it rather government work is to protect the rights of its citizens. 8

#### **4. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN (DPT)**

This party was founded on 10 August 1990 in Dushanbe by the philosopher Shodmon Yusupov. This party drew members from all nationals, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Jews and Russians. But later on its membership among the Russians is reduced when the president of party on television criticized that the interference of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) troops in the affairs of Tajikistan will have spill over effect and that would threaten Russian living in Tajikistan.

When the party was formed it calls for, Tajik sovereignty with in a loose confederation of independent states, its short term objective included the removal of communist party's cells from police, armed forces and the KGB 9. After independence party aims at:

1. Protecting the freedom of the people, disregarding their culture, language and religion.
2. Complete political, cultural and economic autonomy.

According to Yusupov:

To solve the present political crisis, all powers of the president should be surrendered to a council of state. An election for a national Majlis with representatives from all provinces and all parties and assemblies should be set up as soon as the council of state has prepared the population. He does not believe in the representative character of the present parliament, he proposes that all powers of the president should be taken away and the executive branch of the government meaning the Council of Ministers should be consolidated. The parliament as it exists today has no more right to convene and decide on new laws and agreements. Ultimately, the council of state will transfer to a parliamentary democracy with a national assembly. 10

In economic field party's president feels that:

In past Tajik only exported raw material and big powers in order to meet their needs exploited Tajik's raw material and even now big powers wanted to retain their hold over Tajik's raw material. That we can not tolerate an economically we do not want to rely upon anyone. That's why party have a clear cut economic programme. But in the presence of communists, we can not achieve our goals. 11

In foreign relations, party wanted to have relations with big and super powers but on equal grounds and with respect for each other. Party tried to have especial, cordial and friendly relations with Iran because,

Iran, for all persian speaking people, is like a mother land and we should not deteriorate our relations with Iran because other western power do not like it. 12



That's why party prefer to abolish the visa system between the two countries.

According to the president of the party:

Turkey and America with their nasty aim wanted to convert us puppet so as to bring us under their influence. Because whatever they had done in Iran before revolution they wanted to create a similar situation here. Our only chance of survival is to have good cordial and strong relations with Iran. In world politics equality is only criteria for good relations. 13

The secular character of the party does not rule out the role of Islam in the society, because it was due to Islam, which during the Bolshevik rule, that Muslim retain their separate identity and ultimately achieved independent. But party supports the freedom of religion of every member, whether they pray or not is their choice.

## 5. LAL-I-BADAKHSAN PARTY

Party advocated greater autonomy for the Gorno-Badakhstan Autonomous Region and defended the right of Pamirs. Party was active in May 1992, riots. Party's aims are:

1. To reach a democratic government.
2. Independence of Badkhshan.
3. Cultural relations with Badakhshani living in Tajikistan and outside Tajikistan.

According to president of the party, Atabak Amir Beig:

Parliamentary System of the government is the only solution for economic, political and cultural crisis in Tajikistan. He ruled out any possibility of an Islamic state because politics and religion are two different things we can not mix them. 14

Emphasis was paid to have good relations with China, Afghanistan and Iran, especially in the field of economy.

## **6. ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY (IRP)**

It was not founded by Central Asians but by the better organized Russian - based Tatars and Daghestanis in 1990. This non ethnic movement claims to represent all the Muslims of the former Soviet Union 15. Its activities were not legally sanctioned until October 1991. After independence, party became the biwgest political party in Tajikistan. Haji Akbar Turajonzoda is the spiritual leader of the party.

The party advocates the establishment of a democratic state and in the ultimate analysis an Islamic polity that is Islamization of Tajik society and politics. But its spiritual leader is aware of the difficulties that beset the creation of a state ruled by the Shariah because of lack of the needed expertise. Besides, it might provoke the traditional hostility of neighbouring Slavs, the Muslim divine population of Tajikistan. 16

Besides above mentioned political parties there are small parties like People's Congress popularly known as Congress of National Unity, Popular Unity Front etc.

The story, struggle for power in Tajikistan, began in 1990 when an opposition began to surface, representing a mixture of democratic, nationalist and Islamic challenges to the communist regime. Rakhman Nabiev who had been first secretary of the CPT since 1982 was replaced in late 1985 by K.Makhkamov.

Before the August coup, Tajikistan's leaders were preparing for upcoming direct presidential elections. Nabiev was campaigning as a populist, promising to break the Makhkamov - controlled party organization and to share power with three large political groups, Rastokhez, IRP and Democratic. The August coup upset his strategy. After the abortive coup struggle between communists and democrats started in Tajikistan. The February 1990 demonstrations were used by the communists as an excuse to ban

opposition candidates for elections to the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan. Thus 94 percent communists of Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, re-elected K. Makhamov as president of the republic. The refusal of the communists to accommodate the opposition, at time when other Soviet republics were liberalizing the political process, was to convince the IRP that there would be no compromise with the communists. Moreover the Tajik Communists refused to contemplate any economic liberalization. Thus they remain unaccommodative of all the communist parties in Central Asia who were trying to adjust with the trauma of change brought about by Gorbachev. 17

Opposition groups took to the streets in round - the - clock protests . The protestors demanded the removal of Makhkamov and raising slogans in the favour of democracy and victory of "light over darkness" and ultimately dissolution of parliament and fresh election. In a memorandum Tajik Democratic Party put forth a charter of no fewer than 15 demands like:

1. Condemnation of coup of 19 August 1991.
2. Dismissal of communist party office bearers in all units of Tajikistan.
3. Dismissal of Makhkamov.
4. Dismissal of National Assembly and holding of fresh elections.
5. Constitutional guarantees for civil liberties for all Tajiks.
6. Declaration of Tajik SSR as democratic republic of Tajikistan.
7. Freedom of press.
8. Introduction of original Tajik script (Arabic) instead of existing Russian script.
9. Guarantees against interference by the armed forces in constitutional and legal civil authority etc.
10. Military service for Tajik youth within Tajik territory.
11. Besides these demands Tajiks also demanded, e.g renaming of Lenin Square in Dushanbe as Maidan-i-shahidan, renaming Detrovsky Avenue as Ismail-i-samani avenue, recognition of Hizb-i-Islami as legal political party etc. 18

Local parliament passed a no confidence motion against the president and on 31 August 1991 accepted his resignation and named its own chairman Kadriddin Aslonov to be acting president. 19

In September 1991, K.Aslonov banned the communist party and frozen its assets but hardliner communist parliamentary deputies refused to accept this and overturned the ban and staged a surprise come back on 23 September 1991 when they forced the acting president to step down - communists main protest was against the ban against communist party and subsequent attacks on Lenin's statues in Dushanbe. Thus state of emergency was declared. 20

Rakhman Nabiev's replacement due to communist deputies, triggered protest because he immediately after capturing power declared martial law and revoked the ban on the Communist Party of Tajikistan. Mass protests continued and administrators outside the parliament building forced a reversal of the reversal. Several hundred people resorted to hunger strike in Dushanbe and other towns as well demanding dissolution of parliament and banning of communist party 21. The impetus to the opposition movement was added, when newly established political parties, led by IRP, together with Democratic Party and Rostakhez society, has accused the:

1. Undemocratically elected president Nabiev.
2. His men of being yes-men of the kremlin.
3. Held the president responsible for deteriorating situation in Tajikstan.

As soon as IRP and other parties joined the demonstrators the issue of over throwing the government became the focal point. The impetus was added when official Kazi Turajonzade joined the opposition and number of protesters rose to a 100,000. They passed the following resolution:

1. Dissolving the parliament which was run by communists.

2. Dissolving the presidium and sacking the Prime Minister Kenzhae (Tajikistan's KGB head).
3. Fixing a date for the parliamentary general election and allowing the multiparty system.
4. Preparing a new constitution.
5. Declaring a temporary coalition government.
6. Forming a new presidium of parliament with appointment of 50 percent members from the opposition. 22

Under pressure parliament on 8 October agreed to organize a direct presidential election and lifted the ban on the IRP and other opposition groups. Election were held on 27 November 1991. The renamed Communist Party candidates was R.Nabiev. The opposition alliance Democratic Party, Rastakhiz and IRP, supported Davlat Khudanazarov, a Pamiri, who was a chairman of the All Soviet Union of cinematographers. He had gained a reputation as a reformist deputy in the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet of the former Soviet Union, to which he had been elected from Dushanbe. He was also a strong supporter of Yeltsin in the August 1991 events in Moscow 23. The political life thus witnessed plurality of organization, which formed United Block of Democratic Forces of Tajikistan, which took anti communist position.

The official results gave Nabiev 57 percent, to Khudanazrov 30 percent and 6 minor candidates split the remaining votes. The result that was surprising for all Central Asian was that IRP and opposition's candidate won unexpectedly large chunk of voters. The election was not fair in that the party and state controlled the media. Khudanazarov claimed that "it was simply rigged". The opposition demanded fresh election but Nabiev's government refused it 24. The crucial factor in the Nabiev victory, in the view of some commentators, was the very important regional factor in Tajikistani politics. Nabiev received the votes of his own populous Khojend province as well as those of Kulyab region. 25

Once elected president Nabiev - a hard liner communist - resumed the style of a communist party autocrat. The ruling party was again given its old name of the Communist Party in January 1992. Moreover at the party conference where this renaming was announced, a speech was delivered in which it was proclaimed that "with this action the process of restoring the USSR had began". 26

Dictatorial rule was the order of the day, legislation was enacted limiting freedom of the press and assembly. Former pro opposition, Dushanbe mayor Maskud Ikramov, who had ordered the removal of the huge Lenin statue during the demonstration of the autumn 1991, was imprisoned on charges of corruption in March 1992. Other members of the Dushanbe city council and leaders of Rastokhez and DPT, were also arrested. According to the Democratic spokesman:

Human rights and international law standards were regularly violated in the republic and that the new leadership establishes an anti-Democratic regime in Tajikistan. He further added that, persecution of the opposition, ban on the professions for its members, the on slought on the freedom of speech and assembly and political prisoners was taking place in the republic. 27

Fuel was added when Interior Minister Mamadaez Navzhuvanov was removed in March 1992 on charges of corruption and exceeding his authority. But actually he was removed because he had refused to carry out oral instructions given in September 1991 to disperse the demonstration under way at that time. Mass protest, once again, began in Tajikistan's capital city when inhabitants largely from Gorno-Badakhshan of Pamir area — — — Navzhuvanov's home region - came out after the Navzhuvanov's charged that he was dismissed ecause he was minority Pamiri from that region 28. For about five weeks, 100,000 demonstrators besieged the parliament and the country stood still. The demonstration on Shahidan square demanding the resignation of the government turned into a permanent opposition's compound. Whereas presidents supporter organized a rival demonstration on Azadi square. Each side blames the other

for starting the violence 29. Thus two predominant influences that came out to the forefront in the politics of the republic are those of Islamic and communist party persuasions. The rallies of Shahidan and Azadi are a symbolic representation of these two influences. Nabiev introduced a dusk-to-dawn curfew in Dushanbe.

The communist regime said that there was apprehension that in the case of dissolution of the communist regime, it was very likely that fundamentalist would come to power and that mean nothing but the retardation of Tajikistan in all walks of life. According to chairman of the Communist Party, Shadi Shabdolov:

...but the communist will never support the idea of creating an Islamic state. 30

On the other hand according to the Islamic party spokesman D.Usman:

The question of Islamic state can not be decided by the party. That can only be decided by the people and in no circumstances by the party. We have no intention of attempting to establish a new system by force. 31

According to Haji Akbar:

The decades of communist rule have killed the trust of many people in God and thus would apparently take more than a year to accept the idea of an Islamic Republic on their own. 32

But according to Rastokhez chairman Tokhir Abdudzhabor in an interview with Izvestiya, on 27 April 1992, admitted that:

It was not the democratic intelligentsia of Rastokhez or TDP who directed the activities of the protestors. He stated that, it was the IRP who exerted the greatest influence over their actions. 33

Similar views were expressed by Rahmon Masov of Tajikistan Democratic Party, who after realizing that:

...they had too few members and too little power to confront the autocratic regime of R.Nabiev and former CP, compromised their democratic principals by entering into a coalition with much stronger IRP and supporters of Kazi Akbar Turazhonoda. 34

The combination of bitter economic grievances, political protest and regional rivalries (Khojend Province as communist hold and Kurgan Tyube, Karategin and Kulyab province with Islamic influence) made an explosion hard to avoid, in which fuel was added by president Nabiev on 2 May 1992, when he announced the establishment of a National Guard under his personnel command as there was no National Army to back the Nabiev's decision and he distributed 1,800 automatic rifles to Kulyabis on Azadi square 35. Nabiev's National Guard of some 700 men, recruited partly from criminal elements from Kulyab, carried no credibility or military strength. The opposition responded by forming their own para military force. After gun battles between the two national guards the opposition took over the control over a portion of the city of Dushanbe, having seized the presidential palace, television station and airport. On 7 May president Nabiev fled to parliament building and it too was taken over the opposition 36. As a result, law and order broke down completely.

The spread of fighting and fears that the IRP was gaining an upper hand prompted Russian officers, commanding Commonwealth of Independent State military units in Dushanbe, to organize talks between the opposition and Nabiev. After all night talks, an agreement was reached. Ultimately the president conceded to the demands of the opposition, except that he wanted to retain to the post of president. The opposition



divided on the issue. The extremist wing wanted that the president and prime minister should not find any place in the new government. The other opposition's view was that in order to prevent the disintegration of the country it was necessary for them to continue. It was feared that Kulyab and Khojend Oblasts would declare themselves autonomous and turn to the neighbouring Uzbekistan. As it was reported that the leadership of the Khojend was planning to proclaim the area as the Northern Republic of Tajikistan if Nabiev was removed from office. In another pro-Nabiev region- the southeast city of Kulyab, the district authorities threatened to make the city independent rather than accept dictates from the new coalition government. whereas Gorno-Badakhshan. Autonomous Oblasts in April had declared itself as autonomous republic 37. Here one can not rule out the support of Afghan Tajik trying to play on ethnic cards. Thus the political struggle in Dushanbe created unrest every where as each region declared its autonomy and threatened to split away from the republic.

Hostilities ended on 11 May after the government and opposition reached an agreement on the creation of a coalition government of National Reconciliation. This was to be for the interim till the new constitution was adopted and fresh election held. Opposition were given half the seats in the parliament, 24 ministerial portfolios were given to opposition, majority were from IRP and the other seats were shared by Nabiev and other parties. Eight important governmental posts like vice premiership went to the IRP party's Davlat Usman, deputy chairman of IRP . General Rakhmanov was named as the head of the republic's Defence Council 38. Nabiev was allowed to remain as nominal president until the general elections which will be held by the end of 1992.

According to the coalition of National Reconciliation agreement:

1. There will be immediate ceasefire.
2. All opposition forces will be disarmed.
3. The airport and railway station will be reopened.
4. The presidential palace, council of ministers and TV studio will be liberated from demonstrators.

5. Tajiks will have a national state.
6. No interference in the religious affairs of Qaziat and this inturn will not interfere in the political activities of the state.
7. No prohibition on the activities of the parties and organizations.
8. Freedom of speech.
9. Open freedom for the mass media.
10. A supreme council was to replace the presidium and the presidential council. The new body was to be composed of the state, religion, science and cultural representatives.
11. All the important committees have to work with the government of national reconciliation.
12. Chairman of the National Defence Committee, state TV and Radio Corporation and the vice president must resign.
13. Effective measures should be taken to empty the two squares in Dushanbe.
14. As a part of new set up, the president announced the setting up of Majlis (National Assembly) of the republic of Tajikistan. It was to be formed on multi party basis.

The president decreed the end of the emergency and that all weapons should be surrendered. The president further issued another decree to disband the special purpose units and the separate battalion ,National Guard, within its formations. Some of his powers with regard to security were also transferred to the new government. 39

One thing was clear that although opposition controle the capital city of the republic, it however, was not in control of the different regions of the republic, all this meant that bloodshed would not end with this agreement. In a letter to the president Mahmmmd Izatov, member of the independent Board of Muslims of the Kulyab Oblast condemned the "illegal rally" and held that "demonstrators no longer claim to speak on behalf of the nation. The nation was not and will never engaged in conspiracy" 40. Thus the formations of government of National Reconciliation in Dushanbe failed to reconcile Nabiev and anti Nabiev forces in the south of Tajikistan. The Khojend and Kulyab oblast refused to recognized the new government, while the opposition again appeared in the

Shahidan square, alleged that the agreement had been violated. Behind the scene the fuel was added to the situation, by the reluctant communists on the one hand to share power and to bring economic reforms, while on the other hand impatient opposition wanted power immediately. According to Dost Mukhammads, one of the leader of the DPT:

We accepted the new government...with drew our troops from strategic positions...but when we saw a column of armored cars moving in Dushanbe under red Soviet flags, we realize the government was not seeking peace. 41

Opposition fighters seized control of the center of the Kurgan Tyube oblast, where they attacked largely Uzbek supporter of the old regime. From this base, they also launched attacks on Kulyab, which they block for several months. By June heavily armed communists from Kulyab were attacking collective farms around Kurgan Tyube that supported the IRP 42. Tajikistan was in chaos. The president was helpless and unable to rule beyond the city limits of Dushanbe. The government now constituted both the ruling party and the opposition- a political duality which paralysed the administration. Both sides kept undermining each other and threatened to seize total power. parliament existed but failed to meet. Moreover by the refusal of the communists in Khojend and Kulyab to recognize the coalition government, Nabiev and his supporters were ensuring that the slide into civil war would be sooner rather than later. 43

The opposition armed forces were under the nominal control of a Front for National Salvation (Nijat-i-Milli) headed by Shadman Yusuf, chairman of DPT, and Davlat Usman. This was founded on 17 June after an attack on opposition forces in Kulyab. In Dushanbe an opposition armed group known as Youth of Tajikistan, under command of Mullah Khudaidad Abdul Ghaffur, emerged. The Kulyabis formed the main armed force of the excommunists side. The Kulyabi and the ex communists forces were led by a new organization, the Popular Front of Tajikistan (PF) which developed out of Nabiev's National Guard. Sangak Safarov, a Kulyabi Tajik, emerged as its powerful leader. The PF's forces in Kurgan Tyube were led by Faizali Saidov, a young man of mixed Uzbeks

and Tajik ancestry, who claimed ethnically mixed group of Uzbeks, Arabs, local (non-Gharimi) Tajiks and even some Russian speakers 44. The forces obtained weapons from various sources in Afghanistan, from government and from regional states.

As the confrontation between the opposition forces continued and intensified, the people of the Kulyab, Vakhsh, Bakhtar and other parts of the republic began to flee from areas of conflict, mainly to Dushanbe, to other CIS and Afghanistan.

According to Ghulam Sarwar:

Tajiks are in a perpetual state of agony as they are forcibly being pushed to leave their homeland. Countless Tajiks are leaving their homes to escape the ravages of the civil war and its attendant evils... sad part of the story is that people are not migrating for jobs or better conditions, but because of ethnic and religious compulsions. Sword of economic hardship and ethnic discrimination is looming large on their heads. 45

As a result of disturbances ethnic group belonging to European descent that is Russians, Germans, Ukrainians had left the land. Round about 100,000 Russian and others fled Tajikistan by the end of 1992. 46

According to report of Time International:

...all political, religious and ethnic divisions have fueled a brutal war. More than 20,000 Tajiks have been killed and half a million have become refugees. Burned-out villages stretch along broken roads and untilled fields. Economic activities slumped nearly a quarter: only a third of the cotton crops was harvested and slightly more than half the normal tonnage of aluminum was produced. Overall, Tajikistan has sustained damage at 300 billion rubles since the war began. 47

Round about 326,000 Tajiks 48, had fled to seek shelter in Dushanbe but found no more safety than local residents:

...bread is in short supply. Food conveyors are protected by armed men. Works stops by four in the afternoon, when public transportation crawls to a halt and people head indoors. At 9 P.M, a nine hour curfew shuts down the city (Dushanbe), and the streets echo with a rumble of petroleum tanks and armored cars... gun fire shatters the nights calm. 49

The fuel was added when in September 1992, students belonging to Youth Of Tajikistan -organized by the Qazi- stormed the parliament building (taking some of the deputies as hostages) led to a vote of no confidence in president Nabiev by the Supreme Soviet Presidium and Cabinet of Ministers. Prime Minister Akbar Mirzoyev and several other Ministers resigned. Talks between the government and the opposition broke down and the Presidium of the parliament declared Nabiev's removal from office on 3 September. An emergency meeting of the parliament to elect a new leader was called for 4 September, but member's supporting Nabiev did not attend. Nabiev took refuge in the Tajik KGB headquarters and refused to go, from where he ordered firing at the opposition. That did not help him either. Under pressure he prepared to escape to Khojend on 7 September, the leaders of the opposition's National Salvation Front captured him at the airport and forced him to sign a letter of resignation. The Pamiri chairman of the supreme soviet, Akbar Shah Iskandarov, became acting president. 50

According to R.Ahmed:

Nabiev's forced resignation was the worst possible nightmare scenario for other Central Asian leaders. Not only was he the first communist leader to be deposed, but the manner of his ousting was a naked coup d'etat and an abrogation of the constitutional norms

that these leaders were desperately keen to preserve in such uncertain times. 51

In October 1992, the opposition led government rule in Dushanbe was threatened when forces led by Safadrili Kenjayev, a former chairman of the Supreme Soviet and the supporter of the Nabiev, from Kulyab stormed Dushanbe and seized a president building, radio, television and railway stations. They proclaimed the parliament speaker as president but withdrew the following day on Iskanderov's assurance to seek the vote from the 228 members of parliament on the legality of Nabiev's resignation. On October 24, the president proclaimed a state of emergency until 1 January 1993. Dushanbe went under a prolonged curfew. 52

As Tajikistan has no organized a regular standing army or military training facilities, so it depends to a considerable extent on help from foreign armies. The Prime Minister, Abdullazhanov, requested the Uzbek government to send 2 or 3 units of its army to Dushanbe, Kulyab and Kurgan Tyube, but to no avail. The Uzbek's president, Islam Karimov, wrote to the UN Secretary General, saying:

The threat of anarchy and chaos looms on the entire region, and he warned that, our region must not become the next hot spot and object of geo-political games. 53

He asked for the UNO's peace keeping and humanitarian assistance.

As situation accelerated, it began to set off alarms in Central Asia and especially in Tashkent and Moscow, and as Tajiki government sought assistance from the CIS, Russia deployed 10,000 troops from 201 Motorized Rifle Division and ordered 2,000 additional troops to fly to Dushanbe on 28 September, the Kirghiz government promised in September to send one or two battalions of about 300 men. CIS troops took over key installations in the country and have been deployed along the border with Afghanistan.

The Iskanderov's government can remain in office only so long as the Russian troops are around in Tajikistan. 54

As the main source of weapon for opposition is Afghanistan, the CIS took a serious notice of the situation and decided to seal off the Tajik Afghan border. It was decided at the CIS summit meeting in Minsk on 22 January 1993 that the states which had signed the CIS charter would send a 500 strong battalion to Tajikistan to reinforced Russian units patrolling the Afghan border 55. Whereas by September 1992, 1000 new border guards, from Russian and other central asian forces, raised the total deployed alongwith Amu Darya to about 3,500. 56

The irony of the situation was that, opposition does not trust the Russians and fellow Uzbeks either and accused then of covertly supporting the communists and Kulyabis. According to the Deputy Prime Minister and IRP leader Davlat Usman:

I have no faith in the CIS or in Russia and no foreign forces can restore peace. The Russian army has been the main source of supply of weapons to the warring sides. 57

With acting president Iskandarov committed to call in Russian troops and the opposition determined to protest against their presence, the government was itself divided and become even more incapable of offering a political solution.

The government, riven by factionalism, had lost all credibility and was forced to accept the demand for a meeting of parliament in Khojend on 16 November 1992. It invalidated Nabiev's resignation but he than offered voluntarily and died on 10 April 1993. The parliament than abolished the office of president and elected Imamali Rahmanov, chairman of the Kulyab Oblast Executive Committee, as parliamentary chairman - the highest executive post. This election signified parliaments support for the Khojend - Kulyabi aligns, but with the Kulyabis now on the top 58. Abdulmalik Abduljanov from Khojend was elected as prime minister. The parliament also voted to replace the country's

presidential system with a parliamentary system. It announced a ceasefire and reconciliation between warlords from opposing factions. The hard pressed Skandarov accepted the parliament decision and resigned along with his cabinet.

The calm was broken down when on 6 December 1992, forces from Hisar, backing from Uzbekistan, attacked the opposition forces in Dushanbe, who were resisting attempts by the new president to take up office in the capital. After several days of bloody street fighting, Hissaris controlled the city. The Kulyabis also moved into Dushanbe and had taken control of Kurgan Tyube. Imamali took up his post in Dushanbe on 14 December 59. The defeat of alliance after 6 months of power May - October 1992 was due to their political inexperience, military weakness and lack of foreign support. The events of fall and winter 1992 expressed the comeback of the communist with the support of Uzbek minority, the Russian army and the Tashkent, against a so called "Islamocratic opposition", whose constituency is based on the university intelligentsia, clergy, Tajik nationalists and people from south of Tajikistan.

According to Imamali's regime's understanding:

Democracy cannot survived in Tajikistan, nor can Islam offer anything without bloodshed, as way out, the best option is to have the previous system reinstated. 60

The regime justifies the legitimacy of Russian and Uzbek interference as that the Islamic and Democratic alliance is the enemy of other nations. The IRP is accused of being separatists with the aim of seizing power through violent and not through democratic elections. Meanwhile the new regime's forces continued their offensive in the east of the country, focusing on the area around Gharm and on Gorno-Badakhshan in the Pamir mountains, where members of the ousted government including former president A.Iskandarov, had taken refuge. 61



The situation was further deteriorated when Kulyabi PF troops, with new weapons from Russian/CIS forces or Uzbekistan, had begun to sweep south and systematically destroyed and looted Gharmi villages. According to UN High Commission for Refugees estimated that 5000 houses were destroyed in the two raions of Shartuz and Qabadian alone. As a result Gharmis fled either to Dushanbe or south towards the Afghan borders. Over 20,000 people have already crossed the border into Afghanistan, while 50,000 Muslim women, children and elderly people are under siege by CIS army near the Afghanistan border. The CIS army neither allow them to return to Tajikistan or to enter Afghanistan. Anyone who tried to cross Amur Darya were shot by Russian border guards. Thousands of people camped out in freezing weather with no shelter, food or water supplies. Already the food shortage caused many deaths. Many cities such as Kurgan Tyube, Kulyab and Kofirnikhon, opposition strong hold and support were destroyed. The army used tanks, heavy artillery and machine guns against muslim women and children. 62

They are killing our people indiscriminately, says a Tajik women. I have nothing to do with politics, but tomorrow they may come here and take me away, as they have taken so many others. They are removing dead bodies by the truck load. We are all scared, says a Tajik man. 63

To deal with situation Imamali, introduced the state of emergency and curfew on 7 January 1993. Further to normalize the situation along the border, organized the return of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan and to confiscate arms from illegal armed formations. All rallies, parties, strikes and other political activities had been suspended during the emergency. The Tajik leadership appealed to Russian border troops, who police the 2000 km border to help to enforced the measures 64. As a result, it was reported that on 24 March 1993, president Imamali welcomed over 100,000 refugees who have returned to their homes and promised to support them financially, provided with temporary housing and food stuffs 65. Still thousands of refugees are reluctant to return to their country.

Beside reconciliatory policies the use of arms and force is the only means of staying in power. Criminals who had been in jail for long time for various crimes have been freed on conditions that they support the regime. The freed criminals have been given arms to join army. Anyone suspected of opposing the regime is either arrested or shot dead. Their body is either buried on the side of the road or left on the spot. Those who tried to flee the troubled areas by train or bus their possessions are looted by arm guards and allowed to travel further 66. Even the totally ruined inhabitation of Kurgan Tyube are being robbed off food and money. One National Front officer gave his men the necessary order in front of foreign journalists, unaware an interpreter was present. 67

Armed vigilantes patrol the streets and checking identities. Combat helicopters roam the mountains in a campaign to destroy remaining opposition strong holds "we do not have to catch fighters, we run them down" 68. Says Einkeer, a senior Lieutenant with 201st Russian division. In Dushanbe the Kulyabi militia under their ruthless commander Saanjak Safarov went on the rampage against supporters of the opposition. People were dragged out of their beds at night and shot in the street, hundred of women were raped and children, men, old and sick people were killed. Most of the victims were supporters of the DPT and IRP, but hundreds of Ismaelis were also killed. Perhaps as many as 5000 people were killed in this Tajik-style ethnic cleansing to which civilized world turned a blind eye. 69

Most prominent religious scholars, journalists and other prominent figures from all walks of life not siding with the regime are arrested and TV, Radio and Newspapers are controlled by the regime so that news is suppressed e.g Oleg Panfilov, Russian journalist was forced to flee Dushanbe because he sympathizes with opposition. Similarly according to Enikeer, a senior Russian officer:

when I watch the news about Tajikistan on Television, I feel like laughing, we lower all the figures to try not to frighten people. 70

A US based human rights group urges Tajikistans pro- communist rulers to held what it called the persecution of political opponents.

We have received a number of reports from reliable sources about the summary executions, attacks on journalists and people active in the political opposition and also persecution of individual, based on their region of origin. 71

Helsinki watch said most reports of human rights violations blamed the former soviet republics pro-government Popular Front Party but security forces had often cooperated with them.

The government denied that such actions are official policy. While insisting that they are determined to push a head with their offensive against the opposition. According to president Imamali,

When there was trouble in Los Angeles, all necessary force was used to quite it. We also will use whatever measures are necessary.

72

It did , however, banned all opposition publications and immediate criminal proceedings against opposition leaders. Illegal arrest and sentence without trial are common place. For instance on 30 July 1993, a member of the Tajik parliament Shaidsho Shoev and his brother Siyarsho Shoev were arrested in Dushanbe. The where abouts of another seven members of parliament is un known 73. But most important one was the imposition of ban on four political parties for their involvement in subversive activities and violation of countries constitution during the events that took place last year. On June 24, by supreme court on the request of procurator - general on 10 February 1993, as he asked the supreme court to outlaw the four principal opposition groups on the grounds that they had violated their charter and engaged in unlawful action. 74

The pro government forces are shooting the Islamic forces even when they surrender. 75

As a result many prominent opposition leaders have been forced to take refuge in the other countries or to go under ground. Two prominent opposition leaders, Akbar Turanjonzada and Davlat Usman are now in an area of Afghanistan held by Gulbadin Hekmatyars guerilla unit's, while Sharif Himmatzada is in exile in Iran. Leaders of DPT fled to Moscow and the Baltic republics as death sentences were passed on them by government. Taking full advantage of the situation, Imam Fatkhullo Sharifov, of Gissar district, was elected as new head of Tajikistan Muslims "Mufti".

The Mufti said in his first speech that:

Religion will not interfere with state affairs and go in for politics. The Muftiate supports the new government whose actions are aimed at the earliest stabilization in society and establishment of peace on Tajik soil. 76

Meanwhile, thousands of Tajik guerrillas, belonging principally to IRP are now regrouping and training across the border in Afghanistan. Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's party Hezb-i-Islami has supplied weapons to pro-Islamic forces and now training around 2000 Tajik fighters in Kunduz, 80 km south of the Tajik border. In Taloquan to the north east of Afghanistan, Defence minister Ahmed Shah Masoud (ethnically Tajik) is also helping in training. IRP militants draw their strength from 95,000 refugees that escaped across the Afghan border. 77

These Tajik militants, or Mujahideen, or the rebels as they are called, have intensified attacks in border territories. The most significant attack took place in May 1993 when a skirmish involving 130 Islamic rebels resulted in the death of two Russian guards 78. While another took place in July, in which 25 Russian border guards, 70 Tajik

rebels and 200 civilians were killed . Such attacks widened the conflict and according to Barannikov's aide (Russian Security Minister) Vladimir Bondarenko:

Moscow reserved the right to launch pre-emptive strike against Tajik opposition rebels and Afghan Mujahideen based in northern Afghanistan. They have crossed into our territory and we therefore have the right to cross into theirs although we have not done so. 79

The fuel was added by the shelling of Russian troops which killed 300 Afghan, mostly civilians and rendered 6000 people homeless. 80

The situation is heating up as Moscow has alleged that Afghanistan's leaders want to export the Islamic revolution, and Tajik foreign minister has declared that Tajikistan was Russia's forward bastion against "militant Islam". If militant Islam comes to Tajikistan, it will get to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirghzistan and ultimately knock at the gates of the kremlin", on the other hand, Kabul has responded strongly against deployment of Russian troops on its borders with Tajikistan and called it highly provocative and pointing to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan over the same borders in 1979, declares that Afghans "have not forgotten the past 14 year". 81

Tajik former Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdulajanov said that:

Tajikistan would defend itself against attacks from Islamic opponents based in Afghanistan. 82

He ruled out any possibility of negotiating with opposition:

with civilized opposition it would be possible, but not with these peoples who talk only with guns. 83

On the other hand similar views were expressed by chief of the IRP, Muhammad Sharif Himatzada, who declared that Jihad will continue in his country till the collapse of the Moscow back regime in Dushanbe. According to Himatzada:

Initially I was of the view that problems can be solved by political means but now it is my firm belief that Jihad is the only course to resolve the issue 84. He further stated that, this shaky government can not survive long as it is not backed by the masses. I am sure that the Russian troops will leave Tajikistan after suffering heavy losses because Moscow is already facing pressure from the media at home on the deployment of its troops in Tajikistan. While regime in Dushanbe can not sustain for many days after the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Tajikistan. 85

In order to resolve the Tajik crisis, he said that:

1. The communist regime in Dushanbe must go as this is not able to sustain without the help of the Russian troops.
2. Foreign intervention must be stopped immediately.
3. A neutral government should be set up in Dushanbe comprising judges and educationalists.

"We will never enter into talks with the regime, however we can talk to the Russian as they are the main party to this crisis" He also recommended a five party talks participated by the Tajik mujahideen, Moscow, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the government of Iran. He further stated that "...we have been preparing for a total war against the communists in Dushunbe". 86

As Tajikistan's conflict threatens regional stability, because more and more external plus regional players are getting involved in the conflict, president Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan and Nusrullah Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan called on leaders of embattled

Tajikistan to resume dialogues with opposition rebels and announced new elections. In a joint news conference held in Alam Ata, both presidents stated that parliamentary election would allow the Tajik leaders to restore stability in Central Asian Republics (CAR) rocked by months of violence at its border with Afghanistan 87. Tajik president Imamali was also pressurized to held talks with his counter parts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Similar views were expressed by other CAR leaders, alongwith Russia and Afghanistan. But according to Afghan prime minister Hikematyar:

Our cabinet has unanimously decided that the real parties to the conflict are the Tajikistan government and its opposition and they themself should settled the issue in an amicable way... we are not interfering in their internal affairs of Tajikistan. 88

However he promised to act as a mediator if needed.

Finally efforts bear fruits when three sides, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Russia, agreed to bring Tajik groups to the negotiation table following consultations between the special envoy of Russia, Mr. Alexander Alöexiev, Pakistan's foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, and Afghan's foreign minister Dr.Arsalah. 89

The struggle between opponents and government took a new turn on 7 September 1993, when the parliament of Tajikistan voted to postponed presidential elections scheduled for 25 April and referendum which was to be held in May 1994 to decide whether it wanted a strong presidency for a strong parliament. Also opposition parties, previously disallowed to participate, could contest elections freely. The two elections were held on 6 November 1994. 90

The breakthrough in the government - opposition stand off is the result of efforts, of two rounds of talks between the parties involved in war were held in Moscow and Tehran 1994. Moscow round of talks were held from 5 to 19 April 1994 in which a joint

commission on welfare and repatriation of Tajik refugees was set up. However after ten days of UN sponsored talks, the two sides failed to agree on a cease-fire. This situation forced Russia to put more pressure on government in Dushanbe. I.Rakhmonov was told that if he wanted the continuation of Russian financial and military support, he would have to negotiate seriously with the oppositions. As a result the second round of UN sponsored talks were held in June 1994 in Tehran. Tehran consultations resulted in the:

1. Temporary ceasefire accord.
2. To set free 52 political prisoners of opposition and opposition was bound to set free 40 prisoner of the government.
3. International Redcross would act as an observer for exchange and safety matters of political prisoners of both sides. 91

The third round of UN sponsored intra-Tajik peace talks began in Islamabad on 20 October 1994. The main task of the third round of intra-Tajik talks was to get an extension of the ceasefire agreement signed in Tehran. Tajik vice president Dostiev Abdul Majid and the opposition leader Akbar Turanjonzada agreed on an agreement according to which:

1. To extend the temporary ceasefire and cessation of hostility till 6 February 1995.
2. 11 member joint commission to implement and monitor the ceasefire. 11 members will include five each from Tajik government and opposition and one senior UN official.
3. Exchange 27 prisoners each before midnight of November 5, through the good offices of international community of Red Cross.
4. Setting up of a border post at Ishkanist which would be opened after every 15 days for the supply of contingents to belonging to the Tajik opposition. 92

The two demands which threatened to halt peace talks were, no war zone and exchange of prisoners. The opposition wanted the Tajik forces to withdraw from the no



war zone, established on the Afghan- Tajik border at Badakhshan region, and be replaced by the CIS forces and to be ensured that they get their prisoners of war (POWs) on November 6 before they revalidate the temporary ceasefire agreement suppose to expire on that date 93. Because Tajik opposition had no faith left in the government after it violated the 17 October deadline set for releasing their POWs. Both Tajik and opposition were holding 52 and 40 POWs respectively 94, and opposition two leaders, Syed Ashraf and Mr.Aliov, were killed by the Tajik government and opposition is worried that same danger exists for other prisoners 95. Although agreement was signed but one can feel hatred and bad feelings of Tajik government for opposition in the words of Tajik vice president who said that being a Tajik, he was "deeply ashamed that our friends, Moscow, Tehran and now Islamabad had to bring us to the negotiating table", in an effort to end hostilities through political solution instead of battle field. 96

War-racked Tajikistan held its first presidential election and a referendum on the constitution (proposed), and first parliamentary elections on 6 November 1994 and 26 February 1995 respectively.

As country is broadly split between northern and southern clans, so did the candidate. Abdul Malik Abduljanov, a 46 years old technocrat and businessman, former prime minister and Tajikistan ambassador to Moscow, had been counting on the support of the clans around the city of Khojend in the industrial north. Whereas Imamali, a former communist chief and state farm director and president had his power base among the southern Kulyabi clans. 97

The opposition boycotted the elections because according to Akbar Turanjonzada:

We believe these would be black election. For democracy to play its role, there should be freedom of press and the political parties which is not there in Tajikistan 98. Moreover he added, one third or about 900,000 of eligible voters had left the country during the civil war and could not take part in the election. 99

Furthermore, many leaders of an Islamic group and liberals are in Afghanistan and in other countries.

As the elections results were announced, according to which Imamali Rakhmonov received 60 percent and remaining 40 percent were divided between the only opposition candidate Abdul Malik and invalid or blank ballots, Mizro Kabirov. Imamali, as predicted took 95 percent of the vote in his heart land in the south.

Tajikistan's opposition rejected the result of elections, according to Akbar:

We will negotiate with the new president not in the capacity of president, but head of the opposing side 100. He also complained that, only the communist party had the right to engage in political activities in Tajikistan while other parties and the press were deprived of freedom... and without free press there can not be a free society.

101

Abdulajanov's campaign member Ikron Kamilov called the election as undemocratic. Because before elections Abdulajanov was being refused access to national media, particularly state television which "devotes all the time available for the election campaign to Rakhmonev" and supporter of Abdulajanov were beaten, threaten and were subjected to psychological black-mail particularly telephone threats by certain circles in Dushanbe 102. During the election he said at one polling station in Dushanbe those who intended to vote for Abdulajanov had been beaten up while at another station ballot papers had been distributed without Abdulajanov's name. 103

On the other hand Rakhmonov rejected such things and said:

... his regime had put an end to the civil war and stabilized the country, and had earned the right to lead the republic. 104

Similarly, on 26 February 1995, Tajikistan held its first parliamentary elections for 181-member parliament, with 354 candidates, who are close allies of the president. Communist party, Popular party and Economic Renewal party of Tajikistan, all allied to president Imamali Rakhmonov. As the Islamic opposition is banned, the only legalised opposition party allowed to stand for just five seats, is the People's Unity Party (PUP), led by former prime minister Abdumalik Abdullahdzanov, pulled out of the polls two day earlier because of alleged "anti-democratic practices by the Rakhmonov regime" 105. As a result Islamic opposition rejected in advance the results of the vote.

The polls took place in the absence of any international observers, like Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or United Nations, who refused to send observers to the elections on the grounds that they were not democratic because of absence of virtually any opposition candidates. According to Gancho Ganchev, head of the OSCE mission in Dushanbe:

Even in Cambodia, where the United Nations Organized a poll, there were not as many irregularities. 106

Rakhmonov, rejecting the criticism, said:

Our elections are democratic. The best candidates will be elected. You don't build a democracy in one ten or even a hundred years. 107

The new parliament of "red barons" will be strongly supportive of Rakhmanov and hostile to any rapprochement with Islamic opponents.

Here a question arises can without the participation of the exiled opposition, the Tajikistan crisis can be resolved? Only future can give us the answer to this question, but one thing that can be predicted that is "no". Because absence of opposition may lead to little change but it can not solve the problems. Now the spectrum of conflict has

widened. It is not just the matter of who will get the power but also rehabilitation of refugees in Afghanistan and in Gorno Badakhshan, involvement of external players which provided training facilities and support to both the sides, clashes between Tajik rebels and Russian troops, shortage of fuels, money and other supplies, and most important one is the shattering economy: a monstrous problem.

## CONCLUSION

Tajikistan is divided into three distinct geographic regions stretching from the Oxus river on the south, having border with Afghanistan, to the Syr Darya on the north, Khojend region in the north, Badakhshan in the east and the southern with the capital city of Dushanbe and Murgantepe and Kulyab sub regions. Russian always favoured the northern Tajikistan, who were relatively better educated, to rule Tajikistan. Khojend was the center of the Tajik Bolsheviks. The southern region was a part of the Eastern Bukhara Emirates and come under Russian rules in 1920. It was in this southern part of the Tajikistan that first Basmachis and then Afghan Mujahideen's influence penetrated greatly and as a result south became a strong hold of IRP and Democratic Alliance. 108

The war in Tajikistan seems to be the power struggle between the people from Khojend and Kulyab on one side and those from Dushanbe, Pamir and Kurgan Tyube on the other. It is North vs South. The internal situation in Tajikistan is a war - like as it used to be in Afghanistan in 1980s. The conflict is also struggle of ideas, Islamists with support of liberal democrats against the communist hard lines. A new colour in the Civil war has been added by criminal groups, aligned with political parties, are fighting for the control of their respective regions.

What is a matter of serious concerned is the gradual involvement of outside powers in Tajikistan war. Government in Dushanbe has founded support from its neighbouring countries in the region and its allies in Moscow, the Islamists on the other

hand had turned to wards Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan for help.

The political struggle in Dushanbe created unrest everywhere and each region declared its autonomy, thus threatening the integrity of the republic e.g, Gorno-Badakhshan transferred itself into an autonomous republic within Tajikistan, while pro-communist leadership threatened to form Northern Republic of Tajikistan, if communists are removed from office.

So far republics leadership managed to hold power with force. They are reluctant to share power with opposition, to involve the people in political process, to bring about economic, social and political reforms and above all they failed to give a sense of equal citizenship to the Tajikistan people. The leader of Tajik Democratic Party S.Yusupov, has proposed, as a solution to the conflict, that under the supervision of the UN and the CSCE (conference on security and cooperation in Europe) a coalition government should be formed, the refugees should be returned to their homes and, after a year and so, a general election should be held. 109

However, a new government or election would not be sufficient because:

1. Any reconciliatory discussion have to touch on basic issues of state building as well.
2. As opposition is afraid of security forces under the control of Russians, Uzbeks and PF commanders, non-CIS peacekeeping force might create adequate confidence. Opposition must have some contribution force in a peacekeeping force.
3. International community should emphasize to the Dushanbe authorities that the existence of the law - bound state is necessary condition for the domestic stability and foreign investment.
4. The leaders of the opposition, taking refuge in neighbouring and Muslim countries, must be allowed to return home and ban on religious political parties must be lifted.

5. Russian government guarantee that it should not get involved in the internal affairs of Tajikistan.
6. To disband and disarm different irregular armed militants.
7. Economy, ruined by civil war, must be given priority.

According to Barnett R.Rubin:

The likely hood of a settlement in the near term, however, is small. If the government with defecto Russian support blocks all avenues of opposition and the economy constitutes to fail, conflict will reemerge and the influence of Russian military will grow. Tajikistan will become a Russian - Uzbek protectorate in all but name. The moderate elements of Tajikistan opposition will be increasingly marginalised, while the guerrilla groups will become more radical and more beholder to the most radical sectors of the International Islamist Movement. The tragedy would be compounded if this occurred without a serious attempt to prevent it. 110

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DOMESTIC, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS

Central Asia for the first time, after Soviet collapse, has emerged as an independent participant in modern world politics. The region merits attention due to variety of reasons. Five Central Asian states contained 50 million people and enormous natural resources, with its location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Its shadow falls on the Persian Gulf. For geographic, historical and cultural reasons, the ripples of upheaval in Central Asians have the potential to touch Russia, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Middle East 1. On the other hand Central Asian states, for economic and political reasons, are eager to forge ties with outside world especially with Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Western world. These states did not want that their relations should be deteriorated their relations with former Soviet republics especially Russia.

Even during the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period, in Tajikistan, as else where in Central Asian Republics, nationalism and religion gained strength, which gave rise to a need to develop new foreign relations to supplement the old center- periphery relationship with Moscow. Here is a question to which way Central Asia will look now. Will it look to North, West or South ? In term of its foreign relations Tajikistan pays special attention to the following countries.

#### IRAN

Since the last years of Soviet rule, Tajikistan and Iran have shown increased interest in each other and two countries have discussed cooperation in various fields from cultural to economy. The fact is that in the region, Tajikistan is the most fertile ground for Iranian influence due to its Persian speaking inhabitants and Iran became the first country to open an embassy in Dushanbe.



Source: Martha Brill OICott, "Central Asia's Catapult for Independence", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No.3, Summer 1992.



Much of the Iran-Tajik interest is cultural. Most important one is linguistic. The Soviet decision in 1929 to abandon the modified Arabic alphabets in which Persian is written was revived in 1989 by a language law according to which Arabic script has been introduced, other CAR's (Central Asian Republics) opted for Latin script. Iran is playing a major role in this change by providing teachers, text books to use in schools, printing material and publications 2. This change of alphabets and reliance on Iranian aid pose problems for Tajik speakers. Because Tajik, belonging to the Eastern branch of the Persian language family, is not identical to standard Iranian Persian. For the time being, printing material in Tajikistan is still in cyrillic script, which is quite distinct from standard Iranian Persian. This distinction can be lost when the language is written in the Arabic alphabets, but what about vocabulary changes ? Because there are vocabulary differences between Tajik and Iranian Persian. In Tajikistan, besides the Russian loan - words there is the survival of old Persian terminology and the incorporation of words from Eastern Iranian language. To overcome this problem Iran setup the Association of Persian Languages on 19 February 1992, with Tajikistan, Afghan Mujahideen and any other state that wished to join it. 3

Secondly religion, Islam, is also a source of friendly relations between the two countries. Iranian revolution and its spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini had great impact on Tajikistan. Even during the last years of Soviet Union, Tajik Islamic leaders demanded an Islamic state in Tajikistan based on Iranian model. Where as Iranian electronic media, press, radio, T.V etc all emphasized Islamic solidarity and warn against Western imperialism 4. Iran backed the government of president Iskandarov with money and goods. At the headquarter of the Tajikistan Democratic Party (TDP) military wing, commander Nazarudin Zuberdulla admitted:

Iran is helping the TDP with funding, food and other supplies..." At Dushanbe's central Mosque, new madrasha building was build, and according to Qazi Torandzhanzoda ...the building has been built with Iranian funds, that their (teachers) salaries were paid by Tehran.... 5

## SPILL OVER OF ETHNIC POPULATION

COUNTRY	NATION	1978	1983
CHINA	Uzbeks	14,000	13,000
	Tajiks	20,000	26,500
	Kirgiz	120,000	115,000
	Kazakhs	840,000	930,000
IRAN	Turkmen	550,000	650,000
	Azerbaijani	5,800,000	6,200,000
	Tajiks	40,000	44,000
AFGHANISTAN	Uzbeks	1,300,000	1,500,000
	Tajiks	3,000,000	350,000
	Kirgiz	10,000	58,000
	Turkmen	300,000	350,000
TURKEY	Turkmen	100,000	120,000

Source: "Central Asia: Current Situation and future prospects", *Strategie Digest*, Vol. XXIII, No. 8. August, 1993.

Foreign diplomats claimed that the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was receiving air drops of weapons from Iranian aircrafts. Here too, Iran faces problems because Tajiks are Sunni Muslims and not Shites like the majority of Iranian.

Besides cultural and religious relations the two countries also involve in economic affairs. As Tajikistan is the poorest republic of former Soviet Union, despite the fact that the Tajikistan has large amount of natural resources deposits, agricultural land and live stock, now as independent state, Tajikistan's top priority is how to develop the country's economy and for that purpose Tajikistan seeked the membership of International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Economic Co-operation Organization. But for Tajik nationalist, Iran provided alternative economic model on the ground that Iran offered a relevant example of a country which had formally been dependent economically but had achieved self reliance and prosperity. That's why two countries discussed joint ventures e.g. in shipping, cotton weaving, transportation i.e. rail, roads and air links, cattle breeding etc. But the most important one is that Iran provided technical and skill full men and modern technology for Tajikistan for its economic uplift. 6


The governments in Tehran and Dushanbe encouraged increased political and diplomatic contacts between the two countries. The turning point came in June 1990 when Otakhon Latifi, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, headed a delegation to Tehran to attend the first anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini's death. K.Mahkamov visit, head of the republics government and first secretary of its communist party, on 25 August, 1991 was cancelled because of the August coup of 1991 and removal of K.Mahkamov from power 7. In November 1991, Iran's foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayeti as part of his visit to several Soviet republics stopped in Dushanbe and met with the Tajikistan's president R.Nabiev and various other officials. He visited Iran's newly opened consulate in Dushanbe. After the Soviet demise, Iran became the first country to establish in Dushanbe an embassy on 9 January 1992. He also during his visit formalized the plans for the opening of branch of the National Bank of the Islamic Republic. He also worked out the details for planned direct airlinks between Dushanbe and Tehran, Mashhad and Tabriz and also for telephone and television services. 8

Despite Iran's cultural and economic undertaking in Tajikistan, much of Tehran's attention north of the border has been directed to other republic, so as to get support for Iran's foreign policy stance like Iraq, economic cooperation and to get military hardware. Thus among the southern republics, Tajikistan is not Iran's highest priority. Azerbaijan is of particular importance to Tehran, because large number of Azeri population live in Iran and a possible mix of these can be explosive. Whereas the Armenian - Azari clash has the potential to pose a major security threat to Iran 9. Furthermore Iran's role was greatly reduced after the coalition government was ousted by the Khojend and Kulyabi forces.

Iran has opportunities to outstrip the obstacles. Iran, through its access to the Indian ocean and the overland route via Turkey to Europe, offers Central Asian's state away to breakout of their geographic confinement and dependence on Russia. The Iranian port of Bandar Abbas is operative for this purpose 10. At a conference among the littoral states of the caspian sea, Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmanistan and Azerbaijan, in Nowshahr, discussions were held on creating uniform shipping rules, Iranian use of Kazakh and Turkmen ports for exports to East Asia and the use by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan of Iran's Caspian sea ports for goods bound for Europe and Middle East. At the Ashkabad Summit agreements were signed on reviving the Silk road by building a highway from Turkey through Central Asia to western China and creating a rail link by connecting the railway at the Iranian city of Mashhad to the Turkmenistan railway. Iran also offered one of the closest platforms for airline connections to the rest of the world that also reduces the reliance on Russia. 11

Thus for Iran on southern borders, as northern one, instead of Tajikistan, other Central Asian states can play a crucial role e.g, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are crucial for the construction of rail links between existing Chinese, Russian, Central Asians and Iranian lines as a means to establish a commercial route. Tajikistan is only peripheral to it. Iran can not antagonize the Turkic speaking majority by solely supporting Tajikistan.

## **TURKEY**



Source: Hazhir Teimourian "Turkey & Iran for friendly competition," Pakistan & Gulf Economist, May 29 - June, 1993

Turkey is likely to have less influence in Tajikistan because people speak Persian. Turkey appears to be a natural model for rest of the CARs because of its pro-western, Muslim, secular and democratic character. Most important one is that it has an expanding market economy. Secondly, it is considered as the motherland of Turkistan.

12

Central Asians are opting for the Turkish model of development. According to Uzbek president,

... the Turkish path of development is more acceptable to us, above all as a secular, civilized path for the development of society. And so we must workout our - above all - path of development and economic and political course, relying on the experience of Turkey... it is not just the opinion of Uzbekistan, but that of Central Asia of a whole. 13

President Nur Sultan of Kazakhstan has spoken about the possibility of common wealth of Turkic states, whereas for the president Askar Akaev of Kirghizistan:

Turkey is the morning star that shows the Turkic people the way. 14

Ankara moved swiftly to build its influence in the region. In March 1991, Turkish president Turgut Ozal invited the presidents of all five republics and Azerbaijan to Ankara, where the seeds for future cooperation were planted. It was the first major international gathering of the Central Asian leaders and it immediately altered Iran, Pakistan and the Arab countries to Turkey's efforts. 15

Unlike Iran, Turkey is seen by the Central Asians leaders as a bridge to the west and advocate of their economic needs. Turkic aids come without political strengths attached, but most important one is that west also preferred Turkish model as a counter to Iran. Turkey is trying its best that new states choose the Turkish model in preference

to others. About 10,000 Central Asian students are currently studying at Turkish Universities. Turkey had supplied technological support to the region and sponsored its telecommunication and television networks 16. More than 1,000 Turkish delegations visited Central Asia during 1992. Except Tajikistan, all other CARs has opted for Turkey's variety of the Latin alphabets. 17

It is wrong to get the impression that Turkey is not paying any attention to Tajikistan. Tajikistan, being a Persian speaking state, can pose a threat to the idea of pan-Turkism solidarity and cooperation. Here Turkey can play its religious (Sunni) cards. Both the countries signed numbers of bilateral agreements concerning, economic, technology, agricultural etc. For instance in January 1993, Tajik Deputy Prime Minister Abdurrahmon Mukhtashev paid a visit to Turkey where President Turgut Ozal received the Tajiki guests. Turkey agreed to provide a loan of 50 million dollars to Tajikistan and opened Turkish airlines flights on Dushanbe - Ankara-Istanbul route. Turkey also agreed to provide training to Tajik cadres in technical and military fields and also to Tajik pilots in International aviation. Turkey is also providing various computers to Tajikistan 18. On the arrival of humanitarian aids from Turkey, Orhan Erdivanli, Turkish ambassador in Tajikistan, said:

...the leadership of my country understands whole complex nature of the socio - economic situation in your republic and is ready to support it at a difficult time. 19

So far Turkey has been successful in extending its influence in Central Asia. But can Turkey be able to maintain its position in Central Asia? Because:

1. The secularism may appeal to the progressive - minded urban intelligentsia, but not to a rural population which still give high priority to their religion e.g south of Tajikistan.
2. Moreover sub nationalism, regionalism and tribalism may seriously hinder the Turkey's movement in Central Asia.

3. Turkey's high rate of inflation is another problem. It is not clear from where Turkey will raise 1.1 billion dollar package of credits for Central Asia. Turkish companies did not have the funds for serious investment in Central Asia.
4. Turkey has cursory knowledge of Central Asia - because of the discouragement by Turkish authorities of the study of Soviet ruled Central Asia or for that matter, of anything Soviet.
5. Turkish government would not like to escalate the Turkish - Iranian rivalry in Central Asia which has already begun. 20

## AFGHANISTAN

The developments in Central Asia, have a profound impact on Afghanistan, regardless of the ideology of regimes there. With Tajik as second major nationality after Pashtuns, third and fourth largest nationalities are Uzbeks and Turkmens respectively. Afghanistan shares its northern border with three Central Asian states - Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Tajikistan has a 1,300 km long border with Afghanistan and Dushanbe is just 100 km from the Afghan border. 21

The link between external support to religious parties in Afghanistan and Central and Southern Tajikistan was established through the Mujahideen from mid 80s. In former Soviet press reports about the involvement of Afghan Mujahideen in propagating the militant ideology of Islam in Tajikistan appeared regularly. It was also reported that anti Soviet, political and Islamic literature was smuggled into Soviet Central Asia via Afghanistan. This literature smuggling by Afghan Mujahideen and their agents into Central Asia has been facilitated by the common ethnic and religious background of the people inhabiting the Tajik and Afghan border areas. Even more important, the Mujahideen have been a source of inspiration to the Tajiks. A Tajik intellectual told an American Iran specialist,





Source: The Nation, January 9, 1995.

...in 1904 - 1905 the Japanese showed an earlier generation of Central Asians that Russia was not invincible, the Afghan Mujahideen have demonstrated this to the present generation. 22

The Tajik troops sent in Afghanistan in the Red Army, their views changed when they came to realize that they were fighting against their own nationality and coreligions. The Mujahideen have supplied arms and ammunition as well as training in guerrilla warfare to the IRP fighters.

In power struggle between Tajikistan's ex communist rulers and coalition of democrats and Islamic radicals. The communist have the backing of Russians, Uzbeks and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), while the coalition forces have the main support from Afghanistan. As fighting escalated the opposition from Kurgan Tyube province crossed regularly into Afghanistan to secure arms, training and safe heaven. In order to cut the main support of opposition, the CIS took serious notice of the situation and decided to seal off the Tajik - Afghan border. The basis for CIS and particularly Russian involvement in Tajikistan conflict was created by the signing of the CIS Treaty of collective security in July 1992 and bilateral treaty of friendship and security that have been signed between Russia and Tajikistan.

Tajikistan's leader Imamali welcomed such decisions and said that:

Such move would demonstrate to Afghanistan that Tajikistan is not alone and all CIS countries are working together to protect the borders. 23

This decision, instead of contributing positively, added more fuel in the situation which intensified attacks in border territory between Afghan and Tajik Mujahideen and CIS troops mainly composed of Russia. Both sides Afghanistan and Tajikistan, accused each other for violation of the border.

The most serious problem is that of refugees. Due to escalating civil war, round about 90,000 people have crossed into Afghanistan in 1992. As many as 30,000 sought refuge in Gorno-Badakhshan. About 60,000 refugees mainly from Gharmis, Kurghan Tyube remained in northern Afghanistan - which is controlled by local commanders and war lords and not by the central government 24. By the end of 1993, it was estimated that more than 200,000 Tajik refugees entered into Afghanistan. 25

These refugees lived in three distinct areas. About 25,000 - 27,000 lived in around the city of Mazar-i-sharf in Balkh province, and 2,000 - 4,000 nearby Tashqurghan. In the province of Kunduz, borders directly on Kurgan Teppa, the United Nations Human Rights Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that about 30,000 Tajiks found refuge in different parts of this province 26. The Afghan government is making its best to provide basic necessities to Tajik refugees on its soil. But it doesn't have enough resources to meet their requirements. According to Afghan Minister, Wahidyar, with responsibility for refugees said:

Afghanistan had its own refugees in other countries and it would never tell its Tajik Islamic brothers to leave. 27

Abdul Rashid Dustom, an Uzbek, who installed his control in north Afghanistan, help to evacuate Uzbek refugees from Kurghan Tyube during the war, but he have also welcomed Gharmis but did not permit any Tajik opposition military training in his area 28. His political organization, Junbish-i-Milli-yi-Islami-yi-Afghanistan, emerged as regional ally of president Karimov of Uzbekistan. In this area, Sayyid Mansur Nadiri, is an important ally of Dustom. He leads the Ismaili community of Afghanistan. He helped to mediate between the Dushanbe government and his coreligionists in Gorno-Badakhshan, whom he warned against cooperation with fundamentalists.

Another important force in this area is the Jamiat-i-Islami-Yi-Afghanistan (JIA). This is the party of Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani and former defence minister Ahmed Shah Masud, who are both Tajiks. Takhar and Afghan Badakhshan are largely

under the control of JIA commanders loyal to defence minister Masud's Supervisory Council of the North (SCN). Masud established SCNs headquarters in Taliqan. Since 1993, the IRP has established its exile headquarters in Taliqan from where weapons and training facilities are provided to the pro Islamic forces in Tajikistan. The IRP Mujahideen wear the uniforms of Masud's SCN 29. The government of the Islamic state of Afghanistan denied any military training for the guerrillas and said that such military training of Tajik refugees is the work of commanders in areas of north Afghanistan, not under government control.

The occupation of Sher Bandar by the forces of Ahmad Shah Masud has angered Rashid Dustom and this led to serious ethnic conflicts in the northern region of Afghanistan which is bound to create new ethnic rivalry not only in Tajikistan but also in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan 30. Any alliance between Tajiks of Afghanistan may drive Uzbek general Dustom to fall back on the Pashtun leader Gulbadin Hekmatyar to meet the common Tajik rival Burhanuddin Rabbani. However fragile would the Uzbek Pashtun friendship be, Hekmatyar may have strong backing from the Peshawar based Pashtuns thus jeopardizing Pakistan's relation with Afghanistan and Tajikistan and later even with Uzbekistan 31. Beside providing training facilities, arms and shelter to refugees, Badakhshan and other areas of north Afghanistan are centers of the opium cultivation and war lords used the drug trades to finance arms purchases. It has been observed that:

... the drug dealers of Khorog (Gorno-Badakhshan)... go to Afghanistan to obtain their merchandise, sell it in Moscow or elsewhere, and return to Afghanistan to buy arms. This is particularly the only way for Pamir to obtain them, but it is a route that costs those who follow it into the arms of the Afghan parties financed by the opium trade. 32

North Afghanistan also provided asylum to the opposition leaders, after the government announced an official ban on the four opposition political parties. Akbar

Turanjonzada and Davlat Usman are no in an area of Afghanistan held by Gulbadin Hekmatyars guerrilla units.

Afghanistan also played vital role in the three round of peace talks between Tajikistan government and opposition leaders in Moscow, Tehran and Islamabad respectively.

Burhanuddin Rabbani, president of Afghanistan, visited Tajikistan in the mid December 1993, with the objectives to bring about reconciliation among with Tajiks in Tajikistan and to solve the refugees problems. The two sides signed an agreement according to which:

1. Non interference in the internal affairs of the country.
2. Cessation of war and border conflicts.
3. Return of prisoners of war.
4. Return of the Tajik refugees to Tajikistan and a promise by the Tajikistan government to rehabilitate them in their original homes and jobs.
5. The return of the Afghan Orphans sheltered in Shahr-e-Nau.
6. Continuation of gas supply from Afghanistan to Tajikistan.
7. Facilities of free education to be provided for Afghan students in Tajikistan.

After the signing of the agreement, the Tajik government has passed a new law for the rehabilitation of the Tajik refugees in their original homes and jobs. Nearly 60,000 refugees have so far returned 33. After Rabbani's visit, the chances of conflict between the two countries have been removed and hence border clashes between the two have become negligible.

The most serious problem for Afghanistan is that Afghan nationalities are more identity conscious then ever before. In future Afghan, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens would like to re-establish the broken linkages with their more prosperous brothers across the border. A more alarming phenomenon is the emergence of a move in the Central

Asian republics to take over parts of Afghanistan inhabited by their ethnic groups. This was notable in Tajikistan where idea of "Greater Tajikistan" embracing the Tajik areas of north Afghanistan was heard 34. While Abdul Rashid Dostom made several visits to neighbouring Uzbekistan to get supports for a separate northern state for his Uzbek people. This secular entity would act as a buffer for Central Asia against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from the Pashtun dominated area of south and Iran in the west.

35

The Tajikistan civil war created the possibility for conflict between the governments of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, any development in either side, have the potential of spill over effect. More important, the danger is by no means restricted to Afghanistan and Tajikistan alone, the likely hood of conflict within and among other Central Asian states can not be ruled out. While the possibility of conflicts between Central Asian states and other countries, is also there.

## PAKISTAN

Pakistan has its own set of designs in Central Asia. Pakistan's military and strategic interest in Central Asia is determine by its rivalry with India and support for Pakistan stands on Kashmir Issue. The idea is to set up an "Islamic crescent" in its north stretching from the Caspian to the Arabian sea. This idea owes its birth after the disintegration of Soviet Union, which came at a time when Pakistan had virtually lost its front line status following the soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and was experiencing the consequences of a new American doctrine aimed at containing Islamic fundamentalism and American tilt towards Delhi instead of Islamabad. It also came at a time when Pakistan was fully involved in supporting the Afghan Mujahideen in the ongoing Afghan crisis. The crisis was also occurred when Pakistan was singled out by the International community for its development in nuclear weapon programme, drug trafficking and international terrorism 36. Pakistan hoped to revive its fortune in the West by selling its new geostrategic importance as the gateway to Central Asia for Western businessmen.

Timely action was taken by the government of Pakistan. Pakistan became the first country to recognize all Central Asian states and embassies were set up at capital cities of Central Asia including Tajikistan which is nearest to Pakistan. Islamabad and Dushanbe is 640 km, and by road Dushanbe lies at a distance 2720 km from Karachi. Dushanbe is nearer to Chaman than Chaman to Karachi 37. Tajikistan would be sharing land border if the Wakhan strip was not wedged between the two. To enter international trade through shipping, three states Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan can use Karachi Port which is about 1,500 miles away from these states. In contrast the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas is 3,400 kilometers, Vladivostok 9,500 kilometers and Rostov on the Don 4,200 kilometers away 38. In this geographical setting, Afghanistan occupies the pivotal position in respect to transit trade, due to network of roads linking Kabul with border towns of the Central Asian states. As Kabul controlled Pakistan's land access to Central Asia, solution to the Afghanistan problems became Pakistan's first priority. A peaceful and stable Afghanistan would provide an easy land route for Pakistan to meet and economic penetration in Central Asia.

In November - December 1991, Pakistan's Economic Affairs minister, Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali, led a delegation of businessmen, industrialists, economists, journalists and scholars to Central Asian Republics and Russia. They were able to meet their counterparts and memoranda of understanding were exchanged with each of five states at the official level. According to memoranda of understanding with Tajikistan's government:

1. Cooperation in a number of fields.
2. Barter agreement with Tabani cooperation for supply of wheat, rice, tea and meat in exchange for cotton and aluminum from Tajikistan worth fifty million dollars.
3. Joint venture with Tabani corporation for international chartered transportation between Dushanbe and Karachi.
4. Arfeen International of Pakistan to establish communications systems.
5. A Pakistani private party to set up a five star hotel in Dushanbe. 39

In March 1992, Pakistan tied up a \$500 million deal with Tajikistan in which Pakistan would provide food and consumer goods for five years, the profit of which Tajikistan would use to finish construction of a dam that would produce electricity to be supplied to Pakistan, transmission line would cross the Pamirs and the Wakhan corridor 40. Pakistan also offered 10 million dollars, 5,000 tons of rice, gift of medicines worth 1000,000 dollars to Tajikistan, two separate land routes to Central Asia to the sea - one through Afghanistan and other from Kirghizistan and Kazakhstan through China's Xinjiang province via Karakoram highway to link with northern Pakistan. 41

Pakistan has been banking on the big Sunni Chunk in Central Asia, their Islamic heritage, their role in the spread of Islam and Sunni theology in the sub continent, and finally their communism - oppressed sentiments of the co-religionists as in the case of Afghan Mujahideen. Pakistan Mullahs have made deep inroads in Tajik Sunni Muslim Society in rural areas leaving the capital city for the time being. The newly formed Tajik Hezb-i-Ahyay-e-Islami is developing along Pakistan Jamat-i-Islami pattern, making the base among the rural population 42. The Jamat chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad called on the government to confront:

US imperialism and the new world order by using the Central Asian Republics for a combined fight, saying that, Pakistan must provide Central Asia with Islamic guidance rather than economic aid. 43

In March 1993 the foreign ministers of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan directly accused the Jamat of arming and training Muslims radicals from their Republics. The Jamat also helped IRP leaders in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to establish links with Arab groups.

Pakistan in collaboration with Iran and Turkey has tried to institutionalize the various regional, Islamic and economic blocks e.g Economic Co-operation Organization, Organization of Islamic Countries, etc. In February 1992, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif described the membership of CAR as "new dimension and of special significance" 44. Pakistan was invited to participate in Ashkhabad meeting, on May 11, 1992, of the



head of the eight countries - Turkey, Turkmenistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan. All participant countries supported Pakistan's stands on Kashmir Issue but the main purpose of inviting Pakistan in the regional meeting was Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan's possible contribution in CARs economy. 45

There are many hurdles in the way of Pakistan's cooperation and Afghan problem is the biggest one. Afghan problem is a big hurdle in the way of importing gas and electricity from the Central Asian states, because the gas pipelines and electricity lines will pass through Afghanistan. Agreements between Pakistan and Tajikistan for the supply of 1000 mw electricity to Pakistan would be facilitated till the settlement of the Afghan issue. Similar is the case of the natural gas from Turkmenistan, and Turkmenistan's government desired the establishment of joint ventures for supply of gas to Pakistan through Afghanistan 46. Also the route via Afghanistan which is the shortest, trade route can only be utilized after peace in Afghanistan.

Another hurdle is the ongoing competition in the region. Turkey, Iran, Russia, USA, India and other Muslim and western countries are playing their cards to establish relations with them. Here Pakistan simply can not play its Islamic card because stress on the Islamic aspect of cooperation needs to be tempered by the realization that the present leadership in Central Asia is secular in outlook 47. In Tajikistan all the Islamic and nationalists parties were outlawed and their leaders are taking asylum in other countries. These republic on the other hand are headed by a communist. According to Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali:

They are Muslim no doubt this... if we let loose any ideological movement there, we will be badly rejected by them... we found that religion as a nationalist force was for greater than as an Ideological force. 48

Pakistan's role has been further reduced due to signing of the Treaty collective security by CIS members states in Tashkent on the May 15, 1992.

To counter these problems, Pakistan is offering all facilities and generous concessions to foreign investors in Pakistan and in return offering cheap and skilled manpower in technical, industrial as well as in military because Pakistan have enough experience in this respect in the Gulf countries. Pakistan hoped to market its short routes to the sea, land and air and provide services such as transport, banking, insurance, business training programmes. It could also provide expertise and international contacts to help to develop the textile industry in Central Asia. Pakistan's prestige was enhanced in Central Asia by Pakistan's governmental role in the third round of Inter Tajik peace talks. At inaugurating meeting, Pakistan foreign Minister Sardar Asif said that he felt privileged to be the first minister from Pakistan to undertake a visit to Tajikistan after its independence and said that Pakistan hoped to be able to build tunnels and roads connecting Tajikistan and Pakistan through the Wakhan corridor. He further added "Pakistan wished to build relations with Tajikistan on the basis of non interference". 49

The efforts bear fruits, and president of Tajikistan Imamali Rakhmanov paid a state visit to Pakistan from 29 March to 1 April, 1994. Both countries entered into a ten-year agreement for reciprocal promotion of investment. The agreements signed are:

1. Agreement on the reciprocal promotion and protection of investment.
2. Protocol on cooperation between the foreign affairs ministries of Pakistan and Tajikistan.
3. Joint declaration of sister cities by metropolitan of Lahore, Pakistan and municipal authority of Dushanbe, Tajikistan. 50

## INDIA

The breakup of the Soviet Union brought to an end a special relation between Moscow and New Delhi. Moscow - Delhi relations were based on Soviet perception of

"India as bulwark against American and Chinese expansionism in South Asia". In the context of the cold war, the Soviet Union was willing "to pour large sums of money and political support into the relationship. The logic of cold war has disappeared, and with it the basis of the earlier closeness" 51. Soviet Union was not only the principal suppliers of sophisticated arms but also extended immense financial support. India had more than 20% of its export with Soviet Union.

After the independence CAR's India have to adjust itself in the new situation. According to Indian foreign secretary Muchkund Dubey, in November 1991, said "we have started dealing with various republics separately" 52. According to an Indian scholar:

...In the span of forty years, Indian - Central Asian relations developed on a sound footing. In all spheres, such as economic, trade, commerce, science and technological, cultural and spiritual fields. In India and CAR had reached to a high level of relations.... in the changed circumstances India has an edge over all neighbouring country in terms of an understanding after the collapse and disintegration of the SU. It was in this spirit and appreciation gained through experiences over time, that India and CAR opened new chapters of Inter - State relations which were continuity in spirit and fresh in content. 53

Economic interaction have been the for most concern of India for reestablishing relations with new states. India had a thriving trade with CAR covered under the Indo - Soviet trade agreements, and safeguard of these inter - actions in the fields of trade and commerce was vital for laying the new foundation of bilateral relations with the CARs. For instance in Tajikistan in late October 1992, Surya Hotel, managed by a group of six non Resident Indians, bagged order worth Rs.600 crore in Tajikistan, who set up Surya Hotel as an Asiad project in 1982 54. The order includes setting up of two hotels, and

a glass factory in the first phase. The second phase undertaken in 1994 involves development and building of real state sectors.

Secondly, India's concern in Central Asia stemmed from the in the political environment around its immediate neighbour hood. Important consideration was the growing perception of Islamic threat - a phenomenon perceived as a challenge to the liberal democratic world in the post - cold war period. India still remember the role of Muslim world in Indo - Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, and was afraid of any possible emergence of "Islamic Bloc". That's why India is trying its best to win over these newly emergent Muslim states and signed bilateral agreements with Central Asian states.

As far as Tajikistan is concerned, it is of special concern for the Indian government, it is because of the fact that IRP is only legalized in Tajikistan and Islamic opposition is quite active here. Indian felt threatened of Kabul - Dushanbe - Islamabad axis and then spill over effect of Islam in other states of the region. But here the Irony of the situation, favourable for India, is that communist elites held sway over a society that was predominantly Muslim. These elites emphasized secular outlook, as that of India. Thus India established cordial bilateral economic, cultural, scientific, artistic etc relations with CAR. For instance on February, 1993 alone India signed six agreements and offered five million dollars credit to Tajikistan to boost bilateral economic cooperation. Other agreements includes economics technical, banking and other activities including culture, arts and education. Two sides also agreed to exchange television programmes and films.

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Besides its secular outlook, India has an edge on account of its past relationship, in view of the edge it has in many areas of science and technology and presence of hundred of persons and students who are familiar with Central Asian social, economic, political, cultural situation and speak of its official working language which is Russia. But it does not have the advantage of direct land communication via Afghanistan and China that Pakistan has. 56

## RUSSIA

In the initial stages of the Tajik crisis - from the breakup of the SU until the escalation of the civil war, Russian interest and involvement was strictly limited. It was perhaps felt that this was a crisis far away, with no vital Russian interest at stake. Also the memories of Russian fate in Afghanistan act as a deterrent for Russian involvement in Tajikistan. Russian leaders made some attempts to mediate the conflict. The CIS/Russian 201st Motorised Rifle Division, which had been left in Tajikistan after the disintegration of Soviet Union, was ordered to stay there and to remain neutral.

It was only in the autumn of 1992, that Russian policy - maker began to show great concern over the escalating violence in Tajikistan. The main reason for this was the vulnerability of Tajikistan to Afghan Mujahideen influence and border penetration captured the attention of both Moscow and specially the Central Asian states mainly Uzbekistan. Russia defines the main threat from which it is shielding these states as "Islamic fundamentalism" 57. And that if fundamentalism succeeded in Tajikistan, would lead to the further penetration into Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and further with dangerous consequences for Russia. Another reason was the present of nine million Russians in Central Asia. According to V.Barannikov, the security Minister of Russia:

The presence of over 200,000 ethnic Russian in Tajikistan placed the region in Russia's direct sphere of influence. 58

Behind the scene, since 1985, 800,000 slaves - primarily Russian, have left Uzbekistan, 185,000 Russian have left Kirghizistan since 1989 and 90,000 Russian left Tajikistan in 1992 alone 59. An out flow of large numbers of ethnic Russians created painful problems of refugees, unemployment, housing, food etc in Russia. A sizeable population of Russia, must therefore, remain in Central Asia.

A number of measures, in the later part of 1992, were taken by the Russian government to play a more active role in the resolution of the Tajik crisis. In May 1992,

Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan signed a "Treaty on Collective Security" in Tashkent which specifically committed the signatory states to undertake cooperative military action under article 4 of the new Treaty:

An act of aggression committed... against any of the participating state will be regarded as aggression against every participating state. States that came under attack will receive "all necessary assistance including military assistance", from other signatories. 60

The decision, to embrace a mutual security pact with Russia, grew out of concerns raised by the demise of the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. After the Afghan president Najibullah's government collapsed in April 1992, leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and other neighbouring states feared that instability and Islamic fundamentalism might spill into their own countries. The collective security treaty codified a new political - military relationship between Russia and the other signatories similar to that between former Soviet Union and the members of the Warsaw Pact.

At the request of Tajik government, a bilateral relations between Russia and Tajikistan were initiated on 21st July 1992 in Dushanbe. Russia agreed to protect Tajik - Afghan and Tajik - Chinese borders and Russia will take the border troops of the CIS under its jurisdiction 61. That is the military formation in Tajikistan will take their orders from Moscow rather than Dushanbe. On the request of former president Nabiev, the CIS blue helmets in Tajikistan's "conflict zones" are patrolling the areas.

The Russian security relation with Tajikistan, however, remained subject to domestic pressure generated by opposition forces in Tajikistan. Democratic and Islamic groups accused them of covertly supporting the communist and Kulyabis. The Committee for National Salvation, e.g, strongly protested against the presence of the "foreign military contingent" 62 and called it as an attempt to re establish Moscow's authority over former Soviet Central Asian Republics. Whereas the Tajik Prime Minister, Abdul Jalil Samadov, supported the Russian military present in Tajikistan as:

... it prevented the influence of fundamentalist elements, leading stability to the country. 63

In July 1993, the Russian parliament gave the Russian government the go-ahead signal to "use all necessary measure" 64, to protect troops on the Tajik - Afghan border. It also proposed that aircraft, mobile units and infantry units should be used. The Russian President Boris Yeltsin has gone so far as to say that:

Afghan - Tajik border is infact Russias because bilateral friendship treaty and article 51 of the UN charter, both gave Moscow the right to fight to defend Tajikistan. 65

This stirred old tension between Moscow and Kabul. The Kabul cabinet said in a letter to the Russian parliament:

The deployment of Russian troops along the border is a kind of intervention. We have not forgotten the past 14 years. 66

A senior Russian military officer, V.Bondarenko, warned that " Moscow reserved the right to launch pre-emptive strikes against Tajik opposition rebels and Afghan Mujahideen based in north Afghanistan" 67. A spokesman of Russian border guard colonel Vladimir Novikov said:

This is no longer a domestic Tajik affair. It is a strike against Russia which will be met with the merciless response. 68

Thus some 25,000 Russian troops - including about 15,000 border troops - patrol Afghan - Tajik frontier, engaging in daily fire fights with the opposition forces. 69

Due to the Russian involvement in Tajikistan affairs, many Russian diplomats and commentators feared that the Russian could be sucked into an Afghan - style guerrilla war

and that Russia could only avoid this outcome by sponsoring a political dialogue between the different factions and groups in Tajik society. According to Igor Zvonarjov, a Russian border guard commander in Tajikistan:

Moscow could be dragged into a second Afghanistan while helping to defend the neo-communist government in Dushanbe.... We are faced with a new guerrilla force. Russia could be dragged into a second Afghanistan. 70

Gavril Popov, a democrat and the formal mayor of Moscow, called for a withdrawal of all Russian forces from Tajikistan. He argued that his country against risks being dragged into a civil war on the side of a repressive un popular government 71. Besides these pressures, the Russian media coverage of the developments on the Tajik - Afghan border and wide spread public concerned over the vulnerability of the Russian troops forced the political leadership in Moscow to declared that measures of reconciliation, not repression were needed 72. On 7 August 1993, Yeltsin convened a Russian - Central Asian summit in Moscow, and appealed to the United Nation's Secretary General to help in the search for a political settlement with the help of interested regional powers like Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yeltsin also made it clear that all Central Asian state would have to cooperate with Russia in resolving Tajik problems and that Russia was unwilling to shoulder the whole burden. He emphasized to the Tajik leadership that it could not expect continued Russian support unless it agreed to engage in a direct dialogue with all sections of the opposition 73. As a result, in April 1994, talks were held for the first time in Moscow between exiled opposition and the Tajik regime under the auspices of the UN and Russia.

It was the Russian Uzbek pressure which compelled the Tajik government to provide concession to opposition parties. The Russian Foreign Minister in his talks with president of Tajikistan Imamali in Tashkent on 26 August suggested that the Tajik government should allow opposition party to contest elections and that:



Elections must be held with some opposition so that Tajikistan can really choose a legitimate government and not vote in a phony elections where voters have no choice. 74

It was on these grounds that Tajik government announced the postponement of presidential election, referendum and the holding of parliamentary polls.

Russia also took over the task of creating a new army for Tajikistan. General Pavel Grachev, CIS Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Farrokh Niyazov, alongwith 31 Russian officers arrived in Dushanbe on 4 February 1994 as a part of the Russian military delegation that assist the Tajik government in building army.

Besides military relations between the two countries, Tajikistan is economically and politically dependent on Russia. Tajikistan concluded a bilateral Treaty of friendship, cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Russian government on 25 May 1993. According to former prime minister Abdul Malik:

...Tajikistan has the same currency as Russia and it needs Russian military and technical help. The Tajik authorities understand that it is impossible to restore the economy without highly skilled personnel and therefore, they are taking some measures to cut the exodus of Russian speaking people. First is to declare the Russian language as a second state language and the language of international community, and secondly, all the Russian - speaking must be allowed to have double citizenship.... 75

He also pointed out the important role that Russian had played in the stabilization of the situation in Tajikistan,

We always consult with Russia and act in coordination with Russia.

76

The conclusion to be drawn is that the Russian role in the Tajik civil war is multi dimensional and Russia has its own goals to achieve. First, to maintain stability in Central Asia so that Islamic fundamentalism and Turkic nationalism would not developed into threat to the integrity of Russia itself. Secondly, Russia by using military force can demonstrate to the Russian public and the outside world that Russia is still forceful actor and is capable of defending its interests. Third, Russia can take revenge of the humiliation that it encounter in Afghanistan. Fourth, to get the control of the Tajikistan's uranium - enrichments facilities for its nuclear programme. Fifth, Moscow does not need Tajikistan as a state but as a buffer zone between Russia and Islamic Afghanistan. Finally, to save guard the interest of ethnic Russians in Central Asian states.

Deputy Foreign Minister and official incharge of CIS affairs, argued that:

Tajik domestic problems, including the rivalry of north and south, which did not arise yesterday and will not disappear tomorrow, will not have a major bearing on the essential understanding that Russian - Tajik relations will remain close as all political forces would welcome the significance of a treaty with Russia and would recognized its legal validity regardless of the development of the situation. 77

This interview reflects the general view of Russian foreign ministry on Central Asia.

## **UZBEKISTAN**

Immediately after independence a territorial dispute between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Tajik western neighbour, started. Tajikistan claimed Samarkand, Bukhara, Farghana, Sheher Sabz and Khiva 78, which were included in Uzbekistan, as bulk of their population is Tajik, leaving the Tajiks with the backward town of Dushanbe as their Republic capital. For their part, the Uzbeks claim to all of the Farghana valley, which includes Kirghizistan's Osh Oblast, and part of the Khojend Oblast in Tajikistan 79. But

Kirghistan and Tajikistan both rejected the claim. The likely hood that Tajik - Uzbek acquire border shifts are slim.

The Uzbekistan's government involvement in Tajikistan affairs can be traced when "Islam-Democratic" opposition groups came to power in Dushanbe. The Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, a communist, could not restrain himself at the overthrow of Nabiev who was also a communist. He was also fearful of "Islamism" extending to Uzbekistan especially to its provinces of Farghana, Samarkand and Namanjan, fearing that the same forces that rose to challenge Nabiev's government will seek to oust him as well. In mid March 1992, Karimov crushed Islamic self government in Namanjan province and imprisoned a number of leaders and activists of Adolat organization 80. With the presence of Islamic revolution and Jihad in Tajikistan and supply of guns and ammunition to the opposition, he closed the border between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and stopped air traffic between Dushanbe and Tashkent, to prevent the influx of Islamic agitators and arms from Tajikistan 81. He prohibited political organizations in Uzbekistan from receiving financial support from outside the republic. At a meeting of CIS Foreign and Defence Ministers in Tashkent on 16 July 1992, he requested the deployment of CIS border troops along Tajik - Afghan frontiers to stop the influx of arms. He was also the most influential figure demanding greater Russian involvement by warning that:

If Russia did not defend southern borders of the CIS and prevent the encroachment of Afghan Mujahideen and Iranian fundamentalism, the Central Asia would be engulfed by the Islamic world. 82

In an interview on the eve of the Tashkent meeting, Islam Karimov, said:

It goes without saying that ongoing events in Afghanistan, the uncertainty there is an object of close scrutiny in our part. And they can hardly fail to influence the socio-political situation in Uzbekistan and the other republics of Central Asia. When I spoke about signing the mutual security document and the fact that the Russian ought to

be the guarantor of security it was this problem that I had in mind. When I was in Ashkhabad I made a statement whose gist was that Tajikistan is an inseparable part of Central Asia, and that to assert that Tajikistan might suddenly find itself under the sphere of influence or under any protection of Afghanistan's Mujahideen is absolutely unacceptable. 83

Thus in the Tajik civil war, Uzbekistan became the regional ally of Russia. With the downfall of the democratic - Islami coalition government and the consolidation of pro - communist forces in Tajikistan, new phase of Uzbekistan's involvement started. He conferred legitimacy on the new pro - communist government Uzbekistan not only provided logistical supplies for the pro - communist forces throughout the conflict, but it was more specifically involved in the military aspects of the civil war. Uzbek officers trained a brigade of Tajik troops in Termez, a small border town. In addition pro - communist forces were provided with armoured vehicles and air support. Thus played a significant role in ousting of the democratic - Islamist opposition from Dushanbe into the Pamir mountains and Afghanistan.

According to democratic party leader Dost Mukhammadi;

The Popular Front's newly acquired armour was provided by Uzbekistan. In further support of the Tajik regime, combat, aircraft, based in Uzbekistan, bombed opposition strong holds in the Ramit valley, 30 km north east of Dushanbe, where roughly 2000 anti government fighters are holding out. Regular Uzbek troops entered Dushanbe under the flag of the Popular Front and immediately launched a bloody purge. They would surround a house and start searching apartment by apartment. Those they took away were all executed. He further says by enlisting the aid of Uzbekistan Kulyab forces became the beholden to Uzbek president Islam Karimov,

whose authoritarian regime regard unrest in Tajikistan as a threat to its own hold on power. Now Tajikistan is Karimov's Vassal. 84

After installing the pro - communist regime in Dushanbe, a shift can be seen in Tashkent's policy when on 7th August, 1993 at Moscow, president Karimov declared that there was "no military solution to the Tajik conflict". He appeal to the UN Secretary General Botris Gali to help in the search for a political settlement and requested UN observer to be sent to Tajikistan 85. He, as did Russian president, called on leaders of embattled Tajikistan to resume dialogues with opposition rebels and announce new elections. Because parliamentary elections would allow the Tajik leadership to restore stability in the Central Asian republic rocked by months of violence at its border with Afghanistan. According to Karimov:

It is impossible to solve problem by force. Force will only lead to increased tensions in the near future. He also stated that president I.Rakhmanov should hold talks with his counter parts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 86

That's why Uzbekistan's delegation actually participated in three rounds of peace talks between opposition and Dushanbe government at Moscow, Tehran and Islamabad.

This shift in Karimov's policy was perhaps due to internal developments in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's leadership has not only ignored the issues of democracy (as championed by Moscow) and suppressed its own domestic opponents and their occasional Moscow supporters, but also openly rejected the inclusion of a human rights clause in the CIS charter. A United State government report on human rights accused the Uzbek government of attempting to "to silence the opposition", through arbitrary arrests, beatings, press censorship, phone tapes and sever restriction on individual liberty 87. Uzbekistan is also facing economic problems, and internal unrest especially in Farghana, Samarkand and Namanjan.

The short term priority of Tashkent is to restore the old elites in Central Asia.

## OTHER COUNTRIES

### CHINA

During 19th and 20th centuries China was hardly a player in the "Great Game" in Central Asia. Now with Great Britain gone and Russia's influence waning, it is China which can play its role. China has adopted a realistic approach and recognized and established diplomatic relations with the CARs. It has embassies in all the republics and Beijing has received all the leaders of Central Asia including Tajikistan and showed them the free economic Zones in South China and economic achievements it has made under socialism.

President of Tajikistan Imamali paid his first official visit to China in March 1993. There he signed a joint declaration and 10 cooperation agreements. Dushanbe - Urumqi - Beijing air route has been opened. China also provided commodity credits amounting to 30 million yen and humanitarian aid amounting to 3 million yen. But according to members of the Tajik delegation, questions of military cooperation or of China's participation in building Tajikistan's armed forces, or in peace keeping missions on the Chinese territory were not discussed or even raised<sup>88</sup>. This means that Beijing view Central Asia as a economic market. China has opened its borders with Central Asian states. China is trying everything to attract traders from Central Asia e.g regular trade fairs are organized in border towns of China, China also wished to reconstruct the traditions of the ancient Silk Route through a new railway line linking China with the west to Central Asia.

Politically, China's policy towards the CAR is driven by its national concerns. China's main interest is to stop instability spilling over into strategically important Muslim province Xinjiang which borders with three Central Asian states, it shares 1533 km with Kazakhstan, 858 km with Kirghizistan and 414 km with Tajikistan<sup>89</sup>. The rise of

nationalism in Central Asia could spill over in to China's Xinjiang - Uygur autonomous region where majority population are the Uygurs Kirghizs, Kazakhs and Tajiks. The Beijing government faced rebellion in Xinjiang region in 1990, when the Uighus, Kazakh, Kirghiz and Tajik people of the province tried to seek independence or unification with their brethren across the border with whom they share religious, cultural, linguistic and historical values then they do with Han Chinese 90. It is clear that any political movement in Central Asia emphasizing either the distinctiveness of national units or project ethnicity would raise Beijing's concerns about China's territorial integrity. For instance the gathering of delegates in Bishkek, Kirghizistan's capital, in July 1992 for an assembly of the "for a free Uygurstan party", aim to create a Uygur state in Xinjiang, is the sort of development that China fears. 91

Furthermore, with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the Sino - Soviet territorial dispute in the western sector now not split into Sino - Kazakh, Sino - Tajik and Sino - Kirghiz disputes (in 1986 both the countries had been able to solve their territorial dispute in the eastern sector) but so far only Kazakhstan has accepted in principle that it has a border dispute with China. Both Kirghizistan and Tajikistan do not claim to have any border dispute with China. Talks have been held in China with a single delegation representing all the four states and map of the terrain along the border between China and Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Tajikistan and Russia in the western sector was signed 92. Still their possible revival can not be ruled out in the event of strain relations between China and its Central Asian neighbours.

Realizing that for the immediate future atleast, Central Asians major economic partner is China, these states are keen to maintain correct relations so as to reap the benefits of economic and political cooperation.

## **UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

At present Central Asia does not appear high on the list of priorities in global policy of the United State and Europe. This does not means that this policy will remain

for ever because region has an obvious strategic importance for the US because of its location close to vital industrial center of Russia, borders on China, Iran and Afghanistan, it is very close to India, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. It can not overlook the current struggle between Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India for establishing their political, economic, ideological and cultural influence in the area. The most important one is the existence of the nuclear weapons, growth of Islamic fundamentalism and the narcotics trade centers on the territory of the CAR. 93

United State policy in the region, is therefore both short term and long term. The short term strategy included identifying and supporting democratic forces, non - violence and religious tolerance in Central Asia. The long term is to create economic, social and political conditions in the area that would increase the chance of these forces gaining the upper hand in the struggle for a post Soviet Central Asia. 94

As far as Tajikistan is concerned, its uranium enrichment facility at Chalovsk (established during 40s by Stalin and provided material for the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb) has given an added significance to Tajikistan in the eyes of United State policy makers. But the most important American concern is over the visits of Iranian intelligence delegations to Central Asian republics that began in the spring of 1991. Chamdiz, an Iranian expert in weapons of mass destruction, met several officials from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, who pledged support for the Iranian quest for an Islamic bomb 95. The concern in Washington resulted in American secretary of state, James Bakers visit to Tajikistan in mid February 1992 to persuade president Nabiev from exporting uranium to certain countries meaning Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq and Libya - whom America suspect making the Islamic bomb. Thus an agreement was signed between the two countries to limit the export of uranium and a huge American textile company has undertaken setting up of a modern textile mill at Kulyab. 96

The importance of American role in the Tajik conflict is clear from the words of A. Turajonzada, who toured the United State and exchanged views on the future of Tajikistan and its prospects of peace:



We told the Americans that we are not Islamic fundamentalists nor do we want to enforce Islamic fundamentalism in the country as is being feared by the west.... I assured the Americans we do not want power, nor are we terrorists, we just want peace in our country and an end of military interference from Russia. 97

To achieve its political goals in Central Asia, the United State is likely to gradually increase the scope and intensity of their own activities in the region. However, America will persuade in the region in an indirect way that is through the support to Turkey. The west in general and United State in particular is keen to push Turkey to serve as a model for the CARs, to wean the CARs away from Islamic fundamentalism and Iran - Pakistan axis because Ankara enjoys a better economic position, ethnic and religious affinity with Central Asian Muslims plus admission of the Central Asian states to the CSCE improves Ankaras diplomatic triumph over the Central Asian states. West and America will be cautious in allowing Turkey's influence in the region due to the fear of pan - Turkism. Because the idea itself has enough potential to assume an Islamic character and have all possibilities to come up as strong modern states challenging the west in the future.

As the United State ability to influence events in Central Asia has been undermined by competition for influence in the region by the above mentioned states, the American government can carve out its way by, first encouraging private US entrepreneurs to explore business opportunities there. Second, the National Endowment for Democracy, a congressionally - funded organization chartered to help democratic forces all over the world, should play its role in Central Asia. Third, United State aid could provide modern western technology plus experts. Fourth, agricultural assistance to Central Asia could be extremely helpful and finally, humanitarian assistance is one of the most important traditions of US foreign policy. 98

## SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia is not territorially contiguous to the region, but growing Iran's presence in Central Asia seems to be stimulating the growing Saudi Arabian presence in the area. The Riyadh card is hard currency which other, including Iran, can never afford. The Saudi role in the area so far has consisted mostly of funding new mosques, providing religious literature and donations to the religious societies etc. In order to increase its manoeuvring, Saudi embassies are now been operating in all the states. Saudi Kingdom since 1990 has spent an estimated one billion dollars on its activities and trade. Another card that Riyadh can play is of Wahabism. The Wahabis have been active in their mission and according to Pakistani Scholars visiting Tehran have been told about "Wahabi threat" posed by Saudi Arabia's activities in Central Asia. 99

Other Arab countries have also shown their interest to participate in the economic and cultural ventures in the region. There were reports that Arab financiers have provided a credit to Tajikistan to purchase one million tons of grain 100, but most of the Arabs fund have been channelled through the organization of Islamic countries and Muslim world league.

## CONCLUSION

The almost sudden independence of the former Soviet Union republics in the Central Asia, has given rise to new alliances, alries and new spheres of influence. "The Great Game", a century ago was played in the region between Russia and Britain, during the cold war the game was played between Russia and west, after disintegration the new great game is yet to materialize but the signs that have become apparent show that the new great game is more likely to involve the emergent regional powers then the distant players from the west. As far as great game in Tajikistan is concerned, it has been materialized by different players to safeguard their long term strategic, economic and political interests. Strategically Tajikistan is important for CIS members because of its international border with China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These borders also provide an

easy access, to the land locked Central Asia states to the rest of the world. Economically Tajikistan's mineral wealth, including gold, iron coal, gas, tin, aluminium etc, immediately caught world attention and different countries tried to evolve in bilateral economic affairs with Tajikistan. Politically Tajikistan's political uprising is bound to effect, CIS members states, Central Asia, West Asia, South Asia and to some extent the distant players from the west.

The three West Asian countries, Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan, that have common borders with the former Soviet Union are likely to be effected more with any developments in the region than the South Asian nations. These nations, being direct neighbours, have great number of people sharing ethnic, cultural, historical and linguistic ties with newly formed nations. Among these two, Iran and Turkey are in competition again.

For Iran in the region, Tajikistan is the fertile ground for its influence, but the fact is that Iran cannot afford to antagonize other Turkic speaking states by supporting Tajikistan because for Islamic Iran, the entire region to its north including CAR, Azerbaijan and Russia offers an escape from its political isolation and is trying to increase its influence through economic diplomacy and through the appeal of an Islamic polity e.g Iranian broadcasts to Central Asia emphasis Islamic solidarity and war against western imperialism. Secondly, it has removed the real threat that it has always perceived from Russia from the time of Tsarist expansion from 1722 and during the two world wars Russian forces occupied the northern parts of Iran.

However, the problem for Iran is the presence of Azeri population close to its border in Azerbaijan and clash between Azerbaijan and Armenian has the potential to pose a major security threat to Iran. So to counter the threat Iran propose a grouping of Caspian sea countries, Iran Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Russia and Kazakhstan, in which it would have the leading role. Another problem is that except Tajikistan, other Central Asian states have a closer cultural and linguistic affiliation to Turkey and the overwhelming majority in Central Asian Muslims including Tajiki are not Shia but Sunni.

Yet the strong religious content of the Iranian revolution which failed to evoke positive response among the secular minded elites who opted for Turkey model, nor fit well with other influential players in the west or in the region.

Yet it would be mistaken to see the Iranian role in Central Asia as a revolutionary crusade. Iran through its access to the Indian Ocean and the over land route via Turkey to Europe, offers Central Asian states a way to break out of their geographical confinement and dependence on Russia. Tehran has been negotiating agreements designed to make port Bandarabbas a commercial way - station to and from Central Asia. It also entered into bilateral economic ventures in all Central Asian state e.g Iran proposed a Turkmen - Iranian - Turkish - European gas pipeline and oil pipeline from Tengiz field in Kazakhstan to the persian gulf. Agreements were signed on reviving the silk road. 101

Furthermore, Iran's motives in the region do not began an end with the desire to extend its influence among co-religionists. Iran also seek to counter United State - sponsored Turkish strategy in Central Asia.

Tajikistan is only perpheral to Turkey. As far as secular Turkey is concerned it is more successful in extending its influence in CAR due to the following reasons:

1. 70 percent of the population of the CAR is ethnically Turkish and speaks Turkic language. Tajik are persian speaking and opted for Arabic script.
2. The leadership in these republic is secular in outlook.
3. Turkey strong economy makes it a far more effective supplier of aid and technical expertise then Iran.
4. Turkish aid is without political strings attached and has the added benefit of United State approval.
5. Turkey is seen by the Central Asian leaders as a bridge to the west and advocate of their economic needs.

6. Turkey can also play a major role in the intellectual and cultural life of Central Asia. 102

With independence of Central Asian states, new impetus was added to the idea of pan-Turkism. However, this ideal of regional unity is confronted with. First hurdle is the poly-ethnic population of the region. Tajikistan will not welcome any such idea. Second, regionalism, sub nationalism, tribalism may seriously hinder such a concept from taking a concrete shape. Third, west may not welcome this idea because of the fact that pan-Turkism has enough potential to assume an Islamic character. China would also not approve this idea because of its impact which may be felt as far as Xinjiang's region. 103

Pan-Turkism, also directly challenge Iran's territorial integrity as Iran's suspicious are heightened by pro-Turkish sentiments of Azeri president Elchibey, and accused Tehran for its aid to Armenian nationalists in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkic theme of Turkic solidarity raises the issue of rights of Iran Turkic minority. Turkic influence in Azerbaijan could promote secessionist aspirations among 25 percent Iranian Azari. In term Iran stepped up its support for Turkish Kurds specifically Kurdistan worker's party - that since 1984 has been campaigning for independence 104. Thus Turkish-Iran rivalry has been started and Iran warned Turkey in January 1992 that it would not tolerate the anti-Iran campaign by Turkey's media. Iran further accused Turkey of clouding with American imperialism which is a "part of cultural plots of global arrogance against the Islamic Revolution". 105

The Iran-Turkey rivalry in Central Asia have the potential to be destabilizing. The two countries have different strategies to follow, contrasting models and principles of political legitimacy. Different point of views about west, divergent interests in the region, different players to take sides. In short, development in Central Asia could increase Turkish-Iranian tensions which could interm, lead to conflict between the two countries.

The most serious effect of any development in Tajikistan will be on the ethnic patch work of Afghanistan as it poses a challenge to national cohesion. According to Eden Naby, Afghan expert:

Whether Afghanistan might explode one day, with the Northern part gravitating towards what would be the increasingly independently Central Asian Republics, essentially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 106

In the multi ethnic Afghanistan, after Pushtun, the second position is held by the Tajiks numbering 3,500,000, third Uzbeks with population of 1,000,000, Turkmens are around 125,000 107. These people remain culturally and ethnically link with Central Asia, as Soviet took a great deal of interest in the nationalities within Afghanistan to reduce the dominance of the Pushtun by giving importance to the nationalities link to the CAR. The Soviet developed the communication infrastructure in such a way that most of the provision capitals in the north were linked to cities in former Central Asia. That's why to take full advantage of these roads and railway links for trade and transit, peace in Afghanistan is the prerequisite. The most alarming phenomenon is the emergence of a move in the Central Asian Republics to take over parts of Afghanistan inhabited by their ethnic groups. This was notable in Tajikistan where the idea of "Great Tajikistan" embracing Tajik area of Northern Afghanistan has been heard. 108

The Pushtuns, traditionally dominated the political life of Afghanistan, have to cooperate with Uzbek and Tajik demands for greater political power. On the other hand the leader of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could face popular demands to champion the cause of the Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan. Alternatively Tajik and Uzbek leader in Afghanistan will agree not to back Islamic movement in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in exchange for support in the intra-Afghanistan struggle for power. Fragmentation of Afghanistan on ethnic lines, will effect the security of Pakistan over the issue of Pushtunistan that is greater Pushtunistan comprising the Pushtun region of Afghanistan and Pakistan's N.W.F.P. 109

Tajikistan's civil war created the conflict like atmosphere between the governments of Tajikistan and Afghanistan on one hand and between Russia leading the CIS and Afghanistan on the other. Also Afghanistan became the safe heaven for refugees and exile opposition leaders, guerrilla training, arms and ammunition and so on. Thus the possible path that can deescalate the ongoing war is the modest level of western funding for Afghanistan reconstruction, combined with the political opening to the exile Tajik opposition and continuation of peace talks.

As far as South Asia is concerned the birth of independent states in Central Asia could alter the scope of rivalry between India and Pakistan. Geography, culture and religion altogether given Pakistan advantage in the region, that constitutes India's western flank and thus can harm the Indian interest. The Indian objective is to prevent the creation of pro-Pakistani coalition of Islamic states. Indian leaders main concern is that Pakistan will lobby the Central Asian for support Pakistan over Kashmir dispute because that what happened at Ashgabad meeting on 11 May 1992, where all the participating countries including Tajikistan supported Pakistani stand on Kashmir issue. Similarly during his state visit to Pakistan the president of Tajikistan Rakhmanov expressed regret at the human rights situation in Kashmir and agreed that a lasting peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute must be found to promote the strengthening of security in Asia and trust between the people of the Sub-Continent. Moreover resurgence of Islam in CAR can provide new external partners to Kashmiri Muslims in their freedom struggle. For India to reestablished a new workable relationship with these states is on priority list.

On the regional level Uzbekistan is the most significant ally of Russia because it is powerful of the Central Asian states, its geographic location in the center of the region - Uzbekistan is capable of projecting power by exerting pressure on Tajikistan, Kirghizistan, Turkmenistan and even Afghanistan as has been demonstrated in Tajik crisis. Also the Karimov's regime's pro-Russian and anti Islamic orientation has convinced Russian policy makers to confirm Uzbekistan as the defacto regional policeman of the region. According to M.Meshahi:

... the role of Karimov in Central Asia could be compared to the role of the Shah of Iran as the policeman of the Persian Gulf in the 1970s. As in the Russian - Uzbek case, American - Iranian security understanding was based on an overall perception of threat i.e political instability emanating from revolutionary and unwelcomed political alternatives. And as the US was uncomfortable with Iran's regional hegemonic ambitions, so too has Russian refused to endorsed the ambition of a "Greater Uzbekistan". Yet Russian post Soviet realities have encouraged coordination of interest and modification of differences between Moscow and Tashkent, as American post Vietnam realities encouraged Washington's accommodation to the Shahs policies.... 111

Russia's direct involvement in Tajikistan indicated that Moscow may not be willing to shoulder total responsibility to Uzbek regional policing. Furthermore, continuing Russian influence through military, political, economic and social channels to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kirghizistan indicates that Russia policy makers do not want to alienate these countries that can forced them to search for other strategic partners. Moreover the Tajikistan seeks Moscow's attention due to is economic resources, vital security infrastructure and Russian who live in the area holding important positions in the republic that can be helpful for Russian in its future move. That's why, Moscow pursue a policy to protect pro-Russian elite in Tajikistan.

On the southern flank Russia wanted to have a belt of good neighbours there, because the vulnerability of the area will provide an opportunity to regional actors as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan to interfere in the area alongwith their Islamic threat. But for Russia the important thing is in their policy of containment of the Islamic threat should not lead to the opposition and hostility towards Islamic world and to avoid a second Afghan adventure.



Thus the real fear for Russian and Uzbekistan and other Central Asian leaders from the Tajik civil war is the threat of an anti-status quo political alternative, be it Islamic, democratic, or other, that might successfully unseat the existing elite and have political implications for adjacent republics. Because the resulting danger can not be confined to Tajikistan alone or even the region. As shown, any development in Tajikistan represent both opportunities and challenges for Russia, Uzbekistan, China, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. As far as west is concerned its interest is to support the call for any internationally sponsored political settlement.

As far as west, especially USA, is concern, its interest in Tajikistan's civil war stem from the fear of radical Islam and the influence of Iran . The western media became quite active over the spread of Islamic fundamentalism with the begining of Tajik civil war. Western states will prefer a solution according to their own interests that is neither Islamic nor communist government, but a liberal democratic one.

To be concluded, Tajikistan's relations with the rest of the world were dominated not so much by what they wanted, but by what the rest of the world desired to do with Tajikistan.

## CONCLUSION:

The Republic of Tajikistan is situated in the north east of Central Asia. It is bordered by People Republic of China in east. Afghanistan in South, Uzbekistan in west and Kirgizstan in north. The Persian speaking Tajiks are considered as indigenious and oldest People of Central Asia. They were distinguished from their Iranian language and sedentary life style, which was copied by many of the Central Asians nomadic tribes. The Iranic speaker who appears in the valleys of Amu-Darya Syr-Darya in the middle of 6th centry B.C, became part of the first world known monarchy, known to the history as the Achaemened state. The area was formed part of Graeco-Mace-donian empire and later on as part of Greco-Bactrian state. The Kushan period, which succeeded Greco-Bactrian State, was one of the cultural and economic expansion of Central Asia including Tajikistan.

The Arabs formed a state Maveranener in 7th and 8th centuries in Central Asia. These new masters of the area brought with them their religion, Islam. Thus Tajiks became the first to accept and practice Islam. They adopted Islam about 1200 years ago. The major achievement of Islam, other than cultural commercial scientific, is in term of idenity because before Islam nomedic or sedentary identities were strong.

Whe Russian penetration began in Central Asia, the sedentary population mainlyTajiks were in the hands of Emir of Bukhar, Khanate of Khiva and Khanate of Khokand. While Karategin, Zervashan, Gissar, Darvaz Vakhan and other semi autonomous principalities grouped in the Pamir mountains and paid tribute to emir of Bukhara. In the 19th century when Russian Empire expanded south words, the Tajik principalities came under Russian rule. The white Tsars divided the area of modern Tajikistan between the Khanate of Bukhara, Samarkand and Farghana provinces for administrative reasons.

The white Tsars arrogantly considered themselves as the bearers of the "torch of civilization" and superior to natives, took it upon themselves to enlighten, modernize and civilze the backward Central Asians and adopted typical colonial policy towards Muslim

subjects. On the other hand, Russians were considered as intruders by the locals. This general antagonism of the local towards the Russians and vice-versa gave birth to nationalist feelings which further highlight us vs they. Thus wanted to free themselves from the Russian control.

When Tsarist Empire fell in 1917, the Bolsheviks established their control over north Tajikistan which was incorporated into the Turkistan's Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1920 Khiva and Bukhara were declared People Republics and forced to sign "treaties of alliance" with the Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks were now prepared to impose communism on a society that was reluctant to accept it. The Bolsheviks made no attempt to understand the complex clan tribal basis or Islam and nationalism of the society they ruled. They considered the existing Muslim Central Asian Cultural values, institutions and traditional identities incompatible with the ideological goals and objectives of the revolutionary Soviet state, intended to create a socialist society. Thus in order to make members of Muslim society loyal to Soviet ideology and state, it was essential to destroy all forms of traditional Islamic social and cultural identities, loyalties and institutions and replace them with new Soviet ones. To achieve these objectives, the Soviet policy makers carried out a three prolonged attack on traditional, social, cultural and religious system of Central Asia.

1. Fragmentation of Turkistan territorially politically and culturally.
2. Cultural isolation of the people of Turkistan, both from their historic past as well as other Muslim and Turko-persian speaking areas in the region.
3. Destruction of religious, Islamic belief and values and devastation of Islamic institutions. 1

Although in 1917 the peoples of Central Asia, including Tajikis, were discovering nationalism, it was only in 1924, when Joseph Stalin implemented his "territorial delimitation" policy, that new national consciousness among Soviet Muslim evolved. The sense of territorial, ethno-linguistic national identity was further intensified by Soviet policy of industrialization, urbanization, increased education literacy and communication,

which stimulated the emergence of variety of professional and elite groups. These groups were the architects of the for the coming nations. Furthermore the governments of newly created republics possessed all the basic means necessary to create and spread the idea of nationalism. As a result this gave rise to self interested bureaucracies, desired to live according to one's own customs, traditions, ideology, religion and to utilize one's resources. This desire was curtailed for many decades due to authoritarian communist rule. But the pressure mounted with the passage of time for greater recognition of local requirements, cultural autonomy and accommodation for local leaders within the power structure. The existence of such nationalist "timebomb" in Central Asia means that the government in Moscow must adopt policies to contain, resist or defuse it. Even glasnost and perestroika could not change the situation.

The reason, other than political economic and social, behind the Tajikistan society's inaccessibility to Soviet social engineering is Islamic identity of the population. This identity, which provided common cohesive intellectual and organizational framework for the ethnolinguistically heterogeneous people of Turkistan, was considered incompatible with the requirements of modern, secular, rational and industrial socialist way of life. Therefore it could not be tolerated. Despite more than 80 years of multifaceted Soviet anti religious policies, Islam retains a large following among Tajik Muslims, which resulted in the revival of Islam to which impetus was provided by Gorbachev's perestroika and the loosening of communist control. Whereas the floodgates of the Islamic revival opened in 1979, due to the spill over effects of Khomeini's revolution in Iran and failed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Islamic revival was particularly strongly felt in the southern areas of Tajikistan near the Iranian and Afghan borders. But one thing is sure that such encouragement did not fall on barren ground. Tajikistan's religious ground is receptive for such external influences. Tajikistan's people were able to find ways of teaching their beliefs to succeeding generations and have had continued to practice their life cycle rituals since Soviet rule. The Muslims of Tajikistan, like Muslims of other parts of Soviet Union, were not merely passive objects manipulated by the central government to become atheists or by foreign powers to become observant and staunch Muslims. Thus the policies adopted by the Soviet leaders were according to the requirements of the Central

government , or what Soviet leaders labelled as “need of the time”, without giving due consideration to natives feelings or needs.

Once the independence was gifted to the Tajikistan, like other Central Asian states, the process of building a new national identity has begun. Irony of the situation on the one hand is that Tajikistan, like other Central Asian republics, did not go through any of the natural process of state building thus their identity is at best confused. On the other hand under communist rule, people who were alienated from the political structure and decision making, come to believe that if the government was strong and brutal it must be obeyed and if it was weak it could conveniently be ignored. These are the principles that still guide many people and allow leaders like Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan and Imamali Rakhmanov of Tajikistan to continue to rule in the old way.

As far as Tajikistan is concerned, the communist rule, clan politics, localism and patronage flourished, creating one of the worst inefficient political system in Central Asia. Although the civil war in Tajikistan has been fueled by ideological and strategic causes, the main domestic factor seems to be a lack of common Tajik identity, which give rise to the issue of regionalism and localism in Tajikistan, it is particularly important pitting Tajiks against Tajiks. What is at stake in the present Tajik civil war is, whether Tajikistan can become a stable independent state or not?

The civil war in Tajikistan seems to be a power struggle, in which three factors are important:

1. Sociological (former political elites against new intelligentsia)
2. Ethnic (Uzbeks vs Tajiks or Tajiks vs other ethnic minorities, like Russian)
3. Geographic origin (people from Khojend and Kulyab on one side against people from Karategin, Kurgan Tyube and Pamir on the other side).

The last factor of localism or clan division became so potent in Tajik politics that leadership positions were openly divided amongst the clans which resulted in present civil war. The very basis of power for the new independent Tajikistan is the district of Khojend and Kulyab. The Khojendis or people from Khojend monopolized the power in the Communist Party (CP). In the 70s the CP leaders in order to enlarge their basis of power promoted people from Kulyab, a southern traditionalist district.

On the other hand, Islamo-democratic opposition's constituency is based on university intelligentsia, clergy, Tajik nationalists and people from South i.e. Dushanbe, Pamir and Kurgan Tyube. Furthermore generalization of education in Dushanbe has brought many young educated from Karategin, Garm and Zervashan, who resented the Khojend-Kulyab grasp on power. They also became the cradle of the democratic and Islamic movement.

Beside regionalism, there are urban and rural forces - a new political trend. In Tajikistan, a notable fact is that local population scattered in the countryside while outsiders, like Russian, tend to live in the cities. In urban centers western culture have been supported. In rural areas traditional forms of culture persisted. In fact it seems that the control of KGB or CP did not expand into the mountain villages.

With the independence of Tajikistan, firstly Russian presence and power diminish so too the voices of those local people, largely secular in culture, who supported urban Soviet style and culture. The force of religious culture is beginning to make itself felt in the large towns, especially at teaching institutions that draw their students from countryside. Thus a tension between those of rural origin and urban dwellers started. The tendency is for urban dwellers to worry about the removal of the support of secular culture. For rural dwellers the changing socio political condition is an opportunity to develop local languages, culture and positions of power voluntarily or involuntarily vacated by foreigners especially Russians. 2

On the other hand, it is on the basis of resurgence of religious culture, customs and removal of the communist regime through a popular Islamic-cum-democratic forces, that Tajik religious leaders have been able to use the concepts of Islam to attack the regime's lack of legitimacy and so on. It is predicted that in Tajikistan there is greatest chance of an Islamic government.

However, the appeal to Islamic identity or unity has been defeated due to secular and Islamic interests. Secondly the new elites in Tajikistan are bound by their strong clan loyalties. Thirdly, Muslim elites and population are far better educated, their exposure to science and technology is greater, they have been greatly exposed to secular world view, than the population of any other Muslim country. The Soviet controlled educational system has changed the conceptual environment of the masses, it has transformed the intellectual world of the intelligentsia, who would prefer for European world view rather than traditional Islamic states. They are highly unlikely to accept the mullah's concept of Islam.

The civil war gave outside powers an unprecedented opportunity to establish their influence in Tajikistan. However Tajikistan relations with rest of the world have been dominated not so much by what Tajik wanted or their need is, but by what the rest of the world desires to do with Tajikistan in order to safeguard their strategic, economic and political interests. Strategically, Tajikistan forms the frontline defence state for the CIS members because of its international borders with China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Thus Moscow, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states tried their best to protect Tajikistan under the CIS umbrella against Islamic fundamentalists. Economically Tajikistan's vast mineral wealth and uranium enrichment facilities, cannot be ignored by the western, Muslim and regional states. Politically Tajikistan's political unrest is bound to affect the geographically contiguous countries, which can quickly transcend borders. Further more, Tajikistan cannot be ignored by Russia and West, because of its Germans, Russian, Tatars, Jews, Uzbeks, population. Also, countries advocating liberalism, democracy or human rights cannot turn a blind eye over the civil war or human rights violations in Tajikistan.

The situation in Tajikistan has been further aggravated by the competing international interests which has the potential to pull Tajikistan's political parties in different directions e.g. the dispute between the Arab world and Iran, India and Pakistan, Iran and Turkey or between Muslim and western world. Thus different political parties in Tajikistan have different views as far as foreign policy is conceived, for instance CP favoured good relations with China, Holland, Korea, Switzerland and especially Russia. For Rastokhez Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan are important countries, while Democratic Party of Tajikistan wanted good friendly relations with superpowers.

In sum Tajikistan is a time bomb which could engulf the entire and neighbouring regions with all its devastating effects. There are no easy and over night solutions to the problems of Tajikistan. Still the fear hangs over Tajiks head that Tajikistan could break up along regional lines, with communist in southeast and northern Khojend region, separating anti-communist south west. While Gorno-Badakhshan in eastern region demanding an autonomous republic situates within the Tajikistan. The republic's leadership have so far just managed to keep their hold on power, and are unable to provide solutions for an increasingly demanding and demoralized public. They paid little heed to the demands of the new situation and refused to involve the people in political process. Despite the all ingredients of nationalism, Tajik leaders failed to give a sense of citizenship to their people. So far people of Tajikistan have not risen up to demand their rights. Then what? According to Ahmed Rashid.

The key to future stability will be how quickly the ruling elites will be able to change its old habits, move from centralized, controlled economic management to the market and private enterprise, give up its totalitarian methods of government and allow greater democracy and political pluralism and decentralize the huge bureaucratic apparatus so that farflung regions can decide their own economic and political paths to development. Above all the leadership will have to become more accommodating to the growing political pressures it faces or it will sweep it aside through political



coups or in bloody tumultuous movement, such as have already been seen in Tajikistan. Only by adopting a more sympathetic and farsighted attitude to the Islamic revival and the appeal of nationalism by encouraging the opposition to participate in nation-building through a more open and democratic political system can this be avoided. 3

Thus bold initiative are required to break the "statusquo" which required the greatest wisdom and participation on the part of the local politician to compose their differences, so that a better future plan can be chalked out. The more the democratic forces are allowed to play their independent role, the more the people of Tajikistan will march forward to a better and a better world.

Appendix-A

**TAJIKISTAN  
REPUBLIC PROFILE**

OFFICIAL TITLE ..... Republic of Tajikistan.

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE ..... Tajiki.

CURRENCY ..... Rouble.

INDEPENDENCE DECLARED ..... 9 September 1991.

CAPITAL..... Dushanbe (population 500, 000). It contains Gorno -  
Badakhshan Autonomous Region.

AREA ..... 143, 100 sq km, or 55, 250 sq miles.

POPULATION ..... 5, 357, 000 (official estimate at 1 January 1991).

**POPULATION BY NATIONALITY**

Tajik ..... 58.8 %

Uzbek .....	22.9 %
Russian .....	10.4 %
Tatars, Germans, Ukrainians, Kirghiz and others, .....	7.9 %.

## PRESIDENTS

Rakhmon Nabiev ..... (23 September 1991 to 7 September 1992),  
 Akbarsho Iskandarov ..... (7 September 1992 to 19 November 1992),  
 Imamali Rakhmanov .... (19 November 1992, reelected 6 November 1994).

## POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Hizb-i-Nuzhat-i-Islami, Communist Party, Rostakhez or Renaissance Party, Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Islamic Renaissance Party, Lal-i-Badakhshan and other small parties.

## NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

China, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan.

## POPULATION CENTERS

There are 20 Towns and 50 urban type settlements. Major cities are Nurek and Pendikent.

## ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

The Republic includes the Gorno - Badakhshan Autonomous Region, the Khojend (Leninabad), Kurgan Tyube, and Kulyab Region and 8 districts of republican subordination.

## AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

Grain, wheat, barley, rice, maize, potatoes, seed cotton, cotton, grapes, vegetables, silk worm farming, sheep, goats, cows and yark, medicinal plants.

## MINERALS

Tajikistan is rich in deposits of non - ferrous and rare metal ores, coal, oil and mineral raw materials.

## INDUSTRIES

Aluminum and electrochemical plants, textile machinery, silk mills and carpet mills, flour grading etc.

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

1990 total exports: ..... 1,999 million roubles.

Foreign exports: ..... 356 million roubles.

Inter-republic exports: ..... 1,643 million roubles.

61% of total exports were to Europe and 18% to Asia.

1990 total imports: ..... 3,464 million roubles.

Foreign imports: ..... 383 million roubles.

Inter-republic imports: ..... 3,081.

67% of total imports were from Europe and 17% from Asia.

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## Appendix-B

### NATIONALITY COMPOSITION OF THE FOUR CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS, 1979-89

#### TURKMENISTAN

Nationalty	Population (1000s)		1989 as % of 1979	Percent of Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
<b>Total Population of which:</b>	<b>2765</b>	<b>3523</b>	<b>127.4</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
Turkmen	1892	2537	134.1	68.4	72.0
Russian	349	334	95.6	12.6	9.5
Uzbeks	234	317	135.8	8.5	9.0
Kazakhs	80	88	110.4	2.9	2.5
Tatars	40	39	97.3	1.5	1.1
Armenians	27	32	119.6	1.0	0.9
Azerbaijans	24	33	141.7	0.9	0.9
Baluchis	19	28	152.2	0.7	0.8
Belorussians	5.3	9.2	174.3	0.2	0.3
Persian	4.8	7.6	158.2	0.2	0.2
Kurds	3.5	4.4	124.6	0.1	0.1
Gennans	4.6	4.4	97.2	0.2	0.1
Bashkir	3.9	4.7	119.5	0.1	0.1
Others	40.6	49	120.7	1.5	1.4

Contd....

## KIRGIZIA

Nationality	Population (1000s)		1989 as % of 1979	Percent of Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
<b>Total population of</b>	<b>3523</b>	<b>4258</b>	<b>120.9</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>which:</b>					
Kirgiz	1687	2230	132.2	47.9	52.4
Russian	912	917	100.5	25.9	21.5
Uzbeks	426	550	129.1	12.1	12.9
Ukrainian	109	108	98.8	3.1	2.5
German	101	101	100.2	2.9	2.4
Tatars	72	70	97.7	2.0	1.6
Kazakhs	27	37	136.0	0.8	0.9
Uygurs	30	37	123.3	0.8	0.9
Tajiks	23	34	144.4	0.7	0.8
Koreans	14	18	126.8	0.4	0.4
Azerbaijan	17	16	91.7	0.5	0.4
Kurds	9.5	14	149.4	0.3	0.3
Belorussians	7.7	9.2	119.7	0.2	0.2
Jews	6.3	5.6	88.8	0.2	0.1
Others	81	111	137.0	2.3	2.6

Contd.....

## UZBEKISTAN

	Nationality	Population (1000s)		1989 as % of 1979	Percent of Total	
		1979	1989		1979	1989
<b>Total population of</b>		<b>15389</b>	<b>19810</b>	<b>128.7</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>which:</b>						
	Uzbek	10569	14142	133.8	68.7	71.4
	Russian	1666	1653	99.3	10.8	8.3
	Tajiks	595	934	157.0	3.9	4.7
	Kazakhs	620	808	130.3	4.0	4.1
	Karakalpaks	298	412	138.3	1.9	2.1
	Tatars	531	468	88.1	3.5	2.4
	Crimian tatars	118	189	160.6	0.8	1.0
	Kirgiz	142	175	123.0	0.9	0.9
	Koreans	163	183	112.3	1.1	0.9
	Ukrainians	114	153	134.6	0.7	0.8
	Turkmen	92	122	131.7	0.6	0.6
	Turks	49	106	-	0.3	0.5
	Jewsn	74	65	88.6	0.5	0.3
	Armenians	42	51	119.3	0.3	0.3
	Uygursns	29	36	122.9	0.2	0.2
	Germans	40	40	100.7	0.3	0.2
	Azerbaijanis	60	44	74.3	0.4	0.2
	Bashhkir	26	35	134.6	0.2	0.2
	Others	161	194	120.5	1.1	1.0

Contd.....

## Tajikistan

	Nationalit	Poplution (1000s)		1989 as % of 1979	Percent of Total	
		1979	1989		1979	1989
<b>Total population of</b>		<b>3806</b>	<b>5093</b>	<b>133.8</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>which:</b>						
	Tajiks	2237	3172	141.8	58.8	62.3
	Russian	395	388	98.3	10.4	7.6
	Uzbeks	373	1198	137.2	22.9	23.5
	Kirgiz	48	64	131.9	1.3	1.3
	Tatars	78	72	92.4	2.0	1.4
	Crimean tatars	1.4	7.2	-	0.04	0.1
	Ukrainians	36	41	115.5	0.9	0.8
	Germans	39	33	84.1	1.0	0.6
	Turkmen	14	20	146.4	0.4	0.4
	Kazakhss	9.6	11	118.4	0.3	0.2
	Koreans	11	13	120.1	0.3	0.3
	Jews	13	9.7	72.4	0.35	0.19
	Ossetians	7.7	7.9	101.8	0.2	0.2
	Armenians	4.9	5.7	116.3	0.1	0.1
	Bashkir	6.1	6.8	112.1	0.2	0.1
	Belorussians	5.1	7.2	140.9	0.1	0.1
	Mordvinians	6.5	5.5	85.0	0.2	0.1
	Others	21	31	147	0.6	0.6

Source: Nancy Lubin, "Implications of Ethnic and Demographic Trends", William Fireman, ed., Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation, Boulder: Western Press, 1991.



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