

**Understanding the Dynamics of Pakhtun Culture and the Process of
Pakistani Nation-Building in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**



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2022**

**Understanding the Dynamics of Pakhtun Culture and the Process of
Pakistani Nation-Building in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**



**Thesis submitted to the Department of Anthropology, Quaid-I-Azam
University, Islamabad, for the partial fulfilment of the Degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in Anthropology.**

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
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
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


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Acknowledgement

This dissertation is indeed an outcome of my exhaustive efforts and labor. It has been made possible with the help of many people whose assistance is acknowledged here. First and foremost, I would like to express my appreciation to my research supervisor Dr. Rao Nadeem Alam (Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, Quaid-i-Azam University). His continuous constant encouragement and valuable inputs made this work possible. He always tolerated my laziness with patience during assignments. Despite his busy schedule he was always ready to assist with his guidance and help. In, Islamabad I am also grateful to Dr. Ikram Badshah in Department of Anthropology, Quaid-i-Azam University who guided me during my synopsis writing and with relevant literature for my study.

I am also thankful to my friend Qayum Khan Marwat who helped in making my research proposal and providing me relevant material. My gratitude goes to my comrade Jalaluddin Shah who assisted me during my dissertation write up. My special gratitude are reserved for my friend Ali Sher Khalil (Peshawar) and his elder brother Rajwali Khalil who contributed sincerely during research fieldwork. They arranged my meetings with different people in Peshawar which otherwise was a gigantic task. My colleague and a humble soul Shamoon Akbar Khan Gandapur supported me in translating Pashto texts for which I am extremely grateful to him. I am full of gratitude for my colleague Samiuddin Arman who lend me helping hand by arranging numerous reference materials on my research. My close friend Jan Alam assisted me in pointing out some gaps on important aspects of the study which could not be filled earlier and similarly Mansoor Alam Shah in University of Peshawar extended his help in searching some important material. I am indebted to my student Mehran Khan in Edwardes College Peshawar who helped in translating Pashto poems. Khan Zaman Kakar, my dear friend pointed out some important anthropological studies relevant to my topic and discussed with me various aspects of the theoretical framework for hours. Shehzad Alam, a student of Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan provided me numerous Pashto books and magazines relevant to my study. I am also grateful to my friends Obaid and Iftikhar Ahmad who helped me in carrying out my routine tasks in the university in my absence.

Last but not least I am thankful to my family members whose constant encouragement and backing made this dissertation possible. My enrollment in PhD had unequivocal support of

my father even though I was financially dependent upon him. He keenly followed my studies and asked about my progress towards the Ph.D. degree. I am thankful to my brother Jahangir Ahmad Khan who looked after the daily affairs of the family in my absence. I would like to extend my profound gratitude to my wife who took out time in typing and drafting process and her assistance in arranging my research material and the writings that were part of the research. She tolerated my mood swings during the long period of dissertation write up. My sisters and especially my mother constantly urged me to concentrate on completing my degree. It was due to their constant prayers and moral support that I have been able to complete this study. I would like to thank Sohail Ahmed who edited and proofread my dissertation and gave invaluable piece of advice where it was due. A bundle of thanks goes to my cousin Muhammad Salman who helped me in formatting my thesis. I also wish to thank all those people who have been source of help during this process and whose names have been not mentioned unintentionally. Thank you all and God bless you.

Danish Ahmad

List of Abbreviations

- ANP Awami National Party
- CENTO Central Treat Organization
- CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor
- FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
- FATF Financial Action Task Force
- FGD Focus Group Discussion
- IDP Internally Displaced Persons
- IED Improvised Explosive Device
- JUI (F) Jamiat Ulema-e- Islam (Fazlur Rehman Group)
- MPA Member of Provincial Assembly
- NAP National Awami Party
- NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NWFP North West Frontier Province
- SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization
- TTP Tehreek Taliban Pakistan
- UN United Nations
- US United States

Abstract

The reason for writing this thesis is to present a distinctive analysis of the interaction of Pakhtun society's culture with Pakistani nation-building process and pave way for the policy makers, academics and implementers to comprehend if this debate is based on nuances or more serious dilemma. This argument has primarily focused on the ongoing tussle between Pakhtun culture and state cultural policies. The nationalism process on both sides was found at crossroads, difficult to be bridged. The study has focused that how Pakhtuns have responded to the Pakistani nation-building policies and how much Pakhtun culture has altered due to these policies of Pakistani state. Pakhtuns have tried to maintain their autonomy since centuries and hold Pashto language and Pakhtun code of conduct supreme. Any economic, political, social and judicial nation building initiatives from Pakistan are seen as serious intervention to the core freedom of Pakhtuns.

Pakhtuns in their response to state's nation-building practices have used various cultural tools and practices ranging from literature and poetry to political activism to preserve and safeguard their identity. They have preferred their own cultural institutions in comparison to the state owned institutions to resolve their routine issues. The Pakhtun nationalists have also used various tenets of Pakhtunwali to prepare the masses to resist the state's nationalism.

Global economic pressures have self-alienated Pakhtuns forcing external migration and hunt for livelihood, also forcing the Pakhtuns to integrate in Pakistani state. Islamization policy of Pakistani state transformed Pakhtun society into intolerant and violent society. The imposition of Urdu language caused the suppression of Pashto language in public and official domains. The Islamization of Pakhtun society has destroyed the social fabric and tolerant environment that was once its landmark. Caught in such a complex situation Pakhtun youth has been caught in the whirlpool of frustration and blame Pakistan for the fiasco. Revival of Pakhtun identity in this environment of despair is a serious challenge and their leaders are unable to find a viable solution. This situation has caused a strange paradox where the Pakhtuns on one hand are striving for the revival and preservation of a distinct Pakhtun identity while on the other hand they are striving for economic benefits within Pakistani state.

Chapter 1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This study addresses the issue of interaction between Pakistani nation-building and Pakhtun culture in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, the state that has been struggling for the genesis of 'one nation' since its inception, 1947. Pakistan's case of nation-building is not exceptional in its nature as the question of nation-building has been one of the most crucial in the history of modern states. But, Pakistan's project of nation-building has some unique features such as its foundation on the religion of Islam and its relationship with different ethnicities and cultures within its borders. The study of the process of the Pakistani nation building in the context of the dynamics of the Pakhtun culture would not only help us in the understanding of the state system in Pakistan but it will also inform us of the problems of the states in the South Asian Region.

The question of how cultures and cultural groups resist the states' policies and projects of nation-building has remained a popular subject in the contemporary social sciences. In anthropology, cultural perspectives are conventionally used for the understanding of the issue of nation-building.

Anthropologically, culture has been defined differently by different scholars. There is no single agreed upon definition for this concept. According to E.B Tylor; "Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (Tylor, 1871). Similarly, another anthropologist Ruth Benedict states, "What really binds men together is their culture, the ideas and the standards they have in common" (Benedict, 1934). Another scholar Bronislaw Malinowski has defined it as, "culture comprises inherited artefacts, goods, technical processes, ideas, habits and values" (Malinowski, 1944).

Referring to the above definitions, it can be stated that culture is the totality of the human learned behavior which can be transmitted from one generation to another generation and it includes both the material and non-material aspects of human life. This also shows that culture is not genetically transmitted, rather it is learned through a process. It is also an effective tool for keeping the people unified as one unit.

According to Raymond A. Moore, “Nation-Building” is the social process resulting from the interaction of those economic, political, military, psychological and social activities which contributing to the creation, sustenance and development of the national identity usually finding expression in the autonomous entity of the nation state (Moore, 1969).

The Pakistani state has carried out this exercise of development of nation-building almost in the way familiar to the business of the modern states all over the world but it also has some peculiarities which are largely shaped by its own particular cultural context.

As with every culture, Pakhtun culture has been undergoing a change, but what dynamics means for the researcher is the change that shapes and reshapes Pakhtunwali in the process.

Pakhtunwali is the code of conduct for Pakhtuns, and the tenets of this code are shaped by different forces (social, political, economic, natural and religious). It is the core of social behavior practiced by the people in Pakhtun areas. It is an unwritten constitution of Pakhtun society and it has not been defined precisely. The manifestation of this code of conduct can be found in the songs, proverbs, and metaphors thus it is inculcated in the minds of the members of the society (Ahmed A. S., 1978). Pakhtunwali symbolizes a standard course of action for Pakhtuns which has been historically created, shared, and agreed upon to be jointly followed by the members of the society (Ahmed A. S., 1978).

Dynamism as a force has never ceased to exist in the tenets of Pakhtunwali. These tenets have been affected by various historical events as well as person-to-person interaction in the society. Any person’s interaction or participation in larger society confirms his assent to these basic tenets and the common logic behind it.

The Pakhtun code of life which is practiced by Pakhtuns since centuries dominates the values and doctrines of religion, modern state law or other moral codes. Any action that can be legitimized through ‘Pakhtunwali’ is socially acceptable (Ahmed A. S., 1976).

For Pakhtuns identity, only speaking Pakhto is not sufficient, following Pakhtun code of conduct is very much important part of it. The Pakhtun expresses his Pakhtun identity/ Pakhtunness through the language of the code of conduct (Ahmed A. S., 1976).

The Pakhtun code of conduct is very strong instrument that influences life of the Pakhtun people. Even though it is at variance with larger religious beliefs, state authority and other moral codes, it overrules other conducts. Hence the Pakhtuns will primarily follow their own code of life that is derived from their culture rather than following other laws/ conducts.

Besides the cultural orientation of Pakhtuns, there were also some major political movements that influenced the process of nation-building of Pakistani state especially during the formative phase (1947 and afterwards). The Khudai Khidmatgar movement, which was initiated by Ghaffar Khan Alias Bacha Khan was a forerunner in this period. This movement propagated the distinct Pakhtun identity and importance of Pashto language. The Khudai Khidmatgar movement strongly opposed the partition of India, in line with the policies of the Indian National Congress. Later on, when the Indian National Congress and Muslim League agreed on the partition of sub-continent, the Pakhtuns within British India parted their ways with the Congress and demanded the creation of Pakhtunistan as a separate country for the Pakhtuns of the North-West Frontier Province. After the independence of Pakistan; the Pakhtun in the newly created state demanded a separate homeland for themselves (Tendulkar, 1967).

The relationship between the process of the Pakistani nation-building from the time of independence and the Pakhtun culture have gone through a number of phases during the last 73 years. On the one hand, if Pakhtuns have culturally resisted the progression of the Pakistani nation-building, on the other hand, they have participated in the development of the Pakistani nationhood in many other ways.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Legal and political approaches have been used by great amount of scholarly works for the studying of the process of nation-building. Those studies have focused on the political and administrative aspects of nation-building. Very few studies have focused on how states or nations are culturally constituted. Cultural constitution entails a ‘difference’ in the process of nation building. How nations are culturally constituted is the one less-discussed/researched topics in the studies regarding the states like Pakistan which present a complicated relationship between the process of nation-building and cultural dynamics.

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic state and, therefore, a multicultural polity. Consequently, the process of nation-building in Pakistan has always remained a complex issue. The lifestyle, language and geography of different ethnic groups in Pakistani state varies significantly. The national language, Urdu, has somehow remained alien to the ethnic groups living in peripheries as these people speak their own mother languages/tongue and hence cause a discrepancy in the acceptance of Urdu language among the different ethnicities.

Pakhtun culture is one of the constituents of this multi-culturalism of Pakistan. It has remained a unique culture in this area since centuries. This culture (Pakhtunwali) has been practiced by the people when there was no Pakistani state hence the people are very much attached to it and practice it in their lives. The same is the case with Pashto language which is spoken by the people since times immemorial. The studies on nation-building in Pakistan have focused on the political and administrative factors. The failure of an integrated nation has been studied through legal, administrative and political lens. Those studies have overlooked the significance of the distinct cultural values/practices of Pakhtun areas in determining the process of nation-building and the ultimate repercussions of those nation-building policies on cultural values. The current study focuses on how cultural values and traditions are determining the process of Pakistani nation-building. In the present context the research concentrates on how and in what ways Pakhtun culture has resisted and accommodated the Pakistani nation-building process. It analyzes how Pakhtun culture has responded to the state building policies and practices. It also points out how in return Pakhtun culture has been affected by the Pakistani nation building process. The research has focused on how culture, literature and arts of the Pakhtun region have interacted with the Pakistani nation-building effort. It gives a brief sketch of the identity building of Pakhtuns through different movements and tools. This study also focuses on the interaction of the larger state nationalism and Pakhtun ethno-nationalism. The components of Pakhtun culture used by the Pakhtun ethno-nationalists in resisting the state nationalism and conversely the components of Pakhtun culture exploited by the state for integrating the Pakhtuns in Pakistani state have been discussed comprehensively. The policies of cooption and coercion from the state and the resistance and integration practices of the society have been briefly discussed. The study has given a strange/unique synthesis of Pakistani nationalism and Pakhtun ethno-nationalism on how Pakhtuns prefer their identity and at the same time consider Pakistan as their homeland and prefer this country for permanent living.

1.3 Key Research Questions

Following were the key research questions for this study;

- How does Pakhtun culture determine the process of Pakistani nation-building in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa?
- How different socio-political movements in Pakhtuns' area affected the nation-building project of the state?

1.4 Objectives

The main objectives of the current research were;

- To find out the native's point of view about nationhood and statehood;
- To analyze the interaction of Pakhtun culture with Pakistani nation building project;
- To find out the role of Khudai Khidmatgar Movement as a socio-political movement in the construction of Pakhtun identity;
- To investigate the impact of Pakistani nation-building process on Pakhtun culture.
- To study the interplay of Pakistani nationalism and Pakhtun ethno-nationalism.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

Theoretically this work has borrowed insights from the works of many academicians and social scientists. Before going into the detail of the studies conducted on Pakistani nation-building process and its interaction with Pakhtun culture and the emerging nationalism, it is pertinent to elaborate some of the terminologies like nation and nationalism.

The term nation referred to the people that occupied a region and saw themselves as an evolved community formed by drawing upon the variety of communities that were present prior to the nation. Its basis are a shared history, interests and goals commonly expressed in a shared culture that in turn illustrated from several cultures (Romila Thapar, 2016).

The above lines show that for nation to identify itself there must be a common territory, history and culture. These are the ingredients of a nation that bind the people together.

Another terminology closer to nation is nationalism. Many people have talked about nationalism but the most comprehensive work about nationalism is that of Ernest Gellner. According to him Nationalism is predominantly a political opinion/standard, according to which the political and national entity should be similar (Gellner, 1983).

Gellner further says that Nationalism is the outcome of industrial revolution in Europe. The waves of nationalism in Europe erupted due to the same factors of industrialization. These waves of nationalism then spread to other parts of the world (Gellner, 1983). This argument has been criticized by some of the scholars while discussing anti-colonial struggle in the colonized countries but this will be discussed at the end of this segment when we will relate Pakhtun ethno-nationalism and its identity to Pakistani nationalism. At present, the nature of Pakistani nationalism and then the failure of Pakistani state in national integration will be

discussed. At the end the nature of Pakhtun nationalism and Pakhtun identity and its interaction with the Pakistani Nation-Building process will be discussed.

Partha Chatterjee, in his book “Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World”, analyses the nationalist discourse at ‘problematic’ and ‘thematic’ levels. In his analysis, the problematic nationalist thought appears as exactly the reverse of that of orientalism but at the level of the thematic platform, the nationalist thought incorporates the same distinctions like those of ‘the East’ and ‘the West’ and same ‘objectifying procedures of knowledge constructed in the post-Enlightenment era of Western Science,’ consequently there is an inherent contradictoriness in nationalist thinking (Chatterjee, 1986). Neither the thinking of nation-building in Pakistan nor the cultural resistance of the Pakhtuns is free from such contradictoriness.

Chatterjee, in another book “The Nation and its Fragments,” discusses two domains of national culture: the inner or spiritual domain and the outer or material domain. The inner domain involves language, literature, aesthetics, family etc. but the outer domain takes up the question of power (Chatterjee, 1993). In the contest between the process of nation-building in Pakistan and the dynamics of cultural resistance of the Pakhtuns, the question of the functioning of both the inner and outer domains is the most important one, which I have tried to address in detail.

To understand Pakistani nationalism, it is important to consult Ishtiaq Ahmad work on nationalism. Ishtiaq Ahmad (2008) has classified nationalism into two categories:

1. Civic/ Political nationalism [French Model].
2. Ethnic or Cultural Nationalism [Germanic Model], (Ahmed, 2008).

The first category of nationalism can be traced back to the emergence of European enlightenment or French revolution. This type of nationalism is characterized by possessing equal citizenship rights vis-à-vis the state. It eliminated the feudal system of the hereditary privileges demanding subordinates to render obligations to masters.

The second kind of nationalism is ethnic or cultural model of nationalism. Its origins can be traced to German Romantic Movement which arose against Napoleon’s Imperialist wars to spread the European Enlightenment’s universalism and rationalism to the entire European states. For the Germans, this movement meant a domination of French culture rather than some universal spread of rationalism. The Germans stressed the distinctiveness and uniqueness of German culture. The logic behind this hypothesizing was that nations were

organic groups bound together through feelings of love and solidarity deriving from a sense of shared ancestry and ethos (Gellner, 1983).

In the light of above mentioned models; Pakistan's National identity falls under the domain of Germanic model of state nationalism. For the development of state-Nationalism; religion was used as beacon by the founders of Pakistan. In this context; religion was used as 'tool' to differentiate 'Muslim' from the 'Hindu' to create a concept of separate 'nation.' It was the same way the Germans adopted to differentiate themselves from the French. However, German nationalism faced difficulties in promoting a united German identity because of opposition within Germany among different religious sects within Christianity. Same is the case for the Pakistani nationalism as well because Pakistan inherently populates various 'ethnic groups' who prefer their own ethnic identity rather develop larger national identity.

Pakistan is a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic entity and since its independence it is striving for national integration and nation-building. This country is still in search of identity which could unite all the ethnic groups of the country. This cultural diversity is causing hurdles in the process of nation-building.

Hamza Alavi states that though years have passed since Pakistan came into existence but this country is still in pursuit of a shared national identity (Alavi, 1989). According to the writer, the nations in Europe were constituted into states but this process is almost converse in post-colonial states like Pakistan where states have to be transformed into nations which constitute much larger group of people. This problem of nation-building is less severe in those states which have got freedom after an extensive mass-driven struggle. This long struggle benefits the people in creating a sense of common goals and identity. In case of Pakistan this mass struggle was restricted to Muslim minority provinces which are now part of India and there was no substantial movement for Pakistan in Muslim majority provinces. Alavi is of the view that it was the urban middle-class "salarial" which was actively involved in Pakistan movement as they focused on seeking government jobs; and after the formation of the new state, this class of people was involved in promoting state nationalism. He further says that if Pakistan is to be considered as a unified and integrated nation it would be synonymous to "official nationalism"— an identity which is imposed from above by the power structure and not emanating from grass-roots or societal level. This established nationalism is predominantly enforced in reaction to the more influential sub-national

movements which are capable of receiving more widespread response in most of the areas of the country outside the province of Punjab (Alavi, 1989).

Another scholar Muneer Ahmad in his article “Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan” expresses that the founders of this country and their inheritors were so preoccupied with the one-nation state model of Europe that they disregarded the local ethnic variances in the country and considered the people from diverse cultural and ethnic background as one-nation (Ahmad M. , 1971). They failed to comprehend the popular regional ethnic movements and eventually it caused the separation of East Pakistan. He further says that three things in the political system of Pakistan caused Bengali alienation and the subsequent disintegration of the country; authoritarianism, centralization and non-Bengali domination of the central government (Ahmad M. , 1971).

This shows that overlooking the cultural and linguistic differences among various ethnic groups of the country may cause serious threats to national integration and nation-building process. It also gives a message that culture is a basic factor in the lives of the people and we cannot ignore it. Hence culture can serve as a tool for national integration as well as disintegration.

This issue of the formation of a common identity has also been discussed by Talukder Manir-uz-zaman. In his article he says that the serious political progress which is the creation of national identity has not been followed in Pakistan (Maniruzzaman, 1967). General Ayub’s regime only focused on economic reforms and overlooked other provincial issues like ethnic discontent which caused cleavages in the unity and integrity of the country. The author further states that the foundations of Islam were stronger in West Pakistan so there was no serious threat to its solidarity as compared to East Pakistan. Moreover, the economic growth and expansion of Ayub’s era did not do justice with similar expectations in East Pakistan. On the political front the basic democracies (BD) system which was introduced by General Ayub did not go down well with the educated people of East Pakistan. The general impact of these developments resulted in a lack of sense of identity among the huge main stream of educated people in East Pakistan (Maniruzzaman, 1967).

The Ayub regime itself, besides economic-strategic policies, increased the involvement of army in the nation-building process.

Raymond A. Moore has compared the role of army in nation-building in Pakistan and India. The author says that army in Pakistan has gone through a significant phase during General

Ayub's Martial Law (Moore, 1969). Under Ayub's government, Pakistan was involved in various military treaties like SEATO and CENTO. It maintained internal security, combating natural disasters and establishing peace in the country at the time of skirmishes and commotion. It is also engaged in non-military activities and has accomplished successfully various tasks during emergencies like floods and earthquakes. It has established various institutions of education, health and industries which shows its non-military development role in the country. It creates a significant number of officers, doctors and engineers through its various institutions who serve the country. In contrast the Indian army has not been engaged in such non-military adventures. They are also only called by the civilian government in case of emergency and they also deliver their services for establishing peace in other countries. In case of India, the civilian government has supremacy over the army and the army has never sacked a democratically elected government in the post partition era. This non-interventionist role of Indian Army has significantly contributed to the integration of Indian society (Moore, 1969).

As discussed, previously religion was used for the formation of national identity but it caused certain negative misgivings in the national integration process.

Khalid Bin Sayeed, in his article "Religion and Nation Building in Pakistan" states that the creation of the new state of Pakistan was not due to the mere fear of the numerical strength of Hindus (Sayeed, 1963). The Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent were also conveyed by their leaders that there is fundamental variance in their way of living and after the establishment of new Islamic country, they would be able to follow their religion in an independent manner. Though the clerics of the area played a vital role in the struggle for new Islamic state but after the partition the power came to rest in the hands of the leaders of Muslim League who were mainly lawyers and educated landlords. These people were not well versed with Islamic teachings hence caused problems for the new state (Sayeed, 1963). After the partition, the riots against *Qadiyanis*¹ started which created a lot of trouble in the newly formed country. Another thing which caused cleavage in the solidarity of the country was the Islamization of the constitution. So the religion which was considered to be a tool of national integration and solidarity became a basis of conflict between groups of different belief systems. Moreover, the institutions of the state which were borrowed from the colonial powers were westernized in nature. An important point to mention is that the

¹ A minority religious group.

traditional Islam did not play much bigger role in the progress and working of these political institutions (Sayeed, 1963).

Hence the religion which was thought to be a useful instrument in the formation of national identity also served as a tool of disruption among various groups of the country and at a very initial stage of the establishment of the nascent country.

The relationship of Pakistani identity and religion has also been discussed by another scholar Martin Sokefeld. He argues that Pakistan as a Muslim country means having a close link to the concept of nation with the religion (Sokefeld, 1996). In the case of Pakistan the concept of nation and Islam are closely knitted/secured. According to author, the very purpose of the formation of Pakistan was the establishment of a Muslim nation based on a distinct belief system. This ideology was advocated by the founding fathers of the country which primed on the fact that Muslims, when compared to Hindus are a distinctively different nation religiously and culturally. This religious difference was used as concrete basis for the demand of a Muslim state. The main argument of the author in this article is that how the children from class 1 to 8 in schools are taught textbooks to learn the values of Islam and the Muslim nation. These textbooks portray a very idealistic view on nation-building to the school children which is not related to the day-to-day experiences of these students. The author further says that at present it is still debatable whether there is a “Pakistani nation” that portrays a common identity of all the people living in Pakistan. Since its formation, Pakistan has observed many regional conflicts which have shaken the process of national integration and nation building. The significant example of these regional conflicts was that of the separation of Bangladesh. In Pakhtun areas another movement named Pakhtunistan which started during the partition time and which sustained in the subsequent years was another significant instance in this regard. It was led by Pakhtun ethno-nationalists and their main demand was for a separate homeland for the Pakhtuns. This movement also caused a lot of unrest in the country. Furthermore, the 1970 military operation in Balochistan also caused extensive damage to nation-building process (Sokefeld, 1996).

In the current teaching methods, the children in schools are taught that religion can bind them together to form a single nation but the real picture is somewhat different because the regional conflicts exist in the country and play their laid-down role. These regional conflicts then cause serious disruption, though the people follow the same faith.

The emerging Pakistani state replicated earlier the political institutions of the west that were alien in nature to the local people. The power and bureaucratic structure borrowed by the

new Pakistani state have been discussed by Ilhan Niaz. According to him, the culture of power and governance, ethos and discipline of Pakistan after 1947 closely corresponds to the culture of power and governance of the continental bureaucratic empires (Niaz, 2010). The continental bureaucratic empires' culture of power and governance were operated on three key principles. First, the entire country as well as the servants of the state were the personal estate and personal servants of the ruler. Second, the legitimacy of the selection of the ruler was to be through divine or state's official ideology laid down in the constitution. Third, ultimate power for taking final decision in all affairs was concentrated in the hands of the ruler (Niaz, 2010).

The British introduced the 'state of law' and the 'entire apparatus of modernity' in the subcontinent. The author says that in the initial years of the new state, the westernized ruling elite of Pakistan failed to build on the positive aspects of the British imperial legacy of civil and military bureaucracy. They also failed to realize that in bureaucratic state it is the intellectual and moral quality of the servants of the state that determines the smooth law and order situation that leads to uninterrupted national progress. But the results turned out to be worse than envisaged, basically due to destruction and subversion of the state apparatus (Niaz, 2010). Furthermore, foreign advisors to rulers emphasized strengthening of democracy, security and development; and stigmatized taxation, order and general administration as 'colonial' relics of the past. Resultantly, rulers became alienated from the legal, psychological and cultural principles of the British period which rendered the state apparatus dysfunctional in operation and general affairs. Initiated by the elected representatives in the initial years and followed by the governing corporation of mandarins, praetorians, guardians and diwan, all contributed to the general malaise phenomenon which cut across the rise and fall of the governments and administrative institutions in Pakistan. The author argues that the oppression, corruption, violation of law that characterizes the exercise of power in Pakistan today did not distinguish British India to the same extent. Exercise of power in such manner is a mortal threat to Pakistan (Niaz, 2010).

Besides Pakistani nation-building process there were also certain linguistic movements in the country which were prevalent before the partition. Some of these movements were in conflict with the larger state identity.

Tariq Rahman in his article "Language and ethnicity in Pakistan" talks about the role of language in the formation of identity (Rahman, 1997). The author says that identity is a

vague and multifaceted thing. It's a variable and not constant. Language became an important tool in identity formation after the advent of colonial rule and with the arrival of modernity. This modernity brought interaction and this interaction became feasible through language. This interaction through language created sense of identity. Hence language becomes the most powerful instrument after religion for leaders to motivate people and to gain power. The author says that all the language movements in Pakistan started due to certain economic reasons or political reasons and the leaders used language to get access to power and hold on economic resources (Rahman, 1997).

The same author in his book, "Language and Politics in Pakistan" highlights the importance of language in identity formation (Rahman, 1996). The author sheds light on the emergence of different language movements in the country. While talking about different language movements, he also expresses in clear terms about the Pashto language movement which was started by Abdul Ghaffar Khan. This language movement created a sense of identity among Pakhtuns. Before this language movement the tool for identity of Pakhtuns was their code of conduct (Pakhtunwali). This language movement paved the way for the emergence of the Pakhtun ethno-nationalist movement which was different from the larger state nationalism (Rahman, 1996).

The Khudai Khidmatgar Movement of Abdul Ghaffar Khan on one hand was a language movement that promoted Pashto language and on the other was an anti-imperialist movement against the foreign aggressors. Both these factors strived for the formation of Pakhtun identity based upon Pashto language. Ultimately this identity was different from Pakistani identity based upon Urdu language. So this cultural factor of language was an important tool of division between the two identities.

Indian anthropologist Mukulika Banerjee also talks about the role of Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the formation of Pakhtun identity by promoting Pashto language and Pakhtun nationalism. She argues how Khudai Khidmatgar Movement transformed the Pakhtuns into a successful, unarmed and non-violent movement who had been depicted in classical anthropological works and western literature as 'hot-headed', people (Banerjee, 2000). This movement aimed to reform Pakhtun society internally and achieve liberation from the colonial power. The movement was grounded ideologically in Islam and Pakhtunwali (the code of conduct of Pakhtuns). The movement caused a significant alteration in the traditional values of the Pakhtun life. Political consciousness of the people was raised and

they started to demand their rights. This movement was so powerful that even colonial power failed to dent the resolve of Khudai Khidmatgars through repressive measures of killing, incarcerating and counter-propaganda. The British oppressive measures in Frontier had no match in India. The movement transformed the whole society from an ‘unruly’ into disciplined and unified one. The movement could not develop pan-Pathan solidarity in the tribal areas as it was not allowed to carry out socio-political activities over there. But elsewhere, Khudai Khidmatgar Movement worked like a vehicle of change whereby people’s behavior and thinking mode attached with the segmentary society, was abandoned in favor of wider national/ethnic unity in the struggle against colonial authority. Hence this movement was instrumental in creating a sense of identity and political struggles among Pakhtuns (Banerjee, 2000).

This movement was crucial in creating a sense of importance in Pakhtuns regarding their culture and language. This movement was also helpful in producing different literary and cultural figures like poets, writers and artists who worked for the propagation of Pakhtun identity and culture (Rahman, 1996).

In the initial part of this segment we discussed the views of Ernest Gellner about nationalism who consider it as a product of the industrial revolution. But if we look at Pakhtun nationalism, the views of Gellner are not in accordance with it. A renowned Pakhtun scholar Adeel Khan in his study “Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan” argues that Pakhtun ethno-nationalism is not due to industrial revolution or print capitalism, rather it is a symbol of reaction against the colonial aggressors (Khan, 2005). This is because till the first few decades of the 20th century when Pakhtun ethno-nationalism had peaked there was no industrialization in Pakhtun society. The weekly *Pakhtun* which was started by Bacha Khan in 1928 was among the pioneers of print media in the history of the Pakhtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This argument is also supported by Dr. Tariq Rahman in his study (Rahman, 1996).

Now if we look at the present condition of Pakhtun society, it is facing the wave of militancy and extremism. It started after the 9/11 attacks in USA and the subsequent counter attacks by USA on Afghanistan. This wave of militancy accelerated after the military operations of Pakistani state in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). Unfortunately the battlefield for this new war is Pakhtun land. This war has larger impact on culture and identity of

Pakhtuns and now some people misleadingly argue that this militancy is rooted in the culture of Pakhtuns.

Abubakar Siddique has pointed out this issue in his study, “The Pashtun Question”. According to him some people say that the wave of militancy in Pakhtun areas is due to its history and culture. He argues that it is not correct and points out that it is the reluctance of both Pakistan and Afghanistan to integrate Pakhtuns in their state apparatus. Both these states have failed to absorb and integrate Pakhtuns in the larger economic and political structure causing a huge failure in the nation-building process on both sides of the Durand line. He further says that this militancy and religious extremism is the product of these failures and the political elite of both countries are somewhat responsible for it (Siddique, 2014). He also points out that the Pakistani state has two goals in supporting the militants in Afghanistan, one was carrying out the policy of strategic depth for the external enemies and the second was to create a group based on Islamic ideology to counter the Pakhtun ethno-nationalism internally (Siddique, 2014).

The above-mentioned cultural roots of militancy in Pakhtun region has also been countered by Nasreen Ghufuran. In her article “Pashtun Ethno-nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan” she argues about the rise of the militant insurgency of Taliban in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and NWFP (presently Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). She says that the movement of Taliban is not an ethno nationalist movement of Pakhtuns. This insurgency has no ethnic or linguistic roots rather it is based on a particular interpretation of the religious doctrines of Islam (Ghufuran, 2009). The presence of Punjabi Taliban and the militants from Central Asia in FATA authenticates this claim of the author as they have close links with the TTP. An important point to remember is that the main Pakhtun nationalist parties do not support this insurgency and are opposed to it. This insurgency is mainly a reaction towards the military presence of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan (Ghufuran, 2009).

This militancy is causing damage to Pakhtun culture and society, Furthermore, the Pakhtun ethno-nationalists on one hand are resisting this wave of militancy of the non-state actors through different strategies while on the other hand they are resisting the policies of the state and demanding their own rights in this country.

1.6 Research Methodology

The selection of an appropriate research methodology is an important and crucial aspect of the anthropological research. It is the foundation for the collection of data. The most

important is that it defines the type of data to be used. Anthropological research is the collection of many research tools, the researcher, however, cannot rely on a single research tool as it is done in other disciplines. As the current research was focused on obtaining the qualitative data in the settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, so many qualitative tools were used for data collection. The main task at initial stage of the research was to identify the respondents from whom information about the study could be collected. In this research the following research techniques and tools have been used in order to collect data.

1.6.1 Sampling

Looking at the nature of research questions and objectives of the research, I have engaged various types of target respondents for the research study. However, target respondents of the research have been selected in two stages using two different sampling techniques. The usage of two sampling techniques was due to the nature and requirement of research topic. The sampling techniques which have been used in the study are discussed in detail in the following lines.

1.6.1.1 Convenience Sampling

At first stage of this research; researcher used convenience sampling to recruit target respondent for in-depth interviews. The purpose behind adoption of this research technique was to recruit those people who could be accessed easily. It includes the friends of the researcher, his colleagues, students and shopkeepers. The main idea behind using this sampling was to get the viewpoint of these people about the preference of their identity, their opinion about the current political system of the state, their perception about the words nation and nationality and their views about the usage of Urdu language in the daily lives of Pakhtuns. This helped the researcher to a great extent in identifying the relevant and knowledgeable respondents as some of the questions required knowledge of history and understanding of the culture. From this sampling, the researcher further selected the respondents for detailed interview on state's nationalist project and its interaction with Pakhtun culture.

1.6.1.2 Purposive Sampling

This type of sampling was used in the second stage when the researcher identified potential target respondents of this research. These respondents were; political workers, religious leaders, lawyers, journalists, academicians, artists, and literary figures. Purposive sampling was adopted to recruit potential target respondents with specific purpose to gather information according to the need of the research objectives. These respondents provided

abundant information about the cultural response of Pakhtuns towards state's nationalization process, the impact of the state's nation-building process on Pakhtun culture. These respondents were helpful in giving a detailed response to the questions asked from them.

1.6.2 Tools of Data Collection

Multiple research tools were used in the current research as it was difficult to gather data through a single research tool. Following research tools were used for the present study.

1.6.2.1 In-depth Interviews

Anthropologists conduct interviews during research in order to draw conclusion about the topic from the gathered information. According to Hatt and Goode, "Interviewing is the development of perception, focus, reliability and validity in a common social act of conversation (Hatt & Goode, 1952)."

Interviews were conducted from the people having different socio-economic background about the research topic. For the current study 63 interviews were conducted from different respondents. Out of these total sixty three interviews, 22 were conducted from the respondents selected through convenience sampling while the remaining 41 interviews were conducted from the people selected through purposive sampling. The interviews were conducted in multiple locales of Peshawar valley. The researcher included the names of only those respondents in the research who showed their consent for the inclusion of their names.

1.6.2.2 Focus Group Discussion

This tool was also used in the present study. The respondents were divided according to their socio-economic background and were asked to give their viewpoint about the topic. The main idea behind using this tool was to get the point of convergence and divergence among the respondents about specific topics like; nation, nationalism, culture, nation building etc. The researcher conducted 10 focus group discussions for the present research. In Peshawar three focus group discussions were conducted. In these three FGDs in Peshawar first one was conducted from BS students of University of Peshawar, second was conducted from the faculty members of Edwardes College Peshawar and the final carried out among the various shopkeepers in village Tehkal (Peshawar). In Mardan the researcher conducted two FGDs in which one was arranged with the farmers while the second was arranged with the lawyers. In Charsadda one FGD was arranged with the farmers while in Swabi three FGDs were

conducted with the political workers of different parties, literary figures/ poets and school teachers respectively.

1.6.2.3 Audio Recordings and Photography

To preserve the full detail of the interviews, the researcher used audio recordings of the respondents and also conducted photography after getting permission from the respondents. As human memory is limited it was difficult for the researcher to remember each and every point of the interview so audio recording was used to preserve the full version of the interview. The audio recording helped in preserving the data of long interviews. Photography served as a visual proof of the activities of the fieldwork. The researcher also included some pictures from social media which were relevant to the study.

1.6.3 Units of Data Analysis

The units of data analysis for the study were the individuals who were being interviewed during the fieldwork. The segments of the interviews and focus group discussions were analysed in which the respondents gave their opinions about cultural, economic, security and economic policies of Pakistani nation-building project. The views of the respondents about various aspects of Pakhtun culture like Pakhtunwali, traditional justice system of Pakhtuns, Pashto literature and Pashto poetry were also analysed. The secondary data like articles, books, newspapers was also used but it was helped to support and explain the data which was collected through primary sources. It also helped in improving data collection tools such as interview guide and it provided the basis of cross checking the primary data.

For analysing the segments of interviews thematic analysis was used. The audio recordings of the interviews and the details of interview of written in Pashto were transcribed. The transcriptions of the interviews were typed manually. In this study the researcher have used verbatim transcription (transcribing every word) and intelligent transcription (transcribing every word but to make interpretations on various occasions to clean the grammer and to omit the pauses etc.) for transcribing the interviews.

Furthermore inductive coding approach was used for the anlysis of the data. The researcher generated ideas and codes from the data generated from respondents. In the initial stage the researcher started with open and descriptive coding. Later on the researcher used pattern coding (in which data of similar codes was classified under a single code) as well as focused/ selective coding (in which codes were finalized from the previously done open coding).

1.7 Locale

The locale for this research study was the Peshawar valley of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. This province is predominantly inhabited by the ethnic Pakhtuns. As the topic of research was about the relationship of Pakhtun culture and the Pakistani nation-building process so the Pakhtun areas of the settled Pakhtunkhwa were selected for study. The study was conducted both in rural and urban areas. At the initial stages of the field work the data was collected from the respondents in village Tehkal of Peshawar district. It is a historical village which is located on the main Jamrud Road of Peshawar mainly inhabited by the Khalil tribe. Looking at the nature of the research, the respondents of one village were not sufficient to fulfill the research requirement, therefore the researcher also moved to the urban areas of Peshawar for conducting interviews and gathering of data. The researcher then conducted interviews and focus group discussions in district Swabi, Mardan and Charsadda. In initial days the researcher conducted fieldwork in Peshawar but later on data was also collected from Charsadda, Mardan and Swabi district.

1.8 Personalized Subjectivities

An important thing to mention here is that the researcher as other human beings/ researchers has been influenced by various personal experiences. Starting from the selection of topic of the research, the researcher chose this topic as he was observing the integration of Pakhtuns and as well as their resistance and frustration against the state's policies. This paradox motivated the researcher to work on the interaction of Pakhtun culture and state's nation-building process.

The researcher selected Peshawar valley as locale for the research because it was the most developed part of Pakhtun belt in terms of physical infrastructure as well it was the main hub of political activism and a stronghold of Pakhtun etho-nationalism. Thus it looked as a suitable place for the execution of the present research. Furthermore, being an inhabitant of the Peshawar valley, it was easy for the researcher to move around in the locale without any fear as the other parts of Pakhtun belt like former FATA and Malakand division have been affected by militancy. This sense of security also motivated the researcher to conduct the research in the safest area of Pakhtun belt.

The researcher selected indepth interviews and FGDs as tools for data collection as the basic aim to gather qualitative data and to look at the interactive pattern of Pakhtun culture and Pakistani nation-building.

1.9 Significance of the Study

This research is expected to contribute to the existing body of knowledge. It will give new insight into how the culture acts as an instrument in constructing an identity. This study will be helpful in understanding how people prefer one identity over the other identity. As identity is fluctuating so it will help the academicians on how Pakhtun identity is different from the larger national identity in Pakistani context. Furthermore, it will help the researchers in understanding how the Pakhtun cultural identity is somehow paradoxical to the larger national identity and how in this state of affairs the Pakhtuns have accommodated themselves in the Pakistani state. This study gives insights into how Pakhtuns prefer their Pakhtun identity over Pakistani identity and at the same time how they are reluctant to shun their association with Pakistan in favor of Afghanistan. The study gives a detailed picture of the state's carrot and stick policies towards Pakhtuns after the independence. These policies were used to integrate Pakhtuns within the larger Pakistani state structure. The research also gives a detailed picture on how Pakhtun culture responded to the nationalist project of the state. The Pakhtuns used multiple tools of resistance in coping with the state's integration project. The study also probes into the alternatives available for Pakhtuns in this present position of chaos and which alternative they could opt for. This research has investigated the options regarding identity and nationalism in the times of peace and war stressing upon the fact as to what is more appealing to them in the times of peace and what attracts them in times of chaos. This research study will be useful in the future in understanding how the regional culture determines the process of larger nation-building and how it resists this process. This study gives insights on how unconsciously the cultural dynamics change with the nation building policies of the state.

Chapter 2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The discussion in this chapter rallies around the search and suitably applicable literature better understand the research problem. The literature cited below is from different sources and authors. The background of the authors is diverse that include anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists and historians. A brief explanation of different terminologies and topics is given below.

2.1 The Process of Modern Nation-Building

The modern-day comparative politics mainly deals with nation-state as one of the most striking feature of dominance and power that has produced new ideas and forms of identity of the nation state in combination with the questions of political power and concrete manifestations such as state, sovereignty, economic system, distribution of resources and cultural rights. This unit of politics remains our fixed point of reference whether we look at local government politics, or international politics (LaPalombara, 1974). Today there exist more than 150 nation-states. Over a couple of generations their number has more than doubled. The process of fission and fusion will certainly bring more of them into existence, thereby implying that some of the Nations exist today may find their survival in peril in near future (LaPalombara, 1974). Since the beginning of nation-building process, the creation of nation has involved great turmoil and various forms of human suffering. So the question arises as to how to strengthen and build a nation. Nation-building is among the most crucial undertaking that is experienced by the leaders of developing countries (Ali, 1979). Before turning to the process of nation-building it would however be in the fitness of things to define the terms nation-state and nationalism.

2.1.1 Nation State

The nation is a concept denoting a common ethnic and cultural identity shared by a single people, while state is a political unit defined in terms of territory, population, organized government exercising effective control over its territory and inhabitants (LaPalombara, 1974). The nation is an essential element for the formation of a state because the nation seeks to take over the state as political instrument through which it can protect and assert itself (LaPalombara, 1974).

The nation promotes emotional feelings among its members, while state provides political and legal foundation for the identity of its citizens (Emerson, 1960).

Hans Morgenthau suggests, that the nation needs a state, one-nation-one state is thus political postulate of nationalism (Morgenthau, 1948).

Nationalism is considered a success when it implies the linking of an ethnic ideology with a state apparatus. Such linking creates a nation state which has, ideologically, coterminous political boundaries with cultural boundaries (Eriksen, 2010). This basis and definitions of nation, nationalism and nation-state are not the same everywhere: they vary in different time and space and in different historical and political contexts.

2.1.2 Nationalism

According to Gellner, Nationalism is predominantly a political principle, according to which the political and national entity should be similar (Gellner, 1983).

As a feeling and as a movement nationalism can be best defined in terms of this rule. Nationalist feelings or sentiment is the sense of resentment produced by the violation of this rule or principle, or the feelings of pleasure produced by its accomplishment. A movement which is stimulated by feeling of this kind is a nationalist movement (Gellner, 1983).

A crucial difference between ethnicities and nations is that the latter are envisioned as intrinsically political communities, as source of sovereignty, while this is not central to the definition of ethnicities (Calhoun, 1993).

Hans Kohn has defined nationalism as, “Nationalism” is a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be owed to the nation state (Werner Link, 1979). He further says that “Everywhere nationalism is different” in character according to the specific conditions and the peculiar social structure of each country.

Before the age of nationalism, there was no concept of identification of state. Since the eighteenth century and at an accelerating pace during the 20th century nationalism has manifested itself most often in the desire of the members of a nation to control and govern the territory in which they live in (Werner Link, 1979).

According to Walker Connor, loyalty to and with the state is not nationalism but patriotism. Nationalism is rather loyalty to the nation that is neither a state nor the population of a state without regard to its ethnic composition (Connor, 1994). Despite such theoretical

considerations, nationalism and patriotism are not easily differentiable in the contemporary nation state because it is the state machinery that crafts a nation and its nationalism and vice versa. Constantly emerging preservation proclaimed induces

A significant explanation of nationalism has been given by Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (1991) in their study. According to them the relationship between nationalism and racism is dialectical. Racism is persistently developing out of nationalism and in the same way nationalism comes out of racism. Racism in its essence is nationalist because it strives for the protection of pronounced cultural or biological purity of a nation. Both racism and nationalism constantly encourage absolute racial and cultural purity.

Benedict Anderson (1983) has called the word nation as ‘an imagined political community’. In his idea of ‘imagined community’, he refers to the point that the nation is a people’s community who are linked to each other by a sense of belonging without essentially recognizing each other.

Anthony D. Smith (2010) who is a strong supporter of primordial stance about a nation’s identity, terms a nation as a population of human beings having common territory, sharing memories of a common history and myths, having common economy and all members have a legal connection of rights and obligation to each other.

Liah Greenfeld (1993) says that the idea of the nation and nationalism arose in England during 16th century and from there spread throughout Europe, altering itself to fulfill the social and political demands of each geographical region and country.

According to B. C. Upreti, nationalism in the Western World has remained a powerful tool of political demonstration and expression. The whim of nationalism in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century facilitated the creation and recreation of states in Europe. The rise of nationalism led to the breakdown of many political entities, which derived their homogeneity and unity on the basis of ethnicity, language, culture, etc. These homogenous cultural groups consequently emerged as independent nation states. Thus, nationalism played a significant role in the liquidation of great empires and formation of new states. In the third world the idea of nationalism was borrowed from the west in the context of the rise of indigenous movements to fight against the colonial rule (Upreti, 2006).

2.2 The Conception of Nation-Building

Nation-building is an ongoing process that is shared by old and new states of the developing countries. The problem of arriving at a suitable definition of “Nation-Building” is unfortunately not easy. In all the available literature on the subject there is considerably more discussion on its importance, how it works, its characteristics and relationship to older cultures than there is in defining it (Moore, 1969).

Robert E. Scott gives a useful description of the term, “nation-building” through different imperatives. In his formulation he points out the number of factors involved and the complexity of the modern nation-building process. He mentions for instance:

1. External and internal problems.
2. Psychological integration.
3. Development and progress.
4. The Research for national-identity (Rai, 1982).

According to Raymond A. Moore, “Nation-Building” is the social process resulting from the interaction of those economic, political, military, psychological and social activities which contribute to the creation, sustenance and development of the national identity usually finding expression in the autonomous entity of the nation state (Moore, 1969).

Myron Weiner identified the following meaning of the term:

1. Bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups (which are characteristic of a plural society) into a single territorial unity and the establishment of a “national identity” which leads to the subordination of “Parochial Loyalties” to national loyalty.
2. Establishment of central authority of a national character to subordinate regional political units.
3. Forging of a link between the ruling elite (or class) and the broad masses of people who are ruled, that is, reducing the gulf between the elite and the masses in terms of aspirations and life conditions.
4. Development of a minimal end means consensus, which is essential to the maintenance of any social system.
5. “Integrative behavior” which refers to “the capacity of people in a society to organize for some common purposes” or function which changes with the changing character of social organization.

Thus (i) national integration has different aspects and many dimensions, political economic social and cultural, and (ii) all these aspects have to be taken care of, for they are interrelated. That is, emphasis on any one of these aspects to the neglect of others would jeopardize both the understanding of the problem and the formulation and implementation of an adequate and sound social policy of national integration. The use of the term social policy is used here to suggest that the state has a major and positive role to play in this respect (Azam, 1974).

As a process, national integration is partly a by-product of other social and economic developments, partly the result of deliberate government policies. The unplanned component of integration is commonly called social mobilization. It is basically the process by which industrialization induces workers to leave their native villages so as to seek work in the new individual areas, thus eroding the social communities for rural areas and mobilizing workers for absorption into the larger national society. Kinship links become weaker, local languages or dialects give way to the dominant national language, local cultures and customs thus lose their hold. The process does not always work as smoothly as the above sketch suggests, but the sketch serves as a model of what has happened to some extent in most industrial societies and is assumed by some theorist to be an inevitable process. Karl Deutsch (German social and political philosopher) and his colleagues have suggested that compiling an index of personal transactions between people of different regions, including correspondence and telephone calls as well as face to face contacts, can provide a guide to the extent of social integration in the wider society of which the regions form a part (Birch, 1989).

The other component of national integration consists of government policies designed to change people's attitudes and loyalties. By developing national institutions and exploiting tactics of political socialization, the attempt is made to replace local and sectional loyalties by an overriding sense of national loyalty. This process is known as nation-building.

One of the important foundations of nation building in identifying its national citizens is the democratic participation of the masses in the polity and civil society because development of citizenship is by itself a project of nation building for the creation of a national citizen by nation-state (Gerard Delanty, 2006).

2.3 Mechanism to Promote National Integration/ Nation Building

The steps taken to promote nation building can be divided into two categories: The first step emphasizes direct initiatives taken to foster integration with a sense of nation identity and pride. In the step two there are reactive measures taken by the governments to minimize the political effects of ethnic and cultural cleavages within society.

An obvious initiative is the creation of symbols of national identity. Flags, anthems and uniforms all serve this purpose. Sports teams may also do so, particularly if successful in international competition. In recent years new states have thought it important to establish national airlines, sometimes at great expense, to symbolize both the independence and modernity of their nations.

A second and more important feature of nation building is socialization through the educational system (Birch, 1989).

In practice, all state educational systems socialize their pupils regarding the virtues of the nation to which they belong, though some do so more openly than others and the virtues stressed naturally vary. The American schools are the most open, with their requirements that children salute the national flag every morning, in each classroom, and their practice of preaching the virtues of American democracy at every opportunity. The British schools are much more discreet but the message about British national achievements is certainly put across in history lessons. The Canadian schools have a more ambiguous task for the history of their country is one of division rather than unity, but there is now a good deal of propaganda about the virtues of bilingualism and multi culturalism (Birch, 1989).

Another aspect of nation building is the establishment of political institutions seen to represent all sections of society. In liberal democracies this is done by the institution of competitive elections for office, with the peripheral regions sometimes being accorded more than proportional representation to make them feel less dependent on the center. Thus, Scotland and Wales have more Members of Parliament than England, in proportion to their relative populations, while Ireland was heavily over represented when it was an integral part of the United Kingdom. In the United States the coincidence of several elections on the same day enables the parties to nominate 'balanced tickets' in areas of mixed ethnic origin, so that each ethnic group will find familiar names on the list of candidates. Institutional arrangements of this kind give peripheral regions or ethnic minorities influence on the input side of the governmental process. This influence is likely to be integrative in its effects if

the regions or minorities are represented by national parties, but disintegrative if they are represented by regional or communal parties. On the output side, efforts are made to ensure that minorities gain financial benefits from the activities of the national government. In a centralized political system, the poor regions benefit automatically from the fiscal redistribution that occurs as a consequence of the provision of uniform public services. The wealthier regions contribute more per head in taxation while the poorer regions receive more per head in the form of public expenditure (Birch, 1989).

A different kind of nation building activity occurs when national governments take steps to reduce the impact of ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages in society. Ethnic cleavages cannot be reduced directly by governmental action, but insistence on unsegregated schools and legal bans on ethnic discrimination may lead in time to the erosion of ethnic barriers, to intermarriage and to a situation in which ethnic consciousness diminishes (Birch, 1989).

Religious cleavages are intrinsically less permanent than ethnic cleavages in that they can be eroded by conversion or the growth of agnosticism. People cannot change their ethnic identities, though these may become less salient to them, but they can change their religious affiliations. It is sometimes forgotten that many states have at some stage in their development discouraged minority religion (Birch, 1989).

Irrespective of government action, religious faith in western societies has been sharply eroded in the twentieth century with the growth of industrialization, urbanization and affluence. Large cities like London, Paris and Frankfurt have become essentially religious, or de-Christianized as the Catholic Church in France puts it. This development has enabled these countries to resolve issues such as aid to church schools, divorce laws, abortion laws and censorship that posed difficult political problems in the not-so-distant past. Only the United States and to a lesser degree, Canada have escaped this trend, the price of continued religiosity in America being indicated by the fact that in 1986 twenty eight abortion clinics there were bombed by Christian Zealots (Birch, 1989).

In the Middle East there is a conflict between Sunni Muslim and Shia Muslims. In a situation like this there is little that governments can do except to try to divest religious passions away from politics into more innocuous activities like festivals etc.

Pakistan as a multi-ethnic country also faces the issue of national integration. This country was created on the basis on religion and this tool of religious of ideology was considered as

the main force to integrate the different ethnic groups into a single identity group. But it failed to integrate the people of different ethnicities of the country into a 'nation'.

In the context of Pakistan's there are three factors which are hampering its national integration and political stability and which have been constantly ignored during various phases of its history. The first one is lack of establishment of a national identity, the second one is ethnic conflicts/ confrontations and the last one security issues (Rashid, 2010).

As per another explanation Pakistan since its establishment has been facing problem to address three grave problems. The first one is the deteriorated civil-military relationship, another one is ethnic differences/ rifts and the last one is the protection of Islamic ideology. This has enhanced the insecurity of the state and these issues must be seriously envisaged to avoid any further fractures and disintegration in future (Haider Z. , 2010).

National Integration will not result out of creating ethnic or national homogeneity in case of Pakistan. It could be achieved only through creating a common citizenship, shared socio-political structures and to have a common sense of identity/ belonging to each other. It could be attained by accommodating existing diversity through promoting commonality. To substitute the older ethnic identity with the new artificial identity would push it to ethnic cleavages (Jehanzeb, 2013). The Pakistani state is negating the above the mentioned scheme and constantly trying substitute the 'Older Pakhtun Identity' with the 'New Pakistani Identity' which is not working very well.

Linguistic cleavages pose problem of a different kind. They are certainly more serious than other cleavages, since they directly hinder personal communication and nobody can turn a blind eye to them. They also involve the state in a more necessary way, for the government has to designate religion officially. On the other hand, minority languages are more likely to fall into disuse, if given no official encouragement, than religions of minorities are. It is psychologically and mentally costly for people to be bilingual, because the human brain is reluctant to store a multiplicity of labels for a single object or concept. As a consequence in any given territory, there is a general tendency for one language to become dominant and for the other to fade away (Birch, 1989).

When faced with a multilingual society, government leaders have three possible lines of policy to pursue: First, they can designate the majority language as the official language and hope that minority languages will gradually fall out of public use, possibly hastening this process by measures such as banning their use in schools (Birch, 1989).

A second line of policy is to divide the country into linguistic areas, with one language in each area being designated as official but the national government is required to be bilingual or trilingual.

A third possible line of policy is for the government to apply the personality principle of bilingualism, this is to specify that both majority and minority languages should be official throughout the country, with citizens able to do business in either when communicating with public officials and with steps taken to protect the rights of language groups who happen to be in minority in their area of residence. This is the choice made in Canada, with increasing efforts being made since 1969 to ensure that the policy is reflected in practice (Birch, 1989).

For political leaders concerned to build a sense of nationhood the choice between these three policies is sometimes quite difficult. Any choice is likely to upset some citizens and linguistic rivalries have caused political tensions in countries as varied as Britain, Canada, India, Malaysia and the Soviet Union (Birch, 1989).

2.4 Building and Sustaining of Nations

Once a nation state appears on the world scene it will rarely disintegrate or disappear, the dominant pattern of vanishing is amalgamation with or absorption by another nation or political system (LaPalombara, 1974). In all the developing nations there are different ethnic settings. Every ethnic group differs the other in negligible parts. They speak different languages, they have different dress styles, different habits, customs and traditions. They wear quite distinguishable cultural symbols (Rai, 1982).

The societies that are heterogeneous from ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural point of view are more likely to be the focus of all manners of discontent and conflicts (Oberschell, 1973). The conflicts always arise from the structured arrangements of individuals and groups in a social system. When two or more different groups of people are brought into the same social system even by coercion, their relationship tends to be based on common interests. So, as long as the relationship continues to produce benefits to both sides, they are likely to be tolerated. When they cease to do so accommodation turns to antagonism and conflicts (Oberschell, 1973). Thus conflicts start between national loyalties and regional loyalties, because traditional loyalties to ethnic, regional, linguistic, tribal and religious groups frequently take precedence over national loyalties. In those states that have attained their independence only after a protracted struggle, these groups often cooperate against the colonial power but the primary identification of most of individuals remained with their own

groups. These traditional loyalties not only threaten the continued existence of some states, but also demands for separate states or autonomy within the states and thwart the implementation of national policies (Kebeschull, 1973). Cultural differences act as catalysts and political and constitutional instability widen the gulf between different groups and communities. Thus creation of nation is always accompanied by many problems. Whereas an old diversity and ethnic centrism may not be eliminated immediately, there is a dire need to face the realities and evolve ways and means to achieve accommodation and coordination among different cultural entities. The government of developing states should employ a variety of techniques and policies to encourage a sense of national identity (Rai, 1982). In all the new emerging states, the problems of nation-building are compounded by the fact that the ruling elite must perform the task. Political scientists generally agree that politics involves the organization and exercise of authority within a society for the purposes of establishing and maintaining order resolving differences between different groups and individuals, and promoting common goal (Kebeschull, 1973). The primary task faced by the leaders of developing countries, is to transform primordial sentiment into “Civil sentiment” to create a national identity out of, or superior to, parochial identities, to build a nation-state out of multiple subnational groups, a nation state is not merely in the form of international courtesy but also seen as political and governmental reality (Jahan, 1972). So it would be useful to think about nation-building as an on-going process that continually tests the ability of national leaders to deal with such complex problems. They often reach a situation where failure to deal adequately with crisis situation causes disagreement in policy making, reinforcement of old divisions and creation of new ones, the overthrow of political leaders and even greater difficulties in making a national authority a reality. The nation-building crisis itself tends to be universal in nature; that is, it tends to be associated with the evolution of every nation (LaPalombara, 1974).

There is no certain formulae for dealing with these problems. There are, however certain types of institutional arrangements that seem relatively well-adopted to this task.

2.4.1 Legitimacy

A political system is “Legitimate” to the extent that those who are effected by the political power judge its exercise to be right or appropriate. Legitimacy refers to the basis on which and the degree to which decisions of the government are accepted by the populace. Legitimacy of authority should be distinguished from its legality because legitimacy is a state of mind not a condition of legality (LaPalombara, 1974). It is entirely possible that acts

of governance that are perfectly acceptable under law may be considered illegitimate by those who are affected by them. Problems of legitimacy can reach serious crisis levels when what has been considered legal and appropriate is no longer legitimate. Political development, of which nation building is a major component and stage involves in the creation and operation of institution (LaPalombara, 1974). When we speak of the capability of political leaders to deal with the challenges and problems that confront them, we invariably refer to institutional arrangements. Political development, indeed, has been often defined as the ability of political elites to handle demands either through existing institutions or through modification or through the creation of new institutions. Nation-building then is the business of creating and implementing institutions (LaPalombara, 1974). Where governmental institutions either lack legitimacy or lose it, the political system involved is on extremely shaky ground. They must seek to legitimize those institutions through which national as opposed to regional, local or parochial public decisions are made and enforced.

2.4.2 Penetration

The critical problem of administration in the new states gives rise to the penetration crisis, which involves the problems of government in reaching down the society and effecting its basic policies (Kebuschull, 1973). Due to lack of evidence of penetration crisis laws are not enforced; policies are not implemented; geographic areas remain outside the orbit of central national control. The problems, and potential crisis of penetration therefore, raises questions about the fundamental organizational capabilities of the central government (LaPalombara, 1974). The integrity of the territory also requires that sub-sections of the nation should not spilt in form of separate nations or affiliate with some other sovereign political entity. Military organization has been partly associated with the penetration problem for as long as organized society existed. Similarly, if the nation is to survive as such and avoid falling back into an anarchical, brutish “state of Nature”, internal order must be maintained. Police organizations from the most primitive to the most sophisticated are born of this exigency. It is striking to note that in today’s restive world the most frequently and stridently articulated demand is for “law and order”. Where rulers, at whatever level, are identified as unable to provide this, one may expect political upheaval (LaPalombara, 1974). No nation ever succeeds in reaching a complete state of successful penetration but nations differ greatly in this regard, and we must try to learn why this is so and particularly what difference do successful penetration varying patterns of organization make. We may create that terrifying situation where people are conditioned automatically not only to the “Love Big Brother” or

to accept test tube babies certified by the state, but also automatically to pay taxes. Join the army, inoculate cows, build dams and high ways, install seatbelts and anti-pollution devices, take adult education courses, avoid joy walking, identify national enemies and allies, salute the flag, and stop smoking, as may be required by the government (LaPalombara, 1974).

2.4.3 Participation

It is the problem of those who participate in government activities or have some influence over government's decision making. Some people like political leaders want to play a direct role in making the rules that govern the masses while some people would not participate in political process in a direct, ongoing way, and prefer to turn the running of organizations over to others. In nations, that have pluralist democracies, the idea persists that participation, particularly in the form of voting, is a good and healthy thing for the polity. On the other hand, in democratic and non-democratic societies alike, there are critics who argue that voting is spurious anyway and that new, more meaningful form of participation must be found (LaPalombara, 1974). Various aspects of the problem of political participation are treated in depth. For the moment, we can remark that demands for more and more effective political participation constitutes a major problem category. In more recent times, the leaders of labor movements, ethnic and racial minority groups and women liberation movements have demanded the participation in legislation and due representation in political institutions. If the expectations of elites and the ruled who demand participation in political system of the state are reasonably satisfied, we may consider that the participation problem is temporarily resolved, but not necessarily permanently. Political leaders and the politically ambitious groups and individuals can always find anew basis for making demands for participation in the political system. Some of these demands may be based on the claim that existing system of representation is antiquated and require transformation (LaPalombara, 1974). Like many other nation-building problems, that of participation and representation may lie dormant for a while to break out into an issue of critical proportions when any achievement or denial of aspiration is linked to these matters. Participation implies the creation of new institutions and the modification of existing ones (LaPalombara, 1974). Just as problem of national penetration requires that administrative agencies be expanded and given power to specialize, so too do the problems of participation that are required to recommend solution that focuses on different institutional format in order to get optimal performance. National legislatures and executive bodies dealing with social and economic affairs; representative arrangements within national agencies: the birth, growth, and

regulation of political parties; special provisions for regional and local governmental autonomy – all of these and more are examples of the kinds of institutional expansion and extension that accompany the participatory aspect of national development (LaPalombara, 1974).

2.4.4 Distribution

The least easily resolved and most frequently recurring problem that nation-builders face is that of distribution of material benefits and resources. It is the responsibility of government institutions and officials to devise policies for the allocation of resources and material benefits to individuals and groups that make up the polity. In this broader sense, however, distribution is indistinguishable from governance, it means what David Easton describes as the authoritative allocation of values. It refers to the extent to which the decision of the governments is used to distribute material benefits and other benefits in the society through implementing feasible projects for the people. So it is useful to consider that distribution problems in nation-building as related to the allocation of valued material things (LaPalombara, 1974). We can conceive of political leaders faced two different kinds of distributive demands. Members of a polity might simply demand that the government extends its hand in producing or facilitating the production of the materially desired means. Beyond demands for more material resources and benefits, national leaders may confront the moral and ideological demands that the existing patterns of distribution be modified. This second and more demanding imperative requires that the size of the shares going to different administrative units and groups be changed. These demands are redistributive and would tend to affect the power structure of society. Although problems of distribution – particularly of redistribution are ever present among nations, they tend to be especially virulent in the earliest stages of nation-building (LaPalombara, 1974). The maintenance of any semblance of a future democratic order will require much more equality in the distribution of material things than any nation has yet achieved (Kebeschull, 1973). In addition to the economic and social policies designed to promote the unification of the state the leaders attempt to evoke a sense of pride in the accomplishments of the state, stressing that these were possible only as a result of the unified efforts of the people. Those elements such as religion of the various groups in the state are emphasized, while the divisive factors are ignored as far as possible (Kebeschull, 1973). The leader will demand to use an indigenous language, asserting that the use of one language will proceed and promote their culture and establish their identities. The leaders of the new countries want to build up a

modern organization of the state to ensure political stability and development. They place great emphasis upon the development of a comprehensive educational system not only because an increasingly literate and skilled population is necessary for economic development, but also because national unity will be strengthened. Industrial expansion with its corollary development of transportation and communication network is also regarded as a means to promote both the unity and the welfare of the society, because transportation and communication help to link different regions and groups together not only physically but psychologically also (Kebschull, 1973). Economic development is also sought for reasons that are more specifically social and political than economic. Many leaders view economic development as a means of promoting social and political unity among the diverse groups within their states. By creating a more complex, interdependent economy, regional, cultural and economic groups are brought together for the cause of economic progress. Another objective of economic development is the promotion of greater economic and social equality by narrowing the division between the rich and the poor within the society. Military in multi-ethnic states also perform a significant role in the building and maintaining of a nation (Henry Dietz, 1991). In almost all twentieth century states, the military is a universal institution. By the mid 1960's, the armed forces in the new states were being described as modernized and nation-builders, as a political institution (Henry Dietz, 1991). Even where the military has not assumed control, it frequently is a principal agency through which the developmental programs are executed. The army acts as a vehicle of social change by maintaining a modern capable and well-equipped organization. The army is a unifying force for national integration (Kukreja, 1985). It contributes directly to the integration of the citizen into economic, social and political sphere of the state. It makes economic development its prime national goal with the expectation that this would pull the different regions and groups together for a constructive national purpose (Kukreja, 1985). The nation building mission of the army may be classified as:

1. Security operations to preserve and consolidate the nation.
2. Political activity in advising assisting and running the government.
3. Emergency measures of diverse character.
4. Extension of public authority at the invitation of government.
5. Institution building through army programs.
6. Contribution of officer elites to national leadership.

Among these missions, other than protecting and stabilizing the government, have been the building of dams and roads, flood and cyclone relief, malaria control; creation of industries; construction of cantonments, schools; training of civilian personal in scientific farming and animal husbandry; and preventing gold smuggling (Moore, 1969). In short four traits are very important for the unity of nation.

1. Vigorous leadership, for the whole nation.
2. A collective way of solving problems.
3. A strong sense of national loyalties.
4. A basically stable economy (Sanders, 1960).

2.5 Nation-Building in Pakistan

Third world countries after coming into existence had to create a sense of national identity before they could become sufficiently politically stable to hope for launching socio-economic progress. But even today the conflicts between national loyalties and regional loyalties exist in varieties of forms in these countries. The process of nation-building in the newly independent states of Asia and Africa is a common and interesting phenomenon. These problems are shared by both the old and new states of the world. All nations which have emerged due to decolonization in Asia and Africa after World War II are at various stages of nation building and none of them have the desired kind of solidarity (Sanders, 1960). In short, the countries of the third world are passing through a critical stage of state formation and nation-building. In order to find the problems the new states are facing in the process of nation-building, it will be most appropriate to first see what major features of a modern nation state are. The case of Pakistan provides a striking example of a new state that appeared to have faced this issue of national integration. Political awareness had been focused on the external differences with neighboring India and the traumatic cost of separation. A substantial consensus also appeared to have been achieved in Pakistan through an overwhelmingly population adherence to Islamic ideal (Henry Dietz, 1991).

In 1947 when Indian subcontinent was divided, the frontier dividing the new dominions- Pakistan and Indian union was fixed without regard to the national or ethnical compassion of the population of various regions. The only point taken into consideration was the religious denomination of the inhabitants (Jahan, 1972). Pakistan's freedom movement provides the best example, where all the ethnic, sectarian and regional groups identify in the name of Islam which was claimed to be the ideology of Pakistan (Islam, 1990). Islam is not

a creed. It is a social order. It has solved the color problems. It wants to turn the minds of people into a single channel. It originally conceived the unity and the spiritual resemblance among the members of human race therefore ideology of Islam does not recognize any distinction of race, rank, color (Jahan, 1972). But Pakistan from the very beginning has been confronted with five major ethno-linguistic groups (Bengalis, Sindhis, Baluchis, Panjabis and Pakhtuns). Ethnic and linguistic differences arose in the very beginning of Pakistan. A disequilibrium arose in the development of the country's different sectors, i.e. in economic development, modernization, state-building and nation-building (Islam, 1990). The failure to develop adequate nation-building policies resulted in the lack of sense to national identity, which has hampered the economic and political development of the country (Jahan, 1972).

The role of the army has been most important in the process of nation-building of Pakistan and it is because of this factor that Pakistan has remained unable to shape its identity with respect to ethnic, linguistic and historical realities and democratic principles. Such dominance of the army has blocked the any would be consensus over Pakistan's identity. The army as an institution is considered the key to changing Pakistan current perspective but the army is itself slow to change (Cohen, 2004). This is most striking issue concerning the question of federation, democracy and nationalism in Pakistan and also of the state's future. In today's Pakistan, one can rarely find any debate on the country's politics in any quarter of the society that would not have focused the army's dominance as the central point.

2.6 Pakhtun Culture and Identity

As mentioned above, despite the religious similarities there are ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences among various groups of the country. Although the state is trying to overcome these differences through single tool of religion but these massive cultural differences may serve as an obstacle in the process of national integration.

Pakhtun culture is one among these ethnic groups in Pakistan and the Pakistani state from the very beginning has tried to subdue it under the guise of 'cultural homogeneity' and 'one nation'. The Pakhtuns as a distinct ethnic group have their own history and cultural values. These people follow their own code of conduct which is known as Pakhtunwali. This code of conduct and other cultural pillars like language have a deep relationship with the Pakistani nation-building process.

Pakhtunwali and its main pillars are being shaped by different social, political, economic, natural and religious forces. This code of conduct is the foundation of the social behavior of

Pakhtuns. It is an unwritten constitution of Pakhtun society and it has not been defined precisely. This code of conduct is unwritten and it is transferred from generation to generation. The tenets of this code of conduct have been reinterpreted in different phases of history. It is usually transferred and memorized in the form of proverbs for the younger generations (Ahmed A. S., 1978). It is a symbolic tool For Pakhtuns to follow a certain course of action. This thing has been shared by the people of Pakhtun society and it is a must for the people to follow it and it has been formulated by people in throughout the long history of Pakhtuns (Ahmed A. S., 1978).

The Pakhtun code of conduct (Pakhtunwali) which has been followed by Pakhtuns since ages supersedes other modern rules, norms, values and sometimes principles of religion. When Pakhtunwali gives legal cover to a particular action that will be approved socially (Ahmed A. S., 1978).

An important segment which is linked with Pakhtun code of conduct is Pakhtun identity. This identity has also a close link with the language beside Pakhtunwali. The Pakhtuns do not consider a person Pakhtun on the basis of merely speaking Pashto language but his code of conduct matters the most. The Pakhtuns who are living in Pakhtun region show this identity through his/her actions or code of conduct (Barth, 1981).

But Tariq Rahman says that this code of conduct as the basis of Pakhtun identity was prevalent in pre-modern times and before the advent of colonization in Pakhtun areas (Rahman, 1996).

With the advent of modernization the importance of language increased as it was an important tool for communication with other people. Hence many language movements started in the colonized area of Sub-continent. Pashto Language movement was one of them. This movement emphasized the importance of Pashto language in the formation of Pakhtun identity (Banerjee, 2000). Before the start of this language movement the important factor for identity was this code conduct. This movement was started by Abdul Ghaffar Khan who started publishing his own “Pakhtun” newsletter. He emphasized the importance of Pashto language and urged his companions to work for its propagation as it is the basis for the Pakhtun identity .Later on, the movement served as the basis for the modern Pakhtun ethno-nationalism and it produced many poets and literary figures (Banerjee, 2000).

Abdul Ghaffar Khan also emphasized the importance of education (Tendulkar, 1967). In 1921 after the formation of *Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afaghana* as a social welfare organization he opened first *Azad Islamia Madrassa* in his own village in Charsadda. Here the emphasis was also on Pashto language and some other major subjects (Shah, 2007).

After this he opened schools in other parts of the province. This was followed by the start of Khudai Khidmatgar movement which gained wide popularity in Pakhtun region. This movement worked for the revival of Pakhtun identity with special focus on Pashto language. This movement strived for Pakhtun identity and started a new phase of Pakhtun nationalism (Shah, 2007).

This Pakhtun ethno-nationalism later on became a big problem for the Pakistani state in the nation-building process. When the Congress agreed with Muslim League to the Partition of Sub-continent this movement demanded a separate country for Pakhtuns named Pakhtunistan (Tendulkar, 1967).

This movement on one hand worked for the social reformation of the society by teaching them non-violence while on the other hand it worked for the identity formation of Pakhtuns. The basic thing for Pakhtun identity was the use of Pashto language (Banerjee, 2000).

The movement had long lasting impact on Pakhtun nationalism and culture as well as Pakistani nation-building process. The Pakhtun nationalism after partition was the product of this movement and Pakistani state tried its best to counter this nationalism. As Pakhtun nationalists had sympathies in Afghanistan so the Pakistani state tried its best to counter both the external and internal challenges to its nation and state building process.

Through the support of militants in Cold War and then in the subsequent years the Pakistan wanted to ensure its strategic depth policy through these Islamists as well as to counter Pakhtun nationalists and nationalism through the ideology of religion (Abubakar, 2014).

The strategies of both the Pakistani state to carry out the process of nation-building and the strategies of Pakhtun nationalists and Pakhtun society will be discussed in the proceeding chapters. The interaction of state and society as well as state nationalism and Pakhtun nationalism will also be analyzed.

Chapter 3.

CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF PAKHTUN SOCIETY AND METAMORPHOSIS OF PAKISTANI STATE

This chapter outlines a brief insight into the main social features of Pakhtun society and its traditional social structure. It also analyses the evolution of Pakistani state as a post-colonial era and its subsequent policies which produced an uneven impact on the ethnicities living here. It gives an understanding of the nature of both structures (Pakhtun social structure and state structure/ policy) and their subsequent interaction and the resultant outcomes.

3.1 An Overlook of the Traditional Pakhtun Society

The word “Pakhtun” is spelled differently depending upon the variety of regional Pashto language. Pakhtuns also call themselves Afghans but now the word is not commonly used after the emergence of modern state of Afghanistan which stands for multi-ethnic and multilingual Afghan citizens. In the colonial era of British Raj, Pakhtuns were also called Pathans in the sub-continent.

Pakhtuns inhabit the north-west and south-west of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. These Pakhtuns are living in eastern, western and southern Afghanistan, the areas which they also call as their ancestral homeland (Barth F. , 1959). Pakhtuns are spread along the Pak-Afghan border. The Durand line divides the Pakhtuns on both sides into Pak and Afghan nationals. The Durand line is disputed between Pakistan and Afghanistan as Afghanistan lays its claim to the entire belt of Pakhtuns across the border. Pakhtuns in Afghanistan are the dominant ethnic group. They have remained politically and statistically a dominant group in Afghanistan since the establishment of Afghanistan as a state by the Durrani tribe in 18th century (Dupree, 1980).

In Pakistan, Pakhtuns constitute 13.14 % of the country’s population. A large number of Pakhtuns have internally migrated to the urban areas of the country like Karachi which is regarded as prominent commercial hub, to earn their livings (Addleton, 1992). Nearly 1.5 million Pakhtuns from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa migrated to other provinces by 1970’s. In the 1980’s the status of these temporary migrants was changed into permanent settlers as their families too joined them in urban centers such as Karachi (Nichols, 2008).

Pakhtuns speak Pashto language and it has different variant forms in terms of dialects as it changes with different regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Afghanistan. It is

the important identity marker for Pakhtuns through which they distinguish themselves from other ethnic groups. Pashto belongs to Indo-Iranian language family (Rahman, 1995) and it is written in Perso-Arabic script having additional characters. In Afghanistan, Pashto language has got official status with Dari as other official language of the country. It is unfortunate that Pashto and other regional languages are denied an official status despite the fact that these regional languages have a large population who speak it as their mother tongue. It is to acknowledge that Pashto has remained an official language of the Princely State of Swat before its accession to the state of Pakistan (Ahmed A. S., 1976). Basically, there are two common dialects of Pashto; i.e. Peshawari dialect or Hard Pashto dialect and the other is Qandahari dialect or Soft Pashto dialect. Peshawari dialect is commonly spoken in north-west of Pakistan and north-east of Pakistan while the Qandahari dialect is used in south-west and south-east of Pakistan (Ahmed, 1980). Even within each variety of Pashto language there are slight variations on the basis of pronunciation from region to region. Additionally Pashto is not only a language but it is also a code of conduct and to follow is more important than merely speaking the language (Barth F. , 1959).

Pakhtuns are known as one of the largest tribal societies in the world (Anderson, 1978) but they hardly use the term tribal for themselves. The Pakhtuns living in the now merged tribal districts (erstwhile FATA) sometimes use this word for themselves as it is not indigenous and has been used for them in the official accounts of the state. The word tribal is normally used for them in the colonial accounts with negative connotations associated with it. These words tribe or tribal carry negative meanings and have been used to differentiate the tribe (as an unrefined group) for the refined western people. There is another opinion about the tribal society that they are unruly, unstable and messy (Evans-Pritchard, 1969). Another viewpoint about the tribal people in the classic anthropological accounts is that they have an egalitarian pre-industrial economy, they are pre-literate and they use simple tools for the production of simple goods which they consume. It shows that the modern technology and life style is peculiar to them (Gluckman, 1971).

Now if we look at the society of tribal Pakhtun none of the ideas and viewpoints about the word tribe or tribal completely describe the Pakhtun society. Pakhtuns are not at the early evolutionary stages of development to become a society as in the context of the word tribal but they have also borrowed the modern concepts of economic and socio-political developments (Ahmed, 1980). Pakhtuns are vibrant and dynamic in sharp contrast to negative but popular image that they are barbaric, stagnant and belong to a static tribal

society. Pakhtun society is certainly not a lawless society as the Pakhtuns are controlled by their Pakhtunwali code of conduct and they have their own Jirga system to regulate their day to day affairs (Ahmed, 1980). Pakhtunwali is very vast and deeply ingrained concept that regulate their sphere of socio-cultural, economic, judicial and political undertakings.

In the present study, I have used the term tribe or tribal with reference to the traditional social structure of Pakhtuns which has historically remained out of the state apparatus. It is also to acknowledge that Pakhtuns have different ecological variations as well their division into different administrative units. Some of them are living in mountains while some have their homes in plains. Some Pakhtuns have historically remained encapsulated by the state structure like in the settled districts while some have remained unaffected or less affected by the state apparatus like FATA. It has caused a lack of uniformity of social structure in different ecological areas where Pakhtuns live. The acephalous social structure of tribal areas is not present in the encapsulated areas of the settled districts like Peshawar valley (Ahmed, 1980). Although these discrepancies do exist among Pakhtuns but they consider themselves as a solitary body sharing same history, culture and language (Khan M. A., 1998).

The Pakhtuns have traditionally used the Arabic origin term *qaum* for themselves instead of tribe. This Arabic word *qaum* means nation (Laliwala, 2005) and this word has been borrowed by other ethnicities like Pakhtuns from Arabic language. The *qaum* according to Pakhtuns is hereditary, patrilineal and endogamous group (Barth F. , 1959). The Pakhtuns use this term in a wider sense to address the multiple aspects of their patrilineal descent. This word has also been used in Urdu and hence it has been hired by Pakistani state to describe the sum of different ethnic groups living in Pakistan. The roots of its usage in this context came in colonial era when the leaders associated with the Muslim league proclaimed that Muslims are different nation from other *qaums* like Hindus and it became the basis of their two-nation theory. It seems that the basis of this usage of the term *qaum* is religious and not geographical or it is determined on the basis of common descent. It is closely linked with the term *ummah* which is used for the Muslims of the entire world as a distinct social entity (Toor, 2011) . So both the Pakhtuns and the Pakistani state use this term in different ways. The Pakhtuns use it for the group of people having common descent while the state is using it for the people having a common belief system.

3.1.1 Pakhtuns' Code of Conduct (Pakhtunwali)

Pakhtunwali which is the unwritten constitution of Pakhtun society plays a significant role in the daily lives of the Pakhtuns. It has been defined differently by different writers like; it is code of ethics (Banerjee, 2000), it is the code of honor (Ahmed, 1980), it is the way of the Pathans (Spain, 1962). This code of conduct regulates the social behavior of the Pakhtuns. Pakhtunwali is composed of some basic elements that is *badal* (reciprocity), *melmastia* (hospitality), *nanawati* (refuge), *pardah* (seclusion of women). Besides these basic elements, other important principles like; *namoosor noomnamoos* (protection of womenfolk and property), *mashar-kashar* (principle of respect relating to age hierarchy), *Gham-khadi* (maintaining kinship relations). Pakhtun society is basically patriarchal society therefore the Pakhtunwali revolves around the concept of manhood and sometimes it is also referred to as male code of honor. Most of the anthropologists have studied Pakhtun society from the perspective of men and they consider Pakhtunwali as male code of honor. However, this code of conduct is also applied on and followed by Pakhtun women in a different ways. For Pakhtun women the ability to withstand hardships and bear miseries of life are the principal virtues of Pakhtunwali (Grima, 1993). In Pakhtun society, every Pakhtun is expected to uphold the principles of Pakhtunwali in his life. Pakhtunwali is an ideal type of code of conduct in the form of a yardstick and any form of deviance can be measured according to it. The Pashtun code of conduct has the ability to accommodate the social, economic and political influences but not at the expense of honor.

Badal, one of the basic elements of Pakhtunwali is different from its English equivalent word revenge. It can be interpreted as to reciprocate or exchange every harm or favor done to other person. In this context revenge is one form of badal and it has some other forms also.

For Pakhtun women Gham-Khadi (to visit someone in times of sorrow and happiness) is the principal form of badal where they exchange sorrows and happiness with their fellow Pakhtun women (Grima, 1993). Gham-Khadi (sorrow-joy) and *tapos* (enquiry visit) is another principle of Pakhtunwali. Normally, Pakhtun women are very active in this regard and it is their responsibility to undertake this task. It is further added that it is not limited to visiting one another but it means to extend all help and resources to participate in one another's sorrow and to celebrate joyful moments. And if a woman fails to reciprocate on these two occasions her Pakhtunwali becomes uncertain and stained.

Melmestia (hospitality) is a basic principle of Pakhtunwali and if any Pakhtun who does not receive or offer generous hospitality to others, a very derogatory term is used for him and he is called shoom (miser). This tenet of Pakhtunwali supersedes the other tenet like badal as the Pakhtuns would even provide hospitality to their enemies if they would come to them (Banerjee, 2000). It is this principle that leads to the concept of Hujra and all its related norms. The male guests are entertained in Hujra (Barth F. , 1959) while the female guests are served inside houses (Ahmed, 1980). Being the place of hospitality, Hujra serves certain social, cultural and political functions (Ahmed A. S., 1976; Barth F. , 1959). Hujra is kind of community center where young ones learn the etiquettes of social behavior. Hospitality has number of other advantages; it increases one's self esteem and respect in the society. It helps a person to increase his political power and social influence. It also enhances one's personal relations with other members of the society.

Nanawati is one of the important tenets of Pakhtunwali. It means to give sanctuary to someone (Banerjee, 2000). This word is used in different situations and in different contexts. When someone's enemy comes to ask for settlement of a dispute or to accept his mistake be it of any nature, he is given nanawati. It is also practiced when a person asks for the protection of his life when his life is in danger for any reason. This practice is usually observed when a weaker person comes to someone for getting help against strong and common enemy. In all the above cases varying from person to person or situation to situation, the Pakhtuns normally are expected to grant nanawati. The nanawati is granted to people regardless of any economic, social or religious status (Lindholm, 1982). Its symbolic representation is that person seeking nanawati brings a sacrificial goat which is slaughtered and eaten together to celebrate the settlement of the dispute between the two parties. The principle of nanawati works on the extension of brotherhood among the Pakhtun society. It obligates the person who accepts the nanawati from other person to provide and to ensure security in all respects. If the host fails to fulfill his obligations or he does not accept the nanawati it is taken as a sign of disrespect or dishonor in the Pakhtun society. This is because nanawati means to accept one's guilt or reliance on the host.

Purdah (seclusion of women) is another feature of Pakhtunwali. The narrow meaning of it is the seclusion of women and in wider sense it is used for the decent organization of domestic life (Banerjee, 2000). Through Purdah the gender segregation in the society is ensured. The female sphere becomes separate from male sphere. It separates domestic sphere from the public sphere. This tenet of Pakhtunwali denies the intermingling of both

sexes in the affairs of the society. The females usually observe purdah in front of stranger males or when they move from their homes to other areas. *Purdah* is one of the basic components of Pakhtunwali which separates women from men in many activities of daily life but at the same time there are certain issues related to it. Historically women are not given their share in the property (land and houses), they are also denied to give their consent in their own matrimonies. Now if we analyze both these practices, it becomes clear that they are not in conformity with the Islamic injunctions (Ahmed, 1997).

Namoos or commonly known as *noom namoos* is the other component of Pakhtunwali. It is the code of honor for the male elders of the Pakhtun family to protect his land, property and particularly the sanctity of his home that is his women and children. Inflicting harm or having ill intentions about the above mentioned things of a person is considered an attack on his namoos. It is the duty of every male (usually family head) in Pakhtun to protect the namoos of his family. If a person fails to protect his honour in the society he loses his authority and influence even though he might be a land owning and wealthy person (Barth, 1959).

In Pakhtun society the principle of *Mashar-Kashar* is much esteemed. On the basis of age the Pakhtuns pay respect to all elders. From the very beginning the Pakhtun kids are taught to respect their elders. The youngsters are also told not to raise their voices in front of elders. The respect element in Pakhtun society is not only kept to one's kin but extends to all elders on the basis of age difference. Young ones pay respect to the elders and elders treat young ones with love. The principle of mashar-kashar is not based on socio-economic position or status and a younger person who might be wealthy pays respect to the elder who is poor (Lindholm, 1982). Even this principle of respect controls the behavior of elders and young ones. Both keep a respectful distance from each other. None is allowed to cross the limit in order to keep the element of respect. In Hujra the youngsters or *kashars* are supposed to serve the elders or *mashars* and usually they do not sit with them without any purpose.

In addition to the above mentioned tenets of Pakhtunwali an important point to discuss is that this code of conduct and Islam are two different forms of moral systems. Both of these moral authorities compete with each other on many issues. Pakhtuns are pulled in opposite directions by two different systems of morality. It is generally believed in Pakhtun society that Pakhto (Pakhtun code of conduct) is partly based upon *kufir*². The compatibility between

² In Pakhtun society it is used for infidelity or for any action against the principals of Islam.

Pakhto and Islam is a debatable issue. The Pakistani nationalist narrative takes the advantage as any language, culture or ethnicity is deemed to be under the Hindu influence if it is not related to early Islamic period.

3.1.2 Jirga

Jirga is the informal conflict resolution institution among Pakhtuns. It be called public assemblies (Barth F. , 1959) or the council of elders (Ahmed, 1980). It has regulatory and judicial powers for decision making. It is also a democratic institution as it decides the local disputes through consensus. As far as its members are concerned, the Jirga usually is composed of the elder male members of the tribe(s). To decide the disputed matters among the people it usually overlooks the women, the younger people, and the occupational groups in carrying out the negotiations (Tapper, 1991). The Jirga's verdicts are obligatory and they are executed by the Jirga members through different means like imposing fines or the expulsion of the people from their localities (Ahmed, 1976). Normally, the Jirga decides the inter-tribal matters, civil and criminal suits, disputes or handles the internal and external threats. The Jirga jurisdiction extends from local ordinary matters to serious issues. Jirga involves the willingness on part of the both parties. Both the parties having an issue and wanting to resolve it will have to give full authority to exercise its power and to decide the matter according to the code of honor of Pakhtuns (Ahmed, 1980). Although we have a state law operative in the regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, still the Jirga system is a preferable mechanism for the people to decide inter and intra-tribal matters and in some cases it even helps the judicial system of Pakistan.

3.1.3 Social Structure of Pakhtun Society

Pakhtun society is structured into three distinct groups. The first group comprises of those who trace their line of ancestry to a patrilineal descent, more specifically to those Pakhtun tribal heads who are the offspring of an epic ancestor. This group is the principal and major lineage group and according to Barth (1959) this group possesses the ownership of their ancestral lands known as *daftar*. The ancestral land is also known as "*da plar³neka⁴daftar*". Second one is the group of saints or the holy lineage. Their claim is that they are the decedents of the Holy Prophet, hence they trace their lineage to Arabs. These people do not possess ancestral lands but they are given lands by the first group for their religious services. The land given to saints is distinguished from *daftar* and is known as *serai* (Barth, 1959).

³Plar is a Pashto word which means father

⁴Neka means grandfather

Lastly, there is the client or occupational group popularly known as *kasabgar*. This group accords services to the first group in return for political (sometimes but not always, economic) sponsorship. This group relies politically on the first group; they are paid in cash and kind for their services and they don't have a large family network (relatives, commonly known as *khpal khpalwaan*) that is necessary for the family support in some crucial matters. These people do not possess any land and usually live in the dwellings of the major lineage group. Nonetheless, it is essential to consider that this individuality points towards the privileges of the first group (having ancestral land). In everyday routine, these distinctions are not the ones made by Pakhtuns, because making such distinctions in the community could be termed as greatly offensive. Moreover, the client or occupational group avoid inquiring about intricate details such as ones lineage, as these are discussed only in sensitive matters such as making matrimonial relationship with someone or in a jirga usually constituting members from the major lineage group. Furthermore, in their lifestyle and behavior, there are no substantial distinctions made between the people of any of these groups. In some studies on Pakhtun society (Barth, 1959; Ahmed, 1980; Lindholm, 1982) the term "non-lineage" groups signify the non-Pakhtuns. However, in this dissertation, I do not intend to make such distinctions into Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns and consider each and every person as Pakhtun who is native to the Pakhtun belt and regards himself as Pakhtun regardless of the group he/she belongs to.

The membership to the first group is something by birth, this group is segmentary, and usually practice endogamy. Its membership is primarily based upon patrilineal decent. Each and every member is expected to trace their line of ancestry to any of the tribal head. This group is predominantly responsible for safeguarding the norms of Pakhtunwali. The holy lineage and client groups are not given this responsibility, as for the core-lineage groups, the only way to earn respect and repute is to strictly adhere to the norms of Pukhtunwali. The first group in itself has the qualities of equality and egalitarianism (Ahmed, 1980). Nonetheless, the notion of "respect" based upon the hierarchy of age, as a major constituent of Pakhtunwali is principally upheld which goes against the essence of egalitarianism. Within the group *tarburwali* is another feature that retains a reality check on any inclination in the direction of social hierarchy. Both the rivalry/jealousy as well as cohesion among the "patrilineal parallel cousins" is referred to as *tarburwali* (Lindholm, 1982). The patrilineal parallel cousin is termed as *tarbur* and he/she is the immediate competitor in Pakhtun society. *Tarburwali* appears in the form of unity only when the family is facing an external

offense. It has both the qualities of fission and fusion. Internally there is fission in tarburwali but in case of outside threat there is fusion.

The first group differentiates itself from the latter two groups of saints and occupational group by some other means like controlling the political power. No other group is acceptable to wield this power. Traditionally speaking, the core-lineage group has exercised the political and coercive power. Owing to this reason, only the members of the dominant group are the constituent members of the jirga summoned to resolve inter and the intra-tribal conflicts and other issues. Nonetheless, adherents of the saintly group and client groups do partake in the Jirga to discuss and resolve routine issues such as disputes over property and other similar ones. A significant point to mention is that the stratification between the groups is fundamentally based on social factors rather than financial yardsticks. The saintly group as well as the client/occupational groups have their dependency on the first group but this dependency is not economical. Most of the times this dependency is on social and political grounds. Adding to this, trade and business is not generally held in high esteem by the major group, and for this reason, these modes of living are left to the domination of saintly and occupational group.

The basis of the above social division is in line with the notion of honor and that is in turn based upon economic as well as political autonomy and agnatic connections. There is a social interdependency between both, the first group and the occupational group. It is not obligatory upon the client to serve their patrons in case they do not fulfill their duties of patronage (Lindholt, 1982).

The saintly group trace their line of ancestry not to Pakhtun society but to the Arabs and culminating it on the Holy Prophet (PBUH). The only reason they do not form a constituent part of the core-lineage group is because they trace their line of descent to a non-Pakhtun patriarchy. Nonetheless this group also performs their own peculiar functions in Pakhtun society.

The main difference between the first group (*daftar* owners) and the saintly group (*serai* owners) is that the behavior of the former is shaped by the Pakhtun code of conduct (Pakhtunwali) while the latter relies on Islamic injunctions. An ideal member pertaining to the holy-lineage group would be peaceful and appeasing, an embodiment of moral righteousness who would remind the society of its religious obligations as a Muslim. These people remain neutral in times of conflict between the members of the first group (Lindholt,

1982). Though this group possesses no political power, their role as mediator increases due to the segmentary nature of the core-lineage groups and subsequently in the times of conflict between the members of the core group. Thus, this group serves as unbiased mediator between the core-lineage groups and their members.

The saintly group is deeply revered by the first group for the fact that they are supposed to have divine links. Nonetheless, if the saintly group's members break the prescribed boundaries of their expected behavior, they lose the honor and reverence given to them by the other groups.

3.2 Political Orientation of Pakistani State

The following lines shed light on the emergence of Pakistan as newly formed post-colonial state. It gives a brief sketch about its formative period and its subsequent governing policies. It also offers an understanding of the transformation of the state and its plans through various historical junctures.

3.2.1 Colonial Transition from Pre-Partition into Nascent Pakistan

The advent of modern state system was one of the most significant and glaring contributions of colonial empires in their subjugated areas. Colonial masters administered and materialized deep structural changes in their colonies with the help of modern state system and its structure and administration-which still stand its ground in the case of Pakistan in the shape of judicial, executive and bureaucratic mechanism. New systems of control, coercion and discipline, new power relations, cultural changes, new social classes, new status groups and new political pressure groups were created thus by the colonial state in order to achieve its objectives in colonies with ease and not much ado. After independence both India and Pakistan inherited British system of government and administration in its original form. In India, as a constitutional historian lamented, "the framers of Indian constitution could not think of an altogether new system free of the colonial baggage", howsoever the framers of Indian Constitution managed to shape the British system of government and administration in accordance with their own specifications and managed to frame a constitution that was devoid of colonial baggage up to much extent (Chatterjee, 1993). On the other side the case of Pakistan, after Independence, was much different. The new social order and the elite that came out of it-after independence- opted to continue and even improvised the same state structure and further expanded it in order to maintain their grip on state affairs and achieve the same success the colonial masters enjoyed. In contrast

with the Indian experience of/with constitution making, Pakistani political elite conscientiously failed to materialize the promise of secular welfare state as envisioned by Muhammad Ali Jinnah in his speech in constitution making assembly on 11th of August 1947. That conscientious failure was embarked to replace the colonial framework of control with the Muslim/Nationalist framework by the Muslim political elite through the struggle for Pakistan (Khan A. , 2005). That effort led to the making of a nation-state in Pakistan and strengthening of the colonial state structures in the guise of a unified nation based on the dictums of Islam and Muslims regardless of the multi-ethnic socio-cultural fabric of federating units that were made part of Pakistan through partition.

Colonial state structures depended on the centralization of state apparatus in the hands of a strong center with meager or no provincial autonomy as envisioned in the government of India Act 1935 which was vehemently opposed by Jinnah from the platform of Muslim league before partition. However after partition Jinnah himself adopted the same constitution as an interim arrangement for the state business and even made it more authoritative with the inclusion of more arbitrary powers for the office of Governor General which he himself occupied. Jinnah himself was the Governor General of Pakistan and he combined the said office with the president of constitution making assembly along with the presidency of Pakistan Muslim League-the ruling political party. With such tactics Jinnah himself laid the foundation of an authoritative regime where instead of institutionalized distribution of state power, an individual become more powerful and important. As envisioned in Indian Independence Act, emergency powers of Governor General along with the Independence Act itself were to expire within seven and half months, but Jinnah extended those for another year. Pakistan took nine long years of political turmoil and instability to frame its first constitution, which was abrogated even before implementation. The Government of India Act of 1935 which Muslim League opposed in the United India was the main inspiration for all the constitutions ever made in the history of Pakistan that is self-evident of the arbitrarily authoritative nature of elite representing state apparatus.

Such authoritative measures resulted in a centralized polity instead of a federation with no respect for various ethnicities/nationalities and elected political governments in federating units of Pakistan. Through the increased importance of the office of Governor General in polity, the powers of federating units were slashed to minimum-authority to collect sales tax transferred to the center from provinces-and even two provincial elected governments of N.W.F.P and Sindh were dismissed from the office by Jinnah himself (Saeed, 1968). The

most important contribution of Jinnah as an all-powerful Governor General was the enhanced role of central and provincial bureaucracy in administering the central and provincial affairs and the damning and stigmatization of political leadership and political structure with the slogans of traitors and atheists etc. (Alavi, 1983). That gave prominence to British trained civil bureaucracy at the expense of political leadership and bureaucracy became a stakeholder in the polity. At the same time, the politically unstable and insecure leadership of Pakistan was in awe of the perceived Indian threat thus resorted to buildup of defense capacity of military by diverting major chunk of national resources to counter the growing threat of Indian military might. Thus bureaucracy and military were made so influential in the polity of Pakistan in the earlier years that it set the course for military-bureaucratic authoritarianism that still hampers the political system of Pakistan. The power attained by military and bureaucracy in polity of Pakistan led to damning of political structure and system and hence its weakening on one hand but on the hand it also hampered the ethnic composition of state managers. Bureaucracy was predominantly Mohajir oriented and military was only Punjab oriented at the time of partition that led to the domination of Punjab-Mohajir nexus in the polity of Pakistan (Jahan, 1972).

3.2.2 Military-Bureaucratic Domination of Polity in Pakistan

After partition, Punjabi-Mohajir nexus dominated military-bureaucratic power structure in Pakistan through the policies of Jinnah and his companions thus paving way for the domination of Punjabi and Mohajir minority ethnicities. It took such an ironic turn that the state which was created on the pretext of a fearful Hindu majority turned itself into a polity dominated by two minority ethnic groups i.e. Punjabis and Mohajirs while excluding the majority ethnic group Bengalis from the decision making process. Mohajirs migrated from the United Provinces of India which was the hub of landed Muslim gentry that has a substantial share in the colonial administration. Muslim League was launched by the Muslims of United Provinces of India with the help of British to counter the growing influence of Indian National Congress. The thought of communal politics was also ingrained in the Muslim League by the Muslim elite of United Provinces because they feared for the privileges they enjoyed in the colonial rule and the Hindu Majority rule if the Indian National Congress succeeded in gaining Independence from British without partition. The Muslim League was dominated by such Muslim elites from the Muslim minority provinces during the struggle for Pakistan and even after partition they have substantial say and share in the affairs of polity.

It was although uncharacteristic but a vital trait of colonialism that it labeled ethnicities as martial races and cajoled them to join the defense of the empire against foreign and domestic violence, aggression or revolt. Such was the policies of British for the recruitment of army that half of the British Indian army consisted of personnel from Punjab province and majority from the part of Punjab that constituted Pakistan after partition (Cohen, 1984). During the war of Independence of 1857, Punjabis helped the British against the freedom fighters and in return British developed one of the biggest irrigation systems of world in Punjab to help the large landowners to reclaim land and obliged the landowners to provide the manpower for the armed services for strengthening the colonial rule in India (Cohen, 1984).

It was characteristic of British government of India to keep in check the growing tensions among Muslims against it by using segments of Muslim society. On the political front it used the Muslim gentry from United Provinces of India (Mohajirs) and showered them with share in colonial administration and also helped them with the politics of Muslim League against the Indian National Congress. With the help of colonial administration Muslim League prospered in championing the cause of Muslims in India and vied for the partition of India and finally succeeded. On the other hand, as the Punjabi landlords didn't initially share the enthusiasm of Muslim League for a separate homeland, they didn't vouch for the policies of Muslim League as evident from the 1937 and 1946 elections. And most importantly, unlike Muslim gentry of United Provinces, Punjabi landlords were not insecure of Hindu majority because of their share in British forces on which they could depend in case of independence or partition. However when the appeal for Pakistan gathered steam, they didn't hesitate to jump into the bandwagon of Pakistan. Thus two ethnicities having minor numerical contribution as compared to other ethnicities in Pakistan succeeded in gaining majority share in decision making and political power in the post partition period.

3.2.3 Militarization of the State

India was labeled as golden sparrow by the East India Company and the British shone with the plundering of riches of India for more than two hundred years indirectly first and directly after the 1857 war of independence (Tharoor, 2016). Parallels could be drawn between the East India Company and the British trained bureaucrats after partition as both enjoyed the unrestrained power and privileges of decision making. The civil bureaucrats however could not endure the lasting benefits of power as the instability on borders with India immediately after partition led the British trained army to take the center stage in decision making. As

Jinnah himself tilted towards the increased role of armed forces in the wake of initial Kashmir conflict, the political leadership got caught in between the mighty civil bureaucracy and ever influential army command. Thus the role to be played by armed forces in securing the national interests of Pakistan in conflicts with India warranted that major chunk of resources be transferred to development of forces instead of social sector. Secondly a significant role in the emergence of the military as a major stake holder in the Pakistani polity has been played by the international politics and the role sought and ultimately won by United States of America for Pakistan in the fight against Communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. In the geo-political context of politics, Pakistan being influenced by US backed military junta got enormous international aid through regional and international pacts like CENTO and SEATO (Jabeen, 2011) to fight communism as a satellite state which exponentially increased the influence of military in Pakistani polity, thus shifting the balance of power from the civilian bureaucracy to military junta and the militarization of Pakistani polity.

3.2.4 From One Unit to Disintegration

With the evolving politics in Pakistan and the gradual rise of firstly Mohajir, secondly Punjabis and lastly the military junta since Partition, a sense of deprivation took deep roots between and among the ethnicities in peripheries like Bengalis in East Pakistan, Baloch in Balochistan, Pakhtuns in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindhis in rural Sindh. Bengalis were the single majority ethnicity with 54% population according to 1951 census but their political share faded away with the onset of “One Unit” politics. Even before one unit, the state of Pakistan was being run on adhocism which deteriorated the polity and politics and tilted the balance of influence in favor of civil and military establishment. The first constitution of the country which took almost nine years in formulation was abolished even before its implementation in 1956 and the country was taken over by the military junta soon after on the pretext of omnipotent/ambivalent risk to national security and integrity. One unit was created to balance the unbalance-able Bengali majority in Pakistan in the shape of East and West Pakistan. The 15 years of one unit experience resulted in increasing demand for political and financial autonomy for federating units by political parties representing various ethnicities. The most severe case was of Bengali nationalists, their grievances were growing and mass discontent with central government was triggering the fabric of society and polity in East Pakistan which blew in 1971 and resulted in the separation of East Pakistan into a separate country Bangladesh. The debacle of 1971 blew away the two nation

theory's notion that Islam being the cornerstone of Nation is the binding force and can hold together as many ethnicities as possible and set questions on the mechanism of state functioning in Pakistan without the elected representation mandate. The fall of Dhaka led to the formulation of 1973 constitution which guaranteed the political and financial autonomous rights for federating units though it took another three and a half decades to realize those rights by federating units.

However, the role and hence dominance of Punjab reigned military never took a back seat for its role in safeguarding the political and ideological frontiers and the exchequer needed for such accomplishment. The ever growing share of military in current expenditure since 1947 left little fiscal space for the expenditure on basic responsibilities of state such as health, education, employment, security of life, development of infrastructure and social welfare etc. Moreover the natural resources and raw materials in various parts of country were hauled over by polity overshadowed by the military/Punjabi dominance only to benefit them and it also resulted in the discomforture in the peripheries. The Balochs' struggle for rights over the natural resources of Balochistan, Pakhtuns' struggle for right over water and hydel power generation are still ongoing. Balochs on one hand have picked up arms to attain their rights as they see no redress and change in Pakistani policy towards Balochistan while Pakhtun seems to be hopeful that Pakistan may change its policies towards them.

3.2.5 The Disintegration and the Aftermath

With the fall of Dhaka, there came many pitfalls for the political culture and actors/stakeholders in the leftover Pakistan. For the first time executive power was grabbed by elected representatives of Pakistan Peoples Party and a constitution was agreed upon by all the major political, ethnic parties of Pakistan. The role of military was curtailed by Bhutto government for a time however military struck back in the shape of General Zia's coup and the dictator imprisoned the prime minister on charges of murdering a member of the opposition. Even before the military coup, Bhutto dismissed the provincial government of Baluchistan and declared governor rule in there. The National Awami Party with its coalition partners was ruling the provincial governments in Baluchistan and NWFP at that time. The sacking of Baluchistan government by Bhutto was reminiscent of the authoritative behavior imbedded in the ruling polity of Pakistan since Partition. After the sacking of Bhutto government, and the changing regional and international geopolitics' dynamics, the Zia regime got international backing for the fight against communism in the bordering Afghanistan which was invaded by soviet troops in 1979. The fight against the communist

soviets was financed by the America and her allies and the training camps were set up in the towns of Pakhtuns dominated Pakistan bordering Afghanistan. The era of Zia saw unprecedented rise in religious extremism in Pakistan which hampered the social fabric of Pakistan generally and in Pakhtun areas specifically. Through the training camps and militant outfits operating through Pakhtun lands, the extremism penetrated the Pakhtun society and destroyed the social fabric. The withdrawal of soviet forces from Afghanistan a decade later, the infighting between various warlords and the rise of Mujahideen in mid 1990s adversely affected the Pakhtuns. The rise of Mujahideen led to Taliban government in Kabul which opened the gates of Afghanistan for terrorists of every hue and color for training, sanctuary, launching pads for acts of violent terrorism in every nook and corner of the world. Most horrible among such acts were the bombing of twin towers in New York at the turn of century by the terrorists of Al-Qaeda stationed in and safeguarded by the Taliban government of Afghanistan. The attack on twin towers was followed by an international fight against terrorism led by the America, which attacked Afghanistan for harboring the terrorists and failure to hand over them to America. The war on terror also adversely affected the Pakhtun lands over border and violent terrorist acts were witnessed in Pakistan specifically in Pakhtun lands in the shape of suicide bombings, target killings of influential leaders, IEDs blasts etc. The role of Pakistan in fight against Soviet Union led to thinking in stakeholders' minds to claim disputed Kashmir through the battle hardened proxies. The training camps were already operational but new battleground was sought, hence those were directed to Kashmir. The decade of 1990s saw rise in violence in Kashmir on one hand while sectarian violence also erupted at the same time in Pakistan. That decade was a blood drenched period in the history of Pakistan. The war on terror tried to place a full stop on the policy of proxies being used by Pakistan. The dual role of Pakistan was exposed when the dreaded terrorist and head of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden was found and killed by American Special Forces in a garrison town of Pakistan. With the advent of UN sanctioned FATF (Financial Action Task Force), Pakistan is now being forced to take effective steps in countering the activities of various UN sanctioned terrorist/militant outfits.

3.3 Religio-Cultural Orientation of Pakistani State

The colonial rule ended in the creation of Pakistan. This new state came into being as a result of 'two nation theory', according to which Hindus and Muslims were declared two different nations. Due to this the state of Pakistan from its existence alienated itself historically, linguistically and culturally from the Indian's territory and linked itself to

Islamic Arabia on the basis of religion from where this religion diffused (Verkaaik, 2004). The primary concern for the newly formed state was how to accommodate multi-cultural and multi-lingual polities in the new born territory of Pakistan. It is unfortunate that instead of accommodating this ethno-lingual diversity, the state-sponsored nationalism was enforced through systematic institutionalism. This state sponsored nationalism was propagated through certain means. The basic thing was adopting Muslim identity instead of regional identities based on their own languages and cultures. The second pillar of this state nationalism was declaration of Urdu as a national language. So this nationalist project was aimed at promoting Urdu-speaking urban culture, painting history in Islamic color and glorifying it over regional respective culture oriented histories. It then takes the form of nationalistic narrative which is enforced in a territory with which it could not be identified (Devji, 2013). It shows that Pakistan's ideology is based on disowning of regional lingo-cultural diversity and associating itself with the territory of Arabia which was not its own.

Pakistani state followed the pattern of British Raj to promote their own nationalism by using the tools of Muslim identity, Urdu language, and Urdu-speaking urban culture. All India Muslim League put demand for autonomous state on the basis of Two Nation Theory; Muslim identity and Urdu language were among the basic ingredients. Pakistani state used these ingredients to keep intact the cultural and lingual diverse units. Although, it is a bitter truth which is proved later on by the census of 1951 that only 03 percent Pakistanis spoke Urdu language. Urdu language with Arabic script suits well to Pakistani nationalism as regional languages were thought to be antithetical to the Islamic state and therefore will not be able to serve the purpose of promoting Pakistani nationalism.

In Pakistani Nationalist scheme, Urdu language has been imposed by the diverse ethnic groups as it suits the purpose of unification. It is contrary to the fact that the geographic location which becomes the part of Pakistan was ruled by Mughals, Sikhs and British Raj but they never imposed uniform language. Cultural and linguistic diversity have not only been acknowledged but accommodated at that time. Without realizing the repercussions, the state actors imposed Urdu over the vast diversity of language and culture. It gives rise to internal conflicts and demands for economic, political and ethnic rights on the basis of language (Ayres, 2009). The Hindi-Urdu controversy led to creation of India and Pakistan. In Pakistan the Urdu-Bengali divide created Bangladesh. The same pattern has been replicated within Pakistan by the denial of cultural differences and linguistic diversity. This denial is causing the rift and division between Urdu and other regional languages like

Pashto, Balochi, Sindhi and Seraiki. These regional languages are considered as a threat to the existence of the country (Ayres, 2009).

The Pakistan movement and then the creation of Pakistan owe to urban centers of the north-Indian of the subcontinent as the movement was started by Muslim elites of these urban centers of the north-India. Urdu was spoken by that class of urban Muslim elites. These Muslim elites then migrated to Pakistan after its creation. This class of Muslims was the most modernized and educated so naturally the leadership of the nation in different walks of life fell into their hands (Alavi, 1989). They became the potential core of the nation. This elite, educated and modern class ignored other regional languages. They focused on the promotion of urban culture and Urdu as the language of the state. From the very beginning the state has used different means for the promotion of this nationalistic agenda to tell the masses that the regional cultures and languages are rural and therefore cannot serve the purpose to take the nation towards Islamic modernity nor it can fulfill the purpose of the state as “fortress of Islam” in South Asian region (Toor, 2011). In the subsequent years the ruling elite of the country focused on the propagation of urban culture and the language (Urdu) associated with it. The propagation of Urdu language and culture in contrast to the languages spoken in the peripheries has caused a rural-urban divide in the country. Thus in the Pakistani nationalist project the rural areas imply indigenous culture which has been considered as superstitious, backward, primitive, based on oral traditions and hence under the effect of Hindus, while urban culture and language (Urdu) represent the culture of Islam, cosmopolitanism and modernity.

It is unfortunate that through nationalism scheme history is misinterpreted to have the desired objectives. For Pakistani nationalists the history starts with the invasion of Muhammad bin Qasim and culminates with the creation of Islamic state in the form of Pakistan. The Indus Valley and Gandhara civilizations are altogether vandalized and deliberately portrayed as un-Islamic (Toor, 2011). This kind of approach takes the focus from the original history and origin and links it with Arabic culture. This state sponsored nationalism is affecting all the ethnic groups in the country and Pakhtuns are also facing this imposed schema of the state.

As far as Pakhtuns are concerned, they themselves, their culture, language and history are more prone to state-sponsored nationalism. The Pakhtun ethno-nationalism and culture has been under observation by the state due to two solid reasons. Firstly, there is a historical

dispute over the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the subsequent claim by Afghanistan to own the territory inhabited by the Pakhtuns which were included in Pakistan after partition. Secondly, the Pakhtun ethno nationalists before and after partition have been striving for an independent Pakhtun State in the form of Greater Pakhtunistan (Haqqani, 2005); (Jalal, 1985). Due to the above mentioned reasons, the Pakhtun ethno-nationalism and culture has been the prime focal point for the Pakistani State and there is a systematic policy adopted by the state to distance Pakhtuns from their nationalistic pursuits. Pakistan ideology (Islam and Urdu Language) and Pakistani nationalism is a counter strategy to subjugate and eradicate Pakhtun nationalism which is considered as a threat to the former.

In British era, Pakhtuns were presented as savage, fierce and un-refined people (Raikes, 1858). They had their reasons as they were unable to conquer the regions of Pakhtuns so they sketched Pakhtuns exotic and alien to the people of subcontinent.

This representation of Pakhtuns continues till date in the post-colonial state of Pakistan on various levels. Currently if Pakhtuns are analyzed in the Pakistani nationalists' scheme, it turns out the Pakistani nationalists persisted with British legacy. These nationalists will have to present Pakhtuns in the same way to draw and to emphasize the contrast with refined urban Urdu-speaking genteel. In the state's nationalist scheme, Pakhtuns are looked down upon and teased to despise and dissuade them with their own culture and language. The purpose behind this is to urge them to shed off their own culture and language and to immerse themselves in the more refined urban Urdu-speaking nationalist culture.

Similarly, in the nationalist scheme of the state the role of Abdul Ghaffar Khan who was the pioneer of politics in Pakhtun belt and who is still considered as a national hero among Pakhtuns has been completely brushed off from the canvas of the history of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a province having Pakhtuns in majority. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and what he did for Pakhtuns is usually presented with negative connotations in the nationalist scheme of the state (Banerjee, 2000). He made an alliance with All India National Congress; a party that represents all the sections of the community of the subcontinent contrary to All India Muslim League. So, the character of Abdul Ghaffar Khan has been made controversial and his role biased in the eyes of Pakhtuns and onlookers too. His affiliation to All India National Congress did not benefit into the nationalist scheme of the state. His name has been projected as traitor in the state narrative. The denial of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai

Khidmatgar movement in the national history clearly projects that it is not compatible with the Pakistani nationalism.

This nation-building project undertakes every opportunity at hand to distort the Pakhtuns' history and memoirs with a concealed motive behind to draw away the young Pakhtuns from their legacy and to minimize the threat of revolt or any other organized movement. Pakistani nationalism and state-making process encompasses all the levels; if it is individual, social and generational. Pakistani nationalism and state-making process are inherently working on the disowning of religious, linguistics and culture variances rather than to accommodate them as diversity.

Chapter 4.

PAKHTUNS' CULTURAL RESPONSE TOWARDS STATE'S NATION BUILDING

The Pakistani state has adopted numerous approaches to integrate the Pakhtuns like other ethnicities of the country by imposing different schemes of nation building. The Pakhtuns on the other hand have responded and resisted in multiple ways to the nation-building project of the state. This chapter highlights the cultural response of Pakhtun nationalists towards various designs of state's nation building drive and how the Pakhtun nationalists have used the cultural components of Pakhtun society to resist the integrative and nation building initiative and to retain their distinctive cultural identity. The resistance of Pakhtun towards state's nation building and integration project ranges from using different cultural institutions to the usage of different cultural elements like art, literature and poetry in order to achieve their objective.

4.1 Resistance of Pakhtuns through Literature and Journalism

The frontier province has been blessed with natural beauty having a blend of stony terrain and untouched attractiveness. It has gained immense significance in different epochs and this has been comprehensively acknowledged by a number of historians and researchers in their writings. Even in the prehistoric era when different invaders made their way through hind or in later times from the northern pole, and all the other kings and emperors from the Islamic world who came here, have all passed through the historic gorges of the frontier province.

This living abode for Pakhtuns has remained a place where the desire and struggle for freedom has remained the primary motive of the people. The collective efforts of the people of this region have always been directed towards a struggle either for freedom or at other times, to retain their independence by fighting all the foreign intruders and for that reason alone, this region has always remained a place of great political turmoil almost in every age. Owing to these violent historical facts lesser literary and journalistic practices were carried out in this region. Nonetheless, the literary traditions which were established by people such as Bayazid Ansari, Khushal Khan Khattak, Rahman baba, and Akhon Darveza spoke not only of the sacrifices made by the people of this region and their love for national freedom of their region but also such traditions formed the basis for the expression of art and

knowledge in future. It is due to these primitive efforts that we can make an investigation into the outlines of journalistic and literary traditions in the region. Owing to multitudes of socio-political reasons which are peculiar to this region, life in the Frontier province was very different compared to the other regions of sub-continent. It was primarily dominated by Pakhtun nationalism coupled with religious zeal and it were these exhibits that could be traced in the very beginning of journalistic traditions in this region.

When we talk about the beginning of the journalism in the area with reference to its literary aspects and knowledge and news dissemination. This sort of journalism was pioneered by the British missionaries when they took total control of Indian Sub Continent. Their newspapers comprised of miscellaneous articles and editorials regarding knowledge, history, and geography, social issues along with religious teachings (Khursheed, 1963).

Following the British missionaries the Muslims of the North West province also started publishing different magazines and in the second half of the 19th century numerous magazines were launched. These include; Monthly Islam which was started in 1854 by Mian Abdul Ghafoor, Monthly *Pyam-e-Haq* which commenced in 1888 under Molvi Naseer Ahmad and a magazine by *Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam* the same name of the organization which was published in 1892 (Huma, 2006).

The previously mentioned magazines published in the later half of the 19th century from the Frontier Province did not give concrete shape to a more organized journalistic and literary magazines and newspapers. Rather they shaped only an outline but these journals and magazines had their own literary taste and they can also be perceived as pointing towards the literary tastes of the people at that time.

In the year 1903, Syed Abdullah Shah from Shedo Kalay, Nowshera, published the first monthly newspaper in Urdu by the name “Al-Akhlaaq”. In 1909, Syed Abdullah Shah began working on another Urdu-Pushto weekly journal by the name “Afghan.” Its publisher was Sayed Mehdi Ali Shah (Huma, 2006).

Almost no change was observed in this tradition in the first two decades of the 20th century and no such magazine is known to have come into limelight that could be given any serious regard as a purely literary journal. The prevailing orthodoxy at that time, in the published magazines and journals was the atmosphere of resistance in the journalistic traditions to instigate the people against colonization along with imparting religious teachings. These magazines and journals had little space for literary writings. These were strictly scrutinized

by the government and if any journal that sporadically discussed the lives of people and the problems they faced at the time, those journalistic voices were effectively silenced in the name of security and accountability. There was no freedom of expression in the Frontier province, and the popular voices of people were efficiently put down in a number of ways, for any new declaration to be accepted, extreme care and cautiousness was imminent. Publication of newspapers was practically banned even if there was freedom of press in theory and no newspaper was allowed into the Frontier province, and controversial newspapers were immediately confiscated by the authorities. Journalists were either imprisoned or ousted from the province. This was the modus operandi through which British authorities silenced the opinion of people and their freedom of expression.

The British authorities were fully aware of and dreaded the consequences of autonomous journalism in other parts of the subcontinent and for this reason they planned various strategies to ban the entry of newspapers into the Frontier province.

Another magazine was monthly *Sarhad* which was published in 1925 by Allah Bakhsh Yousafi and was considered notorious by the authorities. In 1926 a magazine in the name of Afghan was launched by Hakeem Azad Gul (Huma, 2006).

In May 1928, Abdul-Ghafar Khan who was famously known as Fakhre-e-Afghan began the issuance of a monthly magazine “Pakhtun” under the supervision of *Anjuman-i-Islaah-al-Afaghana* (Rafi, 2015), to educate his people, to keep them up to date on the global scenario, and to revert them towards their own language (Shah S. W., 2007). Abdul Ghafar Khan was the chief editor of Pakhtun while Muhammad Akbar Khadim worked as his deputy chief editor (Khaleeq, 1968; Rafi, 2015). Pakhtun was the first Pushto magazine at that time, and it published the poetry and works of all the renowned literary figures of that time. When Bacha Khan was imprisoned by British government in 1930, the publication of Pakhtun also halted. Its publication resumed in May 1931, and during its second period of publication Abdul Khaliq Khaleeq who was a renowned poet and author, was appointed as the chief editor of Pakhtun. He ensured its regular publication up until December, 1931 but after eight publications, its journey came to a halt again after Bacha Khan was imprisoned once again. The publication of Pakhtun began once again in 1934 but in 1941, when the authorities demanded bail outs from the owners of this magazines, its publication stopped once again owing to financial difficulties. In the year 1945, under the administration of Dr. Khan Sahib, the publication of Pakhtun began for the fourth time and its publication continued until the

creation of Pakistan. In 1947, the publication of *Pakhtun* was strictly banned by the government. After Khaliq Khaleeq, the responsibility of its editorship for a few months was held by Sarfaraz Khan (Khaleeq, 1968). The ban on *Pakhtun* was lifted in 1972 when National Awami Party (NAP) was in power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but before it started its new issue the government of NAP was terminated.

The general outlook and taste of *Pakhtun* journalism was political. News regarding Khudai Khidmatgar movement, speeches of Bacha Khan and translation of the speeches by the political figures of the country was regularly published in this journal. From time to time, different informative writings regarding literature, history, and research were also published in the magazine with a motive of reformation. Bacha Khan was personally interested in the publication of *Pakhtun* magazine. His hujra in Utmanzai was the head office of this magazine which was later transferred to Sardaryaab. *Pakhtun* magazine was a major source of information at that time and awareness raising, and has to this day left everlasting traces on the annals of *Pakhtun* journalistic literature.

Another famous weekly *Angaar* began its journey of publication in 1930. In 1931 weekly *Sailab* started its publication. It was a political magazine of the *Pakhtun* revolutionary inclinations. Sanobar Hussain Momand, who was later known as *Kaka Ji* in the *Pakhtun* literary circles, was the chief editor of the weekly *Sailab*. In 1932 Rahat Zaakheli started publishing the monthly *Starry-Ma-Shai*. The publication of another monthly magazine *Azaad Pakhtun* began in March 1933 (Rafi, 2015), under the supervision of Afghan Literary Jirga. Mian Ahmad Shah bar-at-law was the custodian of this *Azaad Pakhtun* while Khan Mir Hilali, Abdul Akbar Khan, and Mian Jaffar Shah were the people who ensured its publication (Huma, 2006).

Khan Mir Hilali, a well-known name in the world of *Pakhtun* journalism, began the publication of weekly magazine by the name *Jamhoriyat* in 1934.

During those days another weekly magazine *Rahbar* was launched. Its publication was actuated from Mardan in 1936 by Mohammad Safdar Khan Sadiq. In 1937 its office was shifted to Peshawar (Rafi, 2015).

The people who were associated with these journals had adopted journalism as a profession at that time, almost no one could not be termed as a working journalist in a formal sense, because all of them were poets and literary figures who through these magazines and through their writings achieved their goal of an ideological revolution (Huma, 2006).

4.1.1 Pashto Journals after the Partition

After partition the publication of numerous Pashto journals started while some of the journals published in the pre-partition period continued their publication. The main focus of this portion is to highlight the operation of those newspapers and magazines which were active in promoting Pakhtun identity and Pashto literature and opposed government policies of the nation building. The editors of these journals used literature as a cultural genre to resist the nation building policies of the state. There were certain journals which were published in Pashto immediately after the partition but they did not criticize the unjust policies of the state towards regional languages. These include weekly *Insaf* (1947) by Abdul Haleem Asar and *Al-Saadiqa* (1948) by Haji Muhammad Amin (Huma, 2006).

Some of the famous Pashto journals which strived for the propagation of Pashto literature and language are given below:

4.1.1.1 Monthly Aslam (1950)

One of the most respectful radical supporters of the Freedom Movement and a renowned literary figure, Sanobar Hussain Momand who was famously known as *Kaka Jee*, inaugurated the publication of a Pushto literature journal, known as Aslam, from Peshawar in 1950. Every edition of this magazine had normally 40 pages in length, published on a paper which resembled that of a newspaper and with a very simple front page. Its publication was made possible by the donation made in *Olası Adabi Jirga* (National Literary Jirga).

The publication policy of this magazine was quite evident from writings published in this magazine which was to work for the growth and development of Pashto and Pashto literature. Sanobar Hussain Momand, as a writer, followed the progressive school of thought in literature and considered literature as a source for the reawakening of the people and something which could galvanize an ideological revolution in them. That is why, not only his own literary works were a depiction of life itself, but he also encouraged his fellow literary figures in their respective literary practices. Owing to these reasons, Aslam was a true reflection of Sanobar Hussain Momand's literary farsightedness. The writings published in Aslam had no permanent or pre-planned titles but it comprised of different literary articles, theoretical write-ups, stories and fables, Ghazals, poems, and account of *Mushairas* (poetry sessions) that were extensively published in it. All these writings presented different challenges faced by the people and it reflected a true picture of all the ebbs and tides of life. Aslam made sincere efforts for the literary grooming of all the young

writers of that time and provided much needed intellectual support to uplift their works. It also prompted classical poets of the age towards tackling different aspects of modern-day life (Huma, 2006).

Various prosaic and poetic creations of both old and new writers like Dost Muhammad Khan Kamil, Hamza Khan Shinawari, Samandar Khan Samnadar, Qalandar Momand, Hassan Khan Soz, Qamar Rahi, and Hamesh Khalil, found place on the pages of Aslam.

4.1.1.2 Monthly Laar⁵ (1954)

In May 1955, Muhammad Muzaffar Khan Zafar, inaugurated the publication of monthly magazine “Laar,” from Peshawar. Wali Mohammad Khan Toofan was the first chief editor of Laar (Rafi, 2015). Qalandar Momand also remained its chief editor for some time, however, from the year 1959 till the time publication of *Laar* halted, the responsibility of its editorship was assumed by Muzaffar Khan Zafar himself (Huma, 2006).

Laar continued its publication for more or less six years, and during these years it worked sincerely with its outstanding motive to work for the glorification of Pashto language and literature. It provided a space to both old and new, poetic and prosaic literary creations of its time.

Owing to its radical stance on various national issues, Manzoor General Press apologized from its publication and due to this reason, for a short period of time, there was a gap in its publication which soon resumed. From time to time, it published special and memorable editions such as Sameen Jan Khan Number, Rahman Baba Number, Tanqeed Number etc. After Muzaffar Khan Zafar was imprisoned, the publication of *Laar* was also halted in 1961 and hence, this magazine became part of the history of Pakhtun journalistic literature.

4.1.1.3 Monthly Nangyalay⁶ (1957)

The publication of monthly *Nangyalay* began in April 1957, from Peshawar. Its first edition had 40 pages. But later it shrank due to limited information. Ashraf Durrani and Qalandar Momand were the first chief editors of *Nangyalay* but when women were allowed to work for this magazine, Mubarak Sultana Shameem also became part of its team, and she was later joined by Sabira Sultana. Ashraf Durrani remained the chief editor of this magazine from its inauguration till the time its publication stopped.

⁵ Pashto word *laar* means pathways.

⁶ Pashto word *nangyalay* means a person who possess valor and bravery.

Nangyalay was a literary journal and the addition of a feminine section to this magazine along with the participation of women in its editorial team was the first big achievement in the history of journalistic literature and this experiment was very successful.

In the beginning, Nangyalay did not clearly disclose the motives behind its promulgation, but in its 10th edition, this magazine discussed its publication policy in the following words,

“Nangyalay has always made efforts for the betterment of Pushto language and literature, for Pakhtun unification, in other words, to bring unity among the Pakhtuns and to inculcate in their hearts, love for each other, rather than hatred. We will try our level best to achieve these goals and that Nangyalay shall be the representative of all factions of Pakhtuns” (Huma, 2006).

For the achievement of these objectives, Nangyalay provided a platform for the publication of high quality content in it. Creative writings in both poetry and prose including informative and intuitive writings, research articles, stories and fables, ghazals, and poems have always amplified the literary beauty of Nangyalay.

As mentioned earlier, the participation of women in the publication of Nangyalay was a novel idea in Pashto journal writing tradition, and was a step totally unprecedented in the history of Pushto Journalistic literature. In this section, the literary creations of women were published, and it also discussed the challenges faced by them. A special edition by the name “د ښځو کلونه” (Anniversary of Mistresses/women) is the most advanced and novel experimentation in the history of not only this magazine but also the whole of Pushto Journal writing tradition. “Khaas Number” and “Pakhtun Number” also were its other two special publications.

Almost all the well-known writers of that time were accomplices of this magazine through their writings. This high quality magazine stopped its publication journey after more or less 3 years.

4.1.1.4 Weekly Daoraan⁷ (1957)

Daoraan was a weekly magazine of nearly 500 pages, but then its publication became fortnightly. The first edition of *Daoraan* was published from Peshawar, under the supervision of Hamesh Khalil in January 1957. Its owner was Imdad Kiyani. Pakhto and Pakhtun values were the basic motives running through its publication policy and the prime aim behind the

⁷*Daoraan* is also Pashto word which means reign.

publication of this magazine was declared in the following words, in its first edition under the title “ډيري”,

“To keep the spirit of the people alive and the preservation of their language, culture, civilization, and their way of life is the most modest immediate responsibility of this magazine. For the enlightenment of the people, the most primary task was to ensure the progress and development of Pushto literature” (Rafi, 2015).

In its first edition, Daoraan ensured its full support on the grounds of Journalism, to all the political factions working for the betterment of Pushto and Pakhtun values. Later, in its write-ups, it provided a wonderful blend of literature and nationalistic political ideology.

The writings which were regularly published in Daoraan were Literary and research oriented articles, critical essays, stories, dramas and plays, poems, and ghazals. Along with that, a commentary on the current affairs, writings which would inculcate nationalistic consciousness among the Pakhtuns, as well as different scientific and historical information were also provided in this magazine.

Almost all the great writers of that age pledged the allegiance with Daoraan, and this magazine provided space to their creation of poetry and prose with great love and respect. The publication journey of Daoraan continued for one year, but in February 1959 this standard journal ended its journey (Huma, 2006).

4.1.1.5 Monthly Qand⁸ (1957)

Qand was another famous magazine which was inaugurated by the Premier Sugar Mills Mardan in 1957 (Rafi, 2015; Huma, 2006). Qamar Rahi remained its long time editor and he made great efforts to turn it one of the greatest papers of its times. Qand was initially published in three languages; English, Urdu and Pashto but later on the Pashto section became a separate paper (Rafi, 2015). Famous Pashto writers and poets of those times used to write for Qand. It contained various genres of Pashto literature ranging from poetry to prose.

4.1.1.6 Khpalwak⁹ (1958)

Khpalwak was a fortnightly magazine and its publication began in November 1958, from Peshawar. Abdul-Ghafoor started publication of Khpalwak, out of his extreme love and

⁸Qand means sweets

⁹Khpalwak is a Pashto word which means autonomy in a political scheme of words.

passion for the betterment of Pushto language and literature. This was in spite the fact he had no great expertise as a journalist (Rafi, 2015), nor did he enjoy much reputation among the literary circles. A renowned Pushto poet Saif-ur-Rehman Saleem assumed the role of its editorship and later this responsibility fell on the shoulders of Abdullah Jan Maghmom. The only motive behind the publication of Khpalwak was to serve Pushto language and literature. In its editorials, the paper repeatedly prompted the Pukhtun readers to work for the betterment of their own language and literature because no nation of the world could achieve success without enhancing their language (Huma, 2006).

Writings on various topics such as poetry and prose, scientific information, and all major issues of the region were regularly published in this magazine. Almost all the major poets and authors of the age had an alliance with Khpalwak. Its publication was delayed many times because of financial estrangements while on other occasions two of its editions were published simultaneously. The last edition of Khpalwak was published in October 1961 (Huma, 2006), and its publication voyage of two years ended in the same month.

4.1.1.7 Monthly Jwand¹⁰ (1958)

The publication of monthly Jwand began in October, 1958 from Peshawar. This magazine which was in the form of a booklet had 144 pages (Rafi, 2015). Muhammad Amin Amin and Shahzad Khan Johar were the chief editors of Jwand, however after two years this responsibility fell solely on the shoulders of Muhammad Amin Amin.

In the first edition of Jwand, its publication policy has been declared in the following lines,

“Our main objective is the betterment of Pushto language, literature and art along with the glorification of Pakhtun nation. We cannot proclaim whether we would succeed in achieving these objectives or not, but we hope that we shall be given a fair chance of serving Pushto literature and we will try our level best to prove our credentials in serving Pushto language and literature” (Rafi, 2015).

For the achievement of these mentioned objectives, *Jwand* continued its publication for five years to serve the language and literature. *Jwand* provided space to pure literary write-ups i.e creative literary writings in different genres of prose such as stories, novels, and plays and other associated literary outputs with it such as informative articles, Ghazals, poems, and short-stories. Various other types of writings on different knowledgeable and

¹⁰Pashto word Jwand means life.

informative topics such as those from history, essays written by famous historical figures, book reviews, and critical passages were also published in this magazine (Rafi, 2015).

The publication of Jwand continued till October 1963, after which this literary magazine became part of the history of Pakhtun journalistic literature.

4.1.1.8 Monthly/Weekly Ghuncha¹¹ (1960)

Ghuncha began its journey in April 1960 as a monthly magazine consisting of forty pages and it turned into a weekly magazine in the same year more material on various topics piled up. Its size was increased while its length shrank to 20 pages. The publication journey of Ghuncha is divided into two phases. Its first phase ended on 22nd June, 1961. The owner of this magazine in its first phase was Hafeez Quraishi while the responsibility of chief editorship was with Wali Muhammad Toofan (Rafi, 2015), and to assign him that post, his name was printed as the “Gardner”, which goes with the name of this magazine Ghuncha (Meaning bunch of Flower). The editorship of some of last few editions of Ghuncha during its first phase was done by Qalandar Momand. The publication motives of Ghuncha during its first phase was to work for the betterment of Pushto language and literature and to revive nationalism among the masses.

The second phase of publication of Ghuncha was also very brief, beginning in 1969 and after six months of publication, its journey ended in July 1970. During this second phase, Khan Bahadar Khan Advocate was the managing editor of this magazine, Sayed Mehdi Shah Mehdi was selected as the editor, while Hafeez Qureshi remained the manager in charge of this magazine. Ghuncha was basically a political journal and it was the prime representative of the Pakhtun nationalism. Even though, the first phase of its publication was dominated with writings reflecting culture and literature, but nonetheless, these writings also depicted the political influences of Pakhtun nationalism. During its second period of publication, these nationalistic political inclinations are even more evident in its write-ups.

Ghuncha, has declared its aspirations in the first edition of its publication, in the following words,

“Ghuncha has found this opportunity once again to work for the betterment of Pakhtun nation, literature, culture and civilization, for the consolidation of this country and its safety and security, for a complete democracy, for economic equality, for an independent foreign policy, to have fruitful relationship with the

¹¹Ghuncha is a Pashto word which means a bunch (mostly of flowers or fruits).

neighboring countries, to fight against all forms of oppressions done to the masses and to take major steps towards a peaceful environment dominated by love, harmony and peace which will ensure the fulfillment of all these mentioned objectives”(Huma, 2006).

For the actuation of all these mentioned goals, Ghuncha gave space to write ups on a wide range of topics under the titles like; Independence and Writers, “Do not disgrace your nation,” “Who got the independence,” “Khudai Khidmatgar Movement,” “Belittling the Pakhtun culture” etc.

غځای خدتمگار، “آزادي چا خستې ده”، “پښتونک افستپوري خندا”، “ضلوقام مشر موی”، “آزادي اويابان” (تحريک)

Ghazals, stories, poems, plays, and other intricate literary samples could also be found in Ghuncha, but all these poetic and prose creations were the reflection of Pakhtun nationalistic zeal. Ghuncha was memorable magazine and it was a nice blend of literature and the politics of Pakhtun nationalism, which played a major role in the annals of Pakhtun journalistic literature during its publication period.

4.1.1.9 Monthly Lekwal¹² (1963)

The first edition of monthly Lekwal was issued by Abdul Rehman Shaba in November 1963 from Peshawar. This brief journal of nearly 40 pages was actuated for the improvement of Pushto language and literature. Lekwal was a short lived literary journal and its journey ended in January 1964, after publication of only three editions. High standard poetic and prose creations were published in the editions of Lekwal, because almost all the major writers of that age had an alliance with magazine out of great love and respect.

4.1.2 Contemporary Pashto Papers and Their Struggle

Currently there are numerous Pashto daily newspapers published in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which are a source for the revival of Pashto language. Some of them are:

4.1.2.1 Daily Khabroona¹³

This paper was established in 2003 and its publication started from Peshawar. Sohail Shamshad is the editor of daily Khabroona.

According to Shamim Shahid, a renowned journalist in Peshawar, Pakhtun Post, *Ittehad* are other newspapers of Pashto language. Daily *Shahbaz* has a section for Pashto writings. It

¹²Lekwal is a Pashto word which means writer.

¹³Khabroona is a Pashto word which means news.

has writings of Pakhtun history, politics and poetry. Another Pashto newspaper is daily *Wahdat* but its stuff is largely in harmony with the state policy and programs and it was a major medium for the state to propagate its policy through this paper.

Apart from this there are various monthly and quarterly magazines. According to the famous writer Faisal Faran (Swabi), presently there are four prominent Pashto magazines which are published in the province. They are monthly *Leekwal*, *Pakhtun*, *Fanoos* and *Naway Ghag*.

4.1.2.2 Monthly Lekwal

Monthly *Lekwal* started its publication in March 1992 and Noor-ul-Bashar Naveed became its Chief Editor. According to Shehzad Alam there were some other prominent names like Rehmat Shah Sail, professor Shahjahan, Ismat Shahjahan and Zakir Hussain who played a significant role in its publication. This period of publication continued till April 1994. The next epoch of the paper started in January 1995 and it continued till March 1997 when it received notice from the Governor of the province for discontinuation and it was banned in 1998. Its present journey of publication resumed in March 2003 under the editorship of Noor-ul-Bashar Naveed and with the financial assistance from Afrasiyab Khattak. Its publication continued till date and diverse topics about present-day Pakhtun problems, their history, society, literature and nationalism are published in it. It is pertinent to mention that in all the stages of its publication the famous writer Noor-ul-Bashar Naveed remained its editor. It is a great source of propagating the counter narrative of Pakhtuns against the state narrative.

4.1.2.3 Monthly Pakhtun

The monthly *Pakhtun* started its present-day publication in January 2006 from Bacha Khan Markaz (ANP central office) under the editorship of famous poet Rehmat Shah Sayil. *Pakhtun* served as a major forum for the propagation of Pakhtun nationalism. *Pakhtun* publishes writings on many aspects of Pakhtun culture and society. It has been writing about history, translations of various English books into Pashto, poetry, national and international politics, Pakhtuns' problems etc. In 2017 Hayat Roghani became its editor and its circulation also increased. According to Hayat Roghani its circulation has crossed 5 thousand copies. Currently it publishes articles of diverse topics on Pakhtun culture, art, literature and history.

4.1.2.4 Quarterly Fanoos¹⁴

Fanoos is another famous quarterly Pashto Magazine which is published from Mardan under the editorship of Aftab Gulbanr. Its first issue published was in 2018 (January to March).

4.1.2.5 Naway Ghag¹⁵

It is another contemporary Pashto paper which is published every two months. Its chief editor is Zubair Uqaab and co-editor is Sadiq Ameen. Its first issue was published for the months of November-December 2017 and continues till present. It publishes writings on various aspects of Pakhtun society and culture and serves as an inspiring source for the propagation of Pashto literature.

The above mentioned details of Pashto papers shows that Pakhtuns in both pre and post partition period have worked for the propagation of their language and identity. Though both the colonial and the subsequent Pakistani regimes have tried to suppress their voice but the Pakhtun writers and literary people have remained steadfast and have resisted every move of the state to quash their culture and identity.

During my fieldwork when I asked about the content and nature of Pashto literature from a vast majority of the respondents who said that Pashto literature and poetry propagates Pakhtun nationalism instead of Pakistani nationalism. There is a very minute and unpopular portion of Pashto literature which is in favor of the state sponsored nationalism and the common people are unaware of it. The writers and poets usually have written about Pakhtun identity, culture and glorification of Pashto language instead of larger Pakistani identity and Urdu language. The Pashto poets and writers have admired indigenous Pakhtun leaders and heroes instead of state acclaimed heroes. A renowned Pashto poet Aziz Manerwal from Swabi told me that Pashto literature is about Pakhtu, Pakhtunwali and Pakhtun history. You would hear the names of Khushaal Khattak, Ahmad Shah Abdali, and Bacha Khan but you will not find Chaudhry Rehmat Ali and Liaqat Ali Khan in Pashto literature/poetry.
پښتو ادب او کتایب پښتانه د چت لویي قلمچي خان او چوهدري رحمت علي پي دان کړي،
تاله به مخیله د احمد شاه ابلباد خوش حال بیا او باچا اهن بلبان وم درخي"

He further said that majority of the Pakhtun writers and poets are Pakhtun nationalists as they love their language, history and identity. He said that our language is like our mother.

¹⁴Fanoos is a Pashto word which means chandelier.

¹⁵Naway in Pashto means new and Ghag means voice, so it means new voice.

To sum up we can say that the Pashto papers and magazines played a significant role in the formation of Pakhtun identity. Most of the times the content published in these Pashto papers were of political nature, hence it boosted the political awareness of the people. These genres of Pashto text were instrumental in highlighting the problems of Pakhtuns' society and for recommending solution for the problems. It gave knowledge to the masses about their distinct history and culture. Simultaneously it served as medium of propagation of Pakhtun nationalism and a medium to counter state sponsored nationalism/ narrative. Most of these Pashto papers were banned and fined by the state in the pretext of threat to the "national interests" and state ideology. The writers and the owners of these papers also faced severe repression from the state authorities in the form of incarcerations and financial losses. Though the state is powerful and possesses all the economic and logistic resources like the control of media for the propagation of its "national agenda" nonetheless these Pashto papers are still countering the state narrative and are producing a counter narrative of Pakhtuns.

4.2 Pakhtuns' Poetic Resistance against the State's Nationalism

As mentioned in the initial pages, Pakistani nationalism is based on the postulation of "one nation" holding Islam as the common religion and Urdu as the national language. This policy of the state is primarily based on the denial of regional ethnic identities and multi-nationalities. The ruling elite from the very beginning has supported and propagated Urdu language and this policy has been resisted by the regional ethnic groups (Rahman, 1995). These regional ethnic groups while resisting the homogenization policy of the state have presented an antithesis of heterogeneity/diversity based on regional ethnic identities and languages. Though the regional language movements started with the advent of colonization in the sub-continent (Rahman T. , 1997), it continued after the partition as the post-colonial state was also carrying on the old policy of the denial of regional languages and identities. In these language movements the political leaders were mainly supported and assisted by poets and writers. These poets challenged the state's mighty policy and struggled for the revival of their own ethnic identity and language.

The poetic resistance has remained a dominant strategy from very early ages in India and Pakistan. In these areas, the poetry attracts both the educated and the uneducated common people. Historical evidences show that it served as a leading tool in resisting the prevailing unjust social and political structure of the society. Poetry over the years has become a mighty voice against the rulers and foreign aggressors who tried to suppress and subjugate the

masses. The resistance theme in Pashto poetry has its roots in Mughal era when Khushal Khan Khattak wrote poetry to resist and fight against the powerful Mughal Empire. The major wave of nationalistic and resistance poetry in Pashto came during the colonial period under the banner of the Khudai Khidmatgar¹⁶ movement of Abdul Ghaffar Khan alias Bacha Khan. This movement created many poets and writers who played a major role in propagating Pakhtun identity and resisting the colonial powers. These poets/ political workers faced incarcerations and state brutalities but they remained steadfast. The poets of this nationalist movement were instrumental in spreading the importance of Pashto language as an identity marker and resisting the colonial empire. These poets along with their successors in the post-colonial state of Pakistan continued to resist the “One Nation” and “One Language” scheme imposed by the ruling elite.

4.2.1 Understanding the Poetic Resistance

In response to the state’s integration project the people in the peripheral areas of the country like Pakhtuns were involved in resisting the state nationalism through cultural ways. Culture acts as unifying agent of the society and it produces integrity among the members of the society. It also serves as the basis for political activity and hence it is also very much political. Culture can also be used by power structure as a means of control and it can also be used by the people to challenge the dominant political and economic structure or the hegemonic and powerful ruling elite (Duncombe, 2002).

In South Asian context poetry has remained a dominant form of public expression. This form of literature has played an important role against colonialism and internal oppression. Nazneen Ahmed (2014) says that poetry in post-colonial societies has worked as a popular style of communication. It may take a national form like in the case of Bangladesh when in 1971 it was used as an important tool in the separation movement. Nazneen argues that it is the poetic expression that is easily available and understandable to the masses in lesser developed societies where oral traditions play a dominant role. In South Asia, the social gatherings which involve poetry recitation programs (*Mushaira*) and musical execution of poetry has remained a widespread public practice where due to illiteracy the reading aptitudes of the people are limited. This thesis of the author is very much applicable to the local cultures in Pakistan where *Mushairas* are extremely popular across the different sections of the society.

¹⁶Translated as Servants of God or Red Shirts

James Scott in his work 'Weapons of the Weak' discusses cultural resistance in contrast to direct and armed resistance against the powerful people (Scott, 1985). Public transcripts, is a terminology used by the author in this study and it is a conduct or speaking style used to resist the powerful ruling class and is also relevant to the poetic resistance.

This poetic resistance as a cultural tool has been historically also used by Pakhtuns to resist the external and internal oppression. The tool of cultural resistance and poetry was systematically used by the Khudai Khidmatgar movement against the colonial powers and this legacy continues till date.

According to Tariq Rahman (1996), the Khudai Khidmatgar movement played a major role in creating the sense of importance of culture and language among Pakhtuns. This non-violent movement was also instrumental in producing several figures like artists, writers, poets who propagated Pakhtun identity and culture through their writings and works.

Mukulika Banerjee (2000) argues about the role of Khudai Khidmatgar movement and its leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the formation of Pakhtun identity. According to her, Abdul Ghaffar Khan strived for Pakhtun identity by promoting Pashto language and literature. The Pashto language and literature were also used as tools for Pakhtun nationalism against the colonialists.

In the current study, the poetry of six poets has been selected and the resistance themes in their poetry have been analyzed.

4.2.2 Pashto Poetry and Literature in Colonial Era

Though people were engaged with the poetry and literature before the arrival of the colonial powers, the main influx of revolutionary poets came with the advent of colonization and the subsequent birth of Khudai Khidmatgar movement. This movement strived for the promotion of Pashto language. The poetic resistance became the hallmark of this movement. The poets and writers associated with this movement through their poetry and writings created a sense of identity and nationalism among Pakhtuns and hence resisted the policies of colonial powers. In 1928 Abdul Ghaffar Khan started the Pashto monthly newspaper/journal *Pakhtun*, in which the writers and the poets would publish their writings and poetry (Shah, 2007). The dissemination of *Pakhtun* helped in creating awareness among the literate people about the problems being faced by the Pakhtuns.

Apart from this magazine, the poets would narrate their poetry in the public gatherings of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement which would create enthusiasm among the common

people and would prepare them for the fight against the colonial powers to liberate their homeland.

One of the leading figures among that time was Maulana Fazle Mehmood Makhfi who was born in 1884. Makhfi was among the pioneers who created a sense of nationalism and unity among the Pakhtuns (Buneri, 2017). This man was also among those few people who laid the foundation of *Anjuman e Islahul Afaghana*¹⁷ with Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The *Azad Madrassas* (schools) were established under the banner of this organization to spread education among Pakhtuns. The students in these Azad Schools used to sing the anthems and poems written by Makhfi (Buneri, 2017). It shows that his poetry was a major tool in creating sense of nationalism and patriotism among the youth and school children. Makhfi transformed the Pashto poetry from superficial romanticism to nationalistic revolutionary poetry. The following lines show his love for Pakhtuns.

ز هډقو په غم ژوند يم دغه غم مې په زړه ښکاري وي
په خيگر سر وړ له دې مې کښې اور مې دې نېل وي
خداي ه لسې سخت به راشي چې زه زړه زه ازبه هم وي
زه به نجل جرړي لېسې يې په بڼه زه داوکول وي
اے زما ننگي القوم! وخت د زنگ او د سرپالی دے
چې نجل قوم نه کړي پنا مه ن ن هرقوم پ ز نگیالی دے (Buneri, 2017)

I am living on the grief of my nation; this pain has always been in my heart;

My chest is injured due to it; fire is flaring in my head due to it;

Oh God, commence the time; when we will have our own aircraft;

I would follow my own commander; to carry out attack on the enemy;

Oh my brave nation; it is a time of the bravery and competition;

Don't denigrate yourself; as every nation is upholding the valor.

¹⁷Organization for the reforms of Afghans. It was a predecessor organization of the KhudaiKhidmatgar.

When the above mentioned organization (*anjuman*) was banned by the colonial authorities, he gave the idea of forming another organization in the name of Khudai Khidmatgar in 1929 (Buneri, 2017). Abdul Ghaffar Khan in his autobiography has praised Makhfi and argues that I am very much inspired by this man. The poems which Makhfi had written show his love for his nation and the motherland. He wanted his motherland to be liberated from the rule of foreign aggressors.

ز مڼو ږ نځي و والي حج ره	خڼ ده ته ډونه كړي
سپينټو لى ه خوره	يو خڼ ځي پكښ ي د ځل كړي
د پيل اوبې لپښت و نلره	يو زړي وس اهي و شل ي كړي
په غر ټپس ټپت و درنو	لهي و ټپو سپينټو
راځئ چې وي و شولي ونو	نم سو دل هي پوگنو
سپهر مليت و نلر هديره	يللوي ه خدي ه ورن كړي
يا خدي ملي و كړي دا زمان	ز مڼو ږ ل ممل ك ن ه دښ منان
ز مڼو ږ تقام ز مڼو ږ د ځان	په مڼو ږ كړي ز مڼو ږه ځان
(Khan K. A., 2012) سپينټو ټور متي اره	رڼا ز مڼو ږ له ځل كړي

O' Lord fabricate; the Hujra of our unity;
 Put them together; the group of scattered Pakhtuns;
 Make them one heart one soul; these segregated Pakhtuns;
 O' Great tribes of Pakhtuns; occupying plains and mountains with dignity;
 The grandsons of great ancestors; let's be united;
 O' God destroy; the abode of severance;
 The enemies from our country; O' God! Take out them immediately;
 Give us our very own ruler; from our nation, from our own blood;
 Enlighten from your own treasures; the darkness of the Pakhtuns.

There were other prominent poets who were his contemporary and remained alive after partition would be mentioned in the coming lines.

4.2.3 Pashto Poetic Resistance after Partition

The first half of 20th century saw rise of nationalist movements around the world. These movements were very common among the colonized nations. Pakistan emerged as a consequence of “Muslim Nationalism”, the basic pillars of which were Islam and Urdu language. Contradictory to Pakistani nationalism, the Pakhtun nationalism in its nature was secular and focused on regional language of Pashto. The Khudai Khidmatgar movement was considered as a regional plot of the Bolsheviks by the colonial powers due to the red color of their uniform.

The political activities of this Pakhtun nationalist movement were closely observed and monitored by the colonial authorities. Pashto which was used as a symbol of Pakhtun nationalism by Ghaffar Khan was also tainted with these disloyal and rebellious perceptions by the ruling class (Rahman, 1995).

This policy of suspicion and mistrust of Pakhtun nationalists and nationalism was inherited by the newly born Pakistani state and this new state continued with the same strategy of its predecessor by suppressing regional identities and movements.

The Pakhtuns have revered liberty as their cultural heritage and a vital quality of their tribal structure. Due to this cultural virtue they opposed the British colonialism and the later oppressive regimes of Pakistan after partition. The Pakhtuns who have remained distrustful of the central government historically henceforth, in Pashto poetic discourse the state becomes a symbol of domination and oppression.

The early years of the Pakistani state proved to be tough and pitiless for the Pakhtun nationalist movement. This was because the reluctance of the Pakhtun nationalist to join Pakistan during partition. A few weeks ago before the partition, the Pakhtun nationalist demanded a separate homeland for Pakhtuns in the name of Pakhtunistan. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his fellows rejected the partition plan and demanded that a third option of Pakhtunistan¹⁸ should be included in the partition plan for the Pakhtuns. Failing to convince the authorities, the Pakhtun nationalists boycotted the referendum of 1947 (Shah S. W., 2007). This anger with the new state was intensified when the central government of Pakistan dislodged the provincial government of Dr. Khan Sahib¹⁹. The subsequent years witnessed the harsh treatment of the state towards Pakhtun nationalists including literary

¹⁸A proposed name for the separate country of Pakhtuns of the Subcontinent.

¹⁹ He was the elder brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Chief Minister of the then NWFP.

figures and poets. Many of them were incarcerated and tortured by the newly formed state. The Babarra²⁰ massacre which happened on 12 August 1948 was a noteworthy event of those days in which many of Pakhtun nationalists and followers of Ghaffar Khan were martyred (Franck, 1952).

Though Ghaffar Khan offered his services to work with the newly formed government but the Muslim League leadership in the province seemed unwilling to accept him and they continued with the same policy of considering him as disloyal. The poets of this era highlighted the brutality of the state as well as they struggled for the creation of a new state in the name of Pakhtunistan. The poets of this period were mainly those people who were politically active before partition in Khudai Khidmatgar movement.

There were numerous other poets who were active during the period of partition but for the present section only two of them have been focused. These poets were Abdul Malik Fida, and Ghani Khan.

Abdul Malik Fida was born in village Prang of district Charsadda in 1897. This man was also a proactive member of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. Though he was not properly educated in a school but his poetry and thoughts were very much enlightened and revolutionary and it was due to his association and companionship with other members of Khudai Khidmatgar movement that he gained prominence (Buneri, 2017). Abdul Malik Fida faced many imprisonments but he remained loyal, resisting the ruling elite through his poetry both before and after partition. Regarding the Babarra massacre which happened after one year of the creation of Pakistan in which hundreds of Khudai Khidmatgars were massacred he wrote a famous poem. In this poem he mentioned the atrocities of Pakistani state. A few lines of this poem are given below.

کفن ټپ ټرڅځېشې ډسړيالۍ ټيدانله ځم ه
مرگي ه مه رايه درځم ه

سرپ ټټي ټځېشې ډ . ډبارله ورم ه
مرگي ه مه رايه درځم ه (Fida, 2004)

Carrying the coffin, I am going to the front line;
do not bother to come, O' death! I am
coming to you, prepared to give up my life, I am going to see my Allah;
Do not bother to come, O' death! I am coming to you.

²⁰Babarra is the name of a village in district Charsadda.

پہ چارسدکشنی واپلا ده دَ غدارن وپری صلا ده
 پفس فروش وکبلا ده زه دَ خلیق امسر په مرگسری لیکوم ه
 مرگیه مه راعه درخمه

There is moaning in Charsadda;
 agreed upon by the unfaithful;
 the fate of Karbala is the fate of sacrifice
 I am following my nation in facing seekers;
 the death;
 Do not bother to come, O' death! I am coming to you.

بیاد وطنپه خاوره جنگ دے
 مورے ورخمه زره مهیتنگ دے
 مرگیه مه راعه درخمه
 بنکله ے یدان دنام ورننگ دے
 پہ بخله خاور خپلی ینیتوی ومه

Once again there is war waged on our motherland;
 It is a magnificent battlefield in the defense of dignity and honor;
 I am impatient, O' mother! It is the time to depart;
 for the sake of my homeland, I am shedding my blood;
 Do not bother to come, O' death! I am coming to
 you!

سرری جامیراکره زما موری
 نوم ینیتون دپه ملپوری
 سرراته کچوره سترگیتوری
 پہ پینتنه خاور خپل سرقیل ومه
 مرگیه مه راعه درخمه

O' mother! Give me my red clothes;
 comb my hair through brushing and place kohl in my eyes;
 People call me a Pakhtun;
 I am going to sacrifice my life for the sake of Pakhtun land;
 Do not bother to come, O' death! I am coming to you.

پاکستان اور پیفونو
 دوی دَخ داش و تق و مونو
 مره زخمان اوکرلپ نورگنو
 یوظلم نه دے زفہ کوم کوجیادومہ
 مرگیه مه راعه درخمه

The greedy forces of Pakistan;
 Killed and injured thousands of people;
 The other nations are laughing at them (Pakhtuns);
 There are multiple stories of brutalities which one would I mention;
 Do not bother to come, O' death! I am coming to
 you;

په آخرت چه ربقضی شی
 وار نشیید او دَخ ازی شی
 پفتفاع ترسول راضی شی
 زفہ غیلسین ه دَخ خطی په مَخشی برده
 مرگیه مه راعه درخمه

On the Day of Judgment when God will be the judge;
 The Prophet (SAW) will agree to plead;
 When the turn of martyrs and fighters will come;
 I will beg before God to see my bullet-riddled body;
 Do not bother to come O' death! I am coming to you.

عالم الکه خ ان فدا کره
 نوے ژون دونقامل میاد کره
 پوت ه دَخ حقی وه صدا کره
 که خطی راضی شی سفا رشبده کیونه

(Fida, 2004) مرگیه مه راعه درخمه

O' Abdul Malik, give sacrifice of your life;
 Raise a jingle of honesty;
 Grant a new life to your people;
 If God willing, he will plead for you;
 Do not bother to come, O' death! I am coming to you.

These lines show the brutality of the state that how it killed innocent citizens. This poem also depicts the steadfastness and resistance of the poet who condemned and resisted the

mighty ruling elite. His poetry before partition was focused on the liberty of his people from foreigners while after partition he condemned and resisted internal colonization in the name of national integration. According to Dr. Sohail Khan, the renowned academician, Abdul Malik Fida was an illiterate God gifted poet with intrinsic power and strength. As a revolutionary and Pakhtun nationalist he hates subjugation and slavery. He glorifies freedom and refuses to live as a slave.

چې غلام ويې پوره کښې نه شم اړيږي سرکه فدوي کښې لاسي که هم سر لمان وي

فدا بې دلا لک خاور متري لړ کړي چې نکومې زکښ نوم غلام پتان وي (Fida, 2004)

Slave is not considered worthy to be called a man;
Whether he is Sikh, Hindu, Parsi or Muslim;
Carry away the land and the dust of Fida Abdul Malik;
From the land that is known as the land of the slaves.

The poets of this time period resisted the first martial law of the country as well as the One Unit plan of the government. During the martial law of Ayub Khan there was censorship on media and poetic expression. Many revolutionary poets were sent behind the bars for opposing military rule in the country.

Another prominent poet of this time was Ghani Khan. He was the elder son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and is also considered as one of the notable Pashto poets who challenged the powerful ruling elite through his poetry and writings. Ghani Khan was imprisoned for six years in 1948 for his revolutionary poetry and political activities. Though Ghani wrote his poetry on many themes like romanticism and philosophy but his revolutionary and nationalistic poetry gained much popularity among the masses.

Ghani Khan wittily criticizes the Pakistani regimes by terming it identical to the rule of the beloved who spoils and ruins many lovers but soothes no one. This humorous approach shows that he was unhappy with the state-citizen relationship in Pakistan.

زما د لالي راج هم بلش امپيلاکستان ده بل پي کښي ونه وي ښه برباد خوي ي شته

(Khan K. A., 1985)

The rule of my beloved is like the regime of Pakistan;
Benefitting no one and there are many destroyed by it.

Ghani Khan was very much conscious about the identity of Pakhtuns. He glorifies the heroes of Pakhtun nation and urges his countrymen to uphold the glory of their forefathers.

پاڅه ننگي اليه! ن دلهر او چل ازو گتبه
نوم هښتون وگتبه ن اموس لف غ ازو گتبه
تول ج وځي لن كره د نجلش ان پتم اش ا
اے د احمد زوي ه اے چي په شير شاه

(Khan K. A., 1985)

Stand up O' daring man! Win your beloved;
Win the name of Pakhtun and the dignity of Afghan;
With the gory of your status give a surprise to the whole world;
O' the son of Ahmad²², O' the heir of Sher Shah.²³

Ghani Khan hates kings and emperors as they use coercion and violence against the weaker people to sustain their empire. He terms the destruction around the world as an outcome of the power struggle between the rulers and emperors.

بېش اهي دني اخه كړي؟
خ ان لولې زيكه ځ غم
د ناص افغتل مشكل دي
خه به هي كړي خيمه كم
تخت هم نپلي پي زوره
بي هتوري د جلاده
بېش امان چې خومره هير وي
دومره وي نيباده (Khan K. A., 1985)

Getting empire is of no use; why one should increase his own sorrows;
To do justice is a difficult job; some will be favored and some will be disfavored;
Throne could not be maintained without coercion; without the sword of the executioner;
As the number of kings increase; so does the destruction around the world.

Ghani Khan gives hope and optimism to youth and urges them to regain their lost glory. He asks them to work hard and be patient to reconstruct your homeland after damage. It is very much evident from the following lines of his poem.

س و طب اغتالاشن دے
مراوے گل خاوري چمن دے

²²Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Afghan ruler who ruled India in 18th century.

²³Sher Shah Suri, who ruled India in 16th century.

اے پښتون! ستا وطن دے اے پښتون! ستا وطن دے

اچې بن کتېن که گوري نې بنې بل سرستوري

ته خبري چې ته شوک وي ته دري ماس مان وي ته ورے

دې پښو ستگو ؤولنه پاخه هغه جهان جوړکړه

د دې باغ خوري راوخله تون من وې پښتانه جوړکړه
(Khan K. A., 1985)

The fired up garden, the plot looted; the faded flowers and the looted grassland;

O' Pakhtun! This is your land; O' Pakhtun! This is your land;

Looking embarrassed; barren footed and barren headed;

Do you know your status; you are like a star in the sky;

O' disgraced youth! Get up and re-establish that lost status;

Take the soil of this garden; to make a new plot.

He also expresses his grief and anger over the bloodshed of the people during partition time.

He condemns the killings of innocent human beings at that time in the name of religion and

argues that human beings have surpassed the animals by killing each other.

نن انسان شو انسان د وینو ترے نن مجنون شو د جان د وینو ترے

داسې روڼ هېس تگو روڼ دشو ل و هتو دي چې پت پوتو شو هېوان د وینو ترے

(Khan K. A., 1985)

Today one human being is thirsty of the blood of other human;

Today a lover has become blood thirsty of his beloved;

They became such blind due to greed;

That they have surpassed beasts in sucking the blood.

The democratic transition after the end of the first military rule in the country provided an opportunity to the political forces in the peripheries to work with the central government.

Due to these developments, the claim for a separate homeland from Pakhtun nationalists also faded and it also caused a transformation in the themes of the Pashto poetic resistance.

Nonetheless, the democratic period of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was also unsympathetic towards poets and writers. Most of the poets during this era faced state brutality due to their revolutionary thoughts. The Pashto poetry and literature during 1970s and in the subsequent

years after Cold War focused on autonomous Pakhtun province within the federation of Pakistan. The poets of this time period were mainly associated with National Awami Party struggling for provincial autonomy and for the preservation of regional languages.

The revolutionary and nationalistic poetry of this time period was mainly dominated by Ajmal Khattak. He was born in Akora Khattak in 1925 (Buneri, 2017). As a young man Khattak remained active in politics after partition and became a prominent member of National Awami Party. His poetry book “*Da Ghairat Chagha*” had left long lasting impact on the young people of that time. A prominent Pakhtun nationalist and lawyer Saleem Khan (Swabi) who was active in student politics in 1970s says that my life was transformed by reading this book of Ajmal Khattak. He says that many young people like me were inspired by this book during that time. The poetry and of Ajmal Khattak focused the economic disparities of the country. He also highlighted the exploitation of the poor people by the ruling elite of the country. Ajmal Khattak was imprisoned many times due to his revolutionary ideas and poetry. As a Pakhtun nationalist he also strived for the rights of Pakhtun and their specific identity. He challenged the ruling elite of the country who exploited the poor masses for their power and condemned them for their biased and prejudiced policies towards smaller ethnic groups.

دا چې زمونږ ډېلار ټپه ټپه شو
 نن لگوي د خپل هوس لمنونه
 دا د نني قتلدار اوړي ستړگي
 چې لگوي موبه هډ هډ چکونه
 بس د دوي ستړگي غړول غواړي
 نکبر جامنږ کورل غواړي (Khattak, 1958)

Upon the graveyard of our forefathers; running the horses of greed;
 These greedy people for the sake of personal power; biting the parts of our body;
 They must be taught a lesson; their arrogance must be decimated.
 In another poem he states that;

يښت نړايون وپښتو
 يفتسرن سئو پښتو
 راځي پکمو رکښي مړکښوسره
 دنيالئ وخت دے چې جرگشوسره
 ئهيا ليري ورته ځان بدل کړو
 دغه ن ظلم زورجه ان بدل کړو (Khattak, 1958)

O’ Pakhtuns! O’ crazy Pakhtuns; O’ scattered Pakhtun clans;
 Let’s organize our lines; let’s execute a jirga as it is the time of competition;

To rebuild ourselves as the world is transforming; to alter that old brutal epoch.

Ajmal Khattak nationalistic poetry expounded Pakhtun nationalism. He termed the Pakhtuns living in Afghanistan and in different parts of Pakistan as one nation in contrast to Pakistani nationalism. He condemned those powerful people who wanted to divide the Pakhtuns living on both sides of Durand line.

پېښور دے اکہ کټه زم کور دے کټه کلبل، کټه قندهار دے زم اورور دے
هر غصب چي دیکه بنی خنډ اچول غواري کټه دلر دے کټه هر دے مخي پتور دے

(Khattak, 1990)

If it be Peshawar or Quetta, both are homes to me;

If it be Kabul or Kandahar, both are brothers to me;

Every oppressor who wants to rupture our bond;

If he be afar or in highland, will be put to curse.

Another poet who emerged as a young popular voice during this era and is well-liked till present is Rehmat Shah Sail. His poetry also contained the love for the Pakhtuns and the land of Pakhtuns. He has also resisted the unjust policies and the nationalistic scheme of the state through his poetry. He urges Pakhtuns to get rid of this unjust system through a revolutionary movement. He was jailed both in democratic government of Bhutto and the subsequent military government. Sail propagated Pakhtun nationalism and identity through his poetry in which Pashto language occupies a central position. He gives a lot of importance to mother language and the dispersal of education in it instead of official state language. He says that the alien and imposed languages which are usually taught in educational institutions have alienated Pakhtuns about their history, culture and identity. He argues that Pakhtuns need to be educated in their own mother tongue. He hates slavery and points out that when someone ignores his mother language he becomes slave. In one of his poems he expresses the same in following manner;

کړو پېر دوژبو د خپل ځان پرې دېځلې ټي پښتو نېکار دے

غلامي څه وي آزادي څنگه وپه دي دوکتو کښي پښتو نېکار دے (Sail, 2009)

Alien languages have made us oblivious of our identity;

We need a university of our own language;

What is meant by slavery and what do we mean by freedom?

A distinction must be made between these two words.

He remained very critical of the Cold War in Afghanistan and the ongoing War on Terror. He terms these wars as alien wars imposed on Pakhtuns in which our own state is also responsible. These wars have brought miseries and harm to Pakhtuns on both sides of the Durand line. He sees the people living in Peshawar and the people living in Kabul as same people and it hurts him equally if someone is killed on both sides of the Durand line.

په خپلو وطن کښې چېنگ رپټس رډه ه لته زه مره لته هم زه مره

پرډه غوږل ډه پرډه نلر دله ته هم زه مره لته هم زه مره

کوڅ کوڅ ه مې ډر په وینو روزله لاهې زه وټ گورم

هله ما ورثې کفلر فر دله ته هم زه مره لته هم زه مره

یوش ارنیتون دجهو شان وجود دکه کبابی ډه دیکه پینور ډه

یومې زیک ډه بل مې چکر دله ته هم زه مره لته هم زه مره (Sail, 2013)

In my own homeland, I have been loaded with war; I am being killed here in it and I am being killed there in it;

It is the rivalry and the combativeness of alien people with each other; I am being killed here in it and I am being killed there in it;

Every street of mine is drenched in blood bleeding from my heart as I see it daily;

With what shrewdness they kill me through my own brother, I am being killed here and I am being killed there;

They are same Pakhtuns in identity and like one body whether they are from Peshawar or from Kabul;

One is my heart, the other is my darling; I am being killed here and I am being killed there;

Rehmat Shah Sail is very much critical of the rulers of Pakistani state. According to him this wealthy ruling class is not sympathetic to poor people. He considers them as plunderers who are not worthy of being trusted.

رقي بگېلې من مشم ډر زونو څو کي دار وټ لېه نکل څو گشي نکلونو څو کي دار

طالب د مېړونو خولوت مار وي د ج وگړو کي د من فشي د خاورو نکورونو شکر کي دار

(Sail, 2013)

I can't believe the emulous as a caretaker of hearts;
How come a slayer of flowers can become the caretaker of flowers?
The owner of the palaces happens to be a plunderer of cottages;
He can't be the caretaker of the muddy houses.

Rehmat Shah Sail terms the Pakhtuns living in Afghanistan and Pakistan as one nation. He calls Peshawar and Kabul as friends and the abode of Pakhtuns. He states that until and unless the peace is not attained in the land of Pakhtuns, the world cannot achieve development and prosperity.

پېښور او کابل دواړه دوهي اران دي لکه دوه سترگې پېښور او کابل دي

د نړۍ د ابادۍ د عوي دروغ دي چې تر شپې بشپړتې وکورونه وران دي (Sail, 2018)

Peshawar and Kabul are two comrades;
Like two eyes on the face of beloved;
The claims of progress of the world are lie;
Since the houses of Pakhtuns are ruined.

A young Pakhtun writer and poet Sami-ud-din Arman terms the poetry of Rehmat Shah Sail as the poetry of optimism, revolution and struggle. According to him, the poetry of Sail gives hope to the young people of Pakhtun land, saves them from the clutches of pessimism and prepares them for struggle. Sail sings the song of freedom, the song that could not be silenced through the use of violence and coercion.

4.2.4 Contemporary Poetic Themes

The 21st century brought new geo-political developments around the world. The current poetic Pashto poetry was also impacted by these developments. Pashto poetry got a new track after the commencement of American War on Terror in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda²⁴ and the subsequent violence associated with it. This war resulted in the death of thousands of Pakhtuns living in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thousands of people were injured and millions dislocated. The war negatively impacted the economy of Pakhtun region. The social

²⁴ The Islamist militant organization, accused of carrying 9/11 attacks in USA.

fabric of the Pakhtun has been broken and the people are facing multiple socio-economic problems. Although, the Pakhtuns are facing multiple miseries and hardships on both sides of the Durand line however, the poets are giving them sanguinity and hope. The contemporary poetry resists war and violence on Pakhtun land. In the view of Pakhtun poets this war is not their own war rather their land has been subjected to proxy war by international powers. The present-day poets consider Pakistani ruling elite and establishment equally responsible in connivance with foreign powers for their miseries and bloodshed. This war is obliterating the identity, language and culture of Pakhtuns. These poets and writers are also striving for the preservation of Pakhtun identity and Pashto language which has not received any support whatsoever by the state. These poets have countered the state's narrative about terrorism and violence. The state considers militancy and terrorism in the country as a product of foreign interference or a cultural product in the country while Pakhtun poets proclaim it as a state's policy of harboring militants. The poets of modern times on one hand are condemning violence on Pakhtun land and on the other hand they are trying to preserve the distinct Pakhtun identity and culture. These poets are doing this job on many fronts like publishing books, arranging poetry sessions (*Mushaira*) and participating actively in political process. A prominent poet in the present times is Amjad Shehzad whose poetry is full of resistance themes. He terms the present violence in Pakhtun society as imposed by the ruling elite of the country. This wave of violence has ruined the Pakhtun society and he urges Pakhtuns to get united against this oppression of the state. He argues that thousands of Pakhtuns have been martyred by this wave of violence and Pakhtuns are now going to offer more martyrs for the policies of international and local powers.

حوصله به کول غواري في صلبه کول غواري

يوه کربن به ښکل وي او بېلگه به څو وي

ننگام ريلت مړے په اکون گرځوم

نور نشي نېرغ پاره شېدان نه وکوم (Shehzad, 2017)

Courage should be attained; a decision must be made;

A line must be drawn, and a blunt announcement must be made;

To the dead body of the failed state, I am not offering my shoulder;

For the sake of green flag, cannot offer martyrs anymore.

This poet believes in the importance of mother tongue in contrast to the one language policy of the state. He argues that those nations who have conveniently forgotten their mother tongues have become slaves.

هېرکړې د څپلي مورخوږه ټپه جوړشي دسړينه غلام خامخا

سترگي چې دڅپلي ونيظر پردے ځان سټکه لاسي مقام خامخا (Shehzad, 2017)

Whosoever forgets his mother tongue;
Turns him into salve without reason;
Lie the sight of the others in your eyes;
Avoid yourself from such a position.

The poet also criticizes the ruling class for suppressing the freedom of expression. He argues that those states who quell the citizens and terminate the liberty of the people do not progress.

چې د اولس سترگي پتري امجده هغق امون ه خامخا دويپري

چرت ه چې ځم گنډل یشن د ديگر ځم په دي وطن کښي مې اوس سړوب پري (Shehzad, 2017)

When the eyes of the people are tied O' Amjad;
Nations like such would eventually sink;
Wherever I go my mouth is sealed;
I am suffocated in this country.

He urges Pakhtuns that you have been deceived by the State's narrative and the slogans of patriotism. This narrative of state has done nothing good to your land instead it has destroyed your land. In the following lines of his poem he is points out the disparities occurring on Pakhtun land.

پښتون تر لري جالندھري رنه اودکړي

دې شينې يرغ داستاپه وطن څه چاري ونکړي (Shehzad, 2012)

O' Pakhtun! You have been deceived by the Jalandhari²⁵ anthem;
What has been done to your land by this green flag?

²⁵ Referring to Hafeez Jalandhari, who has written the national anthem of Pakistan.

The above discussion shows that the Pashto poetic resistance has evolved through different stages from colonial era to the present times. The shift in themes of the poetry may be witnessed in every time period but the main focus is on the preservation and promotion of Pakhtun identity which is present in all phases of recent history. The basis of this identity is the Pashto language, Pakhtun culture and history in contrast to official nationalism of Pakistan based on Urdu language and Islam.

To conclude we can say that poetry has remained a popular form of resistance in the Sub-continent. As a cultural product and activity, poetry has been liked by both the literate and illiterate people in this region. It has remained a strong tool of the weaker people and nationalities to resist the mighty rulers and foreign oppressors. The resistance themes in Pashto poetry became dominant during colonial era when Pakhtuns faced the domination of the colonial powers. The emergence of Khudai Khidmatgar movement as a non-violent nationalist movement provided a platform to poets and writers to commence their activities. This movement produced numerous poets and literary figures in Pakhtun belt. These people remained politically active both before and after partition period. These poets educated and informed the people in simple and clear language about the importance of their language, culture, liberty and independence. These poets faced many brutalities and incarcerations from the state and consequently became national heroes. The trend of resistance in Pashto poetry continued after the creation of Pakistan because the newly formed state also continued with the same oppressive and unjust policies of their predecessor's colonial rulers. The Pashto poetic resistance after the creation of Pakistan has had three major themes. First one is the quest for a distinct Pakhtun identity as opposed to Pakistani identity. The basis of this identity is Pashto language and cultural similarities to Pakhtuns living in Afghanistan as opposed to Pakistani identity which promotes itself on the basis of religion and Urdu language. The second theme is the perception of Pakistani state as an icon of repression and injustice, denying cultural pluralism and discouraging regional languages. The third theme is condemnation of violence, bloodshed and consistent quest for peace on Pakhtun land. The violence and terror in Pakhtun belt is termed as imposed from above and not the product of Pakhtun culture. The violence and bloodshed of Pakhtuns have been considered as an outcome of the policies of the regional and international powers.

The Pashto poetry during the partition time and in the subsequent years contained the themes for the creation of separate homeland of Pakhtuns. With the new geo-political developments in the region in the form of Cold War, War on Terror and the integration of Pakhtuns in

different sections of the Pakistani state, the poetic themes of resistance have also transformed. The Pashto poetic themes have evolved from separation to autonomy seeking themes. The contemporary Pashto poetic themes consist of a struggle for the preservation and propagation of Pakhtun identity, autonomy within the federation of Pakistani state and condemnation of war and violence in Pakhtun areas. The poetic resistance in Pashto which was in full move during partition time is still alive in present times. Though the themes have transformed, nonetheless this poetic resistance has contributed a lot to the existence and progress of Pakhtun nation. It has played a vital role in mobilizing and organizing the masses with other political and intellectual people and has been fruitful in achieving the economic and political gains for Pakhtuns in the country.

4.3 Conventional Justice of Pakhtuns vs Pakistani Judiciary

In earlier chapter we discussed that Pakhtuns have their own conventional justice system which is prevalent in Pakhtun society since times immemorial. This traditional justice system resolves a variety of matters of everyday life ranging from theft to murder and land disputes among the warring parties. The decisions of this conventional justice system are mandatory and the elders enforce these decisions through certain punishments (Ahmed A. S., 1976). Though the Pakhtuns land has been encapsulated by the state apparatus and its judicial system, the traditional justice system is still intact. The people try to settle their dispute through this traditional mechanism before going to the courts of the state in case the disputes get too lengthy and serious. During interviews it was noted that majority of the respondents preferred to resolve their communal problems through the cultural institution of *jirga* as compared to governments' courts. There was absolute no confidence among the respondents in the judicial system of the state.

According to them the process of courts for settling a dispute is lengthy, time consuming and costly while *jirga* settles the dispute in a few meetings. The social structure of Pakhtuns makes it convenient for the people to settle their disputes through *Jirga* as every person has the right to speak before *Jirga* to give his standpoint. The structure of Pakhtun society is egalitarian and so is the structure of the *Jirga* in which its members enjoy equal status. The people in some cases go to courts if they feel that the *Jirga* is unable to resolve the dispute. Nonetheless, in number of cases the judgement of the court also needs the approval from the traditional *Jirga*. In cases like murder the settlement of the dispute needs both judicial backup and *jirga*'s endorsement and mere decree of the court is not sufficient for the acquittal of a person. One of my respondents Ibrar Khalil (late) said that a murderer

may be acquitted by the court but his enmity does not end by this judicial decree as the accused also needs a clean chit from the jirga. (عدالتت لبري کول مېشي خو د اوکي نه درل ټوپک نشي کوزلوه. د اوکي نه به درل ټوپک چکه کوزوي)

In Pakhtun code of conduct there is a notion of *badal* which is under discussion. According to this notion the male members of a family are supposed to take revenge on behalf of a relative's murder. Though the laws of the state as well as Islamic laws have the concept of revenge (*qisaas*) but its nature is different. The state is supposed to take revenge on behalf of the bereaved party and to punish the culprit. The laws of the state do not allow an individual to take revenge as per their own will, contrariwise the social structure of Pakhtun society permits as well as glorifies this act of an individual. This condition causes a tussle between the judicial system of the state and the Jirga culture of Pakhtuns. As Taimoor Khan (Swabi) says, how will the integration of Pakhtuns occur when they do not follow state laws and government directions? Another respondent Sohail Khan (Swabi) said that the people have a mistrust in the modern judicial system. In most of the cases the killers get bail or get acquittal by the court which creates anger among the bereaved party and hence they take revenge on their own. The people in such cases ignore the state laws. He further said that when the killer of your father gets bail from the court what will you do with him? Definitely you will kill him, because the courts do not punish the culprits. The government will compel you to take revenge with your hands. (چې ډپ رقابتل دي پ هض ملت راوخې ون بېلې به يې خود وژنې نو، عدالت خو چا اوسزا نه وکوي. دا حکوت به تا مړ کلو ت خ پله ه چ بوره کوي)

As mentioned in the last chapter the Pakhtun's *namoos* and honor is the most valued thing in the Pakhtun society. Protection of the dignity and honor of their own house is the duty of every male and female. But in some cases if a person (both male and female) breaches this rule, it is considered as a heinous crime. In such instances the people prefer the conventional justice of Pakhtuns instead of courts of the state. In case when a girl escapes with her lover (دېشخي مېتيزه تلل) without the consent of her parents and enters into love marriage, it is considered as a social crime in Pakhtun society and the girl is called with a derogatory term "*mateeza*." In such cases both the bride and groom face severe consequences from their families. Though the state laws allow court marriages but in Pakhtun society this act of the girl is considered a stigma for her relatives forever. To keep their honour and *namoos* intact the family members of the bride in most of the cases put the couple to death as a punishment for breaching the social code.

In Pakhtun society, the right of inheritance of women is another significant matter. As a patrilineal and patriarchal society the women in Pakhtun belt are not given shares in the property and land of their fathers. Though the state laws and Islamic principles encourage this practice but the Pakhtun society has a contrasting practice. But if a woman (sister or any other female relative) wants a share in the inheritance she first of all exhausts the conventional justice system to take her share. If the traditional system fails to provide her justice then as a last option she knocks at the judicial courts. Similarly the settlement of the disputes of land and the division of property among brothers and cousins is carried out through this conventional justice system. Like if the father or head of a family dies and the family wants to distribute the property among its members then elders of the area gather and settle the matter according to the norms of the area.

The family matters related to any cleavage in the relationship of the family members in Pakhtun society are usually kept secret. The publicity and exposure of family problems is usually discouraged. In extreme cases like the termination of the marital life (divorce) among the married couples and its aftermath in form of the payment of *meher* (the amount both in cash and kind fixed for bride at the time of wedding), mortgaging of the children and other associated matters is settled through traditional jirga system. The visit of female to the courts and waiting long hours for the hearings in courts is considered as symbol of disgrace and embarrassment to the family. But in such cases if the family of the groom does not cooperate with the jirga the family of the bride then approaches the court. In urban centers like Peshawar where accessibility is not an issue, the females in such cases settle the matter through courts but in the villages the people prefer the traditional justice system.

Another significant aspect in this regard is the economic give-and-take among the people and the extending of loans. Traditionally in Pakhtun society people conduct economic transactions and give loans without formal or written procedures. In some cases if a person denies and refuses to pay the debt to the lender the matter is then resolved through the conventional justice system as proving the payment of amount in the courts without written proof becomes difficult.

In the political matters, like the electioneering, the people take the help from the traditional mechanism of justice. Though the judicial system of the country issues its own directions in this regard but the sensitive matters like the voting of females, the location of polling camps of females and other related issues are settled amicably through Jirga.

To sum up we can say that the conventional justice system is still preferably suitable for Pakhtuns to settle the matters pertaining to their daily lives. Pakhtuns unanimously agree on absolute no confidence on Pakistani judiciary. The people do try to avoid the modern judicial system of the court but only as a last resort. It was learnt during research that the people's inclination towards the conventional justice system have multiple reasons.

The foremost reason was the time efficient nature of the conventional justice system compared to Pakistani courts, where matters took excessively long time to be resolved and in some cases it may take decades. Thus to settle the matter in bare minimum time people opt for their traditional mechanism of justice.

Another significant reason is that the people have doubts about the fairness of trial in the courts of the state and about the verdicts by the judges. The nature of the conventional justice system is egalitarian where everybody has the right to speak and to disagree with the arbitrators, hence it creates trust on the traditional system in the minds of the people.

Economic destitute is an additional factor which curbs the people to approach the courts. As most of the people in Pakhtun society are not well off and cannot afford the judicial financial adventure of the Pakistani judiciary, they use the traditional Jirga system to resolve their matters. Raj Wali Khan (Peshawar) said that hiring the lawyers for case and pursuing it in the courts needs a lot of money so people usually avoid courts due to their financial limitations.

In Pakhtun society the matters associated with females are kept private, and the visit of the females to the courts is culturally disliked. So in order to resolve such matters in a more respectful manner and in accordance with cultural values of the society people tend to use the conventional justice system.

4.4 Moon sighting of Ramazan and Shawal: (A religious practice as a source of controversy between the state and Pakhtuns)

Religion can be used as an integrating tool to keep the people together (Durkheim, 1915), but it can also be a cause for disagreement and conflict among the people (Hitchens, 2007). In Pakistani nationalist scheme, Islam has been portrayed as the main instrument for the integration of different ethnic groups. In the context of Pakhtun society every year the religious rituals of *Eid* and *Ramazan* (month of fasting) and its moon sighting practice serves as a point of difference between the state and the Pakhtuns. *Eid* and fasting as religious

rituals have been observed by the Pakhtuns since centuries and according to the traditional way of sighting the moon with naked eye. This practice of moon sighting continued after the establishment of Pakistani state. The announcement of the moon sighting for the months of *Shawal* and *Ramazan* would be traditionally performed by the clergy upon receiving *shahadat* (testimony) from the people. But the moon sighting practice in Pakistan has seldom remained uniform. The Pakhtuns unlike other groups and state in most of the cases have either followed the Saudi Arabia's testimonies or their own native testimonies instead of "Pakistani" testimonies. To bridge these differences among the state and the people, a Central *Rohiyate e Hilal* Committee was formed by the government. This committee was created in 1974 through a resolution passed by the national assembly but till date no rules and regulations have been drafted in writing for the working of the committee (Pakistan Today, 2012). Instead of keeping the people of the country together on the significant religious rituals, the committee converted into a cradle of difference among the government and the people like Pakhtuns. The Pakhtuns in most of the parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa usually celebrate the Eid and Ramazan a day before the federal government. Both the state and the Pakhtuns (common people and clergy) have their own point of view regarding this issue. At federal level the "*Rohiyate e Hilal* Committee" is headed by Mufti Muneeb-ur-Rehman while in Peshawar there is an unofficial team under the leadership of Mufti Shahabuddin Popalzai of Masjid Qasim Ali Khan. The state argues that it is the duty of the committee at federal level to announce the commencing of *Shawal* and *Ramazan*. The common Pakhtuns and their religious leaders including Mufti Popalzai on the other hand argue that the committee at federal level does not accept the testimonies of the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and hence has no religious grounds to issue final instructions. According to them the moon can be seen by anyone and that person would convey this *shahadat* (testimony/ evidence) to religious leaders to announce the commencement of the Islamic month. This disagreement creates a strange paradox where Mufti Muneeb serves as a symbol of central government while Mufti Popalzai becomes a spokesperson of Pakhtuns.

In this scenario it becomes difficult for the public office bearers and public representatives like ministers and chief minister to celebrate Eid and Ramazan with one of these parties. On one side they are holders of important portfolios in the state apparatus while on the other they are elected representatives of the people who have a difference of opinion with the state on this issue. These elected people try to keep both the camps happy. Privately they celebrate Eid with the people of their constituency while a day after this they come to media to show

that they are celebrating Eid with the federal government. The case of Pakhtun nationalists party ANP in this regard is unique and worthy to mention. When they were in power in the province from 2008 to 2013 they openly celebrated Eid and Ramazan with the people of the province and also backed the unofficial committee headed by Mufti Popalzai. The Bilour brothers from Peshawar remained very active in this regard. The former senior minister Bashir Ahmad Bilour (late) openly supported the pronouncements of the unofficial committee of Masjid Qasim Ali Khan and used to sit with Popalzai in the moon sighting meetings. (The Nation, 2009). His elder brother and former federal minister Ghulam Ahmad Bilour termed Mufti Muneeb as a remnant of the General Parvez Musharraf when he declined to accept the testimonies of moon sighting from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He also demanded the immediate removal of Mufti Muneeb from his post. He further said that the provincial government announced Eid by receiving solid evidences of moon sighting (Bacha, 2009). In retaliation to the announcement made by Bilour, the head of Central *Rohiyate e Hilal* Committee Mufti Muneeb argued that moon sighting is the job of the religious people and not the responsibility of the ANP leadership and the central government should control its ministers (Raza, 2009). He also said that Ghulam Ahmad Bilour is representing the moon sighting issue as a Pakhtun issue (Bacha, 2009) . Once in 2012 on the occasion of Eid, Bashir Ahmad Bilour said that if they (Central *Rohiyate e Hilal* Committee) do not acknowledge our decisions and cannot wait for our moon sighting evidences in that case we will also not accept their pronouncement (Haider, 2012). The religious leaders of Pakhtun areas and the parties like JUI-F also follow and back the directions of the Popalzai committee instead of the federal *Rohiyate e Hilal* Committee. Maulana Muhammad Ameer alias Maulana Bijli Ghar (late) used to criticize the central *Rohiyate e Hilal* Committee in his public speeches for ignoring the witnesses of the Pakhtun areas.

During research when the respondents were asked that why they don't celebrate Eid with the central government the researcher received multiple responses. Most of the respondents were not pleased with the arrogant policies and attitude of the federal government. They said that the government never accepts our Shahadat. One of the respondents Anwarullah (district Swabi) said that they are fools to expect big things from the government as it is unwilling to accept our minor testimony of moon sighting. Another respondent Hameed Khan said that it is strange that Eid and Ramzan is celebrated all over the world on a single day but only Pakistan celebrates it a day later. Another respondent Ghufraan from district

Charsadda said that the committee administered by the government has no grounds to refuse the testimonies of Pakhtuns as providing shahadat (testimony) of moon sighting is a job of great responsibility. The person who provides testimony takes the oath in the name of Allah and the Holy Prophet both in written and verbal form. No one would be a senseless to the extent of spoiling his own fortune of the life hereafter for the sake of other people, he said.

The Pakhtun youth has also highlighted this issue on the social media. There are certain sentences, slogans, and images which circulate on social media regarding this issue and which depicts the polarization between Pakhtuns and the state. Some of them are given below;

شہادتیں جان کی ہو یا جان کی (The *shahadats* or testimonies of Pakhtuns are not acknowledged if it is of moon sighting or of life). In Urdu and Pashto the word shahdat is used both for martyrdom and witness. In the image below it is referring to the lack of recognition by the state to the human losses of Pakhtuns in the country due to the ongoing militancy wave and also to the moon sighting by Pakhtuns.



خپل ملاح پل ایچ، ن ہمن و نبال ختر (Our own Mullah and our own Eid, we do not accept anyone's else Eid)

(Source: www.facebook.com)



(Mufti Muneeb ur Rehman vs Mufti Shahab Uddin. Mufti Shahab won once again)

(Source: www.facebook.com)



(Brave Mullah Pakhtun Mullah, our own Mullah our own Mullah)

(Source: www.facebook.com)



(Source: <https://web.facebook.com/110110627337125/photos/a.110110737337114/110113437336844/>)

The above discussion reveals that the Pakhtuns have been observing this religious ritual since centuries and before the establishment of Pakistan. Being a society with lesser modernity, strong traditional values and having an egalitarian social structure where people still value their traditional cultural practices and rituals, the cultural edifice of Pakhtuns sometimes contradicts with the hierarchical nature of state apparatus. In Pakhtun social structure the common people have been given the right to express their view point, like on the occasions of moon sighting the testimonies of common people are acceptable without any condition. In contrast the state structure is hierarchical and when it denies such liberty and do not accept their testimonies of moon sighting then the people go against the commands of the committee comprised by the state. Another thing which we discussed in the last chapter about the social structure of Pakhtuns was the institution of exchange and reciprocity in Pakhtun society. A group or a person is reciprocated the same way as he has done for or given to the first person/group. Since the state does not accept the testimonies of Pakhtuns in the case of moon sighting, the Pakhtuns reciprocate the same to the state by not accepting their testimonies and commands. This is very naïve example of the cultural resistance of the Pakhtuns against the state commands.

4.5 Components of Pakhtun Culture used by Pakhtun Nationalists to counter State Nationalism/ Nation-building

The Pakhtun nationalists have also used multiple components of Pakhtun culture to propagate Pakhtun nationalism and resist the state sponsored nationalism. Since the culture is day to day activity of the people it becomes easy for the Pakhtun leaders to use it for their own purpose. There are multiple components of culture which have been exploited by the Pakhtun nationalist leaders against the state national building project. It ranges from their language to their code of conduct to their history and cultural institutions. The following lines give a brief sketch.

Majority of the respondents during fieldwork argued that the Pakhtun nationalists have used Pashto language as a main tool for the propagation of their ethno nationalism. As language is the first cultural thing which a person learns during the socialization process so keeping the people unified through language becomes easy for the nationalist leaders. The language has served as a vital source for the unification of Pakhtuns and their resistance in many forms against Pakistani state nationalism. They have been told that their language is distinct and ancient than the language of the Pakistani state (Urdu). Hence the people who speak Pashto form a different nation from those who speak other languages. It is commonly proclaimed by the ethno-nationalist leaders that anyone who speaks Pashto language is a Pakhtun. The Pakhtun nationalists have disseminated their literature in Pashto language.

Another cultural tool which has been exploited by the Pakhtun nationalists has been the “unique history” of Pakhtuns. They are being told by Pakhtun nationalists that historically the Pakhtuns in Pakistan are related to the Pakhtuns living in Afghanistan. The nationalists argue that Afghanistan is the homeland of their forefathers. A famous Pakhtun nationalist slogan portrays it. This slogan states that Afghans living both in Afghanistan and Pakistan are same and one entity. "الر اوير ي و ف ل غ ان".

The nationalists emphasize the cultural history of Pakhtuns. The Pakhtun nationalist leader Wali Khan used to say; “I am four thousand years old Pakhtun, fourteen hundred years old Muslim and forty years old Pakistani.” It shows that the main emphasis is on the cultural history rather than other factors of identity. They say that Pakhtuns were living in this region before the advent of Islam and their Pakhtun code of conduct is the most ancient one among the present moral and religious doctrines.

The Pakhtun nationalists have also exploited the virtue of valor and resistance of Pakhtuns against the foreign oppressors and invaders. They are often being told that Pakhtuns have never been subjugated by anyone from outside. Hence the imposition of Pakistani nationalism is also considered as an alien project which negates their egalitarianism and which needs to be resisted. The masses are told by the leaders that Pakhtuns have never accepted slavery. All the Pakhtuns are same and there is no concept of slavery in Pakhtun society. So anyone who wants to impose an idea or plan by force is not accepted. There is a famous rhetoric of the nationalists that Pakhtun have never been the slaves of anyone.

په پهلتنه نه د چا غلامان وو او نه د چا غلامان دي)

The nationalist usually say that Pakhtuns have never been kept slaves by the British, Mughals and many other invaders who invaded the Pakhtun land; and there is no reason why Pakistan will make us slaves.

Jirga is the other tenet of Pakhtunwali which has been exploited by the Pakhtun nationalists. The political gatherings which are convened for discussing an issue are often being called as “Jirga” by the nationalists. As Jirga is based upon egalitarianism and consensus of opinion so the leaders usually show that they are here to ask the consent of the people and are not for imposing their will upon the masses. Wali Khan used to say in his speeches that I have come for Jirga with you people. His successors also used the same word for the political gatherings.

Competition (سيالي) is another aspect of Pakhtun culture which has been exploited by the Pakhtun nationalists. Popularly known as *siyali*, the Pakhtun nationalists tell the masses that the Punjabis are more developed and have gained their rights as they have more unity and nationalism. You people should be united to reach the level of these people. The nationalist also say that those people who got liberation like Bengalis or those who are prosperous have recognized and followed their leadership. The Pakhtuns like them must follow their Pakhtun leadership to be prosperous like them.

Another tenet of Pakhtunwali is revenge (بدل) which has been exploited by the Pakhtun nationalists. Pakhtuns take revenge even after decades if they have not been compensated. The same notion of *Badal* has been used in political language. They say that if the state exploits or kills Pakhtuns a stage will come when Pakhtuns will take their revenge. Wali Khan in his speeches used to say a Pashto proverb which means that an arrogant must be taught a lesson with a punch. (مېرته خټه په سړک سرېږي)

Once in 1998 he was delivering a speech against the construction of Kalabagh Dam and he said, when you will drown the fields of my kids which is a source of their bread, when you would kill my kids of starvation then I will not spare you. On the same occasion he also used to quote a Pashto proverb regarding the revenge of Pakhtuns which means that; the pebble of “Pukhto” does not decay for hundred years under water. **پکھن ت وکلن مپ داوبو** (کبھی س ل کالہ نیلوی کی پری)

A significant component of Pakhtun culture which has been used by the Pakhtun nationalists is the love of the people for the ancestral land and possession of the land. Culturally the Pakhtuns love their ancestral land and in Pashto it is called *daftar* or *dawtar* (دوتار). This love for the ancestral land is identical with the love for the motherland. Selling or losing ancestral land is considered bad in Pakhtun culture. There is Pashto proverb which says that the basis of Pakhtuns is the land which one possesses. **پښتون خو پ ه زمکه** (پښتون دے)

Dawtar is all about the possession or controlling the income of the land. So every Pakhtun wants the ownership of his ancestral land and its resources. The nationalists have used this cultural aspect to tell the people that they are the owners of this beautiful Pakhtun land. They must have control over its resources and they must be the primary beneficiaries of their land. Anyone from outside like Punjab, Sindh and Islamabad who wants to control their land or wants to exploit their resources is their rival. Thus the ruling elite of the country is usually condemned in their political speeches for capturing the land of Pakhtuns and exploiting its resources. There is a famous Pakhtun nationalist slogan which means my land my control, anyone else’s control is not acceptable.

خ پله خ اورخ پل خ نیل، ن ه م د بلختی ار

When the militants were targeting the leadership, workers and political gatherings of the Pakhtun nationalists, Asfandyar Wali Khan, the Central President of Awami National Party used to say that we are being targeted as we are the heirs and owners of this land and not the tenants. When a raider wants to capture an area he harms the possessor of the place and not the tenant. We are the owners and inheritors of this motherland and we will not spare let any oppressor to capture it, he said.

The Pakhtun nationalists have used the Pashto folklore immensely in their contest against the state’s national narrative. Using folklore in speech is an easy way to communicate your viewpoint to the common people without any complication. The Pakhtun nationalist

leaders used Pashto proverbs (ټل) and *Tappa* in their speeches in response to the state's propaganda. Khan Muhammad Kaka, a veteran Pakhtun nationalist of district Swabi said that Wali Khan was skillful in using proverbs and tappas in his speeches. This would make his speech understandable to common people. He further said that common and uneducated people should be educated in simple language.

Allegiance and loyalty to the honor, dignity and ideologies of the forefathers (پېر توبل) is another important virtue of Pakhtun culture which has been used by the Pakhtun nationalist leaders. The masses are usually told by the Pakhtun nationalist leaders that affiliation with the Pakhtun nationalist movement is like keeping the honor of your ancestors. A man of integrity and dignity never deviates from the path shown to him by his father. Following the path and ideology of your forefathers is like you are fulfilling the goals and dreams of your forefathers. Many respondents during interviews said that they are with the Pakhtun nationalist party because their forefathers were with this party. They would commonly say that is the party of my father and grandfather.

دا مې د پلان يک ډېلوتې ده) (So going with the mission and ideology of the forefathers is considered heroic in Pakhtun society. One of the respondent Zahid Khan of Swabi said that I was told by my father during the last years of his life to stay firm with the party of Bacha Khan and Wali Khan and avoid changing the loyalty. How could I deviate from the will (د وړس ي ت) of my father? He added that many people did the same as my father by advising their successors to remain attached to the Pakhtun nationalist movement. Nisar Pukhtoonyar of Swabi said that it is the party of my father and I am proud to follow his path and preserving the legacy they left to us. He said that the Pakhtun leaders occasionally respond to the threats from government by stating that do not frighten us by threats of incarceration, we are the offspring of *Khudai Khidmatgars* who gave off their lives but never bowed before any aggressor. Naeem Khan said that the Pakhtun nationalists also use the word "Pakhto" as a substitute for the Pakhtun nationalist movement or for following the mission of the ancestors. Asfandyar Wali Khan often in his speeches says that it is our common struggle (Pakhto) left to us by our forefathers and we have to fulfill their dreams (Pakhto). دا پېر توبل ته د پلان ي ک نه په شيک هيلتي ده او اوبتو به سر ت ورس وؤ.)

Another component of Pakhtun culture and Pakhtunwali which has been used by the Pakhtun nationalist is *namoos*. Most of the times the Pakhtun nationalist leaders would say that this land is like their mother. دا زمکه زمونږ مور ده. It means the honour of the homeland

and the honour of the mother and family is the same thing. As protection of the property and honour of the family is the duty of every Pakhtun so the leaders urge Pakhtuns to protect their homeland as they protect the honour of their family and mother from the exploitation of the aliens.

Chapter 5.

IMPACT OF STATE'S NATION BUILDING PROJECT ON PAKHTUN CULTURE

This chapter explains how the policies of Pakistani nation-building have impacted Pakhtun culture and society whether negatively or positively. Furthermore, it highlights the cultural components of Pakhtuns which have been exploited by the state for integration of Pakhtuns in the state.

The ways in which Pakistani nation building project has impacted Pakhtun culture run very deep. The relationship between the two has always been that of a patronizing force trying to tame the spontaneity and indigenous flair of the latter, and remaining true to the topic. The same has been the exact case with almost every other culture in this country. The major shortcoming of the project has been the compartmentalization of this country rather than pursuing a policy of emancipation. This project coupled with the globalization has caused huge impact on Pakhtun society as the ideology imposed upon the people runs free around the country and is void of historical perspective. This practice of the state is carried out at the cost of its different native cultures overshadowed by their indigenous colors and flairs. There is a much lesser understanding let alone the peaceful coexistence of these native cultures and the chief cause of this is the ideology that has been thrust upon the nation, the ideology which sometimes runs in 180 degrees to their cultural values.

Nation building is the homogenization of people who hail from different cultural backgrounds. In Pakistan, it seems that this process has gone awry, and more so in case of Pakhtuns and their culture, so that instead of constructing one nation, the process of nation building has led to the formation of multiple sub-nations that are at daggers drawn with each other to seek dominance in the mainstream national discourse.

Beginning from their identity, to all the other cultural aspects which the people of this region adhere to, have been deeply, rather disastrously influenced by this project. In the today's modern age, the most common instrument for the annihilation of a minority, is not the ethnic cleansing but the policies of the state demarcating the cultural identity of a social group. These methods of the state could end in demolition of cultural symbols, forced and involuntary religious conversions, huge displacement of people from their hometowns and the imposition of an alien language etc. (Hashmi, 2014). The case of Pakhtun in meaning is the same as mentioned above in addition to their carnage in the on-going war on Pakhtun

land. There is not a single aspect of the Pakhtun culture which goes unaffected and untouched by the harsh reality. In the global era identity implies not only sameness and uniqueness, since these features cannot be defined in isolation of other cultural identities. In increasingly multicultural contexts identity obtains its meaning primarily from the identity of the other with whom self is contrasted. Pakhtuns' owned way of living since the time immemorial, doing Pakhto, marks Pakhtun culture the way that it helps create and maintain a distinct identity as compared to the other non-Pakhtun neighbors. As cultures are not established and acted upon in isolation, and that environmental factors and external forces are always at work in their formation and re-formation, Pakhtun culture, too, has been through cultural interactions in the wake of foreign invasions and sharing territories with neighboring cultures. With the advent of new state on sub continent map, Pakistan, new politically-moved cultural hierarchies emerged which placed Pakhtun culture in a range of socio-political adjustment, re-adjustments and resistance. Though Pakhtun culture provided its adherents with the ready answers to the questions related to the above mentioned two areas of adjustment and resistance, it also found itself prone to the changes directed by the state sponsored Pakistani national culture. Hobsbawm & Kertzer (1992) compared nationalism and ethnicity to the former being 'a political program that holds the right to, and therefore ought to form a territorial state,' while the latter as 'not programmatic and even less of a political concept, though could acquire political functions in the face of certain situations.' Pakistani culture, if any was reinforced by Pakistani nationalism, which was the embodiment of Pakistani ideology according to the state discourse. On the one hand it was promoted as the main integrating force while on the other it was seen as discriminating tool by various cultural entities including Pakhtuns as an ethnic group. This is what is dealt as the area of discussion in the following lines.

5.1 Nuclearization of Family Structure and the Altering Marriage

Patterns

Extended family has been a Pakhtun cultural feature but also seen as an adaptation to poverty. Struggling with the challenge of economical survival it was best suited to the needs of multiple nuclear family units as living together and pooling resources from landed property and cattle etc made life much easier. Coming out of mainly agriculture based economy, earners from the extended families equated themselves with other means of production but, feeling obligated, would still keep on supporting other members of the family. This kept the families of orientation and families of procreation together that would

lead to norm of intra-family marriages so that the resources remained un-divided and the family stayed intact and rejuvenated with establishing these new affinal relationships. In case a husband would die at young age, then the custom of levirate was, and to some extent is, practiced in which the young widow was wedded to the brother of the deceased, so that she was not left uncared of. Sometimes, and especially when dead husband leaves the widow with children, the widow preferred not to marry again which is more admired among the Pakhtuns.

Generally common to all cultural groups in Pakistan, Pakhtuns are patrilineal in tracing their ancestry and patrilocal as observing the custom of moving of the bride to groom's home. But in spouse selection same family unit or closest in kinship from the same clan are historically preferred. This strict endogamy was responsible for the families to be pulled regressively back to the small units of their own that would restrict the chances of making familial alliances with the other Pakhtun clans and that they would remain internally 'others.' Given the situation, families have been and are still celebrating their own separate presence and relative association with the states' (former and present), where the distinct ethnic identity and sense of belonging in the middle is lost somewhere.

Exogamy is commonly practiced, but nonetheless it is adopted as a result of acculturation when it was prompted predominantly by Punjabi (Indian) culture contingent upon economic benefits than extending mutual respect and acceptance between Pakhtun non-clanships. Previously and still *Valwar* (bride-wealth) is practiced among some of the Pakhtun tribes living in tribal areas of Pakistan and among most of the Afghans. It was customary in which groom's family was obliged to economically support bride together with the groom's family in form of consumable. The custom in its spirit was a compensation for the expenses that her family incurred upon her in acknowledgment of the care that the bride's family had taken in grooming the girl into young, mature respectful person expected to have the ability to take care of the new family. Through this custom, woman's status of being a useful and reliable person was endorsed and recognized. The criteria of descent and clan group membership along with other social qualities (family social standing and background) were the basic criterion in matchmaking. While, under the influence of the state backed urban culture, the Pakhtuns have increasingly adopted the custom of *Jahez* (dowry) that requires the bride's family to provide gold, money and goods as dowry to the girl. It has now become customary for the groom's family to demand a certain quantity of goods which is expected

to ensure a place for the bride in groom's family and the new home that would become her permanent abode.

Furthermore, under the 'national' cultural influence (s) domestic arrangements are made in such a way that the young girls are imparted education in order for them to become economically independent and being able to contribute to making their own dowry. Nonetheless, this results in delayed marriages, while on the other hand it is likely to culminate in changing family composition where joint families are replaced with nuclear families because the newly married couple perceives comfortable by living separately from the relatively big family they currently live in. The male in this case is not spared of family burden that compulsorily requires him to arrange for his sister(s) future matrimonial commitments if any, or to be able to support his own nuclear family from his pocket on his own because he may quite rarely be supported by his "non-nuclear family members" (Brothers and their children are considered to be a family even if living in different households, may be a reminiscence of joint and extended family as a survival of a cultural norm).

The state building project which idealizes the urban culture has impacted the traditional family structure in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This project has caused the nuclearization of families in Pakhtun society. Awal Sher Khan said that in the traditional Pakhtun society the people were living in extended family structure since ages. The nuclear family structure was very rare in our neighborhoods. The family heads of the joint families would usually decide the significant socio-political and economic matters of the family. There was scant level of personal freedom for the youth. Most of the people had close association with the Pakhtun nationalist movement as the heads of the family were supporting it. In contrast the state has promoted the urban elite culture of Urdu speaking people which is the converse of the traditional Pakhtun structure. The state considers the traditional cultural structure as premodern and thus outdated in which individuals have lesser freedom. This state promoted urban elite culture and family structure is usually shown on the mainstream media. This elite Urdu-speaking culture is mainly based upon nuclear family system. The Pakhtuns have also got the currents of this project and both the urbanized and the semi urbanized people are idealizing and moving towards this structure. Now the people who are moving for seeking jobs in cities have nuclear family structure and even those in rural areas too have this structure. Thus the integration of the people living in nuclear family

becomes easy for the state. He said that people have inclination to adopt those things which are shown to them by the state in media.

One of my respondents Ghufran from Charsadda said that with the establishment of the state educational network, plenty of higher education institutions have been established across the country. It has escalated the inter-provincial movement of the people. The Pakhtuns are moving towards Punjab and federal capital and the Punjabis are coming to Pakhtunkhwa for getting education. This has also caused an increase in inter-ethnic marriages. The Pakhtun boys are now marrying Punjabi and girls from other ethnicities and Pakhtun girls are marrying boys who belong to other ethnicities. Some decades ago the Pakhtuns were reluctant to send their daughters to get higher education but now they are sending their females to educational institutions.

Drawing on such complex Pakhtun family it can arguably be said that some features i.e. joint family system, sharing resources and supporting the less fortunate, *Valwar* (bride wealth), and the custom of levirate are built upon Pakhtun tradition that keep alive and reinforce the inter-connectedness of family members. Though the inter-clan marriages were highly encouraged by Bacha Khan (Khan K. A., 2012), and many Khudai Khidmatgars have followed him even in pre-partitioned India, but not many people have followed suit.

If flip side of discussion is seen closely, then fixed endogamy sets Pakhtuns orbiting around the smallest of an ethnic group while treating other ethnic units as irrelevant. Whereas, being influenced by Pakistani culture through adoption of Urban Urdu-speaking customs and norms (Punjabi culture aka Pakistani culture owe much to Indian culture). The main features are dowry, delayed marriages, nuclear family marked by extending less support to the family of orientation. *Purdah* (observing veil) is mainly observed and transformed under the influence of “national culture” and is more in conformity with the prerequisites of nationhood than ethnic tradition.

5.2 Transformation of Pakhtun Economic Structure

Once having been out on subsistence living for quite long, marker or symbol of their pastoral economy, the Pakhtuns with small ownerships would produce only to their needs like, eating, clothing and shelter, but now they are living a semi feudal and capitalist economic life. In the past Pakhtuns would have an intimate relationship with their means of production i.e. relatively simple technology, labor, and land. The land was a collective property in possession of clan members until British intervened and introduced the concept

of private property. Labor was not bought and sold but would have been offered as social obligation called *Ashar* (cooperative work) which was one aspect of social relation and more of a co-work relatives including in-laws. Technology was mainly associated with agriculture and simple transportation that was responsible for the emergence of a class of professionals who would make and repair agriculture implements and transportation tools for a share in crop as a delayed-return. In this mode of production the co-workers (consisting of the owners and their relatives) and the professionals were directly associated with means of production and its produce. Reciprocity was the principle of exchange (both in goods and services) and hospitality as an example of generalized reciprocity in which no immediate return was expected, and was an expression of personal relationships, was exercised. (Hospitality as a general principal of reciprocal exchange is still being exercised and celebrated). This kept them integrated and internally self-relying that was minimizing the need from without and relying on centralized government in terms of economic support. Because of this fact, the time resistance movements and mobilization of the masses were relatively natural and conveniently saved the land from foreign occupation. This aspect has been also highlighted by the Indian anthropologist Mukulika Banerjee in her work on Khudai Khidmatgar Movement (Banerjee, 2000).

After British introduction of land reforms and possession of private property a new social stratification took place in which landlordism, tenancy and sharecropping set the economic panorama aided by skilled professionals working for a share in crops as before. With the passage of time some of the Pakhtuns associated themselves with trade and business while others entered the government jobs. Associated with British government as beneficiaries of extending loyalties or government services, any two types of people were helping to legitimize the foreign rule as well as not sharing their pie with resisting masses to avoid losing privileges. The suit is followed till date (Dani, 1978). Most of the respondents during my fieldwork said that due to the nation-building process of the state, the agrarian economy of Pakhtuns has been transformed into service oriented and up to relative extent into industrial economy. The Pakhtuns have moved from agriculture towards jobs and businesses. The people chose armed forces and other government sectors for jobs. One of my respondents from Swabi, Bilal Ahmad said that now the prestige of a person is gauged through the portfolio or a position which he occupies in the state structure and not the family background. The business or job of a person is now more important than the other economic factors as the former gives them an identity.

At present as a part of the state of Pakistan, Pakhtuns are dealing with numerous economic challenges through various undertakings. The feudal dominance like tenancy and share cropping prevail, though in lesser degree and effect. Labor is sold for cash under the market principle of exchange where the worker is alienated from the means of production, and secures less of the profit from what s/he has produced. Government jobs are the major motivation for creating a compulsive urge for pursuing education and above all most cherished income sources. Major influx of jobs come from the armed forces.

Pakistan state followed the recruitment policy of the British in the army. The objective of the British policy was to have a fighting force to enforce their colonial rule in South Asia and it was not based to maintain equilibrium between races in the military (Haqqani, 2016). The British recruitment policy which was based on ethnicity and calling a few ethnic groups as martial races turned into animosity among different ethnic groups. The British called Pathans, Rajputs, Sikhs, Dogras, and Punjabi Muslims as martial races. These ethnic groups were used against each other to suppress one another. The concept of martial races was used by the ethnic groups to glorify self-images and the profession of the military was used for social mobility (Haqqani, 2016). During the post-independent period, the inter-ethnic relations were determined on the same basis of martial and non-martial groups, and these concepts affected their recruitment policies. On the same pattern, bulk of Pakistan army recruits came from West Pakistan. Even in the West-Pakistan, recruitment was not done equally from different regions. The Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were the main provinces from where the people were recruited. One of my respondent Zarin Jan Kaka (Swabi) said that during the 1960s (Ayub Khan's regime) the army personnel would come to the Hujras (in Peshawar valley) to induct people in armed forces. There was no formal procedure of induction rather they would check the height of the people and their physical appearance. At that time the Pakhtun nationalist movement in this area was at its peak. This was a two prong policy of the state as on one side it was giving jobs to people and on the other hand it planned to weaken the Pakhtun ethno nationalist movement.

The state's nation building process also impacted the women's involvement in jobs. The spread of female education network and health services of the state paved way for the women of Pakhtun society to opt for jobs which was previously considered a stigma. The increasing share of female employment in service sector also owed it to the nuclearization of family as the female felt obligated to share the expenses of household. The women who were only associated with reproductive labor are now going towards productive labor.

Females are increasingly stepping in the existing workforce as a response to financial challenges facing their relative families or in the wake of cultural trend of being self-sufficient. Furthermore, making a living abroad, especially in the Gulf countries is the dominant phenomenon that has been attracting a significant number of Pakhtuns for several decades now who were looking for supporting their families through remittances and were not so optimistic about economic security back home. The number of Pakhtun diaspora in Gulf countries is increasing with every passing year.

The Afghan policy of the state also caused huge ramifications on Pakhtun society. It has facilitated the establishment of a criminal based economy in the state which is based on smuggling, drug trafficking, opium cultivation and proliferation of small arms (Siddique, 2014). This criminal based economy has resulted in the creation of a new business class which later on claimed its share in the legal economy. Arshad Khalil said that smuggling of drugs/black economy and Kalashnikov culture in Pakhtun society is the product of Pakistani nation-building process. It was a project to shatter Pakhtuns' identity and society. Everyone knows that these weapons were brought to our society by the state. The weapon industry was not established in Faisalabad and it was established in Pakhtun village of Dara Adam Khel to break its foundations. The arms trafficking and the drug trafficking was facilitated by the state.

Whatever the job and nature of labor, whether here or abroad, part of its worth goes in taxes that contributes to state's economic stability like taking care of its expenditures in vital development sectors. It enables the state to prove its legitimacy through observing the constitutional provision of redistribution that is spending on the taxpayers in the form of healthcare, education, employment, developing infrastructure, and social services. The people were directly employed in government jobs or were beneficiaries, as at the time of British Indian government in some or the other way were seen to be dissociated from anti-government demands made by their fellow ethnic members and were reluctant to resist at ethnic level and were likely to primarily support the state in its policies. But many a times taking a conflicting stand protesting groups from federating units especially relying on ethnic or party basis contested budget allocations from government did not admired state policies. They started to make demands directly from the government, as they had done in the past, to redress the ill decisions like building the Kalabagh dam²⁶ considered to be

²⁶ A proposed controversial project of power generation and water storage of the federal government of Pakistan on which the smaller provinces/ ethnicities have reservations.

hazardous to public life and property and productivity of lands in multiple districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or the issue of not giving a prime route of CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) to Pakhtun land thus depriving them of their due right. Some other issues like militancy in Pakhtun areas, unpaid hydro power royalty, non revival of industrial sector or stock market made Pakhtuns vulnerable and frustrated. This injustice and discrimination has kept Pakhtuns dependent on other federating units like Punjab and Sindh for jobs.

5.3 A Changing Political Organization

Basically governed by the principle of egalitarianism (Pakhtuns' psychological makeup) Pakhtuns tend to treat and be treated as equals in political affairs. Khan (1958) portrayed Pakhtuns as "the Pakhtun are like rain sown wheat. They all came up the same day. They are all the same." The egalitarianism in Pakhtuns is marked by minor contrasts in prestige that is based on age and gender and not on economic status and strength in number.

Pakhtuns have settled in as conquerors in the current strip of land where agriculture has been and to some extent even today is a source of subsistence, the rivalry on issues of disputed landholdings and envy generated by unequal socio-political standing are responsible for splitting the kin groups from within. This and many other issues related to women's sanctity, claiming their right as being the righteous partner of a member of family or clan, and disputes related to irrigation water and cattle were addressed by the elders as Jirga (Pakhtun council) members. But the antagonism between *Tarburs* (paternal parallel cousins/agnates), that is synonymous with enmity among Pakhtuns, would have so enduring that even after settlement of issues it would emerge from time to time in different shapes.

Jirga as being instrumental in conflict resolution and decision making regarding intra-group and inter-group matters comprised of groups of elders who were experienced in *Narkh* (Customary law based on precedents). Jirga proceedings would give equal opportunity to both, disputing parties and their representatives before reaching a verdict that is unanimous in both, conflict resolution and in addressing intra and inter-group disputes. Much of the Jirga decisions tended to be reformative in nature than punitive which is a feature of current justice system and British Penal Code. Additionally, British justice system, that still prevails and is expensive as well as time consuming. After British administrators introduced justice system that was set in response to their own legal issues back home or a tool to control the colonized subjects here, Jirga carried out by the real leaders of the masses, was cornered and

became ineffective when compared to formal justice. In the modern system warring factions were virtually subjected to series of trials through different courts and made answerable to the laws and justice they had not created for themselves. Even a parallel *Sarkari* (government) Jirga system, comprised of state-tuned members with support from the government officials and institutions, was established. This is how Jirga works and secures its place today in Pakistan as it worked in the pre-partition British era. Though indigenous to the land, reformatory in nature, and responsive to Pakhtun psychology, codification of *Narkh* (customary laws) is a challenge let alone its implication in presence of and parallel to contemporary justice system. Though Jirga is still a preferred mode of conflict resolution among Pakhtuns, certain legal and administrative developments at the state level are shaping its resolutive nature, composition and imposition of verdict. Certain cultural traditions practiced by jirga which were in contradiction with the state rules have been abandoned officially like Swara²⁷ tradition.

This nation building policy of the state also affected the traditional Pakhtun leadership heirarchy. The religious figures/class (ملايان) emerged as the powerful leaders of the Pakhtun society. The traditional Mullah in Pakhtun society would offer religious services and would receive reward in kind. The Islamization policy under General Zia and the subsequent militarization of Pakhtun society altered the traditional mode of transaction and the payment to Mullahs started in cash. In addition, during the Cold War the religious class acclimatized with weapons (in the form of *jihadi* militant groups) which added strength to their power. As Khan Muhammad Kaka says the traditional mullah of Pakhtun society was the “occupational mullah” (ملايان) who was not from the landowning Pakhtun families but due to the Islamization policy in the General Zia regime, the landowning Pakhtuns started to become religious leaders. He further said that the things got worse when the traditional land owner Pakhtun became a Mullah. ق ي ص ه ل ت ه خ ر ا ب ه ش و ه چ ي ک ل و پ ب ن ت و ن ه م ل ا
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Saleem Khan Advocate (Swabi) narrated an interesting story about the conversation of the Pakhtun nationalist leader Wali Khan and American Consul General in Peshawar. He said that “in 1994, I and Awal Sher Khan of Yar Hussain village (Swabi) went to see Wali Khan in his hometown Charsadda. There we saw that the American Consul General in Peshawar was also present with Wali Khan. The American diplomat was concerned about the rise of

²⁷ A tradition in Pakhtun society where female from the murderer’s family marries one of the male member of the murdered person family as a compensation of murder and to settle down the dispute.

Taliban power in Afghanistan and asked him to assist them in countering the Taliban uprising. Wali Khan told the diplomat that how would it be possible for a political party to encounter such a huge project launched by states. He conveyed to the diplomat that the mullah who is now holding a gun is the mullah of Pakistani and American State and not the Mullah of Pakhtuns. Pakistan and America made the Mullah powerful through their money and guns. They took away the mullah from mosque and brought him to the battlefield and hujra. In contrast the Mullah of the traditional Pakhtun society was restricted to mosque and he was even not included in the traditional Pakhtun Jirga. The Pakhtuns would pay him in kind and not in cash. Wali Khan taunted the diplomat with a smile that as you people have made the Mullah powerful so now you people should deal with him and it is not our job.”

The element of *Dala/Talgeri* (Barth, 1959) or *para-jamba* (Banerjee, 2000) is partisanship on social group level that is culturally recognized and has led to an additional form of political alliances that keep Pakhtuns divided on ethnic and national issues under the parliamentary politics. Various players and parties play a vital role in neutralizing the ethnic collective sentiments while highlighting the national and international issues and downplaying the local ethnic issues in relation to the state and other provinces.

The party politics and local bodies' elections have caused rifts in the kinship bonds among Pakhtuns. In some cases a person may be an active worker of one political party while his relative contesting election from another rival political party. This paradox usually results in the shrinking of kinship bonds. Furthermore, it has been observed that in electoral politics sometimes close relatives personally contest elections against one another which causes internal fission in the family.

Another important point to mention is that the Pakhtuns though deprived of their due political status, treat state as an extension of the family in which they strive for equal political rights. It is reflected in the demands Pakhtun nationalists have been making for provincial autonomy, the rights upon their own resources, the right to preserve their culture and history in textbooks and transmit it to the coming generations etc. Pakhtun culture has it that the members of this extended form of family, the other ethnic groups comprising the federating units, are inevitably considered to be agnates who are prone to become 'agnatic rivals' in the wake of ill treatment. Like every other community in the world, affiliation of Pakhtuns' with the state is conditional driven by the principle "do unto others as they have

done unto you.” This rule is observed at every level of relations from personal to state level under the social contract. Partisanship demands loyalties. Whatever attachment and orientation is prevalent it renders the other party to be as responsive as it bounds itself to the standing rules. If one is supportive and humbly accommodative the other finds oneself obliged to reciprocate, but if the relation is hostile and not based on equal treatment the aggrieved party reserves the right to respond in a manner best suited to it.

Furthermore in post-colonial societies like Pakistan, the political organizations/institutions are neither strong nor capable to reach and influence the masses to associate their loyalties and allegiance towards the state. Therefore, the ethnic conflict in such circumstances is focused towards the state and is not interpersonal. The tussle of the ethnic groups with the state creates a situation where the programs launched by the state are recognized as anti-ethnic, consequently, the state fails to produce social solidarity and national integration (Hashmi, 2014). In Pakistani context the case of Pakhtuns is also the same and the conflict of Pakhtuns is predominantly with the state and they consider the state as their immediate rival.

5.4 Education and Cultural Transmission

The distinct cultural identity of Pakhtuns’ strikingly features their language, egalitarianism governing their social and political affairs (grounded in collective claim on the same ancestor), self-reliance in economic endeavors (Pakhtun saying: there is no good in subservience even to the father). The principle of cooperation driving kinsmen’s and interpersonal relations of allied group members’ and their group psychology owes much to their historical peculiarities and ecology of political undercurrents. Such cultural peculiarities in addition to the conquests and establishment of a confederation in Afghanistan in 1772 to which Pakhtuns now living in Pakistan were a part of and it has now become a nation state in the beginning of twentieth century. It set a peculiar sense of belonging with the past that is transmitted through the process of enculturation, oral tradition and non-official history books. Such historical, cultural, political and geographical background places Pakhtuns in contesting the legitimization and de-legitimization in the name of history of Pakistan. It is an attempt that is considered vital in making a nation as Hobsbawm & Kertze (1992) puts it: “what makes a nation is the past, what justifies one nation against others is the past.”

Fanon (1963) in his book “The Wretched of the Earth” stated that holding people in its grip is never up to the content of colonialism, rather it distorts, disfigures and destroys the past of the oppressed. Pakhtuns, have a history of being colonized and then falling to the hands of whom (Pakistani rulers) they never shared their struggle with in favour of winning freedom from British, have never been immune to such attempts of distortion. Jalal (1995) sees it as the imaginings of power which can discard the stray ‘truths’ of pure inspiration and pretend to monopolize the enterprise of creativity that ends up as a sort of amnesia. Distortion of history was and is made possible with the help of textbooks which Aziz (1993) criticised as providing the major inaccuracies, distortions, exaggerations and slants. It makes students to be non-critical and submissive to authority. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto complaining about the absence of a sense of Pakistani nationhood (Hobsbawm & Kertzer, 1992) as the Two-Nation Theory was perceived to have come under attack after the dismemberment of the state of Pakitsan (Creation of Bangladesh). During the reign of Zia-ul-Haq, the education system of the country had been put through enormous changes. Since Ayub Khan's times, the textbooks for schools and colleges were published officially by the government. Pakistan studies textbooks were used by the State to promote national narrative among the young minds.

Indicating to state’s major objectives for creating nationalism and support for the military, Rahman (1998) points out some basic messages repeatedly appear in all the books which are based on degradation of non-Muslims and their culture, propagation of conspiracy theories, glorification of war, and Islamization of Pakistani nationalism. According to him, the non-Muslim part of Pakistan is ignored and the borrowing from Hindu culture was either ignored or condemned. The Pakistan movement is portrayed mostly in terms of the perfidy of Hindus and the British and the righteousness of the Muslims. Only Hindus are blamed to have massacred Muslims while Muslims are not shown to have treated the Hindus in the same manner. India is portrayed as the enemy which is waiting to dismember Pakistan, and the separation of Bangladesh in 1971 is shown as proof of this Indian policy rather than the result of the domination of the West Pakistan over East Bengal. Above all, the 1948, 1965 and 1971 wars are blamed entirely on India, and Pakistan is shown to have won the 1965 war. The armed forces are not only glorified but treated as if they were sacrosanct and above criticism. All eminent personalities associated with the Pakistan movement, especially Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Iqbal, are presented as orthodox Muslims and any aspect of their thoughts and behaviour which does not conform to this image is suppressed. Indeed, the

overall effect of the ideological lessons is to make Islam reinforce and legitimise both Pakistani nationalism and militarisation.

The above mentioned facts can also be confirmed from the brilliant study of K.K. Aziz (1993), "Murder of History in Pakistani Textbooks," in which he has provided the reader with the major inaccuracies, distortions, exaggerations and slants to be found in each officially prepared and prescribed textbook and in a representative selection of private commercial publications which are in wide use as textbooks. In his thorough and fascinating dissection of 66 Pakistan Studies and History textbooks, history has been manipulated, polluted, ill-used and trampled over.

Though, the distortion of history was in fashion in the very early days of the creation of Pakistan Ayesha Jalal (1995) is of the view, that it took a new pace after the state's disintegration. The curricula and textbooks of Bhutto's new Pakistan emerged through the dismemberment of the state, because the Two-Nation Theory was perceived to have come under attack. So, there was a renewed emphasis on the Two-Nation Theory in the form of the Ideology of Pakistan and on finding the roots of Pakistani nation in the neighbouring lands to the west - i.e., Iran, Afghanistan, the Arab World and the Central Asia - again based on religion, which, furthermore, set the ground for waxing and waning of Pakistan with owning Khilji and Ghaznavi era etc. and hijacking foreign figures such as Muhammad bin Qasim, Ghaznavi and Abdali.

Then Zia-ul-Haq initiated the process of Islamization with full zeal. The textbooks continued to lay even greater stress on the Islamic perspective of historical events, and a composite of distorted stories of pre-Islamic India, falsified accounts of Muslim kings, distorted justification of the Two-Nation Theory, Muslim heroes and discussions on the superiority of Islamic principles replaced the existing subjects of history and geography. All history that concerned pre-Islamic events of the territory that now constitutes Pakistan, such as the old Hindu and Buddhist empires, was eliminated from textbooks. During Zia martial law, these texts were rephrased in accordance with the Islamist ideological scheme to promote the state's ulterior and hidden motives (Haqqani, 2016). These textbooks were full of errors and misinterpretations from the historical point of view. These textbooks of Social Studies and Pakistan Studies had narratives that supported the military regime, to provoke dislike against Hinduism, to deliberately distort the pre-partition history and to glorify the battles against other religious groups (Aziz, 1993). The students of the elementary level were taught the biased concepts. For instance, Pakistan was portrayed as the fortress of Islam to promote an extremist approach towards other religious groups. They were told that the advent of Islam

5.5 Altering Outlook of Religion

Culture is being explained in a variety of different meanings that are contextually dependent. Similarly, culture is no longer regarded as unchanging and identical for all individuals, but as an inherently dynamic process of domination and marginalization in which individuals are positioned differently. Thus, the association of homogeneity that was so characteristic of the old concepts of culture and identity, has been replaced by a concern for the question how different people attempt to use the economic, political, and symbolic resources that are available to them in order to try and impose their interpretation and understanding of situations on others, while at the same time attempting to prevent others from making their definition of the situation hegemonic.

Cultural change is a gradual phenomenon while the creation of Pakistan and its subsequent nation-building project is relatively recent. However, this project has impacted various aspects of Pakhtun society including the religious aspect. Religion was indeed part of Pakhtun society before the creation of Pakistan, but it was not a sole defining feature of Pakhtuns' social life. As mentioned earlier, Pakhtuns also had a parallel secular code of conduct which was the main doctrine of their social life. This secular doctrine kept the people together in various crucial situations. The tussle of Pakhtuns under the leadership of Khushal Khan Khattak against the Muslim Mughal Emperors, and the alliance of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement of Bacha Khan with Hindu dominated secular All India Congress against the Muslim dominated Muslim League are couple of examples. It shows that though the religion was present in Pakhtun society it was not politicized nor it was the sole principal feature of Pakhtun society. The religious implications of Pakistani state project are mentioned in detail in the following lines.

5.5.1 Islamization and Arabization of Pakhtun Society

Pakistani state from the very beginning has tried to Islamize and subsequently Arabize the Pakhtun culture and society. Though this project was executed through various regimes after the partition but the Pakhtun culture received a heavy setback during the reign of General Zia-ul-Haq due to purposely encouraged and espoused Islamization policy. This policy was spread and promoted through religious educational institutions, supporting religious groups and personalities. During the initial (1979-1982) years of Zia ul-Haq's regime 151 new madrassas were opened. In the subsequent five years this number increased and approximately one thousand additional madrassas were established (International Crisis Group, 2002). The curriculum was redrafted for the public schools

across the country and there was stress on jihad and radicalization. The foreign agencies provided capital, religious literature and weapons. The borrowed literature was disseminated in these madrassas (Zia, 2003). Under the might of the country's armed forces, Zia sponsored the growing influence of clergy and Islamists in the civil government (Haqqani, 2016). In the same pattern, Islamist journalists under the auspices of the state had started publishing magazines and newspapers to promote the state agenda and these journalists were given spaces in the state-owned television. The Pakhtun society was packed with *madrassa* (seminary) network in the aftermath of the Islamization policy. One of my respondents Maulana Fahad Akbar who is the *Nazim i Taleemat* (Director Studies) in Haji Saib Turangzai seminary (Charsadda) said that only in district Charsadda there are 257 *Madrassas* having almost six thousand male students and approximately ten thousand female students. These madrassa are registered with *Wifaq ul Madaris* which is the operating body of the seminaries in the country. If one district has this much huge number of seminaries, one can easily estimate the extent of this project in whole Pakhtun belt.

Zia ul Haq's Islamization drive effected higher education institutions of the society. Islamist student groups were supported and favored by the Zia regime, which resulted in the clashes between students and secular teachers (Haqqani, 2016). A former student leader Saeed Alam from Mardan said that this militarization policy of the state brought weapons to the university and college campuses. The Islamist students in the campuses were given weapons which resulted in sporadic conflicts among various student groups. These armed encounters took the lives of numerous youth and also ruined the academic environment of the campuses. Thus universities were purged from secular teachers through these Islamist student groups. Secular professors at the university level either resigned or penalized for their secular views. During Zia's regime, a *sanad* or diploma from seminaries was made equivalent to a university degree (Haqqani, 2016). This decision paved the way for the students of seminaries to compete with the university students for government jobs. As a result of it, the influence of Islamists like Jamaat-i-Islami increased in universities and colleges.

Pakistan since its creation had fought so many wars on the issues of its survival, yet there were other wars which were fought with some other motives behind them. But no matter the nature of those wars, it were the Pakhtuns who remained the chief victims of those wars. It was an established and occasionally pronounced fact of the government of Pakistan that most of those wars had nothing to do with Pakhtuns, yet they drastically altered the cultural

identity of the people of this region. From the religious outlook (perhaps the most significant aspect of Pakhtun culture) to their economy, and each and every other aspect of their lives did not remain the same after Pakistan decided to join the American war against the Soviet military intrusion in Afghanistan. The Islamic war “*Jihad*” (holy war) was backed by Saudi Arabia and America. Thousands of Islamist radicals were endorsed by the state of Pakistan to fight the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. Pakhtuns were made the lab rats for this endeavor and even the concept of this jihadist faction was conceived and enacted in Peshawar. These forces brought a new culture with them in the form of Wahabi Islam (the most radical/jihadist form of Islam). Backed by generous funding from Saudi Arabia, a network of Madrassas were established where they taught this radical form of Islam that fundamentally changed the religious outlook of these people. Every aspect of Sufi Islam (a more moderate version of Islam) which previously shaped the religious outlook of these people was torn to shreds by this Wahhabism and it introduced Jihad as the primary duty of Muslims. This was in a complete disregard to the historical and cultural manifestation of the people of this region and it, catastrophically led to the incubation of terrorism in this region, in the name of Islam.

A significant point that needs to be discussed is this Islamization policy of the state which radicalized the divide between the Sunni and Shia sects and violent conflicts among them emerged. The religious places such as mosques and shrines that were the places of reverence were attacked by both sects (Zainab, 2018). These sectarian armed conflicts in some cases continued for weeks. In Pakhtun tribal areas and in the settled areas too, these conflicts took the lives of many people and severely hampered the social fabric of the society. The Pashto literature was replaced with militant and jihadi literature, the pens were substituted with weapons, and musical implements were replaced by the culture of loud speakers. The militant groups carried out attacks on the historical shrines of saints. They also attacked artists and the art centers. The musical instruments, singers, musicians and creative artists of the Pakhtun land were attacked and condemned (Khan T. N., 2019). The state backed policy of pan-Islamism culminated in a novel program of “Pakhtun Islamism.” Due to the continuous support from the Pakistani state, the Pakhtun Islamism evolved into a terrible political power which weakened the threat of Pakhtun nationalism in the area (Siddique, 2014).

Another thing associated with the Islamization policy was the advent of *Tableeghi* network in Pakhtun society. The roots of Tableeghi Jamaat were linked with the Deoband school of

thought. These Deobandis are conservative and keep themselves away from western influences. Tableeghis do not concentrate on gaining political power and they do not look for the Islamic revolution rather they emphasize social changes (Haqqani, 2016). Nonetheless it is a systematic program which brought drastic changes to Pakhtun society. It discouraged the political activism of the people hence it made Pakhtuns apolitical and thus assisted the state to subdue the Pakhtuns. Controlling and governing apolitical society becomes easy for the state as compared to the politically aware people. As Parvez Khan said; politics raises awareness in the people about their rights and teaches them how to get these rights. Agitation and resistance against oppressors are the virtues of the political people because they know how to protect their rights. The Tableeghis made the Pakhtuns apolitical and every man-made calamity (terrorism, poverty) happened to them (by the state) was termed as a calamity from God or punishment from the God for the bad deeds committed in this world. In such circumstances it becomes easy for the state to justify their unjust policies under the guise of “supernatural happening.”

Besides these changes to the Pakhtun society, this religious project also brought some other changes to Pakhtun society like the emergence of women’s *burqa* replacing the traditional shawl. Furthermore, the outdoor cultural games of the females were gradually restricted under the guise of *Pardah*. The musical programs on the eve of wedding started to decline as these events were considered violation of the Sharia.

Another cultural change which was witnessed the afore-mentioned was the inclusion of females in *tableegh*. Women groups of *tableeghis* commonly known as *Mastoorat Jamaat* gained their momentum in Pakhtun areas. A large number of Pakhtuns started to send their females for tableegh to other vicinities for the propagation of religious teachings. These females would spent their days and nights at someone’s residence in other localities. Though spending a night for Pakhtun women at an alien’s place was considered against moral standards in Pakhtun culture, but it was made suitably appropriate under the cover of religious obligation.

Nowadays in almost every district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa there are tableeghi centers (*markaz*) where the tableeghis gather regularly. Another practice which has emerged alongside is the visit of religious scholars to these centers on Thursday night (*shab e juma*) where the people listen to their sermons. These tableeghis are now more inclined towards their Islamic identity instead of Pakhtun identity. Every time they meet the common people

that would say “Thanks to Almighty Allah who created us as Muslims”. According to Jameel advocate, the tableeghis consider themselves as apolitical but majority of them vote for Islamist parties in elections and not the Pakhtun nationalists and progressive parties. He added that it is a soft incursion by the state to make the ground for the Islamist parties and jihadis and to shackle the Pakhtun identity and nationalism.

5.6 Taliban as Pakhtuns and Pakhtuns as Taliban (Racial/ Ethnic Profiling)

In Pakistani nationalist project another major concern related to Pakhtuns is the racial/ ethnic profiling of Pakhtuns. Pakistani government is very much at the heart of this systematic discrimination against the people of this region. This type of discrimination functions not only at the authoritarian levels but rather it has been actuated through print and electronic media, through popular culture such as highlighted in movies and TV dramas, and even through the text books taught in other parts of the country.

Mass media has also portrayed and molded the identity of the Pakhtuns more with the style of racial profiling. The militants in media are shown wearing traditional Pakhtun dress and turban. All the cultural characteristics of Pakhtuns are presented as ethos of the terrorists. The terrorists were recognized and generalized with Pakhtuns and vice versa (Khan T. N., 2019).

The print and electronic media along with the outlets of popular culture such as movie cinema and TV channels are owned mostly by Punjab and what we can easily observe is a racial profiling of Pakhtuns like their culture is depicted as savage and barbaric, and is looked upon with an eye of “otherness,” the people of this region are shown to be anonymous masses rather than individuals with proper names. The cultural dress up of Pakhtuns has been made synonymous with that of a terrorist and their language is seen as a language appropriated for terrorism. This is a serious degradation of the most significant aspect of one’s culture. The Pakhtun character who would often find space on the popular culture of Punjab is almost always bestowed with stereotypical and derogatory roles. The Pakhtun culture is presented negatively in commercial Pashto dramas. These dramas often display the use of violence, weapons and drugs which is seriously affecting the psyche of the young people (Khan T. N., 2019).

5.7 The Imposition of Urdu Language and the Transformation of Pashto Language

The Pashto language which has remained a strong instrument of Pakhtun nationalism and basic an identity factor of Pakhtuns (Rahman, 1996; Siddique, 2014) has faced marginalization from the very beginning in all the domains of Pakistani state. The regional languages have been deliberately kept suppressed and ignored in the educational institutions, mainstream media and official accounts. In educational institution of Pakistan only Urdu and English languages are used. The Urdu language writings in the state educational apparatus have the highest ratio of ideological material (Rahman T. , 2004). This ideological material of Urdu in the educational institution is a double-edged sword of the state, indoctrinating the youngsters by keeping them uninformed about their culture/identity (Pakhtunness) and also averting them from the usage of their mother tongue. The state's nationalization project and the imposition of Urdu language in education system and other mediums has impacted Pashto language in variety of ways. This impact of Urdu language on Pashto language has been discussed in detail in following lines.

5.7.1 Inclusion of Urdu Words in Pashto

The imposition of the Urdu language by the state has caused the mixture of Urdu language with Pashto. Now the Pashto language has a lot of words of Urdu and these words have been used by the common people in Pakhtun society. Shahjehan Khalil argued that now when we go to shop and ask the shopkeeper about the price of a thing, the shopkeeper would say; دپ چاسروپی دے (Its price is fifty rupees) using an Urdu word *pachas* (fifty) for the price instead of Pashto word *panzoos*. Similarly the names of various objects and entities of our dwellings have been changed into Urdu like room is called *kamra* instead of *kota* and door is called *darwaza* instead of *tamba*. The kids use such words frequently because the state has denied the indigenous language of this land in educational system and the kids are educated in an alien language.

According to Arshad Khalil, the imposition of Urdu language in education institutions and other segments of our society has spoiled our language and it has borrowed many words from Urdu. He said that the nationalization policy of the state has also impacted our morality. The traditional verbal abuses in Pashto language have had serious consequences but their replacement with the alternative words in Urdu language have become quite

acceptable and common in use. The verbal abuses in Urdu have infiltrated the daily usage of language and being in use quiet profoundly. (اوس مورين کن گل هم د اردو د غ ککوؤ)

The kinship terminologies which were being used in Pakhtun society have been altered due to the propagation and imposition of Urdu language. The Pakhtuns have started using Urdu kinship terminologies. The Pashto words which were used by kids to call their parents have been replaced by Urdu words. According to Asif Yousafzai now the kids call their parents with the name of *Abbu, Abba Jan, Pappa, Ammi and Mamma* instead of *Daji, Mor and Aday*, similarly maternal aunt is called *khaala* instead of *tror*. (اوس ماشوم ان مور او پلارته داجي، ادي او مورنه لويي اوس وت تابو، اباجان پپپا، امي او ممولو اي، هم دغ هش ان ترورته خله وايي)

5.7.2 Decline of Pashto Reading and Writing Abilities

Another change which has been witnessed in Pakhtun culture due to the state integration policy and the imposition of Urdu language is that majority of the Pakhtun youth nowadays cannot read and write Pashto. When I was conducting my fieldwork in Peshawar I also asked my students (undergraduate class) in the class that how many of them could read and write Pashto. Out of two classes which had 70 students only 4 could write Pashto. When I asked the reason for lack of writing skills the students said they had not studied Pashto in their schools. Saleem Khan, a prominent political figure of district Swabi argued that when you don't teach the children their mother tongue in schools how would they learn to read and write it? In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa most of the newspapers are published in Urdu language and common Pakhtuns mostly read Urdu newspapers. During my fieldwork only four respondents said that they read Pashto newspaper, the remaining were reading Urdu and English newspapers. It shows the decline in the reading and writing culture of their own mother tongue.

5.7.3 Pashto no more a Marketable Language

As mentioned earlier Pashto language has been denied its due place in a variety of ways in the Pakistani nationalistic project hence it has been a lesser language of market and economic benefit. This language has lesser market value in the context of Pakistani nationalistic project. There are lesser job opportunities for those educated or graduated in Pashto language. As Aman Khan (Swabi) said that in Pakistan it is easy to get a job if you have the degree of Pakistan Study or Urdu but the degree of Pashto gives you very scant benefit in economic terms. This depressing and discouraging attitude of the state towards

Pashto language has diverted the masses from their own mother tongue. Besides this, another important thing which occurred in Pakhtun culture is the abundance of Urdu text. There are plenty of Urdu newspapers in the province which are being disseminated across the province in millions on daily basis. There are only a few Pashto newspapers which are read by a minute number of people.

5.7.4 Illustrative Subjugation of Pashto Language

Another impact on the culture of Pakhtuns which was shared by the respondents during fieldwork was that illustratively Urdu has surpassed the Pashto language. The decoration panels in front of shops and other commercial places are written in Urdu. The signboards on main roads are filled with Urdu text. The signboards and charts in public places are written in Urdu. The instructions in shops and other commercial places are mainly written in Urdu followed by English. Kifayatullah Khan said that there are thousands of shops and signboards in Peshawar but you would see only few written in Pashto. Majority of them are written in Pashto.

5.8 Demonization of Red and Glorification of Green Color

Colors as symbols are culturally relative, but dissimilar cultures attach different meanings to the same color and also use them differently. Colors may have variance of usage and meanings in a single culture over the course of time (Birren, 2006). Pakistan is a multicultural entity where every cultural group in it has different choices of color usage as well as meaning attached to them. But in Pakistani nationalist scheme, the green color is a preferred one and the state restrains different ethnicities to shun their own color symbols in favor of the “national color symbol.” As the ideology of the state is religiously driven hence the color chosen from the symbolic representation of the state nationalism also has a religious emblem. In Islamic injunctions the green color is praised and in the Holy Quran it has been mentioned like in heaven “there will be gardens where the rivers pour beneath these gardens, there they (the people of heaven) will be given armlets of gold, and they will wear green clothes of delicate silk.²⁸” It implies that green is the color of heaven. Borrowing from such conceptions the color of the national flag of Pakistan is overwhelmingly green. This greenness of the color in the national flag is an indicator of the religious identity of the people of Pakistan according to the official descriptions. Since Pakistan is overwhelming populated by the believers in Islam, therefore, the green represents the Muslims in the

²⁸ Translation of verse no. 31, Chapter 15-16, Surah Kahf.

country. In other words, in Pakistan the green is a color of particular ‘religion’s people.’ Thus, this color binds the state of Pakistan with the religion of Islam. Pakistan’s official religion, state and nation’s nationalistic ideology is in green color. It shows that the usage of color is not merely cultural but political.

In Pakistani nationalist scheme the two colors that are entailed with the ‘political meaning’ are; Green and Red. These two colors are in binary opposition to one another. Green is the color of the state while red is the color of the color ethno-nationalists (Pakhtun nationalists). This binary opposition also holds its roots in international politics where red was the symbol of communists who were in tussle with capitalists. It was the color of the oppressed people and a color of revolution. This is the reason why red color in Pakistan is not liked by the state’s agents; those who support status quo in politics; those who support privatization in economics; those who supports Islamization in Pakistan; and, those who believe that violence is legitimate in subjugating and conquering others. Its use may not be an issue in some of the domains, like the reddish color of *Biryani* food is not an issue for the above-mentioned actors and agents.

However, in the majority of cultural domains, the use of red in any expression whether in flag, in batch, in cap, in uniforms, in advertisement, in billboard, etc. are like a red rag to the bull of Pakistani state and those afore-mentioned. The “red” in politics is synonymous with change, with revolt, with have nots, and with communism at international level. The hatred against red is manifested in the propaganda by calling the followers of red flag as *sra kafir*²⁹ (Infidels). However, this is empirical fact that ‘red color politics’ does exist in Pakistan and mostly in Pakhtun belt. There are several political parties whose flags are partially or completely ‘red.’ These political parties have major support base in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. One such pioneer political party that popularized the red color in every household and dress and daily routine was Khudai Khidmatgar and its subsequent political successor, ANP (Awami National Party). The use of the red of color was almost cent per cent, its force’s uniform was ‘completely’ red; its flag is ‘completely’ red and its particular history has put it at loggerhead with the Pakistani state and nation building projects. There are still many regions where people do not support ANP through

²⁹ In Pashto “sra” means red and “kafir” means infidel. This term was used and propagated in pre-partition time of the Subcontinent by the Pakhtun clerics under the auspices of the Colonial British for the communists of Russia referring to the red color of their flag. Afterwards in Pakistani nation-building project this term has been equally used for the Pakhtun nationalists and other people having red flag.

voting, but their likeness of red color in day to day life has serious fallout for them. These implications manifest them in various ways.

The first thing is that such person with such color preference is not fit in the larger state scheme of things in Pakistan. He is considered half citizen because his loyalties to the state of Pakistan are questionable as his color preference is not green. His rights abridgment and violation are as such a matter of law but matter of color. His freedom to express is harbored as treason against the state. We know that law does not recognize the color in formal sense but takes cognizance of the act whether it is lawful or unlawful. In Pakistan it is other way round; color determines law and subsequently your status of being acceptable or unacceptable in the polity of Pakistan. The green color is so powerful that it made the ANP's provincial government tenure (2008-2013) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that it fixed a 'huge' green color flag of Pakistan with high pedestal in the city of Peshawar (in Jinnah Park) to give message to the supporters and the province that though ANP's party flag is red but it does not mean it is above the "green, the omni-present and omni-potent."

In everyday life, the green works as psychological violence against those who do not like it because it has state's force behind it. One cannot express, say, if asked in a job interview one's preference for red color even if one adores it by heart. In this sense one's economic prospect is determined by color choice. This lands one in a scenario where one may be financially sound but psychologically feeble. Such instances are a daily routine in Pakhtun society.

In the contemporary wave of militancy in Pakhtun belt, the red and green confrontation has also been underway since the beginning. The militants (having the green Islamist ideology) targeted those who liked or supported the red color party (ANP). Over 1000 member of community and top heirarcy leaders of ANP were killed in this wave of militancy on Pakhtun land, the greatest number when compared to any political party in Pakistan against war on terrorism. This terrorism war is like an invitation to kill and insult yourself at the hand of militants by proclaiming to be supporters of the red. Both the militants and the Pakistani state share the "green religious driven ideology" against the red and secular ideology" of Pakhtuns. Hence red is opposed by both the state and militants.

These historical injustices life and ideology, grave opposition to it, the red likeness, use, and options have down the road become like a persona non grata for the people of Pakhtun in their political struggle and in their everyday life. Since they cannot completely discard it,

but the frequency of its use, its size in various formats, and its public display in Pakhtun society has become fewer and green color has convincingly dominated it. In educational institutions mostly green color uniform is preferred like the color of sweaters, muffler and blazers. The front cover of textbooks is mainly printed green as compared to red, the curtains and cloth sheet on tables in offices are usually green. In commercial areas like markets, the green has superseded the red. In the domain of sports like cricket, the youth nowadays prefer to wear green trousers and shirts inspired from the Pakistani national team popularly known as “green shirts.”

Another important point to mention is that red is labeled as a feminine color, like only women wear red color attire. Hence the men wearing red shirts, dress, and muffler are considered as an act of females. Now you may see red cap, red muffler only in the rallies of political party or other such political gathering. This demonization of the red has force it to take rearguard position in the Pakhtun area and state glorification has pushed green into vanguard position in the Pakhtun land.

5.9 Urbanization of Pakhtun Society

The Pakhtun belt was very dynamic culturally and was connected with the neighboring countries before colonialism through trade and commerce. Colonialism disrupted these vital economic connections on the pretext of keeping the Pakhtuns intact with Sub-continent by using force and Pakhtuns became busy with defending themselves. Even in the post-Colonial period, the Pakhtuns’ relations with the state suffered a major setback as the latter saw the relationship of Pakhtuns with the neighboring countries with a suspicious eye. Their connections whether covert or open were thought to be against the national interest. Resultantly, the Pakhtuns were subjected to social and economic pressures and their links and relations were limited to the new boundaries of newly born state. This approach of the state led to another disturbing element. Due to social and economic pressures the Pakhtuns started internal migration to the urban centers (Nichols, 2008). Urban centers provided them with alternative economic opportunities to earn their livings as compare to the scarce economic prospects they had in the form of agrarian under-developed economic rural setups. It is estimated that up till now 3.0 million Pakhtuns have internally migrated to the urban centers all over the country. A large number of Pakhtun migrated to Middle Eastern countries as labor to earn and send remittances back home. The alarming feature is that now Pakhtuns are dependent on the national and international influences which control them due to the social and economic pressures.

Traditionally the Pakhtuns were living in villages and followed rural life style. With the advent of enhanced communication facilities people started migrating from rural areas to urban areas in search of jobs and more comfortable and less hazardous life. A large number of Pakhtuns moved to Karachi after partition in search of livelihood as it was the capital of the newly established state as well as the only commercial hub of the country. Karachi is now famously known as the largest city of Pakhtuns around the world and it has now surpassed the other major cities like Quetta and Peshawar in terms of population. This urbanization exodus was not only limited to Karachi but the other cities of the province like Peshawar which is also the provincial capital and its population too began to swell. The well to do Pakhtuns started settling in the federal capital in immensely large number. It shows the decline in the rural life of the Pakhtuns which was once the significant indicator of the Pakhtun culture.

A significant reason for the urbanization of Pakhtuns is their higher fertility. The comparison of Pakhtuns to other ethnic groups in Pakistan in terms of fertility testifies the above statement. The higher fertility rate and large family size resulting in economic pressure have compelled Pakhtuns to move to urban centres in search of livelihood. The demographic indicators of Khyber Pakhtunwa shown by the Population Welfare Department of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the year 2017-2018 indicates that the total fertility rate of Pakistan is 3.6 while in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa it is 4 (Population Welfare Department, 2017-2018). Living in the smallest province of the country with higher fertility rate while having lesser economic opportunities in their rural areas a sizeable portion of Pakhtuns have been pushed to urban areas.

The urbanization of Pakhtuns is also caused by the internal war and security policy of the state of Pakistan as the Pakhtun land had been converted into a battlefield. These encounters on Pakhtun land triggered one of the major dislocation of human beings in recent times. The key sufferers of these adversaries were again Pakhtuns (Siddique, 2014). The military operations of the state on Pakhtun land compelled the Pakhtuns to move towards urban centers (Kugelman, 2013) for the sake of refuge and livelihood. The insurgency against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan triggered a new wave of migrants into the Pakistani Urban settlements (Khan H. U., 2018). The wave of terrorism ensued by the events of 9/11 and the subsequent involvement of Pakistani state in “war on terror” has been catastrophic for Pakhtuns. It drastically altered each and every aspect of the lives of the Pakhtuns. Millions of people were made IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) in the

state sponsored military operations and it introduced the Pakhtuns of this region to a completely different and alien form of life. They were forced to live in camps in miserable conditions. Their economic conditions were left in tatters as the IDPs had to leave behind not only their homes but also their means of earning and livelihood. This huge demographic movement of people in search of a safe homestead meant that they were accommodated in not so ideal circumstances. As they were completely broke, most of the families were forced to live in appalling state.

5.10 Components of Pakhtun Culture Exploited by the State for the Integration of Pakhtuns

There was a consensus among the respondents on their opinion that Pakistan state has used Islam as a main tool to integrate the Pakhtuns in the state. Regarding the role of Islam in the integration of different ethnicities, most of the people were of the view that religion can could play a role in the integration of the people. However, mere religion is not enough if there is injustice or discrepancy among the life standard of different ethnic groups.

One of my respondents Bilal Khan of Charsadda gave the example of Bangladesh. They were Muslims but they fought for their liberation as they were deprived of their rights. You must give the people their due rights otherwise mere religion cannot be catalyst of change in order to keep the people together. **ہم صرف یہ مزہب خلکن ہشی یو و خائے کولے دے تے کو حق بہ ہم و کی گئی بنے کاپن بہ نچدا کی دل**

As Pakhtuns only share religious belief with other ethnicities of the country so it is the main apparatus for Pakistan to make Pakhtuns Pakistanized. Abdur Rehman Khan of Swabi stated that Pakistan is Islamizing Pakhtuns to make them Pakistanized. Secular Pakhtun is not in the interest of Pakistan as compared to religious Pakhtun. Secular Pakhtun will talk about his culture, identity and history which is not in interest of state nationalism. Through the Islamization of the state, a network of religious seminaries was established in the Pakhtun region. Pakhtuns were brainwashed and their culture was attacked under the guise of Islam. The Pakhtunness was overshadowed by the notion of *Musalmani*. The state on various occasions has kept the religious card alive by saying that “Islam is in danger” to gain the sympathies of the masses. India is considered as a country of Hindus and a big enemy of Islam though the number of Muslims living in India almost corresponds to the number of Muslims in Pakistan. The state’s Islamization policy is a desperate attempt to downsize the Pakhtun ethno-nationalism.

Another cultural quality which has been exploited by the Pakistani state is the ingrained valor of Pakhtuns. It has been propagated in mainstream media in textbooks by the state to keep the people ready for any project of their interest. According to Aman Khan (Swabi) the training centers of Jihadis were established in different parts of Pakhtun region. The Pakhtuns were trained in it. Weapons on large quantity were brought to the Pakhtun region. Interestingly the mottos of the army and these militant organizations were same like; ایمان، جہانفی سبیل اللہ (Faith, Piety, Holy War in the Name of Allah). He further said that their motto is the same and their objective of destroying the Pakhtun identity is the same. The Pakhtun youth of the belt were sent to Kashmir and Afghanistan for different jihads. This policy has two dimensions; one was using Pakhtun youth against the enemies of Pakistan and the second was to weaken the Pakhtun nationalism.

Hospitality is the other component of Pakhtun culture which has also been exploited by the state of Pakistan in their policies. To make Jihadis incursion in the region easier, the state has used the tenet of hospitality in Pakhtunwali. As Pakhtuns give respect to their guest irrespective of their ethnicity, race or religion so Jihadis from all around the world were brought to Pakhtun region by the state and it was advocated to Pakhtuns that they are your guests and your brethren of religious belief so they should be extended hospitality. These special guests did their duty very honestly, little knowing that these guests were devastating the Pakhtun identity, history and ethno-nationalism.

According to Sherin Zada, recently in Waziristan the state exploited another tradition of *nanawati* by visiting the family of the deceased who had been killed during the raid of the armed forces. The personnel of the armed forces (the accused) went to the family with a goat as a tradition of the area to accept their blunder and to ask for pardon. It shows that every minute thing which the state finds in its favor and console the berieved family has been exploited in Pakhtun culture to make them follow the state's policies.

The above discussion about the implications of Pakistani nation building project on Pakhtun culture can be explained in the context of internal colonization. Peter Calvert (2001) in his study has pointed out that internal colonization and external colonization have common features and strategies like the use of force, physically capturing of the area by extending the political powers and the un-even relationship between the masters and the subjects. In internal colonization the colonial power has been replaced by a ruling elite and this class exercises its powers within the the boundary of a country using the same strategies/ methods

which are being used by external colonists. The term internal colonization could have four different interpretations. According to first interpretation, it refers to the physical take-over of various territories by the state within the political boundaries. But unlike external colonization this taking over of land does not extend across the political boundaries of the state. Secondly, the internal colonization takes the form of the domination of major ethnic group/ race over the minority ethnic groups/ race. In this case the minority ethnic groups are suppressed by the majority ethnic group through the exercise of power. A third interpretation of internal colonization is in the pure economic terms and can be linked to the dependency theory. In this context the peripheries face inferior and weak economic position while the powerful core enjoys the strong economic position. This interpretation of internal colonization has also been given by (Hechter, 1975) in his study where the powerful core exploits the weaker periphery. The last interpretation of internal colonisation which has been predominantly given by the ecologists is under the guise of 'nation-building' and 'development' programs. In this case the powerful ruling elite carries out various development programs in the form of dams, motorways, industrial zones, military headquarters, establishment of urban setups and many other like it to dismantle the weaker and common people.

Now, if we take Pakhtuns as a minority ethnic group in Pakistani state, it has been facing the same internal colonization by the powerful ruling elite/ Pakistani state. All the above mentioned interpretations of internal colonization are matching their case. The Pakhtuns' land has been physically occupied by the State and the ruling elites are exercising their political powers over them. They have been dominated by the majority Punjabi ethnic group where their language, culture and political views face severe marginalization. Their economic resources like electricity, gas minerals etc have also been exploited by the strong central government. Lastly, their land has been exploited for various development programs like making urban centres and dams that has dismantled the local population. Once they are dispersed, they could easily be controlled by the state due to economic pressure.

Chapter 6.

PAKHTUNS' JOURNEY: BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND INTEGRATION

6.1 Pakhtun-ness as a Preferred Identity

Identity is a multi-layered and multi-dimensional phenomenon (Rahman, 1997). It is not static or stagnant but dynamic and changes with time and space. People's inclinations towards a specific identity are shaped by various economic, political and cultural factors. The identity issue among Pakhtuns is also affected by numerous factors. Encapsulated by the state apparatus, the Pakhtuns oscillate between the various forms of identity ranging from Pakhtuns to Muslims to Pakistani identity. Nonetheless, the Pakhtun society is still a traditional society carrying its old traditions and the people do adhere to them

During interviews and informal discussions in the fieldwork, it was witnessed that most of the people preferred Pakhtun identity over Pakistani identity. The respondents were of the view that identity comes through language and through the ways of living. So by speaking Pashto language and following Pakhtun code of conduct (Pakhtunwali), our declared identity is Pakhtun. The preference for Pakhtun identity was not only limited to the uneducated people, most of the educated people also preferred to be known as Pakhtuns. One of my respondents Janas Khan (Swabi) pointed out that we were Pakhtuns before the rise of Islam and before the creation of Pakistan. How would I shed my ancient identity and instead prefer the recent and imposed one to Pakistani identity. He said that it is a big lie that Pakhtuns were liberated by Muslim League from the British. There was no organizational structure of Muslim League on the Pakhtun lands until the elections of 1937. Jinnah came to this Pakhtun area twice before partition and he spent only 20 to 25 days. Pakhtun were not liberated by visit of Jinnah for by 20 to 25 days, rather they were liberated through the struggle of their own under the flag of Pakhtuns and Khudai Khidmatgars. He further said that the Muslim league lost 1946 elections on slogan of Pakistan. Pakhtuns rejected use of any slogan in those elections that's why I am saying that this identity of "*Pakistaniyat*" was imposed on us. Shah-e-Rome Amaan (Swabi) said that nowadays a new terminology "Gul Khan" has been coined by the educated progressive youth for those Pakhtuns who publicize the state narrative or who try to prefer Pakistani identity over Pakhtun identity. It actually implies the stupidity of those Pakhtuns who do

not see or condemn the atrocities of the state and have been deceived by the state's narrative.

A sizeable number of respondents also said that they prefer their Muslim identity. They would say that primarily they are Muslims. For them the Islamic identity was more important than Pakhtun and Pakistani identity. Only a small number of respondents (13 people out of 73) said that they prefer Pakistani identity over Pakhtun identity. The major reasons for preference of Pakhtun identity are the grievances of the people against the offensive policies of the state and the imposition of an artificial and fabricated identity which is alien to Pakhtuns.

6.2 Pakhtuns and the slow pace of Integration

Pakistan is a multiethnic and multicultural polity where the integration of various ethnicities has not remained uniform. The level and momentum of integration of Punjabis is different from other ethnicities of the country. Historically the integration of Pakhtuns in Pakistani state has progressed with a slow drive. It was more like an on-again, off-again program deployed by the state. The Pakhtuns' slow pace of integration in the Pakistani State structure is determined by various socio-political factors. Some of the cultural factors have been already discussed which caused resistance to the integration of Pakhtuns. Besides these, there were various historical events which caused a hindrance in the process of state's nationalization.

In the time of fieldwork most of the people said that there is an incompatibility of the state nationalization project/narrative with the Pakhtun history and culture. Ethnically Pakhtuns belong to a different stock of people from the rest of the ethnicities of the country. The national language of the state (Urdu) and other languages of the country were very much different from the language of Pakhtuns. Urdu never remained a common mode of communication in any area of Pakhtuns before partition. Furthermore, the Pakhtun nationalists were against the partition of the Sub-Continent and on the critical juncture of partition they demanded a separate land for Pakhtuns. Muhammad Irfan (Swabi) said that it is obvious that when you are not in the favor of a project like Pakhtun nationalist were against the partition, then naturally it becomes difficult to accept that project wholeheartedly. He said that another historical factor which caused the slow integration of the Pakhtuns in Pakistan was the issue of Durand line. Afghanistan has a claim over Pakhtuns areas of Pakistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and erstwhile FATA) which were given

to British under Durand Line agreement. This has caused a continuous tug of war between the two neighboring Muslim countries. The successive regimes of Afghanistan and the Pakhtun nationalists in Pakistan have never accepted it as an international border and till date they call it “Durand Line.”

The history of Pakhtuns and the official history of Pakistan have also remained in conflict with one another. According to Babar Khan (Charsadda), the heroes of Pakhtuns were the villains of Pakistani state. Pakhtuns leaders and freedom fighters were labeled as traitors. He argued that how the people would accept you when you would label them as traitors, infidels and foreign agents? (چیتہ مت کفتر، غدار اوواجن توای بی نو زب شنک مت امنم؟). Another respondent Samiullah (Peshawar) said that it was rumored that freedom was gained only due to the struggles of Muslim League and the people in peripheries have done nothing rather opposed the partition. The process was not just limited to labeling, as majority of the Pakhtun leaders were incarcerated on different fake charges after partition. And when someone would protest, the state would brutally massacre them. In Babarra village of Charsadda, the people were protesting against government for the release of their leadership in 1948 and Jinnah was Governor General of the country. This state killed over 600 Pakhtuns on single day; even the British during their rule did not kill that many people on a single day. “Would you spare me when I kill your family men? This is what Pakistan did to us in its early years of formation. You cannot not make someone a Pakistani through brutality and repression.” (پہ ظم چہ پاکستان نے نہ شی جورولے)

According to Janas Khan (Swabi), the matters have not been dealt by the Pakistani state properly and there is no fault of Pakhtuns. We say it is our motherland, recognize our language and culture and the state replies that you are a traitor. (خبر پچن تن ون ہن ہ دہوران ہ، زہ وت هوایم زہ د دی وطنیم زم ژبہ اوکیتور ومنہ دیراتہ لوییتہ غداریی) He said that the state from the very beginning ignored the reconciliation policy towards the people who had a different opinion. When you offend the masses, they will react as it is human nature. What the British were doing with the Pakhtuns was repeated by the Pakistani state; rather the latter was more brutal than the former.

Jalal Khan (Mardan) pointed out the cultural roots of Pakhtun resistance. He said that every alien project brought to Pakhtun society has been viewed suspiciously and it has been resisted by Pakhtuns. The cultural values of Pakhtuns encourage mutual consent and egalitarianism and these values discourage oppression and invasion from outside. If you

want to impose any idea or values without their consent or you invade them, they would resist. He quoted a Pashto proverb which says that Pakhtuns will not go with you by force to heaven and they may accompany you to hell with their consent. پښتنه په زورچا سره جنت ته نۀ ځي او په رضل بډرس رډوزخ ته هم لارشي.

He further said that this resistance was against the assault either by a muslim/non-muslim or native/foreign forces and is not limited to those people who are from other religious beliefs. Pakhtuns have resisted against the Mughals though they were Muslims. The resilient opposition to British came from Pakhtun belt. The main reason behind the resistance of Pakhtuns was that the British colonizers came as invaders on Pakhtun land while in the remaining Sub-Continent they came as traders. انځوي زور ووسنن ته د تاج په كښل راغے او پښتنو ته د قلم په شكل نوځ كې پښتنو نه بلو او مزاحمت يې كولو)

Pakistani state is committing the same mistake and it does not at all understand Pakhtun's cultural history. They are following the same pattern of imposition by force as was done by their colonial predecessors. The state denies the language, culture, heroes and history of Pakhtuns while imposing a language which is alien to them and the end result is that Pakhtuns have not accepted it wholeheartedly rather they have shown a visible resistance. پاكستان هم دغه دانځوي زور د زور دغه چلك پښتنو ته وپيښتو ژبه مون دمنم ځورتور مون دمنم، مشران مون ن دمنم، تړايځ مون دمنم، قريبي مون دمنم او تاسو راسره اردو او شن دج هډا وښئ نوځ كې پښتنه مزاحمت كوي)

The respondent said that by using force every time you cannot win the hearts of the people. There is Pashto proverb which states that you cannot develop a union through force. په زوكلي نكي پري)

These ideas of the above mentioned respondent shows the gravity of the situation. It shows that Pakhtuns repulse all those projects and policies which are imposed by force on them. The homogenization policy of the state has been resisted continuously. This shows that the identity of Pakhtuns must be given space. Mere denial on the part of the state will only worsen the situation.

Ayaz Haidar Khan pointed out that mother tongue and culture is an important tool which keeps the people together. Pakhtuns went to Karachi in search of jobs but still they live in separate areas from other ethnicities because their language and culture is different from others. Their distinctive language and culture has kept them together.

Jameel Advocate (Swabi) talked about political reasons of the slow pace of integration of Pakhtuns in Pakistani state. He said that Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry was dismissed in the province by M. A. Jinnah immediately after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. This unconstitutional step created further alienation among Pakhtuns as their political mandate was annulled. Then "One Unit" was established and our resources like electricity were given to Punjab as we were merged with the province of Punjab along with other two provinces. The province's share of resources were given by British during rule that was taken away from Pakhtuns by the Pakistani State and it was shifted to Punjab. (د انگويز د ختوچ کوم بچ د پښتنو وه ده غ يې هم په وړيو وټ کښو پښتون ه اړخست واپن جابله يې وکره)

The Pakhtuns also resisted the policy of One Unit (West Pakistan was made one administrative province) of the state as they considered it as an exploitation of their resources. The Pakhtuns started agitation under the leadership of Bacha Khan and at last it was rolled back by the state. According to Saleem Khan, majority of the political prisoners during anti One Unit agitation were from district Swabi.

Another respondent Maulana Hussain Ahmad who is the Tehsil *Ameer* of JUI (F) Swabi said that we (Pakhtuns) all are Muslims; we have no enmity with anyone. He also talked about the political cum cultural reasons of Pakhtuns resistance. He said that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and *Kalima Tayyiba*. Its founders promised the masses that the country will be governed through Shariah. But after the creation of the country what people witnessed was opposite to what was promised to them. We Pakhtuns hate those people who do not fulfill their promise and it is also in the teachings of Islam that a man who does not fulfill his promise has no religion. (لا دين لمن لا عهد له)

After witnessing this untrustworthy attitude of the founding fathers of the country, an evident mistrust brewed among the people and their minds tilted towards agitation. How could someone trust a regime when it does not fulfill its promises? He pointed out another politico-cultural event of 1970s when JUI led by Mufti Mehmood and National Awami Party formed provincial governments in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It was an alliance of *Hujra* and *Jumaat* (mosque) as religious scholars represent mosque and the Pakhtun nationalist party represented the Hujra which is a cultural place of Pakhtuns. The central government led by Bhutto dismissed the provincial government of Baluchistan led by JUI and NAP on fake charges and in protest against this step the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government also resigned. These incidents had long lasting impact on the minds

of Pakhtuns and subsequently their integration in the Pakistani state. This act of Pakistani state was considered as an assault on their *Hujra* and *Jumaat*.

6.3 The Notion of “Threat” from the Neighboring Countries and the Pakhtuns

The Pakistani state since its establishment has exploited the perceptive threat frequently. The masses are being told by the state authorities that the country is under threat from the neighboring countries. This practice is usually carried out in order to keep the people together and to divert their attention from their real issues so that they should not protest against the state for their miseries. In Peshawar valley where I conducted my fieldwork I noted that majority of the respondents did not take the threat perception of the state seriously. The threat to Pakistan from the neighboring countries is termed as a joke by most of the people. The people do not consider India as a serious threat to the security of Pakistan. Their views were based on two different logics. First one was the state’s security policy. Most of them were skeptical about the state’s policy of propagating false security threats. In their views the security establishment due to its military engagement with the India wants to gather more funds from the national exchequer. Another viewpoint of the respondents was based upon their overconfidence over the valor and fighting ability of the people of the country. They argued that India cannot defeat us as we have fighting strength. A huge majority of the respondents also said that there is no threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan. According to them Afghanistan is still weak in terms of defense and economic infrastructure. One of the respondent Haji Shahjehan Khalil said that Afghanistan is like a wounded body and is not in a position to show aggression against anyone. (دہلیخیں تانم مثال د ڈوبال وجود دے ہ غ پ ہ چ ا ح لمہ نشی کولے)

Saeed Alam from Mardan said that there is no serious threat from the neighbors. He said that Pakistan has always sent its mercenaries to Afghanistan while Afghanistan has never sent armed groups to Pakistan to capture its provinces and cities. Who were the Talibans? Who gave them training, sanctuary, arms? It is a crystal clear truth now. Even the former generals of the armed forces of this country have admitted it that we have funded, trained and equipped Islamists with weapons in Afghanistan. These are not my words; these are the words of General Hameed Gul, General Pervez Musharraf and Colonel Imam, he added. When you are accepting that I am constantly interfering in Afghanistan it means

that Afghanistan is not a threat to you instead you (Pakistan) are a threat to them, the respondent said.

6.4 Inevitable Pakhtun Nationalism

Caught by the rising waves of globalization and state nationalism project, the emissions of Pakhtun nationalism in Pakhtun society have to some extent faded away, nonetheless the people see the solution of their problems in their own unity and nationalism. Though the people may belong to different political parties but there is a consensus on the point that Pakhtuns should unite to get rid of this turmoil and this could be done only through collective effort of Pakhtuns.

Most of the respondents termed Pakhtun nationalism as advantageous for Pakhtuns. According to them Pakhtun nationalism has brought numerous gains to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Shahidullah Yousafzai, a former student leader of University of Peshawar said that it was the Pakhtun nationalism which strived for the rights of Pakhtuns. It advocated that the Pakhtuns must be given control of their resources, they must be given their due right in the federation, and they must be given their identity. He said that 18th amendment of the constitution is an outcome of this long struggle of nationalists and due to it the provinces have gained substantial financial, political and administrative autonomy and control over their resources. The Pakhtuns of the province have also got identity with the renaming of the province from NWFP (North West Frontier Province) to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through this amendment.

One of my students Haidar Jan said that Pakhtun nationalism is not only accomodative for the Pakhtuns but it is also practical for the whole country. He argued that if Pakhtun nationalists are demanding the rights of their province and if the federal government gives them their rights so it will save the country from anarchy and political chaos. **قلمپس تي د**
تول ملكد پارہ دم بنہ ده در چتہ ب خپل حق رس ي او ټا کبني به سياسي شخړي کامېشي)

6.5 Daily Lives of Pakhtuns and Urdu Language

Though Urdu is the language of State and it has been excessively used in educational institutions and media yet the people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa prefer to use their own mother tongue for communication and daily use. Though in urban centers Urdu has been used in various domains but in rural areas of Pakhtuns its usage is very negligible in terms of everyday activities.

In fieldwork it was noticed that most of the people were negating its major role in the daily lives of Pakhtuns. A huge majority among them argued that it has a very minute role in our daily lives and its usage is limited to Mass media (print and electronic) and offices. According to Atif-ur-Rahman, a former MPA and a leader of JUI (F), the role of Urdu in our daily lives is very minute as we do not speak Urdu on daily basis. We speak Pashto in our houses, in hujra, in mosques, in Bazar etc. (په خوتوله ورځې کې چې ته اردوون هوای وپه ه ځوګونې پېښې ت و وای وپه ه جوم اتکېښ پېښې ت و وای وپه ه ج ج رګه پېښې ت و وای وپه ه ب بازار کې پېښې ت و وای و) He said that Urdu has been imposed from above and has nothing to do with our daily lives except in schools and in the official usage like writing. Most of the times we read Urdu in newspaper or hear it when we sit in front of the television as the media of the country has been in the strict control of the state.

Some of the respondents said that Urdu has also created problems for us as it is the medium of instructions in schools. The early education to children must be given in their mother tongue as they learn subjects easily. Muhammad Abid from Swabi argued that our children are deprived of education in their mother tongue due to which they face multiple problems. The children in our society utilize their energies in learning the alien language and then understanding their lessons. One of the respondents Arshad Khan (Peshawar) said that due to the imposition of Urdu language we lost half of our country in 1971. Nowadays there is state's educational apparatus, media and communication system which propagates Urdu language. Some seventy years ago the people in Momand and Bajaur or Buner were unaware of the Urdu language. This language was only spoken by *Mohajirs* who were living in cities like Karachi and Lahore. It was not the language of any ethnicity in Pakistan. Sindhis speak Sindhi language, Balochis speak Balochi language and Punjabis speaks Punjabi. (او په پاکستان کې ښې ډېرې وړې وېرې به هم نه ده)

Ajmal Khan from Peshawar said that in educational institutions in Pakhtun belt the teachers do speak Urdu in classrooms but when they come out of classroom they converse in Pashto with their students. It shows that this language has been imposed upon people and not willingly acceptable by them. He further argued that the Pakhtuns use Urdu as a language for communication when they visit other provinces. It is the main language of communication among the people of different ethnicities of the country.

6.6 Frustration of Pakhtuns over the Governing System of the Country

The current socio-political conditions of the country could be termed as the worst in Pakistani history. There is lack of peace and security and people are economically fragile. Such conditions could not produce healthy society and it causes frustration among the people. This frustration is then manifested in various forms. During fieldwork it was observed that no one was satisfied with the current political scenario and governance in the country. The people held different views about the causes of this turmoil. Some of them were of the view that our foreign policy is not independent. Pakistan is dependent upon big powers of the world for the formation of its foreign policy. This dependent foreign policy extends financial benefits only to the ruling elite/civil and military bureaucracy. It is not beneficial to the masses of the country rather they pay the price of these policies in term of life and economic losses. Most of the respondents were annoyed with the current policies of the state and wanted to get rid of them but at the same time there was no clear alternatives available to them.

In informal discussions and interviews, I personally noticed that the respondents from different locales had consistently termed Pakhtuns as the marginalized ethnic group in Pakistan. Majority of them were of the opinion that their resources had been exploited by the ruling Punjabi elite. Shahidullah from Swabi quoted the renowned Pashto poet Rehmat Shah Sail that “my land is full of treasures and gold but still I wander around the world in search of labor.” (زم ما وطنی دوسرو س پی ونو نه دک، زه م زووو پس یب او گس غم ه)

The time when I conducted my fieldwork the ruling party at federal level was PML (N). The Prime Minister was Nawaz Sharif, and the Chief of Army Staff was General Raheel Sharif. Majority of the cabinet members on key portfolios like defense, petroleum and natural resources, interior, information, speaker national assembly were held by the Punjabis. One of the respondents Shahjehan Khalil said that we are being ruled by the Punjabi Sharifs (referring to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif) and their federal cabinet is also full of Punjabis. (پدمون ږ دین ج پان وشن پان و حکومت دے اوکسین ه دم بتول ه پن چ ی ل و دک ه ده)

The respondent further argued that major development projects are being executed in Punjab. We (Pakhtuns) have also been deprived of the mega CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) project. Regarding the major problems of Pakhtuns most of the respondents were of the view that the major problem of Pakhtuns was terrorism and

insecurity which prevailed in the region. At the same time most of the respondents termed this lack of peace as a state's policy. A large number of respondents argued that the ruling elite had gained huge financial benefits from the ongoing war on Pakhtun land. According to Saleem Khan (Swabi), Pakhtun land has been turned into a battlefield by the state for its own vested interest. The state only needs money; it does not care about the blood of Pakhtuns which has been shed through this wave of terrorism. He further argued that state's misleading policy had been exposed with the passage of time and the people were now distrustful about the role of the state. **پهلاک سرتان د دروغ و بوج د اوي کلي په دروغ و دکه شوي ده اوسري بي بي تي او وخت راغے دے**

Another respondent Arshad Khan (Peshawar) who was working as a tailor said that only Pakhtuns have been butchered in this wave of terrorism. No other ethnic group in the country is impacted by this wave of terrorism other than Pakhtuns. Pakhtun students, leaders, businessmen, religious figures and common people have been slain in this war. **په دي جي کابصيرف پبش تله دري فپناچي ان هر مش و اونه سنده يان**

6.7 Inclination of Pakhtuns towards Economic Opportunity and Employment

Though Pakhtuns have resisted the nation-building project from the very beginning through certain cultural and political means nonetheless, the state has also countered them through various economic ways like providing employment and better economic opportunities within the province as well as other provinces. The stigma connected with jobs has been alleviated. The shame associated with the employment of females has been reinterpreted under the virtue of *pardah*. The disinclination towards conducting business has been transformed into a welcoming attitude due to economic pressures and competition. The Pakhtuns have now established businesses in various parts of the country which shows their inclination towards the economic integration. Furthermore, the better communication facilities has made easy for the Pakhtuns to move around the country for various economic endeavors. All these trends in Pakhtun society show that though people are not satisfied with the policies of the state but still they are moving towards economic integration in the state. Majority of the respondents preferred to be employed by the government. The family members of a large number of respondents were employed in different government sectors. The reason for opting government employment was the

financial security attached with it. The desire of getting government employment was nearly same in the people whether they belong to any ideology or background.

The attitude towards employment in Pakhtun society generally and in Peshawar valley specially started changing with Gulf boom. The people who went abroad to Gulf countries earned more than those people living on their ancestral lands. This created a competition among them. According to Mansoor Khan (Swabi) another factor which caused the change in attitude of people towards jobs was the distribution of the ancestral land in inheritance. The population increased and the ancestral property became lesser due to inheritance among subsequent generations. This compelled the new generations to look for the alternate source of livelihood because the land which was sufficient for their grandfather was not enough for them after the successive distribution in inheritance. (چې ښي کډي لاس رځې به زمکه وڼو ښي تاه وي ش ن پس درې رځې به پښي شوه)

This dependency upon other resources for livelihood made it easy for the state to integrate the people. He further argued that some years ago participation in political struggle and resistance did not aim at gaining personal financial benefits as the land and its produce was sufficient for the people to fulfill their needs. But with passage of time when the size of land became small the people gave up the ideological politics of resistance and started expending their energies for gaining personal benefits. Now the people literally fight with one another on positions they hate considering thirty years ago. (اوس ځل کپ چ پيس ي توب هم جگړي کوي)

Some three decades ago people would do politics for the sake of sustaining their ideology but now the same people demand jobs from political leaders as a reward for their services, sacrifices and struggle for the party. The collective/national interest has been replaced by personal interest. (ځ بړه دق امي گتې نه فتې گتې ته راغې ده) It shows affinity of people to get integrated in the state to gain personal benefits and to secure their future and economic position. It can be further empirically verified from the response of the people towards government jobs where every year thousands of Pakhtuns apply for jobs in armed forces, Provincial and Federal Public Service commission along with vacancies in other departments. Now it is a known fact that in armed forces Pakhtuns have outnumbered the Sindhis and Balochs, but still there are certain issues on behalf of the state which stops the Pakhtuns from complete integration. The state is unable to provide them employment according to the education and qualification due to scarcity of opportunities. The industrial

luxuries of being in power, the Pakhtun nationalist leaders are not prepared to face the upheaval task of protest against the state's atrocities. Some people argued that the Pakhtun nationalist parties have confined them to their family. They are not allowing other people to become the leaders of the movement. It is causing a hurdle in producing elected, representative, genuine and capable leadership. A few argued that their leaders were selfish, every Pakhtun leader had his own faction and they were reluctant to come together for the sake of larger national cause. Salman Ahmad argued that these leaders urged the common Pakhtun to get united but when it came to their own self they avoided sitting together for the advantage of the masses. (دادمش ران مون ږت هوای ی چې انقباق وکړی خو پخپل هی وبل سره لکي نی)

6.9 Pakistaniyat through Sports

Sports is a healthy activity that keeps the people together. Mostly the youth is associated with this activity around the world. In the contemporary scenario of Pakistani state, the youth has been actively and sentimentally attached with sports which gives a chance to the state to divert their sentiments towards national cohesion and integration. In Pakhtun region the attachment with sports (especially cricket) has been equally massive as in the other provinces of the country. The inclusion of Pakhtun players in the “national team” escalates this inclination. The sports in the context of Pakistan are serving a significant tool for making the Pakhtuns Pakistanized. The Pakhtun youth inspired from the sports heroes of the country are now actively participating in sports. As Mehran Khan (Peshawar) said that like in armed forces, the Pakhtuns are second most representative ethnicity after Punjabis in the national cricket team of Pakistan. It shows the tendency of Pakhtun youth towards integration.

The people from various ideological backgrounds share the same feelings and sentiments by supporting the national team. Though youth may be very much critical about the role of the state but when it comes to sports they fully support the country's team. In fieldwork and during informal discussions with the people, it has been observed that people belonging to Pakhtun nationalist party (red shirts) oppose the state discriminative policies but at the same time they support “green shirts” (Pakistani team). This trend is an indicator that the youth is now more inclined towards state symbols in terms of economy and entertainment.

6.10 Pakhtuns' Future in Pakistan

As Pakhtun belt is currently under the wave of militancy and terrorism where the people have been killed on regular basis, it becomes natural for the people to show their resentment against such gloomy situation. The frustration of the people could be easily observed in their pessimist views. Nonetheless, there was an absolute consent among the people that every citizen should demand his rights from the state in a peaceful and constitutional way.

Majority of the respondents said that if Pakhtuns are given their due rights as per constitution like fundamental rights, equality of opportunity and security to life in the federation of Pakistan, then there is no need for Pakhtuns to revolt against the state. As one of the respondents Kiramat Khan who is a government employee said that people fight with each other when there is frustration broils among them. (پکتنک شې نوپ د جن گشې)

Regarding the future of Pakhtuns in Pakistan, majority of the people were pessimist about their bright future in Pakistan. They argued that the resources of Pakhtuns have been exploited by the state and the Pakhtuns have gained bare minimum out of them. They have been killed ruthlessly since the creation of Pakistan and this bloodshed continues to this day. Their language and identity was suppressed by the Pakistani state and it was considered as a converse to that of Pakistan. One of the respondents Zarin Dad (Swabi) said that they were hearing it for the last 70 years that Pakhtuns will become prosperous in Pakistan but it seems an unrealized joke now. Pakhtuns are being killed on a daily basis and their economy is sharply deteriorating day by day. The Pakhtun land has been turned into a battlefield. Pakhtuns have gained nothing out of this war but dead bodies and handicapped people. The "dollars" have been gained by the ruling elite and Generals, he added. (د اهل کلاو نه اورو چلک سلت کبني هبپبتلنه په مزوش خو پببتلنه ورخ تر ورخت بجاک ي پري.)

The respondent further said that the state has not learned anything from its short history. It denied the rights and identity of Bengalis and they got separated, they exploited the minerals and natural resources of Baluchistan and carried out military operations there, ultimately the Baloch picked up arms and are in an armed struggle with the state. The state is also negating the identity of Pakhtuns and suppressing them in multiple ways, I fear that the Pakhtuns would follow the same path as Balochs if the state continues to exploit them. (مونړوت هوای و بدن گالن هسبقت واخپه پببتلنه دیت ه مه ج پوروی چې دغوی هم ووی چې "ادهرتم ادهر هم")

Another respondent Sareer Khan from Mardan said that they did not have any other option than supporting Pakistan. It is their country and they cannot leave it; all it needs is to correct its political and governing system. He further said that “Pakistan is our first and last option”. (هون ڀرسره اڪيستان زيبه غي ربال خه لوش ته) He said that “if the current discrepancy among the federating units exists it will be harmful for the integrity of Pakistan but I cannot estimate the magnitude of that disaster”.

Most of the respondents were of the opinion that the current system should be amended for the benefit of all the ethnicities living in the country. Some of the respondents argued that we do not want to merge the Pakhtun areas of Pakistan with Afghanistan as the latter is also shattered by decades of war. Its economy and infrastructure have been destroyed by series of wars and it is not in a position to support huge number of people. The main reason which I observed from this argument was that most of the people have been co-opted by the state through incentives like government jobs, development of infrastructure and other financial benefits. Most of the respondents’ family members were doing government jobs. The infrastructure which is present in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is comparatively developed to the one in Afghanistan so the people are reluctant to go for the other option. As Atif-ur-Rahman argued that they did not want to disintegrate the country, all they wanted was that it should mend its ways and solve the problems of masses. (زمون ريباڪستان زيبه غي لي دي ده غه گيلي دي رله ومني، مون تربي لي پرو نه)

Chapter 7.

SUMMARY & CONCLUSION

Pakistan being a multi-ethnic and multilingual country since its inception. In order to transform diversity and variation into uniformity the founders of the country used Islam as a unifying force to convert all types of diversity into singular identity based on religion. Furthermore lingual diversity was replaced with the induction of Urdu as a national language. Islam was used as a driving force to shape the national identity of all Pakistanis. Two nation theory was used to create basic dichotomy between Muslims and Hindus. Since its inception, Pakistani state started the homogenization policy under the guise of “Islam and one national language” to integrate the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural polity right from its establishment. This policy was based upon the negation of sub-national/ethnic identities which were considered divergent to the larger national identity. Pakhtun culture as one of the ingredients of the multi-cultural polity faced severe repressive policies of the state regarding their identity and culture. The reasons behind these state policies was the contempt shown to the admiration of Pakhtuns to their nationalist movement (Khudai Khidmatgar) and the claim of Afghanistan on the Pakhtun areas of Pakistan. The state in order to integrate Pakhtun into the system wanted to weaken the strong ethno nationalist movement which was considered as a major threat for former’s existence. The popular Pakhtuns’ leaders were put behind bars under the label of traitors. Hence from the very beginning the Pakistani state and Pakhtuns were at loggerheads with hardly any interaction or political dialogue. The interaction of Pakistani state with Pakhtun society and culture is a mixture of aggression and partly some concessions from the start till now. The Pakhtuns on one hand have resisted this aggressive homogenization policy by utilizing different cultural tools and practices while on other hand they have also integrated into state due to economic pressures. The socio-political resistance of Pakhtuns towards state’s nation building project has manifested in many ways. Some of the social institutions like jirga have sustained the state’s institutions like judiciary and people still have confidence and trust in conventional justice system. The people are reluctant to approach judicial apparatus of state for resolution of their disputes due to the time consuming nature of the state’s judiciary. This conventional justice system along with traditional values is so entrenched in society that the court decision has to be finally endorsed by Jirga for permanent resolution of dispute. In addition to incompatibility between the cultural institutions and state system, the Pakhtuns have also used some cultural

tools like arts, literature, journalism and poetry to resist this project. As nation building is a political program of the state, it cannot be studied in isolation without considering political domains. This state nationalism as mentioned above has been contested by Pakhtun ethno nationalism from the very beginning. The Pakhtun ethno-nationalism has remained more popular in Pakhtun areas than other political ideologies. This ethno nationalism of Pakhtuns provided an anti-thesis of the state's homogenization policies by using various basic cultural components of Pakhtun society. The language was the basic tool for the Pakhtun nationalists to propagate their ethno nationalism and they considered it the basic ingredient of Pakhtun identity. The Khudai Khidmatgar movement which was a social movement for reformation turned into a political movement and hence it stressed the distinct identity of Pakhtun based upon the Pashto language. Another tool employed by Pakhtuns ethno-nationalists was to counter the homogenization policy and state's imposed identity based upon religion having roots in Arabic culture. The propagation and emphasis was on the concept of unique history and culture of Pakhtuns which has roots in Afghanistan, hence the Pakhtuns living in Pakistan and the Pakhtuns living in Afghanistan have a striking homogeneity. The nature of resistance of Pakhtuns in the immediate post- partition era was mainly dominated by separationist tendencies manifested in literature, poetry and political activism. In later years, due to increasing economic pressures and political favors from the state the separationist tendencies transformed into the demands for autonomy and recognition of identity/language within the system.

State as a powerful and influential entity through its nation building policy has also affected the Pakhtun culture and society with a massive scale. The nation building policy which is carried out through educational programs, communication networks, propagation on media and the economic incentives along with repressive tactics has impacted each and every aspect of Pakhtun society. The traditional extended family structures which were based upon the traditional economies and mode of income have been replaced with the nuclearization of families along with major changes in marriage patterns. The economic outlook of the society has also changed from agrarian to service and business oriented. The better economic prospects in the urban centers attracted Pakhtuns to migrate to urban areas which paved way for the integration of Pakhtuns in state's economic structure. It has also caused the increase of stakes of the common people in the economic domain of the country. But this urbanization was not solely based on economic reasons as the cold war and the

subsequent war on terror also compelled the Pakhtuns to migrate to urban centers in search of stability and life security.

The Gulf boom accelerated economic competition in the society. Hence the orientation of the people based upon collective economic benefits transformed into personal economic benefits. In addition, a new concept of “black economy” emerged in Pakhtun society in the aftermath of Cold War associated with arms and drugs trafficking with the establishment of arms and weapon industries. Through such economic policies of the state, the dependence of people on facilities, benefits, profits, opportunities etc; on state has increased which further boosted the stakes of people in stabilization and continuity of the state’s system. The traditional political organization transformed due to enormous penetration of state’s institutions. Furthermore, a new type of political leadership/ class emerged in the form of religious leaders who had the audacity to stand up to traditional Pakhtun leadership. Due to Islamization policy of state, spread of madrassa networks and introduction of jihadi and sectarian militant outfits transformed religious outlook of the society from a tolerant and accommodative one into violent and brazenly intolerant. This policy also caused the weakening of Pakhtun nationalist sentiments among Pakhtuns. The spread of tableeghi network as an apolitical movement is another outcome of Islamization policy which has altered the values of traditional Pakhtun society. With the advent of Jihadi culture and militant outfits in the Pakhtun society, racial profiling of Pakhtuns also started in the media and Pakhtuns are portrayed as terrorists and miscreants.

The nation building policies resulted in the massive restructuring of the curriculum of the textbooks aimed at the ideological indoctrination of the pupils. It has left greater ramifications on the educational environment and on the larger society. The Islamization policy and the subsequent rise of the Islamists in the country affected the environment of the educational institutions which caused the weaponization of the educational campuses. The homogenization of Pakistani state with the imposition of Urdu language and the suppression of Pashto language in the educational institutions, official communications and mass media have also brought severe consequences to Pakhtun identity, culture and society. This policy resulted in the amalgamation of Urdu words in Pashto, along with inability of the Pakhtun youth to read and write their own mother tongue.

The current scenario of Pakhtun society presents a synthesis of resistance and integration. The Pakhtuns are neither fully integrated in the state system nor have they kept their culture

out of the nation building projects' influence. Though the Pakhtun culture and society have experienced vast changes since the establishment of Pakistan, still the Pakhtuns try to retain their distinct identity based on Pashto language and culture. The Pakhtuns living in Pakistan are facing multiple problems in the form of militancy, terrorism, economic repression, lack of industrial infrastructure, lack of fundamental rights, missing persons, abductions and raids under the guise of security. This has caused frustration and resentment in society generally but in youth especially against the state system/policies. This resentment is not only against the state but also against the Pakhtun leadership that has failed to address their issues properly, and to provide clear and workable political strategy and platform to the masses. However this frustration has not transformed into separationist tendencies and culminated into constitutional struggle as a remedy to their problems. Although the socio-political and economic conditions of Pakistan are not ideal for Pakhtuns and they have strong resentments against the state but they don't have a viable alternative as Afghanistan-where Pakhtuns trace their origin and culture-is not economically and politically stable and lacks economic and political attraction. As mentioned, separationist tendencies in Pakhtuns have faded with the certain historical and constitutional developments where Pakhtuns were somehow accommodated and made stakeholders in the system. This integration of Pakhtuns along with economic benefits transformed their resistance within the constitutional framework and based upon the demands of autonomy within the federation. Pakhtuns now demand the recognition of their identity and language within the official discourse, popular culture and education system. Further they want the ownership of their resources, autonomy and equal economic opportunities as per the spirit of the constitution of the country.

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Appendix-1: Pictures of Fieldwork



Researcher with a respondent.



Researcher during an interview.



Researcher conducting an interview during fieldwork.

Appendix-2: Interview Guide for Fieldwork

Name: _____ Education: _____

Age: _____ Sex: _____ Occupation: _____

1. What is your understanding of the word nation (*Qaum*)?
2. In your opinion what are the basic components of a nation?
3. What is your understanding of the term nationality (*Qaumiyat*)?
4. To which nation do you belong?
5. What is state?
6. How do you differentiate your ethnic group from other ethnic groups of the country?
7. Which national identity do you prefer (Pakistani or Pakhtun)?
8. Why do you prefer this identity?
9. To which political party do you belong?
10. Do you have knowledge of any political movement/party which worked/working for Pakhtun nationalism?
11. What are the demands of Pakhtun nationalists?
12. Is Pakhtun nationalism useful for Pakhtuns?
13. How is it useful for Pakhtuns?
14. Is Pakhtun nationalism useful for the whole country?
15. How is it useful for the whole country?
16. Are Pakhtuns enjoying equal rights in this country as other ethnic groups (Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochs etc.)
17. If not, then what are the reasons of it?
18. What are the major problems of Pakhtuns in Pakistan?
19. How these problems could be solved?
20. Would you support the Pakhtun nationalists if they demand a separate country for Pakhtuns?
21. How many members of your family are in government jobs?
22. Do you prefer government jobs or private jobs?
23. Do you have any business outside the province?
24. In which government institution the Pakhtuns are in a large number?

25. Do you have any knowledge about Khudai Khidmatgar Movement?
26. What role in your opinion it had played in the history of Pakhtuns?
27. Did Khudai Khidmatgar Movement play any role in the identity formation of Pakhtuns?
28. What are the salient features of Pakhtun culture?
29. Don't you think Pakhtun culture (Pakhtunwali) has undergone a lot of changes?
30. What are the reasons of these cultural changes?
31. Are these changes useful for the integrity of the Pakhtun society?
32. Which components of Pakhtun culture have been exploited by the Pakistani state in the process of nation-building?
33. What components of Pakhtun culture have been affected by the Pakistani nation-building process (Pakistanization of Pakhtuns)?
34. Which components of Pakhtun culture have been used /exploited by Pakhtun nationalists in their resistance to the state's nation-building projects/policies/process?
35. Are the rules of the state are in compatibility with your cultural values?
36. Sometimes our cultural values come in conflict with the state's laws, what do you prefer then? (Cultural values or state laws).
37. If religion is the main pillar of state nationalism, do you see any discrepancy among Pakhtuns and state regarding celebration of religious festivals?
38. For settling the disputes, which type of resolution method do you adopt (Traditional or modern)?
39. Which type of dispute resolution method is effective (Traditional or modern)?
40. Are you satisfied with the judicial system of the state?
41. If not, what are the loopholes in the judicial system of the country?
42. Do you read Pashto literature?
43. Can you write and read Pashto?
44. Which type of literature do you read?
45. Does the Pashto literature propagate Pakistani nationalism?
46. Do you know any song in Pashto which propagates Pakistani nationalism?
47. Does it propagate Pakhtun nationalism?
48. Do you support Pakhtun nationalism or Pakistani nationalism?
49. What are its reasons?
50. Are you happy with the present political system of the country?

51. Is Pakhtun culture compatible with Pakistani nationalism?
52. If yes what is the point of convergence?
53. If not, what is the point of divergence?
54. Do you think that there is any possibility whereby both nationalisms can be kept intact? If yes how?
55. What is your viewpoint about the role of Urdu language in our daily lives?
56. Which language do you prefer in your daily life (Urdu or Pashto)?
57. In educational institutions and commercial sector which language is dominant?
58. How much do you think is India a threat to the stability of Pakistan?
59. What is your viewpoint about popular narrative in Pakistan that Islam is in danger?
60. Does Islam play an important role in the integration of different ethnic groups of the country?

Appendix-3: Focus Group Discussion Guide

- In your opinion what are the basic elements of a nation?
- Which identity do you prefer and why? (Pakhtun, Pakistani or Religious identity).
- In your opinion what is the most effective way of conflict resolution in Pakhtun society and why? (Traditional justice system or Pakistani judiciary).
- Is there any compatibility of state's bureaucratic structure and Pakhtun's social structure?
- Which language (Urdu or Pashto) do you prefer and why?
- What aspects of Pakhtun culture have been changed by the nation-building process of Pakistani state?
- How Islamization policy of the state has impacted Pakhtun society and culture?
- How Pakhtuns have responded to state's nation-building process? (How they have culturally resisted and how they have accommodated nation-building policies).
- How do you see the pace of integration of Pakhtuns in Pakistani state?
- How Pakhtun nationalists have resisted Pakistani nationalism?
- Can both these nationalisms go together? If yes, how? If not why?
- How do you see the future of Pakhtuns in Pakistan?
- Is there any alternative available to Pakhtuns other than Pakistan?
- How do you people see the inclination of Pakhtuns towards government jobs and their migration to other provinces of the country?

Appendix-4: Transcription of Interview

Name: XYZ

Education: BA

Age: 33 years

Sex: Male

Occupation: Journalist

1. What is your understanding of the word nation (*Qaum*)?

Answer: By nation I mean the people who follow same culture and speak same language.

2. In your opinion what are the basic components of a nation?

Answer: Language, culture, history and belonging to same ancestry are the basic components of a nation. Nation cannot be constituted on the basis of state and religion.

3. To which nation do you belong?

Answer: I belong to Afghan nation because my forfathers are Afghans and they migrated from Afghanistan.

4. What is state?

Answer: The means which the everyday affairs of the people are regulated through a systematic way.

5. Which national identity do you prefer (Pakistani or Pakhtun)?

Answer: I prefer Pakhtun identity.

6. Why do you prefer this identity?

Answer: The reasons is my history is different from the history of other ethnicities. Our heroes are different as well as our values.

7. To which political party do you belong?

Answer: I usually vote to PMAP and other Pakhtun nationalist parties.

8. What are the demands of Pakhtun nationalists?

Answer: Pakhtun nationalists are nowadays no more different from the leaders of Muslim League. Whatever they say on the stage they do not practice it on the ground. Whenever they come in to power, they work against the essence of their nationalist ideology. The Pakhtun nationalists in past had a clear stance on Durand Line, but now they have accepted it as an international border. In real sense they are working for the stability of Pakistani state.

9. Is Pakhtun nationalism useful for Pakhtuns?

Answer: Yes, but Pakhtun nationalist leaders use it for their own interests. The Pakhtuns do not have any other option than Pakhtun nationalism.

10. Is Pakhtun nationalism useful for the whole country?

Answer: It is not in the interest of Pakistan ruling elites because it will undermine the interest of the elite' ideology.

11. Are Pakhtuns enjoying equal rights in this country as other ethnic groups (Punjabis, Sindhis, and Baloch etc?)

Answer: No

12. If not, then what are the reasons of it?

Answer: Pakhtun Leadership is not sincere, they have 'Pakistanized' the Pakhtuns in many ways. The sincere Pakhtun leadership has been killed by terrorist organizations.

13. What are the major problems of Pakhtuns in Pakistan?

Answer: Insecurity and terrorism is the primary problem, unemployment and lack of education.

14. How these problems could be solved?

Answer: To get rid of the compromises of parliamentary politics.

15. How many members of your family are in government jobs?

Answer: My uncles and cousins are working in government sectors.

16. Do you prefer government jobs or private jobs?

Answer: I do not like government job.

17. Do you have any business outside the province?

Answer: I am a journalist and I don't have any business.

18. In which government institution the Pakhtuns are in a large number?

Answer: They are in every department especially in army and FC.

19. Do you have any knowledge about Khudai Khidmatgar Movement?

Answer: Yes.

20. What role in your opinion it had played in the history of Pakhtuns?

Answer: This movement supported and worked for education in Pakhtun society across gender lines. It worked to bring an end to the class structure and to end internal enmities among Pakhtun tribes and families. This movement created political awareness among the Pakhtuns.

21. Did Khudai Khidmatgar Movement play any role in the identity formation of Pakhtuns?

Answer: Yes, it was a basic movement of identity formation of Pakhtuns.

22. Don't you think Pakhtun culture (Pakhtunwali) has undergone a lot of changes?

Answer: Yes it has experienced drastic changes over the years.

23. What are the reasons of these cultural changes?

Answer: The main reason of change in Pakhtun society is the political usage of religion and then the colonisation. The instrumentalization of religion imposed Arabic values on Pakhtun society. Added to it the cantonments have also changed Pakhtun culture, because it (cantonment) brings its own values. Cantonments are to be built in borders, but they have built them in cities. It has impacted our moralities.

24. Are these changes useful for the integrity of the Pakhtun society?

Answer: No, these changes have badly impacted Pakhtun society and its values such as intolerance has increased, the exploitation of religion for political purpose

has increased. The music is considered against Islamic values and the musicians are being killed.

25. Which components of Pakhtun culture have been exploited by the Pakistani state in the process of nation-building?

Answer: Islam and valor have been used by the state.

26. What components of Pakhtun culture have been affected by the Pakistani nation-building process (Pakistanization of Pakhtuns)?

Answer: Our language has changed, it borrowed the words from Urdu and Arabic languages. The conventional justice system (Jirga) has been badly effected. Our dress pattern has changed, the burqa culture is very common nowadays and the music programs have declined on the occasion of weddings and other celebrations.

27. Which components of Pakhtun culture have been used /exploited by Pakhtun nationalists in their resistance to the state's nation-building projects/policies/process?

Answer: They usually talk about the Jirga, Pashto language, history, art and music.

28. Are the rules of the state are in compatibility with your cultural values?

Answer: In many cases both of these are quite opposite to each other.

29. Sometimes our cultural values come in conflict with the state's laws, what do you prefer then? (Cultural values or state laws).

Answer: I prefer our own culture values.

30. If religion is the main pillar of state nationalism, do you see any discrepancy among Pakhtuns and state regarding celebration of religious festivals?

Answer: Yes, on various occasions like the moon sighting of the holy month of Ramazan and Shawal where Pakhtuns in most of the areas of the province do not follow the instructions of the federal government.

31. For settling the disputes, which type of resolution method do you adopt (Traditional or modern)?

Answer: I prefer Jirga system, and it's a very good mechanism of dispute resolution.

32. Are you satisfied with the judicial system of the state?

Answer: No

33. Do you read Pashto literature?

Answer: Yes

34. Can you write and read Pashto?

Answer: Yes

35. Does the Pashto literature propagate Pakistani nationalism?

Answer: There are few people like Feroz Afridi, Zahid Khan, Jalal, Tariq etc. who have written such material.

36. Do you know any song in Pashto which propagates Pakistani nationalism?

Answer: Humayun Khan, a Pashto famous singer has sung one such song which propagates such type of themes.

37. Does it propagate Pakhtun nationalism?

Answer: Majority of Pashto literature contains Pakhtun nationalist themes and the propagation of Pakhtun identity.

38. Do you support Pakhtun nationalism or Pakistani nationalism?

Answer: I prefer Pakhtun nationalism.

39. What are its reasons?

Answer: It is our need because our identity is under threat and it is necessary for the protection our own identity.

40. Are you happy with the present political system of the country?

Answer: No

41. Is Pakhtun culture compatible with Pakistani nationalism?

Answer: Pakistan does not possess a single culture rather it is an amalgamation of different cultures in which Pakhtun culture is a part of it.

42. If yes what is the point of convergence?

Answer: In Pakistan we have just only a common religion.

43. If not, what is the point of divergence?

Answer: Our history, language, food and political organization like Jirga is different. In Punjab there is Panchayat, but it is quite different from our Jirga because the Pakhtun Jirga is more egalitarian and democratic.

44. What is your viewpoint about the role of Urdu language in our daily lives?

Answer: It has not created any ease in our daily lives rather it is a kind of imposition from state which has impacted our mother tongue. Due to Urdu and Bengali controversy we have lost half of Pakistan which is now Bangladesh.

45. Which language do you prefer in your daily life (Urdu or Pashto)?

Answer: Pashto

46. In educational institutions and commercial sector which language is dominant?

Answer: Urdu and English

47. How much do you think is India a threat to the stability of Pakistan?

Answer: I do not consider India is a potential threat to the stability of Pakistan.

48. What is your viewpoint about popular narrative in Pakistan that Islam is in danger?

Answer: There is nothing like this that Islam is in danger and it's a political slogan.

49. Does Islam play an important role in the integration of different ethnic groups of the country?

Answer: If there discrepancy of economic resources and political powers among different ethnicities then Islam can not play the major role to integrate the different ethnicities of the country.