

**Making Sense of Regulatory Agencies:
A Case Study of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
(PEMRA)**



By

Muhammad Idrees

Supervised by

Dr. Saeed Ahmad Rid

National Institute of Pakistan Studies

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad Pakistan

2022

**Making Sense of Regulatory Agencies:
A Case Study of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
(PEMRA)**



Dissertation submitted to the National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, in partial requirement for the award of degree of M. Phil in Pakistan Studies

By

Muhammad Idrees

Supervised by

Dr. Saeed Ahmad Rid

National Institute of Pakistan Studies

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad Pakistan

2022

Candidate’s Declaration

I hereby declare that this research work entitled “Making Sense of Regulatory Agencies: A Case Study of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)” is the result of my individual research and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for the degree nor does contain any material from published sources that can be considered as a violation of international copy right law. Furthermore, I also declare that I am aware of the terms “Copyright” and “Plagiarism”, and if any copyright violation was identified in this work, I will be held responsible of the consequences of any such violation.

Muhammad Idrees

M. Phil Pakistan Studies

Registration No. 02192011010

**National Institute of Pakistan Studies
Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad**

National Institute of Pakistan Studies
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad

Certificate

I hereby recommend that the thesis prepared under my supervision by **Mr. Muhammad Idrees**, entitled ‘**Making Sense of Regulatory Agencies: A Case Study of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)**‘ is accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of M. Phil in Pakistan Studies, from National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

Dr. Saeed Ahmad Rid

Supervisor

National Institute of Pakistan Studies
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad

Certificate

This dissertation submitted by **Mr. Muhammad Idrees**, entitled **‘Making Sense of Regulatory Agencies: A Case Study of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)’** is accepted in its present form by National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad for the degree of M. Phil in Pakistan Studies.

Supervisor: _____
Dr. Saeed Ahmad Rid

External Examiner: _____

Director: _____

I dedicate this to my Baaboo. Thanks for being my best friend.

ABSTRACT

Name:

Muhammad Idrees

Thesis Title:

Making Sense of Regulatory Agencies: A Case Study of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA).

Key Words:

Regulatory Agency, Liberalization, Media, PEMRA, Regulation, Autonomy.

Abstract:

This research investigates the regulatory agencies in Pakistan by taking Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) as a case study. The establishment of media regulatory agency for electronic and broadcast media remained a controversial yet important factor in Pakistan's media regulation, development and liberalization. Many attempts had been made for regulating the broadcast media in Pakistan since 1997. PEMRA's establishment in 2002 shifted the media from a centralized to decentralized sector like other autonomous agencies. Pakistan adopted agencification process in 1980s but the media remained in the hands of the state till Musharraf's regime. Unstructured interviews of fifteen were conducted that comprised five media experts, five journalists and five Members of National Assembly (MNAs) including those seven who maintained their confidentiality. It is argued that the rationale and objectives behind the establishment of PEMRA have been insufficiently addressed. However, the content regulation of the authority helped in both making the media sector vibrant and efficient along with restoring Pakistan's image. With this in mind, the focus of the study of regulatory agencies is confined to PEMRA, its origin, rationale and its structure and functional role in regulating Pakistan's media.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to begin with paying my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Saeed Ahmad Rid. He enlightened me with relevant theoretical and methodological issues, provided valuable guidance and feedback during all the challenging times in my MPhil.

I would not forget the contribution of my interviewees. I reserve special thanks for them because they gave me their precious time, provided valuable data and made all their resources available for me. Moreover, I feel obliged to pay gratitude to Mardan Library, PASTIC and Quaid-i-Azam University central library for providing comfortable study environment along with the availability of relevant secondary and tertiary data collection materials and resources.

I would like to thank my colleague and friend Naik Muhammad who helped me during my stay in Islamabad. His efforts in finding connections for my interviewees and academic stuff cannot be forgotten. Furthermore, I am also indebted to my good friends Fahad Amin, Jawad-ur-Rahman, Sohail, Abdul Saboor, Syed Muddassir Shah, Zeeshan Khan, Azaz, Ali Nasir and Ali Zeb for their support and company. I owe special thanks to Atta-ur-Rahman, Bilal Shams, Fazal Ghayas and Faizan because without their encouragement and motivation I could not have embarked on this journey.

Finally, I would like to pay special gratitude to my parents and all family members whose support and financial assistance made it possible for me to complete my MPhil degree.

CONTENTS

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Table of Contents	iii
List of Acronyms	v
List of Tables and Figures	vii
<u>Chapter 1</u>	1
Introduction	1
1.1. Statement of the problem	3
1.2. Objectives of Research	3
1.3. Research Questions	4
1.4. Theoretical Framework of the Study	5
1.5. Literature Review	8
1.6. Literature on Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)	14
1.7. Significance of the Study	14
1.8. Research Methodology	15
1.9. Organization of the Study	17
<u>Chapter 2</u>	19
Rationale Behind Autonomous or Regulatory Bodies/Agencies	19
Introduction	19
2.1. Agency	20
2.2. History of Agencies: An Overview	22
2.3. Approaches to Agency: An Overview	24
2.4. Reasons of Agencification	27
2.5. Autonomy of Agencies	29
2.6. Regulatory Reforms in Pakistan	30
2.7. Emergence of PEMRA	32
Conclusion	37
<u>Chapter 3</u>	39
PEMRA: Structure and Functions	39

Introduction	39
3.1. PEMRA Ordinance	41
3.2. Selection Criteria	44
3.3. Remunerations, Loans and Aid	47
3.4. Monopolization	48
3.5. PEMRA Amendment Act, 2007	52
3.6. PEMRA Amendment Act, 2018	54
Conclusion	57
<u>Chapter 4</u>	60
Assessment of PEMRA as a Media Regulatory Agency of Pakistan	60
Introduction	60
4.1. Kargil War and Liberalization of Electronic Media	60
4.2. General Pervez Musharraf and the Media	62
4.3. War on Terror and Media Liberalization	64
4.4. Media Liberalization and PEMRA	66
4.5. Autonomy of PEMRA	69
4.6. PEMRA After Musharraf	72
Conclusion	74
<u>Chapter 5</u>	76
Conclusion	76
5.1.A brief summary of the theoretical part	76
5.2.A brief summary of the empirical part	77
5.3.A brief overview of the study	78
References	81

LIST OF ACRONYMS

BTI: Bertelsmann Transformation Index

CCP: Competition Commission of Pakistan

DRAP: Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan

DSNG: Digital Satellite News Gathering

DTH: Direct to Home Distribution

EMRA: Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance

FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FM: Frequency Modulation

GMPI: Good Manufacturing Practice Inspection

HEC: Higher Education Commission

IAC: Independent Administrative Corporations

ICI: Individualism/Collectivism Index

IMF: International Monetary Fund

LMDS: Local Multipoint Distribution Service

MNA: Member of National Assembly

MP: Member of Parliament

NPM: New Public Management

OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PBA: Pakistan Broadcasters Association

PDI:Power Distance Index

PEMRA: Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority

PML-N: Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz

PPP: Pakistan People's Party

PTA: Pakistan Telecommunication Authority

PTCL: Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited

PTI: Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

PTV:Pakistan Television Corporation

RAMBO: Regulatory Authority for Media Broadcast Organizations

STN: Shalimar Television Network

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

List of Tables and Figures

Table. 3.1. Issues in PEMRA Ordinance	51-52
Fig. 3.1. Chairman and Members of PEMRA (Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022)	55
Fig. 3.2. Administrative Structure of PEMRA (Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022)	55
Table. 3.2. Cultural Differences (Hofstede, 2001)	57
Table. 3.3. Observable Outcomes and Observable Output (Wilson, 1989)	58

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Media plays a vital role in governance and state building. It is considered as the fourth pillar of the state where regulation is used as a means to promote democratic values like freedom of expression, speech and press. The media also makes an effort in making the state efficient by highlighting various issues of societies which government might not be cognizant of. Consequently, the media helps in minimizing the size of governance by regulating its own affairs through autonomy and regulatory powers given by governments. It is more strengthened by exempting the media from unnecessary political and governmental interventions.

Regulatory governance is a notion that emerges through autonomous or regulatory agencies (Farooq et al., 2017). Regulation is the diverse set of instruments that set requirements on enterprises and citizens by governments. Regulations contain laws, informal and formal orders, and sub-ordinate rules issued by all levels of government, and rules issued by non-governmental or self-regulatory bodies whom governments have delegated regulatory powers (OECD, 1997). While governance means rule, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised (European Governance: A White Paper, 2001). Similarly, Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) is an independent regulatory institution that has been delegated with authoritative and regulatory powers regarding private electronic media, broadcast, television, and radio in Pakistan. However, the historical evolution of the regulatory body at times of crises like Kargil and Musharraf's coup and its impacts on Pakistan in world politics has remained unaddressed.

PEMRA was established in 2002 in dictator, General Pervez Musharraf's government. There was government broadcast service, initiated in 1964 till Musharraf's coup in October 1999. After a year, he approves liberalization of media as private radio and television were allowed to run their outlets following the global trend of liberalization of the broadcasting markets (Michalis, 2013). Similarly, according to Papathanassopoulos & Negrine (2011), the private outlets in Europe were regulated by introduction of licensing system in the market and this requirement of license is the same as in the market entry of other industries market (Djankov et al., 2002; Klappera et al., 2006). The introduction of licenses in the private

broadcast system strengthens the autonomous and regulatory bodies in shaping society's opinion.

Nowadays regulatory agencies have become a popular phenomenon. According to Britannica (2019), regulatory agency is an independent governmental body established by the legislative act to set standards in a specific field of activity, or operation, in the private sector of the economy and then to enforce those standards. The agency works outside direct executive supervision as it is delegated with the power of law, legislation and judicial powers concerning regulations (Britannica, 2019). The first regulatory agency was the Interstate Commerce Commission of the United States which was abolished in 1996 but still serves as a prototype for such agencies. The regulatory agencies have become more popular means of promoting fair trade and consumer protection in 20th century. As a result, the world has experienced autonomous and regulatory bodies' expansion in the last quarter of the century in the form of privatization of various sectors.

The privatization of various sectors in public administration took place in the 1980s as a remedy for the inefficiency of the role of the state. The public sector had gone through theoretical changes along with alterations in private sector policies which gave birth to a new spreading perspective, namely, New Public Management (NPM). The management stressed upon the reduction of the size of government and introduction of autonomous agencies (Farooq et al., 2017). Following the same principle, now there are twenty-nine autonomous bodies in Pakistan out of 411 organizational entities (Reforming the Government in Pakistan, 2008). These autonomous agencies are operating at the federal level which regulate various sectors in Pakistan. PEMRA is one of the bodies that regulates the electronic media sector, particularly the private broadcast system.

Kargil crisis impacted Pakistan globally as the world-media mostly promoted Indian side of the news along with the United States of America (Clinton, 2004; "India encircles rebels," 1999). Consequently, it was felt that the media biasness over the Kargil might isolate Pakistan from the world communities. Similarly, Musharraf's coup also affected Pakistan as a democratically elected government was toppled by non-democratic forces. However, the war on terror had a positive impact on Pakistan as it mitigated the threat of isolation by participating in the war against terrorism.

Media plays a vital role in nation and image building of states but after the Kargil crisis and Musharraf's coup Pakistan had faced multiple hurdles both internally and externally. Therefore, there was a need for image building and establishment of an autonomous media body under the rubric of PEMRA. The rationale behind the establishment of such bodies is to ensure that the decision-making is free from political deliberations and private interests (Jacobzone, 2005). The research is not just beneficial for the time but is also relevant in the present and future. The study will provide a source for further explorations in the field of autonomous bodies/agencies and PEMRA's history will be of significance regarding media liberalization and regulation in the context of Pakistan.

1.1. Statement of the problem

Media's freedom in majority of the cases is due to the democratic nature of the state whereas in a coup or dictatorship the freedom of media, press, and expression mostly remain in danger (Randall, 1993). However, in the context of Pakistan, it is interesting that the liberalization and privatization of media took place under military rule. The literature shows President Musharraf wanted to improve Pakistan's and his image globally. As his role in the Kargil crisis had affected the image of Pakistan in the global arena. He could not project his regime using the government owned media outlets because it was not trusted globally. Moreover, the participation of Pakistan in the 'global war on terror' also remained one of the factors in media liberalization as private media's reports were trusted as compared to government owned media.

The Kargil and military takeover created more problems for Pakistan in the world communities and nations at the start of the 21st century due to the unavailability of autonomous and independent media outlets. It further affected security situations of Pakistan with India as the latter was globally supported during and after the crisis. A need was felt for independent media outlets to rebuild its image in the international community. Therefore, the study focused on historical evolution of PEMRA by critically analysing the crisis. It also analysed the impacts of PEMRA's establishment on Pakistan in world politics.

1.2. Objectives of Research

The main objective of this study is to investigate about the operation and mechanism of regulatory agencies using the case study of PEMRA. Agencification process in the developed

world started in order to address issues of inefficiency created by the 'welfare state' concept after World War II. Big governments resulted in creation of more problems than solving. Similarly, people demanded more in less taxes because of the welfare state concept which made governments to downsize and reduce their size. Consequently, responsibilities were devolved under the rubric of autonomous agencies.

Moreover, the process influenced the underdeveloped and developing world including Pakistan. Regulatory bodies were created in Pakistan due to its advocacy by international organizations through NPM. Additionally, the reforms in public sector mostly developed in finance services, energy and telecommunication sectors. Broadcast system in Pakistan was introduced in 1964. It has been in government control and is owned by the state. The media in Pakistan had been given as much importance as the print media until Kargil war in 1999.

The conflict between India and Pakistan affected the latter internationally. Indian media propagated its own narrative-based agenda regarding the incident and influenced the US and the west countries. Pakistan's media was neither trusted locally nor globally and therefore, faced many difficulties and sanctions from international community in term of finances and state image. Meanwhile, a vibrant and liberalized media was considered much more needed element of the time in order to convey the state message and to present a counter narrative to Indian side of the story.

After 9/11, the US asked Pakistan for help in 'War on Terror' which was accepted. It was considered an opportunity for rebuilding Pakistan's image and containing the propaganda against itself. The war against terrorism helped in removal of financial sanctions and prevented Pakistan from international isolation. Finally, this study will analyze key areas and incidents that paved the way for the emergence of PEMRA and the rationale behind its establishment.

1.3. Research Questions

On the basis of statement of problem and objectives of the research, the following questions are formulated:

1.3.1. Main Question

The main research question is to study how regulatory agencies work in Pakistan using the case study of PEMRA. The origin, rationale, structure and functioning of PEMRA since its origin in 2002 is studied in this research.

1.3.2. Supplementary Questions

- What is the rationale behind creating regulatory autonomous bodies/agencies?
- Why PEMRA was established?
- What is the structure of PEMRA?
- How PEMRA performs its functions?
- Has PEMRA served the purpose of its creation?

1.4. Theoretical Framework of the Study

The research is based on and follows **Agenda-Setting Theory** by **Maxwell Mccombs and Donald Shaw**. Agenda-Setting Theory explains the influence of news media on public agenda. However, a particular agenda needs support and back up from the state or a strong body of the state such as autonomous or regulatory media agency or authority. Similarly, regulation means laws, informal and formal orders, and sub-ordinate rules issued by all levels of government, and rules issued by non-governmental or self-regulatory bodies whom governments have delegated regulatory powers (OECD, 1997). In this way, agenda-setting requires permission of specific content/s from either the state or the autonomous or regulatory body. In other words, agenda-setting theory might not work out without media regulation. Therefore, regulation plays an important role in agenda-setting.

Agenda-setting theory describes how viewers' decision are influenced by the media. Similarly, those who have more political power are exposed to greater media exposure. The main purpose of this theory is that the media influences the thinking process of the masses on particular agendas. Similarly, the reports are presented in such a manner that capture attention of the audience. Some of the personages in the media are considered opinion leaders who are capable of bring coverage and end coverage to a particular issue (Cobb & Elder, 1971). This could be termed as opinion makers and by this way the media might influence the audience in making their opinion of issues.

Furthermore, the media forms a list of priorities whereas some of the reports receive much importance while others wait in the corner. In this way, important media contents are created and at the same time the audience pay more attention to what the media portrays as of vital significance. The media does not dictate the masses on what to think but it certainly convinces them on what one should think about (Cohen, 1963). Hence, there exists a media bias which is driven by politics, economy, culture etc. (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In addition to it, McCombs (2005) argues that the factors that mostly led to unequal coverage are financial resources, technologies, foreign trade and money spent on the military.

Moreover, connections and access to certain circles are required for putting a desired agenda on the list. These circles mostly consist of policy-makers where various groups and organizations try to convince and influence them with their concerned interests. Consequently, some of the groups (and organizations) have more access to the responsible circles of power regarding policy-makers than others where they may likely place their demands on agenda (Cobb & Elder, 1971). Subsequently, it is the task of the policy-makers and particularly the key decision makers to forward or have their support in fulfilling the demands of a specific group and/or organization in an agenda. Cobb and Elder (1971) argues that policy-makers are the guardians of the formal agenda and therefore, some key actors in the decision-making process should be convinced or influenced to support and put certain demands on agenda of a group and/or organization.

According to the theory, media in a way controls the reality. The process involves a number of methods such as repetition of a particular aspect of the reality or not giving prominence to certain issues of it by blocking them. Furthermore, it works like a filter that is what is perceived important remains while the insignificant ones are moved out of the way. The remnants are then aired time and again till the end objective (agenda) is accomplishment. Additionally, the media can alter public opinion by repetitive and advertising techniques.

Moreover, the reality will be different for various number of people due to the media they look into. Cohen (1963) explains that because of the writers, editors, and publishers of the paper (and the electronic media) and their thought out and written (and verbal) narrative the world looks different to different individuals. Accordingly, the masses will be influenced by the media constructed important narrative. Many realities are created out of a single reality due to media's preferences of what part of an event should be reported and aired and how it should be presented.

The media might also be utilized by the states in influencing global opinion as well. According to Valeriano (2009), struggle should be made for power maximization by the state for regional or international domination. Consequently, the domination is obstructed by other states as every state is in competition to every other state. It means that every state has the capability of building and making its own agenda and tries to influence the global opinion. Similarly, Lippmann (1922) argues that the mass media establishes a link between world events and the images in the minds of the public. It influences people's perception of events. The influence is then perceived as reality which mostly covers an aspect or few sides of the reality. In this way media constructs a particular reality based on specific agendas.

1.4.1. Application of the Theory

International media played a significant role in building and propagating Indian side of Kargil crisis. The United States of America (USA) along with the Europe sided against Pakistan during and after the crisis (“India encircles rebels,” 1999; Clinton, 2004). The USA went further by appreciating India for restricting herself from waging a full-fledged war with Pakistan. The agenda set by India had gained global acceptance while Pakistan's official media Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) was not even locally trusted (Farooq, 2018). A particular agenda needs support and back up from the state or a strong body of the state such as an autonomous or regulatory media agency or authority. Hate speech, content against the state and integrity of Islam etc. are not allowed to be aired (PEMRA, 2002). Thus, content regulation plays a vital role in setting an agenda.

Similarly, regulation means laws, informal and formal orders, and sub-ordinate rules issued by all levels of government, and rules issued by non-governmental or self-regulatory bodies whom governments have delegated regulatory powers (OECD, 1997). In this way, agenda-setting requires permission of specific content/s from either the state or the autonomous or regulatory body. In other words, agenda-setting theory might not work out without media regulation. PEMRA also regulates the media content which might help in building an agenda. Therefore, a counter agenda and narrative through autonomous and independent media authority was needed in order to contain Indian propaganda against Pakistan.

Pakistan also faced military takeover in the same year which further deteriorated its international standing. It is conspicuous that dictatorships are condemned and democracy is

praised globally. International communities were now looking toward Pakistan with the same opinion as was previously propagated by India and majority of the global media. Consequently, Pakistan was concerned with two main objectives i.e. state image and Musharraf's government. Pakistan tried to convey its message through official media but it was not trusted. Therefore, there was a need for private media outlets in order to counter Indian side of the crisis along with maintaining Musharraf's government.

However, the 9/11 attacks in the USA helped in providing an opportunity for Pakistan to convey its message through media. The media was liberated and PEMRA established after few months which did provide a counternarrative and agenda to Indian propaganda. Jamwal (2006) argue that Pakistan needed to present a narrative against its rival media campaign through vibrant media. Similarly, Talbot (2012) also explains that the liberalized media acted as a mouthpiece for the military after the Kargil campaign. Additionally, the media was also liberated in order to improve Pakistan image (Musharraf, 2006).

The media plays an important role in highlighting and making opinion with respect to certain issues. News sources of media can also define issues which further paves ways for discussions and outlining problems in future (Hilgartner& Bosk, 1988; Berkowitz,1992). Similarly, various agendas can be set based on the media priorities and preferences. India created a reality during and after Kargil conflict which affected Pakistan in international community. On the other hand, it was needed to contain the rival India's propaganda with the same technology, the media.

Agenda-Setting Theory is appropriate in this research as India had its own agenda which influenced the international media. Similarly, international media further influenced the global opinion that could lead Pakistan into isolation. This fear of exclusion led Musharraf to build its own agenda in order to counter the Indian side. Moreover, the agenda will influence global media and world opinion through PEMRA and liberalized media to maintain Pakistan's image in global politics.

1.5.Literature Review

Autonomous bodies or regulatory agencies is new phenomenon which became famous in the post-cold war era. Therefore, most of the literature on the topic is recent. Recently good amount of academic literature is written on the topic of autonomous bodies/agencies.

Some of the studies are related to some specific and particular component in an autonomous body and/or comparison of group of components in multiple agencies. Similarly, some studies are related to a whole structure and functions of agencies. Therefore, the literature is divided into two categories. The first category is on the general theoretical and practical side of the autonomous bodies/agencies and the other category is particularly on Pakistan regarding the agencies.

1.5.1. Literature on Autonomous Bodies/Agencies: Theory

According to Roness et al. (2007), there are multiple descriptions of autonomous bodies/agencies. However, their definition and functions depend on a country's legal and political system along with its culture. According to Pollitt & Bouckaert (2011), mostly the main characteristic of public management reform is to bring changes in organizational structure for improving efficiency. One way of accomplishing the objectives of the reforms is to create autonomous bodies/agencies having performance targets, performance assessments along with senior management and having improved working methods. Thus, we can define agencies according to Pollitt et al. (2004, pp. 22) as "public organizations which have greater autonomy than the "normal" divisions and directorates in the core of the ministry." The term greater autonomy refers to freedom of decision making with respect to its management.

Politt, Talbot, Caulfield, & Smullen (2005) argue that agencification process in Europe and Asia was started to overcome inefficiency of the states. The centralization or accumulation of political and legal powers had caused inefficiency. Similarly, state ministers were responsible and involved in almost every aspect of the state. The omnipresence of state ministers along with the size of governments was considered another cause for inefficiency. Therefore, autonomous bodies were established in order to let the state ministers focus on substantial policies (Politt, Talbot, Caulfield, & Smullen, 2005).

Jacobzone (2005) argues that the rationale behind the establishment of regulatory and autonomous bodies is to separate them from private interests and political deliberation. The creation of such agencies is to minimize the size of governments in order to perform its functions efficiently. Similarly, regulatory governments' main feature is to keep an eye on societies by establishing autonomous and independent agencies (Jacobzone, 2005). The independence of the agencies makes them independent in decision-making by ensuring political non-interference. The agencies would increase the efficiency of the state by

delegating regulatory, legislative, and judicial power to manage its sectors (Politt, Talbot, Caulfield, & Smullen, 2005). Moreover, Jacobzone (2005) also states that the focus of autonomous bodies mainly remains in three key areas that is telecommunications which includes broadcasting, energy sector and financial services.

It is interesting to note that opposed to acclaimed theoretical improvement in performance and efficiency of agencies, research shows the current performance of such entities are actually not up to the mark. Overman and Van Thiel (2016) after systematic comparison of agencies' performance in 20 countries deduce that the process of agencification has a negative effect on efficiency and performance of public sector in contrast to acclaimed economic benefits of agencification. In Public Administration, there exists a complex relationship between autonomous bodies and parent department.

Theoretically, autonomous bodies hold significant amount of autonomy but in practice it can be quite different due to many reasons. It is possible, for instance, that departments might treat autonomous bodies as being lower in rank due to their bureaucratic mentality. According to Rommel and Christiaens (2007), there exists a gap between formal and factual autonomy of autonomous bodies. Standard operating procedures continue to prevail and resemble the hierarchical norms of pre-agency status (Pollitt et al., 2004). Failure of political context to alter and fit itself in new situations can be another reason for the gap between formal and factual autonomy (Rommel & Christiaens, 2007). Similarly, Christensen & Lagreid (2007) have shown a complex and dynamic interplay between agencies autonomy and political control. However, there is a paradox in NPM reforms caused by conflicting views on autonomy named as paradox of autonomization. Critics refer to the paradox which means that real autonomy is a myth and external control increases as autonomy increases (Rommel & Christiaens, 2007).

1.5.2.Literature on Autonomous Bodies/Agencies: Practice

According to Levin (2009), the agencification process in Spain made it a distinguished model due to its three main characteristics, namely, higher degree of autonomy than other countries regarding civil servants, proper accountability and openness and decentralization of political authority which is mostly missing in unitary states. This mechanism of creating agencies is known as 'Spanish Model,' as per the author. Similarly, Rothstein (2000) explains

that the reason behind such procedure was corruption, non-cooperative behavior. This model of agencification has been followed by other states as well.

Fulton Committee (1968) describes that Swedish agencies were studied by British Civil Services reformers in 1968 and was implemented after two decades. According to Le Gales, Scott and Jacobs (2010), the social change occurred in actors' behavior after the introduction of new institutions (autonomous agencies and organizations) by the state. Similarly, they also explain that these public sector reforms were taken into consideration in order to address issues of "state retreat, decline, erosion, and impotence." Canada's experience with the agencification program started in the mid 1990s. Program Review had been remained the major part of "Getting Government" initiative at the times. Fyfe and Fitzpatrick (2002) elaborate that efficiency, effectiveness and affordability among others caused reforms in the public sector that is creation of autonomous and separated bodies in Canada.

The Netherlands experimented with agency-type reforms. According to Oosterom (2002), the development of agencies took off in the Netherlands under the banner of "differentiation" in the rules of control. Additionally, the author elucidates that the agency model was introduced in order to address the inefficiency of the state through the means of differentiation, administrative and managerial, to achieve greater efficiency. However, a number of influences by ministries both formal and informal were identified by Pierre (2004) for controlling the greater autonomy of Swedish agencies.

There are studies related to the relationship between agencies and ministries. Furthermore, literature shows that ministries are either too strong or too weak in their functions with respect to autonomous agencies. According to Aucoin (1996), interference in Special Operating Agencies of Canada is to the extent that it has compromised autonomy of the agencies. Similarly, Independent Administrative Corporations' (IAC) autonomy was obstructed through annual reviews of funding and appointment of senior civil servant as chief executive of IAC by Ministry of Finance in Japan (Yamamoto, 2004). Talbot and Caulfield (2002) argue that Tanzania's autonomous agencies are controlled by cashflow shortages and through the President's and his Secretary General's tight grip.

However, ministries in Latvia are too weak and incapable of controlling their agencies (Pollitt & Talbot, 2004). Swedish agencies are also protected from ministry interference but few people monitor the agencies tasks who are considered inexperienced and junior

(Molander et al., 2002). Agencies with the passage of time are becoming stronger and ministries weaker due to downsizing of governments and putting responsibility on the shoulders of organizations and agencies. This is close to what Van Thiel (2001) called 'reversal of control'. Overall, the autonomy of agencies and ministries' control over them could not be completely separated as according to Gains (2004), they are dependent on one another.

1.5.3.Literature on Autonomous Bodies/Regulatory Agencies in Pakistan

There are limited number of researches with respect to autonomous agencies in Pakistan. Jadoon et al. (2012) explain four phases of agencies evolution in Pakistan with its own development policy. The first phase started from the very inception of the state that is 1947 to 1971 under the rubric of 'development administration' paradigm. The second brief phase of the process began after separation of East Pakistan from 1972 to 1977 under 'nationalization policy.' The third important phase went for more than two decades starting from 1977 to 1999 where reforms took place in the public administration through NPM model under the heading of 'development management' paradigm. The fourth and last phase was initiated in 1999 and ended in 2010 under 'development governance' where improvement of service delivery and regulation remained the main objectives.

Similarly, Pakistan, after 1980s, adopted the process of creating autonomous agencies in the public sector and this idea was influenced by NPM (Rizwan &Jadoon, 2010). The number of autonomous bodies with the passage of time gradually increased. Moreover, the process of agencification had also impacted the existing agencies. The previous agencies had gone through restructuring process. The rationale behind creation of such agencies is to mitigate the state inefficiency and poor service delivery and increase the efficiency and service delivery of the state. Corruption, deregulation, autonomy and privatization are other reasons that pave the way and basis for such initiative.

According to Rizwan and Jadoon (2010), agencification in Pakistan had taken place in that political system that had weak administrative institutions and strong bureaucracy that would only support centralization of power and decision-making due to its colonial history and mindset. Therefore, there would be resistance mainly from the bureaucratic set up and the bureaucrats or the autonomous agencies based on NPM model would be made in such a manner that it would not change or disturb the status quo. Additionally, agencies are backed

by having independent legal status followed by a proper management such as chairman, chief executive, head, director, board of governors/directors etc. Autonomy of agencies are mostly limited to operational decisions while the strategic decision-making process resides in ministries' approval (Farooq et al., 2018).

Now literature on different regulatory agencies of Pakistan is discussed one by one.

Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP)

According to Khan and Fraz (2022), markets are disorganized in Pakistan with minimal or negligible competitive practices. They further argue that domestic competition is poorly organized due to regulatory barriers to entry and lack of efficient competitive policies. Regulatory barriers such as fulfilling the requirement of license for entry into a market, inappropriate policies of government or the power to stop effective reforms etc. make the competition ambiguous (Furman, 2016). However, the production and consumption sides of market could be made efficient if competition or economic freedom is ensured (Khan and Fraz, 2022). According to Castelan et al. (2019), competition in various firms in Mexico resulted in reduction of poverty and improved its position in Gini coefficient.

Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) evaluates and analyses the quality of democracy, market economy and political management in various transition and developing countries. According to its score of 1 to 10, a country securing score of 8 or above in terms of market economy is grouped as developed'. Similarly, if a country scores between 7 and 8 it is characterized as functioning'. A country is grouped as functioning flaws' if it has a score between 5 and 7. Likewise, a score between 3 and 5 means poorly functioning' group and ranking of a country is rudimentary' if it scores below 3. According to BTI (2020; 2022), Pakistan is grouped in functioning flaws' countries with a score of 5.3 regarding Organisation of the Market and Competition. The status has been worsened for Pakistan since 2006 with respect to Market Organisation as the country's ranking deteriorated from functioning flaws' group with a score of 5 in 2006 to poorly functioning' countries by securing 4 score in 2020. Similarly, the country has been consistent in maintaining score at 4 along with its position in poorly functioning' group since 2006 in terms of Competition Policy. Though, Pakistan is among functioning' countries with a score of 7 regarding Trade Liberalisation but still the score is lower than the advanced countries. The statistics shows

that markets in Pakistan are not organized with having a minimal or negligible competitive practices.

Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (DRAP)

There exists a gap between pharmaceutical industry and the government's narrative when it comes to the industry's regulation and its output. There are various studies that have been conducted on these narratives in order to find where the reality lies? After analyzing DRAP's three key areas of policies that is ensuring availability of drugs, encouragement of the industry development and its regulation, Rashid (2015) opined that the development of the industry was hampered due to the presence of significant gaps regarding the performance of the regulator. Similarly, Rashed et al. (2019) analysed the performance of DRAP particularly the quality of medicine. According to them, there were significant gaps with respect to recommended medicine quality and the performance of the regulator. They also propose that the overall framework for medicine quality needs further improvement such as increasing Good Manufacturing Practice Inspection (GMPI).

According to Saleha, Hassan and Iqbal (2010), the responsibility of low performance of the industry is on the regulations and it would be better if the regulations had been friendlier. Similarly, there is an element of corruption as well as the World Health Organization (2017) examined and assessed transparency regarding policies in pharmaceutical industry. They concluded that the perception of corruption differs for different regulating categories, with some lower and some higher. Additionally, 67 percent of the overall patients prefer private physicians due to the non-availability of essential medicines at government healthcare centers (Gilani, Babar, & Malik, 2013).

1.6.Literature on Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)

According to Farooq, Saeed, Ahmad, Ata, & Sami, (2017), PEMRA's establishment in Pakistan is the result of the worldwide shift from centralized and concentrated governments to decentralized and minimal under NPM. The authority played a role in making the state media more efficient by liberating and permitting private media outlets. However, the number of private media surged from three to ninety in just a decade which resulted in concentration of ownership (Gul, Obaid, & Ali, 2017). This concentration created domestic problems such as unequal distribution of wealth, class disparities, uninformed citizenry etc. Similarly,

Pakistan's media imitated the Western media model where the cultural ideals of the west gave birth to more problems in Pakistani society instead of addressing them (Farooq et al., 2017). Liberalization of media is globally considered an element of democracy but in the context of Pakistan, it occurred in military government (Gul, Obaid, & Ali, 2017).

It is true that Pakistan's media liberalization took place in Musharraf's rule but at the same time the same media was also intermittently pressurised (Iqbal, 2012). The pressures might be in the shape of threats to journalists, violence, and putting economic pressures on media outlets. Similarly, media channels and/or news-shows of various media outlets were either suspended or banned. Consequently, there was a mixed structure of media freedom and political control in Musharraf government (Iqbal, 2012). PEMRA was domestically considered a tool for concentration of power.

Indeed, the establishment of the authority created problems inside Pakistan but the authority mainly focused on the image and status building of Pakistan in global media. Therefore, the historical context of PEMRA is investigated and studied. Similarly, the rationale behind the authority establishment is also studied. Moreover, the structure, functioning, and impacts of PEMRA on Pakistan are studied in this research.

1.7. Significance of the Study

It is clear from the above brief literature review that research on regulatory agencies in Pakistan was scarce particularly in the case of PEMRA. Similarly, the connection between theory and practice of regulatory agencies is also largely missing in case of Pakistan. Majority of the research done on regulatory agencies in Pakistan is in descriptive style with little connection with theories. Additionally, researches on PEMRA in most of the cases also have descriptive style and largely missing relationship with theories of communication and media studies. Rasul(2017), Sohail (2012), and Farooq et al. (2017) have tried to connect PEMRA as a regulatory agency of media with the theories of media and communication and other researches in this regard did not develop any connection with the theories. My research adds to the work of Rasul (2017), Sohail (2012) and Farooq et al. (2017) with a strong connection between theory and practice.

Moreover, apart from the above authors, there is no scholarly research available with respect to Pakistan's media regulatory authority, PEMRA, in case studies. My research

regarding the case study of PEMRA tries to fill this literature gap. The study of PEMRA covers many aspects of regulatory agencies as some of them have been developed and created before the media regulatory authority. The role played by PEMRA in countering Indian propaganda against Pakistan, increasing efficiency and improving image of the state with the help of the mentioned case studies is investigated and analyzed.

1.8. Research Methodology

This study is based on ‘agenda-setting theory’ which could be subjectively interpreted. Furthermore, the theory about the media and its influence over the audience. In this way, it is dependent on time and space along with propagation of a particular content, agenda, that suits certain actors, groups or states. Therefore, qualitative method is more appropriate regarding this study than quantitative. The purpose of this study is to develop a deeper understanding of autonomous bodies/agencies in Pakistan by taking PEMRA as a case study. Moreover, the role of PEMRA in regulating media and its role in setting a counter-agenda in response to Indian propaganda is also investigated. Both primary and secondary data will be used to examine and elaborate different aspects of the study. Therefore, unstructured interviews of Members of National Assembly (MNAs), media personnel, and academicians especially those who are experts in media studies are used to collect information and relevant data. These interviews would also explore interesting areas for further studies and researches.

1.8.1. The selected case-study

The selected case study in making sense of regulatory bodies in Pakistan is Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). The regulatory authority deals with the broadcast media particularly the private sector. Moreover, this regulatory body emerged after the conflict of India and Pakistan at Kargil. Pakistan’s military and the whole state was blamed by the Indian media propaganda during and after the Kargil campaign. Indian media followed the state narrative and influenced the global media and international community for its support against Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistani media was not even trusted domestically due to the government control over the information.

People of Pakistan shifted to Indian media through dish and satellite TVs for knowing the situation at Kargil. In this way, the Indian propaganda against Pakistan also influenced the domestic people of Pakistan through agenda-based narrative. Therefore, Pakistan needed the

same tool of media for containing Indian agenda-based narrative. The regulatory authority was deemed during the conflict by the military leadership and after few months General Pervez Musharraf toppled the democratic government of Nawaz Sharif in October 1999. The military regime then liberalized the media particularly the broadcast in 2002 for maintaining the state image and countering Indian narrative and propaganda.

The case study of PEMRA provide grounds for making sense of regulatory bodies in Pakistan along with its important aspect of how the private and liberalized media helped in containing the Indian propaganda. Similarly, agenda-setting theory guided the research study as agendas based on media campaign can influence the audience and their opinion. Conclusively, Indian agenda created its own reality that convinced the global media and in the same manner, Pakistan through liberalization of media thought out to contain the Indian propaganda by countering it with its own agenda.

1.8.2. Data Collection

This study collected both primary and secondary data. The Primary data collected through interviews of 15 personnel that comprised media experts, scholars and Members of National Assembly (MNAs), while the Secondary data was extracted from published sources including authentic and standard books, articles, research papers, documentaries, data published by the different ministries, reports, newspapers related to the topic.

Data collection for this research included interviews of five scholars both male and female of Media Studies, five MNAs that were present at the time of PEMRA's establishment which fulfilled the political side of the research. The research also interviewed five journalists for understanding the liberalization and regulation of media.

In this research, the researcher conducted interviews for the collection of accurate data and snow-ball sampling technique was used to reach out the interviewees. Only targeted, relevant, qualified, experts and professionals were consulted through snowball sampling method.

1.9. Organization of the Study

The thesis is divided into five chapters which includes an introduction chapter and a conclusion chapter.

I. Introduction

An attempt is made in this chapter to define and understand the concept of regulatory body/autonomous agency. Furthermore, key terms are defined, objectives of the thesis determined, theoretical framework and relevant literature identified, and the organization of thesis delineated.

II. Rationale behind autonomous or regulatory bodies/agencies

Chapter two deals with the concept of regulatory agency and its historical background. Moreover, various approaches regarding the bodies are discussed. Furthermore, the reasons of agencification and agencies are provided. The emergence of PEMRA is also discussed in this chapter.

III. PEMRA: Structure and functions

In chapter three, the mechanism and responsibilities of PEMRA is analyzed. PEMRA Ordinance and its important features and characteristics are determined. Details of amendments in the ordinance are also analyzed in this chapter.

IV. Assessment of PEMRA as a media regulatory agency of Pakistan

In chapter four, theoretical framework of the study is used as a reference frame for assessing PEMRA's achievements, limitations and overall accomplishment throughout its history. An attempt is made to understand how regulatory body works and what could be learn from the case study of PEMRA.

V. Conclusion

In chapter five, brief summary of thesis is provided and the lessons learnt and conclusions drawn from the study are explained.

CHAPTER 2

Rationale Behind Autonomous or Regulatory Bodies/Agencies

Introduction

The concept and creation of autonomous or regulatory agencies has emerged in order to address state ineffectiveness in its processes and affairs. The agencies provided with regulatory powers are generally called regulators (Jacobzone, 2005). They are entrusted with independence in decision-making to a specific extent. The limited independence of agencies has a system of accountability in order to meet the ministerial authority. Autonomous agency is backed by public law in having power and responsibility, independent in its functions with noninterference of ministries and officials are neither elected nor managed by the elected (Thatcher, 2002). According to Jacobzone (2005), the creation of agencies was caused by regulatory state concept where policy making and ownership are different than regulatory functions. This transformation from Owner State to Regulatory State involved the establishment of autonomous agencies in various sectors such as financial services, telecommunication, broadcast and utility sector. The delegation of regulatory authority for addressing ineffectiveness to a separate body and the independence of the body are two major aspects of regulatory governance (Nicolaidis, 2005).

Jakubowicz (2013) explains that the concept of an autonomous agency is seen as a default option in regulatory governance. The establishment of such autonomous bodies help in mitigating the size of governments by operating on its own and ensuring no political deliberations and private interests in its independent decision-making. Similarly, these regulatory authorities or institutions are different from centralized bureaucracy or could be considered as alternative to the latter. Regulatory state concept is linked with network governance where public, private and social networks interact and according to Irion and Radu (2013) regulatory agencies play an important role in it.

Theoretically, the network governance aims to improve efficiency and performance through various networks interaction but practically attempts for influencing these network actors are made by governments (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). There are complexities in each of these networks which are dealt with accordingly but sometimes dealing with problems, policies and presence of a number of different actors make the processes of decision more

intricate due to different interests of different actors which consequently lead to internal conflict (March & Olsen, 1989).

Similarly, regulatory governance is a notion that emerges through autonomous or regulatory agencies (Farooq et al., 2017). Minogue and Carino (2006) considered regulatory governance as one of the important components in studying regulation, privatization and post-privatization regulatory reforms. Regulatory governance as per Scott (2000) has some important features that include separation of policy making from operations, priority of rules over discretion and establishment of regulatory institutions. According to OECD (2002), the important characteristics of regulatory governance are transparency, adaptability, efficiency, coherence and accountability while Majone (1999) also described some of the characteristics of regulatory state as regulatory institutions' autonomy is determined by government structure, autonomy in finance services, decision-making is delegated to independent and autonomous institutions etc.

In the same context, the remodeling of institutions, state capacity and improved judicial system play an important role in developing regulatory competency (Philips, 2006). The emergence of regulatory state is considered as a paradigm shift from interventionist state towards new public management (NPM) while the major part of the shift is expansion of network-based government through autonomous or regulatory agencies (Majone, 1997).

2.1. Agency

There is no single definition of the concept 'agency' rather it could be described with characteristics and features. There are various terminologies for agency such as regulatory body, autonomous agency, regulatory authority etc. (OECD, 2002). Similarly, the NPM emphasized on focusing and creating independent and autonomous bodies and institutions to address the ineffectiveness and increase performance but according to OECD (2002b), the ambiguous terminologies and incoherent classification of organizational forms obstruct this area for researchers. This problem of not having a comprehensive and mutually accepted definition has also been addressed by others and they succeeded to a certain extent (Greve et al., 1999; Pollitt et al., 2001; Peters & Bouckaert, 2004). According to Pollitt et al. (2005), there is no universal definition and classification regarding agencies or autonomous bodies due to the fact of various and multiple legal systems around the world. Additionally, they also

pointed out that political systems and constitutions are not of the same kind throughout the globe and therefore, standard of functional classification cannot be set as well.

There is indeed no certain classification nor definition of agencies which makes the delineation more worthy because of two goals. The first one is that clear definition would allow to address and classify these autonomous bodies into or out of its 'box'. The second goal is related to empirical research as at least some components of definition are required for it (Pollitt et al., 2005). However, a perfect and accurate definition is not possible in at least social sciences; some of the components could be utilized as far as they fall inside or outside of the box.

'What are agencies' could become fathomable through a process of what they are not. By describing the 'not an agency' would be helpful in defining or coming up with some characteristics of what an agency is. First, they are not part of ministerial hierarchy and have their own divisions distinct from ministries though the disaggregation differs from state to state such as Japan's agencies are legally separate whereas they are still part of their ministries in the UK and the Netherlands (Thatcher, 2002; Pollitt et al., 2005). Second, the primary purpose of creation of agencies are not commercial or corporate unlike the popular notion in the northern Europe (Pollitt et al., 2005). Third, the independence of agencies from ministerial instruction is limited which makes ministers still responsible for them though some of agencies are highly protected from ministries intervention such as in New Zealand and France (Pollitt et al., 2005).

Similarly, Pollitt et al. (2005) also considers agencies as public bodies because they are responsible for particular public services deliverance and they should have greater autonomy than in ministries' divisions itself. The greater autonomy of agencies would help in performing their functions effectively and without any political deliberations or private interests. However, Pierre (2004) explains that informal influences of politicians, political appointments in these bodies, and allocation of annual budget from central governments for more autonomous agencies are tools for controlling them.

From the above discussion regarding the definition, a body in a state could be identified and declared as an agency which:

- is independent in its functions that is separation from its ministry

- is not primarily a corporate or commercial body
- has limited autonomy as budgets and operational goals can be altered through ministers/secretaries
- has a defined status in public law (though the law nature may be different in different political systems)
- has greater autonomy than its core ministry
- is not legally completely independent from its ministry

According to Pollitt et al. (2005), the most important features of an agency are disaggregation and degree of autonomy. The former means that ministerial hierarchy and structure is separated and that agency would have its own structure, structural separation, while the latter refers to freedom in finance utilization or personnel classification or organization. If an organization has these features, it could be classified as an agency otherwise not. Allix (2002) categorizes agencies based on the above criteria where UK Next Steps agencies, Independent Administrative Corporations of Japan, Special Operating Agencies of Canada, many French *établissementspublic* and Dutch *agentschappen* are declared as agencies while most Nordic public enterprises, Sickness funds of Germany and Independent Administrative Authorities of Italy are not. The latter are not declared as agencies due to their too much independence where ministers' involvement or alteration in allocation of budgets is very small, in other words, they are highly protected from ministers' intervention (Pollitt et al., 2005).

2.2. History of Agencies: An Overview

The word 'agency' has been used for government organizations in one of the early studies regarding bureaucracy (Wilson, 1989). The United States (US) had bureaucracy which has been termed by the author as agency but this is of no surprise as the concept of forming or creating new agencies is not a novel idea to the US (Pollitt et al., 2005). The important sectors where federal kept itself responsible for performing functions are forestry, food and drug administration, and posts. These federal sectors struggled for autonomy and they were delegated with such autonomy in the early twentieth century and consolidated in governmental expansions in different sectors particularly public services (Carpenter, 2001).

Similarly, Pollitt et al. (2005) explains that writers on state organizations in Europe assumed bureaucracy as integrating agent of large-scale organizations and they were not in

favor of disaggregation of authorities rather favored ministry type organizations. However, according to the author, the synonymous concept for agency in the US could be called ‘_board’ in Europe and there are many ‘_boards’ provided with particular tasks such as custom and tax collection. Organizations in the US and Europe are of both types that is ‘_ministry’ and ‘_agency.’ The historical evolution of such organizations throughout the world has either mixture of the above two or intermediary forms of organizations that is quasi-autonomous (Pollitt et al., 2005).

The movement for agency creation has its roots in the emergence of Welfare State after Second World War where governments became big and huge ministries were formed. People were employed in large numbers to produce quality goods and services for population but with the passage of time, these huge ministries and big governments became unresponsive, rule-bounded, inflexible and inefficient due to bureaucratic nature of the state. Similarly, O’Connor (1973) argued that people were demanding more in less taxes which would affect governments in fiscal budgets in the 1950s and 1960s.

When the situation under big governments and huge ministries got into more crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, one of the solutions to the problem was to break down governments into more manageable, flexible, less rule-bounded, responsive and efficient agencies that is ‘_unbundle government’ (Pollitt & Talbot, 2004). In this way, agencies emerged and ministries functions are now limited to policy-making and the newly created bodies are mostly linked with regulatory functions. In the same context, today’s post-bureaucratic world has been transformed and shifted from a strict rule-bounded to public dominated, flexible and responsive state. Moreover, according to Pollitt and Talbot (2004), agencies are part of central government reform program promoted by both national governments and international bodies such as World Bank.

Fulton Committee (1968) argues that Swedish agencies were studied by British Civil Services reformers in 1968 and it was implemented after two decades. Interestingly, Hong Kong also tried the ‘_Swedish Model’ in 1970s right after Fulton. Canada, the Netherlands and other states experimented with agency-type reforms after the big UK reform program. The movement was joined by the US and Japan with their own type of agencies. This process has also been adopted by developing and transitional states where reforms were made for agencies and minimizing government sizes (Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Talbot & Caulfield, 2002).

2.3.Approaches to Agency: An Overview

Approaches regarding agencies are multiple. There is no single theory or approach that can explain each and everything rather certain queries at a specific time and space might be addressed by a specific theory. As according to Pollitt and Talbot (2004), theories and questions go hand in hand because the former is supposed to address the latter. Therefore, different approaches investigate different questions which give every theory a unique character and could not be compared comprehensively to other theories. As mentioned, there cannot be a single approach that includes and addresses everything instead each of them has strengths and weaknesses in relation to questions of consideration in it.

There are numerous queries about agencies and at the same time there exist a number of approaches for addressing them but for the moment, three broad approaches which will be discussed and analyzed in the light of agencies in the following paragraphs. They are namely economic, traditional, and interpretive approaches.

2.3.1.Economic Approach

In many of the subfields of politics, public administration and management economic approaches have been remained very prominent for more than three decades. Similarly, variants of rational choice theory are very much popular in the US while in other several countries such as New Zealand it influenced public management (Boston et al., 1996). At the beginning, rational actors or utility maximizing actors have been set out and hypotheses were tested based on deductive logic (Pollitt et al., 2005). Agencies are considered more efficient than a bureaucratic hierarchy based on rational choice variants. However, rational choice theorists do not answer why agencies were not considered efficient or chosen long time ago. Macro-economic historians do address this query by explaining the 1970s and 1980s situations that countries were affected due to building welfare state and global economic crisis. Such economic pressures led the way for finding an efficient solution that is agencies (Pollitt et al., 2005).

According to Taliencio(2004), agency formation based on rational choice has been proved efficient in developing countries regarding revenue collection. Similarly, Dunleavy (1991) elucidates that various operational functions are transferred to autonomous bodies or agencies after senior civil servants' choice to make them enable to focus on policy advisory

work. James (2003) analyzed the UK Next Steps agencies through the lens of Dunleavy's bureau-shaping. Rational choice theory is also used by Van Thiel (2001) where emphasis was specifically on Dutch agencies and ZBOs. However, her theory in this case did not perform well and she has to move to other theories for finding reasons of the so many Dutch agencies formation. Boyne et al. (2003) elaborated that improved responsiveness and efficiency are because of the NPM-type reforms. This goes against the popular rational choice theory where choices were based on rationality that would bear effective results after implementation. The authors also argued that the results are not conclusive rather they are suggestive leaving space for more improvements.

Furthermore, rational choice theory and particularly principle-agent theory also paves the ways for monitoring agencies which could be possible under a set of rules and principles devised for contracts (Lane, 2000; Douma & Schreuder, 2017). These principles are not just showing how good agencies would perform they also warn about the dangers of where the agencies might perform poorly. Additionally, the principle-agent theory has also been used in Sweden for digging out reasons of difficulty for the government office in running many agencies (Molander et al., 2002). However, the rational choice theorists either ignored the different social contexts or being slow to develop a model feasible in various social contexts which may be called 'the problem of the embeddedness of economic action' (Granovetter, 1985).

2.3.2. Traditional Approach

Traditional approach to agencies starts with a definition of concepts and terms and then digging for various factors for better understanding the concepts and terms of agencies. The assumption of this approach about reality is that it is 'out there' and social scientists have to lift the cover off with keen observation and measurements (Pollitt et al., 2005). Hypotheses would be designed and may be tested. Data for the observed phenomenon would be collected and cases regarding agencies be analyzed. There are a number of works that have used this approach in addressing agencies. Hogwood et al. (2000) made an inquiry for finding patterns in behavior of Member of Parliaments (MPs) towards agencies such as some agencies are prominent in public while other are not and how differences between them would affect their relations. Similarly, similarities and differences in federal agencies of the US has been analyzed using this approach (Wilson, 1989). After analyzing the differences between public and private organizations Kickert (2001) concluded that a new form of organizations emerged

due to devolution of authority to semi-autonomous organizations which he called ‘hybrid organizations’ and neither private nor traditional public management principles and norms work properly with them. In the same manner, a number of influences both formal and informal were identified by Pierre (2004) for controlling the greater autonomy of Swedish agencies along with searching for factors for longer survival.

The creation of agencies through the above discussion show that how politicians and senior civil-servants used them for their own interests at particular time and space (Boston et al., 1996; Pierre, 2004; Pollitt et al., 2001; Prince, 2000). A simple fact from the mentioned perspective would be that there are different reasons for creating agencies in different localities. Similarly, problems of one jurisdiction would be different in dealing with agencies as well. Efficiency as proposed by rational theorists might not be the only motive behind agencies and if it exists it might be rare because of differentiations in administrations present in different political systems (Pierre, 2004; Prince, 2000; Talbot & Caulfield, 2002; Wilson, 1989). There is even not a single goal in the field of accountancy where it is supposed that uniformity would be the ultimate goal but still senior academics argue differently while treating agencies (Bromwich & Lapsley, 1997). Overall, there might be some general principles regarding agencies such autonomy in regulatory tasks, management, financial and personnel classification but high morale and a sense of collectiveness are needed which even do not count in performance of agencies (Wilson, 1989).

2.3.3. Interpretive Approach

In this approach reality is not assumed as out there and has to be uncovered or predicted rather the assumption is that almost everything regarding social artefact including organizations and agencies is constructed either in minds or texts. Therefore, reality is not there and nothing could be extracted from it to be studied and called ‘agency’ (Pollitt et al., 2005). There are various competing perspectives with respect to agencies and their meaning. In these various perspectives, culture plays an important role. Every culture has its norms and values along with a set of beliefs and symbols. These cultural components provide ways and mediums for construction of meanings of particular events (Hood, 1998; Hofstede, 2001). The term ‘agency’ may undergo translation and travel far away to different languages where it might have lost its meaning and gained other meanings (Smullen, 2004).

The interpretive approach in public administration is a recent occurrence and poses challenge to both economic and traditional approaches. Agency might be expanded due to fashion and imitation rather than its efficiency (Pollitt, 2001; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). According to Gains (2004), relationship between ministry and agency might be embedded or in other words, they are dependent on each other. However, some social constructivists do not consider this process as imitation. Similarly, studies show that arguments regarding agency creation change their position over time which indicate that it might be part of administrative rhetoric (Hood, 1998; Hood & Jackson, 1991). From the above discussion, it could be concluded that popularity of agency is because of philosophical positions of imitation or trend and rhetoric.

2.4. Reasons of Agencification

According to Pollitt et al. (2005), official policy-making is a process that takes place in majority of the worldly states which could be broadly called as shared ‘official model’ but this model cannot be applied to individual cases and not even to the originator states of agencies (the United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand). The official model means structural independence, separation of executive functions, greater autonomy to their managers, and accountable for their performance or in James’ (2003) words, it is ‘the public interest perspective’. The model shows what should be there to be an agency, a normative approach towards agencification.

However, clear reason behind individual agencification may not be present in the literature. Multiple aims, on the other side, have been forwarded but they are contradictory in some cases such as the Dutch case (Van Thiel, 2001). Interestingly, there is a long list of reasons behind agencification being recommended, suggested or proposed by various proponents of the process (James, 2003; Lane, 2000; OECD, 2002; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Van Thiel, 2001; Talbot & Caulfield, 2002; Taliercio, 2004). Some of the popular reasons are as under:

- To minimize political deliberations and interference for higher and improved efficiency.
- To minimize political deliberations and interference for impartiality in decision-making process.

- To maximize political supervision by creating autonomous agencies/organizations.
- To maximize responsiveness by keeping public services close to citizens.
- To make government size smaller by giving targets to specialized autonomous agencies/organizations.
- To lessen rule-bounded fixed bureaucratic structure and maximize flexibility for better services and efficiencies.
- To upgrade public administration of countries especially developing countries.

However, there are also some unpopular reasons stated by either the same or different authors in their writings (Dunleavy, 1991; James, 2003; OECD, 2002; Pierre, 1995, 2004; Vos, 2003; Yamamoto, 2004; Talbot & Caulfield, 2002; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Some of the reasons are:

- To benefit political allies
- To form power base for a particular party or group.
- To make politicians free of their responsibility by giving it to other organizations.
- To make civil servants busy with policy and strategy tasks and avoid fixed routine base operations.
- To associate with modernization by following and copying trend of creating organizations.
- To create islands of income generation for various purposes.

The above lists have many reasons to agencification and there are also many things to notice. The first is that agencification process is inspired by various motives. Secondly, tensions, conflicts, and incoherencies within themselves might be present between ministry and agency. For instance, agency struggles for more and more autonomy while ministry through political means attempts to control it. Similarly, benefiting political allies and/or mitigating political interference give more space to disputes within a political system. Thirdly, agencification process may be initiated due to more than one reasons at once by multiple actors or groups (politicians, civil servants etc.). This process may be proved fruitful for these actors and groups which would further generate ambiguity regarding rationale behind

agencies. Therefore, a clear reason is missing and a number of ambiguous and contradictory options exist.

With the exception of Van Thiel (2001), there may not be a single study where number of various reasons behind agencification could be measured. In Van Thiel's study of Dutch quangos, these were created without a reason in 53 percent of the cases, 18 percent were linked with efficiency and 15 percent were due to getting closer to the citizens. Many of the above reasons are present in various individual case studies as well, for example (Araujo, 2002; Gains, 1999; Lewis, 1997; Prince, 2000; Vos, 2003). It can be deduced from the above analysis that there is no single reason for agencification and at the same time, there are multiple motives behind the process. According to Smullen (2004), agencies vary even in their extent when they think and talk about themselves and this fact is well known in academia.

2.5. Autonomy of Agencies

In order to provide bodies with i) a differentiated governance structure; and/or, ii) a differentiated control environment; and/ or iii) some management autonomy, governments throughout the OECD area have created bodies with certain degrees of separateness from traditional, vertically integrated ministries.(OECD, 2002, p. 6).

Autonomy is one of the important components in agencification that has attracted many academicians in order to address it. The relationship between ministry and agency, then, becomes interesting. For instance, the relationship of ministry and agency has been examined in a long series of official reports in the UK where lack of relationship was observed (Fraser Report, 1991; Office of Public Services Reform, 2002; Trosa Report, 1994). Similarly, agencies are given targets and they have to fulfill them along with keeping efficiency. Therefore, recommendations have been proposed for agencies' improved performance and good practice (National Audit Office, 2000).

Additionally, some agencies have been kept in public eyes and because of their politically sensitive tasks and they face difficult queries through legislature along with close monitoring from parent ministry while some agencies are not even considered by politicians (Hogwood et al., 2000). A similar relationship between various parent ministries and agencies exists due many factors including level of independence in financial matters, monopoly and

their history (Gains, 1999, 2004). It is very hard to find equilibrium between them due to their desirable and undesirable elements (Pollitt et al., 2005).

There are studies related to the relationship where ministry is considered either too strong or too weak in its functions. According to Aucoin (1996), interference in Special Operating Agencies of Canada is to the extent that it has compromised autonomy of the agencies. Similarly, Independent Administrative Corporations' (IAC) autonomy was obstructed through annual reviews of funding and appointment of senior civil servant as chief executive of IAC by Ministry of Finance in Japan (Yamamoto, 2004). Talbot and Caulfield (2002) argue that Tanzania's autonomous agencies are controlled by cashflow shortages and through the President's and his Secretary General's tight grip.

However, ministries in Latvia are too weak and incapable of controlling their agencies (Pollitt & Talbot, 2004). Swedish agencies are also protected from ministry interference but few people monitor the agencies tasks who are considered inexperienced and junior (Molander et al., 2002). Agencies with the passage of time are becoming stronger and ministries weaker due to downsizing of governments and putting responsibility on the shoulders of organizations and agencies. This is close to what Van Thiel (2001) called 'reversal of control'. Overall, the autonomy of agencies and ministries' control over them could not be completely separated as according to Gains (2004), they are dependent on one another.

The above discussion has covered the general concept of 'agency'. The definition of agency is not clear like so many other concepts in social sciences but there are few characteristics such as structural separation from ministry, having greater autonomy, and managing its own operations etc. Similarly, reasons behind the agency-type reforms throughout are different due to different legal and political systems. Autonomy is one of the important features but is not clear due to the imbalanced relationship between ministry and agency. Now, the following paragraphs will analyze regulatory reforms in Pakistan in general and the case of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) in particular under the regulatory agency's concept.

2.6. Regulatory Reforms in Pakistan

Regulatory reforms in Pakistan had mostly taken place in energy, finance and telecommunication sectors. Pakistan under public sector reform agenda pursued the policy of liberalization but influences of civil and military regimes along with bureaucracy in policy-making and in its implementation had affected its accomplishment (Salman, 2020). The civil and military governments in Pakistan had their own interests and goals regarding policies. Bureaucracy had also been considered one of the powerful institutions in Pakistan and at the same time official policies might be influenced by it as well (Salman, 2020). Similarly, privatization and deregulation did not improve the efficiency in developing countries including Pakistan in contrast to developed countries (Kemal, 2002). Some of the reasons of failure are monopolist practices and influences of big market owner in private and public sectors (Bagdikian, 2004; Kemal, 2002).

Regulatory state emerged as an alternative to central state. The latter had authority over majority of state affairs and administration which resulted in big governments and became weaker in effectiveness and responsiveness. Similarly, the former had a network-based government where various sectors, public or private organizations or agencies, combinedly work in order to improve state efficiency and responsiveness. According to Haque (2002), the transformation from central to regulatory state is because of the NPM model where structure, role and even nature and size of state changed. However, it is difficult to understand what exactly caused these reforms and what had been the objective/s. Historical backgrounds, past knowledge and conscious observations regarding these reforms are considered sine qua non for comprehending their output and results (Farooq et al., 2017).

The influence of NPM has also reached to developing countries including Pakistan where autonomous agencies were initially created after 1980s. Number of the agencies grew with the passage of time and this process is still going on. Additionally, the agencies that are currently present are also going through process of making them more effective (Rizwan & Jadoon, 2010). Zia and Khan (2013) explain that reforms in Pakistan's public sector were advocated by both international and national organizations or stakeholders such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Pakistani politicians and bureaucrats. Moreover, Pakistan has been financially supported and assisted by many countries especially the US during the cold war and post-9/11. The accountability mechanisms in Pakistan after becoming an ally in the War on Terror have been improved in the last two decades due to reforming the public sector (Salman, 2020).

Some agencies were created in order to address ineffectiveness and performance of state where autonomy remained priority and this internationally considered cause has been followed by Pakistan in its regulatory reform program in public sector while basis for this trend was provided by corruption, regulation and service delivery (Farooq et al., 2018). In the same context, the creation of agencies particularly regulatory agencies was funded by international organizations such as World Bank which might have followed the process of agencification according to the founders (Rizwan & Jadoon, 2010). The reforms had been introduced in a political system that had a history of weak administrative institutions and a strong bureaucracy. Additionally, the latter had a mindset of centralization of authority and decision-making rest in its control. On the contrary, agencification would reduce the size of government and its bureaucracy in Pakistan which may challenge the latter's authority. Therefore, according to Farooq et al. (2018), these autonomous and regulatory agencies would either be resisted or made path-dependent by the bureaucracy to maintain its authority.

Accountability of agencies is also an important aspect where agencies are supposed to be evaluated and their performance be checked under a proper mechanism (Kemal, 2002). However, according to Rizwan and Jadoon (2010), proper system for evaluation of agencies is absent. Autonomy without accountability would make agencies free from state which in turn might follow political or private interests and affect the output that is efficiency and performance. Nevertheless, there exists personal and institutional interests behind some reforms programs if the process is funded by international actors or entities (Farooq et al., 2018). The same could be noticed about countries' leadership where reforms are initiate in a particular context. Christensen et al. (2007) argue that these reforms could be used as a source of legitimacy for the leadership and institutions of any country by pointing out popular and/or fashionable consideration/s at particular time in a specific context.

Regulatory reforms in Pakistan initiated after 1980s due to NPM. It also shifted the central state structure to a regulatory state by creating autonomous agencies in various public sectors. The reason behind agencification followed international footsteps to address inefficiency and performance. Similarly, financial assistance of international organizations and national stakeholders helped out in establishing these reforms. However, these reforms were also used for maintaining authority and gaining legitimacy for leadership and institutions. A general and broad view of how agency-type reforms took place in Pakistan has been discussed and analyzed and now, the case of PEMRA would be analyzed in detail.

2.7. Emergence of PEMRA

Media plays an important role in majority of states' domestic and international affairs. Media in the shape of TV channel first appeared in 1964 in Pakistan. It was under the control of government of Pakistan. Similarly, the medium mostly promoted government point of view and narrative while there was little room for independent or private views due to governmental control of the media. Struggle for private media was not successful till 1990s. Efforts were made to privatize and liberalize Pakistan's media in the 1990s but were not fruitful. The private media was either an abrupt idea or was a continuation of the previous strive or need of the hour. The following paragraphs would analyze historical background of media in Pakistan and what causes the establishment of PEMRA.

2.7.1. Kargil War and Musharraf Coup

General Pervez Musharraf launched an incursion into Indian Kashmir's territory, Kargil, in 1999 (Farooq, 2018). Indian and Pakistani army were at 18,000 feet struggling for their own victory. Pakistani army troops sneaked in early on the orders of Musharraf where vacant Indian positions were occupied and taken without a battle. However, the positions were emptied and given back to India under the US pressure and support with Indian narrative of the incident (Clinton, 2004; Farooq, 2018). There were only state operated PTV channels whereas private news media outlets were not yet allowed to operate.

Farooq (2018) explains that during and after the brief period of war, Pakistani public turned to Indian news channels for latest information between the two rival states because of less credibility of the government-controlled media. Similarly, Farooq (2018) quoted senior official of Musharraf government that liberalization of media as an idea emerged when the public relied on Indian news and discredited local ones at the time when Pakistan military was fighting the Indians which came into reality after Musharraf coup.

The Indian side of the story strengthened due to the acceptability of Indian created reality through its news channels by Pakistani public and at the same time, the need for private media was felt within the military ranks in order to counter the Indian narrative. As a matter of fact, Indian establishment and media had been known for using Pakistan governments and intelligence agencies as scapegoats specifically in times of dispute, conflict and war (Jamwal, 2006). Moreover, Saxena (2006) argue that Indian journalists and channels

were also battling for ratings as well and, therefore, promoted official point of view with so fervor that even basic principle of journalism, balance reporting, was forgotten.

However, both countries' newspaper editors were earlier agreed upon refraining from disseminating news that rises communal passion and preventing propaganda against each other (Nehru-Liaquat Agreement, 1950). The agreement played a vital role in amelioration of Indo-Pak relations due to avoidance of inappropriate behavior from media on both sides. This liaison came to an end when Kargil incident happened. Indian media started propaganda against Pakistan and also influenced the west in supporting India (Clinton, 2004; "India encircles rebels," 1999).

Pakistan lost the media war to India regarding Kargil episode due to unavailability of the counter media narrative and autonomous media. This inferiority of the local media had convinced major stakeholders in Pakistan for a liberalized and free media. Hasan (2017) quoted Javed Jabbar, initiator of PEMRA and federal minister of information in Musharraf government, argues that authoritative and powerful circles considered communication or information front of Pakistan as weak and vulnerable. Consequently, Pakistani government, military and intelligentsia combinedly collaborated in order to prevent future crisis which according to International Media Support (2009) became the reason for electronic media liberalization.

Additionally, Pakistan faced intermittent sanctions from the US and the west but the crucial role was played by the 1998 sanctions which had changed political and economic policies in Pakistan. After nuclear tests were conducted by Pakistan in 1998, the then US government suspended its financial aid (Jordan et al., 2009). Similarly, the west followed the US and aid to Pakistan was barred from their side too (Mahmud, 2005). Moreover, Jordan et al. (2009) stated that additional sanctions were imposed due to Musharraf's coup in 1999. Resultantly, Kargil war and these sanctions damaged the image of Pakistan and that of Musharraf as well. In order to address these issues, media liberalization was considered one of the reasons.

2.7.2. PEMRA

Development Communication theory of McQuail (1987) explains many third world countries' media systems where social development with responsibility of the audiences towards society, values for accomplishment of specific socio-economic goals and a sense of nationalism and patriotism through media were highlighted. Furthermore, monopolies in the systems had remained an important element in these countries. Public had been given the freedom in choosing content amongst many. Third world countries include Pakistan which means that the same findings might be there as well.

PTV, the first televised transmission of Pakistan started in 1964. PTV-home and PTV-2 were two channels of the same parent media broadcast. Shalimar Television Network (STN) remained the only private broadcasting channel till 1990s. However, the network had restrictions with respect to airing of news. Similarly, news airing and broadcast was only allowed to "Radio Pakistan" though other FM radio station were allowed to operate but had no permit regarding news broadcast. With the passage of time, Pakistan's media system changed due to many national and international factors such as Musharraf coup, Kargil war, sanctions etc. Resultantly, cable and satellite televisions in the mid 1990s emerged as alternative and popular means of information and entertainment.

Weak audience ratings, few channels and publicly operating media had resulted in turning Pakistani public to Indian channels (Farooq, 2018). In the same manner, cable and satellite means of information and entertainment of India became popular in the masses (Naseer et al., 2010). This popularity of the Indian media had posed many threats to Pakistan and it was considered of ample importance to address this issue with the same technology. Thus, political and cultural invasion of India into Pakistani soil through cable and satellite TVs threatened the then government and it was decided to make amendments and advancements in broadcasting media of Pakistan (Rasul & McDowell, 2012). Similarly, IMF and World Bank also invested in Pakistan for regulatory reforms whereas NPM played an important role in agencification and its promotion through financial assistance of international organizations (Rizwan & Jadoon, 2010). Additionally, the media broadcasting had not been trusted due to the fact of its government-owned and controlled body and therefore, liberalization was one of the reasons for improvement. Privatization and liberalization of media in particular was demanded by NPM through international bodies, IMF and World Bank, that pressurized Musharraf regime to sell off the existing publicly run media broadcast, radio and TV channels in 2001 (Mazzera & Sial, 2010).

The government of Pakistan controlled the electronic media and private media ownership had either not been allowed or had certain restrictions to operate till 1990s. Ali and Gunaratne (2000) and Rasul (2004) pointed out that radio development in Pakistan had remained priority till 2000 as its number grew from three in 1947 to 22 radio stations in 2000 that covered the entire population. After the establishment of PEMRA, licenses have been issued to private outlets which further increased the number and according to Gul et al. (2017), there are now more than hundred radio stations operating in various regions of Pakistan. Similarly, television transmission started in 1964 under the rubric of PTV. It also gradually flourished and prevailed to more than 50 countries broadcasting in more than 15 languages (Ali & Gunaratne, 2000; Hijazi & Naqqash, 1995). Interestingly, private electronic media in Pakistan began to operate in 1990s.

Benazir Bhutto's government in 1990s permitted a privately owned channel named STN of Shalimar Recording Company to operate in Pakistan (Tahir, 1996). It was the first step for the development of private electronic media in Pakistan. The channel transmitted entertainment programs in different cities of Pakistan. However, news remained in the hands of the government as the channel was restricted from broadcasting it (Jabbar & Isa, 1997). Moreover, Tahir (1996) argued that there were 50% shares of the government in the company operating inside Pakistan. The process of letting private electronic media companies to run permitted channels continued. In 1996, license was also granted to another private company, Shaheen Pay TV, which offered both local and foreign channels including CNN, HBO, BBC etc. (Ali & Gunaratne, 2000; Jabbar & Isa, 1997).

Satellite TV also emerged in 1990s but the cheaper and accessible cable TV soon replaced it. Cable industry became popular both in cities and small towns which further limited the satellite industry. Moreover, Pakistani public were attracted by transnational channels and its popularity went further. Similarly, the demand for freedom in choosing what content to watch also rose particularly in urban areas of Pakistan. Broadband television was introduced by Pakistan Telecommunication Company limited (PTCL) and Brain Net in cities due to the growing popularity of the transnational channels in the public (Khan, 2008).

Similarly, Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (EMRA) was officially announced and proclaimed by an interim government in 1997 (Jabbar, 2014). The lack of the following democratic government interest in the ordinance resulted in lapsing of the ordinance. Moreover, due to the satellite and cable TVs popularity and as alternative to the

government-controlled broadcasting media in the 1990s, Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) started issuing licenses to cable TV in 1998 (Rasul, 2017). Additionally, the growing media market in Pakistan also needed a regulatory authority in order to facilitate it.

However, regulation has remained a bone of contention and generated debates in societies. Napoli (2003) and McChesney (2008) explain that means of communication and information in general and mass media in particular mostly go against the elite interests in democratic societies which are considered dangerous to the interests and, therefore, requires regulation in the name of public interest. Regulation, on the other hand, is viewed essential by the elite in order to secure their interests and control a particular body through it. Similarly, information and entertainment industries including media owners and practitioners mostly criticize governments' regulatory practices because of the factor that it gives protection to the elite interests. Nevertheless, autonomous and regulatory authority came into existence for the electronic media regulation in Pakistan.

Regulatory Authority for Media Broadcast Organizations (RAMBO) was the first attempt of regulating the media by Musharraf regime in 2000 but could not be approved (Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022). The regime approved the establishment of a regulator for the nascent privatized and liberalized media of Pakistan under the name of PEMRA in 2002. After its establishment, the electronic media boomed and leapfrogged (Gul et al., 2017). Robison and Crenshaw (2002) argue that media strengthens only in democracy and only democratic governments facilitate media to prevail. However, their argument failed in case of Pakistan where electronic media proliferated and helped out by a dictator, General Musharraf. PEMRA regulates content and issues licenses to media outlets. As a regulator, it also maintains check and balance on media content and intervenes if the content is considered harmful to unity, national security, culture and religions (Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022).

Conclusion

The concept of agency emerged for addressing the issue of ineffectiveness of the state. The problem of ineffectiveness came out as a result of the 'welfare state' concept in the aftermath of the WWII. Big governments and huge bureaucracies made problems instead of solving under the rubric of welfare state. Autonomous agencies provided an alternative to the issue by creating independent and regulatory bodies. The size of government was reduced and the responsibilities of the state were distributed in various departments and agencies.

The historical background of agencification led to the root cause of inefficiency and slow delivery of services from the state. The NPM came forward and changed the course of action for the state by advocating and promoting the need for creating autonomous or regulatory agencies to address the inefficiency of the state. Various approaches like economic, traditional and interpretive have been applied for creating agencies. Similarly, reasons for agencification were also different due to time and space. Furthermore, disintegration and autonomy are considered the main features of regulatory agencies.

The international platforms like IMF and World Bank also advocated for creation of autonomous agencies. The process of agencification in this way reached to the developing world including Pakistan. Pakistan followed the international movement of reforms mainly in the public sector. Telecommunication is one of the main sectors that has been reformed and liberalized consequently under the pressure of international community especially the US and the rest of the Western countries. Kargil War did play a major role in emergence of liberalized media in Pakistan. PEMRA emerged as a result of Indian propaganda against Pakistan during and after the conflict including international pressure.

CHAPTER 3

PEMRA: Structure and Functions

Introduction

Private media had started operating in Pakistan in the mid 1990s. The privatization went on and multiple channels both local and foreign were launched afterwards. The establishment of PEMRA helped in regulating the recently opened media of Pakistan. Erstwhile, PTV was the only medium of multi-broadcast contents run and owned by the government of Pakistan. Though satellite and cable TVs emerged as alternative to the publicly run media in the 1990s, they still did not have the access as PTV because it was expensive and mostly covered urban areas. Similarly, majority of the public had that information concerning news and entertainment which the government want them to watch and see. According to Zulfiqar and Khan (2022), the State, through governments, used the media as a tool for maximizing its monopoly over information sector. In this way, peaceful routine was the norm of the days.

The choice of the public in selection of what they want to watch was limited due to the unavailability of private media and the only availability of PTV. Furthermore, the available outside media channels, satellite and cable TVs, were either expensive or city-centered or both which majority of media customer could not afford. Interestingly, Pakistan made a shift from centralized to liberal policies due to the global change after 9/11. The change was followed particularly in media sector as reforms in the public sector were advocated and financial assistance and aids from the US, international organizations such as World Bank and IMF and the west were ensured (Zia & Khan, 2013; Rizwan & Jadoon, 2010). This transformation brought private media to operate in Pakistan and with it, the media both Radio and TV flourished. Similarly, regulation of the recently liberalized media was considered need of the hour and, hence, PEMRA came into being on March 01, 2002.

The legal base for the establishment of PEMRA is article 19 of the Pakistan's constitution. Freedom of speech is guaranteed by the constitution which is one of the fundamental human rights. The article 19 states:

Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or

the integrity, security, or defense of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, [commission of] or incitement to an offence.

PEMRA had not been the only ordinance in this regard. Before its establishment, EMRA made its appearance in the caretaker government of 1997. Similarly, RAMBO was another attempt for media regulation. Musharraf's cabinet approved the ordinance twice in 2000 but still was not established (Jabbar, 2014). Finally, PEMRA became the second attempt of Musharraf regime to establish media regulator. The regime succeeded in establishing an autonomous authority for regulating media in early 2000s. PEMRA was established on 1st March 2002. There has been no media authority existed in Pakistan before PEMRA and had only state-owned PTV where times were allotted to various programs including news and entertainment.

PTV remained in the hands of the government and the airing content was too handled by the government. According to Jabbar (2014), monopoly of the government in this case was at extreme. Similarly, news-airing was also controlled by the government and the public would watch and see the state-approved contents with little freedom of selection. This limitation of the media also affected many in the opposition of the government. Zulfiqar and Khan (2022) argue that the state-owned media had been used against opponent political parties and groups by disseminating politically motivated contents, mostly negative. However, newspapers had room for criticizing the government. Hence, a sudden and abrupt change in media would bring a huge change in state structure as well. Therefore, a strong, powerful and well equipped PEMRA was need of the hour in order to not let things go out of hand (Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022).

Mandate of PEMRA, according to PEMRA Ordinance (2002), is regulation of establishment and operation of broadcast media and distribution services. It also includes foreign broadcast operators in Pakistan along with other local TV and radio channels. The authority also has the power to issue laws regarding regulation, if necessary. Similarly, it can punish, reward, suspend, close or reopen any channel and/or distribution house and/or media broadcaster. The following paragraphs will investigate about the structure and functioning of the authority through the PEMRA ordinance and amendments in it.

3.1. PEMRA Ordinance

PEMRA was established in 2002 for regulation of electronic media in Pakistan. Interestingly, there had not been a single legislative form of the laws related to the media before PEMRA and instead divided in many legislative measures like Pakistan Television Company Act, 1964, Merchandise Marks Act, 1889, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Custom Act, 1969 (Abrar, 2012). As in the middle of 1990s the privatization of media took off and many companies launched mostly entertainment channels. The surge of private electronic media was deemed to be controlled and thus, Pakistan Telecommunication Authority had given the responsibility after its operation in 1997. However, according to Abrar (2012), after the establishment of PEMRA, PTA now regulates the creation, operation, and maintenance of telecommunication systems and the provision of telecommunication services in Pakistan.’

The ordinance has delegated many powers to the authority regarding regulation of the broadcast media industry. However, it has been chained by the same ordinance such as giving upper hand and final say to the federal government in decision-making and policy related matters. Similarly, section 5 of the ordinance had made PEMRA answerable to the government at center and simultaneously, can issue directives to the authority and that would be obliged as the finality of decisions in policy and rules resides in the hand of the government. Moreover, the subsequent section 6 permitted and made the government at Islamabad capable of intervening in leadership design of the authority. On the other hand, such rules might have effects on the autonomy of regulatory agencies especially PEMRA.

The powers of the federal government drafted in the ordinance reflect more authoritarian elements than democratic. This is fathomable as government of the time was of a dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, and the ordinance had also been approved by him and his cabinet. Nevertheless, it becomes more important to ask that why then the successive democratic governments did not change or make changes in the concerned sections of the ordinance? One of the reasons might be the opposing political forces whose power could not be ignored even if they are out of government. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), if political losers are powerful then change might not be possible but if they become less powerful or powerless then probability of the change increases.

Additionally, Zulfiqar and Khan (2022) argue that a more autonomous and independent authority might complicate bargaining process of the federal government with the media and therefore, the ruling elite had maintained PEMRA under its control on purpose. However, it could be seen as obstacle as well for autonomy is one of the main features of regulatory

agencies. A compromise in this regard would affect the authority, its leadership and the mechanism involved. PEMRA have been remained in the federal government control since its inception. Interestingly, democratic governments at federal level unlike Musharraf regime mainly come to power through Punjab and Sindh votes.

Majority of the national level political parties tend to secure more votes and seats in Punjab and Sindh. Reason behind this assumption is that any political party if secured more seats in these provinces would consequently form government at the center. On the other hand, it may indicate the priorities and preferences of the ruling elite. Since these provinces are considered road to the power to rule, therefore, PEMRA under control and not autonomous and independent would be preferred by any political party in power. The ruling elite in majority of the cases have their control over institutions, elite capture, mostly through economic means (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2005). Other ways of bending the authority to federal governments could be found in the ordinance provisions such as section 5 and 6, for instance, which have given the government more power than the authority itself.

Moreover, Interference by the federal government will always take place because of two reasons. The first one is about the control of the media industry. A controlled media could not air what the government might dislike or against it. Additionally, the media or any other sector, organization, agency or group under tight leash may not be able to move without the permission of the government. The second reason behind intervention is bargaining with the media. This type of interference has been addressed by Zulfiqar and Khan (2022) where they explain that the ruling elite are not in favor of making PEMRA more autonomous and independent as it might make bargaining with the media difficult. Such incidents and events have been happened in the past and there is no guarantee for the future as well (Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022).

Furthermore, the above reasons might also indicate the purpose behind the drafting of the ordinance. PEMRA is drafted in such a manner that it would not go against the whims and wishes of the federal government. Musharraf regime may have established the authority for itself but the following democratic governments too utilized PEMRA for their own political interests with maintaining its control over it. In order to make the authority more useful and market-friendly, the draft needs to be revisited for certain indispensable changes to make it

according to Pakistani society and its social, cultural, economic, and political dynamics (McChesney, 2008; Napoli, 2003; Burger 2006; Kemal, 2002; Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022).

Similarly, it can be used as a punishing tool by the federal government. A particular media outlet could be penalized by the authority if its content is not in line with the government. This can happen as section 5 of the ordinance empowers the government at Islamabad to issue orders as and when it desires besides having final say in decision-making in policy matters. Additionally, PEMRA cannot refute or refrain from the orders issued. It is understandable in dictatorship but what remains unfathomable is that this undemocratic power till today has not been changed by the successive democratic governments. As a result, a controlled media through PEMRA is preferred than free media by the political party in power at Islamabad.

A regulator for such a novice and juvenile media was need of the hour. Likewise, media sector had not been so liberalized in Pakistan and same was the case with the need for a regulator. According to Zulfiqar and Khan (2022), queries like what type of regulation is required, mechanism of regulation and its implementation process are not as simple as they appear while addressing. Similarly, it is also argued that whenever a regulator and its powers remain unspecified, its autonomy unappreciated and when big corporations can even influence the legislation, rules and regulation then doing the opposite instead of what is needed would not work properly (Zulfiqar & khan, 2022).

An independent, autonomous and a functioning media will assist the government and promote good image of the state. However, sections 5 and 6 allow intervention of the federal government in the authority leadership design and policy making which halts PEMRA's independence, freedom and autonomy. PEMRA is designed in a way where the ruling elite have given the final say and through it the government curbs the authority. Interests of the political party in power are fulfilled and according to Sohail (2012), PEMRA works as a puppet of the government.

Moreover, the control over the authority does not stop here. The ordinance has an indemnity section which further empowers the government at Islamabad. The authority cannot even go against any illegality or invalidity of the governments both federal and provincial or their designated person. In the same manner, any action taken by the

governments or the person including illegal can be justified by just declaring it as done or purporting or intended to be done in good faith. Section 38 states:

No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Federal Government or any Provincial Government or local authority or any other person exercising any power or performing any function under this Ordinance or for anything which is in good faith done or purporting or intended to be done under this Ordinance or any rule made thereunder.

Similarly, subjective language has been used in the ordinance many times like good faith in the above section but it remains undefined as what it actually means. What is it? How could it be defined? And what comes under good faith? In the same context, these words could not be termed friendly as well and at the same time could affect the media market. A market-friendly draft could be effective rather than putting subjective language and lexicons in the ordinance. Therefore, the ordinance requires revisit, review and reconsideration. The media is considered as a pillar of the state because of its reach and power. The importance of media can be highlighted through the statement of Thomas Jefferson in his letter of 1787. He states:

Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. (Jefferson & Ford, 1904, pp. 253).

PEMRA like the judiciary has to be free from interventions and interferences. These should not be limited to governments only rather any political involvement in the authority matters should be discouraged. In this way, efficiency in the operations and functions could be improved. Similarly, the authority needs not to be answerable to the government instead it should become answerable to the state. Furthermore, sections 5 and 6 should either be changed or erased to make PEMRA more autonomous, independent and free.

3.2. Selection Criteria

The chairman and members of the authority's selection currently vests in the hands of the president of Pakistan as mentioned under sub-section 1 of the section 6. This political involvement in selection makes PEMRA questionable. Interestingly, in the following sub-section 2, criterion for chairmanship is that the person who would be selected for the post should be of known integrity with expertise and experience in the field of media, business,

management, finance, economics or the law.’ These sections of the ordinance portray the authority more of a tool for the government like appointment of the chairman and members by the president and a criterion based on a wide range of fields. Sub-section 2 could also be analyzed as giving room to the government for bringing up a politically favored person.

This political control of the federal government over the authority along with the intervention in its leadership design has to be delinked. Regulatory agencies such as PEMRA has to be kept out of politics and political deliberations. Political biasness is supposed to be minimized rather than maximized. Similarly, the criteria for the chairman and the authority members also needs to reviewed. Discussions and debates about the criteria should be held in order to minimize both biasness and influence of the government. Moreover, it is also argued that media corporations may also influence the ruling party and political leadership while drafting rules and regulations in order to fulfill their interests through formal and informal powers (Rasul and McDonald, 2012; Bagdikian, 2004; Machensy, 1999; Machensy, 2008; Napoli, 1997, 2003; Mosco, 2009).

In the same line, the authority could be used as punishing tool for those media outlets that are either disliked or their content is considered rebellious or hostile by the government. GEO TV, for example, would be relevant in highlighting how PEMRA acted as a puppet, as per Sohail (2012), and a tool in the hands of the federal government. According to Rasul and McDonald (2012), TV channels of Jang group bluntly criticized Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government and consequently, the group came under the lens of PEMRA in tax evasion case and even GEO broadcasting was banned for a short period as well. Similarly, media outlets were punished by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) through the authority for not following national narrative in Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) dharna times (Waleed, 2020).

Furthermore, the media also faced penalties in various forms in PTI government as well. According to Waleed (2020), thousands of media workers lost jobs, unpaid bills due to government were stopped, advertisements from the government also declined, and a number of media outlets including ‘_Waqt News’ had to go out of the business. This control has made PEMRA and its authority as a part of the government. The job of the authority is to regulate the media but at the same time it has to obey what the federal government finalizes. PEMRA has been playing the same role since its establishment of remaining a listening authority which punishes media outlets because of either the authority dislikes their content or the

government at Islamabad objects on specific media program or product (Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022).

In the process of selection, sub-section 3 of section 6 also plays a vital role. According to it, one member of the authority be permanently appointed by the federal government while the other five members should be eminent citizens. Among these five, two must be women. All of them are supposed to have some experience in any field related to media, law, human rights and social service. The same question of criterion raises here again. The authority main object is regulation of the media and, therefore, technical experts would be more efficient than just eminent citizens. Additionally, ex-officio members are also included. The existing conditions for appointing and selecting members might affect PEMRA's management. Furthermore, need of experts in the authority besides keeping in view the media's sensitivity would be much better than just picking and selecting representatives from various genders or groups like women and men.

In the ordinance, sub-section 1 of section 7 further shows the control of the government over the chairman and the members of the authority. It is described in the sub-section that ~~The~~ Chairman and members, other than ex-officio members, unless earlier removed for misconduct or physical or mental incapacity, shall hold office for four years and shall be eligible for re-appointment for a similar term or as the Federal Government may determine." Subjective language has repeatedly been used in the ordinance such as misconduct in this section. The explanation of the term as given in the ordinance is that ~~For~~ the purposes of this section the expression "misconduct" means conviction for any offence involving moral turpitude and includes conduct prejudicial to good order or unbecoming of gentleman".

The term misconduct is vaguely defined here. If the chairman says no to the government then would it be counted as misconduct or not. Similarly, it is explained unclearly as well which has benefited the federal government thus far and at the same time weaken the chairman position. The authority leader also might not be able to absorb pressure, mostly political. How could PEMRA in such a controlled environment function freely and without taking pressure from a political party being in power? Would these constraints not obstruct the proper working of the authority, its chairman and the entire team? The term misconduct needs to be legally defined to avoid any inconvenience with respect to PEMRA.

Overall, the federal government has a major part in selection of the chairman and members of the authority. The ordinance states that the government would appoint one member and after completion of the seats it can select and two more members. Additionally, Chairman PTA, Chairman FBR and Secretary of MOIB along with two other ex-officio members of the authority are representatives of the federal government in PEMRA's leadership design. In this way, the government at Islamabad controls the authority through the selection and appointment of the members including the chairman. This process of assigning needs to be reformed, revisited, revised and reviewed which would pave a way for an inclusive and independent PEMRA.

3.3.Remunerations, Loans and Aid

After analyzing the selection criteria for various seats in the authority, the important issue of finances will be discussed. The president of Pakistan decides the salary of the chairman and members of the authority. There is no limit for the president to determine any amount of pay to be paid to the chairman and members. Section 9 of the ordinance states:

The Chairman and members shall be paid such emoluments as the President of Pakistan may determine and shall not be varied to their disadvantage during their term of office.

The chairman, on the other hand, might also be influenced through financial means as a strong relation could be seen between the president and PEMRA. The same problem of criterion like the previous lies here as well. There is neither a settled condition nor limit to the payment packages. Therefore, a standard through legislation of the parliament is needed for remunerations of the members of the authority.

Similarly, sub-section 2 of section 14 has further five sub-sections which deals with the funding of PEMRA. According to sub-section 2 (i), the federal government will provide seed money to the authority. Interestingly, sub-section 2 (iii) allows the authority for loans and the government might grant it by considering either a general or special case. In analysis of this section, it could be seen that the federal government has repeatedly continued and maintained its control through different sections of the ordinance. The point of understanding is to know that the state and government are not the same. The former remains but the latter changes from time to time.

PEMRA is a state body and its improvement and accountability should be in the hands of the state. Government is one of the pillars of the state and the same goes for the media in today's world. The government controls the authority but what if PEMRA controls the government. The government might not run smoothly and efficiently due to outsider's interests. In the same manner, government involvement, interference and control also effect the operations and functions of PEMRA that will further impact the media market.

Additionally, sub-section 2 (iv) also permits the authority for accepting foreign aid as funding with the approval of the federal government. This section is alarming. How could the authority be considered free in its operations when it is paid by foreign donors? Similarly, particular agendas of specific foreign donors might also take place because they might be paying PEMRA for certain reasons and by accepting the offer the authority may act as they wish. Therefore, donations and foreign aid are supposed to be not accepted and the section regarding this also needs to be diminished. Furthermore, the authority annual funding report should be made public to maintain public trust on the media industry.

3.4.Monopolization

Another important aspect of the ordinance is section 23 which deals with concentration of power or monopoly. Sub-section 1 states:

No person shall be entitled to the benefit of any monopoly or exclusivity in the matter of broadcasting or the establishment and operation of broadcast media or distribution service or in the supply to or purchase from, a national broadcaster of air time, programmes or advertising material and all existing agreements and contracts to the extent of conferring a monopoly or containing an exclusivity clause are, to the extent of exclusivity, hereby declared to be inoperative and of no legal effect.

In the above statement, any kind of monopoly would not be encouraged by the authority. PEMRA would also prevent the media market from emergence of monopolies as well. The reason behind is that giant media industry groups can control information production, its dissemination and targeted audience through the corporate economics. In the same way, this will affect the authority and the overall media and information set up might lose its strength. Consequently, the purpose of the media would rather be restricted to specific agendas and at the same time the efficiency and outcomes of the regulatory agency would be affected too.

Mosco (2009) explains that economics of media can be used by big corporations for twisting, altering, limiting and even airing their own agendas. Allowing few market giants to have a major part of the industry would lead to control over media market and its content. Additionally, content that support and promote a particular agenda can also be produced with keeping the audience incognizant of the reality (Mosco, 2009). Monopolization has these capabilities and therefore, it needs to be addressed particularly in the media. Similarly, PEMRA has the responsibility of facilitating the media industry by providing fair ground to all relevant corporate sectors.

However, the pressure from print media firms regarding the regulation of cross-ownership can be traced to the initial days of PEMRA. The novice liberalization of media could not sustain the pressure and the then Minister of Information, Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, submitted an amendment in the ordinance with respect to the cross-ownership regulation on July 12, 2003. The amendment was approved by the cabinet. Nevertheless, the cabinet had already decided that the first ten applicants would be awarded the first ten broadcast licenses and interestingly, among the applicants, majority was of the top newspaper groups, for instance, Jang, Nawa-I-Waqt, Khabrein, Business Recorder and the Daily Times (Gul et a., 2017; Riaz, 2003).

On the other hand, on 13th of July, 2003 announcement of the approval of the proposed amendment was made by the minister, though it was a provision of the amendment, which the national newspapers highly appreciated (Raza, 2004). Similarly, according to Riaz (2003), the relaxation in cross-ownership rule by the cabinet was considered as a great victory after an aggressive and fervent lobbying since the establishment of PEMRA. Big corporates can influence policy-making, agenda-setting and even decision-making. Additionally, monopolization also controls market that can be used for either allowing someone's entrance or exit from it (Rasul & McDonald, 2012). A relation could be found between the media and politics where interdependency exists. According to Bagdikian (2004), needs of politics and media are fulfilled by each other such as influence of giant media corporation are capable of changing existing policy/ies. Media needs political connections and politicians require media for its political interests.

Rasul and McDonald (2012) argue that concentration of ownership and monopoly is one of the biggest challenges for PEMRA. The pressure of the media conglomerates is capable of even influencing policies and decisions. In this sense, if the authority tries to stop or ban a

media outlet belonging to a big corporation it might create problems for itself. Additionally, small industries might also face difficulties in competing with these entities. They are capable of ousting small firms from business (Rasul & McDonald, 2012). Furthermore, political leverage makes such entities so popular that they could harm the government through media campaigning. Therefore, the government and the authority mostly avoid to indulge with such media conglomerates and instead favor them (Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022).

In connection to the above, section 4 of the ordinance deals with functions of PEMRA. According to this section, the authority is responsible for regulating the establishment of all broadcast media and distribution service. The authority has the power to design or make rules for national, international, local and regional media broadcasters. The section also authorizes PEMRA for issuing new rules and publish it in the Gazette of Pakistan. The important point of monopolization and concentration of ownership has either been ignored or was not considered significant. It is understandable at the time of Musharraf regime but in democratic governments it shows the degree of seriousness towards democratic norms and market fairness.

Similarly, Independent Media Group (IMG) also known as Jang group leads in term of revenue. The group is considered one of the big players in the media industry. It was the first in Pakistan that launched its TV channel, Geo. Before diving into the broadcast media business, the group has been active in the print media. English language newspaper, The News International, and magazine, Us, along with the Urdu language newspaper, Jang, are owned by the same group. Rasul and McDonald (2012) argue that the group had topped the list of revenue in print media before its broadcast sector.

It has now five TV channels of various genres, sports, entertainment and News. In addition to its print media side, the group's revenue has multiplied manifold. Its pace in the broadcast media has not been less than its earlier print media. Erstwhile, the group was known for the latter but with the passage of time, now, it is known for the former. Out of total advertising spending in 2009, Geo TV channels seized 24 percent; its Urdu and English newspapers grabbed 34 percentshare of the total advertising spending (Gallup, 2010). In that particular year, Rs 30 billion was total advertising spending on TV. In 2020-21, the spending went upward to Rs 75.64billion(‘Aurora Fact File 2021’, 2022).

Other competitors of the group are Waqt media group, Pakistan Herald Publication also known as Dawn News group, and Century Publication or Lakson group which is also known as Express group. They are the second, third and fourth leading advertising spending revenue generators respectively. Similarly, these four media conglomerates also own Pakistan’s media industry. PEMRA was established to regulate and control the growth of TV channels. However, the owners of the channels influence policy- and decision-makers in order to make rules that suit them and their interests (Rasul & McDonald, 2012). Similarly, it is impossible for small corporations to compete with these giants (Rasul & McDonald, 2012).

The ownership of media houses in few hands results in creation of problems rather than providing solutions. Problems related to content commercialization is among the major issues. Similarly, private interests over public interests also play its role along with maximizing profits. Furthermore, these media owners also have political connections through which various interventions in different sectors could be carried out for their outlets. The strength of these conglomerates can be noticed that sometime government policy changes with their interference (Croteau & Hoynes, 2006; McChesney, 2008; Riaz, 2003). Moreover, this concentration also decreases the number of information sources and leaving few disseminating sources for the masses. According to Riaz (2003), the media ownership in few hands also benefits the government as a limited number of sources can help in manipulating public opinion and/or punishing few media and broadcast houses.

Table. 3.1. Issues in PEMRA Ordinance

Section 5	The Federal Government may, as and when it considers necessary, issue directives to the Authority on matters of policy, and such directives shall be binding on the Authority, and if a question arises whether any matter is a matter of policy or not, the decision of the Federal Government shall be final.
Section 6 (4) (A)	—.....the remaining two members will be appointed by the federal government on need basis.”

Section 7 (1)	The Chairman and members, other than ex-officio members, unless earlier removed for misconduct or physical or mental incapacity, shall hold office for a period of four years and shall be eligible for re-appointment for a similar term or as the Federal Government may determine.
Section 9	The Chairman and members shall be paid such emoluments as the President of Pakistan may determine and shall not be varied to their disadvantage during their term of office.
Section 14 (2)	The fund of the authority consists of seed money by the Federal Government. Loans obtained with the special or general sanction of the Federal Government. Foreign aid obtained with sanction of and on such terms and conditions as may be approved by the Federal Government; and all other funds received by the authority from any other source.
Section 23 (1)	This section focuses on discouraging and elimination of monopolies and states that —no group or person to benefit from any monopoly or exclusivity.....inoperative and of no legal effect.”
Section 38	No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Federal Government or any Provincial Government or local authority or any other person exercising any power or performing any function under this Ordinance or for anything which is in good faith done or purporting or intended to be done under this Ordinance or any rule made thereunder

3.5. PEMRA Amendment Act, 2007

The PEMRA Ordinance, 2002 was amended through PEMRA Amendment Act in 2007. Number of amendments made in the Act were 28 in total. Majority of the amendments explained the technical terminologies and their definitions for operation purposes. Similarly, more terms were added in separate clauses and sub-clauses like broadcast media, broadcast

station, channel provider, distribution service, DTH, LMDS. These additional terms were either introduced or explained for further clarity.

Categories of licenses were introduced. Before this amendment, there was no distinction in licenses issued to the relevant industry, company or group. With the introduction of various sections, the authority made it easier to identify who is receiving the license/s. For instance, the categories created were international and national scale station, provincial scale broadcast, local area or community-based radio and TV broadcast, specific and specialized subjects, distribution services and uplinking facilities like teleporting and DSNG. However, this making-task-easier process would also give space to more problems. International or foreign media, if issued with a license, could influence and affect the domestic culture. Mahnoor et al. (2017) explains the cultural influence of the west has created more problems because of the differentiation between the two regarding the media sector of Pakistan.

Similarly, the cross-ownership and monopolization or concentration of power had also been addressed in the amendment. The process involving issuance of licenses to different categories had to be made fair and open. Similarly, if applications for issuing licenses are more than the number of licenses to be issued then PEMRA should follow bidding process in order to maintain its integrity and avoid biasness. However, certain media conglomerates and political connections do play their role in bidding process for particular media groups and/or channels (Ex-PEMRA employee, personal communication, June 28, 2022). In the same manner, particular broadcast media also promote and support specific agenda/s in order to maintain its political links and existence in the information and communication sectors (A. Alam, personal communication, June 25, 2022). If politics can interfere in such procedures, then the authority could not be able to perform its functions fairly and smoothly as mentioned in the document.

Additionally, an ex-employee of PEMRA revealed in an interview via email that there is a need of amendments to be made in the ordinance. According to the ex-employee, “the sections of the ordinance that require amendments are mostly related to the code of conduct, licenses renewal fee and the penalties defined in the document” (Ex-PEMRA employee, personal communication, July 22, 2022). Interestingly, another PEMRA employee in a telephonic interview stated that objections have been made by licensees, media channels, broadcasters, operators and even by the authority itself in order to make some amendments in the document (PEMRA employee, personal communication, July 05, 2022).

Similarly, the control of the federal government over the authority also needs a reconsideration and revision. PEMRA has been remained an autonomous regulatory authority in its outlook but in actuality, it has not been (Ex-Chairman PEMRA, personal communication, July 07, 2022). The upper hand of the federal government over the authority makes it rather a servant of the government at Islamabad. There are many objections of various broadcast media licensees and as per the employee, PEMRA is also in favor of these amendments.


3.6. PEMRA Amendment Act, 2018

The Ordinance was amended again in 2018. The amendments include various sections, sub-sections, clauses, addition of sub-section and sub-clauses in the Ordinance. In the amendment act, the Federal Government ‘in writing on a matter of policy’ can issue directives to the Authority under its respective section. Similarly, the finality of making decision in time of ambiguities, questions or concerns also rests with the Federal Government.

The number of members in PEMRA has also been reduced in the Act. Accordingly, it will now include a chairman and eight members having qualities of integrity and competence. The appointing authority of the members vests in the hands of the Federal Government. Criteria for chairman and members also includes education qualification of at least master or professional degree from an institute recognized by Higher Education Commission (HEC). Additionally, they must have experience of twenty years in one of the following fields: Media, Business, Management, Finance, Economics or Law.


Moreover, the members appointed by the Federal Government will comprise one permanent, one BS-22 officer, the Chairman of PTA, one nominated member by the Pakistan Broadcasters Association (PBA) and one nominated member of all provincial governments from general public whereas two out of four must be women. The provincial governments’ nominated members will be based on rotation basis. Furthermore, two ex-officio members in the composition is must. Those members will vacate their offices after not attending three consecutive meetings, however, ex-officio members of the composition are excluded.

Fig. 3.1. Chairman and Members of PEMRA (Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022)



Source: Zulfiqar, F., & Khan, F. M. (2022, pp. 118). Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority. In F. Zulfiqar (ed.), Evaluations of Regulatory Authorities, Government Packages, And Policies. Islamabad: PIDE.

Fig. 3.2. Administrative Structure of PEMRA (Zulfiqar & Khan, 2022)



Source: Zulfiqar, F., & Khan, F. M. (2022, pp. 118). Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority. In F. Zulfiqar (ed.), Evaluations of Regulatory Authorities, Government Packages, And Policies. Islamabad: PIDE.

Structure and design of agencies matter when culture, management and technical issues come to the fore otherwise the formality does not make sense if discussed in a vacuum (Pollitt et al., 2005). Similarly, PEMRA’s structure and functions would work in accordance with the context that is acceptable to the common standards of decency in the society. Moreover, morality also matters regarding communication and information particularly the broadcast media sector as they could influence behavior of societies. Culture and morality issues have been addressed by PEMRA Ordinance as according to Pollitt et al. (2005), some

organizational structures perform well in one context and fail or sometimes produce worse outcomes in another due to cultural, managerial and technical issues.

Additionally, the cultural context of majority of societies and/or states vary. Hence, there is a possibility of failing in either copying or following organization structures of other societies and/or states. As mentioned, culture matters along with morality and common standards of decency in designing such structures particularly related to the broadcast and electronic media. Therefore, questions like autonomy of agencies or ministries' control over them are supposed to change from generality to particularity like appropriate autonomy of agencies or how should ministries guide or steer them (Pollitt et al., 2005).

Institutional culture also matters and it may influence management of agencies. Every institution and organization have its own culture which comprises values and norms like that of societal culture. Similarly, hierarchy exists in majority of institutions and organizations whereas norms develop accordingly. The relation of head-subordinate, for instance. In this case, different institutional subordinates treat their heads differently like acceptability and unacceptability of the hierarchical inequality between them. Furthermore, individualism and collectivism also influence the management. The former emphasizes on loose ties in societies whereas the latter stresses upon loyalty to the whole rather than part of it.

Hofstede (2001) explains various dimensions of institutional culture that helps in understanding inter- and intra- organizational relations. The acceptability ratio, Power Distance Index (PDI), and private or group preferability, Individualism/Collectivism Index (ICI), predict cultural differences as per Hofstede's (2001) 50 countries investigation suggestion. The higher the PDI the higher the acceptance of the inequality between subordinates and heads of institutions and organizations. In the same manner, the higher number in ICI means higher individualistic tilt and vice versa (Hofstede, 2001). Some of the countries from the list are shown in Table 3.2.

Table. 3.2. Cultural Differences (Hofstede, 2001)

Country	Power–distanceIndex (PDI)	Individualism/Collectivism Index (ICI)
France	68	71
Great Britain	35	89
India	77	48
Iran	58	41
Pakistan	55	14
Sweden	31	71
United States	40	91

Source: Hofstede, G. (2001, pp. 500). Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage publications.

The factor of culture both societal and institutional does play an important role in agencies and their management. It also explains how one institution is different in its functions from others. The more vital point here is that one cultural analysis might fail or produce worse effects if applied to another context because of cultural dissimilarities. The US, for instance, with PDI equals to 40 and ICI of 91 shows difference exists even inside an organization. Therefore, cultural influence in management of agencies and organizations has to be kept in mind in times of dealing with such institutions.

Moreover, performance and strategies of management of agencies could also be affected and influenced by the tasks of agencies. The activities further depend on the degree of observation as it is considered sine qua non in the process of finding out the final results. According to Wilson (1989), observable and unobservable outputs (performance) and outcomes (impacts) of agencies undertakings are the two main features that might have effects on management, Table 3.2. However, sometimes managers have to convince political superiors of following the rules if operators are given free hand in running things the way they see them appropriate and right as Wilson (1989, pp. 164) states:

If the manager cannot justify on the grounds of results leaving operators alone to run things as they see fit, the manager will have to convince political superiors that the rules governing government work are being faithfully followed.

PEMRA established in early 2000s as a regulatory authority for electronic media in Pakistan. Its structure and functions are documented in PEMRA Ordinance, 2002. The authority has delegated certain regulatory tasks like license issuance, content regulations etc. Similarly, the Federal Government has the power to issue directives in matters related to policy making. There are certain rules of the authority which upon breaching may result in cancellation of licenses, seizing of the media broadcast equipment and inform the Court to issue warrant against a person. Moreover, agencies like PEMRA are also influenced by cultures. Furthermore, agencies activities also impact performance and strategies of their management.

Table. 3.3. Observable Outcomes and Observable Output (Wilson, 1989)

		Outcomes observable?	
		Yes	No
Output observable?	No	Production organizations e.g. a mail service; tax collection agencies	Procedural organizations e.g. a mental health counselling service
	Yes	Craft organizations e.g. field inspection agencies	Coping organizations e.g. a diplomatic service; certain types of education

Source: Wilson, J. Q. (1989, pp. 158-171). *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. New York: Basic Books.

Conclusion

PEMRA's structure and functions indicates the mechanism of how the authority works following certain rules and regulations that is the Ordinance. It has been observed that the structure has many issues regarding the recruitment and selection of staff. The chairman and the members could probably not be allowed to say no to the Federal Government because of their political appointments. Similarly, monopoly and concentration of power might not be addressed by the authority due to the influence of the media conglomerates on policy-makers and political actors though a section of the ordinance prohibits concentration of ownership and monopoly.

PEMRA can accept loans and foreign aid and donations with the consent of the Federal Government. The loan might not raise any problems but the foreign aid could. There are multiple implications of how the donations and foreign aid impact autonomy and independence of the authority. It might be used as an agent for certain foreign company that donates money to PEMRA. The media may also be restricted from airing any content against the particular foreign company which would ultimately affect the authority both structure and its responsibilities.

There is also an issue of culture. The regulatory authority has to keep an eye on the effects of culture on the authority's structure and vice versa. The structure and functions of regulatory bodies are influenced by domestic cultures and societal norms. PEMRA's structure and administrative management could create problems if it does not align itself with the domestic culture and norms. There are observable and unobservable elements that affect autonomous and regulatory agencies in various ways.

CHAPTER 4

Assessment of PEMRA as a Media Regulatory Agency of Pakistan

Introduction

Agencies in general terms were emerged as alternative to concentrated and central governments. Similarly, the welfare state formation and building also contributed to their development. Agencification process started as a solution to the ineffectiveness of governments. These agencies were named differently in various territories like regulatory authorities, autonomous agencies and bodies etc. Majority of agencies development occurred in finance services, energy and telecommunications and broadcasting sectors (Jacobzone, 2005). They are different from bureaucracy and departments attached to ministries. Autonomy and structural separation from ministries are the two main features which could identify agencies. The process of agencification was promoted through NPM and international organizations such IMF and World Bank (Rizwan & Jadoon, 2010). In Pakistan, it was advocated by both international and national stakeholders like UNDP, IMF, World Bank and Pakistani politicians and bureaucracy (Zia & Khan, 2013).

Pakistan with the financial support of the Western world and international organizations started reforms in the public sectors (Rizwan & Jadoon, 2010; Zia & Khan, 2013). In 2001, Musharraf regime felt pressure for selling off the publicly run media by international bodies such as World Bank and IMF (Mazzera & Sial, 2010). And interestingly, PEMRA, an autonomous and regulatory authority, established in 2002 for regulation of the electronic media in Pakistan. The assessment of the authority from its emergence to date is discussed in the following paragraphs.

4.1. Kargil War and Liberalization of Electronic Media

Privatization and liberalization of media as a move came to the fore because of military campaign in 1999 (Farooq, 2018). General Pervez Musharraf, the then Chief of Army Staff, sneaked his troops in and captured Indian positions in Kargil. The mountainous area has been under Indian administration for decades. The weather is sustainable in summer but winter season is unbearable due to very low temperature at the height of 18,000 feet. Therefore, Indian positions were mostly vacant because of the temperature and Pakistani military took

advantage of taking control of the empty positions. This expedition sent an alert to India and both states' militaries faced each other at Kargil. Pakistan, subsequently, came under the US pressure and returned back from Kargil (Farooq, 2018).

Majority of the US and the western media in this war supported and promoted Indian side of the story (Clinton, 2004; "India encircles rebels," 1999). It was possible because of the Indian media that created a reality which influenced the world media. Even Pakistani public relied on Indian news channels more than their own regarding Kargil crisis (Farooq, 2018). On the other hand, Pakistan had only PTV for news broadcasting and it had access to majority of the far-flung areas in Pakistan. However, its credibility was not up to the mark as the public shifted to rival state media through dishes and satellites.

Pakistani media at the time may be lagged behind due to unavailability of liberal policies. Similarly, PTV was not trusted even in its own surroundings. According to Farooq (2018) while quoting one of Musharraf regime's senior officials, the public trusted Indian media created reality at times when Pakistani military was fighting a war against India. These factors strengthened Indian narrative while Pakistan's side was either ignored or not considered trustworthy. It was cleared inside Pakistan that a strong and free media would have helped in this situation. Farooq (2018) explains that due to Kargil expedition the government realized the importance of liberalized policies particularly regarding media laws.

Indian media and journalists tried to sensationalize the crisis and provoke Indians through promotion of patriotism against Pakistan. Saxena (2006) described Kargil coverage as battle for ratings and to create hyper nationalism in Indian public. The media of India supported official line to such an extent that it forgot basic principles of journalism and balanced reporting. Similarly, Indian media also did not keep its commitment of refraining from any kind of propaganda against any of the states (Nehru-Liaquat Agreement, 1950).

The Pakistani military lost on both grounds that is at Kargil and media. Hasan (2017) explains that after the war, it became obvious to the military that India had won the war of media. On the other hand, under the US pressure, Pakistan left Kargil as well (Farooq, 2018). However, Hasan (2017) quoted Javed Jabbar, former federal minister of information in Musharraf regime, explaining that he resigned from his ministerial position because of the consideration of Pakistan's communications and information sectors weak and vulnerable in the power circles. Consequently, plannings for future preparation were now considered by the

Pakistani government, military and intelligentsia which sparked the liberalization of media in Pakistan (International Media Support, 2009). Additionally, Pakistani rulers and ISI have been remained the most convenient scapegoats for India and its establishment and therefore, Pakistan needed to present a counternarrative to what India has created and propagated (Jamwal, 2006).

4.2. General Pervez Musharraf and the Media

Musharraf came into power through toppling of a democratic and constitutional government. He used undemocratic and unconstitutional way to power but his regime's move towards liberalization, privatization and opening up of Pakistan's media has been considered one of the contributions to democracy. The concepts of free press and media are related to democracy and at the same time looked in jeopardy in dictatorship. However, this whole concept fails in case of General Musharraf's dictatorship as the openness in media sector became a reality in his regime in Pakistan.

Moreover, the argument of Randall (1993) implies that the press media faces repressions and sanctions where government and the state affairs are controlled, managed and conducted by an imposed dictatorship. Gunther and Mughan (2000) explained that state control on media remains strict in non-democratic regimes particularly news broadcast sector. In the same context, Ezrow and Frantz (2011) also described that the control on media is considered as personal preference by military leaders. Interestingly the above arguments contradict when it comes to Musharraf's regime where liberalization of the media became possible under the rule of his dictatorship in Pakistan.

Erstwhile, Nawaz Sharif in his second term of government did not treat the press well. He was portrayed as a bully because of his heavy-handedness on those journalists who criticized his governance (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2000). As a matter of fact, the broadcast media remained in government control but it was the press that needed to be under its command too. Consequently, restrictions and constrains in 1998 and 1999 resulted in welcoming coup of Musharraf by the press instead of standing with a democratic government (Hasan, 2017).

The liberalization of the media by a dictator has surprised not just local but international communities as well. Musharraf's regime reformed many public sectors including the media.

According to Zaidi (2011), the process of opening up the media was a response to the Asian neighborhood. Similarly, the regime also tried to change the conservative and orthodox nature of the state through liberal policies of his ‘enlightened moderation.’ Lodhi (2011) believes that the shift taken by the dictator in the media sector was nothing but a continuation of his liberal agenda. However, after the Kargil conflict, it was considered as a mouthpiece for the military (Talbot, 2012). Additionally, International Media Support (2009) also explains that planning for future preparation inspired the media liberalization. In the same sense, Jamwal (2006) argued that a counternarrative was needed against the reality created by the rival India’s narrative through its media.

The image of the regime had certainly gained leverage in international community due to liberalization of media and promotion of democratic norms (Rasul & McDowell, 2012). The state controlled and publicly-run media is still operating but with issuing licenses to private owners and companies in the sector made Musharraf acceptable in both Pakistani press and international communities. However, the media was intermittently tamed by regulations. According to Gunther and Mughan (2000), non-democratic rulers often times impose political and social order to repress populations and their priority is demobilization instead of mobilization. Similarly, Rasul and McDowell (2012) elaborated that Musharraf did control the media time and again but at the same time introduced some regulations which favored the media industry. Overall, the media structure and power have been significantly changed since Musharraf’s liberalization.

The establishment of regulatory authority for broadcast media in Pakistan was influenced and caused by Indian media. The fast growing technologically advance neighbor also pressurized Pakistan through its media by persuading the US and the western countries to support Indian narrative in Kargil conflict. Moreover, there was only publicly run media broadcast in Pakistan that too had less credibility in the public eyes. The information regarding Kargil war had been accessed by the Pakistan population through dish and satellite TVs which had mostly Indian channels. According to Farooq (2018), the idea of liberalized media came in 1999 when the military was fighting Kargil war against Indian troops. The media was believed to be a mouthpiece for the military after Kargil campaign (Talbot, 2012). Similarly, Jamwal (2006) also explained the cause of the liberalization of media as presenting counternarrative against Indian narrative and to be prepared for future.

Musharraf's privatization and liberalization was an ideological change from conservative to liberal. Regulatory authority for the media remained part of his liberal agenda. The regime might also be inspired from international organizations advocated for media to be regulated independently. Buckley et al. (2008) explains that the media would have to be regulated by independent regulatory body that has legal bindings and powers documented in the law. Musharraf regime might have used both ideological change and international approaches towards the formation of an authority for the media in Pakistan unlike Europe.

In Europe, as Jakubowicz (2013) argues that ideological change from welfare system in Western Europe, from communist ideology in Eastern and Central Europe towards a laissez-faire system involving deregulation in many sectors resulted in creation of regulatory agencies for broadcast media sector. Similarly, PEMRA has been delegated with the authority to issue licenses and regulated the broadcast media in Pakistan. According to Irion and Radu (2013), issuing of licenses and regulation of telecommunication sector by independent regulatory authorities is considered good practice worldwide.

4.3. War on Terror and Media Liberalization

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan faced criticism worldwide because of the Indian propaganda during and after Kargil war. Additionally, Pakistan also suffered from the sanctions of the western world including the US at the time. Thus, Pakistani establishment along with the government came up to present its own perspective regarding Kargil as well as preparing for future through a vibrant and independent media. Pakistan's image was declining in international communities, platforms and states but 9/11 happened and war on terror was declared. Afghanistan was blamed for the attacks and the US needed Pakistan's help in reaching out Taliban in its western neighborhood.

It could be termed as an opportunity for Musharraf regime for improving not just his image but also Pakistan's as well by utilizing and reforming the broadcast sector. The media may now provide an alternative to what has been propagated against Pakistan by Indian media. It would also portray Pakistan as a frontline state in the war against terror. This opportunistic mindset of creating propaganda tool inside the state emerged after Kargil war. According to Talbot (2012), Kargil was the reason in liberalizing the media and would work as a mouthpiece for the military. Similarly, Hasan (2017) explains while quoting General

Jehangir Karamat that one of the reasons in media liberalization has been the conflict of Kargil. The general in his interview with the author states:

Kargil was one of the events that demonstrated that you cannot fiddle around with the media anymore. Media to some extent is a propaganda tool, but just like other segments of the society, the media also gets divided. It has sponsors, it has its own leanings, even anchors have leanings and the military was trying to use it. It was trying to develop expertise to use the media positively towards themselves. (Hasan, 2017, pp. 81).

However, there exists resistance against the US in Pakistan. Moreover, domestic rulers and governments that support or show their support for America also face hurdles from the public in the shape of protests and dissents. Similarly, it remained the same for General Musharraf after joining the US in the ‘War on Terror’. The regime was criticized for taking sides without consulting the parliament. It became difficult for Musharraf government to maintain its popularity inside while supporting a domestically disliked outsider. However, ‘enlightened moderation’ strategy was adopted as an equilibrium for balancing the two opposite phenomena. According to Kennedy (2006), the main objective of the strategy was to provide a cover to international pressure on policies implementation in such a manner that minimizes the internal challenges to its local interests. In this way, the regime survived and liberal policies were implemented as well.

PEMRA was established after five months of the 9/11 attacks. It could be implied that the thought-out opportunity of the regime for presenting a counternarrative to Indian propaganda and ameliorating the image of Pakistan in the world had knocked on itself. Similarly, before Musharraf, the broadcast media in Pakistan remained restricted because of the government heavy handedness and control over it (Baxter, 2001). On the other hand, print media in Pakistan had evolved differently than the television and broadcast media. Moreover, restrictions and censorships were mostly faced by the print media in various governments and the broadcast media was already under their control.

Interestingly, Musharraf understood the importance of the broadcast and television sector and also knew the phases of transformation and evolution of the print and the broadcast media in Pakistan. Thus, the government focused on that sector of the media which could stand against Indian propaganda and at the same time improve both relation with the US and image of Pakistan in international community. Therefore, the broadcast media was given

greater autonomy and independence. According to Hasan (2017), it was believed within journalistic community that the liberalization of media was not possible without the involvement of a foreign hand.

It is a fact that Musharraf wanted good relations with the Americans like other nations. He also desired to remain in the good books of the US. That is why the press and the media did not face repression as in the other dictator regimes before him. A senior journalist, Sajjad Mir, according to Hasan (2012), states:

There was an unsaid understanding with the Americans that unlike Zia-ul-haq he will not muzzle the press. We were convinced in Pakistan that Musharraf had that understanding with the Americans. (Hasan, 2012, pp. 82).

Musharraf, as mentioned above, adopted liberal policies and democratic model to minimize the international pressure such as financial sanctions. The regime initiated a four-tiered strategy that is macroeconomic stability, targeted poverty interventions, improved governance and structural policy reforms such as deregulation, privatization and liberalization (Hussain, 2006). Additionally, Pakistan joined the US in the war on terror as well. After implementation of such policies and support of the war on terror, the relation between two states improved. Financial sanctions removed, restructured the bilateral external debt, multilateral and bilateral assistance poured in, remittances of workers multiplied, huge volumes of foreign direct investment flowed in and international capital markets' access was established (Hussain, 2009).

Prior to 9/11, Pakistan faced international pressure and various sanctions majority of which were related to economic and financial sectors. Similarly, Indian propaganda in Kargil war also played its part in isolating Pakistan from international community. 9/11 was a blessing in disguise as it just not prevented Pakistan from isolation but also improved its economic crisis and relations with the US. In the succeeding years after the attacks and declaration of 'War on Terror' Pakistan received more than two billion dollars per year or almost 19 billion dollars from FY 2002 to FY 2010 (Zaidi, 2011).

4.4. Media Liberalization and PEMRA

The media liberalization in Pakistan came as a result of the conflict at Kargil in 1999. In the race of media campaign and propaganda regarding the war, India defeated Pakistan. Indian media created and built an agenda-based narrative in order to isolate Pakistan internationally. Ironically, Pakistan was already facing sanctions due to conducting nuclear tests in 1998. The Indian side of the story influenced the global media and international community especially the US and the major European countries. The developed world in return showed its response in the shape of supporting the Indian narrative and blamed Pakistan at the same time. On the other hand, governments in Pakistan did not pay attention to privatization of its information sector. This could be one of the reasons why Indian narrative won in this competition.

Similarly, domestic media had been controlled by the federal government since its inception in 1964. There were little room for criticism and opposition along with less tolerance for private media sector. The privatization of media in Pakistan started in the mid of 1990s. However, it was not allowed for airing news content. Additionally, the interim government of 1997 attempted to regularize and permit private media outlets to run their own broadcast channels but it lapsed as the successor government was not interested to liberalize and regularize it in order to protect itself from criticism.

RAMBO emerged as a second attempt in the process of media regularization and openness. It came into the limelight in 2000 after its approval from the cabinet of Musharraf. The reason behind such media regulatory agency was “devolution of responsibility and power to grassroots by improving the access to mass media at the local and community level” (International Media Support, 2009). Nonetheless, the establishment of RAMBO was approved twice by the cabinet but it did not make its way through the parliament. Another attempt in this regard is the formation of PEMRA in 2002.

Musharraf regime’s liberal approach has made it possible for the media of Pakistan to be owned by private companies and individuals. In the same way, competition took place in the media market that would improve both the economy and the quality of broadcasting. Similarly, market competition in liberalization of media is increased by the state through intervention, expansion of the market and facilitation in raising the number of participants in the communication and information services (Mosco, 2009). The government of the time adopted liberal policies in order to secure his image internationally and to maintain incessant supply of financial aid from the US and the western countries (Hassan, 2017). This openness

of the media to private industries and companies helped the regime to maintain its image along with Pakistan's. Similarly, the regime was appreciated and supported by the US and the rest of the Western world in this respect.

However, Musharraf recruited various military personnel and his loyalists into the media regulatory authority to have an upper hand on the concerned body. The apparently following democratic norm and values of free media indirectly controlled or influenced the important sector of broadcast media that is news outlets by the military and the government along with putting obstacles to fact-based media reporting and journalism inside Pakistan (Mezzer&Sial, 2010). Moreover, the free media had also been limited as the governance in Balochistan and the recently merged tribal areas (former FATA) remained out of sight from criticism (Salman, 2020). The liberalization of media might be a tool with which the dictator tried to control the political opposition, protests and prevent criticizing voices against the government with a different method that is liberal media.

According to International Media Support (2009), the media in Pakistan boomed since its liberalization in 2002; monopoly of the state over communication and information sector came to an end and licenses of TV broadcasting and radio were issued to a number of private media outlets. This move resulted in growing the number of channels from few to many. There are now more than eighty television channels operating in Pakistan including terrestrial, private satellite and cable TV channels (Hasan, 2017). Additionally, the number of radio channels are more than hundred after allowing licenses to various private radio stations.

Interestingly, the media turned against the same regime that given the liberty to speak freely and openly in 2007. The prominent cases in this regard are the raid of Red Mosque (Laal Masjid) and the lawyers' movement of 2007. In the former case, Abdur Rashid, leader (Imam) of the mosque and school (Madrassa), had given air time and uninterrupted platform for directly conveying his message to the public. The eye opener for the regime at that time was his provoking of people both civil and political groups to topple the dictatorship. It could also be noted that with such uninterrupted campaign against Musharraf and his regime the control over the media authority seemed to be defeated by the same media outlets.

Similarly, the lawyers' movement also utilized the media for raising voice in favor of independent judiciary and against the military regime along with Musharraf. Subsequently, the government declared state of emergency in order to put an end to the ongoing opposition

of the media and its support for democratic forces. The importance of liberal media had been realized and, in few months, the regime felt the opposition stroke and ultimately the government had no option except conducting general elections where dictatorship came to its fate in 2008.

The Pakistani media has been liberalized but according to Croteau and Hoynes (2006), liberalization of media mostly gives birth to different problems of concentration of ownership, content diversification, and preference of private interests over public interests. The first ten licenses, for instance, had been given to the first ten applicants at the time of the establishment of the authority (Gul et al., 2017; Riaz, 2003). Thus, it could be concluded that at the time of the approval of such provision there was either no understanding of the gravity of concentration of power or it was not considered important. Furthermore, the authority in the long run might not be able to resist the oligopoly of private media industries owners due to their significant share in the media market. Mosco (2009) endorses this point that liberalization though results in lower prices, service expansion, and innovation but on the other hand, it also encourages oligopoly of private individuals or companies and consequently leads to promotion of oligopoly agendas and its privileged consumers.

4.5. Autonomy of PEMRA

PEMRA was established in March 2002. The concept of creating an autonomous media regulatory authority was initially proposed by Javed Jabbar, the then Information Minister. The authority was planned to regulate, facilitate and license the electronic media in Pakistan. In the beginning of the regulatory organization, it remained under the command of the Ministry of Information. The ministry as in charge of the media organization raised questions about media's independence and impartiality in Pakistan. Soon this issue was realized and placed under the Cabinet division which approved the suggestion regarding independence and impartiality of media.

However, Javed Jabbar's resignation as a Minister of Information made PEMRA questionable because there were differences on issue of media freedom between Musharraf and him which ended on quitting his job (Khan, 2008). Similarly, the authority's control once again went into the hands of the ministry after an amendment in the ordinance in 2007 in order to contain the airing of the regime's anti-democratic steps and the opposition of the electronic media to it (Dar, 2008). Processions and protests of various groups of journalists

and civil society were followed right after the action taken by the regime. The autonomy of the media authority had been altered.

Additionally, the media faced difficulties after the imposition of emergency in November 2007. Dissident and pro-democratic voices of both the media and civil society were banned to be televised. Some of the TV channels had even been stopped from airing and blacked out. Nevertheless, the imposition of emergency, ban on media and dissenting voices, and the removal of the Chief Justice of Pakistan declined the popularity of Musharraf and made him a pariah (Rasul, 2009). Consequently, the general election in February 2008 resulted in the defeat of Musharraf and his regime while alliance of democratic parties won.

PPP formed a coalition government after the election. The move of the previous government with respect to PEMRA went to the erstwhile position of being answerable to the prime minister after going through the Cabinet Division. This step of the democratic revival was appreciated and considered a path to a more autonomous and independent PEMRA. However, the authority still remains under subordination of the Ministry of Information. According to Khan (2008), PEMRA's responsible posts from the very start had been occupied by the officials of the so-called "information service." The bureaucratic approach applied to PEMRA is inefficient for regulation of the electronic media. Subsequently, the autonomy and independence of the regulatory body still hangs in between politics and concentration of ownership.

Furthermore, how could any regulatory body be autonomous if its decision-making and managerial responsibilities are dictated by governments? The same can be applied to PEMRA as the authority is controlled and even a disagreement cannot be tolerated by the federal government and if it happens then the finality of deciding what path should be followed resides with the government at Islamabad. The regulatory authority could rather be considered a subordinate department of the concerned ministry because of its recessive, all-time available and yes-boss character. According to section 5 of the ordinance, the federal government can issue directives "as and when it considers necessary" and the authority should abide by those directives and in case of a disagreement regarding whether a matter is related to policy or not, the final decision of the government will be followed.

Moreover, the authority has very little say in its leadership design. Majority of the members including the chairman could be appointed on political basis. For example, the

military and government loyalists had been recruited and appointed in the Musharraf regime. In the same manner, the criterion for the selection of the members and the chairman in the ordinance is very broad. Anyone who has experience in any field among media, business, management, finance, economics or law along with good character and integrity can be appointed as the chairman. Additionally, the members other than the chairman can be selected if they have expertise in any field among media, law, human rights, and social service. Section 6 of the ordinance could be utilized by the any political party in power to appoint its own loyalists and favorites. By making such individuals to be on the responsible posts, it could be expected in return that the political party would use the authority as a tool against dissents voices and political resistance.

The ordinance further endorses and empowers the political appointments and selection in section 7. It explains that the chairman and the members can be reappointed by the Federal Government after ending the four years term. This reselection process can influence the authority along with strengthening government's control over it. However, the same section can also be used against the already posted members. For example, the chairman and/or the members can be removed by declaring them either physically or mentally unfit or through misconduct. Similarly, an independent and apolitical individuals' appointment could be difficult but if happened, they might suffer from such political and subjective use of various sections against them.

The remuneration also plays an important role in political appointments and the government control over the authority. Political attempts like finality of the federal government in decision-making, recruiting and posting the desired persons and their reposting could be further increased with the power of determining pay packages for the authoritative posts in PEMRA. The president of Pakistan has the power to decide how much salaries should be given to the chairman and the members of the authority. Interestingly, section 9 sets no limit with respect to emoluments. This mechanism of kind of buying the members and the chairman might be possible in military regimes or dictatorships but maintaining such authoritarian and dictatorial section/s in democratic governments is unfathomable.

In the same context, there is very little room for remaining independent in decisions and actions with accepting foreign aid and donations. Interestingly, section 14 permits the authority to obtain aid and donation from foreign sources which could affect its integrity and autonomy. The aid or donation from a foreign source might be for airing or supporting certain

agenda/s and upon its acceptance the authority would ultimately back up that particular agenda/s. Similarly, there is possibility of content prohibition or particular channel/s might face restriction from PEMRA if the foreign company/ies that financially support the authority are targeted.

The most important and main section of the ordinance that directly affects autonomy and independence of the authority is the indemnity of the Federal and other local governments including provincial and authorized persons from any type of legal procedures that is section 38. Additionally, an illegal activity if found by PEMRA cannot be taken into court as well. It implies that the authority is not even independent in raising voice against any corruption of the concerned governments, authorities or persons. Moreover, it also makes the authority so subservient that it would only act as a tool for the political party in power until the inclusion of the indemnity section in the ordinance.

4.6. PEMRA After Musharraf

Media regulation through the authority has been controlled by the Federal Government since its establishment. PEMRA after Musharraf remains the same and very little is changed that could be termed as democratic. In March 2009, a call for a “Long March” was announced from the opposition benches to restore Iftikhar Chaudhry as Chief Justice. This march had given airtime with the support from the media as well. PPP-led government and President Asif Ali Zardari through PEMRA banned Geo News in major cities of Pakistan to put a stop to the march and weaken its prominence (International Media Support, 2009). Sherry Rehman, the then information minister, resigned in protest after Geo News and Aaj Television were taken off-air (CPJ, 2009). Similarly, PEMRA banned sports and music channels of Geo TV in April 2011. The Jang media group, owner of Geo TV, blamed that the ban was part of harassment pattern whereas the government claimed that the channel violated the terms of its license (PPF, 2011a; 2011b).

The authority under the government not only putting pressure on national channels but also international media outlets. One of the prime media houses operating in Pakistan is BBC which is mostly known for its unbiased news in Pakistan. BBC has faced bans multiple times since Musharraf's times. In 2009, half of the FM radio stations of BBC broadcast were halted citing the failure of agreement's documents with the stations (PPF, 2009; 2010). However, BBC claimed that the paperwork submitted to PEMRA had the full requirements and it would

challenge the ban in courts (Khan, 2010). On the other side, PEMRA claimed that it followed and acted on government orders. According to Asian Human Rights Commission (2010), the ban on BBC came through the military of Pakistan as the media outlet highlighted its human rights violation in operation conducted against the militants. Additionally, nine other foreign channels were banned from live news coverage operating through unauthorized and illegal means after Osama bin Laden's killing in May 2011 (PPF, 2011). They were asked to take permission from the concerned authority on covering certain, mostly terrorism related, incidents and events.

Radio stations inside Pakistan has also been treated differently in different areas. There had been stations which were operated illegally and without any restriction from the state. In the first decade of the 21st century, the most eminent illegal radio station operated by militants was in Swat region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The then head of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Mullah Fazlullah, was known as 'Radio Mulla' where he propagated anti-Pakistan and anti-US sentiments. Similarly, in the four provinces of Pakistan, Balochistan is treated differently when it comes to dissemination of information. Balochistan is one of the most deprived provinces in Pakistan including broadcast and information. Journalist Aurangzeb Khan reveals that Balochistan's deprivation from information is because of the close association and operation of PEMRA with the state (A. Khan, personal communication, July 08, 2022).

In the same context, PEMRA is more sensitive when it comes to separatist movement and issues. Balochistan is allegedly considered a hub of separatists in Pakistan. Furthermore, broadcast channels and TV that has orientation towards Baloch concerns have also not been permitted for operation. According to Asian Media Barometer (2009), Balochi-oriented newspapers and TV's establishment and operation had been curbed through coercion, arrests and shutdowns. According to Hamid Mir, journalist, the authority also controls issuance of licenses through anti-government or anti-establishment leanings of the concerned broadcast outlet/s. However, such incidents and cases have very rarely been reported (H. Mir, personal communication, July 02, 2022).

PEMRA in the eyes of the media practitioners is considered as a license issuing office. The licenses are also controlled through various means. One way of curbing the licenses is looking into the leanings of the requested licensees whereas the other method is the license fee. Matiullah Jan, journalist, in a telephonic interview indicated that the regulatory authority is

kind of collector of Bhatta (extortion money) in a legal and legitimate way (M. Jan, personal communication, June 27, 2022). Furthermore, regulation by the authority also remains one of the issues for it has been the tool or weapon through which the Federal Government either tames or pressurizes broadcast media. The government at Islamabad has the authority to nominate and select the leadership of PEMRA along with other privileges and perks documented in the ordinance. The authority's chairmanship and other members comprised bureaucrats and ex-policemen where there is no representation and participation of media stakeholders in the leadership structure of the regulatory body (M. Jan, personal communication, June 27, 2022).

The authority has not been blamed just for national and international media outlets and houses but also with individuals. The prominent case in this regard which comes under the civilian governments is that of Nawaz Sharif, former chairman of PML-N. In 2019, bans on speeches of Nawaz Sharif were imposed by PEMRA after a petition filed against the authority in Lahore High Court (Ali, 2022). Similarly, another ban imposed on his speeches' broadcast and rebroadcast. This time PEMRA's decision came after Nawaz Sharif's targeting PTI government along with military and judiciary institutions (Tribune, 2020).

Conclusion

PEMRA plays an important role in setting and regulating a vibrant media in Pakistan. The causes of the authority's establishment could be found at times of Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan. It was the Indian propaganda that shocked Pakistan's military leadership and the government of the time. The campaign of Indian media against Pakistan had almost resulted in its exclusion from international community. The political and military leadership realized the importance of liberal media during and after the war at Kargil. Indian agenda-based narrative was strengthened due to its international support. On the other hand, Pakistan lost the media war to India because of its only government and state-controlled media which had not been trusted even domestically since the Kargil campaign. Moreover, it also provided raw materials for privatization of media and a tool for agenda-setting. Liberalization of Pakistani media might not have become a reality if Kargil war was not happened. It also provided a platform for countering Indian agenda through the same technology and presenting Pakistan's counternarrative to Indian narrative.

General Pervez Musharraf and his government played vital role in privatization and openness of the electronic media in Pakistan. The military regime liberalized the media in order to maintain its image with preventing Pakistan from international isolation and exclusion. Erstwhile, Pakistan faced sanctions due to the nuclear tests in 1998 whereas additional financial sanctions were imposed with the Kargil incident and Musharraf coup in 1999. Additionally, the regime was pressurized for reforming the public sector including the media. The ‘enlightened moderation’ played a significant role in balancing such liberal policies in such a conservative society. With the liberalization of media along with other liberal policies helped the regime in amelioration of its image.

Similarly, Musharraf regime was relieved after 9/11 attacks. The US required Pakistan’s help in fighting against terrorism. Similarly, with the declaration of ‘War on Terror,’ majority of the financial sanctions on Pakistan were removed. Moreover, it was considered an opportunity for regaining Pakistan’s and Musharraf’s image. Furthermore, the media liberalization of media came into existence after few months of the ‘War on Terror’ declaration. The openness of media helped in presenting a counternarrative to Indian agenda-based narrative and it did work. Pakistan did influence the global media through its liberalized media and countered the Indian media constructed reality with the help of the same technology.

However, the ordinance regarding PEMRA made the Federal Government more powerful than the authority. PEMRA is a regulatory body for the electronic media in Pakistan but it acts and could be used as a tool in the hands of the government against political opposition and dissent voices. The government at Islamabad maintained its control over the authority through different sections of the ordinance. In the same manner, the autonomy of this authority has also been restricted with the injection of various political and subjective sections in the ordinance since its establishment.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis mainly consists of two parts, the theoretical and empirical. The former component formulated the conceptual and theoretical framework for understanding regulatory agencies in Pakistan. The later component of the thesis deals with the empirical part where the conceptual and theoretical framework is applied on Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). A brief summary of both of the above parts is provided in this chapter. An attempt is also made in order to see the contribution of thesis to our knowledge both theoretically and empirically. At the last of this chapter, a brief overview is provided for regulatory agencies in Pakistan.

5.4.A brief summary of the theoretical part

The concept of agency or regulatory or autonomous body or authority is initially explained and clarified with the help of relevant literature. Then the historical roots of agencies are traced in researches based on regulatory or autonomous bodies or agencies or authorities. The main cause for agencification lies in big governments and huge bureaucracies that made the state inefficient after the concept of the 'Welfare State.' NPM played an important role in addressing the big governments by advocating and promoting the creation of autonomous and regulatory bodies and downsizing governments and its various sectors to improve the state efficiency and service delivery. However, the Swedish agencies were created before NPM and they act as a model for some countries including the UK. But the 'Swedish Model' type agencies were different than those advocated and promoted through NPM.

Agenda-setting theory of McCombs and Shaw (1972) is applied to PEMRA whereas the theory base can be found in 1968 presidential campaign where they investigated Chapel Hill voters in order to verify their hypotheses that 'media sets the agenda.' Similarly the same concept can be note in Lippmann's *Public Opinion* (1922) where he linked the media created images of the events and its influence over the public. The 'media sets the agenda' hypotheses of McCombs and Shaw plays an important role in predicting the mechanism of influence of the media over the minds of not just the common masses but also on distinguished policy-makers and political actors. The hypotheses of the above authors is used in developing theoretical framework (agenda-setting theory) to understand regulatory agencies in Pakistan particularly PEMRA.

There is no doubt that the agenda-setting theory comes from the above mentioned sources but its formulation for the assessment of PEMRA and its application on the authority is genuine contribution of this research. The theory explains how media can influence the public minds and convince them to consider what is important and what is not that is setting an agenda for a particular purpose. The setting of an agenda (counternarrative to Indian propaganda) with respect to Kargil War is achieved by analysing PEMRA, its rationale, origin, structure and functions.

5.5.A brief summary of the empirical part

An attempt is made in application of the agenda-setting theory to the Indian media and its influence during and after Kargil war. The incident provides various elements that is Indian state narrative, its propagation through media and the utilization of the media to set the Indian agenda and its power to convince and influence the global media, international community and public opinion regarding the Kargil conflict. Furthermore, it helped in understanding the significance of ‘media regulatory body’ which regulates and coordinates with the state narrative along with maintaining its autonomous position. Moreover, the regulatory agency of media also helped in improving the efficiency and performance of the state through accountability. The theory played an important role in its implementation to Indian media where a strong and powerful media can create its own reality (agenda) and influencing the public minds including Pakistani public at the same time.

The origin of regulatory agencies in Pakistan had its roots in the 1980s. However, the process intensified after the removal of democratic government through military coup General Pervez Musharraf. The agencification in the public sector happened due to the influence of NPM and its international and local supporters and promoters. They were created mainly to address the issues related to corruption, regulation, and non-cooperative behavior and to increase the efficiency and service delivery of the state. These vital elements played an important role in the application of agenda-setting theory to PEMRA, the media regulatory agency. PEMRA was established in 2002 but its origin can be noticed in the Kargil conflict.

PEMRA provided a platform for countering the Indian propaganda and agenda-based narrative with respect to Kargil War. It also paved the way for preventing itself from international isolation and exclusion from international community. However, the structure of the regulatory authority is not as strong as it has to be that is less autonomy and greater

control of the government over PEMRA. The liberalization of Pakistani media created an alternative to the Indian media by presenting a counternarrative against the Indian propaganda regarding Kargil campaign.

McCombs and Shaw's agenda-setting theory is applied for the first time to PEMRA in assessing the contribution of the media regulatory agency in Pakistan as per the empirical contribution of this research is concerned. On the other hand, studies and researches are conducted regarding PEMRA in recent years (see introduction chapter for details) but no comprehensive research and study is available on the same topic with respect to the application of agenda-setting theory. This study provides both a deeper insight in understanding regulatory agencies and achievements of PEMRA in the agenda-based narrative war between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the study points out various limitations in the authority and also suggests ways for improving the regulatory agencies especially PEMRA.

5.6.A brief overview of the study

Autonomous and regulatory agencies emerged as alternative to big governments. The centralized form of governance also shifted to regulatory governance and a strict state to regulatory state. The agencies were considered a panacea to the already inefficient and poor performance state. They minimized the size of the governments that have been produced by the concept of 'welfare state' after WWII. Similarly, reformatory movement started for creating agencies in majority of the public sectors through NPM. This movement was promoted and advocated by international organizations such as IMF and World Bank.

The main features of agencies mainly comprised autonomy and structural separation from ministry. Additionally, they are also different from the bureaucratic set up. An independent and regulatory body would perform better because of having the freedom to decision-making. In the same way, disintegration gives immense authority to agencies due to its not binding to or being a department of ministries. The important reason behind the structural separation and autonomous nature of agencies is that noninterference of politics and freedom from political deliberations.

According to Jacobzone (2005), agencification have mostly taken place in three major sectors and they are finance service, energy and telecommunication. Developing countries

including Pakistan also joined the reformatory process in various public sectors. Pakistan's media remains one of the key sectors that was influenced by the international forums like World Bank and IMF (Rizwan & Jadoon, 2010). Privatization of the media started in the mid 1990s but there were restrictions regarding airing of news which only the state-owned media could transmit. However, during and after Kargil war, an autonomous and liberal media was considered need of the hour in order to counter Indian propaganda against Pakistan.

The Kargil campaign by the military of Pakistan led the stakeholders to design such a liberal and open media for future (International Media Support, 2009). Similarly, sanctions, mostly financial, from the US and the West also played its role in privatization of the media. Interestingly, this liberalization happened in the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf instead of democracy. Moreover, 9/11 attacks and declaration of 'War on Terror' helped Pakistan to improve both the regime and the state image in international community by through the media.

PEMRA established in 2002 for improving the standard of information, education and entertainment. The rationale behind its establishment has been various such as international pressure especially the US, Kargil war and Musharraf's coup. The important among them is the Kargil incident because it remained the moment where Pakistan faced many criticisms and pressures. Similarly, the liberalization of media as an idea emerged during the conflict between Pakistan and India (Farooq, 2018). In the same manner, Jamwal (2006) also pointed out that a counternarrative to Indian narrative was needed for Pakistan after the war.

The ordinance regarding PEMRA has delineated its structure and functions. The features consist of many such as objectives and purposes, responsibilities, code of conduct, council of complaints etc. Moreover, the ordinance has been amended time and again. Additionally, the authority came into being in a dictator regime and it might not of any surprise to have an authoritarian draft of PEMRA. Interestingly, the successor democratic governments maintained major part of draft as it was.

The Federal Government, according to the ordinance section 5 and 6, has the power of decision-making if there is a disagreement on policy matters. Similarly, the government can issue directives to the authority and PEMRA cannot disagree or refute. Moreover, section 38 explains that the federal, provincial governments, local authority or any person under the ordinance cannot be legally proceeded by the authority. Furthermore, concentration of

ownership and monopoly, funding, loans, foreign aid, salaries of the members and the chairman etc. also complicate the authority regulatory functions. Overall, PEMRA needs to be revisited, reviewed and redrafted after parliamentary discussions and debates. Legislative changes might help in making the authority more autonomous, independent and free in its regulatory and managerial functions and responsibilities.

In the last, McCombs and Shaw's and General Pervez Musharraf's statements regarding the regulation of media content is of great importance with respect to how the media influences and sets an agenda and why the media was liberalized in Pakistan.

In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position... The mass media may well determine the important issues, that is, the media may set the "agenda" of the campaign. (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, pp. 176).

Many private television channels have opened since the liberalization of our media. We have to work hard to improve our image around the world, and we must proceed on all fronts simultaneously... The media need to gear up to sell Pakistan abroad. (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 321).

References

Books

- Abrar, Muhammad. (2012). *Enforcement and regulation in Relation to TV Broadcasting in Pakistan*. PhD thesis, University of Glasgow.
- Ali, A. O., & Gunaratne, S. A. (2000). Pakistan. In S. A. Gunaratne (Ed.), *Handbook of the Media in Asia* (pp. 155–181). New Delhi, India: Sage Publications.
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth. In P. Aghion & S. N. Durlauf (Eds.), *Handbook of Economic Growth* (1st ed., Vol. 1A, pp. 385–472). Elsevier.
- Allix, M. (2002). *An Overview of Agencies in France and Italy*. [Unpublished manuscript]. Department of Public Administration, BSK, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
- Bagdikian, B. H. (2004). *The New Media Monopoly*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Baxter, C. (2001). Political Development in Pakistan. In H. Malik (Ed.), *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities* (pp. 126–148). Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press.
- Berkowitz, D. (1992). Who Sets the Media Agenda? The Ability of Policymakers to Determine News Decisions. In J. D. Kennamer (Eds.), *Public Opinion, The Press, And Public Policy* (pp. 81-102). USA: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
- Boston, J., Martin, J., Pallot, J., & Walsh, P. (1996). *Public management: the New Zealand Model*. Auckland: Oxford University Press.
- Boyne, G. *et al.* (2003) *Evaluating Public Management Reforms*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Buckley, S., Raboy, M., Mendel, T., Duer, K., Price, M., & Siochr. , S. (2008). *Broadcasting, Voice, and Accountability: A Public Interest Approach to Policy, Law, and Regulation*. The World Bank Group.

- Carpenter, D. P. (2001). *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Christensen, T., Lægreid, P., Roness, G., Røvik, A. (2007). *Organization Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth*. New York: Routledge.
- Clinton, B. (2004). *My life*. Chicago: Vintage.
- Cohen, B.C. (2015). *Press and Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Communities, C. O. (2001). *European Governance: A White Paper*. Brussels: Belgium.
- Croteau, D., & Hoynes, W. (2006). *The Business of Media: Corporate Media and the Public Interest* (2nd ed.). California: Pine Forge Press. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/businessofmediac0002crot/mode/2up> (Accessed on June 29, 2022).
- Douma, S., & Schreuder, H. (2017). *Economic Approaches to Organizations* (6th ed.). London: Pearson Education.
- Dunleavy, P. (1991). *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science*. London: Routledge
- Frantz, E., & Ezrow, N. (2011). *The Politics of Dictatorship: Institutions and Outcomes in Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Pub.
- Fraser, A. M. (1991). *Making the most of Next Steps : The management of ministers' departments and their executive agencies*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Gains, F. (1999). *Understanding Department-Next Steps Agency Relationships* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Sheffield). Retrieved from <https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/6028/1/311828.pdf>(Accessed on July 28, 2022).
- Gains, F. (2004). Adapting the Agency Concept: Variations Within 'Next Steps'. In C. Pollitt & C. Talbot (Eds.), *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation* (pp. 53-74). London, UK: Routledge.

- Hassan, K. (2017). Why did a military dictator liberalize the electronic media in Pakistan?. In S. Udupa & S. D. McDowell (Eds), *Media as politics in south Asia* (pp. 77-94). New York: Routledge.
- Hijazi, M. A., & Naqqash, G. M. (1995). *Mass communication: Theory and practice*. Lahore, Pakistan: A-One Publishers.
- Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage publications.
- Hogwood, B., Judge, D., & McVicar, M. (2000). Agencies and Accountability. In R. A. W. Rhodes (Ed.), *Transforming British Government* (Vol. 1, pp. 195–222). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hood, C. (1998). *The art of the state: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hood, C. & Jackson, M. (1991). *Administrative Argument*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Husain, I. (2012). *Reforming the government in Pakistan*. Vanguard Book Pvt Ltd.
- International Media Support. (2009, July). *Between Democratisation and Radicalization in an Unfolding Conflict: Media in Pakistan*. Denmark: International Media Support.
- Irion, K., & Radu, R. (2013). Delegation to independent regulatory authorities in the media sector: A paradigm shift through the lens of regulatory theory. In W. Schulz, P. Valcke, & K. Irion (Eds.), *The Independence of the Media and Its Regulatory Agencies: Shedding New Light on Formal and Actual Independence Against the National Context* (pp. 15–54). Bristol, UK: Intellect.
- Jacobzone, S. (2005, January). Independent regulatory authorities in OECD countries: An overview. In *Designing Independent and Accountable Regulatory Agencies for High Quality Regulation: Proceedings of an Expert Meeting in London (January 10–11)* (pp. 72-88).

- Jadoon, Z., Jabeen, N., & Rizwan, A. (2012). Federal agencies in Pakistan. In K. Verhoest, Van Thiel, S., Bouckaert, G., & Laegreid P. (Eds.). (2016). *Government agencies: Practices and lessons from 30 countries* (pp. 372-380). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jakubowicz, K. (2013). Broadcasting Regulatory Authorities: Work in Progress. In W. Schulz, P. Valcke, & K. Irion (Eds.), *The Independence of the Media and Its Regulatory Agencies: Shedding New Light on Formal and Actual Independence Against the National Context* (preface). UK: Intellect.
- James, O. (2003). *The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall: Public Interest Versus Bureau-Shaping Perspectives*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jamwal, P. (2006). Media as a Tool of Nation-State. In I. Alam (Ed.), *Media & Peace in South Asia* (pp. 130–132). Lahore, Pakistan: SAPANA.
- Javed, J., & Faez, I. Q. (1997). *Mass Media Laws and Regulations in Pakistan, and a Commentary from a Historical Perspective*. Singapore: Asian Media Information and Communication Centre (AMIC).
- Jefferson, T., & Ford, P. L. (1904). *The Works of Thomas Jefferson* (Vol. V). G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Jordan, A. A., Taylor Jr, W. J., Meese, M. J., & Nielsen, S. C. (2009). *American National Security* (6th Edition). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Khan, K., & Fraz, A. Market Regulations, Competition Policy and the Role of Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP). In F. Zulfiqar (ed.), *Evaluations of Regulatory Authorities, Government Packages, And Policies* (pp. 01-18). Islamabad: PIDE.
- Khan, R. Q. (2008, June 30). *Development of Electronic Media in Pakistan*. The Post, A6.
- Klijin, E. H., & Koppenjan, J. (2016). The shift toward network governance: Drivers, characteristics and manifestations. In S. Van de Walle & S. Groeneveld (ed.), *Theory and practice of public sector reform* (pp. 158-177). Routledge.
- Lane, J-E. (2000). *New Public Management*. London: Routledge.

- Lasswell, H. D. (1938). *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. New York: Peter Smith.
- Lewis, D. (1997). *Hidden Agendas*. London, UK: Hamish Hamilton.
- Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Lodhi, M. (2011). Beyond the Crisis State. In M. Lodhi (Ed). *Pakistan Beyond the Crisis State* (pp. 45–78). Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press.
- March, J., & Olsen, J. (1989). *Rediscovering Institutions: The organizational basis of politics*. New York: Free Press.
- McChesney, R. W. (1999). *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.
- McChesney, R. W. (2008). *The Political Economy of Media: Enduring Issues, Emerging Dilemmas*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- McQuail, D. (1987). *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*. Sage Publications, Inc.
- Mezger, M., & Sial, S. (2010). *Media and Governance in Pakistan: A Controversial Yet Essential Relationship* [Pdf]. Retrieved from https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20101109_CRU_publicatie_mmezger_era.pdf (Accessed on June 14, 2022).
- Michalis, M. (2013). Thirty years of Private Television in Europe- Trends and Key Moments. In , Donders K., Pauwels C., & Loisen J. (Ed.), *Private Television in Western Europe: Content, Markets, Policies* (pp. 37-55). UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Minogue, M., & Carino, L. (2006). *Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
- Molander, P., Nilsson, J. E. and Schick, A. (2002). *Does Anyone Govern? The Relationship Between the Government Office and the Agencies in Sweden*. Stockholm: Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS).
- Mosco, V. (2009). *The political economy of communication* (2nd ed.). London: Sage.

- Mughan, A., & Gunther, R. (2000). The Media in Democratic and Nondemocratic Regimes: A Multilevel Perspective. In R. Gunther & A. Mughan (Eds.), *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective* (pp. 1-27). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Musharraf, P. (2006). *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. London: Simon & Schuster.
- Napoli, P. M. (2003). *Audience Economics: Media Institutions and the Audience Marketplace*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Napoli, P. M. (2003). *Foundations of Communication Policy: Principles and Processes in Regulation of Electronic Media*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
- National Audit Office. (2000). *Good Practice in Performance Reporting in Executive Agencies and Non-Departmental Public Bodies*. London, UK: Stationery Office.
- Nicolaides, P. (2005). Regulation of Liberalised Markets: A New Role for the State. In D. Geradin, R. Munoz & N. Petit (Eds.), *Regulation through Agencies in the EU- A New Paradigm of European Governance* (pp. 23-42). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Noelle-Neumann, E. (1993). *The Spiral Of Silence: Public Opinion-Our Social Skin*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- O'Connor, J. (1973). *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- OECD (2002), *Distributed Public Governance: Agencies, Authorities and other Government Bodies*. Paris: OECD Publications Service. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264177420-en> (Accessed on July 18, 2022).
- Office of Public Services Reform. (2002, July). *Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century*. London.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1997). *The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform: Synthesis*. OECD.

- Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
- Papathanassopoulos, S., & Negrine, R. M. (2011). *European Media: Structures, Policies and Identity*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- PEMRA Ordinance. (2002).
- Peters, G. B., & Bouckaert, G. (2004). What is available and what is missing in the study of quangos? In C. Pollitt & C. Talbot (Eds.), *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation* (pp. 22–49). London, UK: Routledge.
- Phillips, N. (2006). States and Modes of Regulation in the Global Political Economy. In M. Minogue & L. Carino (ed.), *Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries* (pp. 17–38). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub.
- Pierre, J. (1995). *Bureaucracy in the Modern State: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration*. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Pub.
- Pierre, J. (2004). Central agencies in Sweden: a report from Utopia. In C. Pollitt & C. Talbot (Eds.), *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation* (pp. 22–49). London, UK: Routledge.
- Pollitt, C. & Bouckaert, G. (2011). *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis—New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State* (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pollitt, C., & Talbot, C. (Eds.). (2004). *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Pollitt, C., Talbot, C., Caulfield, J., & Smullen, A. (2005). *Agencies: How Governments do Things Through Semi-Autonomous Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Powell, W. W., & DiMaggio, P. J. (Eds.). (1991). *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. University of Chicago press.

- Rasul, A. (2009, July). *Media Frames Vs Individual Frames: An Analysis of the Framing of Politico-Judicial Crisis in Pakistan*. Paper Presented at Annual AMIC Conference, New Delhi, India.
- Rasul, A. (2017). Excessive Regulation Through Bureaucratic Bullying: Evaluating Broadcast Regulation in South Asia. In M. Friedrichsen & Y. Kamalipour (Eds.), *Digital Transformation in Journalism and News Media* (pp. 151-168). Cham: Springer.
- Roness, P. G., Rubecksen, K., Verhoest, K., Verschuere, B., & MacCarthaigh, M. (2007, September). Explaining Autonomy of Public Sector Agencies in Norway, Ireland and Flanders. In *EGPA Annual Conference, Study Group 'Governance of Public Organizations* (pp. 19-22).
- Sahlin-Anderssen, K. (2001). National, International and Transnational Constructions of New Public Management. In T. Christensen & P. Lægried (Eds.), *New Public Management: The Transformation of Ideas and Practice* (pp. 43-72). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Saxena, A. (2006). Electronic Media in India. In I. Alam (Ed.), *Media & Peace in South Asia* (pp. 148–151). Lahore, Pakistan: SAPANA.
- Smullen, A. (2004). Lost in Translation? Shifting Interpretations of the Concept of “Agency”: The Dutch Case. In C. Pollitt & C. Talbot (Eds.), *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation* (pp. 184-202). London, UK: Routledge.
- Sohail, S. A. (2012). *Ofcom, PEMRA and mighty media conglomerates*. Master's thesis, University of Twente.
- Tahir, S. N. (1996). Television in Pakistan: An overview. In D. French & M. Richards (Eds.), *Contemporary Television: Eastern Perspectives* (pp. 113–131). New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Talbot, C. and Caulfield, J. (2002). *Hard Agencies in Soft States: A Study of Agency Creation Programmes in Jamaica, Latvia and Tanzania, Report for the Department for International Development, UK*. Pontypridd, UK: University of Glamorgan.

- Talbot, I. (2012). *Pakistan: A New History*. London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Taliercio, R. (2004). The Design, Performance and Sustainability of Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities in Africa and Latin America. In C. Pollitt & C. Talbot (Eds.), *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation* (pp. 264-282). London, UK: Routledge.
- Trosa, S., & Fraser, A. (1994). *Next Steps: Moving on: an Examination of the Progress to Date of the Next Steps Reform Against a Background of Recommendations Made in the Fraser Report (1991)*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Van Thiel, S. (2001). *Quangos: Trends, Causes and Consequences*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Vos, E. (2003). Agencies and the European Union. In L. Verhey & T. Zwart (Eds.), *Agencies in European and Comparative Perspective* (pp. 113–148). New York: Intersentia.
- Wilson, J. Q. (1989). *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It*. New York: Basic Books.
- Yamamoto, K. (2004). Agencification in Japan: Renaming or Revolution. In C. Pollitt & C. Talbot (Eds.), *Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation* (pp. 215-226). London, UK: Routledge.
- Zaidi, S. A. (2011). *Military, Civil Society and Democratization in Pakistan*. Lahore: Vanguard Books.
- Zulfiqar, F., & Khan, F. M. (2022). Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority. In F. Zulfiqar (ed.), *Evaluations of Regulatory Authorities, Government Packages, And Policies* (pp. 107-144). Islamabad: PIDE.
- Asian Media Barometer (AMB) Pakistan. (2009). *The first home grown analysis of the media landscape in Asia*. Retrieved from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/asia-media/07479.pdf> (Accessed on Nov. 22, 2022).

Conference Papers

Rizwan, A., & Jadoon, M. Z. I. (2010, September). *Agencification in Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Regulatory and Service Delivery Agencies*. Paper presented at the EGPA Conference, Toulouse, France.

Historic Documents

Nehru-Liaquat Agreement, 1950. Retrieved and downloaded from <https://mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/PA50B1228.pdf> (Accessed on June 28, 2022).

International Indices

Stiftung, B. (2020). Transformation Index BTI 2020. *Governance in International Comparison, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung*.

Journal Articles

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000). Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development. *American Economic Review*, 90(2), 126-130. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/117205> (Accessed on June 28, 2022).

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369-1401. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677930> (Accessed on June 02, 2022).

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4), 1231–1294. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935025> (Accessed on June 08, 2022).

Araujo, J. F. (2002). NPM and the Change in Portuguese Central Government. *International Public Management Journal*, 5(3), 223–236.

- Aucoin, P. (1996). Designing Agencies for Good Public Management: The Urgent Need for Reform. *Choices: Institute for Research on Public Policy*, 2(4), 5–19.
- Bromwich, M., & Lapsley, I. (1997). Decentralisation and Management Accounting in Central Government: Recycling Old Ideas? *Financial Accountability and Management*, 13(2), 181–201.
- Burger, M. (2006). The Discursive Construction of the Public and the Private Spheres in Media Debates: the Case of Television Talk Shows. *Revista Alicantina De Estudios Ingleses*, (19), 45–65. Retrieved from https://rua.ua.es/dspace/bitstream/10045/5169/1/RAEI_19_04.pdf (Accessed on June 28, 2022).
- Christensen, T., & Lagreid, P. (2007). Regulatory Agencies-The Challenges of Balancing Agency Autonomy and Political Control. *Governance*, 20(3), 499-520.
- Cobb, R. W., & Elder, C. D. (1971). The Politics of Agenda-Building: An Alternative Perspective for Modern Democratic Theory. *The Journal of Politics*, 33(4), 892–915. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.2307/2128415> (Accessed on Sep 01, 2022).
- Djankov, S., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). The Regulation of Entry. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(1), 1-37.
- Farooq, M., Jabeen, N., Rizwan, A., & Salman, Y. (2018). Autonomy of HR Practices in Pakistan: A Study of Provincial Autonomous Bodies. *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 55(1), 115-129.
- Farooq, M., Saeed, A., Ahmad, K., Ata, G., & Sami, A. (2017). Making Sense of Electronic Media Regulatory Agencies: A Case of PEMRA. *Journal of Managerial Sciences*, 11(3), 437-456.
- Fyfe, T., & Fitzpatrick, T. (2002). Distributed Public Governance: Agencies, Authorities and Other Autonomous Bodies in Canada. *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, 2(1), 81-102. Retrieved from <https://www.oecd.org/canada/43506633.pdf> (Accessed on Aug 04, 2022).

- Gallup. (June 2010). Total Advertising Spend Has Risen to 30 Billion Rupees. Retrieved from https://www.gallup.com.pk/bb_old_site/News/Media%20Cyberletter.pdf (Accessed on June 13, 2022).
- Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 91(3), pp. 481–510.
- Greve, C., Flinders, M., & Van Thiel, S. (1999). Quangos—What's In a Name? Defining Quangos from a Comparative Perspective. *Governance*, 12(2), 129-146.
- Gul, M., Obaid, Z., & Ali, S. (2017). Liberalization of Media in Pakistan: A Challenge to Democracy. *The Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 25(1), 37-54.
- Haque, M. S. (2002). Globalization, New Political Economy, and Governance: A Third World Viewpoint. *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, 24(1), 103–124.
- Hilgartner, S., & Bosk, C. L. (1988). The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 94(1), 53-78. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2781022> (Accessed on Aug 13, 2022).
- Iqbal, Z. (2012). Media and Musharraf: A Marriage of Convenience. *European Scientific Journal*, 8(3), 38-64.
- Kemal, A. R. (2002). Regulatory framework in Pakistan. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 41(4), 319-332.
- Kennedy, C. H. (2006). Pakistan in 2005: Surviving Domestic and International Tremors. *Asian Survey*, 46(1), 125-131.
- Kickert, W. J. (2001). Public management of hybrid organizations: Governance of Quasi-Autonomous Executive Agencies. *International Public Management Journal*, 4(2), 135-150.
- Klapper, L., Laeven, L., & Rajan, R. (2006). Entry Regulation as a Barrier to Entrepreneurship. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 82(3), 591-629.

- Le Gales, P., Scott, A., & Jacobs, A. (2010). A British Bureaucratic Revolution? Autonomy Without Control, or “Freer Markets, More Rules.” *Revue Française de Sociologie*, 51(1), 117–143. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40731130> (Accessed on Aug 20, 2022).
- Levin, P. T. (2009). The Swedish Model of Public Administration: Separation of Powers-The Swedish Style. *JOAAG*, 4(1), 38-46.
- Mahmud, E. (2005). Post-Cold War US Kashmir Policy. *Policy Perspectives*, 2(1), 83–110. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42909143> (Accessed on June 08, 2022).
- Majone, G. (1997). From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance. *Journal of Public Policy*, 17(02), 139-167.
- Majone, G. (1999). The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems. *West European Politics*, 22(1), 1-24.
- McCombs, M. (2005). A Look at Agenda-setting: past, present and future. *Journalism Studies*, 6(4), 543–557. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700500250438> (Accessed on Aug 5, 2022).
- McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The Agenda-Setting Function Of Mass Media. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36(2), 176–187.
- Napoli, P. M. (1997). A Principal-Agent Approach to the Study of Media Organizations: Toward a Theory of the Media Firm. *Political Communication*, 14(2), 207–219.
- Oosterroom, R. V. (2002). Distributed Public Governance: Agencies, Authorities and Other Autonomous Bodies in the Netherlands. *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, 2(1), 103-120. Retrieved from <https://www.oecd.org/netherlands/43506886.pdf> (Accessed on Aug 04, 2022).
- Overman, S., & Van-Thiel, S. (2016). Agencification and public-sector performance: A systematic comparison in 20 countries. *Public Management Review*, 18(4), 611-635.
- Pollitt, C. (2001). Clarifying Convergence: Striking Similarities and Durable Differences in Public Management Reform. *Public Management Review*, 3(4), 471-492.

- Pollitt, C., Bathgate, K., Caulfield, J., Smullen, A., & Talbot, C. (2001). Agency fever? Analysis of an international policy fashion. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 3(3), 271-290.
- Prince, M. J. (2000). Banishing Bureaucracy or Hatching a Hybrid? The Canadian Food Inspection Agency and the Politics of Reinventing Government. *Governance*, 13(2), 215–232.
- Randall, V. (1993). The Media and Democratisation in the Third World. *Third World Quarterly*, 14(3), 625-646.
- Rashid, H. (2015). Impact of the Drug Regulatory Authority Pakistan: An Evaluation. *New Visions for Public Affairs*, 7, 50-61.
- Rasul, A. (2004). Role of Radio in Development: The Case of Pakistan. *Journal of Mass Communication*, 11(2), 54-67.
- Rasul, A., & McDowell, S. D. (2012). Consolidation in the Name of Regulation: The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) and the Concentration of Media Ownership in Pakistan. *Global Media Journal*, 12(20), 1–15. Retrieved from <https://www.globalmediajournal.com/open-access/consolidation-in-the-name-of-regulation-the-pakistan-electronic-media-regulatory-authority-pemra-and-the-concentration-of-media-ownership-in-pakistan.pdf> (Accessed on June 14, 2022).
- Robison, K. K., & Crenshaw, E. M. (2002). Post-industrial transformations and cyber-space: A cross-national analysis of Internet development. *Social Science Research*, 31(3), 334-363.
- Rothstein, B. (2000). Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12(4), 477-501.
- Salman, Y. (2020). Public Management Reforms in Pakistan. *Public Management Review*, 23(12), 1725–1735. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2020.1850084> (Accessed on July 23, 2022).

Scott, C. (2000). Accountability in the Regulatory State. *Journal of Law and Society*, 27(1), 38-60.

Thatcher, M. (2002). Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual Mediation. *West European Politics*, 25(1), 125-147.

Valeriano, B. (2009). The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Testing Aggressive Power Politics Models. *International Interactions*, 35(2), 179-206.

Zaidi, S. A. (2011). Who Benefits from US Aid to Pakistan? *Economic and Political Weekly*, 46(32), 103–109. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23017764> (Accessed on July 23, 2022).

Zia, Y. A., & Khan, M. Z. (2013). Drivers of Public Sector Reforms in Pakistan: A Comparison of NPM With Alternative Reform Drivers. *The Dialogue*, 8(4), 453-459.

Newspapers' Articles

Aurora Fact File 2021. (2022, January 13). Retrieved from <https://aurora.dawn.com/news/1144317> (Accessed on July 03, 2022).

Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power Introduction | Semantic Scholar. (2016). Retrieved from <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/BENEFITS-OF-COMPETITION-AND-INDICATORS-OF-MARKET/474b0c4db8f4cfaf5257c6c1b0b58cc50e8fe04a> (Accessed on June 13, 2022).

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2019, October 1). Regulatory Agency. Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/regulatory-agency> (Accessed on April 13, 2022).

Committee to Protect Journalists. (2000, February 7). *Pakistan: The Press for Change*. Retrieved from <https://cpj.org/reports/2000/02/pakistan07feb00br/> (Accessed on July 30, 2022).

Dar, N. (2008, October 25). Information Revolution in Pakistan. *The Nation*.

- Farooq, U. (2018, December 26). *Pakistan's private TV news revolution under General Musharraf*. NewsLaundry. Retrieved from <https://www.newslaundry.com/2018/12/26/pakistans-private-tv-news-revolution-under-general-musharraf> (Accessed on June 28, 2022).
- Hussain, I. (2006). Why Reform the Government? [Word document]. Retrieved from https://ishrathusain.iba.edu.pk/speeches/WordDocs/WHY_REFORM_THE_GOVERNMENT.doc (Accessed on June 27, 2022).
- Hussain, I. (2009, April 08). "Pakistan-US Economic Ties." Dawn. Retrieved from https://ishrathusain.iba.edu.pk/speeches/New/Pakistan-US-economic_ties.pdf (Accessed on June 12, 2022).
- India encircles rebels on Kashmir mountaintop*. (1999, July 2). Retrieved from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9907/02/kashmir.pakistan/> (Accessed on April 09, 2022).
- Jabbar, J. (2014, May 5). A Media Myth. *DAWN.COM*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1104318> (Accessed on July 13, 2022).
- Media Advertising Spend in Pakistan: July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010. (2010). Retrieved from https://gallup.com.pk/bb_old_site/News/Media%20Cyberletter.pdf (Accessed on June 06, 2022).
- Raza, S. (2004, April 18). Cross-media Ownership: Changes in PEMRA Rules Okayed. Retrieved from Daily Times: <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk> (Accessed on June 09, 2022).
- Riaz, T. (2003, December). Is Media Cross-ownership Good for Pakistan? Retrieved from Media Law Bulletin: <http://www.internews.org.pk> (Accessed on June 10, 2022).
- Salman, F. (2020). *Evolving News Media Landscapes in India and Pakistan: Implications for regional peace and stability*. Retrieved from <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/evolving-news-media-landscapes-in-india-and-pakistan-implications-for-regional-peace-and-stability/> (Accessed on July 24, 2022).

- Waleed, A. (2020, March 1). Pakistani Media Crisis: Censorship and Economic Slowdown Not the Only Reasons for Downturn | Special Report | [thenews.com.pk](https://www.thenews.com.pk). *The News International*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenews.com.pk> (Accessed on July 22, 2022).
- CPJ. (2009, March 16). Government orders cable carriers to drop independent news broadcasters, some services restored. Retrieved from <https://ifex.org/government-orders-cable-carriers-to-drop-independent-news-broadcasters-some-services-restored/> (Accessed on Dec. 03, 2022).
- PPF. (2011a, April 12). Television network claims sports channel targeted by media regulatory authority. Retrieved from <https://ifex.org/television-network-claims-sports-channel-targeted-by-media-regulatory-authority/> (Accessed on Nov. 26, 2022).
- PPF. (2011b, April 14). Private TV station's broadcasts suspended by media regulatory authority. Retrieved from <https://ifex.org/private-tv-stations-broadcasts-suspended-by-media-regulatory-authority/> (Accessed on Nov. 26, 2022).
- PPF. (2009, Nov. 04). Media regulatory authority orders FM radio stations to stop broadcasting BBC news bulletins. Retrieved from <https://ifex.org/media-regulatory-authority-orders-fm-radio-stations-to-stop-broadcasting-bbc-news-bulletins/> (Accessed on Nov. 25, 2022).
- PPF. (2010, May 03). Twenty-four radio stations prevented from broadcasting BBC news. Retrieved from <https://ifex.org/twenty-four-fm-radio-stations-prevented-from-broadcasting-bbc-news/> (Accessed on Nov. 24, 2022).
- Khan, A. (2010, June 07). BBC to move court against ban on bulletins. Retrieved from http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C06%5C07%5Cstory_7-6-2010_pg7_19 (Accessed on Nov. 24, 2022).
- Asian Human Rights Commission. (2010, June 04). BBC Pakistan news is censored by the Pakistani authorities, on the instructions of the Army. Retrieved from <http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2010/3470/> (Accessed on Nov. 23, 2022).
- PPF. (2011, May 12). Media regulatory authority warns foreign channels over unauthorized satellite uplinking. Retrieved from <https://ifex.org/media-regulatory-authority-warns-foreign-channels-over-unauthorised-satellite-uplinking/> (Accessed on Nov. 23, 2022).

Ali, A. (2022, Sep. 02). Petitioner moves LHC against PEMRA over broadcast of Nawaz Sharif's speech. Retrieved from <https://www.samaaenglish.tv/news/40016058> (Accessed on Nov. 20, 2022).

Tribune. (2020, Oct. 01). PEMRA bans speeches of 'proclaimed offenders' following Nawaz's 'fiery speeches'. Retrieved from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2266536/pemra-bans-speeches-of-proclaimed-offenders-following-nawazs-fiery-speeches> (Accessed on Nov. 21, 2022).

Reports

Fulton Committee (1968) *Committee on the Civil Service – Report*, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Naseer, M., Katib, K., & Ejaz, S. (2010). Role of media in Pakistan. *Pakistan Studies, Faculty of Management Sciences*. Retrieved and downloaded from <https://pdfcoffee.com/role-of-media-in-pakistan-pdf-free.html> (Accessed on July 12, 2022).

Working Papers

Rodríguez-Castelán, C., Araar, A., Malásquez, E. A., Olivieri, S. D., & Vishwanath, T. (2019). Distributional Effects of Competition: A Simulation Approach. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, (8838). Retrieved from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31603/WPS8838.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y> (Accessed on June 23, 2022).

Rommel, J. & Christiaens, J. (2007). Blocking and Accepting Steering from Ministers and Departments: Coping Strategies of Agencies in Flanders. *Working paper Universiteit Gent*. Retrieved from https://wps-feb.ugent.be/Papers/wp_07_431.pdf (Accessed on July 12, 2022).

Interviews

Ex-PEMRA Employee (2022), interviewed on 28/06/2022.

Alam, Absar (2022), interviewed on 25/06/2022, Ex-Chairman PEMRA.

Ex-PEMRA Employee (2022), interviewed on 22/07/2022.

PEMRA Employee (2022), interviewed on 05/07/2022.

Ex-Chairman PEMRA (2022), interviewed on 07/07/2022.

Khan, Aurangzeb (2022), interviewed on 08/07/2022, Journalist and Researcher based in Peshawar.

Mir, Hamid (2022), interviewed on 02/07/2022, Journalist at Geo News.

Jan, Matiullah (2022), interviewed on 27/07/2022, Journalist and Media activist.