

**Politics of Disasters: An Ethnography of Disaster Affected Communities in
District Chitral**



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**Politics of Disasters: An Ethnography of Disaster Affected Communities in
District Chitral**



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Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Anthropology, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, in partial fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Assistant Commissioner
AKRSP	Agha Khan Rural Support Program
AKDN	Agha Khan Development Network
BJP	Bharti Janata Party
BKK	Batrik Kandisar Krakal
BS	Big Shekhandeh (a hamlet in the Kalash valley)
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDLD	Community Driven Local Development
CO	Community Organization
C&W	Communication and Works
DDMO	District Disaster Management Officer
DC	Deputy Commissioner
DDMU	District Disaster Management Unit
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DPM	District Program Manager
DRM	Disaster Reduction Management
FWO	Frontier Works Organization
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area
GI	Galvanized Iron
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for technical cooperation)
HKH	Hindu Kush Karakorum Himalaya
ICIMOD	International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
JI	Jamat I Islami

JUI	Jamiat ul Ulamai Islam
KW	Kilo Watt
KP	Khyber Pukhtunkhwa
LED	Light Emitting Diode
LSO	Local Support Organization
MA	Master in Arts
MHP	Micro Hydel Power station
MNA	Member of National Assembly
MPA	Member of Provincial Assembly
MW	Mega Watt
NAB	National Accountability Bureau
NCOC	National Command Operation Centre
NDMC	National Disaster Management Commission
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NHC	National Hazard Center
NTCh	Nai Tareekh-i-Chitral (latest version of Chitral history)
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PAR	Pressure and Release (model)
PCF	Provincial Consolidated Fund
PDMA	Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PEDO	Pukhtunkhwa Energy Development Organization
Pesco	Pukhtunkhwa Electric Supply Corporation
PHD	Public Health Department
PPAF	Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund

PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek I Insaf
RCC	Reinforced Cement Concrete
SRSP	Sarhad Rural Support Program
SHO	Station House Officer (in charge of police station)
TMA	Tehsil Municipal Administration
USAid	United States Agency for International Development
VC	Village Council
WCO	Women Community Organization
XEN	Executive Engineer

ABSTRACT

This ethnographic study aims to present a detailed account of the relationship between politics and disaster in two valleys of district Chitral, Reshum and Kalash. Chitral is a landlocked area located in the North West of Pakistan. The present study spans over thirteen months during 2017-18. The data was collected through participant observation, informal discussions, semi-structured and structured interviews, life histories, and case studies. Chitral was a princely state before its merger to Pakistan in 1969. Roughly three social status groups existed in the princely state including the ruling elites (*adamzade*) and nobles known as (*arbabzade*), the middle-status (*yuft*), and the lower-status (*ghalamus/shirmoosh*, etc). The research unpacks that the historically embedded social stratification resulted in differential vulnerability to natural disasters. The lower status groups, being marginalized, are the most affected groups in flash floods in both the selected locales.

After the merger, a new power structure was introduced in the shape of bureaucratic institutions that affected the already existing power edifice. Similarly, owing to the introduction of democratic institutions a new political contestation led to the establishment of a new power structure and power dynamics in Chitral district. As a result new political players emerged. These players become stakeholders in the politics of disaster includes village councilors, leaders of lower-status groups and upper-status groups, district and sub-district *Nazims* (mayor/local government head), and members of provincial assemblies, officers of district administration and Non-Government Organization's officials play a crucial role in the disaster management. However, the data shows that a clash of interests exists between and within these groups. Firstly, there is an inherent clash of interests among the local community's stakeholders, which is

intensified by the post disaster reconstruction process. Secondly interaction between district administration including other state institution and local communities also increases in the post disaster circumstances that lead to a bargaining situation between the local leaders and state bodies. This clash of interests and bargaining situation between different stakeholders is often reflected in the forms of contestation, agitation, and struggle for maximizing interests in the relief and reconstruction process that I call the “politics of disasters”. Current study suggests that “politics of disaster” not only affects the process of disaster management but also adds to the vulnerability of the already vulnerable groups. Thus I propose that we need to understand the politics of disaster to understand not only disaster management processes but vulnerabilities of the people to natural hazards and disasters.

Keywords: Flash Floods, Politics of Disasters, State Institutions, , Stakeholders, Disaster Management, Chitral, Pakistan,

1. INTRODUCTION

A few weeks before the final submission of this thesis, Pakistan was ravaged by a massive flood which started in mid-June 2022 causing death of approximately 1400 people, including 499 children. It damaged 1.77 million houses, 269 bridges, and 6674.7 KM of roads. 750,223 livestock washed away in different parts of the country (National Disaster Management Authority, 2022). The destruction of standing crops is yet to be measured as floods left one-third of the country under water, affecting more than 33 million people including at least 3.4 million who are in the need of immediate response to save their lives (UNICEF, 2022). The destruction of the floods still continues. Owing to massive water flow in human settlements, various diseases, including cholera, malaria, dengue, and other infectious diseases, are widespread in flooded areas. Pakistan will soon face issues of food and water security in the flood effected areas.

It is estimated that since 1959, Pakistan has emitted only 0.4 percent of heat-trapping carbon dioxide compared with 21.5 percent by the USA and 16.4 percent by China. According to experts there has been a 400 percent increase in the average rainfall in the areas of Sindh and Baluchistan which triggered the extreme flooding (The Guardian, 2022).

Pakistan is one of the worst disaster affected countries globally due to climate change. According to the long-term Global Climate Risk Index from 2000 to 2019, it stands 8th on the most affected countries list (Eckstein et al., 2021). While it is placed in 5th position among the most affected countries in 2020 on the most vulnerable countries list (Abubakar, 2020). The damages caused by climate change-related hazards and disasters in Pakistan to property, humans and livestock is mainly due to low resistance potential, low per capita income, and lack of

institutional development. The occurrence of floods, melting of glaciers, earthquakes, storms and avalanches is regular and enormous in their intensity while community's joint physical strength is weaker (Hussain et al., 2020).

Environmental degradation and the worst effects of climate change become catastrophic when disaster management is not effective. In Pakistan, disaster management is mostly reactive and disaster mitigation is not a priority (Fisher, 2010; Ahmed, 2013). Post-disaster relief and reconstruction create politics of disaster and brings little help to the most affected and vulnerable groups (Sokefeld, 2012).

Exploring the relationship between politics and disasters is a relatively new area of research (Olson, 2000; Sokefeld, 2012). Studies on the relationship between politics and the political structure of the communities on natural disasters is profound (Olson, 2000; Olson & Vincent, 2003; Oliver-Smith, 2009; Alam et al., 2011; Guggenheim, 2014; Sokefeld, 2012, 2020; Marks & Lebel, 2016; Venugopal & Yasir, 2017; Siddiqi, 2018; Islam et al., 2021). The current study is an attempt to understand relationship between politics and disasters in district Chitral, one of the most vulnerable areas of Pakistan (Rafiq & Blaschke, 2012), by exploring political and social circumstances of the communities before and after the flash floods (2010, 2013 and 2015) and the 2015 earthquake. The pre-disaster situation is focused on the relationship of vulnerability to natural disasters and the power/ political structure of the communities. Meanwhile in post-disaster case, the connection between politics and disasters is focused in light of the interaction of three stakeholders, the state, NGOs, and the local communities during relief and reconstruction process. This study focuses on the politics of disaster management in two communities, namely Reshum and the Kalash valley. My argument is that the historical marginalization of the lower status groups renders these communities vulnerable to disasters and

that politics of disasters not only negatively affects disaster management but also adds to the vulnerability of the already vulnerable communities. The politics of disaster is the result of historical and current political conditions which have resulted in the particular socio-political structure of today's Chitral

Almost every summer, the rivers swell, effecting thousands in Pakistan. The two leading causes of these floods are: heavy monsoon rains and the melting glaciers. In the country's southern parts, the monsoon is the leading cause of floods, while in the northern part of the country, glacial melting and high-intensity monsoon rains are responsible for flash floods (Yaquub et al., 2015). In such circumstances, damage control becomes a priority. Much work (Kazi, 2003, 2014; Tariq & Giesen, 2012; Rasmussen et al., 2014) that has been done is related to floods in Pakistan mainly deals with the technical side of the issue that answers questions as to how floods can be controlled and its adverse impacts be reduced.

However, there is a lack of ethnographic studies on floods in Pakistan. When water from the mountains gathers speed, it turns into floods and hits human settlements. The same happens when heavy earthquakes disrupt and destroy human lives. Three main stakeholders originate responses to such disasters. These are the State, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the local people. The current study is an attempt to understand the political aspects of the interaction of these three stakeholders in redressing the damage.

The study focuses on the pre-conditions, especially the power structure of the communities that causes the vulnerability of people to natural disasters, and the factors responsible for making people defenseless to such hazards on one hand. Taking disaster as a

process, on the other hand, the study focuses on all the events and circumstances, including vulnerability to disaster and post-disaster situations.

Natural catastrophes happen worldwide, though the types and magnitude of these hazards vary. After interacting with vulnerable population, hazards turn into disasters (Awotona, 1997). According to Oliver-Smith (2004), the concept of vulnerability is linked to political ecology. Political ecology is a concept that focuses on the relationship between the people and their environment and the multiple factors that develop a relationship with a particular emphasis on the political economy of the man-environment relationship (Cutter, 1996; Hewitt, 1983. as cited in Oliver-Smith: 2004). This perspective connects the concepts of disaster, vulnerability, politics, and the economy of communities.

Subsequently, small or large-scale disasters are followed by relief efforts and reconstruction. This gives a chance for the local population to interact with external people, projects, organizations, and agencies from outside that bring new concepts and structures with them. The concerned stockholders (state, Non-Governmental Organizations, and local populations) have their backgrounds, political structures, perspectives, and techniques to handle disaster situations. The interaction of these three stakeholders develops a new and extraordinary condition in a post-disaster environment that affects them all.

Politics and natural disasters seem unrelated to each other at first glance. However, debates on disasters have persuasively established that disasters are natural events and social phenomena. The fundamental definition of disaster provides that it is triggered by nature; nevertheless, it takes place in a social structure that is hardly apolitical (Olson, 2000). Politics is about power and authority that functions in social networks. It is not just about the national level

policy decisions that affect mega projects on a national and international level, but the impacts are at all levels. Likewise, disasters do not happen in minutes, hours, or days, as every disaster is somehow connected to vulnerabilities that turn them into long-term processes. The concerned stakeholders make decisions about creating and controlling these vulnerabilities before or/and after the disasters. The power of deciding before and after the disaster makes disaster a political situation (Sokefeld, 2012).

Disasters are political situations. To understand the dynamics of disasters without considering and taking account of the power structure, power relation, and processes is equal to ignore an important aspect of it without which it is not possible to understand disasters (Sokefeld, 2012, p. 28).

In the course of recovery and reconstruction, different stakeholders take part. Various stakeholders (government, non-governmental organizations, local village councils, families, and individuals) intervene in the disaster area to restart routine life. This interaction between different stakeholders is also the interaction of power that each stockholder possesses.

Furthermore, the current study is also related to knowing the stakeholders' interaction, creating new political situations, and how these political situations affect each stakeholder. These effects are not yet adequately documented or evaluated and are therefore a valid and significant area to explore.

Chitral is a thinly populated district and far from the mainstream political and economic hubs of Pakistan. It is essential to learn the priorities of the government institutions and their techniques and skills to tackle the disasters and disasters-hit people in this area. Moreover, NGOs

(Local, national and international) like Agha Khan Development Network¹, FOCUS² Humanitarian, Al-Khidmat Foundation³ and Sarhad Rural Support Program⁴ etc., working in this area to mitigate and reconstruct disasters hit communities. This allowed me to analyze my topic on three levels: mitigation, response, and reconstruction.

1.1. Statement of the Problem

The study investigates the link between natural disasters and politics in the selected locales. The two areas selected have been subject to natural disasters for many years. The effects of these disasters had caused agony and engaged local community in a long time struggle to rebuild their damaged property. The majority of the suffering population found it most difficult to rehabilitate simply due to the vulnerability of the affected communities and post-disaster manipulation of power by the concerned stakeholders. The study argues that the historical marginalization of the lower-status groups renders these groups vulnerable to disasters and that the politics of disaster not only negatively affects disaster management but also adds to the vulnerability of the vulnerable communities.

Historically, Chitral remained a hierarchical society, divided into four visible groups namely *adamzade*, collectively ruling class and upper-status lordly families, *yuft*, which is lower in status

¹ The agencies of the AKDN are private, international, non-denominational development organisations. They work in the developing world, particularly in Asia and Africa. Some programmes, such as specific research, education and cultural programmes, span both the developed and developing worlds. While each agency pursues its own mandate, all of them work together within the overarching framework of the Network so that their different pursuits interact and reinforce one another. For more details visit <https://www.akdn.org/>

² FOCUS is the lead implementing agency for humanitarian assistance of the Agha Khan Development Network (AKDN) in Pakistan, has its Offices at Islamabad, Karachi, Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral. <https://www.akdn.org/pakistan/focus>

³ Alkhidmat Foundation Pakistan is one of the faith based, non-profit organizations, working since 1990 throughout Pakistan. <https://alkhidmat.org/>

⁴ Established in 1989, Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP) is registered under the Company's law as a non profit company. SRSP is part of the rural support programme (RSP) approach to community empowerment and economic and livelihood development in Pakistan. For more details: <http://aw1.srsp.org.pk/site/>

than the first two, and lower status groups. The division between these groups was relatively sharp before the merger of Chitral princely state in Pakistan in 1969. After the merger, a new power structure was introduced in the shape of bureaucratic institutions that affected the already existing power edifice. Democracy emerged on the other hand has its role in the struggle to establish a new power structure and power dynamics in Chitral district.

It is essential to conduct an in-depth study to see the connection between the degree of the community's vulnerability to disaster and the area's power structures/political conditions. Moreover, the study attempts to see the link between the historical political structure of the communities living in the vulnerable locations in the remote regions in the district of Chitral and the reason for neglecting their genuine concerns.

Government and citizens' relationships after disasters are always different from ordinary circumstances. States and governments are considered responsible by the affected population for the disaster and inadequate safety and recovery measures after disasters (Siddiqi, 2018). The local people (both affected and non-affected) manipulate their conditions after disasters. A micro-level analysis is required to understand the state-citizen relationship after disasters.

Similarly, government and NGOs allocate their resources in both pre-disaster and post-disaster reconstruction phases. It is essential to know the political consideration and prioritization of such allocations. The study also answers: how these organizations utilize local political setups and power structures to operate in the communities. How much share does each area, group, and individual get in the relief and reconstruction phase? Do political structure and power relations of the local community impact that?

Relief agencies and NGOs mostly rely on the local leaders as brokers or intermediaries of the project they launch. It is, therefore, possible that the relief and reconstruction process might

be affected by local political structure. The local power structure cannot remain unaffected by the post-disaster relief and reconstruction process. Hence, the study also asks what happens to a local power structure that comprises different classes with unequal power when interacting with national and international NGOs and aid agencies.

In most cases, the local politics of the regions interacts and blends into the politics of relief and reconstruction. So, the question arises: What happens to local politicians' power after a disaster as disasters provide opportunities and challenges to the local political actors of the affected area? To answer all these questions following objectives have been formulated.

1.2. Objectives of Research

Following are the objectives of the study

- To understand the political power structures of the selected locales and the district of Chitral.
- To find out the relationship between the local power structures and the vulnerability of the effected communities to natural disasters in selected locales.
- To understand how natural disasters affect the existing socio-political structure.
- To explore politics of disaster and its impact on the post disaster relief and reconstruction processes.
- To understand how manipulations by different actors (local influential/people, state and NGO officials) affect disaster management and vulnerability of disaster affected people.

1.3. The Operational Definitions of the Concepts

In this section, the concepts used in the research are operationally defined and conceptualized. This conceptualization helps clarify my argument regarding the concepts I have used in the current study.

1.3.1. Politics

Politics as a concept and its meaning has changed over time. I want to start with Aristotle's famous saying that man is by nature a political animal (Aristotle, 1984). A classic political scientist Lassewell (1936) defines politics as "who gets what, when and how." From his perspective, politics is all about attaining and utilizing resources. It further classifies elites to get more from the available, and the rest are the masses. Disagreement is what makes politics exciting. This disagreement is about how one should live and who should be given what. It comprises of possession of power and resource distribution. It is also about who will decide the outcomes. For Aristotle, politics was the master science because of its attributes (Heywood, 2002).

Some consider politics an art of governance; some call it the collective decision-making ability, while others consider it a science that tells us how to allocate scarce resources. Some even call it science to deceive and manipulate others. However, recent philosophers have described it as a tool in the power game, explaining how one can utilize the power as an individual or as a group. It is pertinent to look into a few of these, if not all, different definitions for further explanation.

Politics is an art of governing; definition is classical as the city-states originated in ancient Rome. Everything concerned with the affairs of these city-states was considered politics. Politics is not a science but an art of governing. It is an exercise of controlling the masses by taking decisions with possession of power. According to Easton (1979), politics is the authoritative enforcement of values. It is a process through which governments bring harmony by allocating benefits, rewards, and punishments for specific acts of the masses.

Politics as public relationships views politics as a broader domain that goes beyond the affairs of government. Politics as a conciliatory and agreeable discipline is slightly different from the last two. Instead of using force, it is more inclined toward conflict resolution and decisions, conciliation, negotiation, and compromise. Crick (1992) defines politics in the following words. "Politics [is] the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of the rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community" (p. 17).

Politics as power, the fourth definition of politics is more encompassing and covers most human social activities, not confined to specific areas of human or group activities. According to Leftwich (2004), politics is at the heart of every human action: collective, social, formal or informal, public or private in all groups, institutions, and societies. In his opinion politics is concerned with production, distribution, and allocation of resources. This definition also equates politics to power. If one has power, it can practice politics. Similarly, politics is a struggle over scarce resources, while power is the ability that enables politics to work. In the present study this perspective is employed which equates politics to power and takes that the two concepts, power and politics, are closely related. Current study tries to understand the determinants and sources of power and its use in pre and post-disaster situations. It also tries to understand how disasters are creating or increasing power of people and institutions which they use to do politics. This perspective helps understand the relationship of vulnerability to disasters or the post-disaster situation.

1.3.2. Power, Authority, and Local Power Structure

The term power has been used with multiple meanings across disciplines. In social sciences, the term means the ability to influence others and their behavior. On the other hand,

authority is the use of power that is approved by society (Gledhill, 2000; Kurtz, 2001). In the current study, the power and authority of individuals and groups are discussed who used it to gain benefits for themselves and their group members by manipulating their positions. The study also examines the origin and determinants of power and authority.

Similarly, Jibowo (1992) defines power structure as the distribution of authority and influence in a pattern among various members in a community or group (Jibowo, 1992; Kilonzo & George, 2017). Local or community power structure is a complex network of the power relationship that exists primarily in traditional or/and rural communities. These networks of relationships exist between recognized power holders within groups. Power holders usually influence and play significant roles in activities related to the community. However, sometimes such influence is to achieve objectives that serve these leaders. This way, power-holders within the community control the community's affairs (Kuponiyi, 2008).

Knowing local power structure is imperative to understanding local politics and decision making within the community. It is essential to understand such networks and their functions in the research locales. Chitral has remained a princely state where local leaders also belonged to royal families in most cases. Although the modern democratic structure has affected the old power structure, it is still firm in decision-making for the community. Understanding the local power structure was essential to knowing the nature of vulnerability in the selected locale. In the princely state of Chitral, a hierarchy existed among different groups, which led to differential vulnerability within the population.

Similarly, the mutuality of past and present power structures was also essential to understand. It is tested to understand the connection of power structure to vulnerability and to

natural disasters in the locales. Additionally, the role of local power structure is crucial for understanding post-disaster politics between the stakeholders in selected locations.

1.3.3. Stakeholders

Stakeholders can be a group, an individual, a community, or an organization that can affect an event, site, organization, project, or business and groups, individuals, community, or organization affected by the event, project, business, or organization (Alexander, 2008). Though there can be several visible and invisible stakeholders to any event, the selected stakeholders in the current study are:

- 1) State institutions like district administration, specialized institutions to handle disaster situations such as National Disaster Management Authority⁵ (NDMA), Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), District Disaster Management Unit (DDMU) all local, provincial, & national level elected members and state departments.
- 2) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)⁶ (local, national and international)
- 3) Local community (both affected and non-affected by the disasters)

The role and involvement of the above three stakeholders and individuals working in it are linked directly and indirectly to the communities affected by the disasters in the district and the selected locales. In modern nation-states, affairs of the communities are considered the state's responsibility making the state a key stakeholder in all disasters. Similarly, in less developed nations like Pakistan, the role of NGOs is crucial. The role of NGOs broadens in extraordinary situations where humanitarian support is needed such as natural calamities. The local community

⁵ National Disaster Management Authority is federal level agency to deal with disaster management activities in Pakistan. For further details visit <http://cms.ndma.gov.pk/>

⁶ The term NGO is used for various formal and informal organizations and associations that differ in their functions, level of operations, goals, structure, and membership. They include religious, charitable, research, environmental and environmental organizations. Detail is given in chapter five.

is the third stakeholder, affected by both disasters as well as by the activities of the above two stakeholders. It is pertinent to mention that all the stakeholders affect each other simultaneously as they work together to respond to the event.

1.3.4. Vulnerability

Vulnerability, hazards, and disasters are all interrelated concepts. When hazards hit vulnerable populations, the situation turns into a disaster. So what is vulnerability, its underlying causes and what makes people more vulnerable to hazards than others? These factors are discussed in detail in the literature review chapter. Here I am only defining vulnerability with a brief explanation. It is "the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process). It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone's life, livelihood, property, and other assets are put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event (or series or 'cascade' of such events) in nature and society" (Wisner et al., 2004: 11). In the current study, vulnerability is one of the main variables. This variable is pertinent in its relation to natural disasters and understanding vulnerability's relationship with the local political structure.

1.3.5. Disaster

As the magnitude and frequency of disasters have increased over the past few decades, different researches have tried to understand and define it. A disaster seems to be quite a simple phenomenon to describe, but when studied in depth, it becomes obvious that defining a disaster is not so simple. Many renowned social scientists specializing in disaster studies, such as Quarantelli and Oliver-Smith, have written extensively to explain disasters. For anthropologists and disaster research specialists, consensus on the definition is not very important. However, the

need arises due to the increased number of hazards and disasters resulting from the rapidly changing human environment, producing new threats (Oliver-Smith, 1999).

According to Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (2002),

Disaster is a process/event combining a potentially destructive agent/force from the natural, modified, or built environment or a population in socially and economically produced a condition of vulnerability, resulting in a perceived disruption of customary relative satisfaction of individual and social needs for physical survival, social order and meaning (p-4).

The definition of disaster encompasses most of the areas responsible for cause and/or affect phenomenon. Alexander (2005) defines factors that show how disaster is defined:

- a) "The examination of the background of the disasters or hazards phenomena;
- b) Questions of whose perspective is used as a definitional referent; the public, the victims, researchers, policy-makers; c) The definer's vision of social science" (p. 27).

While discussing disasters, the understanding of hazards cannot be ignored or sidelined. Hazards are:

The forces, conditions, or technologies that carry a potential for social, infrastructural, or environmental damage, a hazard can be a hurricane, earthquake, or avalanche; it can also be a nuclear facility or a socioeconomic practice such as using pesticides. The issue of hazard further incorporates the way society perceives the danger or dangers either environmental or/and technological that it faces and the ways it allows the danger to enter its calculation of risk" (Oliver-Smith & Hoffman, 2002: 4).

Here, the important thing to acknowledge is that this research focuses on floods and earthquakes as natural disasters. These two definitions elaborate on how natural disasters are connected to human activities.

1.4. Significance of the Study

At a time of increasing worldwide vulnerability to natural hazards, the study of disasters has become an essential focus for anthropological research. Consequently, current study falls within the domain of anthropology of disaster. It brings about the anthropological perspective regarding the political structure of a community and its link with the wide range of pre and post-disaster situations. This study also attempted to understand the relationship of vulnerability of the affected community to disaster and the power structure while on the other; it is an attempt to grasp the perpetual effect in the post-disaster situation.

Similarly, NGOs also try to increase their influence in such situations. The interactions of all these stakeholders are somehow guided by the power structures that occupy a significant place especially in the post disaster situation. This study attempted to understand these priorities and the interplay between stakeholders and the effect of the power structure in the research locales. District Chitral is a remote area situated in the northwest and is considered the most vulnerable to natural disasters like flash floods and earthquakes (Rafiq & Blaschke, 2012). By understanding the relationship between the power structure, vulnerability, natural disasters, and reconstruction, this study also guides for effective policymaking.

Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (2002) argue that anthropology is ideally suited to understand the processes of disasters, vulnerability, and recovery, holistically. Disasters also give essential insight into classical anthropological fields of interest, such as adaptation to the environment,

power structures, inequalities, constructions, conceptions of morality, values, and cosmologies (Hoffman & Oliver-Smith 2002:6-12). I argues that disasters form interesting subjects of anthropological attention in exploring how people make sense of the unexpected from already existing cultural categories and act upon these understandings and negotiate social change. It attempted to look deep into the power interplay and inequalities in the selected communities and their relationship to disasters.

1.5. Locale of the study

I did fieldwork in district Chitral. Chitral is situated on the northwestern side of the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. This district is prone to floods especially after 2010 due to climate change, affecting thousands. The mountainous terrain of Chitral makes this place more vulnerable to flash floods and other hazards. In July and August 2010, 2013 and 2015 a series of high flash floods hit different parts of the Chitral district, causing heavy damage to property and life (District Administration/ Chitral District Disaster Management Unit, 2015).

The Hindu Kush mountain range is known for earthquakes and many fault lines run through it. In October 2015, high-intense earthquake jolted the whole Chitral district and caused many casualties, and affected the infrastructure. When I started my fieldwork in Chitral city, I contacted District Disaster Management Office (DDMO)⁷ to learn about the floods affected areas. I visited the affected areas to observe the situation and decided to select two places for my fieldwork in the district: the Kalash valley and Reshum. The first village was situated at a two-hour drive by jeep from district headquarters and lies in the Chitral tehsil. This is a predominantly Kalash-populated village with small hamlets.

⁷ District Disaster Management Unit (DDMU) is district level branch of National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA).

Reshum is sixty kilometers away from Chitral town and is part of Mastuj tehsil. Metaled roads from Chitral city leads to this village and is almost two-hour drive from the district headquarter. This village is populated with ethnic Ismaili⁸ and Sunni⁹ Muslims.

1.6. Justification for Locale Selection

Chitral is one of the most vulnerable districts of the country to natural hazards and disasters (Rafiq & Blaschke, 2012), and this was the first rationale for selecting this locale. Second, Chitral is surrounded by high mountains peaks from all sides, making it inaccessible for outsiders. Tthis is part of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa has remained neglected because of its hard accessibility. The population is widely scattered and lives in rugged terrains. Because of its low population density and challenging topography, Chitral has remained out of the mainstream developmental projects and basic living facilities. It is not easy for the government to provide facilities to its population which the rest of the country enjoys. Such a situation leaves an open ground for the NGOs to work independently where the government is unable to establish its authority or the area falls out of its priority. Owing to this, studying NGOs is relatively convenient in disaster situations.

The third reason for selecting the Chitral district was the hierarchy among different groups. In the princely state of Chitral, the community was divided into various groups with non-uniform statuses. This hierarchy still existed in different shapes in the Chitrali community. Finding the relationship between the power structure and community's vulnerability to natural disasters is relatively easy in hierarchical political systems where different groups have unequal

⁸ A sect of Islam and sub-sect of Shia, Islam living in almost every continent of the world. They consider a living leader, nowadays His Highness Kareem Agha Khan, a spiritual figure who explains the real version of Islam and lead all Ismaili. Total population is around 15 million. Detail is given in chapter four. <https://the.ismaili/global/about-us/the-ismaili-community>

⁹ Sunni is one of the two major branches of Islam and are in majority thann any other group. Sunni Muslims regard their domination as the mainstream and traditionalist branch of Islam. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sunni>

political powers. These three factors make district Chitral perfectly suitable for the data collection and analysis.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the relevant literature on the relationship between politics/ power structure and natural disasters. The literature cited in the chapter is thematic and written in chronological order to understand the significant concepts used in the study. The first portion of the chapter discusses different theories and models related to disasters, hazards, vulnerability, reconstruction processes, and their relationship to the political structure. The second portion reviews empirical studies conducted in different regions and areas relevant to current research. It is pertinent to mention that politics, power structures, and disasters have not been researched frequently in combination with each other as its nature is novel. This chapter does not cover all the secondary relevant data. Part of the relevant literature is explained in each chapter, especially on the history of the locales, political structure, and political history of the district and areas of the study. Moreover, the related literature on NGOs, disaster management institutions and state institutions is given in the upcoming chapters.

2.2. Anthropology and Politics of Disasters

The present study attempted to grasp a new dimension of disasters and therefore, it becomes worthwhile to search for the literature that connects disasters to politics and anthropological concepts. Anthropologists have been studying disasters for decades now, and there is abundance of material available on disasters, either man-made or natural. The challenging part of this study was to find a logical connection between disasters and political or power structures. The writings of Oliver-Smith (1977, 1986, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2009) and Hoffman (1999, 2002) on the subject are worthwhile. Olson (2000) and Sokefeld

(2012, 2020) are two researchers whose writings have helped in determining the theoretical understanding of link between politics and disasters. Similarly, the "pressure and release model" developed by Wisner (2004) and his colleagues is crucial in understanding the vulnerability and its relationship and power structure. In the coming section, I have tried to sketch the evolution of anthropology of disaster as a distinctive sub-discipline and its significant contributors.

2.3. Anthropology and Study of Disasters

The relationship between disasters and anthropology is interwoven, particularly regarding adaptation to new circumstances and environments. Since the emergence of anthropology as a discipline, it has focused on the evolution of societies; where biological and cultural adaptation has become one of anthropology's main concepts (Oliver-Smith, 2009). For survival, human beings interacted with the forces of nature and performed several material activities (Patterson, 1994; Oliver-Smith, 2009).

The journey of anthropology to study disasters directly started from Wallace's (1956) interest in learning about disasters in the 1950s. His curiosity on understanding mental health and personality traits changes in humans under stressful conditions emerging from disasters moved him to study disasters. He is the first anthropologist to formulate a model for disaster, plotting the process of disasters with spatiotemporal dimensions (Wallace, 1956; Faas & Borrios, 2015). Despite being the pioneer in studying disasters essentially with cultural anthropology in the conceptual framework Wallace's study on disaster lacked the relationship between human beings and the environment.

In the 1960s and 1970s, anthropological inquiry into disaster grew gradually as it focused on other topics like education, health, medicines, development, etc. (Anderson 1968; Bode 1977;

Lessa 1964; Oliver-Smith 1977; Faas & Borrios, 2015). In a review of the nascent subfield of anthropology of disaster, Torry (1979) expressed his concern about the scarce contribution of anthropologists to study disasters and in view of the importance of the subject; the contribution of anthropology being low. Torry considered it understudied and under-theorized (Oliver-Smith, 1999).

During the 1980s and onward, Oliver-Smith's (1977, 1986, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2009) contribution to the subject was prominently expressed. The initial interest of Oliver-Smith was to understand market dynamics in Young Young. On the recommendation of his mentor Paul Daughty, he started studying disaster recovery for his dissertation. As a result of this change of interest, Oliver-Smith went on to produce "The Martyred City: Death and Rebirth in the Andes" (Oliver-Smith, 1986). It is still regarded a key research in the study of disasters. Oliver-Smith initially focused on the mourning and recovery process and the transformation of natural, social, and built environment in recovery. Oliver-Smith mainly focused on disaster politics and termed it the result of unequal distribution of resources and power on local and global scales (Faas & Borrios, 2015).

Meanwhile, other contributors, primarily geographers (Hewitt 1983; Wisner et al., 1976), believed that natural hazards are not born but are mainly the result of human-environment interaction. They also contributed to the theoretical framework of political ecology. In 1976, the Natural Hazards Centre (NHC) establishment at the University of Colorado further strengthened the connection between geographers and other social scientists to understand disasters. The contribution of anthropologists and other social scientists increased after the earthquake of Mexico City in 1985, when government officials, policymakers, and civil society came to see the

merits of anthropology and other social sciences like sociology, geography, etc., in mitigating natural disasters (Maskrey, 1993).

Hoffman is another anthropologist who contributed to the understanding of disasters and added to the theoretical side of the phenomenon. She had personal experience of disasters as she had lost her home and other possessions during the 1991 firestorm in Oakland, California (Hoffman, 1999). Hoffman and Oliver-Smith met at the 1992 meeting of the American Anthropological Association in San Francisco. The first contribution from the collaboration of both was *The Angry Earth: Disaster in Anthropological Perspective* (Oliver-Smith & Hoffman, 1999), a landmark work that is about the contribution of anthropology in understanding the dynamics of disasters and mainly focused on the vulnerability of humans to hazards in Europe, Americas, and Asia. *Catastrophe and Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster* (2002) was the collaboration's second contribution, which offered several theoretical concepts and models.

Disaster research in anthropology diversified in the twenty-first century. Various theoretical and methodological models are combined to understand the causes and perpetual effects of hazards and disasters and added to a broader anthropological theme of culture change, social networks, identity, power, political ecology, development, and the tensions between representation and practice. After twenty years of the first review of the sub-field anthropology of disaster by Torry (1979), when Oliver-Smith reviewed it for the second time, it was challenging to grasp the breadth of studies and trends and to cover it in one article. Because of the breadth of the sub-discipline, anthropology of disasters, he declined to review it for the second time in the second decade of the twenty-first century. It is hard to draw the line between where anthropology begins and where it stands now because anthropologists study disasters and

development in combination and inter-disciplinary context (Oliver-Smith, 1996; Hoffman, 1999; Faas & Borrios, 2015). This shows the importance of using anthropological approach in understanding different dynamics of disasters.

2.4. Politics and Disaster; Anthropological Approach

The anthropological technique to study social aspects of human lives differs from political scientists, geographers, or other social scientists. Sokefeld (2012) identified the unique way of understanding political aspects of disasters. In general, social anthropological understanding of politics, power manipulation, and its effects on societies are different. Anthropological knowledge of "the political" covers much broader aspects within societies. Unlike political science, social anthropology does not just focus on authorities, governments, states, and formal institutions. It also focuses on informal political structure and power relations in societies and communities that affects all aspects of life. For example, local-level power manipulation, on the village level or neighborhood level, and how it serves local interests remained the subject of political anthropology. Who decides what and which group is more powerful to determine things for people? What are local-level power sources, and how it is used in local contexts? What kinds of alliances are present between different groups to pursue common interests, and how do they compete for? Politics related to disaster can broadly be understood by understanding power (Sokefeld, 2012).

Politics and power structure are related to disasters in pre-disaster vulnerability situations and ultimately affect the post-disaster processes. In this study, I tried to understand the link between politics in both by using the broad anthropological technique of understanding power

structure to understand the vulnerability of certain groups and how power structure affected the post-disaster situation and processes in the locales.

2.5. Anthropology of Disasters and Political Ecological Approach

Linking politics and natural disasters seem irrelevant as, apparently, disasters are natural processes. While exploring the connection between politics and disaster, literature provides two broad areas where this relationship seems obvious. The first relationship can be seen in pre-disaster situations where political structures of the communities, including economic and social networks, play a significant role in creating differential vulnerability of groups of people to disasters.

Secondly, Post-disaster situations increase the interaction of individuals, groups, and institutions in areas where disasters take place. This interaction involves decisions regarding the scope of the damage, financial assessment, relief, rescue operations required, available manpower, reconstruction, and development. The controversial-ridden decision makes post-disaster situations deeply political occasions. In the sections to follow, the researcher attempts to build a clear connection between politics and disaster both before and after the disasters in accordance with the available literature.

One of the challenges that most anthropologists, who studied disasters in the 1970s, faced was the general understanding of disasters as natural events or acts of God. As a result of this approach, the focus used to be solely on managing the crisis after the onset of disasters and leaving the essential factor to understanding the differential effect of disasters on different groups (Oliver-Smith, 1999). Oliver-Smith introduced the political-ecological approach to understand natural disasters by studying the work of other researchers, geographers, and

sociologists in Latin America and the global south. This approach emphasizes understanding disasters in the context of long historical events and processes involving human interaction with cultural values, political processes, systems, technologies, and the material environment. The introduction of a political-ecological approach changed the idea that disasters are unavoidable natural events and can only be managed through practical post-disaster planning to mitigate their effects. Instead, human policies and actions are responsible for the severity of the geophysical events.

Moreover, after recognizing the political ecological approach to understanding disasters, methodological approaches like ethnographic, historical, sociological, and geographic, subjected to critique, modification, and change, resulted in effective mitigation techniques before the occurrence of disasters. This change in studying hazards and disasters has lasting effects. The political-ecological approach to understanding disasters produced new avenues in anthropology's already existing pool of knowledge and interest (Faas & Borrios, 2015).

Thus, disasters are now understood as events and processes that engulf the capacity of vulnerable groups or classes and their economic activities and infrastructure to resist or recover. To understand disasters adequately, it is essential to eliminate the barrier between human activities and ecosystem activities as they affect each other significantly. Thus, disasters cannot be limited to natural, technological, or triggering events, as vulnerabilities are closely connected to political events and linked to political and economic conditions (Oliver-Smith, 2002, 2004; Wisner et al., 2004). Researchers from the global south were expected to rethink disasters from political and economic perspectives like economic conditions, power structure, low income, etc., which leads to the conclusion that the basis of disasters lies more in society than in nature.

2.6. Vulnerability and Disasters

Vulnerability is a critical concept in understanding disasters. Hazards hit vulnerable groups of people, resulting in disasters. A straightforward definition of vulnerability is "the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process). It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone's life, livelihood, property, and other assets are put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event (or series or 'cascade' of such events) in nature and society" (Wisner et al., 2004: 11). To understand the effects of disasters in the selected locales, it is necessary to understand the vulnerabilities of the people living there and the determinants of such vulnerabilities.

It is observed that people living in the same geographical boundaries may have different vulnerabilities to natural hazards. Some groups are more exposed to dangers and suffer more than others. Some key factors or variables considered responsible for the differential impact of hazards includes wealth differences, class, gender, caste, occupation, and extent of social networking (Cutter et al., 2003; Wisner et al., 2004). Vulnerability varies in magnitude, and some groups experience higher than others do. The opposite of vulnerable is the security or the ability and capacity to cope with the hazard and recovery (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989; Eade, 1998; Wisner, 2003; Ariabandu, 2009).

It is equally essential to understand vulnerability in the context of time. It means vulnerable groups suffer more at the time of occurrence of disaster and so does their capacity to reconstruct their livelihood after the post-disaster situation. Such conditions make vulnerable groups increasingly susceptible to future hazards. In defining vulnerability, the concept of livelihood is fundamental that includes but is not limited to income, resources, tools, and land of

individuals and groups (Wisner et al., 2004). For billions of people, the nature of vulnerability and the strategies to cope with it are changing, thus leading to an intensified situation. On the other hand, the ability to cope with it is diminishing, which leads to feelings of insecurity in the future. People who are already marginalized and live in a state of poverty and uncertainty are defenseless due to resource depletion at a local and global level (Ferguson, 1999).

2.7. Theoretical framework

To understand the relationship between natural disasters and politics/ power structure, the vulnerability model and the Foucault concept of governmentality by Sokefeld (2012) are used for the current study. The first part of the study, the relationship between vulnerability to natural disasters and the power structure of communities, are discussed in light of the Pressure and Release Model of Wisner et al., (2004). The second part of the study, which is mainly about the response of different stakeholders to post disaster situation focuses on the governmentality concept of Michael Foucault, discussed in detail in the coming section.

2.7.1. Vulnerability Model and Disasters

Literature on disasters and vulnerability could not provide a comprehensive theoretical understanding to investigate hazards in the context of inequalities, both social and environmental, and uneven regional and geographic conditions (Cutter, 2003; Peet & Watts, 2004; Bolin & Kurtz, 2018), until Hewitt's publication "Interpretations of Calamity from the Perspective of Human Ecology" in 1983 that shifted vulnerability studies to "physical hazard agent" that was considered separate from already existing socio-political and economic processes and social order (Hewitt, 1983). Researchers who focused on vulnerability afterward developed


the understanding that disasters are shaped by existing political, economic, environmental, and social conditions and are not natural occurrences (Cannon, 1994; O'Keefe, Wisner et al., 1976).

To understand the relationship between vulnerability and its root causes, I have used the pressure and release model developed by Wisner et al. (2004: 51; see Figures 2.1 and 2.2), which provides a comprehensive approach to understanding vulnerability to hazards. This section explained the model and its relevance to my study. Partly it is discussed in chapter five, where I have analyzed the data in light of the model.

The "Pressure and release" (2004) model is considered the most explicit model for taking into account the political-economic position. The model gives both geographical and historical contexts of vulnerability and provides a stage-wise progression of vulnerability that moves from larger contexts, both temporal and spatial, to local conditions of vulnerability. The model provides conceptual clarity for researchers to understand the situations that put different groups of people who are not similar because of their ethnicity, race, class, gender, or age at varying levels of risk from same hazard. In the same environment where hazards exist, disasters are inevitable because of the patterns of vulnerability present historically in social and political organizations, infrastructure, and systems of production and distribution, and society's ideology. The vulnerability pattern of a community is a crucial feature of any disaster. The vulnerability affects the behaviors on individual and organization levels in disasters more than the actual forces of destruction that cause disasters. The details that produce vulnerability affect the whole process until reconstruction (Oliver-Smith, 2009). Thus, when we talk about flood and earthquake disasters in district Chitral, we need to understand political, economic, environmental, and social factors. These factors and processes are deeply rooted in the past and


can give us a glimpse into the future beyond the local power sectors and economies to global political and economic structures.

Figure 2.1. Pressure and Release Model for Understanding Disaster-Related Vulnerability



Source: Wisner et al., 2004

Figure 2.2: Vulnerability Analysis and Natural Disasters



Source: Adapted from (Wisner et al., 2004)

2.7.2. Governmentality and Disaster Response

Referring to Foucault's concept of *governmentality* used by Sokefeld (2012) in "Exploring the Link between Natural Disasters and Politics: Case Studies of Pakistan and Peru," is instrumental in analyzing the politics of disasters. For Foucault used this concept to clarify the way states around the world changed the art of governance. At the beginning of the evolution of the state, the art of governing was different from recently developed new concepts. The interference of the state in the affairs of its masses was less. Previously the image of the state was more powerful, using coercive measures like collecting taxes, etc. In recent years, the state role has shifted to more a caring attitude and the masses have attained a more prominent status. The state needs to know more about its citizens, and it collects information through surveys and other means. Thus, more institutions take good care of the population as the condition develops. At the same time, the devolution of power through this multiplication of institutions occurs; ultimately, the boundary between state and society becomes blurred (Sokefeld, 2012).

Disasters are new areas where the governmentality is implemented. It provides an opportunity to different institutions of state and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to increase their influence on local population. This increasing interaction between the state, NGOs, and local population generates a new situation. This unique situation where the interaction of these three stakeholders, state, NGOs, and society, need to know about certain aspects and that need to answer specific questions like how people perceive the state in disaster situations? What do they expect from the state and NGOs? What do they experience? How do states and NGOs portray themselves? The opposite of governmentality is when people consider the state

responsible for almost all areas of life including natural disasters, inadequate measures of mitigation and post disaster relief and reconstruction process(Gupta 1995; Sokefeld,2012). “For affected citizens, disaster may thus become an opportunity to express discontent and to protest against what is perceived as inadequate and insufficient efforts for relief or reconstruction. Especially opposition groups or parties may take the opportunity to protest against government. Thus, post-disaster situations easily become sites of political contestation”(Sokefeld, 2012: 9). In District Chitral, the occurrence of natural disasters increased the interaction among the state, NGOs, and the local community creating political contestation. The current study is an attempt to understand the different dynamics of this interaction focusing more on its political aspects.

2.8. Politics of Disasters and Phases of Disaster Management

The power structure, class, race, economic structure, and social structures are not limited to producing unequal vulnerabilities but also affect the processes and mechanisms on a local, national and international level designed for mitigation, risk reduction, resource allocation, and reconstruction after disasters. Research on disasters, politics, and political economy has focused on various disaster stages for a deep insight to understand their effects. First, it is crucial to understand different stages and terms to understand politics, political economy, and other underlying forces. Following are basic phases or sub-concepts, though other demarcations will be discussed later. It is also essential to understand that the following stages and terminologies are mainly used for sudden onset disasters like earthquakes, floods, toxic spills, etc.

(1) Pre-Impact, the time or period before the event. Other concepts related to this phase like preparedness, mitigation, , and risk reduction. Mostly these phases take place before any disaster. One crucial point to understand is that all these phases are not linear but somewhat

cyclical (Birkland, 1997). The pre-impact stage with related concepts is linked to other stages that I will mention ahead

(2) Impact, the time, minutes, or hours, sometimes maybe more, when communities are affected and sustain direct physical losses

(3) Response involves saving people, valuables, etc., and is done mainly by immediate community members. It is usually not very long and ends at most in two or three weeks in case of bigger disasters or catastrophes.

(4) Recovery is the phase when necessities of life are regained. This includes clean water, power and energy supply, food, medical facilities, etc. and this can take years. In one of the locales where I conducted fieldwork, the power supply remained suspended for three years.

(5) Reconstruction: this phase is longer than all phases and, in most cases, overlaps the first phase, which is the pre-impact phase, because for almost four decades now, areas with fear of hazards, communities are protected through proactive mitigation where through different projects such communities are protected to minimize the impact of risk (Drabek, 1986; Olson, 2000).

These are cyclical processes where the post-disaster situations are linked with the pre-disaster social and political systems. Collectively they determine the impact of disasters (Alexander, 2005). The current study attempts to understand the relationship between politics/power structure and flood and earthquake disasters in the selected locales in all the phases listed above.

2.9. Political Economy and Disaster Risk Reduction

Disaster risk reduction involves several factors that influence the process. Scattered studies on floods and other natural disasters in India and Bangladesh provide ample examples now. One such study was conducted by Islam et al. (2021) to identify different factors affecting disaster risk reduction, mainly rooted in the political economy. As climate change-related natural hazards are on the rise, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) practitioners consider the need to protect and mitigate the most vulnerable population. The endeavor to protect vulnerable communities and physical infrastructure are influenced by factors like level of vulnerability, the needs of the local population, and disaster risks. Still, this list of factors is not exclusive. Political-economic factors are vital in providing funds for mitigation and disaster risk reduction processes. Dominant leading stakeholders at the local level always influence the process and outcome (Alam et al., 2011; Marks and Lebel, 2016; Mogues, 2015; Purdon, 2015; Vorhies, 2012; Islam et al., 2021). Prominent bodies influence the process at different levels prioritizing the issue and the process, prioritizing the locations and funding amount. As a result, some areas get more funds than others without considering the need and intensity of the cases (Garrett and Sobel, 2003; Neumayer et al., 2014; Sovacool et al., 2017).

The role of the political party in power, control of resource distribution by the elites, power relations among the authorities, discrimination against the weaker are some of the factors that influence mitigation and disaster risk reduction in Bangladesh and the rest of the developing world (Islam 2014; Mallick, 2014; Francken et al., 2012; Besley and Burgess, 2002). Mitigation and disaster risk reduction challenges cannot be isolated from other funds allocated for developmental projects and are influenced by the same factors which play a vital role in additional public funds distribution. All of them are deeply embedded in political-economic

factors like power, authority, institutions, ideas, incentives, and values of key stakeholders (Mogues, 2015; Islam et al., 2021). Based on the political, social, and economic structure of Bangladesh, which remained part of Pakistan till 1971, Islam et al.,(2021) identified the weak state infrastructure, mismanagement and uneven distribution of scarce resources, lack of appropriate governance, collaboration and coordination as some of the factors that provide basis for such ill practices in disaster risk reduction programs. Being part of the same nation-state and sharing a high poverty rate, mismanagement in the allocation of scarce resources, lack of accountability, and high impact of hazards on the economy, primarily of floods, are among many factors that Pakistan and Bangladesh share. A conceptual model has been proposed by Islam et al., to understand the complex relationship of fund allocation on disaster risk reduction with the possible factors that are rooted in political-economic forces. The potential factors that influence disaster risk reduction are;

Power and authority: according to this model, the power and authority of the key stakeholders play a vital role irrespective of the needs of the proposed DRR projects. Power and authority are assigned to key stakeholders, within the government or state institutions or from the communities influence the spending and identifying or prioritizing the expenditure. Three separate studies confirm this effect. The first is from Bangladesh's coastal areas, where shelter houses are constructed to keep the vulnerable population safe from cyclones. These shelter houses were neither based on nor built on need or demand (Mallick, 2014). In a second study based on Thailand's 2011 floods, due to uneven and centralized nature of power and incomplete decentralization of powers affected and compromised the fair distribution of funds for both reconstruction and disaster risk reduction in the country (Marks and Lebel, 2016). Another study in India on the provision of funds related to disaster risk reduction and related

projects for development show that electoral politics influenced funds allocation. Findings of the study show that funds allocation on disaster-related projects are influenced by greater electoral accountability and media projection. This study indicates that funds allocation was increased to gain political power (Besley & Burgess, 2002). As mentioned earlier, Bangladesh's political and bureaucratic structure is very much like Pakistan's. The implications of the power and authority model in allocating resources in the district of Chitral and the selected locales did influence the DRR and reconstruction process that has been discussed in detail in coming chapters.

Interest and incentives: interest and incentives are also vital factors in deciding the allocation of funds for disaster risk reduction (Islam et al., 2021). It affects the decision in many ways, like political and economic relationships that influence decisions in development projects. An analysis of World Bank experiences in seven developing countries provides a study to understand the relationship between the challenges (Fritz et al., 2014). Interest and incentive-based prioritization in funds allocation in India is already discussed (Besley and Burgess, 2002). Incentive and interest factors are more apparent when scarce resources and dominant stakeholders use government apparatus to allocate funds to gain benefits (Islam et al., 2021). Chitral remained isolated because of difficult access preventing it from having modern facilities and infrastructure. Based on the political and economic importance of the district, the interest and incentives model current study tried to understand as to how interests and incentives plays a role in DRR and development projects.

Formal and informal institutions: institutions, rules, and norms are basic elements in human interaction (Dellmuh et al., 2017; Islam et al., 2021). In the Global South, it is primarily the cultural rules which influence the decision-making powers and mobilization. Such cultural rules are taken into consideration at the time funds allocation in current study.

Values and ideas: political, religious, and cultural beliefs that influence behaviors related to the political and economic activities of communities. These can affect the distribution and allocation of resources for disaster risk reduction and divert the normative goals (Francken et al., 2012; Sokefeld, 2012; Islam et al., 2021).

The four factors mentioned above relate to political economy influence DRR. Through these four factors, Islam et al. (2021) tried to link the involvement of politics, economy, and other related variables that affected disaster risk reduction processes in Bangladesh and other developing countries. The current study attempted to consider all mentioned factors to understand their effect on DRR and other fund allocations related to the disaster of flood and earthquake in the district.

2.10. Politics of Relief Aid

After discussing the relevance of politics and power structure to vulnerability and disaster risk reduction processes, it is essential to understand the influence of these variables in post-disaster situations. Research (Cavallo & Noy, 2010; Parker, 2006) suggests that governments and international aid agencies are constantly struggling to formulate an adequate mechanism for the relief, reconstruction, and mitigation of the affected communities. Relief activities are affected by several factors that can decrease their effectiveness one of them being the policy formulation by governments. Political consideration also involves relief and aid mechanisms. The nature of institutions also has a reasonable effect on the relief activities: governments, both on the national and local levels influence aid allocations. In a study on cyclone-hit communities in Madagascar, more relief was allocated to the areas that supported the ruling party in the last elections (Francken et al., 2012).

In a study on the 2014 flood in the Indian governed part of Jammu and Kashmir, Venugopal and Yasir (2017) outlined the political implication of the disaster. This research study represented the insider's view of a post-disaster scenario. "Disaster as a lens" is the concept used to understand the relationship between post-disaster processes and politics. It is believed that disasters reveal transparency and raw clarity of social realities that are otherwise impossible to comprehend. The narrative of survivors can lead to insights, social construction, and experiences. It can only be observed through in-depth qualitative studies.

Venugopal & Yasir (2017) identified six strands of disaster politics to provide the basis for their study. Firstly, disasters are taken as a social and political phenomenon, not as only a technological or scientific issue. It is so because disasters occur in human societies, and all societies are political. For this reason, disasters should be considered social and political issues both for their consequences and causation (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Guggenheim, 2014; Olson, 2000; Pelling & Dill, 2006; Wisner et al., 2004; Venugopal & Yasir, 2017).

Secondly, disasters are moments of political revelations. It provides situations to understand politics. It unveils political issues that are otherwise not accessible to analyze (Guggenheim, 2014). With the suspension of everyday life situations, disasters provide ample opportunities to understand the inner world scenarios. It offers critical political conditions of a society. It also unveils the struggle for rights and inherent inequalities of societies. The relationship between the state and other sectors also becomes apparent in disaster situations when these entities work for relief and recovery after disasters (Cuny, 1983; Pelling & Dill, 2006; Venugopal & Yasir, 2017).

Thirdly, disasters provide, in most cases, transformative political events or "tipping points" (Pelling & Dell, 2010). In disasters, the relationship between state and society gets clear that it is not visible in normal circumstances. Politics of disasters has a strong effect on the relationship between states and societies where the question of citizenship in light of the state-society relationship (Gaillardet al., 2008). The fourth point of disaster and political association is the social construction of disasters. Disaster-related events like suffering, relief, recovery, body count, and rehabilitation costs are not just scientific and statistical realities but a process of meaning-making that takes place between victims, administrators, relief workers and the rest of the stakeholders as a result of an event. Another essential factor that makes disasters political occasions is the relationship of failed relief in the destabilizing relationship between state and society and the role of donors. It widens the gap between influential donors and weak recipients. Weak recipients accept their inferior positions in the social hierarchy. Thus, disasters reproduce and perpetuate the more vulnerable position of recipients in the future (Venugopal & Yasir, 2017). In their research, Venugopal and Yasir (2017) tried to analyze all these factors from the victims of the 2014 flood in Kashmir to understand lived experiences of the people. This research provided a fundamental relationship between politics and disaster in light of the relationship between state and citizens. Indian media have exaggerated the army's role in helping people in disaster to convert the hostile relationship between the people of Kashmir and the Indian army in the valley into friendship which was a purely political move.

Similarly, the opposition parties like Peoples Democratic Party, Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) criticized the party in power for inadequate measures to rescue the flood-affected citizens. Separationist politicians also criticized and blamed the central government for not taking an interest in the flood and saving only tourists and senior politicians in the valley. This study

provides the political implications of the disaster aid process. Disaster relief and reconstruction create diverse political consequences in other social and political structures. The same five factors mentioned in this section can have different implications in other settings. Based on this study, the current study tried to understand the post-disaster situation and the relationship between citizens, formal institutions, and the state in district Chitral. Similarly, it also attempted to understand the relationship between the communities and government, at the local, provincial, and national level political actors in post-disaster relief and reconstruction processes. All these actors are found to be more active in post disaster situation.

2.11. Disasters and “Disaster Citizenship”

Since its emergence, citizenship, rights, and obligations have been the subject of political science and other related disciplines. The social contract theory explains the rights and responsibilities of both state and citizens toward each other. This tangible relationship between the state and its citizens is about two primary components;

Firstly, the state usually considers it its responsibility to take care of its citizens and provide the necessary resources to live a quality life. Secondly, citizens expect the state to help fulfill its needs as passive recipients and expect the state to proactively provide all basic amenities as part of the state’s responsibility (Siddiqi, 2018). As observed, disasters do not always affect the state-citizen relationship alike. Based on varied circumstances, sometimes disasters damage the social contract between citizens and the state (Pelling & Dell, 2010). But sometimes, it is not detrimental. Instead, the political spaces provided by disasters strengthen this relationship (Siddiqi, 2018).

After every natural disaster, states and their citizens are always in different relationships than they used to be in normal circumstances. Disaster-hit populations are constructed as "innocent" who do not have any control over stopping or causing disasters. In such situations, the efforts of states are considered very important. Democratic states are obliged to protect their citizens in calamities and disasters (Chhotray, 2014). Thus disasters provide key events of political importance in the lives of citizens and societies (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Pelling and Dill, 2010). Literature on disasters shows that states and governments marshal the relief and rescue activities and put their resources to maximum use to reach out to people help them in recovery activities. Modern nation-states consider it an obligation and moral responsibility to help their citizens during disasters, but it is not a constitutional right in most cases. In the case of Pakistan state, parliament passed National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) Act which put responsibility on the state to provide relief to the citizens. Still, it also kept the disaster relief not a constitutional right of the citizens.

In the Indian state of Odisha, the manipulation of situation and victimhood has been discussed with the social and political structure of the community even after efforts to make the relief assistance free of bias by the special relief commissioner of Odisha. Some quarters were reported bribing the revenue inspector's lower staff to get their names included in the list of affected people to get financial relief assistance. Those with no cash to bargain for name inclusion are left without help. Similarly, in sharecroppers, the landowner always received money for crop damage, and the growers received nothing because the financial aid was given based on land ownership documents. These practices proved injustices in the relief process based on differently positioned groups and individuals (Chhotray, 2014). Such unequal relief assistance gives rise to collective anger, which pressurizes state apparatus through organized media

portrayal and is considered political actions for justice and recognition (Pantii & Wahl-Jorgenson, 2011).

Siddiqi (2018) on the active participation of flood-hit communities in Lower Sindh in demanding relief assistance mentioned the active agency of the affected population that changed the state-citizen relationship after the flood disaster. The government also reacted promptly and designed cash transfer programs which is not usually the case in most of the global south, even Pakistan. The "transformative political space" that emerged after Pakistan's 2010 and 2011 floods affected the state-citizen relationship. People in the area, considering it their right, actively reached for help and pressured the authorities to generate resources for rehabilitation. Many flood-affected people and protesters blocked roads were recorded where the pressurizing the state to get their "right", and have the demands fulfilled. The 2010 floods and subsequent events of protests for demanding political rights proved transformative as they transformed passive citizenry into an active citizenry (Siddiqi, 2018). Above mentioned studies demonstrate that disasters provide vast avenues to study the altered nature of the citizen-state relationship where "victims" become more powerful to demand their political rights.

The situation in district Chitral, after successive floods and earthquakes, created managerial problems for the local population and state institutions. In most cases, the relationship between the state and local populations deteriorated after earthquakes and floods. The current study attempted to know the causes of the changed relationship between the state and the local population. It also attempted to learn the tactics used to pressure each other.

2.12. Political Excuses in Post-Disaster Circumstances

It was not common for political scientists to study the political aspects of disasters until Olson (2002) emphasized the need to understand the political dimensions of disasters and its aftermath. Political scientists studied disasters initially from a policy perspective. It has been ignored primarily because geographers and sociologists mainly led disaster studies. Natural disasters become political within minutes of their occurrence that should be studied as political occasions (Olson, 2000).

One of the fundamental aspects of understanding the relationship between politics and disaster is how state and government officials respond to disaster events. It is mandatory for the state to provide relief to disaster-hit populations in modern nation-state political structures. In such extraordinary situations, it is essential for state officials to "manage" the situation and have the responsibility to *explain* it too. In many cases where life loss, property damages, and large-scale injuries are involved, three critical questions are posed that are always politicized.

What happened? Though the answer to this question is scientific or technical, this is the start of making the process political to give meaning to the technical answer to the question. The second question that comes after the first question is usually about the magnitude of the losses. Why were losses in the event so high or/, and the response inadequate? This combination of questions becomes political soon after the event as it involves all the considerations and efforts of the concerned authorities within the state's apparatus and the government. It is embedded in policy formulation for pre and post-disaster situations to mitigate and rescue affected people. It also involves the effect of the policies related to the event. It creates contradictory stories from stakeholders, blaming each other for being responsible and accountable, usually known as the blame game. Once the emergency response is complete, the third question is about the

reconstruction and recovery, which is what to do now? It involves a considerable amount of finances and decisions about utilizing the money. The combination of these two is politics (Olson 2000).

To dilute the intensity of the event and to decrease the responsibility of the government and state officials, frivolous excuses are designed. It is similar to denying the situation or commitment and is actively crafted. McGraw (1991) mentioned six reasons in political processes that Olson (2000) used to analyze disaster situations. These identified excuses are used by state and government officials to decrease or avert the intensity of responsibility.

The first excuse is about blaming the event. It is also known as the spiritual cousin of "the will of God." This is one of the basic excuses in most natural disasters. It is to consider disasters or losses unpredictable on a large scale, leaving authorities and state institutions helpless. This is how authorities define the event and give meaning to it by considering it beyond their control. This excuse is also known as "beyond code" (McGraw, 1991; Olson, 2000).

The second most common excuse is to blame previous governments or administrations and consider them stupid, unwise, or less farsighted. It provides enough room for the authorities to handle uncontrolled situations and save them from humiliation.

The third excuse to save officials and governments is to blame the context or situation. It includes many institutions like economic and financial position, political structure, budget, etc. Officials portray themselves to be devoted to the welfare of the people in disaster situations, but because of the structural flaws, they act helpless again with good intentions. This excuse is more applicable in the global south like Pakistan, where state structures are inefficient, and the state

has less interest in mitigating the vulnerable population. Similarly, governments allocate significantly less for the people who suffer due to disasters because of financial constraints.

The fourth common excuse is to blame everyone and everything. This is also known as "horizontal diffusion of responsibility," where individuals, institutions, or agencies are blamed for inappropriate responses in disaster situations. It is specifically true in modern political and state structures where many agencies and institutions work together.

The fifth excuse is to blame the top management like the state machinery by the officials working in the field or with the communities. Similarly, upper management on the national or provincial level blames lower institutions or agencies for their inefficiencies in responding adequately. This type of blame game is also prevalent in most disaster situations. McGraw and Olson mentioned the sixth category of blame as the "plea of ignorance," where officials and concerned authorities consider themselves unable to foresee the odd consequences (Olson, 2000). The categories of the blame, also known as blame management, are political tactics that also uncover different layers from the authorities, governments, and entire regimes.

The current study targeted both the local and district level governments and tried to observe the perspective of the state institutions and officials responsible for providing relief and reconstruction work in the post-floods and earthquake situations. The study aimed at understanding the capacities of specialized bodies like NDMA and DDMU and their management skills of handling the disaster situation as well as the blame game between the government bodies and various parties in the district and the locales.

2.13. Politics and Disaster; Anthropological Approach

The anthropological technique to study social aspects of human lives differs from political scientists, geographers, or other social scientists. Sokefeld (2012) identified the unique way of understanding political aspects of disasters. In general, social anthropological understanding of politics, power manipulation, and its effects on societies are different. Anthropological knowledge of "the political" covers much broader aspects within societies. Unlike political science, social anthropology does not just focus on authorities, governments, states, and formal institutions. It also focuses on informal political structure and power relations in societies and communities that affects all aspects of life. For example, local-level power manipulation, on the village level or neighborhood level, and how it serves local interests remained the subject of political anthropology. Who decides what and which group is more powerful to determine things for people? What are local-level power sources, and how it is used in local contexts? What kinds of alliances are present between different groups to pursue common interests, and how do they compete for? Politics related to disaster can broadly be understood by understanding power (Sokefeld, 2012).

As discussed at the start of this chapter, politics and power structure are related to disasters in pre-disaster vulnerability situations and ultimately affect the post-disaster processes. In this study, I tried to understand the link between politics in both by using the broad anthropological technique of understanding power structure to understand the vulnerability of certain groups and how power structure affected the post-disaster situation and processes in the locales.

2.14. Floods as Natural Disasters

Leading causes of floods are related to human activities that affect the environment, resulting in climate change. Climate change is the outcome of overuse of natural resources, reduction in vegetation and increased human population that ultimately increase the load on urban centers and megacities. All these events that cause floods and increase the severity are related to humans' overuse of their environment especially deforestation and the emission of unwanted material into the atmosphere (Nott, 2006).

The vulnerability and exposure to catastrophe increase the community's chances of suffering over time (Smith & Ward, 1998). Floods are the most costly and wide-reaching of all-natural hazards. They are responsible for up to 50,000 deaths and adversely affect some 75 million people worldwide every year.

Lindsell and Prater (2003) argue that the social impacts of disasters like floods can cause a significant threat to the normal functioning of human societies. For this reason, it is pertinent to look into the wide range of structures affected by floods.

Ariyabandu and Wickramasighe (2005) stated that the affected populations are measured in terms of human and property loss. How many crops are affected, or what percentage of infrastructure is damaged? Disasters always affect men and women, children and aged differently. The same is the situation with people who can afford better and safe housing than the rest. Extending this argument, the impact of disasters is different for different regions of the same country.

2.15. The Power Structure, Climate Change, and Disaster Vulnerability

Humans have been producing and emitting greenhouse gases for thousands of years. Recent climate change is part of human activities mainly due to increased consumption and production patterns that started after the industrial revolution (Baer, 2012). The changing climatic conditions lead to extreme weather conditions across the globe. Still, some regions are more affected than others. Though, climate change and the resultant extreme weather conditions will affect the whole human population if it goes unchecked, it is also true that certain factors contribute to greater vulnerability toward climate-induced weather conditions (Thomas et al., 2019). Though there could have been multiple factors that make some groups more vulnerable to climate change-related extreme events, four primary factors are social, economic, historical, and political. It is widely accepted that factors responsible for varied vulnerability to climate change hazards are social rather than physical.

Out of four factors responsible for pushing some human groups toward the vulnerable end, one is access to resources. Social processes of disenfranchisement and marginalization produce vulnerability to natural hazards. Simultaneously, climate change-induced hazards further jeopardize access to resources and increase exposure (Denton, 2002; Leichenko & Silva, 2014; Shepherd & Binita, 2015; Thomas et al., 2019).

The second essential factor that increases the vulnerability related to climate change is governance. Local governments, institutions and firms, and civil society try to manage the climate-related hazard but have their limits. Representation, empowerment, and power differentials are essential components responsible for differential exposure to risk mitigation (Watts & Bohle, 1993).

Another fundamental factor that increases the vulnerability of certain groups over others is unequal social power distribution. Such unequal social power creates hierarchies within communities, influencing access to resources. For this reason, the two factors mentioned above are regularly quoted as products of power differentials. Thus, vulnerability due to power differentials is not a static phenomenon that keeps individuals and groups more vulnerable with low power share, but due to the process that perpetuates or expands marginalization, it keeps the power away from being vulnerable (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Atteridge & Remling, 2018; Warner & Kuzdas, 2016; Thomas et al., 2019).

Groups with more political power can secure more resources and funds to keep themselves safe from the climate change hazards. Power vested in the politics, aristocracy, and bureaucracy increases the inequalities in capacities to mitigate threats by enabling powerful groups to avoid negative environmental factors (Collins 2010). In the locales of current research, all the factors mentioned above are considered to examine their effect on the groups' vulnerabilities.

2.16. Disaster Risk Profile of Pakistan

Because of geographical and demographic factors, south Asia is one of the worst-hit regions as far as natural and man-made disasters are concerned. . It is worst affected by climate-related disasters, but other hazards also affect many people, like earthquakes, floods, and incessant rains, tsunamis, etc. In the last 40 years, more than 980,000 people have been killed by natural disasters in South Asian countries. On the other hand, more than 2.4 billion people are affected by these disasters. The total number of small and large-scale; disasters is more than 1333, including floods, earthquakes, land sliding, avalanches, and cyclones. The total cost of damages in these 40 years is around 105 billion dollars (Ahmed, 2013). Though natural disasters

of varied nature hit this region, global warming and climate change remained the primary cause of most natural disasters. It is also predicted that this region will suffer from natural disasters induced by climate change. Pakistan is one of the major countries at risk for natural disasters. Global Climate Risk Index kept the country in the top ten most at-risk countries. From 1991 to 2000, Pakistan occupied the number eight slot among the most affected countries by natural disasters related to climate change. In 2010 Pakistan reached the top of the list due to devastating floods that affected most parts (Ahmed, 2013).

2.17. Disaster Risk Management Policies and Plans

In Pakistan, disaster management mainly focuses on Emergency Response Paradigm (ERP). Efforts to respond to natural disasters have been organized under the Calamity Act of 1958. This act primarily provided constitutional backing for response in case of calamities. Different emergency response institutions have been formed since they overlap their work domain in many cases. The response paradigm is a reactive mechanism that only responds to disasters without prior mitigation and preparation mechanisms. Recent large-scale disasters put a question mark on the capacity of the state to manage situations in disasters. After the 2005 earthquake, the government of Pakistan set up an independent body under the National Disaster Management Ordinance (NDMO) an autonomous body under the NDMO called National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). The institution's formation was considered the first serious step towards a more integrated disaster response. In 2007 a mechanism for the business of NDMA was prepared on a national level, which involved different ministries, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations in designing the framework for the institution. It identified the priority areas where the action was supposed to be taken. It identified five years action plan to make NDMA an effective institution. It included the legal and institutional

arrangement of vulnerability assessment and hazards identification, training, awareness programs, local level, and community-based risk reduction mechanism, and mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction mechanisms into development programs (Ahmed, 2013).

Apart from it, there is a network of different institutions and agencies designated to respond in case of disasters and emergencies. These are the provincial irrigation department, federal flood commission, Dam Safety Council, Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Pakistan Red Crescent Society, Civil Defence, Pakistan Metrology Department, Earthquake Reconstruction, and Rehabilitation Authority, Pakistan Army, police etc. Despite all these institutions and agencies emergency response has not been very effective. One reason is the overlapping functions of these institutions, while the other is the lack of trained staff to handle the hazardous situation.

Pakistan enacted laws and framed policies related to Disaster Reduction Management (DRM) like many other countries and international policies and practices. However, the guidelines are far from being implemented due to a lack of good governance, non-availability of funds, weak political commitment, over-ambitious commitment, and economic constraints. The conclusion is that even in the presence of proactive DRM policies institutions concerned lacked the momentum to chalk out an organized plan for carrying out the promised work. As a result the suffering of the population of the country could not be reduced.. The 2010 floods were not the first of their kind, but institutions concerned could not successfully implement their policies. The Supreme Court of Pakistan's verdict on the 2010 flood in the country stated that it became catastrophic because DRM policies were not implemented (Ahmed, 2013).

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodological process of data collection. The data is collected through multi-sited ethnographic techniques. Two communities were selected on the basis of severity of the disaster and the variation in population due to religion, language, socio-economic status of the population, etc. Sokefeld (2012) considered anthropological research techniques most suitable to understand different dynamics of disasters. “When a researcher approaches the field with some questionnaires or survey the respondents very often expect some material boon” (p-8), which the fieldworker cannot fulfill. Similarly, Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (2002) argue that anthropology is ideally suited to understand the processes of disasters, vulnerability, and recovery holistically. It is for this reason; ethnographic research techniques are used for data collection which is discussed in detail in this chapter.

3.1. Research Methodology and Data Collection

According to Bernard (2006), in anthropology, research methods are used for designing, sampling collecting, and analyzing data. In qualitative research, the purpose of methodology is to understand the day-to-day experiences on the individual and group levels resulting from socio-cultural, political, and economic processes (Kleinman, 2004). I used a set of data collection tools in the field. Most of the data collection methods were used and modified, considering the nature and approach of respondents, the type of information to be collected, keep a watch on nothing is missed. Both primary and secondary sources were used to collect relevant data.

Primary data was collected through tools that are well known in anthropology. The multi-sited ethnography was used to collect primary data. Because of the growing complexity of the subjects and the requirement of the nature of the investigation, multi-sited ethnography is in use

that moves ethnography from its traditional single-site ethnography to multi-site participation and observation (Marcus, 1995). As mentioned earlier, the current study was conducted in two locations, e.g., Reshum and the Kalash valley. The purpose of including two villages in the current research is their political, religious, social, and economic variation. I wanted to understand how different locales with varying political structures affect the vulnerability and reconstruction process. Chitral town was also included to conduct interviews with state and NGO officials.

Participant observation was employed for data collection. In anthropology, this is considered a key method to pave a path for the rest of the data collection tools on the one hand and helps build a good rapport in the field on the other. It was used at different levels and are discussed later in this chapter.

Three different documents were used to record primary data in black and white correctly. The first one was a jotting pad to record every notable observation. Each day, the comments were transferred to a second notebook, written in detail, from the jotting pad. The third one was a personal diary to write personal feelings daily.

At later stage, formal interviews were conducted based on the respondents' knowledge and previous interaction. The data was collected through structured and semi-structured interviews with the NGO staff, district government members, and other government officials. The data collection and writing were done with great care because this process of recording of the data is not always objective and carries researchers' biases. Fink (2000) pointed out that no data collection tool is perfect, and almost all have disadvantages. This especially goes true for data collection document through writing (Fink, 2000).

3.1.1. Participant Observation

It is the distinction of anthropologists to acquire qualitative data while wholly immersed into the native's lifestyle. As a researcher, this technique helped me to observe the daily routine, psyche, customs, norms, values and interaction of the natives with each other in a natural environment. I participated and shared different processes of local life and was in a better position to understand their philosophy of articulating certain things. Moreover, it was an exciting experience to participate in their activities and gatherings.

It was relatively easy to develop a good rapport with the Kalash community in Kalash valley as I found Kalash community people and their culture more accommodative. After developing a good rapport with selected respondents of the community, I conveniently discussed at length with them during routine activities. I managed to have an informal conversation with them inside their houses. I had the opportunity to use my cooking skills in their places and discussed stories they wanted to share, both with males and females. I attended their death rituals weddings, etc., which I found quite different from our cultural practices. Opportunities to participate in reconstruction projects allowed me to understand the political dynamics within both locales. Kalash people were not happy with the antagonistic behavior of non-Kalash living in the area during the relief and reconstruction process. Still, they preferred to remain reticent initially but as time passed they started sharing their stories with me.

I also got a chance to teach young students in the Kalash School established for Kalash students by a group of educated young Kalash people. The purpose of the school was to teach the Kalash students about their culture, language, and values and instruct them on how to keep intact

their distinct identity. I felt it an honor and a great degree of acceptance to teach Kalash children in the school.

I participated in some cards playing groups at night in Reshun and discussed different rehabilitation projects that started after the disasters. I spent time with families as they invited me for dinner in the cold winter. As I was residing in a school building in Reshum, I was also teaching for a few weeks in the school. This helped me to know children and teachers, both male and female, and their families, which assisted me in selection of respondents with whom I could interact more conveniently.

3.1.2. Sampling

It is essential to select representative samples during data collection as it is not possible to cover all units, individuals, or cases. The accuracy of the finding depends significantly upon the sample size and its representativeness (Bernard, 2006). As mentioned earlier, district Chitral is home to many linguistic groups and sects. Considering the nature of research, it is imperative to have a representative sample. The selection of locales was contingent on the available data on recent flash floods. The gravity of destruction was higher in the selected areas compared to the rest. Secondly, these two sites were chosen for the diversity in the population. The purposive sampling technique is used in the current study to reach out to the most suitable respondents. "You, as a researcher, only go to those people who, in your opinion, are likely to have the required information and be willing to share it with you" (Kumar, 2011: 207). In purposive sampling, the researcher identifies what kind of information s/he wants from informants and communities. Researchers try to find out the most appropriate respondents. Researchers take what s/he can get by approaching the required respondents (Bernard, 2006). It is pertinent to mention that the number of respondents and their selection was not pre-determined. I stopped

interviewing until I felt saturated and realized that interviews were becoming repetitious and I could not get anything new in the in-depth discussions (Seidman, 2006). I interviewed eighty-six respondents in total.

In the Kalash Valley, 78 households were directly affected by the 2015 flood as their houses were washed away completely. Most of these households were also affected by previous flash floods in 2010 and 2013. Though I collected information about them, I managed to meet 20 of them for baseline data. I collected data about the families whose valuable land, crops, and walnut trees had been washed away from the regional land revenue office and met five members whose land was annihilated. Out of all above mentioned, I collected data from nine individuals for further in-depth interviews, group interviews, and case studies. Nine individuals were selected based on their sub-groups, groups affected by flood, lineage or clan, the intensity of losses, the relative location of houses in the valley, participation in reconstruction projects, etc. Apart from it, I included five local government representatives and a local member of the land revenue department, *patwari*. I interviewed six women, including one local pub owner and two university graduates who worked with an NGO in the valley. A women village Councilor, a Women Community Organization (WCO) head, and a local museum employee who is also working with a Community Organization (CO) on different projects, were also my respondents. This made a sample of 37 individuals in Kalash valley. It is pertinent to mention that there were still many other individuals in the localities, Kalash valley and Reshum, whom I interacted, and they shared valuable information with me during informal discussions.

In Reshum, I used the same criterion. In the first phase, out of 98 fully affected families, I met 20 of these affected families for baseline information. Out of these 20, I interviewed 11 for the second in-depth interviews and discussions. These individuals were chosen to get a

representative sample of affected families based on residence in different hamlets, sects, and different clans, the intensity of the losses, strategy of coping with the hazards and financial and economic positions, etc. I interviewed five local government representatives, four political figures active in the powerhouse reconstruction movement, and three village elders, making a total of 32 members. I could not include females from Reshum because of cultural restrictions.

In the last phase, I interviewed 17 respondents from NGOs, district-level local body representatives, and government officials from the district administration office, police, Public Health, C&W, and forest department.

3.1.3. Rapport building

Building a good rapport is considered vital in anthropological research. It is next to impossible to get accurate and reliable data, especially in an alien environment without a strong rapport. As it is a continuous process throughout the field research, I tried my best to develop and maintain a friendly environment with the people I had informal discussions with as relationship has to be maintained. In the Kalash valley, many anthropologists had already researched different aspects of Kalash culture, and it was, therefore, easy for me to introduce myself as an anthropologist. Building a good rapport was easy.

In Reshum, the situation was a bit different. They had met an international anthropologist who had carried out some fieldwork, but people criticized him. The criticism was on his way of analysis. People thought he had made public the private information of the area and its residents. During my stay, it was the concern of many, if not all, what I would do with the data. I learned during this fieldwork that a researcher should be frank with the respondents during the fieldwork. I got the impression that it is a kind of trade; the more you available to your respondents; the more they would divulge their experience and background stories.

For this reason, I kept myself and my topic of research open to my respondents. This helped me to maintain a good rapport. One of the foremost priorities was to avoid discussion on controversial issues, like religion, sects, and practices that had become taboos if I was to successfully obtain important information. I utilized my academic affiliation with the university's campus in Chitral. I was transferred to the Chitral campus upon my request for the sake of field research. I introduced myself as a researcher and university lecturer during my interaction with respondents. This university position helped me build a good rapport in the field.

3.1.4. Key Informants

The assistance and guidance of key informants are very significant in anthropological research. A field worker's most essential informers occupy special positions in the local society. These informants are called Key Cultural Informants who provide the researcher with valuable knowledge about the culture and community. Key informants play a vital role in documenting data (Bernard, 2006). The need for key informants increases due to the researcher's scant knowledge about the people's language and cultural conditions.

when I arrived at the university campus in Chitral, one of my colleagues introduced me to a master's graduate in sociology currently working in a courier company. He became my first key informant. He introduced me to the people in the district headquarters offices. Similarly, he helped me meet state authorities in the district and NGO personnel.

I wanted to explore all the areas battered by the 2015 floods. Khwaja took me to district administration office where I got necessary information and documents related to flood and earthquake. Khwaja introduced me to the Assistant Commissioner of the area, and he pledged

full support and information that I needed from offices concerned throughout my stay in the locale.

An official of the District Disaster Management Unit (DDMU) who kept records of the ravaged areas shared with me lists of flood effectees. The inventory was prepared by DDRU in collaboration with national and international NGOs working in the district.

We visited three communities in upper Chitral and three in lower Chitral. I selected two areas. Khwaja helped me meet people in these communities and introduced me to those who later became my hosts during my stay in these locales.

Arif was my key Informant from Kalash valley who worked with a national NGO. He introduced me to the local Station House Officer (SHO). The SHO and Arif helped me selection of a hotel located right in the middle of the valley for my stay. Arif introduced me to many of his friends, both Kalash and non-Kalash in the valley. He would visit me in my hotel on weekends and share stories of people of the valley.

During my stay in the Kalash valley, I met Kabir, who helped me understand Kalash culture, religion, and politics. He always had something new to share about Kalash culture, people, floods, his reservation, and a critical view of their people. He was well informed about the history of the Kalash community and the survival tactics Kalash adopted when outsiders tried to loot them and during disasters. He made it possible for me to penetrate deep into Kalash culture, and I was able to build good association with other people in the valley.

Photo 2.1 & 2.2: Author with Respondents in the Locales



Source: Author, 2017

In Reshum, a law graduate from Peshawar University and a general village councilor helped me as a key informant. He taught at a local private school where I stayed during fieldwork. He was from one of the well-known families in the village and an active member who was involved in most of the village affairs. He shared the most interesting stories about the politics, people, different tribes of the village, and disasters of flash floods in the village. His residence was next to mine and that's why he accompanied me to friends' places in cold winter nights and we discussed various topics of mutual interest. . He arranged many meetings with prominent personalities from the village. Through his consistent help and cooperation I could access and identify new research factors that otherwise would not be easy to explore. In short, he made my work much easier.

Many other people made my access in the field easy, and I spent more time with them in both locales. The list of the associates is long, and they would not go unacknowledged in this research work. I met most of these people without any prior appointment as such plans transpired almost accidentally; such unscheduled plans helped me to move deeper into the communities. There could have been people that were more convenient to approach and extended their help in understanding the situations more objectively. Still, I am pretty sure that the people that I spent most of my time with for data collection are no less valuable for the information they shared and the support they extended during my field stay.

3.1.5 Qualitative Interviews

A qualitative interview is a form of direct communication in which the data is gathered through face-to-face contact. It is the most reliable collection method as it is versatile and flexible. The qualitative research interview seeks to describe the meanings of central themes in

life. The main task in interviewing is to understand the importance of the interviewees' perceptions (Kvale, 1996). Interviews are beneficial for retrieving the story behind the experiences of the participant. The interviewer can pursue in-depth information around the topic. Interviews may be helpful to follow-up the confident respondents to questionnaires, e.g., further investigating their responses (McNamara, 2006). I used informal, unstructured, structured, and semi-structured interviews to collect data during the research.

3.1.5.1. Semi-Structured Interviews

I conducted 49 semi-structured in-depth interviews and was able to collect most of the data. The reliance on these types of interviews was essential to comprehend the impact and extent of disaster and the reconstruction process centered on the devastated economic and social life of the flood and earthquake affectees.

I tried to limit myself to my topic by keeping the objectives and research question in mind. In the process of formulating interview questions, many modifications were carried out. Some questions developed initially were eliminated as they were found irrelevant and outside the purview of the study.

3.1.5.2. Unstructured Interviews

I conducted around 20 interviews that were like informal talk while wandering in the selected locales or on my way to different places, mostly without prior planning of the interview. During unstructured interviews, I let the respondent express their opinions freely and frankly.

3.1.5.3. Structured Interviews

I conducted 17 structured interviews with the employees of NGOs, district administration officers, and district government members. Most of the interviews were scheduled

through proper communication. I used different interview schedules for different people like flood-affected people; I used one set of questions for councilors and *nazims* (village council, union council, or district council head in local government). I used different sets of questions for different categories of respondents as I required diverse kind of information from them. The duration of the interviews varied a lot as with some respondents; I spent not more than an hour with some, while some interviews continued for more than two days.

3.1.6 Group Discussions/Informal Conversation

During fieldwork, I used the group discussion technique to learn about different views about the floods and earthquakes, their occurrence, devastation and impact on the social-cultural and economic life of the affected families, and the time taken for rehabilitation. These discussions were always informal and without any prior plan. The reason for not making a formal setting was to avoid binding the participants to specific topics. In the field, I used to sit near the fire at night in the bazaar and discuss diverse issues in which at least three people used to take part initially. Later on, this group became bigger and it discussed topics regarding the problems of reconstruction and relief among different groups. I also visited various places with respondents to nearby areas where such discussions took place. Such discussions also helped me observe closely and learn the level of interaction between different groups. It helped me know people's collective viewpoint about a particular issue and I could cross-check the information gathered during individual formal interviews.

3.1.7 Case Study Method

The case study method is used for studying social situations through the comprehensive analysis of individual cases. These cases can relate to community, episodes, persons, groups,

events, projects, or any unit of social life. It intensively analyzes specific details often ignored or overlooked by other methods (Kumar, 2011). Twenty-four case studies are included in the study; the details are as follows:

In Reshum, I selected three individual case studies of three families that explained how successive floods in 2013 and 2015 affected the low-status population in the village to understand the relationship between vulnerability to natural disasters and power structure. One case study is about the performance and reputation of Frontier Works Organization (FWO) in the village after the flash flood, while one is about the experience of a resident with the military personnel in the village in the relief process. Two case studies are about the reconstruction of micro power houses in the village and their political dimensions. Two case studies are about the protection wall construction in two hamlets. One case study is about the link between the political atmosphere and grazing issues in the village. Apart from that, I selected three other case studies in Reshum: The Reshum powerhouse that was destroyed in the 2015 flash flood, its political implication and the controversy between two groups on goats grazing, which is connected to flash floods in the village. Another case study related to the construction of protection walls in the village is also analyzed. One case study is about reconstructing the drinking water project in Reshum after the 2015 flood, making a total of thirteen case studies.

In the Kalash valley, three case studies were selected to analyze the link between political/power structure and the vulnerability of the population to flash floods. A case study is about the competition between various council members of the village on reconstruction projects. One is related to a village councilor and his political interest during relief and reconstruction process. One case study is associated with manipulating a Kalash girl to use her

links to initiate a reconstruction project. Two case studies of two individuals are related to the assessment and reservations of the earthquake in the Kalash valley. One case study is about a local *patwari* and the 2015 floods and earthquake relief process. Two other case studies are about the reconstruction projects: a water channel and a protection wall while the other is about reconstructing a *bashali* after the flash floods. One of the case studies in Kalash valley is about rowdy protests after flash floods and the earthquake of 2015.

3.2. Limitations of the Study

Every research has some limitations and delimitations that are valid for current research. The first limitation is that of sampling. In this research, it was not possible to apply hard and fast sampling rules, and at times it was impossible to follow the desired specific guidelines. It is valid for research in natural environments with almost no control of subjects or units under observation.

Another weakness is the language barrier. Initially it was a challenging job to learn and understand *Khowar*, the local language spoken by the communities in my locales for daily use. I learnt it slowly, but this may have affected the research findings as intrinsic essence of locals' conversation in the first phase of the fieldwork could not be grasped fully.

Another difficult job was to get information related to my topic from the district bureaucracy. The officials were quite shrewd in hiding or divulging the information I requested. There was no point in arguing with them, forcing me to use my contacts to get relevant information from these offices. This exercise took almost two months.

Uneven topography and the varying temperature of the area posed another challenge in data collection. Chitral is a district of Pakistan where the state is almost absent in terms of providing basic facilities, infrastructure, hospitals, etc., though, one could witness some

promising changes in the recent past. Due to the lack of basic amenities it was not easy to stay in the locale for long, especially in cold biting winters when the temperature dropped to minus twenty-two (-22) and life was limited to homes or male guest houses where they relaxed, sipping tea and playing cards. Flash floods had destroyed the mini-hydropower generating power for the whole upper Chitral, and I lived without electricity for almost six months in one of the locales.

Another significant limitation was the unfortunate exclusion of women in one of the locales. It was relatively easy to access women and collect data from them in Kalash valley as they were open to outsiders. In Reshum, it was a challenge, and I deliberately avoided accessing women for data collection. Another reason was the local community's concern regarding indulgence in their private life, especially their females. I mentioned earlier about an anthropologist who spent more than five years in this area and was able to build social bridges with local people who allowed him to contact and talk to their women freely inside their houses. When he published his ethnographic research, it created anger and rage among the local people as in the ethnography, private affairs was discussed, which local people did not want anyone to make public. The anthropologist mentioned kept the names, identities, and places anonymous, yet everyone knew where he stayed and whom he discussed in ethnography research, even by using pseudonyms. To avoid this, I refrained from accessing women for their perspectives on the research topic.

3.3. Data Analysis

Traditional ethnographic data is used to be primarily descriptive with limited numeric data. The same is true in the case of the current study. Therefore, it is essential to analyze and

represent the descriptive data in a meaningful manner. There are two steps mechanism to analyze ethnographic data.

- 1) Descriptive analysis takes a bulk of data and breaks it down into patterns, regularities, or themes.
- 2) In theoretical analysis, the second phase provides a possible connection between the patterns, regularities, or themes. It also checks such practices with the literature or patterns found in other studies (Angrosino, 2007).

Data analysis in the current research has been done following the aforementioned analysis technique. The data compilation, arrangement and analysis were done in the following manner:

a) Data Management: It is essential to record and keep research data in a manageable form. For this purpose, it is recommended to keep field notes, diaries, and all documents concisely and distinctly with proper tagging for quick identification (Gibbs, 2007). As mentioned in the previous section, I regularly transferred data from jotting pads to detailed notes every day. I kept jotting pads and detailed notes of the field in different sections as I was doing a multi-sited ethnography where I collected data from the two locales and state and non-state officials and local leaders. I used to put category dividers within the notes, which helped me identify them at the time of analysis.

b) Overview of notes; it is essential to read field notes and data repeatedly to understand and make the patterns before formal analysis and throughout the process of thesis writing in qualitative research (Angrosino, 2007). I reviewed all the data repeatedly to

understand the relationship between different case studies and patterns. It happened throughout the process of analysis. It helped me understand the similarities and differences between the political structures of the two locales and the response of the local population to hazards, disasters, and efforts of the state in providing relief and rescue facilities.

c) Clarification of Categories; in this stage, themes and patterns are identified and modified by checking the available literature on the issue. Politics and disaster are relatively new domains in disaster studies, and not many researchers have conducted studies on them. Still, the categories and themes that I developed based on my field data are somehow connected to each other and are present in the literature in many cases. However, as I was expecting, the political realities, power structure, and the role of actors vary significantly from culture to culture and region to region. That is why some unique patterns and themes emerged from the data.

The most important and challenging job in ethnographic research is to manage and analyze the data in a meaningful manner. It requires well-developed analytical skills as mainly the social and cultural data is in the shape of stories, conversations, debates, and observations (Seidman, 2006; Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007). I analyzed the field data manually and arranged them into themes, case studies, and chapters. Mostly I did systematic data analysis based on themes.

4. RESEARCH SETTING

4.1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the area where I did fieldwork, its physical and social structure. In the first part, basic information about the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and brief history of floods is given. This portion also explains basic information about the district; its political and administrative division. The second part of the chapter describes the political structure in of the district, and the villages where I conducted fieldwork. For a proper understanding of the political structure of the locales, it was crucial to understanding the political history and power structures of the communities lived in Chitral and in particular the selected locales as traces of the past power structure has implication in current social structure. The political structure revolved around the ownership of resources and its association to the power structure. It also sheds light on the affiliation between different tribes and lineages in the district. Historically, a strict hierarchy prevailed among tribes, clans, and lineages in Chitral. This hierarchy was essential for resource holding and the mechanism that guided the distribution of resources within groups, tribes, and lineages. After grasping the background of various families and groups and their relative position in the hierarchy, it became easy to understand the rapport between vulnerability and power structure. This has been discussed in chapter 5 in light of data collected. At the end of this section, details about the current circumstances of the two selected sites


4.2. Land, Weather and Boundaries of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP)

Geographically Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (30°–35° N and 67°–72° E), previously known as North West Frontier Province (NWFP), of Pakistan is located on Iranian Plateau

(Rafiq et al., 2021). The northern part of the province comprises a mountainous range and has cold weather compared to the rest of the country. This part of the province stretches from the valley of Peshawar to the mountains of Hindu Kush and is the main attraction for tourists due to the natural beauty of meandering rivers, high rising mountainous ranges, and green landscape (Khan & Rehman, 2013). According to the 2017 population census, the province's total population is 30,508,920 (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

KP is linked with Gilgit-Baltistan in the northeast to the east with Azad Kashmir, and in the Southeast with Punjab province. Afghanistan borders the west and north of the KP province. The administrative divisions in the form of FATA and KP were established after the independence of Pakistan, but before that, these areas were one unit under British rule. After passing the historic 31st amendment in the National Assembly of Pakistan on 24th May 2018, Federally Administered Tribal Areas became part of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (Ullah & Hayat, 2018).

Figure 4.1.



Source: Metrological Department KP, 2019

4.2.1 Climate, Rainfall, and Floods in KP

The major part of Pakistan is experiencing an arid to semi-arid climate and receives 250 mm of rainfall in a year, while humid conditions prevail over a small area in the north (Khan, 2003). Generally, rainfall steadily increases from south to north, and aridity gradually diminishes (Shams, 2006). There are two well-marked rainy seasons in Pakistan, the monsoon (July–


September) and western depressions (December to March). District Chitral receives scanty rain from local convection and thunderstorms in the intervening periods. Northern Pakistan, especially the Himalayas range, receives annual precipitation between 760 mm and 1270 mm, nearly 72 % of the mean annual flow in the Indus River System. In the world's deadliest floods list, the flood of 1993 ranked 41, 1950 ranked 44, 1992 ranked 59, and 2010 ranked 64 (Tariq & Giesen, 2012).

In Pakistan, the causes of floods include low lying areas along the river banks, monsoon rains, and heavy melting of snow/glaciers in the north. In addition to this, intensifying human factors have also contributed much to both the plains and fragile mountain systems (Mirza, 2003; Ali, 2007). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is also susceptible to floods because of its physiographic conditions and uncertain climate (Khan & Rehman, 2013).

4.3. District Chitral

Chitral is situated in the extreme north-east of KP, parallel to Afghanistan's panhandle-shaped Wakhan corridor. It lies within 35° 15' 06" to 36° 55' 32" North and 71° 11' 32" to 73° 51' 34" East. Chitral is connected to the rest of the world by two routes Lawari pass and Arandu pass. The Lowari Tunnel is constructed in 2019 near Lawari Pass. Tirich Mir (25,289 feet), the highest peak of the Hindu Kush, is also situated in Chitral (Haserodt, 1996; Ali & Qaiser, 2005).

Figure. 4.2. District of Chitral Map



Source: Pukhtunkhwa Disaster Management Authority –Provincial Reconstruction Rehabilitation & Settlement Authority /DC Offices, 2015

The central valley of Chitral is approximately 354 km long and around five kilometers wide. However, the valley is less than 180 meters wide in certain places, while the side valleys are also very narrow. Most villages and cultivated fields are formed on these deposits (Ali & Qaiser, 2005).

Figure 4.3: Map of Major Roads and other Facilities in Chitral District




Source: Pukhtunkhwa Disaster Management Authority –Provincial Reconstruction Rehabilitation & Settlement Authority /DC Offices, 2015

Most of the land (76%) of Chitral is either glacial or covered with bare mountains and rocks. Small patches of forests, alpine and pasture meadows cover 24%, and croplands make up only 1-2% of the total land in the district (Haserodt, 1996). There are about 22 glaciers that are more than 10 km long, including the longest Chianter glacier, which is 32 km long, covering an area of 170 km square. In the high glacier regions, precipitation may be as high as four times, whereas the valley bottoms are dry and desert-like (Haserodt, 1996; Ali & Qaiser, 2005).

According to the 2017 census of the Chitral district, the total population is about 447362 (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Ethnically most of these people are Chitrali, although Pashtuns dominate the southern valleys of the region. Most Chitrali people differ in their cultural outlook fundamentally from the dominant Pashto-speaking people of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; even though Pashtuns fellow belong to the same land. "Khowar-speakers refer to themselves as belonging to an ethno linguistic group (Chitrali), which they distinguish from the Pukhtun-speaking Pukhtuns. Chitralis say that their language is "sweet" (*shirin*) and their "people" (*roye*) are "noble" (*sharif*) and "sophisticated" (*tazhibi haftah*) compared to the "wild" (*jangali*) Pukhtuns who speak a "hard" (*saht*) language. Chitral people are especially famous in Pakistan for their love of horses, polo and other "lordly" sports, especially duck and ibex hunting" (Marsden, 2005: p-14).

Figure 4.4: Areas Affected by 2015 Floods



Source: Pukhtunkhwa Disaster Management Authority – Provincial Reconstruction Rehabilitation & Settlement Authority /DC Offices, 2015

4.4. Short History of Chitral State

For geographic and environmental similarity, this whole region, from Astor to *Nuristan*, was once occupied by culturally homogeneous groups. A Buddhist emperor Kanishka of the Kushan Empire conquered Chitral in the 3rd century AD. In the 4th century A.D., the Chinese took control of the region and imposed strict administration, introducing forced labor for the conquerors. Until the 8th century AD., there was a constant power shift between local chiefs and

the Chinese (Din, 1969; Biddulph, 1880; Dani, 1989; Baig, 1994; Holzwarth, 1996; L' Homme & L' Homme, 1999; Murtaza, 1982; Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001). After the 8th century, the Chinese disappeared from the scene while lower Chitral areas remained in control of Kalash (*Kafir*) chiefs while upper Chitral was ruled by legendary *Bahiman i Kohistani* around 930 AD (Ghufran, 1962; IUCN Pakistan, 2004).

Chitral history is divided into three stages 1) *Kafir* period 2) *Rais* period 3) *Kator* period (Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001). According to Holzwarth (1996), Chitral remained without any firm centralized state structure till the sixteenth century without any trace of Islam. Chitral population was "*Kafir*" till the end of the 16th century (Jettmar, 1995; Mirza, 1895; Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001). Out of the two known *Rais* rulers, the first ruler and founder of the *Rais* dynasty Shah Nasir's rule lasted till the end of the sixteenth century (Biddulph, 1880; Schomberg, 1938; Scott, 1937; Holzwarth, 1996; Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001).

First *Kator Mehtar* was Muhammad Shah *Kator*, the grandson of Baba Ayub, who settled in Chitral in the sixteenth century. He came from Herat, Afghanistan (Ghufran, 1962; IUCN Pakistan, 2004). Some historian believed that the *Kator* family rule did not start earlier than the 19th century (Raverty, 1888; Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001). With the arrival of the British in the sub-continent and to the Hindu Kush, the *Kator* family ruled princely state of Chitral with an iron hand. British started influencing Chitral state directly in 1885 while the state merged into Pakistan in 1969 and became a district of then North West Frontier Province (NWFP).


Chitral is different from other areas that constitute northern areas of Pakistan. It is mainly because of the political status of other northern areas of Pakistan, including Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. Till the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Gilgit and Baltistan were

parts of Kashmir state (Senge, 2010). A dispute started between Pakistan and India in Kashmir state. After the 1948 war between India and Pakistan, a portion of the Kashmir state became part of Pakistan, while another portion became part of India. The whole region of Kashmir was declared disputed territory by the UN since then. Thus the nature of the contract between Chitral and other northern areas of Pakistan is different.

4.5. Social Structure of Chitral; Past and Present

The society of the princely Chitral state was hierarchical with unequal status groups. Chitral was a centrally controlled state with many sub-states that were semi-independent within the central authority and with a chain of administrative positions (figure 4.1). *Mehtar's* sons or brothers, who belonged to *Kator* family, ruled these multiple sub-states or provinces (Young husband, 1896; Eggert, 1990; Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001). Under the command of provincial *Mehtar*, a number of administrative chiefs like *Hakim*, *Charwel*, *Charbu*, *Asaqal*, *Baramosh* used to work (Biddulph, 1880; O'Brien, 1937; Murtaza, 1982; Eggert, 1990; Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001; Forsyth, 1875).


Figure: 4.5. Titles of Rulers and Administrators in Descending order in the Princely State of Chitral



Source: Eggert, 1990 cited by Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001

In the princely state, people were divided into three broad categories. One was *adamzade* which meant "sons of man." This class made landowner elites and rulers and can roughly be called upper class or upper status group. *Mehtars* (rulers) belong to this class. Other lineages in this group included *Khushwaqte*, *Rezaye*, *Khushahmede*, *Mohammad Bege*, etc. (see figure 4.2). This class remained detached from the lower classes by hypergamy and endogamy (Schomberg, 1938; Hussam-ul-Mulk & Staley, 1968; Biddulph 1880; Murtaza 1982; Staley 1982).

Figure 4.6: Scheme of Social Stratification in Chitral



Source: (Eggert, 1999: 53; Parkes, 2001: 15)

They own the fertile land with ample water supply. This class participated in *Marakha* (court proceeding in Chitral state for taking important decisions). They remained aristocrats of

Chitral irrespective of the material circumstances (Government of India, 1928; IUCN, 2004). Though such a hierarchy no longer exists, high-status members still consider themselves different from the lower-status groups.

Yuft are groups in the princely state which can be called middle status groups. Below them are lower-status groups. Lower status was further divided into four sub-classes. The further sub-classes were *patani*, *bolduy*, *rayat* and *khanazade*. *Khanazad*. The artisan class was lowest in the ranking (Murtaza 1982; Eggert, 1990).

Another category included in the last four lower classes was *shirmoosh*, which meant "milk kin," but also carried other meanings. Sometimes it was also used for an enslaved person who took care of the children. It was common both in the ruling class and *adamzade* to give their newborns as foster child to people of lower classes, and they were returned to the actual parents after two to three years. The royal family used this foster relation to increase the alliances with tribes to gain support. The foster parents on the other hand get favors of the ruling class. *Adamzade* gave land to foster relatives as a sharecropper to rear kids and work for them as servants. The ruling family gave their children to *adamzade* only and not to any class below them to be their foster parents. The *adamzade* gave their children to lower-class people to be their foster parents (Parkes, 2001).

The political and social structure changed gradually after the influence of the British and subsequent events like the creation of Pakistan and the merger of the Chitral state in Pakistan. When the British colonizers started ruling Chitral indirectly in 1885, they abolished slavery. After the merger of the princely state into Pakistan, the introduction of the bureaucratic institution in the shape of district administration and other state departments and the democratic

structure transformed the power structure of the district. Tenancy act safeguard the rights of tenants while land reforms gave ownership rights to the lower-status groups in the district, which proved a move of liberation from the clutches of high-status groups. Similarly, the local government structure provided opportunities for lower-status groups to participate and elect their members and raise their issues on various forums. All these changes in Chitral affected the old power structure significantly though high-status groups are still prominent in the new power structure.

The old power structure was also affected by the introduction of post-colonial bureaucratic structure in the district. This structure, headed by Deputy Commissioner (DC), link all line departments such as District Health Department, District Police, District Education, Communication and Works Department, *tehseeldar* (Sub-District Revenue Officers), *patwari* (lower rank officer in district bureaucratic structure who keeps land record). This structure created new actors in the politics of the district.

4.6. Profile of the Selected Locales


The locales of research were the most affected villages by the 2015 flash floods. Similarly, these two locales cover the ethnic variation of the district, both linguistic and religious. One of the two locales is in upper Chitral and the second in lower Chitral. Upper and lower Chitral is an administrative and geographical division. The lifestyle of people is also different in these two areas. Though they mostly speak the *Khowar* language, the accent is different. At both the sites, a mixture of other ethnic groups was living, which I have tried to explain in detail.

4.6.1 Reshum

I did not use the names of the places deliberately where I did fieldwork to keep confidentiality and anonymity intact. Magnus (2005), who wrote the ethnography "Living Islam," avoided using actual names of respondents and places for anonymity. However, there were complaints from the community where he spent time that he should not have disclosed these people. Local people were not expecting him to make things public that were private to them. I tried my best to avoid such circumstances.

Reshum, not a real name, is the first of two villages where I did the fieldwork. I spent more than six months in this village. As I discussed earlier, Reshum, an old village in the area is located in upper Chitral, where the population is scattered along a stream in the small valley. Reshum *gol* (stream) pours its water into the main Chitral River.

Figure: 4.7. Map of Reshum Village



Source: Author, 2018

6.6.2. General Description of Reshum Village

Reshum is situated on the main road that leads from Chitral to Booni. Booni is the capital town of upper Chitral. It takes almost two hours to drive from Chitral town to reach this village. River Chitral is running on one side of the road. On the other side, the small hills of the Hindu Kush are situated. Behind these hills, a series of glaciers and high mountains of Hindu Kush are spread all over the area and only devoted hunters and goat grazers visit these glaciers. The stream running in the middle of the village emerges from these glaciers. Charun is the head office of the union council situated in the north of the village at a distance of five kilometers.

Residents of the village believe that this whole village is built on the debris of the many flash floods brought from high mountains and spread over the area for thousands of years. The main ingredients of this debris are pebbles, large and small, clay and sand. About the 2013 and 2015 floods, an old man said: "it was an attempt by the floods to reassure their territory as we all have captured the territory of the stream."

The Hindu Kush is an active seismic mountain and is not stable. A few months after a series of floods in the whole district in 2015, a heavy earthquake hit Chitral, and its epicenter was near the upper Chitral Hindu Kush Mountains.

Most of the vegetation is around the river belts or along its tributaries. In Reshum people grow different crops and trees for their domestic use. Both sides of the stream were covered with thick trees of *shahtook* (mulberry), *birmogh* (walnut), *angoor* (grapes), apricot, persimmon, pomegranate etc. The flood washed away most of the fruit trees near the stream, and only a few walnuts and trunks of mulberry tree traces are visible. All these trees were chief source of food as well. Most of the village's land away from the floods is fertile, and people grow wheat, rice and maize on these fields. Other crops are red beans, tomatoes, chilies, okra etc.

Koppen-Geiger while discussing climate classification, states that the climate of Reshum is classified as a semi-arid or steppe climate (Climate Reshun, 2019). The average rainfall in the village is 345 mm per annum, and the average temperature is 13.3 Degrees Celsius. This is a type of climate that falls in between desert climate and humid continental climate (Peel et al., 2007). In this region, precipitation is below potential evapotranspiration but above desert climate.

It is a challenging task to provide electricity from the national grid to Chitral. In Reshum, the provincial government had installed a mini-hydro power station in Reshum *gol* (The World Bank, 2008). This mini-hydropower produced 4.2 MW of electricity at installation back in 1990. Reshum importance increased because of this mini-hydropower station in the area. This powerhouse was producing electricity for the upper Chitral, Mastuj sub-division, and some parts of lower Chitral. It is pertinent to mention here that the price of this off-grid electricity was lower in the district than that produced by the national grid

Two sects of Muslims are living in the village, Sunni and Ismaili. Ismaili makes up around thirty-five percent of the total Muslim population in the Chitral district (Pradhan, 1995; Holzwarth, 1996; Marsden, 2005). In Reshum, the Ismaili population is around 40 percent, while Sunni population constitutes 60 percent. There is a long history of rivalry between these two sects. Two significant incidents of sectarian violence erupted in 1982 and 2001 creating antagonistic relationship between these two sects (Marsden, 2005).

4.6.3. Social and Economic Structure of Reshum

Five high-status groups live in this village: *Khushahmate*, *Riza*, *Khushwaqte*, *Kator*, and *Zondra*. Most of the fertile land is owned by *Khushahmate* lineage in the village. They also received *Mehrabani* land from Mehter as a reward for their services to him (Scott, 1937). This

lineage is bigger than any other group in the village; they are more resourceful than any other group.

In the village, the *Khushahmate* lineage lives in a well-protected area. Due to the population increase, some houses have shifted recently in the vicinity of the stream. Many members of this lineage served in government in positions as teachers, bankers, and in armed forces, etc. Few *Khushahmate* families play polo and keep horses as it was customary for most royal families to breed horses and play polo. During my fieldwork, I did not see anyone from low-status groups who played polo. One of the respondents once said: "polo is the king of games and is a game of kings. Only high-status people play polo here".

Khushwaqte is another high-status lineage living in Reshum. They are descendants of Khushwaqt-I, the brother of the first *Kator* ruler Muhtaram Shah *Kator* and son of Muhammad Beg (Biddulph, 1880; Scott, 1937). On the southern side of the Reshum stream, the *khushwaqte* family, headed by Haji Awal, a retired school headmaster resides. All his sons are university graduates. One of the sons is a good polo player. He is also a graduate of Economics from the University of Peshawar. He is a member of the village council elected on the youth seat and a good polo player as well.

Kator families live on the extreme eastern side of the village. They have around five extended families. They are *metajao* (*Kator* family members whose mothers are not from the royal family). These extended families own *last chatur* (fertile land) that they cultivate.

Riza is the next royal family in the village who owns cultivated land. All the *Riza* families live between Chitral River and Booni to Chitral road, east of Reshum stream. *Zondra* family is also considered one of the lordly groups in the district. Though they are not

genealogically linked to the last royal family of the Chitral state, still many of these families are first-class *adamzade* (Scott, 1937). In Reshum, there are few families of the *Zondra* clan. Ishfaq, who is from the *Zondra* clan, a private school teacher, a law graduate, and a member of the village council. Ishfaq, also my key respondents, invited me once to dinner at his house. He showed me *ghalamus* (serf) rooms at the back of the male guest portion of the house. He wanted me to accompany him to these quarters. There were three male kids, roughly around fourteen to eighteen years old. There were also some older men resting in one of the rooms. They visited their kids from upper Chitral, where they work and care for Ishfaq family land and livestock. Latter, these kids made a fire for us in a well-furnished male guest room. Most lordly and upper-class families want to demonstrate their upper status through all possible means.

Mixed *Yuft*¹⁰ families too live in the village. Most of them have small shops in the Reshum *bazaar*. The villagers are well aware of the background of other families and their previous status as they have lived together for very long. Second, the difference of status and rank among families was evident in the past, making the distinction more obvious, but usually, people avoid mentioning it in daily conversation. Clan, known as *Bubak* claims to be *Yuft*. The total population of *Bubak* is more than any other *Yuft* or other class, which is considered lower than *Yuft*. Few of these families live in Golguch, the northern side hamlet of Reshum stream, but mainly on the north side of the hill and the stream.

All the families mentioned above live mostly away from the stream or near the main Chitral to Booni road. The groups discussed in the coming section live on both sides of the stream, making them more vulnerable to floods than any other group.

¹⁰ *Yuft* are considered middle class groups in Chitral.

On both sides of the stream, houses are situated immediately after the powerhouse. The residents of the *Panandeh* hamlet are known as *Panaye*. Some families of *Panaye* are also living near the main road. Because of minimal land for cultivation, most families depend on *mal* (livestock), mainly cows and goats. Goats remained a major source of income for many families in this hamlet. Saadat of *Panandeh* is in the seventies once an active goat's trader now depends on a few goats for his livelihood while his children have shifted to down districts in the province. They graduated from there and have reasonably good jobs. One son is a medical doctor, and the daughter is a lecturer in a government college. He said:

My *paye* (goats) and other livestock enabled me to earn enough to send my kids to colleges and universities. If I had no cattle, it would not have been possible to educate my children. When my kids need money for fees I sell my goats. Many people do same here.

Nasrullah is a business administration graduate from Peshawar University and teaches in a private school/college. One of his brothers is teaching at Agha Khan College near Booni. They and their other family members live with an extended family, but the location is vulnerable. His father is a medical doctor, and he is serving in Peshawar. Many have shops in the *Reshum bazaar*, while others work in the deserted powerhouse.

As stated earlier, the difference in relative status in the princely state of Chitral is significant as it directly co-relates to the district's social, political, and economic realities. Marsden (2005) reported the same in his ethnography. Though it is considered inappropriate and distasteful to talk about the relative status of different clans and families, it is still a central feature of hushed talk. It has important implications (Marsden, 2005).

In the recent past, when the relative difference between the lordly lineages' social, political, and economic status and the rest started diminishing, tension between upper and lower status groups also escalated. In the case of Reshum, one example is the controversy that relates to *Panaye* people's origin or genealogy. An author from *Khushahmate* lineage, who writes for a local publication, penned a story about the origin of the *Panaye* clan. The statement was very derogatory to the *Panaye* people. The reported account is about a *ghalamus* (serf) lady who worked in the house of one of the *Khushahmate* forefathers. She got pregnant, but there was no proper arrangement for *ghalamus* (serf) to deliver the baby. She was lying in a small space in the wall of a room, big enough for a single woman. She gave birth to a male child in that space in the wall. Emic term for that space in the wall is *Pan*. According to the document, the residents of Panandeh are considered the descendants of that woman. Many lordly families in the village consider this story valid. This narrative created unrest in the residents of the Panandeh. They took the matter to a court of law, the village elders resolved the issue. The writer, however, stuck to his claim. He registered an apology for hurting the feeling of *Panaye* people but remained firm about the correctness and authenticity of his story. The writer still lives in Reshum and shared the whole story with me.

The residents of the next village *Batikandeh* are known as *Batik*. Proximity to the stream makes them vulnerable as they mainly live on marginal slopes. In the front, they have Reshum stream and at the back of their houses is a high mountain. Like the residents of Panandeh, there is almost no land for crop cultivation, except for a few of the residents, who have small plots to grow fruit trees and vegetables or, in some cases, wheat. The land of all three hamlets is *choni* (not fertile) but is vulnerable to flash floods that wash away the crops.

The literacy rate in the hamlet is reasonably high and people are employed in public sector as a teacher, in the police as security staff, Chitral scout, border police, etc. Few residents run shops and engaged in business in the main Reshum *bazaar*.

Batikandeh hamlet is relatively smaller than Panandeh. They are less dependent on goats and cows compared to Panandeh people. Livestock, once the mainstay of the community's source of income and an exceptionally essential commodity for the village is on the decrease. It is believed that overgrazing can cause flash floods (Murphy et al., 2021). Some local NGOs, mainly AKRSP, conducted seminars on the relationship between flash floods and grazing animals in the village and surrounding areas and concluded that grazing by animals cause floods in the village stream. This has led to decrease in the number of goats in the village. When the controversy over grazing¹¹ goats intensified, majority of residents of Batikandeh abandoned the goats primarily to avoid damaging from the threatening flash floods and to prevent potential conflict arising from maintaining goats. The repercussions of the goat grazing issue has led to lengthy debates and disputes among people of different hamlets and groups to be discussed in coming chapters.

The third hamlet is Gulguch, situated on the northern side of the Reshum stream. In this hamlet, residents do not share their ancestry as they belonged to different groups. On the top eastern corner of the village is Hakimidur. All the residents are from one family in *hakimidur*. Some family members live outside the village as hakim owned land in different places. This family is not a lordly clan, but they belong to upper-status groups because of their position in the Mehter administration.

¹¹ In Reshum there are two groups, one is in favor of grazing goats and other oppose it. Some NGOs conducted workshops in the area and considered overgrazing a cause of flash floods. This created the two groups and hatred among them. Details are in the coming chapters

On the Eastern part of the Golguch, several different families, including migrants from Wakhan (part of Afghanistan extending into the north of Chitral district), Rayat, Bubak, and other families, live. These families are located very near to the stream. Most of the families depend on earning from shops and small businesses in the nearby *bazaar*. Few are working in government jobs in the education department and armed forces. The only land they possess is barely enough to construct their houses. Like Panandeh and Batikandeh, this is the most vulnerable part of the village, and the flash floods have damaged houses heavily in the past. One important personality in this hamlet is Amirullah, commonly known as chairman in the village. He was the first to be elected in local body elections in the 1980s and later also. He is considered representative of the lower-status residents of the village and nearby areas.

In the villages of upper Chitral, people know about families and households who remained the serfs of lordly families. The dwelling places of these families and households are primarily isolated or separated from lordly families. In the case of Marsden's research locale, it was *Ghalamusandeh* (hamlet of the low-status group) (Marsden, 2005), while in the case of Reshum, these three hamlets are identified as such.

Many members of lordly families told me that dwellers of these hamlets, situated on both sides of the Reshum stream, and remained their servants. The principal of the government high school in the village, grandson of a *hakim* (administrative position in the court of *Mehtar*), told me that most of the Batikandeh residents were servants of his family and other lordly families. Some families also raised their kids as developing foster relationships was one way of securing benefits, discussed earlier.

The land that rulers or aristocrats gave families as a reward to foster their children is *Shirmuzh Galu*. Other forms of land given to lower-status people within the state are *Khana Zad Gulu* land provided for cultivation by *adamzade* as a reward for domestic chores for the landlord and *Darali Zamin* again to foster the landlord's kids (IUCN, 2004). Residents of these three hamlets received the land as a reward for their services to rear their children or provide other services to the landlords or lordly families in the village. The constant pressure of population increase cost and availability of land that is further fragmentation of land further push these people toward vulnerable and marginalized locations prone to flash floods and earthquakes.

The situation changed steadily since the arrival of the British in Chitral back in 1892 as *Mehter* after that brought a few changes, and one of them was to abolish slavery, the legacy of British rule (Curzon, 1926; Din, 1987; IUCN, 2004). Subsequent events like the creation of Pakistan and then the merger of Chitral state into Pakistan in 1969 further diminished the long-established strict hierarchical system. The relative social, economic, and political status of different groups and families still exist.

Like the rest of the district, Reshum also has scarce cultivable land. Till very recently, the people of Reshum had to go back to subsistence domestication of animals. After the merger in Pakistan in 1969 introduction of modern and higher education created more opportunities for the people to open their own businesses and shift to other means of income and salaried jobs.

After graduation, most educated people got employed in elementary education system as teachers. This is the highest government employment in the village, both for males and females. Few started working in banks while females, mainly from Ismaili families, joined nursing in down districts in Peshawar. Apart from this, in the small bazaar shops are lined up on both sides of the main Chitral-Booni road. These shops are mostly owned by people who belong to

relatively lower-status clans. Some people go to down districts for work in winter, return in summer, and do manual labor at hotels and shops. As socio-economic conditions of the area are changing and people of high-status lineages can't meet their needs just by farming, forcing them to open shops recently for extra income.

4.6.4. Political Dynamics in Chitral and Reshum after Merger into Pakistan

After 1969 when Shuja ul Mulk, Mehter of Chitral, handed over the state administration of Chitral to Pakistan state, the *Mehter* family and other royal members remained the most successful political figures in the district. There is a continuum of power in these elite families. Those in power in the princely state were in control when Chitral was a semi-autonomous princely state and are now in politics. However, they have continuously changed their affiliation with the political parties (Marsden, 2007; Cutherell, 2011). One famous name in the political process of Chitral is the grandson of Shuja ul Mulk, Shahzada Mohiyuddin. He has been elected to the National Assembly Seat four times and thrice served as district government head. One of his sons won the election in 2013 for the national assembly seat from the district (Election Commission of Pakistan, 2013). Religious parties, Jamiat Ulema e Islam (JUI) and Jamat I Islami (JI), won elections a few times. Jamat i Islami remained victorious twice in the National Assembly seat and district government *Nazim* (head of the local body elected council) seat. As high-status lineages and ruling families have constantly influenced the political structure of Chitral, members of religious parties are critical of their influence. They consider themselves the legitimate representatives of the Chitrali people, and only they can relieve the people of Chitral from the old un-Islamic feudal system (Marsden, 2007).

Pakistan People's Party (PPP) remained very popular among Chitral people. Initially, the princely family led the PPP but soon, it became popular in lower-status groups. It was during PPP first government that lower status people of the district were given ownership rights of the land they were cultivating or where they were living. In Reshum, party politics is not very different from the rest of the district, though some active participation of lower-status people has placed them among top politicians. Amanullah Khan is one of them. He joined PPP when he was still a student. His first membership of political representation started in the 1980s. He is an active voice of the people of Charun union council in general and that of Reshum and Reshum *gol* in particular. He has been elected twice as head of the union council Charun in the local government election and was runner-up in the 2015 local body elections. Amanullah Khan has been a key figure in the fight on *paye janjal* (goats issue) in the Reshum.

The recent introduction of Pakistan Tehrik i Insaf (PTI) and specifically in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (K.P.) gave a new opportunity, especially those who were not part of any party previously, joined PTI. Ghazi won the 2015 District membership seat of Charun union council election on PTI ticket. Ghazi is also a member of the central party membership in the Chitral district. He is from the *Khushahmate* lineage. Shazda won the Reshum village council seat and became chairman of the village council. Shazda also belongs to the *Khushahmate* lineage and has more cultivable land than anyone else in the village. Other village council members are from different families and groups, one from *Zondra*, one from *khushwaqte*, and the other from *Yuft* families and Reshum *gol*. Respondents told me that all the *adamzade* families regained the glorious position that they once possessed in this election. The election results exposed the village politics, especially the tension between high-status and low-status families, which intensified recently because of the goat grazing issue and flash floods and its subsequent effect

on Reshum *gol*. The above mentioned leaders and local government members were key political actors in reconstruction process.

4.7. The Kalash Valley


The second locale of my research was one of the three valleys where majority of Kalash people lived. Much has been written about the Kalash people by anthropologists, journalists, historians, and visitors, being polytheist pagan religion of northern Pakistan. They have a three thousand-year history in the region (Cacopardo, 2008; Taj & Ali, 2018). Because of their uniqueness, researchers have developed different theories and myths about their origin (Cacopardo, 2008). Some consider Kalash people the descendants of ancient Greeks (for example, Trail, 1996). Still, others believe that Kalash people lived in this region long before the arrival of Alexander the Great and other ancient Greeks (Choudhry et al., 2018). In the coming section, I tried to explain the Kalash valley's people, culture, and environment. Actual names of places and people have been kept anonymous for the sake of maintaining confidentiality. .

4.7.1. General Description of the Kalash Valley

The Kalash valley is relatively greener than most of the other parts of the Chitral district. It is because of its nearness to the green belt having average rainfall around 250-400 mm per annum (Ahmed, 2007), and that it has taller pine trees in the valleys. This particular valley where I conducted research consisted of many small hamlets. It is a narrow valley on undulating land, and the plane area is scarce (see figure 3.6) and is adjacent to the road and stream. Most of the houses of Kalash community are built along the hills. Highlands in the valley are covered with pine trees. As one goes deep into the valley, the temperature drops gradually, and the upper parts of the valley are relatively cold than the lower part.

The stream that runs from the upper part of the valley is fed by the two glaciers. During the last decade, the streams were over flooded causing several inundations. The 2015 floods are considered the most devastating, and they affected people socially and economically by destroying their lands, crops, and houses. The central hamlet contains most shops, schools, hotels, and community centers, including village council offices, which saw flood overflows causing extensive damage.

Figure: 3.8. Map of the Kalash Valley



Source: Author, 2019

The land is fertile; that is why the valley produces good crops. Most Kalash residential areas are up in the hills. There is a very famous saying in the valley about the round stones. They say, "These round rocks are eggs of floods. Do not build your house where you find these eggs (round rocks) as flood will move these eggs." Much of the plain land and the small bumpy road is a stream catchment. Most of the houses along the stream were affected by the consecutive floods and destroyed in the 2015 flood.

According to Sheikh (2013), approximately 1.5 percent of the total land is irrigated through tiny channels where wheat, maize, legume, and fodder are grown. One percent of the whole land is at a low elevation and is used for haymaking. 14% of the total land is covered by trees like mulberry, apricot, walnut, apple, pomegranate, etc., while 15 percent of the land is covered by deodar and other pine species. Above this forest is the green pasture makes up 60 percent of total land, while the rest 8 percent consists of snow peaked mountains (Sheikh, 2013).

The Walnut (*Juglans regia*) trees are mostly grown near the catchment area of the stream and are a staple fruit consumed by the Kalash people. Though walnut is used for dietary purposes in cold winter, development agencies and NGOs have completed many projects on Kalash Valley nuts for marketing as it is considered one of the best among the rest (Ahmed, 2007).

Three mountain ranges surround the Chitral district. On the northeastern side is Hindu Kush range and the northern part Karakoram ranges are predominant. Hindu Raj ranges on the eastern side of the Chitral district stand out prominently (Qaiser & Ali, 2009). Because of these high mountain ranges, the winters remain very harsh. Kalash valleys are situated on (35-40N latitudes and 71-40 E longitude) in the Hindu Kush ranges (Ahmed, 2007).

The average maximum temperature of the valley is between 21 and 27 Celsius in

summer. In recent years, the precipitation level starts rising in the monsoon season, mainly in July, due to the climate change and increase in temperature which results in flash floods in the region (Ahmad et al., 2016). On the other hand, the winter season is very severe, and the temperature remains mostly below the freezing point. The average yearly precipitation is approximately 28-32 inches (700-800mm) (Sheikh et al., 2015; Denker, 1981). Most of the rains occur in winter.

This valley is part of the Ayun union council. Ayun is a sub-administrative division in lower Chitral tehsil. Ayun has three valleys of Kalash, one relatively larger and Ayun village is the gateway to these valleys. According to the 2017 census total population of the union council is 28,182 in 3983 households. The total population of the valley is 5093 individuals. The total number of households is 689, out of which the total Kalash population is 35 percent, and Muslims making 65 percent of the total population (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017; Sheikh, 2013).

There are three primary sources of income in this valley; land, livestock, and the tourism industry. Some people are also employed in Chitral scouts, border police, and state schools. Very few people work with local NGOs.

The land use is on the top of the said income sources in the valley. It provides food in the shape of wheat, maize, vegetables, and fruits. Only walnuts and dried fruits are traded with the outsiders and this trend started very recently. Different government and Non-Government Organizations are developing local skills of the local people to help them increase the quantity and quality of these products to meet the market demands. There are different perspectives about these projects, and most of these are not matching indigenous techniques.

Agha Khan Rural Support Program¹² (AKRSP) was the first NGO that arrived in the area in the mid-80s and started its operation in Chitral in 1982. AKRSP initiated some social sector projects in collaboration with the World Bank and in the process job opportunities were created for the local people were involved at various levels. In the late 90s, Sarhad Rural Support Program (SRSP) made a promising entry. Since then, several NGOs and funding agencies working in the area have changed the structure of the local community, its environment, political, economic, and social network (Parkes, 2000). A specialized wing of Agha Khan Rural Development Network (AKDN) was empowered to provide relief to disaster-affected people in the district, now one of the leading agencies known as FOCUS. Similarly, Al-Khidmat Foundation, faith-based organization and a charity wing of a religious political party, Jamaat-e-Islami, is famed for relief, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of disaster-hit communities in the district.

The local Support Organization (LSO)¹³ of AKRSP is working on different projects that they have earned from the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), USAid, and other funding agencies with the support of AKRSP. Similarly, Sarhad Rural Support Program (SRSP) is also working in the valley side by side.

4.7.2. The Kalash Valley; Social and Economic Structure of the Community

The Kalash community seems homogenous without any differences within it. Mostly, Kalash community is considered a lower status group within the broader hierarchy of statuses within the population of the Chitral state. One reason for this could be an oversimplification of

¹² The Agha Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) is a private, non-profit company, established by the Agha Khan Foundation in 1982 working in Gilgit Baltistan and Chitral. <http://akrsp.org.pk/>

¹³ Local Support Organizations (LSO) are Union Council level community organizations which includes many village and women organizations within the union council. LSO acts as a bridge between upper management of AKRSP and village based community groups. <http://akrsp.org.pk/index.php/programmes/social-pillar#:~:text=Since%20its%20inception%2C%20AKRSP%20has,men%20and%20women%20in%20GBC.>

the hierarchical structure by some British administrators who made categories and filling communities accordingly (Parkes, 2001; Sokefeld, 2005; Marsden, 2007). According to Scott (1937) Kalash is not part of any hierarchy that distributes the Chitral population. Kalash has remained away from the country's business as non-*Kho* speakers though they worked like other *kho* (majority group's language in Chitral) speakers for *Mehtar* (Scott, 1937).

There are well-documented sources that identify hierarchical classes within the Kalash community. Out of these four classes, the lowest in the hierarchy was *Bari* or *ba.ri*. *Bari* were not free men, rather were the weakest of all castes before conversion to Islam (Robertson, 1896; Darling, 1979). *Bari* were craftsmen in the community, and served their masters known as *atrozan*, the high class in the community. *Bari* were wood carvers, potters, jewelers, house builders, and leather workers (Darling, 1979). *Bari* people were considered impure and were not allowed to enter certain places of worship, and neither were they allowed to live in the upper regions of the village and lived in the lower areas at some distance from the village (Robertson, 1896; Darling, 1979).

People in Rumboor and Bumburate, two Kalash valleys, used two terms interchangeably for the enslaved persons or serving class, *Bara* or *Baira*. They were endogamous, and this practice was an evidence that makes them *Pragata* (impure) for high-rank Kalash tribes. Kalash people do not practice endogamy. In Rumboor, the people of *Bara* origin are protected by a secret treaty, and no one discloses or talks about their ancestry anymore.

In Bumburate, a whole village, *Kandisar* or *Krandisar*, lives near the stream was converted to Islam en mass at Schomberg's visit in the 19th century to escape servitude. From this fact, it becomes understandable that in Bumburate, there were families who remained slaves of

high-status Kalash. They had limited or almost negligible resources and lived near the stream (Daling, 1979; Cacopardo, 1992). It did not mean that conversion happened only in the lower classes. Upper-status Kalash also converted to Islam but with varying circumstances. The difference is that these new conversions happened in different circumstances than in the previous case (Kalash & Heegard, 2016). These statuses also represented relative political, social, and economic differences between households and groups.

Though after the conversion of lower-classes and the current flow of outsiders have faded the identity of these converted people, many families still remember or claim to recognize households and families who belong to such groups. In the Kalash valley, these families live on the streamside stretching from one corner of the valley to the other corner making their settlement vulnerable to flash floods.

Raza-ullah, who is in his seventies, is affected by the flood. He is still living here in the same spot. His relatives live nearby and are affected by the flood. He used the term *arakash* living there. *Ara* or *Ari* word is common in Urdu, Pashtu, and many other local languages, which means saw, the tool used to cut wood for his clan. They were artisans in the princely state, and upon the call of the *Mehtar*, they used to cut timber from the forest as this area was full of trees used for making furniture. Raza-ullah narrated:

Our forefathers were experts in woodwork. We used to cut wood from the forest and made many useful things from it. They also used to work in the valley for the Kalash people as Muslim population was small here as narrated by my father.

Arakash is an artisan group that worked for high-status groups. These families own houses, constructed almost on the stream bed rendering it the most unsafe part in the valley for construction. All the households living on the banks of the stream are either recent migrants or

the old lower-status Kalash dwellers (Kalash & Heegard, 2016). Mainly these new migrants are *Kho* speaking migrated from parts of Chitral.

4.7.3. Clans/Tribes in the Kalash valley

People in the Kalash valley can broadly be divided into three groups, where I conducted fieldwork. The first group has been discussed already with their socio-political and economic positions that live near the stream. *Zondra* clan, the second group lives at the point where the road enters the valley from Ayun. *Zondra* clan is considered *adamzade* in the status hierarchy (figure 4.2). They are the second prominent landowner in the valley. Most of the families who belong to the *Zondra* clan depend on agriculture. Some of the clan members are state employees. They remain active in local politics and have links with district officers. Some of the members are in border police and Chitral scouts. From a recent disaster perspective, one "important" personality is *Patwari*¹⁴. He prepares lists of the families who lost their houses floods and earthquakes.

Pahalwandeh, Aneesh, Brun, Batrik, and Krakal are Kalash majority hamlets. Most Kalash households dwell in the middle and portion of the mountains, not on leveled ground. At the same time, the streamside is occupied by Muslims. Kalash people construct hotels near the stream recently but not houses.

Beyond Krakal, the last hamlet of the valley is Shekhandeh. It is further divided into *chota* (small) Sheikhandeh and *bara* (big) Sheikhandeh. A political figure, Sajeed, in Shekhandeh has represented the valley in local government elections, won thrice and was elected head of the local government council. He owed his success to his allegiance with the Kalash

¹⁴ A government land officials who keeps public land record and works a representative/focal person of the district administration in general administration and disasters).

population, but in the 2015 local body elections, Kalash elected their candidate. It is considered the first step toward harmony and success by many Kalash.

4.7.4. Kalash Status in Changing Circumstances

Kalash, third group in the Kalash valley, once ruled the southern part of Chitral. There were two well-known names in the history of Kalash, Bulasing and Raja Krizhnug. Bulasing ruled over present-day Chitral. Raja Krizhnug ruled the lower Chitral region of Drosh. Raja Krizhnug ruled this region from Bumburate. Kalash kings' rule ended in the late seventeenth century (Murtaza, 1982; Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001). After these kings' names, many Kalash people have a surname in this valley. Ikram Bulasing, employed in *Kalasha Dur*, a Kalash cultural museum, considers himself from kings' clan. Imran Kalash, one of my respondents, said:

We were warriors and conquerors. We have ruled lower Chitral in the past. We used to keep weapons like daggers and swords. This was the only import from outside. Otherwise, we were self-sufficient.

Many other families claim ancestries of royal families as the ruler once headquartered in this village. As discussed earlier, there are social, political, and economic divisions within the population (see Robertson, 1896; Darling, 1979; Cacopardo, 1991). After Kalash's rule, the *Rais* dynasty and the *Kator* dynasty controlled the area's political landscape as many people converted to Islam. Kalash now live in three valleys which remained seat of one of the Kalash rulers.

It is not justified to equate all Kalash at the bottom of the social structure of hierarchy present in the *Kator* rule, there are exceptions too. To understand this phenomenon, we need to look into the attributes that associate families and individuals to specific groups.

First, land ownership is connected with the high-status families. *Kator* family had more land than anyone in the Chitral state. *Adamzade* had more land than lower-status classes. All lower-status groups have minimal land, used mainly to construct houses. Kalash clans own more land than anyone else in all the Kalash valleys. The Kalash Valley is the most productive in the whole district, with more pine forests of all kinds, fertile pastures, and an abundance of water.

Second, land tax contributed a significant portion of state revenue. *Mehter* used to collect a part of the produce of the land. *Adamzade* used to pay nominal tax, and in some cases, it was in shape of cooked food when *Mehter* visited their areas. The tax rate was higher for the lower classes that grazed cattle or cut wood in the pastures and forests. In the case of Kalash, pastures and forests were owned by the Kalash communities as they are today (Eggert, 1990; Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001).

Tax on pasture was known as *qalang*, paid to *Mehter* in the center. In the case of Kalash, they paid a much smaller tax known as *push chasha* (the flower cheese) consisting of cheese equal to one time milking cheese in one year. Similarly, in the slave trade, the enslaved individuals sold by *Mehter*, who could not pay taxes (Cacopardo & Cacopardo, 2001). Having herds of goats and lived on the most fertile land of the state with plenty of water, the crops, benefiting from thick pine forests yet to meager tax, *push chasha*, the probability of enslaving them due to their non-payment of taxes was very low. In Kalash, it was mainly lower status Kalash who were enslaved (Eggert, 1990; Darling, 1979).

Kalash community ruled the region, and that affected the socio-political and economic structure. When the power changed hands in the shape of new dynasties the new rulers started subduing the old rulers, which affected the socio-politico-economic structure but the older socio-

economic system continued to resist to some extent. One proof of this was the existence of Kalash culture and religion that had endured the rigors of time. The persistence of the older socio-economic structure of Kalash, which was also strengthened by the indigenous survival skills and belief system, enhanced the capacity of the Kalash people cope with the hazards, both natural and manmade with resilience.

4.7.5. Local Power Structure and Party Politics in the Kalash Valley

Rafi, chairman of the elected village council in the 2015 local body elections, is of the view that; "This valley is not a priority for the government as they have not done any sustainable developmental work for poor people of this valley. We are relying on NGOs, who work to earn money only, and nothing is sustainable, but at least they help us in the time of need." The reason he explained was that they had no members from provincial or national assemblies to represent them.

Party politics in this Kalash valley is different from Reshum and most of the central towns of the district Chitral. The main cause includes the Kalash population, its remoteness from mainstream politics, and power structure. The power structure changed over time within the Kalash community.

In the last three local government elections, a prominent political figure, Sajeed, emerged from the Shekhandeh hamlet of the valley and has not lost a single election. This person has remained a favorite leader in his hamlet as the population is more than any other hamlet. Moreover, he also has made allegiance with Kalash and non-Kalash within the valley.

In the 2015 local body elections, many Kalash people supported a candidate from the Kalash tribe whose family has recently converted to Islam. The conversion dates back to 40 to 50

years to his father's generation. Not all but the famous group in Kalash who are active in the cultural and religious survival of the Kalash community supported him. Other members of the elected village council are a *Moulvi* (Muslim cleric), who proudly claims to have converted many Kalash to Islam. He gathers *chanda* (donation) from down districts of Pashtuns. There are elected Kalash females as well. These female Kalash councilors remain active but often complain about NGOs discriminatory practices in the allocation of funds and the government not providing enough development funds. All the elected local government representatives, including some other leaders, were active players in the politics of disaster.

4.7.6. Alcoholic Drinks and Power Dynamics within Kalash Community

Kalash community entertains guests, both locals and outsiders, with local fruits and alcoholic drinks. One of these drinks is a locally brewed wine. Some Kalash people do not like this tradition. They think most outsiders try to exploit this tradition of the Kalash community in many ways. Recent developments in local pubs as alcoholic sales to the guests also affect the power structure of the Kalash community. Ritualized consumption of *sharab* (alcohol) is part of Kalash culture, so they consume it in routine. Within the community, some houses used to entertain high officials of NGOs and district administration, and other prominent district officials. One such home is in Aneesh hamlet and the family has cordial relations with high officials of a reputed national NGO and well-known district politicians. He managed to get many projects from NGOs to serve his interests by using the strong association bond with high-ups. The detail of the projects appears in seventh chapter.

When I asked the SHO about the status of this illegal business, he said: "yes, it is illegal for Muslims to drink wine and other banned drugs here as elsewhere in Pakistan. The senior

officials advise us to be lenient to those involved in such practices as they are not embroiled in other crimes. This is a remote and peaceful place, and people come here to relax. Even the Kalash community is partly relying on these tourists to make some financial gains.” Thus, these bars are bases for creating links with powerful figures to broaden social capital that ultimately affects the local power structure.

4.8. Conclusion

Current chapter describes the social and physical structure of district Chitral and the locales. It was essential to understand the district's political history and socio-political structure in the past to comprehend the current political and power systems. The northwestern part of Pakistan remained independent with princely states like Swat, Dir, and Chitral. The State of Chitral remained independent until recently when British colonizers first increased their influence in 1895. Three prominent dynasties were recognized in the Chitral district. These were Kalash rulers who mainly ruled the lower Chitral region, the *Rais* dynasty, and the current *Kator* dynasty.

Historical sources provide enough information about the social structure in these dynasties. Three divisions existed in the princely state, translating the groups' political, economic, and social statuses. Populations with high-status or lineages were directly connected with rulers through blood. In two locales where I conducted the fieldwork, traces of hierarchy still existed, which is the remnant of the old princely state.

Four high-status lineages in the village claim high social status by blood in Reshum. Others are below them while there are still the lowest status groups living in the village. Land ownership remained fundamental for high-status lineages in the princely state and the village.

High-status lineages and families had more land than lower-status families. Secondly, high-status families had fertile land while low-status families owned land mostly in marginal low productive areas of the village. Most land, which was now the property of the low-status families in the princely state, was given to them for their services to high-status families. These services included working on farms to grow and harvest crops, rearing newborn children, which remained customary in the state, and doing other domestic chores. These families live in three hamlets known as Batikandeh, Panandeh, and Golguch.

The Kalash valley, situated in lower Chitral, in southern part of the district, differs politically from Reshum. Kalash valley remained the capital of the last Kalash ruler, who ruled most of the lower Chitral. Families belonging to a high-status *Zondra* clan are residing in the valley. Kalash is on top in landholding, while the *Zondra* clan is next with second-most landowners. There are three groups of people living near the stream in the valley. One of them is Kalash converted people. It has been reported that Kalash remained a hierarchical social group where four different groups are traced. The lowest used to work for upper Kalash and lived near the stream as they were considered impure and were not allowed to reside in the upper parts of the valley. Most of them converted with the advent of Islam in the region to avoid ill-treatment because of their lower class Kalash. Another group in the valley residing near the stream in vulnerable locations is *arakash*. They are also artisans and used to work for rulers and local upper-class groups. The third group comprised of recent migrants from different parts of the district. The said three groups living near the stream are more vulnerable than the rest due to their proximity to the stream. The historical power structure is still visible throughout district Chitral and both the locales, benefiting the old elite class one way or the other. The introduction of democratic forces has provided opportunities for other groups to share the power structure

with old elites. How the low-status groups are vulnerable to natural disasters and how the political actors play their role in politics of disaster in both the locales is explained in coming chapters.

5. LINK BETWEEN POLITICS /POWER STRUCTURE AND VULNERABILITY TO NATURAL DISASTERS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the relationship between the political power structure and the vulnerability of the affected people to natural disasters such as flash floods in the selected locales. The first portion of this chapter explains the political conditions or power structure, social stratification, economic conditions, social structure, and its link with the vulnerability of groups in the context of disaster. The chapter explains its implication in the locales where the flash floods and earthquakes pose a constant threat to the lives and property of the people who belong to low status. Low-status groups, discussed in detail in chapter 4, are the most affected groups in 2010, 2013 and 2015 floods in both the locales. It proved that historically marginalized groups are more vulnerable to natural disasters.

5.2. Power Structure and Vulnerability to Natural Disasters

Some areas are more hazardous than others for settlements; the question is why then humans choose to live in such risky areas. This interest in human behaviors brought a paradigm shift in disaster research that focused on vulnerability to natural hazards (Hewitt, 1983; Sokefeld, 2012). Because of this paradigm shift in disaster research, social scientists started theorizing about disasters in the context of vulnerability.

The Pressure and Release (PAR) model is already briefly discussed in chapter two. According to this model, a hazard can lead to disaster when it hit vulnerable populations. Political and economic systems are mainly responsible for the vulnerability of communities. Limited access to power and resources due to political and economic systems prevailing in the society are root causes of vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004). Root causes of vulnerability also

reflect power distribution within society. Marginal groups are economically weak, live in marginal areas, and mostly are powerless to demand their rights to the resources. The marginal areas, where the vulnerable groups have established their settlements are unsafe for living and like flood-prone areas, dangerous and unstable slopes, and marginal urban locations. Such places are usually not useful or less important for people or groups who hold a significant share in the power structure and control the economy (Blaikie & Brookfield 1987; Wisner, 1976, 1978; Wisner et al., 2004). It also creates special groups that are more vulnerable than others to disasters.

In most cases, people are vulnerable because they have an inadequate livelihood. This leaves individuals and groups of people no resilient to shocks bigger or smaller. Any hazard can quickly destabilize and jeopardize their survival as the affected population cannot battle against the natural calamities (Wisner et al., 2004). Low-status groups are living in flood-prone areas in Chitral. Historically, these groups have a minimal share in the political structure and economy of the region. Their sources of livelihood were limited and fragile.

There are criticisms of such circular interrelationships between economy, power structure, and vulnerability. Middleton and O'keefe (1998) write about vulnerability and its relationship to the power structure. They have also criticized the circular interrelationship between economic and political factors of vulnerability, as acknowledged by Sokefeld (2012). The fundamental reason for differential exposure or susceptibility to hazards and disasters is political conditions prevailing locally and globally. Unequal distribution of power creates unequal social conditions. Thus unequal social conditions create differential vulnerability to disasters (Middleton & O'Keefe, 1998; Sökefeld, 2012).

According to this analysis, the most apparent reason for their vulnerability is their little share in the power structure and economy of the region. The interdependence of the economic base and the power structure is not deniable. They affect each other in different ways in different circumstances and always have a positive relationship. In this case, it seems true that the vulnerability of the people is because of their poor resource base, which is the result of the most negligible share in the political structure.

Bankoff et al. (2004) tried to place vulnerability in historical perspective and argued that it is the product of the past as it may have taken centuries to develop vulnerability to natural hazards. Without understanding the historical root causes, it is not easy to understand vulnerability. If we know the context in which the population lived, it would be easy to understand vulnerability. Specific segments of the population live in a more hazardous situation than others due to circumstances embedded in the past. Political, economic, and social consequences increase the vulnerability of some populations.

Understanding the aftermaths of disasters and their causes is possible if the history of the people and area is known (Oliver-Smith, 1979, 1986; Lees and Bates, 1990; Bankoff et al., 2004). The connection between vulnerability and power structure in the princely state of Chitral in past is discussed hereunder. For this reason, understanding the political and social structure, both in past and present was important that is explained in chapter four. Current chapter explains the vulnerability of the marginalized and lower-status groups in the locales in light of 2010, 2013 and 2015 flash floods destructions.

5.3. Vulnerability to Natural Disasters in District Chitral

Chitral is one of the most vulnerable districts to natural hazards (Rafiq & Blaschke, 2012). Most of the population lives in U-shaped narrow valleys drained by tributaries of the Chitral River. The central valley is not more than one Kilometer wide, and it is even much narrower inside valleys and these are prone to hazards like water and debris and landslides (Khan & Rehman, 2013; Khan et al., 2013). The onslaught of flash floods that occur regularly from June to August destroys the property, agricultural land, and irrigation channels are damaged because the arid, vertical landscape often limits settlement and cultivation to active alluvial fans (Dekens, 2007). Climate change and temperature increases have added to the vulnerability of the already susceptible population. On the one hand, a restricted resource base limiting choices for people of Chitral to fight with any hazards, and on the other hand, climate change and increasing temperature increases the risk of flash floods.

Chitral district is situated in the Hindu Kush range, famous for frequent seismic activities (Chalise, 1994; Beniston, 2002; Usman et al., 2011). A fault line is running below this mountainous range that is causing high-magnitude earthquakes, leaving the population vulnerable. 2005 and 2015 earthquakes recorded on the rector scale were 7.5 to 7.8 that jolted the region and caused colossal destruction. Flash floods, earthquakes, landslides, and avalanches are different types of natural hazards that occur in the district with varying frequencies and are making it difficult for most of the people of Chitral to live without fear of natural disasters (Haq, 2007; Khan & Rehman., 2013).

Chitral district has been neglected for its remoteness and lack of government attention (Ali & Butt, 2021). Among other reasons the federal government has not provided sufficient funds to Chitral district when compared to the major districts. Chitral consists of volatile mountainous structure, where the provision of many modern facilities is a challenge. Dr.

Inayatullah Faizi, a well-known figure in the Chitral district, an educationist, aged 68, and principal of Chitral Model College, is critical of the and disregard of the state in the allocation of genuine funds and its implementation for the development of the district. He narrated during a discussion:

Chitral has never received its due share in funds allocation and policymaking. I do not even call Chitral part of Pakistan. Whenever I go to southern districts, Peshawar or Islamabad, I tell people I have come to Pakistan from Chitral. Unfortunately, Chitral is not enjoying the facilities that people of districts of Pukhtunkhwa other provinces relish. We are proud of ourselves as we do not suffer from the evils of being extremists or intolerant. People of Chitral are *Sharif* (noble). The literacy rate is still very high compared to any other district in Pakistan.

Arab, a shopkeeper from Reshum, around 55, considers the quality of tolerance and sedation of people of Chitral in a different context. He is one of the leading activists for the restoration of the Reshum mini powerhouse washed away by the 2015 flood. He complains about the non-serious attitude of authorities for not providing funds and technical support to restore the facility. He stated:

People of this area are not violent but whenever disaster struck, state authorities become oblivious of the grave threat to the people. In absence of any positive response, the people of other districts come out to block roads and carry out violent protests to express their rights against the injustice by the state. It is partly because of the gentle behavior and inconsistent pressure of our people in Chitral that state deliberately takes advantage of their soft nature and does not fulfill their fundamental rights.

An executive member of FOCUS, one of the sub-branches of AKDN, in Chitral, which focuses on disaster preparedness and relief in Chitral, remarked:

People of Chitral are living in a risky environment. It is not easy to provide basic facilities to everyone here as the terrain is uneven and access to the needy is a grueling task. State institutions never function fully in the district principally due to the callous attitude of the officials who are non-performers and transferred here as a punishment. How can the primary state machinery effectively respond to disasters if it's not entirely in place? Moreover, the frequency of flash floods and avalanches increased in the recent past because of climate change. Two Asian industrial giants, India and China are our neighbors making a significant share of the factors responsible for global warming. The worst effect can be felt on Chitral and its people who remain open to the natural calamities.

Thus, apart from internal political/power dynamics and their relevance to vulnerability, external factors, national and international, contribute to susceptibility to disasters in Chitral.

Chitral district had been in isolation until recently because of no easy land access. The area remained cut off from the rest of the country for more than five months a year due to heavy snowfall. The construction of the Lawari Tunnel that connects Chitral to other districts of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Pakistan is constructed recently. The lack of developmental projects and funds is one reason for the collective vulnerability of the population. Ferguson (1999) calls it "abjection," where a significant portion of the population is kept away from development process.

Interestingly the new world order does not have territorial centers of power as it works virtually and is without static borders (Hardt & Negri, 2001; Bankoff, 2004). Ferguson (1999) believes that this new order is creating spatial inequality. It reinforces the existing disparities and further deprives a significant portion of the population the promise of development (Ferguson, 1999; Bankoff, 2004). Bankoff (2004) relates such inequalities with power structure on a local

and global level that leaves billions of people in geographically less developed zones and areas more vulnerable to disasters.

Chitral is one example that is a victim of inequality and injustice, deprived of proper planning and development by the state institutions. By not providing sufficient funds for education, health, roads infrastructure, clean water is equal to pushing Chitral further abyss. The local power structure is a hurdle in the way of shaping the priorities of governments and states to channelize and monitor their resources.

The following section explains the connection between vulnerability, power structure/ political structure, and disaster. In last decade in Chitral, there have been flash floods and a few imperiling earthquakes. These flash floods and earthquakes have unfolded the district's social, political/power structure, and politics within formal state institutions. It also magnified the politics and policies of NGOs working in the district. First, I have described the intensity and frequency of the flash floods in the selected locales and then its effect on the different status groups living in there.

5.4. Flash Floods in Reshum

Reshum is one of the many villages in the district of Chitral where streams are draining the water of massive glaciers. This *gol* (stream) is the lifeline for most in the village as it provides water for drinking, irrigation of agricultural farms, and other domestic uses. The two Reshum glaciers, situated 14000 feet from sea level pour the water into the stream. The average length of the glaciers is 3 to 4.5 kilometers and they are 0.5 to 0.8 kilometers wide respectively. Both glaciers have created glacial lakes that have a thick rocks and silt bed. The height of the village Reshum is about 6225 feet. The glaciers lie at relatively higher elevation and continue to

pose a serious danger to the life, property and infrastructure of the village (Hamid, 2013; Rehman, 2015).

Along with the threat of glaciers, there is always a chance of flash floods and heavy rains in the valley that deluges the narrow stream. The relative difference in the height of glaciers and villages, the fragile nature of glaciers, the relatively wider area of the stream behind the village, and the narrow path of the stream where it enters the first hamlet of the village make the village susceptible to flash floods. The glaciers are affected by seismic tremors that break them with rising temperatures. The recent rise in temperature due to global warming affected the glaciers of Hindu Kush, Karakorum, and Himalaya (HKH). The melting rate of the glaciers is increasing, resulting in flash floods in these regions. The frequency and intensity of flash floods increased manifold in recent decades compared to the past. Flash floods affected many communities in downstream riparian areas (Richardson & Reynolds 2000; Riaz et al., 2014).

Two flash floods, 2013 and 2015, caused severe damage to the village of Reshum. There are different claims about the causes of these flash floods as some experts attribute these to the glacier breakup while others blame the heavy monsoon rains as the real cause. These flash floods were responsible for human casualties besides colossal damages to the livestock, houses, roads and bridges, drinking water facilities, irrigation channel heads, etc.

Though everyone in the village and its vicinity was affected by the flash floods, the most severely affected settlements had a historically low political, economic, and social status. Low-status people used to build houses away from homes of high-status families and clans. These clusters of houses were mainly constructed on vulnerable locations. Data of 2013 and 2015 floods from government departments, Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), and

District Disaster Management Unit (DDMU) indicates that low-status communities are affected more than high-status people. This is mainly because of their vulnerability and marginalized dwelling pattern.

Complete lists of these affected communities in flash floods were further investigated through individual case tracing by cross verifications. Affected families were further identified and investigated for their socio-economic and political backgrounds to understand the situation.

5.4.1. 2013 Flood at Reshum

July 31, 2013, was the day of the *hon* (flood). It was *khot* (cloudy) for two days in the district. Nobody knew whether the rain caused the flood in the Reshum stream or the bursting of a glacier. In the village, the *paizal* (shepherd) informed people of the flash flood as he was grazing *mal* (cattle) in the *mal rochini* (pasture) situated in the upper part of the valley. Traditional calling in case of flash floods in the village somehow decreases the effect of the flood as it warns the residents to run towards the mountain to save their lives. It is done usually by making fire and screaming loudly. In recent time powerful torches have replaced the fire signal if it occurs at night. Suppose a person listens to it in the first hamlet of Panandeh, loudly yells facing another village and the latter village gets the hint. This warning method continues until everyone gets informed. Cordless telephones, are other innovations, have introduced a new warning system that is more efficient. People get to safe places, usually towards the higher ground, especially in the *gol* area, where the valley is narrow and dangerous.

In 2013 the shepherd in high pasture would shout with a full pitch directly, *hun af hai usherurar* (flood is near. run to save your life) and also through a torch to inform people in the first hamlet, and then it reverberate all over the village. Amati, lived in the upper part of the

valley near the stream, but has a summer residence up in the mountain. When he heard a horrendous sound of the rocks and water, he immediately informed the people in the village. He could not save his two sons, while wife sustained serious injuries. His goats, house and other property was destroyed by the flash floods. Though the rest of the people in the village rushed frightened towards the mountains to save their lives, they could not protect cattle, homes, and crops from the onslaught of the floods.

Before the 2013 floods, Reshum village and especially the adjoining streams sides used to be very scenic and attractive and were lined with apricot, willow, walnut and mulberry trees. Above these trees were grapes vines. For most of the residents of Reshum the flood of 2013 was the first ever that was ferocious and merciless. The last recorded flash flood of more or less magnitude took place on August 13, 1975 (Wasson, 1978).

According to locals of the village who witnessed the bridges acted as hurdles in the free flow of floods and blocked a mixture of floodwater, *bohat* (rocks), *shugur* (sand), *chute* (dirt), *ochi* (vegetation), *kan chot* (tree trunks), and branches. Bridges were constructed mainly to reach the mini-hydropower house. Because the debris mixed with tree trunks and branches blocked water at each bridge, caused more damage. All four bridges could not resist the flood and were completely vanished. The hamlets located in the deep valley lost the physical contact with the outside world. Houses were wholly and partially destroyed, especially in *gol* and livestock washed away.

According to the District administration and DDMU, the following is the list of damages that occurred in the 2013 flash floods in Reshum.

Table no. 5.1. Damages in Reshum in the 2013 Flash Flood

Damaged Items	Quantity
1. Life loss	02
2. Livestock perished	35 Cows, 02 Goats
3. Damaged houses	23 Fully and 16 Partially
4. Damaged <i>zoyee</i> (irrigation channel) heads	09
5. Damaged water supply schemes	03
6. Damaged link bridges	05
7) Damaged bridge on main Chitral-Booni road	01
8) <i>Gol</i> (stream) damaged road	01 Kilometer
9) Government primary school damaged)	01 (partially)
10) Standing <i>neyamat</i> (crops).	15 % of total in the village
11) Damaged orchards the village.	03 % of total in the village

Source: District Administration/ Chitral DDMU, 2013

The 2013 flash flood mainly occurred along the stream, so the *gol* (stream) area and its residents were primarily affected. When people heard of the flood, they rushed towards *zom* (mountains) picked objects, most precious to them, as they had very little time to escape in the middle of the night. Goats are usually sent to pasture up in the mountains in summer, but cows are kept at home as it's not easy to take them to high pastures due to the steep slopes. This is one reason why more cows are killed in the flood though the number of goats and sheep

is higher than cows. Secondly, the number of goats decreased after an organized campaign against locals' who rear goats.

Cows and goats are making the fundamental source of subsistence as locals use its milk, and its other products, and sometimes eat its meat and sell. Losing cows and goats in a flood means a lot in such circumstances for people who depend on them for life. Washed away *lashoo* (cows) and goats were solely the property of the residents of the three hamlets where low-status people were residing. *Dur* (houses) are defined as fully damaged if not safe for living or they were washed away in the floods. All such damaged houses were located in the three hamlets of the *gol*.

When flash floods washed away the bridges along one-kilometer road, these hamlets were also cut off from the outside world. It caused great inconvenience to the people as they were completely stranded and routine supply chain of food, water, and other everyday necessities was cut off. Similarly, because of risk factors in the aftermath of flash floods, the relief workers could not access the affected people. A group of village youngsters created a Facebook page where many village residents post their views. A subscriber explained the uncertain post-flood situation in the following words after 2020 flash flood:

Although, the volunteers of different outlets are serving the humanity in Reshun and other flood affected areas very well, but we the people of Reshun Gol are still waiting someone to knock the doors with at least with a first aid box or with bottles of drinkable water. We haven't witnessed neither the jackets of Al-kihdmat nor that of FOCUS here yet (The People of Reshun, 2020).

In response to this post, another subscriber had this to express:

Sir, for your kind information I myself witness the two days visit of focus volunteers with first aid kits and two groups have worked in restoration of

damaged house. And today we were told not to visit goal side as a precautionary measures.... you can't expect anyone to visit u in goal today it is life risk. Thank you (Zakir, 2020).

The phenomenon of floods is unpredictable and its timing is quite weird. Each flood follows another overwhelming threatening surge. If the hazardous situation continues unabated, creates relief and recovery work for hamlets situated in *gol* become complicated and it increases their vulnerability. These factors make the *gol* area much more dangerous for living than the rest of the village, especially during floods.

Similarly, the crops mainly cultivated on small landholdings on both sides of the stream were badly damaged. The land in this part of the village is not suitable for continuous cultivation for different reasons, one is the narrowness of the valley where steep elevated mountains and the stream in the middle leaves very little cropping space. Secondly, the soil is unsuitable for good yield due to the presence of sand and rocks sediment. The third is the fear of flood. Recent floods decreased the cultivable land in 2013, and 2015 floods brought a mixture of sand, rocks, and stones, spreading it over the nearby land used for cultivation. So the already marginal land is further devalued by recent flash floods. During my stay in the village, I observed a few residents leveling the ground and removing big stones to grow crops, but most of them did not. Akram from Panandeh was waiting for the excavator to come and help him level the land full of heavy stones after the 2015 flood. He said:

A continuous line of willow trees protected the land that my grandfather planted. These trees are also used to prevent our farms from flooding in low-intensity floods that are routinely hit in July and August. The 2013 and then 2015 floods were too huge and threatening. It washed away not only trees and crops, but the top fertile soil from the cultivable land leaving bare slopes and steppes.

It is manually not possible to make the land capable of growing crops. Akram has promised that his field will be fixed for cultivation once excavator reaches the village and starts leveling the area. Two excavators are working on different sites in the district to help people recover from flood devastation.

Similarly, the fruit trees belong to families living in the three *deh* (hamlets). Heavy trunks of some walnut trees are still visible in the debris of the flood. Walnut, mulberry, and apricot make an essential portion of the cold winter diet in Chitral. Losing these trees is also a significant loss to the residents of *gol*. In short it was only the residents of the three hamlets where low-status groups are residing, became victims of 2013 flood.

5.4.2. The 2015 Flash Flood in Reshum

In 2015 another flash flood hit Reshum village. This flash flood was stronger in intensity than the 2013 flash flood. Damages to infrastructure were more than those of the 2013 flood. Unfortunately, it struck in the middle of the night, but people near the stream were on alert. It had rained that day, and people were expecting a flood as it usually happens. Ibrahim, a resident of Panandeh, said while talking about the night of the flood:

People came to know about the flood mainly because of the heavy sound of the collision of the rocks near the mini powerhouse. This collision was so heavy that it produced a loud sound just like a bomb explosion and emitted light. Everyone was *bohtuwaro* (frightened) because nobody was aware of the exact intensity of the flash flood. The heavy sound produced appeared as if the entire high mountain might fall due to the heavy flood. Everyone scampered toward the mountain as it was the only safe place in the *gol* hamlets. We were able to evacuate our cows and goats in time. Because of the 2013 experience and daytime rain; most of the streamside hamlets' residents were shifted to the *charo* (mountain base, a safe

place where people gathered at the time of flood) and were lying in the *kholaw zagh* (open sky). But we could not save our houses from becoming prey to the flood. I informed my friends in the lower part of the village to get in touch through cell phones. Within minutes, the flash flood reached the last hamlet of the village. Residents of the *gol* area remained more cautious than the rest of the village as flood seldom ran over its limits. This is one reason residents of other hamlets remained calm and did not take necessary precautions during flood season compared to *gol* residents; this time, however, it hit a few houses outside *gol* area.

The DDMU reported the following damages to the village Reshum.

- 1) Mini powerhouse damaged at Reshum
- 2) Bridge on Chitral-Booni road washed away
- 3) Reshum powerhouse road washed away again
- 4) Five irrigation water channel heads wholly washed away
- 5) All drinking water pipes damaged and washed away
- 6) 98 houses are fully damaged, while around 50 are partially damaged
- 7) Three people died

Source: Distt.Admin/ Chitral District Disaster Management Unit, 2015

In Chitral, power is generated mainly through small turbines built on water channels constructed on small streams. Powerhouse at Reshum is the biggest of its kind in the district. The maximum capacity of the facility was 4.5 megawatts at the time when it was constructed.

Photos 5.1& 5.2: Situation After 2015 Flash Flood in Reshum and the Kalash Valley



Source: Authror, 2015

Photos 5.3 & 5.4 Showing destructions of 2015 Flash Floods in Reshum and the Kalash Valley



Source: Author, 2015

Half of Chitral remained without electricity for more than three years as well as residents of Reshum village. The latter and upper Chitral were hopeful in that government would fix the facility soon in the initial days of the aftermath of the flood. The long period of neglect raised anger and resentment in the people who started agitation in the shape of a movement known as *Tehreek I Bahaliye Bijlighar Reshun* (movement of the restoration of Reshum powerhouse).

The damaged powerhouse of Reshum provided a platform to the local political activists to raise voice against the authorities and political parties in power. All political figures of the district found it a good opportunity to win over the sentiments of the local people to prepare ground for elections. Committees were formed to negotiate with the authority's concerned government office bearers in the province, plan to pressurize the concerned quarters through media and organize protests at the local level, in Chitral town and provincial headquarters. It created an excellent example of how the disaster-hit people could manage their power to protest and force the government officials. The details are given in chapter six.

As the intensity of the flood was high, it washed away the bridge situated on the main Chitral-Booni road in Reshum. Similarly, the flood washed away the road that was the only route to the three hamlets from the main road. After the 2013 flood, the said road was destroyed but restored temporarily by the Communication and Works (C&W) department. The 2015 flood destroyed it completely. Residents of the *gol* hamlets faced problems in getting the relief supplies. There was no available route for the workers to reach the people in distress in the initial tough days. Most of the streamside people were stranded and could not return home because of the unsafe situation of their houses and threats of more flood episodes. Relief goods were distributed primarily on the roadside in the village and even the specialized relief agencies could not help people in the remote parts of the village. To summarize, vulnerable road structures left

the population in three hamlets in desperate uncertainty because of the non-access to the main road.

The flood also destroyed the heads of irrigation channels that directly affected the sowing and cultivation of crops. An NGO carried out the restoration and cleansing of channels with the help of the local community. Initially, it was decided to reward the participants with bags of flour and other edibles. Later, the management changed its mind and paid cash to the workers. The community benefitted receiving money and food.

Five leaders managed this activity as the said NGO selected them to manage the work. They were acting as supervisors. All of them were supposed provide lists of workers on the project so that they could be rewarded according to these lists. All the supervisors were from high-status families. Inclusion and exclusion of workers for different areas rested on the personal discretion of the respective supervisor. One of the supervisors, my key respondent, said that he included some members even though they did not work on the channels being either weak or sick but deserved the relief goods and money. In many cases, supervisors included people on the list who they wanted to benefit.

In the 2013 flash flood, only the three hamlets, Panandeh, Batikandeh, and Golguch, were affected. In the 2015 flash flood, residents of these hamlets were again found themselves displaced, more than in other parts of the village especially the western part.

Out of 98 fully damaged houses, 30 were affected by the 2013 flood. In the 2013 flood, 39 homes were affected. All of them were in three hamlets, Panandeh, Batikandeh and Golguch. In the 2015 flood, 30 of these houses were damaged again totally. Five out of the remaining nine households shifted to a nearby village. They had recently purchased land in that village about

two kilometers away from Reshum. After the 2013 flood, these families constructed houses on the purchased land and shifted there. The remaining four of the nine households moved near the mountain, safe from the flash flood but vulnerable to earthquake. In the 2015 flood, these families remained unaffected but the earthquake in 2015 affected these houses due to their proximity to the mountain. The entire affected thirty households had reconstructed houses again in the same place where they lived before in 2013. They had limited choices as they did not find safe places to shift, nor could they purchase land.

5.4.3. “I cannot explain the situation (of flood), women and *azhelie* (children) were *kalik* (crying) and *chergha* (shouting)”: Ashraf Khan

In this section, individual life histories and case studies are discussed to clarify the situation of flash floods and their effect on individual households. As most of the houses are from *gol* area all the cases are from the same part of the village. Because of space limitation, it is not possible to discuss all the affected families. I tried to include case studies based on their geographical representation and include cases to represent how the flood affected the population and what strategies were adopted to tackle the disaster.

Ashraf khan is the head of one such household affected by the 2013 and 2015 flash floods. He is a resident of Golguch, one of the three severely affected hamlets of the village. His forefathers migrated from Wakhan corridor. Wakhi people were migrants from the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Chitral princely state, these migrants were of lower status. In Golguch, there are 11 Wakhik (migrated from Wakhan) families. In most cases, the lands where they constructed houses were given as a reward for their services, either to foster the children of high-status families or render other services to these families in the village. He asserted:

My great grandfather lived here in the same place I am living now. He used to do *zahank* (manual work) as well as keep goats and cows. I could complete my education up to ten grades only because of scarce resources and the pressure of earning. When I got married, my wife too had completed the tenth grade. I was the only person in my family who was an earning hand. Now she is graduated in education. She is serving as a teacher in a high school. It became possible because of the efforts of *mawla* (spiritual leader, master) Sir Agha Khan and his determination to introduce education and health facilities in Chitral. He also motivated all Ismailis through *Jumat Khana* (mosque of Ismaili sect Muslims) to learn the importance of education.

In *Jumat Khana*, both males and females offer prayers and participate in sermons, which is not the case in a Sunni Muslim mosque. Sir Agha Khan used this forum and requested his followers to improve education and health, both for males and females. Most of the Ismailis in Reshum live in three hamlets of the village situated on both sides of the stream. Their financial, social, and political conditions were worse, but their spiritual leader emphasized improvement of health and education for all and provided social and financial support. Khan narrated his situation during and after the flood in these words:

In Golguch, we were exposed to floods more than anyone else in the village. My house was fully damaged in the 2013 flood. We rushed towards the mountain to find a safe place at the back of my house. I cannot explain the situation. Children and women were crying and shouting for help. My family and four other families in my neighborhood were gathered in one place. We could not save anything as the flood was so sudden. We were trapped by flood as it had *baghani* (washed away) the *sear saeran* (bridges) and the only route to the main Chitral-Booni road. We all spent one week under the open sky. FOCUS employees reached us through a mountain route. They provided *chatir* (tents), drinking water, and food. I send women and children to a relative's house. They lived there for two months. Meanwhile, I was busy reconstructing my house, which was full of mud, and the

roof had collapsed. It took me six months to rebuild it. In 2015 it happened again. This time it was more severe, and it carried away everything. I rebuilt it again in the same place. It took me one year to complete this time. I have no other place to live or to construct a house. In summer, we remain on alert as we are in a hazardous location. It's a routine now. One of my cousins, who were also affected by the flood, built his house very close to the mountain. It is *buhtuwaru* (dangerous) as rocks can fall on a tin roof and turn the house in wreckage.

According to Khan:

Because of the education reforms and awareness through the efforts of *mawla* the people of *gol* have to some extent overcome poverty and ignorance that has helped them in mitigation of hazards like floods. On the one hand, different agencies of AKDN are helping the displaced population in Chitral where life is hard, and facilities are not available unlike in lower areas of the country. AKDN has made efforts to educate people and create jobs for them in both government and private sectors. When Agha Khan came with Pakistan People's Party (PPP), founder Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Chitral in the early 70s he implemented education reforms. However, the high-status people were not interested in education as they were more occupied with falconry and polo. Low-status people like those in *gol* took education seriously at the request of *mawla*. As time passed, their efforts were rewarded and now people from *gol* have more jobs than *lal*" (literal meaning is elder, but in Chitral, this title is used for families with royal blood or high status). We, people of *gol* are more at risk than *lal* people, but the permanent jobs have greatly helped us in reducing our risk factor as we are financially better now. Had AKDN not initiated education, health, and other services in the region and village situation would have been worse for people like us who have less or no land and are not resourceful enough to get our work done from the government departments.

In village *gol* out of 135 households, 97 are Ismaili sect Muslims while the rest are Sunnis. Ismaili is a sect of Muslims who consider their spiritual leaders as the actual and rightful

interpreters of Islamic rules and Holy Quran and guide the followers in the changing circumstances. Prince Karim Agha Khan is the current spiritual leader of this sect. Though Ismailis are spread out worldwide, the majority population is settled in Gilgit-Baltistan, Chitral, and Karachi in Pakistan. In Chitral, the Ismaili population is more in upper Chitral.

5.4.4. “The 2015 flood was *tip hun* (severe flood), and it washed away everything:” Sher Muhammad

Sher Muhammad is another victim of the 2013 and 2015 floods. He is a sub-contractor and gets work from large and influential contractors for construction of small portions construction projects. He wants his children to complete their higher education and find jobs away from Reshum. He does not want his children to waste time here as there are fewer opportunities for young graduates. Sher Muhammad is actively involved in the issue of *paye janjal* (goat grazing issue). Goat grazing is a hot issue in the village. It started before the 2013 flood. Those who favor goat grazing believe it has nothing to do with floods. But the issue is not simple as it involves many hidden motives, which are discussed in chapter seven.

Sher Muhammad is also Wakhik and a resident of Golguch. They also call themselves Qaziye. He revealed:

The 2015 flood was *tip hun* (severe flood) and washed away everything. It continued for many days from 15th to 25 July. This year (2015), it happened nine times. Everyone got used to it, and no one expected it would get so heavy. We all were taking it lightly though we were cautious about it. When it happened in the night, everyone hurried towards the mountains as some families took refuge in at the backside near the hill. The worst thing that happened to us was that the flash flood isolated us from the rest of the world. We lived without water for more than 24 hours as the water supply line was also damaged by the flood, and stream

water was full of dirt. Only a narrow path was available that was impossible to cross to reach other parts of the village to get water and other utilities. We all were helpless before the nature. The only access was the long *zahank zom* (steep mountain) which was too hard to climb. In the 2013 and 2015 floods, we lived in tents for months. In 2015 we lived in tents for more than three months. Flood keeps us worried every summer. I do not have any other place to shift. Some of the families affected by the two floods moved to the nearby village, but that place had no proper access.

Once during a discussion, he asked me:

Why do not you ask me the most important question? And that is the basic reason for flash floods occurring here. I was hoping you could raise this issue through university and other sources as it is more important than anything else. It will save our lives. The land behind the village is very steep. When goats are grazing there, the soil underneath breaks becomes soft and easily flushes with water. It's mainly because of *safan rochek* (overgrazing).

Sher Muhammad is leading the litigation from one group opposing goats grazing in upper pastures. More than two hundred people contributed to finance the goat grazing case proceedings.

5.4.5. “My wife was crying for her cow as flood washed it away too. It was just like a family member”: Abdul Shakoor

Abdul Shakoor is resident of Batikandeh. He has a grocery shop in Reshum *bazaar*. He has two sons; one is studying in college and two school-going daughters. He retired from Chitral Scout. He retorted:

The 2013 flood destroyed the three hamlets because of small bridges on the stream. We all saw it. We moved toward *charo* (the mountain base) as it was relatively *bach* (safe) from the flood when we heard the warning of the flood. It

was so sudden that we could not save anything. It was a great loss as the flood washed away everything; house, utensils, cow, hens, etc. My wife was crying for the cow as the flood washed it away. It was just like one of our family members. It is hard to imagine the pain unless you face this dilemma.

Most of the families from the three hamlets spent many days in the open after floods. They remained in tents when it rained in summer. The government gave fifty thousand rupees and FOCUS, NGO, supplied household routine stuff. Shakoor expressed:

As I could not afford to purchase land anywhere else to construct the house, we built the house on the same place where it was before the 2013 flood. Another reason for constructing the house in the same place was that nobody expected the flood to happen again. The 2015 flood proved us wrong, it turned out to be more destructive. It washed away my house again though we managed to save a few important items.

After the 2015 flood, Shakoor purchased a small piece of land on a mound in the nearby village Greemasht to avoid the adverse effects of floods that devastated everything almost every year. FOCUS International provided a prefabricated shelter house after the 2015 flood. They installed that prefabricated shelter house in Greemasht and they now spend nights in that shelter house in extreme flood months in July and August. Shakoor is not shifting there for two reasons. The first is that he doesn't have enough finances to construct a house and secondly, there is no permanent route to reach there. Members of a *Kator* family in the village do not allow a permanent route through his land to that place. Serious conflicts took place on the issue of the road. One reason is grazing conflict. *Kator* households in the village are on the pro-grazing group side, whereas the entire Batikandeh residents are against it. The price of the land purchased by Shakoor and some other families of *gol* is low because of no permanent route. Shakoor stated:

We have shifted little household stuff; otherwise, we live in the same old house because the prefabricated shelter is too small for the whole family. We cannot live in two places; many issues like safety and security constantly lurk in our minds.

Four other families of Batikandeh also purchased land in the same spot that was affected by floods. They have built temporary houses and stays there where there is probability of flood.

5.5. Kalash Valley and Flash Floods

The stream of the Kalash valley where I did fieldwork is draining two tributaries, namely *Zinore* (16645 feet) and *Lot* (15312 feet). These two are also names of the valleys covered with snow throughout the year. The stream provides drinking water and water for irrigation in the valley. In winter, the valley is frozen, and the level of water drops. In summer the water level rises due to melting of snow and July and August are flood months (Khan, 1994; Kalash, 2021).

The flow of water in the stream varies around the year. Its flow increases in summer and collision of rocks produces thunderous noise because of the speedy flow of water in the stream. Water speeds downstream because of the steep slopes that begin from the first hamlet of the village and continue till it reaches and merges with other tributaries of the main Chitral River in Ayun. Monsoon rain rarely reaches here as gigantic mountains between lower plains and Chitral act as a barrier against the wet monsoon clouds and stop them from entering the valley.

In March, the water flow increases and reaches its highest peak in June and July. In these months, when it rains for more than one hour, it can cause a flash flood in the valley, especially in those parts where the stream originates but these flash floods are considered normal. Before the 2015 flash flood in the valley, both sides of the stream were lined with different trees. They acted as barricades against the gushing floodwater and contained it within limits. In the case of

low-intensity floods in the river, trees were prevented floodwater entering the houses built near the stream (Kalash, 2021).

The frequency and intensity of flash floods have increased in recent years in northern areas of Pakistan. One of the reasons for this increase is global warming which affects the glacier melting rate, but the rain pattern is also affected. Arif, one of the respondents from Kalash valley, said:

We have experienced the same kind of rain recently as it happens in down districts of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa in *pinimor & mozmes* (monsoon) season. The soil and mountains of Chitral cannot bear the intensity of heavy monsoon rains as it happens in other districts. Due to deforestation, the vegetation line in Kalash valleys is decreasing, and it cannot firmly hold the ground when it rains heavily. As a result, flash floods of high intensity strike the valley and cause bigger damage.

In 2010, 2013, and 2015 flash floods affected the residents of this valley. The 2015 flood was high in intensity as it washed away more houses, standing crops, and orchards. Data for flash floods is obtained from government reports on floods. The affected people were cross-confirmed during field work.

5.5.1. The 2013 Flood in the Kalash Valley

On July 31, 2013, the first episode of flash flood struck the valley. It affected houses and standing crops. Two days after, it happened again. It damaged more homes, crops, corn, bean, and fruit trees. It affected the most vulnerable population of the valley residing near the stream. Table number 4.2 shows the 2013 flood damages per district administration records and other sources as different bodies had assessed the damages.

In 2013, the flood destroyed 4% of orchards and 50% of crops in the valley. The destruction of fruit leads to food shortage for the valley's residents. Water channels from the valley stream provide water to all the farms and orchards. Shortage of water affects the fruits in the summer season but the flood water poses a constant hindrance. Most of the farmers do subsistence farming. Most of the diet, mainly cornbread and red beans, is produced and used locally as a staple food. If the crops are affected by flood or any other reason, it becomes hard for the local population to support their families as they do not have multiple income sources.

Table no. 5.2. Damages in the Kalash Valley during the 2013 flood

Damaged items	Quantity
Irrigation channels	12
Crops	50 %
Orchards	04%
Houses	33 Partially Damaged
Houses	6 Fully Damaged
Road	1 Kilometer at Different Locations
Water supply schemes	01
Micro hydel power	01

Source: District Administration/ Chitral District Disaster Management Unit, 2013

Most of the houses affected in the valley in all the flash floods belong to lower-status people. Such families can be divided into three groups, discussed in chapter four. The first group is the old converted Kalash, who were lower in status. Because of their low social status within the Kalash population, they were not allowed to construct houses in the vicinity of high-status population or above them in the mountains. They are forced to construct their homes near the stream mainly in Gambak and Kandisar hamlets and few families live in other two hamlets Broon and Broon Thar. The second group is that of *arakash* (carpenters or woodworkers). They primarily have made their settlements near Broon on the stream bed. The third group comprises of migrants who migrated from other parts of Chitral and mainly lived near the stream. These groups are not easy to distinguish. One obvious similarity between them is their residing pattern.

Most of the houses in all the flash floods affected belong to these families. Shah Jee, the owner of a small restaurant, destroyed in the 2015 flash flood, in the valley near the stream, explained:

The families affected by flash floods every time consider the flood a blessing. They construct a house in the middle of the river after the flood. Next year flood washes away their house, and they receive relief money. For them, it's a profitable business. They don't have much to invest in the construction of houses or purchasing household stuff. What they lose is always less than what they receive as a relief.

Many people do not support this view, especially those affected by the flood. Still, many blame these people for constructing houses in vulnerable locations, but most of the families residing near the stream in vulnerable areas belong to socially and economically lower strata. They have limited choices to change their living style and avoid living in vulnerable locations close to the stream. In 2013 all the families whose houses were either fully damaged or partially

damaged belonged to the three groups. Almost 15 houses that belonged to *arakash* group were also damaged in the 2010 flood. Till 2013, no one from *Zondra* or Kalash family was affected. Strategically they have constructed houses in locations where flash floods cannot reach. For Kalash, it is part of their belief system to build homes at high altitudes. Construction of dwellings near the stream is considered a sin as the area is considered *paragata* (impure). The concept of *Onjesta* (purity) and *Paragata* (Impurity or pollution) makes fundamental concepts and religious cosmology of Kalash Community and dictates most worldly affairs. “The *ónjesta* and *prágata* are a symbolic system of the Kalash”(Choudhry et al., 2017: 5).

The road that leads to Kalash valley and the one that runs in the valley are very rough and bumpy. It suffers from the effects of the flood every year because of its proximity to the stream. The only alternate route to the valley and other destinations is through the mountain track used for transportation when floods destroy the main road. Everyday cars and jeeps, around ten in number, travel to the main Chitral town as people bring food and other necessary stuff for daily use. Access to other places from Chitral town becomes inconvenient if the road is blocked for long. Similarly if someone gets sick or injured, it is almost impossible to take the patient to the main Chitral town hospital.

The prices of food items increase manifold when the road was damaged and blocked. Residents have to carry heavy loads on their back to reach home and walk many miles in the mountain. If a person cannot climb the mountain route to the town, they purchase items of daily use at higher prices.

5.5.2. The 2015 Flash Flood in the Kalash Valley

Sher Alam, a primary school teacher in the valley, narrated the spells of the flood.

The first spell of flash flood occurred on July 16 in the morning. All Muslims of the valley were awake for *sehri* (early breakfast for fasting) as it was the month of *Ramadan* (Islamic month of fasting). Kalash people were still sleeping. In the upper part of the valley, the Border police were awake. When they observed a flash flood, they immediately warned the residents through the phone. It took almost an hour for the flood to reach the valley. The flow was not very strong, but still, people were frightened as it produced ghastly sound and repulsive smell. In the first spell, sixteen houses were affected.

After a few days after the first flash flood, the second spell struck. Ayube, a geology graduate and high school teacher living in the valley, recounted the incident:

The second spell of the flood made its way to the valley around 10 p.m. on July 29 with a thunderous roar, no less than the *qayamat* (doomsday) and jolted the entire valley making it difficult for people to judge if it was a flood or a *boilmuze* (earthquake). All and sundry, especially those who had their houses near the stream, made good their escape on higher ground near the mountains. The flood was in full fury for almost three hours. The deafening of tumbling rocks could be heard in the in the whole valley. A mixture of slush and water accelerated the momentum of huge rocks, which destroyed everything on their way. In addition, trees on both sides of the river created an impediment to the flood, which brought extra destruction. The second spell of the flood destroyed sixty other houses. The cause of the flood was *boshek* (rain) in *Zinore* valley that seeped through the mountain cleavages and loosened the big rocks.

Table number 4.3 shows damages of the 2015 flood in the Kalash valley as per the District Administration and DDMU.

Table no. 5.3. Damages in the 2015 floods in the Kalash Valley

Damaged items	Quantity
Road	7 Kilometers
Bridges	Five bridges, including one constructed on main Chitral to Kalash valley, the only route that is used by vehicles to reach the valley
Crops	148 acres
Fruit trees	719
Damaged house	78 fully and 06 partially
Shops	15
Hotels	05 including Pakistan Tourism Department Corporation
Irrigation water channels	07
Drinking water supply lines	02

Source: Distt.Admin/ Chitral DDMU, 2015

In the 2015 flood, this road remained closed for more than six months due to blockade at different locations. The high flood washed away the road at various points, and according to the district administration report, seven kilometers of the road disappeared after the flood. It was a momentous challenge for the state bodies and the NGOs to reach the affected community with relief after the flash flood. It was also not easy for the local population to physically re-connect with the outside world. In this situation, the first relief operation of the government was carried out by helicopter, which brought food items for the affected population. As the government's resources are limited, performing all relief activities through aerial routes was not possible.

Under such circumstances, the whole valley suffered tremendously. The first vehicle reached the valley after a month, and it took six months to repair the road and restore the traffic.

The effects of road blockage were adverse for the local population. It halted the availability of routine goods and as a result, the prices of food items skyrocketed since the market was not easily accessible. In normal circumstances, the local population relied on local food items, but the flood interrupted the regular supply of food. Water mills (*khorah*), mostly destroyed by flood, stopped working and grinding of *gom* (wheat) and *juwari* (maize) could not be done resulting in the increase in the demand for outside food.

Two Kalash valleys, including the one where I did fieldwork, were linked to Ayun and Chitral through a bridge constructed on one end of the valley where the stream originated. The 2015 flood destroyed it completely. Apart from that, four other bridges, both for pedestrians and small vehicles too were damaged. These bridges were a connection for the communities living on both sides of the stream which could not only fetch the goods but also meet their dear and near ones. Destruction of these bridges disconnected the people, which increased their miseries. Only two of these bridges were reconstructed. After one month, the main bridge that connected the valley to Ayun and Chitral was rebuilt after the flood by Frontier Works Organization (FWO), Pakistan Army's organization. It could not sustain for long and drowned in the stream soon after its construction. Later, the Communication & Works department (C&W) constructed it again, but that took more than a year.

One hundred forty-eight acres of land was destroyed, and the 2015 flood also washed away the standing crops. Similarly, destruction of walnut, apricot, and other fruit trees being cash crops that made significant portion of their income, brought financial crisis. More than 719 trees

were washed away, including walnut and apricot trees. It was a massive loss for the low-income population of the valley, mainly when most of them were engaged in subsistence farming.

The loss of fruit trees left the population with no permanent source of income. Low-income communities where the population primarily dependent on agriculture and whatever limited income they had was affected by floods. In such communities, because of the narrow resource base, even small-scale losses impact the population higher than those with a high-income level, and people with diverse income sources. A disaster only affect a portion of latter's total resources, and consequently, the impact is relatively small (De Silva & Kawasaki, 2018). The same is true for most people in the Kalash valley, who depend on subsistence farming mainly and have limited land to cultivate which is their primary source of living. They lost one hundred forty-eight acres of land, undoubtedly a significant loss. Most of the cultivable land was strewn with huge rocks brought by the 2015 flood. Loss of a substantial source of living increased the vulnerability of the already vulnerable population.

Most of the damaged houses in 2015 flood belonged to the three low-status groups discussed already. In 2015 almost 95 percent of damaged houses belonged to these groups. It is no surprise to mention that most of the affected houses in the 2015 flash flood had been damaged by the previous floods. Twenty-two out of 34 houses were damaged partially or fully in the 2013 flash flood and damaged again in 2015.

Similarly, all 2010 flood-damaged houses were also on the list of 2015 floods. It showed a continuous trend of regression. In the 2010 and 2013 floods, all the damaged houses belonged to lower-status families that formed the three groups. They faced a threat of overflowing summer water in the stream

Kalash considers low land near the stream as *paragata* (impure) and that's why they do not usually construct houses there as it is against their belief system. Out of 84 damaged houses, only four Kalash houses were affected. Most of Kalash's community members live up in the mountains. Similarly, only one house of the *Zondra* clan was affected in the 2015 flash floods.

Shops are scattered on the valley's roadside, and there is no central market. Most of these sell grocery items. Most of the flood-affected shops belonged to people dwelling near the stream. On the other hand, Hotels belong to Kalash as well as non-Kalash.

Whenever the flood hits the valley, it also *khatum* (destroys) water channel heads. These heads pour water from the stream into water channels. Floods occur in hot summer when fruit trees and standing crops need more and timely water, but most of them are severely affected due to the chances of floods. It happened in 2010, 2013, and 2015 floods. The badly ruined channel cannot carry any water and water mills lay waste because the cereals grinding comes to halt and wheat has to be purchased from the open market at a higher price.

When compared to Reshum, the vulnerability of the total population is higher in Kalash valley. This confirms the relationship between exposure to natural disasters and the political/power structure of the affected communities. In the coming section, a few case studies of individuals are included.

5.5.3. “We are three families and received compensation for one ...while those who have links with the in higher echelons get more”: Abdul Wahab

Following case studies were selected to compare the families living away from the floods and the ones close to the path of the floods. Two families were residing in Shootar hamlet, situated at the entry point of the valley near the road. One family belongs to the *Zondra* clan, and

the other family is *sheikh* (converted people to Islam from Kalash). The *Zondra* clan belong to high-status groups. Biddulph (1880) writes that *Zondra* residing in Ayun¹⁵ helped Shah Muhtaram Shah and Shah *Khushwaqte* Shah, the first rulers of the present ruling family. According to local *Zondra* families, they shifted from northern Chitral in *Kator* rule. They were compensated by land as they helped the *Kator* family many times in their war against their enemies. The present-day status of the *Zondra* clan is not very different as they have most of the land in the lower part of the valley. They have links in various state offices as many members work there. Many *Zondra* families are also living in the union council headquarters Ayun. They all have links with each other as they consider themselves blood relatives.

Most of the converted Kalash people who reside near the stream were lower-class Kalash and were converted to Islam. *Sheikh's* family resides right in the middle of the stream as it runs on both sides of his house. Three separate households are living in two houses. Three brothers live in one place while their paternal uncle lives next to them in a separate home. As they live in the middle of the stream, 2010, 2013, and 2015 flash floods affected their houses. Damages were more in the 2015 flash flood than the previous two. The eldest of the three brothers is a carpenter and works in a nearby woodshop. The middle one is a bricklayer, while the younger brother is a tailor making fitted clothes for men.

They are living near the property of a *Zondra* family. One of the *Zondra* family's five brothers lived near the stream before 2015. He is the only *Zondra* clan member in the valley whose house was damaged by the 2015 flash flood. He is a retired *subedar* (a senior non-commissioned rank in the Pakistan army). One of his brothers is still in the Pakistan army as

¹⁵ Ayun is name of the Union Council, an administrative unit, and the Kalash valley where field work is conducted falls in this union council.

subedar while the other three depend on farming for their livelihood. When the flash flood damaged the house of the retired *subedar*, he shifted to another place near the road.

One of the two brothers of *Sheikh* family, Abdul Wadood, said:

Hon (flood) destroyed everything we had. Water entered the house from all sides as we lived in the center of the stream. In 2010 and 2013, the flood smashed only a portion of the land and the house's boundary wall. We were not expecting such a powerful flood. When the authorities warned against the on-coming flood we had to escape to the roadside. Everyone was frightened. On the night of the flood and for the next thirty days, we lived with the brother of *subedar*, Ismail, who lived away from the stream. Two days after the flood, I reached my home and found it full of slush, rocks, and sand. The walls were missing leaving behind a few traces. As the flood subsides, we started to rebuild our house from the scratch.

All three households also started construction of their houses in the same place in the middle of the stream. They used same rocks that accompanied the flood. Wahab reported:

When we break big rocks and use them in constructing the house, our limited land would be cleared for use. So it is giving double benefit of clearing land and free construction material. We are building our home with our own hands as we cannot pay the contractor for construction. Secondly, we cannot shift from here because we have no other place to build the house. If *Allah* wants us to suffer from floods, we have no way to escape.

It is relevant to discuss how communities control disasters' fear and psychological challenges to put vulnerability perspective in place. Researchers believe that religions give hope in disaster situations. Religions provide a feeling of solace when melancholy has descended over the distressed people (Piggin, 1981; Fujiwara, 2013; Stratta et al., 2014; Zaumseil et al., 2013; Gianisa & Le De, 2018). In the case of Chitral, where vulnerability has touched the highpoint

people still feel a degree of satisfaction mainly because of religious beliefs. One evening when it was snowing, I was waiting for a vehicle from Ayun to the Kalash valley along with many other residents of the valley. Finally, a pickup truck arrived, and all sat in it. The road was too risky to drive because of rain and snowfall; there were landslides at different points on the road. Almost ten passengers, including me, were seated inside the truck while some took to the top due to limited space inside. I was worried how we would make it to our destination because of the slippery and risky track. As the vehicle swayed and jolted a person sitting in front started narrating his experience in *tableegh* (a religious movement where Muslims worldwide travel in groups for preaching Islam to Muslims and non-Muslims). Everyone started listening to him without caring much about the risky road. The sermon was a source of blessing for both the listener and the narrator. It was an excellent experience to understand how easy it becomes, even the hardest of times and risks, when one believes as the believer's total submission gives them control over events. Religious beliefs play a significant role apart from other physical strategies to adjust vulnerability and make it relative or minimize its psychological effects.

Abdul Wadood is not satisfied with the mechanism of relief and reconstruction after the disaster. He lamented:

We were three families, but we received compensation for only one family. (Rs. 1,00,000 for fully damaged house and 50,000 to 80,000 for a partially damaged house), Those who have links with the in higher echelons get more for even a slightly damaged house. One of my neighbors, Subedar, who has his house near the stream, shifted to his land; a safer place, and received compensation twice. His brother-in-law is a member of the union council elected cabinet in Ayun and has other *Zondra* clan relatives who have links with state authorities. He received compensation twice, once 1,00,000 for the damage to the house and another

2,00,000 by showing to the people the remains of the same house to get earthquake compensation.

The *patwari* who prepared the list of houses affected by the earthquake is from *Zondra* clan and relative of the *subedar*. At the time of the assessment, he wrote the name of the *subedar* and reported his flood-affected house, pretending that it was destroyed by the earthquake. In this way, he received double the amount of compensation. Wahab further recounted:

Subedar received extra financial assistance in the flood relief because the Pakistan army and other Paramilitary forces were involved in the relief and reconstruction process. He received more as he had links in the military; all army relatives, whether retired or on service, were compensated more than others. Even NGOs treated us differently. Two prefabricated shelter homes were given to the person in our neighborhood but the same NGO denied prefabricated shelter home to us because we do not have links with the people in power both in government and in NGOs; owing to this, we did not get as much relief package as they did.

Most families living near the stream and whose houses were damaged did not get prefabricated shelter houses. One fundamental reason for this was the policy of most of the NGOs regarding the construction of prefabricated shelters for affected households. They were directed to construct structures in places where the threat of any calamity like a flood was none. Most of the families affected by the flash flood in the valley could not provide such safe places due to non-existence. In such circumstances, NGOs did not give prefabricated shelter houses, but rather provided makeshift tents that could be installed anywhere in an emergency.

In some cases, people whose houses were damaged paid rent to the landowner for the land where they planned to construct shelters. In the case of Kalash valley, however, most people could not find safe ground where NGOs could build prefabricated shelter houses for them. The case of Abdul Wadood and *subedar* is not much different. Abdul Wadood has no safe place to

construct a prefabricated shelter home, and that's why he could not get compensation for building his own house. *Subedar*, however, owned a safe place where a shelter house was built. This mechanism favored those who had ample land compared to those who were financially weak to purchase safe land and living on vulnerable locations.

Subedar and his brothers were still expecting the government to pay them compensation for their land as one of the *subedar*'s brothers, Ismail, reported:

We are five brothers, and we have not distributed the land yet among us. We all own a piece of land near the stream. The flood washed away the top fertile soil and the standing crops. Nobody believed that it was once a fertile piece of land but now outspread with immovable large rocks turning it into a wasteland. After the flood, stream changed its route, stream water flows in the middle where our farm once existed. The government and NGOs compensated our brother as his house was damaged, but nobody asked how our losses will recover. The land measuring more than 4 Kanals (505 square meters) was worth millions. Our brother was compensated because his house was damaged, and he had links with people who worked for NGOs and the government to pay the affected people, but we didn't get any compensation for our wasted land. The compensation criterion might be wrong.

By comparing the *sheik* and the *Zondra* families, it can be concluded that political influence and power structure play a vital role at different stages in a disaster situation, both pre and post. *Sheikh* family was vulnerable because they had limited resources. It was connected to their lower-status in the power structure in the past. This lower status made them vulnerable, which was hard for them to change in the current situation. Similarly, in the relief and reconstruction process after the disaster, the share of this family was less than the one who had access to authorities concerned. Even the relief policies did not favor them where temporary

shelter house construction compensation was given to those who can show and provide safe land. The *Zondra* family received more relief and reconstruction from the government and NGOs than the sheik family. It was embedded in the power structure of the valley.

5.5.4. “...I have no other option though it is risky to live here in the middle of the stream”: Sadiquallah

One group, as mentioned earlier, the migrants, even the recent ones lived near the stream. They were from different parts of Chitral. The trees planted by the new migrants acted as barricades, stopped the flow of water and as result it overflowed on the sides playing havoc with the livestock and property.

Sadiquallah, a migrant family from Gombak, a hamlet in the upper part of the valley was a victim of the flash flood of 2015. He had a small shop where he sold vegetables and groceries. In the 2015 flood, both his shop and house were completely washed away. He stated:

My grandfather migrated here. Since then, my family has lived near the stream. I was sixteen when I started my job in the Pakistan army as a laundryman. I spent time in Kashmir, Lahore, and Pindi. I earned money and started building my own house here in the valley. I spent all my money constructing the house. It was not yet completed when the flash flood washed it away. All my savings and efforts went in vain. My other family members were near the stream, but they were not affected. I moved toward the streamside as there was no land left to build a house near my other relatives. FOCUS, installed a prefabricated temporary shelter for me. It was near my brother’s house. It is 17 square feet of structure with a washroom near it. It is a temporary house. I will construct my home again in the same place. Government cannot stop me from building my house in the same place as I have no other option though it is risky to live here in the middle of the stream. Although the 2015 flash flood of this intensity occurred in centuries, as recounted by elders I guess it will not happen again in a lifetime. If the government wants me to shift, they will have to provide me with an alternative as I cannot afford to purchase a safe place. I spent all I had on that house and now I am left with nothing.

Fazal Rahim was another victim of the flash flood in 2015 as both his house and grocery shop was destroyed. In 2013 flood, the water entered his shop and home. Before the 2013 flood, his house was on the backside of the road. 2013 flood washed away the road, and stream water reached his house. As there was no road, the government constructed a road behind his house. He blamed the government and the person who gave land for the road. If the government had constructed a road at the same old place, his home could have been saved.

My father migrated here, and we have been living here since. It was a safe place as the flood had never reached this level before. We never considered this place risky before the 2013 flood. It is not safe for living anymore. The flood destroyed my house and shop. It also washed away my land. I do not have any other option but to construct my shop and house again though it is risky. Things cannot be the same as before 2015. It changed my life and so of many here. Now I do manual labor to earn for my family.

Fazal Rahim's name was not included in the government's first assessment for compensation. It was formed after many efforts. He stated:

My house and shop were in front of the road and visible to everyone. Still, it was not included in the first assessment. It was a quick assessment; maybe that's why my name was not included. I traveled to the Deputy Commissioner (DC) office many times to get my name included in the list.

He thinks the mechanism to compensate the affected people is not justified. He was paid for his house but did not get any compensation for his shop. Secondly, people are paid two lakh rupees if their houses are affected by the earthquake, but they are paid only one lakh if flood was the cause of damage. He said:

It's not justified because it washes away everything in case of a flood. In case of an earthquake, even if the whole house is damaged, the raw material remains

intact; the ground remains stable to reconstruct the house again but not in case of a flood.

The government compensation policy is again targeted on genuine grounds by Rahim. PDMA announced a compensation of Rs. 2,00,000 to those households whose houses are fully damaged due to the 2015 earthquake (Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), 2015). In contrast, compensation for flood-damaged homes was RS 1,00,000 (District administration/ District Disaster Management Unit Chitral, 2015). People living in locations vulnerable to flash floods are because of their low socioeconomic and political status that is somehow embedded in their most negligible share in the power structure, as in the case of the Kalash valley and Reshum. If those affected by floods are paid half the amount compared to the amount paid to earthquake-affected households, it again leaves the most vulnerable without adequately addressing their concern.

5.6. The Case of Kalash Community

No Kalash *dur* (dwellings) were affected in 2010 and 2013 flash floods. In the 2015 flash flood, only four houses of Kalash community members were destroyed. There are specific reasons which keep Kalash safe from natural disasters like earthquakes and flash floods.

Power structure and vulnerability to natural disasters, e.g., flash floods, are linked as discussed in the selected locales. A low share in the power structure in the princely state of Chitral forced communities to live in marginal locations that were more vulnerable. Similarly, the power structure of the princely state left low-status communities with little economic diversity compared to high-status clans.

The relative position of the Kalash community is discussed in detail. I want to summarize it here. The Kalash community once ruled the lower part of Chitral. This valley remained the center of the ruler at that time. As there were four castes in Kalash, upper classes lived on height as the lower part of the valley is considered impure. Lower caste people were living in lower areas near the stream.

Similarly, lower-class Kalash were not allowed to go to high pastures for being impure. Most of the Kalash families greatly depend on domesticated goats and other animals. It increases the chances of survival in case of calamities like flash floods which destroy crops and cultivable land.

Secondly Kalash community had land, forests, and pastures that were not possible for other lower-status people in Chitral princely state. Kalash community still owns more land and forest than any other group in the valley. The third factor is tax collection from the Kalash community in *Kator* rule, which was nominal as it was *adamzade*, the lordly class, and lowers than other lower-status classes.

All these factors put the Kalash community in a unique position. The Kalash community has evolved a deep understanding of the environment and survival techniques for their long presence in the area (Fentz, 1996). Disaster mitigation is part of the total survival mechanism as this community retained the close relationship and interdependence between them and nature. “Kalash community has actively used its environment to fulfill its needs through subsistence agro-pastoral economy enabling them to combine both knowledge of the environment, its natural resources, its optimum use and the proper sanction of this knowledge through religious beliefs. Dwelling patterns, selection of site for building,

building codes, use of wood, trees, land, water etc., are properly dictated by religious beliefs that are to ensure sustained survival of the whole community. It is because of this indigenous knowledge, belief system and its proper translation into action that the community has been keeping itself safe from “natural” as well as manmade disasters and hazards for centuries” (Ishaq et al., 2020).

5.7. Conclusion

This chapter describes the vulnerability of communities to natural disasters in the context of local power/political structure. According to well-known models on vulnerability, the communities' political and economic structure plays a vital role in shaping their resilience to natural disasters. Groups and individuals with the most negligible share in the local political structure are most susceptible to natural disasters due to their place of living, nature of the job, house patterns, etc. (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Wisner et al, 1976,; Wisner et al., 2004; Wisner, 1978).

People who belong to low status in the princely state still live in marginal locations, making them much more vulnerable to flash floods in both locales. According to the available data on the last two floods, 2013 and 2015; mainly households of the three hamlets are prone to floods in Reshum village. Their land, crops, fruit trees, houses, roads, and other valuable resources are affected more than high-status families and lineages in the village. The difference between the effects of hazards on two segments of the community, where one remained on high status in the princely state while others remained lower in status and remained servants of high-status people, is primarily because of the differential political status. It reflects the effect of power structure on the vulnerability to natural hazards and disasters in the village.

Data from field and government reports show that in all three flash floods in the Kalash valley, families from low-status groups were primarily affected in 2010, 2013, and 2015. Because of limited choice to relocate, they are most vulnerable to natural hazards in the valley compared to other groups like *Zondra* and high-status Kalash who settle on higher ground. Kalash, who traditionally have a dwelling pattern which they have evolved being indigenous and ruler of the area in the past, which made it possible for them to avoid natural hazards in the valley. In the Kalash valley, the most vulnerable groups remained politically less important in the past.

Kalash community is relatively safe from natural disasters, at least their houses, because of the knowledge of the area and natural environment; they have internalized the safety measures through their belief system. They also ruled the region at some point in history, which helped them choose durable places to build their houses for survival and sustainable existence against all kinds of odds.

6. POLITICS OF DISASTER RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION IN RESHUM

6.1. Introduction

Government of Pakistan constituted a specialized institution to handle disasters and catastrophic situations in the aftermath of the earthquake of 2005 in the KP and state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir known as National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). The first part of the chapter describes its structure and function at district-level. District administration works as District Disaster Management Unit (DDMU). DDMU proved to be an ineffective body without proper planning and resources to handle disasters in Chitral. Similarly, the role of military and paramilitary agencies in relief and reconstruction is also discussed in light of the firsthand experience of the flood-affected community in 2015 floods.

This chapter also discusses the relief and reconstruction process and its connection with the political atmosphere of Reshum. District administration and village council members created a symbiotic relationship to benefit each other. The village council helped the district administration to help maintain the law and order situation after the flash flood and earthquake. In response, the district administration helped local government members from the area by allocating more funds to the directives of local council leaders. How the cooperation took place is discussed in the chapter.

The presence of the lordly families and their long-term invisible opposition to low-status people in the village is surfaced by the successive disasters in the village. The last part of the chapter discusses the effects of resistance between low-status groups and lordly families on the reconstruction process. This tug of war between the leaders of lordly and low-status groups affected the reconstruction process. This village is situated on the main road that connects upper


Chitral to the rest of the country. Because of the inherent political structure, state institutions dealing were different in handling the disaster “situation” than the Kalash valley.

6.2. Disaster Management in Pakistan and Chitral; Structure and Function

The frequency and magnitude of both natural and manmade disasters have increased recently. This escalation has affected communities worldwide, and its damages and costs are believed to be huge. Owing to this threatening situation, many governments and agencies are trying to formulate workable strategies and mechanisms to reduce the impact of disasters. Many countries still focus on the post-disaster relief approach but without necessarily getting the desired results (Ainuddin et al., 2013). In the modern nation-state politics it is the responsibility of the governments to construct institutions that deal directly with the adverse situation and bring reprieve to the people and the disaster hit areas (Shah et al., 2020). Following the 2005 catastrophic earthquake the people contributed huge relief packages and reconstruction funds for the affected people in Pakistan, especially in the Hazara division and State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The government created the National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) in 2007 to implement disaster-related response (Ainuddin et al., 2013).

District administration was handling disasters and emergencies before the introduction of NDMA. District administration is the third level administrative division after province and division. The Deputy Commissioner is the head of this administrative division. Most of the state departments work under the leadership of DC (see figure 6.1). After the NDMA act, the same district administration handles disasters and emergencies at the district level.

Figure 6.1: Structure of District Administration




Source: Nayyer-Stone et al., 2006

Under the NDMA act 2010, a three-tier hierarchical disaster management structure was formed. The first tier, headed by Director General, NDMA was constituted to coordinate, implement and monitor all disaster management strategies in the country. The second tier, Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) was formed to make policies for every province and execute, monitor, and evaluate disaster-related management measures. It also recommended the provincial governments to generate funds and resources for disaster and risk management. Similarly, the third tier called District Disaster Management Unit (DDMU) was responsible for disaster-related operations at the district and union council level (see figure 6.2). District *nazims* (chief of district government) and district administration were District Disaster Management Officers (Shah et al., 2020). Assistant Commissioners acts as District Disaster Management Officer (DDMO) in current model. DDMU also includes union councils to operate at the time of disasters.

NDMA has been criticized for not adequately performing according to international standards of disaster risk reduction. The strategies designed by NDMA are considered over-

ambitious either to justify its existence or to impress international donors. It is affecting the capacity and performance of the organization. According to the act, the function of authority was more reactive than proactive, which means the focus was on post-disaster situations than mitigation to increase the resilience of the vulnerable communities (Fisher, 2010; Ahmed, 2013).

Figure: 6.2. Structure of NDMA in Pakistan



Source: Mukhtar, 2018

Like other poor political, social, and economic infrastructure, Pakistan's institutional capacity to deal with disaster suffers from the same fate. It is primarily military forces to deal with disaster situations though a formal institution is in place (Geiser & Suleri, 2010; Azam et al., 2012). From its design, the formation of the authority and its lack of capacity to adequately address the issues for which it is formed seems more of a political scoring than to take the issue of disaster more seriously. For this reason, when the Covid-19 pandemic hit the country, the government

formed another committee, namely National Command Operation Centre (NCOC), to handle the situation in 2020 that collects data from all over the country and warns the citizens about the Covid situation and the precautions to be taken. Similarly, in 2022 floods in Pakistan, another national level flood coordination body namely National Flood Response and Coordination Centre (NFRCC) is formed owing to the ineffective services of NDMA.

The frequency of flash floods in summer has increased in last few years as a result of climate change causing problems to those on the way of the floods. Chitral has seen the emergence of different disaster-related institutions. In Chitral, I first visited district administration offices to know about DDMU; District administration mainly relies on district-level state machinery locally known as Line Departments such as Communication and Works (C&W) Department, District Police, Municipal Administration, District Health Department, District Education Department for relief work. These district-level departments do not have any training to respond to disaster situations adequately.

Similarly, they have financial and human resource constraints. I found one of the Assistant Commissioners, who was also DDMO, very confident about the strategy and effectiveness of state institutions in the 2013 and 2015 flash floods. He said; “We have been in control of everything and provided everything to disaster-hit people in these two flash floods.” On the other hand, the response of officers’ to district administration tells us a different story. One of the employees in district administration shared:

No one in the district administration has any proper training to handle disasters. There are three bulldozers with the C&W department that are not enough for the whole district to keep the roads open at the time of disasters. They hire the

services of the local contractors at the time of emergencies and disasters to carry out the restoration and repair work.

Recently, on the instructions of District Disaster Management Officer (DDMO), the food department stored food and non-food items in the selected areas in summer to provide the affected people in case of floods. They also order utility stores of the government to provide such items to the disaster-hit people. In Reshum and the Kalash valley, these items were not available in the 2013 and 2015 flash floods as these measures started after the 2015 floods. Still, these items can only partially meet flood-hit people's demands.

6.2.1. Power Struggle between District Administration and District Government in Disasters

There is always a tussle between elected political figures and bureaucracy in Pakistan. The stranglehold of democracy has created hurdles and weakened the local government system in Pakistan (Bakhsh, 2018). The relationship between district administration and district government remains tense as no official wants to share his powers, especially the Deputy Commissioner. Similarly, the district's overall allocation of developmental budgets remains a bone of contention between Deputy Commissioners and *nazims*. Elected members want to maximize their share in the district developmental budget. In contrast, the district administration wants to sideline elected members to pave way for strengthening already established power structure of the district administration where the Deputy Commissioner remains the center of all powers (Hasnain, 2010; Bakhsh, 2018).

In DDMU, this power struggle was also evident at the district level. The power of DDMO has shifts between district *nazim* and district administration since the start of the establishment of the authority. In district Chitral, the utilization of resources and allocation of

funds became an issue when the newly elected *Nazim* of the district resumed his office after the 2015 local government elections. In the new situation, it was not just the Deputy Commissioner and district *Nazim* who stood against each other. Still, sub-district *nazims* and provincial assembly members also active in the struggle to maximize their share. In an interview, *Nazim* of the district explained:

Power is the main factor when it comes to governance. Be it district government, provincial government, or the national government, it is all about power and authority. If the district government is not given authority to conduct affairs, it cannot perform its functions. The provincial government is now thinking of limiting the powers of the district government to make its members more powerful. At the same time, the district administration also wants to reduce the role of the district government. If we do not have powers, I think district government would be weak and toothless.

Such a clash of powers at the district level also affects the routine business at the district level and the relief and reconstruction activity in the time of disaster.

6.2.2. District Funds, Account number IV¹⁶, and Reconstruction; The Case of District Level Politics

The DDMU and DC usually divert the developmental budget for relief and reconstruction though the compensation money is specified for the affected families and reaches every district after disasters. The developmental funding of the district government comes from Provincial Consolidated Fund (PCF). It divides the total fund among districts and provincial government by 42:58 ratios, where 42 percent goes to account-IV of the district and is allocated by district officers (Hasnain, 2010). Though these funds are specified for developmental projects, authorities decide where to consume them at the district level.

¹⁶ This is an account at district level mainly for developmental projects usually utilized jointly by head of the district government and deputy commissioner.

Assistant Commissioners and Deputy Commissioner utilized these funds for relief and reconstruction projects in district Chitral. District administration and DDMO were obliged to use the funds as there was pressure from the public to open roads destroyed by the 2015 floods. The provincial government allowed the district administration and DDMO to utilize it in the relief and reconstruction process. Members of the provincial assembly (MPAs) were also in favor of using these funds, and they played their role to divert these developmental funds to reconstruction. Both the provincial government members of the district supported the Deputy Commissioner, but the said fund could not be allocated without the approval of district *nazim*. It is pertinent to mention that both the provincial assembly members from Chitral were from Pakistan People's party while the District *Nazim* was from Jamat I Islami. After resuming the office, the district *Nazim* stopped the flow of funds in reconstruction projects. It created a deadlock in the reconstruction process. On the other hand, sub-district *Nazims* demanded that the funds be allocated through their disposal. A senior officer in the district finance division explained:

Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners (DDMOs) utilized the funds from account-IV. After the district government elections, the *Nazim* stopped the flow of funds. He wanted to allocate the funds on projects other than the ones already started by the DDMOs and the DC as the *Nazim* wanted to build-up his influence. There were three projects of 160 million rupees (\$1.57 million), *Kuragh* road, *Garam Chashma* road, and *Bumburate* road, annihilated by flash floods in 2015. District *Nazim* was of the view that these funds were allocated for development projects and should not be used for reconstruction. These funds should be apportioned to the district *Nazim*, "the real representative of the district." This power skirmish led to a deadlock and for two years there was no activity on the projects.

The district's provincial government members blamed district *Nazim* for not releasing funds in a press conference (Khwaja, 2016). This blame game started from all side. District *Nazim* blamed the DC and DDMO for inappropriate use of valuable funds and resources of the district. On the other hand the DC used MPAs and sub-district *nazims* against district *Nazim*. After a delay of almost a year, the General Commanding Officer Malakand, head of the army at divisional level, reached Chitral to settle the dispute among the DC, district *Nazim* and MPAs so that reconstruction projects could be restarted (Bashir, 2016). But even after that meeting, it took another year to release funds from account-IV to complete the pending reconstruction projects.

The lack of proper coordination at the district level does affect reconstruction and relief activities. There is a discontinuity in the policies and implementation of the guidelines. This left the district level institutions without a clear vision. There is also a lack of a balance between the powers of state institutions and elected bodies. Attempts to maximize the power of each institution, in such cases, affects the performance and service delivery. At the time of disasters, such rivalries become more apparent and ultimately affect the most vulnerable people.

6.3. Military and Disaster Relief & Reconstruction

The involvement of the armed forces in humanitarian response has increased recently. Their rigorous training to handle emergencies put them in a relatively appropriate position to handle emergent situations. Despite that, there are concerns that when militaries are deputed in times of natural disasters for relief and humanitarian response, political and security concerns may overwhelm and override humanitarian concerns. Humanitarians often question methods of

militaries that they use when they do consultations and assessments; they may not reach the most vulnerable because of their inability to maintain impartiality (Madiwale & Virk, 2011). As in many other fields, the Pakistan army is a crucial stakeholder in disaster situations from top to bottom. Since its inception, all Chairmen of NDMA have been the top-ranked serving army general except once when a civilian remained its chairman from 2011 to 2013. Due to their involvement, military did not let NDMA to develop as an independent institution to strengthen and like many other fields in Pakistan, they consider their presence inevitable in disaster management.

In most of such natural disasters, Pakistan Frontier Works Organization (FWO), an engineering wing of the Pakistan army is given the task of relief and reconstruction. FWO was welcomed by the people of Chitral initially after the 2015 flood for reconstruction, especially to restore the transportation in the district as most of the roads became non-functional by flash floods. The main road from Chitral to Booni remained closed for vehicles for weeks as flood washed it at many locations. People expected FWO to have specialized machinery and equipment to restore transportation but they could not meet the local expectations. One of the Communication and Works (C&W) department employees told me that FWO used their machinery and fuel.

Additionally, they hired local contractors for the said purpose in most cases. Many of the local contractors complained about not being paid for their job by FWO. In Reshum, the local community's views of the FWO were not very different from the rest of state institutions; additionally they were blamed for their aggressive attitude.

6.3.1. “They care more about their reputation and less about flood-affected people”: Hameed

For more than half of the total time since the independence of Pakistan, Army ruled the country. This tendency made most of the army heads remain popular in the masses. Like many other leaders, the army chief also visited Chitral after the flash flood of 2015 (“Gen. Raheel Visits Flood”, 2015). He also visited Reshum village along with other army officers and FWO local in charge. It was the third day of the high-level flash flood in the village. On the occasion of the chief’s arrival, the reconstruction of the bridge in Chitral to Booni road started, which was washed away by the flood.

FWO built a steel bridge overnight. It was a shining new and durable bridge with Flags of Pakistan and FWO. When the army chief left after staying for few hours and addressing the people of Reshum, FWO replaced the bridge with another old steel bridge. Hameed, in his early 40s, a university graduate, remains in the village as he is not doing any paid job. He narrated the story about the bridge reconstruction:

FWO constructed the first bridge to show it to the chief and get appreciation. When the chief left, they replaced it with an old one. They care more about their reputation and less about flood-affected people. Politics is deeply rooted in the Army culture.

I discussed the above situation with one of my friends, a senior officer in the Pakistan army, to know the possible reason for fleeing in the Army ranks in the presence of their high-ranked officers. I learned that every performance of officers is measured and systematically recorded by high-ranked officers—these quantifications of performance become basis for promotion to senior positions. The visit of the Army Chief to flood-hit Reshum and the quick response by FWO to make a shining and durable bridge within a short span would have earned generous praise for the officers concerned.

Photo 6.1: Bridge on Reshum Stream Installed by FWO after the Departure of the Army Chief



Source: Author, 2017

The principal of the government high school of the village, while talking about the visits of different leaders, claimed:

Everyone took *faida* (advantage) of the poor condition of disaster-hit people, especially *lothoro* (leaders). They showed up here with dozens of *change wada* (empty promises). The army chief promised to help the local community till they built their houses, roads, and other destroyed installations in the village. It never happened.

The visit of the chief to the area was criticized by many. However, others still praised the chief that though his visit did not bring any good to the village materially, it helped people psychologically that top leadership cares about them. It took around twenty-four hours to remove the bridge installed especially for the army chief and replace it with another one. This maneuver posed great difficulty to both, the NGOs and the local population to continue relief activities. Though flood created obstacles on the main road, keeping the road blocked deliberately for around twenty-four hours without prior intimation in such circumstances was painful for the local population and relief agencies.

6.3.2. ... A soldier hit him with the gun. I was distressed to see this ugly scene, but remained quiet because of *buhtuyek* (fear).” Mubarik

On the day of the Army Chief’s visit, the security was tightened and the people faced difficulty carrying out the relief activities. Security personnel had out-numbered the local population to ensure that all areas of security were in place. Residents were stopped from moving, especially on the roads because of security protocol. Most of the NGOs and other agencies were transporting relief goods for distribution to the affected people on the roadsides. Mubarik, a school teacher in the Agha Khan Foundation higher secondary school Chitral, age 34, from upper hamlet Panandeh, narrated:

When I reached the main road after crossing an arduous route above the mountain as the road to Panandeh was washed away by the flood, I saw army soldiers patrolling with weapons. I wanted to take food and water for my *khandan* (family members) stuck in the village. One of the soldiers ordered me to move to the local dispensary where many of my village men were also waiting. All of them were held there for security reasons. When a *chaq* (child) tried to see the chief addressing people in a nearby school above the dispensary wall a soldier hit him with the gun. I was distressed to see this ugly scene, but remained quiet because of *buhtuyek* (fear). We all waited for more than three hours for getting a signal to move out. I posted this story on my Facebook page as I considered that the only forum where I could share my feelings. My brother, who was studying at Peshawar University, asked me to delete the post as it could create problems for me as nobody is allowed to speak against “them.”

The Army Chief promised many reconstruction activities to be done by FWO. Ishfaq, a village councilor who is a law graduate and teaching in a local private school, stated:

The powerhouse was badly damaged, and I advised the village council to ask the chief about restoring the powerhouse. The Chief promised he would make arrangements to repair it in a month.

The powerhouse remained one of the main issues. It took more than six years to restore the facility.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan twice visited the flood-affected areas of Chitral. Upon his visit, local people demanded the prime minister, through a member of the provincial assembly, to order FWO for initiation of reconstruction work. The roads had been ruined by the floods and it was expected from FWO to complete the work fast so that that routine could return quickly. It is the responsibility of the C&W department to keep the roads open for traffic. Roads in Chitral are built on sloppy mountains and prone to land sliding round the year. In case of blockade, the C&W department hired local contractors who used their machinery to open roads in such cases, .

People of upper Chitral demanded FWO to clear the debris and do all types of reconstruction work as they were expecting them to get the job done fast.

FWO hired the services of local contractors, and the process of reconstruction was prolonged. In the C&W department, a local contractor complained:

FWO gave half the money that I spent on restoring the road. For the other half, I requested them over and over again but in vain. I know I can never get this money as many other local contractors who did work for FWO and not paid.

On the other hand, an employee of the C&W department told me that FWO officers come to the office and received their payment immediately without any delay. It is pertinent to mention that FWO constructed two bridges in the Kalash valley and Reshum. After two months of its installation, steel structured Kalash Valley Bridge broke bringing the traffic to discontinue. On the other hand, when Reshum Bridge was replaced with an old one after the Army Chief's visit, it created terrible noise when vehicles passed through it. A local contractor and volunteers filled it some with soil and wood to avoid the irritating noise.

Many people from Reshum complained about the *wedachu* (rude, ugly) behavior of FWO workers and for using the property of the local population without their permission. They used local people's land to build alternate vehicle routes without permission. The owner of a local school and college told me that they opened the gate of the school building without asking and used it for months. Five kilometers on each side of Reshum village, three main obstacles kept the road blocked for traffic. It took more than a month to open it. Link roads to the rest of the remote areas took more time to open.

6.4. District Administration, DDMU, and Politics of Relief

To understand the mechanism of the state institutions in the time of disasters, I conducted interviews with some district administration top officials. As stated earlier, it was mainly the district administration which included the DC, AC and other related officers to handle the relief and reconstruction activities on behalf of the state. District administration was entitled to direct all the line departments to work for relief and reconstruction in times of disaster. They also issued NOCs to NGOs working in the district for relief and to reconstruct the depleted structures of the local affected communities. As with any other institution, the head of the Mastuj sub-division administration, the AC claimed to have the capacity to handle disaster situations. In an interview the AC of upper Chitral claimed:

We have all the necessary arrangements to handle disaster situations. We have rescue teams to help affected people. We have identified vulnerable places with more chances of flood and addressed them accordingly. We have a shifting facility to transport affected people to safe locations. Our health teams provide first aid to the injured. We direct police in emergency and disaster situations. We make protection walls to reduce the damages and provide water and food to affected people.

To understand the structure and function of DDMU in Chitral, I tried to know the nature, magnitude, and feasibility of the projects of district administration for the people before, during, and after the disaster.

In the case of flash floods in Reshum, most of the claims of DDMO were incorrect. After the flash flood in Reshum, the local community performed relief activities. Those with unsafe houses were shifted to their relatives' houses and they stayed in the open for days without any help from the district administration. FOCUS and Al- Khidmat Foundation volunteers were the

first who reached for help from outside. They provided both food and non-food items to the affected families. There are volunteers with these two organizations in different villages who perform relief activities in emergencies and disasters.

Residents of Reshum came to know about the flood through a shepherd who was provided with a card-less phone as cell phones are not working in remote pastures. The warning system is inbuilt. State institutions could not develop the capacity of their staff to warn the communities about flash floods here in time. Two organizations, FOCUS and International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), have been working in the region for a long time to observe changes in glaciers and gather other related information about the mountains. They conducted surveys and held awareness sessions with communities living in the Hindu Kush region about natural hazards.

The district administration does not have any specialized force or equipment that could rescue people at the time of disaster. During my stay in the field, I observed the helplessness of DDMO when eleven people were missing in an avalanche near Reshum. DDMO asked officials in NDMA to arrange a helicopter to reach the place of the avalanche and search for the missing persons. NDMA arranged a helicopter from the army. In another landslide, the army personnel died because of heavy snowfall at the same time. As the helicopter was operated by army pilots, they first took the dead body of the army personnel to the army base and then to his house and made arrangements for his funerals as all routes were blocked and the helicopter was the only option. The DDMO wanted to reach to the civilians but he had no other options except the use of an army helicopter. He faxed three letters to demand another helicopter as the first one was in use by the army though demanded by DDMO. It took three days to reach the missing persons.

By then they were recovered from the avalanche by the local community as all were dead. DDMO was not happy with the way the army responded in the matter but he was helpless.

DDMO mainly mobilizes tehsil municipal administration (TMA) and other line departments at the time of disasters. Their staff is neither trained nor enough to handle such critical situations. The size of the disaster area widespread with scattered population and they have no means of transport to reach the affected places. In Reshum, a water tank of TMA reached to bring drinking water for the people. The road was cleared by Al- Khidmat Foundation and FOCUS volunteers and local people on the third day of the flood as NGOs got relief goods for the affected population.

Four kilometers on the northern side of Reshum, Chitral River washed away the road as the water level rose dangerously high. It took more than a month to clear the road for traffic. Again FWO gave the task of construction of the road to a local contractor. There was no route to the Mastuj subdivision, also known as upper Chitral. Locals and NGOs had to use the mountain routes to provide relief goods to people as flash floods also hit many other parts of upper Chitral. Roads in remote areas took even longer to reopen for traffic. The local population was alone doing all relief activities as state institutions could not reach there as there was no assistance from the state. Even near main road villages, as in the case of Reshum, in the absence of proper routes, relief activities were carried out mainly by the local population. Initially, reaching the main village was an issue, and then to deep parts like the most affected hamlets, Panandeh, Batikandeh, and Golguch. Most NGOs, charity wings of religious groups, and some state institutions brought relief goods and distributed them on the main road. It was not even possible to identify the most severely affected people in most cases. NGOs and other relief bodies were

again relying on local political leaders for relief activities, and the chances of political influences were high.

6.5. Powerhouse Reconstruction and Blame Game

The 2015 flood destroyed the mini-hydropower station built by Pukhtunkhwa Energy Development Authority (PEDO) with the financial and technical aid of GTZ (German Agency for technical cooperation) and the German government. Prior to the flood, it provided electricity to most of the upper Chitral region, with around 16,000 households. Resident engineer, who was head of the powerhouse and was an employee of PEDO, said: “I was in the powerhouse at the time of the flood. One big rock fell on the main room where turbines and generators were installed. It destroyed 70% of the total machinery.” In Reshum, this powerhouse was the only source of electricity. For the residents of Reshum in particular and the whole of upper Chitral in general, the destruction of the powerhouse was a significant loss. Reshum residents were consuming low price and uninterrupted electricity from the powerhouse. That is why when the Pakistan army chief visited the village after the flood, members of the village council, including other elders, demanded only powerhouse restoration.

When residents of Reshum realized that there was no sign of reconstruction work on the powerhouse, along with upper Chitral residents, they started a series of campaigns reminding the authorities concerned to reconstruct the powerhouse. Later on, the demonstrations evolved into a movement known as *tahreek I bahaliye Reshun bijlighar* (Reshum powerhouse restoration movement). The purpose of the movement was to organize combined efforts of the area's residents to pressurize the authorities concerned and government to reconstruct the powerhouse. Almost all political activists, current and former provincial and national assembly members,

participated in a dozen protests and hunger strikes. Previous members criticized current federal and provincial assembly members for not doing “enough” to reconstruct the powerhouse. Members of the national assembly considered it a provincial matter. Members of the provincial assembly’s party were opposition in the provincial assembly and criticized the provincial government for not providing funds for the reconstruction of the powerhouse. Members of the district government from the union council accused the district head of the local government of deliberately delaying the reconstruction of the powerhouse as he wanted to privatize it and wish to construct it through his sources to earn from it and influence voters of the area. In short, all the political figures of the area criticized each other in front of the media and people of the area to switch the responsibility to someone else’s shoulders. Both local and national news agencies covered all the protests. It provided an ideal ground to the local politicians for political scoring. Member of the committee along with few leaders from the area also went on hunger strikes.

On the other hand, the DC participated in the procession to convince the residents of his support. The bureaucratic structure of Pakistan is considered to control people, processes, places, and things by state. This mechanism of control and command is partly done through bureaucratic correspondence. No doubt, it also entails political functions (Hull, 2012). The primary purpose of the DC’s participation was to keep the protesters in control. He held meetings with village council members and VC’s chairman for bargaining. Member of the district council from the same union council was also part of the dialogues. The Deputy Commissioner wanted assurance from the VC chairman and district member of the local government to keep the protesters and their leaders from blocking the road. There were varied views among the leadership on dealing with the district administration. The village council’s chairman and other council members

received a share through two projects from the district administration that were discussed in the coming section of this chapter.

During my interaction with the Assistant Commissioner of upper Chitral, I enquired about the provision of electricity and reconstruction of Reshum powerhouse as the whole area remained without electricity. During my stay in Reshun, I observed how difficult it was to live without electric power source. Residents of the village criticized authorities for not providing it. Students' studies were interrupted and it was not hard to imagine what it meant to the people who received a 24/7 uninterrupted supply of electric power and now they were permanently without it for years.

According to the district administration, the provincial government is working on two projects to provide electricity to the residents of upper Chitral before the disaster struck powerhouse making it dysfunctional. The Assistant Commissioner at Booni mentioned that the government is constructing fifty-five micro-hydro powerhouses (MHPs) in the area, which will complete in a year. Secondly, the government plans to distribute 2700 solar panels at a nominal price of Rs. 9,000 per panel. This would help the affected population to get the electricity they need. I will discuss two projects one by one and its implication for Reshum village.

The said fifty-five MHPs that PEDO is installing with the help of AKRSP are not just for the flood-hit zone of upper Chitral but for the whole district. Reshum powerhouse, when it was intact, could not meet the demands of the entire population. MHPs were designed to provide electricity to whole of Chitral due to insufficient capacity of powerhouse. The manager of AKRSP at the Booni office said eleven MHPs are included for upper Chitral, in which post-flood MHPs are also included. Apart from the PEDO and AKRSP projects, SRSP was also

constructing MHPs in upper Chitral. All these projects were only fulfilling a portion of the total requirement for the population of upper Chitral. The total number of households in upper Chitral is above twenty-two thousand (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017). The whole electric power generation of SRSP and AKRSP MHPs is around four megawatts. Each household receives 500 watts from MHPs, which means about 8000 homes would be given electricity at 500 watts per household (AKRSP, 2018).

Five hundred watts is not enough for one household, especially if heavy home appliances are used. In Reshum, most residents considered MHPs inappropriate compared to the Reshum powerhouse. Still, if MHP is installed in the village, it could somehow decrease the residents' miseries. Regarding the construction of MHP in the village, leaders have had various, mostly opposing, claims and reservations.

In Reshum 1st MHP was approved by AKRSP and Amanullah, an active political figure from Golguch, remained a member of local government on the district level. He was a leading figure in the goat grazing issue discussed later in this chapter, claims: “*masr ghair haya kormo ka koi*” (who else can bring such developmental projects except me).

Second, MHP was approved by the VC chairman and elected member of the district council from the Charon union council. One of the core committee members for restoring the Reshum powerhouse claimed that the second powerhouse was approved because of the committee's efforts. When the committee members approached higher authorities of PEDO for the reconstruction of the Reshum powerhouse, they instead promised the construction of a MPH in the village.

Arbab, a shopkeeper dealing in hardware in the main Reshum *bazaar*, from one of the Yuft families, an active leader and one of the four members of the core committees for the restoration of the powerhouse, blamed a few leaders in district government and two NGOs for the delay of reconstruction of Reshum powerhouse. He claimed:

The two national NGOs, SRSP and AKRSP are working in this region for a long on MPHs construction. They were against the reconstruction of the Reshum powerhouse. Both were shrewd and their CEOs had a discerning eye. They were aware of the fact that the Reshum powerhouse was a long term project that could take years to construct. Their alternate plan was to promote the installation of MPHs and for that it would be easy to get more projects from the government and other donors to construct MPHs in the district, which is not a substitute for the Reshum powerhouse. If they succeeded the employees could retain their positions on the projects and paid on time. They would install many boards for *manshoor* (publicity), which was one of their primary purposes. On the other hand, the district head of the local government wanted to privatize the powerhouse and reconstruct it through his sources as he wants to attach his name to this significant project and earn a good reputation. Similarly, the construction of MPHs in the area also involved local political figures who could be interested their own people in the project implementation. Another reservation on the construction of MPHs was that the provincial government launched MPHs projects as these took less time to complete though in many cases, it is not sustainable and not an alternative as it provides only 500 watts per household.

According to Amanullah, a key political leader of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in upper Chitral:

Pakistan Tehreek I Insaf (PTI) government in the province wanted the completion of such tiny powerhouses in their tenure in the province to take credit of completing smaller hydel projects in time for the next general elections the bigger ones having been left for the future as they required ample time and resources.

6.5.1. Controversy of the first Micro Hydel Power (MHP) after Flood of 2015; “Dost Ali opposed the construction of powerhouse for political reasons”: Resheed

The first MHP was planned to be built near the old Reshum powerhouse in Panandeh by PEDO and AKRSP after the 2015 flood. Through their links, Amanullah and Ali, a bank manager who belonged to the main Reshum village, brought the MHP project for Reshum. After the survey, AKRSP selected a place on the stream near the old powerhouse as this place provided the perfect site to construct a 500 Kilo Watt (KW) powerhouse. 500 KW was enough for the whole village to provide electricity as according to the MHP formula; each household was to consume 500 watts. According to this formula, the project was to cover 1000 households, which means all village households. For the project, AKRSP asked them to form a Community Organization (CO). A meeting took place in Batikandeh, one of the most affected hamlets in the village.

In the meeting, the formation of CO took place, and members of CO selected Haji Buland from Batikandeh as President. The next day all members of the CO went to see the site in Panandeh near the old powerhouse. The landowner of the site was also present. He was from the Panaye clan. He did not speak, but one of his relatives, Dost Ali, asked CO members to wait till the next meeting about the land owner's decision. After a few days, when CO members returned to the site to listen to the land owner's decision, he hesitated to speak. He said that as the family members' owned the property, which is not yet divided among heirs, he could not lend it to construct the powerhouse.

Many, not all, of the residents of Panandeh supported the pro-grazing group as they are residing near upper pastures taking their goats to high pastures for grazing. The majority of residents of Batikandeh meanwhile, and Golguch residents were against the goat grazing on high

pastures. The President of the CO was an active member of the group against goat grazing, and the same stood true for the secretary from Golguch. Additionally, Amanullah, the key figure who brought the project to the village, was leading the group against the goat grazing practice on high pastures and leading it in the court. After the 2013 flood, when the two opposing groups on the grazing issue took it to the district administration, the AC and land revenue officers, the people of Batikandeh and those of Panandeh who were in favor of grazing started blaming each other, and the relationship between two hamlets got bitter. In Panandeh, some residents are also against the grazing practice, but politically they could not stand openly against the pro-grazing group. One reason for that is, in Panandeh, an influential figure; Dost Ali was in the pro-grazing group. Rasheed, living on the southern side of the old powerhouse and stream, was employed in the powerhouse. His house was affected by the 2015 flood. He also opposed the grazing practice on high pastures but was not an active participant to oppose it. He narrated:

In Panandeh, some people disliked the grazing practice as the people of Batikandeh and Golguch did. One reason for not participating openly in favoring the anti-grazing group was Dost Ali. He was an influential personality in the hamlet, and he convinced his cousin not to allow the construction of MHP on his land. He had personal issues with Amanullah and did not want him to take credit of any reconstruction project. This was the actual reason to oppose MHP in Panandeh.

Dost Ali openly opposed Amanullah in the 2015 local government election as well. Even though he was not rearing goats and other livestock he strongly supported the pro-grazing group from Panandeh. Dost Ali and Amanullah were at loggerheads due to land conflict in high pastures. Amanullah considered himself the leader of low-status communities and Dost Ali always countered him and his projects. Owing to this rivalry, when Amanullah became the leader of the group who were opposing grazing on high pastures, Dost Ali joined the opposite camp.

Residents of Panandeh told me that after the visit of the CO members, Dost Ali wrote an application to AKRSP to postpone the construction of MHP. Dost Ali also pressured his cousin, whose land was selected for the construction of MHP, not to allow the construction. Similarly, he also convinced the pro-grazing group that if Amanullah builds MHP, he will win the local body election and will use his office to ban grazing, which the grazers group is not ready to afford. In this way first MHP project could not start because of the personal rivalries of the two leaders.

6.5.2 Construction of Second MPH; *chairmano koshisha mumkin hoi* (chairman of the village council made it possible): Shahzad

The construction of another MHP took place on the lower part of the stream, where it meets the main Chitral River. It was constructed on Shehzad's land, one of the VC chairman's cousins and his close supporters, as both were from the same *Khushahmate* lineage. Shehzad told me about the construction of MPH: "it was because of the efforts of VC chairman and district member from Charun union council. They visited DC office many times to bring this powerhouse project." Shehzad, VC chairman and district council member of the village were from the same *Khushahmate* family and supporters of one ruling political party PTI. VC chairman was the President of the CO who was constructing the MPH. Shahzad was the contractor's fifty percent partner who was building a canal for the MPH and other necessary construction. Chairman of VC said:

I and Ghazi, members of the district council from this union council, brought this powerhouse for the village from DC. During protests against the reconstruction of the old Reshum powerhouse, he had promised us that he would help the village as much as he could through his office.

The total capacity of this new MPH was 200kw. It provided electricity to 400 households at 500 watts per household only. All lordly families in the village were included to provide electricity from this powerhouse. Panandeh, Golguch and Batikandeh were excluded.

The project benefited all three persons namely; Shehzad, VC chairman, and district member from the union council. For Shehzad, it was advantageous because the powerhouse was constructed on his flooded land, which was not capable of farming anymore. It needed finances to bring it back under cultivation as it was full of *qayii bohate* (big rocks) brought by the flash flood. Secondly, the protection wall and canal constructed to carry stream water for the powerhouse protected the rest of this land and his house from future flash floods.

The third benefit was in the form of cash that was earning from the construction of the powerhouse as he had a fifty percent share in its construction. Other financial benefits included employment in the powerhouse as he planned to hire two persons of his family after its completion.

On the other hand, it was beneficial for the VC chairman and district members. Most people getting electricity from the powerhouse were combined voters of these two, mainly from the same lordly family. Chairman of Reshum VC once told me that though most of the residents of main Reshum village were their relatives and supported him in local body elections, they always needed favors in the shape of share from the projects or in any other possible way; otherwise, they could brew problems for me. He mentioned:

One of my relatives did not allow laying of the extended water pipeline (explained in detail in the coming section) as I did not include him in the protection walls project that CDLD constructed. He complained to me for

overlooking his request so I planned to do something for him too. The same was the situation with others.

As for these two powerhouses, local political tug of war, power struggle, and personal interests influenced the reconstruction process. The district administration claimed they were constructing the powerhouses to provide electricity to people who were facing miseries from power outages since 2015 mainly due to local power manipulation. In Reshum, the first project could not succeed because of continuing political antagonism based on personal conflicts between two leaders. The second one was being built to provide electricity to all the lordly families to serve their political and financial interests.

6.5.3. Solar Panels for Flood Affected communities; “it is good for nothing.”: Hussain

The government tried to resolve the power outage issue resulting from the flash flood in Chitral by providing solar panel packages. The district administration mentioned the provision of electricity for the flash flood victims in Reshum (Energy and Power Department KP n.d). The energy and Power department of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa redirected 2750 panels for the distribution among the people in the flood-affected areas of Chitral. The numbers of solar panels, including other appliances, were shifted to be distributed among the affected consumers of Reshum powerhouse. The package included a solar panel that generated 200 watts, three Light Emitting Diode (LED) lights, one ceiling fan, one pedestal fan, one mobile phone charging slot, and two batteries. According to local distributing contractors and employees of district administration in Booni, the original price of the said tools was around Rs. 85,000 provided to the affected areas at a discount rate. The cost of one solar panel was fixed at Rs. 9000/- by the government. According to the formula, a specified number of solar panels were distributed equally among each union council in the upper Chitral region affected due to flash floods in

Reshum. The specified number of solar panels for other union councils of upper Chitral was 115. The distribution authority invited everyone to write applications for the said solar panels. In case of more applicants the quota for distribution to each village council was made on a lottery basis.

In the case of Reshum village council, the number was increased. According to the core committee members for the restoration of old powerhouse, one reason for granting more solar packages to Reshum was the active participation in the protest organized to restore the Reshum powerhouse to pressurize the authorities concerned in the government. For Reshum alone, 450 solar panel packages were granted by the government to diffuse the rising tension. The village council chairman explained:

The Assistant Commissioner of Booni asked me to provide names for the solar panels as the government had increased the share of Reshum village to 450 solar panels packages as it was the worst affected village. After discussing the situation with village council members, a consensus was developed that the offer should be rejected because the number of solar panels was much less than the requirement. Total number of household in the village is 800. Secondly, the active members of the core committee for restoring the old powerhouse would blame us for accepting less number of solar panels.

Thus people of Reshum village collectively rejected the solar panels. They wanted the government to provide every household with a solar panel. The government should simultaneously begin reconstructing old powerhouse as solar panels are only a temporary arrangement (Reshun Residents Wants Solar Panels, 2016).

After discussing it with different stakeholders I learned other reasons for the Reshum village elders not accepting solar panels. Firstly, residents of Reshum showed strong ownership of the old powerhouse as it was constructed on their stream water, their land and supposed to

provide electricity to Reshum village and nearby hamlets. Later, every political leader in power increased the range by installing more poles in remote areas of upper Chitral to increase their vote bank. However, electricity was available to most remote areas only for a few hours from the old Reshum powerhouse. The government provided these solar panels to all those areas that were devoid of electric power, even in other districts. The government's policy of not giving solar panels to all households of Reshum village was not justified at all.

Secondly, it was an unjustified measure by the government to charge the residents of Reshum village for the solar panels same amount as other districts though the latter districts were not affected by the flood. A third reason for not accepting solar panels from the government was the limited utility of solar systems in the village. In winter, sunlight is not strong enough for the panels to store the energy and be consumed by the household. Similarly, cloudy conditions in the region minimize its utility. The upper parts of the village like Panandeh, Golguch and Batikandeh, receive sunlight for less than three hours during the whole day from November till February. Because of the less utility of the solar panels, it was not wise step to accept the solar panels from the government while paying for them. Hussain, who is an advocate by profession, aged above 60, belongs to *Khushwakhte*, a lordly family, and does not consider the solar panels as a suitable alternative for old powerhouse. He stated:

Yoro plate (solar panels) is good for nothing. The government is just deceiving us, and many of us get deceived. It is only good if a more extensive solar system is installed in one place that provides electricity to the whole area. It cannot solve our actual issue. Government is not serious about it. The government earned millions of rupees from Reshum powerhouse since 1999 though the German government had installed it and now they say there are no funds to reconstruct it.

The most important reason for not accepting solar panels was that if residents of Reshum agree with the government's solar panels, it would give an impression that residents of Reshum had compromised the reconstruction of the old Reshum powerhouse. They could not demand the rebuilding of the powerhouse from the authorities concerned, and movement for restoring the old powerhouse would be affected by accepting solar panels. Residents of Reshum benefited maximum from the old powerhouse, and they were the ones who started the movement for its restoration. So compromising the struggle was not an option for residents of Reshum. The collective strategy of most of the stakeholders was to refuse the government's offer of the panels and continue to coerce it for reconstruction of old powerhouse. There were residents in the village who thought they should have received the solar panels from the government. Arbab, a core committee member, claimed:

The decision of not accepting solar panels reached most of the authorities in Chitral and even the provincial offices as we were repeatedly meeting top officials in Peshawar. Even the chief minister of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa knew about it and he announced 1000 extra solar panels for the people of Reshum that we are still waiting for.

Like many other leaders on different occasions, the chief minister also made false promises. On his visit to the Shandur Polo match, an annual event that attracts international tourists and tourists from Pakistan, the Chief Minister announced that he would provide 1000 extra solar panels for flood-affected people of Reshum (“Thousands Reached Shandur”, 2016). The government panels were rejected by the people of Reshum, instead an NGO came with solar panels. The total number of solar panels was 240. The district head of the local government directed the NGO to take the project to Reshum. Amanullah was friend of the district head of local government, and their political parties had made a coalition in district government. The

district government head wanted Amanullah to distribute the solar panels in the village. Still, it was not possible to do it without the consent of the village council as they did not allow other individuals to work with NGOs without the permission of the village council and chairman VC. Amanullah invited the VC chairman to distribute them among village council members and get his share. Amanullah took 90 solar panels while the rest was given to the village council to distribute among their voters. Ishfaq, one of the village councilors, said:

Though the village council accepted it, they were confused about how to convince the people why we rejected 450 solar last time when the government was distributing it and why we are receiving a much smaller number now. Then we reached a consensus that we would convince people by saying the offer was rejected previously as it was from the government, and we wanted to maintain pressure as they were not giving them to all households. This time we accept it because an NGO is providing them.

Ishfaq got 50 solar panels and distributed them among his people in the village. It is to mention here that the solar panels were 25% of the actual cost to be paid by users. It was much higher than that of government solar panels. It was a political gimmick of the powerful stakeholders to provide the affected population with a lesser number of panels at a high cost and yet be able to convince the villages about the efficacy of the deal.

6.6. Politics of Giving and Taking in the Reconstruction

Four months after the deadline for the flash flood, Reshum's first protest took place (“Sit in Starts”, 2015). The initial protest was mainly to record the reservations against the government for not fulfilling the demands of the Reshum flood-affected people. Like many other leaders, the prime minister of Pakistan promised the people of Chitral that each affected household would get five hundred thousand rupees. As discussed in the previous chapter, each fully damaged home

received only one hundred thousand rupees, while a partially damaged home received eighty thousand. Another reason for the protest was the powerhouse. So it was the start of a series of protests demanding the reconstruction of the powerhouse.

As mentioned earlier, a committee had been formed to organize and channel the protests and efforts of Reshum and other adjacent villages. I asked one of the active members of the Reshum powerhouse reconstruction committee, Saeed Hussain, a social, worker, and contractor, why he did not let the village council do the job of organizing people for protests for the reconstruction of the Reshum powerhouse. He said:

When we realized that the government was not interested in the reconstruction of the powerhouse, we all gathered and decided to start *qahra asoni* (protests). At that time, there was no committee for the powerhouse reconstruction. All of us made banners with written demands on them. DC of Chitral also reached the place of protest. He took the VC chairman with him away from the protest place. After that, the formation of the committee took place.

Core committee members were not confident that the village council was doing enough to restore the powerhouse. On the other hand village council members thought that the core committee members and other active participants instead of strengthening the movement for the powerhouse reconstruction were trying to spoil VC members' image. Many of the committee members were involved in active politics in the area and village, and a few had contested the last local body election. Vice-chairman of Reshum village council narrated:

Some candidates who lost the election in the last local body elections were now on the committee. At the same time, few want to build a good image to cash their efforts for powerhouse restoration in the coming elections. In the initial days, committee members spoke against us that we did not restore the powerhouse.

That is why we actively started to organize and hold protests for powerhouse restoration.

On May 6th 2016, almost ten months after the flash flood, members of the village council held a meeting near the old guest house of the village. The village council members specifically requested people not to come to the road or block it, rather blame political leaders at provincial and district levels to make restoration efforts (*“Reshun Power House Me”*, 2016). This meeting was crucial in preventing people from coming to roads to protest and damage public properties.

I enquired from the VC chairman and other councilors about the meeting of DC and village council members. I was told that DC and district administration wanted to keep the protesters under control and not let them block the road because half of the district would be cut off from Chitral headquarters. Keeping the main road open is the prime duty of the district administration. The May 6th meeting was important for DC and village council members to keep the protesting people calm. As the VC chairman told me, DC ensured full support of DC office to village council members and increased the village's share in reconstruction fund. The village council chairman convinced like-minded councilors to keep the protests peaceful and not block the road. One of the councilors once blamed committee members for crossing the limits but things remained under control. All this was to prove the village councilors faithful supporters of district administration and get a maximum share for village councilors in the reconstruction process by district administration. Village councilors praised DC for his efforts for the people of Reshum. When the DC died in an airplane accident on December 6th 2016, one of the respondents, a youth counselor in Reshum village council, said: “We were unlucky to lose DC as he was making every effort for flood-hit people of Reshum.”

On the other hand, as mentioned in the previous chapter, some of the core members wanted to record protests of maximum magnitude. Arbab, one of the core committee members for restoring the old Reshum powerhouse, told me that once:

When we met with top officers of the power and energy department, the government of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, they praised the people of Chitral for their patriotism and their friendly behavior. I think, and I told the officer that it is because of our good nature and patience to accept our miseries with an open heart. We have been without electricity for more than a year and do not know how long we shall have to wait. Being exceptionally calm in such circumstances is not suitable for us and our coming generations. We need to use full force in protests. Only then high authorities and government would realize our miseries.

He wanted to keep the roads blocked so that the government could realize the intensity of the issue and the pain and suffering of the people of Reshum. Arbab and many other core committee members contested 2022 local body election as predicted by the previous councilor.

Chairman of the VC and councilors' role in the powerhouse issue and protests and then making a deal in connivance with the DC is example of how reconstruction efforts and problems can be diverted toward gaining political and other interests. In the next section, services of the DC office and district administration to the village council have been discussed. It is also true that without aggressive efforts and protests, it was not easy to compel the provincial government and concerned authorities to think seriously about the reconstruction of the old powerhouse and make electricity available for Reshum people and the rest of the upper Chitral residents.

6.7. Politics of Protection Walls; “We need the protection wall the most as we faced threats from both sides, but nobody listened to us” Rasheed

In Reshum village protection walls are constructed by two bodies, Sarhad Rural Support Program (SRSP) and Community-Driven Local Development (CDLD). This section discusses the relevance of the protection walls with the power structures and their manipulation both in external and internal contexts.

CDLD is a provincial project with Euros 64 million financial support from the European Union for flood and militancy-hit Malakand division that includes six districts, including Chitral (Community Driven Local Development CDLD Government of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, n.d). It was a three-year program initially that started in 2014. The mechanism of the project was to invite applications from community organizations (COs) in the respective districts, all districts of Malakand Division, to identify the proposed area of work by community members. In normal circumstances, from writing a proposal by CO to the project's final payment, a process was to be followed to ensure of transparency. After the flood of 2015 in Chitral, the mechanism of funding the projects and its approval changed. According to the contingency plan, which the chief minister of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province approved, district administration would receive proposals directly from communities to start work on proposed projects (Community Driven Local Development CDLD Government of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, 2015). As per the contingency plan, the powers of DC were enhanced and he could now finance the projects without much interference.

Comparing the post-flood schemes in two of my fieldwork locales implemented by CDLD after the 2015 floods is pertinent. The total population of the Kalash valley where I did fieldwork is more than Reshum. In Reshum total number of fully damaged houses was 99, while in the Kalash valley there were 84 in the 2015 flash flood. The number of bridges, roads, land, and water channels destroyed in the Kalash valley was higher than Reshum. The CDLD projects

better known as flood schemes were completed under the contingency plan and supervision of the district administration and DC office. These offices were given extra powers to select the sites for spending CDLD money for rehabilitation and reconstruction of flooded communities. However, by comparison, the number of projects in Reshum was double of those in the Kalash valley. According to this record of the Kalash valley, the total number of schemes is seven while the total number of projects is fourteen in Reshum village. Following is the detail of the projects carried out through the CDLD program.

Table: 6.1 Comparison of CDLD reconstruction projects in Reshum and the Kalash Valley

Projects	Total no. of projects	Protection Walls	Communication	Irrigation
The Kalash valley	7	03	02 Bridges	02(Water Channels)
Reshum Village	14	14	00	00


Source: CDLD District Chitral Official Record, 2017

The projects in the Kalash valley were different. Two of them were pedestrian bridges washed away by flash floods. Without these bridges, it was impossible for the residents of Brunthar and Kandisar, two hamlets in the Kalash valley, to connect physically with the main road, so the residents required it urgently. Two water channels, one of which is discussed in detail in the 7th chapter, were also necessary as they provided water for domestic use and water mills, fruit trees, and crops. Three protection walls were constructed in anticipation of flash floods to protect buildings, houses, and valuable land. In Reshum, in all the projects protection walls were built to protect from future flash floods. Undoubtedly, mitigation is an important

segment in protecting vulnerable communities, but the process is very technical and should be carried out carefully. In the case of the Kalash valley, I have discussed three instances in chapter seven where two of the protection walls protected human installations and land. Still, on the opposite side, it also caused damage because of which CDLD postponed the third protection wall due to reservations of the community. In the case of Reshum, the building of protection walls provided safety to the selected houses, which would be discussed in detail.

As mentioned earlier, after following the instructions of DC in protests for Reshum powerhouse, VC chairman of Reshum and district member of local government went to meet DC where he showered praise on them. As CDLD projects were in control of DC, he increased the share of the village council in CDLD funds. Thus most of the protective walls were built in the area on the instructions of the district councilor of the union council, village council chairman, and other councilors (see figure 6.3).

Figure: 6.3. Protection Walls in Reshum Village



Source: Author, 2018

Ideally, CDLD projects were designed to receive proposals from Community Organization (COs). After checking the feasibility of the project and resolving both technical and social issues, permission used to be given to start the project. In the case of Reshum, DC and district members of local government from Reshum, all village councilors along with the chairman and *tehsildar* (sub-district revenue officer) first came to the village council office. Then village councilors took them near the stream to select sites to construct protection walls. After this survey, DC asked the village chairman to make COs for funds and start working on the projects. Initially, the number of proposed protection walls was higher, but later the number was reduced. The involvement of the district administration head in site and project selection and the village councilors is not seen in the case of the Kalash valley.

The first hamlet, Panandeh, received no protection wall though it is one of the main hamlets where houses, land, crops, and fruit trees were destroyed by the 2013 and 2015 floods. Rasheed, a security guard in Reshum powerhouse, lives on the exact opposite side of the powerhouse and was affected by the 2013 and 2015 floods. He complains about the authorities:

There is no protection wall in front of my house and houses in my neighborhood. Fourteen households are still living on the southern side of the stream, opposite the old powerhouse. They need protection walls as floodwater hits them directly when it comes out of a narrow path from high mountains. Behind our houses, huge mountains are a threat as in earthquake rocks fall from it and in front are this stream. We needed the protection wall the most as we faced threats from both sides, but nobody listened to us. The person we supported in the election lost; otherwise, he would have constructed a protection wall in front of our hamlet.

The first protection wall is constructed in front of a Reshum village councilor, away from the Reshum stream but a small tributary of the stream. The protection wall protects his house and

nearby houses, mostly his near relatives. In Batikandeh, many vulnerable houses are situated near Reshum stream. These houses and the irrigation farms were affected by the 2013 and 2015 floods. Most of the houses are located near Reshum stream in Batikandeh hamlet, and the front irrigation land is open to flood and vulnerable, but there is no protection there.

The following protection wall is in front of Hakimidur, a small hamlet living near away from the stream. These houses belong to an administrator of last *Mehter* (ruler of Chitral princely state). It is because of the family links, and one of the family members is a supporter of a district member of local government. The protection wall is constructed on his recommendation as the president of the COs was the same person. Only one house was affected in the 2015 flood.

Golguch hamlet is extended on the northern side of the stream and is almost one kilometer long. This part of the village was the most vulnerable and most affected hamlet by the 2013 and 2015 floods. Only one protection wall is constructed before a destroyed medical dispensary, built by the Agha Khan Development Network (AKDN). The 2015 flood annihilated it. This is a small protection wall constructed parallel to the flow of both flood water. It is half the size of other protection walls. The budget of the rest of the protection walls is one million RS while that of Golguch is half a million. On the opposite side of Golguch, the Romandur hamlet is situated, which is mainly populated by *Khushahmate* lineage. Here two CDLD protection walls are constructed only fifty meters apart. On the same side, after these two protection walls, one protection wall has been built by SRSP and, beyond that, another by CDLD. Initial two protection walls protect the central Romandur hamlet, but after that, the two protection walls, one of SRSP and another of CDLD, are not saving anything on the same side of the road as there are no houses behind it. But on the eastern side of the road, most of the VC chairman's families,

paternal uncles, and brothers live. So the last two protection walls are mainly constructed to protect those houses.

I wanted to know the possible reason for not constructing protection walls in front of the village's most affected and vulnerable part. I got different responses

The youth concilor of the village council said:

I could not do anything for the people of *gol* to build protection walls for them though I got most of my votes from there, and I wanted to help them as they deserved the most.

The Chairman of the village council is of the view:

We know Golguch needs more protection walls, but the basic logic behind constructing protection walls in front of Roomandur and not Golguch is that more people live in Roomandur than Golguch.

There are multiple factors to prefer Roomandur on Golguch. Firstly, most of the residents of this part of the village are *Khushahmate*, supporters of both VC chairman and district council members. Secondly, the VC chairman wanted to benefit his family members as they are his supporters in the election. Suppose he does not favor members of his lineage. In that case, being lordly family, they can create issues for him in the reconstruction process.

Golguch's mountain ridge separates it from Noghore hamlet, where mostly *Khushahmate* families live on the same side. SRSP constructed one protection wall in front of a *Khushahmate* family. Along with that, three CDLD protection walls are built. These protection walls protect mainly *Khushahmate* families and a few Ramdasi families. Sarhad Rural Support Program has constructed two protection walls near Raghain. It is because of an old connection between the ruler family of Ayun and a *Khushahmate* family in Raghain. This family served one of the sons

of the last ruler of Chitral state, *Mehtar* Sir Shuja ul Mulk as foster-kin. It was customary for most rulers and other high-status families in the princely state of Chitral to send their son and daughter after a few days of birth to a foster mother till the kid grows to six or seven years. This kind of arrangement is known as alternative social structure or foster relations (discussed in chapter four). The implications of such an arrangement were different for foster families and for those whose son or daughter is taken as a foster child. A foster family mainly connects to high status and ruling family to get political, social, and economic favors (Biddulph, 1880; Parkes, 2001). One such relationship developed between the last son of Sir Shuja ul Mulk and a family in Raghén of Reshum. The name of the son of Sir Shuja ul Mulk was also *Khushahmate* because of his foster family as they belong to *Khushahmate* lineage. *Khushahmate* died recently. One of his two sons, Masood ul Mulk is Chief Executive Officer of SRSP, a well-known name in humanitarian aid in Pakistan. He employed members from his father's foster family and extended favor like one in the shape of protection walls and other assistance at the time of disasters.

As most of these walls are constructed near the main Chitral-Booni road, it also protects houses on the western side of the road, a government high school, and immediately after that is Shehzad house. This is the only house on the west side of the road near the stream. A separate protection wall has been built only for Shehzad's family, the cousin of the VC chairman.

SRSP has built another protection wall on the opposite side of Shehzad's house. It is protecting one home, and that is the brother of the VC chairman. SRSP built this protection wall for Imran Khan Foundation, a charity wing of Pakistan Tahreek I Insaaf (PTI). As a member of the district, the council is a near relative of the VC chairman family, and he is among the top PTI leaders from Chitral district; it was because of his efforts that SRSP built this protection wall. In

2015 flash flood houses of the VC chairman's brother were not affected as it is situated in a very high place.

Two of the protection walls are built on the main Chitral River. Out of these two one was for Ishfaq's and his family land to protect from floods in main Chitral River. The second one was built on the land of the *Riza* families. *Riza* is also a lordly family of the village and had a sizeable cultivable land. The last protection wall was built again by a councilor near his house in Greemlasht, a separate village near Reshum.

The protection walls were constructed through mutual understanding between district administration, DC, village council members, and the district member of the local government from the village and it served the interests of all these stakeholders. In this give-and-take business, the share of the village council head and district member of local government remained high. They served their voters and family members and so did the rest of the councilors. DC benefitted from this symbiotic relationship by keeping the protesters of the village and especially the lordly families, under control.

6.7.1. "Kajan is problematic *lal* (an elder of a lordly family) and creates issues in the development projects if he is not satisfied" Chairman VC

Kajan belongs to *Khushahmate* family. He is around 60 years old and a retired *subedar* major from Chitral scouts. He has an arrogant and aggressive personality. He has two sons, one is studying in college, and the older is an economics graduate from Peshawar University. They have two dogs and a horse to play polo in the village. He is one of the few lordly families who were against grazing practice of goats. He did not allow lordly families to construct water tanks

to provide water to other lordly families after the 2013 flood (discussed late in this chapter). The Chairman of the village said:

Kajan is a man who is hard to please. He is problematic *lal* (an elder of a lordly family) and creates issues in the development projects if he is not satisfied. He can take such liberty because he owned more land in the upper part of the village and is resourceful. So it is better to keep him happy by giving him a share in reconstruction and development projects for smooth completion.

His son Ghufran, a good polo player and a good hunter too is a firm believer in a class hierarchy that prevailed in Chitral princely state. He considered non-lordly families impure. He explained the situation when district member and village chairman, along with other councilors came to finalize locations for protection walls:

My father did not allow the construction of protection walls in the first meeting with the chairman. In the second meeting, the chairman offered him one protection wall (50 feet long, 6 feet high, and three feet wide). My father became president of the CO and he was given one million rupees for its construction.

The protection wall is right in front of his house. This part of the village is approximately twenty feet high, and the flood never reached there. It was built to persuade Kajan and benefit him financially as well as by protecting him from future floods.

6.7.2. “Because of Ghazi, we could not get any share in CDLD protection walls” Sheer Muhammad

Golguch hamlet is the most vulnerable to flash floods as it is right in front of the stream and situated at depth. Despite its vulnerability to flash floods, it did not get any protection wall, unfortunately. Sher Muhammad, a resident of Golguch, leading the legal battle on behalf of an anti-grazing group, and a retired army *Subedar* blamed CDLD and members of the district government for violating merit in the construction of protection walls. Sher Muhammad

supported Amanullah in the last election against the local government's current district member, Ghazi. Sher stated:

I have an active CO developed by LSO. We proposed protection walls in front of Golguch but in vain. I visited the DC office thrice to know the status on the resolution that we had written about the protection wall, and every time I saw Ghazi (member of district cabinet from Reshum) there. Because of Ghazi, we could not get any share in CDLD protection walls.

As the protection walls were constructed on the instruction of district members of the union council and the chairman of the village council, they excluded Golguch because it was home to the most active opponents of the current district council members. When I asked Amanullah for no protection wall in the Golguch, he replied:

Sardars (elites or elders of the tribes) are dreadful wherever they are. (He showed me a few verses from the Holy *Quran* supporting his argument). These people (his opponent, district council member and other lordly families) do not like anyone who opposes their power and authority. I am doing it, so they are targeting me in every possible way; not allowing us to construct a protection wall for our hamlet is revenge. But I would bring it from other sources.

The process of selecting sites, the concrete structures of protection walls and the actual place where construction of the protection walls was needed, is evidence of political influence. To build them, protection walls do not necessarily need any prior visible destruction by flash floods. It was relatively easy to benefit the desired people or groups of people. That is one reason in Reshum where more protection walls are constructed than in Kalash valley. The laws had been breached in the normal process; COs were to take proposals to concerned authorities or district administration for reconstruction for their approval even in the contingency plan. In this case, the district administration reached out to the places where the village council and members

of the district council wanted it to be constructed. This is proved by the solid structures of protection walls. The total number of protection walls on the stream in the three hamlets, repeatedly affected by flash floods is two. The total number of protection walls, including those constructed by SRSP, is eighteen. More than eighty percent of the affected population in the villages was from the said three hamlets, while their share in the protection walls was less than twelve percent.

Similarly, the micro powerhouse of AKRSP installed in the village by local political leadership serves only the main village, and the other three hamlets did not get any benefit. The construction of protection walls and the micro powerhouse in Reshum village embodies the opportunity provided by the flash flood to the local political structure to increase their influence and manipulate the situation in their interest. Similarly, the district administration head also abused his position and power to bargain with the local community to keep the emerging protests under control.

6.8. Grazing Controversy and Politics of Reconstruction; “ *paye ke waja se sailab ata he*”(overgrazing is the cause of flash flood): A local shopkeeper

When I first visited upper Chitral, on my way near Reshum village, I stopped by a small grocery shop on the roadside. During our conversation, I asked young boys about the possible cause of flash floods in the village. One of the two shopkeepers replied:

It is because of goats. When many goats go onto high pastures and remain there, it causes damage to land and glaciers, and floods occur in the village after rain.

The issue of overgrazing is a bone of contention in many parts of the district. In upper Chitral, the intensity of this controversy is more significant and has divided people into rival groups. In Chitral district lower courts, more than a dozen cases are pursued on this issue. As

discussed in previous chapters, goats and other domestic animals remained the primary source of income, and still, many people are dependent directly on them. The goats continue to remain a vital part of the religious activities of traditional religions like Kalash. The population depends less on goats lately, as they have shifted to other sources of income from the traditional subsistence economy.

In Reshum, the situation is not very different. People's reliance on domestic animals is diminishing. Still, many families keep goats and other domestic animals. Traditionally, people kept goats and took them to high pastures in summer. One reason for reducing reliance on goats is the reservation of people, which relates to the grazing of goats on high pastures to the emergence of flash floods. In Reshum many families still keep goats but with varying degree. Though few families still have continued the practice of traditional grazing where a family member remains with goats in pasture for most of the grazing season in summer, lordly families have other arrangements for their goats' grazing. People also started hiring *charwaha* (professional herders) to take their livestock to pastures for grazing in summer. A respondent in Reshum, while talking about the reason for hiring professional herders, explained: “most youngsters go to schools, college or universities. Only a few members of each family remain at home. Every family cannot take turns staying with goats in high pastures.”

The service of *gujjar* has been hired to take care of most of the goats of lordly families. Gujjar people take goats to the pasture and live in the pastures situated in the upper part of the valley from where the stream water of Reshum is coming. Hakeem, a 60 years old resident of the village, who considers grazing one of the causes of flash floods, explained:

When *gujjar* takes hundreds of goats from outside to high pastures, they cut shrubs and trees to make fire as the temperature remains very low, especially at

night in high pastures, even in summer. So both their goats and their protectors are a cause of flood.

Though the issue of grazing goats on high pastures remained in Chitral for a long time, community-based training and sessions by some disaster-related agencies and national NGOs, primarily FOCUS, educated people about the role of overgrazing on high pastures and its impact on flash floods in the district. As the frequency of flash floods increased, the negative effects of grazing have become conspicuous by their frequency. The people of the village have been divided since the start of the issue. Some families are still dependent on domestic animals, so they are not ready to change the practice. There are still other families, mostly lordly families, who have been defending grazing practice. Almost all of the lordly families in the village supported the grazing practice on high mountains. Most of the affected population living in three hamlets, Golguch, Batikandeh, and some families in Panandeh, opposed the practice of grazing on high pasture. The issue of grazing escalated after 2013 when the flash flood struck the streamside hamlets. Meetings were arranged mainly by residents of hamlets situated near the stream for organized efforts to stop the practice of grazing.

People against grazing blamed some *Kator* and other lordly families of the village who arranged for a professional herder, a *gujjar*, to take their goats for grazing in the pastures. They claimed that the same *gujjar* takes goats of other people from other villages to feed them in the Reshum pastures. Many people in the village told me that the grazer takes hundreds of goats from areas till Chitral town to the pasture and takes a long route and enters from other sides through the mountainous region as he avoids being seen in the village. Pastures are situated many miles up in the difficult mountain range, and it's not possible to reach there every time and keep a check on them. They also claimed that lordly families know about the illegal practice of

bringing goats from other areas to the pasture as it is the property of the people of Reshum, and others are not allowed to graze their cattle on it. As compensation, professional grazer provides *pandir* (traditional cheese) to the lordly families and one male goat annually.

People who are against goat grazing, mostly low-status groups, and Ismailis consider it the cause of the frequent flash floods after 2010. People who favor grazing have another perspective. One respondent who belongs to the lordly family, a pro-grazing family, narrated:

When you ask people in our village, especially those against the grazing practice, they tell you a lot about how goat grazing is causing a flood. It seems that all of them have done PhD in goat grazing. They will tell you how their hooves cut the ground and vegetation and eat grass to cause a flood.

Pro-grazing families consider it blasphemous to consider goats and grazing as the leading cause of floods in the stream. As it is usual in most traditional communities to consider disasters the wrath of God, the same is true for most pro-grazing people who defend their stance by considering the floods as acts of *Allah* and overgrazing of goats has nothing to do with it.

When the grazing issue worsened, an organized group against grazing took the case to the Assistant Commissioner's office and pleaded ban the practice of overgrazing by the said *gujjar*. They wanted to ban all kinds of goat grazing in the pastures. Families from Golguch and Batikandeh were among the top participants. Amanullah, who remained head of the union council and member of the district council, a key figure of Pakistan People's Party Upper Chitral, and a resident of Golguch, is leading the group against goat grazing. Upon their application, Assistant Commissioner upper Chitral directed the concerned departments to stop the entry of outsiders' goats. The opposing group took the matter first to the Deputy Commissioner's office, and in the end, it reached to district and the then high court in 2013,

2014, and 2017 respectively. Peshawar high court decided the case favoring grazers, and advised to limit the number. The group against goat grazing considers the decision in their favor as it limited the number of grazing goats that is, three goats per family. Still, the issue is not resolved as it is always difficult to check the number of goats grazing in high pastures.

Meanwhile, the two groups remained active against each other as either side put maximum force to win the case in their favor. Similarly, this grouping also affected many reconstruction activities and the 2015 local government elections is discussed in detail in the coming sections

6.8.1. “*payan wajhen nog lothoro paida honi*” (Grazing issue created new leaders): Shakeel

The grazing issue has affected the political and social structure of the village. The issue of grazing was taken seriously by all stakeholders, even by state institutions, after flash floods in the district. Flash flood added fuel to the case, which affected the reconstruction process and the political structure of the village. Similarly, this issue created new leadership and strengthened the senior leadership, especially within low-status groups of the village. A respondent from the *Khushahmate* family, age 35, stated:

paaye (goat) issue created many leaders within the people of *gol*. Those who never spoke in front of others delivered sermons to people like political leaders. Similarly, old leaders of the low-status groups in the village made good use of the issue to strengthen their social standing.

Another perspective that emerged from the issue of grazing was to level the score with most of the lordly families supporting grazing practice. Low-status people could never speak openly against the lordly families on all the forums collectively as they are doing now. Lordly

people never considered the low-status people equal to them though they did not speak it openly. The grazing issue and flood also provided an opportunity to settle the score.

6.8.2. The 2015 Local Government Elections and Grazing Issue

Most of the residents of Reshum, especially those living near the stream, talked about the village's situation before the recent flash floods. Reshum was one of the most attractive tourist places in upper Chitral. The stream was a narrow line passing through the center of the village and watering beautiful fruit trees and crops on both sides of the stream. People also recalled the integrity and harmony between the three hamlets, Panandeh, Batikandeh, and Golguch. Baseer, a respondent from Panandeh hamlet, a business administration graduate, around 35 years of age and teacher in one of the private schools in Reshum, stated: “people of the *gol* (stream) hamlets were very close to each other before flash floods.” Three reasons are considered responsible for changing the village's physical and social environment. For people like Baseer and many others, these changes left the village with conflicts and rifts, especially within *gol* hamlets. Things were not very friendly even before floods between *gol* residents and the village's lordly families. Baseer said:

The first reason was flooding. It affected the physical landscape of the *gol* area so severely that it looked deserted. It affected most of the houses in *gol* and people were distraught watching the monstrous floods eating into their homes. They were frightened and worried about their dwellings made with their life time savings as severe flash floods affected them psychologically and financially and that included people of all ages. If their financial position allowed them they were ready to leave the place anytime, but that was not a favorable option.

The second issue that affected the village and is connected with the flood is the grazing issue. The third issue that affected the village is recent local body elections. Rival groups

contested elections in local elections against each other. It involved the village as many candidates emphasized the previous issues to each household. The grazing case created more leaders, and thus more candidates emerged.

One case study to understand the connectivity of the above three factors is a contest on the district council seat from Charun union council in the 2015 local bodies election. Reshum is one of the villages of Charun union council. One contender was Amanullah, who remained a district council member twice from the same union council. Amanullah was popular representative of lower-status residents of the area. Pakistan People's Party (PPP) is viewed as a pioneer in introducing a democratic structure in the district, which somehow reduced the strict division between high-status lordly families and low-status commoners. It was during PPP first government that gave ownership rights of the land to the tenants and lower-status groups. Amanullah has been an active member of the PPP.

In the 2015 local body elections, one of the senior members of the PPP, Ramdasi, wanted to contest the election on the party ticket from the Charun union council. He is also a resident of Reshum village. Leadership in the district selected Amanullah over Ramdasi ("PPP Announces Candidates", 2015). Ramdasi first announced leaving the party and later revealed to compete for the said seat as an independent candidate. Panaya people of Panandeh considered some families in the lower part of the village, Raghain, from their clan, including the family of Ramdasi. Dost Ali, mentioned earlier in this chapter who opposed the construction of first MHP, was approached by Ramdasi to support him against Amanullah in the election. Elder, son of Dost Ali said:

In our first meeting with Ramdasi, my father agreed to support him, saying that Ramdasi could not win the election. We would try to minimize Amanullah supporters so that he loses the election.

After that, Dost Ali started an open campaign in favor of Ramdasi. As discussed in previous sections, many residents of Panandeh were still relying on goats and cows and grazed their goats to high pastures in summers. When Amanullah and other elders from Batikandeh started efforts to stop grazing, these families in Panandeh stood against them. Dost Ali does not have goats and cows but still supports the pro-grazing group. One reason for this is his rivalry with Amanullah, as they have a history of conflict over land issues.

Beyond the first hamlet of Reshum, Panandeh, Dost Ali used a piece of land for cultivation. That part and beyond it used to be a communal pasture of the whole gol residents in the past. When Dost Ali started cultivating that land, other residents faced problems. When Amanullah won district council membership elections, he used his office to remove Dost Ali from the said land. From that day onwards, Dost Ali consistently campaigned against Amanullah but never succeeded as Amanullah was considered a shrewd politician. He always convinced lower-status groups to be his voice.

While campaigning for Ramdasi, Dost Ali tried to convince residents of Panandeh that if Amanullah won the election, he would definitely use the floor of the district council to ban the grazing practice in the upper pastures as the matter was already with district administration. When Amanullah and other anti-grazing residents approached sub-district offices in Booni, they formed a committee to deal with grazing. As the pro-grazing group were mostly lordly families and had links to higher echelons the anti-grazing group registered complaints. It demanded the removal of concerned authorities for not implementing the committee decision on grazing

through public meetings and press conferences in which Amanullah remained the leading figure (“Reshun residents seek immediate removal”, 2015). Amanullah would have used his resources and links to implement the decision in the area if he had won. Dost Ali successfully convinced pro-grazing residents of Panandeh and the other regions to vote against Amanullah.

Ramdasi received more votes in areas where Dost Ali did campaign for him. Amanullah lost the election by less than 200 votes. Ramdasi also lost the election, and as a result, another candidate from another village won the district council election. Dost Ali celebrated the defeat of Amanullah as this is what he wanted out of the efforts that he made for Ramdasi. On the other hand, Amanullah also benefited from supporting the anti-grazing group as Ramdasi divided his party vote, but still, he maintained to secure a handsome score.

6.8.3. Politics of Reconstructing Drinking Water Pipeline Schemes and Grazing Issue

Reshum residents used stream water for drinking. Back in 1988, most people started using tap water as before that they used to get it from water channels constructed on the stream. The old pipeline, which provided drinking water to many parts of the village, was completed in 1988, was pouring water of stream into a pipeline starting on the top of the initial hamlet of the village and passed through a safe route. That is why it was still intact. With the increase in the village population additional pipelines were provided to meet the growing demand. Floods destroyed most of newly laid pipelines.

After the 2013 flood, most of the water supply, both for agriculture and other uses through pipes, was interrupted and destroyed by floodwater. People started water supply restoration for drinking. The 1988 water pipeline got restored by self-help as it was broken at few places. Other drinking water pipelines were destroyed entirely.

Similarly, water channels and pipes of Shagran, Zayd, and Green lasht, three villages situated on north and south of Reshum where water is provided both for irrigation and drinking from Reshum stream, water supply was damaged completely. Frontier Works Organization (FWO) was tasked to provide drinking water to the affected village hamlets. FWO wanted to engage civil contractors from the local community to complete the project.

Amanullah, a local contractor, started efforts to get the joint contract. Being a prominent member of a leading political party in the region and a seasoned contractor, a member of the provincial assembly gave him a particular task to look into reconstruction activities after the 2013 flood. It is pertinent to mention that local contractors mostly played a vital role in local political activities. They were either part of the local election process or supporters of the political parties. Being party leader in the area, he was known for keeping himself informed about most things that happened at the top level in political and non-political important developments in Chitral. When the FWO wanted to sign an agreement with a local contractor, he established links with the army and won the contract to spread pipelines for provision of drinking water to the villages. Most of the residents in the said three villages, Zayd, Greenlash and Shagran, were supporters of Amanullah in the grazing issue as they want to ban the grazing practice. Many of the residents belonged to the low-status groups that had supported Amanullah in previous local body elections. This project had provided an opportunity to increase their share in water and benefit their voters. A friend of Amanullah said:

He was enthusiastic about the project as it was a golden opportunity to provide enough water to his voters, as water shortage had remained one of the main problems of the residents of these villages.

On the other hand, another group of lordly families and stakeholders in village politics was observing the situation. This was the same group that opposed the ban of grazing goats on high pastures in court. If Amanullah completed the project and provided drinking water to the said villages, things would not be favorable for future political endeavor of the lordly families. They initially wanted to get the contract for the project but failed. An urgent meeting of the most seasoned elders of the lordly families of Reshum was called to develop a political strategy and find a possible solution to stop Amanullah from achieving any success.

In this meeting, there was a person who used to be a close friend of Amanullah, but he sided with lordly families and attended the meeting because of the grazing issue. They developed a consensus to submit a resolution in writing with signatures of most of the village residents. In the resolution, they blamed civilian contractors for indulging in corrupt practices and having compromised on the quality of proposed project. “The residents wanted to carry out the project solely through FWO instead of the civil contractor to eliminate corruption in the project.” Pro-grazing lordly family elders cleverly planned the resolution until then; the army was considered corruption-free by most common citizens. The military is regarded as the only stable institution, and whatever business they do, it is successful.

The said friend of Amanullah was given the responsibility to get the written resolution signed by the residents of Reshum and deliver it to head office as proof that residents do not trust the civilian contractor. Amanullah stopped this person from going ahead with his plan as it would spoil his efforts to complete the project. Amanullah made a deal with the said person to work on the project together. The elders of the lordly families of the village agreed to jointly work with Amanullah on the newly designed project subject to receiving a bigger share. The construction of a water tank to provide water to the main Reshum village where all lordly

families are residing was approved mutually by the elders of lordly families. The share of the other villages was decreased, which meant a blow to the political quests of Amanullah. Amanullah accepted this new design because otherwise, the powerful lordly families and their elders would not have let him complete the project. Everyone in the village came to know that a water tank would be constructed on the upper ground near the village to provide water to every house in the village.

On the proposed day of ground-breaking ceremony on the proposed place, Amanullah incidentally met that person and denied construction on the proposed place. The mediator, a *Zondra* clan member, aged in the mid-60s, narrated:

When I inquired Amanullah about not constructing the water tank on the proposed place, he replied the new design came from GHQ (General Head Quarter), and nobody could change it. When I heard this from Amanullah, it made me upset. What does GHQ have to do with the water tank? He just wanted to prove that we know nothing and that I, including my group, have no say in the project. Amanullah was not ready to sacrifice his political interest by reducing the share of the other three villages in the project.

Amanullah wanted to benefit his voters by providing water to the other three villages, which was impossible in the new project design. He wanted to build a water tank on top of a mound from where it was possible to provide piped drinking water to other villages. Amanullah just wanted to buy time for the project launching and stop the written resolution signed by residents of Reshun. He then planned to work on his old project design to benefit his supporters in the other three said villages. Zahir Hussain, who is in a pro-grazing camp, aged around fifty, claimed:

Amanullah is the king of the area's low-status residents and poor people. As he is a member of the Pakistan People's Party, a liberator of poor classes in Pakistan, poor and low-status people of the area believe that he is the one who liberated them from lordly classes. As Amanullah belongs to the same class, he is very famous and popular as leader.

When news reached the pro-grazing group, they redoubled their efforts again to stop Amanullah from working on the project as he had contravened the project's design. The group intensified their endeavors again to bring a new resolution to benefit residents of the main Reshum village only and exclude all other villages that Amanullah wanted to benefit. All the lordly elders attended the meeting. They agreed to meet the head of FWO in Chitral town and give logical reasons to shelve Amanullah's initiative. The new resolution had three main points. Firstly, as the 2013 flood mainly affected Reshum village, not the other three villages, the reconstruction project should be confined to Reshum village. Secondly, the other three villages already used Reshum stream water for irrigation and drinking. If extra water is taken from Reshum stream, it would be against the rights of Reshum village residents on stream water. The 2013 flash flood directly affected three hamlets, Gologuch, Batikandeh, and Panandeh. Main Reshum village wanted to benefit from water pipe project where lordly families lived and where lordly elders and the pro-grazing group were indirectly affected and no direct damages occurred to their houses and properties. Indirect effects include drinking water pipelines and irrigation water channels.

The third point in the resolution was about the place of construction and route of pipe. According to Amanullah's project design, the pipeline route was straight down from the top to the end of the pipeline and into the tank he proposed to build. This pipe route is unsafe as it goes along the vulnerable area of the village near the stream for more than 3000 meters. It is the

shortest but vulnerable route for the pipeline. The suggested way in resolution was longer but safer. It was the old 1988 route of the channel, which goes through the houses of Batikandeh and Golguch hamlets. Two water tanks were suggested in the resolution, one near the Kajan house where Amanullah and the opponent group developed consensus in the previous design. The next suggested tank was near the houses of *Kator* families. This tank was supposed to provide water to *Kator* and *Riza* families at the southern corner of Reshum.

Pro-grazing group met FWO chief in Chitral town to discuss the said project and its various aspects. One of the members of the pro-grazing, lordly families elder said:

At the beginning of the meeting, we praised the role of the army and FWO in the relief and reconstruction process after the flood in the village and the district. After that, we presented the written resolution on behalf of the whole village about reconstructing the water pipeline and suggested changes in the said design.

The head of FWO sent an army captain to conduct another survey and address the reservation of the residents of Reshum. According to the new design of the project, the proposed pipeline to the other three villages was canceled. The route of the pipeline was also changed to make it durable and strong. The proposed two water tanks became part of the latest project design. In this way, all suggested changes were incorporated into the project.

This new design was a heavy blow to the plans of Amanullah as all the changes made were against his strategy. As a seasoned politician he never gave up and began his campaign against the new design approved by FWO. He first convinced Kajan to halt the construction of the first water tank near his house as it was supposed to be a built on his property near his home. Belonging to lordly family he was against the pro-grazing group. Similarly, Amanullah convinced residents of Batikandeh and Golguch not to let the pipeline go through their land and

houses. It was easy for Amanullah to convince the said people as the grazing issue was at its peak and all the people belonging to the group wanted to ban goat grazing. It was easy for Amanullah to convince these people as the pro-grazing lordly group suggested the new design. It benefited mainly the lordly pro-grazing group of Reshum. They did not allow the pipeline through the said hamlets. As a result, concerned authorities postponed the project, and no one could benefit from it.

The houses situated on the eastern side of main Chitral-Booni road, located on the western side of the main road until Chitral River, were without proper drinking water arrangements. Kasheef, who helps his brother in his poultry shop, aged around 24, narrated:

Since the 2013 flood, there has been no tap water in our house. Women cross the road every time to bring drinking water from another side of the road. For other domestic use, we use canal water that flows near our house.

The water pipes damaged in 2013 could not be reconstructed even after the 2015 flood.

6.8.4. Reconstruction of Water Pipeline after the 2015 Flood

When the reconstruction process started after the 2015 flash flood, the Public Health Department of the district wanted to spend 15 million rupees (\$ 0.147 million) on the construction of the water pipeline as most of the houses in the main Reshum village were without tap water. A local NGO reconstructed the drinking water pipeline for Panandeh and parts of Golguch. For the rest of the village the pipeline was to be rebuilt by Public Health Department (PHD). The PHD, which is mainly working on providing drinking water in the district, started the project with the newly elected local government village council. The Chairman of the village council and the rest of the councilors tried to stay neutral on the grazing issue to avoid

controversies related to grazing. However, most of their near relatives of many councilors and chairman of VC were active participants and supporters of the pro-grazing group. When they started working on the project, they tried to convince every related person before the formal start of the project to make it successful and pass the pipeline through a safe old route to benefit everyone in the main Reshum. To avoid interference the local population in the project, (XEN) of public health reached the site himself. XEN, chairman of the village council, and most village councilors were present when they started work on the project.

XEN announced that the pipeline is a government project, and we would make sure it passes through a safe route so that possibility of damages could be minimized in case of a flood. In the presence of the XEN and because of prior convincing of village council members, the pipeline reached Hakimidur, which is the upper part of the Golguch hamlet. The next day when XEN was not present, the village council chairman tried his best to convince residents of Hakimidur to let the pipeline through their houses as it was the only safe route for the pipeline, but they did not allow it. Residents of Hakimidur were strong members of the anti-grazing group. Inevitably, the public health department laid the pipeline almost 3000 feet had to pass through a vulnerable route. It was between a temporary road and a stream inside the sand and rocks brought by the last flash flood. An employee of public health told me that half of the total pipe from the source of water to the place where it crosses the stream passed through a vulnerable route and flash flood could easily destroy it again.

The village council wanted to complete the project one way or the other as it was one of the main issues of the whole village. I stayed during my fieldwork, near the roadside which falls in main Reshum village. Though tap water was available here during winter, it froze from December to February because the pipe size was less than half-inch. Similarly, in summer when

the stream water gets dirty because of the mixing of dirt, tap water also got dirty due to sediment. Village council members wanted to bring bigger pipes and placed deep in the ground to avoid freezing in winter. They also wanted to build a bigger water tank in the village where the dirt would settle down purifying the top layers. Youth councilor of the village council, who was from *khushwaqte* lineage, lordly family in the village and his father is one of the leading figures who supports the grazing of goats, said:

Drinking water was one of the main problems here. More than half of the households were without tap water and had to fetch drinking water from faraway places after the 2013 flood. Amanullah does not want us to complete the water pipeline project and uses various tactics to fail the project. We, members of the village council, are sure that if we could complete the water pipe project, we could assure the success of all the councilors in the next local body elections. Amanullah cannot defeat us then.

For this reason, the youth councilor provided space for the water tank to be constructed on his land in front of his house as Kajan did not let it happen on the old, most suitable place for the water tank from where clean water could be given to the whole Reshum village. The water problem remained unresolved because of the persistent flash floods in the stream and the clash of rival groups embedded in the grazing issue and other political competitiveness, mainly between lordly families and low-status groups.

6.9. Conclusion

In Pakistan, disaster management institutions are struggling to develop an effective mechanism to respond to disasters and hazards in the country. Since its inception in 2007, National Disaster Management Authority has been working and trying to reach vulnerable communities in all parts of the country. In the case of the Chitral district, which is one of the

most vulnerable districts of the country, district level, and local level management is facing many challenges to control the hazardous situation. It seems more of a political and bureaucratic consumption warehouse created by the state than an effective disaster management institution.

The chapter's findings and discussion suggest that state institutions and leadership at different levels try to maximize their influence in the post-disaster situation by promising them a new world to the affected people. The army chief's visit and other political leadership in the locale after the disaster were evident. However, it did not make any marked impact as far as relief and reconstruction activities were concerned. Mostly such visits are a formality and are arranged to justify the position of such leaders.

Similarly, state institutions and individuals working in these institutions proactively use different tactics and opportunities to keep the affected people in control for smooth running of affairs of the state. At the same time, local political figures also try to maximize their share of political influence through implementing different projects, whether it is initiated from the community side or by the state or NGOs. It is not possible without expressing and showing the power they gain for locals through disaster, also known as disaster citizenship (Siddiqi, 2018). For state institutions, it originates from their inherited authority through their offices. Protests for powerhouse restoration and construction of protection walls on the Reshum stream constitute evidence of bargaining favors between state institutions and local political leaders.

The reconstruction and disaster recovery process is driven by the power structure prioritization of what and where to build and rebuild (Vale & Campanella, 2005; Mulligan, 2013; Cretney, 2017). It is also evident from the data that the inherited political structure of the communities also affects different reconstruction activities. Powerful rival groups in the

community try to take the lead in the reconstruction and development projects. Already existing political structure not only affects the reconstruction and relief projects but also in response such processes also affect local power structures. The grazing issue between high-status families and lower-status groups and its effect on the reconstruction process shows the clash between the interests of different political figures in the locale. It also unveiled the hidden rivalries between upper and lower-status people triggered by flash floods in the locale.

7. POLITICS OF DISASTER RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION IN THE KALASH VALLEY

7.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the Kalash valley's political environment and power manipulation among the stakeholders after the flash floods. State institutions and various NGOs are working on multiple projects in the flood hit areas to revamp the infrastructure in the Kalash valley. As discussed in previous chapters, Kalash valleys are situated in remote areas where it is a challenge for state institutions to provide basic facilities. NGOs of various types, e.g., local, national, and international, filled the space and providing different facilities to the people of the Kalash valley. When the flash flood hit the valley, it destroyed the infrastructure of the valley, detail given in chapter five. As the flood subsided, several projects were initiated by state institutions and NGOs. This new scenario created challenges and opportunities for local stockholders, state institutions, and NGOs to manipulate their position and pursue their interests while providing relief to the affected communities. This chapter tries to explain the interaction of groups and individuals and the way they used their influence in a new situation created by the flash flood in the valley. I have selected a few case studies to explain the political contestation between the stockholders.

7.2. Non-Governmental Organization and Politics of Disasters

The term NGO is used for various formal and informal organizations and associations. There is a disagreement on the definition of NGOs and more about its functions (Carroll, 1992; Fisher, 1993; Princen & Finger, 1994). They differ in their functions, level of operations, goals, structure, and membership. They are religious, charitable, research, and environmental

organizations. Some have few employees, while others have hundreds of employees with billion-dollar budgets (Fisher, 1997).

The role of NGOs has increased since 1984 in mainstream and alternative development¹⁷. The increase in the operations of NGOs has a profound impact on development theory, practice, and grassroots movements of social change. They provide, in some cases, economic and power opportunities for some and create inequalities of power and wealth. In many cases, they act as an opportunist and claim to represent poor or ethnic minorities to obtain funds from international funding agencies (Edelman & Haugerud, 2005). Same is the case of Kalash valleys. Being last pagan religion of the area, different NGOs and individuals are getting financial assistances and claim they want to protect the Kalash community and provide basic facilities.

Interest in NGOs is related to states' poor and disappointing performance worldwide, especially in the Global South. This poor performance has economic and political implications and dimensions. Because of poor economic and political performances, these states also lack well-connected and integrated development programs. There were concerns that such states were not serious about the rights and needs of their citizens. Instead, they used their citizens to pursue their interests (Farrington et al., 2005).

In disaster situations, the role of NGOs becomes more alive and energetic. In case the level of work is arduous and difficult to manage by the national governments or their capacities are limited or still they are incapable or disinterest to work in the marginal regions, the NGOs usually take the responsibility to work for people. For their operational input the NGOs utilize local political connections in the post-disaster situation. As a result, powerful figures manipulate

¹⁷ It is a redefined development to be self-directed and focused on self-reliance and is closely associated with the environment and sustainability.

their position by using the resources of NGOs. The distribution of relief goods and prioritization is "intimately entangled with power relations" (Sokefeld, 2012, p-11). In the case of disasters in Chitral, the engagement of NGOs with local communities and political structure proved this argument correct.

7.3. Politics of Disaster and Phases of Response

As discussed in chapter two in detail, there are usually four phases after a disaster. First is the rescue. In this phase, most people at the place of disaster help each other. It needs sudden and immediate response from the people to save individuals and property and get them to a safe place. It is usually a very short period and lasts not more than a week. The second phase is the relief which comes after the rescue. It is generally done in the shape of food, water, shelter medicines as the affected communities cannot arrange it independently. This phase is also not very long but still longer than the first one. The next phase is the reconstruction which and last for a longer period, sometimes goes side by side with development. As these phases move from rescue toward development, the power dynamics of different stakeholders and their mutual contest is multiplied (Sokefeld, 2012). Same happened in the Kalash valley as politics of disaster intensified at later stages.

In the case of flash floods in the Kalash valley, in the first phase, that is rescue, the entire community helped the affected families. Even though the community is divided mainly into Kalash and Muslim populations, at the time of the disaster, everyone came up with assistance for the common cause. Most of the affected population was from the Muslim community. Mostly the near relatives and neighbors helped the affected people by saving for them as much housing material as possible.

Flash flood was furious, and it washed away everything. Those families, whose houses were intact, gave shelter to those directly affected as their houses were destroyed. They let the affected families live with them for months. It gave the affected families a feeling of security, love and harmony. The warning came so late that flood struck the village so fast, the affected families couldn't save food items, clothes, utensils, etc., neighbors and relatives in the village provided them with all basic items initially. Later NGOs reached to their help.

Imran, a local respondent, aged around 40, said.

They shared houses with them. As roads were washed away by the flash flood and there were no alternative routes even for relief agencies to reach the affected population, the local population came to the rescue of the affected families. They provided food for the first few days.

Solnit (2009) calls this situation "Paradise built in hell" (Solnit, 2009; Sokefeld, 2012). When the external relief reached the valley after a few days the situation changed. They provided drinking water, as the water in the valley was not suitable for drinking after many days of flash floods. The spring water was *zoyo ough* (full of dirt). Watermills were carried away by the flood and there were no other means for grinding maize, and wheat. Soon after the flood, all available food sources were exhausted and creating another crisis in the valley.

The price of flour reached Rs. 4800/- per 50 kg in the valley, which was many times higher than the market price. The valley fell short of donkeys, the main carriers of goods in the mountainous terrain. Those families who were affected by the flood were receiving relief goods but most of them, whose houses were not hit by the flood, did not receive any relief items though they were in dire need. The families, whose houses were damaged, started agitation to let others receive relief goods. They were pressurizing both local communities and relief agencies

to provide relief packages only to them as they were directly affected—this created inconvenience for families whose houses were intact but had nothing to eat. The tension arose on possession of relief goods between the groups. It was not just houses that were affected by the flood but much more as the details show (discussed in chapter four). Jaquish, a young man in mid-thirty from Kalash community, narrated:

Valuable land and more than half of the fruit trees were also washed away, which was our economic asset and main source of income. When these families could not get anything, the turmoil began. Even later, these families were left without any compensation.

The relief phase created tension between the said groups as everyone waited anxiously to receive the relief package. This tension was expressed in different ways. As discussed in the previous chapter, one respondent blamed the residents near the stream and said that most flood-affected people deliberately construct houses in unsafe locations as they are affected by floods almost every year. After the destruction of their property, they showed they were victims of destitution and oppression.

It is a well-planned strategy of this group. Another respondent who is not living near the stream also blamed people living near the stream. He posited:

These people should not build houses or anything near the stream. A hundred feet on each side of the stream is state property. They are living here illegally. So if they are affected by the flood, as has happened many times, they should not be compensated.

Many people blamed the residents of the stream, and the most obvious reason is their behavior at the time of relief when they did not let anyone else to lay hand on relief goods

because houses of all others had remained safe though their houses, properties, crops and lands were affected.

7.3.1. The Case of Ahkamuddin in Reconstruction

After the first phase, when external relief goods arrived, people rushed for them. Ahkamuddin a 55 year old member of village council explained:

The unfortunate thing was that almost everyone was affected by the flood one way or the other. There were more than thirty bridges, out of which four were used for vehicles and the remaining was used by pedestrians. These were built mainly by the people at different locations to transport goods in the stretched valley but the flood annihilated them. The main road that was the only means of transportation was full of huge rocks as floodwater had reached there. It remained closed for more than five months. Watermills were out of order as the flood destroyed them too. In such circumstances, it was hard to get anything from outside. The only alternate route to *bazaar* in Ayun was over the mountain. People used *gurdughan* (donkeys) to bring food items, mainly *peshearuk* (flour).

The hatred and blame game affected the relief process. Owing to this situation, Ahkamuddin tried to compensate those not residing near the stream and did not get relief goods after the flood when he received relief goods from NGOs. Ahkamuddin explained:

I wanted to compensate all the residents in the hamlet (Gambak). Residents of the stream did not allow people residing away from stream to get food items and other relief goods in disaster relief in the valley.

He also blamed the government for the inappropriate distribution of relief goods:

The government only gave relief and reconstruction money whose houses were affected or who were on the lists. These people considered it their due right on all the relief and reconstruction goods and services. They protested and put full

pressure on everyone to keep away the rest of the people. It is all because of the inappropriate policies and decisions of the government.

He brought pit toilets and galvanized iron (GI) sheets from NGOs to provide them to the affected families by the flood. GI sheets are commonly used to cover houses and used as a ceiling. He distributed it mainly to the families who did not get relief goods because the affected house group did not allow them. Munir Khan from Gambak, a 45 years old and manual laborer, said:

The councilor gave GI sheets to only one person from the Kalash community whose house was destroyed in the flood as he was a voter of the councilor. The rest of it he distributed among his voters. He distributed GI sheets per family among fifty families. All these families were his voters. He did not give us any of these sheets though we deserved more than anyone else as our houses were damaged in the flood. When we asked him to provide us with GI sheets, he replied we would get them in the next turn, which never came. Then he brought pit toilets, and again he distributed them among his supporters.

Families and individuals do manipulate their position being affected by disasters as compared to those who are not included in government lists or not belong to severe affected area. Contestation between these two groups, which affected the relief process, provides a perfect example of how the affected people from disasters manipulate their power of being “affected”. As people were not compensated for crops, *mewah darh kan* (fruit trees), and *zemean* (land), they also needed external help which was denied by the other group.

7.4. NGOs and Politics of Reconstruction in the Kalash Valley

NGOs try to portray a non-political image, but from an anthropological perspective, they are not apolitical (Sokefeld, 2012). On the one hand, NGOs distribute goods and allocate

services among people in post-disaster situations. There is a strong indication that outside powers intervene and influence the distribution of relief goods. Who gets what somehow depends on power relations in the area. The NGOs need intermediaries or brokers to identify people and areas to allocate goods and services within the local community. Such intermediaries are influential figures in the communities or become powerful when they become intermediaries of NGOs as they allocate NGOs resources. Such persons are often very well connected within communities and can manipulate relations for their personal advantage. Thus local politics mixes with the politics of distribution of relief goods (Sokefeld, 2012). In the Kalash valley, this is true as well. As discussed in the 4th chapter, different sources became power bases in the said community. In the coming section, I would discuss how people had various power sources and manipulated their positions in the flood relief and reconstruction process.

The local government elections took place in May 2015 in all districts of KP. It was a challenge for elected village council members to meet the expectations of their voters in the Kalash valley flash flood of 2015. The post-disaster situation was an opportunity for the elected village council members to deliver. In the relief phase, state institutions conducted the first surveys. Members of the village council were not happy as they were not consulted in the list generation for compensation money. The village leadership thought their services were neglected and their trust became doubtful. The food and non-food items distribution in the first phase of relief was done by the Pakistan army and other paramilitary forces. A village council member said:

The Deputy Commissioner was not capable of carrying out relief work through his own office. He gave full authority to the army to carry out the relief process. As a result, no civilian leadership or members of the elected council were involved in the process.

According to NDMA Act 2010, each district administration's responsibility clearly mentioned and the Assistant Commissioner is to lead the relief and rescue activities in disaster situations. Both district administration and district government are key stakeholders in the disaster.

On one hand, expectations of local people from the state were high. They directly wanted the state's involvement in relief and reconstruction activities. On the one hand, they were expecting from local government and elected village councilors, and on the other hand, they wanted the state to do it directly. That is why they were satisfied with the district administration assessment of flood damages and this kept the local politicians out. Another councilor stated:

People were happy initially that the district administration had directly done the assessment and not the local political figures from the village council. They considered district administration and their employs as “actual” state representative for the implementation of work. It is commonly believed that district administration officials are better positioned to help them. Local political figures are from the same vulnerable community and do not have the state's power. They are vulnerable, backward, and less resourceful, while state bodies are stronger and more resourceful.

The local people expected the state to send their representatives from outside the community. Local political figures were also struggling to get something from the state or NGOs one way or the other to help their voters as they were expecting a good response from them too but the local elected members were not represented in the government relief process. Non-participation of the elected members in any state relief and reconstruction activities created confusion and unrest among the elected members.

7.4.1. " Floods and earthquakes created *dawordik* (competition) between the political figures and councilors of the village:" Hanif

Multiple NGOs engaged local government members in projects that somehow helped them save their faces before their voters and community. Hanif was a local contractor and elected village council member. He is also president of the community organization, namely *shahi yaraan*, from his helmet Broon Thar. He commented:

NGOs kept our honor in this area at the time of disaster as we were elected by local people. They expected us that we would help them in time of need. They consider us their leaders at the community level. After the disaster, the people depended on us to do something for them. The community does not understand the structural flaws. They just want help from those who they have elected. We were facing humiliation as we could not do anything for our voters and community. NGOs saved us from *perashani* (embarrassment) in such circumstances as they launched different projects through us. Most of the projects were through my involvement as head of the community. I am President of Community Based Organization (CBO) developed by Agha Khan Rural Support program (AKRSP).

NGOs always required local level leadership as brokers to get involved in the community for initiating development and reconstruction projects. Hanif completed various projects of Islamic Relief and Red Cross such as water supply schemes and pit latrines. The involvement of NGOs in different reconstruction projects started a competition among village council members. One of the village councilors also asked me to use my links to get him projects from NGOs.

Flood and earthquake created a contest between members of the elected councilors in the village. Every councilor wanted to use all links to attract NGOs to work through their involvement. This involvement was to ensure the influence of the councilors on voters within the

constituency. Different tactics were used to compel executives and employees of the NGOs by the councilors to award the development work. Hanif described:

Floods and earthquakes created *dawordik* (competition) between the political figures and councilors of the village. I brought Islamic Relief and the Red Cross to work for my hamlet. This competition is ongoing. No doubt, disasters increase the intensity of contest between local political leaders.

NGOs provided an opportunity to local government members at the village level to earn fame among their voters. Thus, village council members started to attract NGOs to work through them or to involve them. NGOs also needed intermediaries to reach the local community. Local government at the village level started using their links that would help them launch projects for the community in the relief phase.

The vice-chairman of the village council is member of Jamat I Islami, a renowned political party in the district and it has won MNA seats several times. A charity wing of Jamat I Islami, namely Al-Khidmat Foundation Pakistan, is also famous for relief activities throughout the province and in the Chitral district, discussed previously. It is a well-connected charity organization that conducts relief activities through Jamat-I-Islami (JI) members everywhere. It generates its finances through donations throughout the country and abroad. In the valley, Al-Khidmat Foundation involved the vice-chairman of the village council in carrying out relief and reconstruction activities. The head of the district government is also from JI. At the district level, NGOs need the approval of district heads in launching relief and reconstruction projects, in case of disasters. His position as the head of local government at the district level can influence NGOs to favor his party. In the valley same happened. First, Al-Khidmat performed all his relief activities under the leadership of their vice-chairman. Later, the district head of local

government, a Jamat I Islami member, also favored him by directing NGOs to do relief and reconstruction projects in collaboration with the vice-chairman.

NGOs and district officials such as the DC always work together under a symbiotic relationship. NGOs want to work in the communities, and the initial permissions comes from the DC office. Similarly, the district *Nazim* has close ties and support in the community, this office tries to benefit his supporters one way or the other. During a discussion with a famous¹⁸ NGO employee, working in Chitral, on the selection criterion of employees, he explained:

Vacancies are rarely posted publicly or even if so, selections are always subject to manipulation. The recruitment happens through bargaining, where mostly influential figures are involved. Most employees come through references from political parties in power, Deputy Commissioner, and powerful and resourceful families in the district.

The head of two NGOs, leading in the district, are from *Katore* families. One way or the other, such NGOs are used for political interests in the district. Being a peripheral district, development funds rarely reach here. In such situations the burden on NGOs increases and are also used for political gains.

7.5. “Disaster Citizenship” and Protests in the Kalash Valley

The state and citizen relationships are based on mutuality, subject to respective symbiosis where citizens and state have responsibilities. States take care of their citizens, and citizens take it as their social obligation to respect the state policies and laws in times of peace or disaster. It is also a fact that the situation between state and citizens changes after disasters. Sometimes the relationship between the state and citizens turns friendly, but in most cases, it worsens after

¹⁸ To maintain the anonymity, names of the NGOs are kept hidden at some places

disasters (Siddiqi, 2018; Pelling & Dell, 2010). Writing about the changed condition of citizenship after the 2010 flood in Sindh, Siddiqi (2018) is of the view that disasters transforms passive citizenry into active by creating political spaces. This is what she calls “disaster citizenship.”

Similarly, disasters create space to criticize those in power, corporations, institutions, and governments, which is difficult for them to hold accountable as individuals and groups in normal situations (Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen, 2011). Thus disasters generate the power for the affected population to deal directly with state institutions.

As discussed in the previous section, the government did not involve local political figures and village council members in any state-driven rescue and relief process. One way to divert the attention of the community expecting from the village councilor is to protest against the government and authorities. The protest against authorities is one way to win voters' support and give them a ray of hope that they are their genuine leaders. At the same time, community leaders did pressurize the authorities for more. Such situations put local leaders in a bargaining position with higher authorities that is not possible in normal circumstances, making disasters political occasions.

After the flood in the Kalash valley and the rest of Chitral, the task of rehabilitation was handed over to the district administration and not to the village council members. *Patwari* was given the responsibility to develop an assessment list of the affected families in the valley. Details about the assessment are discussed in chapter six.

Many demonstrations took place after the flood in Kalash valley; I mentioned only three of them either within the Kalash valley or led by the residents and local political figures. The

first demo was in front of the press club Chitral on 23rd November 2015 where they registered their protest in front of journalists. Most of the village councilors and one district councilor on minority seats represented led the protesters who had come from all three Kalash valleys¹⁹. Most of the councilors were from the valley where I did the fieldwork. The main concern in the press conference was the assessment of the affected families both in flood and earthquake. Councilors warned the district administration officers to register the reservations of the affected people who represented the whole community and concentrate on the resolution of the demands, the most important being assessment on merit so that the deserving people could get the compensation. They requested the Prime Minister to take action against the officers concerned in case they were found guilty of preparing fake assessment lists and instruct them to do all assessments on merit.

The second protest was organized mainly by the village council chairman with some like-minded councilors. The former village head of the local government also joined the camp, and the protest was scheduled during the Kalash community *Chilam Joshi* festival held mid-May every year. Among many other celebrations of the Kalash community, *Chilam Joshi* is more prominent as it is celebrated in a more publicly, and outsiders turn up in thousands. National and international tourists tourists from different parts of the country and come and enjoy this festival. All local and national news agencies, channels, and newspapers cover this festival. On many occasions, senior government officials and military leadership have visited the valley to see the festival.

According to Rafi, chairman of the village council stated:

¹⁹ One of the local online Urdu news website recorded the protest which can be seen of the website <https://chitralexpress.com/updates/2015/11/23/2597/>

We were organizing a protest on *Chilam Joshi*²⁰ because usually, most district officers come to see the festival, and the media fully covers it. The plan was to delay the festival and let everyone notice the protest both inside and outside Chitral. Both Kalash and non-Kalash were on the same page as both wanted to be compensated on merit and fully supported the cause. As expected, when the news of this plan reached the Deputy Commissioner's office, they reached the valley and tried to convince us to postpone the protest and used different tactics. First, they wanted me to postpone the agitation. They promised that the Deputy Commissioner's office would extend help directing NGOs and state machinery to maximize the valley's share in reconstruction and development projects. We did not accept their offer, as they always made false promises, and never kept them. Watching our stubbornness, they started threatening me to order my people to stop the protest; otherwise, I would be abducted from the valley forever. They knew if this protest were to be registered, it would be a big blow to the credibility of both Major of the Pakistan army deputed in Chitral and the Deputy Commissioner. They were not ready to let this happen. When all these tactics failed and tension between the protest organizers and district administration flared, they used another person from the Kalash community. Zargai, one of the Kalash community members, is a minority representative in the district government from Jamat I Islami. He had good relations with the Deputy Commissioner's office staff. The staff used him conciliator when everyone was ready for protest. He came out shouting, "why are you interrupting their religious ceremony" and he would not tolerate it as it is against their religious freedom. Though almost all the Kalash community members were with us when he spoke these words, no other Kalash could respond to him.

Imran, from the Kalash community and a minority member district councilor, supported Zargai to speak against the protest in front of all. He was very sure about the effect of *Chelam Joshi*

²⁰ Spring festival of the Kalash Community.

protest that it would be positive outcome for the whole valley, but he wanted to stop it for another reason. Imran said:

Sajeed, who remained head of local government in the valley and won all previous elections on *nazim* (head of the village council) seat, has always exploited the Kalash community. I did not want Sajeed to take credit for the protest if it was successful.

However, Imran is a close friend of the current chairman of the village council. He was among the top supporters in local body elections to convince the Kalash community to vote for Rafi. Though he is a converted Kalash, he opposed the protest, not openly but through Zargai. Sajeed, fully supported the chairman village council in the protest. Sajeed posited:

This was the right time to protest in front of all as it would have better consequences for the whole valley.

The youngsters and the drivers of the valley who travel daily to Chitral town in the morning and come back in the evening started the next protest. Despite the dilapidated road the village councilors used it to reach the required destination i.e. Press Club. The road was washed away by flood at different locations, and it took too long to repair it. It also ended at the press club. Again village councilors were leading the protest.

These three protests were recorded at the Press Club and highlighted the concerns of the people of the valley. The councilors of the valley showed the district administration how they manipulate their position to pressurize them. After these protests, the Deputy Commissioner's office awarded a few reconstruction projects to village councilors.

7.6. *Bashali*²¹ Reconstruction: A Case Study of Politics between NGOs and Kalash Community

The NGOs involvement in the Kalash community has been discussed from different perspectives, both by the people from within the community and outside. On the one hand, NGOs and development agencies are claiming visible improvement in various sectors of the so-called backward Kalash community, while on the other different activists from outside and within the community consider the involvement of NGOs exploitative and disastrous. Parkes (2000) mentioned that when NGOs work with a few community members, others stay away from it, saying, why should we participate? NGOs or political groups, or fractions have taught this behavior. It has damaged the unity of the community (Parkes, 2000).

After the flood, NGOs launched several projects in the valley. One of the national NGOs, AKRSP, working here developed Community Organizations (COs) to launch projects. These COs were created with the help of local leaders. These include community organizations (COs), Women Community Organizations (WCOs) at the village level, and Local Support Organizations (LSO) at the union council level. CO or WCO are usually a group of people living nearby and they are run by a president and a secretary or vice president. Ideally, they conduct monthly or bi-monthly meetings and discuss collective problems. They also do the nominal saving, which is kept in the joint account of the organization. If CO or WCO intends to do any development project, they write it to LSO. After that, LSO personnel come to discuss the project with the people of that area in the presence of CO or WCO concerned. When everyone from the community agrees on the terms and conditions of the project, LSO gives a go-ahead signal for the project subject to the situation if they have finances for the project. In union

²¹ Kalash menstrual house where women stay at time of child birth and menstruation

council Ayun, the NGO has its LSO connected to all COs and WCOs in three Kalash valleys and Ayun. The manager of the LSO is an educated Kalash who graduated from the University of Peshawar. Initially, it was developed by AKRSP, this LSO set into a small local NGO and now sends proposals for funding to national and international donors. This LSO is famous for having roots in the Kalash community, making it easy for the LSO to attract funds by portraying images of the Kalash community, showing them as helpless, backward who needed immediate relief. The said NGO is criticized by many educated Kalash members for exploiting exotic photos of the Kalash community for their financial and political interests. Imran, a key respondent from the Kalash community, narrated:

The organization manager knows how to attract donors by presenting colorful images of the Kalash indigenous community.

He has mobilized three young women who graduated from different universities in Pakistan. They helped him organize activities of WCO in the valley where I did fieldwork. Among many other projects, I am writing about one of the reconstruction projects for the Kalash community. This case study will help understand how different stakeholders of reconstruction in the valley exercise their power to pursue their interests.

Bashalis are mainly constructed near the stream. It is considered *onjeshta* (impure) where Kalash women stay when they are pregnant, at the time of childbirth, and after that, when they menstruate (see Wynne Maggi, 2001). In the 2015 flash flood *Bashali* of Aneesh, one of the hamlets in the valley was also damaged. For every hamlet in the Kalash valley, there is one *Bashali*. As the structure of the Aneesh *Bashali* was not very stable, the mighty flash flood damaged it completely.

Photo 7.1: Construction of *Bishali* Destroyed by the 2015 Flood in the Kalash Valley



Source: Author, 2018

The construction of this *Bashali* was one of the main concerns of the Kalash community of Aneesh. There are many other *Bashali* in the valley, but it is inconvenient for women of this hamlet to travel to other hamlets.

The conflict appeared between different groups within the Kalash community of Aneesh on the construction of *Bashali*. A WCO wrote to LSO for construction of the said *Bashali*. LSO had funds to provide for the construction of *Bashali*. The LSO's personnel reached the hamlet where most of the people were gathered to discuss the mechanism of *Bashali* construction. When dialogue started about who would take the responsibility to construct the *Bashali*, disagreement surfaced. Three stakeholders emerged from the community, while the fourth one was the manager of the LSO. To understand the variances and conflicts between these stakeholders, it was crucial to understand the background and relationship of the stakeholders and the rationale behind the disagreement on the construction of *Bashali*.

Nazar is a well-known figure in Aneesh. He had links with AKRSP and LSO for a long time. He had completed more than five projects through his CO, mainly channelization in the valley at the backside of the Aneesh. Nazar contested the 2015 village council elections and because of his contacts and roots in the community, he was sure to win the election even without a campaign. Kalash community, especially the dwellers of Aneesh, considered him their leader and he was elected as the president of the forest committee to represent the community. He was president of the CO from Aneesh too. He lost his position as a leader and president of the forest committee. People accused him of constructing water channels on the land he had leveled after cutting the forest wood. He mainly served his interests through projects financed by the said NGO. Through the five projects for water channelization, he extended the water channel to his land and reconstructed it many times using finances from the said NGO. He constructed

protection walls to protect his land from the flood. AKRSP financed all the projects. One of the respondents from Aneesh, 35 years of age and a small scale dry fruit supplier, said:

This person knows how to make his ends meet. He has manipulated his links through projects to benefit him and pretended that he is doing it for the community. He used the name of the community. He even did not hesitate to use his wife and daughters to develop links with people who could benefit him.

Serving guests with homemade wine was not considered bad here. Still, when people started to use it to develop links and then manipulate these links, a group of youngsters began opposing as discussed in the fourth chapter. Similarly, community members considered him responsible for corruption in cutting and selling forest timber in the market. The court accused four members of the illegal cutting and selling of forest timber. Share of the community was also compromised in the same case. It was the responsibility of the president of the forest committee to ensure the community share as royalty in the selling of the forest trees. It was not possible to cut forest trees on a large scale without the committee's consent. So in the forest royalty case, the Kalash community of Aneesh considers Nazir responsible.

In 2015 Nazir lost village council elections that he was not expecting. This put a big question mark on his leadership in the community, and it felt like he had lost his position as leader. He blamed everyone in the community for his loss in the election. Before the election, his wife was president of a WCO, and Hwar Begum, another woman from the Kalash community, living near Nazir, was the secretary. Nazir considered the father-in-law of Hwar begum responsible for his loss and cut the water supply line of tape water, saying that he had done it from his pocket, not any NGO though it was an AKRSP project. He first dissolved the WCO, in which his wife was the president, saying,

I do not want to work with these *paseti qam* (lower castes) and *shea phoseta* (black skin) people anymore as it does not suit me.

Then he removed Hwar begum as secretary of the WCO. Hwar begum formed her own WCO after that. Hawar Begum, who wrote the resolution through her WCO to LSO, is president of the new WCO. She wanted to construct the *Bashali* through her WCO. That is why she forwarded a written resolution. Before the disaster and 2015 local election, there was one WCO in the village. When I checked the register, which every WCO maintains to keep a record of meetings and savings, I learned she is arranging regular meetings of her WCO as all procedures and meeting proceedings were written on registers provided by LSO and AKRSP. She had completed one project with another NGO, Islamic Relief, for her community of Pit latrine. She wanted to do the project through her WCO, so she forwarded the resolution for *Bashali* construction.

The next stakeholder is Zargai, brother of Nazir and is also a resident of Aneesh. He is one of the two Kalash community members who were recently selected by Jamat I Islami for the minority seat in the district government. He is an active community member involved in development projects as a government contractor. The same *Bashali* was built by Zargai last time from government funds. He has also worked with LSO and AKRSP as a community member launching community development projects.

On the day of the discussion, LSO office members and Kalash community members of Aneesh were gathered to decide who would build the *Bashali*. When the manager of LSO announced that Sister Pakistan WCO, which is presided over by the wife of Nazir and is the first WCO of Aneesh, would build the *Bashali*, Hwar Begum and Zargai both opposed it. The main opposition to LSO chairman was Zargai.

Nazir used his links to get the project of *Bashali* as he has been working with AKRSP since the LSO was not formed. The manager of the LSO also wanted Nazir's wife WCO to do the project, but Zargai opposed it because there was a clash between the two brothers, Nazir and Zargai. Zargai married a woman who was married and had two daughters. One of these daughters of Zargai's wife from the previous husband had an affair with the elder son of Nazir. They ran away, married, and spent time outside the valley. After some time, he left the girl. This created animosity between the two brothers and their families.

If WCO of Nazir's wife got the project, Nazir would do the construction. There were many reasons for him to do the task of *Bashali* construction. Firstly, Nazir had a significant share of forest. He can get much more construction wood on the license issued for the construction of *Bashali*. It means he can maximize his profit through the project.

Secondly, he had lost election in the recent village council election. If Nazir's wife won the project, it could restore his position and status because the construction of *Bashali* is considered an important activity in the community. He already won this from Hwar begum as this project meant a lot for Nazir, but Zargai appeared in the shape of another rival at the eleventh hour. As two brothers had hostile relationship and they made it a matter of honor to get the project by hook or by crook. So the reconstruction of *Bashali* surfaced family rivalry between two brothers and their families.

On the other hand, Zargai was also facing opposition from the community and the chairman of LSO. The Chairman of the LSO manager was reluctant to do the proposed project through Zargai. Manager of the LSO is a firm supporter of PTI. Zargai is his political opponent

in the valley and both were expecting to become provincial ministers on minority seats from KP.

As Zargai stated:

The manager does not want me to construct the *Bashali* as I am from Jamat I Islami and a district council member. The manager of the LSO never wants me to relate my name with the construction of *Bashali*.

When I first met with Zargai at his house during our discussion about the role of NGOs in the valley, he spoke against the projects of the LSO, saying that this was nothing but to earn money and political fame. He told me that the manager of LSO was a political worker, and, he wanted to magnify his position in the party and community through these projects. He said: "manager is next favorite candidate for minister's seat on reserve seat for minorities from PTI." When I came to know the manager's selection as minister on reserve seat for minorities by PTI ("First Kalash MPA vows", 2018) and adviser to the chief minister of KP for minority rights, suddenly the face of Zargai flashed into my mind.

After that discussion in front of all Kalash members of Aneesh, which ended with no conclusion, more meetings took place to build the consensus. After many debates, when Zargai realized that the LSO would not give him the *Bashali* construction project, he pressurized the LSO manager that he would bring a resolution against him and the LSO in the district council. He also warned the manager of the LSO that he would construct the *Bashali* from his funds in the district government and would not let the LSO do the construction. He wanted to postpone the project of *Bashali* construction one or the other.

The manager of LSO selected a man from Anesh who was also affiliated with Jamat I Islami, to counter Zargai. The manager had chosen this person from the same political party to control Zargai as he wanted to stop the construction of *bashali* through his party. Now, as the

new caretaker of the project was from the same party, pressure from Zargai had been diffused cleverly, and LSO started construction of the *bashali*.

The case of Bashali construction presents the internal power struggle to gain projects. Realizing the importance of the project within the community, different stakeholders tried to maximize their interests by utilizing their sources of power. The opportunity to maximize the interest and political share within and outside the community by various stakeholders was provided by the reconstruction process.

7.7. *Bachen Khangeh* (Protection Walls) and Politics of Reconstruction

Protection or retention walls are considered bulwark against flash floods for preventing the water from entering human installations, houses, shops, hotels, water channels, etc. In the Kalash valley, few such structures were constructed to contain flash floods. The construction of protection walls was done recently and but is not part of the traditional mitigation strategy against flash floods in Kalash valley. Construction of such structures required finances, which was impossible for people living in the valley. It is again NGOs and state institutions that could provide finances for this expensive work.

Still, recent flash floods and the effect of such protection walls raised questions about the unplanned construction of protection walls on streams. Locals of the area were not satisfied with the mitigation strategies of the state. One mitigation project was to dig the stream and prepare walls of the same rocks brought by the flash flood through the excavator and not adding anything else into it. Another strategy was to make protection walls by mixing cement, stones, and sand. Yaqoob Khan, a geography graduate of the University of Peshawar and teacher in high school in the valley, said:

If the government wants to protect us from flash floods, they should build a dam up in the mountain from where the stream enters into the valley.

Another respondent who is a hotel owner in the valley stated:

Excavation into the stream to protect people from a flash flood is useless and just a wastage of resources. Flash floods brought huge and small rocks firmly fixed on the ground. When the excavator digs, it unearths the locked rocks, which are relatively easier for a flash flood to relocate and can cause more destruction.

It is pertinent to mention that the Irrigation Department had spent more than twenty million rupees collectively on the stream to excavate and give way to flood water.

Nazir constructed one of the first protection walls along the bridge near Aneesh to connect Sarojal, a small hamlet situated on the opposite side of Aneesh. The bridge was mainly constructed to bring forest trees to the valley's main road to be transported to Chitral town and down districts of the province. Nazir and one of the former MNAs, who belonged to the *Kator* family and won elections several times, had a close relationship. One of his sons was elected to the national assembly from the district in the 2013 election. Another was arrested by National Accountability Bureau (NAB) for embezzlement in forest royalty ("NAB Arrested Five Persons," 2015). The same MNA helped Nazir connect to AKRSP. His son-in-law remained chief of AKRSP, also from the *Kator* family.

Along the bridge, a protection wall was constructed. Behind the wall, most of the land belonged to Nazir. The protection wall was erected to protect the land from floods. In the 2015 flood, the protection wall saved his land. He proudly said: "protection wall that I built protected my land." According to residents, the protection wall was strong enough to stay foot in front of an intense flash flood. It washed away the bridge, though. It stopped big rocks, which diverted

the water flow in the opposite direction. There is no trace of protection wall as it had disappeared under big rocks.

The flash flood washed away four Kanals of the land of Sher Hakim and five Kanal land of Ghufran with many walnut, apple, pear, and apricot trees. Javed, a *subedar* in the Pakistan army, lived on the opposite side of the protection wall. His house was situated at the height of almost forty feet on stream. When the protection wall pushed water toward the opposite side, it washed away land below the house of Javed and then the house too. There are no traces of the house anymore, and he shifted to Chitral town.

Similarly, in Broon hamlet, another protection wall was constructed by the LSO and CO of residents of Broon. It was also overflowed by the 2015 flash flood, which damaged houses and road. The manager of the LSO took me one day to the protection wall that he had built and said: "this protection wall protected many houses and the road." The claim was partially correct, but when I saw pictures of the road right after the flood, that part of the road and houses were seriously damaged even at the back of the protection wall. Actual damages happened on the opposite side of the protection wall. Three Kalash houses were thoroughly washed away as the protection wall diverted floodwater.

These two cases were evidence that protection walls somehow saved the population from flash floods or reduced the damages, but at the same time, they were responsible for damages to opposite sides. Therefore, it was not safe to construct protection walls without adequately considering the technicalities of such structures especially on streams that run in steep valleys as in the Kalash valley. Similarly, houses close to the stream were liable to be affected by the diversion of floodwater by these protection walls.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the flash flood damaged many water channels, especially heads of water channels that poured stream water into canals that operated the water mills. Most channel heads were situated in the upper part of the valley from where the stream started. Before I arrived in the valley for fieldwork, CDLD had begun working on different reconstruction projects. One of its projects was to restore the head of the water channel that provided water to Batrik, Krakal, and Kandisar, three hamlets situated in the upper part of the valley. The mechanism of CDLD projects was not very different from that of the LSO, though CDLD was mainly a provincial government program and district administration, and its head Deputy Commissioners were responsible for its launching and completion. One of the national NGOs, Sarhad Rural Support Program (SRSP), was helping the district administration to look into the social feasibility of the projects.

One of the councilors from the village council wanted to initiate the project to reconstruct the water channel as the water was not enough for the trees, crops, and water mills after the flash flood. It was initiated by a community organization (CO) of Batrik, Kandisar, and Krakal (BKK) under the leadership of Kabir, a village councilor, as president and vice president Durdama. They wanted to reconstruct the water channels for all three hamlets, Batrik, Kandisar, and Krakal though there were other water channels too where the water was not enough for crops, fruit trees, and watermills. The 2015 flood had destroyed the head of the water channel.

Additionally, stream water run deep down than the level before the flood as floodwater dug stream bed at the point where the head of the water channel was constructed. The head of the water channel was situated above all the hamlets near the two hamlets of Shekhandeh.

After considering the resolution for the said project permission was granted to the CO to start the task of channelization. Work on the channel began under the supervision of Kabir. Initially, Kabir arranged finances from his sources as CDLD usually approved the budget after partial completion of projects. They started from the lower side of the channel, where it ended to stop the seepage of water from the channel and cement its weak sides. When they completed the first part of the project and reached the channel's head, a conflict started between Kabir and residents big Shekhandeh.

They wanted to construct a protection wall to make it safe from heavy water flow in the stream for this channel head. In absence of protection wall, it was predicted that strong water flow could wash away the water channel head and this could lead to the failure of the project. The construction of a protection wall was proposed by the engineer of SRSP on the recommendation of the CO for the durability of the project. Sajeed, who remained head of the village council many times in the past and belonged to Sheikhandeh hamlet, narrated:

I will not allow the construction of a protection wall on the proposed site. It can damage the whole village in case of flood in future as the water would divert straight into our houses.

Sajeed, being a political opponent of Kabir and another village councilor in small Sheikhandeh, did not want them to benefit from the project in any form. He blamed Kabir for only pursuing his interest and not taking into account the serious concerns of others.

He is the project contractor but he is always thinking about how much benefit he would accrue for himself while ignoring the concerns of others. He wants to complete the project well before time to get his earnings. It would earn him a good name and reputation in the three villages that voted for him and increase his supporters. Ultimately, he is thinking only about himself, and no one else in the

village. Kabir talks about the rights of the people living in the three hamlets, BKK, but he is just using them for his interests.

Another councilor, Baseer, in small Shekhandeh hamlet, who had affiliations with Jamat I Islami is the reason for Sajeed's opposition to the project. After the flash flood and during reconstruction, he had been active in helping people in the two hamlets. He had full support of the Al-Khidmat Foundation, a charity wing of Jamat I Islami. He had recently approved a bridge for the Sheikhande hamlet from the district government as its head is from Jamat I Islami. His contribution to Shekhandeh is raising his image and making him a solid political opponent. Baser is owner of two water mills situated on the same water channel. If water flow increases, these water mills would become fully functional. According to Baseer, the village councilor from Shekhandeh:

Sajeed does not want any political opponent in these two hamlets. One reason is that he is motivating the people of Shekhandeh to oppose the construction of a firm channel head is his opposition against me. He never wants me to earn from any project financially or politically.

According to the project design, the protection wall was proposed to be constructed in front of the stream to divert water, leaving the water channel head safe. Sajeed and people from Shekhandeh claimed that if the protection wall is being built on this place, high water flow in summer and floods can directly hit the village and wash away the hamlet, which is not acceptable for them.

7.7.1 Manipulating the Kalash Girl, Called Durdama

Durdama, the secretary of BKK CO, is one of the key members who organized BKK for the said project. Durdama is one of the Kalash community's active woman activists. She is in

her mid-30s, and is working for the welfare of her community for a long period. She is also working in a Kalash museum as a receptionist. Kalash women and girls have more social and physical mobility than those Muslim women in their surroundings. As mentioned by Maggi (2001) Kalash often says *homa istrizia azat asan* (our women are free), (Maggi, 2001). Kalash females with more physical mobility have developed better contacts with the people working in institutions, especially development institutions and NGOs. Durdama developed connections with employees in state institutions and NGOs like AKRSP and SRSP, which are actively used in different development projects in the valley. Back in 2007, Durdama had set up a women's community organization (WCO). Through this WCO, she reconstructed the same water channel through the Water Management and Irrigation Department. She remained active in other projects for the Kalash community as well.

Women's participation is highly appreciated by the NGOs, especially in conservative societies. The national and foreign donors appreciate the images and active involvement of women in development projects and this helps in bringing funds for NGOs. These factors made Durdama an active member of NGOs and helped her develop a good relationship with them. After the flood, when she visited Chitral town to reconstruct water channels destroyed by the flood, she met an old friend she worked with before on different development projects. She retorted:

I visited the CDLD office, where I met this person now working with SRSP. I wanted to reconstruct the water channel as it was not possible without their financial and technical help. My old friend asked me to include more members as it is the requirement of a bigger project and larger finances to reconstruct the water channel. It was not possible without merging more COs from other hamlets, which was the requirement of CDLD and SRSP projects. I could not do all this as

I was working in Kalash people's Museum as a full-time employee. Kabir, a village council member, came to know from somewhere, maybe from the CDLD office, that I have links with CDLD program manager. He came and requested me to support him in obtaining the project. He promised to take care of everything, including making bigger CO by merging many COs. Thus, we made BKK, a combined CO of three hamlets Batrik, Krakal, and Kandisar, in which I became secretary and Kabir the president.

They wrote an application for the project and sent it through Durdama. As she had links with the program manager, it took no time to approve it. The total amount per CDLD record was Rs. 1.45 million, higher than any other reconstruction projects done by CDLD in the valley. The project was designed to make a cemented head for the said water channel to pour enough water into it. This would create enough water available to irrigate crops of the three said hamlets and run water mills.

Kabir, who was also an *imam* (the person who leads prayers in the mosque) of a mosque in Batrik, was also famous for converting the Kalash community people to Islam. When I first met him, he told me:

I am doing a great job of saving the Kalash community by converting them to Islam. My grandfather was among the first Muslims who introduced Islam in the valley by converting non-believers to Islam. He built the first mosque in the valley.

He spends the month of *Ramadan* mostly outside Chitral. He collects *chanda* (donation) from like-minded people in lower districts of the province who want to convert non-believers (Kalash) to Islam in the valley. He did not hesitate to acquire the help of the same Kalash to initiate and approve his project. When the project halted due to interference by Sajeed, Kabir requested her again to re-start it.

7.7.2 Clash of Interests among Local Leaders and Post-Disaster Reconstruction

On the day of foundation laying for digging of the protection wall, Kabir came to the place where the head of the channel was proposed; a group of men from big Shekhandeh (BS) hamlet reached the site and instructed the excavator to stop the work. After clash of bitter words, Kabir went to the police station and registered a complaint. He blamed Sajeed for inciting and leading the people of his hamlet to stop the said project, which is the due right of the three hamlets. Residents of three hamlets were also with the Kabir.

The Police Station House Officer (SHO) asked the people of BS and Sajeed to come to the police station. SHO of the station made arrangements to resolve the issue between the two parties. The meeting ended in no resolution. Sajeed registered a complaint in the CDLD office addressed to the district program manager (DPM) to stop the project; otherwise, he would be responsible for the consequences if anything worse happens.

The issue escalated, and as a result, CDLD stopped the project funding because the proposed design of the project was not feasible to continue in the same place where it was designed in the initial survey because of reservations from the community. This decision of CDLD was a heavy blow to the interest of Kabir, who had already invested a lot of money in the project besides having completed the first part of the channel by investing from his pocket. He initiated fresh efforts to start the project.

Muhib, a resident of BS, shared some stories when we were waiting for a vehicle at Kalash valley terminal in Chitral Town:

Kabir is under pressure now because we stopped his project, and he has invested his money in the project. He will surely lose if the project does not start on time.

Kabir leveled allegations against the engineer of CDLD that he had been bribed by the opposing party to stop this project, and if he is not going to permit to restart the project, he will make it public and take action against him. Meanwhile, Kabir requested Durdama to play her role in the matter. She approached the program manager again to find a solution to the case. Kabir wanted to use her links again in the issue. Durdama narrated:

I wanted to solve the issue as Kabir was confused and desperate. He had spent money on the project, and if CDLD stopped working on the project, Kabir would not recover his money.

After consultation with the program manager, they prepared a new plan. According to the new design, the protection wall was not part of the project. They would construct an interim head for the water channel to address the community's reservations.

In this case study of building protection walls in the valley, it became evident that different stakeholders with the power to manipulate the project used it to maximize their power and serve their interests. In the last case where the head of the water channel was to be constructed, the obvious clash of conflict surfaced in the post-disaster reconstruction process. Kabir, famous for his hate to Kalash religion and Kalash people and always wanted to convert the Kalash population to Islam but he did not hesitate to use a Kalash female activist to get the project. This project was necessary for his political career, apart from other interests, and increased his influence in the valley. As the interests of Kabir were directly affecting the political career of Sajeed, he used the controversial design and structure of the protection wall to convince his hamlet residents and manipulate them to stop the construction. This entire morass was the result of the 2015 flash flood.

7.8. Conclusion

It is believed that initial phases after disasters like a response, rescue and relief were most non-political occasions as mostly everyone who survived or was in a position to help others. As time passed after a disaster, political impasse becomes more and more apparent (Olson, 2000; Sokefeld, 2012).

In the Kalash valley, relief and reconstruction after disasters of floods and earthquakes took place through joint efforts of NGOs and state institutions. Local political figures have been among the main stakeholders and worked as brokers between the state, NGOs, and the valley population. Essentially, stakeholders are groups or individuals that affect and are affected by reconstruction activities after disasters. Stakeholders can also affect the goals, development, and even survival of the process and the activity. They can be beneficial to each other if they support the reconstruction process but can be antagonistic if they oppose it. So, they have had power to be a beneficiary or give a threat (Siriwardena & Haigh, 2011). State institutions like district administration initially did not involve local political figures in relief activities. Local political figures resorted to different tactics to pressurize government and state institutions by complaining about the "inappropriateness" of relief and reconstruction efforts. Such protests resulted in the inclusion of local elected political figures in reconstruction.

Local political structure was fully involved by including different NGOs in all response phases after the disasters. Because of the remote nature of the valley, NGOs have been working here for a long time and have developed various networks to work on different projects. Sometimes, these networks and individuals tried to increase their participation or decrease opponent groups' involvement in reconstruction projects. Disasters provided an opportunity to

local political setup to increase their influence by using NGO resources for the affected and non-affected populations who are their voters. Different projects of NGOs and government also provided the opportunity to increase the influence of people working in NGOs and local political figures. Other rival groups within the community also used various techniques to increase their impact or compromise political opponents' influence through post-reconstruction projects.

8. *BOLMUZEH* (EARTHQUAKE) DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND POWER OF LISTS

8.1. Introduction

On October 26th, 2015 an earthquake of 7.5 on the Richter scale hit northern Pakistan and Afghanistan region (Hayes et al., 2017). Due to its proximity to the epicenter, the earthquake affected many parts of the Chitral district. The government wanted to compensate the affected communities by distributing money for those dead, injured, or whose houses were damaged by the earthquake. In this chapter the discussion is focused on earthquake relief methods and the interplay and manipulation of power between state institutions and the "affected" population in the post-earthquake situation. More specifically, it discusses the situation that emerged after the inaccurate assessment of the earthquake-affected families and the compensation based on the inaccurate assesment.

8.2. Making lists of the Earthquake Affected Families; “Nobody could resolve the issue of earthquake compensation, but the genius Deputy Commissioner (DC) did it”: Raed

Lists are everywhere and are one of the oldest forms of documents ever existed. In the field, ethnographers confront different kinds of lists that are misleading if considered simple documents. It does not only demonstrate the state of affairs but creates particular conditions. They make action-oriented categories and do the categorization. Lists, once approved by the competent authorities have the power to either bring people together or dismantle them (Riles, 2006; Sokefeld, 2020). Through such lists, a state makes people legible as disaster victims.

On the contrary, people make their strategies. They derive empowerment from the lists. "Solidarity crumbles in most cases as soon as outside help arrives on the scene and (post) disaster governmentality is enacted. Relief goods need to be distributed and require decisions

about who deserves help and who does not. Surveys and lists that register some and leave out others often become an arena for competition for resources" (Sokefel, 2020: 4).

To identify the affected population of Chitral, the district administration utilized its human resources, mainly land revenue employees, to collect the data and prepare lists so that affected families and households could be compensated after the earthquake. *Patwari* was given the task of assessing the affected people. In the case of the Kalash valley and Reshum the *patwaris* who collected data on the earthquake-affected families, belonged to these two villages. *Patwaris* collected data for the required and submitted it to the district administration. After a month, based on available data, the affected people were given a compensation amount that was two lakh (2,00,000) or Rs \$2000, for each damaged house. A total of 14000 families were compensated by distributing compensation cheques.

Soon after handing over the compensation amount to earthquake-“affected” families, other people started raising reservations about the assessment of the earthquake victims. Residents from most villages of the district claimed that authorities concerned were biased and showed favoritism in the assessment, and the deserving families did not get compensation for their damages from the earthquake. The assessment teams were accused of favoring non-deserving people, who were either relatives or friends of the officials,

This situation created a political chaos and blame game between the stakeholders in which the targeted stakeholder was the district administration headed by the Deputy Commissioner (DC). The district government, including district government heads and many village councils, started protests against the district administration for conducting the inaccurate assessment. Protests from most parts of the district were recorded.

The prime minister of Pakistan on his maiden visit to Chitral in the aftermath of the earthquake listened to the grievances of the affected people and promised to compensate them in time. The prime minister also mentioned that the affected people of the 2015 flood were not compensated in time. He ordered district administration to complete the assessment and issuance of cheques among the affected population within 3-4 days, ("Keeping Chitral on Empty Promises," 2015). Later, DC ordered the district administration to complete the assessment process within the given time to avoid the inconvenience and the prime minister's wrath. All district administration officers gathered to discuss and devise a mechanism for quick assessment. The district administration was not ready nor had any mechanism to reach every corner of the district and do the assessment at such a short notice. *Patwaris* were given the job to assess all the houses destroyed by earthquake.

In Pakistan, *patwaris* are judged as the main corruption pillars throughout the country with deep rooted corruption practices, favoritism, and nepotism. They have land records that they can manipulate according to their interests. They have links with revenue authorities and feudal lords, increasing the chances of corruption in land ownership cases (Khan, 2007). The situation in Chitral is a bit different as, until very recently, there was no formal and written land settlement record in the district. The land settlement started in 2001, and it is still in the process to complete (Settlement & Re-settlement, Revenue, and State Department, Government of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, n.d.). The establishment of the land revenue department and *patwaris* is a recent trend in Chitral district. Thus the institution of *patwaris* is not very strong in Chitral compared to down districts of KP where land settlement has been done long before, and people always refer to *patwaris* in case of land disputes and other land-related issues. This makes the *patwaris* an important office and institution in down districts. In Chitral, earthquake assessment was one of

the early opportunities *patwaris* experienced and realized their importance in public and state affairs.

Qaiser, a forty-year-old and graduate of political science from the University of Peshawar is an employee in the Revenue Department in Chitral district headquarters, stated:

The prime minister might not know about the structural challenges of assessing on short notice of three days. It is never possible to do it, especially in Chitral, as accessing the population in the far flung areas is very difficult because of the rough terrain. The Prime Minister (PM) may have played a political gimmick to impress the people and win over their sympathies.

Being local to the area where *patwaris* did the damage assessment, it was easy to identify the affected population. Still, the chances of favoritism and nepotism were high as families, friends, and foes of the said officials lived in the same locality where they did the assessment.

As a result, the assessment of the earthquake done by *patwaris* mainly proved incorrect. When I asked the Assistant Commissioner of Booni for the lists of affected households of Reshum in the 2015 earthquake, he first denied saying we do not have the hard copies. We cannot provide as power was out and there was no alternate power supply to provide the lists. In another interaction, when I asked again for the same lists, an officer in the office said: "it is incorrect, and we cannot issue it." Later, I received it from one of my key respondents in the Kalash valley who is working with an NGO as he took pictures of all the lists of people who were compensated. The lists were up on the notice boards of district administration.

During my field research in both the locales, many people complained about the inaccurate assessment of the earthquake. As the earthquake took place immediately after flash floods in the district, people shared their stories of earthquake and post-earthquake experiences. I

wanted to know about the list to cross-check the claims and the underlying causes of the inaccurate assessment.

One of my senior university fellows is working with one of the NGOs in Chitral for the reconstruction of the flood-hit area. The donor NGO provided financial assistance to FOCUS to construct temporary prefabricated shelter houses for flood-affected people of Chitral. In the second phase, the organization wanted to help earthquake-affected populations and needed accurate statistical figures about the most hit areas. When they acquired lists of the affected people and shared their interest in working for the earthquake-affected population in the district during a formal meeting of the said NGO with the DC. My senior university fellow narrated:

DC refused to provide lists citing internal problems, lists being unauthentic as these were not prepared through proper assessment. He advised us to work for the relief of flood-affected people in the second phase as well.

Protests started at different levels and of varying magnitude throughout the district when district administration distributed compensation money based on the inaccurate lists prepared mainly by *patwaris*. The protests started immediately after the distribution of compensation amount. The first protest occurred near Reshum, and the main road was blocked ("Quack Hit People Blocked...", 2015). During the demonstrations, the protesters almost all over the district threatened the district administration and the provincial government with consequences. They warned authorities of road blockage, moving to another province like Gilgit-Baltistan, and even to Afghanistan ("Sit-in by Chitralis", 2016), if their demands of providing financial assistance were not fulfilled. The situation started getting out of hand so the provincial government ordered a new assessment accusing the incompetence of the local government at village council levels ("Fresh Assessment of Quake Damages", 2015). However, the targeted stakeholder was district

administration, *patwaris*, local community, and local government councilors in the assessment. In the second assessment, people were asked to submit applications if they claimed they were left out in the first assessment and deserved relief money. Teams would then go to the applicant's place to check the condition of the houses for confirmation.

The number of applicants that reached the DC office was not easy to handle. The same was the situation with upper Chitral, where the Assistant Commissioner (AC) office at Booni was receiving the applications. District administration faced problems as it was almost impossible to verify many applicants by sending officials to the affected sites for verification. Secondly, compensation for all those applicants was not possible for the government. Initially, 14,000 cheques were distributed among the earthquake-affected population, out of which 4,000 were from upper Chitral.

Deputy Commissioner (DC) wanted to reduce the number of applicants for easy handling. DC notified applicants to write the application on a surety bond with a written pledge that if the claim of damages due to the earthquake would be found baseless and misleading, the applicant will be liable to pay 0.3 million rupees as a fine. Most of the DC and AC office employees, including *patwaris*, appreciated this intelligent move as they all were equally pressurized by the rising issues due to faulty assessment. So using his power to direct the applicants, the DC diverted and minimized the massive flow of applicants. Many of the office employees praised him and considered it a genius move. Raheed, a superintendent in the DC office, explained:

No one else could make such an intelligent decision at times of such mounting pressure. Nobody could resolve the issue of earthquake compensation, but the genius DC did it.

District administration earned time to handle the applicants and the situations for which only the district administration, including *patwaris*, were considered responsible by the community. After this move, the number of applicants decreased many-fold, but still, the government could not spare such a large amount of money to distribute it among the applicants. DCs move also diminished the anger of the general population and reduced the number of protests, news reports, etc., which were a challenge to the district administration to counter. Surety bond sellers earned thousands in a few days as queues of applicants used to wait for their turns in courts both at Booni and Chitral district headquarters.

How did this process work from the earthquake till the second assessment affected structures of local politics within villages? To understand this, case studies of the two locales, 8.3 and 8.4, the Kalash valley, and Reshum, are discussed in the coming section. It explains the situation at the individual level and the influence and manipulation of power structure on the assessment process.

8.3. Politics of Earthquake Assessment in the Kalash Valley; "*patwari tan cheta list saweza asoni*" (patwari prepared a list of "affected" people as he wished): Rafi to check headings

Patwari is a state official at the village level. Mainly patwari is responsible for the land record but also performs additional duties at ground level on behalf of district administration. It includes different kinds of surveys as well. Though patwari is a state official mostly, they are from local communities. Social, political and religious affiliations affect his official duties. So, making lists of affected people was affected by the social, political and personal affiliations and rivalries. Patwari makes and unmakes the lists. He has the power to include and exclude people from the lists. Such inclusion and exclusion rest on the limitations to access because of limited

resources or to perform the duties on short notice. Similarly, such inclusions and exclusions are mainly affected by social, political and personal favors and rivalries.

In the Kalash valley, the earthquake assessment was done by the local *Patwari*, who belonged to the *Zondra* clan. The residents of the Kalash valley challenged the credibility of the assessment on many forums. Some of the protests were organized and led mainly by the village council cabinet have been already discussed in previous sections. Protesters criticized the district administration for conducting the incorrect assessment leading to resultant protests in the valley. People in the valley also threatened *Patwari* for not including their names in the lists.

As Sokefeld (2020) discussed, accessing state offices and documents, especially for the lists of compensation for disasters, can have social consequences. “In other words, lists need to be kept under control, which hints strongly at their power” (p. 13). As mentioned earlier, it was not easy to get the list of people compensated for earthquake damages. I managed to obtain it through a close resource person. I double-checked the impact of damages based on the lists provided. Many of the houses included in the lists in the valley were not affected. At the same time, I observed many other houses, especially in the upper parts of the valley like Gambak and Kandisar; the earthquake had damaged the houses. Still, the families were not compensated as they were not included in the list prepared by the *Patwari*. The number of families compensated through cash was higher in the vicinity of the *Patwari* home who conducted the assessment. The number of families included in *Patwari’s assessment list* was 140 from the Kalash valley. Each family on the list was given 2,00,000 rupees as compensation, while thirteen others were paid 1,00,000. Fifty-three families were included from hamlets predominantly populated by the *Zondra* clan. Most of these families were *Zondra*, and their families, included in the list and interestingly there were no visible damages to the houses of these families. There were few

families in these hamlets that were not compensated, but the earthquake visibly affected their houses. Some were even from the same *Zondra* clan, but they are on bad terms with *Patwari*, as discussed later in this section.

Compared to the flood in the valley, damages from the earthquake were fewer, but still, the compensation amount and total number on the list, which was incorrect, was higher than those of the flood. Many local people criticized the policy of the government and concerned authorities as compensation were double for the earthquake. Many respondents criticized the assessment process. Still, there were different perspectives regarding the compensation for earthquakes. Yasin, 56 years old and a village councilor from the Kalash valley, claimed:

Everyone could have benefited if the district administration and the *patwaris* wanted, as there was no proper evaluation of the assessment that was proved. A double or triple number of families could have been compensated, and they deserved it because of poor infrastructure and the disaster-hit population of Chitral.

A highly influential study by Ferguson (1990) suggests that state interventions for development and other reasons increase the state's power, its institutions, and the people working in it. Post-earthquake relief process increased the power of local *Patwari*, which benefited him one way or the other. On the other hand, they also proved to be capable of avenging those on bad terms with the persons in the valley. *Patwari's* own house was under construction before the earthquake. He had demolished the old structure. In the assessment, he added his own house to the list. Three of the workers working with him as manual laborers and mason were from nearby hamlets Bronthar and Tewish. All of them were on the compensation list. In the deal with the worker, *Patwari* fleeced half of the compensation in return for approving the former's case (one

of them is discussed later). All five brothers, including a retired *Subedar*²², the only person of the *Zondra* clan whose house was damaged in the flood, were included in the list. The flood damaged more than four Kanal of land and crops of the *Subedar* and his four brothers as the land is shared and inherited. It is situated near the road. Flood inundated the land with rocks, big and small, and sand. This material is suitable for the construction of the building. Big stones are usually broken first and then shaped to fit in the walls. As it was situated near the road the loaders easily filled and transported the material to *Patwari* place of construction of his new house. The *Patwari* included *Subedar* and all the five brothers, to receive compensation. *Subedar*'s own house was damaged in the flood, and he was still living in a tent and prefabricated shockproof shelter provided by an NGO. Despite that, he was included in the list. *Subedar* is also from *Zondra* clan. Both parties reciprocated each other. The traditional building structure, especially roofs, includes wood and soil as primary ingredients as these are available in abundance locally and does not need cash to purchase. At the time of roof construction, I visited the *patwari* house. It was Reinforced Cement Concrete (RCC) type roof that included steel, cement, and sand as significant materials. The *Patwari* told me proudly:

I am the first in the whole valley to construct the RCC roof of my house as no one else ever built it before.

The cost of RCC structure in the valley is exorbitantly higher compared to traditional house roof construction. Many people considered the construction of the house and using expensive materials due to the earthquake assessment that the *Patwari* manipulated. He earned from earthquake assessment and spent it on constructing house which was otherwise impossible in his limited salary.

²² A senior non-commissioned officer in the Pakistan Army

When the district administration asked *Patwari* to assess the earthquake victims, the village council chairman suggested *Patwari* to conduct the joint survey so that every deserving person could be compensated. *Patwari* refused the combined assessment and asked the chairman village council to carry it out separately; then at the end, both lists would be matched, and names on the list would be finalized with consensus. Rafi, chairman of the village council, stated:

Patwari prepared a list of "affected" people as he wished. After that, he sent us his list for verification and ignored our list. I refused to verify. *Patwari* said nobody could question my assessment as I am representative of the state. Thus he sent it to the district administration office without verification, and compensation cheques were issued based on that list.

When people in the list received compensation money, they started protests. Thus a series of demonstrations and press conferences started, led mainly by the village council chairman from all three Kalash valleys.

After the decision of re-assessment for the earthquake-affected people by the provincial government and the subsequent decision by Deputy Commissioner Chitral to write an application for compensation on a surety bond, affected population started submitting applications to the concerned office. Around fifty applications for the compensation were received, written on a surety bond from the Kalash valley. Writing an application on a surety bond was proof that claims were genuine. None of them is compensated.

As discussed in the 6th chapter, district administration and Assistant Commissioners oversaw the affairs on behalf of DDMU. As part of the administrative culture in Pakistan, the district administration is famous for nepotism and its collectivist orientation. Similarly, such institutions impose a structure of common obligation which perpetuates nepotism and patronage

in government enterprise. In such cases, individuals who happen to be in authority favor their relatives and friends, violating merits and rules of conduct (Islam, 2004).

Mairaj, a *Zondra* by clan, served as a computer operator in district administration headquarter Chitral, and is a cousin of the *Patwari* who conducted earthquake assessment in the Kalash valley. Another *patwari* was also in the valley, but he did not get the earthquake assessment task. When the district administration decided to conduct a quick evaluation through local *patwaris* to distribute compensation, Mairaj helped in the selection of his cousin *patwari* for the earthquake assessment in the Kalash valley. It is pertinent to mention here that the power of all staff workers working in central administrative offices is higher than relatively high-rank employees working in peripheral offices because of the linkages with the high ranked officers in the main offices. As mentioned earlier, collectivist orientation works for the relatives of the officers and colleagues who develop links within offices, and this relationship often favors each other in times of need. The selection of the said *Patwari* by his cousin, who belonged to one of the high-status clans in the princely state, *Zondra*, proves it correct. In response, *Patwari* served his interests and helped other relatives of Mairaj in the valley to benefit from the assessment.

No case was considered inaccurate, and no official who conducted the assessment was punished in the whole district. Only two cases in upper Chitral headquarters, Booni, were highlighted by the Deputy Commissioner in a press conference against one of the leaders of civil society organization who fought for the rights of the people of upper Chitral known as *Tehreek-e-Tahaffuze Haqooq-e-Awam* (movement for the rights of the people of upper Chitral). During protests against the assessment of earthquake-affected people, the leaders of this rights organization spoke against the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner in a meeting for the defective evaluation. In response, DC termed the said leader as a manipulator and

blackmailer as he received three cheques for all his brothers but still blamed the district administration ("DC's Booni Visit Brings no Relief", 2016; "Tehreek Leaders Afraid of Inquiry", 2016).

The team sent by the district administration to the Kalash valley was known to Mairaj, cousin of the *Patwari* of the Kalash valley and spent the night at the residence of the same *Patwari*. Nothing changed as it was set before the visit, and money was already distributed. Thus the *Patwari* went clean as everything regarding monitoring and evaluation of the assessment was planned and was not supposed to fix responsibility but to fulfill the formalities to satisfy high ups, protesting public of the district, and media. It also earned time and kept the protesting masses calm for a while. Such tactics broke the agitation of the protesters and the blame-game by the district administration in the valley and the rest of the district.

This game of district administration affected people who wanted to be compensated spent a lot of time and energy in protests, writing applications and visiting the Chitral headquarters. Many wrote applications against the said *Patwari* to initiate inquiry against his assessment but in vain as all the administrative structure of the district was equally responsible for it. One of the respondents who wrote an application for compensation on surety bond as his house was damaged by the earthquake and his name was not added to the list by the *Patwari* and is a resident of Kandisar, complained:

In Pakistan, those who were in power get everything. DC humiliated us for a whole month and finally, we got nothing. There is no justice for the poor here. Many applicants affected by the earthquake usually visit Chitral headquarters very rarely. They cannot fight for their rights.

In the same village, applications were submitted to the Deputy Commissioner on the surety bond, but no one was compensated. One of the village council members stated:

It is better to get the survey conducted by someone from outside to avoid nepotism. They would come to the village council, and thus assessment would be on merit.

Most of the residents opposed the survey and proposed some alternative arrangement for conducting such surveys as the current assessment was considered inaccurate except for those who received the relief money.

8.3.1 *Patwari safar beimani kori asetani* (Patwari had committed a clear-cut fraud): Jilani

Jilani is a farmer and around 55 years old. He is residing near the road and stream in Ahmedabad hamlet. He has two houses, one near the stream that he constructed for his cows and goats. He is a neighbor of the *Patwari*. Another house is near the road where he resides with his wife and four children. During the flash flood of 2015, his house was partially damaged, but his second house remained intact. In the 2015 earthquake, his second house was also damaged. One room and the whole boundary wall were razed to the ground. Other rooms were also partially damaged and became unsafe for living. During the earthquake assessment, his house was not included by the *Patwari*. He explained:

Patwari did not include my name because I did not allow the *patwari* to marry my daughter. This is the only reason for not including my name in the assessment list. My house is damaged, and I have already applied for a surety bond, but that is no use. We protested in front of the DC office, but they all were connected. *Haya saf chogha musalman ka nika* (everyone is corrupt here. there is no real Muslim here). *Patwari* committed a clear-cut fraud.

Jilani is first among those who had scuffle with the *Patwari* and threatened him in his face. He supported the village council in protest against the *Patwari* and district administration and other offices. He explains:

People came from the DC office to the *patwari* house to cross-check the assessment list in the village after receiving complaints from the people of the village. After that, many people came to check the assessment of the earthquake. Nothing changed, and officials did not make any changes to the list or held *Patwari* responsible for the fraud he committed in the assessment. They all are united as one and defend each other when a controversial situation arises which can question the authority and performance of the district administration.

During the fieldwork, many respondents complained about the inaccurate assessment by the *Patwari* and the subsequent negligence of the authorities concerned even after protests. There were still others who became part of the lists.

Patwari's stance on the whole assessment issue is against most respondents. As mentioned by many respondents, he considers himself a state representative and has every right to make lists without interruption, as it is his duty. He said, "I am the state, and my opinion is the opinion of the state in the village". He also termed all allegations of biased assessment as baseless as no one has proved him wrong.

8.3.2 " Patwari did not pay me for my work and said I gave it to you in the earthquake ": Razzaq

Patwari used the power of making the earthquake assessment list. He included those people in the list who benefitted him. One of them is a mason, Razzaq, aged 42, from Tewish, a small hamlet in the Kalash valley. *Patwari* included him gain his help in constructing his house

as he had started it before the earthquake. When Razzaq demanded full payment after the work, *Patwari* refused to make full payment. Razzaq said:

He gave me half of the total amount when I asked for payment. *Patwari* did not pay me for my work and said I gave it to you in the earthquake. It was my right, and the government gave me, not *Patwari*.

Similarly, *Patwari* ignored local political representatives and proved himself above the elected village council and called himself the real state representative. One of the village councilors had a good relationship with the *Patwari*. After the 2015 flood, when various NGOs were distributing relief goods, the said councilor gave one package of the relief goods provided by the Red Cross to *Patwari* though his house is far away from the stream, and he was not affected by the flash flood. In the earthquake assessment, *Patwari* included around eleven families in the list on the instruction of the said councilor. The councilor did not oppose the earthquake assessment in response. He did not participate in the protests and press conferences against the *patwari* and district administration.

8.4. Politics of Earthquake Assessment in Reshum: “This is Pakistan, and here people in power benefit their friends and relatives”: Shazda, the Chairman of Reshum Village Council

In Reshum, the earthquake assessment was also conducted through the local *Patwari*. The local community's reaction to the assessment of the earthquake was not as harsh as that of the Kalash valley because of the difference in political structure between the two locales, discussed later in this chapter. Still, many complained about the assessment against the district administration and the *Patwari* who conducted the assessment. The total number of

compensation cheque for full and partial damages was around 14,000, out of which only 4000 were allocated to the residents of upper Chitral. However, the earthquake's epicenter was near the upper Chitral, which increased the chances of danger to the upper Chitral from the earthquake. The total population of upper Chitral is around 170,000, while that of lower is 278,000 (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017). The main reason behind more compensation for the Chitral subdivision is the influence of people on the state resources. Many officials and district local government council members told me that most of the families in Chitral town had received the cheques as they had links in offices in district administration. More families may be compensated for the earthquake because of their proximity to the main offices of district administration.

In Reshum, the *Patwari* who conducted the survey is from the *Khushahmate* lineage. The village council and district council member is also from the same lineage. This triangle made things different in conducting the assessment, protest, and the say of elected members in the assessment. The total number of households compensated for the earthquake damages was one hundred and thirty-four. Thirty-four were given 0.2 million while one hundred were given 0.1 million rupees.

Only five houses in the whole village were damaged as in these cases at least one room was damaged entirely and the walls were damaged which were on the list. In the rest of the cases, almost all the houses were intact except for a few boundary walls and main structures developed minor cracks. In most cases, there were no visible damages. Many people, whose houses were damaged, though partially, were not included. Ishafaq, the village council member, said: "damages were not heavy and many were compensated while many others omitted. In the village, no one knew exactly how many people were compensated. The assessment became

controversial from the beginning, and the list was unavailable to most people, therefore, no one knew exactly how many people were compensated. Village Council chairman claimed:

In Reshum, only a few houses were affected and almighty Allah, the Merciful, saved them.

He also admitted the nepotism in the assessment, as did most of the people. He said: "This is Pakistan, and here people in power benefit their friends and relatives." When I received the list, I discussed the families who were compensated in the earthquake with a key respondent in the village who is also a village council member. I wanted to see the houses if that were affected by the earthquake or not. As I mentioned earlier, only a few people knew the number of people and families who were compensated as the list was unavailable. The said respondent also wanted to know about the list and the people who received their share. He said:

In the initial assessment, *Patwari*, chairman VC and a few other village council members, including me, were together. Only a few houses were affected that we included in the list. This new list (the one I shared with him) includes many people who were not part of the first assessment. The chairman might have included these extra people from the village in the list.

The involvement of the chairman village council in the assessment changed the outcome. The VC chairman and district council member were involved in finalizing the assessment, manipulated to serve their interests by both the elected members.

Many people in the village were left out though their houses were partially affected. In the game of elected members and district administration, affected residents suffered because of running after the compensation money that was not meant to be distributed. One of the residents

told me his story of how things happened to him. Arif, a vegetable vendor in the *bazaar* in the mid-40s, complained about the assessment. He narrated:

Money was given to our neighbor, and his house was not damaged. On the other hand, my house was partially destroyed as one of the rooms was razed to the ground, but I could not get compensation money. I was not applying for the compensation, but my mother wanted me to go to Booni and submit the application as she knew about the neighbors who received compensation money. There were thousands of applicants in the queue. After many hours of waiting, I realized that I needed to write an application on a surety bond and a picture of the damaged house to show. On the second day I reached the said office before sunrise. Around fifteen applicants were already there. After three hours, the office employees came and started taking applications after taking tea in the office. They took my application and asked me to wait for their call to receive the cheque, but in vain. There has been no cheque to date.

Thousands of applicants suffered such hardships. People from remote areas managed to reach upper and lower Chitral headquarters and kept waiting for days as thousands of applicants had queued up.

8.5. Kalash Valley and Reshum; a Comparison of Political Structure and its Influence on Post-Earthquake Situation

As discussed in previous headings and chapters in detail, the political and power structure of Reshum and the Kalash valley is different. In Reshum, there are around five lordly clans and lineages. *Khushahmate* lineage, one of these lordly families, won recent local body elections, and both village council chairman and district council member are from this lineage. On the other hand, in the Kalash valley, one lordly clan, *Zondra*, is living, but the village council chairman is from a Kalash family converted to Islam. These political combinations and compositions played

a vital role in the post-2015 earthquake relief and reconstruction phase, especially in the post-assessment situation.

In Reshum, the local *Patwari*, who conducted the assessment for earthquake-affected households, is from *Khushahmate* lineage. Being from the same family background and other overlapping interests, both chairman and member of the district council manipulated the assessment. The village council defended district administration first by not initiating or leading any protest in the village and in upper Chitral headquarters. Similarly, member of the district council saved the district administration during protests near Reshum village by defusing a gathering and in a meeting in upper Chitral when DC was meeting with the leaders of civil society organization for the rights of upper Chitral ("Quake Hit People of Upper Chitral...", 2016).

In the Kalash valley, the *Patwari* who conducted the assessment of the earthquake was from the *Zondra* clan. He did not allow the village council chairman to include names in the list. He considered himself "state" or "real representative of state". One reason for this non-cooperation between district administration representatives, *Patwari*, and local elected members was the power politics of the village. Earthquake assessment provided the opportunity for the *Patwari* to reassure his clan status and serve his political, social, and economic interests.

As a result, many village councilors, including the chairman of the village council in the Kalash valley, led the protesters of the valley and gave a tough time to the district administration. It is crucial to mention that the internal political structure of the communities can change the post-disaster relief and reconstruction activities. In both the villages, many non-deserving families got the relief money, and still, many were deprived of their due right in the assessment.

Still, the effects of the reconstruction and relief process differed because of the difference in the locales' pre-disaster political and power structures. It signified how the power structure permeate into post-disaster relief and reconstruction processes and change the outcome.

The episode of inaccurate assessment provides a perfect example of the inability of the state functionary and their inherent weakness in handling the emergency and disaster situations. There is no speedy and systematic mechanism to reach the people in such mountainous places nor any other means to help people affected by large-scale disasters or create mitigation and resilience by implementing adequate measures. The state waits for disasters to happen and after that, blames the situation like in the case of Chitral, a remotely and sparsely populated region that is hard to cover. In chapter 6th the inability of the state to handle the situation at times of disaster is discussed in detail. The order was passed on by the head of the then government in the 2015 earthquake to conduct a quick assessment in three days and somehow they did it.

In most cases, "disasters often trip away layers of semantic, symbolic, and process cover to provide clear insight into the nature, priorities, and capabilities of authorities, governments, and entire regimes. They are deeply, deeply political" (Olson, 2000. p. 283). After the earthquake and flash floods in the locales, the situation proved the priorities and capabilities of the concerned authorities and their interplay with the local political structures. There is no policy of fair play and appeasement for the deserving. In an act of narrow-mindedness, those who are given a responsibility to follow a balanced manifesto, instead fall to avarice.

8.6. Conclusion

Assessments and the preparation of lists are common practices in post-disaster situations in areas hit by disaster. These lists are powerful entities that include some and exclude others

from receiving relief packages (Sokefeld, 2020). Some possibilities have revealed injustices in relief to the individuals and groups positioned differently (Chhotray, 2014). Such unequal distribution pulls together the collective anger of the common man to pressurize the state apparatus through protests and media, which aim at getting their rights are considered political actions for recognition and justice (Pantti & Wahl-Jorgenson, 2011; Siddiqi, 2018).

On October 26th, 2015 a 7.5 Richter scale earthquake jolted northern parts of Pakistan. It affected many parts of the Chitral district as the epicenter was the western Hindu Kush ranges around fifty Kilometers from Chitral town. This penetrating earthquake very strong and it hit the population of Chitral, which was struck by the flash flood too. The prime minister of Pakistan issued special instructions to conduct a survey in the district within three days and distribute relief money, which many considered a political move to influence the masses. The district administration could not conduct a transparent survey on such short notice based on merit. The district administration staff at the lower level, *patwaris*, conducted the assessment and, as was expected, violated merit. People from many parts of the district started complaining about the merit violation in the earthquake-affected population's assessment. In many cases, both district government and village council members led the processions and the protesters.

District administration and protesters started using their stances and powers to pressure each other. District administration, representing the state in the district and responsible for the people, faced a tough situation when the government announced a re-assessment as thousands of applicants reached the district administration offices. The Deputy Commissioner used different tactics to control and pacify the protesters.

The affairs of Kalash valley and Reshum were handled differently by the Deputy Commissioner and district administration, especially the *Patwari*. In Reshum, the village council chairman surveyed the earthquake damages with the local *Patwari*. The opposite happened in the case of the Kalash valley. The difference in bargaining between the two village councils was because of the different positions for negotiation. In Reshum, village council head and the *patwari* are from the same *Khushahmate* lineage, a lordly family, which gave them a favorable opportunity to exchange favors. While in the Kalash valley the superior clan, *Zondra patwari* did not want to share the authority of assessment. The importance of such variables in reconstruction and relief projects endorses the profound role of politics in a post-disaster situation.

9. CONCLUSION

The purpose of the current study was to understand the relationship between politics/power structure and natural disasters in two valleys namely Reshum and the Kalash in Chitral. Chitral is a remote mountainous region situated in northern Pakistan. Historically, Chitral remained a princely state ruled by three prominent dynasties Kalash, *Rais* and *Kator* in different periods of time. Kalash ruled the lower Chitral region while the *Rais* and then *Kator* ruled the entire current Chitral region.

The dynastic rule during all the three dynasties resulted in a sharp hierarchy dividing people into three visible status groups, translating their political, economic, and social conditions. During the Kator era, the last dynasty, people were divided into three broad categories: the ruling elite [*adamzade & arbabzade*], middle status groups [*Yuft*], and lower status groups [*ghalmoos, sheermoosh* etc.]. Every invasion during princely state led to re-allocations of land rendering the lower-status groups landless. These landless/ lower-status groups in both the locales are living on marginal locations mostly on mountainous slopes and near the streams prone to hazards such as flash floods, earthquake and land sliding. Due to climate change, the frequency and intensity of the flash floods increased the vulnerability of the lower-status groups more than high-status groups.

The political and social structure changed gradually after the influence of the British on the region and subsequent events like the creation of Pakistan and the merger of the Chitral state in Pakistan. After the merger of the princely state into Pakistan in 1969, the introduction of the bureaucratic institution in the shape of district administration and other state departments and the

democratic structure transformed the power structure of the district. Tenancy act safeguard the rights of tenants while land reforms in 1970s gave ownership rights to the lower-status groups in the district, which proved a move of liberation from the clutches of high-status groups. Similarly, the local government structure provided opportunities for lower-status groups to participate in the political processes and elect their members and raise their issues on various forums. Religious groups also consolidated their position through elections. All these changes in Chitral affected the old power structure significantly. However the high-status groups due their big land holdings, other economic resources and their prominent role and position in the political structure are still possess dominant position in the new power structure.

The old power structure was greatly affected by the introduction of the bureaucratic structure in the district. This structure, headed by Deputy Commissioner (DC), links all state departments locally termed as line departments such as District Health Department, District Police, District Education, Communication and Works Department, *tehseeldar* (Sub-District Revenue Officers), *patwari* (village level land officials who keeps public land record and works a representative/focal person of the district administration in general administration and disasters). This change led to the emergence of new actors who play vital roles in politics of disasters.

In this study, I have tried to understand the determinants and sources of power in situation of disasters and the implications of its use in pre and post-disaster situations. I also have tried to understand how disasters create and/or increasing power of different people/actors and institutions which are brought into play during political processes. The research techniques used for data collection were participant observation, key informants, informal discussions, case

studies, and (semi)structured interviews on the basis of purposive sampling with all possible stakeholders. Total number of respondents was eighty six.

The dissertation broadly is divided into two parts. The first part of the study (chapter four and five) focuses on the relationship between historical socio-political structure and its relation to vulnerability to natural disasters. The second part of the study (chapter six to eight) discusses the interaction of different stakeholders related to existing power structure and disasters in the research locales. In disasters, the interaction of various stakeholders (state institutions and individuals working in these institutions, NGOs, and people of the affected areas) increases as well as their powers and its exercise. Such powers create opportunities and challenges for state institutions, government officials, and the state. Similarly, disasters increase NGOs' activities to provide relief and "reconstruct" disaster-hit populations especially in the remote areas in Global South.

Affected communities are directly connected with state and non-state institutions in post-disaster activities. The nature and frequency of these interactions are constantly accelerated by disasters. Disasters, on the one hand, destroys the livelihood of communities while on the other hand increases their capacity and power to negotiate with the state and manipulate their citizenship. In such circumstances, negotiation of the local population with state institutions and NGOs provides a different level of power manipulation. It is essential to understand the nature of the power structure of communities, which ultimately affects the power of negotiation of the communities with the formal institutions that deal with disasters directly or/and indirectly.

Reshum, one of the locales, is situated in the upper Chitral. This village is considered the gateway to upper Chitral. Four high-status lineages namely Katore, *Khushahmate*, *khushwaqte*,

and *Riza* while one high status clan reside in the village. Other is below them as per status, while there are still the lowest status groups living in the village.

Land ownership remained symbolically fundamental for high-status groups in the princely state and continues to be the same in the village today. They have more land than lower-status families. High-status families have fertile land, while low-status families have marginal lands usually not very productive. Most of the lands possessed by the low-status families in the princely state were allotted to them in recognition of their services to high-status families. These services included growing and harvest crops and rearing newborn children, a customary practice in the state, doing other domestic chores too. Most of the lower-status families live in three hamlets known as Batikandeh, Panandeh, and Golguch. These hamlets are situated on slopes and bank a stream that swells during the floods and overflows its banks, causing widespread damage in the nearby settlements. This area is more prone to disasters, and the vulnerability of the people is higher to flash floods. Available data in the last two floods, 2013 and 2015, shows that mainly households of the three hamlets are affected. Their land, crops, fruit trees, houses, roads, and other valuable resources damaged more than high-status groups in the village. The difference between the effect of hazards on high-status and low-status groups is mainly because of the differential access to power in the local power structure. It reflects the effect of power structure on the vulnerability to natural hazards and disasters in the village.

The Kalash valley, situated in lower Chitral, the southern part of the district, is politically different from Reshum. The Kalash valley remained the capital of the last Kalash ruler, who ruled most of the lower Chitral. Families of the high-status clan, *Zondra*, reside in the valley. Kalash possess the largest landholding in the valley, while *Zondra* clan are the second biggest landowners but are higher than Kalash in the status scheme that prevailed in the Kator dynasty.

Three groups of people living near the stream in the valley, and all of them are lower in status. One of them is Kalash converted people. A strict hierarchy also prevailed within the old Kalash population, where four different groups were traced. The lowest of them used to work for the high-status Kalash and lived near the stream as they were considered impure and were not allowed to reside in the upper parts of the valley. Most of them converted with the advent of Islam in the 19th century to avoid ill fate being lower class Kalash. Another group in the valley residing near the stream in vulnerable locations is *arakash*. They are artisans and used to work for local rulers in Chitral related to woodcraft. It is unclear whether this group is similar to the one that converted from Kalash. Nevertheless, they were undoubtedly artisans and provided services to high-status people. The third group comprises of migrants from different parts of the district.

Families from the above three groups were affected by the 2010, 2013, and 2015 flash floods. Because of limited choice to relocate, they are most vulnerable to natural hazards in the valley compared to other groups like *Zondra* and Kalash. Kalash community people have traditional living patterns and techniques that have evolved since they were rulers. The techniques that they have evolved includes the selection of places for house construction guided by traditional rules, following strict building codes, avoiding the stream's vicinity to build houses and consider it impure, etc. Thus in the Kalash valley, the most vulnerable groups remained politically less important in the past.

The response of states and their institutions during disasters and emergencies is considered one of states' primary responsibilities in modern political systems. District administration used to take care of the emergency situations since long. Pakistan formed a specialized authority to handle disaster situations, namely National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), in 2010.

NDMA, because of technical and financial limitations is not very effective and same bureaucratic institutions of district administration handle disasters in their own way. They lack the technical capacity in dealing with natural disasters. They are reactive in their operations than proactive to build resilience of the vulnerable communities. However, they recently started conducting training sessions to mitigate communities from devastation of natural disasters. Chitral District Disaster Management Unit (DDMU), a district-level unit of NDMA, lacks the ability and know-how to handle disaster situations. The District administration tries to save the state's image with the minimum efforts it can make in its capacity. Different leaders from political and military elites also tried to improve their image through post-disaster visits and making promises to the affected people.

The post-disaster situation is also heavily influenced by the political structure of communities (Olson, 2000; Sokefeld, 2012). The political network of communities and state institutions directly affect each other after disasters. Such relationships are also agreed upon between local power structures and NGOs working on relief and reconstruction after disasters. The interaction of state institutions and NGOs varies in each case. It is again dependent upon the political composition of the communities. In two locales, the negotiation and interaction of state institutions remained different because of the inherent nature of local power configuration.

In the Kalash valley, state institutions somehow kept the local political figures to participate in state-driven relief activities. Even in the reconstruction phase, the role of the local political leaders was minimized. However, local leaders tried to increase their share in the reconstruction process through public protests and media campaigns in the reconstruction phase. Local political leaders from the Kalash valley considered NGOs a last resort to bring relief and reconstruction projects to the valley and work for their voters. After the flash floods of 2015,

followed by an earthquake the same year, local political leadership was entirely ignored by the district administration due to the weak position of local leaders in negotiation for their people and lack of participation in the mainstream political structure of the district. This is again somehow rooted into the historical power structure of the princely state as village council members were not from lordly families. As a result, local leadership started organized protests to pressurize state institutions which somehow let local political leadership be adjusted by district administration through providing funds in the reconstruction process. During the reconstruction phase, NGOs and local power holders used their links within the community to complete the projects successfully. It was again based on give and take between NGOs management and local political leaders.

Two aspects are worth mentioning here that changed after the floods in the two locales of the study. In Reshum, the rivalry between the two groups, the lordly families and the low-status groups intensified. Low-status groups consider lordly families responsible for the destruction of flash floods. Similarly, they also blame lordly families for receiving more in the post-disaster reconstruction process. this situation also created leadership in the low-status group who talk openly against the high-status group. Secondly, the interaction between state institutions and the local community increased. As mentioned in the previous chapters in detail, Chitral is a relatively remote and less developed district. People of the district and the selected locales are now actively participating in different processions and sit-ins to demand their rights like roads, electricity, health facilities, etc.

Struggle between various leaders within the valley also increased during the reconstruction phase in NGOs and state-driven projects. Local leaders wanted to bring more and more reconstruction projects and funds to increase their influence in the community or to decrease the influence of the political rivals. Similarly, opponent political groups wanted to halt such projects initiated by their rival political leaders to limit their influence. The reconstruction of *Bashali* by an NGO, water channel, protection wall by the district administration in collaboration with SRSP in the Kalash valley, and opposition between different rival political leaders are examples of the struggle between rival groups. Similarly, the NGOs and people working for NGOs also try to increase their influence through reconstruction and development projects. They also used different alliances and networks within the local community for smooth completion of reconstruction projects. Sometimes the workers of NGOs also became a party and faced opposition within the local group.

In the case of Reshum, it appeared inevitable for the district administration to involve elected local government members in the reconstruction process to avoid inconvenience for the district administration. Being situated on the main road to upper Chitral, a strategically important village, the district administration ensured to keep the situation normal and avoid protests from the community. When protests started to pressurize district administration and the government to restore the Reshum powerhouse, the district administration made a deal with village councilors for compensation to keep the protesters from blocking the roads. It was on the directives of member of district government of the village and the chairman of village council, both from the same lordly family, to construct protection walls from the funds at the disposal of the district administration head that added to the political influence of affluent leaders. Local government leaders were better positioned to bargain with the district administration because of their pivotal

role in mainstream politics and the village's strategic position. Because of these realities, the total share of funds from district administration for reconstruction projects for Reshum was double compared to Kalash valley.

In Reshum, there are two groups one from lordly family and the other from low-status groups. Elected council of the village at the time of 2015 floods was mostly comprised of lordly family members. Lower status group used various tactics to decrease the influence of elected council on reconstruction projects while elected council benefitted mostly their own voters.

Lower-status groups used the grazing issue in the pasture to target lordly families. Most of the high-status families keep professional grazers to graze their sheep and goats which is a bone of contention. Banning the grazing is directly targeting lordly families and a few other groups. Most of the lower status group members are of the view that professional shepherd bring thousands of goats from other areas to graze on the pastures behind Reshum stream. NGOs, that are working on disaster mitigation of the informed local communities that overgrazing is one of the main causes of flash floods. After the 2013 flood, the issue of using the fields and pastures for grazing gained momentum from both sides, and rivalries increased, pushed further by 2015 flash flood in the village. Leaders of lower-status groups, mainly affected by floods in the village, used the grazing issue to target lordly families. Reconstruction of water pipelines after 2013 and 2015 floods was affected by the rivalry between upper status and lower status groups. Lower status group, led by a famous leader who is known as liberator of poor people in the village, wanted to benefit their own supporters through reconstruction of pipeline after 2013 flood. Lordly families tried to benefit their own people by getting maximum share in the project. The concerned authorities cancelled the project and diverted the funds to another area because of

this rivalry. This rivalry affected the water pipeline again after 2015 flash flood. Similarly, the 2015 local body election was also affected by the grazing issue.

The post-earthquake situation in the district also created a struggle between district administration and the local population. To obey the orders of the Prime Minister to distribute compensation money within three days, the district administration prepared lists of the “affected” population of the earthquake which were incorrect because of nepotism and favoritism. This created chaos in the district. The local population started protests to pressurize the district administration and government for conducting the survey again to prepare fair lists. In response, the DC used its powers and different tactics to settle the situation.

In both the locales, due to different power structure, the outcome of the post-earthquake compensation process and situation was also different. In the Kalash valley, it ended up with protests against the patwari, district administration personnel who conducted the survey for compensation, because the said patwari did not consult the village council while in Reshum there was no protest because the village council chairman included his men in the list.

In the current study, I have observed that the lower-status groups who have been marginalized in the princely state of Chitral and living in vulnerable locations are the most affected by the flash floods since 2010. It means that climate change is affecting them more than high-status groups. They were the most affected people in the reconstruction process.

I also have noticed that political actors during the politics of disasters manipulate processes, procedures, and situations for their and their supporters', families', and voters' benefits. Politics of disaster also provide opportunities to new actors, even from marginalized groups. People try to pressure state bodies and government through protests and media

campaigns; they get some resources, but still, at the district level, they neither can provide nor they have the capacity to fulfill the demands of the affected people.

Local administration lacks the resources, capacity, and will to mitigate disasters and provide relief to the people. Though there is a national-level organization, NDMA, they have appointed AC as DDMO, who already had this role in responding to disasters before the formation of NDMA. Similarly, NDMA does not provide enough resources to respond effectively to disasters.

In light of the current study's findings, we need to understand the politics of disasters in different locales. My study was conducted only in two villages, but these findings can guide future research to understand the politics of disaster. The existing political actors use different tactics and strategies to manipulate the situations and safeguard their political interests. In this process, the vulnerable groups that do not have proper access to power corridors suffer the most. Since I conducted this in two villages, the pattern I have unearthed can be used to understand the politics of disasters in other locations and its repercussion on vulnerable communities.

As discussed in previous sections, the current study is unique and novel because it tries to see the connection of the politics/power structure of communities, state institutions, and NGOs with natural disasters. There are isolated studies (Alam et al., 2011; Guggenheim, 2014; Sokefeld, 2012, 2020; Marks & Lebel, 2016; Venugopal & Yasir, 2017; Siddiqi, 2018; Islam et al., 2021) conducted on different aspects of this connection in other parts of the world. The current study is unique because it tries to connect various elements of politics and power structures to natural disasters in one setting.

This research can work as a ready reference for policymakers. Policymakers should keep in mind the vulnerability of vulnerable groups, the politics of disasters, manipulations of political actors, as well as lack of capacity of district management and lack of well so that effective disaster management could be ensured and relief could be provided to marginalized and most affected people. The connection between the power structure of communities is directly connected to their vulnerabilities to natural disasters. Most powerful groups in communities are least vulnerable to natural disasters, because their houses and land is situated in much safe areas, and vice versa. For the implementation of effective mitigation programs, it is crucial to consider power composition of the community to protect most vulnerable who are less resourceful. Such groups are not easy to access as they cannot influence the local level decisions in reconstruction and post disaster development process. Secondly, the local political and power structure is also essential to consider in the post-disaster relief and reconstruction process. An inclusive model should be adopted to benefit the most affected segments of communities. It is possible through understanding various groups, upper and lower, within the disaster hit community. Local community should engage to the maximum in reconstruction throughout the process, from initial decision to final execution. In doing so, most powerful and most affected should be identified to balance the access to resources and so that a balanced representation could be ensured.

The study also revealed that despite national-level disaster management bodies in place, their effectiveness can be improved to make them operational. Currently, NDMA has a top bottom approach where the structure at the bottom is almost non-existent. NDMA management should also focus on local-level coordination and facilitation. A well-connected mechanism needs to be established at the village council and union council level for effective operations to tackle disasters and emergencies. Local knowledge and models for mitigation and handling of

post-disaster situations should be given top priority. District administration should prepare a mechanism to identify a vulnerable population at each district and sub-district level. It is also necessary to keep a check on the patwari and the rest of the state officials to maintain transparency in relief and reconstruction processes.

As the current study is limited to two communities in remote rural settings, more studies should be conducted to see the connection between politics and natural disasters for effective mitigation, relief and reconstruction mechanism. I believe such future studies would provide valuable knowledge to understand different dynamics of politics-disasters relations in communities and create harmony and coherence to achieve collective results for the benefit of the suffering masses. The study will help find new and practical avenues for policymakers for effective disaster governance and management.

Climate change-induced hazards and other geological disasters have affected the human population in the Indian subcontinent and, more specifically, Pakistan. To reduce the impact of such hazards and disasters, it is imperative to respond to them with their full potential. The current study has provided evidence not only to understand different factors that are contributing toward the vulnerabilities of the human populations but also provides a sound understanding of the structural flaws that are affecting the proper addressing of the issue and post-disaster process. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a comprehensive solution to cover all areas wherever improvement is possible and which can be helpful to address the most important sectors. The following are a few necessary suggestions, in my view, that can improve disaster management in Pakistan.

Vulnerability assessment: to reduce the worst effects of disasters on the population, it is very important to do a vulnerability assessment. The study suggests that those groups and individuals who are economically and politically weak tend to be more vulnerable. They chose to reside in marginal locations. More recently, because of the unprecedented population explosion, such groups are edging toward vulnerable locations and resorting to living in extremely vulnerable locations. When natural hazards, like floods, hit such human installations, the effects are very severe. Because of their low economic and political emancipation, recovery of such groups is next to impossible and creates a humanitarian crisis. It is, therefore, necessary to do a vulnerability assessment to locate vulnerable locations. The best way is to relocate such a population and prevent further human installations in such vulnerable locations. Government and state machinery should prioritize assessing such groups. There should be clear directives for construction in vulnerable locations. Pakistan's areas and districts are not equally vulnerable to natural hazards. Some areas are more vulnerable to earthquakes and floods than others. Through

vulnerability assessment, such areas and districts should be identified. These areas and districts should be given special attention.

The district-level administration situation could be more satisfactory in effectively responding to disasters and emergencies. This situation needs to be improved to address and respond properly. A bottom-up approach is necessary to respond to disasters effectively. As discussed in detail, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) at the federal level and Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) are working in all the provinces. District level body, DDMU, could be more effective because it has yet to develop a proper response mechanism because of inherent challenges. In NDMA Act, it is mentioned that union council-level and village-level setups should be formed. On the ground, it is non-existent. Participation at all local levels, village and union council levels, should be ensured, keeping the socio-political and socio-economic realities in view. Most vulnerable groups should be given a proper representation. This can ensure the incorporation of indigenous knowledge in policy for effective mitigation and post-disaster management.

Similarly, the improvement of institutions and bodies that are concerned with disasters and hazards is necessary. The current study reveals that disaster management is a burden on the shoulders of district administration, which is a remnant of the colonial mindset. On the ground, *patwari* is the evaluating and implementation officer. This institution is already infamous for corruption and favoritism. To improve the disaster management situation at the district level, it is of utmost necessity that a proper check and balance is incorporated to control ill practices. Similarly, more trained and resourceful officers and employees should be allocated for all the vulnerable districts to handle emergencies properly.

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APPENDIX

Semi-Structure Interview Guide

Power Structure of the Region and the Locales

Historical background of local political structure

What is the distribution pattern of resources in the locale in the past and how it changed?

Caste, ethnic and/or class wise distribution of resources

Who occupy most of the resources? Is it related to power structure of the region and the locales?

Decisions regarding community are collective or imposed?

Level of Political participation of the people/ power distribution among groups and individuals

What is local perception of political power?

Who holds the political offices in the district and in the locales?

Is local power structure related to vulnerability to natural disasters like flash floods?

Vulnerability analysis

How often are you hit by flash floods?

What are welling structures, sites and material ?

How flash flood affected you and your family life?

Do you feel threaten by flood and earthquake in your current location?

Which family do you belong to? Do you think your family or group is more affected by flash floods and earthquakes?

What was the role of your family in princely state of Chitral?

What is your occupation? Is it permanent or temporary?

Did flood affect your profession?

Do you own land? Is it affected by flood?

Do you want to leave this place?

Do you feel enough Education enough about disasters in the region, vulnerability and coping strategies, both technical and traditional?

Political awareness and participation

Who controls major resources here?

What is your opinion States level protection activities for mitigation

Other institutions like local, national and international level NGOs and mitigation of the area

Location of home and work is safe or in hazard prone area?

Reducing vulnerability and destruction

How local people perceive vulnerability?

What are the family and individual survival strategies to reduce vulnerability and the effects of floods?

What is the role of Kinship and family networks to tackle the disaster of flood?

What local NGOs are doing to reduce the vulnerability for floods and other disasters?

What are the different livelihood methods that local and international NGOs are working to enhance mitigation of local population?

Are NGOs working according to international standard to increase resilience and reduce vulnerability?

Stakeholders; Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

How many structures are concerned about the flood in the locale?

Are there any local level organizations about flood and other disasters?

Is there any family level grouping to tackle with floods?

Are there any sect, class or ethnic level organizations to tackle flood and other disasters?

How many NGOs are working on disaster related issues and at what aspect of disaster and hazards?

How many national NGOs are working in area and what are their specializations?

How many state bodies are working directly and indirectly to floods and other disasters?

Is there any specialized government body to deal with disaster?

Who are controlling NGOs in the area?

How NGOs are contacting people in the locales?

Who are the intermediaries between NGOs and local communities for reconstruction and relief?

Does local power structure affect the work of NGOs?

What local people think of NGOs? Do they perceive them as powerful entities? Political power?

What is the experience of locals after working and interacting with NGOs?

What is the impact of access of locals to NGOs resources on power structure? Does local political figures use NGOs for their political image ?

What is the method of intervention of NGOs and state institutions other relief institutions?

What is the level of dependency of NGOs on locals as broker or intermediaries for reconstruction process?

Stakeholders (state driven institutions related to hazards and disasters)

Understanding of projects related to floods in the region.

What state institutions are helping people in disasters?

Is there any specialized body or institution to help people tackle disasters?

What is the mechanism of state institutions to tackle disaster situations?

What are the strengths and weaknesses in state level efforts in flood and earthquake ?

Is the mode of state level efforts regarding disaster management are participatory or top to bottom?

Does the local power structure affect the work of state institutions regarding disaster management?

What is the level of expertise of state institutions to tackle the disaster?

Do disasters affect the intervention level and power of state, its institutions and people working in it, in disasters?

Power Manipulation and Post-Disaster politics

Does local power structure affects post disaster situation?

Who are getting more in the reconstruction phase? Is it related to power structure in the locale?

Are locals manipulative? How they manipulate and negotiate their position after disasters?

How the relief and reconstruction phases affect local political scenario?

What are the new strategies of negotiation and discourses local people learn during this interaction?

How the affected people manipulate their own situation?

How the affected people manipulate and negotiate the distribution of relief?

What disaster mean for local politicians? Is it an opportunity or challenge for them to enhance their power and status?

Does disasters and post disaster reconstruction is an opportunity for local power strugglers?

How much existing social structure and power relations are affected on relief and reconstruction activities?

Are claims of property loss or any other claims are affected by pre disaster power structure or newly established one?

What kind of conflicts, emerged on allocation of funds after disasters in the reconstruction phase?

What is affecting the making of plans and policies for relief and reconstruction?

Whose interests and visions are favored? Clash of vision and disputes.

Issues on the distribution of funds, powers and competencies among and within organizations.

Interview schedule for Assistant Commissioners

What is the role of district administration in the time of disaster or before disaster to reduce the vulnerability of the vulnerable people?

What is the process of district administration and District Disaster Management Unit (DDMU) to help disaster hit population?

Is there specialized force to help people in disasters?

Is there any mechanism with DDMU to train local community about hazards?

Do you feel the district administration and DDMU has the capacity rescue people at the time of disaster in the district?

What are the challenges to DDMU and district administration to handle the situation at the time of disaster in the district?

In case of the destruction of main power generators powerhouses, what are the other options with the district administration and government to provide electricity?

What kind of hurdles district administration face from local community, both affected and non-affected by disasters?

What are different projects of government for disaster hit population?

Interview schedule for District government representatives

What is the role of district government in disaster situation? Are you satisfied from its role?

Is there any fund on disposal of district government to allocate on hazardous areas? Where did you allocate these funds?

What is the process of allocating the funds the district by district government?

Is there any clash between district government, provincial government, national government, and district administration of the allocation of funds? How such clash of interest affect the relief and reconstruction process?

Are DC and AC accountable to district government?

How district government is related to the work of NGOs in the district?

Does district government regulate the activities of NGOs and provide NOCs to them?

Do the members of district government manipulate NGOs to gain political benefits?

Interview schedule for NGOs working on the projects related to disasters in the district

When the NGO did start its operation in the district and the locales?

The capacity of the NGO regarding helping people in the district in disaster situation and performing relief and reconstruction activities.

How many projects the NGO has completed in the district? Any details?

What specific projects the NGO has completed or in progress related to floods and earthquake?

How the NGO reach to local community to launch projects?

Does the political structure of local community influence the prioritization and starting of development and reconstruction projects?

What is the experience of the NGO with district administration and district government?

Does district administration and district government affect the work of the NGO?

Do the district level political/ power structure like influential families, political and religious groups, affect the work of the NGO?

Is the influence of few families in district more on the NGO?

Does the recruiting process of the NGO is influenced by the political structure of the district?

Is it true that powerful political figures and officers use NGOs to gain political benefits?

GLOSSARY

<i>Adamzade</i>	True human being, noblemen, High-Status Lineage in District Chitral
<i>Arakash</i>	Carpenter
<i>Azhelie</i>	Children
<i>Bach</i>	Safe, not vulnerable
<i>Bachkorine Kchangeh</i>	Protection wall
<i>Baghani</i>	Washed away
<i>Bari</i>	Lowest Status Group in Kalash
<i>Bazaar</i>	Market
<i>Birmogh</i>	Walnut
<i>Bishali</i>	An exclusive place for women staying at times of menstruation cycles and pregnancy
<i>Bohat</i>	Rock
<i>Bohtuwaro</i>	Frightened
<i>Bolmuzeh</i>	Earthquake
<i>Buhtuyek</i>	Fear, not confident
<i>Chanda</i>	Donation
<i>Change wada</i>	Empty promises
<i>Charogoch</i>	Mountain base, a safe place where people gather at the time of flood
<i>Charwaha</i>	Professional herders
<i>Chatir</i>	Tent
<i>Cheq</i>	Child, young boy
<i>Cherga</i>	Shouting
<i>Chilam Joshi</i>	Spring festival of the Kalash community
<i>Choni</i>	Less Fertile Land
<i>Chute</i>	Dirt
<i>Darali Zamin</i>	Piece of land given by high status people to families as reward to raise their kids
<i>Dawordik</i>	Competition, struggle
<i>Deh</i>	Hamlet, Village
<i>Deodar</i>	Cedrus Deodara, the most durable variety of pine trees
<i>Droch</i>	Grapes
<i>Dur</i>	House
<i>Faida</i>	Advantage
<i>Ghalamus</i>	Serf
<i>Ghalamusandeh</i>	Hamlet of Serfs
<i>Gol</i>	Stream
<i>Gom</i>	Wheat

<i>Gujjar</i>	A caste or tribe but in Reshum village it used for the person who is a professional shepherd
<i>Gurdughan</i>	Donkeys
<i>Hakim</i>	An Administrative Post in Princely State of Chitral
<i>Houn</i>	Flood
<i>Imam</i>	The person who leads prayers in the mosque
<i>Jangali</i>	Wild
<i>Janjal</i>	Fight or Issue
<i>Jumat khana</i>	Mosque of Ismaili sect Muslims where both male and female gathers for prayers
<i>Juwari</i>	Maize
<i>Kafir</i>	Infidel
<i>Kalashadur</i>	Home of Kalash, a museum constructed by a Greek philanthropist for Kalash.
<i>Kalik</i>	Crying
<i>Kan Chot</i>	Tree Trunk
<i>Kator</i>	Ruling Family of Princely State of Chitral
<i>Khana Zad Gulu</i>	Land provided for cultivation by Adamzade as a reward for domestic chores for the landlord
<i>Khandan</i>	Family
<i>Khatum</i>	Annihilate, Destroy
<i>Kholaw zagh</i>	Open sky, without any roof or house
<i>Khorah</i>	Water mills
<i>Khot</i>	Cloudy
<i>Khowar Terms</i>	Meaning
<i>Korum</i>	Manual labor
<i>Lal</i>	Lord, Literal meaning is elder, but in Chitral, this title is used for families with royal blood or with high status
<i>Lashoocow</i>	
<i>Last Chatur</i>	Fertile Land
<i>Lot</i>	Big, name of the glacier and tributary in south-west of the Kalash valley
<i>Lothoro</i>	Leaders, elders
<i>Mal Rochini</i>	Pasture
<i>Mal</i>	Cattle
<i>Mal</i>	Livestock
<i>Manshoor</i>	Publicity, fame
<i>Mawla</i>	Spiritual leader, Master
<i>Mehter</i>	Ruler of Chitral Princely State
<i>Metajao</i>	Kator family male members whose mothers are not from the royal family
<i>Mewah darh kan</i>	Fruit trees

<i>Mozmes</i>	August
<i>Nazim</i>	Head of the Local Body Elected Council
<i>Neyamat</i>	Standing crops
<i>Ochi</i>	Vegetation
<i>Onjeshta</i>	Pure
<i>Paizal</i>	Shepard
<i>Pandir</i>	Traditional cheese, when professional grazers takes hundreds of goats to pastures, the best use of its milk in remote pastures is to turn milk into cheese by traditional methods. This cheese is preserved in tin cans for months by burying it into muddy grounds. Its smells very strong and not easy for everyone to eat
<i>Paseti qam</i>	Lower castes
<i>Patwari</i>	A government officer who keeps records regarding the ownership of land
<i>Payee</i>	Goats
<i>Perashani</i>	Embarrassment
<i>Peshearuk</i>	flour
<i>Pinimor</i>	July
<i>Pragata</i>	Impure
<i>Push chasha</i>	A kind of Tax Imposed by Ruler of Chitral Princely State
<i>Qahra asoni</i>	Protests, fight
<i>Qayamat</i>	Doomsday, an unbearable bad day
<i>Qayii bohate</i>	Heavy rocks
<i>Ramadan</i>	Islamic month of fasting
<i>Roye</i>	People
<i>Safan rochek</i>	Overgrazing
<i>Saht</i>	Hard
<i>Searan</i>	Bridges
<i>Sehri</i>	Early morning breakfast of Muslims before sun rising for fasting.
<i>Shahbaloot</i>	Holm Oak tree
<i>Shahtoot</i>	Mulberry
<i>Sharab</i>	Alcohol
<i>Sharif</i>	Noble
<i>Sheikh</i>	Recently converted to Islam from other religion
<i>Shirin</i>	Sweet
<i>Shirmuzh Galu</i>	Piece of land given by high status people to families as reward to raise their kids
<i>Shugur</i>	Sand
<i>Siah Posh Kafirs</i>	Wearers of Black Robe (a group of Kalash people)
<i>Subedar</i>	A senior non-commissioned rank in Pakistan Army

<i>Tableegh</i>	A religious movement where Muslims worldwide travel in groups for preaching Islam to Muslims and non-Muslims considering it a sacred duty
<i>Tazhibi Hafta</i>	Sophisticated
<i>Tehsildar</i>	Head of land revenue office at sub-district level
<i>Thuwek</i>	Gun
<i>Tip-hun</i>	Severe flood
<i>Wedachu</i>	Rude, ugly, inappropriate
<i>Washili korik</i>	Pollarding, cutting of tree branches to use it for different purposes mainly for fire
<i>Zahank Zom</i>	Steep Mountain
<i>Zemean</i>	Land
<i>Zenore</i>	Name of the glacier near the Kalash Valley
<i>Zom</i>	Mountain
<i>Zoyee</i>	Irrigation channel
<i>Zoyo ough</i>	Water full of dirt