# The State of Kalabagh: It's History, Authority and

# **Social Political Setup**



By

## Muhammad Bilal Qureshi

Taxila Institute of Asian Civilization Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad

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I hereby declare that this dissertation is the product of my individual research, and it has not been submitted presently to any other university for any other degree.

(Muhammad Bilal Qureshi)

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I hereby recommend that the dissertation prepared under my supervision by Muhammad Bilal Qureshi titled "The State of Kalabagh: It's History, Authority and Social Political Setup", be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy.

Dr. Sadeed Arif

Supervisor

Taxila Institute of Asian Studies Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

#### CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation submitted by Muhammad Bilal Qureshi, is of sufficient standard to justify its acceptance by the Taxila Institute of Asian Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, for the award of Degree of Master of Philosophy.

Dr. Sadeed Arif

Supervisor

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#### Muhammad Bilal Qureshi

To,

# The Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)

Who is the best of all man-kind

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
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#### PAKISTAN



## THE PUNJAB PROVINCE



**DISTRICT MIANWALI** 

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#### Abstract:

The thesis draws upon an analysis of colonial records pertaining to the Jagir of Kalabagh. Kalabagh is located on the banks of the Indus River. It had a history of being ruled by the Nawabs for more than 900 years. Their history is started from Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni's reign. Throughout the British colonial era, Kalabagh stayed not granted the status of a princely state. Instead, it remained a *jagir* or land grant that had been under the rule of the Nawabs since 1100 AD. The control of Kalabagh was established by ancestors of the Nawabs who belonged to the Awan community with Arab origins. The Nawab took great pride in his Awan heritage and asserted that his lineage traced back to a figure named Qutb Shah. Qutb Shah had been an officer in Mahmud of Ghazni's army and the ruler of Herat. Mahmud of Ghazni himself was a successor of the Hashemite lineage. That lineage was connected to the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) through Hazrat Ali (R.A) other than Hazrat Fatima (R.A). This historical connection was important to the Nawab of Kalabagh. These records include reports on income collection from the Jagir, correspondences from commissioners and superintendents, and World War I service records from the Mianwali District. Kalabagh's history is closely tied to British colonial rule and its patronage system. This town was strategically located on a trade route between Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, making it a significant hub for caravans and armies traveling to India in the past. The area had fame and existence mainly due to its salt quarries, alum works and rock oil. All have been essential mineral resources of this area for many centuries. Banday Ali, the grandson of Shaikh Adu and a descendant of Qutab Shah Awan, became the chief of Kalabagh by taking control of the salt mines. He established his authority by controlling the ferry, imposing duties on salt from rock and alum, and collecting honor from the Khatak Bhangi Khel community in the nearby mountains. The area has been a blend of peculiar social, political and historical importance since the ages and it must be preserved for future prospects.

## Chapter I Introduction

Kalabagh is a town in Pakistan's Punjab province. The location of the Indus River in Mianwali District of Punjab is on the western bank<sup>1</sup>. It held the status of a principality ruled by the Nawabs for an impressive span of almost 900 years, dating back to the era of the Ghazni Sultan Mahmud. Throughout the British colonial period, Kalabagh didn't receives the designation of a princely state, unlike many other territories. Instead, it retained the designation of a "jagir," a landholding, and remained under the governance of the Nawabs. This arrangement had been in place since the year 1100<sup>2</sup>. Notably, a considerable number of the states established during the British colonial period were essentially fabrications devised by the British authorities. In contrast, the history of Kalabagh is stretched back to long before this period.

The lineage that ruled over Kalabagh traced its origins to the Awan tribe, with its ancestors having Arab roots. The Awan tribe's forebears migrated from the vicinity of Ghazni in present-day Afghanistan to India. The founder of the dynasty, named Qutab Shah, was an integral figure in this narrative. Historical accounts suggest that Qutab Shah hailed from Ghazni and arrived in India alongside Sultan Mahmud. Mahmud, renowned for his conquests in the early eleventh century across regions that now encompass parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Northern India, was assisted by Qutab Shah and his six sons. These progenies were credited with playing a pivotal role in Mahmud's endeavors.

Qutab Shah and his sons purportedly received recognition and accolades for their bravery and contributions during Mahmud's conquests. As a token of appreciation, Mahmud bestowed upon them the title of "Awan," signifying "helper." This gesture is seen as an indication of their honorable status within Mahmud's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Census Commissioner, Census of India (India: Commissionerate of India, V-14-1914) 498.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Indu Banga Agrarian System of the Sikhs

Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century (California: The University of California, 1978) 260.

entourage. Over time, according to tribal traditions, Qutab Shah's descendants established their presence primarily in the Salt Range region, which holds geographical significance in the area.

Sir Lepel Henry Griffin, an authority on the region's history, emphasized the Awan tribe's significance and history. He highlighted that the Awan tribe's various branches concurred in their assertion that their origins could be traced back to the vicinity of Ghazni, with their genealogical line extending to Hazrat Ali, one of the Prophet Muhammad's sons-in-law. Griffin noted that the Awans had a significant political influence primarily in the Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Shahpur districts. Notably, in the Shahpur District, they held dominion over the mountainous terrain from northwest, including Naoshera, Sukesar, and Jalar<sup>3</sup>.

In essence, the history of Kalabagh and the Nawabs who ruled it is deeply intertwined with the Awan tribe's heritage, their ancestral connection to Ghazni, and their distinguished role in assisting Mahmud of Ghazni during his campaigns. The bestowed title of "Awan" reflects the tribe's valor and contributions, making them a significant and respected presence in the historical and geographical landscape of the region.

After the British took control of Punjab, they set up a system of government that relied on the support of the powerful landowners in the province. Both sides benefited from this arrangement<sup>4</sup>. The British used the landowners to maintain order and make money, while the landowners received support from the government. Even though many years have passed, the politics in Pakistani Punjab are still controlled by these landowner politicians. This is true even though the society has changed a lot. This study tries to understand why this is the case. It looks at history and argues that the way the British and the landowners worked together created a system that made the landowners more powerful over time. This power continued even after Pakistan became independent. The landowners were also able to keep their close relationship with the British government and later with the Pakistani military<sup>5</sup>. This helped them keep pursuing their interests. The study looks at how the rich people who owned land in rural areas during colonial times in Punjab controlled things

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Vidya Prakash Tyagi, Martial races of undivided India (Kalpaz Publications: New Delhi, 2009) 197.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> John McCormick, British Politics and the Environment (London: Taylor & Francis, 2013) 80

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Lepel Henry Griffin, London: Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Barrier Between Our Growing Empire (London: Asian Educational Services, 2004) 221.

like farmland, lending money in informal ways, and the availability of workers<sup>6</sup>. These wealthy landowners worked together with government officials to create connections between local traditions and the ideas of the ruling empire. This allowed them to control and use their power and money for their own benefit. As a result, most of the money and profits flowed towards these rich landowners and the government, which made it hard for regular people to improve their social status and make the economy better.

To understand how things developed over time, this research focuses on a specific place called Kalabagh, a small town in the northwestern part of Pakistani Punjab. It shows how the policies of the colonial rulers affected this town differently than other parts of Punjab. Instead of helping the area develop, the colonial government kept the traditional social structure where rich landowners had a lot of power. The leader of the town, called Rais, worked with the colonial rulers. He controlled the system of lending money on his land and kept workers in a situation where they owed him money and could not leave. This made them almost like servants. This system continued even in the 1900s<sup>7</sup>.

This situation had two main effects. First, it made the difference between rich and poor people even bigger and took away opportunities from the rural workers<sup>8</sup>. Second, this difference in social status helped bring the community together to fight for their rights and their country's freedom from colonial rule.at the start of British rule in Punjab as a really important time. It tries to figure out why the British worked with the powerful landowners and how that affected how things went in the future. The research also looks into how this continued for a long time, focusing on how laws, government power, and elections were used to keep this system going. Lastly, the research checks out times when this way of doing things was challenged, even though these challenges did not succeed. The goal is to learn when and why these challenges happened and what we can learn from them about making the government in Punjab more democratic and involving for the people<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Muhammad Nazim, The Life and Times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 288.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Patricia Kennedy, The Making of the United Kingdom (Oxford: Pearson Education, 1994) 56.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Alexander Keese, Ethnicity and the Colonial State (Leiden: Brill, 2016) 23-31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Stephen M. Lyon, Political Kinship in Pakistan: Descent, Marriage (London: Lexington Books, 2019) 23-33.

#### **Review of Literature**

The extant literature that is pertinent to comprehending the determination of landed authority in Punjab province will be briefly summarised in this section. Since a large portion of this literature frequently draws arbitrary distinctions between the post-colonial and eras colonial, it frequently overstates the degree to which political procedures in the province are characterised by past disjuncture. This review will begin by presenting pertinent material from the settler era earlier going on to the post-colonial era in keeping with the temporal boundaries that are characteristic of the literature. In each instance, additional literary divides along analytical and thematic lines will also be noted and analysed appropriately.

Different topics and analytical categories can be used to categorise the works on settler rule in Punjab. These include the official and unofficial work of colonial administrators, historians' descriptions of Brits administration in Punjab province, and more newly, critical analyses of the consequences of settler rule in the region.

The initial group, which includes the writings of settler administrators themselves, offers valuable current perspectives on British control in the region. The settler government in Punjab province prepared three volumes of district gazetteers, although there are also a number of unofficial works like Ibbetson's Punjab<sup>10</sup>. Castes, Cust's Manual for the Guidance of Revenue Officers (1868) and Tupper's volumes (1901) on Punjab Customary Law (1880), both of which offer views into the inner workings of the colonial official's thinking as well as the settler perspective on Punjab and Punjabi society.

Trevaskis (1928), Darling (1928), and Thorn Burn (1983 [1886]) provide firsthand accounts of the situations surrounding several of the colonial government's results with regard to the Punjabi wealthy elite and the defense of their shared interests. All three authors wrote in their private capacities<sup>11</sup>. The authorized reports,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Arthur F. Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet SAW (Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1998) 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Horace Arthur Rose, Denzil Ibbetson, A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab (Delhi: Nirmal Publishers, 1978) 52.

letters, and other records that relate to settler governance and taxation are excellent additions to these stories, even though they all frequently show a blatant bias in the colonial government's favour.

In addition to the aforementioned contemporary descriptions of the settler administration in Punjab, historiographers have attempted to offer analyses of the mechanisms that supported the upsurge of settler power in the region. The British Utilitarians and India by Eric Stokes (1959) is an attempt to comprehend why the recognized instruments of settler control took the system they did gives a brilliant analysis of the various arguments and ideas that shaped the fiscal and governmental policies during the first period of British settler rule in India<sup>12</sup>. This issue is expanded upon by Metcalf (1962; 1964), van den Dungen (1972), Penner (1986), and Lee (2002), who all look at in what way the arguments emphasized by Stokes influenced the organizational procedures and viewpoints of the Government of Punjab in its early years.

Though, these studies leave a lot of questions unresolved on how these official changes affected Punjabi society because they concentrate almost entirely on official discussions and the creation of the proper machineries of settler rule. Bayly (1973), Metcalf (1979), and Washbrook (1997) investigate how settler rule was predicated on the co-option of local privileged through patronage politics in an effort to provide an answer to this question.

These studies don't directly focus on Punjab, but they do show how colonial government changed in reaction to shifting political and economic needs, having a long-lasting impact on the makeup of local politics. Imran Ali's (1988) landmark study of the interaction among the Punjabi wealthy classes and the settler state in the canal colonies established at the culmination of the 19th century develops this issue<sup>13</sup>.

Ali's study highlights the degree to which this project bound ties between the Punjabi wealthy elite and the state by focusing on how the associations were designed to facilitate greater accumulation by the settler state while also strengthening the economic and political position of the state's landed allies. Particular focus is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> C.A. Bayly, D.H. Kolff, Two Colonial Empires: Comparative Essays on the History (Leiden: Springer, 1986) 35.

placed on how the canal colonies project led to a stronger integration of the landed classes in the Punjab within the colonial bureaucracy.

Barrier (1967; 1968) and Puri (1985), who both stress how the colonial state's policies occasionally led to resistance among the regime's allies, reflect another aspect of this connection. This prompted changes in colonial policy. The interactions between the state and the landed elite during the colonial era are also examined in Talbot (1988a; 1988b) and Gilmartin (1988), with the former tracing the development of the ties between the British and the Punjabi landed elite and the latter concentrating on the favours the colonial government bestowed upon particular Biraderi networks and landowner religious leaders who displayed loyalty to the regime<sup>14</sup>.

Separate but connected works include Yong (2005) and Saif (2010) argue the implementation of policies that would ensure stability in the province was required due to the political importance of the province and the fact that its landowning biraderis proven to be a dependable and abundant source of recruits for the colonial army. According to these experts, the administration of Punjab was closely intertwined with the necessity to safeguard the colonial government of India's larger strategic objectives.

These pieces raise important issues regarding the interaction between the landed class and the colonial state, but they are only partially able to shed light on post-colonial politics. A variety of categories can be used to categorise the literature from this time period, each of which will be covered in turn in the following paragraphs. The first of these categories especially examines Punjab's economic dynamics, taking into account both the colonial past and the inequity that permeates the rural economy.

Work on elections, party rivalries, and the formal political system falls under the second group. The work that examines the sociological foundations of various political parties and organisations in Pakistan,<sup>15</sup> concentrating on how their interaction with one another underpinning the dynamics of significant political

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Mitra Sharafi, Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 74.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Nicolas Martin, Politics, Landlords and Islam in Pakistan (Oxford: Routledge, 2016) 46.

events, provides a supplement to these mostly descriptive studies. Explicitly Marxian assessments of the relationship between the state and class in Pakistan fall under a similar paradigm.

The 'institutionalist' category of literature is the last one to be covered in this review analyses in Punjab and Pakistan that make an effort to identify and explain institutional continuity and change<sup>16</sup>.

A satisfied peasant enjoying the benefits of progressive policies and years of economic expansion is often depicted in colonial writing on Punjab's economy. However, recent research has been seriously contesting this narrative.

Mishra (1982), Nazir (2000), and Mukherjee (2005) emphasise the upheaval that colonial economic policies have had policy, highlighting the relationship between debt, growing inequality, and deteriorating productivity characterized these days. In tracing the effects of colonial agricultural policy on growth in the post-colonial era, Ali (1987; 2004) makes the case that the institutional legacy of colonialism served as a significant barrier to Punjab's economic development. The Green Revolution in Punjab is examined by Alavi (1976), Hussain (1988), and Niazi (2004). They show how it enabled the rural elite to engage in capitalist agriculture, strengthening their economic position. Studies by Husain (1999) and Khan (2006) demonstrate the extent to which these elites control Pakistan's agricultural economy, and both studies explain how the character and makeup of Pakistan's rural economic elite have changed over time<sup>17</sup>.

Studying the institutional legacies of colonialism from a different perspective concentrate more on the influence of colonial administrative structures on future political processes. In order to bolster the claim that the 'liberal' institutions of British colonial authority were favourable to considerably higher levels of development after independence, Lange, Mahoney, and von Hau (2005) compare the levels of development of former Spanish and British colonies<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Eric Alston et al, Institutional and Organizational Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 266.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Shivaji Mukherjee, Colonial Institutions and Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021) 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ishita Banerjee-Dube, A History of Modern India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 233.

Lange (2009) elaborates on this argument suggesting that the success of post-colonial politics was significantly influenced by the British use of direct or indirect systems of authority<sup>19</sup>. According to Lange's research, direct rule—which places a focus on the development of integrated, formal mechanisms of governance—is more likely to result in the emergence of bureaucratically strong states than indirect rule, which would give rise to weak central states with a high degree of patrimonialism through the use of intermediaries and local authorities. As opposed to Lange's (2009) approach, which is based on a comparison of several African colonies, He contends that India is a hybrid nation that combines elements of direct and indirect control.

Although some of the ways in which British colonialism influenced post-independence political and economic systems are described in these comparative examinations of colonialism's effects trajectories, they do not pay particular attention to Pakistan's continued tyranny. However, there remains a need to examine landed power in the *jagir* or estate like Kalabagh and about the Nawabs of Kalabagh of District Mianwali<sup>20</sup>.

#### **Statement of the Problem**

The present study mainly focuses on the history, authority and social political map of a state cum jagir of Kalabagh of district Mianwali located in Pakistan's Punjab province. This region is situated in the the salt region. It is a hilly area in the province of the Punjab, Pakistan. It derives its named after the region's significant rock salt deposits. The area is given the name by virtue of huge rocksalt reserves present in this area. The region spreads from the River Jhelum to the River Indus inthe crossways of the north of Punjab. Mianwali has great mines of iron ore and rock salt at Kalabagh, coal mines at Makarwal. It also has vast deposits of gypsum, silica sand, dolomite, kaolin, and various other minerals<sup>2</sup>. The *jagir* of Kalabagh has very unique history, the people that are quite different to the rest

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Emmanuel Akyeampong, Robert H. Bates, Nathan Nunn, Africa's Development in Historical Perspective (London: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 57.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Lindsay Whitfield, Economies After Colonialism: Ghana and the Struggle for Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 39.

of people of all the district of Mianwali. The natives of Kalabagh has also a typical pattern of traditional language that recalls the old aged dialects of Hindi, Pashto, Saraiki as well as other languages dialects pertaining to the people who had been living along the banks of River Indus. This is because in primitive times, the people used to travel along the banks of River Indus and their intercommunication developed unique dialects. The reason why other people of the district have different dialects of Hindi, Pashto, Saraiki as well as other languages is perhaps that at Kalabagh, the upper delta of River Indus Begins<sup>21</sup>. The people of Kalabagh were mainly linked with the people that used to travel through narrow mountain paths whereas the rest of the district Mianwali is consisted of the immigrants like Niazis, Pashtoon, Jats and various others. That's why, they have different dialects of spoken Hindi, Pashto, Saraiki as well as other languages.

In this thesis focusing on the topics of history, society, and socio-political map of the State of Kalabagh, there are several key questions and aspects that can be addressed to provide a comprehensive and insightful analysis. Here are some of the questions to consider:

#### **Research Questions**

- 1. What is the historical context of the region or society under study?
- 2. What major socio-political changes have occurred in the region over time and how these changes influenced the society of Kalabagh and its structure?
- 3. What are the key socio-political institutions in the region and what role do they play in society?
- 4. What are the major societal dynamics in the region, including cultural, religious, and ethnic factors?
- 5. What are the current socio-political challenges or issues facing the region?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Avijit Gupta, Large Rivers (Leiden: Wiley, 2007) 355.

#### **Objectives and Aims of the Study**

The following are the goals and objectives of the current study .: -

- To point out the historical context of the region or society under study.
- To indicate major socio-political changes have occurred in the region over time and how these changes influenced the society of Kalabagh and its structure.
- To highlight the key socio-political institutions in the region and what role do they play in society.
- To explain the major societal dynamics in the region, including cultural, religious, and ethnic factors.
- To show the current socio-political challenges or issues facing the region.

In order to address these questions, the proposal is divided into the subsequent chapters.

The significance of a study about the state of Kalabagh, including its history, society, and political map, can be multifaceted and important for various reasons. Here are some key points to consider: Significance of the Study

#### 1. Historical Understanding

Examining the history of Kalabagh can shed light on its cultural, social, and economic evolution over time. This historical context can help us better understand the region's heritage, the dynamics of its society, and the factors that have shaped it.

#### 2. Societal Dynamics:

An in-depth study of Kalabagh's society can reveal valuable insights into its demographics, cultural practices, traditions, and social structures. Understanding the social fabric of a region is crucial for policymakers, sociologists, and anthropologists to address local issues and implement effective development programs.

#### **3.** Political Mapping:

Analyzing the political map of Kalabagh can provide insights into the governance structure, political parties, and power dynamics in the region. This knowledge can be essential for political scientists, policymakers, and governments to make informed decisions regarding governance, representation, and resource allocation.

#### 4. Resource Management:

Kalabagh's geography may include valuable natural resources such as water, minerals, or agricultural land. Studying the region's political map and history can help in sustainable resource management and resolving potential conflicts related to resource allocation.

#### 5. Conflict Resolution:

Kalabagh, like many regions, may have experienced political, ethnic, or social conflicts in its history. Understanding the root causes of such conflicts through historical and sociological research can be crucial for conflict resolution and peace-building efforts.

#### 6. Policy Formulation:

Researchers and policymakers can use the findings from a study on Kalabagh to formulate effective policies that address the specific needs and challenges of the region. This can lead to improved governance, economic development, and social well-being.

#### 7. Cultural Preservation:

The study of Kalabagh's history and society can contribute to the preservation of its cultural heritage. Documenting traditions, languages, and historical sites can help ensure that the region's unique cultural identity is safeguarded for future generations.

#### 8. Regional and Global Context:

Kalabagh's location and its relationship with neighboring regions can have implications for regional and global geopolitics. A thorough study can provide valuable insights into regional dynamics and international relations.

#### 9. Academic Research:

From an academic standpoint, studying Kalabagh can contribute to the body of knowledge in various fields, including history, sociology, political science, geography, and anthropology. It can serve as a case study for broader academic discussions and research.

So the comprehensive study of Kalabagh, encompassing its history, society, and political map, can be significant for understanding the region's past, present, and future. It can inform policy decisions, promote cultural preservation, contribute to academic research, and aid in conflict resolution and resource management. Ultimately, such a study can have far-reaching implications for the well-being and development of the region and its inhabitants.

#### **Organization of the Study**

In order to address these questions, the proposal is divided into the following parts.

The thesis is started with an abstract and then introduction about the state of Kalabagh, its history, society, and political map. Then there is a comprehensive theoretical framework in this thesis which is thoroughly supported by pertinent theories.

The third chapter is comprised of the historical perspective of Kalabagh in which the discussion has been supported by the etymology, history, the arrival of the old aged tribes in this area.

The fourth chapter discusses the politics of West Pakistan's governor, Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan

in the Ayub Khan era. Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan belonged to the Rais of Kalabagh family. It also includes the politics of the Mianwali in particular as well as the politics of the whole Pakistan in general.

The fifth chapter is consisted of the support and British Control in Kalabagh during colonial times. The chapter provides the detail of the colonial legacy in this particular area.

The last chapter is presenting the conclusions in which there is detailed recommendations and suggestions about the topic concerned.

In the last of this thesis, bibliography of the whole thesis is presented.

## Chapter II **Theoretical Framework**

This chapter intends to explore theories about the history of society and political map. From this perspective. There are three main ways to think about politics: pluralism, elite or managerial theory, and class analysis, which is similar to Marxism<sup>22</sup>. Pluralism sees politics as a competition among different interest groups. Elite theory is a concept that delves into power dynamics within modern society. It suggests that a small, influential group, comprised of economic elites and individuals in policy-planning systems, wields the utmost significant control. This influence is seen as separate from the outcomes of democratic elections $^{23}$ .

Elite theory is also known as the theory of the ruling elite. It was first presented by two prominent sociologists and political scientists: Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. They developed this theory about the turn of the 20th century.

Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist and sociologist, published his ideas on elite theory in his work "The Mind and Society" (La mente e la società) in 1916. Pareto argued that societies are typically characterized by a small elite group of persons who grip the most control and influence, while the majority of the population is relatively powerless<sup>24</sup>.

Gaetano Mosca, also an Italian political scientist and sociologist, developed similar ideas independently. In his work "The Ruling Class" (Elementi di Scienza Politica), first issued in 1896, Mosca emphasized the existence of a ruling elite that dominates and controls political and social systems.

Both Pareto and Mosca contributed to the development of elite theory, which has since been further

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Robert A. Nye, The Anti-democratic Sources of Elite Theory: Pareto, Mosca, Michels (Michigan: SAGE, 1977) 58.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Edoardo Ongaro, Philosophy and Public Administration: An Introduction (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2020) 34. <sup>24</sup> Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (London: Creative Media Partners, 2017) 119.

expanded upon and refined by other scholars in the fields of sociology and political science<sup>25</sup>.

These elites exert their influence through their roles in corporations, corporate boards, and by supporting financial networks for policy-making means or else by holding situations in consider tanks and policy debate groups. Key characteristics of this theory include the concentration of power among a unified elite, the lack of power among the non-elite population, the shared interests of elites due to their shared positions and origins, as well as the idea that institutional positions are the defining factor in determining power.

In contrast, elite theory opposes the idea of pluralism, which emphasizes multiple powerful social groups and interests influencing and being represented within the ruling class, leading to more representative political decisions that align with the requirements of society as a whole<sup>26</sup>.

Elite theory acknowledges that "counter-elites" can arise within ostensibly excluded groups even when they are founded on aristocracy, ethnicity, gender, or religious considerations rather than other typical state power networks. Conversations between elites and counter-elites are seen as talks between these disenfranchised groups and the state, with the elites' potential to co-opt counter-elites being a major worry.

One notable finding is that democratic systems assume that voting behavior directly shapes policy outcomes, which are supposed to conform to the tastes of the common of voters. However, research from 2014 revealed a strong correlation between income levels and the realization of policy preferences<sup>27</sup>. This means that policy outcomes are more likely to reflect the preferences of higher-income individuals, raising questions about the causation behind this correlation, which remains an active subject of study.

#### **Ancient Perspective on Elite Theory:**

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Giorgio Volpe, Italian Elitism and the Reshaping of Democracy in the United States (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2021) 111.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> William A. Galston, Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy (London: Yale University Press, 2018) 23-34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Christopher Deeming, Minimum Income Standards and Reference Budgets (Bristol: Policy Press, 2020) 230.

A long time ago, around 150 B.C., a thinker named Polybius had some interesting ideas about how political power works. He didn't call it "Elite Theory" back then; he simply called it "autocracy." Polybius believed that there were three main sources of political power: one person in charge (monarchy), a few people in charge (autocracy), and many people making decisions (democracy). But here's the catch: he thought that if these forms of power were not kept in balance within a "mixed government," they would turn into bad versions of themselves.

In Polybius' view, if one person had too much power (monarchy), it would become like a cruel tyranny. If many people ruled without checks and balances (democracy), it would become chaotic mob rule. And when a small group of elites had too much power (autocracy), it would become corrupt and unfair, which he called "oligarchy." He believed this happened because people didn't properly balance these different forms of power and the institutions that followed them<sup>28</sup>.

#### **Italian School of Elitism:**

There is a group of Italian thinkers who had similar ideas about power and elites. They were Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels, and they're considered the founding members of the Italian school of elitism, which had an impact on later Western elite conceptions. It is common thinking that: -

#### Power comes from being in charge of important Institutions:<sup>29</sup>

They believed that the people in key positions in politics and the economy held the real power.

#### **Elites are Different:**

It is thought that elites had something special that set them apart from the rest of us. They had things like intelligence and skills, and they really cared about how the government worked. They believed that ordinary people were not capable of governing themselves, but the elites could make things work because they had a lot to do the same.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 33.
 <sup>29</sup> D. Wirls, The Federalist Papers and Institutional Power In American (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 99.

#### **Contemporary Elite Theorists:**

#### 1. Elmer Eric Schattschneider

Elmer Eric Schattschneider criticized the idea of pluralism in American politics. Instead of believing that American democracy is a fair system where many different Schattschneider stated that this system favours the most educated and wealthy members of society despite the fact that interests of people are equally represented and advanced by several interest organisations. He emphasised that there is a considerably larger disparity between those who actively participate in interest groups and those who do not than between those who vote and those who do not.

Schattschneider stated in his book, "The Semi-Sovereign People," that the pressure system, which comprises numerous interest groups, has a relatively small influence. He said that there are very few organized, well-known groups, and they are not representative of the entire population. He also emphasized that the pressure system tends to favor businesses and the upper class. He believed that the idea that this system represents Contrary to popular belief, the community is actually biassed and unbalanced in favour of a small portion of a minority population<sup>30</sup>.

#### 2. C. Wright Mills

In 1956, C. Wright Mills wrote a book called "The Power Elite" where he introduced a new way of looking at power structures in the United States. He talked about three major groups that hold power: the political, economic, and military elites. These groups, according to Mills, may not always work together but collectively wield a significant amount of influence in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Geraint Parry, Political Elites (Oxford: ECPR Publishers, 2005) 59.

country.

Mills believed that these powerful elites had come into existence due to a process called rationalization, which happened in advanced industrial societies. This process concentrated power and control in the hands of a small, occasionally dishonest group of people. This, in turn, led to a decline in the importance of political debate and reduced it to mere formalities. Mills argued that this trend showed how democracy was eroding in advanced societies, as real power was held by a group of people who were not elected representatives<sup>31</sup>.

Mills was influenced by a book called "Behemoth: Franz Leopold Neumann's "The Structure and Practise of National Socialism, 1933–1944." This book examined the rise of Nazism in Germany, a democratic country<sup>32</sup>. It served as a warning about potential risks in contemporary capitalist democracies and gave Mills a framework for comprehending the formation of political institutions.

#### 3. Ralf Dahrendorf

Ralf Dahrendorf contends in his book, "Reflections on the Revolution in Europe," that because engaging in politics requires a high level of competence, political parties end up functioning more like providers of "political services." In other words, they prioritise managing municipal and governmental public offices. Each party seeks to persuade people during election campaigns that they are the best option for running the government<sup>33</sup>.

Dahrendorf suggests that it would make sense to officially recognize these parties as businesses that offer services. By accomplishing this, the members and associates of these legitimate corporations would form the ruling class<sup>34</sup>. Elections would be used by the "class that is ruled"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Alan Wolfe, (The Power Elites (London: Oxford University Press, 2000) 47.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Guoping Jiang, Corruption Control in Post-Reform China (China: Springer Publishing, 2017) 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Cornelius Mathews, The Various Writings of Cornelius Mathews (California: California University Press, 1843) 233.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> <u>Ralf Dahrendorf</u>, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New York: Chatto & Windus, 1990) 23.

to choose the state administration firm that best serves its needs.

In simpler terms, Dahrendorf is proposing that political parties are essentially service providers in the business of running government offices. To make this arrangement more transparent, he suggests officially registering them as companies that can be chosen by the public during elections to manage the state's affairs. This way, the political process becomes more like selecting a service provider that aligns with the interests of the citizens.

#### 4. Floyd Hunter

The elite theory study the of control wasn't only practical to broader contexts but was also employed on a smaller scale in studies focused on community power dynamics, like the one conducted by Floyd Hunter in 1953. Hunter conducted an extensive investigation into the power dynamics within his "Regional City," aiming to identify the individuals who truly held power, as opposed to those holding official positions<sup>35</sup>.

To carry out this study, he adopted a structural-functional approach that involved mapping out the complex networks of relationships and hierarchies that exist within the metropolis. The power relationships between numerous groups, including businesspeople, politicians, and the clergy, among others, were shown by this map.

The primary goal of Hunter's study was to challenge prevailing notions of democracy within urban politics. He worked to disprove the existence of true democracy and strengthen justifications for the necessity of a real representative democracy<sup>36</sup>.

Not only was this type of analysis used in Hunter's work, but also in later, more thorough investigations. For instance, M. Schwartz investigated the power relationships among the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Masamichi Sasaki, Trust in Contemporary Society (Leiden: Brill, 2021) 27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (New York: University of North Carolina Press, 2017) 77.

corporate elite in the US and used a similar methodology to elucidate the underlying dynamics of power in this setting.

# "Classic" Elite Theories: -

These theories were formulated by academics in the late 19th and early 20th centuries like Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels, were heavily influenced by Max Weber's theories, especially his views on the importance of political influence and charismatic leadership.

These common theorists argued that in large-scale societies, the existence of powerful "elites" was inevitable. They challenged two prevailing ideologies: democratic theory, which advocates a system of government "of the people, by the people, and for the people," and Marxist beliefs socialism that is egalitarian and based on class strife. As opposed to elite theories proposed an enduring division between dominant minority groups (referred to as "elites," "ruling classes," "political classes," "oligarchies," "aristocracies," etc.), and the majority, also referred to as the "masses."

Mosca, Pareto, and Michels each offered their unique perspective on elite power. Mosca believed this polarization of power reflected the "superiority" of ruling minorities in terms of material, intellectual, or moral aspects<sup>37</sup>. Pareto attributed elite control to the aptitude and emotional characteristics of these class, coupled with their adept use of power and encouragement. Michels saying the dominance of "oligarchies" as an inevitable the result of extensive organization. They all agreed that political control, rather than belongings ownership, formed the basis of political and social structures. Importantly, elite theorists argued that discharge from elite control was impossible; uprisings merely represented shifts within the elite, as exemplified by the Russian Revolution. Consequently, egalitarian political orders and participatory democracies were considered ideological ideals, with history being viewed as a succession of different elite groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Peter Bachrach, Power and Poverty (Carolina: Oxford University Press, 1970) 35-46.

Elite theories also responded to The rise of bureaucratized mass parties, the concentration of corporate power, the development of strong centralised mass media, and the establishment of fascist and communist movements and regimes are all examples of "modern trends" that strengthened the state. These trends were seen as consequences of bureaucratic industrialism, leading to increased complexity in society, progressive bureaucratic organization, and the elites' accumulation of power. In this view, elites effectively managed democratic institutions, garnered privileges, gathered large-scale backing and protected their positions by restricting access to the top. Classic elite theory placed a strong emphasis on the idea of power stratification, the idea that elites are universal, as well as elite traits as important explanatory variables.

The second aspect of classic elite theory alarms the ability of control holders to establish themselves into unified groups. While short-term intra-elite conflicts on exact policies could occur, elites acted in unison to protect their shared power interests<sup>38</sup>.

The third aspect relates to the connections between "social forces" including classes, social movements, and ethno-racial groups and elites. Conventional elite theorists emphasized the importance of these linkages for elite power but did not provide a precise definition of what these linkages entailed.

Access to elite status and succession are the subject of the fourth aspect. Entry into elite ranks was closely regulated by existing elites and required the acquisition of particular, rare traits (such as wealth, prestige, and education). They controlled the selection of successors by using institutional "gatekeepers" and elite "selectorates" at various levels of the hierarchy, which led to a biassed social composition and the survival of elite perspectives even during times of high social mobility and elite turnover.

The final aspect highlights how leaders usually exercised their influence. All exclusive theorists agreed that elite domination was achieved through persuasion, manipulation, and occasionally the use of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 76.

force<sup>39</sup>. While democratic elections played a symbolic role and facilitated they hardly ever changed the core makeup of the elite in terms of their personnel's orderly movement.

Since the thesis is based on the political power of the Nawabs of Kalabagh and their subjects are the poor people who played the role as their subjects, therefore the elite theories are quite resemble with the example of the landed elite of Kalabagh.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> John F. Padgett, Walter W. Powell, The Emergence of Organizations and Markets (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012) 48.

# Chapter III Kalabagh: A Historical Perspective

#### Abstract

Kalabagh is a city and union committee in the district Mianwali. It's situated on the the Indus River's western bank. The name "Kalabagh" comes from a combination of "*Kallra*," which refers to a Hindu tribe, and "*Baghoo*," the sun god. There used to be a temple dedicated to the sun god on top of a mountain, where the *Kallra* Hindus worshiped.

In the past, the *Kallra* Hindus were part of the Kauroo tribes. Over time, Kalabagh was taken over by different rulers, including the *Kambho*, *Lodhi* Afghan, *Khemat*, and *Gahroo*. Even Alexander the Great captured this area at one point, mainly for its salt resources, which were already being mined by Hindu tribes before the Greeks arrived<sup>40</sup>.

#### Kalabagh: In View of Evolution

This area is located in the Indus Valley. It has a long history of hu. man habitation. According to the documents of the District Mianwali Census of 1998, the area is dated back to the ancient Indus Civilization. Over the centuries, this area is governed by various powerful rulers and invaders from the Indian Subcontinent.

In ancient times, this region was known as "Hindu Shahi." This name goes back to Alexander the Great's reign in the early fourth century B.C. when they invaded India. Later on, Mahmud Ghaznavi and then Mohammad Ghori conquered this area along with a significant portion of Punjab and thus, incorporated it into the Ghazna empire<sup>41</sup>. It was during the period in which a significant number of local residents began

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Sir Lepel Henry Griffin, The Panjab Chiefs: Historical and Biographical Notices (Howard: Howard University Press, 1890) 234.
 <sup>41</sup> Griffith, The History of Punjab Castes (New Delhi: Prime Publishers, 2019) 76.

converting to Islam. In the subsequent era, the Niazi Pathans migrated into the north-western part of this district, contributing to its evolving demographics and history.

It led to the displacement of the Awans towards the east beyond the Salt Range. This movement is historically noted by the Mughal emperor Babur during his campaign to conquer the Pakhtuns and the Punjab in 1520. The Mughal Empire governed the area through the Ghakkar feudatories. But those rulers were eventually removed by the Niazis. Due to that phenomenon, the Mughal Empire got weak especially afterward Nadir Shah's conquest of India.

The early history of the area of Kalabagh has no sound evidences. Many aspects of its past are still unknown. However, there is a commonly acknowledged narrative that suggests various communities inhabited the region before the arrival of Christians.

Before the 15th century, it is believed that the lower part of the area was inhabited by scattered tribes of Jats. Over time, these Jats migrated from areas such as Multan and Bahawalpur and settled in this region. Following them, the Baloch people also migrated to the district from the south.

According to historical accounts, Bannu and the upper portion of the region both saw military expeditions led by Mahmood Ghaznavi, a major monarch of Ghazni. The Hindu community in these places was driven out as a result. During Mahmud's reign, Afghan immigrants began moving into Bannu, and groups like the Niazis, Bannuchis, and Marwats settled in less fertile lands. They later expanded northward along the Kurram and Gambila rivers. But this migration was heavily resisted by a young group of Lodhis who defeated the Afghan immigrants<sup>42</sup>. The Lodhis pushed them across the Kurram River near Dara Tang. At the time of the Niazis' immigration, the banks of the Indus River were inhabited by Jat and Awan communities. Notable sections of the Niazi tribes included Isa Khel, Mushanis, and a portion of Sarhang.

During the supremacy of Jahangir, the fourth Mughal ruler, further developments and historical events likely took place in the area but there is no sound record in this regard. The history of the area of Kalabagh is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, Origins and History of Jats and Other Allied Nomadic Tribes (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 2008) 325.

marked by a complex interplay of different communities and migrations, with various groups such as Hindus, Jats, Baloches, and Afghans. All played significant roles in the early history of this area. The narrative also hints at the broader historical context of the region during the reign of Mahmud of Ghazna and Jahangir<sup>43</sup>.

#### The Area in Antiquity

Beginning with Mahmud of Ghazni's reign, the nawabs of Kalabagh ruled the province for approximately 900 years. In the time of British rule, it was a princely state. The Persian and Turkish words "Kala" for "black" and "Bagh" for "garden," which relate to the region's verdant gardens, may have inspired the name "Kalabagh." The Awan community has a long history in Kalabagh, and Malik Atta Muhammad Khan, the father of Malik Amir Muhammad Khan, was given the title of "Khan Bahadur" during the colonial era. In Kala Bagh, people of Niazi, Awan, or Bangi Khel Khattak ancestry make up the bulk of the population. Another settlement called Kara-Bogha, which takes its name from the illustrious leader Sardar Karbogha Khan, is located a few kilometres to the north. The Saghari Khattak tribe was led by Sardar Karbogha Khan, who moved his people from the Shawal Valley to Kara-Bogha. Following the Indus Valley culture, which lasted from about 3300 BCE to 1300 BCE, the region was a component of the Vedic culture. Arabs who had settled in Multan after the Islamic conquest of Punjab took control of Mianwali and the adjacent territories of Punjab. Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi succeeded his father, Sultan Sebuktegin, as ruler of the Ghaznavid dynasty empire in 997 CE. He first overcame the Hindu Shahis in 1005 CE before moving on to the Punjab region<sup>44</sup>. This area was governed by the Delhi Sultanate and then by the Mughal Empire. Mianwali's sizable Saraiki population led to its association with the Mughal Empire's Multan region. Following the invasion of the Punjab region by several Muslim kingdoms from Central Asia, the population there shifted to becoming mostly Muslim.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Muhammad Hotak, The Hidden Treasure: A Biography of Pash toon Poets (New York: University Press of America. Inc. 1997) 197.

<sup>44</sup> Himayatullah Yaqubi, Mughal-Afghan Relations in South Asia (Islamabad: NIHCR, 2015) 154-160.

Although the Mianwali region has historical origins that go back to the year 900 AD, Qutb Shah's entrance there in the year 1090 AD is what is most strongly associated with its accuracy. He gave his sons the authority to colonise and rule the area, and now the Awan clan, descended from them, may still be found in Pakistan's Mianwali district. Numerous significant South Asian kings have ruled this region throughout history. When detailing his wars against the Malik Awans and Niazi Pakhtuns during his invasion of Punjab in the 1520s, Mughal emperor Babur mentions Isakhel in the Baburnama.

There is not much historical evidence regarding the northern half of the district prior to Nadir Shah's invasion in 1738. The Gakhars, who were Mughal Empire vassals, controlled the district's upper part. Up until the invasion of Nadir Shah, this persisted<sup>45</sup>. A detachment of Nadir Shah's army entered Chashma in 1738 and terrorised the Bannuchis and Marwats into paying a hefty tribute. Another section of the troops descended to Dera Ismail Khan after crossing the Darra Pezu. During the siege of Delhi, soldiers from Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan marched under Nadir Shah's flag.

The Delhi monarch gave Nadir Shah the region west of the Indus River in 1739. Ahmad Shah Abdali took control of this region after Nadir Shah passed away. The Ghakkars were still in control of the cis-Indus regions of the district in 1748 when a Durrani army under the command of one of Ahmad Shah's generals crossed the Indus at Kalabagh and drove them out, despite the fact that they had formally sworn loyalty to the emperor in Delhi. Moazzam Nagar, their stronghold, was destroyed. The Mughal era in this region came to an end after this.

During the British Raj, the Kalabagh along with the whole district of Mianwali was one of the regions under British control in the Punjab<sup>46</sup>. There were established regional offices of the East India Company up until the winter of 1883, when the regional office was shut down due to turmoil and unfavourable circumstances.

# **Ruins of Sirkapp Fort near Kalabagh**

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Kumkum Roy, Looking Within, Looking Without (Delhi: Primus Publishers, 2015) 274.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Vikas Khatri, World Famous Wars and Battles (Calcutta: Pustak Mahal, 2012) 37.

The Gazetteer of Mianwali, which was published in 1915, contains an intriguing description of Sirkapp Fort's remains. This fort is located on a high ridge near the village of Nammal in the Khudri region and serves as a reminder of a historical period long gone. Positioned strategically and surrounded by hills on three sides, Sirkapp Fort was likely the stronghold of Raja Sirkapp, a prominent ruler of the region who lived around the same time as Raja Risalu of Sialkot, who eventually defeated him.

Over time, the fort has deteriorated, but some parts of its outer wall still exist, albeit in a rundown condition. The once-thriving complex, possibly housing a significant number of soldiers, now lies in ruins, with collapsed buildings and scattered intricately carved stones. Notably, ancient water lifts were found, which were used to transport water from the stream below to the hilltop, indicating the advanced engineering of the fort.

The Mianwali district has seen three distinct waves of settlement from different commands. The Awans originated from the northeast, The Pathans came from the northwest, and the Jats and Biluchs travelled up the Indus Valley from the south. Currently, the Awans predominately live in the Khudri, Pakhar, or Awankari region of the area<sup>47</sup>. They may have settled there after the Arab invasions of the seventh century, and they have been the main occupants of this region for almost six centuries.

However, the claim that the Awans originated from Arabia, while strongly held, lacks substantial evidence. It is more likely that they migrated from the east and can trace their ancestry back to the Rajputs, who may have assimilated and abandoned their caste identity due to intermarriage with lower clans. This theory is supported by the fact that Phakar, a region in the district, was once a Rajput stronghold, as evidenced by the presence of Raja Sirkapp's fort overlooking Nammal. The legends surrounding Raja Sirkapp and his connections with Raja Risalu of Sialkot continue to be passed down through songs and stories, preserving the memory of a bygone era.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Henry George Raverty, Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan (Islamabad: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2001) 543-566.

Exploring the remains of Sirkapp Fort provides a captivating glimpse into the rich history of the Mianwali district<sup>48</sup>. The remnants of this once-powerful fortress and the stories they inspire offer valuable insights into the cultural, architectural, and social aspects of the region's past. Preserving and studying these ruins can help us better understand the lives and legacies of the rulers and residents who once thrived within the protective walls of Sirkapp Fort.

#### **Etymology of Kalabagh**

The name "Kalabagh" has clear origins in both Turkic and Persian languages, meaning "Black Garden." It's important to note that simply changing the way we write these words can't erase the historical connection to ancient tribes, whether they were Turkic or Persian. The historical significance and reality of Kalabagh will always be prominent in the course of history.

The temple in question holds great importance and is akin to the grandeur of human heritage. Although it's a Hindu temple, this fact is widely acknowledged and accepted as part of human civilization, irrespective of any biases or religious differences.

Drawing a parallel, the Greeks constructed a colossal statue called the Colossus of Rhodes. This statue was situated where the modern city of Kalabagh stands today<sup>49</sup>. Unfortunately, it was destroyed by various invading forces, including the Saka tribes, the Aver Huns and the Parthians.

Furthermore, the Greeks revered a goddess named Kapheira, who was believed to be the daughter of Poseidon. Her followers would often paint their bodies with colors and *Mehndi*, then perform dances in front of the goddess, showing their painted bodies to the chief priest, called the Sacredos, to receive blessings. Notably, the statue of Kapheira depicted her as nearly nude, with a smooth groin area, and she would wear a white silk gown. The Sacredos would mark her with tattoos in three specific spots, forming a triangular pattern representing the Earth, the Sun, and the Pluto. Her first kid was named Poultices, and this tradition

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Jennifer S. Larson, What Is Money, Anyway? (USA: Learners Publishers, 2010) 123.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Sayyid Shāh Gul Hasan Qalandarī Qādirī, Hasan Askari, Solomans' Ring (London: Altamera Press, 1998) 57-68.

led to the practice of referring to the firstborn child as "Plothee ka bachha," a custom that has persisted through the years.

# **Chapter IV Politics of Amir Muhammad Khan**

#### Abstract

The political beliefs of Malik, the Nawab of Kalabagh Muhammad Amir Khan were shaped by his education and conservative feudal background. In most areas, including foreign relations, he was in favour of keeping things as they were. He cautioned Ayub Khan against siding with China because he thought it would anger the US. He was not overly optimistic about resolving the Kashmir issue and preferred peaceful negotiations over confrontation. Many people view on him as a usual owner who opposed schooling and press is liberty. While there is some truth to this perception, he did support a responsible press that wasn't completely unrestrained. In Pakistan, East Pakistan had a larger population, and being from West Pakistan, he was wary of their numerical strength. Nawab considered politicians opposing the One Unit He treated his political adversaries according to their power and goals. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was untrustworthy in his eyes because he was too ambitious to be dependable. He allegedly chose Chaudhri Zahoor Elahi as his target because Chaudhri wanted to succeed him. In his own region, Mawlana A. Sattar Niazi, Habibullah Paracha, and the Pir of Makhad Sharif contested his authority, which prompted the Nawab to deal with them harshly. Overall, he had a political outlook that was typical of a feudal lord.

#### Introduction

Malik Amir Muhammad Khan was born at Kalabagh, Mianwali, on June 20, 1910. He received his education from top colleges and universities in England and British India (1858–1947). His career as an all-India politician officially began when he joined the Muslim League. On March 23, 1940, he took part in the Muslim League's historic meeting in Lahore, where the Pakistan Resolution was passed (Jahan Dad Khan, 1999). He campaigned for Mawlana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi, a Muslim League candidate, in the pivotal 1946 election (Anjum, 1992)<sup>50</sup>. He managed his estate's affairs concurrently,

Kalabagh and participated in regional politics. In addition, he kept advocating for the needs of the landlord community (Rokhri, 1994). Before the 1958 coup, he had a lot of power due to his extensive exposure. Being close to Pakistan's President Ayub Khan (1907–1974), he was forced to take on official duties during the new administration (1958–69). He developed a reputation as a stern, honest, and capable individual with excellent managerial and administrative skills while serving first as Chairman of Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and later as Chairman of the Food and Agriculture Commission (The Pakistan Times, June 1, 1960). On June 1st, 1960, Nawab assumed the position of Governor of West Pakistan, whichhad been regarded as "the most important job after that of the President<sup>51</sup>. Malik Amir had both the good andbad characteristics of his class as a true feudal. He was bold, devoted to his friends and family, generous withhis hospitality, open with his finances, and all of the above. Due to his feudal mentality, he also displayed some undesirable traits, such as a strong "commitment to the maintenance of the status quo" and a "authoritarian outlook" (Jahan Dad, 1999). He and Ayub Khan had similar opinions about politics. He opposed the re-election of those "discredited" politicians on numerous occasions. One by one, his positions on many political and national issues can be examined.

#### Kalabagh Nawab and the Concern of Kashmir

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Hari Ram Gupta, History of the Sikhs: The Sikh Lion of Lahore, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, 1799-1839 (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1978) 457.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges (London: Oxford University Press, 2001) 78-89.

In 1965, during a broadcast on August 16th, Nawab of Kalabagh made a significant statement about the situation in Kashmir. He talked about the valiant Mujahids who bravely fought against the imperialist occupation of Kashmir. These courageous individuals were risking their lives to liberate their homeland, and their struggle was of utmost importance to Pakistan. Nawab of Kalabagh emphasized that Pakistan considered its own independence incomplete as long as Kashmir remained under subjugation. He also mentioned that Pakistan was committed to resolving this issue through peaceful means.

At that time, Ayub Khan's cabinet members, with the exception of the Kalabagh Nawab, solidly recommended the capture of Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas, a prominent figure in the Kul Jammun-o-Kashmir Muslim Conference. Due to Ghulam Abbas' outspoken opposition to the Ayub Government's stances on the Azad Kashmir Act of 1960 and the implementation of the Basic Democratic system in Kashmir, this recommendation was made.

However, Nawab took a strong stance against this suggestion. He argued that if even Maharaja Hari Singh had been unable to intimidate Ghulam Abbas, imprisoning him would not shake his resolve. He believed that arresting Ghulam Abbas would only put Pakistan in a position similar to India's actions against Sheikh Abdullah, making it impossible for Pakistan to condemn India. Ayub Khan eventually agreed with Malik Amir's argument, and Ghulam Abbas was spared from imprisonment<sup>52</sup>.

Malik Amir was sympathetic to the Kashmiri cause but opposed using a hardline strategy to settle the conflict. He and Muhammad Shoaib were regarded as potential dovish candidates. Malik Amir lost hope in the Tashkent Accord's ability to resolve the Kashmir issue and enhance Indo-Pak relations. In March 1966, negotiations at the level of the foreign minister in Rawalpindi did not produce favourable outcomes, which aligned with Malik Amir's earlier prediction. He believed that the rigidity on both sides was the primary reason for the failure of these negotiations. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, was given the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, Born to be Hanged (Rupa: rupa University Press, 2018) 189.

duty of bringing about peace between India and Pakistan. Malik Amir expressed concerns about this decision, likening it to selecting an arsonist to put out a fire. Swaran Singh, the then-Indian Foreign Minister, was criticised for being selected as the principal negotiator, and he called him "noted for his low brain power."

#### Amir Muhammad Khan and Education<sup>53</sup>

Nawab was known for his deep knowledge on various subjects, which left a lasting impression on his visitors. Jacqueline Kennedy once referred to him as the "most amazing history professor of all." Despite some detractors who highlighted the feudal and orthodox mindset of the Nawab, such Altaf Gauhar, Malik Amir's intelligence and contributions were widely praised.

Gauhar recounted an incident where the Governor supported his argument with a story about a artist or mason named Meraj Khan or Din Muhammad from his hometown. Meraj Khan's educated son ended up becoming a criminal and ended up in jail, while his illiterate son continued to work alongside him. Interestingly, Gauhar had mentioned this same story in two of his books, "Gauhar Guzasht" and "Likhtay Rahay Junun Ki Hikayat," yet the characters have different names.

Another interesting fact is that Malik Amir started the reform of basic education being required in the Lahore area on July 25, 1961.

Qudratullah Shahab shared another anecdote from his time working with Nawab. When student riots forced the closure of colleges in Lahore indefinitely, Ayub Khan urged the Governor to reopen them. However, the Governor disagreed, arguing that there was no harm if students did not study. He pointed out that our ancestor was not educated, yet this did not hinder advancements and successes.

Nevertheless, the Governor's personal concern resulted in educational facilities being provided to the residents of Kalabagh. He made Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan aware of the deplorable state of Kalabagh High School, which prompted them to order the construction of a new school structure. Financial assistance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (Washington: Howard University Press, 2014) 107.

was provided to needy but talented boys from various areas to support their education. The Kalabagh familyowned Indus Bus Company provided free passes to college students so they may travel to Mianwali city for their academic pursuits. Through the Nawab's advice, many educated young men were able to get employment in factories like Jinnah Barrage or Daud Khel Industrial Estate.

The old educational system worried the governor much as well. He suggested building a technical, vocational, and agricultural school in Mianwali that would offer instruction appropriate for rural culture<sup>54</sup>.

He did not, however, have a progressive stance on girls' education. In answer to the Kohat community's call for a ladies' college, he stressed his belief in educating females to make good housewives and mothers (Dawn, October 18, 1960).

#### **Government of Kalabagh and Students**

The Head of Mission for Great Britain shared his thoughts about a troubling time. He said that during this period, there were many student protests, and it was quite distressing. The students had some issues, but it seemed like their main goal was to cause trouble for the government. It appeared that opposition politicians were using them for their own purposes.

There was a proposal called the Sharif Commission that suggested changing the bachelor's degree program to three years (B.A). Strong opposition to this idea from students, parents, and instructors resulted in demonstrations throughout West Pakistan beginning on September 18, 1962. The Governor of West Pakistan now has the authority to withdraw the degrees of problematic students thanks to a new university ordinance. The Ordinance had transformed their educational institutions into prisons, according to a resolution issued by students in Lahore on April 4, 1963. The "Commission on Students' Problems and Welfare," headed by Justice Hamud-ur-Rehman, was established in 1964, advocated amending the University Ordinance to remove the objectionable provisions. Malik Amir voiced his displeasure with politicians who abused students

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Surinder Kumar Sharma, Yaqboo ul Hassan, Ashok K. Behuria, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (USA: Pentagon Press, 2019) 295.

to further their own political objectives. Instead of innocent children, he thought that student leaders should be held accountable. Due to the high number of arrests under the Tashkent Accord, there was agitation among students. However, the situation was handled by the Governor, who withdrew cases against students and postponed exams, taking a more lenient approach<sup>55</sup>.

Freedom of press and Kalabagh Government

On April 26, 1960, the Press and Publication Ordinance (PPO) was unveiled. The PPO was changed by the Nawab of Kalabagh in August 1963 to become the West Pakistan Press and Publication Ordinance 1963 (XXX 1963), which came to be known as the "Black Law" because of its tight limitations on print media. These modifications included:

- Giving the executive branch, rather than the judiciary, the power to confiscate security deposits.
- Prohibiting printers, publishers, and editors from reporting on legislative or court proceedings unless officially provided.
- Increasing the maximum security deposit from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 30,000.
- Requiring government press releases and handouts to be published precise.
- Permitting the creation of a commission to look at the finances and relations between the workforce and management.

Replacing the High Court by a Special Tribunal that would hear appeals against government decisions and be composed of a government official, a retired Supreme Court judge, and a government nominee from the media sector.

Far ahead, on November 29, 1964, Nawab of Kalabagh revoked these amendments due to strong protests from journalists and editors. Altaf Gauhar derogatorily commented on the journalist community during this period. Majid Nizami accused Governor Malik Amir of threatening to ban Nawa-i-Waqt. However, Abdul Wahid, Convention Muslim League's general secretary, claimed that Ayub Khan was primarily responsible

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Muhammad Anwar, Ebad Baig, Pakistan: Time for Change (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2013) 73.

for these press laws, with Nawab advising a more lenient approach. Nawab argued that most newspapers supported the rule, except Nawa-i-Waqt, and suppressing it would only tarnish the government's image. The closure of Outlook in Karachi in August 1964 left West Pakistan without any critical newspapers, while four opposition newspapers continued to operate in East Pakistan. The Lahore and Multan editions of the Monthly Tarjuman-ul-Quran, the Monthly Afkar, and the Daily Kohistan were all briefly outlawed. Progressive Papers donated its magazines and newspapers to the National Press Trust, which had just been founded on March 27, 1964.

The Tashkent Agreement led to the implementation of a fresh Press order in February 1966. This ordinance granted District Magistrates the authority to deny the renewal of declarations if a newspaper was deemed to have malicious intentions against defense, law and order, or foreign policy. Sipra, a police officer, ordered a truck to run over a journalist's camera to break it, but no investigation was conducted. The journalist community called off their boycott after the Governor established a tribunal on August 16, 1966, to address newspaper-related issues and grievances<sup>56</sup>.

There are rumours that creative writers also had limitations. According to reports, Malik Amir was upset when Abdullah Hussain received the Adam Jee Award for his filthy novel "Udas Naslain" in Urdu. Nawab thought to accuse Abdullah Hussain, but the federal authorities decided against it. Later, in a letter to Ayub Khan, Nawab accused Shahab of endorsing immoral literature. Authors including Shahidullah Kaiser, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Shaukat Siddiqui, Abdullah Hussain, and Ahmad Nadim Qasimi were allegedly promoted by the literary organization Writers Guild, which was founded in the All-Pakistan Writers Convention in January 1959, with purported ulterior intentions<sup>57</sup>.

Abdul Wahid Khan said that Malik Amir declined to order the arrest of Shorish Kashmiri and did not favour severe treatment of the press<sup>58</sup>. He was considerate of allowing a free press in Kalabagh, nevertheless, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> (Weekly Zindagi, October 6, 1969, pp.15-6).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> (Niazi, 1986).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> (Dawn, August 17, 1966).

told news vendors to throw out newspapers with offensive content into the Indus River. He thought that sensationalised material will lead to turmoil in Kalabagh<sup>59</sup>.

On January 29, 1965, a terrible incident occurred when journalist Zamir Qureshi was fatally shot outside the home of opposition leader Malik Ghulam Jilani after perhaps misreading the target. On March 9, 1965, Malik Amir gave the Zamir Qureshi Fund 5,000 rupees, while nine province ministers each gave the charity 1,000 rupees. However, the murder investigation was unable to move forward, and by the end of 1965, the provincial government decided that disclosing additional information about the inquiry would be contrary to the public interest<sup>60</sup>.

#### Amir Muhammad Khan's Opinion over Bengal

Malik Amir Muhammad Khan supposedly had a negative view of the Bengalis living in East Pakistan. It appears that Nawab had some sympathy for the Bengalis who were complaining about the allocation of land at the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage, However, he also saw it as a political ploy by some self-serving politicians<sup>61</sup>. He claimed that despite the government spending 1.6 million on them, the Bengali settlers at the Ghulam Muhammad Barrage had not paid any taxes (Nawa-i-Waqt, May 20, 1963). Mujib-ur-Rehman advocated for returning these settlers to East Pakistan so they may live on their own land, even if it meant suffering.

Malik Amir, not being truly democratic, may have been afraid of the numerical strength of the Bengalis. Ayub's diary, dated April 13, 1969, reveals Malik's mindset in this regard. Do you know what this man Jinnah is doing? Malik quoted his relative, Sardar Muhammad Nawaz of Kot Fateh Khan (1901–68), who said as much in 1946 or thereabouts. He desires that Bengal's lower castes rule over us.

#### Six Points of Shaikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and Nawab of Kalabagh

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> (Shahab, 1994).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> (Shah, 2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> (Feldman, The Ruling Elites, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). 77.

In 1966, Mujib-ur-Rehman presented a significant proposal known as the Six ideas at the Lahore house of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali. These Six Points aimed to establish greater autonomy for the provinces, following the principles outlined in the Pakistan Resolution of March 23, 1940. These demands ultimately played a key role in the eventual division of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh. Here's a breakdown of the Six Points:

- Complete Provincial Autonomy: The first point called for full autonomy for each province within Pakistan.
- Limited Central Authority: The central government should retain control only over Defense and Foreign Affairs.
- Separate Currencies: Either there should be limits on the movement of capital between East and West Pakistan, or both should have their own currencies.
- Provincial Control Over Finances: Provinces should have complete control over their taxes and foreign exchange.
- Right to Raise a Militia: East Pakistan should have the authority to establish its own militia.

There are different perspectives on the origin and purpose of the Six Points:

Some historians believe that it was conceived by nationalist Bengali intellectuals. Others suggest that it may have been a political maneuver by the Ayub government to divide the opposition.

According to a notion put up by S.M. Zafar, Mujib-ur-Rehman received these details from Kalabagh's thengovernor, Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan. According to Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan, he believed that he could control West Pakistan but not both East and West Pakistan together<sup>62</sup>.

Nawab of Kalabagh Amir Muhammad Khan predicted the consequences of the Six-Point conspiracy accurately. He foresaw that it could serve two purposes: advisors to The East Pakistanis would be encouraged

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror (Taylor & Francis, 2005) 107.

to adhere to the Six Points while Ayub would mistreat the Bengalis, eventually contributing to their desire for independence. He was concerned that mishandling the situation could lead to significant bloodshed<sup>63</sup>.

#### External Policy of Pakistan and Opinion of the Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan

Malik's substantial political and international relations understanding greatly impressed a group of senior research colleagues from the Imperial Defence College of London. They noted that he was the most well-informed person they had encountered in Pakistan. Malik Amir showed a remarkable capacity for logical and assured discussion on a variety of topics, particularly foreign affairs (Jahan Dad, 1999). He understood the value of globalisation and intergovernmental cooperation.

It is undeniable that developing countries require assistance from developed nations. However, it is crucial to understand that positive economic aid not only contributes to global peace but also serves the interests of nations worldwide. In today's interconnected world, no nation, whether large or small, can afford to isolate itself and succeed independently.

The moderate, pro-capitalist wing of Ayub's government was led by Nawab Malik Amir. His detractors saw him as a tool of the United States and the United Kingdom, alleging that he had no independent opinions and was frequently persuaded to advance their interests by their diplomats. Jahan Dad Khan, his military secretary, thought otherwise since he saw Nawab as too patriotic and self-assured to be ruled by others. The Governor said on August 6, 1965, "If American aid is stopped, we won't go hungry";<sup>64</sup>

Ayub's pro-China stance did not excite Malik Amir because he thought that Pakistan might eventually be encircled if the Silk Route was opened. He did not, however, advise cutting China off from friendship. Instead, he advocated for Pakistan to pursue a neutral, autonomous foreign policy that was independent of both superpowers (Rokhri, 1994). He believed that a pro-Western stance and support for the Capitalist Bloc could considerably advance the nation's economy, increase security, and preserve its cultural legacy (Jahan

<sup>63 (</sup>Dawn, August 17, 1965).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> (Razi & Shakir, Pakistan: The Journey to the Tough (Sang e meel, 1997). 45

Dad, 1999). He advocated for a practical and reasonable approach to the Kashmir conflict as well as Indo-Pak ties.

The Nawab of Kalabagh, Shoaib, and other moderate leaders in the government, according to the British High Commissioner in Pakistan, supported the reasonable and moderate policies towards India that the President of Tashkent had endorsed. However, since August 1965, Nawab had been unhappy with the way Ayub had handled the Kashmir problem. (Roedad, 2002, N.J. Barrington British High Commissioner in Pakistan to R.W. Whitney, South Asia Department, Commonwealth Relations Office, July 8, 1966) He made an effort to establish a balance, avoiding excessive anti-Indian sentiment while expressing the sentiment of the general populace<sup>65</sup>.

#### Nawab Amir's Policies Against Anti One Unit Activities

In 1963, a plan called the One Unit plan was put into action with the goal of rapidly developing all of West Pakistan while using the revenue it collected. The plan aimed to suppress regionalism and ethnic biases. The Nawab of Kalabagh criticized politicians who initially supported the plan but later opposed it for their own selfish reasons.

However, Balochistan showed strong opposition to the One-Unit plan. At one point, it seemed like Baluchistan had practically seceded due to open defiance of authority. Rao Abdur Rashid, a retired police officer, noted that while the issue was initially handled politically, under Malik Amir's leadership, it turned into a law-and-order matter dealt with by force. This approach humiliated Baloch Sardars and fueled resentment.

An order imposing martial law that ordered the surrender of all firearms not in possession of legal permits was what started the rebellion in Balochistan. The turmoil was exacerbated by rumours of land reforms in Balochistan. Baloch Nationalists demanded a number of things, including the removal of limitations on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (Greenwood: Prager Publishing, 1980) 57.

legally owned firearms, the reinstatement of Riwaj (Baloch customs-based law), the closure of all police stations and the withdrawal of officers, and the suspension of work on the Khuzdar-Saruna route.

On suspicion of sedition, prominent tribal leaders like Khair Bakhsh Marri, Attaullah Mengal, and Nawab Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugti were detained. These sardars lost their positions of authority, and their allying relatives filled them. However, one by one, these sardars were later executed by the government. Young Baloch rebels known as Pararis or Fararis emerged at the same time to oppose the government.

In response to a plea from Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Malik Amir tried to persuade Ayub Khan to free Attaullah Mengal and Akbar Bugti. However, the governor was forced to comply with Khair Baksh Marri's demands, forcing him to take non-political action.

The demands included asserting sardars' ownership of minerals in their areas, withdrawing police and revenue department officials, compensating Marri tribesmen killed in 1965-6, allowing only sardars to recruit levies and nominate Jirga members, stopping new road construction, and restoring sardars' privileges while releasing the assassin of Doda Khan Marri<sup>66</sup>.

Which of these requests, according to Ayub Bakhsh Awan, indicated a struggle for national identity? The Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, thought Ayub Khan was the brains behind the anti-Baloch policies. He claimed that Malik Amir charged Ayub with damaging Baloch interests in order to appease the Afghan government. The Baloch were favoured in Ayub's strategy while the Pathans were given more influence. Malik Amir thought that Ayub intended the Pathans to rule the province.

## Malik Amir with his rivals in politics

Jahan Dad Khan argued that the label of "ruthlessness" assigned to Nawab was actually unwarranted because he did not rely on direct physical force. Malik Amir himself claimed that his approach was not to use physical force or torture but to hit his opponents financially.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Ahmet T. Kuru, Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019) 48.

Here are some instances that shed light on how Malik Amir dealt with his political rivals:

- 1. It is said that the Nawab gave the Regional Transport Authority instructions to revoke the route permits of the Gujrat Bus Service, which was run by Mian Akbar Pagganwala, a Gujrat-based opposition Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA).
- 2. Khan Bahadur Malik Amir thought nothing of Hafiz Muhammad Habibullah Paracha, an old-time Muslim League member and proprietor of the Paracha Textile Mill, considering him to be no more than the son of a Makhud shopkeeper. The primary point of contention initially concerned ownership of royalties from the Makarwal collieries. In May 1966, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, an anti-Ayub politician, defeated Convention League candidate Paracha in a by-election in Lyari, Karachi. Bizenjo was openly endorsed by two provincial ministers in Malik's cabinet, Ghaffar Pasha and Mahmud Abdullah Harun, and there were claims that money was offered to voters as an incentive. The governor's participation was rumoured but not confirmed.
- 3. The Pir of Makhad Sharif, Syed Muhi-ud-Din Lal Badshah, invaded the dry plains of the Nawab., and despite Nawab's requests, the Pir did not comply. As a result, Nawab ordered the shooting of the trespassers, which led to the loss of lives among Pir's disciples. This incident earned Nawab the epithet of the "Nawab of terror." In 1938, a murder case known as the Nikki murder case also involved the Pir, leading to his imprisonment for six months. It was said that estate employees were instructed to teach the Pir a lesson as he had interfered in the domestic affairs of the Nawab.

However, political rivalry also had ideological roots. The Progressive Front of the Muslim League was the group that the Pir of Makhad joined, led by Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana, which promoted land reforms beneficial to farmers<sup>67</sup>. Malik Amir, on the other hand, sided with Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot's team. Punjab's landlords were uneasy because the Pir of Makhad presided over the Kisan Conference at Khanewal, which attracted attention.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 47.

When Malik Amir was appointed governor, he wrote to the Pir to express his desire to put their disagreements aside while he was in office. Later, in the 1965 Presidential election, Miss Fatima Jinnah was supported by Pir Safi-ud-Din, the Pir of Makhad's son and political heir, who ran against Ayub Khan. Governor Malik Amir allegedly ordered the canal water supply to the lands of the Makhad family in Khanewal to be shut off, according to Pir Ghulam Abbas Shah, the present Pir of Makhad<sup>68</sup>.

#### Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

Having severe reservations about Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), the Nawab of Kalabagh. He thought that British civil officials had an impact on the Bhutto family. As the head of the pro-China faction in Ayub Khan's cabinet, Bhutto, on the other hand, thought that some members of the government, particularly the Nawab of Kalabagh, intended to get rid of him.

The Nawab also thought that Bhutto was behind the "misadventure in occupied Kashmir" during Ayub's rule. He believed that Bhutto did this to weaken Ayub Khan and ultimately gain more power for himself. When Bhutto tried to use the Tashkent Accord for political gain, he lost his position as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In a meeting with the Governor, Bhutto was warned about the consequences if he publicly opposed the government.

Gauhar Ayub claims that the Governor even proposed that Bhutto may be killed if Ayub consented, but Ayub refused and insisted that the Governor be held accountable for Bhutto's safety. A woman once accused Bhutto of kidnapping and raping her, but the claim was ultimately shown to be maliciously false. Bhutto was a powerful Federal Minister, but Pir Rashedi observed that he also wanted more power in West Pakistan. The Nawab of Kalabagh was cautious about any meddling with West Pakistan's governance, though. Bhutto visited Malik Amir in the Governor House after being fired, and Malik gave him a warm reception and vowed not to harm him in any manner.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Yunas Samad, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958 (Islamabad: SAGE Publications, 1995) 138.

Later on, Bhutto took advantage of the political turmoil to remove Ayub from power, but he waited until Malik Amir resigned.

#### Mawlana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi

In a crucial election in 1946, the Nawab of Kalabagh firmly backed Mawlana Niazi. Deputy Commissioner (R) Khaliq Dad Khan, a candidate for the Unionist Party, lost to Mawlana Niazi. However, their relationship was short-lived, and they later developed savage rivalries in politics that lasted the remainder of their lives. Mawlana Niazi said the Nawab's influence played a role in his removal as president of the Mianwali Muslim League. Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot's buddy, the Nawab, reportedly sought to punish Niazi for his participation in the investigation into the "Sahiwal Firing Case." In this case, police shootings resulted in the deaths of some Rajput Muhajirins from Rao Rashid Ali Khan's tribe. The Provincial Government was deemed to have been negligent in this situation by an inquiry commission that included Mawlana Sattar Niazi, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, and Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot (Monthly Zia-i-Haram (Lahore), April 1973, p. 22).

Mawlana Niazi allegedly received an offer of Rs. 5,00,000/= to withdraw from the projected 1958 election from Mianwali and enable Iskander Mirza to represent the same constituency, according to Hakim Anwar Baberi (1922–77). Malik Amir was enraged by Niazi's rejection and firmly asserted that martial law will be imposed instead of an election as he twisted his moustache<sup>69</sup>.

Niazi claimed that Malik Muzaffar Khan, Malik Amir's son, was defeated in the 1962 provincial elections thanks to the use of state apparatus.

A petition including seventeen accusations was delivered to Ayub Khan in 1963 and was headed "Petition against the criminal governor of West Pakistan, Malik Amir Muhammad Khan [History Sheeter Column B]".<sup>70</sup> Malik Amir was charged with a number of offences in this petition by Mawlana and "the people of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> (Dogar, Islam and Pakistan (McMillan, 1977) 181

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> (Weekly Rafaqat (Sargodha), November 20, 1972).

Mianwali," including rigging, murder, smuggling, black marketing, slave trafficking, corruption, and misbehavior.

Another plea was submitted in the court of Justice Abdul Qadir Sheikh, claiming that Mawlana Sattar Niazi was detained while engaging in protests against the University Ordinance because he was falsely accused of looting and setting fire at Islamia College Lahore. He was allegedly subjected to nine police officers' abuse while in jail, kept awake for 55 straight hours, and denied warm clothing and adequate bedding in bitter cold. Niazi said that he was the target of multiple assassination attempts to punish him for standing up for Miss Fatima Jinnah against Ayub Khan (Naya Piyam, September 15, 1969).

#### Chaudhri Zahoor Elahi

Malik Amir Muhammad Khan's political journey had its share of ups and downs, and it's important to consider his background and upbringing when analyzing his actions. He was known for his strong character, valor, unwavering loyalty to friends, and generous hospitality. However, his demeanor could also be uneven and strict, making him appear unforgiving, arrogant, and cruel to his adversaries.

Malik Amir executed his plans without ethical constraints. In his native area, he used various tactics like teasing, threats, temptations, and interference with businesses to keep his rivals in check. While there were allegations that he physically harmed his opponents, these claims have little basis in truth.

Amir's loyalty to Ayub Khan led him to employ autocratic measures, earning him a negative reputation. Some of his suspicions about Ayub's close associates, such as Bhutto, turned out to be accurate. His supposed opposition to free speech and education is a myth mixed with actuality. Even though Ayub Khan, a tyrant, forbade an unconstrained press, newspapers continued to serve as the voices of various communities and ideologies<sup>71</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> (Nawa-i-Waqt, December 10, 1965).

During his tenure, the education sector saw significant progress, although he was not particularly enthusiastic about girls' education. Amir's socioeconomic class, education, and upbringing all had an impact on his tendency towards capitalism. Being a landlord, he opposed communist doctrine, which called for the redistribution of big estates to peasants and an equitable society. He counselled Ayub to keep friendly relations with the capitalist bloc while avoiding alienating the USSR.

Amir Muhammad Khan, often referred to as the "Dove," opposed military confrontation with India and sympathized with the Kashmiri people. He advocated for a pragmatic approach to the Kashmir dispute but remained skeptical about achieving tension-free relations with India due to both sides' inflexibility.

Amir began to distrust the Bengalis due to their agitational politics, fearing that their numerical strength might lead to their permanent dominance over West Pakistan. He believed that Bengali centrifugal politics would eventually result in Pakistan's partition. He strongly supported the One-Unit system as a means to maintain Pakistan's integrity and dealt firmly with Baloch sardars and the National Awami Party, viewing them as threats to the federation.<sup>72</sup>

In summary, Malik Amir Muhammad Khan will be remembered as an efficient administrator who worked tirelessly to implement his dictator friend's plans to achieve specific outcomes. While not a proponent of democracy, he was a skilled manager who maintained a massive land with a low criminality rate and an well-organized state equipment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy (London: Howard University Press, 2014) 87.

# **Chapter V Support and British Control in Kalabagh during Colonial Times**

#### Abstract

This chapter examines the history of Kalabagh during colonial times. It specifically focuses on how the British government's policies affected this area. In some parts, like the canal colony districts, the British introduced policies that aimed at both progress and paternalism. It was meant they wanted to develop the region while also maintaining control. However, in agriculturally backward areas like Kalabagh, things were different. In the town of Kalabagh, the British government worked to strengthen the existing tribal and feudal leadership system. It was based on family connections and dependency networks. They did this to fit the "community" into their ordered political structure. In addition, this study highlights the important role of moneylenders in this town, who exploited the rural deprived by governing economic activities, land dealings, and debt, similar to the jajmani system. The poverty and lack of development in Kalabagh were not just due to the colonial economic policies. Instead, it resulted from teamwork between the local elite and the colonial administration. This partnership allowed them to maintain political control and keep society stagnant.

#### Introduction

Kalabagh used to be an important town for business a long time ago. It was located on a hill, making it a stopover for travelers and armies going to India. The town's existence was mainly because of its salt mines and alum production. The land was flat and fertile, and there were valuable minerals like salt and even rock oil in the area.

Three hundred years ago, a man by the name of Bandey Ali, the grandson of Shaikh Adu, the Awan tribe's first settler, took command and assumed leadership over the salt mines. In addition to controlling the ferry and collecting salt and alum taxes, he also received homage after the Bhangi Khel, a Khattak community who lived in the peaks to the northward of Kalabagh. Kalabagh was like a feudal society, where people were connected by family relationships, and those in power controlled the lives of those beneath them.

In 1849, the British government took over the Punjab, and they brought in a modern system of government that controlled many aspects of society, like agriculture and taxes. They also made deals with local leaders from different tribes, like the Mazaris, Legharis, Noons, and others, to cooperate with them. Some powerful chiefs were given land and authority over their areas<sup>73</sup>. The Rais of Kalabagh, for example, were given control over the town's administration and finances.

The cooperation between the big landowners and the British government was mainly because the Punjab was important for the British as a stronghold in India. This was partially due to the local elites' stronghold on the economy and society provided by their lands and prominent role within the established family networks. They played crucial duties, such as collecting taxes, providing soldiers, and upholding law and order, and in return the British government supported and rewarded them.

#### Nawabs and Kalabagh

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> David Gilmartin, Blood and Water (California: University of California Press, 2020) 98-103.

The Kalabagh Rais were local leaders who became wealthy under British rule, but they did not deliver as much military support to the British as other chiefs in West Punjab, like the Tiwanas in Shahpur, Jhang, and especially Multan. In Talbot's biography of Khizar Tiwana, it is said that the Tiwanas amassed wealth and power over many years by their military prowess.

The Rais were instrumental in assisting the British during the 1857 revolt as well as the second Sikh War in 1848–1849. In Bannu, Rais Allah Yar served the British Army, while in Peshawar in 1857, Muzaffar Khan organised a hundred supporters to back Herbert Edwardes. The British granted Muzaffar Khan land concessions in exchange and recognised his jagir, or landholding, as hereditary and inalienable.

John Lawrence put in place a strategy that acknowledged the pre-existing jagirdars after the Punjab was annexed in order to avoid resistance from them and their biradari networks or extended family connections. The Board of Administration decided to provide the Rais hereditary tax-free land grants and recognise their ownership rights over two villages, Nikki and Massan, according to the Financial Commissioner of Punjab. The Board also waived the tribute that the Sikhs had previously collected and granted the Rais access to a portion of the Kalabagh mines' profits<sup>74</sup>.

The jagir, or land-holding, was quite extensive, stretching from Bhangi Khel in the northward of the Indus River to Massan in the southeast and Esakhel in the westward. The primary center of this landholding was Kalabagh. The Rais, who were the owners of this land, had various sources of income:

- They earned Rs 200 from property in Esakhel tehsil that was exempt from taxes, as well as from Kalabagh, Kotchandana, and Jalalpur.
- 2. The village of Massan brought in Rs 4726 in perpetual income, mostly from the salt mountain's selfgrown vegetation.
- 3. An additional Rupees 34 came from shaving taxes in Kalabagh.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Sir Robert Warburton, Eighteen Years in the Khyber, 1879-1898 (London: J. Murray, 1900) 178.

- 4. The duty on alum produced in Kalabagh contributed Rs 3223 to their income, along with taxes on alum-bearing earth, which was spread to various parts of India until 1854. However, their jagir revenue faced a significant decline by 1865, dropping to Rs 12,000. This decrease was mainly due to alum production increasing in other parts of India, leading to a decrease in demand and price.
- 5. The removal of gold-sand amalgam from the Indus River bed generated an additional Rs 245 in income.

The Khattak tribe, which supplied a sizable number of recruits for the military, predominated in the mountainous region of Bhangi Khel in the jagir. The government gave the Khans a 10% allowance on the money made from Bhangi Khel as compensation for their recruitment efforts. This allowance was first given to Muzaffar Khan, and then to his descendants Yar Muhammad Khan and Allah Yar Khan. Khan effectively ran his jagir and had a large number of excellent horses and mules.

Another announcement providing Yar Muhammad Khan revenue-free property in Kalabagh, Kotchandana, Jalalpur, and Nikki arrived in 1903. When Yar Muhammad Khan passed away in 1908, Ata Muhammad Khan became the new lineage leader. In the district, Ata Muhammad Khan was a key player in the colonial government's recruitment efforts.

Role of Rais of Kalabagh During First World War and Title of Nawab

During the First World War, the government needed more people, money, and resources from the Punjab region in India to support its military efforts. In particular, they needed soldiers for their army.<sup>75</sup> Mianwali district, which had a large population of Pathan people, was an excellent place to find recruits for the military. One person who played a significant role in this recruitment effort was Rais Ata Muhammad Khan. He had control over the Bhangi Khel circle, which allowed him to provide a hundred employees for the settler army. In addition to this, he contributed a substantial amount of money during the First War loan of 1917. He also spent 35,000 rupees to purchase 30 horses for the Brits Aid Remounts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Romesh Chunder Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule (New York: Routledge, 2000) 95-106.s

In the second Conflict Loan of 1918, Rais Ata Muhammad Khan donated another fifty thousand rupees and later contributed 75,000 rupees to the aero plane fund. As a result of his contributions and support, he was honored with the title of Nawab and received land grants as a reward. This action by the British government created a new group of loyal landowners in the region.

The British in Punjab brought local leaders from rural areas into their government system through a special role called the zaildar. This position was exclusive to the regional government of Punjab. The zaildar performed two jobs. First, they oversaw a group of villages, making sure their leaders followed government policies and assisting in their implementation. Second, they spoke on behalf of these villages' interests before the colonial government. This rank was offered as a token of appreciation for fidelity and to acknowledge regional sway and power.

By appointing them as honorary magistrates and darbar members, tribal leaders and landowners were also included in the governance structure. For instance, within his estate, Rais Ata Muhammad Khan was chosen to serve as the zaildar of Massan, Thamey Wali Zail in the Tehsil of Mianwali, and Kalabagh Zail in the Tehsil of Isa Khel. Later, he took over his father's duties as a Provincial Darbari and was given the power to enforce law and order as an honorary magistrate<sup>76</sup>.

He had a stronger bond with the colonial state thanks to this arrangement. Owning property was essential to enhancing his power because it gave him the ability to govern society and economic resources, which in turn helped the colonial state maintain order and amass wealth.

## **Condition of Trade**

Prior to the advent of railroads, Kalabagh was connected to adjacent towns and villages by river trade. Different villages made up the population in the rural areas. Some of them were craftsmen, some were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Max L. Gross, A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia (Washington: National Defense Intelligence College, 2007) 136.

farmers who worked on the land, and others were laborers who did various jobs for the wealthy families in charge.

Their economy mainly revolved around making things like boats, traditional crafts, spinning and weaving, and making tools. They sold these things in their local area and also in other places like Bannu, Kohat, and Dera Ismail Khan. They also made pottery, baskets, mats, and iron tools.

There were 6,805 weavers in the town around the start of the First World War, and a total of 16,421 people relied on these businesses for their living. They typically made between four and twelve annas per day, which is not a lot of money.

Some of the weavers had their own money to start with, but most had to borrow money from others, and this put them in a tough spot because they had to pay back these loans with interest. The rich families in charge, known as the Rais, didn't do much to help the poor. Instead, they put extra taxes on the local industries and craftspeople. Even though they might have seemed caring, people were more afraid of them than anything else. These taxes affected the poor people a lot because they had to pay them when building houses, setting up looms, making boats, and running ferries across the river. The government officials collected these taxes, and the right to operate the ferries was auctioned off every year.<sup>77</sup>

# Importance of Kalabagh Among the Area

Prior to the advent of railroads, Kalabagh was connected to adjacent towns and villages by river trade. Different villages made up the population in the rural areas. Some of them were craftsmen, some were farmers who worked on the land, and others were laborers who did various jobs for the wealthy families in charge.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> N. C. Asthana, Anjali Nirmal, Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities (New Dehi: Pointer Publishers, 2009) 284.

Their economy mainly revolved around making things like boats, traditional crafts, spinning and weaving, and making tools. They offered these items for sale in their neighbourhood as well as in Bannu, Kohat, and Dera Ismail Khan. Additionally, they produced mats, pottery, baskets, and iron implements.

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## British Agricultural Expansion in the Area

The British administration in the Punjab region launched an extensive agricultural development project between 1885 and 1926, building nine new "canal colonies" along the province's five western rivers. Redefining social interactions and addressing the existing hierarchies between the local populace and the government were the main driving forces behind this endeavour. A potential threat to colonial power was also represented by those who held significant roles in rural leadership.

The colonial state did not have the financial wherewithal to invest in the difficult terrain of Kalabagh in northwest Punjab. According to C.L. Tupper, a class of middlemen with ownership rights was essential to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> George Watt, Indian Art at Delhi, 1903. Being the Official Catalogue of the Delhi Exhibition, 1902-1903 (London: Creative Media Partners, LLC, 2022) 143.

British plan to irrigate and colonise the Punjab's uninhabited regions. In Kalabagh, the colonial authorities relied on the local elite to sustain the native tribal system while generating income and taxes through their power and influence<sup>79</sup>.

The Rais owned the majority of the land used for agriculture in Kalabagh town; the remaining land was mostly used for grazing pastures and salt hills, leaving little room for farming. Along with the Rais, the agrarian society also comprised artisanal biradaris who provided local services and small-scale commodity production, as well as a class of landless wage labourers.

Banerjee noted that landless people in agricultural communities had inferior status in the social and political structure of farming and were directly dependent on landowners for their financial security. The Rais, who owned the land, had complete control over it, whether it was cultivated by tenants or laborers. The only challenge the Rais faced was in 1862 when hereditary peasant cultivators disputed his ownership of Massan village. The occupancy tenants complained about excessive demands and petitioned the court to establish a fixed rent amount. Nevertheless, the Rais managed to strengthen his control over the land.

Following the initial settlement in 1878, some cultivators gained occupancy rights, but with certain restrictions. However, according on the main sources, there is no proof that the town has any additional occupation renters or peasant landowners. Due to this structure, privileged landowners and village owners received an unfair allocation of administrative, economic, and political rights. As a result, the government didn't exert its authority at the village or town level but rather used these affluent colonial middlemen to communicate with the local populace.

#### The State of Kalabagh and Its Division

The Kalabagh estate was separated into two main segments. One portion was known as 'Patti' and was further split into two *zails: zail* A, also called *Nikki*, and *zail* B, known as Massan. These *zails* were managed directly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Theodore Leighton Pennell, Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier (Seeley: Seeley Publishers, 1909) 124.

by the Rais himself, who held the position of zaildar. The further segment of the state was situated on the bounds of Kalabagh and consisted of the riverine expanse of *Katcha*.

Wheat, gramme, jawar (sorghum), bajra (pearl millet), jammaun, and tara mira (Jamba oil) were the most important community crops grown in the patti area. Katcha was a low-lying, flat area with creeks that was situated close to the Indus River. During monsoon season, flooding was a common occurrence. Khudri was a rocky area of the estate that was situated near the Salt Range. Bhangi Khel, a steep region, was located at the North West Frontier's most northern frontier. The Rais took extra care to cultivate the soil with the assistance of the Khattaks of Bani Afghanan, a neighbouring cis-Indus town, even though some of the soil in the Bhangi Khel region had been hardened by floods from hill streams<sup>80</sup>.

There were just a few Jat peoples, as well as the Hirayahs, Bhambs, Chinas, Jakors, and Anotras, living on this agricultural land when the Rais gained it. To develop the land, the Rais used rudimentary and erratic farming techniques and hired agricultural labourers and tenants. Their agriculture was heavily reliant on river moisture, with wells and jhallars (special wells near rivers used to store water for irrigation) serving as supplements. The district gazetteer stated that either through natural overflow or man-made channels, wells had to be continuously refilled with water from the river. Additionally, hillside slopes were altered for cultivation, and bunds or embankments were constructed to control water from hill torrents, redirecting it to flat fields through structures known as 'ghandi' in the local language.

# Foundational of Kalabagh-Bannu Railways

In 1913, when the Kalabagh-Bannu railroad was opened, it had a significant impact on the trade and economy of the region. The riverine trade, which had been thriving, started to decline. Old trade routes and commercial

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Bayly, C. A. "Local Control in Indian Towns—the Case of Allahabad 1880—1920." (Modern Asian Studies, 1971, 5, no. 4.

towns like Bhakkar and Isakhel saw a decline in importance as a result<sup>81</sup>. As a result, just twelve boats were produced locally each year by the local boat manufacturing sector.

Instead, Kalabagh began to emerge as a hub for agricultural produce and a center for exporting goods, thanks to its new railway station. The railway connection allowed Kalabagh to access larger markets and adapt to changing price trends. The Kalabagh estate included the two significant railway stations of Mari and Massan. They were crucial in moving grain from the rough, ravine-filled Khudri circle as well as salt and grain from the Kalabagh salt mines. Those who served as the zaildar of Massan zail, such as Rais Ata Muhammad and later Ameer Muhammad, oversaw this operation.

The introduction of railways had a significant impact on the commercialization of agriculture in the Punjab region. One of the primary effects was an increase in agricultural prices and labor wages. It's important to keep in mind, though, that Mukherjee claims that this price increase mostly benefited the zamindars who had sizable landholdings. Mukherjee maintained that small-scale, self-cultivating peasants did not gain from rising prices due to increased costs for labour wages, irregular changes in water rates, and land revenue assessments in a study of the Sialkot and Shahpur districts from 1900 to 1920. Instead, it was the tenants and laborers who benefited more. Similar conditions were observed in the Mianwali district.

Rais or nawab of Kalabagh benefited the most from this situation. He changed the method of payments to the marginal tenants and farm laborers. Instead of giving them cash, he started giving them goods or kind payments. This meant that these people had to derive from the Rais to meet their non-food needs, and they could not easily repay these debts.<sup>82</sup>

Around 1908, during the first regular settlement, wages for laborers in the district and the entire province went up. This was because there was a growing demand for labor due to irrigation projects and railway

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Chaudhri, T. R., and I. Habib, ed. The Cambridge Economic History of India Vol.1 C. 1200-c.1750. New York: Cambridge University) 77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Hotri, I. A. "Agrarian Change in the Canal Colonies, Punjab 1890-1935." PhD. diss., (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru University) 1987.

construction. Labor wages and agricultural prices increased because more land was being cultivated and wealthier farmers were emerging.

However, the Estate of Kalabagh was not significantly affected by these changes. While cultivation increased, labor wages remained unfairly small in the domain. The kind rent charges (batai rates) enlarged elsewhere in the district and province due to rising land and commodity prices, but the Rais paid a fixed rate of 3/2, with 3 portions going to occupants and two parts to the land.

The charge rates in each town on the Rais' land be contingent on tradition and the relationship amid the Rais and the occupants. For instance, in the Khudri ring, the customary rent was one by third. However, the Rais used his feudal authority to add an imaginary plough to the tenants' ploughs when dividing the produce. This effectively increased the rent from 1/3 to 1/5, which was referred to locally as *'moa jora'* or dead plough<sup>83</sup>. The town had extensive grazing lands that generated significant revenue. People mostly paid this revenue by selling well-lit butter (ghee) and wool. Those who kept cows also had to reimbursement the Rais a cropping tax each six calendar month, which was four annas (pence) for goats and one rupee for cows and buffaloes.

# Hierarchy of Land Ownership in Kalabagh

In the colonial era, village proprietors known as the Rais had significant control over laborers and menials in their villages, even though these workers were not legally allowed to own property. In Kalabagh, there was a tradition that required new settlers to pay an entrance fee called 'jhuri' and an annual fee known as 'malikana' to acquire land for cultivation. Despite being the actual owners, these settlers were given the status of 'adna maalik' or inferior owners. The cost of paying malikana fluctuated, and if a new settler couldn't afford the 'jhuri' price, a more seasoned landowner would give them a cultivable plot with no property rights; these people were known as 'butimar' renters. They cleared ground and built embankments mostly in low-lying alluvial regions like Katcha.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Amir Abdullah Khan Rokhri, Main aur Mera Pakistan Lahore: Jang Publishers. 1994) 84.

In his tenure classification for the first Summary Settlement, Captain Mackenzie emphasised "Jhuri" as a crucial distinction between "adna maalik" and "butimar tenants." It's crucial to remember that this practise was legalised and protected in colonial societies even though it predated those societies.

According to Irfan Habib and Himadri Banerjee, social stratification resulted from the uneven agrarian ties between zamindars (landowners) and tenants, splitting rural society into two groups: landlords and the landless. The hierarchy of land ownership in Kalabagh resulted in a clear distinction between the Rais and the tenants, strengthening the Rais' position in the markets for both land and credit<sup>84</sup>.

The British administration in the Punjab carried out an expansive agricultural plan between 1885 and 1926 by founding nine new "canal colonies" in the western region of the province. This initiative aimed to bring about social changes, reduce hierarchies between the local population and the government, and weaken potential threats to settler rule. The colonial state could not afford to invest in the difficult terrain of Kalabagh in north-western Punjab. According to C.L. Tupper, middlemen with proprietary rights were essential to the British strategy to irrigate and colonise Punjab's wastelands. The colonial state depended on the local elite to raise money and pay taxes by abusing their position of influence and power. The Rais, who owned the agricultural land in Kalabagh, held complete proprietary rights and had tenants or laborers cultivate it. Although some cultivators gained occupancy rights with restrictions after the first regular settlement in 1878, These arrangements created unequal administrative, economic, and political rights by favouring wealthy landowners or village owners. This made it possible for the state to communicate with the local populace primarily through privileged colonial middlemen.

The Kalabagh estate was split into two sections: one was referred to as "patti," which was then separated into two zails, Nikki and Massan, both of which were overseen by Rais acting as zaildars<sup>85</sup>. The other segment was Katcha, a riverine tract on the outskirts of Kalabagh, prone to flooding during the monsoon season. The estate also included Khudri, an uneven tract along the Salt Range, and Bhangi Khel, a hilly area on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Zafar, S.M. Through the Crisis (Lahore: Book Center, 1970), 35-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Altaf, Gauhar, Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler L(ahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1994).229.

(N.W.F.P) border. The Rais prepared the land in these areas for cultivation, often relying on the durable Khattaks of Bani Afghanan for labor.

There were several Jat families living on this agricultural land when the Rais acquired control of it, including the Hirayahs, Bhambs, Chinas, Jakors, and Anotras. They used rudimentary and erratic farming techniques that relied on river moisture and were supported by wells and jhallars. Wells required continuous resupply from rivers, either naturally through overflow or through man-made channels. As water from hill torrents was controlled by embankments and directed to flat land by dams called as "ghandis" in the local dialect, hillsides were also cultivated<sup>86</sup>.

Trading towns like Bhakkar and Isakhel were impacted by the loss in riverine trade that followed the inauguration of the Kalabagh-Bannu railway in 1913. As a result, only twelve boats were produced locally per year in the boat-making sector. With the addition of a railway station that gave it access to broader markets and price variations, Kalabagh developed as a centre for the export marketing of agricultural products. Under the direction of Rais Ata Muhammad Khan and then Ameer Muhammad Khan as the zaildar of Massan zail, the railway stations in Massan and Mari, which were a part of the Kalabagh estate, handled grain from Khudri Circle as well as salt and grain from Kalabagh's salt pits<sup>87</sup>. Kalabagh had important transformations and developments throughout this time:

# **Agricultural Expansion**

The British government's establishment of canal colonies in the Punjab was a crucial part of their strategy to expand agriculture. These new colonies aimed to bring previously unused or underutilized land under cultivation, thereby increasing agricultural output.

#### **Social Transformation**

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Jahan Khan, Pakistan: Leadership Challenges (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 74.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Rafi, Raza,. ed. (*Pakistan in Perspective: 1947-97 9*Karachi: Oxford University Press.1997) 90.

One of the underlying goals of this agricultural expansion was to bring about social change. The British sought to reduce the existing social hierarchies between the local population and the colonial government. This was seen as a way to create a more controlled and manageable social order that served the interests of colonial rule.

# **Role of Proprietary Rights**

The presence of intermediaries with proprietary rights, like the Rais, was pivotal in the British plan. These intermediaries played a crucial role in managing land and labor, often acting as landlords. They were responsible for ensuring that the land was cultivated and revenue and taxes were collected.

# **Unequal Rights**

The system created by the British favored elite landowners and village proprietors, granting them more administrative, economic, and political rights than others. This unequal distribution of power and privilege further entrenched existing social hierarchies.

# Land Use and Irrigation

The cultivation in Kalabagh involved various techniques, including relying on river water, wells, and *jhallars* for irrigation<sup>88</sup>. The local topography, including the riverine tract of *Katcha* and the uneven terrain of Khudri and Bhangi Khel, required careful land management and water control.

# **Economic Changes**

By the introduction of the Bannu-Kalabagh railway in 1913, the region's economic landscape shifted. The decline of riverine trade affected traditional trading towns, and Kalabagh emerged as a center for agricultural

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Roedad, K(comp.) The British Papers: Secret and Confidential, India-Pakistan- Bangladesh Documents 1958-1969 Karachi: Oxford University Press.

produce and export. This change brought the town closer to larger markets and exposed it to price fluctuations.

#### Transportation

The railway played a crucial role in the economic changes, with Massan and Mari railway stations serving as key transportation hubs. They facilitated the transportation of grain and salt from the region to other markets.

The retro between 1885 and 1926 saw the Brits government in the Punjab region of India pursuing an ambitious plan to expand agriculture and bring about social changes. This plan relied on intermediaries with proprietary rights and had a significant impact on land use, irrigation, and the local economy, ultimately transforming the region's social and economic dynamics.

The railways in Punjab helped make farming more commercial, and it created markets for goods. The most significant impact was that agricultural prices and labor wages went up. Mukherjee argues that this increase in prices mostly benefited wealthy landowners (*zamindars*). In some areas like Sialkot and Shahpur districts, small landouwners couldn't benefit from higher prices because they had to spend more on labor, water rates, and land taxes. Instead, tenants and laborers benefited. In Kalabagh, the Rais, who were the landowners, changed the way they paid their marginal tenants and laborers, making them borrow money and trapping them in bonded labor. Between 1905 and 1915, wages went up because more people were needed for irrigation and railway projects. But the Rais' estate was not affected much by these changes; wages for labor remained low<sup>89</sup>.

The Rais charged kind rent (*batai rates*) for the land. They added their own plough to the tenants' when dividing the produce, increasing the rent by 1/5th. The term for this was "moa jora" (dead plough). Grazing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Khan, Roedad. (comp.) *The British Papers: Secret and Confidential, India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1958-1969* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002).33.

land produced income, which was mostly covered by the sales of ghi (clarified butter) and wool. Every six months, cattle owners were required to pay a grazing tax.

The colonial system gave the Rais significant control over laborers and menials (workers) who couldn't own property. New settlers had to pay fees and annual payments to become landowners, and those who couldn't pay became "*butima*r" tenants. These tenants cleared land and built embankments but didn't have ownership rights<sup>90</sup>.

The unequal relationship between *zamindars* (landlords) and tenants created a divide in rural society, strengthening the situation of the Rais in property and credit markets. In the 1930s, loyalty to the colonial power became more of a practical alliance due to economic difficulties caused by the Great Depression. Some groups opposed colonial recruitment, especially in Kalabagh.

Ameer Muhammad Khan, the son of Rais, collaborated with the colonial state to suppress dissent, gaining support from British officials. This collaboration helped the estate grow during the economic depression, while wages in kind made tenants and laborers suffer. During the 1930s agricultural depression, landlords in West Punjab granted rent remissions, but in Kalabagh, the Rais controlled credit and debt, reinforcing economic inequalities. Most laborers lacked capital and borrowed from the Rais, as moneylenders were scarce. Land Alienation Act 1900 made it hard to borrow from moneylenders in Punjab. In Kalabagh, the poor who owed money worked as bonded laborers. Various groups of menials, like blacksmiths and carpenters, helped in agriculture. Payment was usually in kind, with different items given based on the menial's role. For example, bards and barbers were paid more because they provided personal services, and cobblers were important in areas where tough shoes were needed.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Zameer Niazi, Press in Chains (Karachi: Karachi Press Club Publication, 1986) 127.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Syed Sadiq Hussain Shah. Swaneh Hayat Nawwabof Kalabagh: Malik Amir Muhammad Khan( Multan: Sidaq Rang Publications, 2014) 76.

The railways in Punjab led to higher agricultural prices and wages but mainly benefited landowners. The Rais in Kalabagh had significant control over labor and debt, which reinforced economic inequality. Bonded labor was common, and different menials were paid in kind based on their roles<sup>92</sup>.

#### **Railways and Agriculture**

The arrival of railways in Punjab made farming more like a business, and it created new places to sell farm products. This had two main effects: prices for farm goods went up, and the wages paid to farmworkers increased. However, these benefits mostly went to the big landowners called "*Zamindars*." Smaller farmers could not take full advantage of the higher prices because they had to spend more money on paying workers, water rates, and taxes.

In Kalabagh, things were a bit different. Here, the Rais or *the rich landowners* changed the way they paid their tenants and laborers. They made them borrow money for their needs and then had a hard time repaying it. This made them almost like slaves, as they could not get out of this debt.

#### Wage Increase

Between 1905 and 1915, wages for farmworkers went up because more workers were needed for big projects like building canals and railways. However, this did not affect the Rais' estate much, they still paid very low wages to their workers<sup>93</sup>.

#### Nawab' Control

The Rais charged a special kind of rent called "*batai* rates," and they added their own share when dividing the farm produce, making it more expensive for tenants. They also took extra rent by adding a made-up plough to the tenant's share. The term for this was "moa jora" (dead plough). In Kalabagh, the sale of butter

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Pir Ali Muhammad, Rashedi. Rudad-i-Chaman: Asbab-i-Halakat-iJamhuriat (Lahore:Sang-i-Meel Publications, 2002) 33-38.
 <sup>93</sup> Razi-ud-Din, Shakir Hussain. Pakistan:14 Agast 1947 se 14 Agast 1997 tak (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications. 1997) 17-21.

and wool was the main source of income for grazing land. Owners of cows and buffaloes were required to pay a levy for allowing them to graze.

#### Land and Debt

The Rais had a lot of power over the people who worked on their land. New settlers had to pay fees and an annual payment to become landowners. If they could not pay, they became *"butimar"* tenants and didn't have full ownership rights.

#### **Social Divide**

The way landowners like the Rais and tenants interacted created a clear divide in the countryside. It made two groups: rich landlords and landless workers. This division made the Rais even more powerful in land and money matters.

# **1930s and Economic Problems**

In the 1930s, the association between the Rais and the settler government changed. People in Punjab were suffering because of a big economic problem called the Great Depression. Some groups, like the *Majlis-i-Ahrar* and *Khudai Khidmatgar*, used this situation to protest against the colonial government. This was the first time such a big protest happened in Kalabagh.

#### **Effects of Economic Depression**

During the economic depression, landlords in other places had to accept less money for their land or lower rent because tenants couldn't pay. But in Kalabagh, the Rais' estate did well, while the workers continued to suffer because they were paid with goods instead of money.

# **Debt Bondage**

In the 1930s, in some areas of India, where workers refused to be employed as bonded labour, there was conflict between landlords and tenants. But in Kalabagh, the Rais had a lot of control over their workers because they lent them money and made them work to repay it. This was called "begaar" or forced labor.

#### **Menial Workers**

Different groups of workers, like blacksmiths and carpenters, helped with farming. They were usually paid with goods, not money. For example, people who provided personal services to the Rais got paid more, and those who made things like shoes were important in places where those were needed.

#### **Economic Inequality**

All this led to big differences in wealth and power in Kalabagh. The Rais got richer, and the workers and small landowners got poorer. The Rais controlled money and credit, which made things even harder for the poor. Money lending gave the Rais a lot of power and control in their society. The people who worked for them, called "menials," were stuck in a system where they owed money to the Rais. This made them kind of like servants to the Rais.

The menials had to do various jobs like carrying things and working in the Rais' houses. Sometimes, the Rais would give them a little extra money, but not much. This system made it really hard for the menials to improve their lives or change jobs.

Because of this system, the town's social structure didn't allow people to move up in society, and the menial caste, called "*kamins*," stayed poor. The Rais became more powerful over time, while the *kamins* were exploited economically.

The Rais used forceful methods to keep this system in place, and it became a big part of the region's economy. The rural poor didn't benefit much from the growth in agriculture because the Rais controlled it all. So, the Rais became even more powerful while the poor had very little say in the changing economy.

#### **Dynamism and Enervation**

During the period between 1918 and 1939, agriculture in India faced significant challenges and was generally performing poorly. To boost the rural economy, a campaign called 'grow more food' was initiated in the Punjab region, focusing on both extensive and intensive cultivation. As a result, Punjab's total cultivated area rose from 30 million acres in 1939–1940 to about 35 million acres in 1942–1943.

The influential landowners, the Rais, expanded their agricultural operations concurrently using the same strategy. They switched to a different type of irrigation, building dams (called bunds) in streams to stop the flow of water using both human and animal labour. On the banks of the Indus River, they also constructed a fort with two main portions. The Rais family's residences, known as Borh Bungla and Pepal Bungla, were located in one section, while a welcoming open courtyard was located in the other. This complex featured historical artefacts, such as cannons and hunting trophies, and was outfitted with Victorian furniture. Notably, the roof was supported by Scottish-made girders. The Rais bought 100 camels and 10 bulls to transport agricultural items from their farms to the market, and wells were built to supply water for the fort. They also built fresh granaries, a stud farm, a fish farm, and new stables<sup>94</sup>.

The estate was run with a sizable administrative staff that included the head of the estate (Kardar), manager, assistant headman (jamadar), revenue officials and accountants (maldar), and numbardar, who were all in charge of different tasks related to the estate and communication with the villagers. These officials were given horses for their official responsibilities as well as a salary from the estate. The maldar was assigned to the estate's grain storeroom and was based at the Massan railway station.

The local term for attendants is "karaway," and they kept a watchful eye on the harvesting operation. The harvested produce was put into specialised "jaati" sacks made of lamb wool and stamped with the estate's logo. Then, these bags were moved to granaries that were placed at places like the Massan railway station.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> C. L. Tupper, ed. Punjab Customary Law. (Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing. Lahore. 1881)

While the remaining grain was sold to grain dealers at auctions held at the railway station, the estate reserved its portion of the crop in these granaries.

By taking into account their personalised power and how it interacted with the stratified politics and stratified economy of the town, one may comprehend the Rais' control over the social and economic facets of their domain.

Local panchayats, which operated in accordance with Punjabi customary law, were a key component of the colonial government in Punjab. This was referred to be a state-supported legal system that linked British law with indigenous tribal underpinnings by British official C.L. Tupper. The landed elite's bargaining leverage with the government was boosted by this system, which required integrating them into the state apparatus. The Rais, a powerful group, controlled both formal governmental structures and informal panchayats, which were based on a social hierarchy.

The panchayat of the Rais was modelled after the Jirga of the tribe, as opposed to the more liberal and charitable Punjabi panchayats. The Rais acted arbitrarily as an honorary magistrate with legal protection with the support of neighbourhood institutions such the bureaucracy, patwari, forestry officers, station master, and police. The Rais occasionally overstepped his bounds by interfering with official investigations, particularly in minor criminal and tax cases.

According to Ranajit Guha, a major part of indigenous authority and control was 'Danda,' or force, exerted through informal power structures. The Rais ran a territorial court and kept a private security force made up of Khattak tribe members. They threatened people with bonded labour (known as "begaar"), had some power over civil and criminal law enforcement in terms of tax collection, physical punishment, and fines for crimes like theft and embezzlement<sup>95</sup>. They also enforced sanctions on women who disobeyed patriarchal moral standards, explaining their acts as vital for upholding morality. Even ejected from the town were two ladies who were allegedly involved in prostitution. The Rais claimed that only they had the objectivity and sense

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> T. T. Yong, *The Garrison State:* Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab 1849-1947 (New Delhi: SagePublications, 2005) 36.

of "fair play" necessary to manage the town's affairs successfully. In this situation, keeping the town under control and in order depended heavily on force and intimidation.

# Conclusion

In conclusion, kinship-based tribal institutions in Punjab were safeguarded and strengthened by the British government during the colonial era. The tribal leaders served as intermediaries between the colonial system and the tribes, aligning their interests with the imperial regime. District administration in Mianwali oversaw these tribal regions, and many of the influential landowners, like in other parts of Punjab, were memberships of the Union member party<sup>96</sup>.

The British adopted a number of initiatives in Punjab, mostly concentrating on canal colony districts, including land settlement, irrigation projects, demographic changes, military recruiting, and improvements in education and communication. They sought to end parasitic landlordism in order to advance political and economic progress and give the peasantry more influence, particularly in central Punjab. The Potwar region, though, continued to be separate from central Punjab. There was no foundation for economic development in this area set up by the colonial state, prioritizing revenue collection and military recruitment instead. In the barani region, where land relied on rainfall, economic conditions were notably different, with many residents choosing military careers.

The landed elites and the state were able to retain the current institutional order through electoral politics, bureaucratic interventions, and legislation. More land ended up in the hands of the landed elite in Kalabagh town than with moneylenders despite the local elites' membership with the Unionist party, which pledged to defend economically disadvantaged classes from exploitation by the wealthy. This paradoxical scenario was brought on by the lack of supportive development incentives. Although capital and industry connected the rural economy to metropolitan markets, the benefits mainly went to the Rais and the colonial state. This led

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Darling, M. The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt. 4th Edn.( London: Oxford University Press, 1947) 76.

to cycles of low incomes, underemployment, and limited alternative job opportunities, restricting social mobility and perpetuating the divide between the wealthy and the poor in rural areas<sup>97</sup>.

The Majlis-i-Ahrar in Punjab provided a platform for nationalist views to be expressed at the beginning of the 20th century. Ahrar rallied the rural poor against the prevailing social and economic dominance in Kalabagh town, argued for unification against British control, and promoted socialist ideals. Ahrar and its allies, however, came up against fierce opposition from those who supported the colonial administration. The establishment of Muslim ethno-religious identities was aided by Ahrar's employment of religious and nationalist language, which widened racial divisions in local politics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> M. Bloch, Feudal Society: The Growth of Ties of Dependence, Vol.1. (London: Routledge, 1962) 23.

# **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The concerned authorities must consider a serious approach towards the historical development of Kalabagh, so that it's significant events and milestones should be highlighted that have shaped its history. The authorities must emphasize the historical context that is essential to understanding the present state of Kalabagh. The government must develop the social fabric of Kalabagh, including demographics, culture, and social structures. The government must highlight any unique characteristics or challenges faced by the society in this region. Theresearch department of the Punjab and Pakistan must analyze the political dynamics of Kalabagh, including the governing structures, key political actors, and any notable political issues or conflicts. The historical context of political developments must be considered positively so as to preserve this unique antiquity of Indus Valley Civilization. The Concerned authorities should discuss the significance of the political map of Kalabagh in the context of regional and international politics. Any societal disputes or territorial issues that may impact the region's stability should be addressed. The colonial state protected and consolidated tribal structures based on kinship networks in rural Punjab. Tribal chiefs were colonial middlemen whose interests were closely tied to the imperial system. These tribes are monitored by the Mianwali district government. As elsewhere in Punjab, most of the region's landed elite are members of the UP. British policies including land settlement, irrigation systems, population transfer, conscription, and expansion of education and communication facilities were largely limited to the canal colonial areas. The abolition of "parasitic" land ownership was considered crucial to the conomic and political development of the province and the prosperity of farmers, especially in central Punjab. The government must improve the economic situation in Kalabagh, including industries, agriculture, and economic challenges. Various potential economic drivers or

opportunities pertaining to the rock salt, alum, silica sand, iron ore and other minerals of the area must be given full positive consideration. The major challenges faced by Kalabagh, whether they are political, social, economic, or environmental should be analyzed and should be solved for the proper identification of potential opportunities for growth and development.

#### **Recommendations:**

There are some recommendations towards policymakers, local communities, or other stakeholders for addressing the challenges and capitalizing on the opportunities identified.

#### **1. Future Prospects:**

There are various natural phenomena which are present in the area of Kalabagh. For example, River Indus, valuable minerals including rock salt, iron ore, construction stones, silica sand etc. All these gifts of nature should be put under consideration for the the future trajectory of Kalabagh. Discuss potential scenarios and their implications for the region and its people. The Nawabs of Kalabagh must do every possible effort to up lift the standard of living of the poor natives. They must introduce financial, technical and every kind of effort to make best utilize of the natural gifts for the employment of locals.

#### 2. Conflict Resolution and Diplomacy:

All the diplomatic efforts of political agents to resolve all territorial disputes or border

conflicts that may exist in the Kalabagh region.

#### 3. Promotion of dialogue:

The promotion of dialogue between relevant parties to foster peaceful relations should be encouraged in order to prevent potential escalation of conflicts.

#### 4. Economic Development:

Investment in infrastructure development, such as roads, bridges, and energy supply must be under taken by the government to stimulate economic growth and improve living conditions in Kalabagh. There should be a support to local entrepreneurship and small businesses to diversify the economy and reduce dependency on specific industries.

# 5. Social Welfare and Education:

There should be enhancement to access to quality education and healthcare services in Kalabagh to improve the overall well-being of the population. Implementation of social welfare programs must be regularize to address poverty, unemployment, and inequality, particularly in marginalized communities.

# Abbreviations

□ AD	Anno Domini "A.D." stands for anno domini, Latin for "in the
	year of the lord," and refers to the birth of Jesus Christ (Hazrat
	Esa (A.S).
□ BCE	BCE stand for "before the common or current era"
□ CE	CE stand for "common or current era"

# Glossary

Awan	Awan is a Jat Gotra in Pakistan and Punjab, India. Aman or Awan clan
	is found in Afghanistan.
Paggar	A kind of work or job without payment. It is either physical, mental or
Begaar	
	in any shape.
Biraderi	Baradari, or Biraderi means Brotherhood and originates from the Persian
	word Baradar, meaning "Brother". In Pakistan and India, it is used to
	denote a number of social strata among South Asian Muslims.
	6
Colonial Powers	Colonial power is a country which possesses, or formerly possessed, colonies
	in different parts of the world.
Dhak	A mountain area about 30 kilometers east of Mianwali city, situated near
Dhun	
	Namal Lake, rich in limestone, silica-sand, and a variety of other valuable
	minerals.
Dhanoran	An old name of District Mianwali.
Ghazni	Ghazna or Ghazni historically known as Ghaznin or Ghazna, is a city in

central Afghanistan with a population of around 270,000 people.

- Jaba This place is situated near Kalabagh in Mianwali, Punjab, Pakistan, its geographical coordinates are 32° 38' 0" North, 72° 22' 0" East and its original name withdiacritics is Jāba.
- Jagir Jagir also known as Jahagir is the right to enjoy the revenue of a region on behalf of the King. Sardars who were in service of the rulers were given jagirs as a source of income in the place of salary. These jagirs were given accordingly based on the salary a Sardar would receive.
- *Jat* The Jat people are a traditionally agriculture-based community living in rural parts of Northern India and Pakistan.
- NikkiThe estimate terrain elevation above 220 meter at sea level. It is a placewhere the agricultural land s of the Nawabs of Kalabagh are present.

*Kachhi* Meaning, 'a place like an armpit'.

Namal	In the Mianwali District of Punjab, Pakistan, Namal is a region
	that includes a lake and is close to Rikhi, a village on one corner
	of the Namal valley. It was established after the Namal Dam
	was built in 1913. 32 km separate Mianwali city from Namal
	Dam. The lake has a surface area of 5.5 km <sup>2</sup> .

Pashtun	A member of a Pashto-speaking people inhabiting southern
	Afghanistanand north-western Pakistan.

*Rais* It is an Arabic title meaning 'chief' or 'leader'. It comes from the word for head, boss, a landlord etc.

*Shanoran* An old name of Mianwali.

*Sitnam* An old name of Mianwali also.

ThalThe Thal desert is located in Pakistan's Punjab province.Between the Jhelum and Sindh rivers, close to the PothoharPlateau, is a large expanse with a maximum width of 190 miles

and a length of 190 miles from north to south. of 70miles (110 kilometers) and minimum breadth 20 miles.

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