

**CIVIL MILITARY IMBALANCE AND DEMOCRACY IN
PAKISTAN (2008-2018)**

M. Phil Thesis

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CERTIFICATE

This dissertation submitted by Mr. Zahur Rehman entitled: “Civil Military Imbalance and Democracy in Pakistan (2008-2018)” is accepted in this present form by National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid I Azam University Islamabad for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Pakistan Studies.

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DECLARATION

I Mr. Zahur Rehman hereby declare that my M.Phil. thesis titled "Civil Military Imbalance and Democracy in Pakistan (2008 - 2018)" is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for any other degree from Quaid-i-Azam University or from anywhere else.

At any time if my statement is found incorrect even after the receiving of M. Phil degree, the University has the right to cancel my degree.

Zahur Rehman

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Zahur Rehman

Dedication

This Research is dedicated to my Parents

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

PRODA:	Public Representative Office Disqualification Act
CMLA:	Chief Martial law Administrator
AL:	Awami League
PPP:	Pakistan People's Party
FIA:	Federal investigation Agency
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
MRD:	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
IJI:	Islami jamhori Ittehad
PML-N:	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PML-Q:	Pakistan Muslim League Quaid -i-Azam
PTI:	Pakistan Tehrik Insaf

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Abstract:

In a democracy, it is essential for the civil and military institutions to have a balanced relationship. In Pakistan, however, the military has often dominated the civilian government, leading to political instability and the failure of democracy. The Pakistani military is a well-organized and professional force that inherited its traditions from the British. In a democracy, the military is supposed to be subordinate to the civilian government, but in Pakistan, the military has often intervened in politics, either directly or indirectly. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the military has a strong sense of its own importance and its role as the guardian of the country's security. Second, the politicians in Pakistan have often been corrupt and incompetent, which has led the military to see itself as the only institution capable of providing effective governance. Third, the military has built a strong network of supporters within the civilian bureaucracy and the political parties. This imbalance in civil-military relations has had a number of negative consequences for Pakistan. It has led to political instability, as the military has repeatedly overthrown civilian governments. It has also made it difficult for the government to address the country's economic and social problems. For Pakistan to achieve true democracy, it is essential for the civil and military institutions to find a way to work together in a more balanced and cooperative manner. This will require both sides to make some concessions. The military will need to accept that it is not the only legitimate authority in the country, and the politicians will need to learn to govern effectively without relying on the military's support. The balance in civil-military relations is essential for the smooth functioning of the state machinery and political stability.

CHAPTER 01: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Civil military imbalance refers to the military's violation of its constitutional function. Their constitutional duty is to defend the nation from external aggression. They must work under the supervision of civilians. However, the military's influence across the globe is not subordinate. In certain regions of the globe, such as Africa and Asia, the army plays a dominant and influential role. Pakistan is one of the nations where the military plays a dominant and active role. They have a significant impact on decisions regarding foreign policy, national security, and domestic issues. Therefore, the relationship between the military and civilians is typically contentious.

To comprehend the nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan, one must examine the character of civil-military relations in British India during the British Raj. Before the British era, the Indian Army was the private property of the sovereign. However, the administration of British India implemented significant military reforms. Initially, the military was institutionalized and brought under the law. The military was then separated from politics and became more professional. Thirdly, the military was no longer used for administrative purposes. Fourthly, the bulk of the military was reduced, and the focus shifted from quantity to quality. Likewise, the law defined the functions of the military. The military was required to carry out its duties within the confines

of the law. In British India, the military was responsible for four duties, including the defense of India against external aggression, especially from the north-west, the control of the Pathan tribe, participation in military expeditions of the British

government outside India, and the provision of assistance to the civilian government. Not in India, but in British India, the army was subordinate to the civilian government in London. Both the British India army and administration were accountable to the British government and held equal status.

After partition, the Muslim League assumed authority of the newly formed nation. Quaid-i-Azam was appointed governor general of Pakistan, while Liaqat Ali Khan assumed the role of prime minister. The primary responsibility of the first constituent assembly was to design a constitution for the newly founded nation, but the political leadership of Pakistan was unable to produce a constitution that was acceptable to all parties. Pakistan Muslim League was split into various factions. In contrast, the Military was the organization with the strongest organizational structure. Moreover, India did not fully embrace the partition plan and remained a constant security menace to Pakistan's existence. In addition, the geostrategic context of the cold war paved the way for military intervention in politics. Later, four military regimes, most notably the Musharraf regime, used constitutional amendments and other means to further entrench the army's influence in Pakistani politics. When he appointed Ayub Khan as the first defense minister, Iskander Mirza was the first politician responsible for the introduction of the army into politics. Later, in 1958, the military seized direct control, establishing its dominance, and retaining it until 1971. But the East Pakistan debacle put the army on the defensive, and a civilian administration was established under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for only six years. In 1977, the military retook direct control of the country under the leadership of General Zia-ul-Haq, who remained in power until 1988. After Zia's death, the Military altered its strategy, and instead of assuming direct rule, they decided to play a dominant role behind the scenes in the realm of foreign and security policy, as well as in certain domestic issues that they

perceived as a threat to their corporate interests. From 1988 to 1999, the military played a covert role in politics. But in 1999, the Kargil War and other disagreements with the civilian government put the army back on the offensive, and Chief Of The Army Staff Gen Pervaiz Musharaf deposed the elected government of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz and became the country's leader. Eventually, Musharaf also disengaged the military from direct authority and installed a puppet civilian government under the Pakistan Muslim League Q. On the other hand, Musharaf's establishment of a National security council in which the service commander sits directly opposite an elected representative demonstrates the army's involvement in Pakistani politics. The military, under the command of army chief of staff General Perviz Kiyani, resolved not to participate in the country's political affairs following the Musharaf regime. Ishfaq Perviz Kiyani recalled all military personnel who had been appointed to critical civilian institutions. Apparently, the military was not embroiled in politics under the Zardari regime, but they did play a covert role. Although the PPP administration attempted to assert civilian supremacy, they were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the first elected government completed its constitutional tenure and a new government was elected to power. However, civil-military relations were not cordial, and the military establishment dominated decisions regarding foreign policy and national security. Despite the fact that, for the first time in Pakistan, one democratic government has completed its term and peacefully transmitted authority to another democratic government, this is not a historic event. Nawaz Sharif's PML-N administration attempted to consolidate the political system. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, attempted to preserve a balance in civil-military relations due to previous negative experiences. In 2014 and 2015, he progressively lost ground to the military. With the PTi dharna, the balance of civil-

military relations began to shift away from Nawaz Sharif. As a consequence, the military establishment consolidated its power and made numerous unilateral decisions, such as the ZARB AZAB operation, without consulting the civilian government. Similarly, the establishment of a military court under the 21st amendment revealed an imbalance in the civil-military operation. Therefore, the imbalance in civil-military relations has raised a number of important questions, such as why the military intervene in politics. What effect does military interference in politics have on the democratic process? Why have democratic administrations and armed forces been unable to reconcile civil-military relations?

1.2. Statement of the Problem:

After the Musharaf regime, a democratic government led by the Pakistan People's party was formed; it was the first government in the political history of Pakistan to complete its constitutional term. After the 2013 elections, it transferred power to a democratic government led by the Pakistan Muslim League. In both democratic terms, however, the army retained its political authority and subtly exerted its influence over democratically elected governments. . So how the army covert role has created imbalance in the civil military relation and impacted the democratic process in the country, and how it paved way for the hybrid regime?

1.3. Research Questions:

- a. What were the characteristics of civil-military relations during the British era?
- b. Why has the military been so dominant in Pakistan's political system?
- c. Why did the military decide to support democracy following the Musharaf regime?
- d. What factors have contributed to the imbalance in civil-military relations?

e. How do civil-military relations influence the democratic process in Pakistan?

1.4. Literature Review:

"The Man on the Horse back by Samuel Finer" focused primarily on the role of politics and the reasons why the military intervenes in politics. Similarly, the author also discussed the military's political strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, S.M. Finer examined the degree of intervention in developed and underdeveloped political cultures. In this volume, the author also discussed the potential outcomes of the intervention and its effect on the political system. The work of S.M. Finer would aid in comprehending the motivations behind military intervention in political affairs.

why nations fail by Acemoglu and Robinson: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty openly declared that the prosperity and progress of a country do not mostly depend on climate, geography or culture, but these are the institutions which play a vital role in its stability. The example of ancient Rome and the Tudors of modern China are the examples which are given by them

Pakistan's political culture: essays in historical and social origins by KK Aziza political thinker and also his religious and sociological insights unfold and analyze the background of Pakistan's political insight. He puts forward authentic explanation of the political system that underwent a stumbling process from one crisis to another crisis. During 70 years of its independence Pakistan has made it politically laughing stock as parliament a fish market and its political figures, but of ridiculous while democracy has remained in its ugliest form, only military generals feel comfortable in such ambience. The political leaders can do nothing but are only spectators. Pakistan's politicians are naive in the field of politics and behave like pampered and spoilt

children. Poor leadership brings bleakness over the whole perspective. It also destroys the political institution and makes the military intervention inevitable.

The book "The military and politics in Pakistan" by Hassan Askari discusses how the military has become the dominant political force in Pakistan, as well as the reasons behind the decline of the civilian institution. He also analysed the nature and functions of military administrations, as well as the close cooperation between the military and bureaucracy that developed over the years. The author also discusses the interaction of the military with political forces and the treatment of political dissent, the policy measures of martial law regimes during political crises, and the efforts to establish viable political institutions.

Hassan Askari Rizvi's "Military state and society in Pakistan" provided a comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. The author concentrates primarily on how the military acquired such influence in the political system and its effects on the decision-making process regarding foreign and security policies, as well as important domestic political, social, and economic issues.

Tilak Devesher's "Pakistan Courting the Abyss" is a comprehensive study of Pakistan's main problems, including the rise of terrorism, extremism, and violence in the society, the water issue, civil military relations, the economy, and Pakistan's relationship with India. However, all of these issues have significant effects on Pakistan's political system. However, the chapter on civil military is highly pertinent to my work. According to the author, Bhutto, Zardari, and Nawaz Sharif wasted the opportunity to reduce the size of the Pakistani Army. However, the author's view is idealistic, as the Army has profound foundations in the Pakistani political system. Therefore, it is difficult for a civilian to act against the army's interests. "Ilhan Niaz's

The culture of power and governance of Pakistan, 1947-2008, attempts to trace the contemporary culture of power and governance in Pakistan. He investigates the reasons why Pakistan's administration, legislation, and judiciary are perpetually plagued by problems. These issues present Pakistan with an existential peril. Niazi argued that Pakistan's authorities conduct like bureaucratic emperors of the past, disregarding appropriate rules and law and order. Therefore, this work will be useful for illuminating the culture of power in Pakistan and its effect on the Pakistani constitution.

“Pakistan democracy; issues of development and security by veena Kakerjee and MP. Singh. The book is a compilation of eleven well-researched and well-documented papers by various authors on various aspects of Pakistan, including democratic development, economic issues, security, the role of the military, defense expenditures, and religious expenditures. According to the author, despite the passage of more than half a century, Pakistan as a nation is still in the process of formation. Due to military intervention, there is political instability, feeble institutions, and frequent breakdown of the democratic political process. Therefore, this book will be useful for providing information about the faults in Pakistan's political system.

Muhammad Wasim's " The issue of political development in Pakistan " focuses primarily on four factors that are determining the shape of politics in Pakistan, including Punjabi Mohajir dominance of the policymaking process, the ascendancy of the military in the country's politics, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan, and an authoritarian trend in Pakistan's political system. The author focuses primarily on the obstacles that stand in the way of an inclusive political democratic system in Pakistan.

1.5. Methodology:

The methodology for this MPhil dissertation, titled "Civil-Military Imbalance and Democracy in Pakistan (2008-2018): A Secondary Source Analysis," follows a qualitative research approach aimed at comprehensively understanding the intricate relationship between civil-military dynamics and the state of democracy in Pakistan during the specified timeframe. The principle data source for this study comprises a carefully selected array of secondary data, drawn from reputable and diverse sources, including academic journals, government reports, media articles, historical documents, NGO and think tank publications, all directly related to Pakistan's civil-military relations and democratization. The criteria for source selection prioritize relevance, credibility, and academic rigor. The analysis of this secondary data will be conducted through thematic analysis, comparative analysis, and content analysis, enabling the identification of recurring themes, trends, and narratives related to civil-military interactions and their impact on democracy. Ethical considerations, including proper citation and data privacy, will be adhered to throughout the study. Limitations, such as source bias and temporal constraints, will be transparently acknowledged, ensuring the research maintains a comprehensive and balanced approach to examining this critical aspect of Pakistan's political landscape.

1.6. Conceptualization of my Topic:

First of all, it is necessary to conceptualize three main terminologies in my thesis statement i.e. Civil, military and the imbalance. Another point which is very crucial is the effect of this relationship on the process of democracy. I will try to explain, what does I mean from military and civilian in my country. The other most important term is democracy, which I mean the democracy prevailing in west. Without explaining

and conceptualization of these terms, I think it would be ambiguous to talk about my thesis statement.

1.7. Research Tools:

As from the topic it is crystal clear, that our research needs deep review of the literature written on the same topic since the creation of Pakistan. As we have specified Era of research but I will study background of this issue in detail. Different research paper and reports will be reviewed and analyzed. To establish a relation between these terms, different agreements and pacts signed in the history of Pakistan for the improvement of democracy, will be reviewed and analyzed. We will also compare the political developments in the Era of military and civil govt in Pakistan by studying their regime. UT means the main tools would be the literature found in different form like paper, magazines, reports, statistical data, regulations and acts.

1.8. Era of Interest:

Although I will study the about the relation of civil military in Pakistan since its creation, but my main focus would be the Era of 2008-2018 because of my interest. As I have mentioned earlier that I would try to see the effect of these relation on the process of democracy, it would be something new for us to study that how for the first time in the history of Pakistan, parliament completed its tenure In 2008-13. Now it would be seen that how were the relations in that period of time.

1.9. Objectives of the Study:

- I. To have an understanding of the nature of civil-military relations.
- II. The second objective is to identify the causes of the civil-military imbalance in Pakistan.

III. To investigate the factors of the military's dominance in Pakistan

IV. Examine the impact of the civil-military imbalance on Pakistan's democracy.

V. Analyse the inability of democratic governments to maintain a balance between civil and military relations.

VI. To discover means of establishing civil supremacy and providing a foundation for democracy in Pakistan?

1.10. Organization of the Study

This thesis focuses primarily on the civil-military imbalance between 2008 and 2018. During this time, two democratic governments completed their terms for the first time in Pakistan's history. Despite this, the relationship between the military and civilians remained contentious. In both democratic administrations, the military establishment participated in the political affairs of the nation. Despite claims of apolitical after the Musharaf regime, how did the military gain prominence in civilian government's decision-making? The second chapter examines the historical overview of civil-military relations in Pakistan and how each stakeholder contributed to the civil-military imbalance in different phases. In addition, what factors contributed to the military's ascendancy in Pakistani politics?

The third chapter primarily focuses on the transitional period [2008-2013] in which the PPP ruled the country. Many positive steps have been taken to establish civilian supremacy and restore parliamentary democracy such as abolition of National security council, brought ISI under interior ministry and the most important step 18th amendment through which original nature of the constitution were restored. In addition president Musharaf were forced to resign and it seemed that democratic

forces learnt from the past and determined to put the country on the of democracy. Furthermore COAS Ashfaq Parviz Kiyani also announced that Army would not interfere in the political affairs. However the Kiyani failed to do this and the military was actively involved in the political decision making and different tools were used by the military to put pressure on the elected government and protect the institutional interest. In this period the most positive development is peaceful transfer of the government from one elected government to another.

The fourth chapter is consisted of the Nawaz sharif 3rd tenure from 2013 to 2018. Nawaz sharif wanted to limit the role of the military establishment in the matter related to the security and foreign policy and took steps to restore trade relations with India and Afghanistan. In addition he also took initiative trial of Musharaf which became cause of the civil military imbalance. As a result, military adopted different methods to weaken the elected government in which included the dharna politics Media campaign and the Judicial activism. Nawaz sharif once again failed to complete its term as a Prime Minister although the government completed its term. In the decade of democracy, military establishment did not retreat from the political affairs but more actively and effectively participated but indirectly. The covert role has greatly damaged the democratization process in the country. Political instability has created political social and economic polarizations. Political forces did not learnt from the history and being used by the military for the destabilization of elected government.

CHAPTER 02: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN: HISTORICAL VIEWS

2.1. Introduction

This chapter explores the history of civil-military relations in Pakistan with an emphasis on the fundamental problems that constrained their growth in the country's early years. We shall examine the factors that contribute to military superiority from two perspectives. The acquisition of control by the military over other political and security organizations and assuming a leadership role was of utmost importance. The effectiveness of prominent state institutions, such as the legislature, the judiciary, and political parties, has also been impacted. Therefore, it is imperative to consider this aspect as well. To address these concerns, our underlying proposition posits that during the initial phases of state establishment, the military received preferential treatment due to the security dilemma, which involved fears of danger from India. The dynamics between the civil and military sectors in Pakistan have grown fraught with challenges and disagreements due to the absence of an alternative functional structure, leading to military dominance and the establishment of a civilian front to facilitate power sharing. This chapter examines three distinct areas of concern: military ascendancy, the effects of military dominance, and conflict and cooperation between the military and civilian political parties and their leadership in order to explain the development of civil-military relations and various power-sharing arrangements. The objective is to explain the evolution of civil-military relations and the emergence of diverse power-sharing arrangements. The aforementioned principles formed the basis for the formulation of organizational concepts. The second half of this text offers a brief overview of Pakistan's military and post-military regimes.

2.2. Civil-Military Authoritarianism is Growing

Pakistan has experienced significant issues with its political, economic, administrative, and security institutions ever since the inception of the nation. Upon achieving independence, Pakistan faced a significant dearth of defense resources. Despite the absence of essential provisions and equipment, the entity in question accommodated the troops, barracks, and military units that remained within its

authority. The allocation of military assets between the two dominions of the British Indian Empire was a subject of ongoing discussion within the program. During his speech, British Prime Minister Attlee refrained from addressing the internal divisions among the military forces.¹ In April 1947, Liaquat Ali Khan initiated a discussion with Viceroy Lord Mountbatten, advocating for the development of a comprehensive plan to allocate military resources to facilitate a prompt division of the armed forces.² In an epistolary communication dated August 14, 1948, the military pledged allegiance to Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The commemoration of Pakistan's inaugural year of independence was heralded by the Army through the expression, "Greetings from the Army on this First Anniversary of Independence Day."³ Our unwavering commitment, dedication, and capabilities have been and will persist in the service of Pakistan. The first examination of the army's association with the governor general occurred during the Kashmir dispute. Inquiries about the institution's purported dedication to Jinnah were raised when the Commander exhibited insubordination by disregarding directives to assemble his troops and initiate operations. Jinnah expressed profound anger in response to the incursion of Indian soldiers into Kashmir, which occurred in violation of the intended partition. Upon the deployment of Indian troops in Kashmir, Jinnah initially refrained from engaging in discussions about the issue. Nevertheless, Jinnah and the governing class of Pakistan decided to deploy military forces to Kashmir. Jinnah dismissed the Commander-in-Chief from his position due to the latter's failure to comply with the issued directives on the army's relocation. Douglas Gracey, the second British Chief General, emulated his predecessor's conduct by abstaining from carrying out the "civilian" command without Auchinleck's consent. The prioritization of defending the recently established state superseded all other significant tasks for the nascent state due to external concerns and the physical separation of East and West Pakistan. Pakistan's territorial integrity faced imminent and tangible dangers.

Jinnah advocated for the significant advancement of civic institutions since he possessed a genuine commitment to constitutionalism and parliamentary principles. The individual knows the potential hazards linked to the increasing influence of the

¹ Akhtar, Nasreen. "Civil Military Relations During The Zardari Regime (2008-2012) In Pakistan: Internal And External Factors." 2017.

² Rizvi, Hassan Askari. "Pakistan Studies Class IX, X." (2000).

³ Akhtar, Nasreen. "Civil Military Relations During The Zardari Regime (2008-2012) In Pakistan: Internal And External Factors." 2017.

military. Subsequently, he delivered a speech to the military troops of Pakistan, taking into consideration the aforementioned factors. It is important to bear in mind that as individuals participating in military services, one's duty includes serving the public. Your ability to influence changes in national policy is limited. The individual in question had undergone a shift in perspective, no longer subscribing to the notion that the military played a pivotal role in safeguarding the nation's security. Instead, they said that the responsibility for decision-making rested with the collective citizenry. Furthermore, they emphasized the imperative for individuals to fulfill their assigned responsibilities. This phenomenon can be attributed to how high-ranking military officials handled themselves during interpersonal interactions. Given the upbringing and socialization of military officials in a post-colonial culture, it is understandable that they had challenges in establishing connections with those who had recently achieved independence. Consequently, Jinnah had legitimate grounds for expressing worry over the army. Jinnah expressed his discontent with the trajectory of Pakistan's bureaucracy. The manner in which he spoke with the officials rendered it exceedingly challenging for anybody to manipulate his message to his detriment. The dissolution of the parliament and the constitution, two prominent governmental institutions, occurred due to the goals and influence of the generals, notwithstanding Jinnah's apparent inclination towards prioritizing representative institutions.⁴

2.3. Challenges in the Post-Jinnah Era

Liaquat Ali Khan appointed Khawja Nazimudin as the Governor General of Pakistan subsequent to the demise of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The prime minister had a strong desire to evaluate his own leadership principles following a significant period of being overshadowed by Quaid-I-Azam. Nazimudin emerged as the most suitable candidate due to his expressed preference for a management approach that minimizes interference from the head of state. Liaquat Ali Khan, the former prime minister and influential figure, expressed his endorsement of civilian governance. The primary focus was on security, yet, subsequent to Jinnah's leadership, prominent political actors in Pakistan showed less interest in political democracy. . The Governor General was urged by Liaquat Ali Khan to use PRODA against "corrupt" politicians, who

⁴ Burke, Samuel Martin. *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*. 1973

were frequently political competitors.⁵ He emphasized the paramount importance of safeguarding the state, asserting that this objective takes precedence over all other governmental endeavors. Pakistan's primary areas of concern during this period encompassed politics, the economy, and security. The leaders of the embryonic state had formidable obstacles due to the insufficiency of their domestic resource base, unstable economy, and developing issues. Liaquat Ali Khan recognized the imperative of foreign assistance for the economic and security needs of Pakistan. Following the conclusion of World War II, it was primarily the United States of America that possessed a strong economy and demonstrated a keen willingness to provide assistance to other nations in their efforts toward post-war rebuilding. During the early stages of the Cold War, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and his cabinet, together with bureaucratic colleagues, notably those inside the Foreign Office, exhibited a pro-Western orientation and showed a favorable inclination towards the United States. Liaquat Ali Khan played a pivotal role in establishing enduring relations between Pakistan and the United States by actively seeking financial and military assistance from the US and demonstrating a readiness to align with American interests during the Cold War era. The influence of this individual was advantageous for both Pakistan's internal and external policy. His tenure as a leader in Pakistan significantly influenced the country's foreign and security policy due to his simultaneous authority over the domains of defense and foreign affairs. During the initial years of the 1950s, there was a noticeable decline in the state of civil-military relations. The denial of Major General Akbar Khan's request for military reinforcement in Kashmir by the prime minister led to an escalation of tensions between the military and civilian leadership. Akbar Khan, along with a select group of military commanders in his proximity, began to exhibit a growing sense of disillusionment, maybe stemming from their political ambitions. During the specified time frame, a number of military generals made attempts to depose Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Ayub Khan revealed the 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' in March 1951, and everyone concerned was put behind bars. The prosecution of the conspirators was advocated for by both political parties and civil society organizations. There was a proposal to use Islamic law and punish the military conspirators as "munafqeen" (hypocrites) as a means of deterring others from

⁵ Talbot, Ian. *Pakistan: A Modern History*. Hurst, 2009

harboring similar malicious intentions against civil power.⁶ Despite the fact that all those involved were found guilty, they only received light terms that they were never required to serve.

2.4. Participation in Military Crisis Leadership

Despite encountering substantial political and economic challenges, Liaquat Ali's tenure as the leader of Pakistan predominantly upheld a state of stability. The individual shown proficient ability in skillfully managing and exerting control over the volatile political dissensions, as well as maintaining strong affiliations with various factions within the Muslim League. Following the demise of the individual in question, Pakistan experienced a notable transformation in its formerly relatively calm political environment. Following the calls for Khawaja Nazimuddin to resign from his position as governor general, a vacancy emerged for the role of prime minister. Nazimuddin made an offer to assume the position of prime minister of Pakistan in return for political benefits.⁷

Ghulam Muhammad was a bureaucrat and a close associate of Ayub Khan. Ghulam Muhammad was a suitable candidate since he supported the military and shared General Ayub Khan's interest in the military's financial interests. The selection of Ghulam Muhammad as Governor General was orchestrated through a collaborative effort between the military and civilians. This occurrence was an early instance of military involvement in the political landscape of Pakistan. The persistent and violent campaign conducted by religious parties against the Ahmadi community proved impervious to intervention from both the governor-general and the prime minister. The initial imposition of martial law occurred in Lahore on March 6, 1953, in response to widespread civil unrest targeting the Ahmadi community.⁸ This incident functioned as a case study illustrating the extent to which the country depends on its military and the inability of local government institutions to address complex political challenges effectively. In the realm of managing various domestic issues, encompassing natural disasters and political turmoil, the military emerged as the

⁶ Dryland, Estelle. "Faiz Ahmed Faiz And The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case." *Journal Of South Asian Literature* 27, No. 2, 1992: 175-185.

⁷ Governor General had power to dismiss the Assembly, Ghulam Muhammad was shrewd he became Governor General so he could remove the prime minister and the Assembly. Later he did.

⁸ Sayeed, Khalid Bin. "Collapse Of Parliamentary Democracy In Pakistan." *Middle East Journal* 13, No. 4, 1958: 389-406.

preeminent and versatile entity within the nation. This was evidenced by the army's ability to effectively respond to exigencies through the implementation of martial law, thereby affording both the military and the civilians an opportunity to evaluate the efficacy of swift and stringent measures.

Iskandar Mirza, the individual serving as the defense secretary during that period, assumed responsibility for the strategic formulation and execution of the removal of Nazimuddin. Mirza and the military were collaborating in the coup attempt. All of these operations were authorized by the military. Mirza made the decision to choose Muhammad Ali Bogra as his prime minister. The military assumed control of governance due to the perceived inadequacies of Nazimuddin's government. The political upheaval was influenced by strategic actions undertaken by high-ranking civilian and military personnel. Pakistan had a period of political instability in the initial decade subsequent to its liberation from British colonial rule. The pursuit of national objectives has been undermined by the prevalence of party politics and the prioritization of personal interests. The consequential impact of the power struggle between the Prime Minister and the Governor General had a notable influence on the parliamentary processes of the Constituent Assembly. The drafting of the Constitution was delayed until 1956 as a consequence. Nonetheless, the act of dissolving the Constitutional Assembly by the Governor General at that time resulted in a decline in confidence about the establishment of robust democratic institutions, while concurrently solidifying the practice of vice-regal tradition. Over time, the military has emerged as a prominent actor in decision-making processes, extending its influence beyond its traditional professional domains and into non-military areas. Ayub Khan received substantial financial and military assistance from the United States, which contributed to his elevated standing and international recognition. Nonetheless, Ghulam Muhammad, harboring discontent towards both the members of parliament and the Prime Minister, took the decision to dissolve the Constitutional Assembly on October 24, 1954, asserting that it had "failed to garner the trust of the populace."⁹ In an effort to enhance and update Pakistan's military capabilities, Ayub Khan, leveraging his role as the defense minister, pursued diplomatic endeavors with foreign nations and fostered relationships with influential figures.

⁹ Rizvi, Hassan Askari. "Pakistan Studies Class IX, X." (2000).

2.5. The Second Military Coup of 1969

Praetorianism persisted even after Ayub's dictatorial rule ended. In the event that weak General Ayub Khan refused to step down, General Yahya Khan had already prepared a military coup. Ayub, who had lost Yahya Khan's favour, gave in to his demands. General Yahya is widely regarded as one of the least competent and inefficient commanders in the history of the Pakistani Army. The 1962 constitution was superseded by the Legal Framework Order (LFO), a transitional instrument that was subsequently abolished by General Yahya Khan shortly after seizing power. Yahya is attributed for organizing the inaugural national elections in Pakistan. During the 1970s, elections were widely perceived as being characterized by fairness and freedom. However, the conclusion elicited astonishment from all individuals involved. The Awami League emerged as the clear victor in East Pakistan, securing a resounding triumph. Despite its restricted influence in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, Bhutto's political party successfully attained control over West Pakistan. The decision to endorse Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was made by the army because to their waning confidence in Yahya, mostly driven by the realization that the majority of his backing originated from the Punjab region. The province of Punjab functioned as the principal hub for military recruitment. General Gul Hassan, a staunch supporter of Bhutto, exerted pressure on Yahya to publicly declare his retirement and transfer authority to a leader chosen via democratic means. The aforementioned decision was enacted by high-ranking military officials as a response to increasing dissatisfaction and loss of faith among the military personnel. The military asserted that General Yahya bore sole responsibility for the army's shortcomings in the Eastern region, further stating that Bhutto posed no threat to the military, whereas Shaik Mujib had the potential to downsize the armed forces. Consequently, the conclusion of military governance marked the conclusion of the second phase of praetorianism, which had contributed to the calamitous situation in East Pakistan. Following their failure in East Pakistan, the military made the decision to abstain from engaging in political affairs.¹⁰

¹⁰ Siddiqi, Abdul Rahman. "East Pakistan the endgame: an onlooker's journal 1969-1971."2004.

2.6. Post-coup Democracy and Civil-Military Relations: The Bhutto's Regime

Following the events of December 20, 1971, when East Pakistan succumbed, Ayub Khan appointed Bhutto as the primary enforcer of martial law and granted him authorization to vacate his position in the Foreign Ministry. The individual in question established the Pakistan People Party, an independent political entity. During the 1970 election, it was observed that the area of West Pakistan exhibited a significant level of support for the Pakistan People's Party, led by Bhutto. Bhutto's tenure brought about a transformation in the political landscape of Pakistan. In the realm of Pakistani politics, the impact of political families and electables was significant prior to the emergence of the individual in question. He eliminated the presence of political discussions within the boardroom and facilitated its availability to the general populace. The individual fostered a strong bond with the general public by means of engaging in political processions. He identified himself as the representative of the general populace. The family to which he belonged had characteristics of a feudal system. Upon his appointment as Pakistan's inaugural chief martial law administrator and subsequent elevation to the position of prime minister, he had aspirations to assume every post inside the nation.

Bhutto used "patrimonialism" to achieve political consolidation for his people's government, following the model of post-coup administrations. Bhutto was characterized by a focused and feudal mindset. Although he attained his position through democratic means, his governance primarily involved the use of authoritarian power. In actuality, Bhutto's primary objective was to attain political dominance over the military and administration. He initiated a strategic endeavor aimed at acquiring authority over the armed forces, the governing body, and the factions opposing his cause. In the regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province, the individual made efforts to influence the political stance of the competing parties, namely the Jamiat-i Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) and the National Awami Party (NAP), both of which were operating under coalition governments. Lt. General Gul Hassan, who played a significant role in facilitating Bhutto's rise to power, was afterward removed from his position. Air Marshall Rahim Khan was among a group of prominent military officers who were compelled to

resign. A significant number of individuals, primarily including officers, expressed their dissent towards military operations in the Eastern region and engaged in a conspiracy to kill General Yahya Khan, with the aim of facilitating the ascension of Bhutto to the office of power. During her tenure as the president of Pakistan, Bhutto initiated a public campaign advocating for the military surrender of East Pakistan. Bhutto's attempts to create civilian oversight over the armed forces were met with rejection by the army, leading to a shift in their perception of him from a potential savior to a perceived menace. The pinnacle of civil domination was attained when Bhutto's initiative compelled Gul Hassan to retire. Additionally, Bhutto implemented the establishment of the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee" (JCSC) and undertook a comprehensive restructuring of the military's command hierarchy. This decision was made with the intention of granting a civilian individual a higher level of authority compared to the military commanders, who would thereafter assume the role of chief of staff for the president.

Bhutto, known for his expertise in inspiring military personnel, endeavored to alter the prevailing dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan during 1975. This was achieved through the implementation of a policy that restricted the duration of service heads to a maximum of three years. Additionally, Bhutto curtailed the army's involvement as outlined in the 1973 constitution, specifying its primary responsibility as the defense of Pakistan against external aggression or threats. The military's incursion was deemed a grave offense, commonly referred to as "High Treason." In an effort to assuage the military's concerns, Bhutto increased the defense budget. During this period, military officials had the belief that their advantages and autonomy were under threat. The Pakistan Army Bill was adopted by the National Assembly in November 1975. As a result of this act, Bhutto was granted the authority to use discretionary power in the appointment of officers within the Pakistani civil armed forces.¹¹ The individuals who may have been seconded in the past were exclusively limited to those officers who willingly chose to join the civil armed forces. Furthermore, Bhutto enacted land reforms that had an impact on the privileges held by the military. Based on Ayub's proposition, those holding the military ranks of Colonel through General are deemed eligible to own land within the range of 150 to 240 acres. As a consequence of Bhutto's reform, officers were compelled to relinquish a portion

¹¹ Nawaz, Shuja. "Crossed swords: Pakistan, its army, and the wars within." 2008.

of their land. Additionally, Bhutto made alterations to the mission and scope of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), namely by including domestic political activities into its responsibilities. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) gained the authority to intervene in political affairs in subsequent decades since its utilization for bolstering political control was pioneered by its first chief. Bhutto further formed the Federal Security Forces (FSF) with the intention of protecting his own political goals. As a consequence of his policies, Bhutto was held in contempt by the military. The establishment of the FSF, a distinct uniformed force that may be utilized by the prime minister in their role as the head of state, incited strong displeasure among the army. Bhutto implored the military to provide training for the FSF, however, their request was rejected. Utilizing the FSF in a coercive manner to suppress political opponents was in violation of the army's policy. The political prospects of Bhutto were significantly jeopardized by rival political factions. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was a confederation including nine distinct regional, religious, and national political parties, which served as a significant hindrance in the given context. In the March 1977 elections, the political coalition known as the PNA, led by Maulana Mufti Mahmood, participated. The PNA expressed doubts over the legitimacy of the election, alleging substantial manipulation. Additionally, the PNA raised serious issues pertaining to corruption, political repression, and the presence of the FSF. The pre-election campaigns were utilized by the Bhutto government as a means to convince the opposition parties of the perceived inequities in the voting process. Bhutto's refusal to comply with the political parties' requests for transparent and equitable elections, as well as the detachment of the state machinery from the electoral procedure, may be attributed to his self-centered disposition towards authority. The individual employed a comprehensive range of tactics in order to secure a notable triumph. Conversely, heightened tension ensued during the 1977 General Elections as a result of the disputations between the contending parties about the election outcomes. The government's capacity to effectively rule was significantly compromised due to a series of strikes, protests, and a pervasive state of instability. Ultimately, Bhutto opted against reaching a definitive resolution and instead consented to engage in discussions with the PNA over the prospect of conducting fresh elections. The convergence of factors such as the perception of a manipulated election heightened political hostility, and the government's reluctance to make compromises culminated in a significant political crisis six years following the

attainment of independence by East Pakistan. The severe political unrest was too much for Bhutto to handle.

2.7. The End of Democracy and Third Martial Law

Democracy is a political system characterized by compromise and the cultivation of mutual tolerance, which facilitates its growth and development. There existed a significant discord between the opposition and Bhutto. The political dispute further exacerbated the divide between Bhutto and the opposition. In the midst of the prevailing era of turbulence, the retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan¹² covertly made a proposal for the military to assume authority over the administrative apparatus.

Bhutto held the belief that the inclusion of generals within the PNA would intensify the pressure exerted on the political opposition. However, General Zia acknowledged Bhutto's limited political acumen and acknowledged the formidable influence wielded by the army as an institution. Over the course of time, in the absence of a resolution, General Zia progressively acquired additional power and control over the fundamental components of the government. Zia expressed fervent endorsement for Bhutto's proposition of a referendum. Consequently, the National Assembly enacted a referendum legislation on May 16, 1977, which was subsequently rejected by the PNA. Simultaneously, the level of support for General Zia was diminishing. Bhutto enjoyed significant support from the Pakistani populace, however, Zia and his associates perceived a waning sense of trust in them from Bhutto. In contrast to his followers, who expressed discontent with the overall performance of his government, specifically citing issues such as limited supplies, inflation, and unfavorable economic conditions, Bhutto opted to place his trust in the military. In order to consolidate his authority, Bhutto proposed to Zia that they jointly govern Pakistan by bestowing the military with a "constitutional role." Detractors of Bhutto implored the military to intervene for the preservation of the nation, simultaneously endeavoring to oust him from his position of authority. The military effectively retained governance over the nation, particularly in the perception of the general populace, by garnering public backing for its resistance against Bhutto's regime. On July 5, 1977, General Zia assumed power and implemented Pakistan's third martial law. The military coup, under the leadership of General Zia, resulted in the downfall of the enduring

¹² Air Marshal retired Asghar Khan was head of Tehrik-e-Istiqlal-i-Pakistan (an ally of PNA)

contemporary democratic system. Bhutto's assessment of the challenges posed by the political opposition was insufficient. Furthermore, he overstated the military's capacity to promptly and definitively address the situation. General Zia was widely seen as exhibiting docility and loyalty due to his adherence to the principles of a disciplined military and his support for an elected prime minister, without raising any objections to Bhutto's authority. During his inaugural address, General Zia made a solemn commitment to conduct elections within a period of 90 days and to ensure the withdrawal of the troops to their respective barracks. Zia's perspective underwent a transformation upon assuming a position characterized by stability and power. Bhutto's adversaries advocated for his arrest due to their suspicions over his alleged involvement in the demise of Ahmad Raza Kasuri's father during Bhutto's tenure as president. Zia was subjected to capital punishment subsequent to the verdict rendered by the Supreme Court, which ascertained his culpability in orchestrating the aforementioned occurrence with the intention of causing harm to Bhutto. General Zia opted not to grant mercy to Bhutto because to apprehensions regarding the potential resurgence of Bhutto's political influence and the possibility of retribution against him. It is highly likely that Bhutto will maintain considerable public backing despite her removal from the government and the resistance he faces from the rich elite.

General Zia has a clear understanding that his act of treason had transgressed the provisions outlined in the Constitution of 1973. He used considerable effort to imbue his administration with Islamic characteristics, aiming to solidify its legitimacy. Zia received reassurances from his advisors regarding the preservation of his authority in the event of its imposition under the banner of Islam, as well as the potential for its expansion through the invocation of Islamic laws. After a period of 90 days, he came to the realization that the existence of Pakistan relied heavily on the process of Islamization, which represented a distinct departure from the strategies pursued by previous military regimes.

2.8. Zia's Regime: Domestic and International Environment

General Zia's global standing had a notable enhancement subsequent to his decision to collaborate with the United States in aiding the Afghan Mujahedeen, thwarting the Soviet Union's intended incursion into Afghanistan. The military establishment of Pakistan put out the argument that the Soviet invasion gave rise to significant security

apprehensions. Pakistan was significantly more strategically positioned to engage in competition with the formidable Soviet empire in Afghanistan, primarily due to the provision of financial assistance from the United States. As a component of the accord, President Carter eased the sanctions that were imposed on Pakistan in 1977, with the intention of providing assistance to the military leadership. General Zia demonstrated strong support for Bhutto's military administration and nuclear aspirations, although the United States disregarded both endeavors. The economy of the military dictatorship experienced significant advantages as a result of two aid packages provided by the Reagan administration, amounting to a total of \$3.2 billion and \$4.2 billion, respectively.¹³

The domestic environment further supported the government of Zia. The recognition of the concept of jihad against the Soviet Union was prevalent in Pakistani society. The manner in which Zia's authority was legitimized through a referendum in December 1984 exemplifies this phenomenon. In 1985, General Zia-ul-Haq expressed his intention to conduct elections; nevertheless, he prioritized consolidating his authority before proceeding with the electoral process. Similar to Ayub Khan, Zia endeavored to obtain a mandate in order to validate his own rule and that of the military. In the past, the sole method of validating his legitimacy was the conduction of a referendum. Moreover, it can be observed that Zia's allegiance had transitioned from the military to civilian motivations, as evidenced by the national elections of 1984. The judiciary authorized the removal of a civilian administration by a military ruler for the second instance, being aware of the ruler's existing backing from the legal system. This support was granted through the application of the "doctrine of necessity," which upheld the ruler's governance in accordance with the rule of law.¹⁴

General Zia aimed to orchestrate general elections with the objective of instituting a civilian administration subsequent to his five-year tenure as president, thereby upholding a semblance of political legitimacy. In February 1985, Pakistan witnessed the conduction of non-partisan elections, marking the advent of a managed democratic system in the country. In spite of the boycott initiated by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), the citizens of Pakistan actively participated in the

¹³ Schaffer, Howard B., and Teresita C. Schaffer. *How Pakistan negotiates with the United States: Riding the roller coaster*. US Institute of Peace Press, 2011.

¹⁴ Siddiq, Ayesha. "Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy: Separating friends from enemies." *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 1, 2011: 149-162.

electoral process, granting a certain degree of legitimacy to Zia's government. This participation was crucial in establishing a perception of legitimacy, however limited in nature. Through the transfer of authority to a civilian administration lacking in strength, the military dictator was able to sustain dominion over the nation. General Zia, the incumbent leader, designated Muhammad Khan Junejo to assume the position of Prime Minister. Zia aspired to have a relationship with an individual who possessed similar political ideologies. Furthermore, he commenced advocating for his previously established ideas. During the period from 1977 to 1985, the authorization of all ordinances was required by the newly established Parliament. The constitutional revisions in parliament were supported by voters who were politically motivated.¹⁵

Political concerns emerged subsequent to the enactment of the Revival of Constitutional Order (RCO), which resulted in modifications to a total of 67 articles. The RCO served to enhance the president's jurisdiction and institute the National Security Council (NSC) as a means to officially incorporate the military's participation in the event of a severe calamity. According to Article 58-2(b) of the Eighth Amendment, the president is granted the authority to disband all legislative bodies, including the position of prime minister. In its original form, Article 43 of the 1973 Constitution imposed a prohibition on the President, disallowing them from occupying any position that may result in financial benefits. Zia modified Article 41-(7) in order to assume the positions of President and Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The presence of a dual presidency led to imbalances of power between the civilian Prime Minister and the military president in uniform. Despite the termination of martial law, General Zia continued to exert significant influence as a highly regarded and accomplished President, overseeing civilian politics and maintaining authority in subjects pertaining to defense and security.

Junejo favored civilian authority over the military system when he was elected prime minister. He declared that he wanted to exercise his constitutional authority right now. When Junejo decided to regain military command, civil-military relations suffered. Junejo promoted and ousted certain army officers, much like Bhutto did. His hardline policies infuriated the military. The military held a strong disdain for his strict policies. The military's apprehensions escalated when Junejo made the decision to refrain from renewing the contracts of two generals who had served as close

¹⁵ Ibid.

associates to Zia. Junejo played a pivotal role in facilitating the selection of General Aslam Beg as the vice chief of army staff. Junejo was alleged to have engaged in overt interference in military matters. The suggestion to designate the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) as the executive body of the Federal Anti-Corruption Committee was also met with rejection by the military. The committee was tasked with conducting an inquiry into corruption across both the civil and military domains. The armed forces were very disturbed by Junejo's commitment to ensuring the accountability of corrupt personnel, regardless of their military or civilian status. Junejo made the decision to reduce his defense budget. The decision to substitute large vehicles with smaller ones was made on the basis of the perception that top generals experienced a sense of diminished status in the presence of civilian leadership. The activities of Junejo had a significant impact on the financial interests of the military, leading to heightened concerns regarding dominance.

In May 1988, Prime Minister Junejo undertook official visits to China and Korea. Upon his return from the visit, he expressed his intention to execute his decision of dismissing a select number of generals and thereafter naming a new Chief of Army Staff (COAS). On the 29th of May, 1988, General Zia removed Junejo from power by dissolving the National Assembly and implementing restrictions on the civilian Prime Minister's authority to investigate or dismiss military members.

2.9. Democratic Transition (1988–1999)

The untimely demise of Zia in an airplane accident on August 17, 1988, brought about a significant shift in Pakistan's political environment, as it served as a catalyst for the resurgence of democratic factions. The appointment of General Aslam Beg as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and the designation of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who held the position of chairman of the Senate at the time, as the interim president of Pakistan were significant developments. The decision made by Beg to initiate the organization of elections paved the way for the establishment of an open political system and the resurgence of democracy in Pakistan.

The third general election in Pakistan took place on November 16, 1988. The Pakistan People's Party emerged victorious in the election, securing a total of 92 seats. In contrast, the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad, which enjoyed support from the Inter-Services Intelligence, managed to get only 56 seats. The President and the military undertook

multiple efforts to obstruct Benazir Bhutto's ascension to power subsequent to the elections. The President intentionally refrained from extending an invitation to join the administration. The PPP's leadership mandated her to establish the government. The domestic and foreign media published interviews with Benazir that contained threatening content, with the aim of influencing the military and the interim president, who enjoyed military support.

During this pivotal juncture, the assistance of US Ambassador Robert Oakley proved vital in facilitating mediation efforts between the military and the civilian population. According to the military, there are three conditions that Benazir must fulfill prior to taking the oath of office. He made it clear that Benazir's government would not pursue Zia's family simply because her father Bhutto was executed while Zia was in power. She will also abstain from meddling with Pakistan's nuclear and foreign policy decisions.¹³⁴ Benazir, on the other hand, chose to disregard the demands made by the Army, ISI, and President. Benazir assumed the position of prime minister on December 2, 1988, becoming the first female prime minister in the Muslim world. The post-military democracy, which was characterized by a weak and underdeveloped state, was governed by both the military and a robust civilian president who assumed power after Zia's tenure. Bhutto's influence on foreign or national security planning was limited. Benazir made a commitment to collaborate with the President prior to assuming her official duties. Questions were raised regarding her allegiance to the President and the military hierarchy due to her apparent intention to repeal the 8th Amendment. Benazir assumed responsibility for military matters although without the requisite power to do so. Benazir Bhutto made an attempt to dismiss Admiral Iftikhar Sarohi, while General Hameed Gul was subsequently replaced as the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) by retired General Shamsur Rehman Kallu. The President at that time reiterated to Benazir that the authority to exercise these powers was exclusively vested in the President. Following Beg's departure, she proceeded to designate Lt. Gen. Jan Mehsud for the role to command the army. Transfers, promotions, and extensions of officers in the armed forces are typically awarded solely based on performance and not influenced by an individual's political ideologies. In 1990, Benazir's suggestions were rejected by the Selection Board. The departure of Lt. General Mehsud prior to General Beg ensured that the previous leadership of the ISI was not compromised. In general, it is evident that the military

expressed dissatisfaction with Benazir's involvement in military affairs. It was felt by many that the prime minister was renegeing on the pledges she had made prior to assuming her official duties. In addition to encountering military hurdles, the Benazir government faced supplementary obstacles.¹⁶

During a Corps Commanders meeting held in July 1990, under the leadership of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the panel reached a resolution to formally propose the President to exercise his authority as outlined in Article 58-2 (b) of the constitution, thereby dismissing the Prime Minister and dissolving the assembly. The decision was made in adherence to Article 58-2b, a potent mechanism enabling the President and the military to oversee civilian administrations.¹⁷ Following the deposition of Benazir, Nawaz Sharif assumed leadership of the democratically elected administration of the country, enjoying the backing of both the President and the ISI. Both the President and the ISI provided support to the IJI; yet, the administration had challenges in achieving its intended goals. In stark contrast to the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which garnered a mere 44 votes, the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI)¹⁸ coalition secured a significant support base of 106 members in the National Assembly during the 1990 elections. Consequently, the IJI alliance successfully assumed power and formed the government. Within a span of fewer than 24 months, a subsequent governmental body was instituted. The former DG ISI Asad Durani alleged in his affidavit to the Supreme Court that "the COAS instructed him to provide logistical support in the disbursement of donations made by Karachi businessmen for the IJI election campaign."¹⁹ The primary rationale behind extending support to the IJI was to safeguard the perceived "great national interest," as the security establishment regarded Benazir Bhutto as a potential threat to security. Subsequently, Nawaz Sharif assumed the distinction of becoming the inaugural leader in Pakistan to garner military backing in favor of a democratic administration. Similar to Junejo, Nawaz incited anger from both the President and the military as a result of his defiance of instructions and subsequent assertion of his constitutional rights. The military exhibited opposition towards Nawaz Sharif's endeavors to establish his authority, hence contributing to an uneven

¹⁶ Shafqat, Saeed. "Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto." *Asian Survey* 36, no. 7, 1996, 655-672.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 233.

¹⁸ Islamic Democratic Alliance

¹⁹ Ziring, Lawrence. *Dilemma And Challenge In Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan. In Pakistan 1992.*, Routledge, 2019.

civil-military relationship that rendered the establishment of a civilian power center unattainable.

In October 1993, a subsequent round of general elections was conducted amidst the ongoing political dynamics akin to a musical chairs game. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), led by Benazir Bhutto, achieved a majority in the National Assembly by securing victory in 86 seats, assuming leadership of the legislative body. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) secured a total of 72 seats in the election. Benazir demonstrated a notable level of maturity and sound judgment in her political endeavors subsequent to reaching the position of power. This can be attributed to her sense of assurance since she enjoyed the support of the military and their unequivocal recognition of her as the prime minister. Upon assuming office, Benazir Bhutto appointed President Farooq Khan Laghari. Benazir had placed her trust in Laghari due to his longstanding support for the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Following her ascension to leadership within her political party, she formulated a strategic approach aimed at instilling fear among coalition members, all the while ensuring the preservation of backing for her objectives at both the federal and provincial levels. During her subsequent term, Benazir Bhutto enhanced her aptitude for negotiation and compromise, displaying proficiency in engaging with both opposition factions and those within her own political party. Following a year, she initiated a campaign targeting the leaders of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), namely the Sharif brothers. The ensuing conflict between Nawaz and Benazir further intensified the political landscape in Pakistan. Nawaz first asserted that the electoral outcomes of the 1993 election were subject to manipulation by the ruling elite.

Upon assuming the position of Prime Minister for the first time, Benazir lacked prior experience in engaging with the influential military establishment in negotiation processes. During her subsequent term, she exhibited a heightened sense of prudence in her interactions with the influential institution and refrained from entangling herself in the internal disputes of the military. She had a close relationship with General Kakar. Due to a divergence of views between Nawaz Sharif and the incumbent president, Benazir expressed her discontent in a vehement manner when Nawaz voiced his concerns about the appointment of General Kakar as the Chief of Army Staff. In her capacity as Prime Minister, Benazir exercised heightened prudence and astuteness in her interactions with high-ranking military officials. All promotional

events were executed flawlessly. General Jehangir Karamat assumed the position of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) subsequent to General Kakar's tenure.²⁰ In a significant milestone for Pakistan's military and political landscape, the appointment of a senior general as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) marks a historic first. Historically, the appointment of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) was predominantly determined by the Prime Minister, often disregarding considerations of seniority. The selection of General Karamat on the basis of merit was widely praised by the nation's major political parties as a significant victory for democracy.

The administration led by Benazir Bhutto maintained a consistent focus on promoting the business interests of the military. Benazir Bhutto undertook a visit to the United States with the objective of influencing former President Bill Clinton to ease the restrictions on military supplies. Based on the assessment of the military establishment, she maintained significant connections with the United States.²¹ The individual presented a positive and inclusive portrayal of Pakistan within the United States, which had a notable impact on the Clinton administration's adoption of the Brown Amendment in 1995. The implementation of the Brown Amendment facilitated the provision of financial assistance, a significant achievement recognized by the administration. Pakistan has the potential to acquire military equipment that was previously subject to restrictions, with a total value of \$368 million. Benazir Bhutto played a crucial role in preventing the United States from designating Pakistan as a state that sponsors terrorism. This threat arose due to the inability of the Nawaz Sharif government to convince American authorities that Pakistani terrorists were not involved in the conflict in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. Moreover, the United States maintained communication with the military of Pakistan with the objective of reestablishing frequent and substantive dialogues pertaining to regional and global security matters.²²

2.10. Political Turmoil and Benazir's Dismissal 1996

Pakistan is widely recognized as a nation characterized by its diverse ethnic composition. Throughout its political history, several political parties and military

²⁰ Hussain, Zahid. *Frontline Pakistan: the struggle with militant Islam*. Columbia University Press, 2008.

²¹ Haqqani, Husain. *Pakistan: Between mosque and military*. Carnegie endowment, 2010.

²² Interview of former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador, Riaz Khokhar.

regimes have strategically employed ethnicity as a means to achieve their political goals, often exhibiting preferential treatment towards specific ethnic groups while marginalizing others. Sindh possesses a highly intricate ethnic network within the country, with Karachi, the largest metropolitan city in the nation, serving as a focal point of contention among various prominent ethnic groups, including the Baloch, Sindhi, Pashtuns, and Mohajirs. For an extended period of time, the city has experienced a state of unrest. During the second term of Prime Minister Bhutto, her political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) entered into a coalition government. However, it is noteworthy that the anticipated peace and stability pledged to the city were not effectively realized. The law and order situation in Karachi continues to pose a significant challenge. Benazir had concerns regarding inadequate management, nepotism, and dubious investment and financial arrangements. However, due to Zardari's notoriety and the failure of Benazir's policies, the widespread corruption in the country became a catalyst for animosity among security personnel. In September 1995, a coup plot against the government and high military leadership expressed this anger. Four days before the coup, 147 intelligence services discovered the concealed plan. When the COAS, General Karamat, was on a foreign trip, forty conspirators were apprehended. The accused were tried under the 1952 Military Act. The threats against the Benazir government, however, did not stop there.

Disagreements emerged inside the PPP government, namely between the President and Prime Minister. Benazir and Laghari appeared to have a harmonious working relationship. Laghari served as her trusted confidante, nominee of her political party, and an active member of the party. She held the position of the nation's foremost executive and served as the chairperson of the political party. The individual's political and constitutional legitimacy to exercise governance over the nation based on their personal political preferences and interests remained unquestioned. Laghari utilized the 8th Amendment as a means to curtail the authority of the Prime Minister in their capacity as the President. The nomination of judges by Benazir was a notable factor that exacerbated the strain between the Prime Minister and the President. The President and Prime Minister both desired to demonstrate their power.²³ Both sides

²³ Hussain, Hamid. "Judicial Jitters in Pakistan—A Historical Overview." *Defence Journal* 22, no. 1 (2018): 69-87.

failed to reach an agreement, as the President appeared determined to use his constitutional authority to stop the deterioration of state institutions at the hands of reckless, corrupt politicians and bureaucrats who, in his opinion, had collectively contributed to the discredit of parliamentary democracy.²⁴ In Pakistan's political history, no COAS has ever played a role in mediating disagreements between the President and the Prime Minister. General Karamat was the first to offer himself as a go-between for the President and the Prime Minister in an attempt to settle the escalating political and institutional crisis. Benazir disregarded the demands and admonishments put out by President Laghari. The Prime Minister had the prerogative to exercise her authority, however, Laghari, who had the constitutional ability to remove the government by dissolving the assembly, opted to pursue his politically motivated agenda against an obstinate Prime Minister. The practice of engaging with familial ties, personal acquaintances, and established political factions rather than political parties has been a longstanding characteristic of Pakistani politics. Benazir Bhutto, for instance, heavily relied on her spouse and strategically aligned herself with political allies who shared her ancestral background.

It is unfortunate that Pakistan's democratically elected leaders have not effectively utilized their authority in alignment with constitutional principles and democratic values. Working with family, friends, and established political clans rather than political parties has long been a hallmark of Pakistani politics. Benazir relied heavily on her husband and chose political allies who shared her origin.²⁵ Zardari had established tremendous weight in Sindh by this point, and he was utilizing government machinery to punish his opponents in his home province. The Sindh Police high command reported to Zardari rather than the Sindh Chief Minister.

2.11. 1997 Election and Second Term of Nawaz Sharif

On February 3, 1997, Pakistan held its second general election, which added to the political circus that is that nation. There have been four general elections in the last ten years. The mistakes of the Bhutto administration gave Nawaz a solid mandate to start his administration. When the election results were made public, the PML-N had secured 137 seats in the National Assembly. PPP might only win 18 seats. Except for

²⁴ Najam Sethi. "Ladies and Gentlemen, the President", Friday Times, October 3, 1996

²⁵ "Asif Ali Zardari Case History",

Baluchistan, every province had been taken over by the PML-N. This time, with Benazir's support, the 8th Amendment was repealed. This occurred as a result of the president dismissing both of them in compliance with this rule. Before presenting the idea in Parliament, Nawaz consulted with the army chief. The 13th Amendment, which eliminated Article 58-2b and restored the parliamentary nature of the democratic system, was ratified by Sharif's administration. Today, the Prime Minister has constitutional authority over the selection of judges and military leaders.

Nawaz Sharif began to display authoritarian tendencies that alarmed some sectors of the country, especially the military and the judiciary, once he gained constitutional authority and the first-ever two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives. He even made the decision to add Islamic principles and a new judicial system in the proposed 15th amendment in order to ensure swift justice. The Supreme Judicial Court, however, rejected this notion. The Court also rejected a 1997 anti-terrorism law passed by the Parliament because it was deemed insufficient and called for more changes. The executive branch and the judiciary began a public battle. Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah wrote to the prime minister to urge him to appoint candidates for the five vacant judicial positions. Nawaz Sharif disregarded court orders to obey them. The President was also asked by Nawaz to revoke the notification of Sajjad Ali Shah's appointment, but he declined. Looking back, it looked like the President and the Chief Justice were collaborating to limit Nawaz Sharif's authority and, if he resisted, to have him removed. Once again, individuals have used the power bestowed upon them by the constitution and the institutions they govern to topple their competitors in Pakistan due to a clash of personal interests.

When institutions respect one another and don't interfere with each other's legal rights, democracy advances. Instead of trying to make things right, the Prime Minister started criticising judges in his public remarks. Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah reported that as a result, a "contempt of court" notice was sent to the Prime Minister. The Supreme Court issued a notice of contempt of court to Nawaz, one of the architects of democracy. The country's legal system was suspended as a result of the significant dispute between the Prime Minister and Chief Justice, which led to political turmoil. Nawaz and the CJ both resorted to the COAS for help in defusing the crisis. Karamat tried to mediate the court of contempt issue, but nothing came of it.

The political crisis within the nation was caused by a divergence of opinions between the head of state and the judiciary. On November 27, 1997, a group of individuals supportive of the government, under the leadership of legislators affiliated with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), engaged in an act of aggression towards the Supreme Court. This incident occurred during a contempt of court trial against the Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, when the Court had the potential authority to disqualify him if found guilty of contempt. The Supreme Court experienced an assault, so posing a threat to the personal security of the judges as well as the reputation of the institution. In response to the Executive's influence, the Chief Justice formally communicated a request to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) for the safeguarding of judges in a written correspondence. Nawaz Sharif made a request to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and the President for assistance in the dismissal of the Chief Justice. Nawaz had devised a strategy to retaliate against Justice Sajjad Ali Shah due to the latter's attempts to disqualify him.²⁶ In contrast, Laghari demonstrated a refusal to engage in any unlawful activities. Nawaz was quite angered by this. He wrote to President, pushing him to resign or face impeachment. As a result, the President decided to resign. Pakistan's next elected President, Rafiq Tarar, was merely a ceremonial figurehead. The Prime Minister was now in a position to impose his authority. He filed a petition against Justice Sajjad Ali Shah at the Supreme Court's Baluchistan registry, alleging that he was appointed in violation of Supreme Court decisions—which, according to the famous judges case, he was not.¹⁵³ The Supreme Court declared his appointment unlawful in December 1997, and Justice Saeed Zaman Siddiqi was appointed as the next Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.²⁷ Zardari was compelled to seek refuge in order to evade potential legal proceedings in Pakistan, being cognizant of Nawaz's adversarial stance towards Benazir. He was apprehended and incarcerated on allegations related to corruption. He was incarcerated for a period of eight years without being formally convicted of any charges.

The democratic administration led by Nawaz Sharif encountered a range of domestic issues. The hurdles to democratic government arose from the repeal of the Eighth Amendment, the legal issues faced by Nawaz, and the subsequent compelled departure of Laghari. The Prime Minister was bestowed with unfettered authority,

²⁶ Khan, Gohar Ayub. "Glimpses into the Corridors of Power." 2007

²⁷ Benazir Bhutto ignored two senior judges and appointed Sajjad Ali Shah.

devoid of any mechanisms of oversight or balance from the President. Consequently, the process of political planning was disrupted. Following the tenure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif assumed the position of Prime Minister, so becoming the second individual to attain significant authority as a civilian leader. As aforementioned, Nawaz aspires to undertake a comprehensive reform of the court system through the introduction of the Sharia bill. The aforementioned legislation sparked a contentious debate within the Supreme Court, prompting the military elite to voice significant apprehensions regarding Nawaz's political approach. The military conceptualized a structurally equitable institution in which other establishments exercised oversight and counterbalanced authority. The military leadership perceived the National Security Council (NSC) as a valuable asset amidst the nation's domestic turbulence. General Karamat shown initial reluctance in announcing the military's engagement in political affairs, although he was compelled to make such a declaration during a gathering of Corps Commanders at the General Headquarters (GHQ) on September 19, 1998. The proposal for the National Security Council (NSC) by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) during his speech at the Naval War College in Lahore on October 6, 1998, resulted in a significant escalation of tensions between the military and the civilian leadership.²⁸ Due to Karamat's shown proficiency, the military deemed it unsuitable to engage in the political domain immediately, as the management and administration of governance were regarded as the purview of civilian authorities.

Following the Kargil incident in 1999, bilateral relations saw a decline. The Kargil conflict witnessed an unexpected military offensive launched by General Pervez Musharraf, which took India by surprise. The individual did not make any effort to acquire formal authorization. Nawaz and his staff were not provided with a briefing on the operation prior to its commencement, a crucial prerequisite for the initiation of a war. This mistake was done by the military command, leading to a historically robust response from India. Musharraf shown unwavering determination in engaging the Indian troops during the Kargil conflict. Regrettably, Pakistan did not receive any diplomatic assistance from either China or the United States. The Clinton administration expressed agitation and anxiety about the Kargil operation due to

²⁸ Nawaz, Shuja. "Pakistan's security and the Civil-military nexus." *The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater* (2010): 18.

apprehensions about potential nuclear implications in the region. In contrast, China expressed a preference for engaging in bilateral dialogues. Pakistan has had challenges in obtaining foreign assistance or diplomatic support. China expressed its objection, prompting the US administration to perceive it as a potentially hazardous nuclear power maneuver that could escalate into a large-scale armed conflict. The Kargil battle exerted pressure on Nawaz's rapport with the military leadership. Nawaz was compelled to acquiesce to the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil due to the exertion of pressure by the United States. The army perceived Nawaz's decision to withdraw from Kargil as an act of "betrayal," eliciting strong emotions of anger and animosity.

Nawaz's decision to evacuate Kargil can be justified on the grounds that a minor conflict had the potential to escalate rapidly, given the possession of nuclear weapons by both Pakistan and India. After Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, a series of international restrictions were imposed. The Kargil conflict posed a significant challenge to the diplomatic endeavors of former Chief of Army Staff, General Musharraf, hence undermining Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's attempts to mend bilateral relations with India. The sudden removal of troops has had a detrimental impact on the military's standing and has led to a significant loss of life. The deterioration of civil-military relations can be attributed to the perceived reluctance of Nawaz to collaborate with the military establishment, leading to an atmosphere of animosity and distrust.²⁹ On October 12, 1999, upon Musharraf's return to Pakistan from Sri Lanka, Nawaz made the decision to dismiss him from his position as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and appoint Lt. General Zia-u-din Khawaja, who was serving as the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as his replacement. It was already agreed by Musharraf and other high-ranking military officers that any measures taken by Nawaz against the military would be nullified, resulting in the military assuming power. The fall of Nawaz's regime can be attributed to his excessive consolidation of power and unrestricted exercise of authority. The individual held the belief that Zia-u-din would likely receive a positive reception because to his association with the influential position of authority. Consequently, the individual did not anticipate encountering a severe response from the military. The

²⁹ Akhtar, Nasreen. "Civil Military Relations During The Zardari Regime (2008-2012) In Pakistan: Internal And External Factors." 2017

second democratic transition was overturned when the Commanders made the decision to assume authority prior to the arrival of Musharraf's jet in Pakistan. Pakistan's political landscape was dominated by the military during the subsequent decade.

2.12. Fourth Military Regime

One of Pakistan's sad political realities is that a strong civilian prime minister will frequently face political penalties for attempting to utilize his constitutional authority. Nawaz was dismissed from office for using his constitutional rights against security forces. Musharraf's fourth military takeover was unique in that the COAS was not present in Pakistan. The coup was carried out by senior generals Sayed Zafar, who was also acting COAS at the time, General Aziz Khan, and General Mehmood Ahmad. Musharraf orchestrated the coup to escape being sacked by the Prime Minister.³⁰

Unlike his predecessors, Musharraf did not tell the people that elections would be held to hand over power to the people's representatives. From Ayub Khan to Pervez Musharraf, all military dictators have used the same talking points to justify their rule and highlighted how dire the country's economic and political conditions were prior to their takeover.³¹ The military has positioned itself as the state's "savior" and "guardian," acting only to put the country back on track and advance it toward economic success and improved governance.

Musharraf did not guarantee the populace that elections would be held to hand over power to the people's representatives, in contrast to his predecessors. When Musharraf was in power, some judges refused to acknowledge his authority, opting to jeopardize their careers rather than condone illegal behavior. When Musharraf issued the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) in December 1999, six of the nine judges, including the Chief Justice, refused to take a new oath of office and were subsequently removed from their positions.³² The new Supreme Court justices were chosen personally by General Musharraf. Justice Riaz Ahmad Shaikh has been

³⁰ Islam, Syed Sirajul. "Civil-Military Relations: Western and Islamic Perspectives." *American Journal of Islam and Society* 17, no. 2 (2000): 97-121.

³¹ See first speech of Pervez Musharraf, Dawn, October 13, 1999. Available on <https://www.dawn.com/news/1211744>.

³² "6Justices Refuse Oath to Shield Military," Chicago Tribune, January 27, 2000.

appointed as Pakistan's new Chief Justice (CJP). The fourth military dictatorship received constitutional protection as a result of this decree, restoring the traditional pattern of military seizure and judicial confirmation.³³ Justice Shaikh supported the military coup, and the Supreme Court gave the administration three years to implement reforms, including changing the constitution.

Musharraf had taken several steps to consolidate his position of authority, but the 17th Amendment's reintroduction of an article was possibly the most significant element of his agenda to promote guided democracy. Musharraf reinstated Article 58-2 (b), granting him the authority to dissolve the elected Prime Minister and Assemblies. Musharraf's most practical option for preventing Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from entering politics was to invoke the 17th Amendment. This provision barred both candidates from running for prime minister for a third time. Musharraf gained support from the political elite in order to maintain his position of power.

Military officers have long advocated for the establishment of the NSC. When COAS Karamat proposed the NSC in 1998, ties between the civil and military sectors became strained. Musharraf's National Security Council (NSC), created in 2004, now comprised the prime minister, provincial chief ministers, and increased participation from the armed forces. The NSC had the right to recommend the expulsion of a province or federal administration, and it was tasked with directing, controlling, and overseeing future elected administrations. Both the PPP and the PML (N) opposed the measure, which was supported by Musharraf-supporting organizations.

2.13. Problems to Musharraf Regime: End of the Military Rule

Musharraf, like his predecessor General Zia, held elections to establish the groundwork for democracy. The pro-Musharraf PML-Q won 118 of the 342 National Assembly seats. A new religious party alliance known as Mutahida-Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) secured a substantial number of members in the National Assembly and also secured the majority of the seats in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). The Pakistan Muslim League-Q's candidate for prime minister was Zafarullah Khan Jamali. Later, internal political squabbles over President Musharraf's constitutional reforms, as well as a standoff between the opposition and the government,

³³ Zafar Ali Shah vs. Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan PLD 2000 SC 869. <https://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/p-l-d-2000-sc-869/>.

exacerbated tensions between Jamali and Musharraf. A civil-military dispute resulted in Jamali's resignation and the collapse of his government in June 2004. Jamali was the first casualty of the military government's National Security Council, which was perceived as a new assault on democracy despite the fact that it was a "controlled democracy."³⁴

Musharraf brought in Shaukat Aziz from the United States to mold him into a more likable future prime minister. Aziz, a technocrat, had never held a post in the executive branch before. Musharraf and Aziz were in charge of making the majority of decisions in this embryonic government, both internally and outside. In 2006-2007, Musharraf and his democratic administration targeted Akbar Bugti in Baluchistan and clerics in Islamabad. These two actions, which aided terrorism and extremism, had an impact on the country. He sustained political damage with the removal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in March 2007. A successful restoration effort was launched in 2007 as a result of anti-Musharraf organizations uniting to support the Chief Justice.

For the first time, two major political parties agreed to collaborate to strengthen democracy in the hopes of reducing the military's potential future involvement. The Charter of Democracy (CoD), which Nawaz and Benazir signed in May 2006, included several demands, including the removal of General Musharraf, the reinstatement of the 1973 Constitution, a new election held under interim rules, and an independent Election Commission. This dangerous political tactic was intended to strengthen the opposition and put pressure on Musharraf to reconsider his political objectives.

Democracy had failed throughout both the first decade of independence in the 1950s and the subsequent first democratic transition in the 1970s due to patrimonial and authoritarian types of government. This technique resulted in client-pattern links that were so close to being corrupt that they may have been the result of nepotism. Lawlessness and corruption, the two root causes of these issues, harmed Benazir's government throughout her second term. Domestic and international News outlets became very interested in Benazir's corruption. Zardari advanced to become the

³⁴ A senior military officer shared his view with author that Jamali was reluctant to introduce bill for NSC although bill was passed Musharraf decided to get rid of Jamali who was considered 'yes boss man'. But Jamali asserted himself and not fully supported his policies that annoyed Musharraf.

epitome of greed and corruption in the world.¹⁵¹ Because of Zardari's role in the shady manipulation of state institutions, the President had the opportunity to fire Benazir's cabinet. She had no choice but to leave because she was helpless to stop her husband from misusing governmental resources for private gain. He did play a crucial role in the downfall of Benazir's second democratic government. On November 5, 1996, the government was dissolved when Laghari met with General Karamat before being fired. The accusations of corruption, political turmoil, and nepotism that had been made against Bhutto in earlier firings were repeated as he carried out this action.

2.14. National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO): A Political

Compromise

The NRO has fundamentally changed the political landscape in Pakistan despite its lengthy history of political compromises. It appeared that the NRO was a "political accord," a pact between President Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto, despite the fact that its main objective was "political reconciliation." Political organizations pushed Musharraf to quit COAS as the political climate became too tense and demanding for him to continue in that position. Contrarily, Musharraf wants to keep his position as leader. On August 8, 2007, he attempted to impose martial law in Pakistan, but Richard Boucher, the assistant secretary at the time, and Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state of the United States, intervened. With Benazir, who was living in exile, they were crucial in forging a political pact. It was Rice who brought Musharraf and Benazir together and convinced them to sign the political settlement. Along with the US secretaries, Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, director general of ISI, was a key player in mediating the conflict between Musharraf and Benazir. Benazir wanted the accusations against her and Zardari dropped before she entered the race for president in 2008. Benazir had to back Musharraf up. In exchange for releasing the NRO the day before the election, Musharraf received the PPP's political support. Musharraf was re-elected as president in 2007 but he couldn't take office until the Supreme Court approved his five-year term. The judiciary, which is frequently abused, contested Musharraf's right to retain two offices.³⁵ On November 3, 2007, Musharraf declared a state of emergency in an effort to retake power. CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry was one of the

³⁵ Yousuf, Muneeb. "Book review: Declan Walsh, *The Nine Lives of Pakistan: Dispatches from a Divided Nation*." (2021): 302-305.

sixty judges with the authority to overturn the president's declaration of a state of emergency. According to Musharraf's historic choice, the subsequent elections for the transitional democracy would be held on February 15, 2008. On November 29, 2007, he appointed General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani as the new COAS prior to the elections. Political initiatives for peace allowed Benazir and Nawaz to come home from exile. After a decade away, Benazir returned to Pakistan. She denounced the Taliban and the way they handled themselves in FATA, where they had questioned the legitimacy of the government. On December 27, 2008, she was assassinated during a political campaign. By paving the way for democracy, Benazir's passing changed the nation's political climate.

CHAPTER 03: NEW ERA OF DEMOCRATIZATION (2008-2013)

3.1. Introduction

Civil military relations in a country determine the quality of democracy and institutional harmony. The countries which have strong democratic system have harmonious and balanced civil military relationship, such as United Kingdom and United States. But the countries where democratic institutions have no strong roots are vulnerable to the interventions of frequent intervention of the Non democratic forces such as some Africa countries and Pakistan. One needs to explore first the factors which contribute to the civil military imbalance and negatively impact the political and democratic system. Military intervention is mostly occurred in the developing countries owing to the low level of political culture, economic crises, corporate interest of the military and some other external factors which induce army to intervene in the politics.³⁶ Pakistan is the prime example where military has a great role in politics. In 75 years history Pakistan has experienced four direct military rule. Even in the democratic set up military covertly play dominant role in the policy making and decision making especially security related issues and foreign policy of the country. Ayub khan was the first military ruler and Musharaf was the last military dictator to rule the country directly. But contrary to the promises the military rulers, in which include Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharaf had also failed to provide a strong and stable political system to the country. Under the Military rule, the country's social political and economic situation further deteriorated. After the Musharaf regime the military has decided to take a back seat and allow the civilian to take the control of the country. In 2008 general elections Pakistan formed a coalition government with the help of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz, MQM and ANP. After eight years of Military rule the reign of the country once again came into the hands of the democratic government. In the last years of Musharaf regime, military faced a severe criticism from different sections of the society. So under the Chief of army staff Gen Kiyani, army decided to return to their barracks and allow the civilian government to

³⁶ Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. "The military and politics in Pakistan." In *Civil Military Interaction in Asia and Africa*, pp. 27-42. Brill, 1991.

rule the country without any kind of intervention apart from army. Similarly, political leadership also wanted to establish civilian supremacy in the country and the PPP led coalition government had taken certain steps such as abolition of National security committee, provincial autonomy and the abolishment of political wing of ISI. For the time being army had accepted the subservient role under the new elected government. But the harmony between civilian and military did not last long and the governance, security related issues and some external factors had created chasm between the elected government and the military establishment. But this time military was showing reluctance of not taking risk of direct rule, owing to two obvious reasons; first at international level direct military rule is not acceptable and second Musharaf regime had earned bad name for military among the masses. So this time army decided to play a role from behind the scene and public opinion developed against the elected government through press media and electronic media, opposition parties and judiciary to challenge the authority of the civilian government.³⁷ Despite all challenges the first elected government had completed its term and transferred power to another elected government formed by Pakistan Muslims league Nawaz. Almost all political parties accepted elections results with some complaints of rigging. Nawaz Sharif led government initiated some policies in which include independent foreign policy, all out action against the terrorist organizations trial of Musharaf in the case of abrogation of constitution resulted in the imbalance of civil military relations, because military establishment deemed such initiatives counterproductive to their interest and decided to prevent it though not through direct involvement, but mobilize some other actors in which include journalists, judiciary and pro establishment politicians like Imran khan and Tahir UI Qadri to obstruct unfavorable government initiatives, Although PML [N] led government also completed its term. But they also failed to establish civilian supremacy. Relations between elected government and the military have been remained tense and military establishment continuously defying the authority of the elected government through one pretext or the other. As a result, although for the first time two elected government completed its constitutional term at a stretch, but both the government has failed to establish civilian supremacy and made the military subservient to the elected government. Contrary to that military establishment further entrenched itself into the political affairs of the country. In 2018

³⁷ Shah, Aqil. *The army and democracy: Military politics in Pakistan*. Harvard University Press, 2014.

general elections they decided to back and support new political party Pakistan Tehrik Insaf led by Imran Khan, because military establishment wants a man who does not pose any threat to their corporate interest.³⁸ So in 2018 elections P.T.I formed a new government with the help of establishment. Imran led government was a hybrid in which everything is controlled from behind the curtain. So in the era of democratization political forces could eliminate military political role but further penetrated into the political landscape of the country through hybrid regime. Strong democratic system is still a distant dream despite of elected governments have been governing the country since 2008.³⁹

3.2. Military and Politics

Military is an important stakeholder in the modern state system. Its main function is to defend country from external aggression as well as provide assistance to civilian authority to deal with internal crises. There is a concept in the modern state that nature of military must be apolitical. It should be kept aloof from the political activities of the country, because it could disrupt the organizational structure of the army which in return affects its fighting capabilities. But the relationship between the military and politics has been remained a complex phenomenon through the history. Each institution has its own type of function. Military mainly look after the nation's sovereignty and safeguarding its interest, while the politics mainly deal with the management of public affairs and the governance of the country.⁴⁰

3.3. Historical Perspective

Throughout history the relations between military and politics has been remained tense. In ancient civilizations military leaders often transitioned into political position and took control of the country. The same practice continued through medieval time and still in practice in modern era, where a strong military leader assumed political power by staging a coup. A successful coup resulted in authoritarian rule. In the 20th century in many countries a military leader rose to power by staging a successful coup such as Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan. These military leaders assumed political power

³⁸ Shah, Aqil. "Pakistan: Voting under military tutelage." *J. Democracy* 30 (2019): 128.

³⁹ Ibid p 137

⁴⁰ Sheikh, Md Ziaul Haque, and Zahid Shahab Ahmed. "Military, authoritarianism and Islam: A comparative analysis of Bangladesh and Pakistan." *Politics and Religion* 13, no. 2 (2020): 333-360.

in the pretext of elimination of corruption to bring political and economic stability to the country. But in most cases they also failed in fulfilling the promise they made. Basically army intervention in the polity is not universal phenomenon. It is varied from society to society according to the political formula existing there. According to S.M FINER "Where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong military intervention in politics will be weak and where public attachment to civilian institutions is weak or non-existent, military intervention in politics will find wide scope- both in manners and in substance" The country where civilian associations and parties are strong and the procedure of transfer of power are exercised according to the constitution and the location of supreme authority is not seriously challenged, then the military will not be allowed to play any kind of political role.⁴¹ On the contrary, where the political parties and civil society weak and few, where the procedure of transfer of power is irregular or even non- existent, where the location of supreme authority is a matter of huge disagreement, there the military, political scope will be very wide. For instance, UK and United states, where the political culture is high, attachment to civil institution is strong, the military role is subservient to the civilian authority. But the countries where political culture is low and the attachment to the civilian authority is fragile, the military intervention is more frequent such as Pakistan. In seventy-five-year history Pakistan has seen four directly military rule, while in elected governments the military is being playing dominant role in the decision making especially in the matter related to foreign policy and security issues. When Pakistan got its independence in 1947, the founding party Pakistan Muslim league could not transform itself from movement into organized political party. When the first-tier leader Quaid-i-Azam and Liaqat Ali khan died, the part turned into different fictions which started promotion of provincialism. On the other hand, Pakistan inherited a military which was the most organized institution. At initial stage Pakistan were facing multiple crises in which include domestic issues such as refuge problem, economic crises and external security pressure. State survival became the central concern of the rulers of Pakistan, who equated it with an assertive federal, government, strong defense posture, high defense posture high defense expenditure and an emphasis on monolithic nationalism. According to Hassan Askari "Preference were given to state security instead of creating participatory political institutions and

⁴¹ Shafqat, Saeed. "Pakistan military: sustaining hegemony and constructing democracy?." *Journal of south Asian and Middle Eastern studies* 42, no. 2 (2019): 20-51

processes “. Quaid I Azam the founder of Pakistan adopted a vicegeral system which was highly centralized. On the other hand Pakistan society was divided on the basis of ethnic and linguistic line. Highly centralization of authority instead of playing any positive role in national building created fragmentation in the society. The political leadership demanded federal system with provincial autonomy, which became a primary cause in the delaying of the constitution.⁴² The country was run without constitution for nine years. The political leadership failed to develop a consensus political system, while Pakistan army was the only organized institution ultimately filled the gap created by the political leadership owing two factors; first fear of India which did not accept the partition whole heartedly and the central leadership deemed the partition a temporary transition, second internal fragmentation also pushed Pakistan army to play the role of guardian to protect the country from completely annihilation. The higher ranks of army considered themselves a more suitable option for the ruling the country owing to professionalism and its organizational structure. The people of Pakistan were fed up from continuous political instability and economic crises. The political leadership was failed to produce inclusive political system for this multi ethnic, multi religion and multi linguistic society of Pakistan, because of lacking of organized political party. Pakistan Muslim league revolved around the charisma of the personalities such as Quaid I Azam and Liaqat Ali khan, but both were failed to transfer charisma to the party and the political system, and gave birth to political vacuum.⁴³ According to the Hassan Askari “The gap of leadership at the top encourages factionalism and personal jealousy in the party which had led the freedom movement, regional leader and sectional political parties come up. Since their power base is some region, tribe or community, they have parochial approach and narrow outlook.” So, in such situation when one section dominates the power corridor, the other sections of the society automatically rise up with the complains of exploitations which give birth to distrust hostilities and economic and political disparities between different region and classes. The regional and parochial forces adversely impact the effectiveness of the government to deal with the problems arising during the transitory stages of modernization. The words of Dankwart A Ruston about the problems of the new nations in these words “Disagreement on constitutional procedures inexperience with government by

⁴² Khan, Hamid. "Constitutional and political history of Pakistan." (*No Title*) (2001).

⁴³ Ibid

discussion, a precarious feeling of national identity, lack of technical qualifications among civil servants, a general dearth of educated personnel. Atrophy of political parties, diffuseness of economic interest groups- all these reduce government capability”. Absence of inclusive approach among the political leadership contributed to the alienation of the masses from the government, decrease the capability of the government which become a cause of political and economic instability to the extent that political leaders find it difficult to improve the condition of the masses.⁴⁴

On the other hand military was more organized than the civilian institutions. Basically, four major characteristics contributed to military organizational superiority over the civilians; centralization, hierarchy, inter-communication and esprit de corps. At initial stage of independence civilian authority mostly sought help from military authority to deal with any kind of emergency situations, such as demonstration floods and other natural calamities. For instance, in 1973 when religious parties were demonstrating to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslim. Civilian authority was failed desperately to manage anti ahmadi riots. Consequently, the federal government called military and declared martial law under Major Gen Azam Khan as a chief martial law administrator in Lahore to dispel the demonstration. The Lahore was divided into six sectors headed by one chief martial law administrator for each sector. It was the first opportunity for the military to run the civil administration.⁴⁵ Aqil Shah opines in the book “The Army and Democracy; Military politics in Pakistan” that “the use of the military in Non-professional field has three major consequences, First it gives the military experience to handle what is considered to be the responsibility of political leaders. Secondly it arouses the suspicion in the mind of the military about the efficacy of the government and they acquire first-hand knowledge of the depth of popular antagonism against the civil government. Third an impression is created in the society that the armed forces have the power and ability to handle a situation when it goes out of control of the civil administration”. In Pakistan case the high rank of military hold the similar views about the political leadership or civilian authority. When the first martial law was imposed, Ayub Khan addressed to the nation as a chief martial law administrator on 8th October 1958 that “the army entered into politics with

⁴⁴ Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. "The military and politics in Pakistan." In *Civil Military Interaction in Asia and Africa*, pp. 27-42. Brill, 1991

⁴⁵ Akram, Sidra, Mughees Ahmad, and Sobia Naeem. "Constitutional and Political Dilemma: A Case Study of Pakistan." *Government: Research Journal of Political Science* 11 (2022).

great reluctance but with the fullest conviction that there was no alternative to it except the disintegration and ruination of the country". Basically military used two method for consolidation; first that the military has no political ambitions but the deteriorated political conditions compelled them to take the reign of the country to protect the country from external enemies as well as internal elements which pose threat to the social political and economic order of the country. Second they introduce certain reform to improve the living condition of the common man. In Pakistan political history four military dictators directly ruled the country. These military rulers whenever assumed power had taken certain steps which could provide base to their illegal rule. For instance Ayub khan introduced a new constitution in 1962 with presidential form of government. Under the new constitution president enjoyed extensive legislative and executive powers. Similarly political activities were banned in the country.⁴⁶ Political leaders were tried under the new law introduce by the regime EBDO to debar them from active politics. Yakhya khan and Zia ul Haq also followed their predecessor to consolidate the military regime. Even in the transitional period of democracy in which the elected government run the affairs of the country, but military role in the decision and policy making were not eliminated altogether and the continuously playing the role in making and overthrowing governments. As a result in the period of 1988 to 1999 not a single political party completed its constitutional term. In 1999 once again military decided to take direct rule of the country and elected government of Pakistan Muslim League [N] under the leadership of the Nawaz Sharif was overthrown by than the Army chief Gen perviz Musharaf on 12th October 1999.⁴⁷

3.4. Rise and Fall of Musharaf and Collapse of His Political System

Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif won majority of seats in National assembly and three provincial assemblies in which include Punjab, then NWFP and Baluchistan and form governments in center and in three provinces, while in Sindh Pakistan People party got the majority and formed the government. Benazir and Nawaz sharif became a victim of the 58[2b] in previous regimes. So, when Nawaz Sharif took the reign of the country this time, the first step he took was the deletion of 58[2b] from constitution

⁴⁶ Shah, Aqil. *The army and democracy: Military politics in Pakistan*. Harvard University Press, 2014.

⁴⁷ Khan, Hamid. "Constitutional and political history of Pakistan." (*No Title*) (2001).

through 13th amendment. Now the president could not be able to dissolve the government by using 58[2b]. The president role was restricted to the titular head of the state. However, despite of strong government on the back Nawaz sharif could not initiate any drastic reforms in social political and economic sphere. The country was lurching from one crisis to another. The foreign debt was increasing at alarming rate reached to 32 billion and the foreign reserves was depleting also. The country was on brink of default. Similarly ethnic violence and sectarianism deteriorated the law-and-order situation in the country especially in Karachi. In addition, Prime Minister was in conflict with then the Chief Justice of Pakistan Sajid Ali Shah over the elevation of the judges. The confrontation with the judiciary caused schism within the supreme-court and in this way divided and destroyed. the court the government failed to build political consensus in the country and many political parties even in alliance with the ruling party were complaining of not paying heed to their demands. Similarly Nawaz sharif also caused great harm to the federation. According to Hamid khan that "The act and policies of his government only strengthened the perception that Punjab dominates other provinces which were not given their due"⁴⁸ Furthermore, Nawaz Sharif concentrated all the power in his hand and act as an authoritarian ruler. Hamid khan expressed his opinion in his book" Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan that "Nawaz sharif further personalized the system of governance by holding open courts instead of strengthening state institution. Nawaz sharif ruled the country like a private fiefdom." The authoritarian attitude of the Prime Minister brought him into the direct collision with the armed forces. The Army Chief Gen Jehangir Karamt presented a proposal of establishment of a National security Council for addressing important national issue. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did not like the proposal to the extent that he forced the Army Chief to resign and replaced by General Parviz Musharaf. Although, Army chief resigned without showing any reaction but the move of the Prime Minister did not like in the rank and file of the army. ⁴⁹The decision of the removal of the army chief was deemed as a humiliation to the armed forces. But Nawaz Sharif chemistry with the new Army chief General Pervaz Musharaf did not last long and when the Nawaz sharif withdrew army and Mujahiden unilaterally from the Kargil war under the Washington deal. He blamed the Musharaf for not consulting him, while started Kargil war. On the other hand army was not happy over the

⁴⁸ Tudor, Maya. "REnEWEd HopE in pakistan?." *J. Democracy* 25 (2014): 105.

⁴⁹ *ibid*

unilateral withdrawal of the army from Kargil while they were in better position. After the Kargil crisis the relations between the Nawaz government and armed forces were extremely souring and the rumour in the air that Nawaz Sharif was going to sack another Chief of Army staff. On 12 October Prime Minister promoted Lt General Zia-ud-Din to general and appointed as army chief although he was senior to many colleagues. The army reacted to this decision and decided to overthrow the elected government and it was announced by General Musharraf that Pakistan Muslim League government was removed and the armed forces took the charge of the country.

Gen Musharraf assumed power as a chief executive of the country and emergency was imposed. The constitution was suspended, and provisional constitutional order was promulgated in the country. President Rafiq Tarar was allowed to remain in the office, but all the assemblies were dissolved. Like his predecessor, General Musharraf also presented the same pretexts for the justification of this unconstitutional move, that the country was on the brink of collapse. The country was entangled in social political and economic crises. The speech he made to the nation on 13th October the “The people should remain calm and support the armed forces. The army has left with no other option to prevent the country from complete collapse. The Armed forces would preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the country at any cost.” However In the modern states system, military dictatorship is considered a worst form government. So whenever military leader overthrows the elected government, he needs legitimacy to rule the country. Musharraf coup was also unconstitutional which was not acceptable at international level. But in Pakistan political history judiciary has played a role of rescue to give the legal cover to any unconstitutional step under the doctrine of state necessity.⁵⁰ This trend was started in the Maulvi Tamiz u din case in which then the Chief Justice Munir gave the verdict in favor of the governor general Ghulam Muhammad decision of dissolving the constitute assembly under the doctrine of state of necessity. After that it became established norm in Pakistan. Ayub Khan and Zia ul Haq also legalized martial Law under the above mentioned doctrine. In Musharraf case also supreme court rejected all the petition against the military take over with the following findings “On 12 October 1999, a situation had arisen for which the

⁵⁰ Haider, Muhammad Waqas, and Tahir Mahmood Azad. "Analysing Kargil Conflict in the Light of the Democratic Peace Theory and the Decision Making Process." *AJAR| Asian Journal of Academic Research* (ISSN: 2790-9379) 2, no. 1 (2021): 1-14.

constitution provided no solution and the intervention by the armed forces through an extra-constitutional measure became inevitable. Sufficient corroborative and confirmative material had been produced by the federal government in support of the intervention by the armed forces through extra-constitutional measures. Thus the intervention was validated on the basis of the doctrine of state necessity and the principle of *Salus populi suprema lex* as embodied in Begum Nusrat Bhutto's case". The Supreme Court gave legal cover to the military takeover of 12 October 1999. In addition, 9/11 changed the political scape of the world in general and Pakistan in particular. When the incident happened, Bush administration directly put blame on the Al Qaida chief Osama Bin Laden who resided in Afghanistan. America put pressure on Pakistan and demanded co-operation, otherwise Pakistan would face dire consequences. On the other hand Pakistan was without constitutional government and all the burden of important decision on Musharaf. But Musharaf could not withstand in front of the America pressure and abandoned the support of Taliban regime and showed readiness to provide every kind of help to US against the Al Qaida and its allies. Hamid Khan in his book Constitutional and political History of Pakistan opines that "The event of 9/11 provided a golden opportunity to consolidate his rule. Like Zia who gained from American support due to the Afghanistan war in the 1980". America also extended support to Musharaf regime and got legitimization due to the support of the Bush administration. However he consolidated his power at the expense of sovereignty of Pakistan and constitutional government. After consolidating his power he took subsequent political and constitutional steps which greatly perverted the true nature of the constitution of the country.⁵¹

Like his predecessor General Musharaf also decided to hold referendum. The basic aim of the referendum was to give extension to his rule for further five years. Although Supreme Court issued order that general elections should be held in October. The decision of Musharaf of holding referendum was basically an attempt by Musharaf to legitimize the results of his coup and stay in power regardless of October's election result. In Musharaf's referendum the question was asked that "whether he should continue his democratic reforms and efforts to fight terrorism". The referendum result came in favour of the Musharaf and 97.7% voters voted for Musharaf seven point reform agenda. But the voting process was highly rigged. State

⁵¹ AKHTAR, SHAHNAZ. "Role of Judiciary in the Politics of Pakistan (1947-2008)."

machineries were widely used. General people showed least interest which resulted in low turnout. Almost all the political parties opposed the referendum and termed it against the constitution of Pakistan. According to Ian Talbot “Sceptics, both at home and overseas, saw the referendum as little more than an attempt to clothe authoritarianism with the fig leaf of a popular mandate.” Similarly, Musharaf also introduced a local government system with the aim of the devolution of power to the grass root level. But military leader always use local government system to create the new political class supportive of his regime. Musharaf also used the local government system for this purpose. It undermined the provincial autonomy because local representatives derived their power from central government instead of provincial set up. In addition to give a civilian cover to his government, Musharaf got the support of the Pakistan Muslim League {Q}. In 2002 General elections PML{Q} got majority of seats in National assembly as well as Punjab and formed coalition government with MMA while in Punjab single handedly. As Shuja Pasha expressed in his book *The Battle for Pakistan* that “Pakistan Muslim league Q support helped Musharaf to legitimize and civilianize his role”. Furthermore he formed national security committee to give overview over the matters of security and foreign policy. 17th amendment was passed which was the alternative of the 8th amendment. The dissolution powers were once again returned to the president. Despite all these steps Musharaf’s political system could not be able to take roots. Many factors contributed to the failure of Musharaf such as; Musharaf alliance with West and anti-Americanism sentiment among the masses, rise of terrorism in the country. Conflict with judiciary and civil society played a prominent role in the regime failure. When Musharaf lost support within the rank of army, then he left the post of Chief of Army staff and also announced General election which was held on 18 February 2008 in which Pakistan people party got majority of seat although not in position to form a government singlehandedly. However after 2008 election the electoral democracy was restored, but Musharaf eight years long rule did great damage to the polity and to the constitution. Authoritarianism posed great challenge to the democratic norms of the society. It also cause harm to the federal structure. Suppression of opponent politicians became norm of the day. The regime further destabilized the political

institutions which resulted in erosion of civilian authority and entrenched the military dominance in Pakistan's politics.⁵²

3.5. General Election 2008 and Post Transitional Period

Musharraf had failed to give extension to his power because of loss of support among the masses and within the high rank of army. In addition mobilization of lawyers, civil society and political parties also played a significant role in the downfall of the dictator. As Aqil Shah described in his book "The Army and Democracy" that imposition of emergency on 3 November 2007 to save the uniformed presidency proved a last nail to his coffin. Similarly domestic and international pressure also compelled Musharraf to relinquish his army post and to hold general election. Finally he resigned from the army but the outgoing parliament elected him for second presidential term. The general elections were due on 8 January 2008, but could not be held because of the murder of the Chairperson of Pakistan People Party Benazir Bhutto. The postponed election was held on 18 February 2008, in which Pakistan People Party won the majority of seats in the National Assembly but not be able to form a government single handedly. So the Pakistan People Party formed coalition government with the help of Pakistan Muslim League and Pashtun nationalist party Awami National Party in the center. However Pakistan Muslim League left the coalition when Zardari's government was showing reluctance in restoration of Judges. Although, Nawaz Sharif continuously supported the government in the parliament and on 7 August both the parties reached an agreement to restore judges and to impeach Musharraf. In addition four provincial assemblies also resolution demanding that Musharraf seek voted of confidence resign or face impeachment. The impeachment movement got momentum. There was a speculation that president might use Article 58[2b] to dissolve assemblies and dismiss the government to avert the impending impeachment, but it did not happen because this time Military was not ready to extend its support. According to AQIL SHAH that "it was decided in the corps commander meeting on 7 August that military would not provide any kind of assistance to Musharraf decree to oust the elected government because such move could cause political instability and disrupt the public image of the army". AS a result Musharraf

⁵² Mahmood, Dr Zahid, and Prof Dr Muhammad Iqbal Chawala. "Theory of Separation of Power: Balancing the CivilMilitary Relations in Pakistan 2013-2018." *South Asian Studies* 1, no. 35 (2021).

decided to resign on 18 August 2008 and left the country without facing any kind of persecution with the help of the military establishment and International establishment. The political parties celebrated the Musharaf resignation and termed it a victory for democracy. Pakistan people party and Pakistan Muslim League declared it the fruit of the charter of democracy.⁵³

3.6. Army Disengagement from the Politics under the COAS General Ashfaq Parviz Kiyani

Musharaf's eight years authoritarian rule disrupted the image of army in the eyes of the people. When General Perviz Musharaf took the command of the army, it was decided to not meddling in the political affairs of the country to restore the army image. Several step taken by the military high command indicated that military decided to become apolitical. For instance, military did not intervene in the general elections 2008 and remained relatively neutral. After the Coalition government led by Pakistan people party was formed, Chief of Army staff general Ashfaq Perviz Kiyani debarred officers from meeting politicians and called back several army officers working in the civilian administration. ISI which was involve in rigging election, blackmailing, bribing politicians and intimidating politicians, and the control all these things through political wing. General Ashfaq Parviz Kiyani also shut down the political wing of ISI. Military disengagement under the CAOS Ashafaq Perviz Kiyani as observed by the Aqil Shah that either the disengagement means the acceptance of reality of civilian supremacy and subordination or its tactical move to see the civilian deal with governance challenges. Although military restrained itself from seizing power and willing accepted the democratic norms in initial phase of the elected government. But the army has reserved all the rights of intervention and would intervene if the civilian government is not performing up to the mark and its policies undermine political stability, military institutional autonomy national security. It shows that military despite of claim of apolitical could not give up a role of guardianship and ready to play arbitrary role in political conflict, keep vigilant check

⁵³ Shah, Aqil. *The army and democracy: Military politics in Pakistan*. Harvard University Press, 2014

on government performance, preserve its corporate interest and consider themselves exempted from the rule of law.⁵⁴

3.7. Restoration of Parliamentary Democracy

The 1973 constitution of Pakistan is based on the parliamentary form of government but successive government failed to establish it in true spirit in the country. Subsequent interventions by the military further diluted the true form of the constitution. Eighth amendment passed by Zia-ul-Haq and 17th amendment passed by Musharaf regime turned the parliament into a mere rubber stamp and all the powers resided in the president office. When Pakistan people party formed the government, they decided to restore the parliamentary democracy as laid down in the charter of democracy. It was 35 points document reached between the two major political parties Pakistan people party and Pakistan Muslim League. According to the charter of democracy that all the amendments in the constitution made by dictators would be reversed. Autonomous federal structure would be introduced. ISI should be accountable to PM. Defense budget should be place before parliament. No assistance would be provided to the military ruler or military sponsored government. The Prime Minister Gillani led government while keeping in mind the points of charter of democracy took certain step to assert civilian supremacy and restoration of parliamentary democracy. ⁵⁵On 26 July 2008 notification was issued to place the civilian IB and the military's ISI under the Ministry of interior. According to the Shuja Pasha that it is the Prime Minister who pick ISI chief and also report to him but in theory, in practical term ISI work under the supervision and direction of the Army Chief. The top brass of the military reacted to the notification and showed some displeasure and the message was delivered to the Prime Minister while he was on foreign trip, that it would undermine the capability of the supreme intelligence agency. The message was delivered to Prime Minister by the army in these words that the army, and especially was trying to refrain itself from playing any kind of political role but the decision of the placement of ISI under the interior ministry was an

⁵⁴ Ali, Shahzad, Ahmer Safwan, and Rabia Sana. "Image of Civil and Military Establishment of Pakistan in Perspective of Combating Terrorism and Extremism: A Qualitative Analysis of Mainstream British and American Print Media." *Pakistan Journal of Media Sciences* 4, no. 1 (2023): 36-45.

⁵⁵ Rana, Muhammad Ahsan. "Decentralization experience in Pakistan: the 18th constitutional amendment." *Asian Journal of Management Cases* 17, no. 1 (2020): 61-84.

attempt to incite the institution to intervene. The high rank deemed the decision as an interference in the domain of the military and it could affect the professionalism of the institution. The Prime Minister could not succumb to the pressure of the military and rolled back the notification in a matter of hours. Consequently civilian government once again failed to stick to its decision and prove its authority. Once again Army won the battle the successfully challenged the constitutional authority of the elected government. Senior journalist Hamid Mir reported that “Prime Minister contacted the PPP co- chairman and informed him about the army reaction to the decision of placement of ISI under the interior Ministry, Zardari advised to the Prime Minister to immediately reverse the decision because the country could not afford the civil military conflict in this critical movement. The country had just got rid of the authoritarian regime of the Musharaf and the conflict with the military could derail the nascent democracy”. The reversal of the decision indicated that the Institution still retained its influencing position in the polity and they would exercise it whenever they feel that the decision of the civilian government could threaten their interest. Later on Zardari admitted that one should need to do more homework while taking such sensitive decision. Although he also clarified that the government has no bad intention. SHUJA Nawaz a recognized political and strategic analyst also analyzed the decision critically as; thus, That the government had no prior understanding of the nature and working of the security organization especially those under the military’s Jurisdiction. The Inter Service Intelligence has six wings, only one deal with the domestic political issue while the rest wings see the security related matters at home and abroad, in addition the majority of the staff of high rank of the ISI belong to the army. So before taking such a high level decision to place the ISI under the control of the civilian there would need to fully comprehend the nature and role of the intelligence agency. This miscalculation of the power of the army created misunderstanding and imbalance between the civilian government and military. The military continuously challenged the authority of the elected government in the later part of the Zardari regime. But Zardari led government introduced many reforms which to some extent restored the parliamentary democracy and first move toward the civilian supremacy.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Ahmed, Imran. "The 18th amendment: historical developments and Debates in Pakistan." *ISAS Insights* 641 (2020): 1-6.

In the charter of democracy both the political parties, the Pakistan Muslim League {N} and Pakistan people party were agreed upon that they would restore the parliamentary nature of the constitution. Provinces would be made autonomous. No assistance would be provided to the military regime or formed government with the help of the military. In addition joint efforts would be made to protect the derailment of the democracy. When Pakistan people part formed government after 2008 general elections. They started efforts to implement the charter of democracy and fulfilled the promise made by the PPP assassinated leader Benazir Bhutto. The first step taken bby the government toward civilian supremacy was the dissolution of the National security council by the Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani. Basically, National security council had created Musharaf with the aim to influence the political affairs when military was out of power. The most important reforms of all were the passage of the 18th amendment that restored the real nature of the constitution with the provincial autonomy. In 2009 the special parliamentary commission on constitutional Reform was formed under the seasoned politician Raza Rabbani with the task to lay the ground work for the restoration of the 1973 constitution to its original form. The committee produced 133 pages document which were passed by parliament and the president gave it assent known as the 18th amendment in the constitutional history of Pakistan. The amendment was not only abolished those constitutional changes made by the Musharaf such as LFO 2002 and the 17th constitutional amendment, but it gave the new direction to the people of Pakistan. Some new rights were given to the people of Pakistan pertaining to freedom of association and expression access to education. Similarly, 18th amendment was also aimed at to improve the governance in the country. For instance the central and provincial government should not exceed to 11 percent of the total members. Furthermore the president was deprived of many powers such as; the dissolution power of the National assembly, now the Prime Minister could be removed through vote of no confidence, the power of the appointment of the chief election commissioner was given to the Parliamentary committee. In addition, supreme court judges would by appointed by the supreme judicial council consisted by the chief justice, two most senior judges, a former chief justice, law minister, the attorney general and a senior advocate. Furthermore, the appointment of the chiefs of

the armed forces were also assigned to Prime Minister. Under the 18th amendment the position of the president was restricted to the titular head of the state.⁵⁷

3.8. Internal Challenges and Civil Military Split

In post transitional period Pakistan was entangled in social political and economic crises. From social perspective the country was deeply polarized. Ethnic, sectarian conflicts were in full blown especially in major cities such as Karachi, Rawalpindi. Terrorism in the country was rising at alarming rate. The tribal belt and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa was facing some brutal type of terrorism. Economically the country was in brink of the collapse. The world recession had a adverse on Pakistan's economy. People were struggling to make both ends meet. Politically also Pakistan was in deep trouble. The country had experienced nine years long rule of the military's dictator. Under the military regime the political system of Pakistan was collapsed. He changed the nature of the constitution through different constitutional amendments such LFO 2002 and 17th constitutional amendment. After 2008 election when Pakistan people party assumed the power they had to deal with many challenges such as to elimination of terrorism, ethnic and sectarian conflicts and to give political and economic stability to the country. The PPP led government believed that all these problems could be treated through the restoration of parliamentary democracy and implementation of civilian supremacy.⁵⁸

3.9. Civilian Supremacy and the Military's Response

The newly elected government was determined to assert the civilian supremacy and restore the real democracy and abolish the foot print of the dictator's rule altogether. In addition the military was also in the back foot because they were facing backlash owing to Musharaf's some of the policies and announced that military would not be intervened in the political affairs and would provide full support to the democratic government in every respect. In addition to promoting peace and stability in South Asia, Zardari vowed after taking the oath of office to combat terrorism and

⁵⁷ Ali, Mohsin, and Muhammad Ramzan Shahid. "The Charter of Democracy (2006) and the Way Forward." *Journal of Indian Studies* 8, no. 2 (2022): 355-368.

⁵⁸ Ahmed, Zahoor, Muhammad Wasif Zafar, and Sadia Mansoor. "Analyzing the linkage between military spending, economic growth, and ecological footprint in Pakistan: evidence from cointegration and bootstrap causality." *Environmental Science and Pollution Research* 27 (2020): 41551-41567.

strengthen democratic practices in Pakistan. On September 12, 2008, General Kayani, the Chief of Army Staff, made a precise announcement about his close support for the new Parliament. In this regard, he declared, "All elements of national power will defend Pakistan's territorial integrity with the people's full support, under the new democratic leadership." At first glance, the military and civilian government appear to share the same opinion. General Kayani summoned some 300 active-duty military personnel from public institutions, but this did not imply that the military had agreed to submit to civilian rule. In November 2008, the civilian government disbanded the National Security Council to reduce the interference of the military in the public affairs. Furthermore the elected government also tried to bring the ISI under the direct control of the interior Ministry, however the military elite reacted to this decision and pressurized the government to take back the decision and resultantly government reversed the decision immediately.

The National Logistic Cell (NLC) incident, in the meantime, increased concerns about institutional weaknesses in the system, which also had an impact on civil-military ties. Both military and civilian organizations use the services provided by NLC to carry logistics across the nation. The problem became apparent when the news went viral on print and electronic media to discuss the top NLC officials' illegally invested 1.8 billion in stock exchange, which was regarded as a major legal violation. However, the message was delivered that no institution is exempted from the rule of law.⁴⁵ In a statement, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) said that the "The COAS was upset about the scandal and initiated an investigation against the two lieutenant generals and one major general and declared that army was committed about the accountability". Although In 2011 the national assembly public account committee referred the case to the NAB. But General Kiyani did not let the National accountability Bureau to investigate the military officer in the civilian court and the alleged army officers were reinstated and declared that they would be tried under the army act 1952. Exemption from the law of the land shows that the British Maxim "King can do no wrong" is practically implemented in Pakistan because in Pakistan military consider itself guardian of the state. So no can questions its actions. On the other hand

civilian authority showed inability to assert its authority over the military, because of the fear of the derailment of democracy.⁵⁹

3.10. Security Issues and the Expanded Military Role

The military's legal power has been expanded over civilian apparently to counter terrorism and militancy. Although the Army Act 1952 was amended by Musharaf during the emergency in 2007 to empower military to try civilian in military courts for offence detrimental to the national security of Pakistan. The elected government was pressurized the Zardari's government to promulgate the Action in Aid of Civil power Regulations 2011 to which authorizes the military to detain terror suspects indefinitely during its operations in the ex FATA and the PATA. However ISI and MI have no legal powers of arrest, they have illegally detained tortured even killed many suspects. The expansion of military power to try civilian in military courts has drawn many criticisms because its usage has not been only limited to the suspected terrorists or other militant but the nationalist leaders especially of Baluchistan have also been tried in the Military courts. It is sheer violation of human rights to try the civilian in the military court, because in military courts the accused is deprived of the right of defense. Furthermore military uses this law as pressure tool against those who challenge their tutelary role. So once again military has proved itself powerful authority in the country can do anything which is beneficial for its corporate interest.

3.11. Political Crises and the Army Arbitrary Role

The PPP government was facing huge challenge of restoration of deposed judges. The two major political parties Pakistan people party and Pakistan Muslim league had differences about the strategy of the restoration of judges. PML[N] wanted it to restore them within one month, but the PPP the party in power was showing hesitancy in restoration of the sacked judges. The delaying of the government created deadlock which resulted in the lawyer movement. Opposition political parties also joined the movement. The conflict between the executive and the judiciary provided an opportunity to play arbitrary role to resolve the issue. Aqil shah opined in his book *The Army and Democracy* that "Then the Army chief gen Ashfaq parviz Kiyani put pressure on the zardari 's government to restore the sacked judges instantly to avoid

⁵⁹ Kumar, Sanjay. "Military Intervention in Pakistani-Politics and Indo-Pak Relations." *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TRADE & COMMERCE-IIARTC* (2020).

the crises further deepening. The government decided to restore judges because the fear was felt by the government that the situation is going to get out of hand and it might be resulted in the military coup. In addition military also played important role in rescuing the people from flooding areas and provide assistance to them in 2010 flood. So, in this way the army again proved itself as most effective institution and regained its lost reputation. Furthermore the division among the political class also helped the military establishment to play a prominent role in the polity of the country.⁶⁰

3.12. External Factors and its Impact on Civil Military Relations

External factors also played significant role in civil military relations during the Zardari's government from 2008 to 2012. The PPP led government witnessed many incidents which posed great challenges to the state and raised questions over the working relationship of the civil military. For instance, Mumbai attack, Abbottabad's Raid, Karry Logar bill, Raymond Davis case and the most notorious the Memogate case, all these instances created a great rift between the civil military relations and posed great challenge to the emergence democracy. In addition military establishment for all these issues blamed civilian leaders and tried to question its credibility deemed them a threat to the national security of the country. Similarly military's claim of apolitical also proved wrong and once again presented itself as the guardian of the state and the survival of the state only dependent on them.

3.13. Mumbai Attack and the Split between the Civilian and Military Establishment

The Mumbai attack 2008 had a great devastating impact on civil military relations. India instantly blamed that Pakistan sponsored the terrorists of Mumbai attack. But Pakistan rejected the Indian's allegation and offered India collaboration in investigation of the incident. The government had decided to send the director of ISI to collaborate to investigate the incident and helped the Indian to reach the main mastermind of the attack. However, the military establishment refuted to send the chief of the intelligence agency and forbade the government from taking such a

⁶⁰ Misra, Jitendra Nath. "Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington, DC:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, 397 pp. \$35.95 (paper, \$17.95)." *Jindal Journal of International Affairs* 9, no. 2 (2011): 66-68.

action. The government quickly realized its fragile position and left the space for the military to oversee the security and defense matter. The PPP led government had a desired to develop a trade relations with India while put the Kashmir issues on the back burner. Zardari in a interview with the journal of the Wall street stated that “India had never been a threat to Pakistan and declared the Kashmiri Mujahideen terrorists”. The establishment expressed angered over the statement and created trust deficit between the civilian government and establishment. Similarly, president Zardari and the Prime Minister of India Manmohen Singh were agreed on a deal over the Kashmir, but the military establishment did not let the elected government to strike a deal over Kashmir without the prior approval of the Army. Such an attitude shows that the elected government was allowed to take a decision in several matters especial security and India related, although it was the domain of the civilian government, but in Pakistan’s case the military dominate the decision of the civilian domain which greatly affected the democratization and the civilian supremacy in the country.⁶¹

3.14. Kerry Luger Bill and Response of the Military Establishment and Opposition Political Parties

The rift between the civil and military authority was further widened owing to the Enhanced Partnership Act of 2009 commonly known as Kerry Luger bill, which basically 1.5 billion non-military assistance offered to Pakistan. But the bill was drawn great criticism within Pakistan. The military establishment and the opposition political parties termed it sheer interference in the internal matters of Pakistan and termed it a security threat to national security of Pakistan. The objections were made over the some of the provision such as the military would be made subjective to the civilian government and their political and judicial role would be eliminated. Christophe Jaffrelot discussed in the book *Pakistan at the Crossroad* that “the military mobilized the public opinions against the bill through electronic media and print media by presenting it as a interference in the internal matter”. Basically the military wanted to put pressure on American to modify the provision related to the Civilian dominance over the military. The prominent anchor presenting different conspiracy

⁶¹ Javaid, Umbreen, and Marium Kamal. "The Mumbai Terror '2008' and its Impact on the IndoPak Relations." *South Asian Studies* 28, no. 1 (2020).

theory that the central aim of the bill to weaken the army of Pakistan and deprived the country from the nuclear open. Similarly, the PPP government was heavily criticized and termed it agent of the America. The military once again proved itself a dominant and strong institution and thwarted every attempt which bring them under the civilian control. They have attached the institution interest with the national interest. So the threat to the institutional interest presenting as a threat to the national interest. In addition Karry Lugar Bill controversy also eroded the trust of the people over the elected government owing to the severe media campaign against the democratic government sponsored by the military to mobilize people against the said bill. The military presented themselves as only protector and the savior of the country. The elected government of Pakistan people party could not do anything over this military activism because of the threat of the coup and the erosion of the popular support.⁶²

3.15. Raymond Davis Case and the America Pressure on Civilian and Military Establishment

Raymond Davis was arrested in a case of killing of three persons in Lahore on 27th January 2011. He justified his act that he took this extreme step in self-defense. After the arrest the USA government immediately started effort for the release of the Davis by declaring him a diplomat. According to the International law diplomat cannot be tried in other country's court. So being a diplomat Davis also qualified this criterion so he cannot be tried in Pakistani court. The US government put pressure on Pakistani government and demanded quick release otherwise in response financial aid could be halted or suspended. But on the other hand Zardari government was showing reluctance to give immunity to the Davis owing to two reasons; one anti Americanism sentiment was too high among the people and declared America a main factor in destabilization of the country. Fear of the losing popular base halted the federal government to take step regarding the release of the US diplomat, second the incident was happened in Lahore and the Davis was in custody of the Punjab government and after 18th amendment the federal government could not interfere in the matter related to the provincial subject. On the other hand Davis's incident created chasm between civil and military relation. The Military establishment blamed the Pakistan's

⁶² Akram, Muhammad Shahzad. "Aid, Politics, and the War of Narratives in the US-Pakistan Relations (A Case Study of Kerry Lugar Berman Act)." *BTTN Journal* 2, no. 1 (2023): 94-99.

ambassador to Hussain Haqani that he issued 2800 visa to the CIA agents without prior security clearance. The president, the Prime Minister and the Interior minister were cognizant of the ambassador this misusing of power, but did not take any action against him. The ISI gave briefing to the senior anchor person to expose the government visa policy which was posing threat to the national security. The aim of the briefing to media was to mounted pressure on the government. On the other hand opposition political parties also agitated and demanded a punishment for the Raymond Davis according to the law of the land. In addition the US government increased pressure and Obama made a phone call to President Zardari and discussed the level of anxiety in Washington. When Zardari showed his helplessness, the upcoming talks between the two countries were postponed and it was conveyed that sanctions might be imposed against Pakistan.⁴³⁷ Pakistan was receiving aid from US and military was engaged in fighting the militants in FATA. Pakistan could neither afford sanctions nor was a stalemate in bilateral relations with the US an option. As a result DG ISI came forward and played the role of arbitration between the victim and the US government and the blood money was paid to the victims and the court issued a release order of the Raymond Davis Then the DG ISI gave explanation as thus;

“Pakistan had done what America wanted to be done. The government was failed to resolve the issue owing to public pressure. As a result the ISI came to the fore and played arbitrary role between the victims and the US government. Resolution of the issue through give and take was the need of the hour because Pakistan was at critical stage and was not in a position to counter the superpower. The compensation deal was a rational move. Without the army and ISI role it would be difficult task for the Raymond Davis to acquit himself in double murder case”.⁶³

The Raymond Davis case basically exposed the disequilibrium in the power structure and the how the dependency on US determines the course of the internal politics. Firstly the rift between civil and military was still existed and the military claim of apolitical was a tactical move. They were still involved in the polity and showing willingness to play its role as an arbitrator and through these way they tried its supremacy and project themselves as the only institutions which can deal with any kind of situations, and on the other hand they tried to malign the politicians and

⁶³ Abdul Rahim, Dr Adil Zaman Kasi. "Pakistan-United States Diplomatic Relations: Analytical Study." *Pakistan Journal of International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (2020).

presented them as a threat to the national security through organized media campaign which ultimately created a gap between the elected government and the masses. This gap is detrimental to the democratic culture of the society. Secondly Pakistan too much dependency on America also affected the internal politics to the extent that Pakistani state was showing inability to prosecute the American citizen in the double murder case and provide justice to her own citizens. Both the civilian authorities and military establishment made efforts to resolve the issue without having any effect on Pakistan US diplomatic relations. It was a purely legal case and the judiciary would have to decide the case according to the law of the land, but in Pakistan the government and the military establishment took the responsibilities to make the victim family agreed upon the negotiations, because American threatened the authorities with dire consequences. Similarly the interference of the executive in the legal matters also raised question over the independence of Judiciary. In addition the military establishment had nothing to do with this case. It was the responsibility of the government to deal with the America threat of dire consequences and the judiciary to decide the fate of the Raymond Davis. But the military played its decisive role and put pressure on the victim family and agreed upon the consequences. The institution arbitrary role in this case indicates to many things that the military still considers it a privilege to play its role in the polity. The America dependent on army for the arbitration showed the weakness of the civilian authority and also indicated that too much dependence on USA allowed her to determine the power structure of Pakistan.⁶⁴

The Memogate controversy, which erupted in October 2011, had significant implications for the delicate civil-military relationship in Pakistan. At its core, the issue revolved around a memorandum that had been addressed to the former US military Chief, Admiral Mike Mullen. This memorandum conveyed concerns that elements within the Pakistani military might attempt to overthrow the civilian government following the decision to order the military to stand down during the operation that led to the death of Osama Bin Laden.

The memorandum, attributed to Pakistani civilian officials, sought assistance from the Obama administration to avert a possible military coup in Pakistan. The letter was reportedly delivered by the then Pakistani Ambassador to the US, Mr. Hussain

⁶⁴ Ibid

Haqqani. This action immediately raised suspicions about the loyalty and intentions of the civil government towards its own nation. It was widely perceived that the memorandum had been written in response to serious reservations held by the Pakistani Armed Forces, particularly in light of how the civilian government had handled the Abbottabad Incident.

However, instead of clarifying matters, the Memogate incident exacerbated the existing gap between the civil government and the military establishment. The incident prompted discussions in both print and electronic media, which questioned President Zardari's alleged reliance on the United States to safeguard his government, potentially undermining Pakistan's sovereign status. The controversy eventually led to a petition being filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, calling for the establishment of a Judicial Committee to thoroughly investigate the Memogate Scandal.

During the investigation, the contents of the memorandum were testified by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and submitted to the commission through Lt. Gen. (retired) Naeem Khalid Lodhi, who was serving as the Defense Secretary at the time. In response, the government removed General Lodhi from his post, seemingly in retaliation. This heightened tensions between the government and the military. Opposition in the Parliament also criticized the scandal, further deepening the trust deficit between the civilian and military sectors.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan intervened, seeking explanations and clarifications regarding the Memogate issue from the government, the ISI, and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Prime Minister's criticism of the Armed Forces, implying that the army was overstepping its bounds, further escalated the situation. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a press release stating that such allegations were of utmost seriousness, potentially carrying grave consequences for the country.⁶⁵

The Memogate confrontation between the government and the military had significant implications for the democratic process in Pakistan. This incident also brought to light historical tensions between the military establishment and Hussain Haqqani, who had previously been involved in controversies like the Kerry-Lugar incident of 2009.

⁶⁵ Gohar, Shaista, Safia Jawad, Hasnain Sajid, Muhammad Ayaz Khan, Nida Zahid Sumayya, and Usman Ullah. "Pakistan Peoples Party Government and Military Relations during Zardari Era (2008-2013): An Analysis."

While the military had demanded Haqqani's expulsion during the Kerry-Lugar issue, this time the military was less inclined to trust him, putting further strain on the relationship between the two entities.

Ultimately, the Memogate issue contributed to the expansion of the military's influence over the civilian government in terms of national security matters. This incident highlighted the complex nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan and underlined the challenges faced by elected governments in asserting control over state institutions. The episode reflected a recurring pattern where the military wields considerable influence over political matters, with tensions arising between democratic institutions and military authorities.⁶⁶

3. 16. Conclusion

In summary, the discussion highlights the complexity of civil-military relations in Pakistan since its inception in 1947. The military's historical involvement in security challenges from neighboring countries, coupled with internal bureaucratic-military collaborations, has often hindered civilian control. Despite constitutional provisions aimed at restricting the military's role, power struggles between these two entities have strained civil-military relations and impacted democratic growth.

Examining the period from 2008 to 2013, the patterns observed were consistent with historical norms. The elected government's attempts to assert control over the military were met with challenges, such as the establishment of a defense committee and attempts to limit the ISI's political involvement. The military's influence extended to settling conflicts between the executive and judiciary and shaping foreign policy.

The Memogate issue and the Kerry-Lugar bill further strained these relations. While the military's dominance in national security remained, questions arose about the government's commitment to state security, notably during the Abbottabad incident. Despite attempts to assert civilian supremacy, the government couldn't capitalize on opportunities, and the military's economic interests bolstered its control.

In this context, the analysis suggests that historical legacies influence civil-military relations in Pakistan. These relations are marked by power struggles, where the

⁶⁶ *ibid*

military seeks to preserve its prerogatives even when civilians are in power. To ensure stability, a balanced relationship between the civilian government and military is essential. This equilibrium is crucial for Pakistan's democratic progress and overall stability. One thing was more important that the first elected government had completed its constitutional period transferred power to another elected government. Many times it was felt that army was going to dislodge the government through direct coup but the army restrained itself from direct rule. There are many other positive things about the PPP regime such as restoration of parliamentary democracy, provincial autonomy through 18th amendment. In addition steps toward civilian supremacy were taken such as brought the ISI under the interior ministry, abolition of National Security Council and replace it by the defense cabinet committee but all these efforts towards civilian supremacy were prevented by the military establishment but in return many instance armies asserted its supremacy over the elected government.

CHAPTER 04: CONTINUATION OF DEMOCRACY: PATH TOWARDS CIVILIAN SUPREMACY (2013-2018)

4.1. Introduction

The day of May 11th, 2013 holds significant historical importance within the political landscape of Pakistan. The initial elected administration successfully fulfilled its constitutional tenure and subsequently relinquished authority to a subsequent elected administration. In the May 2013 general elections, the political party known as May 2013 secured a majority, allowing them to establish the government. Consequently, Nawaz Sharif assumed the position of Prime Minister of Pakistan for the third occasion. Furthermore, a third political entity known as the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) emerged on the political landscape under the leadership of Imran Khan. In terms of electoral support, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) garnered the most number of votes following the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), thereby leading to the formation of the government in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In a similar vein, it can be seen that the leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, Imran Khan, possesses a populist ideology and exhibits a charismatic character. These attributes have played a pivotal role in mobilizing the younger demographic, resulting in significant youth engagement throughout the electoral proceedings. There has been an improvement in the general turnout as well. The transition of government from one political party to another has been widely regarded by numerous impartial observers as a significant milestone for the democratic system of Pakistan. During Nawaz Sharif's tenure, Pakistan encountered numerous obstacles including terrorism, a fragile economy, and energy issues. Pakistan's diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, namely India, Afghanistan, and Iran, were not favorable, with the exception of China. Pakistan was perceived as a nation that sponsors terrorism on the global stage and was observed to be rapidly moving towards a state of isolation. In order to address the aforementioned difficulties, it became imperative to establish a state of political stability. The necessity of consensus was recognized by all institutions. The next government should consider implementing decisive measures to effectively address these concerns. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif expressed a desire to pursue an autonomous foreign policy and sought to establish harmonious relations with

neighboring countries, especially India, despite historical tensions. This approach was motivated by the recognition that fostering amicable diplomatic ties is crucial for achieving economic stability. Likewise, the PML[N] administration expressed a desire to eradicate the distinction between favorable and unfavorable factions within the Taliban, advocating for comprehensive measures to be taken against this terrorist organization. Furthermore, the government made efforts to uphold the principles of the rule of law by initiating legal proceedings against the former dictator, Perviz Musharaf, on charges of treason. There was an optimistic expectation that the process of consolidating democracy was underway, and the historical narrative included the resolution of conflicts between the civilian and military establishments. However, the military establishment did not support the civilian government's position on matters such as independent foreign policy and security policy with little military participation. They aimed to hinder the civilian administration from pursuing these initiatives, including the prosecution of Musharaf. The assertion that the apolitical nature of a certain entity has devolved into a mockery, accompanied by the military's increased involvement in the political sphere through novel strategies aimed at undermining the duly elected government. The lack of knowledge acquisition from historical events has perpetuated the continued dominance of the military in policy-making, particularly in topics pertaining to security and foreign policy. The elected government experienced destabilization as a result of the utilization of Dharna politics, media campaigns, and judicial judgements. In Pakistan, it has been observed that no Prime Minister has successfully completed their constitutional term, with instances of disqualification occurring in the aftermath of the Panama case. Despite the government successfully completing its term, the achievement of civilian supremacy continues to elude, as the military continues to exert dominance over the system through coercive means. In the general elections of 2018, the military made the decision to provide its support to the emerging political party known as PTI. The administration led by Imran Khan secured a majority of seats in the National Assembly, as well as in two provinces, namely Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). However, in the regions of center and Punjab in Pakistan, the political party Tehrik Insaf did not possess the capability to independently establish a governing body. Consequently, they sought the support of a coalition partner. The military had a role in facilitating the formation of the government by supporting the winning party and exerting influence on independent members to align with the PTI government.

Consequently, the formation of the coalition government was facilitated via the assistance of the military institution. Numerous analysts have characterized the government as a hybrid regime, wherein the military institution has control over governmental operations, including significant legislative matters. Additionally, the elected government has sought the assistance of the military to bolster parliamentary representation. The military in Pakistan became more deeply ingrained inside the political system during the Hybrid government. After the completion of two consecutive elected government terms, there was an expectation that the country was progressing towards the establishment of a stable democratic system. However, these hopes were dashed during the 2018 election, as non-democratic forces exerted significant influence over the electoral process, government formation, and subsequent legislative procedures. Political adversaries were subjected to intimidation and victimization through the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The Imran-led administration imposed limitations on freedom of expression. Once again, Pakistan was observed to be following a trajectory characterized by managed democracy. Political parties have once again proven ineffective in eradicating the military's political influence and establishing parliamentary supremacy. This failure can be attributed to several factors, including the lack of internal party democracy, politicians driven by personal ambition for power, disunity among political factions, a disconnect between political parties and the general public, and the prevailing dominance of elite power structures. In a similar vein, the military perceives itself as the sole protector of the state and characterizes politicians as inept, disloyal, and incapable. However, there are additional factors that contribute to the military's resistance in establishing civilian supremacy. These factors encompass military corporate interests, apprehension regarding accountability, concern over tarnishing their tutelary image, and harboring unfavorable perceptions towards the military. Pakistan's inability to achieve progress and prosperity might be attributed to the prevailing conditions of the garrison or security state. There exists a pressing necessity for implementing reforms aimed at establishing both political and economic stability. The implementation of several measures can contribute to the establishment of civilian supremacy and the strengthening of democracy. These measures include ensuring a peaceful transition of power, fostering unity among political actors, asserting civilian control over the Ministry of Defense, demilitarizing the civilian administration, implementing parliamentary oversight mechanisms, and establishing robust democratic institutions.

Pakistan has become significantly embroiled in a multitude of social, political, and economic challenges as a result of the inherent imbalance within its civil-military relations. As the day progresses, the situation is anticipated to escalate beyond control. The need of maintaining sanity should be emphasized. It is imperative for national and regional political parties to forge a unified front in order to effectively counteract and thwart any attempts that may undermine the constitutional framework. Likewise, it is imperative for the military establishment to acknowledge that, in their capacity as guardians, the challenges faced by Pakistan have been exacerbated. Rather than engaging in political intervention, it would be more prudent for them to prioritize on the prevailing security concerns within the nation. The future of Pakistan is contingent upon the establishment and maintenance of a robust democratic system.

4.2. The May 2013 General Election: An Examination of a Peaceful Transition

The day of May 11th, 2013 holds significant historical importance for the nation of Pakistan. The country conducted its tenth round of elections. The Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) emerged as the winning party and thereafter established its government at both the federal level and in the province of Punjab. The government in Sindh, Pakistan is currently led by the People's Party. In the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), a newly established political party known as Pakistan Tehrik Insaf (PTI) successfully created a coalition government through collaboration with the Jammāt Islami party. Nevertheless, the election environment remained plagued by incidents of extremist violence. During the 40-day period leading up to the polling day on May 11, 2013, the nation had a total of 128 terrorist attacks, resulting in an average of more than three attacks per day. The aforementioned entities, namely the Taliban, asserted their ownership over these incidents, designating the 'secular' Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Awami National Party (ANP), and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) as their intended victims. The 2013 general elections held significant importance for several reasons, primarily due to the fact that these elections marked the completion of a full term by the previously elected administration. Furthermore, a significant proportion of young individuals have actively engaged in the electoral process as a result of the influence exerted by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. Furthermore, a novel political entity has

surfaced inside the political landscape of Pakistan. Furthermore, there has been a significant increase in voter turnout. The voter participation rate was recorded at 54.4 percent. Tahir Mehdi, a columnist for Dawn, interprets this as an indication of the increasing faith of voters in a democratic system. Furthermore, the faction of the Pakistan Muslim League associated with the monarchy saw a complete electoral defeat. It secured victory in merely two national constituencies. Likewise, individuals cast their votes in the 2013 elections based on candidates' prior performance. The prior performance of the PPP was deemed unsatisfactory, particularly in the economic sector, and it also fell short in its efforts to enhance law and order conditions. Following the 2013 election, the party experienced limitations and was confined to the province of Sindh, where it secured a number of members in the national house. Tahir Mehdi asserts that the inadequate governance exhibited by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) resulted in its loss of political influence in the province of Punjab, leading to a significant decline in its voter base from 6 million in 2008 to 2.5 million in 2013. Despite the presence of certain drawbacks, the electoral process as a whole was deemed to be both free and fair. Numerous observers regarded it as a favorable advancement in the ongoing efforts to strengthen democratic principles. The European Union election observation mission has stated that the 2013 elections in Pakistan showcased a significant display of democratic commitment by the state institutions, civil society, political parties, and voters. In spite of the increasing frequency of militant attacks and several procedural deficiencies, the electoral process exhibited significant levels of competition, a notable rise in voter engagement, and a general acceptance of the final results.

4.3. Nawaz Sharif's Tenure as Prime Minister for the Third Time:

Endeavors Towards Civilian Supremacy

On 5 June 2013, Nawaz Sharif assumed the position of Prime Minister for his third term by taking the oath of office. The nation found itself surrounded by a multitude of challenges, encompassing issues such as terrorism, economic downturns,⁶⁷ sectarian tensions, and ethnic conflicts. The government, led by Nawaz Sharif, exhibited a resolute commitment to addressing each of these challenges individually. The Prime

⁶⁷ Jaffrelot, Christophe. *The Pakistan paradox: Instability and resilience*. Oxford University Press, 2015.

Minister shown a strong resolve to uphold civilian sovereignty and sought to curtail the military establishment's impact on domestic politics, foreign policy, and security matters. During an extensive pre-2013 election interview conducted by Najim Sethi's daughter, he asserted his commitment to rectifying previous errors and diligently working towards the establishment of a robust democratic system within the nation. Furthermore, he expressed his intention to maintain a clear separation between the military and political spheres. Upon entering power, the first problem faced by the individual was the selection of a new Army chief. The individual's initial decision to appoint Musharaf as the army head led to a military coup, subsequently enabling him to maintain his position of authority for nearly a decade⁶⁸. Against the aforementioned context, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was compelled to tactfully navigate the procedure of selecting the next Army Chief in November 2013. General Khalid Shamim Wyne was granted permission to retire from his position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in October 2013, without the immediate announcement of his successor. In contrast, Lt Gen Rashad Mehmood, who was the Chief of General Staff and a preferred candidate of Kayani, was promoted to the ceremonial position of successor just a day prior to Kayani's retirement on November 29th. Raheel Sharif, who ranked third in the order, was selected as the Army Chief, surpassing his seniors Haroon Aslam and Rashad Mahmood. It is possible that Nawaz Sharif, in his capacity as the Prime Minister, aimed to assert his independence and autonomy⁶⁹.

4.4. Chief of Army Staff Gen Raheel Sharif and the Growing Military

Influence in the Political Affairs

The military under the Musharaf regimes always asserted their non-involvement in politics and expressed unwavering support for the democratic administration. However, the military has repeatedly substantiated the assertion of being apolitical. During the tenure of President Zardari, the military exerted undue pressure on the civilian government in a manner that violated constitutional principles. This was particularly evident when the Interior Ministry assumed control over the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), leading to strained relations between the government and

⁶⁸ Shah, Aqil. *The army and democracy: Military politics in Pakistan*. Harvard University Press, 2014.

⁶⁹ Jaffrelot, Christophe, ed. *Pakistan at the crossroads: Domestic dynamics and external pressures*. Columbia University Press, 2016.

the military. Another instance occurred during the Mumbai attack, when the government sought to cooperate with the Indian government in order to demonstrate its innocence regarding allegations of involvement. However, the military perceived this collaboration as a potential threat to Pakistan's national security. Similarly, in the context of the Kerry-Lugar bill, the United States government aimed to provide non-military assistance to bolster the civilian government's authority. Nonetheless, the military viewed this aid as a potential risk to Pakistan's national security. Aqil Shah characterizes the Pakistan military's acquiescence to the democratic government as a strategic move aimed at assessing the political and economic efficacy of the civilian administration. Upon becoming power, Nawaz Sharif endeavored to establish diplomatic ties with India and Afghanistan, as well as to reinstate trade contacts, with the aim of revitalizing the struggling economy. In a same vein, the government has undertaken measures to engage in negotiations with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) without consulting the military. The military establishment exhibited dissatisfaction with the initiative undertaken by the elected administration, leading to the subsequent withdrawal of the government. According to Christophe Jaffrelot, Nawaz Sharif declined the proposal put up by New Delhi for the reciprocal bestowal of the Most Favored Nation title, citing military pressure as the primary reason for his decision. Furthermore, the government enacted the Pakistan Protection Act. The Zardari administration exhibited resistance towards this act in its earlier stages. The newly enacted legislation has conferred significant authority upon law enforcement agencies, granting them the ability to exercise warrantless entry and search privileges, as well as the capacity to effectuate arrests. This form of power poses a threat to the fundamental rights of Pakistani citizens. The populace residing in Balochistan and certain regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa experienced a sense of estrangement due to the unexplained disappearances of their beloved individuals. Additionally, it should be noted that the National Security Council underwent a process of reconstitution in August 2013. During the previous regime, Nawaz Sharif dismissed Chief of Army Staff Jahangir Karamat due to his plan to establish a National Security Council. Subsequently, Musharaf implemented the plan put out by Jahangir Karamat, thereby establishing it. However, the government led by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) terminated the initiative in 2009. The reestablishment of the National Security Council facilitated the active involvement of the military establishment in the process of civil decision-making. The aforementioned observation indicates that the military

did not withdraw to their designated quarters, but rather continued to engage in political activities, so presenting a significant challenge to the authority of the civilian government.

4.5. The Trial of Musharaf and the Split in the Civil Military

Relations

Nawaz Sharif exhibited a resolute commitment to establishing civilian supremacy, regardless of the associated expenses. The absence of a sacred cow is evident within the nation. In Pakistan, all citizens are regarded as equal under the law. The administration has elected to hold Musharaf responsible for all of his unconstitutional actions during his tenure. The ex-president faced charges in five distinct cases, namely the detainment of judges in 200, the Red Mosque operation, the demise of Benazir Bhutto, the passing of Akbar Bugti, and the declaration of emergency in 2007, which was deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the aforementioned charges, he repatriated to his home nation. The individual was subjected to a period of confinement within their residence. In August 2013, Musharaf faced accusations in the Benazir Bhutto case as presented by an anti-terrorism court in Rawalpindi. In January 2014, the Supreme Court dismissed the further plea submitted by Musharaf challenging the judgement of 31 July, which deemed the declaration of emergency as unlawful and determined that Musharaf would face trial for treason. Subsequently, a specialized court ruled that the treason case involving Musharaf will be adjudicated in a civilian court as opposed to a military court. Musharaf expressed his disagreement with the ruling of the special court, seeing it as a manifestation of personal animosity on the part of the Prime Minister and the former Chief Justice, Chudry Iftikhar. The military expressed significant apprehension regarding these developments. Christophe Jaffrelot asserts that the military explicitly conveyed to the Supreme Court its stance on excluding civilian courts from adjudicating cases involving military personnel accused of any wrongdoing. In the case of Musharaf, the military was involved in collaborating with the civilian government, particularly with the interior minister Chudry Nisar Ali Khan, to facilitate the accommodation of Musharaf. The Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, also provided assurance to the Chief of Army Staff that former President Musharraf will be permitted to travel overseas following his indictment for instituting a state of emergency in November

2007. However, the aforementioned pledge failed to materialize as Nawaz Sharif, along with several members of his cabinet, including Defense Minister Khawaja Asif, expressed support for the trial of Musharaf. The Defense Minister contended that permitting Musharaf to travel overseas would significantly erode the government's credibility. When the security establishment was unable to obtain concessions for the former Chief through covert communications, they opted to undermine the elected administration through the utilization of Dharna politics. In the present scenario, the military establishment has strategically involved new political figures, namely Imran Khan, a former cricketer turned politician and the chief of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), and Tahir ul Qadri, the chief of Pakistan Awami Tehrik. These individuals have put out their respective demands in order to orchestrate a sit-in protest against the democratically elected government. The discourse revealed that the military establishment continues to perceive itself as an untouchable entity. In the realm of military personnel, even after retirement, individuals are immune from prosecution for any form of offense. In this particular scenario, the English phrase "King can do no wrong" is effectively put into practice. The security establishment is willing to jeopardize the integrity of the political system in order to shield the former head from being held accountable. In the instance of Musharaf, it can be observed that the prioritization of institutional interests took precedence over national interests. The elected government's power was subjected to challenges and erosion, not by the institution itself, but rather by many other political groups.

4.6. The Phenomenon of Dharna Politics and the Discretionary

Influence of the Military Establishment

Following the Musharaf dictatorship, the military establishment made a strategic decision to refrain from direct intervention in the political affairs of the country. Instead, they opted to exert their influence on the civilian government from behind the scenes, so achieving a more effective level of control. Novel methods have been devised to exert influence on the civilian administration in situations where the interests of the institution are perceived to be at risk. These methods include employing media campaigns and leveraging the judiciary. In the context of the PPP government, a media campaign was initiated with the aim of undermining the civilian government in response to the Karry Luger law. In a same vein, the judiciary assumed

a prominent role in investigating the Memogate issue, aiming to substantiate the claim that the civilian administration poses a potential risk to the national security of the nation. During the tenure of Nawaz Sharif's administration, concerns were raised by the security establishment regarding potential threats to institutional autonomy. These concerns mostly revolved around government initiatives aimed at rebuilding amicable relations with India and Afghanistan, as well as the trial of former President Musharraf. Consequently, two new political figures, Imran Khan, the leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), and Tahir ul Qadri, a religious leader heading the Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT), were introduced with the intention of destabilizing and exerting pressure on the elected administration. Both leaders initiated a march towards Islamabad⁷⁰. Tahir UL Qadri has called for an impartial inquiry into the model Town incident that occurred on June 17th, resulting in the deaths of multiple Pakistan Awami Tehreek activists and causing others to sustain gunshot wounds. In contrast, Imran Khan has asserted that Nawaz Sharif assumed the position of Prime Minister through the assistance of the judiciary, election commission, and the caretaker government. The leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party characterized the general elections as being subject to manipulation, while also asserting that the administration led by Nawaz Sharif was plagued by corruption and lacked adherence to democratic principles⁷¹. The government did not impose any obstacles on the demonstrators from both parties and permitted them to stage a sit-in in Islamabad. Imran Khan and Tahir ul Qadri have called for the resignation of the Prime Minister. In response, the government has opted to establish a judicial committee to investigate the allegations of election rigging, as proposed by Co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari and Jammāt Islami Ameer Siraj ul Haq. Imran Khan declined the establishment of a judicial commission unless Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resigned. A convened joint session of the parliament witnessed unanimous support from all political parties for the democratic administration, wherein they advised Nawaz Sharif against submitting his resignation. The negotiation between the government representatives and the protesters ultimately proved unsuccessful after multiple rounds of discussion. Neither leader demonstrated a willingness to exhibit

⁷⁰ Hassan, Ahmad. "Agitational Politics in Pakistan: A Case Study of the PTI's Dharna 2014." *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 59, no. 1 (2022): 69.

⁷¹ Ullah, Yaseen, Manzoor Ahmad, and Syed Wasif Azim. "Politics of Protest in Pakistan: Causes and Features of the PTI (2014) dharna in Islamabad, Pakistan." *Global Strategic & Security Studies Review* 1 (2020): 23-31.

flexibility on the request for resignation. The impasse between the two political factions led to instances of violence, with supporters of the PTI and PAT engaging in attacks on state institutions, including the Pakistan Television (PTV) building, as well as causing damage to the gates of the Parliament and Pakistan Secretariat. Consequently, the Army emerged as an intermediary between the administration and the protesters. During a joint meeting, Imran Khan made mention of the army's involvement in mediating between the two parties and the government. During a meeting held on August 28th, General Raheel Sharif, the Chief of Army Staff, provided assurance to Imran Khan that the Army will provide a transparent probe into allegations of election tampering. Furthermore, the Chief of Army Staff, Raheel Sharif, announced during a meeting with corps commanders that although the army fully supports democracy, it holds significant concerns regarding the ongoing political difficulties. The military expressed disapproval towards use force, as it was believed that such action would exacerbate the situation. The resolution of the matter should be pursued through political means in a timely manner. The Army maintains its unwavering dedication to fulfilling its role in safeguarding the security of the state and will steadfastly uphold the nation's ambitions without making any concessions. Once again, the military has emerged as a safeguard of national interests and is prepared to assume the position of mediator between politicians driven by a thirst for power. Despite being deployed under Article 245 with the intention of preventing violent actions by protestors, the army refrained from intervening as the protesters launched attacks on state buildings, including the parliament. Numerous observers have asserted that the media outlet shown a bias towards the demonstrators, aiming to undermine the Nawaz Sharif government, if not to ultimately remove it from power. It has been claimed by observers that the military institution had a significant role in supporting the Imran and Qadri Dharna, with several indicators being highlighted. According to the Minister of Information, Parviz Rasheed, it has been reported that Imran Khan held a meeting with the former Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Shuja Pasha, prior to commencing the Azadi March. In a conference held on August 20 in Rawalpindi, the Ex-Servicemen Association, led by Retired Admiral Ahmad Tasnim, called for the dissolution of assembly and the conduction of new elections. Furthermore, despite the deployment of the Army under Article 245 with the objective of preventing the demonstrators from accessing the red zone, the military assumed a passive role. Imran Khan and Qadri maintained regular

communication with the Army Chief, and they announced that the government had designated Raheel Sharif to assume the role of arbitrator in order to resolve the ongoing conflicts. In a statement, Javid Hasmi, a member of the sixth party, reported that Imran expressed the view that the involvement of the military is crucial for the success of the movement. Additionally, it was mentioned that new elections are scheduled to take place in September. However, Qadri and Imran refuted any claims of receiving support from the army. In a similar vein, the Army has likewise asserted its non-involvement in the present political turmoil⁷². Ayesha Saddiqa highlighted the significance of the army chief's meeting with Imran and Qadri, as well as the army's lack of intervention in restraining the protestors. She emphasized the importance of demonstrating respect towards the armed forces and refraining from resorting to violence against soldiers, as was witnessed in the treatment of the police.

Nevertheless, the democratic factions, notably the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), unequivocally support the democratic administration and convey a resolute message to the anti-democratic factions during the joint session of parliament, emphasizing the unwavering commitment to preserving the integrity of the legislative body regardless of the circumstances. However, the Prime Minister's reputation was diminished when he extended an invitation to the Chief of Army Staff, Raheel Sharif, to assume a mediating role in the ongoing political turmoil. By making this decision, Nawaz Sharif effectively granted permission for the military to intervene in political matters, despite having the support of the parliament. There was no requirement for military intervention. Baber Sattar asserts that the Khaki establishment is currently under strict control. According to Pakistani media reports, it has been conveyed to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that while a coup is not anticipated, his government must now coexist with the army if it wants to maintain its survival⁷³. The decision to refrain from displacing the Sharif administration was made during the corps commander meeting convened in August. However, it was seen that certain high-ranking officials, such as DG ISI Gen Zaheer ul Islam, expressed support for a direct coup. Nevertheless, Raheel Sharif dismissed this idea due to the unfavorable economic conditions at the time, since a direct coup may potentially exacerbate the situation. The military

⁷² Jaffrelot, Christophe. *The Pakistan paradox: Instability and resilience*. Oxford University Press, 2015.

⁷³ Ahmed, Raja Qaiser, Rida Fatima, and Muhammad Shoaib. "A new political lexicon in Pakistan's civil–military relations (2013–2018)." *Asian Politics & Policy* 14, no. 2 (2022): 249-263.

establishment currently exhibits a reluctance to engage in direct governance, while also expressing a desire to retain its political influence and continue participating actively in the political sphere. This is why the security establishment has embraced the utilization of dharna politics as a novel strategy to instigate political turmoil⁷⁴, so affording them the chance to assume an arbitrary role in resolving such crises within the nation. The military aims to accomplish two objectives through arbitration: firstly, to convey to the general populace the indispensability of the army for the survival of a nation. Furthermore, there is an attempt to impede the government from encroaching onto projects that may jeopardize the interests or autonomy of institutional corporations. In the context of Pakistan, the prominence of dharna politics has assumed a significant role, resulting in a detrimental impact on the legitimacy of the country's administration and giving rise to several inquiries and concerns regarding its efficacy. The aforementioned strategy has demonstrated efficacy in exerting pressure on governmental entities, and over the course of the last seven years, the utilization of those measures has experienced a notable increase. The renowned sit-in organized by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) in 2014 provoked a fresh surge of protests, blockades, and admonitions, so causing disturbances to the tranquility of the nation. The prolonged protests in 2014 have not only adversely affected the peace of the country, but have also had a significant impact on its economy. The utilization of dharna politics has resulted in significant harm to the process of democratization. According to Senator Farhat Ullah Babar, who previously held the position of press secretary under former President Asif Ali Zardari, both the government led by Sharif and Imran Khan are accountable for the emergence of a significant challenge to the democratic system. Furthermore, Farhat Ullah Babar emphasized the necessity for the administration to have initiated a serious engagement with Imran Khan at an earlier stage. Currently, the prevailing political instability is causing a transfer of power from Islamabad to Rawalpindi. The phenomenon of dharna politics has once again disrupted the equilibrium in the dynamics between civilian and military actors, resulting in the latter assuming a dominant position.

⁷⁴ Usman Khan, Dr Jamal Shah, and Bakhtiar Khan. "Analyzing Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan and Turkey (2002-2018)." *Pakistan Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 2 (2021).

4.7. Dawn Leaks: A New Call to Crisis

The October edition of the Dawn newspaper had a story about a meeting that took place between civilian and security authorities. During the conference, civilian officials expressed concerns that Pakistan may encounter international isolation if it fails to undertake sufficient measures against terrorist organizations in a comprehensive manner. There have been instances of heated exchanges between civilian and military authorities, particularly involving the Chief Minister of Punjab and the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Rizwan Akhter. It has been said that when civilian security agencies apprehended terrorists, intelligence agencies covertly facilitated their release. The claim from the Dawn was refuted by the Prime Minister's office, which subsequently called for swift measures to be taken against individuals responsible for disseminating false information. The government has placed the name of Cyrill Meda, a reporter from Dawn, on the Exit Control List (ECL). Sharif dismissed his adviser, Tariq Fatemi, and instructed for appropriate measures to be taken against senior official Rao Tehsin Ali. It has been officially declared that both civilian and military leaders are in agreement over matters pertaining to security. Nevertheless, senior military officials have expressed profound apprehension regarding the leaked information, characterizing it as a plot against the military, intelligence services, and Pakistan as a whole. The military has released a statement rejecting the findings of the investigative report on the Dawn Leaks. The military operates under the constitutional framework, with the Prime Minister providing oversight. In what circumstances can the military refuse to comply with orders issued by the Prime Minister? After the military's refusal, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan held a press conference in Islamabad, indicating the potential for subsequent measures to be taken about the matter. The user suggested that the prime minister's notification was disclosed to the media before to the ministry's opportunity to take action. In October, the prime minister dismissed the former information minister, Pervaiz Rashid, in relation to the leak. According to numerous analysts, the occurrence of Dawn Leaks in Pakistan is indicative of a broader issue, namely the persistent endeavors undertaken by the military to subvert the political authority. According to Abid Hussain, a journalist based in Islamabad, the military persists in posing challenges to the government, thereby maintaining a defensive stance. The primary objective is to ensure that the civilian government

remains in a condition of uncertainty and instability. According to Hussain, a recurring pattern in Pakistan involves the military seeking to demonstrate the corruption and ineffectiveness of politicians whenever civilians hold positions of power. As the upcoming general elections in 2018 draw near, there are anticipations that Sharif will regain power with a more substantial mandate. According to analysts, the army high command expresses apprehension regarding a potential scenario when a Punjabi prime minister with a more substantial electoral mandate emerges as the sole political challenge to their authority. Sharif's previous tenure culminated in his removal from power via a military coup. This time, the task at hand would present a greater level of challenge. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, observers have asserted that the army's high command may anticipate a diminution of its position in the forthcoming years. According to an expert, the entity in question is employing several strategies to assure the expansion of its military and economic influence, while simultaneously safeguarding its dominant position in national affairs, short of resorting to a coup. In a recent interview, former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Bajwa acknowledged that his predecessor, General Raheel Sharif, had expressed a desire for an extension of his term. This statement suggests that the issue of Dawn leaks was amplified in order to exert pressure on the Prime Minister, thereby creating unnecessary publicity. Despite the failure of the policy, the dawn leaks controversy significantly undermined the prestige of the civilian administration. The Dawn Leak saga provides insight into various aspects, notably the tendency for politicians to gradually withdraw from their positions, leading to a perpetual cycle of retreat that ultimately results in their expulsion from the political arena. Another lesson that has been gleaned is that inadequate oversight of the civilian government over media outlets enables non-civilian entities to exploit media platforms to undermine the authority of civilian governments. Mian Nawaz Sharif encountered the aforementioned circumstance on two prior occasions before being ousted for the third time. Nevertheless, he harbored the desire to mitigate the crisis and believed in the possibility of reconciling with the military establishment. Ultimately, he came to the realization that any attempt at a benevolent gesture becomes futile once the individuals in authoritative attire make the decision to proceed with their undertaking.

4.8. The Panama Leaks and the Subsequent Disqualification of the Prime Minister

The Panama Papers refer to a series of leaked secret documents that revealed an extensive network of offshore companies utilized for purposes such as tax evasion, money laundering, and various other financial activities. The list comprised individuals of significant political stature and public prominence hailing from various regions worldwide. The occurrence of the leaks took place in 2016, when an unidentified individual sent a substantial volume of data, encompassing emails, financial spreadsheets, and various other documents, to a German newspaper. Subsequently, the newspaper disseminated the particulars to the International Consortium of Journalists (ICJ), a network comprising investigative journalists from around the world. The Panama Papers brought to light the operations of a Panamanian law company known as Mossack Fonseca, which facilitated the establishment of numerous offshore companies and offshore accounts in various tax havens worldwide for its clients. The organization frequently employed strategies to obfuscate asset ownership and clandestinely transfer funds, so enabling individuals to evade tax obligations and conceal their accumulated wealth. The disclosure of sensitive information generated significant international outcry. Numerous politicians, government officials, and celebrities were implicated. Certain individuals, such as the Prime Minister of Iceland, voluntarily relinquished their positions in response to public pressure. Additionally, legal measures were pursued against specific individuals, like Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Despite the absence of Nawaz Sharif's name in the Panama Papers revelations, it is worth noting.

The Panama Papers exposed the existence of offshore firms and assets owned by three of the offspring of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which were not disclosed in his family's wealth statement.

The aforementioned entities consist of three companies, namely Nescoll Ltd, Nielsen Enterprises Ltd, and Hangan Property Holdings Ltd, which are registered in the British Virgin Islands. Nescoll Ltd was incorporated in 1993, Nielsen Enterprises Ltd in 1994, and Hangan Property Holdings Ltd in 2007. These entities have been utilized as conduits for the transfer of funds to procure overseas assets, including certain residential units situated along Park Lane in the Mayfair district of London. The

suggestion that these companies were established with the intention of concealing or laundering unlawfully obtained wealth, or to evade tax obligations, has raised doubts regarding the individual's credibility. Mr. Sharif and his family have refuted any allegations of misconduct. During the proceedings in November, it was communicated to the Supreme Court that the acquisition of their London home was facilitated by investments made in companies affiliated with the royal family of Qatar. The head of government has characterized the disclosure as a deliberate effort by individuals with political motives to undermine both myself and my family. During a national address on April 5, 2016, the speaker asserted that those who possess unlawfully acquired riches tend to refrain from registering assets under their own names⁷⁵. The court's decision was rendered after a comprehensive year-long procedure, during which the court meticulously scrutinized numerous pages of evidence and attentively listened to extensive arguments presented by legal representatives from both parties. The disclosure of the Panama Papers occurred during a period when Mr. Sharif's administration was still recuperating from the 2014 occupation of Islamabad by opposition politician Imran Khan, resulting in a four-month-long paralysis of the federal capital.

In the past, there was a belief that certain elements within the security establishment were supporting the protests in order to prevent Mr. Sharif from pursuing independent domestic and foreign policies separate from the military. The Panama leaks, which received significant media attention, once again placed pressure on the government from Mr. Khan and other smaller groups who called for the prime minister's resignation and threatened to initiate another lockdown of Islamabad. These groups filed petitions at the Supreme Court seeking the disqualification of the prime minister. Initially, the Supreme Court rejected these petitions, citing their reliance on hearsay rather than concrete evidence. However, in October 2016, a five-member bench was constituted to commence hearings on the case. Initially, the leaks appeared to cause panic among the upper echelons of the ruling PML-N party. The departure of Mr. Sharif for London on 13 April 2016, to attend an unannounced visit with his doctors, was widely attributed to the perceived pressure he was facing.

⁷⁵ Oxford Analytica. "Panama leaks jeopardise Sharif's future in Pakistan." *Emerald Expert Briefings* oxan-db (2016).
Cheema, Hasham. "How Pakistan's Panama Papers Probe Unfolded." *Dawn*. Available online: <https://www.dawn.com/news/131653> (2018).

The recent appearance of billboards endorsing the prime minister and his government in certain regions of Punjab and Sindh provinces has been interpreted by some as a potential strategy to mobilize popular backing in anticipation of an unfavorable verdict from the Supreme Court. Imran Khan regarded these leaks as irrefutable evidence of corruption implicating Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Following widespread demands from various political factions, including the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), there emerged a further development wherein petitions were formally submitted to the Supreme Court seeking the disqualification of Nawaz Sharif and other individuals from holding public office. The significance of the PPP's decision to join the calls for Sharif's resignation lies in the fact that, until to this development, the two major political parties had maintained a united front against any military endeavors aimed at removing Sharif from power. The final decision rendered by the Supreme Court in April 2017 exhibited a division among the justices. The verdict did not absolve or incriminate Sharif, but instead mandated the initiation of an inquiry by a Joint inquiry Team (JIT) into Sharif and his children. The primary objective of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) was to ascertain whether Nawaz Sharif, together with his immediate family and some acquaintances, had accumulated assets that exceeded their documented means of income. The Just-In-Time (JIT) committee expeditiously presented its comprehensive 275-page report to the Supreme Court within a remarkably brief timeframe of two months. The expeditious finalization of the report, along with the inclusion of military personnel among its six members, came as a surprise to experienced abroad Pakistani observers like William Milam, as noted in *The Friday Times*. The expeditious completion and findings of the report may lead some individuals to promptly attribute its outcomes to the involvement of the military. On the preceding Friday, the Supreme Court of the country withheld its decision on the matter. However, it was disclosed this morning that Prime Minister Sharif and Finance Minister Ishaq Dar had been deemed ineligible for their respective positions. Sharif expeditiously declared his resignation despite vehemently challenging the ruling. The disqualification of Nawaz Sharif by the Supreme Court was predicated on his failure to disclose his job with Capital FZE, a Dubai-based company owned by his son, on his 2013 nomination papers submitted to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). In his capacity as the Chairman of the company's board, he possessed the entitlement to a salary, which, even if left unclaimed, constituted a receivable asset. According to the court's perspective, the individual in question has contravened

Article 62 of the Constitution, which mandates the individual to exhibit honesty and truthfulness. The disqualification of Nawaz Sharif appears to have been primarily based on a technicality, rather than the corruption charges that have been associated with him since the Panama leaks on April 3, 2016. These disclosures implicated eight offshore firms connected to the Nawaz Sharif family.

The Supreme Court's disqualification of Nawaz Sharif stands apart from previous instances of elected leaders being removed from power by the influential military in the country. Consequently, it is quite probable that the democratic system will persist without any conceivable risk of a military takeover. Historically, the existence of a power vacuum has served as a motivating factor for military intervention. Nevertheless, in this instance, the uninterrupted sequence of successions did not result in the same kind of disconnection. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) currently possesses a majority in the National Assembly (NA), indicating a higher probability that Shahbaz Sharif will assume the position of prime minister until the subsequent elections scheduled for 2018. Nevertheless, there exist certain disconcerting elements about the decision that do not augur favorably for the strengthening of democratic principles within the nation. The historical recurrence of employing the concepts of 'corruption' and 'accountability' as mechanisms to depose democratically elected civilian governments is a prevalent phenomenon in Pakistan. Over the course of the past seven decades following the attainment of independence, none of the prime ministers have managed to serve their whole tenure in office. Nawaz Sharif assumed the position of the 15th prime minister to be ousted on 28 July 2017. The Supreme Court's inquiry into allegations of corruption against a sitting prime minister and his family was an unprecedented event in the nation's history. Furthermore, this measure would have a beneficial effect on the adherence to legal principles and the responsibility of government officials inside the nation. However, the investigation seemed to be primarily targeting Nawaz Sharif's family members and individuals in his inner circle. Simultaneously, the constitutional provision requiring politicians to be "honest and truthful" in order to disqualify Nawaz Sharif is highly subjective and has the potential to disqualify a substantial number of leaders within the nation. The policy in question was implemented by General Zia-ul-Haq, who served as President from 1977 to 1988, with the aim of curbing the influence wielded by politicians during his military regime in the 1980s. The court's utilization

of this Article to dismiss a duly elected leader has the potential to establish a precarious precedent within the nation. According to Fisher and Taub's analysis in the New York Times, the disqualification of Nawaz Sharif raises concerns due to the historical trend wherein non-elected power centers have been responsible for determining the country's leadership, rather than the will of the citizens. The aforementioned power centers seem to be under the jurisdiction of the court, military, or bureaucracy. Between the years 1951 and 1956, a total of four prime ministers were either sacked or voluntarily resigned from their positions as a result of disagreements with the respective Governor Generals during that period. In the year 1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who held the position of prime minister from 1973 to 1977, was removed from power by a military coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq. Subsequently, Bhutto faced a trial and was ultimately executed by the Supreme Court in 1979. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the individual in question, served as the prime minister on two separate occasions, namely from 1988 to 1990 and from 1993 to 1996. Regrettably, her tenure as prime minister was terminated on both occasions, in 1990 and 1996, due to allegations of nepotism and corruption made by the respective presidents. In a more recent development, the Supreme Court of the country rendered Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani ineligible for the position of Prime Minister due to his contemptuous behavior towards the court. Gillani had served as the Prime Minister from 2008 to 2012. This phenomenon creates a structural framework in which elected officials and political factions exhibit vulnerability and insecurity, as they harbor the belief that the individuals or entities possessing genuine authority has the capability to depose them at any given moment. This phenomenon engenders a propensity for myopia and prioritization of self-interest over the welfare of the electorate. The establishment of weak elected institutions stands in contrast to the well regarded and trusted strong unelected institutions, namely the military and courts. Consequently, the general public readily embraces and permits the interventions and oversight conducted by these entities in relation to political parties and leaders. Within this fragile system, opposing political parties also embrace these interventions, generating unrest and openly urging unelected authorities to intervene. The aforementioned cycle recurs periodically within the nation.

The issue at hand is significant due to the tendency of interventions to undermine the strength and integrity of democratic systems. The prevention of democratic institution

growth results in an increased concentration of power among unelected entities. The military, for example, exercises authority over matters pertaining to national security and foreign policy within the nation. Throughout the current term, Nawaz Sharif endeavored to consolidate his authority by pursuing legal action against General Pervez Musharraf for his role in undermining the constitution in 1999. Additionally, Sharif sought to enhance diplomatic ties with India by fostering trade and business connections. Furthermore, a leaked media report raised concerns regarding the military's perceived inadequacy in addressing the issue of militancy within the nation. Despite Nawaz Sharif's repeated retreats, the ensuing tension in civil-military ties led to a convergence of anti-Nawaz Sharif factions. However, Sharif and his party, seemingly assured of re-election in 2018, failed to sufficiently acknowledge this development. The removal of the Prime Minister via a judicial ruling has presented an additional avenue for non-democratic factions to solidify their presence inside the political landscape of Pakistan. In addition to facilitating the development of the military, it also paved the door for the Judiciary to engage in political matters within the nation⁷⁶. The phenomenon referred to by Professor Sadaf Aziz is commonly known as the "judicialization of politics." The decision was met with approval by opposition parties, particularly the PTI, who hailed it as the commencement of an era focused on accountability. The leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party issued a statement following the judgement, expressing that the events witnessed today have the potential to enhance the democratic system in Pakistan. The cricketer turned politician emphasized the importance of accountability in a democratic system of governance. The progress of our democratic development has advanced. Critics of the decision contend that the application of Article 62 to remove the prime minister based on a subjective assessment undermines the delicate state of democracy in Pakistan. According to Owais Tohid, a distinguished journalist and political analyst, Articles 62 and 63 were implemented by General Zia ul Haq, a former military dictator, in 1985⁷⁷. Tohid raises the question of authority in determining an individual's honesty, trustworthiness, and truthfulness. Could you please provide information regarding the identity of the judge? The decision of the court to directly

⁷⁶ Specia, Megan. "How the Panama Papers Changed Pakistani Politics." *The New York Times* 28 (2017).

Rasmussen, Sune Engel. "Pakistani court removes PM Nawaz Sharif from office in Panama Papers case,[online], 2017. 07. 28." *Forrás: theguardian.com* [2018. 12. 02].

⁷⁷ Cheema, Moeen H. "Pakistan: The state of liberal democracy." *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 16, no. 2 (2018): 635-642.

dismiss the prime minister, instead of referring his case to a corruption trial court, is perceived by a significant number of individuals in Pakistan as a detrimental development for the nation's democratic framework. According to journalist Tohid, during an interview with Al Jazeera, it is anticipated that Articles 62 and 63 will be employed in forthcoming instances to impose additional constraints on parliamentary activities, with the manifestation of this phenomenon expected to occur imminently. The preceding discourse demonstrates that several state institutions, such as the military establishment, judicial, executive, and political forces, are engaged in a complex power struggle. Owasi Tohid articulated the aforementioned scenario in the following statement: "There is no inclination on the part of the judiciary and the military to seize control of the nation." The current situation can be understood as a conflict aimed at reclaiming previously lost territory and establishing dominance in determining the future parameters of the situation. Notwithstanding the numerous obstacles encountered, the second consecutive elected administration successfully fulfilled its constitutional tenure, albeit with the appointment of two Prime Ministers. Throughout the 76-year history, no Prime Minister has successfully served a full term. Over the course of a decade under a democratic framework, the civilian forces have been unable to effectively contest the dominant authority of the military institution. The military establishment's political influence continued to exert dominance over elected administrations in crucial decision-making processes. According to Aqil Shah, there are three significant aspects that could potentially help to the establishment of civilian supremacy in the democratic process. The first factor is that the president is no longer able to dissolve the elected government, as stipulated by the 18th amendment. The second administration that is elected through democratic means have the authority to select service chiefs. In theory, the implementation of a more autonomous election commission and a less politically biased caretaker government would enhance the legitimacy of the electoral process and mitigate the potential for fraudulent activities and malpractice. However, it is a well-established truth that the military establishment holds significant influence across the entire political system of Pakistan. A more refined approach has been employed to exercise authority over the civilian administration. The military establishment currently operates covertly, exerting influence on the government by using media, other political entities, and the Judiciary in order to create instability. The judiciary has played a significant role in undermining democracy, since it has consistently interfered in the political matters of

the nation at the behest of the ruling establishment, a common occurrence in both regimes. The appointment of both Prime Ministers by the judiciary has resulted in political instability inside the nation. The substantial influence of the military and its enduring involvement in politics has had a detrimental impact on the progress of democratization in Pakistan. In the aftermath of the 2018 elections, the Pakistan Tehrik Insaf party emerged victorious and subsequently established the government, with Imran Khan, a former cricketer who transitioned into a political career, assuming the position of Prime Minister of Pakistan. The opposition parties have characterized the elections as being manipulated and have made allegations that the leader of the PTI created the government with assistance from the establishment. Despite failing to secure a simple majority in the national house, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party managed to establish a coalition government by garnering support from other smaller parties and independent MPs. In the preceding decade, Pakistani citizens have observed a notable manifestation of democracy, which is currently facing a perceived challenge in the form of a "democratic coup." Similar to previous instances, the influential military establishment in the nation is widely regarded as the primary entity suspected of orchestrating this recent episode of political manipulation. Historically, the military employed two primary methods to undermine democratic governance: orchestrating a direct coup or exploiting its special powers to dismiss an elected government and subsequently manipulate electoral processes to prevent its re-election. However, in 2008, these special powers were abolished, resulting in a significant development in 2013: the successful completion of a full five-year term by an elected government. However, subsequent to that period, there has been a noticeable shift in the prevailing trend, with critics asserting that the establishment is now employing more rudimentary strategies in an attempt to regain its advantage. Imran Khan, in his capacity as Prime Minister, has been perceived by some as being subject to external influence, with the military establishment assuming a prominent role in the governance of the country. The government implemented all actions in accordance with the guidance of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The democratic factions were subjected to targeting under the administration led by Imran. The role of Parliament was limited to a symbolic approval as the majority of legislative actions were carried out by executive ordinances. The aspiration for civilian supremacy was effectively undermined in the year 2018. The political system has been completely dominated by the military. Under the leadership of Chief of Army Staff (COAS)

Bajwa, Pakistan's civil-military balance has shown a strong inclination towards the latter. According to Muhammad Taqi, it is argued that the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of Pakistan has orchestrated a gradual coup d'état, initiated by his predecessor General Raheel, which has now reached its completion. The political forces have once again regained all the lost grounds. During Bajwa's tenure, the establishment has consistently sought to undermine democratic processes at every juncture following its reinstatement in 2008. General Raheel Sharif initiated efforts to curtail civilian influence and assert its political authority. During his term, the Chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) attempted to undermine the position of the three-time Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, by orchestrating public rallies through the army's political proxies. Under the leadership of General Bajwa, the military has gained significant control over both the judicial and political systems, which it utilizes to further its institutional interests. The inaugural peaceful transition of power between two governmental entities represents a significant landmark in the nation's seven-decade chronicles. Nevertheless, the integrity of the democratic system remains subject to scrutiny. The question of whether politics and politicians in Pakistan can achieve immunity from military influence and effectively pursue an agenda aligned with the will of the populace remains uncertain.

4.9. The Shifting Role of the Military During the Period of Democratization

The Musharaf government has significantly tarnished the reputation of the military. Despite the anticipation of military intervention in the country following the restoration of democracy, such a scenario did not materialize on multiple occasions. The military has come to recognize that covert control is more efficacious than direct governance. During the period of democratic governance, the military did not fully retreat to their barracks and acknowledge civilian authority, but rather altered the dynamics of their dominance. During the period characterized by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the military employed proxy actors to undermine the functioning of the democratically elected government. The current period of governance significantly diverges from the preceding era of civilian control, which spanned from 1988 to 1999. Political actors acknowledge the notion that by collaborating, it is possible to reduce, if not entirely eradicate, the

influence of the military in political affairs. The two prominent political parties, namely the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), have encountered significant challenges in maintaining political stability. Consequently, the military has frequently capitalized on these instances of political turmoil, thereby consolidating its authority in crucial domains such as international relations and national security. When faced with situations where its interests were jeopardized by civilian aspirations or escalating instability, the entity took action by removing the governing body. The aforementioned action was executed on three occasions utilizing a proxy within the realm of the presidency, and once by a direct coup d'état. During this particular time frame, both competing political parties experienced the loss of two governments each. Consequently, this pushed Sharif and his counterpart from the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Benazir Bhutto, to reach a consensus on the fundamental notion of constraining the political influence of the army. The restoration of the constitution's fundamental democratic structure necessitated its amendment, as it had undergone significant alterations during past authoritarian regimes. In 2010, a constitutional amendment was enacted to restore the supremacy of Parliament, eliminate the president's authority to dissolve a government, and address historical disparities between a dominant central government and subordinate provinces by decentralizing significant legislative and fiscal powers. In response to a more cohesive civilian front, a constitution with strict limitations, and the emergence of civilian influence in budgetary and administrative matters at the provincial level, the military has resorted to employing alternative strategies, short of a complete seizure of power, in order to reinforce its own authority. The methods employed by the entity in question encompass the manipulation and occasional exertion of influence over democratic voices via its extensive intelligence apparatus. These tactics involve the utilization of bribery and coercion towards ostensibly independent private media outlets within the country, as well as the utilization of proxy politicians affiliated with other political parties, such as the PTI. Additionally, strategic deployment of mass protests through affiliated individuals and groups, such as the cleric-politician Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri and the Islamist far-right coalition known as the Difa-e-Pakistan Council, is occasionally employed. In significant instances since 2008, the military has effectively employed these techniques to seize control from civilian politicians, while also preserving its financial advantages and maintaining independent authority over matters of national security and foreign

policy. The commencement of the most recent civil-military standoff can be traced back to Sharif's resounding political triumph in 2013, which resulted in the military being confronted once more by a leader it had harbored deep-seated suspicions towards. Sharif's foray into the realm of politics commenced during the 1980s, facilitated by the support and favor bestowed upon him by General Zia ul-Haq, a military dictator. However, as his career progressed, Sharif found himself engaged in multiple instances of direct conflict with the upper echelons of military leadership. In the year 1999, the administration of Sharif experienced a military coup orchestrated by Musharraf, resulting in Sharif's subsequent exile for duration of seven years. Following his return to power half a decade ago, Sharif endeavored to navigate an autonomous trajectory in domains that have traditionally been beyond the purview of civilian authority. Notably, these actions encompassed extending peace overtures to the Afghan government, as well as commencing efforts to normalize relations with India and enhance chances for cross-border trade. Both of these initiatives, in addition to an endeavor to prosecute Musharraf for treason, set him on a trajectory of conflict with the military. In addition to engaging in a competition for control over specific policy domains, the military has an inherent skepticism towards Sharif due to the perceived political risk he poses to its vested interests. The military's historical predominance can be traced back to its association with Punjab, the largest region of the country. The majority of the officer corps and the enlisted personnel are predominantly recruited from the province of Punjab. The province experiences a significant degree of military influence over agricultural land, urban real estate, and other crucial commercial enterprises. Historically, the middle class and landed elite of Punjab have been the primary supporters of the military's efforts to consolidate power, while simultaneously dismissing the smaller provinces' calls for fair treatment. Sharif presented a structural challenge due to his status as a Punjabi leader, garnering significant support from many segments of the Punjabi populace owing to his and his party's perceived efficacy in administration. Primarily, his political standing and widespread appeal distinguish him inside a province that has always aligned exclusively with individuals perceived to be in favor with the military establishment. According to the military's strategic analysis, relinquishing control of Punjab to a formidable civilian leader would be the most certain means of forfeiting authority on a national scale.

Throughout a significant portion of the recent administration led by Sharif, the military employed strategies aimed at maintaining a position of advantage in the political arena, so safeguarding itself from any unfavorable outcomes. In 2014, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) organized large-scale protests in response to allegations of electoral fraud during the 2013 elections. These rallies provided an opportunity for General Raheel Sharif, the army head at that time (unrelated to Nawaz Sharif), to intervene and assume the position of a mediator. There were multiple signs suggesting that the mobilization was being actively supported, if not directly enabled, by the intelligence agencies of the military. The objective of such encouragement appeared to be the deliberate weakening of Sharif's recently elected government. The involvement of the military-backed cleric Tahir-ul-Qadri and a significant number of his spiritual followers in the protest provided additional support to the suspicions in question. Following the initial weakening of Sharif, the military strategically consolidated its dominating position through well-crafted social and news media initiatives aimed at enhancing its public appeal. The organization, via its Inter-Services Public Relations division, provides financial support for the production of music videos, television programs, and movies, as well as a substantial amount of content for online news platforms. The extensive utilization of new media platforms fosters a narrative that prioritizes Pakistan's future prospects in relation to a robust military that possesses the capacity to combat both internal and external challenges. Certain factions among the civilian political elite are depicted as corrupt and motivated solely by self-interest, and in certain instances, they are even seen as posing a direct threat to national security. Sharif's endeavors to establish normalized relations with India have served as subject matter for such a depiction.

The Panama Papers release was utilized to further restrict the scope of civilian political authority, which is unsurprising given the existing hostility between the military and Sharif. The deliberate assignment of military personnel to the investigative panel examining the actions of the prime minister indicated a distinct intention to utilize established systems of official accountability as a means of exerting control over the government. Throughout the investigation, numerous media sources claimed that military intelligence services were involved in aiding the formulation of witnesses' testimonies and providing orders to investigators. Despite employing these measures, the military establishment has been unsuccessful in

undermining the widespread public backing. Certain individuals with Islamist affiliations were hired with the intention of undermining the public perception of the political leadership, particularly that of the PML-N. During the months of October and November 2017, a protest movement was spearheaded by Khadim Hussain Rizvi, an extremist cleric. These demonstrations took place in the nation's capital and other prominent urban centers, with the explicit aim of challenging the government's authority in light of accusations of blasphemy leveled against the federal law minister. The demonstrators obstructed a vital intersection for vehicular access to Islamabad, resulting in an extended period of heightened volatility lasting more than fourteen days. The crisis concluded solely upon the government's compliance, which involved the removal of the law minister from office. The primary manifestation of the military's clandestine backing for these disruptive factions (or, at minimum, its implicit endorsement of them) became evident when the administration sought its aid in dispersing the demonstrators. The military issued a categorical denial, which was subsequently disseminated by sympathetic intermediaries in the news media, seemingly with the intention of exacerbating the government's humiliation⁷⁸.

The presence of these destabilizing factors has significantly undermined the progress of democratization in Pakistan. Political and social polarization has emerged as a result. No lessons have been learned from historical events. The military establishment appears to be reluctant to relinquish its involvement in politics and revert back to its primary responsibility of safeguarding the nation's security. Likewise, civilian forces have been unsuccessful in enhancing governance and fortifying political institutions. Both regimes have demonstrated a lack of commitment to implementing projects that prioritize the needs and well-being of the general population. Hence, a communication deficit exists between the general populace and their elected officials. The individuals in question have not succeeded in meeting the desired goals and ambitions of the populace. The democratic system has experienced a decline in public confidence. This is the reason why the general

⁷⁸ Javed, Umair. "The Struggle for Control of Pakistan's Fragile Democracy." *Current History* 117, no. 798 (2018): AhMED, DR NAEEM. "Countering Violent Barelvi Extremism in Pakistan: Challenges, Implications and Way Forward." *Policy Perspectives* 123-128. *on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan* (2021): 83.

populace in Pakistan refrains from advocating for democracy whenever non-democratic entities pose a threat to the established democratic system⁷⁹.

⁷⁹ Basit, Abdul. "Barelvi political activism and religious mobilization in Pakistan: The case of Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP)." *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 21, no. 3 (2020): 374-389.

CHAPTER 05: CONCLUSION

It can be inferred that the aforementioned points collectively support the notion that the military has emerged as a significant institutional actor since the 1950s. Political administrations have historically relied on it for both political and security objectives. Pakistan has undergone a transformation into a "security state" due to the presence of internal and regional challenges, resulting in a prominent role for the military. The factors contributing to Pakistan's evolution into a security state are widely recognized. The nation achieved independence from Britain, although thereafter became embroiled in a contentious dispute with India over the unresolved issue of Kashmir. This dispute ultimately led to the outbreak of four armed conflicts between the two states. The need for Pakistan to enhance and modernize its military capabilities arises from a persistent perception of threat emanating from India, in order to effectively address both internal and external security issues. Conversely, civilian institutions exhibited a state of fragility and instability. The divergence in preferences and priorities has resulted in an imbalance between the political and military establishments. The objective of establishing civilian supremacy is significantly challenged by the prevailing power imbalance in favor of the military. Despite the collective efforts of political elites to establish civilian control over the military and prevent its interference in political affairs, these endeavors have proven to be insufficient in countering the institutional influence wielded by the military, rendering them susceptible and ineffective. Pakistan's political system and culture have persisted as undemocratic and underdeveloped for an extended period. Consequently, the establishment of civilian control has proven challenging, as the military continues to have significant influence despite the presence of a democratic process.

The military's involvement in Pakistan's political affairs can be attributed to the inability of civilian governments to effectively establish their authority inside the state, mostly owing to deficiencies in leadership capabilities and governance. Since their inception, civilian governments have relied on the support of the military in order to ensure their continued existence. Ayub Khan assumed control of the government in response to the perceived inadequacy of civilian leadership and the absence of viable alternatives. Military leaders assumed the responsibility of evaluating the actions of the civilian government and making autonomous decisions

to seize control of the state from the civilian government. Throughout history, it has been observed that upon the establishment of democratic governments, politicians have consistently encountered challenges in fulfilling their obligations. Under civilian governments, there is a lack of improvement in people's lives, with over half of the population continuing to lack basic living essentials and falling below the poverty line. Furthermore, the presence of corruption, disregard for the rule of law, the prevalence of ethnic politics, and inadequate governance have contributed to economic and social conditions that have fostered extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, hence elevating the military institution above its civilian counterpart.

The correlation between military intervention and the breakdown of democratic systems is mutually reinforcing. The existing body of scholarly literature on the political landscape of Pakistan provides ample evidence to support the argument that elected civilian leaders have consistently prioritized the consolidation of their own authority and the promotion of patrimonialism, rather than focusing on the establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions. Furthermore, any efforts made by these leaders to assist democratic processes have been subsequently undermined and dismantled by subsequent military interventions. The military authorities, upon assuming power, consistently undermined the integrity of state institutions, most notably the judiciary, constitution, political parties, and election process - all of which are essential components for the advancement of democracy.

Several political leaders throughout the history of Pakistan have made attempts to confront the tremendous authority of the security establishment, although they have been unable to effectively contend with the influential military institution. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as a prominent civilian political leader who effectively endeavored to exert influence over military institutions, ultimately achieving a considerable degree of success. During his tenure, he exhibited dictatorial tendencies and had minimal concern for political opposition. He refrained from granting his detractors and opposing political parties the opportunity to contest his authority. As a result, his actions led to the estrangement of political groups that had united to participate in the 1977 elections. It has been said that these elections were marred by extensive manipulation, which afterwards incited widespread social discontent and political turmoil. The confrontation between the government led by the Bhutto administration and the opposition resulted in destabilization of the country, so

creating favorable circumstances for a military takeover. General Zia-ul-Haq, whom Bhutto had personally selected as the Chief of Army Staff, implemented the third Martial Law in 1977 and governed the nation until his demise in a fatal aircraft accident in 1988. Following the demise of the individual in question, the military disassociated itself from political affairs, so creating a temporary void. This particular disassociation presented an opening for Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif throughout the 1990s, enabling them to build civilian governments. Both parties failed to adhere to the established regulations of the game. The individuals involved actively participated in a political climate characterized by retaliatory actions and efforts to undermine one another, which may be seen as a perpetuation of the political dynamics observed inside the PPP and the coalition forces opposing it. The dismissal of the elected administrations of both Sharif and Bhutto in the 1990s can be attributed to a failure on the part of political parties, resulting in a lack of successful democratic development in Pakistan. In 1999, the democratic process experienced a setback as General Pervez Musharraf dismissed the democratically elected Nawaz Sharif, justifying his actions by characterizing Sharif's governance as a form of 'fake democracy'. The underlying motive behind his intervention stemmed from personal interests, as he had been sacked by the Prime Minister. The ability of the General to implement the fourth Martial Law in the country, despite the government's two-thirds majority, is indicative of the nature of the "praetorian state."

General Musharraf governed the nation with authoritative control as a formidable autocrat. Similar to his predecessors, he distorted the constitution and consolidated his authority as the President of Pakistan by use of a fraudulent and unconstitutional referendum. The individual in question revitalized the MQM, fostered support for religious parties, and established a novel faction of the Muslim League known as PMLQ through the fragmentation of existing political entities. The events of September 11th, 2001, presented an unforeseen advantage for General Pervez Musharraf, as they resulted in economic and political assistance from the United States and enhanced his global standing. Over time, it resulted in its own set of outcomes. The internal and external security challenges faced by Pakistan were triggered by the decision of President Musharraf to align with the United States. The military's efforts to suppress Baloch leaders and address religious militancy have had a detrimental impact on the security landscape in Pakistan, as well as on the

perception of the military. The army has been subjected to criticism on diverse public platforms. Indeed, the reputation of the military was significantly tarnished. The killing of Benazir Bhutto in 2007, which occurred during her election campaign, exacerbated the existing discontent towards Musharraf, leading to significant electoral losses for the party he established, PMLQ, in the subsequent 2008 elections.

A significant element of the 2008 elections was the impartiality demonstrated by the military, which, under the leadership of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, refrained from interfering and instead facilitated the organic progression of the democratic process. The absence of involvement from intelligence services and the Army in the aforementioned case distinguishes it as an exceptional occurrence within the political history of Pakistan, in contrast to the prevalent circumstances during the 1990s. The non-intervention policy implemented by the relevant authorities effectively fostered an environment that facilitated Asif Ali Zardari's ascension to the presidency of Pakistan. It is noteworthy that Zardari's political party emerged victorious in the 2008 elections, triumphing over two prominent parties, namely the PMLN and PMLQ. Zardari strategically formed inclusive political alliances and implemented a novel political approach centered around reconciliation with his adversaries, aiming to bolster the political entities in opposition to the military establishment. There was also a noticeable shift in the perspective of the military. This facilitated the exercise of democratic principles and the engagement of civilian leadership in accordance with constitutional provisions. The military sought to enhance its reputation by adopting a neutral stance during the elections and actively supporting the process of democratic transition. General Kayani acquiesced to the decision made by his Corps Commanders, wherein it was determined that the military would refrain from assuming control. This resolution was reached in light of the unfavorable reputation that the military had garnered in recent years, primarily as a result of the internal and external policies implemented under Musharraf's tenure. Furthermore, the presence of militancy and insurgency within Pakistan has presented significant challenges, necessitating the military's unwavering commitment to safeguarding national security.

The political landscape and governance structure in Pakistan following the coup are marked by a notable presence of conflict and dissent. These circumstances hindered the government's ability to establish and develop its institutions and political system.

The primary focus of political leaders has been to consolidate the victories, which has presented a potential risk to the system and institutions, while also fostering a climate conducive to patronage and corruption in politics. Zardari and his administration were primarily focused on enhancing their respective power dynamics. The individual garnered robust political backing from the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN) and other coalition allies in the process of ousting General Pervez Musharraf from his position of authority. Zardari used a Machiavellian approach to political strategy. The individual reneged on their commitment to restore the removed judges, whose actions had caused significant political turmoil, due to concerns that their reinstatement could potentially expose their involvement in corruption cases. The Army Chief, who expressed a commitment to upholding democratic principles, intervened and facilitated the resolution of a longstanding conflict between political parties and lawyers regarding the reinstatement of judges that had persisted for three years. This event was General Kayani's initial instance of political intervention. He effectively fulfilled his responsibility in mitigating the prevailing tension throughout the nation. The decision made by the individual in question was indicative of the prevailing sentiment among the general populace, which held the belief that the military should exert its influence over the governing body.

Zardari and his administration endeavored to consolidate their authority by implementing measures aimed at diminishing the influence wielded by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the military. The ongoing conflicts between the Zardari administration and the military have consistently demonstrated their respective institutional influence. The Zardari administration implemented the abolition of the National Security Council in order to diminish the military's influence, subsequently establishing the Defence Cabinet Committee as an alternative. However, it was observed that the Defence Cabinet Committee failed to achieve its intended objectives and proved to be inefficient. The group convened on two occasions subsequent to the Abbottabad raid and Salala check post incident carried out by the United States forces. The Zardari administration abolished the National Security Council in order to establish political dominance and grant the Parliament authority over the military establishment. However, the administration was unable to diminish the military's influence, as it retained residual power to shape national security matters and maintained its prerogative to guide the government in foreign policy affairs.

This study has provided evidence of a novel configuration of civil-military relations. Despite the presence of a democratic system, the military exerts significant influence over security and defense policies. In numerous respects, it aligns with the longstanding practice that originated in the 1950s. Since that time, the primary focus and concern of Pakistan's military has been national security. Military senior officers have consistently provided their expertise and insights on subjects pertaining to security and defense. The concept of establishing a National Security Council was put out by General Jahangir Karamat, a former Chief of Army Staff (COAS). However, this proposal faced rejection from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Sharif perceived his suggestion as a direct meddling in civilian affairs, leading to General Karamat's subsequent resignation in order to prevent any conflicts with the political leadership. The presence or absence of a National Security Council does not significantly impact the military's exercise of power over its traditional policy domains, namely national security, India, Kashmir, and the nuclear issue. Zardari endeavored to establish a state of normalcy in the diplomatic relations between Pakistan and India, driven by a distinct threat perception that diverged from that of the military establishment. The military command found Zardari's attitude towards India, as outlined in Chapter six, and his stance on nuclear policy, particularly the surrender of the first-strike option, to be untenable. However, Zardari was perceived as an untrustworthy leader, leading to a loss of confidence in him and his government by the military. Despite the military's disengagement from politics, it did not relinquish control over matters pertaining to defense, security, and foreign affairs to the Zardari regime. During interviews, certain army officials expressed their belief to the author that Zardari and his team exhibited incompetence, which potentially posed a threat to the security of the state. The military was compelled to closely monitor the actions of the government due to the potential implications for national interests. The Zardari administration demonstrated the military's apprehensions by consenting to the Kerry-Lugar Bill, which provided economic assistance to the government under certain conditions and curtailed the authority of military leaders. However, the military leadership withheld its approval until modifications were made to the bill's provisions. The military in Pakistan demonstrates a willingness to accept political changes when it perceives that its business interests will be safeguarded and the political government would prioritize national interests, as defined in a comprehensive manner that includes the military's concerns. Despite many positive developments, including as the restoration of

parliamentary democracy and the implementation of province autonomy through the 18th amendment, it might be argued that the Zardari administration has not been successful in fully establishing civilian supremacy in accordance with the principles outlined in the Charter of Democracy. The occurrence of economic, political, and social crises, as well as governance issues, has presented chances for military intervention. Nevertheless, the military shown restraint by refraining from executing a direct coup and instead allowed the PPP government to fulfill its constitutional term. In the year 2013, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) successfully executed a peaceful transition of power to another democratically elected administration, marking a significant milestone in the political history of the nation. The Pakistan Muslim League successfully established the government, resulting in the appointment of Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif advocated for the subordination of the military to civilian authorities in subjects pertaining to security and foreign affairs. The government undertook the initiative to restore trade links with India and Afghanistan due to the deteriorating state of the country's economy, which necessitated a cost-effective solution. In a similar vein, the PML-N government made the decision to initiate legal proceedings against the former president in a case pertaining to charges of treason. The military institution responded to these measures, particularly the Mushaf trial, resulting in an imbalance in civil-military ties. The military utilized recently emerged political forces as a means to undermine the legitimacy of the elected government through the implementation of Dharna politics. Imran Khan, the leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, along with Tahir ul Qadri, orchestrated a prolonged period of encirclement of the capital city, with the objective of pressuring Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to step down from his position. However, several political factions provided support to the elected administration, thereby conveying a resolute message to the anti-democratic entities. The government's inability to engage in negotiations with demonstrators has led to the intervention of the military, which has assumed an arbitrary role in mediating between the two major parties and the government. The military has created a view that politicians are inept and driven by a quest for power, while positioning itself as the sole institution that prioritizes the interests of Pakistan. Furthermore, in 2016, a noticeable division between the civilian and military sectors became apparent. This division was highlighted by the report of Cyril Almeda, a journalist from Dawn, who conveyed that the civilian authorities cautioned the military establishment about the

urgent need to combat all terrorist organizations. Failure to do so, it was warned, would result in the country facing international isolation. Additionally, it was mentioned that the Chief Minister of Punjab engaged in a heated exchange, alleging that intelligence agencies were releasing dangerous terrorists whenever they were apprehended by the civilian authorities. Nevertheless, the narrative was refuted, resulting in an erosion of trust between the civilian administration and the military institution. Following the aforementioned incident, the military initiated endeavors aimed at diminishing civilian authority and solidifying its position inside the decision-making process.

The government led by Nawaz Sharif was experiencing a series of crises, transitioning from one to another. Following the Dawn leaks crisis, the elected government was plagued by the Panama leaks. In addition to the military institution, the court also contributed to the destabilization of the political process by invoking Article 62 and 63 of the constitution to announce the disqualification of the Prime Minister. Once again, the Prime Minister has failed to serve the entirety of its constitutional term, despite the government successfully completing its tenure and facilitating the peaceful transfer of power to another duly elected government. The government that emerged following the 2018 election was characterized as a hybrid model in which the military exerted authority over governmental matters. The Prime Minister has recently presented a more approachable image to the public.

The aforementioned study indicates that the state of democracy in Pakistan remains precarious. Non-democratic entities continue to exert significant influence, posing a potential threat to the stability and integrity of democratic systems within a nation, capable of undermining or obstructing democratic processes at their discretion. Likewise, political entities have a strong desire for power. The individuals in question demonstrate a lack of sincerity in their efforts to develop a robust democratic system. Political parties lack substantive manifestos and instead rely on empty slogans. Intra-party elections are not conducted within political parties. The political landscape of Pakistan is predominantly characterized by the influence of feudal lords and commercial elites, who have secured their positions with the support of the military establishment. The interests of these privileged individuals are in direct opposition to the interests of the nation. The feudal class has a vested interest in maintaining a state of underdevelopment, illiteracy, dependency, and regressive conditions within the

country, since it allows them to maintain their dominant position in society. Industrialists and businessmen undergo specialized training to optimize their financial gains, and they perceive politics as a realm akin to conducting business operations. Individuals prioritize their personal interests over the national interest, displaying limited or no care for the issues faced by the general population. This scenario is conducive to the military, which holds substantial authority inside the Pakistani context.

The military's engagement in Pakistani politics is a multifaceted issue with deep historical origins. There exist other causes that have significantly contributed to military engagement. Initially, the direct dominance of the Pakistan military for a span of approximately 35 years allowed them to enjoy various benefits, perks, and legal immunity, thus impeding the progress of democracy. Furthermore, the matter of national security, particularly the subject of Kashmir and Afghanistan, prompts military intervention as it perceives itself as the protector of national security and opposes civilian interference in these matters. Thirdly, the primary factor driving military intervention in politics is the pursuit of economic interests, as it involves the establishment of a diverse business empire encompassing commercial enterprises and property ownerships. According to Ayesha Sadiqa, the Pakistan army exhibits involvement not just in political affairs, but also possesses significant influence in economic domains, encompassing business land ownership and industrial enterprises. The military's establishment restricts the flourishing of democracy in the country due to concerns that a robust democratic system could potentially destabilize its economic empire.

The prevailing political instability is exerting pressure on Pakistan, potentially leading it towards a state of failure. The persistent experimentation conducted by non-democratic entities within the political system has had a significant detrimental impact on the political and democratic culture. The absence of a robust democratic system hinders progress and the ability to effectively compete on a global scale. It is imperative for the military to acknowledge and embrace the constitutional mandate that assigns them the responsibility of safeguarding the security of the state. Hence, it is crucial for the military to acknowledge and embrace the subordinate position assigned to it by the constitution, allowing political forces to govern the nation's political affairs.

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