

# **Decline of Awami National Party from Mainstream Politics (2013-2018): Causes and Consequences**

**M. Phil Thesis**



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## CERTIFICATE

This dissertation submitted by **Mr. Shah Sawar Khan** entitled: **“Decline of Awami Nationl Party from Mainstream Politics (2013-2018): Causes and Consequences** is accepted in this present form by National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid I Azam University Islamabad for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Pakistan Studies.

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### AUTHER'S DECLARATION

I **Mr. Shah Sawar Khan** hereby declare that my M.Phil. thesis titled "**Decline of Awami National Party from Mainstream Politics (2013-2018): Causes and Consequences**" is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for any other degree from Quaid-i-Azam University or from anywhere else.

At any time if my statement is found incorrect even after the receiving of M. Phil degree, the University has the right to cancel my degree.

Shah Sawar Khan

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## **Dedication**

*This Research is dedicated to my Father*

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

NAP:	National Awami Party
ANP:	Awami National Party
ECP:	Election Commission of Pakistan
PPP:	Pakistan People's Party
MMA:	Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
MRD:	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
IJI:	Islami Jamhuri Ittehad
PML-N:	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PML-Q:	Pakistan Muslim League Quaid -i-Azam
PTI:	Pakistan Tehrik Insaf

## Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	9
1.2. Problem Identification.....	11
1.3. Research Questions.....	12
1.4. Review Existing Literature.....	12
1.5. Research Objectives.....	15
1.6. Methodology.....	16
1.7. Chapterisation of the Study.....	17
1.8. Expected Contribution:.....	17
1.9. Theory to be considered during this Research.....	17
CHAPTER NO: 01: HISTORICAL OUTLOOK OF ANP.....	19
2.1. Overview of the ANP's History and Political Significance.....	19
2.2. Historical Background.....	21
2.3. Reasons for the Emergence of Regional Political Parties.....	22
2.3.1. The fall of All India Muslim League after the Creation of Pakistan.....	22
2.3.3. Factors in the Literature Regarding Political Party Decline.....	27
CHAPTER NO. 02: CAUSES OF ANP'S DECLINE FROM MAINSTREAM POLITICS (2013-2018).....	29
The Historical Significance of ANP in Mainstream Politics.....	29
3.1. Wahhabism, Talibanisation and ANP's Ideological Standings.....	30
3.2. The Contribution and Legacy of Ibn Taymiyyah.....	32
3.4. Manipulating Pashtunwali Code: Exploiting the Code for Personal Agendas.....	33
3.5. Gaining Insight into the Taliban through the Lens of Pashtunwali Ethical Values.....	36
3.7. ANP Government in KP.....	44
3.7.1. Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal's Government in KP.....	46
3.8. 2008 General Elections: ANP's Electoral Manifesto.....	48
3.9. The ANP's Domination in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.....	50
3.10. Obstacles in the ANP Manifesto's Implementation during its Ruling Tenure.....	51
3.10.1. Terrorism: The Primary Obstacle to ANP Success.....	51
3.10.2. Growth of Political Islam in the Province: An Additional Barrier to ANP.....	52
3.10.3. The 18th Amendment and the Proposal to Establish Hazara Province.....	54
3.21. The Importance of the 2013 Elections.....	60
3.21.10. Results of the 2013 General Election Analysis: National Assembly.....	69

3.21.12. Government's Establishment under the General Election results of 2013 .....	75
3.23. Internal factors contributing to the decline of the Awami National Party.....	78
3.40. External factors influencing the Decline of ANP .....	82
<b>CHAPTER NO 03: CONSEQUENCES OF ANP DECLINE FROM MAINSTREAM POLITICS .</b>	<b>89</b>
4.1. Consequences of ANP's Decline: Analyzing Political Dynamics.....	89
4.2. Implications of ANP's Exclusion: A Political Analysis.....	90
4.3. Politics in Pakistan: Parties, Governance, and Coalitions .....	91
4.4. Impact of ANP's Decline on Democracy .....	93
4.5. ANP's Decline: Threats to Democratic Values.....	94
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>99</b>



## INTRODUCTION

Awami National Party (ANP) is one of the significant political party in Pakistan. ANP, also known as the *People's National Party* in Pashtun, is a leftist, secularist and nationalist political party in Pakistan. In Urdu, it is known as “*Awami National Party*” (Lavoy, 2009). It was established by Abdul Wali Khan in 1986, the party current president is Asfandyar Wali Khan, the grandson of Bacha Khan, and its current Secretary-General is Mian Iftikhar Hussain. As a member of the Pakistani government's PPP-led cabinet from 2008 to 2013, the ANP is known for its left-wing policies and supports social equality, public sector governance, and secularism (Sappenfield, 2008). Between 2008 and 2013, ANP was the most influential Pashtun nationalist party in Pakistan, having a stronghold in the Pashtun-majority regions of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP). They had power over the province of KP from 2008 to 2013, however they were defeated by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in the 2013 assembly election.

However, in recent years, the party has experienced a decline in its political influence and support (Dalrymple, 2013). ANP is a prominent political party in the country with a rich history and strong political force in the country's northwestern region, particularly KP and some areas of Baluchistan. The ANP has played a significant role in championing the rights of the Pashtun community and advocating for democratic principles and social justice (Safi Ullah Khan Marwat, 2022). This research aims to explore the causes behind the decline of the ANP from mainstream politics and examine its consequences on the party and the overall political landscape of Pakistan. The ANP traces its roots back to the National Awami Party (NAP), which was founded in the 1950s by Pashtun leaders such as Abdul Wali Khan and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, popularly known as Bacha Khan. The party aimed to represent the interests of Pashtuns and other marginalized communities in Pakistan and fight for their rights within the framework of a democratic system.

Throughout its existence, the ANP has remained steadfast in its commitment to Pashtun nationalism, secularism, and progressive ideals (Quraish, 2018). It has consistently advocated for the protection of ethnic and linguistic rights, as well as socio-economic development in the regions it represents. The party's strong stance against religious extremism and terrorism has also been a defining characteristic (Hussain K. , 2013). The ANP's stronghold lies in the Pashtun-majority areas of KP, where it has consistently won seats in the provincial assembly and played a significant role in shaping the region's governance. Its leaders, such as Wali Khan and his son Asfandyar Wali

Khan, have been influential figures in Pakistani politics, known for their unwavering commitment to democratic values and social progress.

One of the key objectives of the ANP has been the empowerment of marginalized communities and the promotion of social justice (Bukhari, 2007). The party has championed causes such as land reforms, labor rights, and access to education and healthcare (Manifesto, 2018). It has worked to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, advocating for policies that uplift the disadvantaged segments of society and provide them with equal opportunities (Manifesto, 2018).

In addition to its focus on social justice, the ANP has consistently spoken out against religious extremism and terrorism (APP, 2012). Pashtuns have been disproportionately affected by militancy and violence in the region, and the ANP has been at the forefront of efforts to combat these threats (Khan A. U., 2005). Its leaders and workers have shown great courage and resilience in the face of targeted attacks by extremist groups (Dalrymple, 2013). The ANP has faced numerous challenges over the years, including violence, electoral setbacks, and internal divisions. The party's leaders and activists have been targeted by militant groups, resulting in the loss of many lives. Despite these hardships, the ANP has remained committed to its principles and has continued to work for the betterment of the Pashtun community and the country (Shehla Gul, 2022).

In recent years, the ANP has expanded its political outreach beyond its traditional base. It has actively participated in national politics and formed alliances with other progressive parties to promote democratic values and counter the influence of religious extremism. In addition, PPP's coalition partner in the NWFP (now KP (Majlish-e-Shoora, 2010) is the ANP, which was headed into conflict with Z. A. Bhutto in the mid-1970s (Rais, 1989). The party has also been vocal on issues such as human rights, freedom of speech, and regional stability (Manifesto, 2018). As Pakistan's political landscape continues to evolve, the ANP faces both opportunities and challenges. It has been an integral part of the struggle for democracy and has contributed significantly to the political discourse in the country. However, it must navigate the changing dynamics of Pakistani politics and address the concerns of a diverse electorate to maintain its relevance and influence. With its commitment to social justice, secularism, and progress, the party has emerged as a significant political force in the country's northwestern regions. While facing numerous challenges, the ANP continues to strive for a more inclusive and equitable Pakistan (Asfandyar, 2012).

The origin of Wahhabism has been analyzed in chapter three for the purpose to understand the origin of the Talibanisation in Pakistan. The Wahhabism is an Islamic doctrine started by Ibn Wahab in Arabian Peninsula. It is, as per the explanations of Wabbhism scholars, purification of Islam from un-Islamic activities and imposing the true Islam which was performed during the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H). Similarly, the Pashtunwali code and the political stances of ANP are on the focus during this research to find out ideological foundations of ANP and compare it with current developments in Pakistan.

The Awami National Party (ANP) has historically been a strong force in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but it faced defeat in the 2013 general elections when the relatively new Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) won elections. (ECP, Election Commission of Pakistan, 2023). Although the ANP has a significant following in other areas of Peshawar and KP, it has never formed an independent government in the province, despite marketing itself as a Pashtun political party. KP is a challenging province to govern, with a tendency for people to change rulers in each general election (Election results of 2008, 2013, and 2018) (Pakistan E. C., 2023). The ANP claims to follow the legacy of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and advocates for Pashtun nationalism and the rights of the oppressed (Shah H. , 2019). The party faced security challenges from the Taliban (Dawn.com, 2012) and criticism for alleged corruption (the proof of this is the plea bargain of Memoon Shah with NAB in a corruption case) (Ali F. , 2016) and its relations with India and Afghanistan. ANP leaders attribute the party's losses to rigged elections, security threats, and the demands they made for Pashtun rights. They assert that their opposition to the Cold War and their leaders being targeted by militants demonstrate their patriotism.

## **1.2. Problem Identification**

The decline of the Awami National Party (ANP) from mainstream politics in Pakistan between 2013 and 2018 presents a significant problem that warrants investigation. Despite its historical significance and previous electoral successes, the ANP experienced a notable decline during this period, resulting in a loss of influence and representation. Understanding the causes and consequences of this decline is crucial for comprehending the evolving political landscape in Pakistan and the challenges faced by ethno-nationalist parties. This study aims to address the gap in existing research by examining the factors that contributed to the ANP's decline, including security challenges, internal party dynamics, electoral setbacks, and changing voter preferences.

Additionally, it seeks to explore the consequences of the ANP's decline in terms of regional representation, the Pashtun community's interests, and the broader implications for ethnic-nationalist movements. By uncovering the causes and consequences of the ANP's decline, this research will provide valuable insights into the dynamics of mainstream politics in Pakistan and contribute to a broader understanding of the challenges faced by ethno-nationalist parties in a complex and evolving political environment.

### **1.3. Research Questions**

This research thesis is based on two main questions:

1. What factors have contributed to the decline of the Awami National Party (ANP) from mainstream politics in Pakistan (2013-2018)?
2. What are the consequences of the ANP's decline on the overall political landscape of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Pakistan?

### **1.4. Review Existing Literature**

To conduct a study on the decline of the Awami National Party (ANP) from mainstream politics, extensive research has been conducted using relevant literature. The literature review delves into the establishment of NAP, its political agenda, activities within electoral politics, rhetoric concerning foreign policy, ideological inclinations, and interactions with various political stakeholders. While there have been studies on political and constitutional development, opposition politics, political parties, and the role of bureaucracy and the military, limited scholarly work has focused specifically on the NAP's decline in the political system of Pakistan. This study intends to close this knowledge gap by offering insights into the NAP's inception, formation, and direction as well as its demise from mainstream politics. The researcher will concentrate on the causes and consequences of the NAP's fall. Party literature, meeting minutes, resolutions, brochures, political agendas, manifestos, and the NAP constitution are among the primary documents that were studied. Government data, police and intelligence files, and works of NAP leaders such as Abdul Ghaffar Khan are also included. (Ghaffar, 1983), Ghulam Murtaza Syed (Sayed, 2003), Abdul Wali Khan (Khan K. A., 1994), and others have been examined. Court hirings, official records, and White Papers published during various times have also provided valuable first-hand information. Secondary materials, such as Khalid bin Sayeed's work (Saeed, 1967) and Lawrence Ziring's book (Ziring L. , 1980) on Pakistani politics, have supplemented the

primary sources. Unfortunately, without exploring the underlying processes, the majority of secondary sources just briefly mention significant facets of the political orientation of the NAP. Rafique Afzal's three-volume book on Pakistani political parties, in particular, goes into great detail about the NAP's origins (Afzal R. , 1984), role, and alliance politics, while K. K. Aziz's study on party politics during the early years of Pakistan sheds light on important themes related to the NAP (Aziz, 2007). Despite various books on political developments in Pakistan, there is a lack of dedicated research solely focused on the decline of the NAP from mainstream politics. Newspapers, periodicals, magazines, biographies, and unpublished sources also play a significant role in understanding the NAP's political approach, actions, presence, and leadership in the general public and in civic society.

Ahmed Naeem's "Ethnicity, Political Parties, and Democracy in Pakistan: A Case Study of the Awami National Party" examines the ANP's decline in the context of ethnic politics and its impact on democracy in Pakistan. It analyzes the party's electoral performance, the challenges faced, and the consequences of its decline. "Electoral Decline of Awami National Party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: An Analysis" by Rahimdad Khan explores the electoral decline of the ANP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It analyzes the factors contributing to the party's loss of support, such as security challenges, leadership issues, and ideological shifts. Similarly, Shahid Qayyum Afridi wrote an article named "Pashtun Nationalism and the Ethnic Politics of Pakistan" in which he provides insights into the ANP's historical role in Pashtun nationalism and its involvement in ethnic politics in Pakistan. While it predates the specified timeframe, it offers valuable background information on the party.

Research work by Mujahid Hussain and Ayaz Khan in "Rising Nationalism in Pakistan as a Tool of Public Administration" examines Pakistan's growing nationalism and how public administration might make use of it. The paper evaluates the changing trend of nationalism in Pakistan and presents evidence to support the claim that Pakistani nationalism is on the rise. After conducting a field study to investigate the evolving trend of nationalism, the author discovered a favourable correlation between rising nationalism and awareness and education levels. The paper suggests that administrators and managers can use nationalism as a tool to build commitment among their employees and subordinates. The author argues that nationalism can be used to improve overall governance in the country and control corruption, nepotism, dishonesty, and inefficiency. The

article also covers the urgently needed topics of weak governance and corruption, disenchanted citizens, and a young population with limited economic opportunities. The author suggests that Pakistan produce a new generation of leaders who are able to articulate the fundamentals of the state during times of crisis and who are also better equipped to protect the interests of the people, based on unflinching respect for various state institutions. In summary, the study offers a thorough examination of Pakistan's growing nationalism and its potential applications in public administration. It offers suggestions for enhancing nationalism and national governance. On the other hand, regional nationalisms such as Pashtun, Sindhi, Baluchi, Saraiki, Punjabi, and others are declining as a result of the rise in Pakistani nationalism.

In the August Report of 2018, "Political Cost ANP Paid in Its Fight against Extremists" Khalid Hussain gave an insight into ANP policies against Extremism. This article's primary focus is the political price the Awami National Party (ANP) had to pay in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, for opposing radicals. The article provides a detailed analysis of the ANP's policies and plans during its five-year rule in the province, and how it took a stern stand against militants to contain their growing social control and terrorist acts. The article highlights the challenges and risks faced by the ANP's leadership and cadre in confronting extremist and terrorist organizations, including negative propaganda, security threats, and lack of resources. In addition, the essay revisits the concepts of colonial powers and indigenous people in the current crisis and explores the Pashtun society's fight to advance modern principles and overcome traditional beliefs. Overall, the article aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the ANP's counterterrorism policy and its impact on the wider region beyond Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

K.K Aziz's "Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-2018," although slightly beyond the specified timeframe, this book offers an overview of party politics in Pakistan, including the ANP's decline and its implications for the country's political landscape. In Addition, Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah in his research work "Ethnicity and Identity in Pakistan: The 2013 Elections in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa" primarily focuses on the 2013 elections, this book discusses the ANP's decline in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and its implications for ethnic identity and politics in the region.

The research articles and books mentioned above provide valuable insights into the decline of the Awami National Party from mainstream politics between 2000 and 2018. This data shed light on factors such as ethnic politics, electoral challenges, security concerns, leadership issues, and

ideological shifts that contributed to the party's diminishing influence. However, there is a noticeable gap in research specifically focusing on the ANP's decline during this period. Further investigation is needed to explore the specific causes, consequences, and contextual dynamics surrounding the ANP's decline, including a more comprehensive analysis of electoral setbacks, changing voter preferences, and the party's evolving relationship with other political stakeholders. Moreover, examining the long-term implications of the ANP's decline in regional representation, the Pashtun community's interests, and the broader political landscape of Pakistan would further enrich the literature on this subject.

### **1.5. Research Objectives**

The research embarks on a comprehensive exploration of the factors contributing to the decline of the Awami National Party (ANP) from the realm of mainstream politics, while also delving into the ensuing repercussions. The primary objective is to meticulously analyze and identify the underlying causes that have led to ANP's diminishing prominence in the political landscape. This entails a critical examination of internal party dynamics, shifts in electoral strategies, changing public perceptions, and potential leadership challenges. Additionally, the study aims to unravel the multifaceted consequences of ANP's decline, both at the party's internal level and within the broader political context. This includes an assessment of ANP's role in shaping regional politics, its impact on ethnic and regional identities, and potential implications for the democratic process in the region. By systematically investigating the causal factors and ramifications of ANP's diminishing influence, this research endeavors to offer a comprehensive understanding of the intricate interplay between party dynamics, societal changes, and the evolving political landscape. In categories, we can divide the key research objectives as follows: The main goal of this study is to find out everything about what happened in Pakistan from 2013 to 2018 that caused the Awami National Party (ANP) to lose power. It looks into the changes in leadership, factionalism, and party structure that happen within the party and how they affect the ANP's decline. The study also wants to look at how outside factors, like political alliances, security problems, and the way elections work, affect the party's falling popularity. The study will look into changes in the ANP's beliefs and what they mean. It will also look at how regional and racial dynamics, especially in the Pashtun community, affect things. It also wants to find out how the fall of the ANP affects the way Pashtun interests are represented in mainstream politics. It will also look at the bigger effects on democracy and government in Pakistan. The study will look at the problems the ANP had during this time and

how they affected their performance in the elections. It will also look at how the media and public opinion affected the decline. In the end, the study wants to give the ANP and other political parties' advice on how to deal with the causes and effects of decline, with a focus on gaining back party support and becoming politically relevant again.

It is important to note that the research objectives can be further refined and tailored to specific research interests and available data.

## **1.6. Methodology**

In order to thoroughly examine the reasons and effects of the Awami National Party's (ANP) fall from mainstream politics between 2013 and 2018, a mixed-methods approach will be used in the research methodology. First, a historical study will be carried out in order to identify the major events and changes that may have contributed to the decline of ANP and to outline the contextual circumstances that led to its dominance in the political landscape. We'll use quantitative techniques, such statistical analysis of election outcomes, to evaluate ANP's electoral performance during the given period of time. Comprehensive interviews including prominent party officials, political analysts, and specialists will be carried out to obtain qualitative perspectives on the internal and external elements impacting the downturn.

This research will employ a mixed-methods approach to achieve its objectives. The study will involve the following steps:

**a) Literature Review:** Conduct an extensive review of academic literature, books, articles, and reports related to the ANP, Pakistani politics, and regional dynamics.

**b) Data Collection:** Utilize both qualitative and quantitative methods to gather relevant data, including interviews with party members, experts, and political analysts, as well as surveying ANP's voters and supporters.

**c) Data Analysis:** Employ content analysis for qualitative data and statistical analysis for quantitative data, using appropriate software and techniques.

**d) Comparative Analysis:** Compare the ANP's decline with other political parties in Pakistan to identify similarities and differences in their experiences.



## **1.7. Chapterisation of the Study**

Here's a suggested breakdown of the chapters for this research proposal on the decline of the Awami National Party (ANP) from mainstream politics in Pakistan between 2013 and 2018:

1. Historical outlook of ANP
2. Causes of the ANP's Decline
3. Consequences of the ANP's Decline

## **1.8. Expected Contribution:**

This study aims to provide valuable insights into the factors contributing to the decline of the ANP from mainstream politics from 2013 to 2018. By examining the consequences of this decline, the research will shed light on the broader implications for the political landscape of Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

## **1.9. Theory to be considered during this Research**

### **Rational Choice Theory:**

The notion of rational choice theory holds significant importance in the field of social work as it provides a framework for understanding the decision-making processes of individuals. Rational choice theory posits that the process of decision-making involves a deliberate evaluation of the associated costs, risks, and benefits before selecting an option. The perception of irrationality in choices can vary among individuals since what may appear illogical to one person may be very reasonable to another, contingent upon their personal preferences.

Individuals pursuing a social work degree will acquire a diverse range of evidence-based theories that can be utilized to inform their professional practice. Acquiring knowledge and comprehending the underlying significance of rational choice theory, as well as examining instances that exemplify this theory, can assist prospective social workers in effectively characterizing, elucidating, and predicting social outcomes. It is possible that this may improve the standard of care and services provided to its customers.

There is a lengthy history of the rational choice theory. The philosopher Adam Smith is credited with creating the idea of rational choice. In "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," published in 1776, he advanced the thesis that riches originated from the natural

tendency towards self-interest in human nature. "The invisible hand" is the term Smith uses to describe the unseen forces that govern the free market.

Thomas Hobbes' philosophical book "Leviathan" (1651) served as an inspiration for Smith's writing. In "Leviathan," Hobbes made the case that political institutions' ability to function was influenced by the choices people made. Concepts from rational choice theory were also incorporated into the writings of Niccol Machiavelli, the philosopher, who wrote "The Prince" in 1513.

Bringing rational choice theory regarding social commerce from economics to the social sciences, sociologists George C. Homans, Peter Blau, and James Coleman did so in the 1950s and 1960s. These social theorists maintained that the trade-off between costs and benefits rationally determines social behaviour. The rational choice hypothesis in social interactions explains why people start or end relationships, both individually and in groups.

### **1.10. Applicability to this Research Work**

Rational Choice Theory posits that political actors, including parties, make decisions based on self-interest and attempt to maximize their utility. In the context of the ANP's decline, this theory can be used to explore how the party's strategic decisions, including policy positions, coalition formations, and leadership choices, might have affected its political fortunes.

## **CHAPTER NO: 01: HISTORICAL OUTLOOK OF ANP**

### **2.1. Overview of the ANP's History and Political Significance**

Pakistan is a country of 249,566,743 (ECP 2. , 2023) population having a federal structure of government. There is a parliamentary democracy in Pakistan which was inherited by the British Raj which took administrative control from the Mughals. The National Assembly and the Senate are the two houses that make up the legislative system (Constitution, 1973). There are 104 seats in the Senate and 342 seats in the National Assembly, which are occupied by various political parties based on the number of seats they secured in the general elections (Seats distribution for 2013 General Elections, 2013). To participate in elections, a party must register its name with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) (ECP, 2023). Chief Ministers (CMs) are the elected leaders of each province and the head of the house (in the National Assembly) for the party or parties that formed the government. The prime minister's chair is located in central government, whereas the chairs of the CMs are located in each province. Together, they control nearly all of the state's executive authorities. From now on, it is evident that political parties play a bigger role in managing the government of a democratic state.

Before going to discuss ANP's history, it is necessary to familiarize ourselves with different types of political parties. Political parties can be classified into several types based on their ideological orientations, scope, and objectives. First, we have ideological parties, which are founded on specific beliefs and principles, such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism, or environmentalism. These parties advocate for policies aligned with their core ideologies and seek to attract supporters who share similar values (Mehmood, 2020). Second, there are catch-all or big-tent parties, which aim to appeal to a broad spectrum of voters by adopting a more pragmatic and flexible approach. These parties often focus on winning elections and forming governments, and their platforms may encompass a wide range of policy positions to accommodate diverse voter preferences (Mehmood, 2020). Third, regional or ethnocultural parties represent the interests of specific geographic areas or particular ethnic or cultural groups within a larger nation. They often seek to address regional grievances and promote the unique identity of their constituents. Fourth, single-issue parties concentrate on advocating for one specific policy area or cause, such as environmental protection, animal rights, or anti-corruption measures. Moreover, we have revolutionary or radical parties that

aim to fundamentally transform the political and social system. These parties typically challenge the existing order and advocate for significant structural changes in society. Similarly, a king party is one which switches a military rule to a civilian government. Pakistan Muslim League (Convention) of Ayub Khan (Afzal M. R., 1986) and Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid) of Musharaf are examples of king parties in the Pakistani context. The next type is the dynastic party which becomes a family line, not transferred to any other person is called dynastic party. Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), PML (N), and ANP are in the current situation are dynastic parties in Pakistan as these parties had nominal intra-party elections. Besides, regional parties focus on their demands instead of national issues and threats to national parties for not fulfilling their demands (Afzal M. R., 1986). Each type of political party plays a distinct role in the democratic process, reflecting the diverse aspirations and concerns of the electorate.

It is a natural process in human beings to make associations. These associations touch on social, economic, and political facets of daily life. A political party is a group of organized individuals who have come together to advance particular political objectives by certain shared values. It bears societal expectations and ideologies. It serves as a bridge between the populace and institutions that are elected to represent them. Political parties are regarded as a requirement for a democratic type of administration. For open, competitive, and representational politics, particularly in developing democracies, strong political parties are necessary. (Johnston, 2005) They have a grassroots impact on political life (Janoski, 2010). According to the sociological-cum-institutional perspective "the penetration of the state by some non-state actors provides political stability (Kavin T. Leicht, 2010)." They raise people's awareness of public concerns and activate them. By expressing interests at both the local and national levels and providing choices for better representation based on their programmes, the political party system helps to close the gap between local and national interests (Party Manifestos). In a heterogeneous society, a political party that has been founded at the national level effectively serves as the agent of national integration. But to accomplish that, it must first become established at the local level in more populous regions of the nation.

There are several political parties that, in contrast to national political parties, have little power at the federal level. Their actions and sphere of influence are restricted to a specific area or the provinces. Working in one area, they may only represent the interests of that community. For

example, Indian regional parties only run for office in one state (province), but they occasionally labour in neighbouring states with comparable cultures. “Defending the interests of a certain region or ethnicity, or both,” is the primary goal of every regional and ethnic party” (Kopecek, 2010) Stramiska asserts that regional parties have their own distinct ideology, programmes, organisational identities, and means of political standing and voter mobilisation (Stramiska, 2003).” Stramiska feels that the same description can be applied to an ethnic political party, with the caveat that in this case, the source and identity are of an ethnic rather than a geographical origin (Stramiska, 2005). Regional parties are generally ethnic, however there might be some exceptions to this pattern (Kopecek, 2010). The Pakhtun interests are simultaneously represented in multiple regions by the ANP, which is an ethnic-regional party that only works in one specific area i.e. KP and some areas of Baluchistan.

In an attempt to get support from the local population, some parties choose to back regional, provincial, or ethnic concerns that are the root of unrest and poverty in certain areas. Without obstructing the achievement of national goals, these parties can work cooperatively with major parties to address their regional concerns. “regional parties with an eye towards national outlook” is how these parties characterise themselves (Gassah, 1992). Leaders in the region have stated that provincial parties that have supported the dreams and ambitions of their constituents have the right to rule in the future (Patnaik, 1970). Nevertheless, regional parties frequently sacrifice national goals and stability in the politics of the nation to advance the local, racial, and economic interests of a certain region.

## **2.2. Historical Background**

Before gaining independence in 1947, all political parties with regional interests were present in the areas that would later become part of Pakistan, except for those that operated on an all-Indian basis, such as the A.I.M.L. and A.I.N.C. While some of these parties were non-communal, many of them were Muslim political parties because these were regions with a majority of Muslims. In addition to one party each in former NWFP, Baluchistan, and Sindh, Punjab has three Muslim political parties operating there. The Sindh province in Punjab was administered by the Nationalist Unionist Party, the Khaksar Organisation, Khudai Khidmatgar in the NWFP, Anjuman-i-Watan in Baluchistan, and the Sindh Hari Committee. None of these regional political groups favoured the

religious division of India, despite the fact that they all made substantial contributions to the struggle for independence.

In the post-independence era, a shaky democracy was established without general elections, allowing for internal loyalty swings within the ruling Muslim League and palace intrigues. Pakistan became a military oligarchy as a result. Among the purported reasons of centrifugal tendencies were the overemphasis on political centralization and the denial of ethnic and regional identities. Regional political parties were able to flourish in the absence of strong national political parties. Pakistan's separation in 1971 was largely due to the Awami League, which only supports Bengali language politics and won the first round of general elections in 1970 (Khan D. W., 2018). The politicisation of identities resulted from additional socioeconomic challenges and resource constraints in the lack of a true representative system, which in turn influenced the direction of ethnicity formations. The causes of the rise of regional political parties are explored in the next section.

### **2.3. Reasons for the Emergence of Regional Political Parties**

#### **2.3.1. The fall of All India Muslim League after the Creation of Pakistan**

The Democratic Workers' Convention was held in Dakka on 25 July, 1957 where Awami National Party was founded. The new party was officially announced two days later of its foundation on 27 July, 1957. Prior to this, in 1949, the All-Pakistan Awami Muslim League was founded in Dhaka, the capital of East Bengal, by Yar Mohammad Khan, Shawkat Ali, and Shamsul Huq, Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani (Rashiduzzaman, 1970). Hussain S. Suhrawardy later joined the group. In order to challenge the Muslim League's predominance and excessive centralization of power in Pakistan, the Bengali community founded the Pakistan Awami Muslim League. After gaining the support of a significant section of the general public in East Bengal (later renamed as East Pakistan), the party eventually emerged as the front-runner among Bengali nationalist factions in their struggle against the political and military establishment of West Pakistan. The primary reason behind the establishment of the National Awami Party was the significant disagreement that surfaced inside the Awami League between Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and Prime Minister Hussain S. Suhrawardy. Leftists and regionalists such as Abdul Hamid Bhashani, Ali Ahad in East Pakistan, Mahmud Ali Qasuri and Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din in Punjab, Afzal Bangash and Abdul Ghaffar Khan

in the NWFP<sup>1</sup>, and Professor Muzaffar Ahmad comprised the NAP's leadership, and the other leaders were Hyder Bakhsh Jatoi and G. M. Syed, Kaswar Gardezi in Sindh, Ghaus Bakhs, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo in Baluchistan, Prince Abdul Karim, and Abdus Samad Achakzai. Enhanced crucial fact was that the NAP's role contained a sizable number of communists. This style of leadership in Pakistan has consistently been the target of right-wing political parties and civil-military bureaucracy. Because of their track record, political stance, relationships, and inclinations toward some foreign nations, they were sometimes viewed with distrust. Some of them had regionalist sympathies and opposed the establishment of Pakistan (Dryland, 1992); several leftist leaders were connected to the Conspiracy Case of Rawalpindi (1951).

Rawalpindi Conspiracy was a coup attempt against Liaquat Ali Khan who was right hand of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and first Prime Minister of Pakistan. The plot was the initial in a series of successful coup attempts against elected governments in Pakistani history. The coup was orchestrated by a number of communist and left-wing Pakistani politicians, Major General Akbar Khan, a well-known commander in the Pakistani army, and a few other dissident army men. Sajjad Zahir, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, and other Pakistan Communist Party members were among these politicians. Later in 1957, a few of these activists and political figures joined the NAP. (Dryland, 1992).

As a result, the Pakistani establishment had doubts about their patriotism. The subsequent rulers frequently questioned their allegiance to the Pakistani state. They were demonized as foreign agents who received funding from nations like Russia, India, Afghanistan, and others while serving the interests of adversarial nations.

The NAP, which purportedly ran on a progressive agenda, rose to prominence in politics soon after its founding. It was one of the Country's intricate political groups because of the popularity of its ideology and the dedication of its members. The NAP's popular front was so extensive and well-integrated from the very beginning that it quickly included every major political party in the country. Of the federal and provincial legislatures of 1957–1958, it contested the Republican Party's and the Muslim League's political dominance. The NAP's organizational strength, according to Lawrence Ziring, “frightened the very centers of state power (Ziring L. , 2006).” It

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<sup>1</sup> NWPF was the old name of KPK which was changed through an amendment in the 1973 Constitution in 2010. As the study time period is after the said amendment, thus I will use KPK instead of NWFP in my research work.

was the sole political cover available to socialist and communist leaders in West Pakistan prior to the formation of the Pakistan Peoples Party. (November 1967). The leadership of the party was highly outspoken in opposing the internal and foreign policies of Pakistan's successive administrations, particularly in opposition to Pakistan's leanings toward the Cold War bloc in the West.

For pro-American civil-military elite in Pakistan, the formation of the NAP with the political clout of all such ethnic factions pursuing an openly communist ideology was a source of considerable worry. Additionally, it opened up to the powerful capitalist bloc led by the United States of America with its pro-socialist stance and progressive outlook on international affairs. When it came to denouncing American misdeeds and meddling in developing nations around the world, NAP leaders were typically at the fore. Because of ideological conflicts, it frequently took a position that was anti-imperial but also backed the governments and foreign and domestic policies of China and the Soviet Union. It is clear from reading some of the party material that communist and socialist forces came together to establish a strong and articulate organisation that is a part of NAP, thereby making it the country's sole leftist party. The political goals of the party and the party constitution were mostly drafted by communists. To ingest all the leftist components, socialist and regionalist ideological and political goals were united. All of these political operatives who supported Bhashani in East Pakistan were attracted by NAP. In comparison to West Pakistan, the eastern part of the country produced more skilled communist laborers who had the support of the general populace, students, workers, and peasants. For progressive employees in the western wing, things were different. In West Pakistan, leftist politics and socialist movements have a shaky history, and the majority of their participants are influenced by regionalist and ethno-nationalist ideologies with only a faint socialist undercurrent. Following the declaration of martial law in October 1958, the NAP workers and Marxist forces came under intense attack. Compared to other political groups, the NAP's leaders experienced the most hardship. Ayub Khan was specifically opposed to both its political platform and the organization's sizable communist presence. The Pakistan Public Safety Act was used to arrest the majority of its leaders because of their prior participation in anti-state activities. Authorities enforcing martial control viewed the NAP as a potent political force with a solid political foundation and the ability to organize resistance. It was mainly feared that because of its power, it would be able to win the majority of the populace's support sooner and more effectively than other political parties. Because of this, the majority of



progressive writers and leftist politicians associated the declaration of martial law with the NAP's growing support. Its political might alarmed both the capitalist bloc and the civil-military establishment.

It was widely believed that NAP would win the most seats possible in the elections scheduled for 1958–1959, allowing it to either form a coalition government or grow into a potent opposition force. The fight against Ayub Khan was started by NAP leaders, who also took the initiative in the 1964–1965 presidential elections. The NAP leadership was also responsible for suggesting Fatima Jinnah as a candidate for president to bring all of the opposition parties together under a common platform (Dr. Azmat Ullah, 2022). However, there were ideological and policy implementation disputes among the party's leadership regarding how to accomplish the party's political goals. The party's organizational structure was more reliant on the communists' supporters on an ideological level. For this reason, the NAP also saw a split into two distinct political parties along with the WCM's break between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The way the socialist program of the party was put into practice led to its division. The post-1965 environment also created political and organizational conflicts among the party leadership on the foreign front. The key point of contention was Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani's cordial treatment of Ayub Khan's military regime (Syed, 2008).

Consequently, the procedure resulted in the establishment of two distinct NAP's in 1968. In Pakistan's political history, both factions were designated as pro-Beijing and pro-Moscow, implying their inclination towards one another. NAP (Wali) and NAP (Bhashani), which were created after the names of their respective leaders, Abdul Wali Khan and Abdul Hamid Bhashani, were other colloquial phrases that the writers regularly used to distinguish between the two factions. (Syed, 2008).

In the 1990 elections, the Pakhtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and northern Baluchistan provided the political foundation for the Awami National Party (Awami meaning people). The party gained six seats in the National Assembly. The party was able to secure three seats in the National Assembly at the 1993 national elections. In 1986 the Awami National Party was formed by the merger of several left-wing organisations, including as the Awami Tehrik and the National Democratic Party. (Hussain K. , 2013). Its inaugural leader was Khan Abdul Wali Khan. His legacy of fervent Pakhtun nationalism served as the foundation for Wali Khan's political career. After the

partition, both men were put in prison because they opposed the foundation of Pakistan (Hussain K. , 2013). In 1956, Wali Khan became a member of the National Awami Party (NAP). The NAP was headed by charismatic socialist Bengali leader Maulana Bhashani. The NAP was divided into two sections in 1965, with Wali Khan rising to the presidency of the Moscow-supporting party (Himmatullah, 2015). JUI and the party joined forces in 1972 to create coalition provincial governments in the province of Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P. These governments did not last long. When the Supreme Court confirmed Bhutto's conclusion that the party was working anti-Pakistan, Wali Khan was put in jail once more, and his party was forbidden from engaging in political activity (Marwat S. K., 2015). Later, General Zia dropped the accusations against the NAP. Following his release, Wali Khan became a member of the National Democratic Party and then founded the Awami National Party. (Marwat S. K., 2015).

Pashtun nationalism served as the foundation for Khan Abdul Wali's political career. This Pashtun nationalist legacy was passed down to him by his father, Bacha Khan, true name Khan Abdul Ghaffar. Even though this party was founded after India was divided, some of its leaders constantly support a united India and opposed the creation of a new state (Pakistan) (Rashiduzaman, 1970) (Khan I. A., 2013). Most of the party's leaders served as right-hand men for the India National Congress before the partition. In 1956, Hameed Khan, a Bengali socialist, was the party's leader after Wali joined the NAP.

Ever since its establishment, Pakistani politics have seen significant involvement from the Awami National Party (ANP). The party was founded by anti-colonialist and Pashtun nationalist Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The democratic socialism, secularism, and Pashtun nationalism underpin the ANP's worldview (Manifesto, 2018). The party has historically performed well in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but it is also widely popular in Sindh and Baluchistan, two other provinces in Pakistan.

Both in the administration and the opposition, the ANP has been a significant player in Pakistani politics. The party has twice been in charge at the federal level, from 1956–1957 and again from 1971–1977. The ANP has played a significant role in provincial politics as well, controlling Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the majority of the time since 1988 (Ali S. , 2019). The ANP has consistently criticized Pakistan's military government. The party fiercely opposed General Zia-ul-

Haq's administration in the 1980s, and it has since voiced opposition to the military's involvement in national politics (Iqbal, 2021).

Additionally, the ANP has been a vocal supporter of Pashtun rights. The party has advocated for increased autonomy for Pakistan's Pashtun-majority regions while simultaneously criticizing the local administration's counterinsurgency strategies. The ANP is a significant political force in Pakistan, and it will probably continue to be so in the years to come. The party is an important factor in Pakistani politics due to its philosophy, its broad base of Pashtun support, and its history of activism. The Awami National Party has made the following specific contributions to Pakistani politics: the ANP was a major force in the movement for provincial autonomy in West Pakistan; the party was a vocal critic of military rule in Pakistan; the ANP has been a strong advocate for Pashtun rights. Given its current prominence and likelihood of continued influence, the Awami National Party is expected to remain a major political force in Pakistan. (Mazari, 2003).

### **2.3.3. Factors in the Literature Regarding Political Party Decline**

The Awami National Party (ANP) has experienced a decline in recent years and has lost much of influence in mainstream politics in Pakistan. Several factors have contributed to this decline. The growth of Islamic extremism in Pakistan is one of the primary causes of the ANP's downfall. It is vocal opponent of religious extremism and has been involved in efforts to counter the influence of extremist groups in the country. However, the rise of extremist groups has made it difficult for the ANP to operate in certain areas of the country, particularly in the KP (Kazmi, 2022). Another factor that has a share in the decline of the ANP is the party's association with the Pashtun nationalist movement (Khan I. A., 2013). While the ANP has been a strong advocate for the rights of the Pashtun people, its association with the Pashtun nationalist movement has made it difficult for the party to appeal to a broader base of voters in Pakistan. This has limited the party's ability to expand its support beyond the Pashtun community. The ANP has also been affected by internal divisions and leadership struggles (Rashiduzaman, 1970). The party has been plagued by infighting and has struggled to maintain a cohesive message and strategy. This has made it difficult for the party to effectively compete in national elections and has contributed to its decline in mainstream politics. Finally, the ANP has been affected by broader political trends in Pakistan. The country has experienced a shift towards right-wing politics in recent years, with parties like PTI gaining popularity (Sherazi, 2013). This has made it difficult for the ANP to compete with these parties

and has contributed to its decline in mainstream politics. Overall, the decline of the ANP due to multiple factors, including the rise of religious extremism, the party's association with the Pashtun nationalist movement, internal divisions and leadership struggles, and broader political trends in Pakistan (Himmatullah, 2015).

ANP has been a major political force in Pakistan for decades. However, the party has seen a decline in its fortunes in recent years. Several factors have contributed to this decline, including:

- **The rise of religious extremism:** The ANP has been a vocal critic of religious extremism, and this has made it unpopular with some sections of the Pashtun population. The rise of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other extremist groups has also made it more difficult for the ANP to operate in some parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Kazmi, 2022).
- **The 2008 suicide bombing:** In 2008, a suicide bomber killed several ANP leaders, including the party's president, Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao. This attack had a devastating impact on the party, and it has been slow to recover (Hyder, 2008).
- **Internal divisions:** The ANP has been plagued by internal divisions in recent years. These divisions have made it difficult for the party to present a united front, and they have also led to a loss of support among voters (Dawn, 2018).
- **The rise of other political parties:** The ANP has also faced competition from other political parties, such as the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F). These parties have been able to attract some of the ANP's traditional supporters, and they have also benefited from the ANP's decline (Ali X. W., 2020).

As a result of these factors, the ANP has seen its share of the vote decline in recent elections. In the 2018 general election, the party won only 01 seats in the National Assembly, down from 03 seats in the 2013 election. The ANP has also lost control of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government (Jazeera, 2018).

The following chapter will be analyzed by taking themes in a sequence: religious impact on the decline of ANP; the next theme targeting of ANP leaders and its impact on the decline of ANP; the following theme will be the internal fights in ANP; and the last theme will be the rise of other political parties.

## **CHAPTER NO. 02: CAUSES OF ANP’S DECLINE FROM MAINSTREAM POLITICS (2013-2018)**

### **The Historical Significance of ANP in Mainstream Politics**

Basing its policies and objectives on its electoral programme for the 2008 general elections, which helped it earn a landslide public mandate, the Awami National Party (ANP) controlled Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for five years, from 2008 to 2012. After announcing in its 2008 election campaign that it would combat the pervasive violent and militant discourses in the province and the surrounding area, the ANP-led government finally adopted a firm stance against the militants and devised a counterterrorism strategy to restrain their growing social control and terrorist acts. (ANP, 2013). Without a question, the militants were contributing to the destruction of lives in addition to destroying the sociocultural discourse in the area, possessions, and dignity of nearly the entire people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and other areas of Pakistan (Khan A. U., 2005).

In the process of confronting extremist and terrorist organisations on political, military, intellectual (discourse), and cultural fronts, the ANP sacrificed its cadre and leadership and alienated a number of national and international strategists. The fundamental idea of a homogenised worldview is meticulously woven into the fabric of extremist or militant language, according to an analysis of the print and digital ideological propaganda literature created by militants. They must destroy the national sociocultural fabric everywhere, even as the militant rhetoric carefully manipulates the concept of Khilafat in an effort to rewrite history. Indigenous wisdom must first suffer, as must contemporary human civilization.

By employing this argument, the discourse has caused a change in religious authority, such as when “Jihad” was declared to be equivalent to “Qital,” promoted as the only avenue available for fight, and finally approved as a private business. The concepts of Jihad and Shahadat are embedded within the concepts of Khilafat and Jihad, respectively. This triangle design is combined with “otherization” to increase its potency in conducting a global battle.

However, individuals who supported the “Jihad” in 1980s, in opposition to the Soviet Union had the ancient Pakhtunwali code<sup>2</sup> recreated to suit their agendas. The Pashtuns are thought to have

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<sup>2</sup> Pakhtunwali is a code of honour of the Pakhtun. It is a traditional way of living style of Pakhtuns. s

been glorified through the combined efforts of the CIA, ISI, Wahabi madrassas, Jamaat-i-Islami, and Pakistani military as a brave people willing to give up and they sacrificed everything for the benefit of Islam and Pakhtunwali, which meant they had to battle the Soviets, who were the adversaries of both. (Hussain K. , 2013).

Rebuilding the borders of Pakhtunwali would probably lead us to conclude that Wahabism seems to be utterly fragmented if tied to the Pakhtunwali code, yet Islam may be a cultural component of Pakhtunwali. Nearly all the human race's recent steps toward civilization have been included in the dynamic code. The code that may be traced back over several centuries includes poetry, art, literature, architecture, music, and dance. When the dynamic part of the code is brought up for discussion by academics and media outlets worldwide, it is typically disregarded. In light of the current crisis, it is necessary to revisit both constructions—the one created by foreign powers and the one created by the local residence people.

### **3.1. Wahhabism, Talibanisation and ANP's Ideological Standings**

The first modern Islamic fanatic and fundamentalist was Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). Wahhab declared the idea that every concept given to Islam after the third century of the Muslim era (about 950 CE) was incorrect and was to be rejected the cornerstone of his reform effort. Muslims have to adhere to the original lessons of the Messenger Muhammad (PBUH) exclusively and rigorously in order to be considered authentic Muslims.

Al-Wahhab took an extreme stance and directed his reform efforts at certain common activities that he saw as a return to pre-Islamic polytheism. These included praying to saints, visiting graves and designated mosques, paying homage to plants, caverns, and stones, and offering sacrifices and votive offerings.

All of these customs are typically and widely connected to religions, although al-Wahhab disapproved of them. The actions of modern seculars are even more repugnant to al-Wahhab's heirs. Current Wahhabists fight against modernity, secularism, and the Enlightenment; in fact, it is this opposition to modernity and secularism that fuels their fanaticism, often to the point of bloodshed.

Any follower of the Islamic reform movement begun in the 18th century in Najd, Central Arabia, by Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and taken up by the Saudi dynasty in 1744, is known as a Wahhabi. In Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Wahhabism is widely practiced in the 20th and 21st centuries.

The movement’s supporters mostly considers themselves as Salafis, or “disciples of the revered ancestors,” a word also used by supporters of other Islamic reform organizations. Outsiders mainly use the term Wahhabi to identify the movement. Because of their emphasis on the absolute oneness of God (Tawḥid), they identify as Muwahḥidun, or “unitarians.” They advocate a return to the original teachings of Islam found in the Quran and the Sunnah (traditions of Muhammad), rejecting any actions that they perceive to be suggestive of polytheism (shirk), such as visiting tombs and honoring saints. They denounce as innovations (bid’ah) all other sources of doctrine. The foundation of Wahhabi theology and jurisprudence is the literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah, as well as the building of an Islamic society based solely on these two bodies of literature (Algar, 2002). These teachings are derived from the legal school of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and the theologian Ibn Taymiyyah. The construction of an Islamic civilization predicated solely on these two corpuses of literature: Quran and Sunnah (Algar, 2002).

It was around 1740 when Muḥammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab started spreading his ideas in the oasis village of Ḥuraymila. He was banished from both ‘Uyaynah and Ḥuraymila’ after local Ḥanbali officials rejected his beliefs, despite the fact that his father was a Ḥanbali jurist and that his ideas were based in the Ḥanbali school of law.

Upon reaching al-Dir’iyyah in 1744, Muhammad Ibn Saud, the emir, gave his movement encouragement. The Wahhabi movement's political fortunes were closely linked to the Saudi dynasty from that point on. By the close of the 1700s, they had conquered all of Najd; assaulted the Shia Muslim holy city of Karbala, Iraq; and taken over Mecca and Medina in western Arabia. The first Wahhabi Empire was destroyed in 1818 by the Ottoman sultan, but Fayṣal-I of Saudi Arabia restored the cult back to life. The Rashidiyyah of northern Arabia decimated the empire again in the end of the 19th century, but it was partially restored after that. The 20th-century endeavors of Ibn Saud ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, securing Wahhabi's religious and political supremacy throughout the Arabian Peninsula.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has remained noticeably more conservative than other states in the region in the late 20th and early 21st century due to the dominance of the Wahhabi religious

establishment. Muṭawwa'un, a sizable religious police force, enforces stringent public behavior norms, such as obligatory gender segregation and adherence of Islamic ceremonies.

Under Saudi authority, a great deal of early Islamic sites, including the residences and tombs of Muhammad's companions, were demolished since Wahhabism prohibits the worship of shrines, tombs, and holy items. According to estimates from preservationists, up to 95% of the historic sites surrounding Mecca and Medina have been destroyed.

### **3.2. The Contribution and Legacy of Ibn Taymiyyah**

Rich in documentation, somber style, and brilliant argumentation, Ibn Taymiyyah's (1263-1328) substantial body of work—this broadened and confirmed his religious and political involvements, and was widely reprinted in Egypt, India, Syria, and Arabia. Apart from the innumerable fatwas (legal opinions grounded in Islamic law) and other statements of faith, two in particular, the most magnificent of which is the Wasīṭiyyah, need particular consideration. Among them is his "Treatise on Juridical Politics," *Al-Siyasat al-Shar'iyyah*, which has been translated into French and English. *Minhaj-al-Sunnah*, also referred to as "The Way of Tradition," is the most comprehensive work of comparative theology that has remained from mediaeval Islam.

Ibn Taymiyyah thought that the various religious sects and schools had too frequently changed the Islamic faith, either completely or partially, and that it was time returned to its original sources. The revealed texts, the prophetic tradition and the Quran, served as the sources. He maintained that unless the *Ijma* (community consensus) was based on those two sources, it was worthless. Notwithstanding his traditionalism, Ibn Taymiyyah did not preclude the allowance of analogical reasoning (*Qiyas*) and the argument of utility (*Maṣlaḥah*) a significant position in his thinking, provided that both were based on the objective facts of revelation and tradition. He believed that the Muslim community, now split and fragmented, could only find unity through a similar return to its origins.

Ibn Taymiyyah sought to characterize God in the Quran and the Prophet's Sunnah, which caused him to side with theological schools against the consensus of the day in theodicy (the defense of God as good when evil is seen in the world). From this stance, a critique of the views of mystics like Ibn al-Arabi, philosophers like Avicenna and Averroes, and dogmatic theologians like Abu al-Ḥasan al-Ash'ari and Fakhr-al-Din al-Razi was launched, often with very subtle argumentation (Raja, 2006).



In terms of praxes, or practices, Ibn Taymiyyah held that one could only mandate in worship those acts established by God and his Prophet, and one could only prohibit in social interactions those acts that are proscribed by the Quran and the Sunnah. Thus, he created an economic ethic that was more flexible than that promoted by the modern schools on many issues, while also advocating for a revision of the system of religious obligations and the dismissal of innovations that should be condemned (*bid'ah*).

Ibn Taymiyyah acknowledged the legitimacy of the Caliphate of Rashida (*Khulfay-e-Rashedeen*), the first four caliphs, but he permitted the existence of multiple emirates and rejected the idea of a single caliphate (Khan Q. , 1973). Ibn Taymiyyah insisted that everyone under the prince's authority obey the established authority, with the exception of situations in which it required disobedience to God. Every Muslim was expected to “will the good and forbid the bad” for the sake of the welfare of the community. He also demanded that the prince within each emirate strictly apply the religious law and rely on it for his legal opinion (Khan Q. , 1973).

Ibn Taymiyyah had many political and religious opponents during his lifetime, but over the past 200 years, he had a significant impact on contemporary Islam. He was the originator of the Wahhabiyyah, an entirely traditionalist movement started by Muḥammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), who derived his concepts from the works of Ibn Taymiyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah also had an impact on a number of reform movements that raised the issue of reformulating traditional ideologies through a return to their original sources (Zargar, 2017).

### **3.4. Manipulating Pashtunwali Code: Exploiting the Code for Personal Agendas**

The code of conduct known as Pashtunwali dates back to the pre-Islamic era and is adhered to by all proud Pashtuns (Rockmore, 2011), regardless of whether they reside in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or are refugees elsewhere in the globe. The indigenous Pashtun people are strongly devoted and autonomous. In light of the significance of Fata given its geographic proximity to Afghanistan, it is critical to comprehend Pashtun culture. The Pashtuns believe their social code produces men who are superior to those developed under the Western model, hence they have no desire for foreigners to impose a new social system on them. (Mason, 2008).

In Pashtunwali, “*melmastia*”—hospitality—is an essential element. “*Melma*” denotes a visitor. However, one should not interpret hospitality in the same way as one would in the West. It entails

showing a guest hospitality while putting aside differences in racial, religious, and socioeconomic status. It also implies that a guest should not be hurt or turned over to an adversary once they are within the host's home. This will apply irrespective of the history of the guest and host's relationship. Melmasthia, another Pashtunwali concept, is more important in this sense than badal, therefore even an enemy who seeks refuge must be given it and protected from his assailants. Elphinstone said in 1815 that “the hospitality of the Afghans is their most remarkable characteristic (Elphinstone, 2019).” The act of upholding this virtue is considered such a source of national pride that an inhospitable person is reprimanded for lacking Pashtunwali.

“To pursue justice or get retribution on the offender” is the definition of “badal,” defined simply. The moment at which one can avenge the injustice is infinite. The injured man or his family will be deemed devoid of honour if badal is not used. When this theory is used, it can result in feuds, generations of warfare, and the loss of hundreds of lives over a single insult. To respond violently to an insult, death, or injury caused is necessary. Typically, a badal comes to an end. An action prompts or requires a corresponding response, and so forth. The famous Pashto poet, soldier, and warrior Khushal Khan Khattak was not far off when he said: “Let the head be gone, wealth be gone, but the honour must not go, because the whole of a man's dignity is due to this honour (Caroe, 1958).”

Another cornerstone of the Pashtunwali code is the “nanawatai” (sanctuary). It enables someone to flee their adversaries by taking up residence in someone else's home. Regardless of the potential consequences to his own family or wealth, the host Pashtun owes it to honour to provide that protection. Traditionally, protection has only been granted while the individual seeking sanctuary is on that person's land. He will no longer be protected once he leaves the host's property. After seeing a group of mujahedeen kidnap and kill a Soviet tank crew in 1986, William Mastrosimone wrote the stage drama “Nanawatai (Mastrosimone, 2013),” which tells the story of a tank driver who is caught during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and his subsequent request for safety from anyone who finds him. Later, the tale was turned into the 1988 motion picture “The Beast of War (Website, The Beast of War movie is available in Netflix, 2023).”

It is always required of a Pashtun to protect his women, property, family, and land from intruders. His name must be upheld in honour. In order to protect the connected honour, lives are sacrificed. This is another facet of the Pashtunwali, “Tureh” (bravery). Other precepts include “Sabat,” or

loyalty, which is directed towards one's friends, family, and other tribe members. “Imandari” (righteousness) is the pursuit of virtue in both speech and deed courtesy to everyone. “Ghairat” means courage or honour; a Pashtun must always be courageous. He doesn't qualify as a Pathan if he lacks ghairat or honour. “Namus” (sexual honour of women) refers to the virginity and sexual integrity of the ladies in a man's family. The Pashtun has to protect his household's women's Namus. This also applies to his extended family's namus. A Pashtun is required to uphold the honour of individuals in his vicinity, or “nang” (honour).

This is by no means an exhaustive list. Nonetheless, it provides a useful understanding of the principles that guide the “Proud Pashtun.” It appears that Pashtunwali is not a legal code. It is more of an honour code that Pashtuns will live by and even sacrifice their lives for.

The Pashtuns follow the Jirga system. The elders of the tribe gather there to make decisions by consensus. This Council of Elders hears disputes involving two or more parties. The Jirga is still utilised as a court for criminal charges in tribal areas. Tribal elders are treated with an incredible amount of respect. The Uzbeks in the area were one of the reasons Mullah Nazir Ahmed departed from the loose formation of the Taliban Movement in 2007. They disregarded the custom of paying homage to the tribal elder. A sin that the Pashtuns will never forgive. However, layers of authority were eventually removed from the Jirga authority in numerous cases as Talibanization expanded. One example given by Mufti Shakir of Lashkar-i-Islam in the Khyber Agency is the establishment of a sharia court with the authority to administer vigilante justice.

The Pashtuns have relied on a code of conduct that predates time itself to govern how they should behave both as a society and as individuals in their interactions with one another. To run state affairs, even stateless nations require specific laws. Frontier Crimes Regulation, a set of laws consisting of six chapters, sixty-four sections, and three schedules, continues to govern Fata, a colonial Act from the British era that gives a political agent the authority to act on behalf of the Pakistani government. Once decisions are made, they cannot be overturned or contested by any legal means (Akins, 2017).

Pashtunwali has battled and been successful in creating a consistent code of conduct in a society where the majority of people cannot easily access justice. State laws are not very broad, and the rules pertaining to the Frontier Crimes Regulation are different from the laws that govern other parts of Pakistan. Contrary to expectations, honour codes may produce circumstances that lead to

a higher likelihood of conflicts arising. Additionally, it leaves outsiders absolutely perplexed when interacting with Pashtuns.

The blueprint to govern Pashtun tribes is not provided by understanding Pashtunwali. This magical part does not exist. Nonetheless, knowing the Pashtun culture is beneficial. When comprehended, the framework can assist in developing a plan for interacting with the native people.

### **3.5. Gaining Insight into the Taliban through the Lens of Pashtunwali Ethical Values**

Early in the 1990s, the Taliban phenomenon gained attention. These days, the term is used so frequently that definitions for it can be found in dictionaries for every language in the globe. The movement has always been led and controlled by Pashtuns since its founding. Pashtuns make up the bulk of the Taliban. The majority of Pashtuns, or Pashtu language speakers, are found in South Asia that is India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Sarbanri, Gharghasht, Batani, and Karlanri are the four principal Pashtun tribes (Caroe, 1958).

The majority of Afghan Taliban are members of the Ghalzai sub-tribe of the Sarbanri tribe. The Ghalzais remain the primary group within the Afghan Taliban, with the other major tribes making up a minor part. Nearly half of the top twenty Taliban leaders are from the Hotak Ghilzai tribe, including the group that leads the organisation, Mullah Mohammad Omar (Shura, 2009). The Durrani tribe is currently leading the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan (Shura, 2009), and the Ghilzais are still significant players<sup>3</sup>.

Whatever their tribe, they are all followers of the Pashtun culture. In the past, Pashtun tribes have only united in the event of a foreign invasion—which has happened frequently throughout Pashtun history—and their society has remained sharply divided even during times of peace. The way that hundreds of distinct Pashtun sub-tribes live and die in adherence to a single, unwritten tribal code known as Pashtunwali is an intriguing subject of research.

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<sup>3</sup> The Durrani clan was in charge during King Zahir Shah's rule over Afghanistan (1933–73). Dawood Khan, the cousin of King Zahir Shah, conspired with the Afghan National Army and the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a Marxist organization supported by the Soviet Union, to overthrow him. Following the assassination of President Dawood Khan in 1978 and several subsequent changes in administration, the Soviet Union interfered. The majority of the Ghalzai tribesmen in Afghanistan were involved in the immediate post-invasion struggle against the Soviet invasion. Four of the seven main Pashtun-led Ghalzai factions in Afghanistan were headed by Gulbedin Hekmatyar, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayal, Younas Khalis, and other individuals. Dobdo

The Pashtunwali code, contrary to popular belief in the West, has its origins in their ancient culture rather than religion. It existed before they converted to Islam in the seventh century. A Pashtun must adhere to the code in order to be respected in the tribal ethos, regardless of the socio-economic class to which he belongs. They adhere to the code strictly, and anyone who tries to break it away ends up alienated and shunned.

### **3.6. Among the code's most notable characteristics are:**

The word *Melmastia* means “hospitality.” The code requires every Pashtun to treat every guest with the utmost kindness, regardless of the guest's race, ethnicity, or religion. If the host violates this tradition or does not adhere to it in letter and spirit, he risks losing the esteem and social status of his fellow tribal members.

*Nanawatai*: To give refuge to those fleeing his adversaries. To ensure his guest(s)' safety, a host may even resort to warfare. This custom is a prehistoric way of granting asylum.

*Badal*: Essentially, it means to exact retribution for any wrongdoing. Once more, it is a fundamental aspect of Pashtun culture.

*Tureh*: It represents courage in the face of adversity. Severe social degradation can arise from cowardice or from neglecting to defend the dignity and esteem of one's tribe and family.

*Sabat*: allegiance to one's tribe over all others, including friends and family.

*Imandari*: Veracity

*Isteqamat*: Unwavering faith and reliance in God.

*Ghayrat*: Dignity and honour.

**Namus**: Honour and reverence accorded to ladies who are either Pashtun or tribal members.

*Hawad*: Love for the Pashtun people as a whole.

*Dob-Pasbani*: Defending Pashtun culture and supporting Pashtun tribes in the event of an invasion or attack by foreign forces, regardless of all previous animosities.

*Jirga*: A council or meeting of elders from various tribes that convenes to settle intra- and inter-tribal conflicts.

***Loya Jirga:*** The Great Gathering

***Rogha:*** A dispute-resolution custom (Economist, 2006) (Kakar, 2006).

Other essential procedures include: Every Pashtun is regarded by the code as being fully independent and free (adult man). Forgiveness is also another crucial Pashtun cultural standard maintaining one's word or honouring commitments made assembling the army of all Pashtun tribes to form the Lashkar in the event of a foreign military attack. At all costs, we must defend the weak and impoverished. Love for the history and culture of the Pashtuns (Cathel, 2009). The Taliban took full advantage of the situation, since Pashtuns make up the majority of their supporters.

No one fought the Taliban when they first took over Pashtun-dominated provinces in Afghanistan and enforced their own vision of Islam, which combined religious observance with Pashtunwali code. This was because it was still the norm in those areas. The takeover of Kabul and the areas that are non-Pashtun regions by Taliban, which had no ties to their interpretation of tribal/Pashtun Islam, was the beginning of the issue. The majority of Afghans, who are not Pashtuns, viewed them as intruders and occupants of their territory. The Taliban were severely outmatched by non-Pashtun forces, who put up a strong fight against forces loyal to Abdul Rashid Dostum, Ahmad Shah Masoud, and the Hazaras of Afghanistan. The Taliban's inexperienced forces faced significant resistance from the Uzbeks (9%), Hazaras (9%) and Tajiks (29%) populations (BBC, 1996). The Taliban were also aided financially and logistically by the regimes in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; the Saudis' primary grievance with the Taliban was that Bin Laden was a Saudi dissident. As the Taliban advanced to seize control of Kabul, the US government did little but watch from the sidelines. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright voiced her disapproval and played a key role in changing US policy towards the Taliban once the group's treatment of women reached unacceptable levels by Western standards. When First Lady Hillary Clinton was a candidate for the Senate from New York State, she spoke out against the Taliban's persecution of women, which marked the beginning of her career in politics.

The Pashtun-dominated districts have never posed a threat to the Taliban government, which is noteworthy given that they share a common culture and way of life. The Taliban really believed that their tribe's regulations were Islamic.

The Taliban were followers of the Deobandi sect of Islam, which was very different from Deobandism in other regions of South Asia among Madressahs. Saudi influence combined with Deobandism and Pashtunwali customs to form the customs of the Taliban<sup>4</sup>. The Taliban sought to establish a state largely based on Saudi Arabian ideals, and their imposition of laws based on “Sharia” and their prohibition of certain practices they considered to be against Islamic customs are two examples of how Saudi influence manifested itself in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. By examining the acts and implementation of tribal-based customs, it is possible to analyse the ideology of the Taliban with clarity.

This tricky combination produced the building that the Taliban attempted to construct and that startled the entire globe. The mullahs of the Taliban described their rule as the authentic embodiment of the ideal Islamic state. In this way, they attempted to impose on the Afghan people a form of Islam that was unprecedented in the world and blended with tribal rituals. Because they lacked the oil money to placate the masses and because Afghan society was tribal rather than homogeneous, the Taliban were more influenced by Saudi Arabia than by Saudis. They also went so far as to adopt Saudi traditions, viewing them as “true” readings of the Quran. Although Deobandism is primarily an urban phenomenon in India and Pakistan<sup>5</sup>, the Taliban's Deobandism was very different, and their practices were more influenced by the Saudi legal system and laws. The majority of these decrees were already deeply embedded in Pashtun culture, therefore even though the rules they enforced were widely disliked, they had been embraced in Pashtun-dominated localities. They did things like label Shia Muslims as heretics and impose the Jizya tax because they were perceived to be following avant-garde Islamic customs. They treated the Afghan Hazara ethnic population in the same way, prohibited a number of specific actions and behaviours, including the following: all types of music; including dolls, photos, advertisements, paintings, dancing, flying kites, sketches, portraits in any medium, and plush animals, encompass a range of objects such as television, satellite dishes, chess, wine, firecrackers, statues, masks, computers, VCR, pool tables, alcohol, lobster, nail polish, photos, Christmas cards, heels, and sewing catalogues.. Any action pertaining to these prohibited items may incur penalties.

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<sup>4</sup> Deobandi sect is a Sunni revivalist movement in South AsiaKP

<sup>5</sup> According to one estimate, in Pakistan, the Shias are 18%, Ismailis 2%, AhmediyaAls 2%, Barelvis 50%, Deobandis 20%, Ahle Hadith 4%, and other minorities 4%.

In order to combat women's transgressions and evil, the Taliban outlawed meetings and mixed-gender events. The only places where women could work were hospitals. Every female school was closed, and some of them were even converted into barracks for the Taliban. Women had to travel with a male relative, preferably a close one like a father, brother, or spouse, and were not permitted to roam around on their own. To oversee the application of all Taliban rules, a religious police force known as "Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue" was formed. Any conduct considered to be in violation of the law was subject to harsh punishment. Theft also carried harsh penalties, including the amputation of a hand and imposing the death sentence for robbery rape, and murder. For men, shaving or trimming their beards was likewise regarded as a serious transgression. Outside of their homes, women were required to cover up, and breaking this regulation carried harsh penalties. Adultery was punished with death by stoning, conversely, homosexuality had to be dealt with by keeping the guilty beneath a roof. Alcohol consumption was also a serious offence, with public whippings meted out to the offenders. As a result of all the sacred shrines being forcibly closed and deemed unholy in accordance with Wahabi/Salafi traditions, many people in The Taliban's anti-Afghan legislation and authority were opposed by the people of northern Afghanistan. (Rights, 1998).

The Taliban seized power over non-Pashtuns areas of Hazara Jat, Herat, and Mazar-e-Shariff after the fall of Kabul. These people resisted the Taliban's attempts to impose a Pashtunwali code that was mixed with Islam influenced by Saudi Arabia and Deobandi. "The conflict over Kabul exposed the divisions between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns as well as between the north and south," claims Ahmed Rashid. Ahmad Shah Masoud's political reputation was severely damaged by his failure to reach a settlement with Pashtun commanders who opposed Hekmatyar, even as Masoud was seizing control of Kabul in 1992. It was not until the Taliban had taken over the north in 1998 that he was able to win back the trust of the Pashtun people (Rashid, 2000).

In line with the movement's military structure, military commanders held leadership positions overseeing both the armed forces and the nation. Rashid also detailed the Taliban's organizational hierarchy and leadership within the framework of this system. At the height of its power, the Taliban had between 25,000 and 30,000 members, this encompasses their religious police. The conventional Taliban army has never exceeded a strength of 25,000–30,000 soldiers, however this figure may rise quickly in the run-up to future offensives. In addition, Pakistani masrassah



students, who by 1999 accounted for over 30% of the Taliban's military personnel, likewise served brief stints before returning home and recruiting new members. Nevertheless, it is impossible to establish a regular or disciplined army with this disorganized recruiting method, which stands in stark contrast to Masoud's 12,000–15,000 regular forces (Rashid, 2000).

The Taliban's takeover of power was interpreted as a success of Pashtun troops and their cultural and religious convictions. Since Ahmad Shah Durrani established Afghanistan in 1747, Pashtuns have always been in charge of the country's affairs. Other ethnic groups were accustomed to this situation, but there was never a strong sense of alienation among non-Pashtuns. Taliban positioned a potent military force in each province to put an end to any resistance, and they nominated Pashtuns as governors of non-Pashtun provinces. The Sufi-Islam that was practiced in the majority of upper Afghanistan and Shia Islam in central Afghanistan were rejected by the Taliban. Prior to the Taliban seizing control, the majority of the bureaucracy's employees were non-Pashtuns who subsequently lost their positions. Under Taliban administration, Afghanistan's multilingual, multicultural, multiethnic, and varied society was ripped apart. The killings by Taliban troops of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras in upper part of Afghanistan and in the center of Afghanistan brought the level of animosity towards non-Pashtuns to an all-time low.

Why the Taliban had adopted this identity, which was foreign to Afghanistan's past at the time. A few significant factors that led to it were as follows: Because they were the offspring of Afghan refugees and were raised in camps in Pakistan amid an atmosphere of enmity and conflict, the majority of these Talibs were foreigners living in their own nation came from an area where Pashtuns predominated and had little knowledge of any other culture lacked knowledge of other Islamic sects and their upbringing had always been heavily influenced by ethnocentrism attended madrassahs run by the Deobandi sect, where they were taught a twisted and extremely limited interpretation of Islam along with tribal customs and practices.

Since a number of their commanders and leaders had fought in the Afghan War, they were able to expel their adversaries from most of the country's southern cities without resorting to force. Because the movement was supported by the general public, they were welcomed in Pashtun parts of Afghanistan and warlords were forced to flee. They didn't encounter any problems until they encountered the formidable forces of General Rashid Dostum and Ahmad Shah Masoud, when

they were severely defeated. However, the casualties were offset by the arrival of more foot soldiers from madrassahs in Pakistan.

The Taliban would not have survived if it hadn't been for the Saudi and Pakistani governments, whose formidable and well-trained armies had not destroyed the movement. They were accustomed to the Taliban's treatment of women since it was ingrained in their culture and Deobandi-Salafi customs. Since they were Pashtuns, it was only natural for them to impose the Pashtunwali code on others, considering it to be the highest and most moral standard of living.

The Pashtuns' ethnocentrism was fundamental to all of their beliefs and customs. They had no understanding about the outside world or the global political scene, so they never gave a damn about what people would think of them or what they were doing. When Pakistan insisted that the Taliban rule acknowledge the disputed Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Pashtun problem resurfaced. Since all of the Afghan monarchs and presidents before him were of Pashtun ethnicity and had always recognised the Durand Line and Pashtun-populated regions of Pakistan as belonging to Afghanistan, Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, steadfastly rejected and so carried on the practice (Line, 2006).

Raised far from their motherland, the Taliban suddenly enforced code on their non-Pashtun subjects without fully understanding its ramifications. This led to a wave of hostility directed at both the Taliban and Pashtuns in general. It is true that the Pashtunwali code is not a part of Islam; nonetheless, the Pashtuns assimilated Islam and added to the code, making it a part of their culture. The Pashtun tribes' code of conduct differs greatly from the true spirit of Islam. Put differently, the Pashtuns had integrated Islam into their own way of life and embraced it in their own unique way. According to the Taliban's interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law, the victim's family must execute the murderer, but not before the judge makes a last-ditch plea to the victim's relatives to spare the killer. The victim's family would be compensated financially or with blood money if they showed pity. Many Muslim theologians, both inside and outside of Afghanistan, disagree about the extent to which the Taliban's view of Islamic law is based on Sharia and the Pashtun tribal code of conduct, or Pashtunwali.

The Taliban's punishments, too, were more tribal than religious in character. All tribal Pashtuns adhered to Pashtunwali, a social code that granted the tribal Jirga, or council, the authority to decide cases based on a traditional set of laws and punishments, particularly those involving land

ownership disputes, the murder of women, and other offences. For the Pashtuns, the distinction between Sharia law and Pashtunwali has never been clear. In actuality, Pashtunwali was the primary source of Taliban penalties, not Sharia. However, Pashtunwali was not the norm for other ethnic groups' customs; rather, it was practiced to varied degrees, either more or less, throughout the Pashtun belt. The country's ethnic division was further exacerbated by the Taliban's determination to impose Pashtunwali-Sharia rule on various ethnic groups through coercion. The attempt to impose Kandahari Pashtun rules on the entire nation was perceived by non-Pashtuns (Rashid, 2000).

They were left with little choice but to interpret the Pashtunwali code as authentic Islam due to their lack of outside information and dependence on the one resource they possessed. Their inflexibility and rigidity demonstrated their ignorance of both the outside world and, more significantly, the spirit of Islam. After their cruel treatment of women and minorities, the entire civilised world became curious. Before they conquered Kabul, the world viewed them primarily as agents of stability and change. In Pashtun-dominated areas, where the majority of the population was well-versed in Pashtun codes, no one complained to their rule or style of government.

The Pashtuns are nationalists in terms of history. The Pashtun society has a high degree of ethnocentrism, and they take a conservative stance in protecting and preserving their code. They refuse to change and keep up with the trends because they genuinely think they are better than every other ethnic group in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This explains why the Pashtun hinterlands continue to lag behind in terms of advancement and development. Not only are Pashtuns in Afghanistan not as well educated as other ethnic groups like the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, but the same may be said of Pashtuns residing in Pakistan. The ties to the culture are still stronger, and the code is still upheld in text and spirit.

It is a sociological issue to comprehend the Taliban way of life, culture, customs, mores, and social taboos. The all-cut-closed Pashtun civilization is causing societal transformation, although it is happening extremely slowly. The issue of socialisation is another. Through societal change, the Taliban are assimilated into Pashtun society without the influence of any other culture. There aren't many change agents, and those that are aren't exposed too much of the outside world. Negotiating with Taliban leaders and dealing with them is significantly more challenging. Al-Qaeda deceived the Taliban by using the Arabs' long-standing knowledge of Afghan principles, which included the

Pashtunwali code, to their advantage. It took Osama Bin Laden two years to acknowledge that he was responsible for the 9/11 attacks (Laden, 2004). Had he done so right away, it would have been interpreted as a violation of Nanawati, allowing the Taliban to turn him over to the United States?

The details of the Pashtun code must be understood by the US and its partners, and appropriate action must be taken. They ought to communicate with them using their own code, in a way that may help the code in discussions and negotiations with the Taliban. Every Pashtun is free to live by the thousands-year-old Pashtunwali code, but they are not permitted to forcibly impose the code on non-Pashtuns. It is by no means a Pashtun-specific rule of conduct.

The inability to comprehend the code is implied by the fact that all previous peace talks with the Taliban have failed. The spirit of the code may be leveraged to persuade the Taliban to include reasonable components, making it essential to peace efforts at all levels. The Pashtunwali code is the primary cause of the rigidity of Taliban behaviour; a respected Pashtun tribal leader would not be able to maintain his honourable demeanour if he were to transgress its accepted standards. We have to admit that this assumption served as the foundation for the Taliban's intransigent refusal to turn over Bin Laden. There was no other choice for Mullah Omar than to follow the code or risk a coup from among his own ranks. Following an unwritten norm that dates back thousands of years had nothing to do with Islamic tradition in the Bin Laden case. Religion did not have the same power as values and traditions. Combining religious beliefs with societal norms would also be a very bad idea. In the same manner that Al-Qaeda has used the code to further its own agendas, the US and its allies may be able to use it.

### **3.7. ANP Government in KP**

The province which was named by British Empire as North-West Frontier Province was named as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment by the Government of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) (Pakistan P. o., 2010). It was one the basic demand of ANP to name this province as per the history of people live in it. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was also merged to KP in 25<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment by the than government of PML (N). Thus, the total area of this province can be count as 1, 01,741 square kilometer (kp.com.pk, 2023). The bulk of the people, the Pakhtuns, are deeply committed to their rich language and culture. Political parties that operation in KP are Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf (PTI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Pakistan Muslim

League-Nawaz (PML-N), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), ANP, Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and others. In these, ANP is a Pashtun Nationalist party, which politics revolved around the community of Pashtuns.

The province of KP saw the birth of its first political organisation in 1907 when the Indian National Congress (INC) established an office in former NWFP. In 1912, the party of Muslims called All India Muslim League also established a provincial section. Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890–1988) created the Khudai Khidmatgari (KK) in 1929 (Marwat D. S., 2015). It was a social reformation organisation that quickly gained popularity as a political party. Subsequently, it partnered with the INC to win a majority in the 1937 KP elections. The INC was able to create its administration three times between 1937 and 1947 through its political partnership with Dr. Khan Sahib (1883–1958), serving as its Chief Minister. Pakistan was established in 1947, and the administration of KP was overseen by several governments until 1970 (Marwat D. S., 2015). 1970 saw the first general elections, the National Awami Party (NAP) formed the governments of KP and Baluchistan through alliance with the PPP and JUI. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto later had disagreements with the NAP, leading to its prohibition in 1975 (Shah S. , 2015). Abdul Wali Khan founded the Awami National Party (ANP), a brand-new political organisation, in 1986 (Marwat D. S., 2015). Raising the voice of the Pakistani community's lower classes was central to its manifesto. Striking for the rights of the average person was its primary goal. For this reason, it quickly gained notoriety as the “Left-Wing Party,” which had a socialist inclination. It participated in multiple elections from 1986 to 2018 and emerged victorious in several provincial and federal seats. With regard to the elections of 2008 in particular, the ANP won a majority of seats in KP but was unable to install an independent government in that area.

Electoral manifesto for 2008 general elections was divided into four main sections. There was a preamble in the first portion, an internal section about Pakistan's affairs, an exterior section about affairs, and a final section about the reforms in FATA. The introductory part of the manifesto adopted Abdul Ghaffar Khan's ideology. Second, it addressed internal matters such as social concerns, administrative challenges, and counterterrorism measures. It also called for Pakhtunkhwa to replace the previous name, N.W.F.P. Pakistan's foreign policy constituted the major topic of discussion in the third section of the manifesto (Rizwan, 2014). It contained suggestions for strengthening and advancing Pakistan's ties with its neighbours. It emphasised the

importance of implementing diplomatic measures to further the nation's commercial and economic interests.

The ANP emphasised in the final section of the manifesto how urgently FATA and KP needed to combine because of the political, social, and economic issues those regions' residents were facing. According to ANP's 2007 manifesto for the 2008 elections, it suggested annexing FATA with the province of KP to provide them the opportunity of equal representation in political system of Pakistan and other spheres of society. General elections 2008 for NA and assemblies of all provinces were conducted. Out of the 124 seats in the KP provincial legislature, the ANP won 48 of those seats in the elections, but because it lacked a simple majority, it was unable to establish an independent administration. The ANP leader, Amir Hayder Khan Hoti was elected as Chief Minister, and resultantly, the parties formed a coalition government on April 1, 2008 (Ali A. I., 2013). It effectively completed its five-year term, which ran from 2008 to 2013 (Ali A. I., 2013).

All of the ANP's objectives and policies during the five-year administration term of ANP were based on its 2008 general election manifesto, which allowed it to garner resounding public support. As the ruling party, ANP made significant contributions to residence KP; nonetheless, it had numerous challenges in carrying out its platform in practice. The Muttahidda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) government in KP from 2002 to 2007 and a devastating wave of terrorism had a significant impact on the ANP government from 2008 to 2013 (Islam, 2023).

### **3.7.1. Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal's Government in KP**

Political and interreligious issues have been carefully coordinated upon by the Religious Political Parties in Pakistan since its founding. The main obstacle to the alliance has always been religious disputes, despite these parties' persistent efforts to unite their support base for an active partnership (Gardezi, 1994). Religious political parties did not form coalitions political parties that are secular; instead, they energised their efforts on building a powerful alliance for election with religious parties itself (Azhar, 2015). Various electoral coalitions were created by religious political parties to compete in the 1993 general elections. After successfully forming Islami Jamhoor-i-Mahaz (IJM), JUI (F) and JUP (N) decided to work with other political parties to develop seat adjustments. The Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) was founded by JIP chairman Qazi Hussain Ahmad to participate in 1993 general elections.

Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, the head of JUI-S make an alliance of twenty-four parties (religious) and JUI-S formed the Muttahida Deeni Mahaz (MDM). The Milli Yakjehti Council was established in 1995 as another effort by religious organisations to improve election unity and sectarianism (Afridi, 2016). In the future, Qazi Hussain Ahmad (Late) hoped to turn it into an electoral coalition and political organisation. However, the allocation of portfolios quickly became a point of contention between JUI (F) and JUI (S), the council's two major parties. The founder of JUI (F), Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, broke away from the coalition in the early years of 2000 to form Islami Muttahida Inqilabi Mahaz (Ahmad Z. , 2015).

Following the September 11th attacks, the United States of America attacked Afghanistan, incited strong opposition from Pakistan's religious parties and Jehadi organisations against the US incursion (Akram, 2002). The reaction was further intensified by General Pervez Musharraf's decision to support the US in the war against terrorism. (Khan A. U., 2005). The Pakistan-Afghan Defence Council (PADC) was established by 35 religious groups and Jehadi organisations in response to US assault in Afghanistan. The PADC's goal was to show support for the Taliban administration. The PADC strongly disagreed with General Pervez Musharraf's decision to provide the US unrestricted support in its war against Afghanistan (Shah J. , 2008). Four months after the US invasion of Afghanistan, in October 2002, General Pervez Musharraf put forward that general elections would be held (Cohen, 2002). After the declaration of the 2002 general elections, Muttahidda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) was established in May 2002. This electoral coalition was formed by six religious political parties— Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat Ulamae-Ahle Hadith (JUAH), Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-F), Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JI), Islami Tehrik Pakistan (ITP), Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-S)—to participate in the October 2002 elections within the PADC (Khan K. A., 2011).

### **3.7.2. 2002 General Elections**

In November 1999, a number of requests submitted pursuant to Article 184(3) of the 1973 Constitution challenged the validity of the October 12, 1999 coup d'état and the subsequent October 14, 1999 declaration of emergency in the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Khalil, 2020). On May 12, 2000, arguments on each petition were heard by a panel of twelve judges, presided over by Chief Justice Irshad Hassan Khan. The Doctrine of State Necessity was used by the Court to support the military takeover. (Alam, 2020). General Pervez Musharraf was granted three years by

the court to finish its agenda before elected representatives of the people took over. The Court additionally granted to change the constitution under General Pervez Musharraf's direction without endangering the essential elements of parliamentary democracy, the judiciary's independence, or the Islamic principles of the constitution (Faqir, 2013). In reaction to the Supreme Court of Pakistan's decision, General Pervez Musharraf announced in July 2002 that nationwide elections would be held in the month of October (Shah A. , 2002).

### **3.7.3. MMA Government Establishment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

Muttahidda Majlis-i-Amal became the largest electoral partnership in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, holding 68 seats in the 124-seat assembly. The Assembly's inaugural session occurred on November 25, 2002, during the course of which members took an oath of office. Ikram Ullah Shahid of JUI-S and Bakht Jahan of JIP have been chosen by the Assembly for appointments as Speaker and Deputy Speaker, correspondingly. The province elected its 18th chief minister, Akram Khan Durrani of JUI-F, on the 29th of November 2002. The total number of ministers in the provincial cabinet has grown from twelve to eighteen throughout time.

### **3.8. 2008 General Elections: ANP's Electoral Manifesto**

The ANP released election manifesto before 2008 elections. Its main objective was to enlighten the public on the policies that the ANP intended to implement if it were to win the elections and take power. It served as a means of inspiring its employees, backers, and candidates for the upcoming elections. Its 2008 general election manifesto consisted into four parts. The prelude was the first section. The second section dealt with Pakistan's internal affairs, including social, political, administrative, and economic problems. The third section dealt with international issues, while the fourth section dealt with FATA-related matters. The manifesto's preamble was based on philosophy and grounds drawn by Ghaffar Khan, he committed his whole life to ensuring the well-being of his people, the Pakhtuns, and fought for socioeconomic justice as well as the liberation of Pakistani society from the grasp of foreign powers. His life's work was to break the cycle of ignorance and poverty for his people. Keeping all of these things in mind, the ANP, like its forerunners the NAP and the NDP, aimed to further the interests of regular people. Thus, it made the decision to advance democracy and freedom by safeguarding human rights, advancing education, ending poverty, and doing away with extremism. It also adhered to the nonviolent policy. It stated unequivocally in its manifesto that the only thing that can solve any human dilemma is peace. Additionally, it stated



that the ANP's government will provide maximal provincial autonomy to all of Pakistan's federating units and treat them equally after taking office. ANP placed a strong emphasis on creating a society that is peaceful, progressive, and devoid of evil. It backed democracy, the supremacy of law, and the liberation of the average person from all forms of oppression. In order to achieve this goal, the ANP supported changes in all spheres of the economy and institutions in order to promote wealth and economic advancement. The ANP was cognizant of Pakistan's geostrategic significance from the outside, given its geographic location, nuclear capacity, and the interest of other nations in Pakistan with respect to their regional and international politics. The ANP placed a strong emphasis on amicable and cordial relations with all nations, particularly its neighbors, while keeping in mind these facts. It additionally asked for respect to the charter of the United Nations Organisation (UNO).

It supported the idea of a multipolar world where bilateral and worldwide disputes between states are settled diplomatically. It promised to pay special attention to Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan and India. I proclaimed that Pakistan's government would base its international relations on the country's interests and that no outside power would be permitted to meddle in the country's domestic or foreign affairs. It declared unequivocally that self-respect and reciprocal dignity would be the cornerstones of its relationship with the United States of America (USA). Moreover, it pledged that Pakistan will take the lead in international organizations and support diplomatic methods rather than military force to resolve disputes on a global scale. The themes of poverty, social evils, extremism, and the lack of a legal system in FATA were emphasized by the ANP in the final section of its 2008 general election platform. The ANP suggested political adjustments and developmental reforms in FATA to end these issues. It was suggested that FATA and KP combine as soon as feasible. All human rights should be protected there, and the Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR) should be repealed. It is necessary to expand the number of seats set aside for tribal areas in various legislatures or representative bodies and to extend the Political Parties Act of Pakistan to include FATA. Additionally, it backed local administrations around the nation that had complete authority. It called for development initiatives for FATA to be on par with those in other provinces and, in some circumstances, even more so because FATA had been neglected for so long by Pakistan's previous governments, leading to inadequate infrastructure and poverty there.

### **3.9. The ANP's Domination in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**

On February 18, 2008, KP's province assembly elections were held concurrently with the national assembly elections. In the provincial elections of 2008, the ANP emerged as the front-runner. Out of the 124 seats altogether, it won 48. In KP, there were 1, 05, 00,430 registered voters overall, of whom 35, 59,276 cast ballots. Attendance as a whole was 33.46%. Excluding ballots that were returned unqualified, the turnout was 32.4%. The KP provincial legislature had 124 seats in total, of which 99 were reserved for general use, 22 for women, and 3 for minorities. Following ANP, MMA held the third spot with ten seats, followed by the PPPP with thirty seats. The ANP was not able to gain a simple majority and seize power in the province, even though they had the most members in the KP provincial assembly. As a result, KP saw the establishment of a coalition government. KP's new chief minister is Amir Haider Khan Hoti. The KP provincial assembly elected Khushdil Khan of the ANP and Karamat Ullah Chagharmati of the PPPP to the positions of Speaker and Deputy Speaker, respectively. An equal number of ministers from the PPPP and ANP were selected to the fourteen-member government. In the assembly, Bashir Ahmad Bilour was named the ANP's Parliamentary Leader and Senior Minister. He also received the position of Minister of Rural and Local Government. Mian Iftikhar Hussain was named Minister of Information and Public Relations, Arbab Ayub Jan was named Minister of Agriculture, and Wajid Ali Khan was named Minister of Forests and Wildlife. Ayub Khan Asharhi was given the Ministry of Science and Technology, while Zarshaid Khan was appointed the Ministry of Zakat and Usher. Barrister Arshad Abdullah was given the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, while Sardar Hussain Babak was given the Ministry of Education. Nemroz Khan was granted the Ministry of Auqaf and Haj, Syed Aqil Shah was named Minister of Sports, Culture, and Tourism, and Mian Nisar Gul was elected Minister of Jails. ANP member Sitara Ayaz received a job offer from the Ministry of Social Welfare.

While ANP was unable to fulfill its promises in every area, it excelled in the areas of social sector development, education, and provincial autonomy. The main accomplishments of the ANP government were the establishment of seven universities in various KP cities, the maximum level of provincial autonomy granted by the 18th constitutional amendment, and the renaming of NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan P. o., 2010). It also passed a number of laws and regulations, the primary goals of which were to raise money for the government's ongoing expenses.

For example, the government raised the taxes and penalty on cars every year. In an effort to raise money, the government also raised the general sale tax. Although it offered career options, they were not very fulfilling. The government reinstated government employees who had been suspended and made contract workers permanent. The ANP made significant contributions to child protection legislation and the creation of penalties for pedophiles and child abusers. It established various child welfare institutes in each district. Committees to protect children were also established by the government. It was enhancing youth detention centers while adhering to humanitarian standards. Children who committed crimes were given basic education. We also considered their social recruitment and mental health. In light of the fact that terrorism peaked in KP during the ANP's rule, the government set several rescue centers. These rescue centers were established to offer prompt first help during crises. Additionally, the ANP government established unique institutes for the purpose of training judges. Every court employee in those institutions received training to guarantee prompt justice. Ombudsmen were chosen to promote the rule of law and justice, combat illicit activity, and eradicate corruption.

### **3.10. Obstacles in the ANP Manifesto's Implementation during its Ruling Tenure**

Following its victory in the 2008 national elections, the ANP attempted to carry out the promises outlined in its manifesto. It was successful in areas such as health, women's empowerment, education, and certain development initiatives, but it fell short in other areas. ANP had numerous challenges in carrying out its platform, but the biggest one that ultimately the party's undoing was its incapacity to combat the continued terrorism.

#### **3.10.1. Terrorism: The Primary Obstacle to ANP Success**

ANP's primary goals were to peacefully eradicate terrorism and establish peace throughout the province. Unfortunately, the public did not support the government's efforts to bring about peace because they were afraid of terrorist strikes. Pakistan suffered mostly as a result of joining forces with the US-led war on terror. Russia is hostile toward Pakistan because of the alliance Pakistan formed with the US in the 1980s to fight the old USSR in Afghan Jihad. Millions of Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan as a result of the Afghan conflict in the 1980s. Pakistan experienced severe disruptions to its social structure, peace, and harmony as a result, leading to extremism and sectarianism. The coalition that Pakistan and the US formed in Afghanistan after 9/11 led to a

number of socioeconomic issues in Pakistan overall and in KP and the former FATA in particular, which is what led to terrorism in the country. Terrorism had a significant negative impact on people's social, economic, and political lives. Pakistan's government first permitted US drone strikes and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) targeted operations while refusing to intervene in FATA to combat terrorist activity.

Thousands of innocent people died as a result, inciting Pakhtuns to harbor animosity toward the provincial government of the ANP at the time. The militants then turned the provincial government of ANP in KP into an easy target after Pakistan launched military operations against them. Because the ANP was generally regarded as a secular party, terrorists opposed it for ideological reasons as well. As a result, the terrorists always assaulted the ANP whenever it attempted to arrange a rally. It occurred not just in KP and FATA but also in Sindh and Balochistan. Between 2008 and 2013, terrorist assaults claimed the lives of almost 700 ANP activists. There was a rift between the leadership, employees, and supporters of ANP since it was included on the terrorist organization's hit list. ANP was likewise unsuccessful in putting its FATA policies into practice. ANP contributed to FATA's political and socioeconomic growth, just like other KP segments. ANP's Central Executive Committee passed a resolution to combine FATA with KP in order to eradicate terrorism from the region, but the then-central government and religious-political parties rejected the proposal. Both the populace and political adversaries rejected the ANP's attempts to combat terrorism and extremism. Religious parties in KP, together with elites in the military and public society, sharply criticized the ANP whenever it attempted to implement progressive policies. Because of this, the ANP was unable to fully carry out its manifesto in KP during its eight years in power.

### **3.10.2. Growth of Political Islam in the Province: An Additional Barrier to ANP**

A center for religious-political parties is KP. Pakistan and the US formed a coalition to oppose Russia in Afghanistan following the Russian invasion of that country in 1979. Then-President of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq, used the slogan "Islam was in danger" in Afghanistan in response to the Russian onslaught in an attempt to win over the Muslim Ummah and the masses of Pakistanis living there. He also proclaimed Pakistan to be becoming more Islamic. In the banner of jihad (the Holy War), Pakistan trained Mujahedeen to oppose Russian soldiers in Afghanistan with assistance from the US. Afghanistan suffered greatly as a result of the conflict, and its citizens fled to their

neighboring nations. When refugees arrived in Pakistan, the social structure of both KP and Pakistan as a whole was upset. In the meantime, Iran experienced an Islamic Revolution that neither the USA nor the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) could accept; as a result, both countries formed new alliances in the area to oppose Iran. To counteract the consequences of the Iranian Shia'at Revolution on Pakistan, they also sent funding to Pakistan. Sectarianism was sparked by the training of Mujahedeen, the Islamization process, and animosity toward the Shia community. This, in turn, made room for Wahabi Islam in Pakistan.

Wahabi Islam led to social instability in Malakand and Swat, resulting in Tehreek e.Nifaz e.Shariat e. Muhammad (TNSM) (Abid, Naveed, & Khan, 2010). No religious organization in KP accepted the ANP's objective of democratic socialism, federalism, Pakhtun nationalism, and secularism. ANP faced obstacles from terrorist groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaida, and various religious and political elements. In addition to terrorist groups, political issues also had a role in the failure of the organization to achieve its goals of combating extremism and restoring calm in the province. Islam was employed by the province's religious parties as a political instrument. Pakistan recognized the Taliban administration in Afghanistan in 1996, even though the majority of the Taliban government in Kabul was made up of Mujahedeen. There was a Wahabist slant among these Mujahedeen. Pakistanis in general and Pakhtuns in particular did not approve of Pakistan's decision to side with the US and reject the Taliban administration following the 9/11 attacks. As a result, in the 2002 general election, the vast majority of voters in Balochistan and the NWFP choose the Muslim-Muslim coalition (MMA), a coalition of religious-political parties, to represent them. The execution of Taliban ideas, such as the destruction of music halls, female schools, video stores, and the prohibition of coeducation, was made possible by the presence of religio-political groups in power in KP. The MMA's KP provincial government and the then-Pakistani central government both failed to take significant action to quell the escalating insurgency in the region. The KP was severely radicalized by it. Although MMA suffered a great deal in the 2008 federal elections, its past actions in KP posed grave risks to the ANP's newly formed administration. Threats were always present for the ANP whenever it attempted to enact progressive legislation or liberal policies in the province. The so-called mullahs and other religious zealots were the source of these threats.

### **3.10.3. The 18th Amendment and the Proposal to Establish Hazara Province**

The issue of ethnic and regional sub-nationalism in Pakistan's smaller provinces is one of the country's main unresolved conflict areas. Pakistan is still a more coherent state than it was before East Pakistan's split, but significant issues still need to be addressed, which makes nation-building more difficult.

People of many ethnicities, cultures, and languages live in Pakistan. The nation's administrative province boundaries remain upheld in spite of its diverse makeup. This federation consists of four provinces and a center, i.e. Baluchistan, KPO, Sindh, and Punjab. The demographics and geographical areas of the four provinces vary. Punjab is the largest region in terms of population, home to 55% of Pakistan's total population, while Baluchistan is the largest geographically but only accounts for 5% of the country's total population. There are rural and urban areas in Sindh. Native Sindhis make up the majority in rural areas, while Mohajirs—Urdu speakers who immigrated to Pakistan from India during the subcontinent's 1947 partition—make up the majority in urban areas. Although Pakhtuns make up the majority, there are other linguistic and ethnic groups in KP. Living in KP's eight districts—Abbottabad, Haripur, Mansehra, Battagram, Upper Kohistan, Lower Kohistan, Kolai Pallas Kohistan, and Torghar—the Hindko-speaking group is the second-largest in the state.

The 18th Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution, which was ratified on April 10, 2010, altered the province's name from NWFP to KP. The inhabitants of the Hazara Division identify as a distinct ethnic, linguistic, and cultural group inside KP known as “Hazarawal.” They therefore began to demonstrate against the former NWFP being renamed as KP. Their protest quickly descended into violence, and on April 12, 2010, authorities used force to suppress the rallies in Abbottabad, which resulted in injuries. It spurred a movement among Hazara people to establish “Subay-i-Hazara,” a distinct province within Hazara. The Hazara people exhibit a certain togetherness amidst their variety. The area is multilingual, multiethnic, and multicultural. For instance, the ethnic composition of the Hazara people consists of both non-Pakhtuns like Sardars and Abbasis and Pakhtuns like Tareens, Mashwanis, and Jadoons. There are also a variety of languages spoken there. For instance, whereas Kohistani is the native language of the people living in Kohistan, Hindko is the language spoken by most people in the districts of Mansehra, Abbottabad, and Haripur. The primary language spoken in the districts of Battagram and Torgrah is Pashto. The Hazara people still identify as a group as “Hazarawal” despite their great ethnic and linguistic

variety. According to the leaders of the “Subay-i-Hazara” movement, Hazara is a mineral and resource-rich region. It is possible to develop the tourism department for revenue collection. Moreover, Khanpur Dam construction could provide royalty and jobs to the province.

The Hazara Division of KP's demonstrations against the national and local administrations put obstacles in the path of the ANP's policy implementation. ANP had to contend with both Hazara anti-government protests and acts of terrorism in Pakhtun-dominated districts. Despite being a provincial autonomist political party, the ANP never backed the creation of “Subay-i-Hazara;” instead, it favored the development of Saraikistan in Punjab, which is why the ANP government was unable to resolve this issue. Because of this, it demonstrated a mismatch between theory and practice, which further reduced its appeal to non-Pakhtuns in KP in general and the Hazara Division in particular.

### **3.11. Advantages of the ANP Government**

The most important aspect of contemporary democracies is their political parties. Public opinion is effectively presented by political parties. As a political party, ANP strives for the welfare of the general populace in addition to presenting public opinion. Every political party has both advantages and disadvantages that determine whether the general public finds them credible or not. The ANP's achievements over its five years in power in KP are listed below.

### **3.12. ANP is a Fervent Supporter of Province Autonomy**

Outside of Pakistan, the ANP is seen as a left-wing secular party. It is the descendent of Khudai Khidmatgari and also known to be Pakhtun nationalist party. It has been passed through many stages of evolution. It has consistently opposed the desire for province autonomy and the consolidation of power throughout its political career in Pakistan. It was in alliance with the PPPP in KP and Sindh, as well as in the center, from 2008 to 2013. During this time, it was in government and carried on the fight for provincial autonomy. On April 10, 2010, the PPPP-led government in the center passed the 18th amendment to the 1973 Pakistani Constitution, making their struggle successful. The decentralization of powers originally intended by the 1973 constitution was reinstated with the ratification of the 18th Amendment, which was regarded as a turning point in Pakistan's political and constitutional history.

If the province been regulated, the 18th Amendment would have had an impact on both the political structure and the economy. With the introduction of the provincial legislative list and the repeal of the 1973 Constitution's concurrent legislative list, the provinces gained significant economic power. It is also very significant since it brought back the two most significant organizations in the Federation of Pakistan: the National Economic Council (NEC) and the Council of Common Interests (CCI). In order to give the provinces more control over their individual economic problems, several institutions were reestablished. The Prime Minister, the chief ministers of each of the four provinces, and three federally nominated individuals made up the CCI's eight members. The primary purpose of the CCI was to settle power-sharing disputes between the federal government and the provinces, while the primary duty of the NEC was to provide advice to both the federal and provincial governments on the development of policies pertaining to financial, commercial, social, and economic matters. The council must convene no less frequently than once every six months. Therefore, in an effort to address every issue pertaining to federating units, the 18th Amendment has tried to revitalize these institutions. The same 18th amendment also addressed renaming the NWFP to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The ANP achieved maximum provincial autonomy and kept its pledge to rename the province by enacting the 18th constitutional amendment.

### **3.13. The alliance between the ANP and the PPPP (A Central Political Party)**

Political parties govern political systems, particularly democracies. Powerful national political parties are viewed as links between the center and the many federating units of any federation. They are regarded as a potent source for fostering harmony and cohesion among the populace. Following the 2008 national elections, in which the ANP secured the majority of provincial seats in KP, the PPPP—which had become the center's most prominent political party in terms of high seat totals—formed a coalition government with the ANP. Having the federal government's support at its core proved to be an asset for the ANP. As the central government partner of PPPP, ANP encountered no significant obstacles from the federal government during the implementation of its plans in KP. With the assistance of its coalition partner at the center (PPPP), it was able to carry out its policies in the areas of social issues, economic sector development, education, health, and the judicial system.



### **3.14. The Government of ANP Places a High Priority on Education**

One of the most important instruments for shaping society's ethical and cultural norms is education. In addition, education increases public awareness, builds national cohesion, and produces labor. It is undeniably true that progress and nation-building depend heavily on education. It has always been a part of human history and the development of ideas. Analysis revealed that in the past, it was solely in the hands of the wealthy, which slowed down societal development. Now, however, everyone has access to it as it is a fundamental human right. The lack of education was the cause of the chaos in modern societies. One of the key tenets of democracy is an informed populace, since ignorance and democracy are mutually exclusive. Illiterate masses are not only a threat to democracy but also toxic to other parts of the society. The true purpose of education is to enable people and equip them to handle complexity, diversity, and change. Thus, it has been demonstrated that the only way to address socioeconomic problems in a society like Pakistan's is via education. As the governing party in KP, ANP carried out its policies in the field of education with the goal of educating the general public. In order to provide higher education for the general public, it established seven separate universities in various cities throughout KP. The ANP government upheld the law requiring free education for a maximum of sixteen years. These laws turned into the ANP government's main asset. It delivers on more of its manifesto promises in the field of education.

### **3.15. Development of the Social Sector as an ANP Strength**

On April 8, 2010, Amir Haider Khan Hoti, the Chief Minister of the ANP, spoke before the KP provincial assembly and pledged to provide the greatest social sector outcomes. The population of KP is primarily rural and social concerns and evils are rampant among the society. For a greater social uplift, ANP made legislations in the health sector, especially in terrorism-proven zones of KP like Malakand. It also worked for the eradication of poverty and social evils, provision of clean drinking water, and food security. ANP also implemented regulations addressing child protection, woman protection, and juvenile. Development in the social setup became the strength of ANP because limited access to social services like education, health, and clean drinking water, etc. is one of the most serious concerns affecting rural people of Pakistan. In order to strengthen the technical personnel, ANP built numerous institutes for the training of students. It also paid significant emphasis to the promotion of research and information technology. ANP with its

coalition partner PPPP tried to do its best in the social sector but was unable owing to the difficulties created by terrorism.

### **3.16. Weaknesses of the ANP's Government**

The political parties are major drivers of the political machinery in a state and have a strong role in the evolution of democracy. In a country like Pakistan where there is a multi-party system, it is difficult for political parties to establish a foothold. Some of the major political parties in Pakistan include PPPP, PML-N, and ANP have majority voters in their respective home provinces due to their strengths. While having strengths, these parties also have weaknesses that limit their popularity among the populace. The shortcomings of the ANP from 2008 to 2013, when it was in power in KP, are listed below.

### **3.17. The ANP's Inability to Stop Terrorism**

One of the hardest regions in Pakistan to rule over is KP. It became harder for political leaders to do their best work in this region as a result of the war in Afghanistan and, moreover, following the US-led war on terror against the Taliban. The people of KP have changed their legislators in every general election in an effort to address both their general problems and the continuous militancy in particular. Despite the ANP's harsh criticism and attempts to use force against the militants, their actions were not curbed. Because of its secular orientation, it was attacked by extremists between 2008 and 2013. Although the topic of eradicating terrorism came up multiple times during provincial legislative discussions, not a single piece of law was created to address the issue. Operation Rah-i-Rast was undertaken in Swat against terrorists commanded by Maulana Sufi Muhammad and son-in-law Mulla Fazl Ullah during the ANP's stint in power, but it was successful in ending the terrorism scourge once and for all. Rather, because of the ANP's position on terrorism and secular-cum-socialist ideology, a large number of party employees and activists were targeted by terrorists. Attacks by suicide targeting the party's leadership and events turned into a regular occurrence. Its leadership avoided frequent large-scale events as a result, isolating themselves from their fans and causing a rift to develop.

### **3.18. A Rise in the Jobless Rate**

Across the globe, one of the biggest problems is unemployment. Pakistan, a developing nation, struggled greatly with unemployment, particularly in KP's rural areas. In KP, the unemployment graph grew daily under the ANP government. ANP came to power at a time when terrorism was seriously affecting KP's socioeconomic structure. Even though it established technical and other institutes in an attempt to fully deliver on its promise, it fell short.

### **3.19. Politics in Dynasties**

Political parties, as one of the main pillars of the political system, govern the political system of a nation. When there are no political parties, national issues and disputes are resolved by coercion, but when there are political parties, these issues and disputes are resolved in accordance with popular desire. Political parties are used by democracies all over the world to transfer power. Political parties serve as a conduit for ideas between centers and federating units. Political parties with strong political ideologies and a history of corruption and despotism steer the nation away from prosperity and toward harmony, development, and prosperity. Pakistan operates under a multi-party system, with many regional parties taking part in both national and local elections. Following Pakistan's independence, the colonial legacy has permeated the country's political system, systematically destroying the country's whole democratic framework.

Political parties' democratic cultures were essential to the nation's economic growth and political stability. Similar to other political parties, ANP lacks a democratic culture. Whether they are leftist or rightist, the majority of Pakistan's major political parties practice dynastic politics. Candidates for many important positions within the ANP are also selected through internal elections, albeit at the leadership's gracious discretion. One of the primary causes of the undemocratic political climate among the parties is nepotism. Similar to the PPP and PML-N, among others, the ANP's top brass transitioned from father to son. Through their conventional households, it surfaced. Due to a few families' monopoly on power, Pakistani political parties have adopted anti-democratic ideologies, and the ANP is experiencing this same problem.

### **3.20. ANP Was Unable to End Intra-Province Disagreements**

In Pakistan, the problem of unequal resource distribution across various regions was pervasive. This dispute lies in the province of KP between the Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan (DIK) Divisions, which are non-Pakhtun dominated areas, and the Pakhtun-dominated areas. The 18th Amendment's enactment resulted in the renaming of NWFP to KP. The majority of KP's Pakhtun residents embraced it. However, non-Pakhtuns began to object to it. The Hazara Division's citizens began protesting against it. They wanted “Subay-i-Hazara,” but the ANP was vehemently against it. On the one hand, the ANP opposed the demand of “Subay-i-Hazara” and supported the development of “Saraikistan,” a plan to divide the Saraiki-speaking regions of southern Punjab in Pakistan. It revealed its inconsistent views and cast doubt on its commitment to the advancement of marginalized ethnic, linguistic, and cultural communities in Pakistan as well as their rights. At the same time, it was unable to bring the Pakhtun and non-Pakhtun populations in the province of KP together in harmony and uniformity. Consequently, the party was unable to gain traction in KP's non-Pakhtun dominated areas and was only able to secure one provincial seat in the Hazara Division.

### **3.21. The Importance of the 2013 Elections**

Pakistan was founded 76 years ago and lived under a dictatorship for more than 32 of those years. Because of this, society was unable to change into a pluralistic society. When Ayub Khan abrogated the 1962 Constitution put forth under his government and surrendered control to Yahya Khan on March 25, 1969, we witnessed a time of transition from one dictator to another (Countrystudy, 2023). Insofar as the failure of a peaceful democratic transition is concerned, the 1977 elections are noteworthy. The founder of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had declared victory, but the opposition alliance organized nationwide demonstrations and dubbed the poll “rigged.” As a result, the ardent Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew the Bhutto government and successfully launched a coup, severely undermining democracy. The democratic parties themselves put democratic transitions in danger in the 1990s (Saddique, 2013). Both the PPP and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) were working to overthrow one other's governments. The Seventeenth Amendment gave the president the authority to dissolve the National Assembly and call elections, hence it was lawfully legitimate. In the 1990s, the typical democratic term was 2.5 years. Until 2008, no democratic administration was able to fulfill its full

term. The completion of any democratic regime's term in Pakistani history occurred on March 17, 2013. The PPP government under President Asif Ali Zardari was the first to serve out the full five-year term and hand control to an elected successor in a nation where the military ruled for more than half of its history, making the elections important.

### **3.21.1. Establishment of an Independent Pakistani Election Commission (ECP)**

The Eighteenth Amendment paved the way for the government and the opposition took a critical step closer to agreeing on the Chief Election Commissioner's (CEC) nomination. The CEC was previously appointed by the president, but the Eighteenth Amendment changed the appointment process and increased the CEC's term from three to five years. (Khan Z. , 2012) To choose one of the six proposed candidates for the position of CEC, a 12-member parliamentary committee was established, made up of 50% members from the government benches and 50% members from the opposition benches. For the position of CEC, the government nominated Justice (R) Munir A Sheikh, Justice (R) Admiral Mulk Mengal, and Justice (R) Zahid Qurban Alvi, while the largest opposition party, the PML-N, nominated Justices (R) Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, Justice (R) Nasim Sikander, and Justice (R) Shakirullah Jan. After then, the government gave in to the opposition's request and named Justice (R) Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim as the ECP's leader. With the presentation of the Elections Laws (Amendment) Bill 2011, the government took another significant step toward ensuring “free and fair” elections (Ahmad T. , 2011). Three main goals were the main emphasis of the bill. The holding of free, transparent, and fair elections was the primary goal. The election laws needed to be brought into compliance with the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act of 2010, and the security and integrity of the electoral rolls database was the second objective. Additionally, one of the most significant aspects of the bill was the need that voters to provide their identity cards both when registering to vote and when casting a ballot. This particular aspect was crucial since, according to Syed Khurshid Shah, around 37 million votes cast in past general elections were invalid, with the majority of these votes coming from the Punjab region (Ahmad T. , 2011). As a result, the requirement that voters produce their identity cards when casting ballots worked wonders to prevent voter fraud and election tampering.

### **3.21.1. Initiatives Undertaken by the Pakistan Election Commission**

The ECP's performance during the 2008 general elections was criticized in the reports made by international observers. As a result, the Commission was given additional incentive to improve before the nation underwent the historic shift. As a result, the Election Commission developed a five-year strategic plan (2010-2014) (ECP, 5-Year Strategic Plan, 2010). In the Commission's fifty-year history, this initiative was the first of its kind. The 15 strategic aims and objectives contained in the strategic plan were as follows:

- Legal system
- Voter registration and electoral rolls
- Conducting elections
- Election grievances and conflict settlement
- Restructuring the Pakistani Election Commission
- Office facilities, supplies, and equipment for the Election Commission
- Personnel administration and compensation
- Budget and finance
- Education, investigation, and assessment
- Computer technology
- Public outreach and communication with the media, civil society organizations, and political parties
- Candidates and political parties
- Voter participation and voter education
- Groups that are marginalized, such as women, minorities, and people with impairments
- Pakistan Election Commission's branding (ECP, 5-Year Strategic Plan, 2010)

Election Dispute Settlement (EDS), which assists the electorate in seeking settlement of election complaints and disputes, is another crucial instrument. Additionally, it helps to keep the voting process legitimate and credible. After the 2008 general elections, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) and other international observers voiced concerns about the ECP's EDR methodology (Mission, 2008). Making the EDR mechanism successful thus became crucial for the ECP.

To maintain the trust of the ECP for the voters, major steps were taken to considerably reduce the likelihood of rigging and maximize transparency. The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) assisted in the preparation of computerized electoral rolls to remove errors, duplicate entries, and bogus entries present in the previous electoral rolls. Additionally, for the first time in the history of general elections, voter photographs were printed alongside their names in the electoral rolls to further obviate the possibility of rigging. In collaboration with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the ECP sponsored training programs for more than 600,000 poll workers (UNDP, 2013). The program sought to improve the skills of the poll workers so they could carry out their responsibilities and tasks with assurance and objectivity. A code of conduct was also implemented by the ECP to prevent extravagant spending and unethical behavior by the candidates. The amount allotted for election expenses was 1.5 million rupees for candidates running for the National Assembly and one million rupees for provincial assembly candidates. Election Day transportation provided by political parties and their employees was prohibited, as were the use of loudspeakers and wall chalking outside of significant election sessions. Parties were not allowed to put up camps near polling places on election day, and it was completely forbidden to use any methods to influence voters' decisions to vote for a specific candidate or not. Anyone found breaking the aforementioned restrictions would be subject to a fine of 5000 rupees and a sentence of up to three years in prison, according to the ECP (ECP, Press Release, 2008).

Political parties were forbidden by the ECP from asking voters to support them based on their race, religion, gender, or caste. Maulana Fazlur Rahman, the leader of Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, criticized this decision and claimed the ECP represented a secular attitude (Hassan, 2013).

### **3.21.3. The Army's Contributions**

In recent years, Pakistan has seen unparalleled judicial activism. The Supreme Court took its duty to help the ECP conduct free, fair, transparent, and impartial elections extremely seriously. The Supreme Court instructed the ECP to fulfill its constitutional duty without restriction or ambiguity to achieve this. It supported the ECP in a disagreement between the ECP and the Law Ministry on changes that were being considered for candidate nomination paperwork (Ghau, 2013). Additionally, the Supreme Court mandated that Article 218(3) of the Constitution, which gives the ECP authority, be put into effect. By using Article 190 of the Constitution<sup>6</sup>, it also commanded the government to follow the constitution's rules and its ruling, which prepared the path for free, transparent, and fair elections. The apex court had recommended delimitation as one of many ways to put Karachi back on a path of peace and stability, keeping in mind the city's unsteady law and order situation. It requested that the ECP come up with a plan for defining the city's constituencies. The Supreme Court's five-judge bench was advised at a hearing by Secretary ECP Ishtiaq Ahmed that consensus was necessary for delimitation. In his statement that the implementation of the Supreme Court's judgment was unrealistic in the absence of new consensus, Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim referred to the delimitation of Karachi before the general elections as “impossible (Ayub, 2013) (Tribune E. , 2013).” The delimitation of certain constituencies, including NA-239, NA-250, NA-254, PS-89, PS-112, PS-113, PS-114, PS-116, PS-118, and PS-124, was announced by the ECP as a result of constant pressure from the apex court (Tribune E. , 2013). The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the city's largest political stakeholder, challenged the delimitation and called it “illegal and unconstitutional.”

### **3.21.4. Army's Role**

The Pakistani Army, seeing how precarious the country's security was, granted the ECP unrestricted support. The Pakistan Army changed the security strategy to deploy troops to the most crucial voting places in response to a letter from the CEC outlining the security issues the ECP was facing. The Pakistan Army also played a crucial role in preventing fraudulent acts of tampering with ballot papers by supervising the entire printing process. It was decided that 70,000 troops

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<sup>6</sup> All executive and judicial authorities throughout Pakistan shall act in aid of the Supreme Court the du



would be stationed throughout the nation to carry out election-related duties, including the provision of security and maintaining law and order (Khan I. A., 2013).

### **3.21.5. Emergence of Other Political Actors**

Other political actors have begun to emerge in the last three to four years, becoming significant players in the nation's political system. The political dominance and position of the two major parties, the PPP and PML-N, were directly contested by these actors. Imran Khan influenced the crowd with “tsunami” shouts, and Tahir-ul-Qadri convinced his supporters to organize a large-scale rally in Islamabad in support of electoral changes. The former applauded the selection of Fakharuddin G. Ebrahim as CEC, but later, PTI spokesman Shafqat Mehmood stated that his party was unhappy with the ECP's performance (Ghumman, 2013), even though it had complied with Imran Khan's suggestion to place troops at sensitive polling stations. (Website, <http://wap.jang.com.pk/GeoDetail.aspx?ID=794>, 2023)

Tahir-ul-Qadri had returned from his self-imposed exile in Canada and reached unprecedented levels of fame and popularity after showcasing He effectively drew in the massive crowds and inspired them to take action. He set out on an adventure, which he dubbed the Long March, from Lahore to Islamabad with the aid of his religious followers to raise awareness of the corruption that was rife. However, in Islamabad, he presented the government with a four-point agenda that included electoral reforms by the Constitution, enforcement of Articles 62, 63, and 218 of the Constitution, dissolution of the ECP, constitutional assemblies, and a demand for the formation of an impartial interim government before the general elections. (Qadri, 2013) However, these demands were immediately rejected by the ruling coalition as well as the opposition and legal experts who had already made similar objections. The talks were successful, and the negotiating team was able to convince Qadri to end the protest.

Interestingly, the government did not carry through any of the decisions, and when Qadri petitioned the Supreme Court to have the ECP reconstituted, the court rejected his request and questioned his allegiance to Queen Elizabeth under the oath of Canadian citizenship. Therefore, the pretend messiah was unable to accomplish anything significant. The main screening of candidates was done considering Articles 62, 63, and 63A of the Constitution, which deal with the qualification and disqualification of candidates.

### **3.21.6. Scrutiny and Disqualification**

Scrutiny was conducted on several grounds. According to the Constitution, these articles must be strictly followed. These articles stipulate that candidates must meet these requirements to run in the general elections: strong moral character, righteousness, honesty, reliability, and adherence to Islamic teachings. The ECP's decision to examine the candidates in light of these articles angered the majority of legislators because they were engaged in corrupt activities. There is no reliable system in place to evaluate morality, justice, and reliability. As a result, the Returning Officers (ROs) were given the authority to conduct the screening and the additional authority to reject the nomination papers of candidates who engaged in behavior that violated the code of conduct (Ghauri, 2013). When the ROs started the screening process, they raised irrational, inappropriate, and amusing questions. Civil society, lawmakers, and human rights advocates who objected to the ROs' actions strongly disapproved of the contentious screening procedure. As a result, the Lahore High Court and the ECP acted, prohibiting the media from covering the scrutiny process (Website, 2023) and ordering the ROs not to ask irrelevant or intrusive questions (Sheikh W. A., 2013). The candidates also faced disqualification for providing false degrees and documentation, failing to declare their assets, and possessing dual citizenship.

### **3.21.7. Election-Related Violence**

In addition to having the highest voter turnout ever, the 2013 general elections were marred by pre-election violence and bloodshed. To undermine democracy, the radical forces promised to rig the elections. To weaken politicians and instill fear in the populace, they started carrying out attacks on their offices, camps, and large gatherings of political parties. The main targets were secular and progressive parties like MQM, PPP, and ANP that had supported military operations against radicals. These parties were unable to effectively campaign across the nation, in contrast to the rightist or center-right parties like the PML-N and Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), who organized large-scale public rallies and campaigned with the greatest vigor and enthusiasm. Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a banned militant group that is responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks, has promoted an anti-democracy agenda and rejected a religious decree (fatwa) issued by Pakistani religious scholars emphasizing the value of voting as “compulsory under Islamic junctions (Khan T. , 2013).” TTP also acknowledged responsibility for numerous attacks on the PPP, MQM, and ANP and promised to continue these attacks. As Khyber Pakhtunkhwa saw the

majority of attacks during the pre-election period, ANP suffered significant losses. However, compared to the attacks on liberal parties, religious parties were only *marginally* targeted by radicals. The report titled “Elections and Violence Monitoring Report (PIPS, 2013)” stated that 298 people lost their lives and 885 others were injured throughout Pakistan between 1 January and 15 May in 148 reported terrorist attacks on political leaders, workers, and voters, in addition to 97 incidents of political violence. Many international organizations and foreign powers expressed concern over the country's deteriorating situation as it was about to witness the historic transfer of power.

### **3.21.8. Media's Role**

Under Pervez Musharraf's leadership, the Pakistani media saw a remarkable liberalization. This resulted in a significant boom in the industry, as seen by the fact that there were just three state-run channels in operation in 2000, but that number has now increased to over 89, both public and private. While free and active, Pakistani media also tends to be sensationalistic and extensively monetized. The media is extremely important, especially as the election transition draws near. By closely examining the choices and actions made by the ECP, the Supreme Court, the caretaker government, and the military forces, the electronic and print media played the role of a watchdog. The media highlighted all divisions between institutions on political and organizational levels on the transparency, fairness, and impartiality of the elections. One of the most important things the media can do is to inform the public about the value of voting in a democracy. Various media outlets ran several initiatives to inform and motivate the public to cast their ballots. To reach a larger audience and provide the best results, all media outlets were used. Furthermore, through electronic, print, and social media, well-known figures from various spheres of society urged the populace to take part in the elections. During elections, a lot of special broadcasts with an emphasis on the platform of various political parties were broadcast. To educate the electorate and aid those in making the essential decision of whom to vote for comparative and critical evaluations were offered.

### **3.21.9. Voting Day (16 May 2013)**

With many parties constantly facing terrorist assaults, conducting elections in a socio-political atmosphere of disarray was a huge problem for the ECP. The law-and-order situation in the nation

was of utmost importance to the interim administration and the ECP since Taliban commander Hakimullah Mehsud had already threatened to attack the PPP and its allies on Election Day. To assist the ECP in fending off security concerns, temporary Prime Minister Justice Mir Hazar Khan Khoso put the National Crisis Management Cell at its disposal.

Despite the ECP's best efforts, several issues plagued the voting day. Due to mistakes made during the voter registration procedure, many voters were prevented from casting a ballot. In the current elections, the names of persons who cast ballots in Karachi in 2008 were not listed in the same constituency. The names of these people were published in other towns and even provinces (PIPS, 2013). Voters and poll workers both filed complaints. The presiding officials at several polling places complained about inadequate and poor-quality polling supplies. Before the polls closed in Karachi, several Islamic political parties—including Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Sunni Tehreek (ST), and JUP—withdrawed their candidates. The MQM-H, a branch of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, also withdrew from the elections. MQM, the main political force in Karachi, chose to partially abstain from the vote. Multiple parties' accusations of rigging in Karachi have called into doubt the ECP's objectivity. In a press conference on Election Day, JI publicly accused MQM of rigging and asked for new elections to be held in each of Karachi's constituencies. While MQM was being accused of rigging elections, PTI chose to run for office rather than boycott. Interestingly, MQM boycotted NA-248 because their agents had been persecuted in Lyari (Haroon, 2013). Allegations weren't just limited to Karachi; they were also made by several parties in other regions of Pakistan. PTI alleged widespread rigging in Lahore's NA-125. Their party members demonstrated against electoral irregularities, such as rigging, in Lahore, Faisalabad, and Narowal, among other places in Punjab. The Baloch National Party-Mengal (BNP-M) in Baluchistan challenged the election results, alleging pre- and post-election cheating against the party (Haroon, 2013). According to the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), “there was more than 100% voter turnout in numerous polling places across the nation for national and provincial constituencies (FAFEN, 2013).” The ECP decided to hold re-voting in various constituencies considering the claims of rigging by various parties. Because of staffing shortages and claims of rigging, NA-250 generated controversy during the whole voting day. The ECP decided to organize re-election after suspending voting in 43 NA-250 polling places. Following the MQM's boycott of the NA-250 election, Arif Alvi of the PTI ultimately prevailed. The ECP also decided to re-poll certain other districts, including NA-

229, NA-230, and NA-103 (Website, 2023). Several terrorist incidents were carried out on Election Day in various cities, resulting in the deaths of 38 people.


A significant bomb explosion that seemed to be directed at the ANP candidate in Landhi signaled the day's start in Karachi. Four bomb explosions and several cracker attacks were reportedly carried out in Karachi on Election Day. More than a dozen explosions and rocket strikes were also reported in the Baluchistan cities of Turbat, Panjgur, Kalat, Mastung, Kuchlak, and Quetta. Supporters of the competing candidates engaged in several violent altercations. While there were no terrorist attacks in Punjab, there were several fights between PML-N and PTI supporters throughout the day in various parts of the province. Four bomb explosions were reported in Peshawar and Mardan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, one of the provinces that experienced the greatest amount of terrorism. Different districts, including Karak, Mansehra, Lakki Marwat, and Upper Dir, reported violent skirmishes.

Despite several threats, voters left their houses on Election Day to take part in the most anticipated elections in Pakistani history. On the other hand, voter enthusiasm was increased by the ECP's promises to make voting easier. In several constituencies, the poll staff was unable to arrive at the voting places in time. Voters lined up to cast their ballots, but there were no poll workers or ballot boxes available. The ECP then declared that polls would remain open an additional hour, till 6:00 pm in all constituencies. In seven of Karachi's constituencies, the extension was increased to three hours. Once more, some Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of KP denied women the opportunity to vote. After JI and PPP agreed, women in Lower Dir were denied the right to vote. A jirga in the Lakki Marwat district barred women from voting. Women were not permitted to vote in several parts of Peshawar. Men generally forbade their wives from voting in Landi Bala, Landi Payan, Sangu, Achini, and Haji Banda (Website, 2023).

### **3.21.10. Results of the 2013 General Election Analysis: National Assembly**

While the election result surprised many people, it was also widely anticipated. The outcomes caused a significant change in party positions in the National Assembly. For instance, the parties that made up the last coalition government were able to win together about 52 seats.

**Figure: 1.1** (DAWN, Elections 2013 Result Analysis, 2013)



In the 2013 general elections, PML (N), which had won 92 seats in the National Assembly in the 2008 elections (ECP, Election Commission of Pakistan, 2013), won 183 seats, making it the winning party. Mohammed Hanif, a well-known columnist, elucidated the motivations behind Nawaz Sharif's support. People chose him because of how much money he talks about spending and how he wants to open a bank on every village street, the author claimed in his essay (Hanif, 2013). Most parties focused their pre-election efforts on Punjab, where more than 80% of PML-N seats are located. This demonstrates Punjab's importance in electoral politics. Famous people like Qamar Zaman Kaira and two former prime ministers, Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, and Raja Pervez Ashraf, lost the conflict in this province. From its 125 seats in 2008 to its 41 seats in this election, PPP dramatically reduced its size. "The PPP government could not handle the electricity crisis, and this caused the party's defeat in the elections," President Asif Ali Zardari said in accepting the PPP's loss (Qayum, 2013). He continued by saying the PPP used a subpar electoral approach, which led to fewer seats. In the end, it was a touching conclusion for those who supported the party.

Several polls conducted before the election indicated that PTI was the party with the highest support. Because of its extensive election campaign and widespread popularity, it was anticipated before Election Day that PTI would win with a clear majority. Imran Khan's election campaign, according to Mohammed Hanif, "galvanized not only Pakistan's parasitical upper classes but also


found support among the country's young men and women of all ages.” He motivated rebels to leave their homes and endure hours of sweltering heat to cast their votes for him (Hanif, 2013). To win more seats, PTI ran their campaign primarily in metropolitan areas in Punjab. PML-N outperformed PTI in Punjab, contrary to PTI's expectations, and it could only win 30 seats in the National Assembly. Compared to the 13 seats it won in 2008, the ANP was unable to persuade the electorate and was only able to win one seat. In actuality, KP was the most badly hit province. Its leadership had pushed for “level playing fields” because of this during the election campaign. On the other hand, some would contend that ANP's performance over the previous five years harmed its standing in the province.

According to MQM, “illegal, undemocratic, and violations of the law are being used tactics to prevent the MQM from participating in elections. (MQM, 2013).” Altaf Hussain advised his regular supporters to go door to door and spread the MQM's electoral message (MQM, 2013). MQM won 23 seats total, down from 25 seats in 2008, as was the case with other PPP partners. MQM suffered a severe blow in this election as a result of the reduction of its seats from Karachi from 17 to 15. Since the PML-Q was neither a victim of terrorism nor a member of the Punjab administration, their defeat is difficult to understand. From 50 seats in 2008 to two seats in 2013, PML-Q has decreased. Its participation in the federal government and its affiliation with PPP are likely to be blamed for its defeat.

### 3.21.11. Election Results Analysis of Provincial Assemblies, Particularly KP


#### Punjab Assembly

(Figure 1.2) (DAWN, Elections 2013 Result Analysis, 2013)



The Punjab Assembly was easily won by the PML-N, as seen in Figure 1.2 above, leaving little room for the opposition. Even as PTI became a serious challenger in the province, it was difficult to limit PML-N's power as it increased its seat total from the 172 it held in 2008 (Pakistan E. C., 2013). On the other hand, the PPP saw a decrease in both National Assembly and Punjab Assembly seats. In 2013, there were just six seats, down from 106 in 2008. Given that this huge decline is the worst outcome for the PPP in the province's electoral history, many questions have been raised about the party's future. Rivals disqualified well-known figures including Khar, Jatoi, Gilani, Cheema, Kaira, Bharwana, Raja, and Wattoo. Latif Khosa, a former governor of Punjab, afterward claimed that the election was rigged (Tahir, 2013). Another significant participant, PML-Q, suffered greatly as a result of the elections. It had previously lost several National Assembly members, but because of this, it drastically decreased from 79 seats in 2008 to just eight seats in 2013. With 26 seats, PTI became the second-largest party. It's interesting to note that Imran Khan had promised to win the election handily, but his hopes were dashed when Nawaz Sharif's political savvy gave him an increase in support. To replace PPP and PML-Q and become the second-largest party, nevertheless, is a significant accomplishment for a young party.

**Sindh Assembly (Figure 1.3)**






The PML-N's close political cooperation with Sindhi nationalist groups was an effort to challenge the PPP's dominance of the province's politics. A 10-party national alliance was created for this purpose, consisting of the Sindh United Front, Sindh Taraqqi Pasand Party, Qaumi Awami Tehrik, PML N, Pakistan Muslim League Functional (JUI-F), and JI. The “anti-PPP slogan (DAWN, 2013)” was used by all of these parties, but the voter was unmoved by their rhetoric. The nationalist parties suffered a crushing loss at the hands of the PPP as a result. About the nationalist parties, Jaffer Ahmed, the chairman of the Pakistan Study Centre, said, “A slogan for the sake of nationalism and against PPP is not just enough (DAWN, 2013).” PPP won 90 seats, maintaining its political control and majority.

Although MQM tried hard to improve its standing in Sindh, the ethnic stamp once more limited it to Urdu-speaking metropolitan areas. By winning 48 seats, MQM continued the pattern and rose to the position of second-largest party in Sindh. After 11 years (DAWN, 2013), the PML-N finally won a seat from Sindh, though the margin of victory was small. However, despite forming a broad coalition with the PML-N and other nationalist parties, the PML-F was only able to obtain six seats. PPP and MQM maintained their position in Sindh despite terrorist activity and poor governance, to sum up the province's results.

**KP Assembly** (Pakistan E. C., 2023)

(Figure 1.4)




Election results in KP have a specific history of extreme disparity. The government of NWFP, now KP, was made up of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a coalition of Islamic parties made up of JUI-F, JUP, Tehrik-i-Jafaria Pakistan, Jamiat Ahle Hadith, and a few other smaller organizations

(Tribune T. E., 2012). ANP, a secular party, established the government in 2008. This extreme discrepancy in the election results is intriguing and shows that voters in KP only consider candidates' performance when casting their ballots, discounting other considerations like religious affiliation. The expectations of the residents of the province were not met by MMA. They chose ANP as a consequence in 2008. They installed PTI in the office because ANP failed to address the problems in KP. In terms of governing, PTI was a relatively new player in Pakistani politics. It obtained a majority in the province and 45 members in the KP Assembly (later three members also joined PTI, and the number reached 48). In any provincial assembly, a candidate needs to meet the absolute majority (51% in total members) criteria to become chief minister (Constitution, 1973). With its victory in KP, PTI has a fantastic chance to back up its campaign promises. The majority of ANP's membership is made up of members of the province's predominant ethnic group, the Pashtun. Ironically, ANP failed to get support based on ethnicity. It had 48 seats in 2008, but it only received four in 2018 general elections (ECP, Election Commission of Pakistan, 2018). Unchecked terrorism and poor governance may be the causes. 15 seats were won by JUI-F in the recent elections. A second religious party, JI, won 8 seats. Right-wing groups in KP have somehow regained control.

**Baluchistan Assembly**

(Figure 1.5)



Baluchistan's instability—caused by ongoing terrorist attacks and unchecked separatist movements—made it difficult for the government and the ECP to hold the polls. Fortunately, they

were held on schedule. PPP and PML-Q engaged in a competitive battle in 2008. In contrast, the latter won 19 seats. The former won 14 seats. The Baluchistan Pashtun party Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) gained 14 seats in 2013 elections because Pashtuns predominate in the province's metropolitan centers, where PkMAP has power. Baloch ethnic party National Party got 10 seats. In the past, it abstained from the 2008 general elections in opposition to the military intervention in the province. PK MAP's victory was not accepted by BNP-M Chairman Sardar Akhtar Mengal, who referred to it as a “conspiracy to keep BNP out of parliament (Shah S. A., 2013).” JUI-F and PML N are two other participants in the province; they each won eight and nine seats. Interestingly, despite not winning any seats in the national elections of 2008, PML-N was able to establish itself in the province.

### **3.21.12. Government's Establishment under the General Election results of 2013**

On June 5, 2013, Nawaz Sharif took the oath of office as prime minister and changed the course of Pakistani politics. As the first politician to retain the position for three terms, he made history. He garnered 244 votes in the National Assembly election, compared to 31 for Javed Hashmi of the PTI and 42 for Makdhoom Amin Fahim of the PPP (Shah S. A., Nationlists Take the lead in Baluchistan, 2013).

Shahbaz Sharif received 300 votes in the Punjab Assembly and won with a resounding majority to become the province's chief minister. Qaim Ali Shah received 87 votes in the Sindh Assembly to become the new chief minister. He has served as the province chief minister for three consecutive terms. Syed Sardar Ahmed, the leader of the MQM, defeated him with 48 votes, while Imtiaz Sheikh, the candidate of the PML-F, received only 18 votes (Desk, 2013).

Pervez Khattak of the PTI won 84 votes in KP to become the province's chief minister. Maulana Lutfur Rehman was the JUI-F candidate against Pervez Khatak, while Wajih-uz-Zamman was the PML-N candidate. Later, the PML-N withdrew and supported Lutfur Rehman, who received 37 votes. It's interesting to note that PPP and APML backed Pervez Khatak. The PTI joined forces with the Qaumi Watan Party (QWP), JI, Awami Jamhoori Ittehad (AJI), and independents to create a coalition government (Tribune T. E., 2013).

Leader of the National Party Abdul Malik won the Baluchistan chief minister election without any opposition. The 55 members all supported him. Together with the PML-N and PkMAP, the

National Party formed a coalition government. Malik is the first provincial chief executive who does not come from a political family or a tribal chief (Khan S. A., 2013).

To cut the major story into pieces, the Awami National Party (ANP) in Pakistan faced several challenges during the period from 2013 to 2018, including the rise of religious extremism, which contributed to its decline from mainstream politics. Some of the major reasons for the decline of ANP are given below in headings:

### **Terrorist Attacks and Violence:**

During this period, ANP was targeted by various terrorist groups, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The ANP was vocal in its opposition to these extremist groups and advocated for a more moderate and progressive approach to politics. The TTP targeted ANP leaders, workers, and rallies, leading to a significant loss of life within the party's ranks. A prominent example of this is the attack on Haroon Bashir Bailor at a political rally in Peshawar (Sirajjudin, 2018) and Bashir Ahmed Bilour, the father of Haroon Bilour, was also slain in 2012 when a Pakistani Taliban bomber detonated himself during a Peshawar party. (Dawn.com, 2012). The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) took credit for an attack at an ANP gathering in Peshawar the next year, in 2013, which resulted in the deaths of fifteen people. Journalists were informed that Haroon was the intended target, but “unfortunately Ghulam Ahmed Bilour got injured” by TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan at the time.

Militant groups operating in the northwest have consistently targeted the ANP, which ruled the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from 2008 to 2013. Hundreds of ANP leaders and sympathizers were slain by the terrorists in attacks around the 2013 election. An explosion during an electoral rally near Takhtikhel Canal earlier this month injured seven people, including a Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal candidate. At the Peshawar hospital, family members are grieving the death of a loved one (Pakisatan, 2013).

The Taliban has often threatened to attack secular parties for allegedly endorsing the “war on terror” and military operations in tribal areas. The city of Peshawar has been a victim of militancy for decades despite there being no immediate claim of responsibility for the incident. This is because the city is on the front lines of the ongoing fight against terrorism and is close to both the Afghan border and unrest-ridden tribal districts. This constant threat of violence hindered the

ANP's ability to campaign effectively and engage in mainstream politics. The main reason of this violence was for the purpose to impose a hardline Islam in Pakistan as we have discussed in Wahhabism (Hourel, 2013). That is why terrorists targeted the shrine of Rehman Baba in Peshawar (Dawn.com, Pashtun poet Rehman Baba's mausoleum bombed, 2009).

### **Malakand Operation and FATA Reforms:**

The military operation in the Malakand Division codenamed Operation Rah-e-Rast, aimed to eliminate militant elements from the region. This operation, while necessary for curbing extremism, also had an impact on the ANP's influence in the region. The Rah-e-Rast operation had a significant impact on the political activities of the Awami National Party (ANP) in Swat. The ANP was targeted on a priority basis during the operation, as they were seen as a political party that supported the Talibanization of Swat. The Taliban had targeted ANP leaders and workers, and the ANP was accused of providing political cover to the Taliban. During the operation, the ANP was forced to go underground, and its political activities were severely curtailed. Many ANP leaders and workers were arrested or went into hiding, and the party's offices were closed down. The ANP's political influence in Swat was greatly diminished, and it struggled to regain its footing after the operation. However, after the operation, the ANP changed its stance and became a vocal opponent of the Talibanization of Swat. The party supported the government's efforts to restore peace and stability in the region and worked to rebuild its political base in Swat. The ANP's change in stance was seen as a positive development by many, and it helped to restore confidence in the political process in Swat.

Moreover, the merger of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, as part of FATA reforms, shifted political dynamics and introduced new challenges for the ANP to adapt to the changing landscape.

### **Displacement and Fear:**

The ongoing violence and threats from extremist groups led to the displacement of a significant number of ANP supporters and workers. Many people were forced to leave their homes and communities due to security concerns. This displacement not only weakened the ANP's support base but also created an atmosphere of fear that deterred people from openly supporting the party.

## **Election Results:**

The general elections of 2013 were a turning point for the ANP. The party suffered a significant defeat in those elections, winning only one National Assembly seat compared to the 13 seats it had won in the previous elections. This decline in electoral support can be attributed to factors like the aforementioned violence, displacement, and the rise of conservative and religious parties.

## **Shift in Voter Preferences: A Populist Context**

The rise of religious parties and more conservative political narratives in certain regions shifted voter preferences away from the ANP's relatively progressive and secular ideology. The ANP's focus on issues like Pashtun nationalism and socio-economic development, while important, faced competition from the religious parties that were emphasizing religious identity and conservative values.

### **3.23. Internal factors contributing to the decline of the Awami**

#### **National Party**

Former supporters, present leaders, and even the province's ruling party appear to concur with the ANP's painfully delayed but crucial self-evaluation.

#### **3.23.1 The Hiring Blues: The Intra-Party Election**

Hashim Babar, a former ANP finance secretary, claimed that unfair internal elections were to blame for the party's defeat in the general elections. In April 2012, Babar defected to the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The unhappy PTI leader Babar claimed in an interview with The Express Tribune that Afrasiab Khattak, the provincial head of the ANP, was partially to blame for the disaster on May 11. According to Babar, the ANP officials used “foul methods” to advance their preferred candidates at the most recent internal party elections—candidates who did not have widespread support (Qalander, 2013). The accusations continued after that. The PTI associate said that party insiders had a say in how ANP went about recruiting members.

He claimed that a former ANP MNA from Peshawar “purchased membership coupon books worth Rs.3 million, but records of those books were not provided to the party convener.” However, Babar opted not to disclose the name of this former public official. He claimed that while the convener

should have gathered CNICs and contact information from new members for the sake of openness, this was not done during the ANP membership drive. Babar said that party members choose the party's central, provincial, and district councilors and that the former MNA personally chose party members from the Peshawar district while accusing him of trickle-up favoritism. 75% of the party's general executive body is then chosen by district and provincial councilors (chosen by party members). The provincial and central leadership of the ANP chooses the other 25% (Qalander, 2013). The district, provincial, and central council members have been chosen without a vote during my eleven years in the party. Tajuddin, a favorite and additional secretary for the ANP, was chosen [by the general executive body] without any opposition. Babar was, however, also chosen to serve as the party's financial secretary during the same elections.

### **3.23.2. ANP's Internal Flaws and Hereditary Politics**

Asfandyar Wali Khan, the president of the ANP, announced at a news conference on Saturday that the party would be reorganized after doing poorly in the general elections. He said "internal weakness" was also a contributing factor in the loss. The leader, who hasn't been to Wali Bagh in five years, claimed that the ANP had "weaknesses in policy, governance, and organization (Tribune T. E., 2014). He stated that the audit discovered a lack of openness in the ANP hiring procedure.

Babar reflected similar themes of "weakness" as well. A flaw rooted in passivity, favoritism, and lack of openness. Babar asserted that the defeat on May 11 and "bad governance in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa during their (ANP) tenure" were both the result of inactive party members. Since the leadership is comprised entirely of their favorites, the general executive body has never utilized the vote of no confidence against it, according to Babar.

The ANP has made positive strides toward democracy, according to K-P Minister for Information Shah Farman, after its defeat in May, parties will experience defeat at the hands of people until they abandon hereditary politics, according to Farman. By the hereditary politics he means ANP tried to make this party a family party, instead of making it a democratic party where those leaders came in front who are doing great job by taking the parties to the power corridors of the state.

### **3.23.4. Inadequate Provincial Leadership**

The Express Tribune (Tribune T. E., 2013) quoted an ANP province leader who requested anonymity as saying, “ANP performed poorly in elections because of the provincial party chairman. According to the fact-finding committee's findings, 80% of the districts attribute ANP's poor performance to Afrasiab Khattak. Afrasiab responded to the allegations by claiming that the fact-finding committee did not “target any individual; it was based on collective responsibility.”

“If people are blaming me for the party's performance in elections, then it must be a personal bias,” the top leader claimed, adding that if the report had named names, the information would be widely known. According to reports, Senator Haji Adil, the newly chosen interim ANP chairman, and Bashri Khan Matta, the head of the province election commission, have the support of the party's members. Election committees for districts and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas will shortly be discussed by the ANP's provincial election commission and organizing committee, according to Saddaruddin Khan, a representative of the commission.

### **3.23.5. Comparison among Political Parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2013**

#### **General Elections**

Keep a watch on the turbulent northwest province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa if you're looking for surprises. Analysts' predictions for the province range from saying that Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) will be in the lead to others saying that the Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) will dominate the provincial assembly. Still, others predict that the incumbent Awami National Party (ANP) will lose support but still manage to be represented in a coalition government.

### **3.23.7. Pakistani Political Landscape: Parties, Struggles, and Emerging**

#### **Dynamics**

A religious political party with significant popularity in the province's southern region is the JUI-F. It has recast itself as a peacemaker among a war-weary people after losing the 2008 elections, bragging about its capacity to communicate with different Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) factions. Due to this, the party has exhibited signs of life over the past year, gaining support from all corners of the province.



Asfandiyar Wali Khan is the leader of the Awami National Organisation (ANP), the current provincial government, which is mostly supported by the districts in the middle Peshawar valley. The ANP is a secular Pashtun nationalist organization. However, the party's main threat does not come from electoral rivals; rather, over the past five years, the ANP has been the target of a sustained campaign by the TTP and other groups, losing reportedly more than 750 workers and leaders to the Taliban's bullets (Citation). The ANP has been criticized for having spent its time in government ineffectively and accused of corruption.

The party that was historically recognized for supporting ethnic Pashtun rights and autonomy within Pakistan has altered its election slogan from “My land, my decisions” [Khþala Khawra, Khþala Ikhtyar] to the morbid “My homeland or the shroud” [Kafan Ya Watan] in response to this menace.

While support for the ANP and the incumbent Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in Islamabad overlaps, the PPP has the added security of a sizable vote bank across the entire province. Despite this base of support, the party has struggled with factionalism during the last five years, and the provincial leadership's influence over the rest of the party has decreased. Like the ANP, the PPP has struggled to mount an effective campaign in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa due to threats from religious anti-state armed organizations.

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), which has historically drawn support from the region's predominately non-Pashtun Hazara belt, is the fourth major party in the province. The affluent Amir Muqam, a former lieutenant of previous military dictator Pervez Musharraf, joined the party, giving it much-needed support in the northern Pashtun region. In its election campaign, the party avoided talking about militancy and instead concentrated on governance-related topics.

The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, is the election's wild card. With an “anti-status quo” stance, the party has routinely scored well in polls and is mostly supported by the Hazara and Peshawar valley communities. However, the party's true electoral potential has not been put to the test and will not be known until Election Day. Other, smaller parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, the Qaumi Watan Party, and others have only run modest campaigns in particular regions, but they could still end up being key players in any coalition formed after the election.

### **3.23.8. Election Trends**

Three significant events must be kept in mind to comprehend the vote dynamics in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. By choosing the PML-Qayyum over Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's PPP in 1970, voters in KP defied the national trend and dropped Bhutto's party to a dismal fourth place. Voters have had a wide range of options at the polls, and this vote splitting has continued to be a recurring topic in elections since that time. It has resulted in the party voting along several lines and giving voters a wide range of voting alternatives.

The second significant event was the 1985 party-free elections, which took place under the military coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq and saw the entry of independent candidates and the advancement of smaller parties into the legislature (Citation). These candidates would receive anywhere from a high of 32% (1990) to a low of almost 19% (2002) of the total votes cast in the province. The last significant election occurred in 2002 when religious political groups won a landslide of seats in the provincial legislature. This was a first for such parties and demonstrated that they had evolved into respectable mainstream alternatives.

All Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provincial governments since 1970 have either been coalition governments or heavily dependent on the support of independent representatives as a result of these three factors: a split in the vote, the viability of independents and smaller party candidates, and the rise of religious political parties.

There haven't been any continuous electoral winners from Pakistan's unstable Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa at the national level because of this ability for the vote to turn out differently depending on post-election coalitions.

### **3.40. External factors influencing the Decline of ANP**

The powerful civilian and military establishment of Pakistan may not have welcomed the ANP's alternative rhetoric, primarily because of two reasons. First, a demand for a secular Pakistan may result from an indigenous sociocultural alternative to the dominant religion. Second, an ANP that controls the province's religious-ideological discourse would advocate for increased regional autonomy.

In 1997, renowned social scientist Hamza Alavi stated: “There is an extra-ordinary sense of insecurity in the minds of our rulers about Pakistan’s nationhood...Their fear was particularly great when ethnic movements began to demand regional autonomy. They hoped that an ideological offensive using religion would neat down ethnic movements and put an end to demand of regional autonomy. (Alavi, 1997)” A number of the author's assumptions are supported by certain recent theories and reports that have been published in national and international media as well as think tanks. For the US to establish a negotiated settlement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, which may pave the way for the withdrawal of NATO combat forces from Afghanistan, the Taliban in Afghanistan are first being positioned as representatives of the Pakhtun national movement (Dalrymple, 2013). Second, even if the general populace is denied genuine representation, favorable political conditions in Pakistan are required for the purpose (facilitating the rise to power of the PTI and JI in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) as the Pakistani military establishment supports a negotiated settlement with the Taliban in Afghanistan with the desire to have a lasting impact. Therefore, it was necessary to prevent the genuine socio-cultural movement and indigenous narrative that the ANP promoted from gaining control in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and other regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which have not received the same attention in the development process being performed in other regions of the country, have also been supported and worked for by the ANP throughout its five years of administration in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Since Pakistan's independence, FATA has been subject to a special arrangement for a specific cause, but the discourse created for that purpose was based on the antiquated Pakhtunwali code we previously mentioned. Pakistan maintained its inherited from British India policies in FATA and elsewhere.

Many researchers and authors contend that in the late 1970s, the British “Forward Policy” evolved into the “strategic depth policy.” The strategic depth policy, as Rahim-ul-Haq described it, “became the practical manifestation of strategic interests, understood through the prism of ideological guardianship of Pakistan military,” A friendly Afghan government was ensured, Pashtun separatism and nationalism were curbed through Islamism, Pashtun separatism and nationalism were stopped, and a haven was provided for the training of ideological non-state actors for Pakistan's regional policy goals. These four elements made up this policy (Haque, 2011).

This time, it was to prevent India from having political influence over the Soviet Union or the Russian Tsar. The entire theory of William Dalrymple of the Brookings Institute is predicated on the idea that Pakistan's internal conflict is primarily caused by its fear of being squeezed between its Western and Eastern neighbors.

With this background, the ANP's central executive committee passed a resolution in July 2009 calling for the extension of the Political Party Order (PPO) (2002) to FATA, the incorporation of FATA into the then-NWFP, and thorough reforms to the FCR to eliminate any provisions that violate the constitution and fundamental rights (Dalrymple, 2013). Senator Afrasiab Khattak, the provincial head of the ANP, wrote in an essay published in Dawn on October 25, 2011, that “the entire design of FATA was targeted at keeping the area as a political 'non-conductive' like a piece of dry wood that is not a conductor of electricity. It is necessary to acknowledge the fact that this colonial concept was largely successful. Instead of being a region populated by people who may aspire to fundamental rights, FATA became more of a “strategic space” Without a doubt, the government's ability to rid FATA of terrorists and bring the estranged tribesmen together is a prerequisite for socio-economic and political growth. Similar to this, one would expect that the government wouldn't put off reforming FATA's integration into the Pakistani state system for another 64 years (Dawn, 2011).

As a result, on January 2, 2012, the ANP convened a Jirga that met in Peshawar. The Jirga demanded that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa incorporate FATA, but claimed that the tribe people of FATA would be fine with Malakand being given a status equivalent to that of FATA. The Jirga approved Afrasiab Khattak's suggestion to provide FATA PATA status (Provincially Administrative Tribal Areas) (Hussain, 2012).

The Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901 may have come to an end with the acceptance of the ANP's proposal, but it may also have marked the beginning of a period of true political, legal, and administrative mainstreaming of FATA. However, the centrist groups and religious political parties both inside and outside of FATA harshly criticized the ANP's idea. One of the key explanations could be that Pakistan would have to review its Afghan policy if FATA were mainstreamed.

The 2013 election results that the ANP attained as a result of its efforts to reform FATA and combat terrorists' violent rhetoric had significant political ramifications for the party. To intimidate the party, prevent it from participating in the election campaign, and set the stage for its defeat in the elections, there was a planned media campaign and a ferocious militant assault.

One can easily conclude that the media was used to widely disseminate the narrative of “corruption,” “pro-Americanism,” and “bad governance” against the ANP after scanning major media outlets a few months before the elections. Except for a few columnists and anchors, the majority of print media columns and the majority of electronic media anchors consistently portrayed the ANP as the loser in the elections. The media manipulators were well aware that this tactic could be used to effectively demotivate ANP supporters, supporters of the party, and workers. Social media was also used extensively and often to denigrate the leadership/p by calling them “corrupt,” “cowards,” and “agents.”

According to a Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) report titled “Elections 2013: Violence against Political Parties, Candidates, and Voters (Services, 2013),” the ANP continued to be the target of terrorist attacks throughout the entirety of the election campaign, not only in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but also in Karachi and FATA. Between January 1 and May 15, 2013, the militants carried out at least 37 attacks against ANP workers and leaders (Walsh, 2013).

In its article titled “Electioneering has taken a dark twist in northwest Pakistan,” published in The New York Times on April 20, 2013, it was stated that “a coordinated campaign of Taliban attacks against the main secular party is violently reshaping the democratic landscape before parliamentary elections scheduled for May (Editorial, 2013).”

According to a BBC article from April 5, 2013, “The security forces have failed to drive the militants out of their known sanctuaries in the north-west, despite the militants' repeated demonstrations of their ability to assault the secular parties. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, which was run by the ANP party, has been the hardest hit. Asfandiyar Wali, the party's leader, nearly evaded a suicide bombing attack that occurred close to his Charsadda home in October 2008. Top party officials have since kept their movements to a minimum and shied away from being seen in public. According to a recent BBC Urdu article, Bashir Bilour, the party's

deputy chairman, was among the more than 700 ANP activists killed by snipers or suicide bombers in the previous four years. The ANP's capacity to run an open campaign has decreased in recent weeks as a result of low-intensity bombs going off at several local ANP election events (Khan M. I., 2013).

In its publication on May 10, the Express Tribune stated: “ANP was the deadliest victim of terrorist strikes. Before the ANP's election campaign in Peshawar, Bashir Ahmed Bilour, a significant ANP leader, was killed in a bombing. In addition to threatening everyone and urging them to abstain from voting, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) branded the party as “un-Islamic.” The militants pledged to destroy the campaigns of the ANP, MQM, and PPP and claimed that they were all secular (Editorial, 2013).

The ANP appeared to be targeted by the TTP in Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, being assaulted practically daily, according to a May 10, 2013 article in Dawn. There have been 25 attacks on ANP employees, gatherings, and candidates since March 2013. Bannu, Kohat, Peshawar, Charsadda, Mardan, Swabi, and Swat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pishin in Balochistan, and Karachi in Sindh are among the locations where the majority of these attacks occurred. Based on the attack patterns, it appears that the TTP wanted to exert significant psychological pressure on the ANP leadership to persuade it to abstain from the elections. If it had occurred, the TTP and other elements with a desire for dictatorship would have been successful in stealing the right of representation from a respected political party in Pakistan (Hussain K. , A blood-soaked discourse, 2013).

The ANP's cadre, supporters, and voters experienced fear and isolation as a result of the terror unleashed on the party before the elections. The terror element severely hindered the cadre's ability to communicate, and the obscurity of the situation left the cadre uncertain about key election-related problems.

According to the author's interviews with 500 cadre members and non-partisan respondents in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa districts of Peshawar, Charsadda, Swabi, and Swat for a research study that will be published later, the local ANP chapters used to receive threats in the three months leading up to elections almost daily. Additionally, poll workers at least 30 polling places in NA4 Peshawar,

NA12 in Swabi, NA7 Charsadda, NA1 Peshawar, and PK 81 Swat revealed to the author that they had received letters in the morning of the election day threatening to destroy polling places with a majority of Laltain (the ANP's election symbol) votes. The voters who had arrived to cast their ballots received the identical letters (Hussain K. , 2013).

A fatwa that exhorted voters to abstain from voting for ANP because it was against Islam was also spotted being distributed in PK 11 and PK 10 of Peshawar in addition to the threatening letters (Hussain K. , 2013).

Inexplicably, from Swat to Bannu, D.I. Khan, and Tank, the rhetoric of “corruption,” “pro-Americanism,” and “cowardice” of the leadership (referring to the absence of leadership) spread through word of mouth. Even in rural areas like the southern and northern districts, where there was no access to electronic media and little literacy for reading print media, the non-partisan masses were told that the ANP was “anti-Islam,” “Pro-American,” “Corrupt,” and that it would never end load shedding if it came back to power.

All of these strategies place too much pressure on the ANP candidates to let them effectively conduct the campaign. The ANP campaign was dealt a deadly blow because the party's top leadership had previously been placed behind a draconian kind of house imprisonment. The local law enforcement agencies would reportedly order the ANP candidates not to hold any rallies or corner meetings for security grounds, as the authors saw in four districts and heard from ten other districts. The ANP cadre was prohibited from waging a counter-propaganda campaign while all forms of negative promotion were continued against the candidates and the party. The cadre attempted to deploy modern technology in a few locations, but lack of funding and ongoing demoralization of the cadre rendered these attempts essentially useless.

The reality is that the Pakistani state has not yet developed places to allow for native socio-cultural discourses. The facts outlined previously in the paper make it clear that Pakistan's geopolitics continue to play a significant role in the country's political economy. Even though Pakistan's political process has given some room for a pro-people socio-cultural rhetoric, political authority still depends on Pakistan's security perimeter. Therefore, political groups in Pakistan that support socio-cultural narratives must become more structured, active, and alert. To provide the

movements with up-to-date information on developing social, cultural, political, strategic, and economic realities, all pro-people political groups in Pakistan, especially the ANP, must have independent think tanks made up of academics. In the meanwhile, the political establishment, including the ANP, must adopt an outgoing and progressive demeanor, improve their connections to like-minded organizations both inside and outside of Pakistan, and reactivate their connections to newly developing domestic, regional, and global realities.



## **CHAPTER NO 03: CONSEQUENCES OF ANP DECLINE FROM MAINSTREAM POLITICS**

### **4.1. Consequences of ANP's Decline: Analyzing Political Dynamics**

Political parties are established to do politics for a cause. To fill that gap, a political party struggles and strives to maintain its position in society. To do so, it also faces some consequences as a result. In this chapter, I will try to analyze the possible consequences ANP is facing while it is declining from mainstream politics as we discussed in detail in the above chapter.

Regional parties are those parties that work for the protection of the rights of people living in a particular area. Such parties exist in developed as well as in developing countries. In Pakistan, there is a multi-party system (Shah S. A., 2018), and parties of all kinds are present in it. According to the website of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), there are 175 parties registered (ECP, 2023).

Pakistan is a democratic country having a parliament consisting of two houses i.e., the National Assembly (NA) and the Senate of Pakistan. The seats of the National Assembly are filled through general elections, conducted after the five-year tenure of each assembly. A party that secures a major vote in NA makes government. If a party is not meeting the absolute majority (50% in total numbers of the house), it is required to convince other members of the house until it reach to the said majority. In such circumstances, parties make alliances with one another. In Pakistan, almost every democratic government makes a coalition set-up. The reason for this is the diverse nature of the Pakistani politics. Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) has a stronghold in Punjab, Pakistan Peoples Parties in Sindh, Baluchistan Awami Party, and some other parties in Baluchistan, whereas KP was currently dominated by PTI from 2013 to 2018 and 2018 onward till the dissolution of provincial assemblies of Punjab and KP by CMs respectively on the quest of PTI Chairman Imran Khan (Farooq, 2020). However, the current developments after 9 May seem that it will cause the decline of PTI from KP. The other parties that have a strong base in different areas of KP are Jamiat-ul-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman), Awami National Party, and Jumat-e-Islami.

Similarly, Pakistan's governmental structure is federalism. There is a central government consisting of the NA and the Senate. Besides, each federating unit has its government in each province. The seats of the NA are based on population basis whereas the seats of the Senate are on

an equal basis among all four provinces. Thus, the legislation in the parliament of Pakistan is equal among all the stakeholders.

The 175 parties registered with ECP have their manifestos which are public before the election to get maximum seats in the national assembly. Manifestos clear to us the policies of political parties and show us which programs they will try to implement when they come to power. As discussed above, Pakistani politics has a unique pattern where one cannot ignore a single-seat winning party. The government as well as the opposition parties need everyone's support to pass or reject any bill present in parliament or in any provincial assembly.

#### **4.2. Implications of ANP's Exclusion: A Political Analysis**

Political parties are created to use politics to further a cause. A political party fights and works to keep its standing in society to fill that cause. It does so with certain negative effects as a result. As we covered in-depth in the preceding chapter, I will attempt to analyze the potential repercussions that the ANP may experience as a result of its exclusion from mainstream politics in this chapter.

Parties that fight to defend the rights of residents are referred to as regional parties. Both wealthy and developing nations have these types of parties. Pakistan has a multi-party system with parties of every description. There are 175 registered parties, according to the Election Commission of Pakistan's (ECP) website.

The National Assembly (NA) and the Senate of Pakistan make up the two houses of Pakistan's democratic parliament. After each assembly's five-year term, general elections are held to fill the open seats in the National Assembly. A party that wins a substantial majority in NA forms the government. A party must persuade other house members to attain the required absolute majority (i.e., 50% of the total number of members). Parties form coalitions with one another in such situations. Nearly all democratic governments in Pakistan form coalitions. The complexity of Pakistani politics is the cause of this. Punjab is strongly held by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), Sindh by the Pakistan Peoples Party, Baluchistan by the Baluchistan Awami Party, and KP by the PTI from 2013 to 2018 and from 2018 onward until the dissolution of the provincial assemblies of Punjab and KP by the respective chief ministers on the initiative of PTI Chairman Imran Khan. But it appears from the latest developments that PTI would diverge from KP after May 9. Jamiat-ul-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman), the Awami National Party, and Jumat-e-Islami are some of the other groups with significant support in KP.

Similar to this, Pakistan's government is a federal one. The NA and the Senate make up the federal government. Additionally, every province in each federating unit has a separate government. The NA seats allocation is based on population, whilst the Senate seats are distributed equally among the four provinces. As a result, all parties have an equal voice in Pakistan's parliament.

#### **4.3. Politics in Pakistan: Parties, Governance, and Coalitions**

The 175 parties registered with the ECP have manifestos that are made available to the public before the election to win the most seats in the national assembly. Political party manifestos make their policies obvious to us and outline the projects they plan to try to enact if they are elected to office. As was already said, Pakistani politics follow a peculiar pattern in which a party that wins a single seat cannot be disregarded. To pass or reject any law that is presented in parliament or any provincial assembly, both the government and the opposition parties must have unanimous support.

Since its establishment in 1985, the Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP) has played a significant role in Pakistani politics. The party has a long history of championing the rights of the Pashtun people and has contributed significantly to Pakistan's growth. The ANP's influence and popularity have, however, declined recently. For the ANP and the nation as a whole, this decline has resulted in several negative effects.

The ANP's demise has left a void in Pashtun politics, which is among its most direct effects. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has found it simpler to gain influence in the Pashtun-majority regions of Pakistan as a result of the ANP's fall, which was formerly the primary voice of Pashtun nationalism (Sheikh S. R., 2016). As a result, there is more violence and instability in these places. The ANP stance and presence in areas of KP will give hard time to the activities of Taliban as they are active again southern KP before holding general elections of 2024. The decline of ANP from mainstream politics can affect the peace status in KP. One of the most important and immediate effects of the Awami National Party (ANP)'s exclusion from mainstream politics is the noticeable void it has left in Pashtun politics. The ANP has long been a significant voice for the interests and aspirations of Pakistan's Pashtun population, notably in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. But as the party dealt with internal issues and outside pressures, its power progressively decreased, leaving a gap that hasn't yet been filled (Sheikh S. R., 2016).

Many Pashtuns are now without a strong and obvious political platform to stand up for their rights and concerns as a result of the demise of the ANP. Its absence has led to a feeling of disillusionment and disengagement among Pashtun voters as a party with a long history of promoting Pashtun nationalism and democratic values. Many Pashtun people feel marginalized and underrepresented in the nation's political scene as a result of the vacuum in Pashtun politics, which has left the community with ineffective regional and national representation (Siddique, 2014).

The dynamics of power and influence in the region have also changed as a result of the ANP's demise. As the party lost support, other political figures tried to fill the hole by making gains, further complicating the political situation (Amir, 2012). To capitalize on the despair and disillusionment of particular Pashtun demographic groups, some extremist elements and non-state entities have tried to fill this void (Iftikhar Firdous, 2023). Concerns have been voiced concerning the possibility of the spread of radical ideas in the area and the erosion of democratic values as a result (Iftikhar Firdous, 2023).

Furthermore, the absence of an ANP-like powerful and organized political organization has affected regional governance and policymaking. The system of checks and balances has been compromised by the lack of a viable opposition with a distinct agenda, which could result in choices and policies being made without being challenged that may not always reflect the needs and interests of the Pashtun people. Therefore, the ANP's decline has had an impact on more than just the party; it has also had a larger impact on the region's overall stability and development.

A multifaceted strategy is needed to address the effects of the ANP's decrease. The party must be rebuilt, its internal conflicts must be resolved, and its political platform must be reformulated. To ensure that the voices and concerns of the community are appropriately represented, other political parties and civil society organizations must also step up to fill the gap in Pashtun politics. To reduce the dangers of extremist elements trying to fill the void, democratic institutions should be strengthened and meaningful engagement with the Pashtun community should be pursued. In the end, the ANP's resurgence or the creation of fresh political parties is necessary to ensure effective representation and give Pashtuns a significant say in determining the destiny of their community and nation.

#### **4.4. Impact of ANP's Decline on Democracy**

Pakistan's democracy has suffered from the ANP's fall as well. The ANP served as one of the key pillars of Pakistani democracy, and as a result of its fall, it has become increasingly challenging for the nation to uphold a stable democratic system. This is so because the ANP was a secular party that stood up for Pashtun's interests. The Pashtun people are feeling more and more alienated as a result of the ANP's demise, which could cause the nation to become even more unstable. One of the most worrying effects of the Awami National Party's (ANP) fall is the negative influence it has had on Pakistan's democracy. The ANP's decline has resulted in the loss of a crucial check and balance within the nation's political system as a party that has historically been dedicated to democratic values and served as a vital voice for marginalized and underrepresented people.

First off, the demise of the ANP has reduced political diversity and pluralism within the political scene. A thriving democracy depends on the existence of numerous parties with various philosophies and policy plans, giving people significant options when it comes to voting. Due to the ANP's decline in popularity, voters now have fewer options, which could result in a less vibrant and competitive political environment.

The opposition's capacity to effectively hold the government accountable has been hampered by the ANP's decline, which is the second issue. To ensure that people in authority are exposed to scrutiny and challenges to their policies and actions, a strong and outspoken opposition is an essential element of a healthy democracy. The absence of a potent ANP, which had a sizable presence in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has created a hole in the opposition's ranks and diminished its ability to serve as a potent counterbalance to the ruling party.

Additionally, there are repercussions for how regional interests are represented in the national decision-making process as a result of the ANP's decline. Due to the party's declining popularity, topics important to the area may have been overlooked. The party had been a vocal supporter of the rights and concerns of the Pashtun people. This could result in a concentration of resources and influence in the hands of the political forces in power, potentially alienating and marginalizing particular geographic areas and people.

Besides, Pakistan's political discourse and decision-making have suffered as a result of the ANP's fall. The ANP contributed to thoughtful debates and discussions on important national problems as a party with a lengthy history and experienced leadership. Its diminished influence may have

lowered the quality of political discourse, making it more difficult to properly address complicated problems and make informed policy decisions.

It will take coordinated efforts from many stakeholders to address the democratic deterioration brought on by the ANP's fall. First and foremost, the ANP needs to reflect on its position in the political landscape, pinpoint its areas of weakness, and take steps to reenergize the party. Other political parties should also see the value of a potent opposition and accept the duty of providing a respectable challenge to the ruling party, promoting healthy democratic competition.

Additionally, to make sure that marginalized groups, like the Pashtun people, have a voice and that their interests are properly taken into account in the decision-making process, the government and civil society must actively engage with these groups. Pakistan can develop a more resilient political system that serves the interests of all its residents by fostering inclusion and pluralism, which would enhance Pakistan's democratic institutions. The only way to handle the ANP's fall in a way that restores and upholds democratic values and practices in the nation is through these coordinated initiatives.

#### **4.5. ANP's Decline: Threats to Democratic Values**

The demise of the ANP may have long-term effects on Pakistan in addition to these immediate ones. Human rights, democracy, and social justice were all values held dear by the ANP. The likelihood that these ideals may be compromised in Pakistan is rising as a result of the ANP's fall. The long-term development of the nation might be negatively impacted by this.

Beyond its immediate impact, the Awami National Party's (ANP) fall has the potential to have major and long-lasting effects on Pakistan. As a party renowned for its unshakable dedication to social justice, democracy, and human rights, the ANP's declining power raises worries about the degrading of these core principles inside the nation's democratic system. Inclusion and equality have been actively promoted in Pakistan's social structure because of the ANP's longstanding commitment to defending human rights and fighting for the rights of marginalized people. These principles, however, run a greater risk of being eclipsed or ignored in favor of more populist or polarising narratives as a result of the party's downfall.

Furthermore, the ANP's steadfast commitment to democracy has been a driving force behind Pakistan's defense of democratic institutions and principles. Its demise undermines the general

commitment to democratic values because the party actively participated in the political process and worked to secure fair and free elections. Lack of a powerful democratic voice, such as the ANP, can result in a reduction in accountability and transparency, opening the door for potential abuses of power and weakening the nation's democratic foundation.

The ANP's commitment to social justice has also played a crucial role in resolving societal injustices and promoting laws that benefit the weaker members of society. The voice and advocacy for marginalized populations may be diminished as a result of its decline, escalating socioeconomic inequalities and depriving vulnerable groups of proper representation. Long-term development objectives could be hampered by this, as well as progress towards a more fair society.

On Pakistan's long-term development, the ANP's demise could have significant repercussions. The stability and unity of the country as a whole can suffer from a deterioration in social fairness, democracy, and human rights. A society may become increasingly polarised and divided as a result of the erosion of these principles, which will make it harder for everyone to work together to solve urgent national problems. In addition, if social justice and human rights aren't prioritized, the nation may have trouble attaining inclusive and sustainable growth because the needs of the most vulnerable people may be disregarded.

All political players, civil society, and individuals must understand how important it is to maintain and advance the ideals the ANP stands for to lessen these potential long-term effects. The growth plan for Pakistan should include strengthening democratic institutions, defending human rights, and promoting social justice. A more inclusive and progressive Pakistan can be fostered through efforts to resurrect the ANP or the establishment of other political forces that uphold these principles. Additionally, it is possible to prevent the key principles that are essential for Pakistan's long-term prosperity and stability from declining as a result of the ANP's decline by engaging actively with marginalized people and remaining steadfastly committed to democratic procedures.

Even while it continues to play a key role in Pakistani politics, the ANP is clearly on the decline. If the party hopes to reclaim its prior prominence, it must address the reasons that led to its decline. It's also likely that the ANP will keep losing support and finally fade away as a political force.

## CONCLUSION

Research on the "Decline of Awami National Party (ANP) from Mainstream Politics: Causes and Consequences (2013-2018)" has involved a thorough examination of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan's sociopolitical environment. This conclusion provides a comprehensive understanding of the many reasons contributing to the ANP's demise and its consequences for regional politics by synthesising the study's primary findings and observations.

One of the main reasons given for the ANP's fall from grace in mainstream politics was its adherence to a secular philosophy that was diametrically opposed to the established power structures. The ANP was marginalised as a result of the party's unyielding adherence to secular values clashing with powerful forces within the corridors of power. The establishment's unwillingness to support a secular agenda led to a situation where the ANP was marginalised and isolated.

The ANP had significant hurdles during the research period due to the rise of the Taliban in Pakistan. Because of the party's opposition to radicalism and dedication to democratic principles, it became a target for militant organisations. The ANP's capacity to successfully traverse the political terrain was hampered by the climate of fear and insecurity brought forth by the radical ideologies' growing influence in the area. Members of the party were directly threatened, which undermined public trust in the party and made it more difficult for it to organise.

Voters' evolving preferences became apparent as a significant contributing element to the ANP's downfall. The electorate reassessed its options and allies as the socio-political forces changed. Voters' search for alternatives was prompted by concerns about the economy, security, and their disenchantment with established political institutions. Facing both internal and external pressures, the ANP found it difficult to adjust to the shifting expectations and aspirations of the voters.

One major factor changing the political environment in KP and elsewhere is the rise of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). A significant section of the population was drawn to PTI because of its populist appeal, anti-corruption attitude, and promises of change. PTI attracted disgruntled voters looking for a change from the status quo in politics as it gained traction. As a result of this political transition, the ANP was further marginalised as the PTI emerged as a strong candidate for power by taking advantage of the shifting political attitudes.



The ANP's exodus from mainstream politics has profound effects for Pakistan's democratic structure. The difficulties the ANP is facing highlight the precarious balance that needs to be maintained between changing political climate, regional dynamics, and secular principles. Divergent voter preferences and the emergence of radical ideologies call for a sophisticated approach to political engagement. Political organisations can learn from the ANP's experience how to adjust to the shifting public opinion and successfully tackle new issues.

Besides, a combination of internal and external factors have contributed to the Awami National Party's retreat from mainstream politics. The political landscape of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has changed due to the interaction of shifting voter preferences, security concerns, ideological convictions, and the emergence of alternative political groups. In order to cultivate a robust and adaptable political landscape, Pakistan must comprehend the elements that have contributed to the downfall of political entities such as the ANP as it navigates its democratic journey.

ANP's secular position has been replaced by the growth of religious parties like JUI-F, JI, and most recent the PTI which is not itself not a religious party but have affiliation with power corridors. The party's reputation has also been severely damaged by internal problems like poor governance, internal strife, and leadership problems. In order to bring the ANP back to life and gain relevance in mainstream politics, it needs to undertake a thorough introspection and strategic reform. This entails rewriting its ideological narrative to appeal to a wider range of voters, resolving internal conflict, and placing an emphasis on efficient governance. The ANP may work to restore its reputation as a powerful force in politics by adjusting to the changing political landscape while upholding its fundamental principles.

Because of their secular worldview, leftist political parties in Pakistan have historically had more difficulty gaining recognition and representation than rightist religio-political organisations. As a socialist and secular party, ANP also had a lot of difficulties in this area. It had a difficult time gaining control. Even after gaining control over KP, its struggles persisted. After examining the ANP's term in office, it is determined whether or not the party has been able to carry out and execute the promises made in its electoral manifesto before the 2008 general elections. The ANP performed best in the areas of social sector development, education, and provincial autonomy, but it was unable to fulfil its pledges in other areas due to a number of obstacles, according to an examination of its five years in office from 2008 to 2013. While the ANP was in power, its

advantages and disadvantages were exposed. ANP's weaknesses proved to be ineffective as a Pakhtun nationalist party in the same elections, but its strengths allowed it to run in the following year's elections. The ANP's shortcomings were from inept leadership brought forth by nepotism. The ANP was founded as a social welfare party by its founders, but it became a dynastic conventional political party via the influence of their descendants. The Party's structure is devoid of democratic culture. Even though the ANP made numerous mistakes while in power in KP, socialist politics could be a viable solution for Pakistan. Pakistan is home to a diverse population with many different languages and cultures. As a result, right-wing political groups want to gain electoral advantage by dividing the country and making it illegal for people to vary from one another. Usually, they are promoting hateful politics.

However, despite their differences, leftist political parties generally offer a common ground to all facets of society. They demand unanimity on the minimum agenda, which they describe as fairness for all people and equal access to public resources. Being a leftist political party, the ANP has the potential to bring Pakistan's masses together based on ideological differences between the “haves” and “have nots.” However, this is dependent on the formation of a charismatic leadership inside the party at the national level.

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