Wealth and Political Representation: Evidence from Pakistan 2013's General Election.

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Degree in Economics at School of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences,

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Dedicated To

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*TO MY SWEET FATHER, TO MY SWEET MOTHER AND ALL
FAMILY MEMBERS WHO ENCOURAGED ME FOR DOING
HIGHER STUDIES.*

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to examine the level of representativeness of members of National and Provincial Assemblies of Pakistan on the basis of asset holdings. In order to achieve the above objective the study utilizes two data sets, one is on the assets of the representatives and the other is on assets of the general masses. The data set which consists of information on representative's assets and liabilities is obtained from the Election commission of Pakistan and the second one which consists of information on the assets and liabilities of general people is obtained from the Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement (PSLM) survey (2013-14). The study compares assets of the members of all assemblies and general people at national, provincial and party level through simple descriptive statistics. The findings show that the distribution of the assets of the political members elected in 2013's general election is significantly different than the distribution of assets of the people of Pakistan at national, provincial and party level. One of the key findings of the study is that all representatives of 2013 election fall in top 1% of people based on asset holding. The study also compares the number of votes and assets of the political parties. Findings suggest a linear relationship between assets of top three mainstream political parties: PML-N, PTI, PPPP and the number of votes they received during 2013's general election. Our work provides evidence about the role of wealth in holding membership of the parliament, Senate, and provincial assemblies. Findings suggest positive correlation among assets holdings of the candidates and membership across all legislative Assemblies of Pakistan.

CHAPTER-1

INTRODUCTION

Section 1.1: The Idea of Political Representation:

Representation of people in governance is a continuing topic of discussion and debate. In the present world if the words of constitutions can be trusted is surely because of the representation of people (J.L Stocks, 1931:405). There was a time when government for most of the time meant monarchy. In old and primitive society powerful figures would evolve to be obeyed, like a chief, under the might is right. This chieftainship evolved to kingship. The king used to select his heirs and predecessors to make a king dynasty or "Monarchy". However, over time the movements of individual rights and freedom strengthened and the governments were turned more responsible to people of a society and democratic form of government became more popular (Dorsch and Maarek, 2014). The consensus among political scientists is that the best government is, where representative of people are from the people and they implement the will of people on people (Abraham Lincoln 1863). In other words democracies emerged as the best form of governments. One of the important aspects of democracy is representation of people and the way they are represented. In political theory, representation describes how some individuals stand in for others, for a certain time period. Representation usually refers to representative democracies, where elected officials speak for their constituents in the legislature. The representation through election could be linked with the idea of self-government, of every man's right to have a say in what happens to him.

Section 1.2 How The Study Tackles Political Representation:

The question is to what extent representative of people are representative of people. The study aims to find answer of this question based on the data of financial statements of members of Parliament, Senate and provincial assemblies elected in 2013. In particular, we are interested in the representation of people based on the dimension of assets. For this purpose, we collect data on assets of all those people who have become members of different assemblies in the 2013 election. We then see if such representation is from the common people. For this we will collect data on the assets of general people from Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement (PSLM micro data 2013-14). We will compare the level of the assets of the representatives with the level of assets of general people of Pakistan.

Affirmative findings will show that the membership of the parliament and other assemblies is a luxury which rich people can afford, only. The analysis will help us make a ground for bringing changes in the electoral process in order to curb the level and role of money in becoming a political representative of the people. We are of the view that there is a significant role of the money in becoming a representative. The reason is that the process which requires a person to be elected requires election campaign which is costly. Hence, the whole process becomes like buying a commodity in the market. And only those can buy it who can afford.

Section 1.3: Hypothesis and Significance of the Study:

We find work in the literature that examines the issue of representation. For example Bartle (2002) used public opinion data to assess representational biasedness at the country level. The author matched constituency opinions on human rights, minimum wage, government expenditure, abortion and psychological self-placement with the response from their senators. He

found that senators in the US are less responsive to the opinion of people with modest income than to the affluent constituents. He draws that constituents at the 75th percentile are 3 times more influential in this regard than the 25th percentile. Furthermore, for the 10th income percentile, a policy is about two times as likely to be executed if it is completely supported, but for the 90th income percentile, a policy is about six times as likely to be executed if it is completely supported.

Monroe (1979, 1998) studied response from the representative of the parliament. His primarily findings suggest that this gap is considerably stronger in the American Parliament. He argues that this relationship does not rising linearly as public laying in the 50th percentile are more represented than those with 10th percentile but less than those with the 90th one. Monroe (1998) observed policy changes over a long time and argued that almost 88% of the policy changes occurred within two years.

Beside the biasedness in political representativeness, the process by which they become representative of the people depends on the additional spending in political campaigns. In the United States, the campaign finance system has become progressively expensive. The role of wealth in this regard is of the primarily importance (Office of Democracy and Governance US 2003). Different scholars have discussed this issue. For example in the 2006 Congressional elections, the total amount spent by the successful candidates for the U.S. House of legislative body was $549 million; that sum does not comprise what the rabble exhausted. The average spending per victor was $1.3million. Many successful applicants spent millions to maintain their places in the House. For instance, Roy Blunt, a Republican of Missouri, spent $3.3 million to re win a seat in the House that he had for years; his rival, Jack Truman, spent almost nothing in that election, as a result representative Blunt won with 67 Percent of the accepted votes. There were

many other winners who spent plentiful amounts on campaigns even though their challengers spent very little or nothing, and, in a lot of cases, the result of the election was not at all in ambiguity (Mark Guis 2009). A great portion of the population is excluded from the mainstream political process due to traditionally social and economic constraints (Saliu and Lipade 2008).

In modern politics representatives deploy huge amount of resources to reach to the elective offices. Actually the losers are the general people whose belief and investment in the system are hijacked and undermined because money, not their will, is made the defining factor in elections (Obasanjo, 2005)[1]. Additional spending in election can change the winning probability of a contesting representative .Researcher has found that, in the 2010 Brazilian House of Representatives election a 1% additional spending increases votes by 0.7% (Dalson, 2014).

Furthermore, political parties which are considered as the motors of today's democracy spends lavishly to maintain their organizational structures ,to run electoral campaigns, to train their members and supporters, and to advertise their ideas and schemes, to appear in the media channels, and to pay their professional workers (Griner and Zovatto, 2004: 298). The question is that from where does this money came from? Who is financing these political entities and why? Whether or not such high expenses on political campaigns are considered to be a danger to a true level of representation of people?

It is undeniable that unrestrained money can introduce major distortions in the representational process. Its uneven distribution impacts, primarily, on the real possibilities of political parties and candidates to convey their message to the voters. Secondly, having money confers on individuals and social groups a differentiated ability to take part in elections and to influence

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[1] Obasanjo is the farmer Nigerian President

candidates and parties by their contributions (Kevin and Deniel, 2016). This is of critical importance for a true level of representation. When political power only mirrors economic power then the standard of 'one person, one vote' loses sense and democracy concludes to be, in the words of the 18th International IDEA Elmer (Schattschneider 1960: 119), 'an alternative power system, which can be used to offset the economic power.

Political campaigns are financed privately, which may lead to exchange between private donors and public decision-makers (Corrado et al.1997:67-77). There is also a possibility that a political contestant may take money from criminal or illegal activities for political purposes (Mayorga 1998:35).This is not just a theoretical possibility. The campaigns of previous presidents Jaime Paz Zamora in the country of Bolivia, the Ernesto Samper in case of Colombia and Ernesto Pérez in case of Panama, and recently the extensive bonds detected between the paramilitary groups and some political parties in case of Colombia, and the interfering of organized crime in the political links of the states of Guerrero and Michoacán in case of Mexico, are just some of the most prominent examples in the area of the diffusion of drug trafficking in political campaigns (Griner and Zovatto 2004: 299–302).

Though money is required to finance democracy but undisclosed and unregulated campaign funding has the potential to distort the political contest and the governing process that follows an election. One among the opinions is that an unregulated use of money can lurk the legality of the representatives, i.e. citizens' perception that representative governments more or less reflect their demands and interests. The memorable phrase of the US politician Jesse (1963), who once said that 'money is the mother's milk of politics', tells one part of the truth. Clearly that milk has major components of toxicity that need to be eliminated or at least taken under control if they are not to destroy the true level of political representation of the people.

Researcher has found that during elections the corporate and business sector invests huge amount of resources to influence the policy outcomes in their favour. In this regard the election process of US presidential election in reality is a contest of the US corporate sector. Hence, every company invests in the election campaign and then uses the president for promoting their business agenda (Lyles, 2013). After describing the role of wealthy people in promoting Obama for presidential election in 2008 he wrote that *"All-in-all, the Obama Administration, as we see, is heavily influenced by individuals who have very strong ties to the Corporate Community, and Wall Street in particular. How can, for example, Mr. Larry Summers, who has deep financial involvement in Wall Street financial affairs, objectively advise President Obama on a course of action that would provide major financial assistance to the average American? President Obama, like the vast majority of American Presidents before him, was auditioned and selected to play the predetermined role in the American Political Drama as a Weak President, one who remains subservient to wealth and hands-off when it comes to any major political decisions that could adversely affect the American Plutocracy's economic agenda."P287.*

We also find study at sub national level in the context of Pakistan, for example the study of Nasrullah (2016). This study examines the rent seeking behaviour in the local body election of district Pakpattan[2]. The study finds out that each category of an election campaign is multiple times greater than the limit, set by the Election Commission of Pakistan. Average spending of candidates across the union council is 3.5 million rupees. This amount is too much greater than the allowed limit which is 100,000 rupees. It implies that all the contested candidates of union elections are involved in rent seeking activities. Similarly in the context of Pakistan the "PILDAT" (2009), has also made a comparative analysis of the assets of MNAs belonging

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[2] Pakpattan is a district of Punjab province in Pakistan.

to the 12th and the 13th National Assembly of Pakistan. The report discloses that the average value of MNAs asset has increased threefold in six years from 2002-2003 to 2008-2009. It also points out that an average MNA in 2008 was twice as rich compared to his/her Equivalent in 2002. The average value of an MNA's asset has increased has increased almost Rs. 81 million in this period. What we are interested has not been investigated in the context of Pakistan. We want to find how much is the role of money in making people representative? We assumed based on the earlier discussion that democracy facilitates wealthy people to become representatives of the people. Is this the case in Pakistan? We did not find work regarding the impact of Pakistani plutocracy on the representation of citizen of Pakistan. This work aims to fill this gap. Our main hypothesis is that only the rich afford to become elected.

The study finds support in favour of the hypothesis. The assets of 267 parliamentarians, 706 MPAs and 104 Senators are analysed and the study finds it much over and above the assets of general people. The study suggests that average assets of the Parliamentarians are 427 times more than the average assets of general Pakistani citizens. Senators are having 473 times more assets than general people of the country. Analysis across provincial assemblies suggests that on average the assets of a representative from Sindh Assembly are 240 times more assets than general people of the discussed province. MPAs from Punjab have 145 times more; those of Baluchistan are140 times while MPAs from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are having 95times more assets than the general people of the respective provinces. The study also reveals that among the political parties MQM is the least assets holding party having 147 times more assets than the general people, while the PML-N is the most assets holding party having 400 times more assets than general people.

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows; after providing the introduction of this work in the 1st chapter, the second chapter consists of theoretical literature review. The third chapter relates to the theoretical framework of the current study. The 4th chapter provides information about data collection and methodology used in this study. The 5th chapter presents findings of the thesis. It contains descriptive analysis, results and discussion. The 6th chapter concludes and contains policy recommendations

Chapter 2

Literature review:

Literature related to the role of money in election:

According to Rasmussen Reports (2011) and Real Clear Politics (2013), a record-breaking 81% of Americans criticize Congress[3] on the bases that they broadly observes that there is too much money in politics causing moneyed interests to receive the attention of Congress, while the problems of the middle-class and the poor remain ignored. Political elites share this assessment: political experts, journalists, and opinion writers all regularly regret the influence of money in politics. They worry about the tremendous time and energy politicians spend during fundraising, and the influence of the extraordinary amount of money circulating in Washington.

Similarly Che and Gyle (1998) work on excessive election campaign expenditures, rent seeking and electoral outcomes. They conduct a questionnaire survey in the United States to collect the data. They explain that the election expenditures have increased trend in every paradigm of election, which is harmful for society. They explain that there are many reasons why increased spending of election campaign expenditures may be socially harmful. Their final findings revolve around four points; 1) the increasing spending trend of election campaign expenditures may lead to increase fundraising for election campaign expenditures which keep the politician away from legislative duties. 2) They also identify that the lobbyist who has done more contribution in election campaign expenditure have more influence on the legislative process. This will give many benefits to this participant. 3) As the campaign expenditures increase, this will enhance the corruption in both private and public sectors. All these forms relate to rent

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[3] Rasmussen Reports is an American polling company, founded in 2003. The company engages in the collection, publication .and distribution of public opinion. Real Clear Politics (RCP) is Chicago-based political news and polling data aggregator formed in 2000.

seeking behavior. 4) the people who will contribute more in election campaign expenditures have more chances to win the election.

In the similar cotext, Calderon and Chong (2000) try to examine the relationship between Rent seeking and democracy in the case of Uruguay (A Latin American country); they use legislative historical data from 1925 to 1983. They estimated VAR (vector auto regressive) model to infer out the results. The granger causality test is applied here to check the relationship between democracies and rent seeking. The results show that democracy granger causes rent seeking action and there is significant correlation exist between these two variables. The correlation value between these two variables is 72%. They also find that rent seeking behaviour does not Granger cause democracy. They also argue that in case of some young democracies, rent seeking granger cause democracy. This happened at that time when the institutions have to face many problems and issues due to lack of governance.

Existing scholarship on the subject of the influence of money within Congress, is largely led by the findings of Hall and Wayman (1990) and Hall (1996), suggests that one of the best places to influence the content of legislation is in committee. In committee is where legislation is enlisted and amended. This process is largely secreted from public view, particularly relative to the public activity of roll call voting, and involves only a small number of representatives, which makes it a good probable point of access for those seeking to influence the legislative process.

Nonetheless, little is identified about the information of money in political parties or in campaigns. In this regard the study of Bryan and Baer (2005) concludes that Political parties financing pattern is extremely opaque officially or not, money, gain access into politics in ways that are intended to be opaque. Moreover, the mechanisms through which financial resources

affect policies are difficult to identify even when the information is available. Empirical studies of the impact of money are limited almost to the United States and generate divergent results, often showing that money has little effect Stratman (2005). The difficulty of these studies is to identify the direction of causality in relation: do parties (candidates) win because they spend more money, or do they have more money to spend because they are expected to win? We find answers of the question in the study of Adam Przeworksi (2010) where he concludes that the winners spend more money on campaigns than loser.

In the similar context Mark Guis (2009) also studied that in the 2006 Congressional elections, the total amount spent by the winning candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives was $549,493,170; that amount does not include what the losers spent. The average amount spent per winner was $1,319,403. What makes these numbers even more interesting is the fact that, in 2006, 94 percent of House incumbents were re-elected. In fact, many winning incumbents spent millions to keep their seats in the House, even though their challengers spent nothing. For example, Roy Blunt, a Republican from Missouri, spent $3,301,391 to keep a seat in the House that he had for years; his opponent, Jack Truman, spent nothing; in that election, Representative Blunt won with 67 percent of the popular vote. There were many other winners who spent extravagant amounts on campaigns even though their opponents spent very little or nothing, and, in many cases, the outcome of the election was never in doubt.

A number of theoretical studies include campaign contributions and campaign costs into theories of elections and generate testable forecasts. Previous models of campaign finance by Cameron (1992) and Smith (1987) find out that spending on political campaigns increases the vote share of the candidates, but they did not identify how candidates and political parties uses money to affect voters. Recent work attempts to be clear about the channels of using money in political

campaigns for, example, candidates provide voters with information or signals through their advertisements.

In the context of above discussion Shepard (1977) examines the impact of spending on election outcomes. The author worked on only 1972 Congressional elections in California, the author estimated two regressions for the election outcome, one for the Democratic candidate and one for the Republican candidate. The explanatory variables used included spending by both candidates, the primary election outcome, and the percentage of voters who were registered Democrats. His results indicated that increased spending by a Democratic candidate has a positive effect on the Democratic candidate, but no effect on the Republican candidate, while Republican spending has a negative effect on the Democratic candidate but only a small, positive effect on the Republican candidate. However, these results are not directly comparable to the results of other studies. In addition, his results are somewhat suspect given that his sample size was rather small (n=33) and only one state (California) and one election (1972) were examined.

In the similar context Jacobson (1978, 1990) investigated the impact of campaign spending on congressional elections. His first study used two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the effects of both incumbent and challenger spending on the election outcome. Jacobson estimated an equation for only the challenger's share of the vote. He assumed that both challenger and incumbent spending were endogenous; hence, two first stage equations were estimated, one for each candidate's expenditure. Looking at the 1972 and 1974 Congressional elections, his results indicated that an extra $10,000 spent by the challenger resulted in an increase in the percentage of the vote obtained anywhere from 1.63 percent to 1.79 percent. An extra $10,000 spent by the incumbent, however, reduced the challenger's share of the vote anywhere from 0.22 percent to 0.5 percent. In his 1990 paper, he used polling data in order to determine if voter preferences

changed during the campaign and attempted to ascertain the determinants of these changes in preferences. The results of this paper to validate the results of the 1978 paper; the more a challenger spends, the more net votes he gets, while the more an incumbent spends, the more net votes he loses. In addition, challengers who spent little or nothing lose support during the campaign. Overall, though, the author found that incumbent spending does not produce a win, while challenger spending may produce a victory.

In the similar context Abramowitz (1991) attempted to determine the factors that reduced the level of competition in Congressional races. In order to determine these factors, he first estimated a model of electoral outcome in which the dependent variable was the incumbent's margin of victory or defeat. The explanatory variables used include campaign spending by both the incumbent and the challenger. His results were similar to those of prior studies; incumbent spending had no statistically-significant effect on the incumbent's margin of victory, while the challenger's spending had a significant and negative impact on the incumbent's margin.

In contrast Krasno and Greene (1988) incorporated into their model of election outcomes a variable that attempted to capture the effect of the quality of a challenger on the outcome. Using a challenger quality index with a range from 0 to 8, where 8 indicates a very high political quality, and using both OLS and 2SLS, they found that campaign expenditures have significant and positive effects on the shares of votes obtained by both incumbents and challengers. This result is in contrast to prior studies which found that incumbent spending has little to no effect on their share of votes obtained.

In contrast Erikson and Palfrey (1998) used a simultaneous equation model in order to estimate the effects of campaign spending on votes obtained. If campaign spending and votes obtained are

determined simultaneously, they hypothesized that the covariance between these two variables must be the sum of the bilateral effects of spending on votes and vice versa. Hence, if one subtracts the vote-on-spending effect from the spending-on-vote effect, then one may obtain an accurate measure of the effects of campaign spending on votes obtained. Using a model that included incumbent and challenger spending, their results indicated that incumbent spending has a greater effect on votes obtained than challenger spending. In addition, the study found that campaign spending has cumulative effects; hence, the more a candidate spends now will not only affect votes obtained in the current election, but the outcome in future elections as well.

In the similar context, Benoit and Marsh (2008) using Irish election data attempted to more fully capture the benefits of incumbency by including as an explanatory variable "public office value spending." This type of spending consists of free publicity, posting privileges, and other administrative benefits that are part of being an elected official; these types of resources are naturally available to the incumbent and may assist them in their re-election efforts. The challenger does not have access to these resources, although it bears noting, that the challenger may already be an elected official and hence may use the resources at his disposal in his current position in order to seek higher office. This study used 2SLS in order to capture any possible endogeneity of campaign spending. Finally, the authors used three measures of election outcomes: vote share, total votes obtained, and a dichotomous variable indicating win or loss. They find out that in either case spending increases a candidate's vote, spending by an incumbent is somewhat less effective in obtaining such votes. These results hold for all three measures of the dependent variable and for both the OLS and 2SLS models, although the author's note that the effects of incumbent spending are more prominent in the 2SLS model.

We also find the study at sub national level in the context of Pakistan, for example the study of Nasrullah (2016). This study examines the rent seeking behaviour in the local body election of district Pakpattan[4]. The study finds out that each category of an election campaign is multiple times greater than the limit, set by the Election Commission of Pakistan. Average spending of candidates across the union council is 3.5 million rupees. This amount is too much greater than the allowed limit which is 100,000 rupees. It implies that all the contested candidates of union elections are involved in rent seeking activities.

In the context of Pakistan the PILDAT (2009), has also made a comparative analysis of the assets of MNAs belonging to the 12th and the 13th National Assembly of Pakistan. The report discloses that the average value of MNAs asset has increased threefold in six years from 2002-2003 to 2008-2009. It also points out that on average MNA in 2008 was twice as rich compared to his/her Equivalent in 2002. The average value of an MNA's asset has increased has increased almost Rs. 81 million in this period. The current study is different from that of PILDAT. Their study made comparative analysis of MNAs assets in each proceeding election, while the current study will make comparative analysis of the assets of MNAs and general people. The current study compares the level of assets of MNAs elected in 2013 general election with the level of assets of the general citizens of Pakistan. The current study also analyses the interest of common people and MNAs. For this purpose the study uses the health and education information of those people whose financial resources match with those of the member of the National Assembly as a proxy for MNAs. From this we want to show mismatch between the interest of common people and MNAs. These analyses will provide further insights regards representation of people.

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[4] Pakpattan is a district of Punjab province in Pakistan.

Literature review related to How Representatives Represent people:

The study found most of the available literature in the context of US. According to Gilen and Page (2014) the body of research on who governs and who really rules the public in consists of four families 1) Majoritarian Democracy 2) Economic Elite 3) Majoritarian Pluralism, wherein more or less the interests of all the citizens are represented equally 4) Biased Pluralism, wherein businesses, corporate associations, and proficient groups predominate. According to the same study each from the above perspective has different suppositions regard independent influence on policy outcomes from Average Americans or "median voter," Economic Elites, and business aligns groups or industrialists. And each of these four families has shaped a most of the literature in this area. These literatures mainly examine that to what extent democracy in America protects or represent the right of general people in which most of the studies provide empirical support in favour of their view. Gilens and Page have made Multivariate analysis in this regard. Their work suggests that elites and organized groups that representing business interests have considerable influence on U.S. policy outcomes , while average Americans and interest groups have no or very little independent influence.

We find work in the literature that examines the issue of representation Bartle (2002) studied different income groups and their relative representation in the U.S government. The author analysed public opinion data to find out how much people with low, middle and high incomes are represented at the national level. The author studied the views of constituency on different issues like civil rights, minimum wage, government spending, abortion, and ideological self-placement etc. He then compared those views with the response from the US senators. He found that senators in the US are less responsive to the opinion of people with modest income than to the rich income constituents. In other words the author found that rich are more represented than

poor. He draws that constituents belong to the 75th percentile are 3 times more represented than the 25th percentile. Furthermore, polices supported in favour of the people belongs to the 10th income percentile is about two times likely to be implemented while those supported in favour of people belongs to 90th income percentile is about six times as likely to be implemented. Representational biasedness is not limited only to US senate.

These results are also supported by the work of Monroe (1979, 1998) in case of the US parliament. His primarily findings suggest that high income groups are more represented in the American Parliament than the senate. He argues that public with 50th percentile are more represented than those with 10th percentile but less than those with the 90th one. Ferguson et all. (2016) demonstrated that the top 1% of the Americans who are mostly businessmen dominated both major parties. They showed that the case of the Tea Party in reality is bargaining between party candidates and businessmen. They Claims that major American businesses financially support party candidates in their election campaigns and later on use them to promote their business agenda. In this way the wealthiest Americans are capable to exercise more political influence than their less fortunate citizens do.

Historically oriented scholar Domhoff (2010) argues that top level managers and owners of large companies work together to shape themselves as an influential power group. They have corporations, agribusinesses and banks through which they form a corporate community. This rich community support the US policy makers at each and every ground for the sake of getting future favour. Altimetry they shapes federal government on the policy issues of interest to it, on those issues that have major impact on well-being, jobs and financial conditions of most of the other Americans.

In case of United States the work of Hacker and Pierson (2010) provides in depth detail and channels through which rich are becoming richer day by day while less affluent Americans on the other side facing opposite results. The author describes how representatives in Washington have "made the rich richer". They argue that in the last decades representatives have implemented most of the policies in favour of the rich. They provide evidence that the very rich (the top one-tenth of one percent) used to pay taxes at a sixty percent rate and now pay about half as much. Government also influences how the market hands out income in the late 1970s U.S laws and rules were changed in ways that weakened labour unions, while at the same time deregulating financial markets to allow hedge fund managers to gain new riches even though new fees and risks were imposed on the rest of Americans.

They further argue that what government does not do also are of importance a lot for example laws to enable unions, and to deliver benefits to the middle class need to be updated on regular basis when the situations change. The authors also suggest that in recent times, powerful interests in Washington have jammed action to appraise important rules and welfares to help majority of Americans. The authors further suggest that in the 1970s, corporate America was organized on an unparalleled measure by investing more money in politics. Most corporate money spending is on lobbying for influencing policy consequences in their favour, not elections. According to an official report overall lobbying costs rose from 0.4 billion in 1983 to 4 billion in 2007 when 14,789 lobbyists work out Capitol Hill[5]. Meanwhile, most Americans have no organizations lobbying for them, thus labour unions and broad civic organizations have lost ground. Many

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[5] Capitol Hill is the largest historic residential neighborhood in Washington D.C.

new, professionally run advocacy groups even those that are called "liberal" pay little attention to bread and butter issues that matter to average families.

Jeffrey Winters (2011) studied that the distinctive feature of oligarchy is to have control over massive resources. An oligarch is thus participant whose uneven wealth makes possible an approach towards political influence, which is not available to other political members of the polity. The author maintains that in this way the top one-tenth of 1 percent of US wealth-holders set up an "oligarchy" with definite power over certain main policies. The author named these activities of the supper rich of America as "income defence".

Nonetheless the implications of unequal political influence depend heavily upon exactly what wealthy Americans actually want government to do. In this regard Soroka and Wlezien (2008) have suggested that if the policy preferences of the affluent were much the same as everyone else's, then their unequal influence would make little practical difference. On the other hand, if the wealthy have very distinctive preferences that conflict with the interests of other citizens, they're Problem for the working of democracy in the United States.

In regards of what actually wealthy Americans wants Gilens, (2005,2012) used hundreds of general-population surveys covering scores of different policy issues and has produced excellent evidence on "affluent" Americans: those in the top 20 percent or so of income earners. Relatively affluent Americans tend to be more generous than others on religious and moral issues, including abortion, gay rights, and prayer in school, but much more conservative than the non-affluent on issues of taxes and economic regulation. Moving a bit higher on the income scale, to the top 4 percent or so, Benjamin Page and Cari Hennessy (2013) have combined three unusual General Social Surveys from the 1970s they found a similar pattern, with particularly sharp differences

between the affluent and other Americans concerning social issues and substantial differences on economic matters.

Rationale of Government:

The fundamental assumption in microeconomics is that markets usually work well for the efficient allocation of resources whether they are for the purpose of consumption, saving and investment. However, there are circumstances such as the presence of public goods externalities, imperfect competition and imperfect information where market fails if left to work freely. In such situations market is unable to maximise social surplus. Here we need Government intervention. The intervention of government is also justified on the basis of other than efficiency such as redistribution of resources vertically and horizontally, social inclusion and intergenerational equity, and ethical grounds such as banning market of organs, blood and other unethical practices. The government intervention for the provision of health and education are justified on the basis of externalities. Likewise the presence of imperfect information in the market brings inefficiency in terms of allocating funds towards those who are best user of money in the capital market and charging high premium from those who are not risky. Thus presence of imperfect information has implication for efficient provision of health care.

Government and Representation:

The intervention of government requires the formation of government. There is consensus among scholars that a government should work for the welfare of people. But the question is how should be in the government. How an individual of a society, which is consist of independent individuals with heterogeneous preference, be given the authority of government. The answer of this question has remained the subject of debates across cultures. For example, in old time the concept of might is right prevailed. Any person who had strong army and could conquer countries was government, judge and administration. His words were final. However, during this whole era, prophets used to realise people the concept of sovereignty of Allah. The job of the government was to administer and implement rules per sanction of Allah's will. The will of Allah was shown through His scripture (The last of whom is the Holy Quran). This concept remains dominate over centuries across the world in east and west. However, the concept of sovereignty of God weakened over time, in particular after the clash of religion and freedom from religion in Europe. And the concept of individual sovereignty emerged. The basic tenants of this movement were individual sovereignty. Thus, the debate about the procedure of assigning government and the role of government converged on democracy, where representative are the people who are supported by the majority votes.

The important question in democratic form of government is that why a person should offer herself when he/she has no incentive for giving such offer as he/she cannot implement her preferences, rather have to act like postman and implement the preferences of people. In otherworld's, the reprehensive has to make decision per the preferences of majority instead of following own preferences. Here comes the dilemma that on one hand a person has no incentive to offer herself for representation of people, on the other hand an individual has incentive to be

representative as after becoming representative he is not supposed to take advice from people for taking decisions. This is the place where he can mould decision in the direction benefiting herself or someone in return of some monetary benefits. The whole literature on rent seeking and favouring lobbyist support this view. Public choice theory is often used to explain how political decision-making results in outcomes that conflict with the preferences of the general public. For example, many projects might not be the desire of the overall people in a democracy. However, it makes sense for politicians to support these projects. The reason is that it may make them feel powerful and important. It can also benefit them financially by opening the door to future wealth as lobbyists. It is also possible that the project may be of interest to the politician's local constituency (e.g making exit from motorway without any real need), thus may increase votes or campaign contributions. In addition, representative in the government can offer varieties of market privileges to people such as monopoly and monopsony rent. The presence of such power has led to the debate that even winning political power is a kind of rent-seeking activity where people compete for gaining a sort of license to take power for making collective decisions. Jadish Bhagwati (1982) Gordon Tullock (1975, 1980), Anne Osborn Kruegar (1974) has argued that rent-seeking has caused considerable waste. In a parallel line of research, Fred Mc Chesney (1987, 1997) claims that rent extraction causes considerable waste, especially in the developing world. Rent extraction happens when officials use threats to extort payments from private parties.

Representation and Wealth:

Based on the earlier discuss that a representative can turn influential in making decision for herself or some lobby, hence can be tempted for becoming representative. If more people will be interested in such representation, then they have to compete with each other for attracting vote of people. This is the place where the role of money comes in. The reason is that during this competition, everyone tries to reach to everyone in the society and present herself as the best candidate. Reaching to every corner and every person in the society is a costly phenomenon. Beside this, political parties who offer tickets to candidates for representation spends lavishly to maintain their organizational structures, to run electoral campaigns, to train their members and supporters, and to advertise their ideas and schemes, to appear in the media channels, and to pay their professional workers (Griner and Zovatto, 2004). This requirement of money enhances the role of wealthy people in society. Consequently, this competition kicks out those candidates from the field, who have less money or not being supported by wealthy people in society. Thus political ground becomes clearer in the competition for the wealthiest candidates in the field. The people have no choice, other than to vote among these wealthy representatives. Empirical evidence in the United States supports our view where almost 43 percent of the incoming representatives (to Congress in 2003) were millionaires, compared with 1 percent of the American public *(Washington Times*, December 26, 2002).

The high cost of campaigns thus becomes a major barriers for various groups to enter the field of representation. This also provide a room for political campaigns to be financed either privately or by some groups with vested interest, who latter use the candidates for representing them instead

of people. In this regard a candidate may, even, receive money from criminals or illegal activities. In case such funding does not come from illegal source, it is clearer that private contributions can weaken the public interest and, may lead to, 'privatize' decision-making by public representatives (Griner and Zovatto 2004). In short the role of wealth in the process allows mega businesses and vested interest groups to get in. They invest in candidates and get them elected. Once such people are elected, they rarely care about the needs of people; rather they protect the interest of those whom he received financial support from. Hacker (2013) is of the view lavish spending on political campaigns doesn't just stand in the way of a fair political system. It also stands in the way of an economy that works for the middle class.

Thus Politicians need money to get into office and remain there. The cost of campaign, during election, forces political parties to increase funds for such purpose Therefore, payback of campaign debts in the form of political favours, which makes the representation of people completely biased. Researcher has found that the excessive role of money in politics has created representational biasedness. In the United States the representatives are found biased towards high income groups. Public with 50th percentile are more represented than those with 10th percentile but less than those with the 90th one (Monroe, 1998). Based on the above discussion we assume that representation is a costly phenomenon, hence we want to test the following hypothesis

Hypothesis: it is a representative elected in 2013 general election of Pakistan is less likely to be a representative of the general masses on the basis of wealth holding

Chapter 3

Data and Methodology

3.1 Introduction:

This chapter provides details regarding the source of data sample and methodology of the study. Section 3.1 provides description of the data on assets of common people and representatives. Section 3.2 consists of construction of variables relevant to the current analysis. The later section of this chapter consists of methods and procedures carried out by the current study

3.1.1 Description of Data on assets of the Representatives:

To test our hypothesis, we need data on assets of the members of all assemblies. This is pertinent to mention that per constitution of Pakistan each returning candidate is required to submit statement of assets and liabilities to election commission of Pakistan (ECP). According to the provisions of section 42A of the representation of the people act1976 and section 25A of the Senate, all elected representatives of National and Provincial legislatures of Pakistan must submit detailed accounts of their assets and liabilities to the Election Commission on a prescribed proforma by the end of each financial year. Failure to submit a declaration may lead to disqualification of the elected member. The detailed assets are compiled and published by Election Commission in the form of a gazette of the Federal government for the information and use of general public. Therefore, we approached election commission of Pakistan for the data which they received from returned candidates on annual basis. However, ECP only keep scan copies of the statements submitted to them by the returned candidates. ECP did not transform the

statements into excel sheet. Thus we request ECP for the provision of data and collect books from them containing statements of assets and liabilities of the returned candidates of all assemblies of Pakistan. Then we collect and transfer information from those in to excel sheets for carrying out further analysis.

The study analysed the statements of 1079 members across Senate, National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. In this study the data of 956 members is used after preliminary cleaning. Only observations with total value of assets between (149million and -79million) were included in this study and the remaining is excluded by considering them as outlier in the data set. Therefore, in this study, we make our analyses based on the declared assets and liabilities of 956 members across all assemblies of Pakistan. The PILDAT [6](2009) has also used the similar process for obtaining data on the assets of the members of the national assembly.

3.1.2 Description of Data on Assets of General people:

For the sake of relative analysis, we have collected information regarding the assets and liabilities of the general people of the country from the Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement" (PSLM 2012-13). The Pakistan bureau of statistics, conducts the PSLM survey on each alternating year. This survey provides the data of household on different variable like income and main income sources, consumption expenditure and consumption pattern, assets in position, health, transfer payments received in kinds, charities, borrowing, savings and many other variables that are important to analyse the economic position of different household, at national and provincial level with urban/rural analyses. Pakistan bureau of statistics provides

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[6] PILDAT is an independent think tank focussed on political and public policy research and legislative strengthening in Pakistan.

PSLM micro data in different sections. Each section then provides information on different variables. Section –7m provides information on the estimated value of durable items. Section -9m (part-A) provides information on immovable assets (land, building and poultry form etc., and Section 9m (part-B) provides information on financial assets, liabilities, loans and credit of households. We select the above discussed sections for data collection as our study mainly focuses on comparative analysis of the assets of representatives and general people.

3.2 Construction of variables:

The current section of the chapter explains different variables which are relevant to our analysis. This will also show the composition of different variables.

3.2.1 Total Assets of representatives:

From total assets we mean the combined value of all assets hold by the representatives. In the current analysis total assets consist of, movable assets, immovable assets, assets in the name of children and wife, agricultural and commercial land, gold, assets outside Pakistan and other assets. Monetary values of the assets are being copied as given per statement by the respective representatives. We have tried to monetize assets where not monetized by the respective member of the assembly with accordance to those statements in which the concern assets were monetized by the members. In this regard agricultural land in rural areas of the country is valued at 10000 per canal, while land across urban areas of Punjab, KPK, Baluchistan, Fata, and Sindh is valued at one lac per canal. Similarly commercial land is valued at Rs.1000000 per canal. Gold is valued at Rs.50, 000 per 10 gram. Foreign currencies such as dollar, euro, pound, and yen etc. are converted back to Pakistani rupee at their market value.

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3.2.2 Total Assets of the General people:

Total assets mean the combined value of all the assets of general masses. In the context of the current analysis total assets of general people consist of, movable assets and immovable assets. Furthermore the movable assets consist of gold, savings, cash at hand, irons, fans, washing machine, refrigerator, vehicles, mobile phone and computer e. t. c. While the immovable assets include houses, buildings, agricultural and commercial land and poultry farms etc. Monetary values of the immovable assets are being copied as given in the PSLM micro data set.

3.2.3 Mean Assets of Representatives:

In this study mean or average value of assets is the value of assets per representative. It is important to determine the Mean assets of the representatives as it gives important information about the data set at hand, and as a single, can provide a lot of insights from the data set. Therefore the study determines the mean value of the assets at national level, by dividing the sum of assets by the total number of representatives of the respective assembly. The study also determines the mean value of the representative's asset at provincial and party level by the same procedure.

3.2.4 Mean Assets of the General People:

For comparison purpose, it is important to find out mean assets of the general people too. The study determines the mean value of the assets of the people at national and provincial level, for national level the study divides the sum of assets by the number of people surveyed in PSLM.

3.3 Outliers in the Data sets:

The study analysed the statements of 1079 members across Senate, National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. In this study the data of 956 members is used after preliminary cleaning. Only observations with total value of assets between (149million and -79million) were included in this study and the remaining is excluded by considering them as outlier in the data set. Therefore, in this study, we make our analyses based on the declared assets and liabilities of 956 members across all assemblies of Pakistan.

Similarly 17989 households were surveyed in (2013-14) from all over Pakistan. In this study the data of 15556 households is used after preliminary cleaning. Only observations with total value of assets between (0.45 million and -0.2 million) were included in this study and the remaining are excluded by considering them as outlier in the data set (Asgher et al 2016).

3.3.1 Simple random Sample:

It is a subset of a statistical population .In this method each and every member of the subset has equal chance to be selected. In this study we use the discussed procedure for choosing different samples across province to take out comparative analysis for the members of provincial assemblies and their people.

3.3.2 Comparison:

The current study use simple descriptive analysis. The study compares average assets of the representatives with the average assets of the general people of Pakistan at national, provincial and party level. The study will also compare the level of the assets of the representatives across the nation, province and political parties. These analyses will provide better insights to check representation at different levels.

Mathematically,

$$D = AAm - AAgp \text{----------------- (3)}$$

Here AAm represents average assets of representatives and AAgp represents average assets of general people.

Equation (3) represents the difference in assets holding between members of the assembly and common people at National level.

In similar fashion, we will compare representatives and general people across province and political parties.

3.3.3 How many times Representatives are Richer:

The study will also find out how many times the assets of the representatives are over and above than the assets of the general people. The study will find the above relation by dividing the value of MNAs assets by the value of the assets of the general people. This will help to know about the assets holding gap between the legislators and common people

3.3.4 Statistical test for the purpose of analysis:

For the testing of hypothesis, the study will compare population means. That is the average assets per Pakistani. Likewise the study will compare average assets per individual across general people and representatives. Two types of statistical tests are commonly used for such purpose: T-test and Z-test. However, the study will use the Z-test as the sample size is large and the population variance is known. Per nature of the data we will use the following specification of Z-test two samples for the mean.

$$Z = \frac{\overline{(x_1 - \bar{x}_2)} - (\mu_1 - \mu_2)}{\dfrac{\sigma_1^2}{n_1} + \dfrac{\sigma_2^2}{n_2}}$$

Where

$\bar{x}_1 = $ Represents Sample Mean of group1

$\bar{x}_2 = $ Represents Population Mean of group2

$\mu_1 = $ Represents Population Mean of group1

$\mu_2 = $ Represents Population Mean of group2

$\sigma_1 = $ Represents population Variance of group1

$\sigma_2 = $ Represents Population Variance of group2

$n_1 = $ Represents the number of observations in group1

$n_2 = $ Represents the number of observations in group 2

Chapter 4

Results

4.1 Introduction:

This Chapter presents the key findings of the current study. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the average assets of Political Representatives and general people across all the legislative assemblies of Pakistan. Section 4.3 provides cross party analysis on the bases of assets holdings. Section 4.4 provides analysis across the National Assembly of Pakistan. Section 4.5 provides analysis across the Upper House. Section 4.6 provides relative standing of the returned candidates among general people. Section 4.7 provides information on how assets and number of votes are related.

4.2 Comparative Analysis of The Assets holds by the Representatives and General People:

Table 4.1 compares Mean assets of political representatives and general public across all assemblies. Findings suggest maximum gap in assets holding between the members of the senate and general public. On average a senator in Pakistan holds assets of 87 million rupees. On the other hand the mean assets of general people of Pakistan amounts 0.15 million rupees. This yields a gap of 86.9 million rupees between the assets holding of senators and general public. In other words member of the senate are 453 times richer than an average Pakistani citizen. Analysing mean assets of representatives across national assembly the study finds that Pakistani MNAs are 427 times richer than the general public. This distribution of the assets of the members of the Senate and Parliament is significantly different than the distribution of assets of the people of Pakistan *(p<0.01)*. These findings support our hypothesis that the process of representation is a costly process and require funds which only the rich can afford. Analysing

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average assets of representatives and general people across province, we find significant difference in the assets of the representatives and general public. Findings show maximum difference in case of Sindh, where mean assets of an elected member amounts to 36 million rupees while general people of this province holds mean assets of 0.15 million rupees. In case of Sindh each elected representative is richer than a common citizen by 35.9 million rupees. In other words elected representatives of Sindh are 240 times richer than the general public of the province. This distribution of the assets of the representatives across the province of Sindh is significantly different than the distribution of assets of the people of this province $(p<0.01)$. Representatives from Punjab stand second in this regard. They are 145 times richer than their people. Representatives from Baluchistan and KPK are at the third and fourth position respectively in this contest. In relative terms representatives from KPK assembly are least deviated from their people in terms of assets holding. Nonetheless, in each of the above cases we find no match in the level of assets, of representatives and the general masses. Hence, the comparison of assets across legislative Assemblies also supports the hypothesis of the study.

Table 4.1: an overveiw and comparison of the assets of representatives and general people.

Assemblies	No of Constituencies	Total Assets of Representatives Rs (000000)	Total Assets (General people) Rs (000000)	Mean Assets of Representatives Rs (000000)	Mean Assets of (General people) Rs (000000)	Number of times Members are richer than common people
National	231	14806	135	64	0.15	427
Senate	83	5923	135	68	0.15	453
Punjab	315	17211	2875	55	0.38	145
Sindh	149	5382	756	36	0.15	240
KPK	113	4567	1443	40	0..42	95
Baluchistan	61	2154	398	35	0.25	140

Section 4.3: Comparison of Assets of the Representatives across political parties:

Comparing assets of political representatives and general people across political parties, the study finds representatives assets significantly different than those hold by the general people. Findings suggest that PML-N is the richest party in Pakistan. On average a representative from PML-N holds assets of 60 million rupees. The general people of the country on the other hand hold average assets of 0.14 million rupees. The last column of table 4.2 shows that a representative from PML-N hold 400 times more assets than an average citizen of the country. The study found significant difference in the average assets of the PML-N representatives and general masses $(p<0.01)$. Representatives from PTI stand 2nd in this regard. They are 347 times richer than common people. PPPP representatives stand 3rd. They are 333 times richer while MQM stands last in this contest. In relative terms representatives from MQM are least different from the common people in terms of assets holding. They are 147 times richer. Nonetheless, in each of the above cases we find no match in the level of assets, of representatives and the general masses. Analysis, across political parties also supports the hypothesis of the study.

Table 4.2 :Compairing Assets of representatives and general people across Political parties.

Political party	Number of seats	Total assets of Representatives Rs (000000)	Total Assets (General people) Rs (000000)	Mean Assets (Representatives) Rs (000000)	Mean Assets of (General people) Rs (000000)	Number of times MNAs are richer than common people
PML-N	408	22764	56	56	0.14	400
PTI	97	5071	14	52	0.15	347
PPPP	137	6012	18	50	0.15	333
JUI-F	34	1244	8	32	0.18	178
MQM	65	1738	12	25	0.17	147

Section 4.4: Analysis of the National Assembly:

4.4.1 Comparative analysis of the Parliamentarians and general people:

Table 4.3 suggests that the parliamentarians hold total assets of 14806 million rupees. On average an MNA in Pakistan owns assets of 64 million rupees. On average the assets of the common people amounts to 0.15 million rupees. This yields a difference of almost 63.9 million rupees. In other words a parliamentarian is 427 times richer than an average Pakistani. This indicates that the average wealth of all elected candidates is much more than the average wealth of the common people. This distribution of the assets of the parliament is significantly different than the distribution of assets of the people of Pakistan $(p<0.01)$. These findings support our hypothesis that the process of representation is a costly phenomenon and require funds which mostly the rich can afford.

Analysing average assets of MNAs and general people across the province, we observed significant variation in assets holding. Findings show maximum variation in the case of the Sindh Province, where average assets of an MNA amount to 58 million rupees. The assets of the general people of Sindh amount to 0.11 million rupees. This yields a difference of 58.89 million rupees. The last column of table 4.3 shows that MNAs of Sindh are 527 times richer than the general public of Punjab. This distribution of the assets of the parliamentarians of Sindh is significantly different than the distribution of assets of the people of this province $(p<0.01)$.Detailed analysis regard MNAs assets is given in the appendix-B of the study.

The Parliamentarians from Punjab stand 2nd in this regard. They are 500 times richer than their people. Members from Baluchistan stand in 3rd position while KPK stands at the 4rth position. In relative terms MNAs from KPK are least deviated from their people in terms of assets holding. Nonetheless, in each of the above cases we find no match in the level of assets, of

Parliamentarians and the general masses. Hence, the comparison of assets across provinces also supports the hypothesis of the study.

Table 4.3: An over view of the assets of MNAs and general people.

Province	No of Constituencies	Total Assets Of MNAs Rs (000000)	Total Assets (General people) Rs (000000)	Mean Assets (MNAs) Rs (000000))	Mean Assets of (General people) Rs (000000)	Number of times MNAs are richer than common people
Overall Pakistan	231	14806	35	64	0.15	427
Punjab	118	8818	36	75	0.30	500
Sindh	57	3279	7	58	0.11	527
KPK	32	1706	19	53.3	0.5	106
Baluchistan	13	470	2	36	0.15	240

4.4.2: Comparison of general People and MNAs across political parties:

Analysing assets of the Parliamentarians and general people across political parties, the study finds that the average assets of MNAs varies significantly across political parties. Findings suggest that PPPP is the richest party across National Assembly. On average an MNA from PPPP is the owner of 75 million rupees. The general people of the country hold average assets of 0.15 million rupees. In other words the study found significant difference in the average assets of the representatives from PPPP and general masses $(p<0.01)$. The last column of table 4.4 shows that an MNA from PPPP is 500 times richer than an average citizen of the country. In the similar fashion Parliamentarians from the PML-N stand 2nd in this regard. They are 480 times richer than common people. MNAs from the PTI stand in 3rd position. They are 407 times richer. JUI-F stands last in this contest. In relative terms MNAs from JUI-F are least different from the common people in terms of average assets. They are 53 times richer than average citizens of the country. Nonetheless, in each of the above cases we find no match in the level of wealth, of

Parliamentarians and the general masses. Analysis, across political parties also supports the hypothesis of the study.

Table4.4: An Overview of assets of MNAs and general public across Political parties.

Political party	Number of seats	Total assets of MNAs Rs (000000)	Total Assets (Common people) Rs (000000)	Mean Assets (MNAs) Rs (000000)	Mean Assets of (Common people) Rs (000000)	Number of times MNAs are richer than common people
PML-N	121	32279	35	72	0.15	480
PTI	20	7988	35	61	0.15	407
PPPP	35	4735	35	75	0.15	500
JUI-F	9	72	35	8	0.15	53
MQM	19	520	35	25	0.15	167

Section 4.5: Analysis of the Upper House:

4.5.1: Comparative analysis of the members of the Upper House and common people:

Table 4.5 suggests that the senators hold total assets of 5923 million rupees. On average a Pakistani Senator holds assets of 68 million while a common individual of this country holds assets of 0.15 million rupees. In other words a Senator is 453 times richer than an average Pakistani. This indicates that the average assets of the members of the upper house are much more than the average assets of the common people. This distribution of the assets of the Senate is significantly different than the distribution of assets of the people of Pakistan *(p<0.01)*. These findings support our hypothesis it is less likely that a representative is a representative of the common individuals on the bases of the assets holdings.

The study finds out significant variation in assets holding of Senators and general people across the province. Findings show maximum difference in case of KPK, where a senator is 460 times

richer than the common people of this province. This distribution of the assets of the Senators of Sindh is significantly different than the distribution of assets of the people of this province $(p<0.01)$. Senators from Sindh stand 2nd in this regard. They are 413 times richer than their people. Members of the upper house from Punjab and Baluchistan stand equally. Nonetheless, in each of the above cases we find no match in the level of assets, of Senators and the general masses. Hence, the comparison of assets across provinces also supports the hypothesis of the study.

Table 4.5: Comparison of the assets of Senators and general people across province.

Province	No of Constituencies	Total Assets Of Senators Rs (000000)	Total Assets (General people) Rs (000000)	Mean Assets (Senators) Rs (000000))	Mean Assets of (General people) Rs (000000)	Number of times Senators are richer than common people
Overall Senate	87	5923	35	68	0.31	453
Punjab	18	994	35	52	0.31	347
Sindh	20	1232	35	62	0.31	413
KPK	19	1307	35	69	0.31	460
Baluchistan	17	883	35	52	0.31	347

4.5.2: Political Parties and common people across the upper house:

Analysing assets of the Senators and general people across political parties, the study finds that the average assets of Senators varies significantly across political parties. Findings suggest that senators who reach the upper house as an independent candidate are the richest senators. On average Senator from IND holds assets of 149 million rupees. The general people of the country hold average assets of 0.15 million rupees. In other words the study found significant difference in the average assets of the independent Senators and general masses $(p<0.01)$. The last column of table 4.6 shows that independent Senator is 993 times richer than an average citizen of the country. In the similar fashion Senators from the MQM stand 2nd in this regard. They are 647

times richer than common people. Senators from the PPPP stand 3rd in this regard. They are 389 times richer. JUI-F stands last in this contest. In relative terms Senators from JUI-F are least different from the common people in terms of assets holdings. They are 307 times richer than average citizens of the country. Nonetheless, in each of the above cases we find no match in the level of assets, of the members of the upper house and the general masses. Analysis, across political parties also supports the hypothesis of the study.

Table4.6: An Overview of assets of Senators and general public across Political parties.

Political party	Number of seats	Total assets of Senators Rs (000000)	Total Assets (General people) Rs (000000)	Mean Assets (Senators) Rs (000000)	Mean Assets of (General people) Rs (000000)	Number of times Richer
PML-N	15	764	35	51	0.15	340
PPPP	25	1462	35	58.4	0.15	389
JUI-F	6	28	35	46	0.15	307
MQM	6	584	35	97	0.15	647
IND	09	1343	35	149	0.15	993

Section 4.6: Relative Standing of Representatives among general people:

This section provides information on the relative standing of political representatives among general people. Here the 1st quartile shows 25% of the general people or representatives who hold low level of assets, while the 4rth Quartile represents 25% of those having top level of assets. Table 4.7 suggest that the value of the first quartile of the representative's assets have no match with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd and 4rth quartile of the assets of general people. In other words these representatives are not from the general people. They possess greater assets than the general population. Quartile analysis compels us for Percentile analysis to know about the relative standing of our representatives among general public.

Table 4.7: Relative standing of political representatives among general people(Quartile analysis).

Assets of (MNAs)	Assets of (General people)	Matching
Quartile, 1 = 12 million	Quartile, 1= 0.03 million	NO
Quartile, 2 = 29 million	Quartile, 2= 0.09 million	NO
Quartile, 3 = 73 million	Quartile, 3= 0.19 million	NO
Quartile, 4= 729 million	Quartile, 4= .62 million	NO

The study finds their exact place with the help of Percentile analysis given in table 5.4 which suggest that the 1st percentile of the representative's assets is matching with the top five percentile of general people. Moreover, the study finds that 99percent of the representatives are from top 1% of the affluent Pakistanis. These findings supports the words of Steiglitz (2012) democracy leads to "government of 1 precent for 1 precent and by 1 precent" .The analysis also supports hypothesis of the study.

Table 4.8: Relative Standing of Representatives among General public (Percentile Analysis).

Assets of(Representatives)		Assets of (G.people)
Poorest one percent	———➤	Richest five percent
Twentieth Percentile	———➤	Richest one percent
Thirtieth Percentile	———➤	Richest one percent
Fortieth Percentile	———➤	Richest one percent
Fiftieth Percentile	———➤	Richest one percent

Section 4.7: Evidence from Assets and number of votes:

Our findings suggest a linear relationship between mean assets of representatives and number of votes in case of the main stream political parties. For Instance we have mentioned in section in 4.2 that PML-N is the richest among political parties Now we are saying that it is not only the richest party in terms of assets but richest in terms of votes too. According to our analysis PTI scored second in terms of assets which we find second in number of votes too. Table 4.5 show detailed in this regard. Thus we conclude that in case of first three main stream political parties more the assets a party hold more the votes it receives. The current analysis point out that electoral success in case of Pakistan depends heavily on assets holding which ultimately reveal that rich are more likely to become representatives .

Table 4.9: Assets and votes across three mainstream political parties.

Political Party	Mean ASSETS Rs (000000)	Number of Votes
PML-N	148	278,133,12
PTI	131	143,022,82
PPPP	108	131,101,10

Chapter 5

Conclusions

5.1 Introduction:

The underlying study aims to investigate that whether or not representation is a costly phenomenon and it is less likely that a representative is a representative of the general masses. We mainly focus on how much is the role of wealth in becoming a representative of the people.

Is democracy facilitating the wealthy one to become representative of the people? We aim to examine this question. To find the answer of the question we obtained data on assets of all those people who have become members of assemblies in the 2013 election. We then see if such representation is from the common people. For this we collect data on the assets of general people from Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement (PSLM 2012-13). We then compare the level of the assets of the representatives with the level of assets of general people of Pakistan, to know whether the distribution of the assets of the representativesis significantly different than the distribution of assets of people of Pakistan. We are of the view that there is a significant role of money in becoming a representative. The reason is that the process which requires a person to be elected requires election campaign which is costly. Hence, the whole process becomes like buying a commodity in the market. And only those can buy it who can afford it. In this chapter, we present the important conclusions of our study.

5.2 Conclusions:

Our findings are based on descriptive analysis. The descriptive analysis provides detail regarding the extent to which these representatives are different in terms of assets holdings from the general masses. It becomes helpful to examine the role of money in becoming a representative of the people. The descriptive results explain that on average the wealth of all the elected members of the National Assembly is 427 times over and above the wealth of the general masses of the country. Analysis of the Upper House (Senate) suggests that on average the assets holdings of the members of the Senate is 473 times over and above the assets of the general masses of the country. The findings also show that representatives of provincial Assemblies are multiple times richer than their people. In this regard MPAs from the Sindh are wealthier. On average their assets are 240 times above the average assets of the common people of the province. The MPAs from Punjab stand 2nd in this regard. They are 145 times richer than their people. Members from Baluchistan stand in 3rd position while KPK stands at the 4rth position. In relative terms MPAs from KPK are least deviated from their people in terms of assets holdings. Nonetheless, in each of the above cases we find no match in the level of assets, of Representatives and the general masses. These findings support our hypothesis that the process of representation is a costly phenomenon and require funds which only the rich can afford.

Different political parties contested election in all provinces of Pakistan. The current study reveals that on average the three mainstream political parties PML-N, PPPP and PTI holds high level of assets. Findings suggest that PML-N is the richest party in Pakistan. On average a representative from PML-N is 400 times richer than the general public of the country. The PTI stand 2nd in this regard. They are 347 times richer than common people. Representatives from the PPP stand in 3rd position. They are 333 times richer. The MQM stands last in this contest. In

relative terms members of MQM are least different from the common people in terms of assets holdings. They are 147 times richer than average citizens of the country. Nonetheless, in each of the above cases we find no match in the level of wealth, of Parliamentarians and the general masses. Analysis, across political parties also supports the hypothesis of the study.

The study also found that the current representatives are from the top 1% affluent Pakistanis. These findings suggest that representation across the nation is a moneyed phenomenon. The current representatives are super rich and a large proportion of the population under them is poor. The reason is that the role of wealth has made serious barrier to entry into the political process for some groups. They may be highly educated, most appropriate for representation, but if they have fewer resources, or not being supported by wealth the high cost of election campaigns immediately stops them in the way. In the light of our analysis we can say that the power of money has made it almost impossible for the laymen to compete with these elite ones (existing representatives) and ultimately to reach the legislative assemblies of Pakistan as when money controls democracy, it sets a negative and argumentative pattern, which imperceptibly exclude the people without resources. We think that our country fall short of a true and fair representational process that is according to our knowledge is a crucial issue. The Election Commission of Pakistan should take serious notice of this. In this regard the study suggests some of the possible solutions in the next section.

5.3 Limitation and future research:

Limitations of this study should be noted that the study doesn't use regression analysis in the case to find out the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes, due to limitations of the availability of a certain set of data. Data on election campaigns is not available in Pakistan. Also the ECP has no record of the assets of those candidates who have lost during 2013 elections. The second limitation of the study is that it examined one election (2013). Future research may study number of elections.

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Appendix-A :

Abbreviations & Acronyms

ANP	Awami National Party
BNP	Baluchistan National Party
IND	Independent
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MNA	Member National Assembly
MQM	Muttahida Quami Movement
NA	National Assembly
NPP	National Peoples' Party
PKMAP	Pakhtoon-Khwa Milli Awami Party
PML	Pakistan Muslim League (previously Quaide-e-Azam)
PML-F	Pakistan Muslim League-Functional
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PPPP	Pakistan Peoples' Party-Parliamentarian
PPP-S	Pakistan People's Party-Sherpao Group
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf
JI	Jumat-i-Isalmi
JUI-F	Jamyat Ulama-i-Isalm (Fazalurehman)

Appendix-B Detailed analysis of Parliamentarians:

The Richest MNAs:

In terms of individual wealth, the 2013-2014 declarations reveal the wealthiest MNA to be
Mr.Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (NA-120,
, Punjab, PML-N) with total assets of Rs. 2.1591 billion. He is followed by Mr Khail Zaman
(NA-16,
KPK, PTI), with total assets of Rs. 1.977 billion, Mr. Salman Hanif (NA-138, Punjab, PML-N)
with
total assets of Rs. 814.08 million,
Mr. Sheikh Fiazuddin (NA-193, Punjab PML-N) with total assets of Rs. 719.87 million and
Mr. Danyal Aziz (NA-116,Punjab , PML-N) with total assets of Rs. 687 million The
assets of these five, amount to total Rs 6.35 billion. Together, these individuals hold 19 % of the
total assets held by all MNAs.

Rank	Name	Constituency	Total Assets	
01	Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	NA-120	2.159	billion
02	Khail Zaman	NA-16	1.978	billion
03	Salman Hanif	NA-138	814.08	million
04	Sheikh Fiazuddin	NA-193	719.87	million
05	Danyal Aziz	NA-116	687	million

Top three MNAs in Each Province:

Baluchistan:

According to the assets declaration in 2013-2014, Ms. Jam Kamal Khan (NA-270, Baluchistan PML-N) was the wealthiest MNA in
the province, with total assets of Rs. 333.59 million, followed by Abdul Qadir Baloch (NA271, Baluchistan, PML-N) and Sardar Kamal Khan (NA-268, Baluchistan, NP).

Table 7: Three Richest MNAs from Baluchistan:

Rank	Name	Constituency	Net Assets
01	Jam Kamal Khan	NA-270	333.59 million
02	Abdul Qadir Baloch	NA-271	207.6 million
03	Sardar Kamal Khan	NA-268	70.65 million

FATA:

In 2013-2014, the wealthiest MNA was Mr. Shahabuddin Khan (NA-44, Tribal Area, PML-N) with assets of Rs. 666 million,
followed by Mr. Bismillah Khan(NA-43, Tribal Areas, IND) and Mr. Qaiser Jamal (NA-47,Tribal Area, PTI)

Table 9: Three Richest MNAs from FATA:

Rank	Name	Constituency	Net Assets
01	Shahabuddin Khan	NA-44	666 million
02	Bismillah Khan	NA-43	178.9 million
03	Qaiser Jamal	NA-47	93.26 million

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa:

The wealthiest MNA in 2013-2014 in KP is Mr. Khail Zaman (NA -16, KP, PTI), with net assets of Rs. 1.977
billion, followed by Mr. Sher Akber Khan (NA-28, KP, JI) and Mr.Omer Aueb Khan (NA-19, KP ,PML-N).

Table 11: Three Richest MNAs from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa:

Rank	Name	Constituency	Net Assets
01	Khail Zaman	NA-16	1977.92 million
02	Sher Akber Khan	NA-28	228.73 million
03	Omer Aueb Khan	NA-19	226.73 million

The Punjab:

In 2013-2014, Mr. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (NA-120, Punjab, PML-N) was the wealthiest MNA in Punjab, with
assets of Rs.2.259 billion, followed by Mr. Salman Hanif (NA 138, Punjab, PML-N) and Mr. Sheikh Fiazuddin (NA-103, Punjab, PML-N).

Table 13: Three Richest MNAs from Punjab:

Rank	Name	Constituency	Net Assets
01	Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	NA-120	2159.1 million
02	Salman Hanif	NA-138	814.08 million
03	Sheikh Fiazuddin	NA-193	719.87 million

Sindh:

In the year 2014-2013, Mr. Mir Amer Ali Khan (NA-206, Sindh, PPPP) the richest MNA from Sindh, followed by Ms.Dr Azra Afzal (NA-213, Sindh, PPPP) and Mr.Ehsan-ur-Rehaman (NA-210,Sindh,PPPP)

Table 15: Three Richest MNAs from Sindh:

Rank	Name	Constituency	Net Assets
01	Mir Amer Ali Khan	NA-206	588.32 million
02	Dr Azra Afzal	NA-213	542.12 million
03	Mr.Ehsan-ur-Ehman	NA-210	430.35 million

ICT:

There are only two MNAs for the ICT in the National Assembly. In 2013-2014, Mr. Asad Umer (NA-48, Islamabad-I,PTI) declared assets worth Rs. 438.33 million, followed by Dr. Tariq Fazal Chaudhry (NA-49, Islamabad-II, PML-N) with
assets worth Rs. 80.30 million.

Table 17: MNAs from ICT:

Rank	Name	Constituency	Net Assets	
01	Asad Umer	NA-48	438.33	million
02	Dr Tariq Fazal CH.	NA-49	80.3	million

Constituency-wise List of MNAs
Along with Their Total Assets and Rank

(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)

NA NO.	NAME	PARTY	NAM	RANK
NA.1	Haji Ghulam ahmad Bilour	ANP	39.16	151
NA.2	Hamid-ul-haq	PTI	3.69	250
NA.4	Gulzar khan	PTI	0.53	263
NA.5	Imran Khattak	PTI	51.14	139
NA.6	Siraj muhmmad khan	PTI	55.32	135
NA.7	Maulana muhamad Goher shah	JUI-F	18.21	200
NA.8	Aftab ahmad khan sherpao	QWP	96.21	89
NA.9	Amir haider khan hoti	ANP	8.57	233
NA.10	Ali Muhamad khan	PTI	36.03	159
NA.11	Mujahid ali	PTI	17.96	202
NA.12	ENGR Usman khan taraj	AJIP	30.49	173
NA.13	Aqibullah khan	PTI	6.72	236
NA.15	Nisar Khan Khattak	PTI	65.73	120
Na.16	Khail Zaman	PTI	1977.92	2
NA.17	Dr. muhamad Azher Jadoon	PTI	33.61	164
NA.18	Murtaza javed abbasi	PML-N	74.78	107
NA.19	Omer Aueb khan	PML-N	226.78	40

NA.20	Sardar muhammad yousaf	PML-N	12.33	221
NA.21	Muhmmad safdar	PML-N	12.26	223
NA.22	Qari Muhammad Yousaf	JUI-F	2.03	259
NA.23	sar Zameen	PML-N	3.02	253
NA.24	Maulana Fazlurahman	JUI-F	6.71	237
NA.25	Dawar khan kundi	PTI	12.62	219
NA.26	Akram khan durrani	JUI-F	16.5	205
NA.27	Amirullah Marwat	PTI	33.06	168
NA.28	Sher akber khan	JI	228.73	38
NA.29	Murad Saeed	PTI	0.41	264
NA.30	Saleem Rehman	PTI	97.01	87
NA.31	Dr ibadullah	PML-N	29.25	175
NA.32	Iftikharuddin	APML	40.8	150
NA.33	Sahibzada Tariqullah	JI	27.22	180
NA.34	Sahibzada Muhammad Yaqoob	JI	170.5	54
NA.35	Jinaid akber	PTI	219.29	43

FATA:

NA NO.	NAME	PARTY	NET ASSETS	RANK
NA.36	Malik bilal rehman	IND	3.28	251
NA.37	Sajid hussain Tori	IND	21.3	192
NA.39	Syiad ghazi gilab jamal	IND	13.59	187
NA.40	Muhammad Nasir Khan	PML-N	5.61	241
NA.41	Ghalib khan	PML-N	13.81	215
NA.42	Muhammad jamaluDDin	JUI-F	4.37	245
NA.43	Bismillah khan	IND	178.9	55
NA.44	Shahabuddin Khan	PML-N	666	6
NA.45	Alahaj shah gul afridi	IND	63.68	125
NA.46	Nasir Khan	IND	24.53	185
NA.47	Qaiser Jamal	PTI	93.26	92

The ICT:

NA No.	NAME	PARTY	Net Assts	Rank
NA.48	Asad Umer	PTI	438.33	16
NA.49	Dr Traiq Fazal Chudri	PML-N	80.3	100

The PUNJAB:

NA No.	NAME	PARTY	Net Assts	Rank
NA.50	Shahid Khaqan abbasi	PML-N	648.85	7
NA.51	Raja Javid Ikhlas	PML-N	172.38	103
NA.52	Chudri Nisar Ali Khan	PML-N	154.82	63
NA.53	Ghulam Server Khan	PTI	173.35	109
NA.54	Malik Ibrar Ahmed	PML-N	65	123
NA.55	Sheikh Rashid Ahmad	AML	39.12	152
NA.56	Imran Ahmad Khan Nyazi	PTI	249.9	34
NA.57	Sheikh Aftab Ahmad	PML-N	15.78	207
NA.58	Malik Ehtibar Khan	PML-N	483.2	15

NA.59	Muhmmad Zain Elahi	IND	77.91	101
NA.60	Maj. Tahir Iqbal	PML-N	34.93	163
NA.61	Sardar Mumtaz Khan	PML-N	99.16	85
NA.62	CH.Khadim Hussain	PML-N	38.21	154
NA.63	Malik Iqbal Mehdi	PML-N	269.5	30
NA.64	Pir Muhammad Amin	PML-N	48.29	147
NA.65	Mohsin Nawaz Ranjha	PML-N	16.86	204
NA.66	CH.Hamid Hameed	PML-N	13.35	217
NA.67	Dr.Zulfiqar Ali Bhati	PML-N	14.93	211
NA.68	Sardar Muhammad shafqat	PML-N	100.56	84
NA.69	Muhammad Uzair Khan	PML-N	87.8	95
NA.70	Malik Shakir Bashir Awan	PML-N	15.52	208
NA.71	Ubaidullah Khan	PML-N	-9.88	266
NA.72	Amjad Ali Khan	PTI	54.45	136

NA.73	Abdul Majeed Khan	PML-N	27.91	178
NA.74	Muhammmad Afzal Khan	PML-N	563.09	11
NA.75	Ghulam Rasul Sahi	PML-N	123.51	76
NA.76	Muhammad Talal Bahadur	PML-N	48.36	141
NA.77	Ch.Muhammad Asim	PML-N	10.38	229
NA.78	Rajab Ali Khan Baloch	PML-N	218.5	44
NA.79	CH.Muhammad Shehbaz	PML-N	6.63	238
NA.80	Mian Muhammad Farooq	PML-N	35.38	162
NA.81	Dr.Nisar Ahmad	PML-N	8.2	234
NA.82	Muhammad Afzal khan	PML-N	-0.13	268
NA.83	Mian Abdul Manan	PML-N	19.91	195
NA.84	Abid Sher Ali	PML-N	75.69	106
NA.85	Muhammad Akram Ansari	PML-N	5.3	242
NA.86	Qaiser Ahmad Sheikh	PML-N	269.76	29

NA.87	Ghulam Muhammad Lali	PML-N	96.31	88
NA.88	Ghulam Bibi Bherwana	PML-N	57.69	128
NA.89	SH,Mohammmad Akram	PML-N	265.48	32
NA.90	Sahibzada Muhmmad Nazeer sultan	PML-N	142.07	66
NA.91	Najaf Abbas Saif	PML-N	200.05	52
NA.92	Chudri Khalid Javaid	PML-N	308.5	26
NA.93	Muhammad Junaid Anwar	PML-N	106.55	83
NA.94	Chudri Asad-ur-rehman	PML-N	6.07	240
NA.95	Usman Ibrahim	PML-N	5.93	214
NA.96	Engineer Khuram Dastagir khan	PML-N	19.54	198
NA.97	CH.Mahmood Bashir	PML-N	30.4	174
NA.98	Mian Tariq Mahmood	PML-N	91.7	93
NA.99	Rana Umer Sher	PML-N	80.78	99
NA.100	Abdul Qayyum Nahra	PML-N	175.12	57

NA.101	Iftikhar Ahmad Chema	PML-N	48.8	140
NA.102	Saira Afzal tarar	PML-N	35.85	160
NA.103	Mian Shahid Hussain Khan	PML-N	0	265
NA.104	Nawabzada Mazher Ali	PML-N	134.97	71
NA.105	Chudri Pervaiz Elahi	PML	310.16	25
NA.106	Jaffer Iqbal	PML-N	31.62	170
NA.107	CH. Abid Raza	PML-N	4.05	248
NA.108	Muhammad Aijaz Ahmad Chudri	PML-N	613.21	8
NA.109	Nasir Iqbal Bosal	PML-N	119.76	77
NA.110	Khwaja Muhammd Asif	PML-N	21.73	193
NA.111	CH. Aramghan Subhani	PML-N	26.45	183
NA.112	Rana Shameem Ahmad Khan	PML-N	47.44	144
NA.113	Syed Iftikhar ul Hussain	PML-N	82.67	98
NA.114	Zahid Hussain	PML-N	316	24
NA.115	Mian mMuhammad	PML-N	64.93	124

Rasheed

NA.116	Danyal Aziz	PML-N	686.8	5
NA.117	Ahsan Iqbal Chudri	PML-N	6.15	239
NA.118	Muhammmad Riaz Malik	PML-N	246.52	35
NA.119	Muhammad Hamza Shehbaz Shifar	PML-N	214.47	46
NA.120	Muhammad Nawaz Shrif	PML-N	2159.1	1
NA.121	Mehar Istiaq Ahmad	PML-N	20	194
NA.122	Sardar Ayaz Sadiq	PML-N	307.84	27
NA.123	MoHammad Pervaiz Malik	PML-N	201.96	51
NA.124	Shaikh Rohale Asgher	PML-N	19.77	197
NA.125	Khwaja Saad Rfq	PML-N	46.26	146
NA.126	Shafqat Mahmood	PTI	203.37	50
NA.127	Waheed Alam Khan	PML-N	72.1	112
NA.128	Muhammad Afzal	PML-N	56.14	133
NA.129	Shazia Mubashir	PML-N	7.5	235

NA.130	Sohail Shaukat Butt	PML-N	56.64	131
NA.131	Rana Afzal Hussain	PML-N	47.61	143
NA.132	Rana Tanveer Hussain	PML-N	352.05	39
NA.133	Mian Javaid Latif	PML-N	12.29	222
NA.134	Sardar Muhammad Irfan Doger	PML-N	41.97	148
NA.135	Chudri Muhammad Bajees Tahir	PML-N	36.86	156
NA.136	Chudri Bilal Ahmad Virk	PML-N	61.41	116
NA.137	Rai Mansab Ali Khan	PML-N	12.99	218
NA.138	Salman Hanif	PML-N	648.85	3
NA.139	Waseem Akhter Sheikh	PML-N	814.08	191
NA.140	Malik Rasheed Ahmad Khan	PML-N	21.56	122
NA.141	Rana Muhammad Ishaqe Khan	PML-N	65.56	14
NA.142	Rana Muhammad Hayat Khan	PML-N	515.34	64

NA.143	CH. Nadeem Abbas	PML-N	154.5	231
NA.144	Muhammad Arif Ch	PML-N	9.74	115
NA.145	Syed Ashiq Hussain	PML-N	70.22	60
NA.146	Rao Muhammad Ajmal Khan	PML-N	157.87	86
NA.147	Mian Muhammad Moeen Watto	PML-N	98.85	42
NA.148	Malik Abdul Ghafar Doger	PML-N	220.47	134
NA.150	Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Hussain Quraishe	PTI	56.04	111
NA.151	Sikendar Hayat Khan Bosan	PML-N	72.46	45
NA.152	Syed Javaid Ali Shah	PML-N	215.43	21
NA.153	Dewan Ashiq Hussain	PML-N	381.14	108
NA.154	Muhammad Sadiq Khan Baloch	PTI	73.61	13
NA.155	Abdurehman Khan Kanjoo	PML-N	517	31
NA.156	Mohammad Raza Hayat Harraj	PML-N	267.16	28

NA.157	Muhammad Khan Daha	PML-N	297.23	126
NA.158	Muhammad Khan Bodha	PML-N	63.13	56
NA.159	Ch. Iftikhar Nazir	PML-N	175.76	22
NA.160	Syed Imran Ahmad shah	PML-N	368.5	209
NA.161	Ch.Muhammad Ashraf	PML-N	15.25	37
NA.162	Rai Hussain Nawaz Khan	PML-N	232.18	18
NA.163	Muhammad Munir Asgher	PML-N	418.24	243
NA.164	Sardar Mansab Ali Doger	PML-N	5.01	69
NA.165	Sardar Ather Gillani	PML-N	147.58	113
NA.166	Rana Zahid Hussain	PML-N	67	157
NA.167	CH.Nasir Ahmad	PML-N	36.65	167
NA.168	Sayed Sajid Mehdi	PML-N	32.78	41
NA.169	Tahir Iqbal CH.	PML-N	221.55	169
NA.170	Saeed Ahmad Khan Manais	PML-N	32.68	68
NA.171	Muhammad	PML-N	148.91	102

	Amjad Farooq Khosa			
NA.172	Hafiz Abdul Karim	PML-N	77.69	145
NA.173	Sardar Awais Ahmed khan Laghari	PML-N	47.32	61
NA.174	Sardar Muhammad Jaffer Khan Laghari	PML-N	157.72	119
NA.175	Hafeez -ur-rehman Khan Darihaks	PML-N	66.81	19
NA.176	Malik Sultan Mahmood	PML-N	145.2	81
NA.177	Ghulam Rabbani Kher	PPP	109.8	172
NA.178	Jamshaid Ahmad Dasti	IND	30.62	266
NA.179	Makhdumzad Basit Bolcheri	PML-N	0	70
NA.180	Ashiq Hussain	PML-N	136.69	97
NA.181	Sahibzada Faiz ul Hassen	PML-N	84.7	127
NA.182	Sayed Muhammad Saqlain Bukhari	PML-N	61.03	254
NA.183	Makhdoom Syed	PML-N	5.35	58

Ali Hassen Gillani

NA.184	Mian Najeebuddin Awaisi	PML-N	169.28	90
NA.185	muhammad Balighurehman	PML-N	65.61	121
NA.186	Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada	PML-N	41.14	149
NA.187	Tariq Bashir Cheema	PML	132.15	73
NA.188	Syed Muhammad Asgher Shah	PML-N	116.19	78
NA.189	Mr. Alam Dad Laleka	PML-N	579.99	10
NA.190	Tahir Bashir Cheema	PML-N	112.28	80
NA.191	Muhammad Ijazulhaq	PML-Z	11.95	224
NA.192	Khwaja Ghulam Rasool Koreja	PPP	31.5	171
NA.193	Sheikh Fiazuddin	PML-N	719.87	4
NA.194	Makhdum Khusro Bakhtiyar	PML-N	90.3	94
NA.195	Syed Mustafa Mahmud	PPP	124.81	75
NA.196	Mian Imtyaz Ahmad	PML-N	262.78	33

| NA.197 | Muhammad Arshad Khan | PML-N | 7.59 | 104 |

The SINDH:

NA No.	NAME	PARTY	Net Assts	Rank
NA.198	Nauman Islam Shaikh	PPP	13.7	216
NA.199	Syed Khurshaid Ahmad Shah	PPP	33.08	165
NA.200	Mr.Ali Goher Khan Mahar	PPP	150.33	67
NA.201	Ali Muhammad Khan Mahar	PPP	56.63	132

NA.202	Aftab Shahban Mirani	PPP	38.58	153
NA.203	Ghous Bux Khan	PML-F	22.8	188
NA.204	Muhammad Ayaz Soomro	PPP	37.45	155
NA.205	Nasir Ahmad Bughio	PPP	26.82	181
NA.206	Mir Amer Ali Khan Magsi	PPP	588.32	9
NA.207	Mrs Faryal Talpur	PPP	213.37	47
NA.208	Aijaz Hussain Jakhrani	PPP	114.79	79
NA.209	Mir Shabir Ali Bijurani	PPP	85.21	96
NA.210	Ehsan-Ur-Rehman Hazari	PPP	430.35	17
NA.211	Ghulam Murtaza Khan	NPP	134.45	72
NA.212	Asgher Ali Shah	PPP	36.15	158
NA.213	Dr. Azra Afzal	PPP	542.12	12
NA.214	Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah	PPP	105.76	82
NA.215	Nawab Ali Wassan	PPP	35.72	161

NA.216	Pir Syed Sadruddin	PML-F	395.96	20
NA.217	Syed Kazim Ali Shah	PML-F	727.2	110
NA.218	Makhdoom Muhammad Amin Fahim	PPP	160.32	59
NA.219	Dr Khalid Maqbool	MQM	93.47	91
NA.220	Syed Waseem Hussain	MQM	21.77	190
NA.221	Syed Amir Ali Shah	PPP	26.46	182
NA.222	Syed Naveed Qamer	PPP	156.07	62
NA.223	Abdul Sattar Bachani	PPP	91.41	137
NA.224	Sardar kamal khan	PPP	18.56	53
NA.225	DR.Fehmida Mirza	PPP	203.87	49
NA.226	Pir Shafqat Hussain	PPP	12.48	220
NA.227	Mir Munawar Ali khan	PPP	33.03	166
NA.228	Nawab Muhammad	PPP	57.58	130

	Yousaf			
NA.229	Mr.Faqir Sher Muhammad	PPP	14.36	212
NA.230	Pir Noor Muhammad Shah	PPP	14.36	212
NA.231	Malik Asad Sikander	PPP	240.4	36
NA.232	Rafique Ahmad Jamali	PPP	69.37	117
NA.233	Imran Ali Caghani	PPP	29.14	176
NA.234	Pir Bakhsh Junejo	PML-F	51.32	138
NA.235	Shazia Mirza	PPP	0.57	262
NA.236	Roshen Din Junejo	PPP	75.8	105
NA.237	Shams Sunnissa	PPP	2.56	257
NA.238	Syed Ayaz Ali Shah	PML-N	19.85	196
NA.239	Muhammad Salman Khan Baloch	MQM	17.98	201
NA.240	Sohail Mansoor Khwaja	MQM	126.76	74
NA.241	Syed Akhter	MQM	10.15	230

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	Iqbal Qadri			
NA.242	Mehbob Alam	MQM	2.88	255
NA.243	Abdul Waseem	MQM	11.89	227
NA.244	Sheikhsalahuddin	MQM	10.97	228
NA.245	Muhammad Rehan Hashmi	MQM	1.79	260
NA.246	Nabil Ahmad Gabal	MQM	24.15	186
NA.247	Sufyan Yousaf	MQM	4.47	244
NA.248	Muhammad Shahjehan Baloch	PPP	3.83	249
NA.249	Dr.Muhammmad Farooq	MQM	2.59	256
NA.250	Dr.arif-ur-rehman	PTI	57.63	129
NA.251	Syed Ali Raza Abidi	MQM	22.49	189
NA.252	Abdul Rashid Godil	MQM	11.95	225
NA.253	Muhammmad Muzamil Qureshi	MQM	8.97	232
NA.254	Muhammad Ali Rashid	MQM	18.25	199
NA.255	Syed Asif	MQM	15.89	206

NA No.	NAME	PARTY	Net Assets	Rank
	Hasnain			
NA.256	Iqbal m Ali Khan	MQM	17.34	203
NA.257	Sajid Ahmad	MQM	47.72	142
NA.258	Abdul Hakeem Baloch	PPP	152.66	65

The BALUCHISTAN:

NA No.	NAME	PARTY	Net Assets	Rank
NA.259	Mahmood Khan Achakzai	PMAP	0	247
NA.260	Abdurahim Khan Mandokhil	PMAP	28.4	177
NA.261	Molvi Agha Muhammad	JUI-F	0.97	261
NA.262	Abdul Qadir Waoan	PMAP	69.2	118
NA.263	Molana Ameer Zaman	JUI-F	14.99	210
NA.264	Malik Muhammad Khan Shirani	JUI-F	3.3	246