

**Survival or Militancy:
A Case Study of the Baloch National Movement**



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CANDIDATE’S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis presently submitted bearing the title “Survival or Militancy: A Case Study of the Baloch National Movement” is the result of my own research and has not been submitted to any other institution for any degree.

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SUPERVISOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the M.Sc. candidate Shakir Adam has completed his Master's Essay titled "Survival or Militancy: A Case Study of the Baloch National Movement" under my supervision. I recommend it for submission in candidacy for the degree of Masters in History.

Hugh van Skyhawk
Professor
Department of Archaeology

'So what if it rains after I am dead?'

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The errors and omissions that remain are solely my responsibility.

Glossary

<i>Anjuman</i>	Political Organization
<i>Azad</i>	Independent
<i>Darbar</i>	Court of a Ruler
<i>Diwan</i>	Assembly
<i>Farman</i>	Royal Order
<i>Fatwa</i>	Religious Decree
<i>Jagir</i>	Granted Land
<i>Jirga</i>	Council of Elders
<i>Kareez</i>	Irrigation Canal
<i>Kaum</i>	Nation
<i>Lashkar</i>	Tribal Army
<i>Mohajir</i>	Immigrant
<i>Mullah</i>	Muslim Priest
<i>Nawab</i>	Governor
<i>Parari</i>	Guerilla
<i>Sardar</i>	Tribal Chief
<i>Shari 'at</i>	Islamic Law
<i>Ulema</i>	Religious Scholars
<i>Vazir</i>	Prime Minister or Minister
<i>Watan</i>	Homeland

Preface

The research, *Survival or Militancy: A Case Study of the Baloch National Movement* is an attempt to make a contribution first of all to research into and to clarify the basic understanding regarding the Baloch areas, that how, they have been affected by the growing sentiments of nationalism since the early 20th century. The primary argument is that, the struggle for the Baloch always aimed for the survival of their existence within their own areas rather to do militant activities in rest of the country. Some of the deadly insurgencies which were for sake of personal interests, or economic in nature, have converted into liberation movement now. The state responsibilities are much greater for the conversion of these insurgencies into liberation movements. The geographic impact and historical phenomenon like ‘ethnic swamping’ and domination of ‘Outsiders’ always resulted in great insecurities for the Baloch. Having neglected, these insecurities, the developments are always designed without put a strong eye on these concerns. Frequent military operation and the control of writ with the use of force always resulted in further alienation of the Baloch toward state.

The main concern of the study revolves around the fact that why after three decades of co-existence and tranquility in Balochistan, the mass movement in shape of liberation erupted in these areas. Apart, shaping new environment of mutual co-existence and peace the ‘disappearance of Baloch’ and ‘Kill and dump’ tactics further fueled the fire. The historical facts and classified documents which are used in this study illustrate that state never opened avenues for power sharing with Baloch. The lack of representation in state machinery is another great source of disappointment.

The present study, after critically exploring the facts, raises the question of the state rhetorical argument that the *sardari* system is the main force behind the turmoil and backwardness of Balochistan. Then, why has the state always backed and favored these *sardars*? Despite high-sounding promises and apologies the state has always used secondary measures to control and undermine the rightful demands of the Baloch. The old British formula the ‘Sandeman System’ and a high militarization of Balochistan are significant. Taking a twist, the national movement after evolving historically, now reached the doors of the middle-class Baloch people.

The present study investigate that economic deprivation, identity crisis, negative tactics to overshadow the rightful demands of Baloch and frequent use of force, which have paved the way for armed resistance in Baloch areas, involving the educated masses and further intensifying day-by-day. The current phase of Balochistan, burning as a result of bloodshed among the liberation forces and security forces, is further removing the possibilities for the negotiations for the solution of this issue. On the contrary, undertaking a series of development and reforms to minimize these liberation sentiments, the neighboring countries are always blamed for backing these liberation movements.

The following research is based on historical facts and figures that took place in the political cum social arena. One thing must be kept in mind: this is not an attempt to favour one side the other. Rather it highlights the basic dilemma of this part of the world. The aim of this research is neither to favour nor criticize any side, neither the state nor the Baloch. The facts being interpreted remain in the domain of research. Whatever facts are produced in this research are explored through the material available in this regard.

Introduction

Balochistan, the richest in mineral and natural resources but the poorest province in Pakistan throughout its short history remained to a great extent in the catastrophic situation which always motivated international and external factors to play their games of conquest. Balochistan is the largest province in Pakistan on the basis of territory, but populated with different ethnic groups. The Baloch are the largest ethnic group in Balochistan. According to the 1998 census; “ethnic Baloch formed 55.4 percent and Pathans 29.6 percent with the rest divided between Punjabis, Hazaras and others.”¹ According to the SPDC (Social Policy and Development Centre), “Balochistan has the highest levels of poverty in Pakistan nearly double that of the Punjab.”² The struggle in Balochistan (the struggle is in the Baloch areas only) is deep rooted in the ‘unwillingness of the state to cede political and economic autonomy’, and the attempts for crushing of Baloch national movements is further ‘feeding’ the Baloch ‘independent’ struggle.

The current situation in Balochistan is much more destructive and disillusioned as compared to the last five decades. Various guerrilla movements having the motive of ‘independent Balochistan’ are coming on the screen and are being support by local masses for different reasons. “Pakistani policy-makers followed the British policy of using handpicked tribal chiefs to control the territory on their behalf, enhancing the power of those *sardars* locally, and ousting others who defied state control.”³ The old British formula is now losing its value because of the socio-economic and political nature of Balochistan which has been transformed to a great

¹ Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (London: Penguin Books, 2011), 347.

² Ray Fulcher, “Pakistan: Balochistan’s History of Insurgency”, *Green Left Week* (30 November 2006): 1-2.

³ International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan* (International Crisis Group, 2006), 2.

extent. The holds of these *sardars* are getting unfastened in Baloch areas. The Baloch areas now show a picture of battlefields between Baloch guerrillas and Pakistani security forces.

However, the insurgency in Balochistan has its roots after the ‘forced merger’ of Kalat state with Pakistan. In April 1948, “the Pakistan army marched into Kalat and, eventually, the Khan signed an agreement of accession.”⁴ The first insurgency was embarked on by Prince Abdul Karim, the brother of the Khan of Kalat, soon after the ‘forced merger’ of the Kalat state with newly created Pakistan. Though, he moved to Afghanistan to get support, the insurgency failed to get major support from within or without and ultimately ended in failure with the arrest of Prince Abdul Karim. This insurgency was mainly based on personal motives. But, this put a red print in the history of Balochistan. The formation of BSU (Balochistan State Union) was the first attempt for the restoration of so-called ‘Sandeman System’. The further events totally changed the politics of Pakistan. First, the formation of One Unit administration and, secondly, the first martial law of Ayub Khan transformed it completely. The arrest of the Khan of Kalat before the first martial law became the reason for yet another insurgency, this time embarked upon by a ninety years-old man. Nauroz Khan soon mounted to hills and waged a series of assaults on the government machinery demanding the withdrawal of Balochistan from the One Unit administration and the release of the Khan. It is believed that he was later deceived by an oath on the *Holy Qur’an*. Later, he was arrested and died in jail. This motivated yet another insurgency which was imitated by the Baloch who called themselves the ‘*Pararis*’ under the leadership of Sher Muhammad Marri, who was influenced by ‘communist ideology’.

⁴ Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (London: Yale University Press, 2009), 66.

Moreover, the '*Parari* movement' was run by a guerrilla movement named BPLF (Baloch People's Liberation Front). This third insurgency ended with the end of One Unit administration in 1970. After getting provincial status, the Baloch nationalists came into power by election. The 1971 crisis which resulted in the separation of East Pakistan into Bangladesh also made a deep impact on all the ethnic people of Pakistan, the Baloch, Sindhis, and Pashtuns, respectively. The dismemberment of Pakistan resulted in the creation of 'New Pakistan' dominated by the Punjab. The 1970 elections which demarcated new lines for Pakistan also brought the first civilian martial administrator of the world. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who dominated the election in West Pakistan later, became the president. The 1973 Constitution adopted by Pakistan also promised a good share of autonomy to the provinces. But, this was never fulfilled. Soon the Baloch nationalist government became the victim of Bhutto and international politics. Bhutto, who believed in absolute power, used a number of negative tactics for uprooting the provincial government under the leadership of Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the chief minister and governor, respectively.

This period also marked the influence of communism in Afghanistan which borders Balochistan. These developments also brought international influence in Balochistan. Mainly for the Shah of Iran this Baloch government was not acceptable. As a matter of fact, the Balochistan government was suspended. This marked another insurgency with much intensification as compared with previous insurgencies. The insurgency continued for five years, from 1973-1977, resulting in the killing of thousands of masses from both sides. The Shah of Iran also supplied '30 US-supplied Huey Cobra' managed by Iranian pilots for defeating the Baloch guerrillas. "The BPLF did not initially seek independence. But, Baluch nationalists, particularly of the

younger generation, who became alienated from Pakistan during the 1973–1977 confrontation, adopted independence as their goal.”⁵ However, the military’s intervention in the politics of Pakistan changed the entire discourse of the Pakistani state. This time it was General Zia, who came with his so-called Islamisation. Though aimed to Islamize Pakistan, the real motives were to stop the Russians with the help of Americans. This entire decade remained peaceful because of the pacification policies of Zia-ul-Haq. It was followed by the so-called ‘Golden Period’ of Pakistan. After a long decade of peace in Balochistan, the conflict again broke out when another military dictator, after proclaiming martial law, came into power.

Pervez Musharraf’s policies enforced without the consent of Baloch nationalists motivated Baloch liberation forces to attack state machinery. After the same bloody event, the military also involved itself in Balochistan. This insurgency led by Akbar Bugti was confined to his own motives. But the killing of Bugti affected all the areas of Balochistan. As a reaction, the local people involved themselves with the liberation movements. On the other hand, the state’s iron hand put more oil in the fire. The nature of the insurgency wholly changed as a reaction of Balach Marri’s killing and after the killing of three Baloch political leaders. Now these liberation movements are being run by educated people having thousands of warriors and followers in Baloch areas. The impact of previous insurgencies is explicitly visible in Balochi literature and in these liberation movements. Previous insurgencies, which were largely based on economic grounds because of the government’s policies turned into liberation movements. So far, unlike the British, Pakistani officials have failed to understand the dynamics of Baloch culture which is totally different. If the Pakistani ruling elite continuously obstinately deny the rights and

⁵ Frederic Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism”, Carnegie Papers, no. 65, (January 2006): 7.

provincial autonomy for Balochistan, the Baloch national movement would be accelerated in the future and as a consequence it would shatter the map of the world.

Statement of the Problem

The biggest and richest province in terms of territory and natural resources, Balochistan shows a picture of remoteness and has remained the poorest province so far in the history of Pakistan. The abundance of natural resources, minerals, gas and productive coastal region haven't succeeded in eliminating its very basic problems. The strategic importance of Balochistan remains vital for Pakistan: the south of Balochistan lies on the Arabian Sea, to its west Iran, and to its north Afghanistan. Without Balochistan, the strategic importance of Pakistan in the international world would be lost. So far, Pakistan has failed to cope with the issues of Balochistan because of internal and external problems. The state authorities always put a great share of blame on the shoulders of tribal leaders for the backwardness of Balochistan. The *sardari* system was considered the only reason for all the complications of Balochistan. But the fact that the most of the *sardars* always remained in the 'lap' of Islamabad, could not be neglected. The *sardari* system is predominant especially in tribal regions and but Balochistan is not constituted of the tribal regions alone. Smaller cities such as, Khuzdar, Turbat, Gwadar, Kalat, Panjgur and others also show the same picture.

Moreover, Balochistan contains the greatest number of illiterate people. Only four universities have been established to serve education for the entire population. It has been 64 years since the creation of Pakistan. But, up to the present day Balochistan has been neglected in all sectors. The lack of good governance and the frequent interventions of the military have also

been detrimental to the situation in Baloch areas. Most of the insurgencies against the government were based on self-interest and personal motives. But the voice for provincial autonomy and ownership of resources attracted the masses to a great extent. The voices of provincial autonomy and 'independence' which had been raised by some exceptional individuals are now being raised by the educated and more political conscious Baloch people. These insurgencies now converted into separatist movements in Baloch areas are being run by educated students and local masses. The role of the Pakistani government in accepting these demands and movements is additional. The state always used an iron hand in dealing with these affairs without taking a share of blame on itself for the creation of such circumstances which motivated the Baloch to take up arms against the government.

Furthermore, the state has failed to understand the diversity and nature of the Baloch people, who are different from the rest of Pakistan. Employing its policies in Balochistan without understanding the culture and without taking the consent of the ethnic Baloch has always resulted in insurgencies. These insurgencies always attracted the masses having the orientation of tribal culture to take up arms against state because they believed it is the only way. Balochistan has been burning since the emergence of Pakistan as far as ethnic issues are concerned. Insurgency began in Balochistan after the 'forced merger' of the Kalat state with the newly created Pakistan in 1948. This insurgency triggered a series of bloody conflicts between the Pakistani state and Baloch nationalists in Baloch areas. The nationalism which was a by-product of the West reached the frontiers of Balochistan with the outbreak of World War I. Like other countries the Baloch also tilted toward this theory and having seen them as a single entity. Nationalism soon took roots. Baloch nationalism began and it has been further intensified with

the passage of time. Slowly and gradually, due to ignorance, maltreatment, frequent military operations and economic disparity, Baloch nationalism reached a point of no return. The insurgency in Balochistan made a serious threat to Pakistan's national security.

Significance and Scope of this Study

The chief aim of this study is based to understand the concept of nationalism in the Baloch people. Balochistan is a key factor for the survival of Pakistan. The Baloch question in Pakistan has now entered into a new phase in which international politics are also involved. Some blame neighboring states for the intervention in Balochistan for the further worsening the issue. Balochistan is very vital for the survival of Pakistan as it the biggest province in terms of territory and the richest province which has rampant economic disparity. It is however, noteworthy, that the vacuum for foreign intervention was created by the Pakistani state due to its instability which itself was created by the military operations and ignorance of 64 years. The 'Baloch Fear' for 'ethnic swapping' remained by far the greatest problem for the Baloch. In this study I discuss the roots of the 'Baloch Fear' which is the main reason for the current catastrophic problems in Balochistan. In addition, the constitutional safeguards which are drafted in the constitution of Pakistan are discussed as well as a critical analysis of how the state has failed to employ these rights.

The study covers the *sardari* system or 'Sandeman System', which is predominant in some of the major areas of Balochistan, and is often criticized and considered a social evil. The *sardari* system is blamed for the backwardness of the Baloch areas. But, interestingly, it is also being backed by the central government. This study fills the gap in academics in the context of

the Baloch national movement, its genesis, and its various aspects throughout history. It also highlights the failure of successive governments in dealing with the affairs of Balochistan and also the failure of the government to understand the diversity, climate and domestic conditions of the Baloch areas. It also focuses on the emergence of Baloch nationalism, whether it emerged from within or from without. The notion of leadership is thoroughly discussed because it is prerequisite for the understanding of Baloch national movement. In this study I also explain the position of Baloch nationalists in today's scenario and further discuss its future prospect. I also explore whether the Baloch are struggling for their survival or are militants. In This study I would try to open new avenues for researchers.

Review of the Literature

There are a host of books written on the Baloch national movement. For my study, I have gone through both the primary and secondary sources which also include foreign surveys reports. Outsiders (other than Baloch) present a compatible view and mainly focus on the solution for Baloch grievances. The insiders' view highlights the causes and suffering of Baloch and contradicts with official version. The official/State version failed to present a true picture of the whole story. But foreigners report and survey support the Baloch causes. Sources written by Baloch which contradict the official version are banned.

In addition, there are articles written by various scholars and international organizations regarding Baloch issues. The Amnesty International, crisis groups and the Human Rights Commission are very useful for understanding the issues regarding the Baloch national movement in Pakistan. Furthermore, various articles in Pakistani newspapers also give minor

details. But the literature review shows that very little research has been conducted during the last few decades. The present study is an attempt to fill the gap in the existing literature on the subject while giving a holistic picture regarding the Baloch national movement.

Tahir Amin's *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors* (1988) is an excellent research work. He studied all the ethno-national movements in Pakistan and has devoted large portions to the Baloch national movement. He largely criticizes the civil military bureaucracy which mostly consists of Punjabis and Muhajirs for worsening the situation in Balochistan and pointed out that the Baloch question is basically the less representation of the Baloch in the civil-military bureaucracy.

Inayatullah Baluch is a renowned scholar of Balochistan history. After taking asylum in Germany, he published the book which is also his PhD thesis: *The Problems of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baloch Nationalism* (1987). It is an excellent research work. Some people called it the Bible of the Baloch. It covers the history of the Baloch people till the formation of Pakistan. He critically discusses all the major events which resulted in the emergence of Baloch nationalism and later which resulted in the merger of Balochistan with Pakistan in 1948. This book contains all the major documents and agreements between Kalat state, Pakistan and Britain.

Selig S. Harrison's work *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation* (1981) present a clear picture regarding the struggle of Baloch against Pakistan during the 1970s. The military operations during the Ayub and Bhutto eras are also focused on.

During the 1970s insurgency, the author also visited Baloch guerrilla camps and also interviewed Baloch tribal leaders who were leading the insurgency. In addition, he also described the role of foreign hands during the insurgency in the 1970s.

Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan: Emergence, Dimensions, Repercussions* (1982) is worth reading. This book is very informative as far as the political developments of Balochistan are concerned. Janmahmad himself is a civil servant and gives an insider's point of view of some major issues in Balochistan. This book covers the history of the Baloch people from the beginning till the Zia era. But, his interpretation is largely based on the Baloch perspective.

Though, Martin Axmann's book *Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955* (2009) covers a very limited period, it is significant in that it represents a neutral point of view. The previous book written on Balochistan represents one sided approach either by Pakistani or Baloch authors. This writer used some of the major primary sources after having visited the Baloch areas. The merger of Balochistan and later issues till One Unit administration are discussed in detail. The roles of the political leaders of Balochistan and Pakistan before and after Partition are also discussed.

Taj Muhammad Breseeg's *Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development* (2004) is a significant source for the understanding of Baloch issues. Though, Taj Muhammad's book covers a very long time period. His analysis is mainly based on the interpretations of the given facts. He scribed all the political turmoil and issues in Balochistan by time period. He also

discussed in detail the history of Iranian Balochistan. He tries to give a medium approach regarding the interpretations of the facts.

Awan's work *Balochistan: Historical and Political Processes* (1985) seems like a state version book because he was also a civil servant. Though this book is very informative, in addition, he simply termed these insurgencies as *sardar* led conflicts for the attainment of their own interests. He basically tried to prove that it was the *sardar* who initiated these insurgencies without the support of the masses. Awan's biases against the Khan are clearly visible in his treatment of the 1950s.

Alok Bansal's book *Baluchistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad* (2010) is a good source on the subject. It briefly covers the brief history of Balochistan after the creation of Pakistan till the end of the Musharraf regime. It mainly revolves around the regime of Musharraf in relation to Balochistan. The importance of this book is further increased because so far there is not a single book which covers the history of Balochistan during the Musharraf regime. The book is generally based on facts, dealing with day-to-day incidents in Balochistan after the previous insurgency.

Key Questions Addressed

This study has addressed the following research questions:

What are the factors which are responsible for the emergence of Baloch nationalism and its various aspects and the role of leadership behind the emergence of Baloch nationalism?

Whether Baloch nationalism is a struggle for survival, or an armed struggle of militants or only confined to the *sardars* and political leaders?

What is the nature of insurgencies in Balochistan and their comparison with present movements?

What is role of the leadership behind the struggle of Baloch against Pakistan?

What is the mode of dealing of Pakistani governments with the of Baloch issue?

The perception of the Baloch and Pakistan which motivated them to undertake their respective plans what was the perception of Baloch and Pakistan?

Why are the local masses which were once aloof from this movement now running this national movement?

Methodology

This study is based upon analytical, qualitative and descriptive methodology. Analytical approach is used to break the study into parts and analyses it and then synthesize it with qualitative information based on different sources. This research is also descriptive which explains and describes the Baloch nationalist movement from its birth till today.

Division of the Study

The study of research is divided into six chapters. After the introduction, chapter one “Historical Background” briefly discusses the origin of the Baloch people. In addition, this chapter presents an explicit picture regarding the land of Balochistan which remained in the influence of different powers in various time. The establishments of the Baloch confederacies and their engagement with different powers such as the British, Afghans, and Mughuls have also been described. The

second chapter, “The Emergence of Baloch National Movement: Birth of a Nation State and the Obliteration of the State” traces back the genesis of the Baloch national movement, for the aspiration of a separate nation state, after the impact of World War 1. This chapter further presents a clear picture regarding the birth and death of the Kalat state after the inception of Pakistan. The roots of insurgency which erupted after the forced merger of Kalat are also illustrated. The third chapter, “The Parari Disturbance: Balochistan from One Unit to New Pakistan” is all about the disturbances or insurgencies which erupted after the “forced modernization” of Ayub Khan. The arrest of the Khan and the merger of Baloch areas with One Unit administration which added fire in Baloch tribal areas are also discussed in detail. The fourth chapter “Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s ‘New Pakistan’ and the Third Baloch insurgency” deals with the most deadly insurgency in Balochistan. This chapter also analyzes the power game and international politics which dominated the entire course of time. The removal of the National Awami Party which has the Balochistan nationalists in key positions in the provincial government became the sole reason for this insurgency. The fifth chapter “The Zia Regime and the So-called Decade of Democracy: The Pacification of the Baloch National Movement” explains the pacification of Baloch national movement for two decades. The last chapter “The Musharraf Regime and the Revival of the Baloch National Movement” focuses on the revival of Baloch national movement after the military intervention in Pakistan. This chapter briefly explains that how due to the military operation and killing of Baloch nationalist leaders the Baloch movement transformed into a separatist movement. It is followed by the conclusion, selected bibliography, and appendices.

Chapter 1

Historical Background

Balochistan is situated in the south-west of Pakistan and covers an area of 3, 47,190 sq. km, or about 44% of the total territory of Pakistan, though it has the smallest population of any province (1998 census). “It has extensive plateau divided into basins with sufficient height and is located at the northern latitudes between 24.30 and 32 degrees with the longitude of 60 and 70 degrees east.”¹ The land of Balochistan is divided into ‘upper highland and lower highland’. The “upper highland, known locally as Khorasan, has an elevation of about 12000ft. with valley floors about 5000ft. above sea level. Makran, Kharan and Chagi ranges are included in the lower range in the west, while in the east, there are the Kithar, Pad, and Suleiman ranges.”² Thus: “Bolan Pass historically occupies an important position connecting the lower Indus River with Balochistan and Afghanistan.”³

However, archaeological evidence and inscriptions clearly show signs of ‘ancient civilization’ in this region. Thus, the history of Balochistan goes back to the eighth millennium

¹ Jamil Baloch, “Field of Archaeology in Balochistan and its Importance in the Baloch History,” Annual Research Journal “Hanken”, Vol.2, (2010): 28.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

B.C. Moreover, the ‘inscriptions found in Spinlingi in Sarawan are still to be deciphered’. The land of Balochistan has been the ‘crossroads of civilizations’ for thousands of years, and Mesopotamia, Indus, and Egyptian civilizations used this land for trading. “Baluchistan is truly an ancient land that has nursed the great Indus valley civilization at Moenjodaro and Harappa.”⁴ This land gave birth to the world’s oldest urban settlement, called Mehrgarh, which is considered to be the first human settlement in South Asia. The people of Balochistan mastered animal and plant domestication as shown by the archaeological remains at Mehrgarh. The houses of the people were made of clay bricks, and jewelry of precious stones, sea shells, and stone-made ornaments were also excavated from Balochistan which indicates that it also experienced the Stone Age. It can easily be projected that Balochistan went through all the ages including the Stone, Bronze and Iron Ages. “Balochistan undoubtedly served as an intermediary link between the cultures of South Asia and the Middle East.”⁵

The earliest account of Baloch⁶ history referred to in “Arabic and Persian accounts are *Burhan-i-Qatib*, *Tarikh-i-Al Rasool*, *Al Maluk* and the *Shahnama*.”⁷ Abdul Qasim Firdousi, who compiled the *Shahnama* in AD 1010 with 5000 to 6000 verses of epic poetry, clearly mentions the Iranian role in Balochistan. The *Shahnama* discusses that “the Iranian empowered Darius (522-485 BC) had conquered Balochistan around 450 BC and declared it as a province of Iranian

⁴ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), 52.

⁵ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan: Emergence, Dimensions, Repercussions* (Quetta: Gosga-e-Adab, 1982), 4.

⁶ The word ‘Baloch’ has been used with different spelling in many accounts. Belouch, Biluch, Baluch, Baloch, Belloch, Beloch, are some of the spelling which can be found in many annals of history. However, Baluch is very common in most of the works of the writers. But in 1990 the provincial government of Balochistan approved the changing of this word and the word Baloch became the standard spelling in Pakistan.

⁷ Javed Haider, “Balochistan: Interplay of the Powers,” *Journal of Asian Civilizations*, Vol. XXX, no. 2, (December 2007): 141.

empire.⁸ The *Shahnama* also mentions that due to the cruelty of the king, the Baloch migrated to Makran from Kho-i-Albraz.”⁹ Later, when the Persians were defeated by Alexander in 331 B.C, Baluchistan fell to the hands of the Greeks. The strategic location of Balochistan is a gateway for the East as well as the West. The Greek historians who wrote the history of Balochistan basically narrated the history of Alexander. “The great conqueror Alexander while returning from India through Makran and Las Bela suffered a lot in the rough and dry mountains of Balochistan, and his dream to annex Balochistan remained a dream.”¹⁰ “After Alexander’s death, Baluchistan fell to his general Seleucus Nicator, and later passed from his descendants to the Graeco-Bactarian kings, who also ruled in Afghanistan and the Punjab.”¹¹

However, there is another school of thought that holds that mutual clashes between Kurds and Baloch resulted in the migration of the Baloch from Aleppo to Mount Al-Burz in the Caspian Sea. It is narrated that Nushervan while coming back after conquering the Indus valley was warned that no one could subdue them because of the vast territory where they lived. Later on, they could not escape the wrath of the emperor who ordered that they be wiped out from the land. As a result a general massacre of the Baloch followed, Thousands were killed which resulted in Baloch migration from the land where they had been indigenous. Thereafter, they divided into two groups.¹² The first group under the leadership of Saad settled in Seistan and later on advanced and settled finally in modern day Balochistan, and the other group under Jalal Khan Rind finally settled in Makran. However, Balochistan in its long history was first conquered by Nushervan. Later, his grandson Khusrau Pervez stayed in Makran for one year.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 7.

¹⁰ K.U. Kureshy, *A Geography of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1977), 146.

¹¹ Imperial Gazetteer of India, *Provincial Series: Baluchistan* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2002), 12.

¹² Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, 54.

Kausi, Khusrawi, Kareez in Turbat are probably the bearers of his name.¹³ The Hindu ruler of Sindh established his influence after the weakening of Sassanian rule but could not remain for a very long time because of the advent of the Arabs.

Furthermore, the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) had inducted a new zeal for the propagation of Islam in the Arabs. The passing away of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in 632 had given an opportunity to the institution of caliphate to extend its mission for the propagation of Islam. As a consequence the coastal region of Hind came under the sway of Arabs. It resulted in the transformation of the socio-political atmosphere of the entire Indian sub-continent. The invasion of the Arab Muslims brought an end to the Sassanid dynasty in 651. So, the Arabs also started their expeditions in Balochistan during the reign of Caliph Umar (634-43), after the conquest of Iran. Towards the close of the reign of Caliph Umar in 644, a military commander named Hakam ibn ‘Amr Taghlibi conquered Makran, which included vast areas of what is nowadays a part of Balochistan.¹⁴ During the reign of the third Caliph, Uthman (r.644-56), an important cantonment named Qandabil (presently known as Gandava, and situated in District Kachi) was consolidated, but no new military expeditions were undertaken. It was, however, during the reign of Caliph Ali (r.656-61) that Thaghar ibn Zu’ar was appointed on the Indian frontier, and a military expedition was sent to Kikan or Qiqan (modern Kalat in Balochistan) under him. He defeated the local ruler of the region.¹⁵

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Muhammad Shibli Naumani, *Al-Faruq-Sawanih Umri-I Hazarat Umar Faruq* (Lahore: Sajjad Publishers, 1960), 217-18.

¹⁵ Ali ibn Hamid ibn Abi Bakr al-Kufi, *Fath namah- i Sindh* (Chachnamah), Persian trans. edited with introduction, notes and commentary by Nabi Bakhsh Baloch (Islamabad: Institute of Islamic History, Culture and Civilization, 1983), 54-55.

During the reign of the Umayyad's, expeditions continued to re-conquer and to put down the local insurgencies or rebellions. Later, in 783 AD, Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sindh via Balochistan. However, the Arabs did not make Balochistan their tributary state because the nomadic Baloch launched a guerrilla war against the Arabs. Thus, "it appears that Arab suzerainty over Balochistan was limited to the coastal belt and their rule never went far beyond the walls of the fortified cities in which their garrisons were lodged."¹⁶ According to Ibn Haukal, when he visited India around 976 A.D an Arab Governor was ruling Jhalawan.¹⁷ The Arabs later failed to create their sphere of influence because their basic aim was to plunder the wealth of India through Sindh. Thus, they could not benefit permanently from their conquests. After the tenth century AD Balochistan came under the influence of the Ghaznavids. In the 11th century Mahmud of Ghazna made an unsuccessful attempt to subdue the Baloch. The coastal areas went under the control of Isa ibn Ma'dan who established the Madaniyyah kingdom. It could not last long because of defeat by the Ghauri in 1178. The influence of the Ghauri and Ghaznavids remained in some areas of Balochistan till the 1400s.

However, in the 12th and 13th centuries the Baloch migrated to the Indian sub-continent because of the Mongols.¹⁸ Despite various hostilities, the first Baloch confederacy emerged around 1100 with 44 tribes under Mir Jalal Hun. This confederacy continued till the British invasion of the Indian Sub-continent. "In Makran, the Baluch divided the newly conquered country amongst five major tribes and formed the Makran confederacy under Jalal Han as their Mir (ruler). It is also suggested that at the time of migration one group remained in Seistan, the

¹⁶ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 8.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baloch Nationalism* (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1987), 94.

other one resided over the territories of the Makran and last one further moved and formed the Khanate of Balochistan. Baluch writers have paid great tribute to Mir Jalal Han, the ‘founding father of the Baluch nation’, who formed the first confederacy in the present territory of Baluchistan.”¹⁹ Even the continuous attacks of the Tugluqs and Mongols could not bring these territories of Baluchistan under their control.²⁰

However, historical annals are silent about the administration of Jalal Han. The death of Jalal was responsible for the division of the Baloch into five great tribes named Rind, Boat, Lashar, Korai and Jatoi. Ecological factors of the nomadic nature played very imperative roles and this laid the basis for a conflict between Makran and Kalat when Makran tried to capture the fertile land of Kachi and Sibi. As a result, the history of Baloch was influenced to a large extent by the tussle between the Rind of Makran and the Brahui of Ralat (Kalat).²¹ Finally, the chief, Mir Umar of the Khanate, was executed and it was annexed by Mir Chakar Khan²², the chief of Makran. “His military victory over the tribes of Kalat resulted in a unified Baloch state with its capital at Sivi (Sibi) around 1487.”²³

But, the unified state of Balochistan could not last long because of the civil war (30 years) between the Rind and the Lashar over the fertile lands. As a result the state disintegrated. Later, Chakar Khan came in contact with the Mughul ruler Humayun who was facing revolt by

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Javed Haider, “Balochistan: Interplay of the Powers,” 151.

²¹ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 96.

²² The period of Mir Chakar was considered a golden period and he is named the “Great Baluch”. In the Balochi folk lore *Hani* and *Shahmured*, his name is also mentioned. Shahmured was the head of the tribal warriors and Hani was his fiancée. Later Chakar by conspiracy married Hani.

²³ Baloch, op. cit., 96.

his brothers. After the fall of the first Baluch confederacy in the 1500s, Balochistan was divided into three states, the Makran state, the Dodai confederacy, and the Kalat confederacy, respectively.²⁴ In the 1500s the Mughuls brought these areas under their sway and placed a governor in Kalat.²⁵ Furthermore, Balochistan came under the indirect rule of the Mughuls. Kandahar, which served as a gateway for the control of the region, was lost during the reign of Shah Jahan, and the decline of the Safavis in Iran provided a chance for the Baloch to form unified rule in Balochistan. Inayat Baloch also observed that “the long distance from Delhi and difficult communication system, as well as the decline of the Safavis of Iran, provided a chance for Kalat to maintain its independence.”²⁶ The effort for the establishment of Khanate could be put on the shoulders of Ahmad Khan (1660-95).

From 1666 to 1740 Kalat was “essentially a very porous confederacy.”²⁷ Notwithstanding, decades of military action and political intrigue and enmity within the elite, the tribal confederacy prevailed.²⁸ Ahmad Khan was said to have been a brave ruler, and the Khanate assumed a more definite shape. In 1736, the Persian ruler Nadir Shah conquered Balochistan; following this the Khan of the Khanate also accepted his sovereignty over Balochistan. However, the Afghan’s paramountcy was not acknowledged by Mir Muhabat Khan. Thus, he was replaced by his step-brother Mir Nasir Khan the Great.²⁹ Nasir Khan was the best ruler among the rulers which ruled the Khanate, who also extended the territories of Balochistan

²⁴ Op. cit., 97.

²⁵ Martin Axmann, *Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 20.

²⁶ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 102

²⁷ Axmann, op. cit., 22.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Baloch, op. cit., 104.

and ruled the region in totality. The year 1758 was very significant as Nasir Khan refused Ahmed Shah Durrani's sovereignty and declared independence.

As a consequence, the Afghan-Baloch war began. The Khan was defeated but Ahmed Shah failed to establish its influence. Finally, a peace treaty was concluded between both rulers which is known as the 'Kalat Treaty', or the 'Treaty of No-Interference'.³⁰ The tribal system, which was established by Nasser Khan, became the administrative structure of the Kalat State in 1750-1795.³¹ Nasir Khan was truly a ruler who set up the socio-political institutions of Baloch society. He gathered together all the tribes of the region and organized a tribal military.³² Balochistan stretched to its maximum territorial limitations and was brought under a single rule. Currency was also coined on the name of Nasir Khan. The flag of the Khanate was also printed and Balochi was declared the state language. Nasir Khan was succeeded by his young son Mir Mahmud Khan. In 1817 Mir Mahmud died and Mir Mehrab Khan emerged as the Khan.

The 1700s is the most critically important period for the Indian subcontinent when the British were consolidating their hegemony on Indian soil. It was during the same period that Balochistan grasped the attention of the British. In pursuit of their interests, British policy passed through four stages:

- (i) 1795 - 1838, Spying, reconnaissance, and diplomatic intrigue
- (ii) 1838 - 1841, Treating Baluchistan as part of the buffer state of Afghanistan
- (iii) 1841 - 1893, Treating Baluchistan as a buffer, an independent ally
- (iv) 1894 - 1947, Treating Baluchistan as part of India.³³

³⁰ Op. cit., 105.

³¹ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 428.

³² Mahmood Ali Shah, *Sardari, Jirga & Local Government System in Balochistan* (Lahore: Edara-e- Tadrees 1994), 15.

³³ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 127.

“The British started out with the notion that the territories at the core of their interest in India were only secure if the neighboring regions could be regarded as having been pacified and used as a broad military glacis.”³⁴ Two policies ‘closed border policy’ and ‘forward policy’ were adopted to safeguard its huge Indian empire. The former talked about establishing friendly relations with local rulers and the latter came up with the plan of direct intervention of British in the state affairs of local rulers and in this regard the ‘closed border policy’ was adopted during 1854-76.

Martin Axman pointed out that, “Kalat’s internal conflicts combined with the movement of Russia into Central Asia led the British to intervene and initiate policies which in effect ‘froze’ the chiefdom.”³⁵ Therefore, to contain the Russians, the British moved towards Balochistan. The British sent different missions to acquire information regarding Balochistan and after getting information they stepped into Balochistan but in an indirect manner. To put it in a different way, the only aim of British was to extend their empire and to extract profit from Central and South Asia. The British threat was obvious. If we turn the pages of history we see that mighty countries or empires always had threats from smaller powers and the British and Russians imagined threats from each other that implicated local powers caught in the middle. But Inayat Baloch has a different thinking about the British threat. He stated that it was beyond Russian power to invade India and the British only used the ‘threat’ as a pretext.³⁶ However, both ideas could be accepted because it was a double gain for them. On one hand, they were increasing their empire to get maximum raw materials and, on the other hand, they were defusing

³⁴ Fred Scholz, *Nomadism & Colonialism: A Hundred Years of Baluchistan 1872-1972*; trans. by Hugh van Skyhawk (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 90.

³⁵ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 25.

³⁶ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 128.

the Russian threat. As a consequence, firstly, they conquered Sindh, Punjab and then they stepped into Balochistan.

However, the British just as other aggressors also had to face resistance from the Baloch. In 1839 Afghanistan was occupied by the British. In addition, the Khan of Balochistan refused vassal status under Afghanistan. As an outcome, relations between both parties deteriorated which laid the basis of conflict between them. On 13th May 1839, Mir Mehrab Khan, the Khan of Kalat, was executed while defending Balochistan from subjugation with a handful of followers. The British thus won their victory and installed Mir Mohabat Khan's grandson, Mir Shah Nawaz Khan, as the new ruler and also appointed their own Political Agent in the state for the supervision of new ruler.³⁷

In addition, the division of the Khanate of Kalat resulted in a revolution against the British. Shah Nawaz, under the command of Mir Nasir Khan II, the son of Mehrab Khan, had escaped from Kalat and taken refuge in Kharan, a province of the Khanate to the west of Kalat.³⁸ In 1841, an agreement was signed between the British and the Baloch after the killing of British soldiers and escape of the former ruler Shah Nawaz. Nasir Khan II assumed the status of the Khan of Balochistan and all the provinces were recovered eventually. Later, Balochistan served as vassal state under Afghanistan. But the murder of Shah Shuja became the reason for the elimination of the British from the territories of Afghanistan. Subsequently, the British abandoned both areas. Thereafter, policy of no-interference was adopted toward Balochistan.

³⁷ Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, 102.

³⁸ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 131.

The treaty of 1854³⁹ (20 years treaty) has a great importance as for the first time, the Khan was recognized as an independent ruler and finance and military aid was also provided to consolidate his position over other tribes as well. In addition, this was another trap by the British to use the Khan for the fulfillment of their goals: firstly, to counter the so-called 'Russian threat': secondly, to protect the trade which was being utilized via the routes through Balochistan and, thirdly, the borders of British India borders were also extended to Western Balochistan to counter the advance of Persia. The exertion of influence over different tribes caused a civil war among the different tribes and the Khan. As a result, both the Khan and the tribes were weakened which served British interests. "The British however, because of their Divide and rule policy" projected the Baloch and the Brahui as different ethnic group.⁴⁰ In 1871, Britain and Iran managed to divide Balochistan (Western Balochistan).⁴¹

The British continued their game and provided material support to counter those rebel chiefs. Inayat Baloch drafted some parts of a long letter in which the commissioner of Sindh instructed Col. Phayre that "As long as the Khan of Khelat remains a free and independent sovereign, our great object is to increase his influence and strengthen his power within his country as much as we can."⁴² The letter further instructed that,

As long as the Khanate of Kalat is in the hands of one person, and that one as at present only desires to act in accordance with the wishes of British Government, we need feel no concern about the safety of our frontier north to south. But once let his power be destroyed and the country falls into the hands of a number of petty chieftains with little control over their followers.⁴³

³⁹ For further detail see Appendix I.

⁴⁰ Javed Haider Sayed, "Balochistan: The Land and The People," *International Journal of South Asian Studies*, vol.23, no.1 (January, 2008): 25.

⁴¹ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 143.

⁴² *Op. cit.*, 135.

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, 136.

The commissioner, Col. Merewether, also informed the Government of India about the constitutional position of the Khan:

His Highness the Khan is de facto and de jure ruler of that country. We have treaty engagement with him, under which he is bound to keep his subjects from injuring British territory or people, to protect trade, etc. But the treaty is with him as ruler only and under none of the arrangements are we called upon to enter directly into the manner in which he carries on his government.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, 1871 proved to be another decisive year in which the Mithankot (Dera Ghazi Khan) conference took place. In this conference two viewpoints were represented, the 'Punjabis' advocated the 'forward policy' to be implemented on Balochistan. But, on the contrary, the 'Sindhis' aimed to maintain the current status of the Khan. The status of the Khan was maintained. The Khan was regarded as supreme ruler and thus the status of the tribal chieftains was weakened. This paved the way for a civil war which lasted till 1876. During the last quarter of the 19th century Col. Robert Sandeman appeared on the scene.

“Sandeman was the first to break down the closed border system and to realize that the Baloch and Brahui chiefs, with their interests and influence, were a powerful factor for good”.⁴⁵ During the 1871 conference Sandeman represented the 'forward policy' but couldn't succeed. In 1875, he went to Kalat to put an end to the civil war between the Khan and chiefs. “The Khan refused to deal with Sandeman and informed him his of constitutional position as an absolute ruler of Balochistan, like the Amir of Kabul and the Shah of Iran.”⁴⁶ In 1876, with the change in White Hall, the supporters of 'forward policy' came into power with that 'Sandeman Game' started. Now the British directly interfered in the affairs of the Khanate. In fact, the British 'forward and closed border policies' were different as far as Balochistan was concerned. In case

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, 19.

⁴⁶ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 139.

of threat the British used to adopt the forward policy along with the pacification of Baloch tribes and respect for the Khan. But, in case of pacification from the external threats, they used the closed border policy also termed as ‘Scientific Border Policy’ to minimize their defense expenditures.⁴⁷

The Agreement of Mastung in 1876⁴⁸ ended the civil war. The agreement affirmed the status of the Khan as the independent ruler but subordinate in external affairs. Soldiers were allowed to be stationed. The foundations of the tribal system were exterminated and the tribal chiefs were directly given the status of hereditary chiefs. “The Jacobabad Agreement (1876) paved the way for the ‘peaceful’ occupation of Baluchistan and the rise of a ‘middle man’ (*Sardari* System) or the ‘Sandeman System’⁴⁹ in Balochistan.”⁵⁰ This system was to bypass Khan by establishing direct relations with *sardars* and tribal chiefs.⁵¹ In 1877, Col. Sandeman assumed the position of the Agent of the Governor General in Balochistan. In 1877, the British-administrated Balochistan Agency was shaped with Quetta as its headquarter and Col. Robert Sandeman became the First Agent to the Governor-General (AGG).⁵²

As indicated above, with Sandeman’s appointment as AGG in Balochistan in 1877, he armed the *sardars* with unlimited powers over their tribes which could be arrested and imprisoned on the indication of the *Sardar* for disobedience to him, while a tribesman who had been put in prison for a serious offence could be released on receipt of a letter by the *mirza* (accountant) of a *niabat* (district) from the *Sardar*.⁵³

⁴⁷ Javed Haider, “Balochistan under the British Administrative System,” *Regional Studies*, no. 2 (Spring 2008):42-43.

⁴⁸ For further details see Appendix II.

⁴⁹ The Sandeman policy can be defined as “to directly interfere in the affairs of the state, to establish and maintain peace and order with the interference as possible with the native usage; to promote the good feeling of the chiefs and tribesmen by associating them with government or as possible with the work of government and assist each tribal leader to make him strong in his tribal area to finish the suzerainty of a single ruler by using the method of divide and rule”.

⁵⁰ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 40.

⁵¹ Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), 161.

⁵² Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 34.

⁵³ Breseeg, *op. cit.*, 162.

By the “Treaty of Gandamak (May, 1879), Pishin, Sibi, Harnai, and Thal-Chotiali were handed over by Yakub Khan to the British Government” on condition that the Amir should receive the surplus revenues after payment of the expenses of administration.⁵⁴ These areas with some others later come to be known as the British Balochistan.

Nonetheless, the British slowly controlled all strategic territories and finally conquered the entire north of Balochistan. After the death of Col. Sandeman in 1892, General Brown was appointed as new political agent. But, soon differences began to stir up between Khan Mir Khudad and Brown. The former was arrested and deposed. Thus, Mir Mahmud II got an opportunity to become the new ruler and must have thanked General Brown. The entire composition of the khanate was changed. The political agent became the absolute authority, the regular army was abolished, but apart from all these reforms the khanate remained independent.

The geographical features of the contemporary province of Balochistan were the consequences of British rule in the region as it was extended to Balochistan. By imposing the treaties of 1841, 1845, 1876, and 1879 on the rulers of Kalat and Kabul Balochistan emerged in its present boundaries. The boundary between Kalat and Iran was fixed by the Boundary Commission in 1871, and it was revised in 1895. In 1896, the demarcation of the Afghanistan border (the Durand Line) and Iran border (the Goldsmith Line) were completed.⁵⁵ The British acquired the Khan’s crown land (*niabat*) in Nushki, thus establishing their complete hold over the entire border region on the southern side of Afghanistan.⁵⁶ This commission gave away roughly 1/4th of the area to Persia, which is nowadays called Iranian Balochistan. “On the other

⁵⁴ Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, 20.

⁵⁵ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 35.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

hand, present Pashtuns areas were ceded to Balochistan by Afghanistan and as a result of the Gandamic Treaty in 1879, and the treaties of 1891 and 1895.”⁵⁷ “The British denial of a Baloch frontier province was caused by their concerns that the linguistic basis of forming a province should have certainly strengthened the feelings of hospitality towards the alien rule.”⁵⁸

British-administrated Balochistan was to comprise all Baloch-Afghan border areas stretching from the Baloch-Persian border in the west to Zhob and the Pashtun tribal areas in the north-east, together with a narrow strip of land connecting these frontier districts with British India through the Bolan Pass.⁵⁹ In order to pursue their imperial policy as well as to control the tribes inside Balochistan, the British divided the Balochistan territories into four political divisions,

- 1) British Balochistan (Pishin, Chaman, Sher Rud, Duki and Shahrig)
- 2) The Leased Areas (Quetta, Noshki, Naseerabad and the Bolan Pass)
- 3) The state territories (Makran, Kharan, Lasbela and Kalat)
- 4) The tribal areas (Kohlu, Marri and Bugti area, Zhob, Chagi and Sanjrani).⁶⁰

The Agent to the Governor General governed British Balochistan while the Leased Areas and Tribal Areas were administrated through political agents. The local rulers were provided the chance to govern state territories under the supervision of the British agent in Kalat. The British introduced various socio-political reforms in the British administrated areas, many institutions were laid down, and Quetta city was entirely constructed as the largest cantonment of South Asia and was connected to Persia, Afghanistan, and British India via railway. The rapid development

⁵⁷ Muhmood Ali Shah, *Essays on Balochistan: Society, Polity and Tribal Administration* (Lahore: Classical Publishers, 2008), 52.

⁵⁸ Javed Syed Haider, “Balochistan: The Introduction of Reforms and Accession to Pakistan,” *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, vol. XXXIX, no. 2 (July-December 2008):32-33.

⁵⁹ Axmann, *Back To the Future*, 35.

⁶⁰ Javed Haider, “Balochistan under the British Administrative System,” 43.

of British Balochistan greatly diminished the Khanate's political and economic significance. Taj Muhammad is of the view that "When the British arrived in the subcontinent, they entered into treaty relations with the state of Kalat. Kalat and Nepal were the two states which never formed part of the Indian Empire."⁶¹

Despite the fact countries like Afghanistan, Iran had existed earlier, yet new territorial boundaries were demarcated by the British, ignoring language, culture and ethnicity. For instance, "the Afghan and Iranian states-nations emerged during the 19th century due to the 'Great Game' in which nations were divided by British and Russian imperialism."⁶² To put it in a different way: the British had left this region but they sowed such seeds for the attainment of their interests which are still bearing their bitter fruits. We must remember that, "the boundaries of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan were drawn by the colonialists, without account of geographical, cultural, or historical factors. Balochistan borders were thus demarcated during the middle of the 19th century without consultation of the Baluch people, who objected and revolted against the colonial decisions."⁶³

⁶¹ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 193.

⁶² Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 8.

⁶³ Ibid.

CHAPTER 2

The Emergence of the Baloch National Movement: Birth of a Nation State and the Obliteration of the State

The dawn of 20th century had seen the position of the khanate which was reduced merely to an administrated land. The harsh policies which were initiated by the British and were carrying with the help of *sardars* brought injustice and poverty in different areas of Balochistan which formed the basis of resistance against the British. Their resistance movements were aimed to liberate Balochistan. “The history of Baloch resistance has a great tradition of a long struggle from 1839-1918.”¹ As well written by Breseeg, “External events, such as the Iranian Revolution (1906-7), the First World War, the 1917 Russian revolution, Turkish and German activities, pan-Islamism and the Indian freedom movement also had effects on the Baloch.”² In western Balochistan the natives who stood against the territorial demarcation of Balochistan later resisted the British and Iran until 1935. The Baloch *sardars* even could not resist the Iranian brutalism backed by the British. The chapter of Western Balochistan resistance was finally closed with the arrival of Raza Khan who looked for the extermination of the sub-nationalism in Iran. The failure of the Baloch resistance movement gave rise to two groups of nationalism,

¹ Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baloch Nationalism* (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1987), 143.

² Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), 193.

(1) Those who decided to migrate from Baluchistan to the Soviet Union and get Soviet support against British imperialism. This group can be termed revolutionaries led by Misri Khan Baluch, one of the leaders of the Marri-Khetran uprising (1919).

(2) The second group consisted of the constitutionalists, who were educated in the British educational institutions and had a middle class background.³

In October 1917, the Russian Revolution took place under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, who declared support of the right of self-determination to all oppressed nations which were fighting against British Imperialism.⁴ In the same year, “the first Soviet representative, Y.Z. Surits, was empowered “to maintain diplomatic relations with the peoples of independent Afghanistan, independent tribes of Baluchistan, and the people of India fighting for their liberation.”⁵ In this point, the Marri and Mengal rebels who revolted against the British later formed a delegation for the Baku Congress of the People of the East. A Baloch delegation in leadership of Misri Khan⁶ Baloch represented Balochistan at the Baku conference in 1920.

The Baloch revolutionaries moved toward Afghanistan and organized a revolutionary organization for the liberation of Balochistan. But the internal situation of Balochistan and the strong authority of the British did not allow them to pursue their revolutionary activities. But as a consequence, “their revolutionary thoughts influenced the constitutionalists on the politics of Balochistan.”⁷ Though, the Soviet cooperation with Baloch revolutionaries had affected Baloch politics, it was only nominal because of the Soviet internal situation.

³ Op. cit., 147.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Misri Khan Baluch was a revolutionary and rebel leader who started a liberation war in eastern Balochistan. Misri Khan later migrated to Afghanistan. From there he moved to Russia. The delegation at Baku was headed by Misri Khan.

⁷ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 149.

Moreover, after the end of the First World War efforts were made to achieve unity among the people and to fulfill the dream for the creation of an independent Balochistan. In 1920, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd 'initiated a political movement in Balochistan' called the 'Young Baloch' in a similar spirit to the 'Young Turks' movement of Kamal Atatürk which remained secretive until 1929. 1920 was very significant for Balochistan. For the first time in history the Baloch initiated a political movement in Balochistan for an independent state and demanded political and constitutional rights as well. Muhammad Yusaf Ali Khan Aziz Magassi, who is considered the founding father of Baloch nationalism, was arrested after drafting an article entitled 'Cry of Baluchistan' in which he demanded constitutional reforms and criticized the harsh policies of the British as well as the prime minister Shams Shah who wanted to replace the Khan of Kalat with his sick eldest son. However, with the influence of the Anjuman-i-Itihade-i-Baluchistan the British refused the proposal of Shams and as a result Mohammad Azam Jan became the new Khan of Kalat.

In 1927, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd and Nasim Talwi published a newspaper (Balochistan) from Delhi.⁸ In 1929, the Anjuman-i-Itihad-i-Baluchistan was formed in Quetta jail by Magassi which aimed for the unity of Balochistan. The leadership and membership were largely drawn from the urban elite, and educated youth, and nationalist religious-minded members and tribal aristocracy.⁹ Magassi became the first president of the Anjuman and Aziz Kurd the general secretary. "In 1931, they demanded establishment of an elected parliament for the Khanate, and consequently, of a responsible constitutional cabinet under the Khan. Such an act would mean

⁸ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan: Emergence, Dimensions, Repercussions* (Quetta: Gosga-e-Adab, 1982), 168.

⁹ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 202.

the end of the *Sardari*-Jirga system as well as the end of indirect, but overwhelming, British rule.”¹⁰ The Anjuman also opposed communalism and sectarianism. Firstly, it was based on the orientation of the Baloch race and, secondly, they wanted to get the support of minorities like *Zikris* and Hindus who had been dwelling in Balochistan for centuries. One thing must be borne in mind, by this time the All India Muslim League had already been created by some Muslims and thus wanted to preserve the rights of Muslims within United India because they feared Hindu dominations.

Despite the fact, that the Khan Mohammad Khan acquired the position of Khan with the help of the Anjuman other activities like the formation of constitutional government were not acceptable for the *sardars* and nor for the new Khan of Kalat because their status would have reduced. “The British government was also determined to preserve the ‘*sardari* system’ in Baluchistan so that their interests would not be threatened by a nationalist movement”. The Anjuman had declared its goal to be the establishment of an independent and united Baluchistan with a representative form of government”¹¹ but voicing his thought on this, the general secretary of the Anjuman said on December 13, 1932.

In the magazine “Zamindar” of September 9, 1932, I have presented an ideology to separate Baluchistan from India and form an independent Muslim government in this country, which I had formulated not today but twelve years ago in 1920 in view of local conditions, and which I had expressed before the world earlier in 1922 in a publication of the newspaper ‘Hamdam’ ... I want to see a constitutional government in Baluchistan which is purely Islamic and independent in all aspects. That is, just as I cannot like the fact Baluchistan remains under the slavery of the Hindus, I am also opposed to my country wearing the enslaving chains of the colonizing Europeans.¹²

¹⁰ Op. cit., 209.

¹¹ Baloch. *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 153.

¹² Ibid.

This was very imperative statement because the Anjuman called for the creation of an Islamic state before the Muslim League (ML). During this period the aim of the ML was merely to get equal rights for the Muslims of India. On October 20, 1932 leaders of the Anjuman issued following statement about the conference

It has been decided to convene the Baluchistan and all India Conference at Jacobabad in the month of December (1932). The Baluch are properly acquainted with democratic principles. But our nation is being tremendously affected by external influence. Consequently, we have no choice but to organize ourselves by establishing bonds of unity and alliance. Otherwise, this will result in our lagging behind all other nations. Our objectives are the following extremely important aims... Unity of Baluch, compulsory education, protection of rights, religious education and legal reforms. We have faith that the members of our nation will spare no effort to make this conference a success.¹³

On 27 December 1932, the ‘Balochistan and All India Baloch conference’ was held at Jacobabad by the Anjuman which aimed for the unity of all Baloch. This conference lasted for three days and was attended by 200 hundred delegates from various parts of India. Various resolutions were passed. But some of the most imperative were the following,

1. The abolition of the Frontier Crimes Regulation,
2. The establishment of a constitutional government in Baluchistan,
3. The establishment of industries in Baluchistan,
4. The establishment of colleges of advanced education in Baluchistan,
5. To unite the Baluch, that is, to create the unification of the different parts of Baluchistan.¹⁴

It should be noted that a few days before “the conference, the Anjuman’s weekly, al-Baluch, from Karachi, in its issue of 25th December 1932, published a map of Greater Balochistan, showing the Baloch areas of the Kalat confederacy, the leased areas of Iran, the territories under

¹³ Op. cit., 153-154.

¹⁴ Op. cit., 154.

British control and the Baloch land in Punjab and Sindh.”¹⁵ Similarly, another conference was also held in 1933. Meanwhile, on December 20 of the same year, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan ascended the throne of Kalat, after the death of his father; Mir Mohammad Jan. Ahmed Khan also supported the Anjuman’s demand for the independence Balochistan. “In 1934, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan sent Mir Yusuf Ali Khan Magassi to Britain as his personal representative to discuss the sovereignty of the Khanate of Kalat with the highest authorities and to negotiate the return of all the leased areas to the Khanate.”¹⁶ But he could not convince the British authorities. As a consequence he had to return to Balochistan and wanted to start an armed struggle with the help of Russia. However, he died in the 1935 Quetta earthquake before he could proceed further along these lines.

In 1937, Kalat State National Party (KSNP) was formed by some political workers of the Kalat State and some members of the Anjuman party. The manifesto was something very unique regarding the issue of Balochistan. The party manifesto is considered one of the most original documents ever produced on the situation of Balochistan.¹⁷ The KSNP aimed for the emancipation of Balochistan and the abolition of the *Sardari* System. As a consequence, the *sardars* also became antagonistic to the party.

In addition, the Khan of Kalat was also not happy with the manifesto of party. “This earned many enemies among the *sardars*, the government and British authorities, who wanted to

¹⁵ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 215.

¹⁶ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 155.

¹⁷ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 169.

curb the party's activities through administrative as well as underhanded tactics.”¹⁸ On July 6, 1939, *sardars* launched an armed attack on the annual meeting of the KSNP and disrupted the gathering.¹⁹ “On July 20, 1939 the prime minister of Kalat State issued a decree declaring the Kalat State National Party illegal within the boundaries of the Kalat State”.²⁰ With the outbreak of World War II all political activities were banned by the British, although the KSNP remained in different shapes.

It must be understood that the Baloch were not represented in the Lahore Resolution which aimed for the formation of autonomous Muslim states in India. This shows that they were not interested in the struggle of the Muslim movement for the formation of new states. But in my opinion this was a great miscalculation on the part of Baloch nationalistic leadership because the text of the Lahore Resolution clearly talks about Muslim independent states. It would have served as the basis and was in favour of the Baloch nation.

In 1945, the party allied itself with the All India States People Conference because of the political change that had occurred in that time. However, the party remained active during the process of independence of the Kalat State and with the formation of the parliament in independent Balochistan. The election also took place for the House of Commons and House of Lords and as a result the party swept majority of seats in the House of Commons, getting thirty-nine out of fifty two. The party also opposed the accession of Balochistan to Pakistan.

¹⁸ Op. cit., 171.

¹⁹ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 156

²⁰ Ibid.

Baloch Nationalist Political Parties (1929-1993) ²¹

Anjuman-e- Itihad-e-Balochistan
(1929-36)

Anjuman-e- Itihad-e-Balochistan
(1929-48)

Active in Baloch areas in British India

Anjuman-e-Watan
(1936-47)

Active in British Balochistan and
the leased Areas.

Kalat States National Party
(1937-48)

Active in the Khanate of Balochistan
Baloch Tribal Areas and the Leased Areas

Ustaman Gal (1954-5)

National Party (1955)

National Awami Party (NAP) 1956-75)

Successor organizations of the NAP

Awami National Party (ANP)

Pakistan National Party (PNP)

Baluchistan Liberation Organization (BLO)

Baluchistan National Movement (BNM)

The promulgation of the Government of India Act of 1935 opened a window for limited and controlled political activities in the territories of British India.²² “The Government of India Act treats Kalat as an Indian state and provides representation for it in the federal legislation. But, the Kalat state was never consulted in the drafting of this Act, nor was it a party to it in any manner.”²³ “The Khan submitted a protest to the Government of India against what he considered to be an infringement of the treaty of 1876”.²⁴ Thus, the Khan decided to start a constitutional battle with British. In year 1936, the Khan of Kalat availed the services of a barrister, Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah as the legal adviser to Kalat State. In 1945, the Labour party won the election in Britain, and after the number of debates it was decided to send three member cabinet mission for the transfer of power in India. The case of Kalat in the form of a

²¹ Paul Titus, ed., *Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Baluchistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 236.

²² Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography* ed. B.M. Kutty (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre University of Karachi, 2009), 40.

²³ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), 267.

²⁴ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 170.

memorandum forwarded to cabinet mission through viceroy of India by Muhammad Ali Jinnah.²⁵ The memorandum contained the following points made by Khan,

(1) That Kalat is an independent and sovereign State, its relation with the British Government being based on various mutual Agreement and Treaties.

(2) That Kalat is *not an Indian state*, its relation with India being of only a formal nature by virtue of Kalat's agreement with British; that with the ceasing of the Agreement of 1876 with Kalat Government, Kalat would regain its complete independence, as it existed prior to 1876; and that Kalat Government would then be free to choose its own way without any interference by others.

(3) All such regions as were given under the control of the British in consequence of any treaty will return to the sovereignty of Kalat State, and resume their original status as parts of the Kalat State.

(4) Other Baluch regions like Kharan, Les Bela, and the Marri and Bugti areas were part and parcel of the Kalat State and acknowledged by the British; and must, therefore, go back to it when the latter vacate.²⁶

In 1946, I.I. Chundrigar, who was a leader of the Muslim League and became the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1957, wrote a memorandum on 'independent Kalat'.²⁷ On April 3, 1947 the Khan announced in Quetta, "When the British would leave Indian; Kalat will declare its independence along with those territories which were leased to the British."²⁸ The Khan's intentions created an "anger and anguish among the Pakhtun supporters of AIML in Balochistan" and as a consequence Qazi Isa the president of Balochistan Muslim League (BML) met with Jinnah on the next day, told him about Khan's intentions, Jinnah replied him, 'this will not happen.'²⁹ However, On April 24, 1946, "the Pakhtun tribal leaders of British Balochistan led by Nawab Mohammad Khan Jomezai sent a telegram to the Mission and Viceroy demanded that "Balochistan might be amalgamated into other provinces. Therefore it is important to give it a

²⁵ For further details of this memorandum see Appendix III.

²⁶ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 142-143.

²⁷ For details regarding this memorandum see Appendix IV.

²⁸ Javed Syed Haider, "Balochistan: The Introduction of Reforms and Accession to Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, vol. xxxix, no. 2 (July-December 2008): 46.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, 46.

provincial status and to execute meaningful reforms.”³⁰ These demands were against the demands of the Khan. The tribal leaders of Balochistan were against the independent separate Baloch nation because it would have served against their interests because they believed that the Khan would be the absolute ruler.

“On June 3, 1947, when Lord Mountbatten announced the plan for the partition of India, the announcement maintained the status of the autonomous princely states as in the memorandum of the Cabinet Mission dated May, 12, 1946.”³¹ These states were also given the chance if they could maintain their independence. The partition plan was to divide British India into two sovereign states, Pakistan and India. Besides that, the princely states, including Kalat State, were absolutely given the right either to merge with India or Pakistan. As far as the tribal states and British Balochistan was concerned, a referendum was followed to decide the fate of these areas. But soon the question of referendum became controversial; Jinnah opposed the right of vote for the members of the Shahi Jirga, stressed on the ration card holders and all members of the district jirga. But, Nehru called for senior judicial members and Quetta municipality people. But both points of views were rejected by Mountbatten. Eventually, the right of vote was given to the members of the Shahi Jirga. In the meantime, a memorandum was sent by the Marri and Bugti to the British government in 1946, demanding the merger of their territories with Kalat.³² Some of the other chiefs wanted to join the Khanate for instance, Jamal Khan Leghari also wanted to merge his areas, Dera Ghazi Khan.

³⁰ Op. cit., 43.

³¹ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 173.

³² Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, 143.

The policies of the British were different regarding Baloch tribal areas and tribal areas of North West Frontier Province (present day *Khyber Pakthoon Khwa*). The fate of the former was decided by Shahi Jirga and the latter was decided by representative *jirgas*. Before, the proceedings of Shahi Jirga Jinnah had sent Abdur Rab Nishtar to Quetta “to mobilize support for Pakistan from Shahi Jirga and Quetta Municipality.”³³ The nationalist historian Janmahmad discussed the problems regarding the Shahi Jirga and given is point of view:

This was against the Baloch interests, because the Shahi Jirga also included members from the leased areas of Sivi, Nasserabad, Quetta and the Marri-Bugti tribal regions. These areas were to be given back to the Khan after the British withdrawal from India. The Khan of Kalat and leaders of the Kalat National Party protested to the British government and demanded that the names of the Baloch members from the leased areas be deleted from the voting list. The British refused..... However, the controversial vote of the Shahi-Jirga, in which the Baloch members of the leased areas participated, complicated the matter and Pakistan refused to honour the provisions of the Standstill Treaty of 4th August 1947 on the basis of *Shahi-Jirga* vote. Shahi-Jirga was a nominated body of tribal chiefs, both Baloch and Pathan, who acted as a consultative and advisory panel to settle disputes. It was non-elective..... Advancement of the date resulted in a non-participation of five members of Quetta Municipality and three members of Shahi-Jirga..... The majority of the members of the Shahi-Jirga and Quetta Municipality were against accession of Pakistan. A conspiracy was hatched by the British authorities with Jafar Khan Jamali and Nawab Khan Jomezai. Soon after the AGG’ s speech, Nawab Muhammad Jomezai stood up and announced that the Shahi-Jirga had agreed to vote to Pakistan and the AGG should take cognizance of the fact.... Four sardars of the leased areas wanted an explanation from the AGG as to whether this vote was to determine between Kalat and Pakistan or between Pakistan and India.....the AGG maintained that this was a matter between the British government and Pakistan.³⁴

The Janmahmad version seems more of a nationalist point of view. However, some other writers have shown another picture regarding the controversial voting of the Shahi Jirga. Awan described the proceeding of Shahi Jirga in these words:

The AGG, the Honourable Sir Geoffery Prior, read out the Viceroy’s declaration about the referendum in Baluchistan. He said that West Punjab and Sind had already given their vote in favour of Pakistan. He said he knew that the members of Shahi Jirga had been discussing the financial position of Baluchistan; he had decided to give them one more day to discuss this and, therefore, the voting would take place to next day. But if they wanted to decide the issue the same day, they should inform him by 3 o’clock in the afternoon. As soon as he sat down, Nawab Muhammad Khan Jomezai, addressing the AGG, said, “We have already heard the Viceroy’s declaration. We do not want any more time to think it over. The sardars of the Shahi Jirga have taken a decision in favour of Pakistan... This was followed by a speech by Sardar Doda Khan Marri in favour of Pakistan. For a few more minutes there was a great noise in favour of Pakistan, but four sardars asked, “Is this matter between Kalat and Pakistan”. The AGG replied, “NO, this is between Pakistan and India only. Kalat has nothing to do with it”. On this, all the four sardars said, “We promised the Khan of Kalat that we would side with him but this is between Pakistan and India only. We, therefore

³³ Javed Syed Haider, “Balochistan: The Introduction of Reforms and Accession to Pakistan”, 48.

³⁴ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 179-181.

give our vote to Pakistan". There were shouts of "Pakistan *Zindabad*" inside the hall... Outside, thousands of people carrying Pakistan Flags were shouting slogans in favour of Pakistan.³⁵

Javed Haider in his article also stated that, the Pakhtun *sardars* were more 'interested in protecting promoting their own privileges' and wanted an insurance from Jinnah that the, "tribal system and *jirga* system will not be disturbed' and they showed 'now confidence in Khan". He further added that on June 3, 1947 "Jinnah assured them that there would be no interference with the old *sardari* system."³⁶ He further scribed that, "The pro-Pakistan elements celebrated this occasion and Nawab Jogezi gave a tea part in honour of Sardar Abdul Nishtar."³⁷ The assurance from the Jinnah also encouraged some *sardars* of Baloch and Pakhtuns to promote the cause of Muslim League for propagation of Pakistan.

"On July 30, 1947, Jinnah clarified Pakistan's policy toward the autonomous states as one of non-interference in their internal affairs, and declared their right to determine their own future."³⁸ In another speech Jinnah declared:

The Indians states will be fully independent, legally and constitutionally.....the states will be free to act per their wish whether to join the Indian Legislature or the Pakistan Legislative Assembly...the All-India Muslim League's policy has been quite unambiguous from the very beginning that we would not interfere in the internal affairs of any state The memorandum of the Cabinet Mission of 12th May, 1946, clearly lays down the policy of His Majesty's Government in respect of the position of the Indian states. It nowhere makes it obligatory upon them to merge themselves with any Legislative Assembly, be it Indian or Pakistani. It is my personal belief that any if State wants to remain aloof, it may do so without pressure from any quarter, whether it be the British Parliament or any political organization in the country.³⁹

³⁵ A.B Awan, *Baluchistan: Historical and Political Processes* (London: New Century Publishers, 1985), 185-186.

³⁶ Javed Syed Haider, "Balochistan: The Introduction of Reforms and Accession to Pakistan," 47-48.

³⁷ Op. cit., 48-49.

³⁸ Baloch. *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 173.

³⁹ Martin Axmann, *Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 223.

As a result of this policy, on August 4, 1947 an agreement was reached between representatives of the British, Pakistani, and Kalat governments, which was later announced on August 11, 1947.⁴⁰ As stated in the Standstill Agreement⁴¹ “the government of Pakistan agrees that Kalat is an Independent State, being quite different in status from other states of India and commits its relation with the British Government as manifested in several agreements.”⁴² Article 4, “In the meantime, a Standstill Agreement will be made between Pakistan and Kalat by which Pakistan shall stand committed to all the responsibilities and agreements signed by the Kalat and British governments from 1839 to 1947 and by this, Pakistan shall be the legal, constitutional, and political successor of the near future in Karachi.”⁴³

Zarina Salamat in her books pointed out that, the government of Pakistan which recognized the Kalat as an ‘independent Sovereign State’ in ‘Delhi accord’, later, “refused to recognize the Delhi accord, which it claimed, was a Standstill Agreement.”⁴⁴ On August 12, 1947 the Khan, while returning from Delhi made a formal proclamation on the day British paramountcy in the subcontinent ended.⁴⁵ Bansal on the other hand claims that, though, the Khan was not representing all of the people of Balochistan yet an “overwhelming majority of the Baloch population supported the Khan’s bid for independence.”⁴⁶ It might have the affiliations of tribal leaders with the Khan that had urged them to support the Khan.

⁴⁰ Baloch, Baloch. *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 173.

⁴¹ For further details about this Standstill agreement see Appendix V.

⁴² Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, 148.

⁴³ Op. cit., 148-149.

⁴⁴ Zarina Salamat, *Pakistan 1947-1958: an Historical Review* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1992), 22.

⁴⁵ Op. cit., 58.

⁴⁶ Alok Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2010), 36.

“The paramountcy that had been exercised by the British was transferred to Pakistan and it was done with the Khan’s consent! Depending on the point of view one could argue that the Khanate of Kalat became part and parcel of Pakistan then days before the state of Pakistan itself came into existence.”⁴⁷ On August 15, 1947, one day after the creation of Pakistan, a ‘formal declaration of its independence’ was announced by the Kalat Government. The national flag of Balochistan was also hoisted colored green and red. Soon after independence the Khan delivered his speech in Baluchi:

I am proud to address you in Baluchi today. Insha Allah, whenever I address you in future, it will be in Baluchi because it is the Baloch nation.....I have not expressed my views and thoughts openly to you because of alien rule. Today our country is independent and I can express my views freely and openly.....we will continue our struggle till we achieve complete independence and unification of the Baloch. We cannot be satisfied unless we achieve our goal.....Foreign policy would be based on the principle of non-interference and friendly relations to all the nations in particular to the neighboring states.....I am proud of being a servant of the Baluch nation and of Islam.⁴⁸

“The Khan had promulgated a ‘constitution’ through what was called the Government of Kalat State Act 1947.”⁴⁹ The Khan became the absolute ruler with the help of constitution. Nawabzada Muhammad Aslam Khan and an Englishman, Mr. D.Y. Phell, were appointed prime minister and the foreign minister respectively. The written constitution provided for a bicameral legislative body, *Darul- Umara* (the House of Tribal Chiefs or Upper House) and *Darul-Awam* (the House of Commons (Lower House)).⁵⁰

The written constitution had paved the way for the first ever elections in Kalat State. The KSNP managed to get 39 out of total of 51 seats in the House of Commons. Inayatullah on the

⁴⁷ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 225.

⁴⁸ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 178.

⁴⁹ Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, 59.

⁵⁰ Baloch, *op. cit.*, 179.

other believed that, “the election was a victory for the democratic forces in Baluchistan, who had worked since 1920 for the cause of democracy and an independent Greater Baluchistan.”⁵¹ Apart from all the political and constitutional progress, the problem of accession was remained a major issue. However, “in pursuance of the provision of the 11th August Agreement, the Khan sent the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the State to Karachi to negotiate for the concluding a treaty on the basis of the 4th August 1947 Standstill Agreement relating to the areas held under lease by the outgoing British Government.”⁵² “The meetings between the officials of the two states were not fruitful due to the policy of the Pakistani Government, which insisted on the unconditional accession of the Khanate to Pakistan”. Furthermore in the same period, “the president of the British Baluchistan Muslim League, Qazi M. Isa met the Khan and conveyed to him a message from Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan, who extended an invitation for the Khan to come to Karachi to discuss future relations between the Khanate and Pakistan.”⁵³ The visit of Khan to Pakistan and the meeting with Jinnah was just confined to the matter of accession with Pakistan.

However, one thing which was very imperative for the understanding of the whole episode was whether one had taken it seriously or not. After coming back, the Khan put the following proposal in front of the parliament. From 12th to 15th December 1947, the proposal was debated in the several sessions of *Darul Awam*.⁵⁴ The House of Commons was dominated by the staunch nationalist members of KSNP which aimed for the independent and sovereign Kalat State.

⁵¹ Op. cit., 180.

⁵² Bizenjo, *In Search of Solution*, 59.

⁵³ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 181.

⁵⁴ Bizenjo, op. cit., 63.

On 14th December 1947, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, who was the staunch nationalist as well as the leader of the House of Commons, gave this historical speech:

The British Government, by force of arms, enslaved most parts of Asia. The British Government was tyrannical, oppressive. It robbed us of our independence. We had never been a part of Hindustan. Pakistan's demand that Kalat, which had earlier been known as Baluchistan, and had been the national homeland of the Baluch, should merge with Pakistan is unacceptable....We are ready for friendship with honour not in indignity. We are not to merge within the frontiers of Pakistan. We have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran. And if the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to amalgamate with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran also be amalgamated with Pakistan. ...If Pakistan as an independent nation wants to have an agreement with us, we shall extend the hand of friendship.⁵⁵

“The *Darul Awam* unanimously rejected the proposal for accession of Kalat to Pakistan because of the presence of KNSP members. The *Darul Umarah* met on January 2, 3 and 4, 1948 and, endorsing the decision of the *Darul Awam*, unanimously rejected the accession proposal.”⁵⁶ Gul Khan pinned down the resolution which passed after the discussion of the *Darul Umarah*:

This House will accept and accede to any respectable and friendly treaty which the Great Khan wants to make with the Government of Pakistan, provided that the independence and sovereignty of this country are maintained. But this House is not ready to accept an accession to Pakistan which endangers the separate existence of the Baluchistan.⁵⁷

The Prime Minister soon departed from Kalat to inform Jinnah about the proceeding of the parliament. But when returning back he brought the letter of Jinnah in which he demanded once again the accession to Pakistan.⁵⁸ Jinnah visited Sibi on February 12, 1948 where a couple of meetings were undertaken between the heads of both states. After the meeting the Khan blamed Jinnah for his unfriendly policy toward the Khanate:

When I met the Quaid-i-Azam for the second time at Sibi, he advised me that the Pakistan Government, with certain modifications and alterations, had prepared another draft Instrument of Accession and I should see this revised form. When I went through the draft, I was surprised to find that reference were made in it to the Government of India Act, 1935, and to the Independence Act, 1947, which were not in the original draft and which affected adversely the historical position of Kalat...This change in the Instrument of

⁵⁵ Op. cit., 62-63.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 184.

⁵⁸ For details see Appendix VII.

Accession was a source of surprise to me and at the same time disturbed me very much... I became ill and was very much disappointed and disheartened by the new change.⁵⁹

On 14th February, due to illness the Khan could not attend the meeting with Jinnah. The special envoy of Jinnah Col. S.B. Shah, met the Khan on the following day. The letter which represented to Jinnah by the Khan shows a great displeasure. However, “the *Darul Awam* again rejected it in its session held on 25th February 1948 and the *Darul Umara*, in its session held two days later, also refused to accept it.”⁶⁰

Moreover, in the view point of Inayatullah Baloch, the accession of these states like Makran, Las Bela and Kharan were “unconstitutional measure adopted by the Government of Pakistan.”⁶¹ The fact can’t be neglected that these *sardars* went to Pakistan on their own capacity. Martin Axman also believed that there were some differences among the *sardars* that is why the Pakistani authorities benefited from the long standing rivalries between the Khan of Kalat and the rulers Las Bela and Kharan.⁶² Janmahmad alleged the government in his own version, he said, “the Pakistan prime minister summoned his military commander on 26th March 1948 and ordered Pakistan’s army to move into the Baloch coastal region of Pasni and Jiwani.”⁶³ He further writes, “The accession of these areas of Kalat was unconstitutional and illegal.”⁶⁴ These states were neither independent nor did their rulers have the authority to decide the political future of the people.⁶⁵ The view point of Awan is different from Janmahmad version, he stated, before the merger the relations among the Khan and sardar had deteriorated and this situation ‘looked serious’.

⁵⁹ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 185.

⁶⁰ Bizenjo, *In Search of Solution*, 64-65.

⁶¹ Baloch, op. cit., 187.

⁶² Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 232.

⁶³ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 189.

⁶⁴ Op. cit., 185.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

At Pasni and Jiwani the Government of Pakistan had valuable installations, such as airstrip and postal and radio installations” that’s why “on the 26th, the prime minister called up the three service chiefs and it was decided to send one platoon of troops, by air, to Jiwani for the protection of the airport, another platoon to Turbat and a company, by sea to Pasni to take over the port and radio stations. The Agent of the Governor General at Quetta and the Khan were both informed.⁶⁶

Inayatullah Baloch on the other hand, also alleged Pakistan on her policy, he stated, “This policy was to breakdown the position of the Khanate, thus forcing it to merge with Pakistan. Kalat lost half its territory and its connection with Iran and Afghanistan and was left with no outlet to the sea.”⁶⁷ In the words of Ahmad Yar, “the Government of Pakistan had now instructed the brigadier stationed in Quetta to be on ‘alert for action’ against Kalat; and the agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan was also preparing for ‘police action’ against Kalat State.”⁶⁸ Later, on 27th March, the Khan of Kalat signed the ‘unconditional merger document’ with Pakistan.

Ironically, the news of All India Radio that the Khan had approached India for the accession of Kalat further added fuel to the current chaotic situation. Later Nehru denied this false report. On March 30, 1948 the Khan signed the merger document. It must be remembered that the decision to merge with Pakistan was the decision of the Khan only. Neither the parliament was in favour of the decision to neither merger nor the other tribal chiefs of their specified tribes. Janmahmad further argued, that “Under the constitution of the Baloch Confederacy, the constitutional head, the Khan could not take a decision of such far-reaching consequence without the approval of the state assembly, which had already refused.”⁶⁹ On

⁶⁶ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 210-211.

⁶⁷ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 187.

⁶⁸ Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, 161.

⁶⁹ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 190.

August 15, 1948 Pakistan got absolute power in Balochistan and it was administered by officials from Karachi.⁷⁰ By this time the “legal entity of the Khan of Kalat was abolished.”⁷¹

Ahmed Yar in his autobiography also admitted that, he signed the merger document ‘without obtaining the formal sanctions’. He also showed ‘confess’ because of exceeding the scope of his mandate.⁷² While justifying his stance, he described many causes, he writes: if he had not signed Kalat’s merger, firstly: “the position of Pakistan would definitely have gone worse”, secondly: “the army of Afghanistan could have easily entered into Balochistan”, thirdly: the India could have sent his navy in Makran sea-coast, last but not the least, it would provide Russia ‘the best pretext’ to “advance through Afghanistan and capture the ports on the Makran sea-coast.”⁷³ Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo regarding merger stated that, it was an illegal and immoral annexation of Kalat which would be known in history as a formal accession to Pakistan.⁷⁴ It was an epoch-making event in the history of the Baloch people which came to an end after 300 years.

Ahmed Yar Khan after merger regarding the political developments writes that, after the merger, he remained in touch “with the Government of Pakistan, striving hard to avoid any misunderstanding between them, and keep intact an atmosphere of mutual friendship”. He continues, on April 15, 1948, he was called by the Agent of Governor General in Balochistan “with an order of the Quaid-i-Azam to maintain the *status quo ante* in Kalat. That is the position of Kalat States would revert back to what it was during the preceding of the British rule”. While

⁷⁰ Op. cit., 197.

⁷¹ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 239.

⁷² Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, 162.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Bizenjo, *In Search of Solution*, 66.

discussing the aftermaths of this political development, he writes: “My (Khan) legal authority as the Khan-e-Azam came to an end... Connections with the affairs of Kalat were cut off and within 20 hours of the orders executed...Several of the ministers of Kalat Government were exiled or arrested”. While showing ‘regret’ he further stated his own point of view:

It was indeed a sad as well as an oppressive thing to have so coolly and deliberately ignored the services and sacrifices which the Baloch and their Khan-e-Azam had so unselfishly and willingly rendered in the struggle for the establishment of the Muslim homeland of Pakistan. To me in particular, the sock was all the more greater; for, apart from my moral and material contributions towards the emergence of Pakistan... The Baluch representative parliament and the Baluch Confederation were broken down by one stroke of the Pen.⁷⁵

“The two legislative chambers and the cabinet of ministers were dismissed, and Kalat reverted back to the *status quo ante*.”⁷⁶ The administration of Kalat was controlled with the help of a political Agent. In April, several members of the political parties were arrested including Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd. According to Awan, “Public opinion in Balochistan, or at least in cities such as the small towns, was overwhelmingly in favour of Pakistan.”⁷⁷ In addition, various arguments regarding the merger of Kalat have been employed, the nationalist writers dubbed it as a forced merger, while most of the foreign scholars also critically agree with the Baloch point of views. Some of Pakistani academics considered it a formal merger with Pakistan. Prince Abdul Kareem, the brother and former Governor of Makran reacted violently, and within two weeks of the accession, he followed an aggressive way and moved to Afghanistan with a large number of followers.⁷⁸ He wanted to embark upon a guerrilla war against Pakistan.⁷⁹ Prince Karim remained in Afghanistan for three months but could not get help from Afghanistan because the idea of ‘Greater Balochistan’ was a threat for the Afghan

⁷⁵ Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, 163-164.

⁷⁶ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 235.

⁷⁷ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 211.

⁷⁸ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 194.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*.

ruler. Prince Abdul Karim's letter that he wrote to Khan from Afghanistan, had demonstrations that how early the feelings against "Punjabi domination and army" erupted. He writes,

From whatever angle we look at the present government of Pakistan, we will see nothing but Punjabi Fascism. The people have no say in it. It is the army and arms that rule... there is no place for any other community in this government, be it the Baloch, the Sindhis, the Afghans or the Bengalis, unless they make themselves equally powerful.⁸⁰

While for military clash with Pakistan, he was arrested with his followers and put to prisoner. General Akbar, who had the command of the seventh Baloch Battalion, which was involved in the action against these insurgents, after 12 years had published an interesting article in Dawn newspaper titled '*Reminiscences of a Solider*' which gives a detailed account regarding the 1948 insurgency.⁸¹ He writes that, "Quaid-i-Azam was touchy about the incident and had a very soft corner for the Baloch tribesmen. He had directed GOC for quick solution of the situation without bloodshed. He also advised him personally not to release reports to the press about the military actions."⁸²

Martin Axman pointed out regarding Prince Karim that, "many years in prison made him the first of a series of Baloch martyrs who innocently suffered in the hands of Pakistan."⁸³ Prince Karim's rebellion was the first insurgency against the government of Pakistan. This insurgency cannot be attributed as a war of independence against Pakistan, because he couldn't get any major help from the people or other tribal leaders. Anas Malik pointed out that, "The army's deployment to coerce the Kalat and three princely states simply lent weight to the view, common

⁸⁰ Farhan Hanif Siqqiqi, "The State and Politics of Ethnicity in Post-1971 Pakistan: an Analysis of the Baloch, Sindh and Mohajir Ethnic Movements", (unpublished PhD diss., University of Karachi, 2009), 129.

⁸¹ For further details see Appendix VIII.

⁸² Major General Akbar Khan, "Reminiscences of a Solider", Independence Day Supplement Dawn: Karachi, August 14, 1960.

⁸³ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 235.

among some Baloch *sardars*, that independence rather than subjugation to the Pakistani state was the only logical option.”⁸⁴

Interestingly, the Kalat State promulgated Islam as their state religion. After the annexation when the question of religion was aroused the guerrillas called them Baloch *Mujahedeen*. “Maulvi Nasser Hossein, Maulvi Arz Mohammad, Maulvi Mohammad Umar, Maulvi Mohammad Afzal and a few others issued the *fatwa* (decree by a learned religious figure) and proclaimed *jihad* (holy war) against Pakistan and demanded that the Baloch people join the national movement. Addressing the government servants and military personnel of Pakistan the *fatwa* demanded that the Muslims of Pakistan and particularly the soldiers should engage in *jihad* against the non-Islamic Government of Pakistan.”⁸⁵ So the question arises that this struggle was a war or a *jihad*.

The inception of Pakistan also awarded independence to the Kalat state through the Act of Paramountcy. But the annexation of Kalat was inevitable. The notion for the annexation of the Kalat state can be understood through different perceptions. To put it in a different way, Pakistan, the Khan or the British had their own different perceptions regarding the Kalat State. To understand the annexation of Kalat one needs to understand the perceptions.

One must understand the perception of the British regarding the subcontinent. Although, legally, the princely states were accepted by the ‘lapse of paramountcy’ as ‘sovereign’ and ‘independent states’, yet the real aim of the British was the merger of those princely states with

⁸⁴ Anas Malik, *Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 132.

⁸⁵ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 241.

Pakistan and India respectively. The strategic location of the Kalat State was unique but lacked the basic pre-requisites of state apparatus. Moreover, there was no question of any princely state having independence. The princely states of Hunza and Nager did, however, remain independent up to 1974 and 1972, respectively, before being annexed by Pakistan. Throughout history rich countries felt threats from weak countries, and the same was true of the British. British policy was based on the imagination threat. “With the rise of the Soviet Union, the emergence of an Iran with nationalist leaning under Raza Shah I, the rise of a pro-Soviet Afghanistan, the national communist trend perceived in western Baluchistan as well as Baluch-Soviet connections coupled with anti-imperialist progressive and nationalist policies in Baluchistan was of particular concern to the British.”⁸⁶ The British were not willing to allow Kalat to become a separate state because they feared that it would generate anarchy and chaos after their complete withdrawal. Earlier, in September 1947, the British Government repeated an earlier warning to the Pakistan Government, through their High Commission in Karachi, of the danger of recognizing the Khanate as a separate international entity because of the weak socio-economic nature.⁸⁷

The perception of the leadership of Pakistan was to annex as much land as possible as quickly as possible. The Pakistani government also encouraged the Nizam of Hyderabad to become an independent state. Though it was ‘less than logical’ and ‘immoral’ as well, the policy remained the same and India also used the same tactics in Kashmir. As far as the role of Jinnah was concerned, in fact, before Partition he had advocated an independent Kalat. But after becoming the Governor General of Pakistan territorial gains and state interests guided his thinking. The deal was done for the accession or annexation of Kalat, the timing was to decide

⁸⁶ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 174.

⁸⁷ For details regarding the British approach see Appendix VI.

by hook or by crook. There was no the question of ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ in the calculation. Pakistan inherited the basic state structure from the British which aimed to rule the subjects and, the ‘Anglo-Muslim elite’ had the same psyche which was demonstrated by the British regarding the princely states.⁸⁸ Awan while parsing the role of Jinnah in these circumstances, he stated: “The role of the Jinnah Quaid-e-Azam throughout had been totally aboveboard. No other Indian leader, at the time, played his cards with such clean hands.”⁸⁹

Thus, Pakistan revived the Sandeman policy while giving subsidies in the form of corruption to put pressure on Khan for accession. Inayatullah further pointed out that, “Jinnah also refused to give autonomy to Balochistan; rather, he accepted the demand the demand of tribal for maintaining the notorious ‘Sandeman System’.”⁹⁰ Jinnah later announced that instead of democratic institutions, Baluchistan needed socio-economic development programmes under his guidance.”⁹¹ The weak socio-economic and political structure of Kalat was proved insufficient as compared to the strong economic infrastructure and strong civil-military institutions.⁹² The *sardars* and tribal chiefs were not loyal to the Khan. Rather, they wanted to enjoy more autonomy and more subsidies in the form of wealth. Thus, it became easy for Pakistan to exploit them, which resulted in the accession of Kalat state to Pakistan.

2.1 Annexation to One Unit

‘Insanity’, it is said, ‘is the doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results’. The cracks that had appeared with the accession of Balochistan widened in subsequent

⁸⁸ For further details see Ilhan Niaz’s book, *The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008*.

⁸⁹ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 212.

⁹⁰ Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Baluchistan*, 190.

⁹¹ Op. cit., 190

⁹² Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 247.

years. Soon after accession the Khan had showed his desire for a trip abroad. But the government of Pakistan turned down the request. It was to stop the Khan from taking any step against the government of Pakistan. The situation in Balochistan presented a deprived picture at that point in time, and many areas of Balochistan were very backward, even by regional standards. Already in March 1948 the *vazir* of Kalat, Nawabzada Muhammad Aslam Khan, had informed the AGG that he perceived the “creation of a Baluch State Union as the only way the states and tribes can be saved from disintegration.”⁹³ However, in 1950, the Muslim League government constituted a ‘Committee of Reforms in Balochistan’. It recommended the formation of a governor’s province in Balochistan, without disturbing the existing institutions of the *sardari* system.”⁹⁴

In March 1952, the Balochistan States Union (BSU) was formed with the merger of the states of Karan, Makran, and Las Bela into Kalat. The notification of this reform was issued on 11th April 1952. Ironically, “the formation of the Baluchistan State Union (BSU) in 1952 had a hidden agenda. According to Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the idea of the BSU was a “trap to lure the Khan before he was dispatched into the eternal oblivion of one unit.”⁹⁵ Awan also argued that, “the idea of union was put forth as a sop to the Khan”. Later events showed “it was a trap to lure the Khan before demolishing him.”⁹⁶ The Khan of Kalat became the President of the BSU, an *ad hoc* constitution was drafted, and the promise was made for the election and formation of a government.

⁹³ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 261.

⁹⁴ Breseeg, *op. cit.*, 260.

⁹⁵ Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions*, 72-73.

⁹⁶ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 214.

Furthermore, Agha Abdul Hamid was appointed as Prime Minister by Pakistani authorities. The former governor of Balochistan added that, “It was a ruse meant to whitewash the adverse fallout from the unjust accession of Kalat to Pakistan through coercion, against the wishes of the people of the state.”⁹⁷ Breseeg, while criticizing the BSU, argued: The formation of BSU was a starting move for the consolidation of the Baloch country into a single political entity.⁹⁸ In fact, the government of Pakistan in Karachi was working on its scheme for the amalgamation of all West Pakistan into one unit.⁹⁹ The abolition of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad abruptly ended the status of the BSU and special areas, and Balochistan, which was a ‘political quandary’. Later, it became a part of One Unit administration.¹⁰⁰

Martin Axman has critically described the process of how the rulers of the states benefited after the formation of the BSU,

Less than a month after the first public proposal, the Balochistan States Union Covenant was signed on 11 April 1952 by Mir Ahmad Yar Khan on the behalf of Kalat, by Mir Baluch Khan Naoshervani (representing his father, Nawab Muhammad Habibullah Khan) on the behalf of Kharan, by Nawab Bai Khan Gichki on the behalf of Makran, by Mir Ghulam Qadir Khan on behalf of Las Bela, and by Colonel Abdur Rahim Khan of the Ministry of States & Frontier Regions on the behalf of the Government of Pakistan. The four rulers accepted the integration of their territories into a single state union with a common executive, judiciary and legislature...the state union administration was to be directed by the wazir-e-azam. He was appointed by a Council of rulers... a legislative assembly with twenty-eight elected representatives and twelve appointed Sardars was to be established. The covenant provided for one elected member for each 20,000 constituents and allotted Sardari seats to the states...eight for Kalat, two for Makran, and one each for Las Bela and Karan... the BSU cabinet was to be chosen from the assembly... the four rulers were charged with drafting a detailed constitution for the union which would meet federal approval.

He further defined the motives of the rulers before the formation of BSU were,

⁹⁷ Op. cit., 73.

⁹⁸ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 261.

⁹⁹ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 265.

¹⁰⁰ Siqqiqi, “The State and Politics of Ethnicity in Post-1971 Pakistan”, 131. Further see Appendix IX.

The rulers' reasoning for agreeing to establish BSU was rather simple and obvious. They were lured by money and a safeguard of their present position. Ahmad Yar of Kalat received an annual allowance of Rs425, 000; Nawab Bai Khan Gichki of Makran Rs200, 000; Mir Ghulam Qadir Khan of Las Bela Rs170, 000; and Nawab Muhammad Habibullah Khan of Kharan Rs61, 000. The Khanate's state securities of Rs4, 150,000, which had been blocked by the government of Pakistan for some time after accession were released and treated as the personal property of the Khan... Ahmad Yar perceived the whole exercise 'as an opportunity for him personally to improve his prospects as the future leader of the combined Baluch bloc. Allegedly, he tried to persuade the Marri and Bugti sardars to apply to the Government of Pakistan for their inclusion in BSU.¹⁰¹

The BSU ultimately failed due to many factors, including the selfish interests of rulers, territorial groupings, lack of budget and lack of wisdom by the government and rulers of the states. "Less than two years after its creation a number of Baloch *sardars* asked the Government of Pakistan to dissolve the BSU, and merge the states with the Chief Commissioner's Province of Balochistan. Inspired by the *sardars* "appeal, the government announced the termination of the BSU and its merger with the rest of Balochistan on 16 June 1954."¹⁰²

The merging of BSU and Balochistan was proposed by the central government not by the constituent assembly of Pakistan which aimed for the establishing of one unit. Breseeg further stated that, in early 1950, the Pakistan Muslim League wanted to take advantage of the political vacuum after the ban of the KSNP, but all in vain. In fact, the Baloch nationalists, headed by Abdul Karim, had formed the "Balochistan Peace Committee" with the aim of getting the right of self-determination for the Baloch.¹⁰³ This committee could not last long and soon was replaced by the Ustaman Gall.¹⁰⁴ Prince Karim Khan became the president, while the

¹⁰¹ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 262-263.

¹⁰² Op. cit., 265.

¹⁰³ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 260.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

responsibility for general secretary was put on the shoulders of Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo. Their flag was red having three stars showing the Baloch of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.¹⁰⁵

However, the Pakistan leaders, who controlled the military and bureaucratic power structure of the central government, feared that the three minority provinces in the western wing would combine with the Bengalis against them. According to Awan, there was a difficulty between the East and West Pakistan over the ‘distribution of seats, on a formula of parity’ and the “Punjab felt that a constitutional majority would always stay with East Pakistan as they would be able to win over the members from some of the smaller provinces.”¹⁰⁶ Harrison pointed out regarding the One Unit administration that the west state authorities decided to consolidate the western wing into a single, unified province that would balance Bengali strength in a projected national government structure based on the concept of parity between the two wings.”¹⁰⁷ Bizenjo believed that, “it was argued that East-West parity in representation, coupled with the integration of the provinces of the West wing into a single unit of West Pakistan would help to strengthen the country and contribute to greater progress and prosperity of the people of the two wings.”¹⁰⁸

Moreover, within two years, differences erupted between the Punjabi-*Muhajir* dominated central government and the Khan of Kalat. The Pakistani leaders including the prime minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, and the Governor General, Iskandar Mirza, began thinking that the Khan

¹⁰⁵ Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 38.

¹⁰⁶ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 217.

¹⁰⁷ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1981), 27.

¹⁰⁸ Bizenjo, *In Search of Solution*, 79.

was working for the creation of an independent Balochistan.¹⁰⁹ Thus, “in early June 1954, the Pakistan States Ministry dismissed the BSU’s assembly, and nearly a year later the union itself was dissolved and merged by the One Unit scheme into West Pakistan in 1955.”¹¹⁰ In January 1955, all the instruments of accession and all previous agreements were abrogated with the BSU Merger Agreement.¹¹¹ The BSU was started with effect from 14 October 1955.¹¹² “Without having achieved the status of a full-fledged Governor’s Province, it was included in the One Unit of West Pakistan together with the Chief Commissioner’s Province of Balochistan.”¹¹³ The formation of the BSU in fact was helpful for both-sides, the *sardars* and the government of Pakistan, respectively. As mentioned above *sardars* had a good chance to earn some wealth from the government and it had also some benefits for the government. Neither was interested in the welfare of the people. The Baloch areas were backward, lacked basic infrastructure in shape of roads, hospitals, schools and so on and so forth. Although the basic aim of the BSU was to provide welfare to the people and region, the self-centricity of *sardars* and the negative role of the political leaders of Pakistan did enough damage to it.

The role of the Khan in this entire episode was a sheer disappointment along with that of the other *sardars*. Rather, it was merely an interest-based game for them. By going along with the formation of the BSU and the merger with the One Unit administration they aimed to get maximum benefits from the government in shape of wealth and personal benefits, the government of Pakistan was also happy to sustain the same system that had been inherited from the British Raj. The British ruled the entire region with the so-called ‘Sandeman System’ and

¹⁰⁹ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 261.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 267.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

government authorities continued the same system. Neither the British, nor Pakistan government not even the sardars were looking to the welfare of the common masses. Pakistan, which inherited the same political, constitution and the bureaucratic structure from the British, sustained the old formula to control the entire region with *sardars* and tribal elites.

Chapter 3

The Parari Disturbances: Balochistan from One Unit to

‘New Pakistan’

The formation of West Pakistan into One Unit against the ‘numerical strength’ of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and for the domination of Punjab was a unique episode in the short history of Pakistan. When the central authorities began to take concrete steps designed to pave the way for the restructuring of West Pakistan, known as the One Unit Plan, Baloch leaders immediately reacted by organizing open opposition in defiance of a ban on the political activity.¹ Martin Axman writes that: Merger was done against the wish of the Khan, and against the will of most *sardars* and a large section of the people of Balochistan.² One Unit was meant to bring Pakistan on the track of development. But, as far as Balochistan was concerned, it was to ‘lure the Khan before demolishing him’. Bansal pointed out that the formation of One Unit administration “sounded the death-kneel for the political aspirations of the Baloch.”³ Awan has a different point of view, he stated that “not even one sixth or 15% of the total areas, was involved, and “even amongst the Baloch, a large chunk of them, such as Makran, Kharan or even Les Bela, never

¹ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1981), 27.

² Martin Axmann, *Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955*(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 267.

³ Alok Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2010), 39.

joined them.”⁴ As a result of the One Unit government, Pakistan raised the privileges and allowances for the Khan and *sardars*. But, the Khan, who previously enjoyed the status of the *Khan-e-Baloch*, now acquired the position of an ordinary citizen of Pakistan. Now the Khan was looking forward to the unification of Kalat, the Balochi-speaking areas and districts of Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi Khan⁵ into a single province.⁶ According to Awan, the Khan was looking forward for to establishment of a ‘separate homeland’. But, it was too late for the self-centered Khan, who had always thought first about his status as the head of all the Baloch areas.

However, according to Martin Axman, the demand for ‘Greater Balochistan’ under his supervision led to a large gathering of thirty-five Baloch tribal leaders in Karachi in October, 1957. Demands were made for the dissolution of the One Unit and the formation of a Baloch province on the basis of ethnicity, culture, language, and historical heritage.⁷ All the participants in that historic meeting agreed for the unification of the Baloch province based on their language, culture and history and also for the breakup of One Unit. But once the Khan manifested his desire to be the head of the entire Baloch areas, the majority of *sardars* left the gathering. The Khan neither looked to the welfare of people and nor to the development of Baloch areas. Rather he was in pursuit of power. On December 17, 1957, a memorandum was submitted by the Khan to the President Iskandar Mirza expressing their ‘full faith and confidence in the Government of Pakistan’ and demanding the ‘withdrawal of One Unit because it was dangerous for the tribal customs and way of life’ and demand was also made that the “Baloch should be treated at a with

⁴ A.B Awan, *Baluchistan: Historical and Political Processes* (London: New Century Publishers, 1985), 231.

⁵ The districts of Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi Khan were part of Balochistan in the past. The areas were detached from Balochistan and merged with Sindh and Punjab respectively by British authorities. In 1946 the tribal chiefs of both areas also aimed to merge with the Khanate. But they later joined Pakistan. But historically these were Baloch areas and till today they consider themselves as part of Balochistan.

⁶ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 281.

⁷ Op. cit., 284.

the people of the North West Frontier, where the tribal customs and traditions had not been touched.”⁸

According to Ahmad Yar Khan that, “the president of Pakistan received thousands of letters of protest against the administration of the states under One Unit government. These letters of protest carried a threat that if the decision was not revoked, the Baluch people would not hesitate to take up arms against the government.”⁹ Ahmad Yar Khan further continues that a meeting between forty-four *sardars* and Mirza was also arranged to discuss the points which were demanded by them. Mirza responded that he ‘would consult legal authorities for the exemption of Kalat State from One Unit and also demanded ‘sufficient proof’ for the separation from One Unit. Mirza also advised me (the Khan) to avail the services of Lord Macnair of London as legal adviser, and Mirza further demanded 50 Lakhs to contest elections against Fatima Jinnah and also suggested to me (the Khan) to put pressure upon the ‘ruler to Bahawalpur and Khairpur to pay him 40 and 10 Lakhs, respectively, for getting their states exempted’ from One Unit.¹⁰ Ahmed Yar Khan further writes that the matter of Kalat’s merger in One Unit was illegal. It was only political tactics.¹¹

The failure of this gathering proved to be the last nail in the political coffin of the Khan. After one year the Khan was arrested on a charge of the high treason against Pakistan.¹² “He was accused of approaching the Shah of Iran to admit Kalat into Iran as an autonomous region, of

⁸ Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), 169-170.

⁹ Op. cit., 171.

¹⁰ Op. cit., 173-174.

¹¹ Op. cit., 179.

¹² Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 285. See also Awan’s book, *Baluchistan* and Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch book, *Inside Baluchistan*.

secretly negotiating with Afghanistan to support a full-scale Baloch rebellion, and of raising the old state flag of Khanate on his fort of Kalat.”¹³ According to Mazari, he had also “seen the Khan’s personal flag fluttering over his palace.”¹⁴ Bansal believed that, the meeting of 44 Baloch *sardars* in 1958, for constituting a “plane to consolidate a Baloch state on a linguistic basis” generated a fear, which perceived it a “grave threat to Pakistan’s integrity.”¹⁵ All the historians who have worked on Balochistan history agree that, “these allegations were deliberately planted to provide a pretext for a nation-wide imposition of martial law on 7 October 1958 that paved the way for General Ayub Khan’ *coup d’état* a few days later.”¹⁶

On 6th October 1958 the Pakistan army moved into Kalat under the command of Gen. Tikka Khan, having believed that the Khan had gathered a force of 80,000 tribesmen in the fortress for a full-fledged revolt against the government of Pakistan but “nothing was found except few workers and servants”. Ahmed Yar Khan writes that, he was arrested; many guards were killed by the Pakistan army, the royal treasury was confiscated by the military, the furnishing looted, and five thousands soldiers were camped in Kalat fortress.¹⁷ About fifty of the Khan’s retainers, and 300 Baloch political leaders were put into prison, divested of all the privileges and immunities, and Agha Daud was formally nominated as his successor.¹⁸ When some three hundred people gathered at Kalat and protested against the removal of the Khan the Pakistani Army had to open fire to disperse them.¹⁹ On 7th October, martial law was imposed all

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Sherbaz Khan Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 83.

¹⁵ Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 39. Further see Awan’s *Baluchistan* and Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, 181-183.

¹⁸ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 286.

¹⁹ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan: Emergence Dimensions Repercussions* (Quetta: Gosga-e-Adab, 1982), 200.

over Pakistan, the constitution which had been constituted nine years before was abrogated, provisional and federal governments were dismissed and all political parties were banned. Ayub Khan then became the first Chief Martial Law Administrator.

This bloody episode was carried further by the martial law authorities when they issued an order demanding the tribesmen to deposit their weapons at the local police station. Awan further traces the roots of this insurgency; he described that, after martial law a “regulation came out which called for the surrender of un-licensed firearms, a large quantity in Balochistan being without licenses”. He also defined the ‘Land Reforms Regulation’ of Ayub which constituted the “lying down of land holding...All kinds of wild rumours started floating about. People said their women-folk would go next and there was wide spread fear of the future.”²⁰ This demand was not acceptable because in Baloch society people love their weapons more than anything. “This caused a wave of anger to sweep through Balochistan”. It laid down the foundation for the second insurgency of tribesmen against Pakistan under the leadership of ninety years-old Nauroz Khan²¹. However, for tribesmen this demand of Pakistan was not acceptable, as a consequence, the Pakistani army not only deployed tanks and artillery in the entire Jhalawan district but this also resulted in the blockade of the passes of Jhalawan and Sarawan. A number of skirmishes took place between the Pakistan army and the tribesman. According to Ahmad Yar Khan, “this resulted in ruthless attacks on Jhalawan and the neighborhood by tanks and guns, and thousands of helpless people were killed.”²²

²⁰ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 227.

²¹ Nauroz Khan was the tribal chief of the Zehri tribe located in the district of Jhalawan. He had a good name as far as bravery was concerned. In 1926 after escaping from the jail he started against the levies of Jhalawan and Makran.

²² Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, 185.

Nauroz Khan who had 750 to 1000 men under his command embarked on a guerrilla war against the Pakistani forces demanded from the central government the 'release of the Khan', to 'honour Baloch tribal customs' and the termination of One Unit. According to Awan, sardar Nauroz Khan was a 'staunch supporter of the Khan' that is why he started the "disturbances immediately."²³ Nauroz Khan with his guerrilla followers conducted a series of attacks on Pakistan army but government responded in the same manner embarking on bombing the villages and also demolishing the property and house of Nauroz Khan.²⁴ In early 1959, near the Iranian border a platoon of the Frontier Corps was wiped out as a result of an ambush by rebels that followed an attack on military convoy and destruction of military trucks.²⁵ Finally, having no result for the hostilities, representatives of army and guerrillas met in 1960 to discuss peace terms, Nauroz Khan and his followers agreed to put down their resistance provided the withdrawal of One Unit administration and promise of safe conduct and amnesty.²⁶

Awan further added that Nauroz Khan also demanded "exemption from the land reforms."²⁷ According to Mazari, "the rebellion lasted for a year and half and ended only when Nauroz Khan's nephew sardar Doda Khan Zehri carrying a Quran assured him that the authorities had accepted all their conditions."²⁸ The tribesmen believed that Nauroz Khan was deceived by taking an oath on the sacred Qur'an that all the demands and the Baloch traditions would be accepted. However, when Nauroz Khan came down with his followers all were

²³ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 227.

²⁴ Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 28.

²⁵ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 287.

²⁶ Harrison, *op. cit.*, 28.

²⁷ Awan, *op. cit.*, 228.

²⁸ Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, 84.

arrested and later shifted to Quli Camp of Quetta.²⁹ Mazari further assumed that, “the Quran was supposedly sent by Brigadier (later General) Riaz Hussain, the army commander engaged against them”, he claimed that, “as a proof of his honest intentions---an incident which General Riaz Husain denied to me in prison during a conversation some years later.”³⁰ Awan also claimed that, “a letter written on the behalf of Nauroz Khan said he was surrendering unconditionally” because his ‘resources dwindled’. He further writes that, he had seen that letter but, “its authority would remain under suspicion.”³¹

Moreover, a total of 163 people were tried by the military court in Mach jail, and Nauroz Khan, his son, Batay Khan, and five other family members were sentenced to death³², except Nauroz Khan because of his old age was put to life imprisonment. Others were executed in Sukkur jail, some in Hyderabad jail in July 1960.³³ Harrison, on the other hand, said that, the brave old man died in Kohlu prison in 1964, ‘a martyr of Baloch cause’, and “stories of his alleged torture by the army are still a staple commodity of Baluch magazines.”³⁴ Selig Harrison narrated some of the stories related to those rebels who were executed. They cried ‘Long Live Balochistan’ as they went to the gallows. One of them tied a copy of Quran around his neck and shouted that if they hanged the Quran must also be hanged because the government had broken its holy oath.³⁵ Another account which is narrated by Martin Axman is that, “after the men had been hanged, the authorities sadistically requested the aged warrior to identify the bodies... ‘Is

²⁹ Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*. 186.

³⁰ Mazari, *op. cit.*, 84.

³¹ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 228.

³² Mir Wali Muhammad Zarazai, Mir Ghulam Rasool Nichari, Mir Sabzal Khan Zehri, Mir Masti Khan, Mir Bhawal Khan, Mir Jamal Khan and the elder son Mir Batay Khan were hanged.

³³ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 287.

³⁴ Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 29.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

this one your son? an army officer cold-heartedly asked. Nauroz Khan stared at the soldiers for a moment then replied quietly, 'All these brave young men are my sons'.³⁶ It must be remembered that in Baloch traditions, the oral promise and the Quranic oath are considered very significant. There is a famous Balochi quotation *Mard Pah Zaban* (that real man always keeps his promise) which emphasizes the importance of promises. According to Breseeg, after the execution of these rebels, there was a general mourning for who had been hanged and thousands of people participated in the burial ceremonies in Kalat.³⁷ Awan also confirms that, the death of Nauroz Khan in jail made him a "legend of a Baloch hero."³⁸

However, whether, was the case, the trust between the people of Balochistan and the center was lost once and forever. The death of Nauroz Khan put a deep psychological impact on the people. Martin Axman confirms that, "It nurtured the popular notion among the Baloch that the Government of Pakistan was not honouring any engagement or agreement, but was set to continue with its 'policy of broken treaties' that had begun in 1948 with Agha Abdul Karim Khan's arrest, despite earlier promises of safe conduct."³⁹ The guerrilla war which was fought against the Pakistani army was labeled with different names, the 'Jhalawan disturbance', the 'first Baloch insurgency', or 'the chieftains' rebellion'. Although, it was merely a small scale rebellion initiated by a number of people just for their own interests, yet the impact was huge on the entire Baloch people. No one could negate this point that it was simply the fault of the central government. The formation of One Unit was basically aimed to safeguard Punjabi domination against Bengali numerical strength. All the problems began with the formation of One Unit

³⁶ Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 287.

³⁷ Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), 289.

³⁸ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 287.

³⁹ Axmann, *op. cit.*, 288.

administration. This problem could easily have been solved if the central government had shown some maturity. The arrest of the Khan of Kalat in October 1958 ‘touched off a chain reaction of violence and counter violence’ that has continued till today in Balochistan.⁴⁰ Mazari while narrating an interesting incident in his book stated: after the martial law, once he was talking on phone with Akbar Bugti in Balochi who was the Defense Minister of Pakistan, “Just then third voice piped on the phone, Speak either in Urdu or English. I don’t understand other languages.”⁴¹ After one year Bugti was arrested, but his “imprisonment during the 1960s was more in lieu of the fact that he was powerful and could threaten the government’s interests in exploiting gas from his region (Sui).”⁴² Awan on the contrary scribed that, Akbar Bugti was arrested because of the murder of his uncle.⁴³

Furthermore, it was the beginning of the insurgency. The roots of guerrilla warfare can be traced back to this period of time. The intervention of the military in the areas of Balochistan and the setting up garrisons in the interiors of Balochistan had provoked the Baloch to set up new guerrilla movements to safeguard their interests and also to give the military a tough time. As a result, a group of politically conscious Baluch who were influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology formed a plan for guerrilla warfare under the leadership of Sher Muhammad Marri,⁴⁴ famously called “General Sherov.”⁴⁵ “The *Pararis* of Sher Mohammad Marri were

⁴⁰ Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, 28.

⁴¹ Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, 86.

⁴² Farhan Hanif Siqqiqi, “The State and Politics of Ethnicity in Post-1971 Pakistan: An Analysis of the Baloch, Sindh and Mohajir Ethnic Movements”, unpublished PhD diss., (University of Karachi, 2009), 135.

⁴³ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 229.

⁴⁴ Sher Muhammad was born in 1924 at Kohlu. He also founded the Mazlum Party in the tribal areas of the Sulaiman Mountains that opposed the Sardari System. Sher Muhammad Marri is considered the pioneers of guerrilla warfare as far as the Baloch are concerned. He was the cousin of the Bijarani leaders of an important section of the Marri tribe. He called himself a Marxist-Leninist. He was also put prison by the British Authorities because of anti-state activities. He served fourteen years in prison like his father and uncle who were also put behind bars because of participating in anti-British activities. He is also known as the ‘precursor of the Baluch People’s Liberation Front.

influenced heavily by the concept of ‘Popular War’ as experienced in Algeria, Cuba, China and Vietnam.”⁴⁶ The guerrillas established their group with the name of *Parari* and “by July 1963, twenty-two base camps of varying sizes spread over 45,000 square miles, from Jhalawan in the south, where Ali Mohammed Mengal was in command, to the Marri and Bugti areas in the north. Manned by what they called a ‘command force’ of 400 full-time volunteers, each camp could call on hundreds of loosely organized, part-time reservists.”⁴⁷

However, the *Pararis* not only fought with the army. Rather they also initiated many reforms to uplift social conditions in the tribal areas and they were also critical with *sardari* system. Sher Mohammed’s movement attracted the urban youth who started joining the *Pararis*. Breseeg also revealed that, an underground weekly paper, *Chingari*, was published in Baluchi, Urdu, and English, and it also attracted the Bengalis.⁴⁸ Earlier in 1962, the Khan was also released and “all privileges were restored. According to Awan, the Khan had been “lodged in a comfortable house in the most fashionable locality of Lahore, reaffirmed his loyalty to Pakistan, asked for forgiveness and was pardoned.”⁴⁹ But, the account of Awan is somewhat shows a state version and is not confirmed by other sources. According to nationalist writer Janmahmad, during the insurrection the *sardars* of Jhalawan, Marri and Bugti had been ousted from their position and were replaced by puppet by the *sardars*. As a result, the tribesmen of these *sardars* also took part in this insurgency, later, in 1963; the new *sardars* were also killed by tribesmen.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, 29.

⁴⁶ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 294.

⁴⁷ Harrison, op. cit., 30.

⁴⁸ Breseeg, op. cit., 292-293.

⁴⁹ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 229.

⁵⁰ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 203.

However, the *Pararis* used the old fashion guerrilla tactics by ‘ambushing convoys’, ‘bombing trains’, ‘snipping at sentries’ and ‘raiding military encampments’. On the other hand, the army also reacted in the same manner by bulldozing 13,000 acres of fertile orchards of almond trees owned by Sher Marri, “this action provoked a major battle in December 1964, when the *Pararis* staged a raid on an army camp that resulted in heavy casualties on both sides”. By December 1965, there was another series of clashes in the Gharur area where Pakistani forces suffered almost 200 casualties. Air strikes were also used by Pakistani forces. The drama further continued with air strikes in the areas of Bambore where it is believed that napalm was also used.⁵¹

The *Pararis* agreed to a cease-fire, ‘Sher Mohammed came down from the hills after the cease-fire’ with the withdrawal of One Unit administration in 1969 by Yahya Khan, who had already succeeded Ayub Khan.⁵² Awan further described another ‘disturbance’ which remained from 1963-1965, which first initiated by the Mengal and later, it moved to north to Marri-Bugti areas. According to him, “general Martial law order for the surrender of all firearms without a valid license; the ‘rumours of Land Reforms’ and removal of Ataullah Mengal from *sardari* and later his arrest along with his father were the main causes which motivated his tribesmen to wage a war against the government of Pakistan.”⁵³

The arrest of Bugti also encouraged his fellow tribesmen to wage similar kind of war against the state. He further added that, these ‘disturbances’ further continued with more

⁵¹ Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 30-33.

⁵² *Op. cit.*, 33.

⁵³ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 228-229.

causality even the government called 'Zhob militia' to help but "Sixteen of their platoons with five hundred men were not enough. Pashin Scouts put in another eight platoons and thirteen" more were called from South Waziristan and these 'disturbances' were ultimately ended in 1967 after the president Ayub Khan "accepted the mercy appeal of the *sardars* of Kalat and Quetta division to pardon certain tribesmen of Marri, Bugti and Mengal clans...And the follies and misconducts of these tribesmen had been pardoned."⁵⁴

Awan further writes that in the same year, the "third installment of the disturbances resulted in the re-arrest of Bugti and Bizenjo."⁵⁵ These ultimately came to an end in 1967 with the arrival of Yahya Khan and releasing of all prisoners. Tahir Amin argues that "During the Ayub regime, the military-bureaucratic elite attempted to dislodge the tribal system through the use of force. Ayub himself threatened the Baloch with extinction."⁵⁶ He further describes that, due to the inaccessibility of army and bureaucracy, the middle class joined the traditional elites against Ayub.⁵⁷ On the contrary, Ayub, unlike his predecessors, abolished the existing tribal leadership, and put in puppet *sardars*. This could not last long and the puppet *sardars* were executed by the people. Finally, Yahya Khan negotiated with the *Pararis* through the governor of West Pakistan, Air Marshal Nur Khan.⁵⁸ On the opposite side, Awan claims, that these "disturbances came to an end with the general amnesty."⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Op. cit., 230.

⁵⁵ Op. cit., 230-231.

⁵⁶ Tahir Amin, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988), 96.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 295.

⁵⁹ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 228.

Now there is a need to look at the political situation during this chaotic era, in 1955, the formation of Ustaman Gall (the People's Party) under the leadership of Agha Abdul Karim and Mohammad Hossein Anka was a major political development in Balochistan. The objectives of the Party were similar to the KSNP. But due to changed circumstances, the party emphasized "creating a separate province for the Baloch on the basis of their ethnicity, geography, culture and language", the merger of all the Baloch areas of Balochistan into a separate province with Baluchi as the official language.⁶⁰ A three day meeting (30th November – 2th December 1956), of six nationalist political parties held in Lahore ultimately laid the foundation of a new political party, Pakistan National Party (PNP) which included 'Ustaman Gall', the 'Khodai Kidmat gar' (Red Shirts) of Abdul Ghafar Khan, the 'Azad Pakistan Party' of Punjab, 'Awami Party' of G.M Syed, Hyder Khan's 'Sindh Hari Committee' and 'Wror Pashtu' of Abdul Samad Achakzai.⁶¹

The salient features of the manifesto were, 'The dissolution of One Unit', 'provincial status to Balochistan', 'and protection of the fundamental rights of all citizens'.⁶² In Dhaka 24-25 July 1957, the Awami League joined the new party and the party was named as National Awami Party (NAP).⁶³ The main objectives of NAP were, "ending the exploitation of Pakistan externally and its people internally", "abolition of One Unit and reorganization of provinces on linguistic basis."⁶⁴ NAP played a vital role in the political life of Pakistan during this period. The political parties were banned due to the martial law of Ayub Khan. Thousands of political leaders and activists were arrested. On 27th December, Ayub Khan got absolute power when he

⁶⁰ Op. cit., 263-264.

⁶¹ Op. cit., 265.

⁶² Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography* ed. B.M. Kutty (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre University of Karachi, 2009), 91- 92.

⁶³ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 265.

⁶⁴ Op. cit., 266.

overthrew the government of Iskandar Mirza who basically coined this martial law. The president of Ustaman Gall, Agha Abdul Karim, was again arrested and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. In Balochistan, Ghaus Bakhsh became the president of NAP. He initiated a movement against martial law and One Unit. But this was not acceptable to the martial law authorities and soon all the members of the NAP were put behind bars in the Quli Camp. Ghaus Bakhsh pointed out in his autobiography that when he was released after spending one year in the Camp, he decided to defend Nauroz Khan by law. But when he approached the Quli Camp to get the *wakalat nama* and other papers signed by Nauroz Khan, he was immediately again put into prison and awarded six months imprisonment and also given severe physical punishment.⁶⁵

On March 23, 1962, General Ayub Khan gave Pakistan a new constitution, and put an end to martial law. In the same year, the Khan was released from house arrest in Lahore and soon returned back to Kalat. Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri were elected to National Assembly as a result of elections held by Ayub Khan. Later they were ousted from their positions and arrested. The NAP in Balochistan continued its effort to support the Baloch people and also opposed the One Unit and the Ayub regime. In 1967, the Baloch Student Organization (BSO) was formed. It was confined to the colleges, yet it played a very significant role in the socialization of youngsters for the Baloch ethno-national symbols.⁶⁶ The county-wide protests against Ayub's government eventually became the reason for the collapse of his government and on 25th March 1969, after his resignation martial law was again imposed on the country by the Commander in Chief, General Yahya Khan. Political activities were banned and central and provisional assemblies were dissolved.

⁶⁵ Bizenjo, *In Search of Solution*, 100-104.

⁶⁶ Amin, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan*, 95.

Moreover, Yahya Khan replaced Ayub and at his first press conference he announced the dissolution of One Unit Administration, creation of a province of Balochistan and he also announced the election on the principle of 'one-man-one-vote'. The Baloch majority areas of Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad were not included in Balochistan, despite the severe opposition from the local masses.⁶⁷ On 30th March 1970, Yahya announced the Legal Framework Order (LFO). Under the LFO elections were held for the National and Provisional assemblies on the 7th and 17th December respectively. "Out of the total of 313 seats in the National Assembly Mujib ur Rehman's Awami League (AL) won 167 seats out of 169 seats in East Pakistan and Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party triumphed on 88 seats out of 144 seats in West Pakistan."⁶⁸ The masses of Balochistan for the first time in their entire history participated in the elections of 1970. The total numbers of seats allocated to Balochistan were twenty, NAP became the sole party after winning eight seats, PML got three seats. *Jamiat Ulemma Islam* (JUI) got two seats and the remaining seats went to independent candidates. In the National Assembly, NAP got three seats and JUI acquired only one seat.

Furthermore, these elections proved to be a disaster for united Pakistan; AL contested the elections of 1970 on the basis of its Six Points which were not acceptable to the civil-military ruling elite of West Pakistan. The drama ultimately finished with the separation of East Pakistan on December 16, 1971. This separation of the East Wing was a stain on the ideology of Pakistan which was created on the basis of Islam. Religion had been used as a unifying force to unite the diverse peoples of Pakistan (on the basis of ethnicity) but could not hold it together for a longer period of time and ultimately failed on Bengali soil.

⁶⁷ Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 41.

⁶⁸ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 295.

During the Ayub Era (1958-1969) the ruling elite was primarily from the top ranks of the civil-military bureaucracy. Amin also believes that lack of representation of Baloch in the top ranks of civil-military bureaucracy also added fuel in fire, he writes, “The Sindhis and Baluch were greatly underrepresented. In the sixties, 60 percent of the army consisted of Punjabis, 35 percent were Pushtuns and others constituted the remaining five percent.”⁶⁹ In the sixties the representations of Baloch were zero in the army. Ironically the Baloch are said to be savage and unamenable to discipline.⁷⁰ Ayub was not in the favour of provisional autonomy. Rather, he had emphasized the economic development. The military-bureaucratic elite had little tolerance. According to Tahir Amin, they frequently used extreme authoritarian methods like arrest, torture, the use of military and air force to crush opponents and to enforce their will.⁷¹

The formation of One Unit Administration has raised concerns among the Baloch people, the elimination of new lines for the provinces, the adoption of Urdu language as the medium of education, and the little share in state affairs had basically raised the grievances of the Baloch. For instance the natural gas which was discovered at Sui was piped out to other provinces without supplying the local areas in Balochistan (the Sui area is still not provided with gas facilities). “The policy of the Indian government to recognize their provinces according to linguistic-cultural criteria had a significant impact upon the ethnic elites of the three movements, who invoked the Indian example in drawing a comparison between Indian democracy and Pakistani dictatorship”.⁷² The breakout of insurgencies in Baloch areas were the result of the policies which were initiated by Ayub. It was also considered a conflict between the ‘forced

⁶⁹ Amin, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan*, 81.

⁷⁰ Op. cit., 86.

⁷¹ Op. cit., 84.

⁷² Op. cit., 86.

modernization' of Ayub with new laws and regulations and the old tribal structure of the Baloch tribesmen with old customs and traditions.

If one wants to comprehend the situation of the 60s, it could be understood through the following perceptions: the *sardars* had perceived that they would lose their status which was awarded them by the British. The *sardars* had been enjoying subsidies for many years and their status was also maintained. But the One Unit administration proved very unpleasant for the *sardars*. Oddly enough, in the beginning they merged the Baloch areas with the other provinces of Pakistan because of subsidies which were given them from the government officials. Previously, it was a weak political system through which they were abstracting their material need. The intervention of the military in politics completely changed the situation for them. Now they were thinking that they would ultimately lose their status and wealth so they revolted against the same system. It was the threat perception that basically affected the mind of the *sardars*. That is why they demanded the complete provincial autonomy on the basis of language and culture. Because it would give them a legitimacy to rule their people and fulfill their material needs. The discovery of the natural resources also fanned the fire.

However, the tribal leadership for the sake of survival countered the aggression through the same process which they had been practicing since time immemorial. It could possibly because of another reason, after the merger of Balochistan with Pakistan, the government continued the old British formula 'Sandeman System' which aimed for the assistance of the tribal heads of Balochistan to remain in peace and support the policies of government. In addition, if there is a clash of interest it always resulted in a conflict among both groups.

In fact, instead, of negotiations, the martial law authorities who had the influence of the imperial British in their minds, had tried to control the situation with an iron hand. Ayub already manifested his serious concerns about the ruling elites. According to him, the politicians were basically responsible for the chaotic situation in the country. Ayub and his team perceived that it would be easy to counter the tribal *sardars*. Firstly, they arrested the Khan, Secondly; they removed the *sardars* from their actual status and put in puppet *sardars*. Later they confronted with the other tribal leaders. Their perception regarding the *sardars* proved a complete failure thus they could not sabotage the power of their opponents.

In a nutshell, the confrontation made a deep psychological impact on the minds of the people; the seeds for separatism were sown. The formation of liberation and students' organizations were the result of the iron hand policies of the government. The creation of students' organizations, political parties and the liberation organizations on the other hand indicated the involvements of more conscious people in the struggle for Balochistan. In fact, previously it was merely a contest between the tribal chieftains and government officials. Awan considered this decade as the "decade of turmoil and confusion through which Balochistan passed". He further asked the question that "for Pakistan, and for Balochistan itself, this should really have been a decade of consolidation instead of disruption. What went wrong?"⁷³

⁷³ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 230-231.

Chapter 4

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's 'New Pakistan' and the Third Baloch Insurgency (1971-1977)

This era is marked by the revival of 'ethno-national movements' in the history of Pakistan. The Baloch movement along with the '*Jiey Sindh*' and '*Pushtunistan*' movements for the greater provincial autonomy put a great pressure on Pakistani government but ultimately without any achievement. On the contrary, some of the writers are of the opinion that these movements were basically aimed at the separation of their provinces from Pakistan and were solely for the purpose of achieving newly 'independent states'. The Baloch insurgency was the most active and dominated the entire frame of time. The separation of Bangladesh had put a significant impact on the Baloch movement. Basically, the separation of the Bangladesh and the negative attitude of the Pakistani leadership motivated the provincial elite to pursue the same policy to put pressure on Pakistan for the attainment of more regional autonomy. The role of Islamabad was 'harsher' as far as the affairs of Balochistan were concerned. It was the interests of certain individuals, like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Shah of Iran and Baloch nationalists and international politics which dominated this era. The wave of the socialism from Russia and China also touched the frontiers of Pakistan as it was favoring the separatist movements all over the world. Tahir Amin pointed

out that the Baloch movement was also influenced by ‘Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought.’¹ While One Unit had already alienated the Baloch, the era of ‘ethno-national movements’ further widened the gap between the state of Pakistan and the Baloch.

Moreover, this period in Pakistani history is dubbed as the socialist era initiated by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto aimed to establish a ‘New Pakistan’ on the basis of socialist ideology. This might have been due to the reason that Islam had failed to fasten both the wings as an ideology. Bhutto emphasized more development and economic policies because he believed that only equal opportunities could remove injustice and inequality among the people and declared ‘socialism as the panacea to all the ills of the country’. Tahir Amin further believed that, “the state elite during the Bhutto regime, in an attempt to restructure Pakistani society into a socialist mould, after following a short-lived policy of granting regional autonomy to the provinces (April 1972-Feb.1973), chose to pursue policies similar to those which Ayub had followed.”²

However, after the separation of Bangladesh, Pakistan faced several gigantic problems and all the blame was put on Yahya Khan. As a result, Bhutto inherited the post of Martial Law Administrator from Yahya and became the first elected Martial Law Administrator in the world. On December 20, 1971, he became the president of Pakistan. It is interesting to note that Bhutto had the disease of power in his mind. He believed in absolute power, inspired very much by Machiavelli, Napoleon, and Hitler. Sometimes he is also dubbed as the ‘Machiavellian Bhutto’.

¹ Tahir Amin, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988), 113-114.

² Ibid.

It was the same lust for absolute power which dominated his entire role. It is rightly said ‘Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely’.

Notwithstanding, after the failure of One Unit, Balochistan got provincial status in 1970, and the first general elections which were held on the basis of universal adult franchise resulted in the emergence of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) as the sole party with two-thirds majorities in the west wing. After the separation of East Pakistan, the opportunity was provided to the PPP to form a government under the leadership of Bhutto. Apart from the dynamic leadership of Bhutto, the PPP had failed to get many seats and form a provincial government in Balochistan. The biggest problem for Bhutto was the formation of a government in Balochistan and the NWFP because Bhutto did not have a majority in these two provinces. Bhutto wanted to break the power of his rivals NAP and JI. He had no intention to handover the power to NAP or to foreign countries.³

However, Bhutto followed the policy of power sharing in Balochistan and NWFP for nine months and the opposition parties, NAP and JUI were allowed to form a provincial government in NWFP and Balochistan.⁴ It was another tactic used to show the national unity in his handling of relations with India.⁵ Bhutto’s other reason was to get the support of NAP to pass the constitution of 1973. According to Ataullah Mengal, “Bhutto would never have agreed to this (giving the governorship to any Baloch); the only reason he surrendered was that the army was

³ Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography* edited by B.M. Kutty (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre University of Karachi, 2009), 161.

⁴ Amin, *Ethno- National Movements of Pakistan*, 122.

⁵ Op. cit., 124.

still facing the Indian forces on the border. Thus, he could not afford a confrontation with the nationalists in Balochistan.”⁶

In addition, the posts of the governors were also awarded to these parties after a long dialogue between Bhutto and the two parties. On April 29, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo became the first Baloch governor of Balochistan who was the president of NAP in Balochistan as well and two months later Sardar Ataullah Mengal became the first Baloch Chief Minister of Balochistan. Arbab Sikandar became the governor of NWFP. Since the merger, it was first time the Baloch were given political representation in Pakistan. Awan describes these ‘measures as important breakthroughs’. But, he further conformed that, the germs of future trouble were contained in these measures.⁷ “Both Governors were made to give certain written undertakings, as though they were being mistrusted from the very beginning.”⁸

Ironically, this chapter ended much earlier than expected, according to Tahir Amin: This short-lived period of the NAP-JUI coalition government ended in Balochistan because of the state elite. Since this provincial government was in the opposition to the ruling party in the center in Punjab and Baloch ethnic elites were alleged to be conspiring against country.⁹ The “London Plan” and *Shashik* controversies were also used in this regard.¹⁰ However, Bhutto himself

⁶ Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), 306.

⁷ A.B Awan, *Baluchistan: Historical and Political Processes* (London: New Century Publishers, 1985), 265.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Amin, *Ethno- National Movements of Pakistan*, 123.

¹⁰ For detail see Bizenjo, *In Search of Solution*, and Awan, *Baluchistan: Historical and Political Processes*.

“expressed ignorance about the ‘London Plan’ and said that it had been unnecessarily overplayed by our press, radio and the TV.”¹¹

Nevertheless, during the NAP government in Balochistan, two incidents further made space for the allegation and also created opportunities for the Center for dismissal of the NAP government in Balochistan. One was the removal of the ‘Punjabi office holders’: the second was the attacks on Punjabi villages by the *Marri* (Pat Feeder incident). The White Paper further asserted that, “Mengal Ministry tampered with the strength, structure and striking ability of the law enforcement agencies in Balochistan”. The White Paper further alleged that, “about eleven hundred men were recruited, mostly supporters of the NAP.”¹² Another excuse was the conflict between the provincial government and Jamotes at Las Bela. Regarding this incident, in March 1973, Bizenjo, while delivering a speech in National Assembly, explicitly stated:

The Las Bela incident is there for everyone to see. In Las Bela, the Muslim Leaguers led by Qayyum Khan paid the Jamotes tribe money and provided weapons so that they could rise against the Baloch government and Governor Rule could be imposed in the province. I issued warrants against the miscreants but they were not implemented. When we asked the provincial militia to apprehend the miscreants, the Centre did not allow the militia to do so. Thus, the only option left for us to call upon our people to suppress the rebellion. The people were successful but even the democratic government of Balochistan was dismissed.¹³

Bizenjo, who was the governor of Balochistan during this phase, discussed both incidents in detail and justification was also provided. According to him, after the disbanding of One Unit administration thousands of surplus government employees were still posted in Balochistan though the One Unit Dissolution Act explicitly required the sending back of these employees. But the central government had failed to take any initiative to send them back. As a result their

¹¹ Farhan Hanif Siqqiqi, “The State and Politics of Ethnicity in Post-1971 Pakistan: an Analysis of the Baloch, Sindh and Mohajir Ethnic Movements”, unpublished PhD diss., University of Karachi, 2009), 138.

¹² Op. cit. 139.

¹³ Op. cit., 139-140.

presence stopped the appointments and promotions of the Balochistanis on government posts. Later, it was decided in the meetings which were headed by Bhutto that all 'surplus employees' would be sent back, these employees were supposed to be sent back in the duration of one and a half years. The governor of the Punjab, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, warned that "if all the employees originally belonging to the Punjab did not return to the province within one month, that Punjab government would not be in position to take back any of them" For that reason thousands of employees were sent back in one month because of the "feudal ego of the Punjab governor". Later, this event was interpreted as 'an anti-Punjab policy'.¹⁴

As far as the incident of *Pat Feeder* was concerned, for Bizenjo, it was totally based on a land clash and later interpreted as 'an anti-Punjabi conspiracy' initiated by Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri. Bizenjo further described that, "The plan was that the army attacks the Marris and the Marris would respond, which could then be used as yet another piece of 'evidence' against the Baluchistan government."¹⁵ In this regard, the provincial government also formed a security force, "*Balochistan Dehi Muhafiz* (BDM) mainly was containing loyal tribesmen."¹⁶

In fact, earlier the state elite had tried to vanquish all the national opposition to the PPP and having failed, they tried to buy the provincial members to turn the majority of the NAP into a minority to replace their provincial government with the PPP. After failing once again, they took 'unconstitutional strong-handed methods' by instructing the civil elite not to collaborate with the provincial government, while also taking advantage of ethnic squabbling to create a law

¹⁴ Bizenjo, *In Search of Solution*, 175-178

¹⁵ Op. cit., 179-181.

¹⁶ Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil*. 42.

and order situation. Basically, it was to create a pretext to dismiss the provincial government in Balochistan.¹⁷

Nonetheless, the governor of Balochistan during the Bhutto's time, Bizenjo, in his autobiography reveals another fact. According to him, the external capitalist powers had a wicked eye on the strategic location and coastal belt of the Balochistan after the formation of the NAP government in Balochistan which was against the interest of these countries.¹⁸ He further stated that the NAP government in Balochistan, under the leadership of the Baloch had made a deep impact on the Shah of Iran, who was facing insurgencies from Iranian Balochistan, which he thought were being aided by Baloch leaders. Before the formation of the NAP government, a widespread protest against the atrocities of the Shah regime in Iranian Balochistan took place. Throughout Balochistan and Karachi the greatest number of people had their allegiance either with the NAP or the BSO. However, on the other hand, the American interests for setting up military bases in Balochistan to check the Soviets and also to block Soviet intervention in the Middle East were at stake after the formation of the NAP government. He further narrated the statement of Bhutto in which he said that "the Shah of Iran would not tolerate a NAP government in Baluchistan."¹⁹

In addition, Wali Khan in the National Assembly and also during his trial in Supreme Court said Bhutto was not in favour of the NAP government in Balochistan and said that, "I cannot hand over Balochistan to the NAP because the *Shahinshah* of Iran doesn't approve of

¹⁷ Amin, *Ethno- National Movements of Pakistan*, 127.

¹⁸ Bizenjo, *In Search of Solution*, 160.

¹⁹ Op. cit., 160-161.

it”.²⁰ Earlier Bhutto in an interview stated that, “ when he visited Iran, he was shown maps of Greater Azad Balochistan by the Iranian government including the Balochistan of Pakistan, and Iran and a small strip of another country.”²¹ In the letter of appointment to governor Bizenjo Bhutto stated that, “Movements like the Azad Balochistan Movement, however nebulous, should be firmly put down, and not be permitted to affect over relations with foreign powers, particularly friendly neighbouring countries.”²² Interestingly, the concept of ‘Greater Balochistan’ was old enough until this era and the map of ‘Greater Balochistan’ including the areas of Iran and Afghanistan, as early as in 1932 was presented by Abdul Aziz Kurd in a conference.

However, after the elections of 1970, the leading Baloch leaders realized the situation and they confined their demand for the separation of Balochistan and under the banner of NAP tried to remove the grievances of the Baloch nation by giving them equal chances in the provincial services and by removing Punjabi civil servants from posts in Balochistan.²³ This era can easily be demarcated from the rest of Baloch history. The previous demand for a new Baloch state was transformed with greater provincial autonomy. Oddly enough, again it was not acceptable to the state elite. The NAP government in Balochistan was being headed by Baloch leaders. But, once again, the state elite were finding new ways to dismiss the provincial government in Balochistan. Though the Baloch elite also had their own interests and motives, the provincial government led by Sardar Ataullah Mengal had been seeking greater control in areas of development and industrialization.

²⁰ Khalid B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 115-116.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, 115.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Amin, *Ethno- National Movements of Pakistan*, 125.

On February 12, 1973 the Balochistan government was finally dismissed, and the pretext used for the dismissal was that a cache of 350 Soviet submachine guns and 100,000 rounds of ammunition had supposedly been discovered in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad and were destined for Balochistan.²⁴ While writing to United States' President Richard Nixon, Bhutto claimed that the "discovery showed that powers inimical to us are not content with the severance of Pakistani's eastern part; their aim is the dismemberment of Pakistan itself."²⁵ According to Tahir Amin, "The NAP leaders counter-argued that if they had desired to get arms from foreign powers, they could have smuggled them across the borders (both the N.W.F.P and Baluchistan are the border provinces). They were not foolish enough to get them shipped through the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad."²⁶ In protest, the NAP government in the N.W.F.P also resigned. The Iraqis also argued that these weapons were for the Iranian Baloch against the Shah of Iran who was helping the Kurds against their government.

The allegations which were put on the Baloch for this event have not been proven so far. Later, Gulam Ishaq Khan told Zia that, "Bhutto had launched the army operation in Balochistan, not because there was an insurgency, but because he could not reconcile himself to a non-PPP government in Balochistan, which he had sacked without any justification whatsoever". He further argued that, "Bhutto was using the army to punish his political opponents."²⁷ Awan for his part, pointed out: "The media built the story that the Russians arms were meant for the NAP",

²⁴ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1981), 35.

²⁵ Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (London: Yale University Press, 2009), 67.

²⁶ Amin, *Ethno- National Movements of Pakistan*, 128.

²⁷ The News, Karachi, January 16, 2012.

but “there was not an iota of evidence to prove this and the allegations never went beyond the stage of mere speculation.”²⁸

On 15 February 1973 Akbar Bugti took oath as the new governor of Balochistan, while on 28 April 1973 Jam Ghulam Qadir became the chief minister of Balochistan.²⁹ The role of Bugti was not positive during this era. His ambitions were very much confined to the attainment of the post of governor. The following statement by Bugti reveals his true ambitions: “(Bugti) along with Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Sardar Attaullah Mengal had been involved in a movement to separate Balochistan from Pakistan with the help of foreign arms.”³⁰ Mazari narrated the words of Bugti when he met Bugti after becoming governor: “If Attaullah Mengal, Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Bizenjo came to him and offered their regrets for the behaviour meted out to him after the 1970 elections, he would not only let ‘bygones be bygones’ but would immediately swear in Attaullah Mengal as the chief minister of Balochistan.”³¹

The new government headed by Jam and Bugti were unable to control the situation in Balochistan. There were reports of armed rebellion by some tribes. Nawab Akbar Bugti later on did not support the PPP policy toward Balochistan and announced his resignation in November.³² The resignation of Bugti provided the chance to the last ruler of the Khanate, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, to get the post of governor. According to Breseeg, the army which was embarking on a number of military attacks did not trust Bugti. While earlier Bugti had a played a

²⁸ Awan, *Baluchistan*, 271.

²⁹ Munir Ahmad Marri, *Balochistan: Political Conflicts* (Quetta: Gosga-E-Adab, 1989), 103.

³⁰ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan: Emergence Dimensions Repercussions* (Quetta: Gosga-e-Adab, 1982), 301.

³¹ Sherbaz Khan Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 303.

³² Muhammad Rafique, “*Pakistan since 1947*” (Lahore: Standard Book House, 2008), 353.

very controversial role in the dismissal of the NAP government, later he himself could not handle the situation.³³

After the dismissal of the NAP government in Balochistan, the NAP was banned. All prominent regional leaders who had also demanded regional autonomy were arrested. Bhutto, who believed in one-party rule, sent four divisions of the army to crush the Baloch movement and Balochistan was once again thrown into the hands of the bureaucracy and army. Tahir Amin while criticizing the government, argued that, “Police, intelligence agencies and the para-military became the mainstay of powers.”³⁴ In August 1973, after an incident in which some military personal had been killed, as a reaction, all the first-and second-rank Baloch politicians were arrested including Bizenjo, Mengal, and Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri and put behind bars.³⁵ The rejection of the proposal for negotiations by the central government and the statement of Mengal:

Tell Bhutto we are glad you have decided that it is useless negotiating with us. We will now teach you what resistance means.³⁶

This year marked another deadly confrontation between the Pakistan army and the Baloch tribal leaders. The nationalist writer Janmahmad believed the army considered “the new adventure a good opportunity to boost the morale of the troops.”³⁷ The dismissal and arrest of Baloch leaders inspired the uneducated tribesmen to go against the state.

³³ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 270-331.

³⁴ Amin, *Ethno- National Movements of Pakistan*, 129-130.

³⁵ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 304.

³⁶ Op. cit., 304-305.

³⁷ Op. cit., 306.

Furthermore, the NAP was eclipsed by a guerrilla organization BPLF (Balochistan People's Liberation Front) and BSO (Baloch Student Organization).³⁸ The Baloch nationalists once again took to the mountains to put pressure on the Bhutto government, and demands were also made to re-install their government on the basis of 1970 elections.³⁹ In April, the guerrilla forces began to ambush the army convoys.⁴⁰ Bansal stated in his book that Pakistan army "used French Mirage and F-86 Sabre jet fighters", he further specified, 13 members of the Iranian Army Aviation team piloting the US-supplied Huey cobra combat helicopters" actively took part in the operation against the Baloch nationalists.⁴¹ According to Harrison, Bhutto on his official visit to Iran got two million dollars for the elimination of the tribesmen.⁴² He further argued: "Bhutto government also requested the Shah of Iran for military and financial aid including gunship helicopters which the Pakistan army did not have at that time."⁴³

Harrison regarding the Iranian assistance argued, "Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi feared that the insurgency would spread across the border to 1.2 million Baluch living in eastern Iran, sent 30 Cobra gunships with Iranian pilots to help Islamabad."⁴⁴ The Baloch could not get any substantial military aid from any of the foreign countries. Their weapons were confined to local made or 'bolt-action rifles'. "After the arrest of *Parari* leader Sher Muhammad Marri, the responsibilities went to the hands of Hazar Marri. The army's heavy-handed approach of

³⁸ Amin, *Ethno- National Movements of Pakistan*, 149.

³⁹ Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 327.

⁴⁰ Op. cit., 36.

⁴¹ Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 44.

⁴² Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds. *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan* Syracuse (Syracuse University Press), 1986, 274.

⁴³ Muhammad Ishaque Fani, "The Resurgence of Baluch Ethnicity and Nationalism in Baluchistan", *European Journal of Social Sciences* 20, no. 4 (2011):664.

⁴⁴ Harrison, S.S. "Pakistan's Baloch Insurgency." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (October 2006):1.

avenging itself on the innocent, ordinary tribal folk only worsened the situation.”⁴⁵ In August 1974, a BSO student, Majid Langove, attempted to assassinate Bhutto but failed. It was the first suicide attack in the history of Pakistan.⁴⁶

Harrison further writes that, in 1974, the frustration of the attempts of Pakistani forces to find the Baloch guerrillas resulted in the bombing and burning of the “encampments of some 15,000 Baluch families who had taken their livestock to graze in the fertile Chamalang Valley, forcing the guerrillas to come out from their hideouts to defend their women and children.”⁴⁷ The guerilla war was carried on by several young people. They adopted the same tactics used in guerrilla warfare, avoiding large scale engagements, and hit and run. As most of the guerrillas had intimate knowledge of their areas, it became difficult for Pakistani forces to engage them effectively. The Pakistani military was under the command of General Tikka Khan. The ‘Chamalang Operation’ in which the Pakistani forces had succeeded and the guerillas suffered heavily made the impression that “the back of the insurgency had been broken.”⁴⁸ The army account claims that 125 guerrillas were killed and 900 captured, and independent estimates suggest that at least 50,000 sheep and 550 camels were captured at Chamalang and auctioned off by the army at bargain prices to the non-Baluch in the Punjab.”⁴⁹ Mazari also narrates the words of two senior *Mothabars*, whom he met,

On a very recent visit to Harnai I met with an Army subedar at a local chaikhana who told me that he was a paratrooper who had participated in the action against the Marris. The subedar said many members of his section had been dropped by parachute at night time near the identified Marri settlement. At dawn they surrounded the settlement and attacked them, killing all those who resisted. After burning down their homes, they arrested all the able-bodied men and took away all their livestock. When I asked the subedar

⁴⁵ Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, 357.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, 359.

⁴⁷ Harrison, S.S. (2006). “Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 05 October 2006.

⁴⁸ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 331.

⁴⁹ Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, 38.

about the Marri women, he told me that they took with them only the pretty ones for obvious reasons and left the others to fend for themselves. The senior Mothabar then confirmed that in his presence alone he saw the army auctioning off over 15,000 head of captured cattle.⁵⁰

All tribes who were waging war in the Marri area fled to Afghanistan to save their lives. In Afghanistan the government of Daud provided them support for rehabilitation but also feared them because the concept of 'Greater Balochistan' which was a threat for his dream of '*Pakhtoonistan*'. Thousands of people were arrested, villages were bombarded, and crops were also burnt by the Pakistan army. The Baloch were also tortured brutally by "purchased torture equipment from America."⁵¹ The kith and kin of those tribal Baloch leaders also became the subject of torture and persecution. The son of Ataulah Mengal, Asadullah, was executed, and the elder brother of Gul Khan Naseer was also killed by state authorities.

Selig Harrison quotes the words of a guerrilla leader Hazar Khan:

If we can get modern weapons it will never again be like the past... Next time we will choose the time and place and we will take help where we can get it. The Bengalis didn't want independence. But if Pakistan continues to use force to crush us, we'll have no alternative but to go that way.⁵²

The BPLF which was fighting hand to hand against the Pakistan Army drew most of its supporters from the Marri tribe and from the BSO, and it had the following of more than 60000 supporters. After the Chamalang Operation it shifted its network to other countries.⁵³ According to Harrison, after the attacks by the Pakistani forces the *Parari* movements, for the sake of their existence, located their camps in Afghanistan. The Daud regime also permitted them to establish their camps on the Pak-Afghan border to run their activities.⁵⁴ In 1976, the vice versa visit of

⁵⁰ Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, 352.

⁵¹ Janmahmad, *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 311.

⁵² Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 39.

⁵³ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 341

⁵⁴ Harrison, *op. cit.*, 39.

Bhutto, the President of Pakistan and President of Afghanistan, Daud “reached a far-reaching agreement. Pakistan agreed to grant provincial autonomy to Balochistan and NWFP and in exchange Afghanistan would recognize the Durand Line as a permanent border.”⁵⁵

Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, who was the head of the Marri clan, was considered to be the most dangerous man during all this period. He was also influenced by ‘Marxism-Leninism’. The Marris had the reputation for anti-state activities. The British were also faced with a similar type of resistance from the Marris when they penetrated in their areas. He remained in the state apparatus during the Ayub era but later he was arrested. The interview which he had given to Harrison in 1978 clearly showed his ambitions:

We want a very simple thing for some sort of nationalism. But all we asked for were our simple human rights. Yet every time there was a price to pay---jail, confiscation of property, being blacklisted, telephones tapped, being thrown in jail, questioned--- a high price for the doing what was so natural... Are Baluch really not human? Are they a lower form of human being?... We are small only in terms of resources... Unless there is a plague, we’ll remain a minority, which means we will always be exploited by the Punjabis. Marxism- Leninism has helped me to understand politics, though being Marxist-Leninist is not easy, and I am not sure that I qualify... Anyone who believes that the problem of Baluchistan can be solved with a Western-style welfare state approach is misled.⁵⁶

On another occasion while he was criticizing Bhutto, Marri said:

Mr. Bhutto through the use of the army wanted to crush our democratic struggle by isolating us from the rest of the national democratic struggle of the country. He knows that politics in Baluchistan are still-tribal or semi tribal. It is very easy to provoke the Baluch tribes because tribal reaction always takes the form of an armed struggle. Once you bring in the army and attempt to destroy the local culture, the tribes will naturally resist in the way they know how to resist--- armed protest... the breakup of Pakistan is as harmful for Baluchis and it is in the interest of the Baluch to preserve it and to fight for their rights within the country.⁵⁷

From 1972 to 1977 more than 55,000 Baloch and 80,000 Pakistani soldiers were involved in a catastrophic war with more than 11,500 combatants that ended in taking the lives of 3,300

⁵⁵ Shahid Fiaz, “The Peace Question in Balochistan”, South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Paper 16, Peace Audit Report 3, (June 2003):29.

⁵⁶ Harrison, op. cit., 46-49.

⁵⁷ Amin, *Ethno- National Movements of Pakistan*, 151.

Pakistani soldiers and 5,300 guerillas Baloch, not including the innocent people and children and women.⁵⁸ This insurgency was led by the three major tribes, Marri, Mengal and Bizenjo along with other sub-tribes. “A total of 178 major engagements and another 167 lesser incidents during this war were officially chronicled by the Islamabad authorities.”⁵⁹ The border, the Shah of Iran deployed five divisions of troops to stop the entrance of Baloch guerrillas in Iran.⁶⁰ Thousands of Baloch migrated to Afghanistan and remained in the camps because of the military strikes on them. Daud gave the guerrillas \$750,000 per year in food and welfare subsidies as refugees, and both the Khalq and Parcham regimes have continued to support the camps since the 1978 communist takeover.”⁶¹

These guerrilla fighters really wanted assistance from the Soviets, which ‘they never got’ because the “Soviets had never backed the demands for independent Balochistan but instead called for greater Baloch autonomy within Pakistan.”⁶² Mazari further manifested: “There was never any attempt by the Marris to secede from Pakistan. Faced with the unjust despotism of the central government in Islamabad these simple tribesmen reacted in the only manner in which they know how to.”⁶³ The fighting force BPLF also argued that, “secession was unrealistic and that the Baloch should settle for the greater autonomy.”⁶⁴ This conflict was ultimately ended with the military coup of General Zia ul Haq and after the release of the Baloch leaders.

⁵⁸ Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics*, 274.

⁵⁹ Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan*, 115.

⁶⁰ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 328.

⁶¹ Harrison, Selig S. “Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry.” *International Security*, Vol. 5, no. 3 (Winter, 1980-1981):160.

⁶² Jones, *Pakistan*, 68.

⁶³ Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment*, 362.

⁶⁴ Jones, op. cit., 68.

Economic grievances were basically the main reason for yet another Baloch insurgency in Pakistan. But the government could not eliminate the economic grievances. Rather, the Baloch were dealt with iron handedly. The collaboration among the Baloch-Sindhi nationalist was another interesting move which aimed for the ‘Sindhi-Baloch federation on economic grounds’ because of the mixed population in both provinces further worsened the situation for the Punjabi-Muhajir ruling elite. Furthermore, the resistance of the Baloch was not for independence rather, they were struggling for regional autonomy and were seeking the creation of a Baloch majority province.⁶⁵ After the fight which ended in 1977, separatist feelings came into the mind of the people because the assaults of Pakistani and Iranian forces especially of the villages had left the legacy of bitter and enduring hatred.⁶⁶

In addition, the government of Pakistan in the White Papers of 1974 put the blame on the tribal *sardars* for the conflict. The White Paper says

Some of the *sardars* wanted to keep their tribes isolated and lands free from the impact of roads, schools, dispensaries, electricity, tube wells, industries and impersonal administration and to resist the ending of their privileges. It was the resistance to change which led to a confrontation in some areas of Baluchistan between the forces of progress and those of reaction.⁶⁷

Bhutto was said to be against the *sardari* system. However, as a matter of fact, he also exploited the *sardari* system to get his interests fulfilled. All measures he took were taken with the courtesy of the *sardars*. “The insurgency in Balochistan resulted in deploying the Pakistan military against the tribes, claiming that they were in open rebellion. For this purpose, all the Baloch nationalists’ leaders were painted as cruel *sardars* fighting for their own selfish ends.”⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics*, 274-275.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 317.

⁶⁸ Op. cit., 318.

In 1973, Mengal government's proposal for the abolition of the *sardari* system in Balochistan was rejected by Bhutto.⁶⁹ In 1986, in an interview the former governor of Balochistan stated:

The NAP introduced a bill in the Balochistan assembly in 1973 for the abolition of the *sardari* system. The PPP opposed that bill and the central government refused to ratify it... Apart from Nawab Khair Bakhsh and Ataullah Mengal, all the other *sardars* have supported every government in power.⁷⁰

Later, in April 1974, after the outbreak of insurgency, Prime Minister Bhutto, while addressing a convention in Quetta abolished the *sardari* system. He said:

Today, with great courage, I declare that lawfully the *sardari* system is being abolished. Today is the last day of the *sardari* system. From today, there will be no *sardar* in Pakistan. In the whole country, the *sardari* system is ended; the most tyrannical, the cruelest, the most dishonest system which has been prevalent for centuries, has been brought to an end through this law.⁷¹

However, in fact, Bhutto failed to implement it. It can be rightly said that, after having known the reality that without *sardars*, he could not sustain his policies in Balochistan, he also used the same system. The role of the tribal leaders did not remain very positive. But, I would call them the 'lesser evil' as compared to the central government and the 'civil-military bureaucracy'. Their demands for 'greater provincial autonomy', like other ethnic leaders, were basically a threat for dominant provinces. The ruling 'western-minded' elite had failed to understand the dynamics of a country which consists of heterogeneous ethnic groups.

However, the situations of the Baloch areas were totally different from the other areas of Pakistan in the 1970s because the masses in the tribal areas had strong affiliations with their tribal leaders. The Baloch have followed the same system for centuries, and when the government went against their will, it soon resulted in another mass resistance. The ruling class further added oil in the fire when they arrested those tribal leaders and later the killing of innocent people

⁶⁹ Op. cit., 318-319.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Fani, "The Resurgence of Baluch Ethnicity and Nationalism in Baluchistan," 663.

further worsened the situation. In the other areas of Balochistan, the other *sardars* also helped the government because of their mutual rivalries or self-interests. The whole era of Bhutto was thus very vital for the acceleration of the Baloch national movement. The impact was deep and people still have their emotional feeling with their people who were killed.

The understanding of international politics is pre-requisite for understanding this frame of period. This was the period of the Cold War, and the world was divided into poles, the Soviets and the Americans, the communist and the capitalist. Both countries were using their best possible techniques to harm each other. The Shah of Iran, who was considered a very important character in all this drama, also feared the Soviets. It was again the threat perception for the Shah which compelled him not to allow any Baloch government in Balochistan. As a matter of fact, the Baloch government in Balochistan became the victim of the international situation. The Baloch were not provided with massive support for the attainment of their goals. If the Soviets had supported the Baloch guerrilla fighters the situation would have been different. Another reason for the failure of the Baloch was the differences among the leaders. Many prominent *sardars* were the ‘stooges’ of the central government and were following in the footsteps of the state.

The Pakistan army suffered a lot at the hands of the local Baloch guerrillas, and more than three thousand soldiers lost their lives in this conflict. But this chapter is missing in the history of Pakistan. The people of Pakistan do not know about this fact. However, in fact, it is dubbed as a revolt by the *sardars* for their own goals. But, the reality is somewhat different. The insurgency was initiated by those leaders who on paper had demanded the abolition of *sardari*

system in Balochistan. But the state, which had been following the ideas of the British, allowed the same system to be run. Because, without *sardari* system the state could have not achieved success in Balochistan. The state had feared in a sense after the abolition of the *sardari* system. The minds of the people would be free and it would further create problems for the state.

Bangladesh was an important example. Those whose minds were politically free struggled for their rights and took back their own land. This fear never allowed the state to embark on such policies in Balochistan, which was already divided into many factions due to the *sardars* each with own motives. During this insurgency, the local and the middle class people were greatly influenced by the fact that the state was involved in the killing of their voices. So, by and large, the state again disaffected the Baloch for the sake of the selfish interests of its leaders. This insurgency was largely different from the previous insurgencies, the former confined to state and few tribes, but the latter, included all the main powerful tribes and politically conscious masses in Balochistan with a little marginal assistance from foreign countries. The Pakistan government with the help of Iranian forces with ‘combined superior fire’ had ‘failed to crush complete’ the Baloch insurgency and this further ‘created deep-sealed resentment and desire of revenge’ among the Baloch.⁷²

⁷² Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan*, 118.

Chapter 5

The Zia-ul-Haq Regime and the So-called Decade of Democracy:

The Pacification of Baloch National Movement (1979- 1999)

The entrance of Zia-ul-Haq through a military coup ‘Operation Fair Play’ to a large extent decreased the armed struggle in the Baloch areas. Zia, unlike his predecessor Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, adopted a more pacifying policy. Interestingly, the military intervention in the politics again changed the socio-political scenario in Pakistan. Zia had adopted a more cautious policy against them. Taj Breseeg writes that, General Zia, who had been the ‘most intransigent’ opponent negotiations with the Baloch guerrillas, later defused the same guerrilla movements through political negotiations.¹ Moreover, Zia, after his martial law, visited the Baloch political leaders in prison and argued that “We all are Muslims and we should not say that we are Baluch or Pushtuns”. Selig Harrison, an American academician, writes that, Bizenjo angrily replied to Zia: “We are Baluch and Pushtuns and we will never make a viable Pakistan except on those foundations.”² Harrison further added some contents of interview which he had conducted with Ataulah who believed that, “Zia had ‘reinforced the feeling of our people that they are second-class citizens of this country. Before we could say that it was just Bhutto. But now they can see

¹ Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), 333.

² Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1981), 64.

that the Pakistan government and the Punjabis are all the same, regardless who is in power.”³

Ataullah continues,

The whole gang of Punjabis... a network that has complete control of the civil services machinery in Baluchistan, has no sympathy for the agreement we have been discussing with General Zia... and this gang actively sabotaged the negotiations with Zia... We're not going to continue going to them, paying homage to them to get their certificate of patriotism and approval. Let them come to us. If they call me a traitor a thousand times, it means I'm loyal to my people, the people of Baluchistan... Let history judge who is right.⁴

The initial step taken by Zia after the military intervention was the withdrawal of military from Baloch areas and releasing of 6000 thousand Baloch prisoners along with the leaders as well as withdrawing all the cases on the political leaders. Zia-ul-Haq's policy was to release thousands of Balochi nationalists and soften his stance towards Balochi leaderships in order to create a fragmentation amongst the Balochi tribes some of whom would be sympathetic to Zia's approach.⁵ Breseeg pointed out another reason for Zia's policies regarding the Baloch: He believed that Zia was “confronted with a two-front situation in the shape of Baloch armed resistance and the supporters of the overthrown and incarcerated Bhutto”. That compelled Zia to initiate such policies.⁶

Furthermore, Zia also pursued economic support to win the hearts of the Baloch, who were already alienated by the state. “But Zia continues to channel development funds through the bureaucracy, ignoring Baluch pleas for local control over development decisions.”⁷ Zia also

³ Ibid.

⁴ Op. cit., 64-66.

⁵ Mukand, Rahul. “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balochistan.” Pakistan Security Research Unit, no.34 (24h May 2008):6.

⁶ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 333.

⁷ Harrison, Selig S. “Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry.” *International Security*, Vol. 5, no. 3 (Winter, 1980-1981):158.

implemented another strategy while empowering the Baloch leadership by assigning them leaders while providing opportunities to marginalize and to insecure the tribal classes.⁸ As a consequence, this ability of Zia to defuse the Baloch gained a lukewarm success, and some of the guerrilla leaders gave up their arms, some of them adopted the democratic way and many of the “*sardars* preferred to collaborate with the center.”⁹ However, the emphasis on granting finance for development and the infrastructure projects had failed to benefit the local masses and could not satisfy the Baloch.¹⁰

However, some Baloch leaders and the main fighting force of the BPLF rejected the proposal for “amnesty offered on the grounds that they had fought with an illegal government and went to Afghanistan.”¹¹ Though the Baloch national movement lost its ‘impetus’ for more than two decades yet the state has failed to root down bitterness completely from the Baloch people. The insurgency which had become the reason for killing of many innocent people including women and children further alienated the Baloch a step back from the central government. Zia’s policies to bring them in mainstream politics remained with success which was missing in the previous government.

Nevertheless, the Baloch tribal leaders who had been busy in confrontation with the Pakistan army were released from jails, and, after two years of negotiations with state authorities, came to the conclusion that “the possibility of resolving the Baloch national question within the

⁸ Mukand, Rahul. “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balochistan.”5-6.

⁹ Foreign Policy Centre, *Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2006), 33.

¹⁰ Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, 153.

¹¹ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 333.

framework of the Pakistan State was not viable” and left Pakistan and settled in different countries.¹² For instance, Nawab Khair Bakhsh and Atallah Mengal took political exile in Europe, “seeking foreign support for independence Baluchistan.”¹³ Other political leaders which stayed in Pakistan, some of them left the politics and other for time being remained silence because of martial law. The Crisis Group reports that Zia, restored the policy of ‘divide-and-rule’ While ‘empowering the *Pashtun* Islamist parties¹⁴ in Balochistan’ with two goals to achieve, first to counter the Baloch nationalist and second to make ground for the recruitment for the so-called *jihad* from the religious *madrasas* to lead the US war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.¹⁵

Zia also used the power of the clergy to undermine the Baloch national movement. In his regard, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was encouraged by the government to set up “*madrasas* in the province in order to penetrate deeper into the ethnic Baluch areas stubbornly opposed to the *mullahs*. Setting up these religious schools has been at the expense of secular education, the lack of which is even more noticeable in Baluchistan than in the rest of the country. The budget of the Ministry of Religious Affairs for the province is said to be approximately 1.2 billion rupees, compared with 200 million rupees allotted to the Ministry of Education.”¹⁶

But, one can’t conclude that either these developments were against the Baloch people, the intervention of Pakistan in the war against Russians to culminate the communism with the

¹² Op. cit., 373.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Jama’at Ulema-e Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) were the two religious parties in Balochistan during the regime of Zia which supported the regime of Zia ul Haq. For them it was a golden opportunity for the first time in the history of Pakistan to take some sort of ground in government affairs.

¹⁵ International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan* (Islamabad: International Crisis Group, 2006), 6.

¹⁶ Frederic Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism”, *Carnegie Papers*, no. 65, (January 2006):11.

help of USA would have been the case in this regard. The Soviet's intervention of Afghanistan in 1979 'heightened the strategic importance' of Balochistan to such extent that it "led the people who had never heard of Balochistan to study the Problems."¹⁷ The 'fear of Russians', 'supported by angry tribesmen', created a panic and alarmed situation for foreigners, which resulted in pouring of billions worth of aid in Balochistan without any check. "Poonegar's 5 billion dollar worth of aid – one thousand dollar each for everybody living in Balochistan-- had been committed by the foreigners by the end of 1987."¹⁸ Even the World Bank's 40 million to one scheme 'without knowing the details' was conformation of the fact that how far they reached for the pacification of Baloch during this era.¹⁹

The so-called religious parties also manifested their concerns regarding the Zikri²⁰ community for declaring them as non-Muslim to further divide the Baloch on a sectarian basis. The Baloch which had lost faith in the government that time also felt that it was a premeditative act to divide them on sectarian basis. Breseeg also included the interview of the Dr. Abdul Majeed, (former Director General of Jinnah Hospital Karachi) who believed that, "To destroy the Baloch youth's moral and physical health, even the promotion of alcohol, opium and heroin were a part of this game of the Pakistani government."²¹

Zia had already showed his intentions earlier while taking 'Baluch problem':

¹⁷ Emma Duncan, *Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey through Pakistan* (London: Arrow Book, 1990), 140.

¹⁸ Op. cit., 141.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ The Zikris are basically Baloch and have been living in the coastal areas and in Kech and some areas of Karachi for very a long time. The fact that the Baloch in Southern Balochistan are very liberal in a religious sense has safeguarded them from becoming a minority in Pakistan. They also supported the Baloch national movement and some of Baloch leaders have their lineage from this sect.

²¹ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 334.

We obviously cannot think of it as having something in particular to do with the Baluch. They have a provincial population equal to one third of the population of one city in the Punjab, Lahore. They have coal, gas and the oil that the whole country needs. We are one country, and the Baluch are part of our country... why do you Americans and the other foreigners make so much of this? Many countries have problems like this and they deal with them in the necessary way... look at your own country... take the case of your South Carolina. It is a depressed state, while California is a developed state. What would you think if the demand should be raised that Carolina should have the same status as California?²²

Zia further discussed the issue of autonomy and also commented on the insurgency 1973-1977.

He argued,

I simply cannot understand this type of thinking... we want to build a strong country, a unified country. Why should we talk in these small minded terms? We should talk in the term of one Pakistan, one united, Islamic Pakistan... President Ayub Khan's One Unit was a valid one ... it was an unfortunate for the country that Yahya Khan had to surrender to pressure...Zia maintained, Bhutto and the Baluch leaders both deserved a share of the blame for the confrontation that led to the 1973-1977 insurgency, and they took the bit in their teeth, even though Bhutto was holding the reins. They did the childish thing, saying the police must be from Baluchistan, giving out the arms openly to their friends, trying to put powers in the hands of local officials.²³

Zia statements explicitly criticized the government and the Baloch leaders for the previous insurgency. He believes that the Baloch are 'part' of Pakistan, he further criticized the Americans for the 'assistance' of the Baloch people, the also talked about a 'unified country' including all the ethnic groups. Though, he criticized the Americans and other powerful countries for supporting the Baloch cause, later he established his palace of regime with the help of the same Americans. He considered the demand for provincial autonomy to be 'small-minded terms' but this is considered the biggest problem up to the present time. However, according to Tahir Amin, the Zia regime brought back the same pattern of military-bureaucracy rule current in the period of Ayub Khan, and it "reproduced a modified version of the Ayub political system."²⁴

According to Harrison, in 1980, organized Baloch nationalist activities in Pakistan were being run by three forces, "the Baluch People's Liberation Front, which believes in the

²² Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 151.

²³ Op. cit., 151-153.

²⁴ Tahir Amin, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988), 168-169.

inevitability of a military confrontation with Pakistan and Iran; the Baluch Student Organization (BSO), which subdivided in turn into two rival factions; and the Pakistan National Party, a moderate, non-violent group favoring a restructured Pakistani constitutional system in which Balochistan would have an autonomous, loosely confederated relationship with Islamabad.”²⁵

However, on the political front, following the banning of the NAP, the NDP (National Democratic Party) was created in 1975 by the same party members and it became the successor party. The differences between the Baloch-Pashtun leaders have been traced back to this period of time. Differences came between the Baloch and Pashtun leaders over the ‘strategy to deal with the military government’ and the separation of the Baloch from the NDP followed on the same question. As a result, the PNP was formed by Bizenjo and the Sindh-Baloch-Pashtun Front (SBPF) was formed by Ataullah Mengal.²⁶ Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri led the BPLF through Afghanistan. Ray pointed out that, the formation of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) having the same motives for the separation of Baloch areas from Pakistan and Iran was another development by the insurgent Baloch leaders.²⁷ There is a general perception regarding the formation of the BLA that it was formed with the support of the Soviets. But this has not been proven yet.

In addition, in 1979, another party named PNP was formed by the Baloch leaders. But it could not sustain itself and was ultimately banned by Zia along with all political parties in

²⁵ Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 71-72.

²⁶ Amin, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan*, 199.

²⁷ Ray Fulcher, “Pakistan: Balochistan’s History of Insurgency.” *Green Left Week* (30 November 2006):2.

Pakistan.²⁸ However, the most active political force during the regime of Zia was the BSO. The BSO itself was divided into two groups, BSO and the BSO Awami. “The BSO served as the most important recruiting grounds for the nationalist organizations.”²⁹ The BSO, which was the ‘militant wing’ of the liberation front, became so popular that “more than 25,000 young Baluch have received their political conditioning as BSO members between 1967 and 1981.”³⁰ The policies of Zia led to ‘dramatic rise tendencies’ in Balochistan and the execution of some students on criminal charges further fanned the fire in Balochistan.³¹

In 1984, a student Hammed Baloch³² was sentenced to death by a military tribunal. The ‘superior courts were by passed’ which had stayed the death sentence because “it was alleged that the procedure of these tribunals was without adequate safeguards for a fair trial and that the military courts themselves had no authority in law.”³³ The tussle between Balochistan High Court and the provincial military courts over the sentence death of Hameed Baloch remained intensified, the provincial military authorities were keen to carry out this death sentences and ordered the jail authorities to do so but, on the other hand, the high court while declaring it ‘illegal’ and ‘contempt of court’ and in case of execution the military officers in the province would be “arrested on the charge of pre-meditated murder.”³⁴

²⁸ Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 57-58.

²⁹ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 342.

³⁰ Harrison, op. cit., 83.

³¹ Amin, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan*, 180-181.

³² Hammed Baloch was an active member of the Baloch Student Organization (BSO) who was executed during the Zia regime on charges of firing on military officers from Oman. Oman was facing internal revolts and to suppress these internal revolts the Oman government was recruiting Baloch foot soldiers for huge salaries to fight against the rebellious elements in Oman. As a matter of fact, the BSO was against this recruitment of Baloch youth. It is believed that Hammed Baloch basically fired on the Omani officer. But he was saved in that incident. But another man was killed due to the firing. Later Hammed Baloch was executed on June 11, 1984 at the age of 23.

³³ Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 360-361,

³⁴ Op. cit., 361.

However, the full bench of the court already said that “an ordinary citizen could not be tried by military courts for offences covered by the ordinary laws, provided such offence was not committed by way of resistance to martial law itself.”³⁵ But the appeal against this case in the Supreme Court by the government and the silence of the Supreme Court and the “propositions laid down by the High Court had not been examined in the case” and the “decisions on these questions were tactfully avoided.”³⁶ Through Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) the powers of the judiciary were also reduced. The execution of Hammed Baloch had a great impact on the Baloch nationalist movement Literature has portrayed him as a hero and martyr of the Baloch nation.

Nonetheless, the division between Baloch leaders which appeared due to Zia’s party-less election was further widened in the 1990s. After the death of General Zia-ul-Haq in a plane crash, acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan announced new elections in 1989 on the basis of the parties. From Balochistan, the BNA (Balochistan National Alliance) swept the elections and Akbar Bugti became the chief minister of Balochistan. In the 1993 elections, the BNM (Balochistan National Movement) a ‘middle class party’, won six provincial assembly seats along with two national assembly seats, secured over sixty percent in Makran.³⁷

Moreover, “The Baluch Movement also made significant headway in terms of gaining public support. Its leaders did not consider it wise to rise against the regime in an open revolt.”³⁸ Though the Baloch were greatly influenced by the Soviet, yet the Soviets and Afghan support

³⁵ Op. cit., 361-362.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 393.

³⁸ Amin, *Ethno- National Movements of Pakistan*, 214.

were not enough for the attainment of their goals. During the course of Soviet government in Afghanistan, Later, the Soviet and pro-soviet Afghan regimes could not assist the Baloch liberation forces because of their own internal problems and war with the capitalistic countries, including Pakistan.

In fact, one of the major events which transformed the entire demographical scenario of Balochistan was the influx of Afghan refugees, which enhanced the grievances of the Baloch. The Baloch who were already alienated as a result of being minority in Pakistan became a minority in Balochistan as well. The Afghan refugees were easily provided with citizenship of Pakistan. The Baloch-*Pashtun* tussle was further increased due to this demographic change in Balochistan. Tahir Amin in his book written that, “The Punjabis, the Pushtuns and the Muhajirs were well represented among the state elite, while the Sindhis and the Baluch were greatly underrepresented thanks to the continuity in the recruitment patterns in the army and bureaucracy which were strictly maintained in their colonial traditions.”³⁹ Balochistan was given only 0.02 percent recruitments from the inception of Pakistan to this era which was to be increased to allow the Baloch to take part in the state affairs.

From 1980 onwards, Baloch leaders tilted more towards the political arena, “and the more they took part in competitive elections, the more they became divided.”⁴⁰ In 1988, BNM (Balochistan National Movement) was formed by Ataullah Mengal and another party by the name of JWP (Jamhoori Watan Party) was formed by Akbar Bugti. In 1991, the factions of

³⁹ Op. cit., 231.

⁴⁰ Foreign Policy Centre, *Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History*, 33.

Mengal and Bizenjo formed another party with the name of BNP (Balochistan National Party). In the elections of 1997, BNP won the maximum number of seats from Balochistan and formed a coalition government in Balochistan with the PPP and the Muslim League (N) at the national level. In 1997, the BNP under the leadership of Ataullah Khan emerged as the single unifying force on the political front and his son, Akhtar Mengal, became the chief minister of Balochistan. The BNP was more inclined towards the center. Mengal eventually resigned in 1998 after the conduct of nuclear tests in Balochistan without his consultation.

However, “The martial law of the 1980s and the so-called democracy of the 1990s acted as a dampener on political activism. In the views of Breseeg, the nationalism among Baloch may have lost its ardour...But it was not dead.”⁴¹ The overthrow of Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1999 by General Pervez Musharraf was responsible for another u turn in Balochistan. In the entire decade of the 1990s, despite military interventions, the ethnic tensions diminished because of “representative participatory institutions.”⁴² The Baloch tribal leaders and the political leaders remained on the side of the state. Different factions were created and fallout among the political leaders for their own political gains dominated the entire course of time in Balochistan. Self-interested elites on both sides failed to undermine the determination of the common Baloch during the entire decade of so-called democracy. This decade is also dubbed as ‘Praetorian democracy’.

⁴¹ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 374.

⁴² International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan*, 6.

The intervention of the army ordered by Zia could not eliminate the problems of the Baloch. The entire period was dominated by so-called Islamization and so-called *jihad* in Afghanistan. Although there was no any major fallout between the military and the Baloch yet questions remained in the minds of the people concerning provincial autonomy which were not addressed by the center. Zia's ability to deal with the ethnic elite remained successful and the provincial elite was tilted more toward Islamabad. Though the death of Zia and the arrival of democracy in Pakistan's politics, favored the angry ethnic elite for maintaining their rights and privileges, the common masses, which had been in a condition of backwardness, remained in the same situation.

Moreover, the outflow of natural resources from the Baloch areas continued without sharing them with the common masses. These questions were remained in the minds of the common public. Subsidies and royalties were enough for the *sardars* to remain silent and execute the state policies in Balochistan. On the contrary, the educated middle class Baloch, which had a political consciousness regarding their rights, chose the political front and aided themselves with educated leaders but ultimately, with no result. To put it in a different way, the Baloch nationalist leaders and *sardars* became more self-centered and they basically looted the center as well as their own nation in the name of the Baloch issue. The 'Baloch card' served their interests and they, for their part exploited the masses as well. To be simpler: the Baloch national movement was hijacked by them.

On the other side, the Pakistani leadership in this entire long period, apart from few developments, failed to uplift the entire socio-economic situation in Balochistan. Zia had rather

emphasized more a united Pakistan with Islam as its basis. The demand for greater provincial autonomy was not acceptable either to Zia or to the civil-military bureaucracy in Pakistan. The death of Zia though paved the way for the revival of democracy in Pakistan. The powers of the president never gave the opportunity to the political system to run effectively. On the other hand, dirty politics was another aspect of the 1990s. Both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto were mutually unacceptable to each other; each was trying to diminish his or her opponent through different tactics. The chaotic situation at the center never motivated the country leaders to take strong steps in Balochistan. They were happy with the same situation in Balochistan that was being run by the corrupt tribal and nationalist leaders.

Furthermore, the statement of Sher Muhammad Marri that, “Baloch nationalism has penetrated the masses and it is not confined to the *nawabs* and *sardars* alone” was proved true if one see the current situation of the Baloch areas.⁴³ But still to a large extent the people are under the control of *sardars* in the upper belt of Baloch areas. The geography of the Baloch areas is highly instructive in a political sense. The *sardars* are ruling in the regions of Jhalawan and Sarawan. On the opposite side, in Makran division and some other areas, there is no concept of the *sardari* system. Obviously, the latter areas have more politically conscious people than the former ones. Musharraf basically inherited the same socio-political condition when he intervened through a military coup in Pakistan.

⁴³ Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism*, 395.

CHAPTER 6

THE MUSHARRAF REGIME AND THE REVIVAL OF THE BALOCH NATIONAL MOVEMENT (1999-2008)

“Don’t push us. It is not the 70s, when you can hit and run, and hide in the mountains. This time, you won’t even know what hit you.”¹ This ‘stern warning’ from a military dictator to the Baloch nationalists was ample for the understanding of the Balochistan issue in the entire Musharraf period which Musharraf himself carved out with the help of the ‘establishment’, undermining the democratic process. This period in the history of Pakistan has brought numerous deadly consequences for Pakistan and also marked the beginning of a new wave of transformed nationalism as far as the Baloch people are concerned. The Musharraf regime, which transformed the entire socio-political situation of Pakistan also triggered the current crisis in Balochistan as did its predecessor military regimes. Though, Musharraf for his part tried to undertake many policies for the development of the nation and to support his ‘Enlightened Moderation’, his efforts in the end failed to bear fruit. The entry of Musharraf by yet another military coup with the help of the army put an end to the democratic process in Pakistan. The policies which were embarked upon by Musharraf became the sole reason for the catastrophic situation in Balochistan which still prevails. The Baloch national movement took a shift on the

¹ The News, Karachi, January 16, 2012.

local level. The movement, which had always been a subject for some of the chieftains, now passed into the hands of politically conscious middle-class people. “The insurgency had also crossed all the regional, ethnic, tribal and class lines” and also put indelible foot prints in the sands of history as far as Balochistan history is concerned.² The ‘Disappearance of Baloch’ students and political activists also began during this period.

Moreover, the separatist movement, which had lost its glory during the preceding three decades, was given a new direction with a new spirit. The Baloch, who had lost their faith in Pakistan to a certain extent, lost it completely. The ‘civil-military bureaucracy’, which had been involved in much of Balochistan affairs, further carried on and was also given strong backing from Islamabad for its harsh deeds. It would not be wrong to say that the part of the state in intensifying this insurgency was in addition to the efforts of the Baloch nationalists themselves, who had been aiming for the intensification of the Baloch national movement. As in the previous insurgency this era also witnessed the same sort of insurgency. But, the consequences this time created sleepless nights for the policy makers of the Pakistan ruling elite. The severe policies of the military government in the democratic out-skirts not only provided it with a new platform but also gave the movement a voice across frontiers.

Furthermore, the roots of current insurgency can be traced after the *coup d’état* and, more specifically, after the election of 2002, which were held by General Musharraf, becoming the reason for yet another insurgency. The nature of the insurgency can be demarcated to a large

² International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan* (Islamabad: International Crisis Group, 2006), 8.

extent from previous insurgencies. The clouds of this insurgency were formed in the tribal region as in the previous insurgencies, but, a sense of depravity and fear soon spread all over the Baloch areas especially in the Makran division and other major cities motivating the masses to raise arms against the government. In a recent interview with a Pakistani newspaper Musharraf said, “The country was on the verge of disaster and then I introduced ‘real democracy’.”³ But contrary to the general’s remarks the public perception is wholly different. Most of the academics believe that it was more of a personal animosity between Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif, the chief of army staff and prime minister respectively.

The humiliating retreat in the ‘Kargil War’, the removal of Musharraf as chief of army staff and, last but not least, stopping the landing of the aeroplane which was bringing Musharraf from Sri Lanka on October, 12 1999, became the causes for the *coup d’état*. The democratic process was put to an end, national, provincial assemblies were dismissed and the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) was given after the abrogation of the constitution. The initial years to a large extent were calm as far as Balochistan was concerned though the general public had half-hearted trust in the military regime, saying that it would transform the socio-economic conditions of Balochistan. Though the entrance of the Army always makes a great impression for the restoration of ‘real democracy’ and the economic system but, on the other hand the goal always aimed for is absolute rule with the iron hand. “Musharraf’s constitutional manipulations made the president the symbolic head of the federation, all powerful, reducing the national parliament to a rubber stamp and depriving the Baloch of the voice they had gained in the

³ The Daily Dawn, Islamabad, March 14, 2012.

democratic forums of the 1990s.”⁴ Owen Bennett writes that, at the time of Musharraf’s coup “half of the members of the Provincial Assembly in Quetta were nationalists and they were complaining about Punjabi colonization of their provinces.”⁵

However, Musharraf’s first initiative was the setting up of the local bodies system very much similar to Ayub’s Basic Democratic (BD) system. Though, the devolution plan or local bodies system was to include representation from all over the country, it too remained a tool to retain absolute power. The local bodies’ elections were largely engineered by the establishment, thus “helping their own kind and preference.”⁶ The Baloch nationalists also rejected the “devolution plan as a mechanism for imposing a unitary form of government in the name of decentralization and a negation of provincial autonomy” and called it a tool to ‘drain powers away from the provinces’ and to strengthen military rule.⁷ Soon after the devolution plane Musharraf, just as Zia, also felt the need for the legitimization of his rule. Likewise, he chose the same way for announcing the referendum that could swear him in as the president of Pakistan.

The referendum of 2002 was employed by Musharraf with ‘70% turnout, and 98%’ voting for the president of Pakistan for another five years. Interestingly, in some of areas Musharraf got more than 100 percent votes. “Voting irregularities, coupled with the absence of formal identification requirements and electoral rolls, tarnished the result and invoked memories

⁴ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan*, 7.

⁵ Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (London: Yale University Press, 2009), 69.

⁶ Akbar Zaidi “Elections: Continuity Rather than Change.” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 37, No. 44/45 (November 2002):4501-4502. (sic).

⁷ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan*, 8.

of General Zia-ul-Haq's 1984 'rigged referendum' that 'legitimized' his power as president."⁸ The "misuse of public money and government machinery in the electioneering had been identified by Musharraf as features of the sham democracy of 1988–99", even, he confessed that 'cases of voting rigging' had taken place and he even showed 'regret' for these cases.⁹

Furthermore, after securing himself as the new president, Musharraf took the next step while announcing elections for the restoration of 'real democracy' because of immense pressure from countries such as U.S.A, U.K and European countries. The elections of 2002 were staged for popular support for the military government. Thus, before the election, state machinery was used to create a supporting pillar for the military government and also to support the policies of the military. Therefore, 'the parties were broken into different factions by the military'. There were 'many irregularities in polling stations' and the acceptance of the certificate of *madradas* as higher educational degree manifests the motives of the military.¹⁰

The Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) was created with "an artificial coalition of retired officers, feudal landlords, wealthy businessmen and political defectors" with the main reason to 'give civilian cover to the general's otherwise naked military rule' along with the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amel (MMA) to undermine nationalist and secular political parties in Balochistan and the NWFP.¹¹ The elections of 2002 demonstrated disastrous consequences for the Baloch because of the 'establishment's' motives to 'sideline' Baloch nationalist forces and,

⁸ Ian Talbot, "Pakistan in 2002: Democracy, Terrorism, and Brinkmanship," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (January/February 2003): 202-203.

⁹ Talbot, "Pakistan in 2002", 202-203.

¹⁰ Vali Nasr, "Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (spring, 2004): 202.

¹¹ Graham Usher, "The Struggle for Pakistan Continues," *Middle East Report*, 246 (Spring 2008): 9.

on the other hand, favoring the Pashtun Islamist parties. “Islamabad considers it especially important to keep the Pathans of Balochistan loyal” to cope with the Baloch problems in the province.¹² The MMA which was also dubbed the ‘Military Mullah Alliance’¹³ was supported and also ‘helped out’ by the military because of “strong representation in rural areas and being main player in Pathan politics.”¹⁴

The MMA thus benefiting from the military government remained the ‘only viable civilian partner for the military’. The MMA also “made agreements with General Musharraf over his proposed Legal Framework Order (LFO) constitutional changes that legitimated military rule, and allowed the general to serve as both army chief and president.”¹⁵ The ‘rigged’ elections of 2002 remained fruits full for PML-(Q) and MMA which also gave the opportunity to the military government to form a coalition provincial government in Balochistan. Though, the chief minister’s post was given to Jam Yousaf (a Baloch) yet the main portfolios were awarded to the Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JHI-F).¹⁶

However, the nomination of the PML-(Q) candidate Zafarullah Khan, a feudal lord from Balochistan, as prime minister of Pakistan who was ‘regarded as President Musharraf’s nominee’ was the first-ever Baloch to hold this position in the history of Pakistan.¹⁷ In 2002 elections, which were staged under the military government, “most observers including those from Europe

¹² Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (London: Penguin Books, 2011), 341.

¹³ The phrase frequently use by Najam Sethi in various programmes.

¹⁴ Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan,” 204-207.

¹⁵ Op. cit., 206-207.

¹⁶ International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan*, 8.

¹⁷ Talbot, “Pakistan in 2002”, 206.

and the Commonwealth felt that a great deal of pre-poll rigging had taken place.”¹⁸ In Pakistani politics the year 2003 remains very controversial regarding the LFO of Musharraf which aimed for the revival of the 58-2B which gave absolute powers to the president who could “dissolve the National Assembly and relieve the prime minister and cabinet of their functions”. Musharraf became the absolute power in Pakistan after the Seventeenth Amendment which included the LFO in the constitution of Pakistan.

Moreover, soon after the election, the Pakistan government projected new reforms while initiating huge development in Balochistan without taking the provincial government and the nationalists in confidence. For instance, Gwadar port, Mirani dam, coastal highway and construction of military cantonments were the major projects. In March 2002, Musharraf announced publically the plan of the Gwadar project. In his words ‘history was being made’. He further added that, “There is no doubt that Gwadar port, when operational, will play the role of a regional hub for trade and commercial activity”. He hoped that the ‘standard of living’ would be raised and the people of Makran would get ‘ample job opportunities’. He further thanked ‘China for assistance’.¹⁹ The Gwadar deep water-port, the coastal highway, the Mirani dam in southwestern Balochistan and the construction of military cantonments were the reasons which incited a new kind of unrest and more violent armed resistance in Balochistan.

The construction of the cantonment was highly controversial for the ethnic Baloch, who regarded this was as an act of ‘colonization’. The construction of cantonments had manifested

¹⁸ Akbar Zaidi “Elections,”4501-4502. (sic)

¹⁹ Nicholas Schmidle, “Waiting for the Worst: Baluchistan, 2006,” *The Virginia Quarterly Review: A National Journal of Literature & Discussion* 83, no 2 (Spring 2007): 214-237.

the central government's approach to safeguard its economic interest in the province which has been in turmoil for its entire history. The cantonments were to be constructed in Dera Bugti at the site of the Sui gas installations, in Kohlu, which has 'rich oil and gas reserves', and the last one at Gwadar to safeguard its naval bases and protect the port. It seems that Musharraf adopted the 'carrot and stick policy' to expand the 'military presence' and, to increase the 'development to weaken the resistance'.²⁰

The strategic location of Balochistan is very much grounded in the coastal belt which is significant for several reasons. Firstly, it is an "exclusive economic zone potentially rich in oil, gas, and minerals spread over approximately 180,000 square kilometers". Secondly, "Two of Pakistan's three naval bases, Ormara and Gwadar, are situated on the Baluchistan coast". Thirdly, it is "located close to the Strait of Hormuz, at the entrance to the Persian Gulf."²¹ The Gwadar port which was connected to Karachi via the coastal highway also had significance for the internal security of Pakistan. It would serve as an alternative port to Karachi port, "which once had to face a long blockade by the Indian Navy", and the construction of Ormara Base was considered 'part of the same policy'.²² Though some of these projects had been designed during the previous government, ultimately they were being completed with the construction of the motorway. The earlier plan was to connect the coastal highway with the Silk Route. But it was Musharraf with the 'patronage of China' who aimed to complete these projects to meet the economic needs of Pakistan.

²⁰ Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, "*Balochistan: Jackboot Justice in Tribal Heartland*" (Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, 2007), 1.

²¹ Frederic Grare, "Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism", Carnegie Papers, No. 65, (January 2006): 4.

²² Op. cit., 7.

The projection of these developments brought many concerns among Baloch nationalist forces, who thus considered them a conspiracy to change the demography or, in pure words, to change the ethnic composition of Balochistan while setting the ‘outsiders’, the Punjabis and Sindhis generally, and the Muhajirs particularly. “The new port of Gwadar which China built at General Musharraf’s request in south-western Balochistan, which was also called China’s ‘String of Pearls’ had further enhanced the concerns of Baloch nationalists who dubbed it ‘ethnic swamping.’²³ In fact, Beijing’s interest in Gwadar is to “protect oil supply lines from the Middle East and to counter the growing U.S. presence in Central Asia.”²⁴ The nationalists believed that these projects are ‘limited development’ not for the ordinary Baloch the construction of Gwadar Port, Mirani dam and coastal highway and supplying the electricity to Makran is basically a one projects with the different name.

Moreover, some of the Baloch Nationalist leaders even considered the Gwadar Project as the ‘Death warrant’ for the Baloch and while compared the Gwadar with Karachi which created the Sindhis as a minority within the Sindh after the influx of other ethnic groups. The roots of ‘ethnic swamping’ can be traced after the soviet intervention which resulted in the influx of millions of Afghans which are still dwelling in Balochistan.²⁵ Anatol Lieven in his book have state that, “the main parties among the Pathans successfully urged their followers to boycott the last census in 1998, in the hope that this would help the Pathan Afghans refugees to merge with the local Pathans population, become Pakistani citizens, and boost Pathan political weight in

²³ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 343-344.

²⁴ Frederic Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism”, 4.

²⁵ The Afghans who came as migrants to Balochistan, particularly in Pashtun areas, are never registered and, being of the same culture, they have very easily assimilated with the Pashtuns of Balochistan. Even a large number of Afghans also acquired Pakistani nationality disturbing the ethnic balance of the province.

Balochistan.”²⁶ Having known these realities, the Baloch remained fearful after these developments and it was highly sensitive for them.

As for the construction of these cantonments the government claimed that these projects “were intended to increase ethnic Baloch recruitment forces and spread employment.”²⁷ As a matter of fact “Islamabad seems to have been unsympathetic to Baloch demands that many of the jobs in these projects be reserved for ethnic Baloch.”²⁸ In the view of the government, these projects were supposed to increase the recruitment of the Baloch into the army and also spread employment. But “things were made worse by the high-handed way in which local land was bought for these projects and distributed to workers and officials from elsewhere in Pakistan.”²⁹ Pakistani officials also blamed the people for selling their lands for a great profit.³⁰ The fact can’t be denied that more than 65% of the land of Gwadar is allocated on the names of ‘Outsiders’. According to Asim Sajjad, “the massive land acquisition that has taken place in Gwadar is nothing less than a transfer of land from Baloch to non-Baloch hands.”³¹

The construction of military garrisons in the most controversial Baloch areas, Sui, Kohlu, and Gwadar, basically added fuel to the fire because the Baloch who were “already feeling colonized by the Punjabis, felt dispossessed by these projects.”³² Brahmdagh Bugti on the other hand also claimed that, Musharraf, ‘wanted to have deep drilling in Bugti areas’ but Akbar Bugti

²⁶ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 347.

²⁷ Op. cit., 348.

²⁸ Op. cit., 349.

²⁹ Op. cit., 348-349.

³⁰ Op. cit., 343.

³¹ Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, “Balochistan versus Pakistan,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 42, No. 45/46 (Nov. 2007): 76.

³² Frederic Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism”, 6.

“refused to give permission. The government offered a huge amount---four billion or eight billion but Bugti refused and asked for previous accounts of the gas recovered from Sui.”³³ Owen Bennett pointed out that, in 2000, having known the reality that the “Sui’s gas supplies would run out by 2012 that is why Musharraf, ordered increased oil and gas exploration activity” in District Marri, Kohlu, but as expected, the surveyors which started exploration were attacked and it resulted in death of ten people.³⁴ This further sparked resentment in district Marri and even in August 2000, the coal mining was also stopped by the Marri tribesmen. To prevent the coal-laden truck for carrying out coal from Balochistan, ‘rocket-propelled grenades and landmines’ were also used and as a consequence, the federal government had to deploy one thousand security personnel to counter these activities.³⁵

The Baloch nationalists however presented their concerns regarding these projects. They believed that these ‘developments will flow to outsiders’ and most of these opportunities would be availed by the ‘Outsiders’ because the Baloch, owing to “large scale illiteracy and poverty, can never avail the opportunity that such developmental projects provide.”³⁶ Najam Sethi, who is a prominent columnist in Pakistan, traced the roots of the Baloch insurgency after the elections of 2002. According to him “the old non-religious tribal leadership as well as the new secular urban middle classes of Balochistan, [saw] no economic or political space for themselves in the new military-mullah dispensation.”³⁷ The opposition nationalist leaders in the provincial assembly also blamed the ‘establishment’ for conspiring against them. It is believed that the

³³ Idrees Bakhtiar, “Portrait of a Rebel Leader” *Balochistan, Crying for Attention* Dawn: Islamabad, December 16, 2012.

³⁴ Jones, *Pakistan*, 69.

³⁵ *Op. cit.*, 69.

³⁶ Foreign Policy Centre, *Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2006), 41-42.

³⁷ *The Hindu*, New Delhi, February 24, 2012.

military had accelerated its 'crackdown' on the Baloch nationalist which were in the Provincial assembly especially Balochistan National Party (BNP) to outcast them from political process.³⁸

However, the resistance against the government had got momentum soon after and the governments construction of Gwadar port, cantonment and highways convinced the BLA a liberation movements which have its roots from 70s to "plant mines, firing rockets, exploding bombs and even ambushing the military convoys from 2003."³⁹ There were 626 rocket attacks, out of which 379 rockets targeted the Sui gas fields and 122 bombs explosions on the gas pipelines were also reported.⁴⁰ Quetta city was also badly affected because of thirty bomb blasts killing 11 people in December 2004. The BLA "claimed responsibility for these attacks that were an endeavor to free Balochistan from Punjabi dominance."⁴¹ The government didn't take these assaults serious until 2004 when the rebels embarked upon a series serious of offensives, executing three Chinese engineers, attacking the CM's convoy, attacking the airport of Sui, and other government installations including the confrontation with military and governments.

However, the other guerrilla groups like Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), BPLF are supposed to merge with the BLA and they were also active while waging war against the military. Regarding these liberation organizations, Akbar Bugti claimed that "BLA, BLF and BPLF were different organizations or, at best, three closely allied organizations."⁴² The CM of Balochistan, while criticizing the role of India, believed that the Research and Analysis Wing

³⁸ Mukand, Rahul. "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balochistan." Pakistan Security Research Unit, no. 34 (24th May 2008):9.

³⁹ Foreign Policy Centre, *Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History*, 41.

⁴⁰ Op. cit., 42.

⁴¹ Alok Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2010), 95.

⁴² Op. cit., 90.

(RAW) assisted these guerrillas, whereas the Governor of Balochistan accused Indian and Afghanistan for helping these guerrillas.⁴³ However, on September 23, 2004, a parliamentary committee⁴⁴ was constituted to ‘address the issue of Balochistan and redress the grievances of Baloch people’, this committee after having viewed the provisional departments, institutions , meeting with the political parties from October 2004-Jan 2005, presented the report with their recommendations but ultimately with no out-comes.⁴⁵ Asim Sajjad informs that a “report detailing the history of Balochistan's alienation from the centre and the government's willingness to address outstanding concerns followed the visit. It appears however that this report was prepared only to temper the anger rife amongst Baloch nationalists and none of its fundamental recommendations have been implemented.”⁴⁶ Baloch nationalists’ leaders further complained regarding the committee, they stated “that two of their demands had not even been addressed: that no military garrisons be built in Balochistan and the Gwadar development project be handed over to the Baloch.”⁴⁷

The more intensive insurgency and armed resistance in Balochistan began in Dera Bugti in February after the rape of Dr Shazia Khalid by ‘army captain Hammad of the Defense Security Guards (DSG) at the Sui gas plant while performing her duty as a medical officer for

⁴³ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan*, 12.

⁴⁴ The Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan which was formed by Shujaat Hussain, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, had two sub-committees, the constitutional committee was led by Wasim Sajjad, which had the duty to deal with the problems in Balochistan regarding provincial autonomy and, on the other hand, the recommendation committee was led by Mushahid Hussain was to have the responsibility of dealing with the construction of military cantonments, Mega projects, and violence.

⁴⁵ Muhammad Ishaque Fani, “The Resurgence of Baluch Ethnicity and Nationalism in Baluchistan,” *European Journal of Social Sciences* 20, no. 4 (2011):664. (sic).

⁴⁶ Akhtar, “Balochistan versus Pakistan,” 77.

⁴⁷ Jones, *Pakistan*, 71-72.

Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) in Sui Balochistan.’⁴⁸ “Dismissing the notion that any officer could have been responsible, Musharraf went on to suggest that the doctor had invited rape to become eligible as a political refugee in a western country.”⁴⁹ Later, Dr Shazia was threatened to “leave the country and warned that if she stayed, she would be killed by government ‘agencies’ and that no one would even find her body.”⁵⁰ While giving an interview to the BBC Dr Shazia Khalid exposed that, “I cannot tell you how many times I was threatened. My life was made impossible. I am still terrified”, But it was also denied by governments officials that “Dr Khalid suffered any harassment from any quarter.”⁵¹

The aftermaths of the alleged rape brought many fatal consequences for Balochistan because the alleged rapist was defended by the government and this ‘provoked severe reaction and unrest in Sui’. After Musharraf’s statement that the “army officer is not guilty, he became determined the embarrassment disappear.”⁵² A storm of protest was broke out in Sui Tehsil after the rejection of the army to allow the local police to interrogate the suspect who was a military officer. This was followed by local tribesmen and Baloch guerrillas “attacking the Sui installation, security forces, and gas pipelines, disrupting the supply of gas countrywide.”⁵³ The Bugti tribe embarked a series of offensives against security forces and the Sui gas installations, which were under the command of Akbar Bugti, having a “force of some 10,000 tribal fighters” which also included the fighters of the Marri and Mengal tribes.⁵⁴ These assaults extremely

⁴⁸ Fani, “The Resurgence of Baluch Ethnicity,” 665.

⁴⁹ Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Deference to the Mullahs, Iron Fist for the Rest: Pakistan under Musharraf,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 41, No. 40 (October, 2006): 4233 (sic).

⁵⁰ Fani, “The Resurgence of Baluch Ethnicity,” 665.

⁵¹ BBC NEWS, London, June 29, 2005.

⁵² Fani, “The Resurgence of Baluch Ethnicity,” 665.

⁵³ International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan*, 8.

⁵⁴ Ray Fulcher, “Pakistan: Balochistan’s history of Insurgency.” *Green Left Week* (30 November 2006): 1-2.

affected the Sui gas installations, security forces, and the gas pipelines, which supply gas resources to different areas of Pakistan.

The government's callousness regarding the alleged rape of Shazia Khalid energized the BLA for launching a series of attacks: "hundreds of rockets and mortar shells were fired, and there was a heavy gun battle, inflicting large scale destruction for the PPL, resulted in cutting off the gas supply to the rest of the country."⁵⁵ Malik Siraj in his book stated that, the "BLA came in the spotlight after following out-break of province-wide violence in Balochistan after the alleged rape of Dr Shazia Khalid. Later, "the federal government, while exercising its powers under Section 11 (b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997, banned the BLA on April 2006."⁵⁶ As a reaction, security forces in the shape of army and security agencies also initiated assaults which resulted in the killing of numerous civilians. In 2005, "there were 187 bomb blasts, 275 rocket attacks, and eight attacks on the natural gas pipelines, 38 attacks on electricity transmission lines and 19 explosions on railway lines."⁵⁷ Government sources confirmed that guerilla forces "fired 14,000 rounds of small arms, 436 mortars and 60 rockets in four days of fighting."⁵⁸ As a consequence of the unrest, which broke out after the alleged rape incident, the "military actually moved in to take over direct control over the gas plant under the guise of protecting national installations, which showed that the state was keen to establish control over at least a part of Balochistan's territory under whatever pretext it could."⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Foreign Policy Centre, *Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History*, 42.

⁵⁶ Malik Siraj Akbar, *The Redefined Dimensions of Baloch Nationalist Movement* (Arizona: Xlibris Corporation, 2011), 26.

⁵⁷ International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan*, 9.

⁵⁸ Foreign Policy Centre, *Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History*, 42.

⁵⁹ Akhtar, "Balochistan versus Pakistan," 77.

In March 21, 2005 the scheduled visit of Musharraf and the Prime Minister of China for the inauguration of Gwadar Port had been cancelled after a violent protest, which continued for three days resulted in the destruction of property of the ‘Outsiders’.⁶⁰ Musharraf’s threat to the Baloch nationalist which he delivered on Pakistan television, outraged Baloch nationalists regarding the attitude of the military. He said: “Don’t push us ... it is not the 1970s, and this time you won’t even know what has hit you.”⁶¹ “By refusing to negotiate Baloch demands for provincial autonomy and control over their resources and opting instead to forcibly subdue dissent political or militant, the Musharraf government has upped the stakes.”⁶²

The ‘Establishment’ simply attributed this violence to the “rejection of nationalist parties by the voters in 2002”. Secondly, the threat of exposing the population with the “modern concept of democracy, the outside influence” caused the opposition to the mega-projects on the part of the Baloch *sardars*.⁶³ For the pacification of the current insurgency, a ‘15-point agenda’ based on the “control of resources, protection of the Baloch minority and a halt to the building of military bases” were presented to the government by Baloch leaders. But “President Musharraf showed little regard for their concerns.”⁶⁴ Islamabad, after rejecting the demands of the Baloch opposition for ending the construction of military cantonments and ‘handing the Gwadar port over to provincial control’, refused to come to the table to talk.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Frederic Grare, “Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism”, 6-8.

⁶¹ Siraj, *The Redefined Dimensions of Baloch Nationalist Movement*, 51.

⁶² International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan* (Islamabad: International Crisis Group, 2007), 1.

⁶³ Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 12.

⁶⁴ Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, “Balochistan: Jackboot Justice in Tribal Heartland”, 1-2.

⁶⁵ Mukand, Rahul. “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balochistan.” 9.

Notwithstanding, the ‘government agencies’ also used media to undermine Bugti’s resistance against the military. They reported that Bugti’s “lavish lifestyle was being financed by the PPL, including Bugti’s family rental charges for vehicles, air tickets, personal transportation, and medical facilities”. They further alleged that “it was bankrolling pay and allowances of personal staff of Nawab Bugti to the tune of Rs. 122 million per year.”⁶⁶ But, all these ‘allegations’ were rejected by Nawab Bugti. Though, Musharraf introduced a so-called free media for the first time in the history of Pakistan with numerous channels, the affairs of Balochistan were never highlighted and never got full coverage. To solve the issue in a democratic way, the officials of PML-(Q) Shujaat Hussain and Mushahid Hussain started negotiating with Akbar Bugti, which ultimately resulted in the ceasefire. In March 2005, another parliamentary committee under the leadership of Chaudhry Shujaat and Mushahid Husain was constituted to ‘investigate the nature of Balochistan's grievances’. After meeting with Akbar Bugti, they “proclaimed that confidence-building measures would be taken and that any further use of violence by the authorities would be eschewed”, but ultimately all was in vain.⁶⁷

Earlier, in response to the notions of attacking the Sui installations, which then stopped the influx of gas and cost millions of rupees and about law and order situation, Bugti while giving an interview to a local news channel, soon after the alleged rape of Dr. Shazia countered that “neither one attacked these installations nor did these were hit. The real targets were the DSG camps, which were surrounded by thousands of pipelines; as a result, these pipes were hit by bullets.” He called it a ‘drama’ or ‘pretext’ to gain the public support and justify the military operation against them. He angrily added, “50 feet high and 500 feet long pipelines which stands

⁶⁶ Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 92.

⁶⁷ Akhtar, “Balochistan versus Pakistan,” 77.

as small mountains, even visible to a blind, how were not possibly seen by the guerillas”. Regarding, law and order situation he put forth the argument as a bombardment of FC and DSG on the civilian, resultantly opened a two-front war, due to that army brigade was called accompanying with ‘tanks’, ‘drones’, ‘jets’ and ‘gunships helicopters’. He argued that he was ready for negotiations providing that the alleged rapist was brought to justice.⁶⁸

The Musharraf-backed provincial government also blamed him for all ongoing violence in the province and its perpetual financial troubles, and the deputy speaker of the Balochistan Assembly, Aslam Boothani, said that “Contrary to Musharraf’s claims, this is not just a problem of the three *sardars*. The federal government has enforced a war-like situation on Nawab Bugti and his tribesmen, and the Baloch are justifiably defending them. They are all a part of this now.”⁶⁹ Musharraf, on the other hand, remained very ‘inflexible’, even on record he stated: “Who has given Bugti the authority to speak on behalf of Balochistan?”⁷⁰ Musharraf’s visit to Kohlu in December 14, 2005, the main heart of the Marri tribe, for laying the foundation stones of the cantonment was an explicit message to the Baloch that the “state would enforce its writ by military means.”⁷¹ The ongoing conflict had taken a twist on the same day after the BLA smashed eight rockets on a paramilitary camp in Kohlu after the visit of Musharraf.⁷²

Furthermore, to put this conflict to end, Musharraf used an iron hand. While stationing army personnel in these in these tribal areas, Musharraf also acknowledged this reality when

⁶⁸ Dr. Shahid Masood, “One World Special.” YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=krDIGN7FQW8> (accessed: January 15, 2012)

⁶⁹ Siraj, *The Redefined Dimensions of Baloch Nationalist Movement*, 36.

⁷⁰ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan*, 8.

⁷¹ Op. cit., 9.

⁷² Mukand, Rahul. “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balochistan.” 11.

saying only 1,000 army personnel are merely assisting the paramilitary and other security forces there. According to the U.S intelligence sources, “six army brigades, plus paramilitary troops, some 25,000 in all” were stationed in these areas.⁷³ Musharraf believed that these “troubles in Balochistan were orchestrated by the three renegade *sardars* and called them ‘anti-development’ *sardars* referring Ataullah Mengal, Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Akbar Bugti.⁷⁴ In 2001, the SPDC conducted research which “shows those areas under control of nationalist leaders, such as the late Nawab Akbar Bugti, Nawab Khair Mari, and Sardar Attaullah Mengal, were often better developed.”⁷⁵

In 2005-2006 Dera Bugti and Kohlu remained a ‘site for intense operations by the Pakistan military’. In addition, “the Pakistan military laid siege to Dera Bugti, attacking with artillery and air strikes. Many civilians were killed and 85% of the 25,000-strong population fled. From December 2005 until June 2006 more than 900 Baloch have been killed, 140,000 displaced, 450 political activists (mainly from the BNP) have disappeared and 4000 activists were arrested”.⁷⁶ In addition, in March 17, 2005, as a result of the ‘aerial bombardment’, 67 people lost their lives including 33 people from the Hindu community. Around ‘80 to 85 percent’ who were either wounded or executed were mainly females and children. The target was the house of Bugti. Though these targets were accurate, luckily, Bugti survived. After these attacks Bugti said that “It was all preplanned and I was the prime target. I am sure that highly trained personnel, probably artillery soldiers were employed, as they hit the place accurately.”⁷⁷ The

⁷³ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan*, 9.

⁷⁴ Siraj, *The Redefined Dimensions of Baloch Nationalist Movement*, 36.

⁷⁵ Ray Fulcher, “Pakistan: Balochistan’s History of Insurgency.” 1-2.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 94.

hometown of Bugti as well as the Bugti house was also bombarded during this operation, which caused the Bugti to take refuge in the mountains in the Marri area.

Musharraf, on July 20, 2006, after delivering a speech on television, “dismissed Baloch charges of economic discrimination and announced a “\$49.8m development programme for the province, half for roads and other infrastructure projects”. He further announced “49.8m development programme for the province”, while criticizing that *sardars* as the ‘real exploiters’ and stealers of development funds, he “claimed that the armed forces have been sent into Baluchistan to protect the Baluch from their leaders while development proceeds.”⁷⁸ In July 2006, Musharraf stated “out of 77 *sardars* only three are ‘anti-development’ and ‘anti-democracy’”. They do not want democracy. Rather, they want to exercise complete dictatorship and control in their areas. We have to go for an operation to change this situation. We have to establish the writ of the government and end the writ of [these] *sardars*.”⁷⁹

However, Rights Commission Pakistan (HRCP) in 2005 reported that “up to 85 percent of the 22,000-26,000 inhabitants Dera Bugti had fled their homes after the town was hit by shelling by paramilitary forces”, this report further said that “there have been many cases of torture, extrajudicial killings and disappearance and accused the security forces of carrying out summary executions, and claimed to possess credible evidence to prove its assertion.”⁸⁰ PHRC had further reported that” indiscriminate bombing and strafing by F-16s and Cobra gunships are again being used to draw the guerrillas into the open and Six Pakistani army brigades, plus

⁷⁸ Harrison, S.S. “Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency” *Le Monde Diplomatique* (October 2006):1-3.

⁷⁹ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan*, 2.

⁸⁰ Mukand, Rahul. “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balochistan.” 8-9.

paramilitary forces totaling some 25,000 men, are deployed in the Kohlu mountains and surrounding areas where the fighting is most intense.”⁸¹ Balochistan has been ‘highly militarized’ establishing ‘one paramilitary post for every 500 people’, further having four mega military cantonments, 52 paramilitary cantonments, five naval bases, including Jinnah Naval Base in Gwadar, and six missile-testing ranges in 2006.”⁸²

While giving an interview, Akbar Bugti said: “The military government has imposed military rule and this has forced the Baluch to defend their land and resources against the might of the armed forces of Pakistan assembled in our areas”. While giving the government the option, he added that, “the dispute is about the national rights of the Baloch, and if the government accepted these rights then there would be no dispute.”⁸³ He further criticized the military government for ‘using its American-supplied jets and helicopter gunships against them’, after they had found bomb shells ‘fragments imprinted’ with ‘Made in U.S.A’ and called them ‘invaders and occupiers’.⁸⁴ Regarding the leadership of the BLA he stated that, “he did not know who was leading the group, but that it was neither a Bugti nor a Marri”. He further predicted that ‘I don’t see it ending’ and “If we are removed from the scene, I can guarantee the government will have a heck of a time from the younger generation, because they are more extreme.”⁸⁵ In July, 2006, while giving an interview Bugti stated that:

They say that I am intransigent, I don't listen to them, and I don't bow before them. They say that I should bow before them and salute them, and give up my weapons, and then everything will be all right.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Harrison, S.S. “Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency.”1-3.

⁸² Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network Balochistan: Jackboot Justice in Tribal Heartland, 1-2.

⁸³ The New York Times, New York, August 28, 2006.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ BBC News, London, August 27, 2006.

Moreover, August 26, 2006 will be remembered in the history of the Baloch as the day which revitalized a national movement and further increased the gap between Islamabad and the Baloch. On this fatal day Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed in his “remote mountain base in a military operation that involved the use of helicopter gunships and ground troops.”⁸⁷ It is widely believed that the cave in which Bugti had taken shelter was blown up by the army with the help of gunship helicopters. General Pervez Musharraf who had earlier threatened the Baloch nationalist that ‘this time you won’t even know what has hit you’ had proved his words and Bugti was unaware what hit him.

After the killing of Bugti, Pervez Musharraf tried to ‘ease tensions’ and called a meeting including all the senior ministers and agencies. Later, Tariq Aziz, who was the spokesman of Musharraf, announced that “Mr. Bugti’s body would be handed over to relatives for burial as soon as it could be retrieved from the rubble of the cave where he died” and he further stated that “soldiers had not known that Mr. Bugti was in the cave when they advanced on it and that he had not been singled out.”⁸⁸ Musharraf also outraged the Baloch by calling it ‘a great victory’.⁸⁹ In an interview with a local newspaper Musharraf claimed that “Baloch leader Akbar Bugti was not killed but instead had committed suicide.”⁹⁰

The Balochistan provincial government had previously remained low-spirited. Mainly constituted with pro-establishment elements, it only kept to the directions of the federal government. But now Balochistan provincial government put all the responsibility on Musharraf,

⁸⁷ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan*, 1.

⁸⁸ The New York Times, New York, August 28, 2006.

⁸⁹ Hoodbhoy, “Deference to the Mullahs, Iron Fist for the Rest,” 4233.

⁹⁰ The Daily Dawn, Islamabad, March 14, 2012.

saying “the entire operation was carried out solely on the orders of then Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf.”⁹¹ Some of the sources have specified that Bugti was located on 23-24 August after a military helicopter had been fired on. Some reports also suggested that this place was located after a ‘satellite phone intercept’.

The role of democratic government was overshadowed by the military dominating the entire affairs of Balochistan. Though the ruling part, or ‘King’s Party’ of the PML-Q, “intervened and tried the political path with Bugti, resulting in an agreed document, which was in the process of being implemented, the military establishment overruled the politicians and went for Mr. Bugti.”⁹² Mushahid Hussain, who was the leader of the sub-committee, later stated that “if fifteen percent of the recommendations of sub-Committee had been implemented by the federal government then the situation in Baluchistan would have been different.”⁹³

In a recent interview, Mushahid Hussain recalls that “Nawab Bugti was ready for any arrangements with the government provided it protected his interests and preserved his dignity and honour”. He continues, “When the latest phase of Balochistan problem was its early stage and there were ‘enough warning signals to warrant a special remedial approach which could result in reconciliation’”. He further revealed that, during this critical situation in Balochistan, there were “two approaches within the government and the military establishment. The establishment approach was to ‘sort them out’ because they believed that a negotiation with a ‘warlord’ was “tantamount to appeasement and undermining the writ of the state”. On the

⁹¹ The Express Tribune, Karachi, April 14, 2012.

⁹² The Daily Times, Islamabad, November 17, 2012.

⁹³ Fani, “The Resurgence of Baluch Ethnicity,” 665.

contrary, the 'soft liners' approach was 'more balanced' and 'realistic' but initially, "the the soft liners prevailed on the hardliners who were waiting for an opportunity to hit back and they managed to do so later in 2006."⁹⁴ Brahmdagh Bugti, the grandson of Akbar Bugti and said be head of a separatist movement in a recent interview blamed Musharraf for 'worsening the situation' in Balochistan.⁹⁵

The Pakistan government claimed this operation which was conducted in the Bhambhore hills in the Marri tribal area which killed Akbar Bugti was the 'decisive battle for Balochistan'. Muhammad Ali Durrani, who was federal minister for information and broadcasting, "broke the news on the night August 26 that 37 militants and 21 military personnel, including six officers had died, so had Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and Balach Marri and two of Bugti's grandsons."⁹⁶ Later, it was confirmed that Balach Marri and Bugti's one grandson had managed to escape. "The senior politicians also had blamed Musharraf for worsening the Baloch issue and believed that the 'attack on his ego', when his helicopter was fired on, "contributed to the decision to kill Bugti."⁹⁷ The absence of a 'fact finding commission' could not suppress the reality behind the controversial burial of Bugti.

Moreover, the governor of Balochistan Awais Ghani told the "media that Bugti's casualty was not the case of target killing and that he died after an explosion in the cave during the negotiation to ensure his surrender."⁹⁸ In addition, a close companion of Bugti later had

⁹⁴ Amir Wasim, "No Easy Way Out" *Balochistan, Crying for Attention*, Dawn: Islamabad, December 16, 2012.

⁹⁵ Idrees Bakhtiar, "Portrait of Rebel Leader".

⁹⁶ Siraj, *The Redefined Dimensions of the Baloch Nationalist Movement*, 52.

⁹⁷ BBC News, London, September, 2006.

⁹⁸ Fani, "The Resurgence of Baluch Ethnicity," 666.

uncovered that, “When security forces entered the cave where he (Bugti) was hiding, he attempted to fend them off by firing a shell. This caused a massive explosion, which resulted in the cave-in that led to the death of Bugti, one colonel, two majors and three commandoes.”⁹⁹ On August 26, 2006 after being surrounded by the military, “Akbar Bugti decided to die fighting rather ‘surrender to security officers’ and he asked his comrades to leave the cave and let him fight them alone.”¹⁰⁰ This is the “biggest blunder committed by the military since the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.”¹⁰¹

In a recent interview with an international newspaper Brahmdagh Bugti, who luckily escaped, revealed that “I was just two kilometers away when he was killed (Akbar Bugti). For a month and 20 days we fought our way through ambush after ambush, heading for the Afghan border.” He further said that they remained in “camps around Spin Boldak and Kandhahar in Afghanistan”. “The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) though, made several attempts to kill me. There was a bombing once; a trap to lure me into an ambush.”¹⁰² Brahmdagh Bugti further said that; “In 2005, after the latest phase of our struggle had begun, we had a procession of Pakistani politicians visiting the region, promising peace and justice. What happened? My grandfather (Akbar Bugti) was martyred by the army, our village bombed, and thousands forced into exile.”¹⁰³

⁹⁹ The Daily Times, Islamabad, May 03, 2009.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ The Daily Times, Islamabad, November 17, 2012.

¹⁰² The Hindu, New Delhi, February 24, 2012.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

Sardar Akhtar, the president of the BNP even bitterly said that “This incident has cut our last link, if there was any, with Pakistan. The Nawab sacrificed his life for Baloch rights. His blood will not go wasted. The Baloch people will see those who murdered Bugti” means to put an end to them, ‘to take care of them’.¹⁰⁴ Akhtar Mengal, who believed that the BLA was waging a rightful war against the military, said that “Our BLA is an organization against the PLA—the Punjab Liberation Army. The Pakistan army is the PLA.”¹⁰⁵ Later, Akhtar Mengal, with his party colleague resigned from the government. After a few months he was also arrested for alleged conspiracies against the state and tried in the Anti-Terrorism Court in Karachi and was put in an ‘iron-cage’. Ultimately he was released in May 2008. The killing of Akbar Bugti spread like a black storm in all over Pakistan, giving a way for deadly protest all of the Balochistan. Violent demonstrations and protests took the entire province with ‘complete shutter down’ and ‘wheel jam’ strikes for one week in Baloch areas. Panjabi settlers in Quetta and other parts of Balochistan were also hit. Government buildings, vehicles, and the national flag of Pakistan were also burnt all over the Baloch areas by violent students. Curfew was also imposed in Quetta because of the critical situation which was out of control in the hands of government. Hundreds of people and students were arrested in Quetta city alone.

The controversial coffin of Akbar Bugti was buried in his hometown Dera Bugti, six days after his death, in a sealed locked coffin without any of his family members or relatives. The burial has given rise to several questions which are still to be answered. There was not a single person from his family to recognize the body except Maulana Malook, (the *mullah* who

¹⁰⁴ Siraj, *The Redefined Dimensions of Baloch Nationalist Movement*, 52.

¹⁰⁵ Nicholas Schmidle, “Waiting for the Worst: Baluchistan”, 2006,” 214-237.

performed the funeral) who said that “I have recognized the body.”¹⁰⁶ Samad Lasi, district co-ordinator of Dera Bugti said, that the “dead body had also been identified with the help of his watch, cane, glasses and ring” because, according to him, the “tribal chief’s abdomen had been crushed, but his face and legs were unmarked.”¹⁰⁷ But, condition of Bugti’s possession after such a drastic explosion raised many question.

The death of Bugti brought immense difficulties for the family members of Bugti. They were not ‘allowed to inherit his property’. His son Jamil Bugti was also arrested, and even in November the bank accounts of two granddaughters were also closed after having been accused of linkage with the BLA. In addition, two days after Bugti’s death, a “handpicked *jirga* (tribal assembly) of rival tribesmen declared Bugti a ‘proclaimed offender’, removed him as chief of the tribe and took over his property.”¹⁰⁸ “Since January 2006, the military regime has initiated a drive to rehabilitate the Kalpars and Masuris, and facilitate their return to Dera Bugti, mainly to undermine Akbar Bugti’s hold over the entire Bugti tribe.”¹⁰⁹ Ironically, till now “one of the family members and admirers of the Nawab are allowed to visit his grave. We still don’t know what is in the locked coffin.”¹¹⁰

The operation by the Frontier Corps continued after the killing of Bugti. On December, 17, 2006, as a result of army operations 86 were killed with the more than 100 wounded.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ BBC News, London, September 1, 2006.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan*, 2-5.

¹⁰⁹ Suba Chandran, “Akbar Bugti and after Implications for Balochistan and Pakistan”. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, no. 38 (September 2006):1.

¹¹⁰ The News, Islamabad, March 20, 2012.

¹¹¹ Mukand, Rahul. “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balochistan.” 8-11.

Almost “2,260 Baluch fled their villages in August to escape bombing and strafing by the US-supplied F-16 fighter jets and Cobra helicopter gunships of the Pakistan air force.”¹¹² In 2007, while giving a speech, Musharraf announced that “they must, in the national interest, eliminate the handful of ‘terrorists’ who are attempting to “hamper the developmental efforts of the government”. He added that “These elements should be wiped out of the country.... Nobody will be allowed to challenge the writ of the government. This would not be allowed at any cost.”¹¹³ The government, on the other hand, claimed that only paramilitary forces are being used to maintain issues regarding law and order, whereas “for ordinary people there is no difference between army or paramilitary forces or law-enforcement agencies. For them, they all look alike and act alike.”¹¹⁴

The disappearance of Baloch also rose in this period. The sources of HRCP show that “69 of 92 reported disappearances countrywide in 2006 were in Balochistan. As of December 2006, there were 242 persons on HRCP’s list of the disappeared, 170 from Balochistan. Other sources cite 600 disappearances in 2006.”¹¹⁵ In March 2007 HRCP also submitted a “verified list of 148 missing persons, the overwhelming majority from Balochistan, and asserted that the law enforcement and intelligence agencies were responsible”, while, on the other hand, the nationalists numbered them between 8,000 to 12,000. “The interior minister himself admitted to having arrested around 5,000 Baloch a couple of years ago.”¹¹⁶ In meantime, “Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court did take up the issue of disappearance of various Baloch activists. The Pakistani state “sensitivity to this issue was

¹¹² Harrison, “Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency.” 1-3.

¹¹³ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan*, 2.

¹¹⁴ The News, Islamabad, March 20, 2012.

¹¹⁵ International Crisis Group, Pakistan: *The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan*, 4.

¹¹⁶ Op. cit., 5.

clearly evident from the treatment it meted out to the then Chief Justice.”¹¹⁷ The ‘issue of disappearance’ became a ‘worry’ for Musharraf because he knew that the ‘judiciary could also threaten his reelection’ and as a consequence he suspended the Chief Justice.¹¹⁸

In November 2007, the execution of Balach Marri remained ‘mysterious’ because of the nature in which he was killed. The ‘cause and location’ in which he lost his life remained unidentified. Balach was considered as one of the ‘biggest anti-state elements’. The nationalists considered it an act of the ‘establishment’ and mostly believed that he was killed by the security agencies in the bordering areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The death of Balach resulted in protests and strikes observed in all Baloch areas. The BLA, on the other hand, says that “it possesses the body” and also “vowed to avenge Balach’s killing.”¹¹⁹ The execution of Balach Marri, which is believed by the Baloch to be the hands of security agencies, further fueled the fire as far as insurgency in Balochistan was concerned. Apart from the previous existing insurgent groups, six more insurgent organizations also erupted in 2007, which included “Lashkar-e-Balochistan, Bugti Militia, Bugti Force, Bugti Lovers, and the Baloch National Army with a secular nationalist outlook.”¹²⁰ In fact, 2007 proved more fatal than 2006 (403 attacks) in Balochistan. In 2007, there were 536 violent attacks reported, more than in FATA (435 attacks) and the NWFP (460 attacks).¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 114.

¹¹⁸ Arch Puddington, et al., eds. *Freedom in the World 2008: the Annual Survey of the Political Rights & Civil Liberties* ed. (Maryland: Rowann & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 536.

¹¹⁹ The Daily Times, Islamabad, November 24, 2007.

¹²⁰ Bansal, op. cit., 116.

¹²¹ Ibid.

In 2008, elections which were supposed to be highly ‘rigged’ and based on ‘selection’ conducted under the presidency of Musharraf given a chance to the PPP and the PML-N to emerge as the largest party winning the most number of the seats. The politics of Balochistan was generally dominated by the loyal feudal chiefs after the boycott of nationalists’ parties. PPP formed provincial government along with the PML-Q and other smaller parties. The elections could not eliminate the disastrous situation in Balochistan rather the ratio of insurgency increased further. In 2008, violence in Balochistan further intensified. In the first two months there were 45 explosions. Moreover, on June 4, 2008, a report which was submitted by the Interior Ministry in the Senate stated that: “Balochistan has been the most violent region in Pakistan during the last five years” with 435 bomb blasts more than NWFP from first January 2004 to May 25, 2008.¹²² However, the reports which were published in the English media described that there were 523 violent incidents¹²³ related to insurgency in Balochistan in 2008.”¹²⁴

The entire period of Musharraf, till the August 2008, remained very fatal in Balochistan, generating deadly consequences for the people of Balochistan more particularly for the Baloch. The Baloch national movement which has lost its status after the 1970s insurgency appeared on the scene with strong orientations. The military with its ‘Praetorian democracy’ has wholly failed in dealing with the affairs of Balochistan. Musharraf, on the other hand dealt with this situation with iron hands. As a matter of fact, in Pakistan the military “Generals do not learn from history because they do not read history. They make history.”¹²⁵ The attitude of the state dealing with

¹²² Op. cit., 118.

¹²³ For detail see Appendix X.

¹²⁴ Op. cit., 188.

¹²⁵ The News, Karachi, January 16, 2012.

the deadly events in Balochistan further alienated the Baloch, pushing them back to take up arms against the state. The formation of various liberation forces and their engagement with state forces explicitly manifests the revival of Baloch national movement in this era. The two ‘rigged elections’ and the methods undertaken for the construction of various schemes, without understanding the socio-political situation in Baloch areas, further encouraged the nationals’ forces to resist Islamabad.

The situation in Balochistan would have been much better had Islamabad taken the consent of the provincial government and the other Baloch nationalist parties. If these projects, as stated by Musharraf, had been really for the sake of the Baloch people, then the prevailing circumstances would have entirely been different. ‘Ethnic swamping’ remained the biggest threat for the Baloch. The influx of ‘outsiders’ has been accepted as a reality in Balochistan, after the Afghan refugees. In the end, the voices remained alive and later, stormed out in all the areas of Balochistan. This catastrophic state of affairs could have been resolved in a democratic way. But the means adopted for handling this situation, put further oil in the fire. The state also sustained its old formula (the Sandeman System), carrying out state policies with the help of loyal political chieftains in this entire period. Moreover, international factors also have made their contribution in this era. The interests of China and the ‘War on Terror’ directly and indirectly affected the affairs of Balochistan. The fire which erupted in Baloch areas was overshadowed by these factors. This insurgency which articulated the hazardous impacts for Balochistan, intentionally or unintentionally did not get much attention in the media. The Supreme Court’s involvement in the cases of the disappearance of Baloch further generated several questions on the capability of government. The removal of the Chief Justice of Pakistan raised many questions which are still to be answered.

Conclusion

The short history of Pakistan has been characterized to a large extent by ethnic disability among the major ethnic groups of Pakistan. Muslim identity was soon overshadowed by ethnic identities. The Baloch national movement for independent Balochistan also came on the scene, though largely based on the aspiration of the tribal elites. So far, unrest and insurgencies remain the fate of Balochistan in its short history, further creating a huge gap, frustration, and alienation among the Baloch people. This was one of the main reasons for the revival of the Baloch national movement. Economic deprivation, less provincial autonomy, identity crisis and frequent use of force further worsen the situation as far ethnic Baloch are concerned. Bestowed with immense natural resources and having a vital strategic location could not eliminate the remoteness of the Baloch. Balochistan could have been a launching pad for the economy of Pakistan. But the government handling made it worse in this regard. Lack of wisdom for dealing with the affairs of Balochistan time and again generated a sense of fear and a sense of survival among the Baloch. One must understand Baloch character before it is possible to understand the political unrest in Balochistan. Having lived in the periphery, with nomadic nature, a sense of survival against outsiders always remained the most significant question for the Baloch throughout history. This threat never allowed them to accept the supremacy of outsiders in their areas because, for nomads, their areas are all important. This resulted in a number of conflict and clashes with outsiders. Tribalism in Balochistan was structured as a result of nomadism after the settlement of different clans in different areas. The geographic circumstances in which people live always generate similar traditions and norms. The Baloch traditions manifest the same sense of survival. 'Assbiya' which can be defined as group feeling, togetherness remained very strong among Baloch because of the sense of survival which asks for mutual effort. Though division

into different tribal areas formed some differences, outside influence was always faced jointly. In all these developments economic interests remained most vital. Tribal and nomadic orientation had set a sense of toughness and resistance among the Baloch which is still visible. The intervention of the British transformed the entire socio-economic and political situation in Balochistan. But the threat perception and survival against outsiders had remained same among the Baloch, which also resulted in a series of conflicts. In the early years, after the intervention, the British faced numerous confrontations with Baloch tribes. At last, while using their diplomacy, the British introduced the Sandeman System or *sardari* system for controlling the tribes and which, ultimately, met with success. Having shattered the existing unified tribal system with the *sardari* system (backing each tribal lord in his region) the British carried out its economic interest. But, it could not eliminate hostilities from the tribal regions which were largely economic in nature. It must be born in mind that the British could not directly subjugate these areas; they were brought under control with the help of different treaties. In addition, these treaties also documented the independence of all Baloch areas after the withdrawal of the British. Balochistan served as an outpost, the British didn't want to change the situation in Balochistan, but it had changed.

The 20th century was responsible for many changes in the world, the Hindu and Muslim which were demanding their political rights from the British within British India. On the other hand, the educated Baloch started their demands for separate nation. It could possibly be the reason of less representation in the state machinery. The sense of economic depravity and less representation could have motivated them for initiating such demands. The Baloch National Movement for the formation of a separate entity for the Baloch had its root in the first quarter of

the 20th century. The founding father of Baloch National Movement, Yousaf Magassi, constituted the aspirations for a separate entity. Later, these ideas were further carried by the leaders of the KSNP, who also rejected the proposal of merger with Pakistan. In fact, both Magassi and the KSNP were against the *sardari* system. The current turmoil in Balochistan can be traced back to the forced merger of the Kalat state with Pakistan, after a short lived independence. Karim's insurgency in 1948 was followed by the 1958, 1963-1968, 1973-1977 and 2005-2006 insurgencies, respectively.

The intervention of army in Pakistan politics added oil in this prevailing enigmatic situation in Balochistan. The formation of One Unit administration and the imposition of new modern laws, further worsen the existing circumstances. The germs of "Punjabi dominance" among Baloch which erupted earlier became intensified as a result of these measures and after the exploitation of the natural resources. The economic deprivation which resulted in the alienation of the Bengalis also spread hostility among the other ethnic groups toward Punjabi dominance. The fear of being deprived of their due rights motivated armed resistance among the Baloch as well. The influx of the Afghan-refugees further cultivated more fear of 'ethnic swamping' among the Baloch. The so-called Islamization, ended with which the establishment of hundreds of religious institutions was taken as a fact to undermine. This fear further intensified after the construction of mega-projects and the construction of military cantonments and the way of handling these projects.

Moreover, these insurgencies didn't aim for separation. Rather, they had largely been based on personal interest and more autonomy. But, the aftermaths of these insurgencies laid

down the foundations of separatism among the Baloch people. A new wave of nationalism with various liberation movements for the separation of Balochistan has become a reality now. So far, the state has failed to understand the dynamic of the Baloch people, their culture, traditions and norms. The failures always ended in the confrontations between Pakistan and the tribes in Balochistan. The state having absolute power always pursued strong measures for crushing these insurgencies without understanding the basic psyche of the people. Each time, the military intervened in Baloch areas, each time the sense of survival and fear was intensified. The Baloch always showed their protests via armed resistance: the only way they know to protest and to get their rights, whilst state authorities always have assisted and taken the loyalties of tribal lords to control the masses and upheavals. The political and bureaucratic structure having the western direction remained a big failure in Pakistan, as well as in Balochistan. Few factors, like identity crisis, the economic deprivation, the overt or covert military operations, if one closely examines, always dominated the politics of Balochistan. The state having the legitimate powers to enforce its writ, always imposed it by force. The use of force further alienated the Baloch toward the federation. The current situation in Balochistan after so much diversity now has come to a point of no return; the possibilities of negotiations are being minimized day by day. The earlier '*assbiya*' has been transformed into nationalism with strong orientations against the federations.

The Balochistan issue could have easily been solved, had the state perused its policies in accordance with the wishes of the local people instead of the *sardars*. The problem would have been solved, had the state granted provincial autonomy to Balochistan, in a country which is surely dominated by a single ethnic group. The results could have been very positive, had the state pursued the policy of development for the sake and welfare of the ethnic Baloch, instead of

for outsiders. The Balochistan issue has always been believed to be an issue created by the *sardars* for their own demand. But, on the contrary, the state always favored the *sardars* leaving aside the masses. While lolling and putting blame on the *sardars* who truly have loyalties with the state, the government never took serious concerns for the development of these areas. The Baloch national movement in current time has been successful for taking roots in the local masses and most of the cities of Baloch areas, which have least number of educated people. These Baloch areas need special care from the state authorities, these reforms and development must be for the sake of the local masses not for other reasons. The current phase is the best time to restrain the Baloch liberation movements, which are a great in number, but in positive way, the use of force and secondary measures would further intensify it, and if it continues in the same manner as it is now then it will end in great bloodshed, taking the lives of thousands of innocent people.

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