

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE US WITHDRAWAL
STRATEGIES IN AFGHANISTAN: 1990 and 2014**



By

**SADAM HUSSAIN
Reg No. 02131413025**

**Supervised by
Dr. MUHAMMED NADEEM MIRZA**

**SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY
ISLAMABAD - PAKISTAN
JULY 2016**

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE US WITHDRAWAL
STRATEGIES IN AFGHANISTAN: 1990 and 2014**



A Thesis submitted to Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, in the partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By

SADAM HUSSAIN

**SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD
PAKISTAN
July 2016**

APPROVAL

The M. Phil dissertation titled, “COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE US WITHDRAWAL STRATEGIES IN AFGHANISTAN: 1990 and 2014” by SADAM HUSSAIN, is approved for external evaluation.

Dr. Muhammed Nadeem Mirza
Assistant Professor/Supervisor

Dedication

I want to dedicate this thesis with love to my beloved parents for their support, and believe in success of my life.

Acknowledgment

I would like to express my gratitude to all those who helped me throughout my research. There is no name above my supervisor, and mentor, Dr. Muhammed Nadeem Mirza. I would like to thank him for all his invaluable assistance, efforts, time, and guidance. The way he taught and guided me throughout my research with his patience and knowledge is indeed a gift to me. Also, special gratitude to my friends Najeeb Ullah Achakzai, and Habib Khan, who were always there for help. The discussions with them were truly very supportive for me.

Sadam Hussain

Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	1
1 Literature review:	3
2 Research Questions:	8
3 Hypothesis:	9
4 Significance of study:	10
5 Methodology:	11
CHAPTER 1.....	12
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	12
CHAPTER 2.....	21
US FIRST INROAD AND WITHDRAWAL: SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR	21
2.1 Different perspectives of the Soviet Union’s invasion:	21
2.2 Objectives of the Soviet Union’s Invasion:	23
2.3 Strategies to achieve objectives:	26
2.4 Failure of means to achieve ends:	27

2.5 US response and interests in Afghanistan:	30
2.6 Objectives of the US in Afghanistan:	31
2.7 Strategies to achieve objectives:	33
2.8 Pakistan as an ally:.....	34
2.9 Casualties, concluding and withdrawing from Afghanistan (Geneva accords, 1988):	36
 CHAPTER 3.....	 40
 IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN: ASSERTIVE APPROACH.....	 40
3.1 Afghanistan after war:	40
3.2 Role of Great Powers after Withdrawal:	41
3.3 Effects on Pakistan:.....	42
3.4 Objectives of Pakistan after withdrawal:	46
3.4.1 From 1992 to 1995:.....	46
3.4.2 From 1996-2001:.....	52
 CHAPTER 4.....	 57
 US SECOND INROAD AND WITHDRAWAL: WAR ON TERRORISM.....	 57
4.1 US-Afghan war:	57
4.2 US objectives and strategies:	59

4.3 Failure of US strategies:	68
4.4 Pakistan as an ally:.....	72
4.5 US withdrawal:	73
CHAPTER 5.....	75
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN: COOPERATIVE APPROACH	75
5.1 Introduction:.....	75
5.2 Effects on Pakistan:.....	77
5.3 Afghanistan unstable internal condition:	79
5.4 Pakistan losing its place in reconciliation process:	81
5.5 Removal of insurgency from Afghanistan:.....	83
5.6 Curbing Militancy at home:.....	86
5.7 Drone Attacks:	93
CONCLUSION	95
BIBLIOGRAPHY	99
ANNEXURES.....	107
Annex 1: Meeting of Politburo of Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union.....	107

Annex 2: Transcript of Telephonic Conversation between Premier Alexi Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Muhammed Taraki	129
Annex 3: Ponomarev Report to CPSU on the Situation in Afghanistan	130
Annex 4: DIA Report “Afghan Resistance (U)”	131
Annex 5: DIA Report “Afghanistan: The War in Perspective”	133
Annex 6: DIA Report “Afghanistan: Soviet Withdrawal Scenario (U)”	137
Annex 7: DIA Report “USSR: Withdrawal from Afghanistan”	141
Annex 8: IIR [Excised]/ Veteran Afghanistan Traveler’s Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Exploitable Weaknesses	147
Annex 9: U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan	154
Annex 10: Memorandum by State Department “Strategic Thought”	161

List of Acronyms

(ANA)	Afghan National Army
(ANP)	Afghan National Police
(ANSF)	Afghan National Security Forces
(ATT)	Afghan Transit Trade
(CEO)	Chief Executive Officer
(COIN)	Counter-Insurgency
(CIA)	Central Intelligence Agency
(ISAF)	International Security Assistance Forces
(ISI)	Inter-Service Intelligence
(MoD)	Memorandum of Understanding
(NAP)	National Action Plan
(NATO)	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NDS)	National Directorate of Security
(PRGF)	Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
(JEC)	Pak-Afghan Joint Economic Commission
(RSCT)	Regional Security Complex Theory

(UIFSA) United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan

(UNAMA) United Nation Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

(UNHCR) United Nation High Commission for Refugees

(UNSMA) United Nation Special Mission to Afghanistan

Abstract

Afghanistan has been the playground for international players since 1970s. The US intervened into Afghanistan in 1970s and 2000s. During both these inroads the interests and the withdrawal strategies of the US were different. This different nature of interests and withdrawal strategies implied different implications on Pakistan. Pakistan has to bear the implication after withdrawal as it was ally of the US during both interventions. According to the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) Afghanistan (mini complex) has direct impact on its neighbor (Pakistan). After the first withdrawal Pakistan opted the policy of assertiveness toward Afghanistan. But, because the nature of second withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan is different, Pakistan opted a different policy of cooperativeness. Pakistan needs to follow this policy of cooperativeness instead of assertiveness as it was back in 1990s to achieve its national interests in Afghanistan.

Introduction

Afghanistan has always been the playground for great powers. It has the tendency to attract great powers. There exist different perspectives defining these tendencies like the theory of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). With every intervention in Afghanistan it is likely to affect the neighbor states as described by the RSCT. In case of Afghanistan and Pakistan, it seems to provide valid ground. With the involvement of great powers in the mini complex (Afghanistan), the internal and external condition of Afghanistan tends to affect its neighborhood, especially Pakistan.

Afghanistan became a playing field for international players since 1970s in which Pakistan has always been involved due to its strategic location. As Pakistan has always been the player so it causes implication on Pakistan whenever there is an invasion, inroad and instability in its neighborhood.

There were two instances in the history that cause major implications for Pakistan. One was the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR in 1979 and second was the inroad of the US in the name of “war on terrorism”.

During its inroads in Afghanistan the interests of the US were different both times. It is important to understand the interests of the US in Afghanistan. Withdrawal strategies of the US depend upon the interest of the US in Afghanistan. For instance, during the first withdrawal the interest

of the US was the exist of the USSR from Afghanistan. So, the US withdrew after achieving its interest. Similarly, during second withdrawal the interests of the US were different, so were the withdrawal strategies.

In the aftermath of first withdrawal it left Afghanistan on its own, after achieving its objectives. But during the second withdrawal the broadening of interests made the US to revise its withdrawal strategies, like, it didn't withdraw completely but left some of its forces for continuous engagements in Afghanistan. The reason behind this could be the lesson from first withdrawal. Leaving Afghanistan after first withdrawal resulted in serious repercussions for the US. For the first time the US soil was targeted in the shape of 9/11 incident by the Taliban operating from Afghanistan.

In both these instances the US was the main player and later on its withdrawal from the Afghan territory caused Pakistan to formulate a policy of keeping Afghanistan close and stable. In formulating such policy, it causes heavy implications on Pakistan.

There were multiple reasons for Pakistan to have smooth relations with Afghanistan. One was the geo-strategic northwestern (Afghanistan) location, second that Pakistan could not afford to have belligerents on its western as well as eastern (India) border, and third factor was stability of Pakistan which depends upon the stability in Afghanistan.

If we look at both these inroads it seems that after the US withdrawal in 1990, the policy of Pakistan was much different as it was after the 2014's withdrawal from Afghanistan. After the first withdrawal Pakistan's policy was much assertive in a sense that Pakistan was involved in the effort for regime change, using different tools. Along with assertive approach Pakistan foreign policy was bit unstable. At a time, Pakistan was supporting a ruling government and on

the other hand emerging Taliban faction, who was anti-government. The reason behind this involvement was the absence of a strong central government to control the internal conditions of Afghanistan. Resultantly, Pakistan was forced to play an active role in Afghanistan.

After the announcement of bulk of the forces withdrawal of the US in 2014 from Afghanistan the implications for Pakistan were same as it was during the cold war. But the scenario now in Afghanistan and back in 1990s was different. So, it meant that Pakistan now had different challenges and opportunities. The major opportunity now Pakistan has is the presence of a great power in Afghanistan. By utilizing this presence, Pakistan can create more opportunities playing a less costly and positive role in stabilizing Afghanistan.

Along with the US, the internal conditions of Pakistan are different now as compared to 1990s. After the U-turn of Pakistan in 2001 to join war on terrorism, the efforts are being made to curb the terrorism at home. Raven by the terrorist acts, Pakistan is now fighting to clean its own territory. The ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan and the internal policy of Pakistan are at the two different ends. The issue here remains the same that without controlling the insurgency in Afghanistan, Pakistan cannot achieve its desired results at home.

So if the scenario in both the withdrawal is different than the implications for Pakistan would also be different, which is the purpose of this research to find out.

1 Literature review:

In order to carry out research, journals, news articles, books and some primary declassified documents have been used.

Talking about the first invasion, the US intervened into Afghanistan due to its cold war rival's presence there. During this time period both great powers had their own interests in Afghanistan. The interests of the USSR included, "bear on the move" thesis, "grand strategy"¹, oil resources, and insecurity.² Similarly, the interests of the US included, making Afghanistan a Soviet Vietnam, oil resources, and the cold war politics.³

After reviewing the end, the means (strategies) to achieve objectives are considered. The military, economic, and other means of strategies are evaluated,⁴ and their outcome.⁵ Both the great powers used their resources to achieve their ends. Difference between their policies was that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, contrary, the US played a proxy war through Pakistan in Afghanistan. The war concluded after signing of Geneva Accord and both super powers withdrew from Afghanistan.⁶ The situation of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of both great powers is discussed because it has direct impact on Pakistan.⁷

Pakistan was a major ally of the US during Soviet-Afghan war. The relations between both were not very impressive. Geo-strategic position of Pakistan helped it to become top priority for the US policymakers in Soviet-Afghan war.⁸ After the US withdrawal, Afghanistan's condition had

¹ David Gibbs, "Does USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'? Reinterpreting the Invasion of Afghanistan," *Journal of Peace Research* 24 (December 1, 1987).

² Rais Ahmad Khan, "US Policy towards Afghanistan," *Pakistan Horizon* 40 (March 1, 1987).

³ Andrew Hartman, "The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan," *Third World Quarterly* 23 (June 1, 2002).

⁴ Joseph Collin, "Soviet Policy towards Afghanistan," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 36 (January 1, 1987).

⁵ S. A. Yetiv, "How the Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan Improved the U.S. Strategic Position in Persian Gulf," *Asian Affairs* 17 (July 1, 1990).

⁶ Agha Shahi, "The Geneva Accords," *Pakistan Horizon* 61 (2008).

⁷ Omar Farooq Zain, "Afghanistan from Conflict to Conflict," *Pakistan Horizon* 59, no. 1 (January 1, 2006).

⁸ Thomas Perry Thornton, "Between the Stools?: U.S. Policy towards Pakistan during the Carter Administration," *Asian Survey* 22, no. 10 (October 1, 1982).

implications for Pakistan. Pakistan suffered socially, economically and politically.⁹ Being a neighbor of a mini complex (Afghanistan) as defined by Barry Buzan in his book “Regions and Power” it’s obvious for Pakistan to have effects of the conditions in Afghanistan.¹⁰

During this era, the Pakistani policy makers paid a due attention to Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan, Pakistan was left alone to manage its affairs. Superpowers vacated the Afghanistan as at that time there seemed no interest for them in Afghanistan.¹¹

The Pakistani foreign policy at that time focused on having a friendly government in Afghanistan. Quickly after the US withdrawal, Pakistan tried to establish a friendly government by signing Peshawar Accord but failed to ensure a stable government in Afghanistan.¹² Pakistani foreign policy at that time was assertive as Pakistan was changing its allies in Afghanistan and involved in regime change. It was discussed by Rizwan Hussain in his book “Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan.”¹³ Pakistan transformed its pro-government stance, supported the Taliban and later their regime.¹⁴

After the incident of 9/11, the US once again entered into Afghanistan. At the time of invasion, the only interest was the killing of Osama Bin Ladin and defeat of Al-Qaeda.¹⁵ Curbing

⁹ A Z Hilali, “The Cost and Benefits of Afghan War,” *Contemporary South Asia* 11, no. 3 (2002).

¹⁰ Barry Buzan, and Ole Weaver, *Regions and Power: The structure of International Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

¹¹ Naveed Ahmad Tahir, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policy: The Regional and International Dimension,” *Pakistan Horizon* 53, no. 1 (2000).

¹² Nasreen Akhtar, “Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Taliban,” *International Journal of World Peace* 25, no. 4 (December 1, 2008).

¹³ Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan* (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005).

¹⁴ Ijaz Ahmed Khan, “Understanding Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Afghan Policy,” *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 2 (2007).

¹⁵ Barnett R. Rubin, and Ahmed Rashid, “From Great Game to Great Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2008).

Terrorism became the bottom line of the US foreign policy. Multiple questions aroused as a result of this event, that what this event has changed? What should be the policy of counterterrorism? What would be the measures of this policy and role of states?¹⁶

But with the passage of time these interests broadened like the promotion of ideological agenda, removal of insurgency, and a stable Afghanistan.¹⁷ After investing so much energy and amount, it was impossible for the US to succeed in Afghanistan, without gaining the support of masses. So, the US interest again widened as it included gaining the support of masses.¹⁸ Light has been shed on similar views by the Peter Thomson that the situation of Afghanistan cannot be improved unless the people are involved. To do so, the culture, norm and values of Afghanistan need to be understood to achieve the goals of international campaign.¹⁹

This time instead of playing proxy war in Afghanistan, the US made direct war. US used its own military, economic, and diplomatic resources.²⁰ US tried to establish a strong central government and institution in Afghanistan, as described by the Barnett R. Rubin in his book “Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror.”²¹ But the dependency of the Afghan government on external powers became a hurdle in developing self-sustained institution.

¹⁶ Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and the U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institute, 2001).

¹⁷ Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad,” *International Security* 32 (2008).

¹⁸ Astre Suhrke, “From Principle to Practice: US military Strategy and Protection of Civilians in Afghanistan,” *International Peacekeeping* 22, no. 1 (November 8, 2015).

¹⁹ Peter Thomson, *The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts and the Failure of Great Powers* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

²⁰ Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” *Congressional Research Service* (October 15, 2015).

²¹ Barnett R. Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Unlike the first intervention, this time the US didn't completely withdraw, rather it made a partial withdrawal. US had announced the removal of large number of forces but due to the complications of Afghanistan, former decided to keep some forces behind.²²

Pakistan like the Soviet-Afghan war again allied itself with the US by joining 'war on terrorism'. By becoming an ally Pakistan sought to attain four objectives: Security of Pakistan, economic revival, nuclear assets safeguard, and Kashmir issue to be solved.²³ At the first hand Pakistan secured some economic gains but later failed to avail the opportunities.

As the US announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan once again had to bear the implication of an unstable Afghanistan. After entering into 'war on terrorism' Pakistan tried to smooth its relations with the Afghanistan at economic, political and diplomatic level.²⁴

In the post-2014 era, Pakistan also had to face problem from unstable Afghanistan as it suffered during the "war on terrorism".²⁵ That's the reason Pakistan tried to remove the insurgency by supporting the Afghan government in accommodating the insurgent groups.²⁶ But Pakistan faced difficulties in maneuvering Afghan government and suffered economic, political and military loses.²⁷

²² Nasreen Gufran, "Afghanistan on 2006: The Complications of Post-Conflict Transition," *Asian Survey* 47, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2007).

²³ Muhammad Ishaque Fani, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Challenges and opportunities after 9/11," *Pakistan Horizon* 58, no. 4 (2005).

²⁴ Zubia Ikram, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations after 9/11," *Pakistan Horizon* 59, no. 1 (January, 2006).

²⁵ Asmatullah Khan Wazir, "Withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan and its way implication for Pakistan-Challenges and a way forward," *TIGAH, A Journal of Peace and Development* 2 (December, 2012).

²⁶ Amina Khan, "The Future of Afghan Government and Taliban Talks," *Institute of Strategic Studies* (September 21, 2015).

²⁷ Syed Hussain Shaheed Soharwordi, "Withdrawal of American Forces from Afghanistan (Endgame): Issues and Challenges for Pakistan," *Journal of Political Studies* 19, no. 1 (2012).

The internal situation of Pakistan is different now compared to the first withdrawal. This time the success of the internal policies depends upon the external (Afghanistan) policies. The ongoing operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ and National Action Plan²⁸ demands stability in Afghanistan. The condition of FATA and the operation of terrorist from that territory depend on stopping the infiltration from Afghanistan.²⁹

After reviewing the literature, the gap that exists is the lack of comparative analysis of the US inroad and withdrawal strategies from Afghanistan. The interests of the US, while entering into Afghanistan and during both withdrawals found missing in the previous studies. The purpose of this research is to fill this gap in the existing literature. This research also focuses on the effects of these withdrawal on the Pakistan. Pakistan has been an ally of the US during both these interventions. So, the implication on Pakistan, keeping in view the comparative analysis of both withdrawal is also new and will be a useful contribution in the literature. Analyzing the policies of Pakistan after both the inroads and withdrawals will also help to understand the patterns of its policy towards Afghanistan. This will also help to find lapses in the foreign policy of Pakistan, comparing the Afghan policy after first withdrawal with the second withdrawal.

2 Research Questions:

1. Why the US intervened in Afghanistan in late 1970s and early 2000s and what have been the its intervention and withdrawal strategies?

²⁸ Ahmad Saffee, “Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism-Policy,” *Institute of Strategic Studies* (October 7, 2015).

²⁹ Razia Sultana, “Major Threats to Pakistan in the Wake of the US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: The Case Study of FATA and KPK,” *FWU Journal of Social Science* 1, no. 1 (summer, 2015).

2. What are the implications on Pakistan after the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan on both occasions?

3 Hypothesis:

“Pakistan adopted an assertive approach after the first US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Now Pakistan needs to adopt cooperative approach, as the interests and withdrawal strategies of the US from Afghanistan are different this time.”

In this research the independent variable is the US inroad and withdrawal strategies from Afghanistan. Pakistan’s foreign policy, on the other hand, is the dependent variable. It means that inroad and withdrawal strategies of the US will affect the policy of Pakistan towards Afghanistan. As the inroad and withdrawal strategies of the US are different, Pakistan needs to revisit its foreign policy to stabilize Afghanistan and achieve its national interests.

According to one of the RSCT’s assumption that states near to each other are more vulnerable to threats than at distance. In case of Afghanistan and Pakistan it means that instability in any of these tends to affect the other. Afghanistan after the withdrawal of great powers implies implications on Pakistan. Policies that Pakistan opted after the first withdrawal needs to be revised.

In the aftermath of first withdrawal, Pakistan adopted the policy of assertiveness. By policy of assertiveness means that, Pakistan was involved in regime change in Afghanistan, breaking and making alliances, and providing shelter to its allies. The reason behind this approach can be the absence of great powers from Afghanistan which isolated Pakistan from international support.

The vacuum was created in Afghanistan and Pakistan wanted to fill it. Pakistan wanted to have a friendly government in Afghanistan and the policy that Pakistan opted was assertive in nature.

Following the second withdrawal, the nature of whom is different from the first withdrawal. Pakistan also needs to check and change its policy. The internal conditions of both Pakistan and Afghanistan are different now. Afghanistan unlike its first withdrawal is not completely vacated by the US, rather it's a partial withdrawal. The presence of the great power in Afghanistan is an opportunity for Pakistan, in a sense that Pakistan is not alone now. By engaging the US, Pakistan can achieve its objectives with fewer burdens on itself. On the other hand, Pakistan is not in a situation to engage itself in Afghanistan as it was in 1990s. Pakistan has commitments at home like NAP and operation Zarb-e-Azb. These policies at home need complete attention. Diversion and commitments abroad can change the desired results of these policies. Hence, Pakistan cannot afford to have an assertive approach towards Afghanistan.

4 Significance of study:

Since 1970's, Afghanistan has always been the playground for international players. This research focuses on the comparative analysis of the US's interests and withdrawal strategies, according to which implications on Pakistan can be calculated. Every activity in Afghanistan has effects on Pakistan. After the withdrawal of the US, it becomes important for Pakistan to make Afghanistan friendly and stable. This will help Pakistan to make Afghanistan strong internally and externally. Besides that, after 9/11 Afghanistan has become the center of attention of the world politics. US fought fourteen years in Afghanistan and debates started again after the announcement of withdrawal. In such circumstance it will be an important contribution in the existing literature to compare both the withdrawals and its impacts on Pakistan.

5 Methodology:

Explanatory and exploratory research techniques are used for the conduct of this study. In explanatory research, the phenomena that have already been accrued is discussed. In exploratory research an accruing phenomenon is studied. A final conclusion is not drawn in this research but it helps to understand the problem. In this research explanatory research technique is used to find out answer for first question. On the other hand, exploratory research technique is used for second question. Both primary and secondary sources have been utilized. For the purpose of primary sources declassified documents have been analyzed. For secondary sources published material like books, journal articles, news articles, and reports are studied.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework

The very basic purpose of all the efforts of the human being is to survive and for survival security is the most vital component. Security simply can be described to eliminate any kind of threat. If we use this concept of security at state level it means the protection from political, military, economical, and societal threats, as well as from domestic, national, and international level threats.

The concept of security over the time has been evolved much efficiently to understand and eliminate the threats. These security threats start from individual to state level and then regional to international level. There are many theories in international relations to describe the phenomena of security and Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) by Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver is being adopted for the conduct of this study.

RSCT emerged after the end of cold war when world was transformed from bipolarity to unipolarity. With this new development at international level, the questions started arising that how the world would be with single superpower and what will be the condition of security in this unipolar world? RSCT answer these questions. It describes the role of superpowers which has ended with the end of cold war. The emergence of single super power, who is not as much interested as it was during cold war in certain regions of the world.

The basic assumption of RSCT is that threat near to a state is more important than at distance.

The RSCT approach after the end of cold war can be described in two points:³⁰

1. The decline of super powers interests to intervene in the matters of world.
2. The development of 'lite powers', who are less busy in military engagements and strategic competition after the end of cold war and are free from the influence of super powers.

These two assumptions have emphasized the role of states in securitizing themselves in their region while interacting with neighbor states rather than with states of other regions. By this it means that in the post-cold war scenario, RSCT focuses on threats near to a state. While talking about neighbor countries it means that the security condition of two neighbor states will affect the other neighboring states which ultimately will affect the whole region and by this way they will make security complex in the region.

According to Buzan and Weaver these threats are not same in every region of the world rather vary from region to region. For instance, the security threats of European region have shifted from military to nonmilitary (economic) threats due to massive economic interdependence. While for the Middle East region it's still the military threats. The authors have described every region of the world differently because the prospects of amity and enmity are different and independent.

During three timeframes the existing regions were formed. From 1500-1939 when international system developed after the creation of sovereign states, regionalism was nearly nonexistent as

³⁰ Buzan, and Weaver, *Regions and Power*, 11-12.

the whole world was a single region between competing powers. This internationalism laid the foundation of regionalism. Second, from 1945-1989 creation of regional systems from the breakdown of many states during cold war and as a result many new born independent states forming certain regions in the world. Third is the post-cold war period when with the end of the rivalry between great powers, states started to focus on their own regions. Thus, the threat produced from neighboring states becomes the attention of states.

This theory provides different level of analysis for the better understanding of the securitization. By looking at the different level we can find out where the security threat lies. The different levels of analysis are:³¹

1. International system; where states interact with each other having no system above them.
2. International subsystem; group of states interacting with each other within International system, but different from each other (regions).
3. Units; actors composed of different communities, sub organizations and sub groups (states).
4. Subunits; organized groups within units (bureaucracy).
5. Individuals.

This theory works at many levels: firstly, at system level that is where great powers engage with each other; secondly, at sub system level which is comprised of regions; thirdly, between the two states; fourthly among organizations of a state. To understand the security problem of one state, different levels of analyses can be use. For instance, Securitization problem at international level

³¹ Buzan, Weaver, and Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 6.

cannot be understood without understanding the sub system. Similarly, the security problem of any state cannot be understood by its national security policy without understanding the regional formation, as policy is not self-contained but relational.

So RSCT provides unlike any other theory different levels of analyses to understand the security threats as said by Buzan and Weaver “The regional level is where the extremes of national and global security interplay, and where most of the actions occur.”³² It means that region is the most important place to understand the patterns as linked with global and national security. But while studying the security threats in a region it’s important to understand the clusters responsible for security threats interdependently instead of dealing them separately. Security described by authors is “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, DE securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”³³ So the security problem of any state can be analyzed at different levels, at single level or at all levels as a whole but keeping in mind that all these security threats are inter related.

The main elements of RSCT are anarchic structure, patterns of amity and enmity, clear understanding of the region and to differentiate between regional and super structure. Dealing with the first element, anarchy is the driving force of environment in which states interact with each other. Anarchic system creates insecure environment which lead states to secure themselves against threats. These security threats can be then defined in terms of patterns of amity and enmity. There can be historical factors, cultural and civilization factor as described by Huntington. While studying these patterns it is necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of regions. What regions meant according to RSCT is based on the interdependence of security

³² Buzan, and Weaver, *Regions and Power*, 43.

³³ *Ibid.*, 44.

of unit. It is not the regions that are already defined or natural as Europe but rather how actors define such security threats and what are their referring objects make a regional security and are different from their surroundings. The last element which deals with this theory is to understand the role of great powers in formulation of security threats in the region.

The system can influence the subsystem but the threat prevailing in the subsystem will remain even if the system is not influential in the subsystem. In simple words the security threat in any region will emerge even if the great powers do not penetrate in the region. The great power penetrates in the region when the states within region try to balance each other. For instance, in cold war Pakistan allied with US and India with USSR to balance each other in South Asian region. Even if both great powers had not penetrated in the region the situation of security between Pakistan and India had remained the same. So by this the assumption of RSCT that threat near to state is more important than at distance proved that state security is interdependent with the neighboring states in a region.

This regional security on the other hand decides the options and opportunities for great powers to influence the outside regions. In unipolar world it does not mean that great power will not penetrate in any region of the world. The security conditions of a region provide such conditions that can attract the great power into that region. So, overall RSCT defines the different stages that are helpful to understand the security condition prevailing in international system that starts from domestic and reach to regional and international level.

Another important benchmark of RSCT is to describe the change in the regional level. The main elements of the RSC structure can be drawn that are: ³⁴

1. Anarchic structure
2. Boundaries of a region
3. Distribution of power; and
4. Construction of patterns of enmity and amity

These elements then lead to the change in any RSC. There are three possible changes in configuration of any region and are:

1. Maintain the status quo that means no change
2. Internal change which means change within the outer boundaries of a region. This implies anarchic environment to regional integration.
3. External change which means that membership of a RSC expands or integrates with another region.

With the development of new dimension of security, the complexities in RSCT arises. With the inclusion of societal and environmental security threats to previously dominated military and economic threats it is vital to look this theory in deep. For instance, most of the security threats are state centric, but if we take societal threat it means that state's security against society. In other word that state itself is a threat to society, which of course is not true. So, to eliminate this confusion it necessary to look at the difference between referred object and securitizing agent.

³⁴ Ibid., 53.

By this way we can find out who the security agent is and what he is securitizing and against whom.

There is an important concept of insulator states in the RSCT. Insulator is a state between two regions and fall neither in any of the region. An insulator state can be defined as “within RSCT, an insulator is a state that cannot create links (and hence properly join) the larger Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) that surround it.”³⁵

These states are mini-complexes and have their own characteristics. These states have their own kind of internal problems due to this they cannot take an active role in determining the RSC of any region. Although these insulator states themselves cannot generate any larger security dynamics but they can attract their neighbor countries and can affect the security complex of a region. Afghanistan is an insulator state. It although does not possess the characteristic like military or economic power to escalate a threat in South Asian region but it has enormous effects upon the security conditions of South Asian region and especially upon the main player in the region, Pakistan.

This theory if applied in the South Asian region the main players in the South Asian region are India and Pakistan, whose relations with reach other determine the security complex of the region. But the presence of an insulator state in this RSC makes it more complex i-e Afghanistan. If we look Afghanistan in the context of Pakistan it has more spillover effect on Pakistan due to the long shared border with Pakistan.

³⁵ Wayne MaLean, “Regional Security Complex theory and Insulator States: The Case Study of Turkey,” *University of Tasmania* (2010): 5.

There are also many reasons for this mini security complex to influence Pakistan and that all reasons are described by the theory. The basic elements of the RSCT the anarchic system, patterns of enmity and amity, and the boundaries are present between the mini complex Afghanistan and one of the main players of South Asian region Pakistan. The sectors of security that are political, economic, military and societal of Pakistan are also affected by the situation of Afghanistan.

Although the theory describes that insulator state cannot determine the security complex of a region and in case of Afghanistan it might be true, but on the other hand it has some capabilities to influence the security complex of South Asian region. India and Pakistan are the two determining states of security complex of South Asia. Afghanistan has its spillover effect on Pakistan more than any state in this region. India has some influence in Afghanistan which it uses to destabilize the internal security condition of Pakistan. If the internal security condition of Pakistan will be destabilized than it will have its effects on RSC. So Afghanistan being a mini complex has the ability to influence the RSC.

As the objective of this study is to analyze the security conditions of Pakistan with reference to insulator state Afghanistan, not India, so the debate will remain with reference to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan has also a very crucial role for great powers during the bipolar and also in unipolar world system. In bipolarity it has been the battle ground between the US and the USSR, and in unipolarity it has been the victim of the US war on terrorism. But the important thing here to see is that Pakistan has always been a player during both these wars and allied with the US. By this, it means that Afghanistan has always been a referred object of security for

Pakistan. Pakistan being a main player in both the invasions has ramifications which after the withdrawal of great powers increased.

Even if there had not been any invasion, there would still be some interdependence of security between two countries as described by the theory. But being a main player in both these invasions, it becomes obvious that after the withdrawal of great powers from Afghanistan, Pakistan would have major implications in political, economic, military and societal security threats. Pakistan has to face or find a solution to eliminate security threats. States have more threats from their neighboring states than from those at distant. The security threat from Afghanistan makes Pakistan more vulnerable than other states due to long border of nearly 2400 km. In this research state level analysis has been used that why Pakistan allied with the great power in Afghanistan's invasion. What implications it left on Pakistan after their withdrawal?

Chapter 2

US first inroad and withdrawal: Soviet-Afghan War

Soviet-Afghan war brought a new dimension between the two competing states of cold war, the US and the Soviet Union. There was ideological, technological and military competition. The already going on competition was further fueled when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on the December 25, 1979. It changed the foreign policy of both the countries regarding Afghanistan, especially the US. Both the countries had their own objectives (ends) and strategies (means) to achieve those goals. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the means and ends of both countries during the era, starting from 1979 and ending in 1989 with the withdrawal of both countries from Afghanistan concluded in the Geneva Accord of 1988.

2.1 Different perspectives of the Soviet Union's invasion:

2.1.1 Background:

Soviet Union had its eyes upon Afghanistan since the old 'great game'. They had always considered Afghanistan its backyard due to its strategic importance. During the old 'great game' Russia played against the Britain for the security of the Central Asian Republics (CAR) which was dependent upon the control of Afghanistan as it is linked with the borders of CARs. During

that period northern Afghanistan was controlled by Russians and most of the Afghanistan was operated by British as per the conditions of Treaty of Gandamak.³⁶

During the cold war Afghanistan had same importance for the Soviet Union but no plan to invade. If we look at invasion by the Soviet Union, it seems that it was not preplanned or desired attack rather, it was a combination of misinformation, confusion and the urge of Afghanistan's government to deploy the Soviet Union's military in the country. This was evident from an unclassified document of the Soviet Union about a meeting of Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. If we analyze the document it seems that after the tensions rose in Herat, a meeting of Politburo was called. In that meeting the leaders discussed, that should the Soviet Union send their troops to Afghanistan or not? Some members of the committee agreed to send while others rejected the idea. On the other hand, Afghanistan's PM Taraki was forcing the Soviet Union to send troops, while Amin, leader of communist political agenda, said that situation was under control, which further raised the misconceptions in the minds of the Soviets. But on the basis of their military personnel in Afghanistan and on Taraki's concerns the Soviet Union's Politburo finally decided to send their troops.³⁷ Similarly Afghanistan's urge to the Soviet Union to send their troops could also be analyzed in a telephonic conversation in which Taraki requested the Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin to send troops.³⁸

³⁶ Gibbs, "Does USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'?", 366.

³⁷ Moscow, "Meeting of Politburo of the central committee of the communist party of Soviet Union," *National Security Archives* (March 17, 1979), accessed November 17, 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs>. See Annex 1.

³⁸ Moscow, "Transcript of Telephonic Conversation between Premier Alexi Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Muhammed Taraki," *National Security Archives* (March 17 or 18, 1979), accessed November 17, 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs>. See Annex 2.

Another reason was the mistrust of the Soviet Union on the government of People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in Afghanistan which was also apparent from secret report in which Politburo clearly showed the incompetency of government to get support of people.³⁹ Hence, the Soviet Union finally invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

The invasion of Afghanistan raised questions. How the Soviet invasion shaped or reshaped the interests in Afghanistan? There could be many objectives for the Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan.

2.2 Objectives of the Soviet Union's Invasion:

2.2.1 Expansionism:

First could be the "Bear on the Move"⁴⁰ thesis which implied that the Soviets had expansionist agenda behind the invasion. This was the first time when the Soviets had put their steps outside the Eastern Europe, also known as Brezhnev doctrine, which states that once a state declared itself socialist it must remain socialist otherwise Soviet Union would intervene.⁴¹ The importance of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union and former's losing control over the internal affairs attracted later to invade.

³⁹ Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, "Ponomarev Report to CPSU on the Situation in Afghanistan," (June 18, 1979), accessed November 17, 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs>. See Annex 3.

⁴⁰ Rais Ahmad Khan, "US Policy towards Afghanistan," *Pakistan Horizon* 40, no. 1 (March 1, 1987): 70.

⁴¹ Moscow, "Transcript of Telephonic Conversation between Premier Alexi Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Muhammed Taraki," *National Security Archives* (March 17 or 18, 1979), accessed November 17, 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs>. See Annex 1.

2.2.2 Access to warm waters and oil:

Second was the control of warm waters and oil of Persian Gulf which concerned the Soviet Union. Afghanistan could provide a way to warm waters of Arabian Sea near Gulf.⁴² Besides that, it could get access to oil resources, which could easily be traded through Afghanistan to CARs and then to the Soviet Union.⁴³

2.2.3 Achieving national security:

Third is the school of thought who denied all these facts and build up their argument that it was merely the national security of the Soviet Union that forced it to invade Afghanistan. The reason behind insecurity was the normalization of diplomatic relations between US and China, and China's desire to get military hardware from West, gave birth to a sense of insecurity to the USSR that led to attack Afghanistan.⁴⁴

2.2.4 Grand Strategy:

Many people claimed that the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was the part of 'Grand strategy'.⁴⁵ But was it so, is the question here? To find out the answer the between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union has to be analyzed. But before starting analyzing the relations let's find out what Soviet grand strategy meant in case of Afghanistan. Grand strategy could define the Soviet Union invasion in three points.

⁴² Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "The Afghan Crisis and Pakistan's Security Dilemma," *Asian Survey* 23, no. 1 (March 1983): 229.

⁴³ Khalid Nawaz Khan, "Soviet Interests in Afghanistan and Implications upon Withdrawal," (B.A. / B.S.C Thesis, University of Baluchistan, 1986): 19-20.

⁴⁴ Yetiv, "How the Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan," 67-69.

⁴⁵ Gibbs, "Does USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'?", 365.

First, a world order dominated and controlled by one center that was Moscow. Second argument could be the uninterrupted expansion of the Soviet Union in the Third World. Third, Soviets thought that, the US would not come in Afghanistan after their defeat in Vietnam.

Soviets tried to influence Afghanistan during old 'great game' following the same patterns as it carried out after World War I. There were two reasons behind this influential role. First the moderating policies of the King Amanullah, that tilted him towards Axis, which was a trouble for the USSR, as it was with the Allies during First World War Second, the Soviet Union needed allies to sustain and spread the revolution, that took place in 1917, and to counter the prospects of counter-revolution in the Russia.

Russia due to the strategic importance of Afghanistan signed a treaty according to which former opened trade routes and provided later with economic and military aid.⁴⁶ Later, during World War II, Afghanistan alienated itself with axis, which gave a chance to the Soviet Union to have more influence in Afghanistan. Soviet Union had always tried to maintain its influence in Afghanistan but it did not wish to invade. It seems that Afghanistan was not the part of 'Grand Strategy' as the events from outside and the insecurity forced the Soviets to invade Afghanistan.⁴⁷ Hence, there are many reasons and objectives for USSR to invade Afghanistan as supported by many writers keeping in view different objectives.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 367.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 374-375.

2.3 Strategies to achieve objectives:

To achieve its objectives USSR used three tools, military, education and diplomatic

2.3.1 Military means:

To achieve its objectives in Afghanistan USSR used both diplomatic and military means. It deployed 118,000 troops, 500 helicopters, MiG-21s, MiG-23, few squadrons of Su-25, and new ground attack aircrafts along with the n army of 30,000 against 120,000 guerilla fighters.⁴⁸

2.3.2 Stop resistant supports:

The Soviet Union strategy also included to stop the recruitment of people in resistance groups by forcing them to migrate. To achieve this purpose Soviet destroyed villages and crops. It resulted in the migration of 3 million people to Pakistan and 2 million to Iran. During the war 80 percent of Afghan territory was influenced by the resistance forces. Soviet army tried to destroy the control of lines of communication.⁴⁹ Another important part of the Soviet strategy was to also attack the resistance supporter countries, mainly Pakistan. Due to this reason the Soviet and the Afghan artillery attacks against Pakistan killed 104 Pakistani people, including 200 airspace violations against Pakistan in 1985 which exceeded to 700 approximately in 1988.⁵⁰ Even during the peace talks in 1987 at Geneva 150 people of Pakistan were killed by Afghan aircraft.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Collin, "Soviet Policy towards Afghanistan," 203.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 204.

⁵⁰ Hilali, "Costs and Benefits," 10.

⁵¹ Collin, "Soviet Policy towards Afghanistan," 205.

2.3.3 Education:

Alongside this the Soviet Union tried to emphasize their focus on education of Afghan people so that the 10,000 people including 2000 military personnel getting training would control the affairs of Afghanistan in future, they were supposed to be pro-Soviet.⁵²

2.4 Failure of means to achieve ends:

Soviet thought that it would be an easy venture but the intervention of the US and Afghanistan resistance gave tough time to them. Military deployment strategies and implications of strategies not succeed. The main reason was the insufficiency of the Soviet troops to perform for a number of reasons.

2.4.1 Military Failure:

First, the Soviet Union military was trained to fight in Europe not in mountainous areas of Afghanistan. According to a source “it took a while for soldier to believe that majority of Soviet servicemen had first time seen mountains here”.⁵³ Second, dissatisfaction among the Soviet soldiers as observed in an interview with Soviet prisoners of war and the deaths by sanitation and disease problems. Third, was the poor off-road capacity of the Soviet forces. The Soviet military heavily relied upon air strikes which did not help to counter the resistance forces. Fourth, the failure to judge opponents’ intentions and rapid movement known as operational security observed in the Panjsher Valley operation where resistance forces had known the plan before the Soviet soldiers could do operation. Finally, the failure of airstrikes on which the Soviets were

⁵² Ibid., 204.

⁵³ Ibid., 205.

dependent during the war as they have failed in ground, due to the access of resistance with stringer and blowpipe missiles. From October to December 1986, 90 helicopters were shot down by rebels.

Soviet Union tried to overcome these issues especially by training their soldiers for mountainous land but failed as analyzed from different writings at that time. In an unassigned editorial *Voenny Vestnik* (Military Herald) it was stated that “we cannot be satisfied with what has been achieved” and that “units must improve training on mountaineering techniques, operation on separate axis, and operation with air-landed forces.”⁵⁴

2.4.2 Diplomatic Failure:

The invasion was a military as well as diplomatic failure for the Soviet Union. After the invasion, two most important countries Iran and Saudi Arabia who were already at distance from the USSR further distanced themselves. The US whose position had been weakened in the Gulf region after the fall of Shah of Iran, indirectly got strengthened by the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.

2.4.3. Iran:

After the Shah’s demise and the establishment of the Khomeini’s government, the Soviet Union failed to achieve their good relations with Iran. Iran who was already in seclusion with the USSR further propagated against it after the invasion of their Muslim brother country Afghanistan. The relations between both the countries were softening when Soviet-Iran military agreement for

⁵⁴ Ibid., 207.

three years was signed.⁵⁵ But the stance of people and also of the leader of Iran didn't get changed on the invasion. This could be well seen in the event when Afghan refugees attacked the Soviet embassy in Iran on the first and fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion. Iran also provided Afghan rebels with economic military and land resources to use it against Soviet Union. But all this didn't help US in a positive way because in spite of the need Iran didn't go to US but in case of Saudi Arabia US got positive response.

2.4.4. Saudi Arabia:

Saudi Arabia, unlike, Iran tried to ally itself with US due to the security threats. The fear of the Soviet southward expansion alarmed the Saudis. For this very reason and the role played by the US in the Gulf War further tilted Saudis towards the US. This was the reason that Saudi rejected the idea by Soviet Union to vacate the Persian Gulf by great powers. So, one of the major power in the Persian Gulf tilted toward the US which helped later to sustain its influence the oil rich region.

2.4.5. Iraq and Persian Gulf:

Same was the case for Iraq and other Persian Gulf states. The Soviets invasion not only alarmed the Gulf States but other states also changed their stance against it, like Egypt, Pakistan and China. Egypt went to that extent that they offered US to use "every facility to reach Gulf whenever any state in Gulf is threatened."⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Yetiv, "How the Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan," 64.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 67.

2.4.6. China:

China showed the same threats due to its commitments to Pakistan's security and urged US to help Pakistan in this situation. For this very reason China sold Pakistan military and navy like petrol boats, Mig-19s and Tu-2 and Tu-16 bombers.⁵⁷ After these developments it was clear that the US had to respond to maintain its influence in the Gulf region by fighting and forcing Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. That is why the US decided to station its Rapid Deployment forces and initiated "strategic consensus"⁵⁸ which was to assure support of the US for the sake of regional security. But by using the force the USSR could not achieve desired results.

2.5 US response and interests in Afghanistan:

2.5.1 Response:

After the Soviet Union's invasion there was no option left for the US, except to get involved in Afghanistan. After the invasion, the US imposed sanctions on the USSR, under the "carter doctrine".⁵⁹ This doctrine focused on the use of military forces to defend its national interest in Persian Gulf if needed.

After the invasion by the USSR, the US increased its aid and also started to give military aid to Afghanistan resistance which was clear from the fact that aid in 1984 was \$75 million, \$280 million in 1985 and \$500 million in 1986.⁶⁰ These facts also lead to the second question that why

⁵⁷ Yetiv, "How the Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan," 68.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 72.

⁵⁹ Khan, "US Policy towards Afghanistan," 72.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 73.

US became so interested in Afghanistan and what were its objectives. There were multiple reasons and objectives of the US to engage itself in Afghanistan.

2.6 Objectives of the US in Afghanistan:

To the US and its foreign policy makers, Afghanistan was not a main concern, prior to the Soviet Union's invasion. There were two reasons behind this lack of concern. First, Afghanistan was a country lacking infrastructure and was having political instability. If the US had intervened in Afghanistan before the Soviet Union, then this engagement had created more commitments for this region.

Another reason was that the US was satisfied with the status quo. But later development in the internal politics of Afghanistan led the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan in the last week of 1979.⁶¹ Contrary to the US interests, Afghanistan had always been a vital country for the Soviet Union. After the Iranian revolution and the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan, the concerns started emerging among the policy makers of the US. Events like the revolution, the fall of Shah of Iran, who was an important ally of the US, installation of new pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan and the fall of President Muahmmad Daud on 27 April 1978, policy makers in the US drew their attentions towards Afghanistan. Prior to the Soviet invasion, the US left Afghanistan for rivalry between the Soviet Union and China.

2.6.1 Defeat of Soviet Union:

Objectives of the US in Afghanistan were the complete withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan. Second the US used nationalist for fighting against the USSR. By this way the US

⁶¹ Gibbs, "Does USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'?", 365.

achieved two goals, first that it would show that US was in favor of nationalism and second withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan. There were multiple objectives of the US, for which it made inroad in Afghanistan.

2.6.2 Control of oil of Persian Gulf:

The US policy towards Afghanistan could have also been the main focus of what it argues the Soviet Union for and that was the control of oil of Persian Gulf and warm waters of Arabian and Indian seas. The 'car culture'⁶² developed in the US, the roads, the bridges were the tangible elements, as focus during cold war was the oil and automobile resources of the world. Talking in context of cold war if we observe the policy of the US it seemed that it was much different in Afghanistan as compared to other areas around the world. The reason behind this could be that Afghanistan was never the part and focus of the US policy makers until the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. After the invasion, the US declared the third security zone of the west which included Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia.⁶³

President Jimmy Carter in an address to nation on 1980 said "The Soviet invasion poses an incredible threat... to the world's access to vital resources and to vital sea lanes."⁶⁴ After Jimmy Carter who in spite of being a Democrat spent a lot of money on defense budget. The next elected President Ronald Reagan who was a conservative and founder of term 'evil empire' continued the spending more vigorously.⁶⁵

⁶² Hartman, "The Red Template," 469.

⁶³ Ibid., 471.

⁶⁴ Raymond L. Garthoff, "Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan," *The Brookings Institute* (December 22, 1982): 1070.

⁶⁵ Hartman, "The Red Template," 472.

2.6.3 Unity at home:

The reason Afghanistan became so important for US was that at domestic level the US got united also. The legislative, executive branch as well as people supported to react against Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

2.6.4 Revenge of Vietnam:

The policy of the US towards Afghanistan was different from other areas because it was emotional and rational. The policy makers wanted to teach the lesson for their defeat in Vietnam and wanted to make Afghanistan a Vietnam for the Soviet Union as in the word of National Security Advisor of President Carter Brzezinski ‘to finally sow sit in their backyard.’⁶⁶

2.7 Strategies to achieve objectives:

2.7.1 Using resistance as a fighting tool:

During the Reagan administration the US started to engage itself fully into the Afghan war. Even before the start of war the US started meeting up the rebels who were fighting against the communists. After four days of the Soviet invasion the US started to give military assistance to ‘mujahedeen’ through CIA using the Pakistan intelligence service ISI who was a major ally and fighting partner for the US.

2.7.2 Proxy War:

US did not launch full scale war but played war by supplying rebels with devices linked to the US satellites, sniper rifles to kill the Soviet official. Soviet arms which were imported from

⁶⁶ Kurt Lohbeck, *Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitnesses to the CIA's Secrete War in Afghanistan* (Washington D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1993): 42.

Egypt and Turkey and Stringer Missiles which were best at that time were given to resistant. The land mines were given in massive amount to Afghanistan by the US and the Soviets. As a result of this, Afghanistan has more land mine per capita than any country in the world. By 1987 the US had given the massive amount of \$700 million per year to mujahedeen under the National Security Decision Directive Number 166.⁶⁷ US strategy included to arm the resistance in such substantial way that they could fight the Soviet troops. In an unclassified report it was said that resistant groups had the enough ammunition and modern weaponry but they lack air missile and in that report they were thinking to give air missile launchers to resistant. US were so confident that this report disclosed that even 50,000 more men of the Soviet Union could not alter the situation.⁶⁸

2.8 Pakistan as an ally:

2.8.1 Historical Background:

In launching its war against the USSR, the US major strategic partner was Pakistan. The relations between the US and Pakistan were not so good before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan was not an important ally unless the ‘third strategic zone’⁶⁹ was created. The relations between both countries had been underdeveloped due to many reasons; most prominent were the wars of 1965 and 1971, and nuclear issue.

Another reason was the shift in the foreign policy of the US which under the Carter administration changed from bilateral or regional to global issues. This shift further shackled the

⁶⁷ Hartman, “The Red Template,” 476.

⁶⁸ Directorate for Research, “Afghan Resistance (U),” *Directorate for Research* (October 25, 1982), accessed November 16, 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html#docs>. See Annex 4.

⁶⁹ Thornton, “Between the stools?,” 966.

already shackled relations between both the countries. The democratic government was overthrown by a military general in Pakistan which was against the democratic agenda of the US. The condition further got bad when a democratic leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged in the reign of a dictator and the development of 'Islamic punishments' which were considered against the US humanitarian agenda.

Another problem was the close ties of the US with India. The visit of President Carter to India while neglecting the Pakistan was also felt to heart by the Pakistanis.⁷⁰ A further most important issue was the buildup of nuclear weapons by the Pakistan. These global issues were emphasized by President Carter's administration. But Pakistan was the victim of these issues and the parts of things which the US wanted to eliminate. So, the relations between Pakistan and the US were under turmoil but as soon as the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan became the top priority on the list of the US over the night. When the Soviet attacked Afghanistan, the US chose to be an ally Pakistan.

2.8.2 Improving relation:

Pakistan demanded too much cost to be an ally in the eyes of the US and what the US offered was just 'peanuts' for Pakistan.⁷¹ But when Zia paid a visit to the US in 1980 the deal was finalized because of the Secretary of State Warren Christopher and NSA Brzezinski's diplomatic efforts. Although there were many doubts in the minds of the Americans at the time of making Pakistan an ally against the Soviet Union like suitability of Pakistan for the US security design,

⁷⁰ Ibid., 965.

⁷¹ Lawrence Wright, "The Double Game: The unintended consequences of American funding in Pakistan," *The New Yorker*, May 16, 2011, accessed December 21, 2015, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/16/the-double-game>.

the agenda of Carter administration upon global issues and the priorities of the Pakistan were different from those of the US. Pakistan was not a proponent of the US new agenda but its geostrategic location was so important that the US could not have launched and won war against the Soviet Union.

Importance of Pakistan was shown by the Chief of Near East and South Asian Division of CIA's Directorate of operation from 1979-1984, Charles G Cogan said "we took the means to wage war, put them in the hands of people who could do so, for the purpose of which we agreed".⁷² So, finally passing through thick and thins Pakistan became an ally of the US for the Soviet-Afghan war. Pakistani intelligence agency worked in collaboration with CIA, Pakistani land was used to train mujahedeen to fight in Afghanistan, and madrasas were built in Pakistan like never before.

2.9 Casualties, concluding and withdrawing from Afghanistan (Geneva accords, 1988):

2.9.1 Casualties:

Thus a proxy war started in Afghanistan which costed all the parties. According to the Moscow official figures there were 13,000 soldiers who were killed and 35,500 were wounded. In Afghanistan according to the UN, over one million people were killed, six million flee their country, and three million displaced in Afghanistan.⁷³ Pakistan also suffered from this war as Pakistan provided food, and shelter to Afghan people as a result of migration. Nearly three million refugee entered Pakistan. Beside that there were arms smuggling, bombing, narcotics and

⁷² Hartman, "The Red Template," 475.

⁷³ Agha shahi, "The Geneva Accords," *Pakistan Horizon* 61, no. 1 (2008): 174

air strikes in Pakistan. For the US, there was an economic burden. According to estimation there were 2 billion dollars' arms supplied to mujahedeen by CIA.⁷⁴ But as the time passed the Soviet Union got frustrated in Afghanistan. With Mikhail Gorbachev coming to power, who considered this invasion as a mistake, the Soviets tried to pull out their army from Afghanistan and after the effort of nine months Geneva Accords of 1988 concluded this war.

2.9.2 Withdrawal:

The US, the USSR, Pakistan and Afghanistan on April 14, 1988 reached to a settlement after the Geneva Accords of 1988 was signed. This agreement came to force on May 15, 1988. The main purpose of this accord was the withdrawal of every actor (the US, the Soviet Union, and Pakistan) from Afghanistan. There would be no military support of any kind to Kabul either from the USSR or the US. Pakistan would maintain its good relations with Afghanistan and stop the infiltration of any kind. The main four points of Geneva Accords were:⁷⁵

1. Bilateral agreement was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the Principle of Mutual Relations especially on noninterference and nonintervention.
2. Declaration on International Guarantees that both the USSR and the US would respect the integrity and sovereignty and non-align status of Afghanistan.
3. Return of volunteer refugees to their homes.
4. Withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan started after 15 may, one half would be withdrawal by 15 August 1988 and process had to be completed in nine months.

⁷⁴Ibid., 174

⁷⁵ Rosanne Klass, "Afghanistan: The Accords," *Foreign Affairs* (1988): 2-4.

Thus a process of withdrawal started but the involvement of the USSR and funding didn't stop to Afghanistan as it was evident from the declassified report of CIA in which they clearly mentioned that the Soviet Union would not stop aiding the pro-Soviet regime in the Afghanistan.⁷⁶ After the collapse of the USSR, the US stopped any kind of aid to Afghanistan and even closed its embassy in Afghanistan.

Leaving Afghanistan in such a way was not appreciated by many US scholars. The concerns proved right when Afghanistan once again became the problem for the US after 9/11 incident. But at that time it was considered in the US that after the Soviet withdrawal there would not be any major activity in Afghanistan as whoever the government would be it would only try to strengthen its position. This was evident from the DIA report in which it was clear that after the withdrawal the new government would only try to strengthen its position and the focus of mujahedeen would merely be resistance.⁷⁷ Same concerns shown by another report in which certain scenarios were discussed after the Soviet withdrawal and report said that Najeeb's regime might fall and the new government might be Islamist but they would maintain only friendly relations with Soviet Union not dependent upon them.⁷⁸ So there was no need to worry about the coming government in Afghanistan. Hence, depending upon these evidences and perception, the US also withdrew completely without addressing Afghanistan's stability, institutional development and especially the left out of what US created 'mujahedeen'.

⁷⁶ DIA, "Afghanistan: The War in Perspective," *Directorate of Central Agency* (November 1988), accessed November 16, 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html#docs>. See Annex 5.

⁷⁷ DIA, "Afghanistan: Soviet Withdrawal Scenario (U)," *Directorate of Central Agency* (May 9, 1988), accessed November 16, 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html#docs>. See Annex 6.

⁷⁸ DIA, "USSR: Withdrawal from Afghanistan," *Directorate of Central Agency* (March 1988), accessed November 16, 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html#docs>. See Annex 7.

The situation in Afghanistan didn't get stabilized even after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. The Afghan society which was composed of different ethnic groups, the differences between the government factions formed after the Soviet withdrawal, less sense of nationalism, drug mafia became stronger and most importantly the rise of Taliban. The sudden withdrawal of the US made Afghanistan less prone to development because Afghanistan had always been the hub of international players, so it was obvious that without the support of any external power Afghanistan would not be able to cope with the existing problems.

With the rise of Taliban government deteriorated the situation in Afghanistan because this was the development that hurt the Afghanistan most; Al Qaeda started to set its steps on the soil. This development was again going to write a new chapter in the history of world, Afghanistan and especially for the world power-US. Afghanistan was in turmoil after the withdrawal of both the superpowers. The vacuum was created after the both superpowers withdrawal. This vacuum was filled by the interested groups in the Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda, which operated secretly at the beginning in Afghanistan, later, spread its steps to other conflict zones showing its anti-American sentiments throughout the world.⁷⁹ Hence, the destabilized situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of both great powers left Pakistan with heavy implications domestically as well as in relations with Afghanistan.

⁷⁹ Omar Farooq Zain, "Afghanistan from Conflict to Conflict," *Pakistan Horizon* 59, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 83.

Chapter 3

Implications for Pakistan: Assertive Approach

3.1 Afghanistan after war:

After the withdrawal of both great powers from Afghanistan, there was turmoil which according to RSCT had a spillover effects upon its neighbors. The effect bearer was mainly Pakistan as it played an active role in Afghanistan; others include Russia, Iran, China, and US. This mini complex (Afghanistan) had engaged all these countries in its security complex. This mini complex was very diverse as it was composed of Hazaras, Pashtoons, Uzbeks, Tajik people etc. There are other groups also including Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan had their engagements in this mini security complex.

Pakistan supported Pushtoon for the reason that the Pustoons of Afghanistan had close ties with Pasthoons of Pakistan. Similarly, every other state had its affections. On the other hand, states which do not share border with Afghanistan could feel the effects like China in Xinjiang and Russia in Chechnya.⁸⁰ But the focus of this chapter is to analyze the policy of Pakistan towards Afghanistan and the effects later had upon former. But before analyzing the foreign policy of Pakistan it is necessary to have a look upon the interest of major powers in Afghanistan after the withdrawal. It is important because Afghanistan became top priority of Pakistan after 1992. The rapid withdrawal by the US and the USSR became more troublesome for Afghanistan and also for Pakistan.

⁸⁰ Tahir, "Pakistan's Afghan Policy," 25.

3.2 Role of Great Powers after Withdrawal:

The USSR breakdown once again brought Afghanistan to the lime light but failed to get attention of any great power. The emergence of newly independent CAR states, enriched in its energy resources including oil and gas gained the attention of great powers. For instance, Turkmenistan has second largest oil resources.⁸¹ CARs were formerly controlled by the USSR. But after the independence shortest route to access the resources of CARs was through Afghanistan. Another reason that drew the attention of major powers was the element of terrorism. With the Taliban coming into power, it was considered that the main home of terrorists was Afghanistan. The spread of Islamic fundamentalism caused deep concern for Russian, China and Iran and later the US.

3.2.1 Russia:

After withdrawal, the interest of both great powers declined in Afghanistan. Russia just blamed Afghanistan for the terrorist infiltration and accused Pakistan forces for the support of Taliban. Due to this Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Psuvalyuk on 7-8 June 1999 paid a visit to Islamabad foreign office to remove the mistrust.⁸² Similarly in the same time span Pakistan Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub visited Moscow. In a statement they declared that both are willing for a stable and broad-based government in Afghanistan. Pakistan denied charges of presence of

⁸¹ Simon Pirani, "Central Asia and Caspian Gas Production and the Constrains on Export," The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (December, 2012): 20.

⁸² Tahir, "Pakistan's Afghan Policy," 27.

Pakistani soldiers on Afghanistan.⁸³ But no special efforts were shown by Russia to resolve the problems of unstable Afghanistan.

3.2.2 US:

On the other hand, it seemed that the US completely neglected the Afghanistan after withdrawal. The US didn't consider reviving diplomatic talks even after the civil war, and formation of Taliban government in Afghanistan. The reason behind this could be the engagements in Middle East, challenges posed by China were the main focus of the US. But the issue of Osama Bin Ladin for trial and drug trafficking latter concerned the US. According to a survey total area used for opium poppy cultivation in 2014 was 224,000 hectares, seven percent increase from past year.⁸⁴ The US tried to break down the deadlock between parties in Afghanistan and nearly succeeded in UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) in 1999 but failed to achieve the desired result.⁸⁵ Finally US imposed sanctions on the Taliban regime which instead of bringing any fruitful results further isolated Afghanistan from the influence of great power. As a result, disengagement provided Afghanistan with more instability in political, military and economic sector, resulting in bad effects upon its neighbors also.

3.3 Effects on Pakistan:

Pakistan was affected by these developments in Afghanistan. The aftermath effects of this war could be seen in every aspect of Pakistani society. It had economic, political, social and ecological effects. As defined and described by the theory that the threat of nearer states is more

⁸³ Ibid., 27.

⁸⁴ United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014," *United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime* (November, 2014): 6.

⁸⁵ Tahir, "Pakistan's Afghan Policy," 30.

vulnerable, means that Pakistan and Afghanistan are more vulnerable to each other. The spillover effect of the mini complex badly affected its neighbor country. The effects were so enormous that Pakistani society itself shackled and faced enormous losses in different field of life. The composition of the society got affected and people got frustrated because of these reasons.

3.3.1 Burden of refugees:

One of the most important elements that affected Pakistan during and after afghan war was the burden of refugees from Afghanistan. Afghans started to migrate towards Pakistan after the Saur revolution 1978 and the strength kept of increasing during the war period. Nearly 3 million refugees took refuge in Pakistan that formed almost one third of the Afghan population.⁸⁶ There were 368 camps settled for the refugees in the province of Baluchistan and KPK (former NWFP). According to a source the expenditure of registered refugees in 1985, for one year was one million. Pakistan paid the fifty percent of this amount and fifty percent was paid by international agencies and donors. That fifty was indeed a heavy burden on Pakistan.⁸⁷

Migration at such massive level created many hurdles for Pakistan. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees it was estimated that refugees brought nearly 45,000 camels and 25,000 donkeys for commercial purpose.⁸⁸ This caused some serious resentment among the local over the control of grazing lands. This also affected the ecology of green areas. Besides that, refugees also involved themselves into the transport business. According to an estimate

⁸⁶ Hilali, "Costs and Benefits," 8.

⁸⁷ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan," 41, no. 1 (January 1988): 27.

⁸⁸ Grand M. Faar, "Afghan refugees in Pakistan: definitions, reparation and ethnicity," in *The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism*, ed. Ewan W. Enderson, and Nancy Hatch Dupree (New York: Pinter Publisher, 1990): 141.

there were 6000 Afghan vehicles on 'temporary registration license' and many unregistered.⁸⁹ The resentments started emerging among the locals because they considered this to their economic disadvantage. Despite the border was closed in 1999 still there were 5000 Afghan refugees that came to Pakistan. Unlike Iran, Pakistan was not able to control this flow and the Afghan refugees spread all over the urban areas of Pakistan.

3.3.2 Smuggling:

The smuggling of things from Afghanistan to Pakistan and vice versa started. Alongwith the refugees Pakistan suffered a shortage of wheat due to its smuggling. The real problem started after the Afghan tax free import via Pakistan. Thing started to move into the Pakistani markets without any taxes. There were hardly any markets in the major cities that didn't buy smuggled things. These smuggled thing caused the loss of \$ 4.7 billion annually in 1993 of the government financial lost revenue.⁹⁰

3.3.3 Drugs:

The drug mafia became the strong holder of the society in Afghanistan that ultimately influenced the Pakistan. Poppy was send to Pakistan for refinement and then transfer to rest of the world. There were about 100-200 refineries working in NWFP province of Pakistan under the supervision of governor (Retd) General Fazal-ul Haq.⁹¹ The effects of this could be seen on Pakistan by the fact that the number of drug addicts increased from 124,000 in 1983 to 450,000

⁸⁹ Hilali, "Costs and Benefits," 9.

⁹⁰ Sultan Ahmad, "Rs. 100 bn worth smuggling Subverts the Economy," *Dawn*, November 5, 1993.

⁹¹ Hilali, "Costs and Benefits," 13.

in 1987. It didn't stop after the end of Soviet Afghan war and till 1991 there were 3.5 million drug addicts in Pakistan.⁹²

3.3.5 Sectarianism:

Another most important element that got rooted in the Pakistani society was the element of sectarianism. Pakistan used Islam as a tool to gather the mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. This Islamic background later hurt the Pakistan most, which is still suffering from this element. During the war the madaris were built in massive amount especially in the region of FATA. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan this madaris culture became dilemma of Pakistan. This islamization policy created different sects in the country and promoted culture of intolerance. This culture spread throughout the country and caused heavy losses. As a result, many casualties were observed. The major incidents were the killing of 2000 people, injuring of 561 in Punjab in 1990 during 234 sectarian incidents. Same was observed in Karachi and NWFP where 529 people had been killed in 864 different sectarian events.⁹³ The society got so intolerant that they started using barrel of gun to resolve a conflict.

Pakistan suffered from problems like drug smuggling, arms proliferation and black market. Although Pakistan managed to control the situation having 'success story' in managing drug crop according to UN but it was unstoppable. Besides that, Pakistan faced blames from Afghan opposition and rest of the world. Afghan opposition blamed Pakistan for supporting specific groups in Afghanistan with money, and military power. On the other hand, Pakistan lost its credibility of a reliable state in the eyes of west due to its political, economic, and social chaos.

⁹² Ikramul Haq, *Pakistan from Hash to Heroin* (Lahore: Annoor Print and Publishers, 1991), 30.

⁹³ Hilali, "Costs and Benefits," 15.

This affected Pakistan's role in region. It had affected the relations with Russia and China. Pakistan needed close ties with China to balance India in the South Asian region and also close ties with Russia.⁹⁴

After discussing the effects of Afghanistan war and the withdrawal of both great powers it was obvious that the policy maker at that time could not have left Afghanistan on its own. If Pakistan had left it on its own fate, then the situation in Afghanistan had gone worst which had more bad affects upon Pakistan. After the war, Pakistan needed the involvement of Afghanistan to work on issues faced during the Soviet-Afghan War. Hence policy makers at that time decided not to leave Afghanistan in isolation and engaged itself into the Afghanistan.

3.4 Objectives of Pakistan after withdrawal:

The purpose that Pakistani policy makers had always in mind while formulating their Afghan policy was the establishment of a friendly government in Kabul because that could only serve the best interest of Pakistan. Second was the access to the resources of the CARs after getting independence from the USSR. Pakistan policy toward Afghanistan after the withdrawal can be discussed into two phases:

3.4.1 From 1992 to 1995:

During this time span the condition of historically weak Afghanistan bear certain blowbacks. One of important was the conservative society. The society thus formed was divided into different ethnic groups each struggling for power and back stabbing each other. Even the UN granted Islamic State of Afghanistan a seat in the general assembly but later failed to achieve the

⁹⁴ Tahir, "Pakistan's Afghan Policy," 35.

criteria of a sovereign state and control over its territory. This could be well observed in a report by UN Commission on Human Rights as:

“Whilst the Foreign office of Afghanistan may appear to demonstrate the features of a central government when viewed from abroad, this is misleading because there is still no effective government which truly represents the country’s political forces and segments of a population. An arm struggle is still going on between government forces and militant groups headed by political leaders and field commanders, and even struggle along ethnic and religious lines.”⁹⁵

Policy of Pakistan regarding Afghanistan was not an easy task to perform. The difficulty which Pakistan had to face at that time was the lack of any kind of international support. “The entire political community had no political strategy for Afghanistan after 1992-1994.”⁹⁶ After the withdrawal of both great powers, Pakistan was left on its own to manage its relation and foreign policy regarding Afghanistan. Other difficulties while policy formations were; that Afghanistan was divided on ethnic, sectarian and regional line.

There were many groups who were stake-holders within Afghanistan. No single group ever ruled with the consent of other groups. There had always been opposition within the Afghanistan to put down each other’s regime. Second was the involvement of great powers in this region that didn’t pay much space to both countries Pakistan and Afghanistan to understand and outline the common interests. This confusion divided the Pakistan policy that whether Pakistan would ally itself to one particular group or work for the betterment and stability of Afghanistan as a whole. Pakistan chose to support a particular group instead of accommodating all Afghanistan’s group.

⁹⁵ Felix Ermacora, “Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan,” *United Nation Commission on Human Rights* (February 18, 1993).

⁹⁶ Khan, “Understanding Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban,” 153.

Thus Pakistan's policy at that time could not be understood without determining the position of a particular group supported by Pakistan. After the withdrawal, Pakistan mostly supported the group composed of Pashtoons.

In the absence of a consensus and a strong government it was not possible to have a controlled situation in Afghanistan after withdrawal. The differences between the PM Gullbaddin Hikmatyar and Defense Minister Ahmad Shah increased the situation of instability in Afghanistan. The difference between both were not ideological or operational rather personal. Another problem Afghanistan faced at that time was the political figures that rose after the withdrawal. Each political figure represented a particular ethnic group and strived for power in the center. These groups who worked as resistance groups during the war replaced the old sardars, and maliks. These later groups were much less educated, selfish and power seekers. That composition of Afghan society instead of solving problem further created problems as it was impossible to accommodate all the groups. The personal clashes between them also were a disturbing factor. This could be well observed when Hikmatyar was again offered to become PM but could not due to the threats posed by forces of Dostum. Dostum represented Tajiks groups.⁹⁷ The government running at that time lacked legitimacy and enough capabilities to govern.

Pakistan goals during this time period didn't get affected even by the changes in its domestic politics. By the end of cold war, Pakistan shifted from authoritarian to democratic rule. The structure of Pakistani government was changed but the nature of foreign policy remained the same because of position of military in political arena. The threat of martial law dominated the perceptions of civilian leaders. During a time period of nearly ten years four civilian government

⁹⁷ Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence*, 170.

were changed, none completing its tenure. The main reason behind this was the involvement of ISI in forming and deforming the governments. The demise of PM Nawaz's government in 1993 by the president of Pakistan was due to the pressure from GHQ. In the words of Hasan Askari Rizvi that army could not allow "attempts to tamper with the military's autonomy and professional interests".⁹⁸ It is said that military influenced nearly every province and political party to have a check upon the civilian government.⁹⁹ So, it was clear that why the policies of Pakistan towards Afghanistan didn't get changed and remained the same as it was during an authoritarian rule.

Another reason behind this continuation of the policy was the Indian held Kashmir. Pakistan wanted to have a friendly government in Kabul to oust the Indian influence from Afghanistan. Pakistan promoted the same culture of Jihad in Kashmir because they thought that it would work in the same way in Kashmir as it did in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.

After the downfall of Nawaz's government elections were held and PPP's Benazir Bhutto elected as the prime minister. Army once again tried to the civilian government. Even the PM instead of making civilian government more strong "appeared intent on developing her own relation with army, confirming its role in Pakistani politics."¹⁰⁰

Pakistan continued its struggle to stabilize Afghanistan. Pakistan focused the same policy as it was during the Soviet-Afghan war, which was to support certain factions in Afghanistan. There

⁹⁸ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 2013), 277.

⁹⁹ Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence*, 172.

¹⁰⁰ Mahmood Monshipouri and Amjad Samuel, "Development and Democracy in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 35, no. 11 (November 1995): 984.

were seven religious parties that were formed after the Soviet Invasion and two secular parties.¹⁰¹ Pakistan historically chose to ally itself with religious groups in 1983 and aid that given to only that group that belonged to one of these parties. The groups that strengthened and received maximum of aid was the Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami due to its close ties with Jammat-e-Islami.¹⁰² Pakistan after the downfall of Najibullah in Afghanistan supported the interim government of Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and later his successor's Burhanuddin Rabbani government, which was according to the Peshawar accord.¹⁰³ Interim government was installed but situation got worsened when the interim government denied to work according to this plan. Ahmed Shah Masood and Rabbani tried to seek the help of both India and Russia to maintain its regime which frustrated Pakistan. Pakistan tried and forced interim regime to follow the accord but situation got bad when four Afghan hijackers were killed in Islamabad. To its reaction Pakistan embassy was attacked on which one employ was killed and injured many.¹⁰⁴

After the failure of Peshawar Accord, Pakistan tried once again to bring a stable government by signing Islamabad Accord of March 7, 1993. This accord focused to solve the difference between the Rabbani and Himatyar but could not achieve its desired goals. The continued selfish interest and changing alliances in Afghanistan, putt all efforts in vain. Beside that the role of regional powers in Afghanistan further detonated the condition as some groups were also supported by

¹⁰¹ Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's untold story* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992), 41-43. The seven parties were Hizb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan led by Rasool Syyaf; Harakat Inqilab-e-Islam of Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi; Jamiat-e-Islami of Burhanudin Rabbani (which included Commander Ahmad Shah Massood); National Islamic Front of Afghanistan led Pir Syed Ahmad Gillani; and National Liberation Front of Sibghatullah Mojaddedi. The secular ones included, Afghan Millat (Afghan Nation), a nationalist party and Shola-e-Javed, a pro-China communist party, as well as members of the royal family and their supporter

¹⁰² Khan, "Understanding Pakistan's Pro-Taliban," 151.

¹⁰³ NAKhtar, "Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban," 55.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 54

India, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This further complicated the situation for Pakistan to achieve its national interests in Afghanistan. The failure of Pakistan and Afghanistan to get desirable results gave birth to a new phenomenon in the country known as Taliban Movement.

Taliban movement's evolution gave a new sense of change in the foreign policy of Pakistan. After the denial of Rabbani-Masoud administration to back down according to Islamabad Accord and the close ties with India gave a sense of insecurity to Pakistan. Now, Pakistan started to utilize the other option that developed in Afghanistan and that was the support of Taliban militia. After 1994, the agenda of undermining the international recognition of Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) started by Pakistan.

Later, claimed that the Afghanistan had no legitimacy as it failed to have a control over the territory and affairs. Pakistan also remained silent on the Hikmatyar activities that also violated the accord, which was ironic. At that point of time Pakistan had understood that it had to take some serious and practical step to bring a more Islamabad oriented government in Afghanistan. For this very reason Pakistan started supported Taliban. How Taliban arouse is not the focus of study but why Pakistan supported them is the focus. Within Pakistan parties and groups like Pakistan Jamaat-i-islamia, and both factions of Fazlur Rehman and Sami-ul-Haq' Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam were also associated with Afghan Pashto Islamic factions.

With the passage of time these Islamic factions grew in Pakistan not in the border areas but also in the main cities like Peshawar and Lahore. Military played a central role in using these Islamists to achieve its national interest. By the 1995 Military has close links with these fundamental groups both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Along with this Pakistani establishment also controlled

the internal structure.¹⁰⁵ This could be well evident from the fact that Fazulur Rehman was selected as the chairman of Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, who was a close to military.¹⁰⁶ Taliban who made their debut in 1994 near Pak-Afghan border were allowed to move freely at border that helped them to gain material, military and intelligence help from Pakistan. With the support of Pakistan, Taliban started to get momentum in Afghanistan. Taliban managed to open the Kandahar to Chaman Highway that was vital for Pakistan trade with Central Asia. They also succeeded to convince Mullah Naqib, the governor appointed by Rabbani to surrender. From that stage the Taliban started to overtake the government and captured nearly 70 percent of the Afghanistan. But the story didn't end here because a new era of civil war started in the country and brought more troubles.

3.4.2 From 1996-2001:

The rise of Taliban marked as a new supporter of Pakistan's agenda in Afghanistan. By allying with Taliban, Pakistan wanted to eliminate the influence of other powers from Afghanistan like India. On the other hand, Pakistan thought that it would bring US closer to Pakistan. The policy makers presumed that US would appreciate the role of Pakistan in supporting Taliban because the control of Taliban would allow Pakistan to access the resources of CARs. By this it would indirectly help the US interests in CARs with the help of Pakistan. In this perspective Pakistan formulated its foreign policy.

The reason and logic behind this support to Taliban seemed that Pakistan had made its Afghan policy on the ground of its domestic policy. Pakistan after the independence used Islam as a tool

¹⁰⁵ Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence*, 188-190.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 190.

to unify itself internally. So, the structure created by elites of Pakistan after independence focused upon the Islam rather than any other means to harmonize the nation on one page. One example is the constitutions of Pakistan, the base of which is provided by the Objective Resolution of 1949.¹⁰⁷ Hence, Islam became the driving force of both internal and external policies of Pakistan, so it was natural for Pakistani policy makers to support religious factor in Afghanistan.

Another reason that tilted Pakistan towards Taliban was due the support of the US for religious forces against the Communist during cold war. That policy of Pakistan didn't change even after the end of cold war as it continued its support for Islamists in Afghanistan. Pakistan by supporting Taliban, succeeded to have a friendly government in Afghanistan and also to keep India at arm's length. But on the other hand Pakistan's relations with US got worsened as US found out that Osama Bin Ladin was settled in Afghanistan and he was responsible for attacking US embassies in Tanzania.¹⁰⁸ Pakistan kept on supporting Taliban, while neglecting the regional and international development; even the regime change in Pakistan could not alter the policies of Pakistan. Even the civilian governments supported this stance. Naseerullah Babar of PPP continued the support for pro-Taliban policies in spite of being a change in party's agenda.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, Pakistan's military supported this stance and it favored to support this pro-Taliban policy and stopped to close the madrasas near Afghan border.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (United Kingdom: Psychology Press, 1997), 194.

¹⁰⁸ Khan, "Understanding Pakistan's Pro-Taliban," 154.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 155.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 156.

All Taliban groups were accommodated and engaged through a controlled mechanism. Pakistan support to Taliban was increased by Pakistani establishment after they captured Herat in 1995. Herat had a particular importance in the context of Pakistan. Control over this ancient city would help Pakistan to get benefit from gas pipelines as was linked with Baluchistan, province of Pakistan.¹¹¹

During this time period Pakistan remains its focus on the Jihadist Pashtun. Taking advantage of resentments of Pashtuns who were victims of Rabbani's government became ally of Pakistan. They controlled the eastern and southern part of Afghanistan. The Pashtun military and bureaucratic elite of Pakistan also supported the same stance and visualized Pashtun as main pro-Pakistani element. Pakistani army provided substantial assistance to Taliban. It was evident from the fact that Pakistan Army's XI corps at Peshawar, that provided superior command, training, and guideline. Beside that retired military personals were attached to this movement.¹¹² Pakistan also played the role of financier of the Taliban along with the help of UAE and Saudi Arabia.

In 1997 after the change of government, the policy of pro-Taliban continued by Pakistan. The defeat of United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA), who was an anti-Taliban alliance led by Mahsud, further increased the importance of Taliban in the eyes of Pakistani establishment. Taliban were succeeding by controlling the Afghan territory. After the capture of Mazar-e-Shairf, the major northern city of Afghanistan, Pakistan continued its pro-Taliban policy. Pakistan recognized the Taliban government led by Mullah Omar. Although

¹¹¹ Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence*, 203.

¹¹² Brian Cloughley, *A History of Pakistan army: wars and insurrections* (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2002), 295.

Taliban lost control over Mazar-e-Sharif but it didn't affect the policy of Pakistan. The support remained with Taliban which gained further momentum after the arrival of Osama Bin Ladin.

Pakistani optimism and support continued for Taliban. The internal political and economic situation also indirectly provided grounds for Taliban policy. According to an estimated 135 million population of Pakistan was below the poverty line which helped the Islamic factions in the country to attract the youth towards this Jihadi culture. This youth than taught in the madaris were send in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Most of the madaris were supported by the international actors like Iran and Saudi, resulted in the clashes between different groups in Pakistan.

By the 1998, the Taliban had nearly defeated the UIFSA and controlled the most parts of Afghanistan. UIFSA that was composed of mostly non Pashtun groups gained support from Iran, India and Russia, but failed to fight against Pakistan sponsored Taliban.¹¹³ The support provided to UIFSA was insufficient to combat with the rival. This different group sponsoring brought turmoil between the relation of Iran and Pakistan. The incident of killing of Iran's diplomat in Mazar-e-Sharif, after the capturing of this area by Taliban, was felt to heart by the former. Iran accused Pakistan for supporting this incident and deployed its troop of 200,000 at the Afghan border.¹¹⁴

Beside Iran, the relation of Pakistan with US also got detracted. The issue of handing over Osama to US became the bone of contention between the both. Osama was accused of bombing on world trade center on 1993 and also working against the US throughout world. US also

¹¹³ DIA, Cable, "IIR [Excised]/ Veteran Afghanistan Traveler's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Exploitable Weaknesses," *Defense Intelligence Agency* (October 2, 2001), accessed December 25, 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/>. See Annex 8.

¹¹⁴ Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence*, 216.

pressurized Saudis but Afghanistan didn't agree to handover Osama to the US. The efforts of Pakistan to legitimize and accord recognition to Taliban rule went in vain. In response to Pakistan, US also forces UNOCAL to withdrawal from Afghanistan. While all these events were going on in Afghanistan, Kargil war started. The conflict moved ahead, pressure from Indian forces and US forced Pakistan to withdraw from the Kargil. Instead of all these events the support of Pakistan continued for Taliban. The stance of Pakistan regarding the legitimacy of Taliban in Afghanistan didn't get affect by such incident.

The results of this pro-Taliban policy were not according to expectations. The international image of Pakistan was damaged because of the western perception of Taliban's steps against women and their other religious practices. Pakistan also faced criticism from China and CARs due to which it failed to achieve desirable economic gains from later. Despite of all these developments, Pakistan didn't change its stance of favoring Taliban. Even after the clues of existence of Osama Bin Laden from Afghanistan was found. Hence, from this pro-Taliban policy gains were less and lost was more for Pakistan.

Chapter 4

US second inroad and withdrawal: War on Terrorism

4.1 US-Afghan war:

After the fall of twin towers, the US decided to invade Afghanistan again. The Afghanistan which had a historical background of attracting the major powers since the days of Great Game once again became the battleground for the US. Pakistan along with the Afghanistan became a top priority for the US. Former chose to ally itself with the US like it did during the Soviet-Afghan war. This was evident from the fact that like in Soviet-Afghan war once again, Pakistani land was used to supply logistics to the US ISAF forces in Afghanistan.

The mini complex once again attracted the major power, which according to RSCT had impacts on its neighboring states, mainly Pakistan. After the invasion of the US and the overthrow of Taliban government, chaos followed in Afghanistan which increased the commitments of the regime invader.

The US goals while waging the war were the destruction of Al-Qaeda, and stopping the use of Afghan soil being used for international terrorism. This was known as the “war on terrorism”¹¹⁵ doctrine of President Bush, was very clear that “either you are with us or against us”¹¹⁶. In

¹¹⁵ Jacqueline M. Gray, and Margaret A. Wilson, “Understanding the ‘War on Terrorism: Responses to 11 September 2001,” *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 1 (2006): 23.

¹¹⁶ John Vinocur, “U.S. question: with us, or against us?: Issue in sharp focus,” *The New York Times*, February 8, 2003, accessed march 24, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/06/news/06iht-assess_ed3__0.html.

achieving its objectives US with the support other states launched a full scale war against Al-Qaeda.

After entering into Afghanistan, the US goals increased due the dependence of primary interest on the other. The other interests include the establishment of more secure Afghanistan, development of more durable and reliable Afghan security forces, promotion of ideological agenda of democracy, using local support to end Taliban support, stopping the role of Pakistani establishment in the affairs of Afghanistan, clearance of Pakistani areas of FATA used for making instability in Afghanistan and operation of insurgent groups from that soil. These objectives of the US could be observed in unclassified documents. In a report to National Security Council by Secretary of Defense the primary objective was depicted in word “Deal with al-Qaeda in a manner that clearly signals the rest of world that terrorist and terrorism will be punished.”¹¹⁷ The other objectives that were the using of local against the Taliban and achieving it humanitarian agenda could be seen in a memorandum by Secretary of Defense Office to President: “indirect (through local non-U.S. forces), in coordination with and in support of opposition group . . . direct use of U.S. forces initially primarily to deliver logistics, intelligence, and other support to opposition groups and humanitarian supplies to NGOs and refugees.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Secretary of Defense, “U.S. strategy in Afghanistan,” *Department of Defense* (October 16, 2001), accessed January 12, 2016, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc18.pdf>. See Annex 9.

¹¹⁸ Secretary of Defense, “Strategic Thought,” *Department of Defense* (September 30, 2001), accessed January 12, 2016, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc13.pdf>. See Annex 10.

4.2 US objectives and strategies:

4.2.1 US military strategy:

To achieve its goal of overthrowing the Taliban regime the US at the first hand used the military tactics. On October 7, 2001 “Operation Enduring Freedom” was started. Under this operation 1000 soldiers, with the support of airstrike, and CIA cooperation started operation against Taliban regime. On October 21st, the US also deployed its 1300 marine forces near the Kandhar to pressurize the Taliban. After the US forces and their coalition forces, namely Northern Alliance, was able to capture Kabul, the Taliban rule ended. The leader of Taliban Mullah Muhammad Umar fled the country. As a result, the “major combat” came to end on May 1, 2003.¹¹⁹

But, the tension didn’t end with the downfall of Taliban regime. An insurgency was started in the country. That insurgency and the commitment not to leave the Afghanistan until it’s stabilize enough to fight its own security threats increased the US’s military engagement. Hence, from 2003-2006 US launched many operations against the insurgent groups. These operations included “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003), “Operation Avalanche” (December 2003), “Operation Mountain Strom” (July 2004), “Operation Lightning Freedom” (February 2005), and “Operation Pill” (October, 2005).¹²⁰ In spite of all these operations insurgency was gaining the momentum in the country instead of slowing down. In the word of Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen, “I’ m not sure that we’re winning war.”¹²¹ Taking the situation into consideration the US decided to increase its troops by 39,000 in 2008 from 30,000

¹¹⁹ Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,” 8.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 23

¹²¹ Ibid., 24.

in 2006. Number of troops of allied countries also increased. After President Obama's coming into power troops increased to 100,000. This was announced by Obama in the West Point Academy on December 1, 2009 to send 30,000 additional troops against the rising insurgency.¹²²

4.2.2 Promoting Ideological Agenda:

Although not primary at the first hand, but one of the important strategies of the US, in making Afghanistan a stable country was the development of democratic institutions in the country. Following this line of action Afghanistan elected its President in 2004. In continuation of this process the elections were held for the Parliament. On September 18, 2005 Afghanistan elected its first Parliament. The elections were held under the supervision of UN-Afghan Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) and declared successful. These were the first such parliamentary election since 1969 and conducted under the obligation of Bonn agreement.¹²³

In these elections people voted for the lower house or Wolesi Jirga (People's Council) and Shura-e-Welayati (Provincial Councils). This was a benchmark in the history of Afghanistan and also a success for the US in making Afghanistan a democratic state. The most important development was that nearly 10 percent of the women contested in the election. One third of seats were reserved for women in a society where they were considered as the lower section of the society.¹²⁴

¹²² The White House, "Remarks by the President in Address to Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan," *The White House*, December 1, 2009, accessed April 2, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.

¹²³ Nasreen Gufran, "Afghanistan in 2005: The Challenges for Reconstruction," *Asian Survey* 46, no. 1, (Jan/ Feb, 2006): 86.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 86.

Although it was big event but the other side of coin told a different story. The voter turnout was much lower than expected. The turnout was 50 percent in contrast to 70 percent in presidential election.¹²⁵ There were many reasons behind this lower turn out. First, was the failure of central government to deliver, which hurt the people. Second factor was the fear created by the Taliban. Although there were not any major casualties during the polling day but the fear of opposing forces might had led to the lower turnout. Third element was that the mostly candidates were either the landlords or from Taliban faction.¹²⁶ This led the people to think that they were fighting against these forces and if they were joining the electoral system then what these elections were meant. Fourth was the exclusion of migrant's votes. In presidential elections with the help of International Organization of Migrants (IOG), migrants were able to vote for President. But the President's failure to develop a system through which they could vote was unseen. Government stance was that if migrants wanted to vote they would have come to their homes first, which it seems was not possible at that time.

Beside the voter's turnout problems there were also many problems in election process. Government failed to conduct election for Shura Woleswali (District Council) on time. The election results were delayed which created suspicions in the mind of people. The final results were also not up to the expectations when the members of communist parties, former Taliban, and war lords secured seats into the National Assembly.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Carlotta Gall, and Somini Sengupta, "Afghan Voters Takes Next Step to Democracy," *The New York Times*, September 19, 2005, accessed May 17, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/19/world/asia/afghan-voters-take-next-step-to-democracy.html>.

¹²⁶ Gufran, "Afghanistan in 2005," 86.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 86.

This process continued and Afghanistan witnessed its third round of election in 2014. In this election, Ashraf Ghani, former Finance Minister was elected as the President of Afghanistan. But the tension created when the runner up, Abdullah Abdullah, former Foreign Minister, called this election a rigged one. He called for the audit of votes and it was done but Ghani succeeded in securing the seat. Keeping the situation in view, the US Secretary of State, John F. Kerry visited Kabul and broke a deal. According to this deal a new post of Chief Executive Officer was created and the US asked President Ghani to appoint Abdullah as the chief.¹²⁸ This sharing of power faced criticisms that in short run it might be a good option, but in long run it would create problems. As in the word of former deputy minister of finance and political analyst “The people voted for only one of them and did not vote to divide the country and divide the power.”¹²⁹ “Of course there will be disagreement, and it will be hard work that it stays on track,” another official said.¹³⁰

Whatever the situation was during the election and will be after the election, one achievement came into the basket of the US that was the establishment of the democratic institutions. Since the US entered into Afghanistan, three elections were held. This was a benchmark in the history of Afghan, as a fragile political system started moving towards a more stable democratic system. This also helped the US, as it got the credit of promoting its ideological agenda, at national and international level.

¹²⁸ Tim Cragg, “U.S.-brokered accord to salvage Afghanistan presidential election face new problem,” *The Washington Post*, August 26, 2014, accessed May 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-brokered-accord-to-salvage-afghan-presidential-election-faces-new-challenge/2014/08/26/c314487a-2d16-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story.html.

¹²⁹ Tim Cragg, “Ghani named winner of Afghan election, with share power with rival in new government,” *The Washington Post*, September 21, 2014, accessed May 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ghani-abdullah-agree-to-share-power-in-afghanistan-as-election-stalemate-ends/2014/09/21/df58749a-416e-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

4.2.3 Gaining support of the masses:

“Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan, the main purpose of which was the elimination of Taliban and Al-Qaeda network from Afghanistan, became the policy of the US. But this time, war increased the commitments of the US unlike in previous Soviet-Afghan war. This time the US decided not to depart from Afghanistan until the objectives had been achieved fully. The US first agenda while invading in words of a navy officer “fangs-out, kill-kill-kill culture . . . the mind set was, maximum number of enemies killed, maximum number of bombs on deck, to achieve a maximum number of psychological effects.”¹³¹ While using such a military strategy, also have some implications.

There were civilian casualties from air strikes. The numbers of civilians killed from 2001 to 2013 were as following: 12349 killed by Anti-government elements, 3547 by pro-government, 1950 by air strikes, and more than 1000 in other instances like search operations.¹³² Killings of civilians at such massive levels were definitely had to have an effect. So, it was obvious that a change in the strategy of the US was needed, a plan that could cost less civilian deaths or in an appropriate term ‘normal accidents’.¹³³ The unintended, unintentional, but foreseeable effects of a war are known as ‘normal accidents’, and in case of Afghanistan it was the killing of civilian during military operations.

There were many incidents that happened during military operations, causing resentment among the US population, Afghan people, and rest of the world. Incidents like Dah Rawood district

¹³¹ C.J. Chivers, “A Changed Way of War in Afghanistan’s Skies,” *The New York Times*, January 15, 2012, accessed June 1, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2012/01/16/world/asia/afghan-war-reflects-changes-in-air-war.html?_r=1&ref=world.

¹³² Suhrke, “From Principle to Practice,” 101.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 103.

where people were celebrating a wedding ceremony and firing guns, a US AC-130 plane came and caused 89 deaths and 200 wounded according to UN team.¹³⁴ Although stats were different from different NGO's and the US, but one thing was sure that civilians were killed. Many other such incidents happened where people, NGO's protested, and even the Afghan government blamed the US for innocent human casualties.

Criticism for everywhere, the US decided to revise its policy. People became its focus. By this way the US could achieve three goals. First and most important, it could get the support of local Afghan people that would ultimately stop the recruitment of people into the insurgent groups and sympathy for their cause. Second, the US could become the champion of humanitarian purpose even in the war. Third, it would justify the war on terrorism at home.

As a result, to win the support of masses Counter-Insurgency (COIN) was started, and a three star headquarter was established at Kabul to see the political and military sides of the missions.¹³⁵ This helped in the less civilian casualties from 2003 to 2005. It was the same era when the US launched attack against Iraq. But later from 2006-2008 again the number of civilian casualties arouse. This was evident from the fact that the number of bombs fell in two months of 2008, were equal to the number of bombs fell in 2006. As a reaction to this, UN passed resolution 1806 which enabled the United Nation assistance mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to investigate and ensure civilians lives.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Brian Knowlton, "UN Report Suggests Higher Afghan Death Count in the U.S. Strikes," *The New York Times*, July 30, 2002, accessed February 11, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2002/07/30/news/30iht-report_ed3_.html.

¹³⁵ David W. Barno, "Fighting "the Other War:" Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan. 2002-2005," *Military Review* (September-October 2007): 32-44.

¹³⁶ Suhrke, "From Principle to Practice," 108.

UN active program, NGO's reporting about the civilian's death, the Afghan Independent Human Right Commission, and the Afghan government pressurized the US to once again overlook its operational strategies. With the efforts of all these the US policy once again became people centric from 2009 onwards. The appointment of General Stanley McChrystal helped the US to work according to people centric approach. Stanley's personality, way of working, and some transparency helped the US. Whether the US succeeded to remove the resentment among the Afghan population is difficult to answer, but one thing was for sure, that US got appreciation for its efforts at international level.

4.2.4 Better Governance for removal of insurgency in Afghanistan:

Another objective of the US after intervening in Afghanistan was the removal of insurgency. The bad governance had caused insurgency, ultimately providing unstable conditions for Afghanistan. Till 2006 full scale insurgency started in Afghanistan. This could be well observed from the facts that number of suicide attack rate increased from 29 to 139 between 2005 to 2006, armed attacks from 1558 to 4542, and killing of 800 percent more people from insurgent based attacks.¹³⁷ While talking about the rise of insurgency, there could be multiple reasons behind this phenomenon. Many theories could answer this phenomenon, like grievances of insurgent groups, their greed, failure of governmental structure (bad governance), and the ideology factor. In case of Afghanistan it seemed that the first three factors have some role, but the fourth factor is the main reason behind the rise of insurgency in Afghanistan.

¹³⁷ Pamela Constable, "Gates Visit Kabul, Cities rise in Cross-Border Attack," *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2007, accessed May 17, 2016, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/16/AR2007011601093.html>.

Dealing with the first element, the ethnic grievances in any society could be the cause of insurgency in any state as literature of this particular school of thoughts suggested. But in case of Afghanistan this could not be true. The reason behind this was that after the downfall of Taliban regime and the installation of new government every ethnic group was accommodated. The good example could be the appointment of Ali Jalali, a Pashtun, as interior minister who later begun to select ethnically diverse police chiefs and governors. Besides that, the population of Afghanistan didn't consider ethnicity as a major problem to them. According to polls conducted by the US State Department in 2007 concluded that different people from different ethnic groups didn't see ethnicity as a problem rather supported the stance of being one nation essential for the development.¹³⁸

The second factor that could support the rise of insurgency is the greed. This is more of an economical phenomenon. When a group of people felt them marginalized from the resources of a country they could create insurgency. But in case of Afghanistan there was not much to feel marginalized from. There was not a good educational system, infrastructure was destroyed, and agriculture was nearly only growing poppy crops. So, there wasn't any reason for any group to support insurgency or create one on the basis of greed.¹³⁹

But the third element seemed evident in the case of Afghanistan that contributed in the rise of insurgency. The poor societal structural could give rise to an insurgency in a country. The poor governance system, in which a country lacked the autonomy to exercise its authority, could provide chances for a particular group (insurgent) to strive for that legitimacy. For example, when a state structure didn't have proper staff, training, funds and motivation to run the state

¹³⁸ Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency," 12.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 13-15.

affairs then it would lead to corruption. This would cause dissatisfaction among the population and support for insurgent groups. The later in turn would try to exercise its control over the territory it possessed.

In other words, insurgent groups played the role which a state structure needed to play and former getting support of stratum. If we apply this framework in case of Afghanistan it seemed that these all factors helped the insurgents. After the downfall of Taliban and the installation of central government, the later failed to deliver. Police wasn't capable enough to control and manage the situation, electricity was only restricted to elites, warlords were once again supported by the US resulting in the weakening of central government, and lack of legitimacy of central government in the rural areas. This caused resentment among the local population who were already in the control of insurgent groups further supported the stance of the insurgent due to governmental failure.

The lack of governmental structure and the strong ideological grounds, the fourth factor, played a vital role in gaining the support for insurgent groups. There were three main insurgent groups at that time in Afghanistan, Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Hizb-i- Islami.¹⁴⁰ These groups were in close alliance with each other as they shared the common ideology. All these three groups managed to get the support within and from outside the Afghanistan. After the downfall of Taliban regime all these three insurgent groups shifted to Pakistan and operated from there. Hence, these insurgent groups gained their support from rural areas due to the religious ideology and lack of government capabilities in rural areas.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 14.

4.3 Failure of US strategies:

The US interests to make Afghanistan a self-governed state failed in contradictions to its efforts. Historically, states needed three things to create an order of their own: accumulation of wealth monopoly of power; and legitimacy.¹⁴¹ But in context of Afghanistan, it failed to achieve all three elements, the reason behind this was the failure of the US strategies.

Talking about the first element that is capital; Afghanistan failed to get its own due to its dependence on foreign aid. Due to this dependency, the structure which needed to build a self-sufficient capital system failed to emerge. Massive aid flow created a situation of rentier state.¹⁴² Due to this flow of aid, government didn't find it necessary to haggle with its own people. The main income of Afghanistan after the downfall of Taliban regime came mainly from the drugs and international funds. According to the facts nearly \$10 billion aid flowed to Afghanistan from the US.¹⁴³ From a nation building process it destroyed the capabilities of state to develop its own capacities.

Corruption became the norm of the society. Bureaucratic structure failed, and system to collect capital collapsed. There was also no system of accountability due to the tilt of system in favor of donors. Aid flowed through the donors chosen members. Hence, a failed system was being established. Afghanistan's government also tried to avail every opportunity in context of gaining aid. This was well evident in the 2002 Tokyo donor conference where \$ 5 billion were called

¹⁴¹ Suhrke, "State building in Afghanistan," 271.

¹⁴² A rentier state is a state that derives all its national revenue from external clients.

¹⁴³ Suhrke, "State building in Afghanistan," 272.

‘peanuts’ by Afghan government.¹⁴⁴ Besides government, the NGOs working in Afghanistan also supported the stance of former and demanded more aid.

During the war, nearly 90 percent of the official expenditure was given through the aid. The pays of senior civil servants, police, army, and most of the development project were funded through aid. Two-third of aid flowed through the selected subordinates by donor. This undermined the sovereignty of state. This created an administration within administration. Government failed to develop the skills needed to collect capital. Hence, at this level the international assistance instead of developing a nation failed in its objectives.

The second element of self-governed system is to have control over the means of violence to ensure security of the civilians, rule of law, and stability. In case of Afghanistan, the situation was different. The coercive power which Afghan government needed after the post-Taliban era was provided by the international community mainly ISAF and the US. This led to the unresponsiveness of the government to put some of its efforts to monopolize power. Another problem was the presence of the many armed factions in the country, each struggling to monopolize the power. Instead of disarming them, both afghan government and international community further armed the militia for their own interests.

To make the government monopolize power, security forces of the country needed to be strong enough to eliminate internal and external threats. But like all other state building processes this was again funded by the international forces. The US funded nearly half the defense budget, paid salaries, constructed garrisons, established four regional Afghan National Army (ANA)

¹⁴⁴ Agence France-Presse, “Afghanistan to ask for 27 to 28 billion dollars at Berlin conference,” *Agence France-Presse* (March 26, 2004), accessed June 13, 2016, <http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-ask-27-28-billion-dollars-berlin-conference>.

commands, and made Central Army Corps of three infantry brigades at Kabul. The US also helped in developing the Afghan National Police (ANP).¹⁴⁵ According to World Bank substantial investment in security sector would bankrupt Afghanistan instead of state building.¹⁴⁶ This also raised questions about the role of military in political affairs of the state. The Afghan army had twice executed the coup in history which helped in change of regime.¹⁴⁷ If security forces played the same role then it would be directly against the democratic agenda of the US.

The third element which was necessary for the self-owned system was the legitimacy. Legitimacy unlike coercive force is non-coercive element gained by generating normative support. As discussed above everything in post-Taliban era was controlled and financed by the external power. That ultimately led to the failure of local government to get normative support. Lack of interest of Afghan government to accommodate every group made them dependent on the external powers.

4.3.1 Failure of leadership to deliver:

After the elections of 2004, the mainly dominated groups belonged to Mujahedeen. In lower house 199 out of 249 seats and in upper house 34 out of 104 seats were secured by the Mujahedeen faction.¹⁴⁸ Thus a parliament formed, where majority was consisted of conservatives. The parliament was also divided and not united. People in the houses belonged from different ethnic groups. In such circumstance, the parliament held its first session on December 20, 2005. The system formed was the semi-presidential system, where the parliament

¹⁴⁵ Suhrke, "State building in Afghanistan," 280.

¹⁴⁶ W. Bryd, and S. Guimbert, "Public Finance, Security and Development. A Framework and Application to Afghanistan," *World Bank* (2009).

¹⁴⁷ Suhrke, "State building in Afghanistan," 281.

¹⁴⁸ Gufran, "Afghanistan in 2006," 87.

could have check upon the powers of executive. Yunus Qanoni became the leader of lower house who wanted an active parliament to have check upon the president.¹⁴⁹

The parliament which wanted to get the support of masses, took some symbolic steps. The first issue discussed was the removal of barricades from Kabul which caused the traffic blockade. These barricades were deployed by the NGO's, and foreign military personnel. After this step, President order to remove these barricades. Another important issue discussed was the check on NGO's working in Afghanistan that was almost 4000 in numbers. Even the Afghan parliament debated on the list of cabinet members given by the President for ratification. Five members were disapproved by parliament and later replaced by President. Parliament also disapproved the 2006-2007 budgets and later approved after their recommendations were considered.

Parliament of Afghanistan was working properly and appreciated by international community. On the other hand, President was losing his popularity. He was blamed of not managing law and order situation with security in the country. He was called "mayor of Kabul"¹⁵⁰ as he failed to maintain the writ of state in other areas of country. He was also unable to stop the corruption and continuously challenged by the warlords in the country. As a result of this, people got frustrated and started moving towards the support of Taliban. This was a moment of concern for the US and also for Afghan government. There were feelings among the international supporter to replace the Karzai but no other option was available at that time. As a result of this, the Afghan

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 88.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 90.

national leadership failed to deliver its people and as a result insurgency started to rise in the country.¹⁵¹

4.4 Pakistan as an ally:

It was obvious that without the support of Pakistan, the US invasion of Afghanistan would have been very difficult. For instance, one of the objectives of the US was to make a strong security force in Afghanistan to control and fight the insurgent groups. But the task was not easy. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) that included 122,000 men, needed to be trained and sustained. The estimated budget was \$2.5 billion for army and \$ 1 billion for police. The revenue which Afghan government collected in 2008 was only \$670 million, which meant that if it increased 8 percent per year even then it was not possible for Afghan government to bear the burden of its security forces in the next ten years.¹⁵²

On the other hand, it was impossible for the US and its NATO allies to achieve this goal. The reason behind this was that it was not just the matter of financial aid rather needed the multilayer program embedded with the US, NATO, and ANSF to meet the international criteria of development. It was not possible for the US due to short time span. So, the only way out for Afghanistan was the change in the regional condition. Changing conditions required the change in the behavior of internal and external actors. By this Afghanistan didn't need to spend too much on its security forces. This was the one of the reasons that Pakistan was chosen an ally in "war on terrorism".

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 91.

¹⁵² Rubin, and Rashid, "From Great Game to Great Bargain," 34.

It was said that Pakistan was pressurized by the US to support in the “war on terrorism.” But it seemed that it was rational decision. If Pakistan had denied going with the US then it would have faced US-Indian-Afghan alliance and Russo-Iranian alliance, both determined to weaken the influence in Afghanistan. Another reason was the link up of Afghan ring roads to Iranian ports, giving access to the landlocked country to the sea, ultimately undermining the Afghan dependency on Pakistan. This insecurity led President to ally with the US, for maintaining its influence in Afghanistan and eliminating the security threats.¹⁵³

4.5 US withdrawal:

The US decided to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan after the death of Osama Bin Laden on June 22, 2011. As a result, the US decided to withdraw. President Obama on June, 2011 announced its withdrawal strategy. According to this plan it was decided that 10,000 forces to be drawn till 2011, 23,000 by September 2012, and 34,000 by February 2014. This withdrawal strategy was devised into five tranches. March 2011, December 2011, May 2012, December 2012, and June 2013.¹⁵⁴ This was confirmed after the announcement of President Karzai and visiting of NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh on June 28, 2013 that Afghan force controlled the most of areas.

Following the precedence of the US, the allies also announced to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. Canada, France, and Netherland decided to withdraw Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The US although decided to drawback its large number of forces from Afghanistan but not complete withdrawal. The reason behind this could be the mistake that the US did in Soviet-

¹⁵³ Ibid., 38.

¹⁵⁴ Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,” 26.

Afghan war, leaving Afghanistan completely. Nearly 9800 army personals would remain in Afghanistan as a part of “Resolute Support Mission”. “Operation Enduring Freedom” was also renamed by military as “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel”.¹⁵⁵

“We are finishing the job we started” said President Obama in Rose Garden. With the elections held in the country and new rulers coming on the same page with the US, later decided to set the faith of Afghanistan in the hands of Afghanistan. But, it was not meant to flee from Afghanistan leaving it alone but in a calculated manner. In the words of Afghan battalion commander “Obama said this week that he would leave Afghanistan in a responsible way.”¹⁵⁶ Following the same line of action the NATO and non-NATO member made partial withdrawal. For instance, Germany decided to keep their forces in the Afghanistan. In the words of a German official “German public opinion was never very fond of this mission, but the government can convince them that it is worthwhile to stay with a much smaller amount of troops.”¹⁵⁷ So, they decided to keep a force of 800 persons in the country in contrast to 3,000.

The strategy of the US this time was different from that of Soviet-Afghan war. This time the long stay policy until the full stabilization of Afghan government to control its external and internal affair was chosen. The US has decided to stay in Afghanistan till the 2017.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 27.

¹⁵⁶ Karen DeYoung, “Obama to leave 98,000 troops in Afghanistan,” *The Washington Post*, March 27, 2014, accessed May 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-to-leave-9800-us-troops-in-afghanistan-senior-official-says/2014/05/27/57f37e72-e5b2-11e3-a86b-362fd5443d19_story.html.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

Chapter 5

Implications for Pakistan: Cooperative Approach

5.1 Introduction:

Theoretically, Pakistan was the immediate state to bear the outcome of the US invasion of Afghanistan. According to RSCT Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan made it vulnerable to the many threats, due to effects of mini complex on neighboring states. Pakistan was affected politically, militarily, and economically. On September 15, 2001 Pakistan announced its full support for the US led "war on terrorism." Pakistan provided its routes to supply military logistics to the US forces in Afghanistan, and three air bases were given for the use of war purposes.¹⁵⁹

Pakistan took a U turn in its policy relating Afghanistan. Pakistan shifted its pro-Taliban policy and became a partner of the US in toppling down the regime. By becoming an ally, Pakistan thought to have achieved four objectives: Security of Pakistan, economic revival, nuclear assets safeguard, and Kashmir issue to be solved.¹⁶⁰ Although Pakistan could not achieve these objectives but the narrative was set on these four points, to justify the U turn.

Another reason in joining the hands could be the fear of isolation from rest of the world. Pakistan could not have denied being an ally as rest of the world was supporting the war.

¹⁵⁹ Fani, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy," 54.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 55.

Hence, “the coalition against terrorism is remarkable not only because of large number of countries involved from all around the world, but also the apparent recognition to the fact that the fight against terrorism will be a prolonged one. That one can see the involvement of diplomatic pressure and financial sanctions, as well as military force against the specified enemy targets. Never in world history have so many countries combined together against a common threat in this manner.”¹⁶¹ So, Pakistani policy makers could not risk standing against the whole world.

Immediately after allying with the US, Pakistan got some benefit. The IMF sanctions were removed that were imposed after 1998 nuclear test. Pakistan’s debt return was rescheduled at lowest rates. Pakistan concluded \$ 15.5 billion Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) with IMF and World Bank. Italy, Canada, UK and Germany gave \$ 500 million of debt to Pakistan.¹⁶² Pakistan secured some economic gain but could not achieve the desired results. After the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan Pakistan had to face the challenges and utilize opportunities.

After the death of Osama Bin Laden President Obama said “justice has been done”,¹⁶³ this implied that the goal of the US had been achieved. So, Obama having said that announced its forces drawdown from Afghanistan. Another reason behind this withdrawal could be observed in

¹⁶¹ Paul Dibb, “The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (spring, 2002): 131-132.

¹⁶² Government of Pakistan, “Economic Survey of Pakistan: 2001-2002,” *Government of Pakistan* (2002): 116, <http://121.52.153.178:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/6549/Economic%20Survey%202001-2002.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

¹⁶³ Declan Walsh, Richards Adam, and Ewen MacAskill, “Osama Bin Laden is Dead, Obama announce,” *The Guardian*, May 2, 2011, accessed April 30, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/02/osama-bin-laden-dead-obama>.

the word of Obama “Now we must invest in America’s greater resources: our people.”¹⁶⁴ This war had costed the US with 4 trillion dollars, nearly equal to the cost of World War II, which was 4.1 trillion dollars.¹⁶⁵

With this announcement the main country to bear implication of withdrawal was Pakistan. By allying itself with the US, Pakistan has faced a loss of three thousand troops and killing of more than thirty-five thousand people in different suicide and bomb attacks.¹⁶⁶ No part of Pakistan was left which didn’t witness the consequences. Every part of the country felt the blowback of joining “war on terrorism”.

At the very first hand, problem faced by Pakistan was the improvement of its relations Afghanistan. After entering into war and President Karzai coming into power Pakistan tried to smoothen its relations with Afghanistan in nearly every field but could not achieve the desired results.

5.2 Effects on Pakistan:

5.2.1 Diplomatic relation:

Since the establishment of interim government in Afghanistan both countries tried to establish strong relations with each other. President Karzai paid a visit in February 2002 to Pakistan and later President Musharraf in September of same year to Afghanistan. President Musharraf during his visit announced an aid of \$ 100 million for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. During

¹⁶⁴ Soharwordi, “Withdrawal of American Forces from Afghanistan,” 135.

¹⁶⁵ Ernesto Londono, “Study: Iraq, Afghanistan war cost to top \$4 trillion,” *The Washington Post*, March 28, 2013, accessed April 19, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/study-iraq-afghan-war-costs-to-top-4-trillion/2013/03/28/b82a5dce-97ed-11e2-814b-063623d80a60_story.html.

¹⁶⁶ Soharwordi, “Withdrawal of American Forces from Afghanistan,” 133.

elections in 2004, on the urge of Afghan government, Pakistan deployed 80,000 soldiers on border, to stop the incursion across the border.¹⁶⁷

5.2.2 Cross border infiltration:

After entering into war, Pakistan faced more terrorist activities on its soil. Terrorism became a problem for Pakistan. The reason behind this was that after the downfall of Taliban regime they took shelter in Pakistan. They took refuges into the tribal areas of Pakistan. The army launched operations to eliminate them but it caused anger among the tribesmen. To curb this terrorist threat a Tripartite Commission was formed including Pakistan, the US, and Afghanistan in 2003.¹⁶⁸ After formation it was expected that it would decrease the terrorist activities but it could not achieve the desired results.

5.2.3 Refugees:

After the collapse of Taliban regime, Pakistan expected that three million refugees would go their home land. In contrast to this more refugees came to Pakistan due to the economic hardships in Afghanistan. Both countries signed an agreement with the United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2003 for the reparation of refugees. It could not succeed to move refugees back due to the unstable condition of Afghanistan.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 133.

¹⁶⁸ Ikram, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations," 18.

5.2.4 Economic Front:

To and improve relations, Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was formed in 2003.¹⁶⁹ By this commission both countries signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for highway construction, opening of Afghan and Pakistan bank branches in each other's country. Railway lines were constructed to connection both like between Chaman and Kandahar.¹⁷⁰ The divergent interests and lack of commitment became hurdle in achieving the goals.

Pakistan suffered a loss of \$ 67 billion. This loss included the reconstruction cost, revenue collection loss due to inaccessibility of some areas, and smuggling. Afghan Transit Trade (ATT) was a key component to economic loss for Pakistan.¹⁷¹ According to Pakistani Federal Tax Ombudsman's office, through this route, high tariffs commodities in Pakistan like cars, and cigarettes were smuggled to Pakistan. Another problem that was created through this route was the mislabeling of containers. NATO/ISAF containers that went through this route were considered non-commercial. So, containers were labeled as USAID and NATO/ISAF, through which things were smuggled.¹⁷²

5.3 Afghanistan unstable internal condition:

Another problem that Pakistan had to face was the shift of security to ANF. The inexperienced forces were not able to control the security condition in Afghanistan. This would mean the more

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 18.

¹⁷⁰ Tahir Khan, "Afghanistan, Pakistan open key economic trade talk," *The Express Tribune*, November 23, 2015, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/996710/afghanistan-pakistan-open-key-economic-trade-talks/>.

¹⁷¹ USAID, "Analysis of Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)," *USAID Trade Project* (May, 2014): 13.

¹⁷² Safiya Aftab, "The 2014 ISAF pullout from Afghanistan: impacts on Pakistan," *Norwegian Peace building Resource Center*, (December, 2013): 3.

incursions into Pakistan. Any instability in Afghanistan had its direct impacts on Pakistan as the theory suggests.

Many suicidal and bomb attacks had been witnessed by the Afghans since the entrance of the US on the soil. Due to these attacks the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan got affected. Recently, Afghanistan on April 19, 2016 witnessed a major attack in its Capital, Kabul. It was one of the major incidents that Afghanistan had faced since the 2011. The casualties in this blast included 64 dead and 347 wounded.¹⁷³ It killed the civilians and Afghan security forces. The blast happened near the wall of National Directorate of Security (NDS) when a car-bomber, blew himself.

On the same day in evening another blast but no casualties were seen. Taliban took the responsibility for attack. Taliban still hold on the many provinces of Afghanistan. The war is going on between the Taliban and government over the control of areas. The most recent among them was the capture of Kunduz by Taliban, fifth largest city, after the post-2014 withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.¹⁷⁴

Pakistan had to face the implication with such unstable condition of Afghanistan. Any attack in the neighborhood had to have its implication of Pakistan. Before this attack the Chief Executive of Afghanistan Abdullah Abdullah was invited by Pakistani PM to pay a visit, but as the attack happened, Abdullah postponed his visit which was to happen in the first week of May. "After

¹⁷³ BBC Reports, "Afghanistan attack: Kabul suicide blast death rise to 64," *BBC News*, April 20, 2014, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36091046>.

¹⁷⁴ Josh Smith, and Hamid Shalizi, "Afghan Taliban kill at least 28 in major attack in central Kabul," *Reuters*, April 19, 2016, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-blast-idUSKCN0XG0BO>.

initial evidence of today's suicide attack in Kabul, CE Dr Abdullah decided to postpone his upcoming official visit to Pakistan"¹⁷⁵ said the Media Office of CE.

If we look at the statement it seemed that the fingers were again going to be signal towards the Pakistan. Afghanistan would once again blame the Pakistan for this attack and Pakistan would deny. Incident like this were the major cause of mistrust between both the countries. Besides that, the inability of ASF to tackle and control the security condition in Afghanistan was a matter of concern for Pakistan. As long as Afghanistan's own forces would not succeed to control such incidents, it's nearly impossible to establish strong relations with Pakistan and vice versa.

5.4 Pakistan losing its place in reconciliation process:

As the US announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan seemed less concerned for the US. Pakistan also lacked a proper guideline about their role in the post-withdrawal scenario. No proper plan or policy came on the screen from the US regarding Pakistan. It meant that Pakistan lost its importance to the US again, like it had happened in the history. Leaving Pakistan in the Post-Cold war scenario is the best example.

Pakistan was on its own to control relations with Afghanistan. Bad relations of Afghanistan and Pakistan could affect the whole region. The growing Indian influence in the Afghanistan can increase the intensity of rivalry between Pakistan and India. According to estimate India had

¹⁷⁵ Tahir Khan, "30 dead, hundreds wounded as Taliban attack rattles Kabul," *The Express Tribune*, April 19, 2016, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1087601/afghan-president-says-several-killed-and-wounded-in-kabul-blast/>.

already invested \$ 2 billion in Afghanistan. That is one of the reasons that Pakistan had deployed its 150,000 troops on Afghan-Pakistan border.¹⁷⁶

The relations between the US and Pakistan were on unequal footings. US always focused its international agenda while Pakistan focused its regional agenda. The relationship between both is guided by superior (US). The history of relations between both the countries tells the same story. From CEATO and SENTO to “war on terrorism” Pakistan allied itself with the US. But still the tilt of the US always remained towards the India. This could have caused the imbalance in the region. Now if Afghanistan not viewed in regional context, could cause some serious problems.

It seemed that after the withdrawal Pakistan would lose its geo-strategic significance for the US. The reason behind this was the signing of “Strategic Partnership” declaration with Afghanistan.¹⁷⁷ According to this declaration after 2014, the US would have the authority to use Afghan military bases for the next five years. It meant that in the Asia Pacific region, the US alliance with Afghanistan would undermine the strategic position of Pakistan.

After withdrawal Pakistan’s role declined in the reconciliation process. By being not the part of this process Pakistan might have to face the same difficulties as it did after the end of cold war.

The main reason behind this declining of Pakistan’s role could be the suspicious role of Pakistan in Afghanistan affairs. These suspicions got strengthened after the Abbottabad incident, when OBL was found on the Pakistani soil. This caused resentments among the policymaking circles of Washington against Pakistan. Beside suspicion the less logistical supply to NATO forces and

¹⁷⁶ Soherwordi, “Withdrawal of American Forces from Afghanistan,” 133.

¹⁷⁷ Joshua Partlow, “Talks on long-term Afghan-U.S. partnership stalled,” *The Washington Post*, July 28, 2011, accessed April 30, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/talks-on-long-term-afghan-us-partnership-stalled/2011/07/27/gIQAX0Afl_story.html.

the drone attacks also undermine the importance of Pakistan. Along with all these the public feeling of both the countries were against each other making the matter worst.

The increasing of strategic partnership between India and the US was also alarming for Pakistan. It would not only decline the Pakistan's position regarding Afghanistan but also disturb the balance of power in South Asian region. The investment India was making in Afghanistan and the establishment of six air bases of the US, all pinned towards the declining of Pakistan's strategic position.

Hence, Pakistan sought to work at three levels with the US. It's importance for Pakistan to convince the US regarding its role after the post-withdrawal scenario from Afghanistan. These three levels include bringing Pakistan on board in reconciliation process, declining India's role and follow 'redline' (surgical strikes/ drones).¹⁷⁸

5.5 Removal of insurgency from Afghanistan:

After the withdrawal of the US one of the vital components for the stability of Afghanistan is the removal of insurgency. This could only be achieved through a process in which every group participates. This was also in the favor of Pakistan to have a stable Afghanistan by stopping the insurgency. This would directly stop the incursions and bring stability to Pakistan.

But this time Pakistan unlike post-Soviet war, had told Afghanistan to solve its matters with its own capabilities. Pakistani policy makers had shown the importance of two states relation in

¹⁷⁸ Ambassador Arif Kamal, "The Projected US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Reviewing the Broad Contours and Implications for Pakistan," *NDU Monograph* 2, no. 2 (2011): 14.

words “Pakistan’s future has high stakes in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.”¹⁷⁹ But on the other hand demanded Afghanistan to solve its own problems “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned”¹⁸⁰ peace process.

Pakistan had also condemned the insurgent attacks. In the words of PM Nawaz Sharif, “any effort by any militant or group to destabilize Afghanistan will be dealt with severely and such elements will be outlawed and hunted down.”¹⁸¹ By this statement Pakistan had tried to deny the criticism that Pakistan still had links with Taliban or insurgent groups and supported a peaceful resolution for Afghanistan.

Pakistan had offered to provide grounds for the reconciliation process by keeping in view the efforts of President Ghani to reconcile every group. But Afghan government had to think on the ground realities. Pakistan could provide the ground but the successes of reconciliation process merely depend upon the Afghan national government.

Beside Pakistan, Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani was also making efforts unlike his predecessor to hold peace talk. He succeeded when he was able to attract the Taliban for peace talks. On May, 2015 unofficial talks were held between the Taliban and government officials, hosted by Qatar and Pugwash Council, a global conflict resolution group.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Amina Khan, “Peace Process in Afghanistan,” *Institute of Strategic Studies* (June 2, 2015): 3.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁸¹ Mateen Haider, and Irfan Haider, “Nawaz Sharif pledges support in Afghan fight against Taliban,” *Dawn*, May 13, 2015, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1181502/nawaz-sharif-pledges-support-in-afghan-fight-against-taliban>.

¹⁸² Khan, “Peace Process in Afghanistan,” 4.

With the urge of Afghan President and Pakistan's efforts talks were held known as "2+1+2 OR the Murree Peace Process."¹⁸³. Representatives from Afghan government, and Taliban joined the talks. The meeting got credence when the Ibrahim Haqqani joined, gave a positive message that Haqqani network was also willing to talk about peace. In these talks the US and China also participated as observers. This peace talk was successful as Taliban agreed to cease fire "if Pakistan and China guaranteed that a united national government would be formed in Afghanistan."¹⁸⁴

In these talks Taliban demanded, a first-tier leadership but Afghan representatives offered third-tier leadership. Talks started, everybody was at least on table, and international community praised the efforts.

But these talks disrupted with the announcement of death of the Mullah Umar before the starting of second round of talks. As a result of his death, in an immediate surge of violence 50 people got killed in Kabul. The Afghan government started blaming Pakistan for this attack. They accused that attacks were planned from the soil of Pakistan. President Karzia also purges the role of Pakistan from peace talks and said "he now wanted the process to be entirely controlled by the Afghan government."¹⁸⁵ Pakistan tried to resume the talk. It was observed when advisor to PM Sartaj Aziz visited Kabul for a regional conference. He met with the Afghan President and tried to bring him on board to resume talk, but could not succeed.

¹⁸³ Khan, "The Future of Afghan Government," 2.

¹⁸⁴ Kamran Yousaf, "Afghan Taliban seek 'united national government'," *Express Tribune*. July 9 2015, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/917517/afghan-taliban-seek-united-national-govt/>.

¹⁸⁵ Mujib Mashalaug, "After Kabul Attack, Afghan Leader Points Finger at Pakistan for Failing to Stop Taliban," *New York Times*, August 10, 2015, accessed May 2, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/world/asia/suicide-car-bombing-kabul-airport.html?_r=0.

Another factor that disrupted the talks was the appointment of new leader of Taliban. After the death of Mullah Umar, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor was appointed as the new leader of the Taliban. There was division of opinion on this new appointment among the Taliban. Initially Umar's son Mullah Yaqoob and his brother, Mullah Abdul Maan denied accepting the new leadership but later they agreed. So, this division among the Taliban faction also raised questions about the peace talks and united government in Afghanistan.

Recently, the killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansour also effected the peace negotiation. He was killed by the US drone attack on May 21, 2016 in Baluchistan. In the words of Sartaj Aziz, advisor to Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, "The death of Mullah Ahkter Mansour in a drone attack on 21 May has added to the complexity of the Afghan Conflict."¹⁸⁶ This further raised concerns about the peace talk. Mullah Akhter was considered a good option for settlement as in the words of Sartaj Aziz "Mullah Mansour was not against the peace talks."¹⁸⁷ Hence, once again efforts were all in vain.

5.6 Curbing Militancy at home:

After the withdrawal of the US, there would be many challenges for Pakistan. The most important among them would the reconciliation of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

5.6.1 Rise of Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP):

After the event of Lal Mosque, the militant groups as a reaction assembled under the umbrella of TTP. Militants included in incident of Lal Mosque were Pakistani but had their relations with

¹⁸⁶ Kamran Yousuf, "Pakistan finally confirms Mullah Akhtar Mansour's death in drone attack," *The Express Tribune*, May 14, 2016, accessed May 21, 2016, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1110836/pakistan-finally-confirms-mullah-akhtar-mansours-death/>.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

Afghan mujahedeen since the days of Soviet-Afghan war. They demanded the imposing of Sharia Law in the country and stopping of NATO supplies. After the formation of TTP, they attracted the Afghan Taliban's sympathies. Hence an alliance was made between TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, and Taliban leader Mullah Umar. After this alliance attacks, high profile killing, and attacks outside Pakistan were carried out by TTP.

This problem was further fueled by the presence of TTP in the Baluchistan area of Quetta. The already going on insurgency and the presence of "Quetta Shura" gave TTP a settled ground to make footing there.

The Taliban who flee from Afghanistan settled in Quetta. All the decisions were taken in this Shura by Taliban. The former ISAF Commander, General Stanley McChrystal, considered this Shura a greatest threat to ISAF. In the beginning Pakistan denied their presence but later in 2009 then defense minister said that Shura had been destroyed.¹⁸⁸ From the Baloch Madrassas they continued to recruit new people.

On the same line the main commercial hub of Pakistan, Karachi also became the victim of TTP. Deobandi Madrassas in Karachi had links with the Taliban of Afghanistan. Even a local newspaper of Karachi had spotted some points where the TTP's leaders held quasi-judicial courts. Their presence could also be evident from the fact; the high profile security people were attacked after 2010 onwards.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ Aftab, "The 2014 ISAF pullout," 3.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 4.

5.6.2 Problems in reconciliation with TTP:

Talking about the TTP, which had its relations with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTF), was a major source of concern for Pakistan. The difficulty for Pakistan in handling non-state actor was that it was divided into different factions. It unlike TTF had no single leadership, with whom Pakistan could have dealt.

These groups were rival to each other, for instance Mehsud group had rivalry with Mullah Nazir Group. Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who operated from North Waziristan, has serious reservations about the Mehsud group. Similarly, the TTP head of Mohmand Agency, Abdul Wali had rivalry with TTF. Fazalullah and Faqir Muhammad had their independent groups, having bases at Afghanistan. So, the problem for Pakistani officials was, they didn't have a single person to deal with rather groups of non-state actors. This made the reconciliation process more difficult and complex. So, it was obvious that after the withdrawal Pakistan would have major challenges to face.

The Fazullah and Gul Bahadur, who operated from Afghanistan, were also accused of getting support from Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the intelligence agency of India and National Directorate of Security (NDS), intelligence agency of Afghanistan. So, the foreign power intervention was also a matter of concern for Pakistan.

Along with these challenges Pakistan also had some opportunities to avail from this withdrawal. This withdrawal will help Pakistan in mainstreaming the militant associated with TTP. Two factors played vital in mainstreaming these non-state actors. First, after the withdrawal the recruit in these militant groups would be diminished. The reason behind this is that they recruited people on the agenda of Jihad against the US. After withdrawal there will be no need for such Jihad.

Second, in Pakistan there are religious parties through them these militants can be pursued to accommodate politically. The extension of political parties act for FATA, gave a new opportunity to de-radicalize the FATA is a good example.¹⁹⁰

5.6.3 FATA:

Pakistan's Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) had been a sanctuary for the terrorist. FATA shared a long border of 600km with Afghanistan.¹⁹¹ Due to porous border with Afghanistan, it was an easy place for terrorist to take refuge there. Another reason behind porous border was the factor of Pashtunwali (the Pashtoon way of life), a life style that governs the behavior of people of FATA, helped the terrorist to mingle with the people. The people of FATA mostly think that the US invasion of Afghanistan was illegal, hence supported the stance of Taliban of waging Jihad.

Pakistan launched operation in the FATA to stop the terrorist's activities carried out from there. At the first hand Pakistan used a soft approach and tried to bring the people of FATA on board by signing accords.¹⁹² These accords focused on stopping the foreigners to use the FATA as their base to launch terrorist attack. This approach proved successful in its initial phase when Waziristan accords proved to be a success in outlining militants' affiliated with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

After the Taliban settled down, they created problems for Pakistan. Kidnapping, assassination and suicidal attacks were carried out these Taliban broadly speaking by TTP. They killed almost

¹⁹⁰ Wazir, "Withdrawal of the US troops," 139.

¹⁹¹ Sultana, "Major Threats to Pakistan," 3.

¹⁹² Aftab, "The 2014 ISAF pullout," 2.

400 Mailks of FATA and Swat valley, killed politicians, people, and security personals.¹⁹³ As a result of this Pakistani army had conducted multiple operations against them. The reason behind carrying out these operations was the failure of talks between state and these non-state actors. These operations include ‘Rah-e-Rast’ on 26 April 2009, ‘Sher-Dil’ on 9 September 2008, and ‘Koh-i-Sufaid, from May 2011 to August, 2011.¹⁹⁴ But the massive operation that started to cube these Taliban was the operation ‘Zarb-e-azb’ launched on 24 June, 2014. On launching of this operation Director General of Inter Service Public Relation (ISPR) said “On the directions of Government, Armed forces of Pakistan had launched a comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists who are hiding in sanctuaries in North Waziristan Agency... they had also paralyzed life within the agency and had perpetually terrorized the entire peace loving and patriotic population,”¹⁹⁵

This was the major initiative of Pakistan to curb terrorism. So it was obvious that reaction had to be major. As a reaction to this operation Pakistan faced the most callous act, in which terrorist attacked an army school of children. In that act 135 people were killed. After this shocking attack, quick response was given by the state and army courts were established to give death penalties. After the launch of this operation, 2,763 militants were killed and 9,000 surrendered in one year.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ Sultana, “Major Threats to Pakistan,” 3.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 3.

¹⁹⁵ Geo News, Pak Army launches operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ in North Waziristan,” *Geo News*, June 15, 2015, accessed March 15, 2016, <https://www.geo.tv/latest/94267-pak-army-launches-operation>.

¹⁹⁶ Shamin Shahid, “Operation Zarb-e-Azab—a little extra need,” *The Express Tribune*, June 23, 2015, accessed 17 April, 2016, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/907973/operation-zarb-e-azb-a-little-extra-needed/>.

5.6.4 National Action Plan:

On January 2015, PM Nawaz Sharid announced Nation Action Plan (NAP) to curb the terrorism at home. Efforts had been made before 2015, but a comprehensive action was announced in 2015. Before 2015, Pakistan National Assembly passed National-Counter Terrorism Authority Bill in 2013. By this bill National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA), formed in 2010, again came into power. Hence, Pakistan announces its first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) on February 25, 2014.¹⁹⁷

The incident of Peshawar Attack as described above forced the Pakistani state to take hard measures against these terrorist. NAP was the outcome. On January 7, 2015 National Assembly amended the 21st amendment which gave legal cover to NAP. Military courts were building and approved by the decision of Supreme Court of Pakistan.¹⁹⁸

The NISP focused on the dialog between stake holder, stopping non-state actors to spoil the environment and their access to technology and even chemical weapons. NISP was divided into two factions; Comprehensive Responsive Plan (CRP), and Composite Deterrence Plan (CDP). The working of CRP included the soft work like gaining support of the people, making a narrative to support the NAP, development of the displaced people, and strive for participatory political process. On the other hand, CDP included the hard component like making National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA) strong; integrate national databases and stopping

¹⁹⁷ National Assembly of Pakistan, "A Bill to Establish National Counter Terrorism Authority in Pakistan," *National Assembly of Pakistan*, accessed March 25, 2016, http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1363071845_127.pdf. See Annex 11.

¹⁹⁸ Hasnrat Malik, "Supreme Court upholds establishment of military courts," *The Express Tribune*, August 05, 2015, accessed April 25, 2016, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/932537/supreme-court-upholds-establishment-of-military-courts/>.

cybercrimes. It formed Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) for coordination during intelligence-based operation.

Under this NAP 62,000 operation had been conducted and resulted in 68,000 arrests. Other than that NACTA had identified 11,000 Deobandi madrassas as ‘sensitive’ and estimated that there existed 18,000 to 33,000 madrassas.¹⁹⁹

Operations had been carried out through the country and showed some good results. Due to operations in Karachi 70 percent of crime rate declined. Same was the case in Punjab. In operations 470 were arrested for producing hate literature and among them 260 were prosecuted and 24 convicted. Similarly, it was identified that there were 950 organizations that received millions of dollars from external power.²⁰⁰

Although Pakistan was having trouble in launching its NAP but the efforts were being put to achieve the desired results, in the words of Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif “We shall not relent until all terrorists, their financiers, abettors, facilitators, and sympathizers brought to justice.” Similar views had been projected at international level when PM Nawaz Sharif while addressing 70th session of United Nation General Assembly said “Our Operation Zarb-e-Azb is the largest anti-terrorism campaign against terrorist anywhere, involving over 180,000 of our security forces. It has made substantial progress in cleansing our country of all terrorists and will conclude only when our objective has been achieved.”²⁰¹

5.6.5 Internally Displaced People:

¹⁹⁹ Asia Report, “Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Pakistan,” Policy Report International Crisis Group (July 22, 2015), accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.aspx>.

²⁰⁰ Saffee “Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism-Policy,” 2.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 4.

Another problem that arose from these military operations was the settlement of Internally Displaced People (IDPs). According to FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) 283,463 people were displaced.²⁰² IDPs faced many problems including food, shelter, loss of identity, and hygienic problem. This would have direct impact on the operation because without winning the hearts of people, it was impossible to achieve the desired result. Another problem was that if IDPs were not accommodated properly they could have been the victims of terrorist.

5.7 Drone Attacks:

Another factor that would create problem for Pakistan was the drone attacks. These attacks started during the Bush administration in 2004 and increased during Obama's administration. After the withdrawal these attacks tended to increase. It would be difficult for Pakistan to handle these attacks. Table below shows the number of incidents occurred from 2005-2016.

YEAR	INCIDENTS	KILLED	INJURED
2005	1	1	0
2006	0	0	0
2007	1	20	15
2008	19	156	17
2009	46	536	75

²⁰² Sultana, "Major Threats to Pakistan," 4.

2010	90	831	85+
2011	59	548	52
2012	46	344	37
2013	24	158	29
2014	19	122	26
2015	14	58	17
2016	3	7	1
Total	332	2808	354+

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP),

(<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Droneattack.html>).

The reason behind this would be the US less interest in Pakistan's concerns and the division of latter in itself. There were two schools of thought one in favor of these attacks and one against them. There was no doubt that these drones had killed some major terrorist target but the civilian casualties were even more. If after the withdrawal these attacks remained at the same intensity or raised, then there would be threat of violence in the affected areas.²⁰³

²⁰³ Ibid.

Conclusion

In comparing both the withdrawal strategies of the US from Afghanistan, it seems that both were different. During the first withdrawal the US drawback simultaneously after achieving its interest in Afghanistan. At that time, the only interest of the US was the withdrawal of the USSR forces from Afghanistan. After the Geneva Accords of 1998 were signed, both great powers came to an agreement. Hence, according to that agreement both great powers made a withdrawal from Afghanistan till 1992.

During the second withdrawal the US strategies were different as the interest were different in comparison to first withdrawal. The broadening of interest in Afghanistan, and the direct involvement implied on the US to withdrawal using different strategies. This visible different was, this time the US did not withdraw simultaneously and completely as it did during the first withdrawal. US made a partial withdrawal. It means that the US withdrew its large number of forces from Afghanistan but still have 10,000 troops.

During the two invasions in Afghanistan, Pakistan has suffered economically, politically, and militarily. Due to effects of mini complex on Pakistan, the Afghanistan has played a crucial role for instability in Pakistan. Pakistan has engaged itself in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, due to its security dependency.

During the first withdrawal the Pakistan bear the burden of refuges, the economic loss, and the promotion of drug mafia. The decade after the first withdrawal, Pakistan suffered serious

implication. There was no way out for Pakistan except to intervene in Afghan and play an assertive role, the price of which Pakistan paid. The attention of Pakistan was divided and shifted to its western border. Thus Pakistan has to face and control the affair on its eastern as well as western borders.

During the second withdrawal Pakistan faced the same implications on its economic, political and military front. But, it seems that Pakistan has the more opportunities now to avail. As both withdrawals are different in their nature, Pakistan has also changed its policy. Pakistan has opted the policy of cooperation instead of assertiveness. Pakistan needs to continue its cooperative policy to achieve desired results in Afghanistan.

Unlike after the first withdrawal, the internal conditions of Pakistan are also different now. This internal environment demands from Pakistan to change its policy. Unlike 90s, Pakistan is now engaged internally and cannot afford to intervene in Afghanistan. The engagement of Pakistani intelligence, and security forces to curb terrorism at home, cannot provide much space to play an assertive role in Afghanistan. Operation 'Zarb-e-Azb' and 'National Action Plan' are the game changer for Pakistan. Pakistan has taken measures to curb terrorism. The state which has a bad image of sponsoring terrorism at an international level can change its image. Along with reputation, the militancy at home demands such military operation. The success of this operation requires complete attention.

The withdrawal from Afghanistan in itself is a major break for Pakistan to achieve its desired results. The withdrawal of the US is an opportunity in itself. After the US decided to return home, it leaves no space for insurgents and militants to launch their war. Their agenda is against the invasion of the US, which after the withdrawal seems to lose its grounds. Pakistan can use

this withdrawal to begin its diplomacy with these non-state actors and can produce good results. This can help Pakistan and Afghanistan both to bring the destabilizing elements on the table and can produce good result on the stabilization of both countries.

Another important factor in post-2014 withdrawal, which can contribute to enhance the opportunity for Pakistan, is the presence of the US in Afghanistan. This time US has not completely withdrawn from Afghanistan, rather it's a partial one. This mean that Pakistan is not alone now in Afghanistan, as it was after the first withdrawal. By utilizing the presence of the major power in Afghanistan, Pakistan can play an active but cooperative role dividing the burden which it took after the first withdrawal. Although the relation between Pakistan and the US are not very cordial and Pakistan's role has been reduced from the post-withdrawal reconciliation process but through efforts, the position can be retained. Through operation 'Zarb-e-Azb' the important of Pakistan in the reconciliation process can be shown to regain its lost position.

Cooperative role can be very helpful for Afghanistan's stability. By helping Afghan government in bringing insurgents on table Pakistan can play a positive role. This is fact that without the help of Pakistan, if not impossible than very difficult to bring these insurgents on table. If Pakistan cooperate than the Taliban can be controlled in Afghanistan. Unlike 1990s Pakistan is no more active in regime change or supporting any particular faction like it supported Taliban after first withdrawal.

The operation at home and cooperation with Afghanistan, Pakistan can also break the nexus between these terrorists group. The breakup of TTP and TTF is the best example of this. These terrorists group in spite of being having their internal difference, work on the same page. Same

strategy should be utilized by Pakistan to bring Afghan government on Table. Once the suspicions between both governments are removed they can curb this militancy issue.

Hence, Pakistan should now focus on the cooperation policy. But while talking about the cooperation policy this should be kept in mind that this policy does not mean the obscure role of Pakistan. In relation with Afghanistan, one thing is important that until and unless, there is no stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan's role cannot be diminished. Like NAP where stakeholder in the country is at same page, Pakistan should work on its Afghan policy the same way. Every institution, and the public needs to be on same page. This is the way only Pakistan can be securitizing itself and Afghanistan.

Bibliography

- Aftab, Safiya. "The 2014 ISAF pullout from Afghanistan: impacts on Pakistan." *Norwegian Peace building Resource Center* (December, 2013): 1-6.
- Agency, Defense Intelligence. "Afghanistan: Soviet Withdrawal Scenario (U)." *Defense Intelligence Agency* (May 9, 1988), accessed November 16, 2015.
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html#docs>.
- Agency, Defense Intelligence. Cable. "IIR [Excised]/ Veteran Afghanistan Traveler's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Exploitable Weaknesses." *Defense Intelligence Agency* (October 2, 2001). Accessed December 25, 2015.
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/>.
- Ahmad, Sultan. "Rs. 100 bn worth smuggling subverts the Economy." *Dawn* (November 5, 1993).
- Ahmed, Akbar S. *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin*. United Kingdom: Psychology Press, 1997.
- Akhtar, Nasreen. "Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Taliban." *International Journal of World Peace* 25, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 49-71.
- Barno, David W. "Fighting "the Other War:" Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan. 2002-2005." *Military Review* (September-October 2007).
- Bryd, William., and Stephen Guimbert, "Public Finance, Security and Development. A Framework and Application to Afghanistan." *World Bank* (2009).
- Buzan, Barry, and Ole Weaver. *Regions and Power: The structure of International Security*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
- Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal. "The Afghan Crisis and Pakistan's Security Dilemma." *Asian Survey* 23, no. 1 (March 1983): 227-243.
- Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal. "Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan." *Pakistan Horizon* 41, no. 1 (January 1988): 23-45.
- Chivers, Christopher John. "A Changed Way of War in Afghanistan's Skies." *The New York Times* January 15, 2012. Accessed June 1, 2016.
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/16/world/asia/afghan-war-reflects-changes-in-air-war.html?_r=1&ref=world.

Cloughley, Brian. *A History of Pakistan army: wars and insurrections*. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Collin, Joseph. "Soviet Policy towards Afghanistan." *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 36 (January 1, 1987): 198-210.

Constable, Pamela "Gates Visit Kabul, Cities rise in Cross-Border Attack." *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2007. Accessed May 17, 2016.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/16/AR2007011601093.html>.

Craige, Tim "Ghani named winner of Afghan election, with share power with rival in new government." *The Washington Post*, September 21, 2014. Accessed May 17, 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ghani-abdullah-agree-to-share-power-in-afghanistan-as-election-stalemate-ends/2014/09/21/df58749a-416e-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html.

Craige, Tim. "U.S.-brokered accord to salvage Afghanistan presidential election face new problem." *The Washington Post*, August 26, 2014. Accessed May 17, 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-brokered-accord-to-salvage-afghan-presidential-election-faces-new-challenge/2014/08/26/c314487a-2d16-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story.html.

Crime, United Nation Office on Drugs and. "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014." *United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime* (November, 2014).

Defense, Secretary of. "Strategic Thought." *Secretary of Defense* (September 30, 2001). Accessed January 12, 2016.
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc13.pdf>.

Defense, Secretary of. "U.S. strategy in Afghanistan." *Secretary of Defense* (October 16, 2001). Accessed January 12, 2016.
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc18.pdf>.

DIA, "Afghanistan: Soviet Withdrawal Scenario (U)," *Directorate of Central Agency* (May 1988). Accessed November 16, 2015.
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html#docs>.

DIA. "Afghanistan: The War in Perspective." *Directorate of Central Agency* (November 1988). Accessed November 16, 2015.
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html#docs>.

DIA. "USSR: Withdrawal from Afghanistan." *Directorate of Central Agency* (March 1988). Accessed November 16, 2015.
<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html#docs>.

Dibb, Paul. "The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?." *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (spring, 2002): 131-144.

DeYoung, Karen. "Obama to leave 98,000 troops in Afghanistan." *The Washington Post*, March 27, 2014. Accessed May 17, 2016.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-to-leave-9800-us-troops-in-afghanistan-senior-official-says/2014/05/27/57f37e72-e5b2-11e3-a86b-362fd5443d19_story.html.

Ermacora, Felix. "Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan." *United Nation Commission on Human Rights* (February 18, 1993).

Fani, Muhammad Ishaque. "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Challenges and opportunities after 9/11." *Pakistan Horizon* 58, no. 4 (2005): 53-64.

Faar, Grand M. "Afghan refugees in Pakistan: definitions, reparation and ethnicity." In *The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism*, edited by Ewan W. Enderson, and Nancy Hatch Dupree. New York: Pinter Publisher, 1990.

France-Presse, Agence. "Afghanistan to ask for 27 to 28 billion dollars at Berlin conference." *Agence France-Presse* (March 26, 2004). Accessed June 13, 2016. <http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-ask-27-28-billion-dollars-berlin-conference>.

Gall, Carlotta and Somini Sengupta. "Afghan Voters Takes Next Step to Democracy." *The New York Times*, September 19, 2005. Accessed May 17, 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/19/world/asia/afghan-voters-take-next-step-to-democracy.html>.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*. Washington D.C.: The Brooking Institute, December 22, 1982.

Gibbs, David. "Does USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'? Reinterpreting the Invasion of Afghanistan." *Journal of Peace Research* 24 (December 1, 1987): 365-379.

Gray, Jacqueline M., and Margaret A. Wilson. "Understanding the 'War on Terrorism: Responses to 11 September 2001.'" *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 1 (2006): 23-36.

Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov. "Ponomarev Report to CPSU on the Situation in Afghanistan." *National Security Archives* (June 18, 1979). Accessed November 17, 2015. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs>.

Gufran, Nasreen. "Afghanistan in 2005: The Challenges for Reconstruction." *Asian Survey* 46, no. 1, (Jan/ Feb, 2006): 85-94.

Gufran, Nasreen. "Afghanistan in 2006: The Complications of Post-Conflict Transition." *Asian Survey* 47, no. 1 (Jan/Feb, 2007): 87-98.

Haider, Mateen, and Irfan Haider. "Nawaz Sharif pledges support in Afghan fight against Taliban." *Dawn*, May 13, 2015. Accessed April 30, 2016.

<http://www.dawn.com/news/1181502/nawaz-sharif-pledges-support-in-afghan-fight-against-taliban>.

Haq, Ikramul. *Pakistan from Hash to Heroin*. Lahore: Annoor Print and Publishers, 1991.

Hartman, Andrew. "The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan." *Third World Quarterly* 23 (June 1, 2002): 467-489.

Hilali, A Z. "The Cost and Benefits of Afghan War." *Contemporary South Asia* 11, no. 3 (2002): 291-310.

House, The White. "Remarks by the President in Address to Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan." *The White House*, December 1, 2009. Accessed April 2, 2016. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan>.

Hussain, Rizwan. *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005.

Ikram, Zubia. "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations after 9/11." *Pakistan Horizon* 59, no. 1 (January, 2006): 17-21.

Jones, Seth G. "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad." *International Security*, 32 (2008): 7-40.

Kamal, Ambassador Arif. "The Projected US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Reviewing the Broad Contours and Implications for Pakistan." *NDU Monograph* 2, no. 2 (2011): 1-18.

Katzman, Kenneth. "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy." *Congressional Research Service*, (October 15, 2015): 1-75.

Khan, Rais Ahmad. "US Policy towards Afghanistan." *Pakistan Horizon* 40 (March 1, 1987): 65-79.

Khan, Amina. "The Future of Afghan Government and Taliban Talks." *Institute of Strategic Studies* (September 21, 2015): 1-6.

Khan, Khalid Nawaz. "Soviet Interests in Afghanistan and Implications upon Withdrawal." (B.A. / B.S.C thesis, University of Baluchistan, 1986).

Khan, Ijaz Ahmed. "Understanding Pakistan's Pro-Taliban Afghan Policy." *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 2 (2007): 141-157.

Khan, Tahir. "Afghanistan, Pakistan open key economic trade talk." *The Express Tribune*, November 23, 2015. Accessed April 30, 2016. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/996710/afghanistan-pakistan-open-key-economic-trade-talks/>.

Khan, Tahir. "30 dead, hundreds wounded as Taliban attack rattles Kabul." *The Express Tribune*, April 19, 2016. Accessed April 30, 2016.

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/1087601/afghan-president-says-several-killed-and-wounded-in-kabul-blast/>.

Klass, Rosanne. "Afghanistan: The Accords." *Foreign Affairs* (1988): 922-945.

Knowlton, Brian. "UN Report Suggests Higher Afghan Death Count in the U.S. Strikes." *The New York Times*, July 30, 2002. Accessed February 11, 2016.

www.nytimes.com/2002/07/30/news/30iht-report_ed3_.html.

Lohbeck, Kurt. *Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitnesses to the CIA's Secret War in Afghanistan*. Washington D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1993.

Londono, Ernesto. "Study: Iraq, Afghanistan war cost to top \$4 trillion." *The Washington Post*, March 28, 2013. Accessed April 19, 2015.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/study-iraq-afghan-war-costs-to-top-4-trillion/2013/03/28/b82a5dce-97ed-11e2-814b-063623d80a60_story.html.

MaLean, Wayne. "Regional Security Complex theory and Insulator States: The Case Study of Turkey." *University of Tasmania* (2010): 1-75.

Malik, Hasnat. "Supreme Court upholds establishment of military courts." *The Express Tribune*, August 05, 2015. Accessed April 25, 2016.

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/932537/supreme-court-upholds-establishment-of-military-courts/>.

Mashalaug, Mujib. "After Kabul Attack, Afghan Leader Points Finger at Pakistan for Failing to Stop Taliban." *New York Times*, August 10, 2015. Accessed May 2, 2016.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/world/asia/suicide-car-bombing-kabul-airport.html?_r=0.

Monshipouri, Mahmood and Amjad Samuel. "Development and Democracy in Pakistan." *Asian Survey* 35, no. 11 (November 1995): 973-989.

Moscow. "Meeting of Politburo of the central committee of the communist party of Soviet Union." *National Security Archives* (March 17, 1979). Accessed November 17, 2015. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs>.

Moscow. "Transcript of Telephonic Conversation between Premier Alexi Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Muhammed Taraki." *National Security Archives* (March 17 or 18, 1979). Accessed November 17, 2015.

<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs>.

News, Geo. Pak Army launches operation 'Zarb-e-Azb' in North Waziristan." *Geo News*, June 15, 2015. Accessed March 15, 2016. <https://www.geo.tv/latest/94267-pak-army-launches-operation>.

Pakistan, Government of. "Economic Survey of Pakistan: 2001-2002." *Government of Pakistan* (2002).

<http://121.52.153.178:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/6549/Economic%20Survey%202001-2002.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

Pakistan, National Assembly of. "A Bill to Establish National Counter Terrorism Authority in Pakistan." *National Assembly of Pakistan*. Accessed March 25, 2016.

http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1363071845_127.pdf.

Partlow, Joshua. "Talks on long-term Afghan-U.S. partnership stalled." *The Washington Post*, July 28, 2011. Accessed April 30, 2016.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/talks-on-long-term-afghan-us-partnership-stalled/2011/07/27/gIQAAX0AfI_story.html.

Reports, BBC. "Afghanistan attack: Kabul suicide blast death rise to 64." *BBC News*, April 20, 2014. Accessed April 30, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36091046>.

Report, Asia. "Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Pakistan." Policy Report International Crisis Group (July 22, 2015). Accessed April 27, 2016.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.aspx>.

Research, Directorate for. "Afghan Resistance (U)." *Directorate for Research* (October 25, 1982). Accessed November 16, 2015.

<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html#docs>.

Pillar, Paul R. *Terrorism and the U.S. Policy*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2001.

Pirani, Simon. "Central Asia and Caspian Gas Production and the Constrains on Export." The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (December, 2012).

Rizvi, Hasan Askari. *Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 2013.

Rubin, Barnett R., and Ahmed Rashid. "From Great Game to Great Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan." *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2008): 30-44.

Saffee, Ahmad. "Pakistan's Counter Terrorism-Policy." *Institute of Strategic Studies* (October 7, 2015): 1-7.

Shahi, Agha. "The Geneva Accords." *Pakistan Horizon* 61 (2008): 143-164.

Shahid, Shamin. "Operation Zarb-e-Azab—a little extra need." *The Express Tribune*, June 23, 2015. Accessed 17 April, 2016. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/907973/operation-zarb-e-azb-a-little-extra-needed/>.

Smith, Josh, and Hamid Shalizi. "Afghan Taliban kill at least 28 in major attack in central Kabul." *Reuters*, April 19, 2016. Accessed April 30, 2016.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-blast-idUSKCN0XG0BO>.

Soherwordi, Syed Hussain Shaheed. "Withdrawal of American Forces from Afghanistan (Endgame): Issues and Challenges for Pakistan." *Journal of Political Studies* 19, no. 1 (2012): 129-141.

Suhrke, Astre. "From Principle to Practice: US military Strategy and Protection of Civilians in Afghanistan." *International Peacekeeping* 22, no. 1 (November 8, 2015): 100-118.

Sultana, Razia. "Major Threats to Pakistan in the Wake of the US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: The Case Study of FATA and KPK." *FWU Journal of Social Science* 1, no. 1 (summer, 2015).

Tahir, Naveed Ahmad. "Pakistan's Afghan Policy: The Regional and International Dimension." *Pakistan Horizon* 53, no. 1 (2000): 21-37.

Thomson, Peter. *The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts and the Failure of Great Powers*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.

Thornton, Thomas Perry. "Between the Stools?: U.S. Policy towards Pakistan during the Carter Administration." *Asian Survey* 22, no. 10 (October 1, 1982): 959-977.

USAID. "Analysis of Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)." *USAID Trade Project* (May, 2014).

Vinocur, John "U.S. question: with us, or against us?: Issue in sharp focus." *The New York Times*, February 8, 2003. Accessed March 24, 2016.
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/06/news/06iht-assess_ed3__0.html.

Walsh, Declan, Richards Adam, and Ewen MacAskill. "Osama Bin Laden is Dead, Obama announce." *The Guardian* (May 2, 2011). Accessed April 30, 2016.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/02/osama-bin-laden-dead-obama>.

Wazir, Asmatullah Khan. "Withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan and its way implication for Pakistan- Challenges and a way forward." *TIGAH, A Journal of Peace and Development*, 2 (December, 2012): 89-101.

Wright, Lawrence. "The Double Game: The unintended consequences of American funding in Pakistan." *The New Yorker*, May 16, 2011. Accessed December 21, 2015.
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/16/the-double-game>.

Yousaf, Kamran. "Afghan Taliban seek 'united national government'." *The Express Tribune*, July 9, 2015. Accessed April 30, 2016.
<http://tribune.com.pk/story/917517/afghan-taliban-seek-united-national-govt/>.

Yousuf, Kamran. "Pakistan finally confirms Mullah Akhtar Mansour's death in drone attack." *The Express Tribune*, May 14, 2016. Accessed May 21, 2016. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1110836/pakistan-finally-confirms-mullah-akhtar-mansours-death/>.

Yousaf, Mohammad, and Mark Adkin. *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's untold story*. Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992.

Yetiv, S. A. "How the Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan Improved the U.S. Strategic Position in Persian Gulf." *Asian Affairs* 17 (July 1, 1990): 62-81.

Zain, Omar Farooq. "Afghanistan from Conflict to Conflict." *Pakistan Horizon* 59, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 79-86.

Annexures

Annex 1: Meeting of Politburo of Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union

TOP SECRET
ONLY COPY
WORKING TRANSCRIPT

PUBLICATION PROHIBITED

MEETING OF THE POLITBURO
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

March 17, 1979

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Presiding

In attendance: Y. V. ANDROPOV, A. A. GROMYKO, A. N. KOSYGIN, A. Y. PELSHE, K. U. CHERNENKO, D. F. USTINOV, P. N. DEMICHEV, B. N. PONOMAREV, M. C. SOLOMENTZEV, N. A. TIKHONOV, I. V. KAPITONOV, V. I. DOLGIKH, M. V. ZIMYANIN, K. V. RUSAKOV, M. C. GORBACHEV

Re: Deterioration of Conditions in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Possible Responses From Our Side

KIRILENKO. Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev] has asked us to commence our Politburo session today at this unseasonable hour, and he will then join us tomorrow, in order to discuss the circumstances that have emerged in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The situation is urgent. Comrades Gromyko, Andropov and Ustinov today have put together some proposals which have been completed and are now in front of you. Let us consider this matter closely and determine what measures we ought to take, what actions should be undertaken. Perhaps we should hear first from Comrade Gromyko.

GROMYKO. Judging by the most recent communications that we have received from Afghanistan in the form of encrypted cables, as well as by telephone conferences with our chief military advisor Comrade Gorelov and temporary chargé d'affaires Comrade Alekseev, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated sharply, the center of the disturbance at this time being the town of Herat.

There, as we know from previous cables, the 17th division of the Afghan army was stationed, and had restored order, but now we have received news that this division has essentially collapsed. An artillery regiment and one infantry regiment comprising that division have gone over to the side of the insurgents. Bands of saboteurs and terrorists, having infiltrated from the territory of Pakistan, trained and armed not only with the participation of Pakistani forces but also of China, the United States of America and Iran, are committing atrocities in Herat. The insurgents infiltrating into the territory of Herat Province from Pakistan and Iran have joined forces with a domestic counter-revolution. The latter is especially comprised by

religious fanatics. The leaders of the reactionary masses are also linked in large part with the religious figures.

The number of insurgents is difficult to determine, but our comrades tell us that they are thousands, literally thousands.

Significantly, it should be noted that I had a conversation this morning at 11:00 with Amin -- Taraki's deputy who is the minister of foreign affairs -- and he did not express the slightest alarm about the situation in Afghanistan, and on the contrary, with Olympian tranquility, he said that the situation was not all that complicated, that the army was in control of everything, and so forth. In a word, he expressed the opinion that their position was under control.

KIRILENKO. In short, judging from the report of Amin, the leadership of Afghanistan is not experiencing the slightest anxiety in connection with these events.

GROMYKO. Exactly. Amin even said that the situation in Afghanistan is just fine. He said that not a single incident of insubordination by a governor had been reported, that is, that all of the governors were on the side of the lawful government. Whereas in reality, according to the reports of our comrades, the situation in Herat and in a number of other places is alarming, and the insurgents are in control there.

As far as Kabul is concerned, the situation there is basically calm. The borders of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran are closed, or more accurately, semi-closed. A large number of Afghans, formerly working in Iran, have been expelled from Iran and, naturally, they are highly dissatisfied, and many of them have also joined up with the insurgents.

The measures that we have drawn out for the aid of Afghanistan are set forth in the proposals that you have in front of you. I should add that we have appropriated an additional 10 million rubles to Afghanistan in hard currency for the protection of the border.

Inasmuch as Pakistan, in essence, is the principal place from which the terrorists are infiltrating into Afghanistan, it would appear to follow that the leadership of Afghanistan should send a letter of protest to Pakistan or issue a declaration, in a word, to come out with some kind of written statement. However, the Afghan leadership has not done that. To be sure, it looks very strange.

I asked Amin, what kind of actions do you consider necessary from our side? I told him what kind of aid we might be able to render. But he had no other requests, he simply responded that he had a very optimistic appraisal of the circumstances in Afghanistan, that the help you have given will stand us in good stead, and that all of the provinces are safely under the control of lawful forces. I asked him, don't you expect any problems from neighboring governments or a

domestic counter-revolution, and so forth? Amin answered firmly that no, there are no threats to the regime. In conclusion, he conveyed his greetings to the members of the Politburo, and personally to L. I. Brezhnev. And thus was my discussion today with Amin.

After a short time, approximately two or three hours, we received news from our comrades that chaos had erupted in Herat. One regiment, as I already indicated an artillery one, fired on its own troops, and part of the second regiment went over to the insurgents. Consequently, only a portion of the 17th division, which is guarding Herat, remains loyal to the Government. Our comrades also tell us that tomorrow and the next day, new masses of insurgents, trained on the territory of Pakistan and Iran, may invade.

About a half hour later, we again received news from our comrades that Comrade Taraki had summoned the chief military advisor Comrade Gorelov and chargé d'affaires Alekseev. And what did they discuss with Taraki? First of all, he appealed to the Soviet Union for help in the form of military equipment, ammunition and rations, that which is envisioned in the documents which we have presented for consideration by the Politburo. As far as military equipment is concerned, Taraki said, almost in passing, that perhaps ground and air support would be required. This must be understood to mean that the deployment of our forces is required, both land and air forces.

In my opinion, we must commence from a fundamental proposition in considering the question of aid to Afghanistan, namely: under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan. For 60 years now we have lived with Afghanistan in peace and friendship. And if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns against the Soviet Union, this will result in a sharp setback to our foreign policy. Of course, it is one thing to apply extreme measures if the Afghan army is on the side of the people, and an entirely different matter, if the army does not support the lawful government. And finally, third, if the army is against the government and, as a result, against our forces, then the matter will be complicated indeed. As we understand from Comrades Gorelov and Alekseev, the mood among the leadership, including Comrade Taraki, is not particularly out of sorts.

USTINOV. Comrade Gorelov, our chief military advisor, was with Taraki along with Comrade Alekseev, our chargé d'affaires in Afghanistan. I just spoke with Comrade Gorelov by telephone, and he said that the leadership of Afghanistan is worried about the state of affairs, and that matters in the province of Herat are particularly bad, as well as in the province of Pakti. The bad part is that the division which is supposed to be guarding Herat has turned out to be ineffective, and the commander of the division at this time is located on the airstrip, more to the point, he is seeking shelter there and, obviously, he is no longer commanding the actions of any regiments remaining loyal to the government. Bearing in mind that tomorrow (March 18), operative groups will be deployed into Herat.

We advised Comrade Taraki to redeploy several forces into the regions where the insurgency has erupted. He, in turn, responded that this would be difficult inasmuch as there is unrest in other places as well. In short, they are expecting a major response from the U.S.S.R., in the form of both land and air forces.

ANDROPOV. They are hoping that we will attack the insurgents.

KIRILENKO. The question arises, whom will our troops be fighting against if we send them there. Against the insurgents? Or have they been joined by a large number of religious fundamentalists, that is, Muslims, and among them large numbers of ordinary people? Thus, we will be required to wage war in significant part against the people.

KOSYGIN. What is the army like in Afghanistan - how many divisions are there?

USTINOV. The army in Afghanistan has 10 divisions, including more than 100 thousand soldiers.

ANDROPOV. Our operational data tells us that about three thousand insurgents are being directed into Afghanistan from Pakistan. These are, in main part, religious fanatics from among the people.

KIRILENKO. If there is a popular uprising, then, besides those persons coming from Pakistan and Iran, who for the most part consist of terrorists and insurgents, the masses against whom ~~are~~ troops are engaged will include ordinary people of Afghanistan. Although it is true that they are religious worshipers, followers of Islam.

GROMYKO. The relationship between the supporters of the government and the insurgents is still very unclear. Events in Herat, judging from everything, have unfolded violently, because over a thousand people have been killed. But even there the situation is unclear enough.

ANDROPOV. Of course, the insurgents coming into the territory of Afghanistan will be joined first of all by those who would rebel and solicit the Afghan people to their own side.

KOSYGIN. In my view, the draft decision under consideration must be substantially amended. First of all, we must not delay the supply of armaments until April but must give everything now, without delay, in March. That is the first thing.

Secondly, we must somehow give moral support to the leadership of Afghanistan, and I would suggest implementation of the following measures: inform Taraki that we are raising the price of gas from 15 to 25 rubles per thousand cubic meters. That will make it possible to cover the expenses that they will incur in connection with the acquisition of arms and other materials

by a rise in prices. It is necessary in my opinion to give Afghanistan these arms free of charge and not require any 25 percent assessment.

ALL. Agreed.

KOSYGIN. And third, we are slated to supply 75 thousand tons of bread. I think we should reexamine that and supply Afghanistan with 100 thousand tons. These are the measures that it seems to me ought to be added to the draft of the decision and, in that fashion, we would lend moral assistance to the Afghan leadership. We must put up a struggle for Afghanistan; after all, we have lived side by side for 60 years. Of course, while there is a difficult struggle with the Iranians, Pakistanis and Chinese, nevertheless Iran will lend assistance to Afghanistan - it has the means to do so, all the more so since they are like-minded religiously. This must be borne in mind. Pakistan will also take such measures. There is nothing you can say about the Chinese. Consequently, I believe that we must adopt the fraternal decision to seriously assist the Afghan leadership. I have already spoken on the subject of payments, to talk more of that is unnecessary, and moreover, as here written, in freely convertible hard currency. Whatever freely convertible currency they may have, we are not going to receive any of it in any event.

USTINOV. Everything that is described in the draft declaration in connection with the supply of arms to Afghanistan, all of that is being done, shipments and deliveries of this equipment are already taking place. Unfortunately, I do not know whether we will be able to supply everything before April; that is going to be very difficult. I would request that we adopt the decision in connection with the supply of arms that is set forth here. As far as concerns payment for the arms, I would delete that.

KOSYGIN. All the same, we must dispatch everything, literally beginning tomorrow.

USTINOV. Fine, we are doing that, and we will ensure that all of these things are shipped by tomorrow.

KIRILENKO. Let us authorize Comrade Kosygin to implement those amendments to the draft of the decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. which we have before us, as relates to those points which we have discussed. Tomorrow he will present the document to us in final draft.

KOSYGIN. Absolutely. I will come here tomorrow morning and do everything.

KIRILENKO. We must undertake measures to ensure that all of the military supplies are sent in March.

KOSYGIN. And if, as Comrade Ustinov has pointed out, it is impossible to ship everything completely in March, then perhaps, a second portion can remain for April, but let that portion be insignificantly small.

I also want to raise another question: whatever you may say, Amin and Taraki alike are concealing from us the true state of affairs. We still don't know exactly what is happening in Afghanistan. What is their assessment of the situation? After all, they continue to paint the picture in a cheerful light, whereas in reality, we can see what is happening there. They are good people, that is apparent, but all the same they are concealing a great deal from us. What is the reason for this, that is hard to say. In my view we must decide this question with the ambassador, Andrey Andreevich, as soon as possible. Although as a practical matter he is not authorized, and he doesn't do what is required of him.

In addition, I would consider it necessary to send an additional number of qualified military specialists, and let them find out what is happening with the army.

Moreover, I would consider it necessary to adopt a more comprehensive political decision. Perhaps the draft of such a political decision can be prepared by our comrades in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, or the Foreign Department of the KGB. It is clear that Iran, China and Pakistan will come out against Afghanistan, and do everything within their power and means to contravene the lawful government and discredit its actions. It is exactly here that our political support of Taraki and his government is necessary. And of course, Carter will also come out against the leadership of Afghanistan.

With whom will it be necessary for us to fight in the event it becomes necessary to deploy troops - who will it be that rises against the present leadership of Afghanistan? They are all Mohammedans, people of one belief, and their faith is sufficiently strong that they can close ranks on that basis. It seems to me that we must speak to Taraki and Amin about the mistakes that they have permitted to occur during this time. In reality, even up to the present time, they have continued to execute people that do not agree with them; they have killed almost all of the leaders - not only the top leaders, but also those of the middle ranks - of the "Parcham" party. Of course, it will now be difficult to formulate a political document - to do that our comrades will be required to work, as I have already said, for a period of three days.

USTINOV. That is all correct, what Aleksey Nikolaevich says, this must be done as soon as possible.

GROMYKO. The documents must be prepared immediately.

KOSYGIN. I don't think that we should pressure the Afghan government to request a deployment of forces from us. Let them create their own special units, which could be redeployed to the more difficult regions in order to quell the insurgents.

USTINOV. In my view we must not, under any circumstances, mix our forces with the Afghan forces, in the event that we send them there.

KOSYGIN. We must prepare our own military forces, work up a statement relating to them, and send it by special messenger.

USTINOV. We have prepared two options in respect to military action. Under the first one, we would, in the course of a single day, deploy into Afghanistan the 105th airborne division and redeploy the infantry-motorized regiment into Kabul; toward the border we would place the 68th motorized division; and the 5th motor artillery division would be located at the border. Under this scenario, we would be ready for the deployment of forces within three days. But we must adopt the political decision that we have been talking about here.

KIRILENKO. Comrade Ustinov has correctly stated the issue; we must come out against the insurgents. And in the political document this must be clearly and pointedly stated.

In addition to that, we must bear upon Taraki; if we are already talking about the deployment of forces, then the question must be considered thoroughly. We cannot deploy troops without a request from the government of Afghanistan, and we must convey this to Comrade Taraki. And this must be directly stated in a conference between Comrade Kosygin and Taraki. In addition to this, Taraki must be instructed to change his tactics. Executions, torture and so forth cannot be applied on a massive scale. Religious questions, the relationship with religious communities, with religion generally and with religious leaders take on special meaning for them. This is a major policy issue. And here Taraki must ensure, with all decisiveness, that no illicit measures whatsoever are undertaken by them.

The documents must be prepared no later than tomorrow. We will consult with Leonid Ilych as to how we can best accomplish this.

USTINOV. We have a second option which has also been prepared. This one deals with the deployment of two divisions into Afghanistan.

ANDROPOV. We need to adopt the draft of the decision which we have examined today, accounting for those changes and amendments which have been discussed. As far as the political decision is concerned, that also must be immediately prepared, because bands are streaming in from Pakistan.

PONOMAREV. We should send around 500 persons into Afghanistan in the capacity as advisors and specialists. These comrades must all know what to do.

ANDROPOV. Around Herat there are 20 thousand civilians who have taken part in the rebellion. As far as negotiations with Taraki are concerned, we must get on with it. But I think it is best for Comrade Kosygin to speak with Taraki.

ALL. Agreed. It is better for Comrade Kosygin to speak with him.

ANDROPOV. We must finalize the political statement, bearing in mind that we will be labeled as an aggressor, but that in spite of that, under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan.

PONOMAREV. Unfortunately, there is much that we do not know about Afghanistan. It seems to me that, in the discussion with Taraki, all these questions must be raised, and in particular, let him explain the state of affairs with the army and in the country generally. After all, they have a 100,000-man army and with the assistance of our advisors, there is much that the army can do. Otherwise, 20 thousand insurgents are going to achieve a victory. Above all, it will be necessary to accomplish everything that is necessary with the forces of the Afghan army, and only later, if and when the necessity truly arises, to deploy our own forces.

KOSYGIN. In my view it is necessary to send arms, but only if we are convinced that they will not fall into the hands of the insurgents. If their army collapses, then it follows that those arms will be claimed by the insurgents. Then the question will arise as to how we will respond in the view of world public opinion. All this will have to be justified, that is, if we are really going to deploy our forces, then we must marshal all of the appropriate arguments and explain everything in detail. Perhaps one of our responsible comrades should travel to Afghanistan in order to understand the local conditions in greater detail. Perhaps Comrade Ustinov or Comrade Ogarkov.

USTINOV. The situation in Afghanistan is worsening. We ought to speak now, it seems to me, about political measures that we have not yet undertaken. And, on the other hand, we must fully exploit the capability of the Afghan army. It seems to me there is no point in me going to Afghanistan; I have doubts about that. Perhaps some member of the government should go.

KOSYGIN. You must go there nonetheless, Dmitri Fedorovich. The point is that we are sending into Afghanistan a large volume of armaments, and it is necessary that they remain in the hands of the revolutionary masses. We have about 550 advisors in Afghanistan, and they must be apprised of the state of affairs in the military.

USTINOV. Even if one of us goes to Afghanistan, still nobody is going to learn anything in just a couple of days.

GROMYKO. I think that negotiations with Taraki should be undertaken by A. N. Kosygin or D. F. Ustinov, and more likely, in the end, by Comrade Kosygin.

KOSYGIN. Before speaking with Taraki, it will be necessary for me to get approval from Leonid Ilych. I will speak with Leonid Ilych tomorrow and then talk to Taraki.

ANDROPOV. And the essence of our decisions here today must be communicated to Leonid Ilych in detail.

GROMYKO. We have to discuss what we will do if the situation gets worse. Today, the situation in Afghanistan for now is unclear to many of us. Only one thing is clear - we cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy. We have to think how to achieve this. Maybe we won't have to introduce troops.

KOSYGIN. All of us agree - we must not surrender Afghanistan. From this point, we have to work out first of all a political document, to use all political means in order to help the Afghan leadership to strengthen itself, to provide the support which we've already planned, and to leave as a last resort the use of force.

GROMYKO. I want to emphasize again the main thing, which we must consider thoroughly, and that is to come up with an answer as to how we will react in the event of a critical situation. Taraki is already speaking of alarm, whereas Amin to date has expressed an optimistic attitude. In a word, as you can see, the Afghan leadership, in my view, has incorrectly assessed the state of affairs in the army and in the country generally.

PONOMAREV. The Afghan army achieved a revolutionary coup d'état, and I would think that under skillful leadership from the government, it could hold to its own position in defense of the country.

KIRILENKO. The problem is that many of the commanders in the army have been imprisoned and executed. This has resulted in a major negative impact on the army.

GROMYKO. One of our principal tasks is to strengthen the army; that is the main link. Our entire orientation must focus on the political leadership of the country and the army. And all the same, we have to acknowledge that the Afghan leadership is concealing a great deal from us. For some reason they do not want to be open with us. This is very unfortunate.

ANDROPOV. It seems to me that we ought to inform the socialist countries of these measures.

KIRILENKO. We have spoken at length, Comrades, and our opinions are clear; let us come to a conclusion.

1. Comrade Kosygin shall be authorized to clarify the document which has been presented to us, to add to it the supply of 100 tons of bread, an increase in the price of gas from 15 to 25 rubles, and to remove the language about a percentage, and hard currency, etc.
2. Comrade Kosygin shall be authorized to communicate with Comrade Taraki, to ascertain how they evaluate the situation in Afghanistan and what is necessary from us. In this discussion with Taraki, Comrade Kosygin shall be guided by the exchange of opinion that has taken place here in the Politburo.
3. The third point that we have discussed here consists of authorizing Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomarev to prepare a political document dealing with an exchange of opinions regarding our policy in connection with Afghanistan.
4. We must appeal to Pakistan, through our channels in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that the Pakistani government not allow any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
5. I think that we should accede to the proposal of Comrade Ustinov in connection with assistance to the Afghan army in overcoming the difficulties that it has encountered by means of the forces of our military units.
6. To send into Afghanistan our best military specialists, through our channels with the Ministry of Defense, as well as through the KGB, for a detailed explication of the circumstances prevailing in the Afghan army and in Afghanistan generally.
7. Our draft of the decision must contain a provision for the preparation of materials that expose the interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan on the part of Pakistan, Iran, the U.S.A., and China, and for publication of those materials through third countries.
8. Comrades Ponomarev and Zamyatin shall be authorized to prepare materials relating to the intervention of Pakistan, the U.S.A, Iran, China and other countries in Afghanistan and to dispatch such material to the press as it becomes available.
9. We must think carefully about how we will respond to the accusations that will be leveled against the U.S.S.R. by other countries, when we are charged with aggression and so forth.
10. The Ministry of Defense shall be permitted to deploy two divisions on the border between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan.

And finally, as has been suggested here, it will be necessary for us to inform the socialist countries of those measures which we have adopted.

Are there any other proposals, Comrades?

ALL. It's all been covered.

KIRILENKO. I will now attempt to make contact with Comrade Chernenko and communicate our proposals to him.

ALL. Agreed. [Recess.]

KIRILENKO. I have just spoken with Comrade Chernenko. He believes that the proposals set forth here are correct, and he will attempt to inform Leonid Ilych about them.

Let us adjourn this session for today. [Session adjourned.]

KIRILENKO. Yesterday we agreed that Comrade A. N. Kosygin should communicate with Comrade Taraki. Let us listen to Comrade A. N. Kosygin.

KOSYGIN. As we agreed, yesterday I made contact with Comrade Taraki twice by telephone. He informed me that on the streets of Herat, the insurgent soldiers were fraternizing with those who support the government. The situation in that town is very complex. If, in the words of Comrade Taraki, the Soviet Union does not lend its assistance at this time, we will not hold out.

Further, Comrade Taraki said that Iran and Pakistan are supplying arms to the insurgents, and that, at the time, Afghans were returning from Iran, but it turned out that they were not Afghans but rather soldiers of the Iranian army dressed in Afghan clothing. And they stirred up agitation and insubordination. Consequently, in a number of provinces of Afghanistan, and especially in the town of Herat, events have unfolded that bring with them a most serious danger. Comrade Taraki said further that the issue could be resolved in a single day. If Herat falls, then it is considered that the matter is finished.

I then put the question to him: in Afghanistan there is a 100 thousand man army, not all of which is situated in Herat; there is only the one 17th division there. Could it really be impossible to form several divisions and deploy them to Herat in order to assist the supporters of the government? Comrade Taraki responded that several divisions were being formed, but that until they were formed, there would be no garrisons loyal to the government in Herat.

In that connection they would like to receive reinforcements in the form of tanks and armored cars for the infantry. I then asked him, will you be able to muster enough tank crews to place the tanks into action? He responded that they have no tank crews, and therefore he requested that we dispatch Tadzhiks to serve as crews for tanks and armored cars, dressed in Afghan uniforms, and send them here. I then stated again, Comrade Taraki, there is no way you

will conceal the fact that our military personnel are taking part in battle operations; this fact will be immediately uncovered, and press correspondents will broadcast to the whole world that Soviet tanks are engaged in a military conflict in Afghanistan.

I also asked Comrade Taraki what was the population of Kabul. In response he told me that the population was 1 million 200 thousand. I then asked him, would it really be impossible for you to form part of a division from the population of Kabul to assist the various provinces, to equip them and, in like fashion, to arm them? To that he responded that there was nobody to train them. I then said to him, how is it possible, given how many people were trained in the military academic academies in the Soviet Union, given how many of the old military cadres have come out on the side of the government, that there is now nobody to do the training? How then, I asked him, can we support you? Almost without realizing it, Comrade Taraki responded that almost nobody does support the government. In Kabul we have no workers, only craftsmen. And the conversation again turned to Herat, and he said that if Herat falls, then the revolution is doomed. And on the contrary, if it holds out, then survival of the revolution is assured. In his opinion, the army is reliable, and they are depending on it. However, uprisings have emerged throughout the entire country, and the army is too small to be able to pacify the insurgents everywhere. Your assistance is required, Comrade Taraki again declared.

As far as Kabul is concerned, there, it is obvious from the telegrams we received today, the situation is basically the same as in Iran: manifestos are circulating, and crowds of people are massing. Large numbers of persons are flowing into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran, equipped with Iranian and Chinese armaments.

KIRILENKO. In Herat the 17th division numbers 9 thousand men. Can it really be that they are all in a state of inaction or have gone over to the side of the government's opponents?

KOSYGIN. According to our data, the artillery and one infantry regiment have gone over, although not entirely, and the rest continue to support the government.

USTINOV. As far as the Tadzhiks are concerned, we don't have separate [deleted]

KOSYGIN. An anti-aircraft battalion located in Herat has also gone over to the side of the rebels.

USTINOV. Amin, when I talked to him, also requested the deployment of forces to Herat to quell the insurgents.

KOSYGIN. Comrade Taraki reports that half of the division located in Herat has gone over to the side of the rebels. The remaining portion, he thinks, also will not support the government.

USTINOV. The Afghan revolution has encountered major difficulties along its way, Amin said in his conversation with me, and its survival now depends totally on the Soviet Union.

What is the problem? Why is this happening? The problem is that the leadership of Afghanistan did not sufficiently appreciate the role of Islamic fundamentalists. It is under the banner of Islam that the soldiers are turning against the government, and an absolute majority, perhaps only with rare exceptions, are believers. There is your reason why they are asking us to help drive back the attacks of the insurgents in Herat. Amin said, albeit somewhat uncertainly, that there is support for the army. And again, like Comrade Taraki, he appealed for assistance.

KIRILENKO. It follows that they have no guarantee in respect to their own army. They are depending on only one outcome, namely, on our tanks and armored cars.

KOSYGIN. We must, obviously, in adopting such a determination in respect to assistance, seriously think through the consequences that will flow from this. The matter is really very serious.

ANDROPOV. Comrades, I have considered all these issues in depth and arrived at the conclusion that we must consider very, very seriously, the question of whose cause we will be supporting if we deploy forces into Afghanistan. It's completely clear to us that Afghanistan is not ready at this time to resolve all of the issues it faces through socialism. The economy is backward, the Islamic religion predominates, and nearly all of the rural population is illiterate. We know Lenin's teaching about a revolutionary situation. Whatever situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation. Therefore, I believe that we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, and that is for us entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a risk.

KOSYGIN. Maybe we ought to instruct our ambassador, Comrade Vinogradov, to go to Prime Minister of Iran Bazargan and inform him that interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan cannot be tolerated.

GROMYKO. I completely support Comrade Andropov's proposal to rule out such a measure as the deployment of our troops into Afghanistan. The army there is unreliable. Thus our army, when it arrives in Afghanistan, will be the aggressor. Against whom will it fight? Against the Afghan people first of all, and it will have to shoot at them. Comrade Andropov correctly noted that indeed the situation in Afghanistan is not ripe for a revolution. And all that we have done in recent years with such effort in terms of détente, arms reduction, and much more - all that would be thrown back. China, of course, would be given a nice present. All the nonaligned countries will be against us. In a word, serious consequences are to be expected from such an action. There will no longer be any question of a meeting of Leonid Ilych with Carter, and the visit of Giscard d'Estang at the end of March will be placed in question. One must ask, and what would we gain? Afghanistan with its present government, with a backward economy,

with inconsequential weight in international affairs. On the other side, we must keep in mind that from a legal point of view too we would not be justified in sending troops. According to the UN Charter a country can appeal for assistance, and we could send troops, in case it is subject to external aggression. Afghanistan has not been subject to any aggression. This is its internal affair, a revolutionary internal conflict, a battle of one group of the population against another. Incidentally, the Afghans haven't officially addressed us on bringing in troops.

In a word, we now find ourselves in a situation where the leadership of the country, as a result of the serious mistakes it has allowed to occur, has ended up not on the high ground, not in command of the necessary support from the people.

KIRILENKO. Yesterday in Afghanistan the situation was different, and we were inclined toward the conclusion that we ought, perhaps, to deploy some number of military detachments. Today the situation is different, and the discussion here quite correctly has already taken a somewhat different course, namely, we are all adhering to the position that there is no basis whatsoever for the deployment of forces.

ANDROPOV. Yesterday, when we discussed this issue, the Afghans were not talking about the deployment of troops; today the situation there has changed. In Herat, not just one regiment has gone over to the side of the rebellion but the whole division. As we can see from yesterday's discussion with Amin, the people do not support the government of Taraki. Would our troops really help them here? In such a situation, tanks and armored cars can't save anything. I think that we should say to Taraki bluntly that we support all their actions and will render the kind of support that we agreed upon yesterday and today, but that in no case will we go forward with a deployment of troops into Afghanistan.

KOSYGIN. Maybe we should invite him here and tell him that we will increase our assistance to you, but we cannot deploy troops, since they would be fighting not against the army, which in essence has gone over to the adversary or is just sitting and waiting it out, but against the people. There would be huge minuses for us. A whole contingent of countries would quickly come out against us. And there are no pluses for us at all.

ANDROPOV. We should state directly to Comrade Taraki that we will support you with all measures and means except for the deployment of troops.

KOSYGIN. We should invite him here and tell him that we will support you with all means and measures but we will not deploy troops.

KIRILENKO. The government of Afghanistan itself has done nothing to secure the situation. And it has a 100 thousand man army at that. What has it done? What good has it accomplished? Essentially nothing. And after all, Comrades, we gave very, very good support to Afghanistan.

ALL. Agreed.

KIRILENKO. We gave it everything. And what has come of it? It has come to nothing of any value. After all, it was they who executed innocent people for no reason and even spoke to us of their own justification, as though we also executed people during the time of Lenin. So you see what kind of Marxists we have found.

The situation has changed since yesterday. Yesterday, as I already said, we were unanimous as to the rendering of military aid, but we carefully discussed the matter, considered various options, searched for different ways, other than the deployment of troops. I believe that we should present our point of view of Leonid Ilych, invite Comrade Taraki to Moscow and tell him about everything that we have agreed on.

Maybe it is true we should send special declarations to Khomeini and Bazargan in Iran and Pakistan?

ANDROPOV. We should invite Comrade Taraki here.

KOSYGIN. I think we should consult with Leonid Ilych and send a plane to Kabul today.

KIRILENKO. Comrade Kosygin needs to speak with Comrade Taraki. If he wants to come to Moscow and not remain in Tashkent, then perhaps Leonid Ilych will see him.

GROMYKO. I think it would be better for us to prepare a political document after the discussion with Comrade Taraki.

ANDROPOV. We have to begin publishing articles about Pakistan and its support for the insurgents.

USTINOV. I assume we will continue with the aid measures that we agreed on yesterday.

ALL. Agreed.

USTINOV. The only thing is that we must rule out the possibility of deploying troops.

KOSYGIN. In short, we are not changing anything in connection with aid to Afghanistan except the deployment of troops. They themselves will relate more responsibly to the determination of questions concerning the government's management of affairs. And if we do

everything for them, defend their revolution, then what remains for them? Nothing. We have 24 advisors in Herat. We should pull them out.

ZAMYATIN. As far as the supply of propaganda is concerned in connection with this undertaking, we have articles prepared about Afghanistan. We also have articles prepared about Pakistan and the assistance rendered to the Afghan insurgents by China. We must get these articles to press today.

ALL. Agreed.

CHERNENKO. Comrades, we must decide who will invite Comrade Taraki.

KIRILENKO. This should be done by Comrade A. N. Kosygin. Let him make the call and invite him to come to Moscow or Tashkent, whichever he prefers.

[With this the session of March 18 was adjourned.]

BREZHNEV. Comrades, since the beginning of the events that have unfolded in Afghanistan, I have been informed about them. I have been informed about the discussions of Comrade A. A. Gromyko with Amin, of Comrade D. F. Ustinov also with Amin, about the latest events that have taken place there in the course of yesterday, and in that connection about the discussion of Comrade A. N. Kosygin with Comrade Taraki.

I have signed documents authorizing the delivery of additional supplies of special materials, including military property and armaments, and also dealing with the issue of a number of measures having a political and organizational character, and authorizing Comrade A. N. Kosygin to communicate with Comrade Taraki, and to brief our press and other media outlets in connection with the events in Afghanistan. In a word, all of the measures that were set forth in the draft decision of the Central Committee of the CPSS submitted on Saturday, all of the measures that have been adopted in the course of Saturday and Sunday, in my view, are entirely correct.

The question was raised as to the immediate participation of our troops in the conflict that has arisen in Afghanistan. In my view the Politburo has correctly determined that the time is not right for us to become entangled in that war.

We must explain to Comrade Taraki and our other Afghan comrades, that we can help them with everything that is necessary for the conduct of all activities in the country. But the involvement of our forces in Afghanistan would harm not only us, but first of all them. Accordingly, it would appear that we ought now to hear the report of Comrades A. A. Gromyko, D. F. Ustinov, Y. V. Andropov and A. N. Kosygin, and with that conclude this phase of the

adoption of measures which were necessary to implement in connection with the conflict in Afghanistan.

GROMYKO. We must discuss today the very acute question concerning the situation in Afghanistan. We have closely followed the developing events in that country and have given instructions to our embassy personnel, advisors and so forth. We have systematically, I would say, very regularly, in the course of the day, received comprehensive information from our representatives in Afghanistan.

What do we have as of today? In an array of provinces in Afghanistan, first and foremost in Herat, there has been an uprising of insurgents. Where did they come from? They were dispatched from the territory of Iran and Pakistan. These are all elements hostile to the government of Comrade Taraki. In order to conceal ⁱⁿ their deployment into Afghanistan, they were dressed in Afghan uniforms, and in numbers amounting to several tens of thousands they appeared in Herat, instigated this insurrection, and we unexpectedly began to receive reports about the events in Herat. There is one government division located there, which was supposed to maintain public order. But as a result of the fact that part of the government forces went over to the side of the insurgents, shooting broke out and there were many casualties; more than a thousand were killed.

I discussed all aspects of the situation in Afghanistan with the Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Amin. But I must say candidly that his assessment was somehow rather relaxed. We were under the impression conveyed by his assessment, and then suddenly the mood of Amin changed for the worse, and he himself began to speak about the fact that the entire division located in Herat had gone over to the side of the insurgents. At the height of the events in Herat, Dmitri Fedorovich spoke with Amin, who bluntly expressed the view that the U.S.S.R. should deploy troops in Herat. It begins to look like a detective novel, how superciliously the Afghan leadership posits such serious questions.

After that, Comrade A. N. Kosygin spoke with Comrade Taraki, who told him that the situation in Afghanistan was bad, and he also requested a deployment of troops to Herat. The border of Afghanistan, both with Iran and Pakistan, is open. Our advisors promptly articulated a series of proposals, but they didn't listen to them.

Today we have received reports indicating that the situation in Herat is not all that bad: two regiments remain loyal to the government after all. Where lies the truth, I can't say, but these are the reports we have gotten.

We may assume with full justification that all these events, not only in Afghanistan but in the neighboring governments, including those in China, are being directed by the hand of the U.S.A. China, Pakistan, and Iran are playing a role here that is not at all far behind.

There are several heartening notes in the fact that in Kabul, yesterday, a massive demonstration took place in support of the government. But all the same the government position in Afghanistan is not in control as it ought to be.

Naturally, we cannot avoid the need to confront the questions relating to the situation in Afghanistan. But I believe that we will have to adhere to our line, our policy, and follow our course with a view to all of the peculiarities. If, for example, we take upon ourselves the risk of deploying troops, we will obtain not as many pluses as minuses. To this time we still don't know how the Afghan army will behave. And if it does not support our measures or remains neutral, then it will turn out that we have used our forces to occupy Afghanistan. In doing this we will create for ourselves an incredibly difficult complication in our foreign policy. We would be largely throwing away everything we achieved with such difficulty, particularly détente, the SALT-II negotiations would fly by the wayside, there would be no signing of an agreement (and however you look at it that is for us the greatest political priority), there would be no meeting of Leonid Ilych with Carter, and it is very doubtful that Giscard d'Estang would come to visit us, and our relations with Western countries, particularly the FRG, would be spoiled.

And so, despite the difficult situation in Afghanistan, we cannot embark on such an act as the deployment of troops.

Parenthetically, it is entirely incomprehensible to us why Afghanistan has been so indulgent with Pakistan, which is obviously engaged in intervention against Afghanistan. Yesterday the government of Afghanistan published a proclamation, but it was not sufficiently strident.

We are rendering major aid to Afghanistan. How the government of Afghanistan will conduct itself henceforth is difficult to predict; fixing the situation there is also problematic. However, there is no basis whatsoever to conclude that all is lost there. I believe that if the Afghan government can find in itself the strength to coordinate its actions properly, then matters might turn out there for the best.

KOSYGIN. I had the opportunity to speak with Comrade Taraki yesterday on two occasions. He says that everything there is falling apart and that we must send troops, that the situation is the same in all of Afghanistan as it is in Herat. He says that if we lose Herat, then everything will fall. Pakistan, in his opinion, is sending a large number of men, dressed in Afghan uniforms. According to his data, 4,000 such persons have been dispatched. There are 500 men situated on the airfield in Herat at this time. I asked him, who in Herat is on your side? Comrade Taraki responded that in essence the entire population there has fallen under the influence of the religious fundamentalists. He said that there are 200-250 persons there who are organizing the entire thing. I asked him, are there any workers there? He said, that there are about two thousand workers. I asked him what, in your opinion, are the prospects for Herat? He said to me bluntly that Herat will fall tomorrow, but that it is holding on for the time being.

They are talking about forming new units and sending them to Herat. In the opinion of Comrade Taraki, all who have gathered from the ranks of those dissatisfied with the new regime will then unite and set out for Kabul, and that will be the end of his government. Again he requested assistance from our troops. I said that I could not answer his request at this time. I said that we were intensively studying the question, and that we would deliberate and then respond.

As you can see, the discussion with Comrade Taraki yielded no constructive results whatsoever. He spoke of the fall of Herat and requested a deployment of our troops. I asked him what was required from our side in order to combine political measures with those of a military character. Taraki then said to me, you should place Afghan insignias on your planes and tanks, and let them move on Herat from across the border. I then said that this would be direct aggression on the part of the U.S.S.R. against Afghanistan.

I asked him, can you muster soldiers and special drivers for tanks and armored cars from the ranks of the Afghans? He said that this could be done, but only a very few.

I told him of our decision to render comprehensive assistance to Afghanistan, to send an additional number of advisors and specialists.

Naturally, we must preserve Afghanistan as an allied government. In addition, it would appear that we must appeal to Pakistan with a warning that intervention against Afghanistan is intolerable. The same measure must be taken in respect to Iran. The message must be directed to Khomeini and to Bazargan. We must also come out with a similar document in respect to Iran.

It would be good if the borders with Pakistan and Iran could be closed.

It seems to me that it would make sense to take the further step of sending a good ambassador to Afghanistan. From the discussion with Comrade Taraki I learned that he doesn't even know to whom the government should turn. A great political task is necessary there, and only in that event can we save Afghanistan as an ally.

BREZHNEV. Letters to Pakistan and Iran must be sent today.

USTINOV. Amin spoke with me yesterday morning. Having consulted beforehand with Leonid Ilych, I told him about the massive aid that we are turning out and will continue to render. Amin said that the Soviet Union is our closest and principal friend. He then started to lament about the fact that Pakistan and Iran are sending large numbers of saboteurs that are being trained on the territory of Pakistan by Chinese advisors, being equipped with Chinese arms, and are then being sent across the border into Afghanistan.

There is strong opposition in Afghanistan on the part of the feudal lords.

He then turned the discussion to Herat and, just like Taraki, asked us to send tanks. I told him about the aid that we had determined to give Afghanistan in the form of a supply of armaments. He said that such aid was helpful, but what they really need is for us to send tanks.

BREZHNEV. Their army is falling apart, and we are supposed to wage the war for them.

USTINOV. We have a large number of advisors in the Afghan army, as well as interpreters. I told Amin that we can send an additional number of interpreters.

Getting to the heart of the matter, in Afghanistan there is basically no information, no ties between Kabul and Herat. There is a single small electric power station there, and consequently the insurgent elements, having deserted the government, are heading into the mountains.

The situation in Herat today is somewhat better. It is calm in the city. Technical assistance, of course, will be necessary for us to send. We will send a great deal of it. We are forming two divisions in the Turkestan military district, and one division in the Central Asian military district. We have three regiments that could arrive in Afghanistan in literally three hours. But I am saying this, of course, only to emphasize our state of readiness. Like the rest of my Comrades, I do not support the idea of deploying troops to Afghanistan. I would request permission that we conduct tactical exercises on the border with Afghanistan and to form regiments and divisions.

I must say that the Afghan leadership is poorly handling very many matters, and that working under such conditions is very difficult for our advisors.

ANDROPOV. The first question that must be decided concerns the difficulty of the situation. In addition to that the situation is increasingly unreliable. Just what exactly is going on in Afghanistan? It has to do with the leadership. The leadership does not recognize the forces which support it, and on which it could depend. Today, for example, a rather substantial demonstration took place in Kabul and Herat, but the leadership did not exploit these massive measures to the necessary extent. Educational efforts have been poorly managed not only in the army but among the population generally. They execute their political opponents. Nobody listens to the radio because transmissions are very weak. It will be necessary for us to assist them with mobile telecommunications facilities.

Amin has essentially had all of the power in his hands, but only yesterday did they ratify a new director of government security and a chief of state. This is the way to achieve some broadening of the political base among the leadership.

On our part, we have advisors there under the direction of the chief advisor for party policy Comrade Veselov. In my opinion he is not up to the task and is coping badly with the situation. It might be better if we were to send there some comrade from the Central Committee apparatus. There are many advisors there. There are advisors in KGB channels, also in large numbers.

I think that as far as the deployment of troops is concerned, it would not behoove us to make such a determination. To deploy our troops would mean to wage war against the people, to crush the people, to shoot at the people. We will look like aggressors, and we cannot permit that to occur.

PONOMAREV. We have 460 Afghan military personnel in the Soviet Union. These are all prepared officer cadres; they could be sent into Afghanistan.

OGARKOV. The Afghans have appealed to us with a request to speed up the training of 160 officers.

USTINOV. We have to speak with Comrade Taraki about getting those people sent there and using them as officer cadres.

KAPITONOV. As far as our chief advisor on party policy Comrade Veselov is concerned, he is a good man. He served as the Central Committee inspector with us, and more recently worked as the second secretary to the Bashkirskii general party committee. He is a young and energetic comrade.

USTINOV. Our party advisors are not sufficiently qualified and there are very few of them, in all, it seems to me, five men, but the work has to be done very quickly.

KAPITONOV. That's right, we really do have only five men there under the direction of Comrade Veselov. But we are right now selecting a number of additional comrades and will send them there.

BREZHNEV. I think that we should approve the measures that have been worked out in the course of these few days.

ALL. Agreed.

BREZHNEV. It follows that the appropriate comrades should be authorized to carry them out aggressively and if new questions arise in connection with Afghanistan, to submit them to the Politburo.

ALL. Agreed.

BREZHNEV. Accordingly, we are adopting the decision:

To bring Comrade Taraki here tomorrow, March 20.

Discussions will be conducted by Comrades A. N. Kosygin, A. A. Gromyko, and D. F. Ustinov, and then I will see him.

ALL. Very well.

With this the session was adjourned.

[Source: Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; Fond 89, Perechen 25, Dokument 1, Listy 1, 12-25.]

Annex 2: Transcript of Telephonic Conversation between Premier Alexi Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Muhammed Taraki

Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Tarki, 17 or 18 March 1979

Kosygin: Ask Comrade Taraki, perhaps he will outline the situation in Afghanistan.

Taraki: The situation is bad and getting worse.

Kosygin: Do you have support among the workers, city dwellers, the petty bourgeoisie, and the white collar workers in Herat? Is there still anyone on your side?

Taraki: There is no active support on the part of the population. It is almost wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans - follow not the heathens, but follow us. The propaganda is underpinned by this.

Kosygin: Are there many workers there?

Taraki: Very few—between 1,000 and 2,000 people in all.

Kosygin: What are the prospects?

Taraki: We are convinced that the enemy will form new units and will develop an offensive.

Kosygin: Do you not have the forces to rout them?

Taraki: I wish it were the case.

Kosygin: What, then, are your propos-

als on this issue?

Taraki: We ask that you extend practical and technical assistance, involving people and arms.

Kosygin: It is a very complex matter.

Taraki: Iran and Pakistan are working against us, according to the same plan. Hence, if you now launch a decisive attack on Herat, it will be possible to save the revolution.

Kosygin: The whole world will immediately get to know this. The rebels have portable radio transmitters and will report it directly.

Taraki: I ask that you extend assistance.

Kosygin: We must hold consultations on this issue. Do you not have connections with Iran's progressives? Can't you tell them that it is currently the United States that is your and their chief enemy? The Iranians are very hostile toward the United States and evidently this can be put to use as propaganda. What foreign policy activities or statements would you like to see coming from us? Do you have any ideas on this question, propaganda-wise?

Taraki: Propaganda help must be combined with practical assistance. I suggest that you place Afghan markings on your tanks and aircraft and no one will be any the wiser. Your troops could advance from the direction of Kushka and from the direction of Kabul. In our view, no one will be any the wiser. They will think these are Government troops.

Kosygin: I do not want to disappoint you, but it will not be possible to conceal this. Two hours later the whole world will know about this. Everyone will begin to shout that the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan has begun. If we quickly airlift tanks, the necessary ammunition and make mortars available to you, will you find specialists who can use these weapons?

Taraki: I am unable to answer this question. The Soviet advisers can answer that.

Kosygin: Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Where are they all now?

Taraki: Most of them are Moslem reactionaries. We are unable to rely on them, we have no confidence in them.

Kosygin: Can't you recruit a further 50,000 soldiers if we quickly airlift arms to you? How many people can you recruit?

Taraki: The core can only be formed by older secondary school pupils, students,

and a few workers. The working class in Afghanistan is very small, but it is a long affair to train them. But we will take any measures, if necessary.

Kosygin: We have decided to quickly deliver military equipment and property to you and to repair helicopters and aircraft. All this is for free. We have also decided to deliver to you 100,000 tons of grain and to raise gas prices from \$21 per cubic meter to \$37.

Taraki: That is very good, but let us talk of Herat. Why can't the Soviet Union send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing? No one will recognize them. We want you to send them. They could drive tanks, because we have all these nationalities in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghan costume and wear Afghan badges and no one will recognize them. It is very easy work, in our view. If Iran's and Pakistan's experience is anything to go by, it is clear that it is easy to do this work, they have already shown how it can be done.

Kosygin: You are, of course, oversimplifying the issue. It is a complex political and international issue, but, irrespective of this, we will hold consultations again and will get back to you.

Taraki: Send us infantry fighting vehicles by air.

Kosygin: Do you have anyone to drive them?

Taraki: We will find drivers for between 30 and 35 vehicles.

Kosygin: Are they reliable? Won't they flee to the enemy, together with their vehicles? After all, our drivers do not speak the language.

Taraki: Send vehicles together with drivers who speak our language—Tajiks and Uzbeks.

Kosygin: I expected this kind of reply from you. We are comrades and are waging a common struggle and that is why we should not stand on ceremony with each other. Everything must be subordinate to this.

[The first page has a hand-written footnote: At the Central Committee Politburo's sitting on 19 March, Comrade Kosygin read the transcript of these conversations in the presence of Central Committee secretaries.]

[Source: Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian, "Special File" program,

Annex 3: Ponomarev Report to CPSU on the Situation in Afghanistan

Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-
Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC on the
Situation in Afghanistan, 28 June 1979

Top Secret
Special File

To the CC CPSU

... Difficulties in the coming-into-being of the DRA have a primarily objective character. They are related to the economic backwardness, the small size of the working class, the weakness of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). These difficulties are becoming more intense, however, as the result of subjective reasons: In the Party and the government a collegial leadership is lacking, all power in fact is concentrated in the hands of N.M. Taraki and H. Amin, who none too rarely make mistakes and commit violations of legality. . . .

The main support of the Afghan government in the struggle with counter-revolution continues to be the army. Recently, security forces, border troops, and newly-created self defense forces have begun to take a more active part in this struggle. However, broad strata of the population are involved in the struggle with reaction only insufficiently, the consequence of which is that the measures which the DRA government has taken to stabilize the situation have been not very effective

Regarding this information, the MFA USSR, KGB USSR, Ministry of Defense and International Department of the CC CPSU consider it expedient to:

... 3. To assist the main military advisor, send to Afghanistan an experienced general and a group of officers to work directly among the troops (in the divisions and regiments). . . .

4. To provide security and defense for the Soviet air squadrons at the Bagram airfield, send to the DRA, with the agreement of the Afghan side, a parachute battalion

disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an aviation-technical maintenance team.

For the defense of the Soviet Embassy, send to Kabul a special detachment of the KGB USSR (125-150 men), disguised as Embassy service personnel. At the beginning of August, after preparations have been completed, send to the DRA (to the Bagram airfield) a special detachment of the GRU of the General Staff to be used in the event of a sharp aggravation of the situation for the security and defense of particularly important government installations.

A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov, D. Ustinov,
B. Ponomarev

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani* (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 76. Liakhovskii notes that this the recommendations made in this document were approved during the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 28 June 1979, in Resolution No. P, 156/XI.]

Annex 4: DIA Report "Afghan Resistance (U)"


DIRECTORATE FOR RESEARCH
 S-26553/DB-2C

Date 5 November 1982
 Response to Request for Intelligence
 For CDR R. P. Zwart, OASD/ISA/NESA
 Subject Afghan Resistance (U)
 1. (U) The following is provided in response to your request
 of 25 October 1982

3.

ASSESSMENT OF INSURGENT EQUIPMENT

- All six major resistance groups appear to have adequate supplies of modern assault weapons and ammunition but still lack the heavier weaponry needed to turn the military situation in their favor. Smaller groups in isolated provinces, however, are still affected by shortages of small arms and ammunition.

- While Soviets can and do temporarily disrupt the two-way flow of men and supplies through major mountain passes, we do not believe the Soviets can permanently seal off Afghanistan from the rest of the world. The rugged terrain, limited manpower thus far available to Soviet/Afghan commanders, hostility of the local populace and the resourcefulness of the resistance argue against a successful effort to permanently close the passes.

4. INSURGENT EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES

- Major military equipment deficiencies among resistance forces include more and better surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, antitank missiles, antitank mines, man-pack mortars and tactical radio equipment.

5. SOVIET REACTION TO PROPERLY EQUIPPED RESISTANCE

- Soviets to alter ground support tactics. These include:

- Bombing raids conducted from higher altitudes.
- Gunships operating in consonance with other gunships or high performance aircraft in order to provide escort protection.
- Use of countermeasures such as heat flares being fired from helicopters to mislead heat-seeking missiles.

6. RESOLVE OF THE RESISTANCE FORCES

the resistance forces could continue the insurgency for the foreseeable future at its present level against current Soviet forces. We believe the Soviets would have to double their strength to break the current stalemate. A 50,000 man increase in Soviet personnel in Afghanistan would not significantly alter the current situation. However, if a 50,000 man increment were to be concentrated in one area, it could be temporarily pacified. But when they move on to another problem area, the insurgents would probably reassert control.

Gordon Negus
GORDON NEGUS
for Assistant Vice Director
for Research

Prepared by:
CPT Chuck Witten, USA
DB-2C2
X25359
G: 4620

cc:

Annex 5: DIA Report "Afghanistan: The War in Perspective"

14. SNIE 37-89, November, 1989, *Afghanistan: The War in Perspective*
(Key Judgments only)



Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~Secret~~
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT

SNIE 37-89

Afghanistan: The War in Perspective ~~(C-NF)~~

*Information available as of November 1989 was used
in the preparation of this Special National Intelligence Estimate.*

*The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:*

The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

also participating:


The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force

*This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.*

~~Secret~~
November 1989

14. (Continued)

~~Secret~~
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT



Unclassified

~~Secret~~

14. (Continued)

~~Secret~~
~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~

Key Judgments

The Kabul regime is weak, unpopular, and factionalized, but it will probably remain in power over the next 12 months. The war will remain at a near impasse. The regime will continue to resist Mujahedin pressure so long as the Soviet Union remains willing and able to continue its massive military supply program and the regime's internal problems remain manageable:

- The Mujahedin hold the military initiative *to the extent that* they move unhindered by the regime in most of the countryside and they choose when and where to fight. The resistance, however, will be unable to prevent the supply of Soviet materiel to regime forces. The resistance will remain a guerrilla force and will find it difficult to seize major regime garrisons.
- This conflict is best understood as an insurgency. Political/military elements, such as regime fragility, Mujahedin disunity, and local tribal factors will be at least as important to the final outcome as strictly military considerations.
- Despite extensive popular support, the highly factionalized resistance is unlikely to form a political entity capable of uniting the Mujahedin.
- The Afghan Interim Government and most major commanders will refuse to negotiate directly with Kabul, *barring the departure of* Najibullah and top regime officials, but we cannot rule out the possibility of indirect talks.

Pakistan will continue to support the resistance, whether Benazir Bhutto or her political opposition is in power. (S NF)

The Soviets will continue to search for a political settlement while providing massive support to Kabul over the next year. Soviet moves could include a dramatic new initiative, especially if Gorbachev saw it as a way to remove the Afghan issue from the US-Soviet agenda before the summit next year. (S NF)

One way to break the impasse would be to alter the pattern of foreign support:

- A unilateral US cutoff of support to the resistance would alter the military balance in favor of the regime and give it the upper hand in dictating the terms of political arrangements.

14. (Continued)

~~Secret~~
~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~

- A unilateral Soviet cutoff of support to the regime would be devastating to Kabul's prospects.
- Mutual cuts by the United States and Soviet Union (negative symmetry) would be unpopular with the resistance but ultimately more damaging to the regime.
- Even with aid cuts, conflict would probably continue indefinitely, though at a lower level of intensity. ~~(S-INT)~~

To reduce its vulnerability to determined efforts by the resistance to bring it down, the regime is likely to continue to seek separate deals with local resistance commanders. ~~(S-INT)~~

~~Secret~~

iv

Annex 6: DIA Report "Afghanistan: Soviet Withdrawal Scenario (U)"

DIAAPPR 15-88
9 May 1988

Defense Intelligence Agency
Appraisal

Afghanistan: Soviet Withdrawal Scenario (U)

Summary

The Soviets are expected to begin withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan on 15 May, in keeping with the Geneva agreements signed on 14 April. The pullout will probably be achieved by the successive evacuation of entire garrisons and areas, rather than through the "thinning" of personnel in units. Larger garrisons will be turned over to Afghan forces. As the Soviets withdraw, the Mujahedin will begin to focus their efforts mainly on Afghan forces in an effort to conserve strength. The limited cohesion of the Afghan forces will continue to erode during the withdrawal, and desertions to the resistance will increase.

Discussion

Projected Soviet Withdrawal Scenario


According to the terms of the agreement reached at Geneva, the withdrawal will be "front-loaded." Half the Soviet troops will return to the USSR within the first 3 months of the withdrawal, and redeployment will be completed within 9 months.

Homeward movement will begin as Soviet outposts and remote base camps are closed or turned over to Afghan forces and as Soviet troops are consolidated in larger garrisons. Some equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel, and other consumables will be passed to Afghan units while most of the armored vehicles and weapon systems will return to the USSR with the units. Certain support elements will depart before combat units, owing to the difficulties of long road marches with cumbersome equipment.

COPY NO.

276

activities and will play down characterizations of the withdrawal as a Soviet defeat or an abandonment of a friendly government.



Once the protective perimeter is manned by Afghan troops, most Soviet troops will depart Kabul by air and land. As this phase nears completion, forces along the LOC may be removed. The last Soviet combat troops to leave will most likely be withdrawn from Kabul by air, and barring major complications, the withdrawal will probably be completed well before the mandated 15 February 1989 deadline.

The Soviets are expected to publicize at least some unit departures and to stage news media opportunities in order to garner maximum domestic and international propaganda benefits. The Soviet and Afghan news media will emphasize the orderliness of withdrawal

Mujahedin Reactions to the Withdrawal

As the Soviets leave the provinces, the insurgents will probably focus on isolating major government garrisons and cities before attacking them directly. The first priority will most likely be to gain undisputed control of resupply routes, followed by efforts to stop aerial resupply and tactical air support to the Afghan garrisons by rocketing airfields and maintaining anti-aircraft gun and missile teams. Before launching attacks to overrun government positions, Mujahedin commanders will encourage Afghan forces to surrender and will try to negotiate mass defections to their side. If this tactic fails, the Mujahedin will carry out direct assaults.

Disunity among the principal insurgent parties could handicap a coherent strategy aimed at reducing the Kabul redoubt and capturing the capital. In any event, the

resistance lacks the capability to storm the capital if it is well defended. As a result, the Kabul region may not fall until after several months of steady pressure. The Mujahedin could, however, be successful if the Afghan forces suffer an internal collapse or if serious factional fighting breaks out.

Afghan Government's Survivability

The six components of the Afghan Armed Forces are the army, the air force/air defense force, the border security forces, the Ministry of Interior's Sarandoi paramilitary units, the Ministry of State Security's (WAD's) combat units, and the militia. The Afghan Government, however, has never been able to fill these forces from the conscript manpower pool, and high desertion rates compound the problem.

Moreover, Afghan aircraft and ground force equipment are generally older and less capable than those in the Soviet forces.

On the whole, the largely unmotivated and poorly trained Afghan troops are no match for the Mujahedin.

The Afghan Armed Forces will continue to erode as the Soviet withdrawal progresses. The number of deserters, most of them with arms, will increase, possibly rendering some weaker units completely ineffective. During the later stages of the withdrawal, the internal security situation will most likely deteriorate rapidly.

This desperate time will be characterized by intense rivalry among People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) factions, and units loyal to the party's Khalq and Parcham factions may clash. The Khalqis are numerous in most combat units of the armed forces. Many believe they can defeat the Mujahedin without Soviet troops and therefore support the Geneva accords. The Parcham faction, which dominates the government, disapproves of the withdrawal agreements.

If these differences are not resolved, the Khalqis may first try to eliminate their PDPA rivals before dealing with the Mujahedin. The Khalqis may also oust President Najibullah as the Soviets withdraw and then form a government that will fight the Mujahedin to the finish. Alternatively, elements of the Afghan military sympathetic to the insurgents could stage a coup following the withdrawal and negotiate with resistance leaders for some type of coalition government.

A less likely scenario envisions the abandonment of Kabul by the PDPA without a climactic battle in order to concentrate in a Communist stronghold in the northern region of Afghanistan. The recent creation of another province in the recently established Northern Autonomous Zone and the numerous direct economic ties established between the northern provinces and the USSR are cited as preparations for a buffer zone between the USSR and veteran Mujahedin bent on carrying an anti-Soviet holy war, or jihad, into the Central Asian minority areas of the USSR.

Outlook

Ultimately, the insurgent forces will cause the demise of the Communist

[REDACTED]

government. The successor government will probably be an uneasy coalition of traditionalist and fundamentalist groups, and its control will not extend far beyond Kabul. No matter which group wins Kabul, it will be under enormous pressure to proceed quickly with the formation of a permanent government.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Prepared by:

[REDACTED]

Annex 7: DIA Report "USSR: Withdrawal from Afghanistan"

11. SNIE 11/37-88, March 1988, *USSR: Withdrawal From Afghanistan*
(Key Judgments only)



Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

USSR: Withdrawal From Afghanistan

Special National Intelligence Estimate

~~Secret~~
SNIE 11/37-88
March 1988
Copy 425

11. (Continued)

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractors/Consultants
PROPIN-- Caution--Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON-- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL...-- This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to...

DERIVATIVE CL BY 0384892
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple

A microfiche copy of this document is available from OIR/DLB (482-7177); printed copies from CPAS/IMC (482-5203; or AIM request to userid CPASIMC).

11. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~

SNIE 11/37-88

USSR: WITHDRAWAL
FROM AFGHANISTAN (U)

Information available as of 24 March 1988 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.

~~SECRET~~

11. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
KEY JUDGMENTS.....	1
DISCUSSION.....	3
The Soviet Withdrawal Calculus and Conditions.....	3
Aftermath of Withdrawal Inside Afghanistan.....	5
The Impact of Withdrawal Inside the USSR.....	8
Impact on Soviet Allies and Clients.....	9
Impact on Moscow's Global Position.....	10
Implications for the United States.....	11

iii
~~SECRET~~

11. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~

KEY JUDGMENTS

We believe Moscow has made a firm decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. The decision stems from the war's effect on the Soviet regime's ability to carry out its agenda at home and abroad and its pessimism about the military and political prospects for creating a viable client regime:

- Although Afghanistan has been a controversial issue, we believe General Secretary Gorbachev has built a leadership consensus for withdrawal. The regime is aware that its client's chances of surviving without Soviet troops are poor. We do not believe that Moscow will attempt a partition of Afghanistan or start withdrawal and then renege.
- The Soviets want to withdraw under the cover of the Geneva accords. We believe they would prefer to withdraw without an agreement, however, rather than sign one that formally restricts their right to provide aid and further undermines the legitimacy of the Kabul regime.
- In our view, the Soviets will begin withdrawal this year even if the Geneva talks are deadlocked. Under such conditions, however, the Soviet leadership would not feel constrained by the provisions of the draft accords, and withdrawal would more likely be accompanied by heavy fighting. Although the Soviets in this case would have the option of delaying or prolonging the withdrawal process, we believe that—once begun in earnest—geographic, political, and military factors would lead them to opt for a relatively rapid exit.
- There is an alternative scenario. A more chaotic situation accompanying withdrawal than the Soviets expect or a political crisis in Moscow could fracture the Politburo consensus for withdrawal and lead them to delay or even reverse course. We believe the odds of this scenario are small—perhaps less than one in five.

We judge that the Najibullah regime will not long survive the completion of Soviet withdrawal even with continued Soviet assistance. The regime may fall before withdrawal is complete.

Despite infighting, we believe the resistance will retain sufficient supplies and military strength to ensure the demise of the Communist government. We cannot confidently predict the composition of the new regime, but we believe it initially will be an unstable coalition of traditionalist and fundamentalist groups whose writ will not extend far beyond Kabul and the leaders' home areas. It will be Islamic—possibly strongly fundamentalist, but not as extreme as Iran. While anti-Soviet, it

1
~~SECRET~~

11. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~

will eventually establish "correct"—not friendly—ties to the USSR. We cannot be confident of the new government's orientation toward the West; at best it will be ambivalent and at worst it may be actively hostile, especially toward the United States.

There are two alternative scenarios. There is some chance—less than 1 in 3 in our view—that fighting among resistance groups will produce so much chaos that no stable government will take hold for an extended period after the Afghan Communist regime collapses. We also cannot rule out a scenario in which the Kabul regime manages to survive for a protracted period after withdrawal, due to an increasingly divided resistance. The odds of this outcome, in our view, are very small. Both scenarios would complicate relief efforts, reduce the prospects that refugees would return, and increase opportunities for Soviet maneuvering.

The impact of the Soviet withdrawal will depend on how it proceeds and what kind of situation the Soviets leave behind. At home, we believe that ending the war will be a net plus for Gorbachev, boosting his popularity and his reform agenda. Nonetheless, withdrawal will not be universally popular and is sure to cause recriminations. There is some chance—if it proves to have a more damaging impact on Soviet interests over the long term than either we or Gorbachev anticipate—that the decision could eventually form part of a "bill of attainder" used by his opponents in an effort to oust him.

Moscow's defeat in Afghanistan will have significant international costs. It is an implicit admission that Soviet-supported revolutions can be reversed. It will demonstrate that there are limits on Moscow's willingness and ability to use its power abroad, tarnish its prestige among some elements of the Communist movement, and lead other beleaguered Soviet clients to question Soviet resolve.

Nevertheless, we—as well as the Soviets—believe the withdrawal will yield important benefits for Moscow. The move will be popular even among some Soviet allies. Moscow will net substantial public relations gains in the rest of the world—particularly in Western Europe—that could ultimately translate into more concrete diplomatic benefits. Gorbachev expects the withdrawal to have a positive impact on US-Soviet relations.

By enhancing the Soviet Union's image as a responsible superpower, withdrawal will present new challenges to Western diplomacy. In South Asia, US relations with Pakistan will be complicated. But Soviet withdrawal under the conditions we anticipate will also produce substantial benefits for the West:

- It will be seen as a triumph for Western policy.
- If it produces the benefits that Gorbachev expects, withdrawal will probably add impetus to the ongoing rethinking in Moscow about the utility of military power in Third World conflicts and accelerate efforts to reach negotiated solutions on other issues.

~~This information is Secret NoFORN.~~

2
~~SECRET~~

Annex 8: IIR [Excised]/ Veteran Afghanistan Traveler's Analysis of Al Qaeda and Taliban Exploitable Weaknesses

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

CONTROLS
~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ (b)(2)
SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

TEXT
COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF), PAKISTAN (PA). (b)(2)
IPSP: (U) [REDACTED]

COMBINE: COMPLETE
SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] /VETERAN AFGHANISTAN (b)(2)
TRAVELER'S ANALYSIS OF AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN EXPLOITABLE WEAKNESSES (b)(2)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20010924.
REQS: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(2)

SOURCE: [REDACTED] (b)(1)

SUMMARY: [REDACTED] EVENTUALLY THE TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA WILL (b)(2)
WAR WITH EACH OTHER. THE WEAKNESS OF BOTH IS IN THE MINDS OF THE INDIVIDUALS THAT BELONG TO THE GROUPS AND IN THE POWER THAT IS GIVEN TO THEM BY THEIR NAMES. AL QAEDA HAVE NOT INTEGRATED WITH AFGHANIS OR THE TALIBAN, LEAVING THEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO EXPLOITATION.

1. TEXT [REDACTED] (b)(2)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)

TEARLINE
2. [REDACTED] BACKGROUND. ANY ALLIED FORCE, SMALL OR LARGE, (b)(2)
WILL HAVE TO LEARN TO THINK OUTSIDE THE ENVELOPE IN DEALING WITH

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. IN ANY JOINT STRATEGY THERE IS A NEED FOR THOSE WHO, BY VIRTUE OF PAST EXPERIENCE, MIGHT OFFER ALTERNATE INTERPRETATIONS, PERSPECTIVES AND INSIGHTS NOT BASED ON REMOTE STUDY OR SPECULATIVE ASSUMPTIONS. IT IS IMPERATIVE TO DERIVE THIS INFORMATION FROM HUMAN RESOURCES, (WHERE THE WESTERN NATIONS ARE WEAKEST) WHO NOT ONLY KNOW WHERE KABUL, KANDAHAR, KHOST AND KHAGA WAGA MIGHT BE ON A MAP BUT ALSO KNOW WHAT THEY SMELL LIKE WHEN YOU GET THERE. THE GRAVEST APPREHENSION AT THIS POINT IS THE LACK OF CLEAR DISTINCTION, OR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN AFGHANS, UNITED FRONT (SYNONYMOUS TO THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE), TALIBAN, AND OSAMA BIN LADIN'S AL QAEDA.

(b)(1)

A. ~~(S)~~ SEARCH FOR THE ENEMY. TO PLACE THE INFORMATION INTO CONTEXT, THE REMARKS ARE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE DEBATE IS ABOUT A WAR RATHER THAN A SINGLE OR MULTIPLE STRIKE RESOLUTION. IF THIS IS SO AND THE PRESENT FOCUS IS ON RECOGNIZING THE ENEMY AND SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY'S CENTER OF GRAVITY, THE MOST SERIOUS DANGER LIES IN USING WESTERN POINTS OF REFERENCE AND NOT THE ENEMIES'. IF THE WEST RELIES ON USING ITS POINTS OF REFERENCE, THEN THE BALANCE OF RESOURCES WILL BE GIVEN OVER TO SEARCHING FOR WHAT WESTERNERS MOST EASILY RECOGNIZE. IN THIS THE OBVIOUS CHOICE IS NATION STATE INVOLVEMENT. IT OFFERS WESTERNERS FIXED TARGETS THAT CAN BE EASILY ENGAGED IN THE MANNER WE ARE BEST SUITED FOR AND MOST COMFORTABLE WITH.

(b)(2)

B. ~~(S)~~ WHILE NATION STATES MAY HAVE SOME INVOLVEMENT, AND THEIR FINGER PRINTS APPEAR TO BE IN EVIDENCE, THEY ARE NOT, IN THIS INSTANCE, THE PRIME ENEMY. THIS WAR HAS BEEN A LONG TIME IN INCUBATION AND NOW HATCHED IS NOT THE WAR BETWEEN NATION STATES WE ARE FAMILIAR WITH. IT IS A WAR FOUGHT ON TWO FRONTS: ONE AGAINST MATERIAL ASSETS AND THE OTHER IN THE MINDS OF MEN. WHILE THE REDUCTION OF MATERIAL ASSETS AND RESOURCES MUST PLAY A PART IN THE WAR CONCENTRATING ON THEM ALONE CANNOT DELIVER LONG TERM SECURITY. IF THE CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT IS UPON THE MATERIAL FRONT IT MISSES A VITAL POINT. IT IS THE MOST VISIBLE, NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT. IT MEANS THE ENEMY WILL HAVE SUCCESSFULLY DRAWN WESTERN PLANNING AND POLICY AWAY FROM WHERE IT SHOULD BE STRONGEST.

(b)(2)

3. ~~(S)~~ THE MINDS OF MEN FRONT. ULTIMATELY THIS IS THE LARGEST FRONT, THE HARDEST TO FIGHT, AND THE HARDEST TO WIN. IT IS ALSO THE FIRST ONE TO ENGAGE. THE TARGET RESIDES IN THE SECRET POWER OF NAMES. IF WESTERNERS CAN ENGAGE (KILL) IT, THEN THEY HAVE SCORED THE FIRST VICTORY. ENGAGING THE POWER OF NAMES REQUIRES NOTHING BUT AN IDEA TO ACHIEVE IT. HOWEVER, WORSE THAN UNDERRATING THE SIGNIFICANCE, WESTERNERS OFTEN TAKE NO NOTICE IT. YET, A NAME HAS POWER AND INFLUENCE OVER THE FOOT SOLDIERS OF BOTH SIDES. IF THE POWER OF NAMES CAN ADD STRENGTH IT CAN ALSO TAKE STRENGTH AWAY. TAKING AWAY THAT STRENGTH FROM THE ENEMY IS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARDS A VICTORY, AND AN EXPLOITABLE WEAKNESS IN THE MINDS OF AL QAEDA MEMBERS.

(b)(2)

A. ~~(S)~~ TAKING POWER OF NAMES FROM AL QAEDA. IN THE MINDS OF THE AL QAEDA, THEY HAD STOLEN THE POWER BESTOWED ON THE UNITED STATES, THEIR PRIMARY ENEMY, BY REPLACING IT WITH A NAME OF THEIR CHOICE, THE GREAT SATAN. BUT THE CHOICE IS A CONSIDERED ONE. IT DOES NOT REDUCE THE FOE TO A PAPER TIGER OF NO CONSEQUENCE. IT RECOGNIZES THE ENEMY IS STILL POTENT AND THEREFORE DANGEROUS,

(b)(2)

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

AFFECTING HOW THEY BEHAVE AROUND IT. EXPLOITING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE OF THE CONNOTATION OF GREEN BERET, SCREAMING EAGLE, RED WEAKEN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE. THERE ARE DANGERS IN HUMOROUS CHOICES.

B. ~~(S)~~ NAMING THE ENEMY. IN SELECTING A NAME FOR THE ENEMY, IT IS ADVISABLE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEIR NATURE AND HABITS ARE THOSE OF A COLLECTIVE FORCE RATHER THAN THOSE OF AN INDIVIDUAL. THE WESTERN PUBLIC WILL NOT CARE WHAT THE TITLE OF THE ENEMY IS, WHY PROMOTE AL QAEDA'S PREFERRED CHOICE? (b)(2)

C. ~~(S)~~ MEASURES TO BE TAKEN. SEEK AN ALTERNATIVE NAME FOR THE ENEMY AND TAKE AWAY AL QAEDA'S CHOICE OF NAMES. GREAT CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN SEEKING AN ALTERNATIVE AND AVOID ANY NEGATIVE ISLAMIC STEREOTYPING. WHATEVER THE WIDER TITLE, IT IS PREFERABLE TO THE CULT OF PERSONALITY FOSTERED BY PROMOTING AN INDIVIDUAL SUCH AS OSAMA BIN LADEN. IT WILL CERTAINLY BEGIN TO AGITATE AL QAEDA IF WESTERNERS DO NOT GRANT THEM THE LEGITIMACY OF USING THEIR PREFERRED CHOICE OF NAME. IT IS A SMALL STEP IN EXPLOITING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WEAKNESSES, WHICH SHOULD BE A FOCUS OF A JOINT WESTERN STRATEGY. (b)(2)

4. ~~(S)~~ EXPLOITATION OF AL QAEDA'S FORCE. AL QAEDA LACKS THE CONVENTIONAL MATERIALS, RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY WE EXPECT AND SEEK TO EXPLOIT. THEIR FORCE MAY BE WIDELY DISPERSED, WELL DISGUISED AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING BLOWS OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO ITS SIZE. HOWEVER, NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF WHERE THE ANSWERS LIE AND FOR ALL ITS DIFFERENCES, AL QAEDA'S FORCES CANNOT ESCAPE BRING THE SAME AS ALL MILITARY FORCES IN TWO RECOGNIZABLE WAYS: THEY ARE HUMAN AND THEY MAKE MISTAKES. THERE HAVE MADE AT LEAST THREE RECOGNIZABLE AND SIGNIFICANT MISTAKES SO FAR. (b)(2)

A. ~~(S)~~ FIRST, MEMBERS OF AL QAEDA IN AFGHANISTAN ARE UNABLE TO AVOID GATHERING IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO PRESENT A TARGET THAT IS RECOGNIZABLE AND WORTHY OF OUR TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES. EXTENSIVE HUMAN RESOURCES ARE REQUIRED ON THE GROUND TO IMPROVE TARGET ACQUISITION AND MAXIMIZE THE IMPACT OF A STRIKE. THIS FAVORS DEPLOYMENT OF SUITABLE SPECIAL FORCES (SF), PREFERABLY AS THE INTERFACE WITH LOCAL RESISTANCE FORCES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT DEAD OR CAPTURED SF IN AL QAEDA HANDS REPRESENTS A DISPROPORTIONAL ADVANTAGE OVER WESTERN LOSS. IN THE CASE OF AL QAEDA THEIR HUMAN ARMOR CRACKS CAN BE EXPLOITED AS PART OF A JOINT "MINDS OF MEN" STRATEGY TO ERODE AND DISMANTLE THEM. PROPERLY APPLIED IT COULD MAKE THEIR LIFE IN AFGHANISTAN UNTENABLE. (b)(2)

B. ~~(S)~~ SECOND, THE STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY IS NOT IN THE MATERIAL RESOURCES BUT IN ITS HUMAN RESOURCES. TO ENGAGE AL QAEDA, THE WEST MUST LOOK FOR DEFECTS IN AL QAEDA'S HUMAN ARMOR. THIS HUMAN ARMOR DISPLAYS PRONOUNCED HUMAN WEAKNESSES. THE CHIEF CRACK STEMS FROM THE VERY SAME LIMITED IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE IT DEPENDS ON IN ORDER TO PRODUCE THE FOOT SOLDIERS IT NEEDS. AS A RESULT, ON BOTH A COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL BASIS, AL QAEDA REGARDS ITSELF AN ELITE FORCE SUPERIOR TO OTHERS. THE EXPLOITABLE WEAKNESS IS AL QAEDA'S INABILITY TO INTEGRATE SUFFICIENTLY WITH THE HOST POPULATION. DESPITE THE RISK OF ATTENTION AND THE RISKS CREATED FOR A COLLECTIVE MISSION, SOME MEMBERS ARE INCAPABLE OF CONCEALING THEIR SENSE OF ELITE SUPERIORITY. IN THIS NEW WAR, WHICH MUST LARGELY TARGET HUMAN RATHER THAN MATERIAL RESOURCES, THE EGO OF THE INDIVIDUAL CAN BE EXPLOITED. (b)(2)

C. ~~(S)~~ THIRD, RATHER THAN DISCREET INTEGRATION AND (b)(2)

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

SUBVERSION FROM WITHIN, AL QAEDA HAVE LARGELY ALLOWED THEMSELVES TO DEFINE THEIR OWN DIFFERENCES WITH THEIR AFGHAN HOSTS. THIS IS A SERIOUS FLAW IN THEIR STRATEGY OF EXPANSION. INITIALLY, AL QAEDA'S PROSPERITY AND GROWTH WERE GAINED THROUGH THE ABUSE OF THE AFGHAN TRADITION OF MELMASTIA, HOSPITALITY. LATER, WITH SUFFICIENT GROWTH, IT RELIED MORE ON CONTROLLING ITS HOST. IN A LAST PHASE IT WILL CONSUME THE HOST AND REPLACE IT, A MOVE BEST MASKED BY A LARGE ISLAMIC BANNER.

D. ~~(S)~~ BY FAILING TO FULLY INTEGRATE WITH TALIBAN FORCES AL QAEDA EXTENUATE BOTH THEIR ALIEN OUTLOOK AND ETHNICITY. AFGHANS HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THE DOMESTIC DIVERSITY OF AFGHAN ETHNICITY. THE AL QAEDA REMAIN RATHER LIKE AN INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE, ONE DIFFERENT IN LANGUAGE, HABIT AND INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM (ALTHOUGH BOTH ARE ACTUALLY SUNNI). BY RUNNING THEIR OWN CAMPS AND OPERATIONALLY LUMPING TOGETHER IN THE 055 BRIGADE, AL QAEDA MEMBERS SET THEMSELVES APART. THIS POTENTIAL FOR EXPLOITATION SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED BY WESTERN MILITARY PLANNERS. THE PRIME TARGET MOST SUITED AND DESERVING OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE THAT THE ALLIES CAN BRING TO BEAR CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ISOLATED. SUPPORT ON THE GROUND BY THE RIGHT MIX OF ALLIED SF AND LOCAL RESISTANCE WOULD ENABLE THE CREATION OF THE IDEAL WEAPON WITH WHICH TO STRIKE AN OTHERWISE PROBLEMATIC ENEMY, WHICH MIGHT NORMALLY BE BOTH WIDELY DISPERSED AND EFFECTIVELY CONCEALED IN A HOST CIVILIAN POPULATION. (b)(2)

5. ~~(S)~~ BIN LADEN'S AL QAEDA NETWORK WAS ABLE TO EXPAND UNDER THE SAFE SANCTUARY EXTENDED BY TALIBAN FOLLOWING PAKISTAN DIRECTIVES. IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT ON THAT ISSUE, CONSIDER THE LOCATION OF BIN LADEN'S CAMP TARGETED BY US CRUISE MISSILES, ZAHAWA (CWA). POSITIONED ON THE BORDER BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN IT WAS BUILT BY PAKISTAN CONTRACTORS FUNDED BY THE PAKISTAN INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (ISI), AND PROTECTED UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF A LOCAL AND INFLUENTIAL JADRAN TRIBAL LEADER, JALALLUDIN ((HAQANI)). HOWEVER, THE REAL HOST IN THAT FACILITY WAS THE PAKISTANI ISI. IF THIS WAS LATER TO BECOME BIN LADEN'S BASE, THEN SERIOUS QUESTIONS ARE RAISED BY THE EARLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIN LADEN AND PAKISTAN'S ISI. (b)(2)

6. ~~(S)~~ THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE TALIBAN LIES IN ITS GENESIS AND THE MOBILE NATURE OF ITS DEPLOYMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. ONE OF THE REMARKABLE FEATURES OF THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN WHO OPPOSED THE SOVIET OCCUPATION, WAS THAT IT NEVER EVOLVED INTO THE SECONDARY STAGE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE, MOBILE GUERRILLA WARFARE. FOR THE VAST MAJORITY OF AFGHAN'S MUJAHIDEEN THE WAR REMAINED A LOCALIZED EVENT. IN A COUNTRY OF DIVERSE CULTURES AND LANGUAGE WITH DEEP HISTORICAL ENMITIES BETWEEN COMMUNITIES AND INDIVIDUALS THERE IS NO SENSE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY. AS A RESULT THE MASS MOBILITY OF THE TALIBAN, ONLY POSSIBLE THROUGH THE SUPPORT OF THOSE MADE THEM, HAS GENERATED A CIVIL WAR OF UNBRIDLED FEROCITY. THE TALIBAN FORCES FEEL NO SENSE OF SHARED IDENTITY WITH POPULATIONS FROM OTHER PARTS OF AFGHANISTAN. (b)(2)

7. ~~(S)~~ THERE ARE CRACKS BETWEEN TALIBAN AND ORDINARY AFGHANS. IF PROOF IS NEEDED, THEN LOOK CLOSELY AT THE UPRISING IN THE KHOST REGION IN FEB 2000. AN UPRISING THERE WAS NOTEWORTHY BECAUSE IT WAS THE HOME OF JALALUDIN ((HAQANI)), THE JADRAN TRIBAL LEADER MOST EXPLOITED BY ISI DURING THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR TO FACILITATE THE INTRODUCTION OF ARAB EXTREMISTS. THE TALIBAN BEGAN

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

- DOCILE; EXTREMISM GREW AS THEIR CONFIDENCE GREW. (b)(2)
- A. (C// [REDACTED]) IF THE PUSHTO TRIBES AROUND KHOST WERE PROVOKED TO UPRISING THEY MUST HAVE BEEN VERY UPSET. IT IS RUMORED THAT JALAUDIN ((HAQNI)) WAS INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY WITH TALIBAN. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AL QAEDA BEGAN TO TREAT THAT PART OF PAKTIA AS THEIR OWN. AL QAEDA APPARENTLY HAVE CAMPS NEXT TO PEWIR KOTAL ((CNA)), WHICH IS MANGAL LAND, AND ANOTHER IN TUNI (b)(2)
- (b)(2) [REDACTED] A FORMER AFGHAN ARMY BASE IN JADRAN LAND. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT TALIBAN WAS IMPOSING ALIEN ATTITUDES INSENSITIVE TO LOCAL FEELINGS. WHATEVER THE CAUSE, UPRISINGS TOOK PLACE, AND THIS IS A SURE INDICATION OF CRACKS BETWEEN TALIBAN AND ORDINARY AFGHANS. (b)(2)
- B. (C// [REDACTED]) THERE WAS ALSO AN UPRISING IN NIMRUZ PROVINCE IN SOUTH-EASTERN AFGHANISTAN AND ANOTHER WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN NARROWLY AVEKTED IN JALALBAD [REDACTED] THE PRIME STOMPING GROUND OF ABDUL ((HAQ)). HAQ'S BROTHER, ABDUL ((KADIR)), CONTINUES TO RESIST THE TALIBAN IN KUNAR (b)(2)
- (b)(2) [REDACTED] IN AFGHAN TERMS JUST UP THE ROAD. (b)(2)
- B. (C// [REDACTED]) INFLUENCING A STABLE AFGHANISTAN. A STRATEGY OF ORDER, INVOLVING GENEROUS HUMANITARIAN AID, SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN AREAS OUTSIDE TALIBAN CONTROL WITH AN AIM AT INFLUENCING A MORE STABLE FUTURE FOR AFGHANISTAN. IT WOULD HELP REINFORCE TO THE WIDER AFGHAN AUDIENCE THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE ARE NOT THE ENEMY. WHEN THEY REALIZE THEY ARE NOT THE ENEMY THEY WILL BEGIN TO WONDER WHO IS. FOR MOST AFGHANIS THAT WILL BE AN EASY ANSWER TO FIND, HAVING TOLERATED UNGRATEFUL FOREIGN GUESTS - AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN. (b)(1)
- [REDACTED] (b)(2)
- A. (C// [REDACTED]) IF THERE IS ONE THING AN AFGHAN CAN NOT BEAR ANOTHER AFGHAN TELLING HIM WHAT TO DO. EVEN WORSE IS A FOREIGNER ATTEMPTING TO TELL HIM WHAT TO DO. IN ATTITUDE, THE FUNDAMENTALIST ARAB AL QAEDA MEMBER WILL TREAT HIS AFGHAN HOST IN DIFFERING WAYS. SOMETIMES AUTHORITY WITH DEMURE RESPECT (AT LEAST ABOVE THE WATER LINE), OR A PATRONIZING PATERNALISM BASED ON HIS SELF ASSURED CONVICTION THAT HE IS THE BETTER MAN, (NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE AVERAGE AFGHANI CANNOT READ OR WRITE IN THEIR OWN LANGUAGE LET ALONE IN THAT OF THE ARABIC OF THE KORAN). (b)(2)
- B. (C// [REDACTED]) THE AVERAGE AFGHAN PEASANT RESPONSE TO SUPERIORITY EXHIBITED BY AL QAEDA OVER THEIR HOSTS WILL BE LAYERED. FIRST, TOLERANCE BASED ON THE AFGHAN TRADITION OF MELMASTIA, HOSPITALITY. SECOND, RESPECT FOR THEIR SUPERIOR EDUCATION (TO SPEAK ARABIC IS REGARDED AS SCHOLARLY). THIRD, IF IMPOSED UPON TOO MUCH, A SLOW BUT GROWING RESENTMENT AT THE FOREIGNER LORDING IT OVER HIM. (b)(2)
9. (C// [REDACTED]) EVENTUALLY TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA WILL WAR WITH EACH OTHER. THE FEAR MUST BE THAT AL QAEDA WILL HAVE BECOME FULLY FORMED, IN SIZE, STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO CONSUME THEIR HOST (ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT CONTINUE TO USE THE HANDY TALIBAN CLOAK WOVEN BY PAKISTAN TO SHROUD THEIR PROGRESS). (b)(2)
10. (C// [REDACTED]) POTENTIAL ALLIED RESPONSES. THE TERRAIN, THE CLIMATE, THE PEOPLE, AND THE PROBLEM STRONGLY ARGUE IN FAVOR OF A MORE COST EFFECTIVE MILITARY ENGAGEMENT THAN THE MASS DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES. THE ENEMY DOES NOT HAVE MASS, WHICH MAKES THEM HARDER TO ENGAGE. (b)(2)

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

- A. ~~(S)~~ HOWEVER, AL QAEDA IS NOT INDIGENOUS TO THE REGION AND IT LACKS THE ESSENTIAL POPULAR SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL POPULATION REACQUIRED FOR ANY HOPE OF WINNING AN EXTENDED WAR. THE DANGER, EVEN THE TRAP, RESIDES IN THE NATURE OF THE ENEMY. AS A NON INDIGENOUS FORCE AL QAEDA MAY LEAVE A HARD-CORE DEDICATED CADRE TO FIGHT, WHILE THE MORE IMPORTANT PARTS SIMPLY RELOCATE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY (POSSIBLY CHECHNYA). THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS WOULD ALSO GAIN MORE PROPAGANDA VALUE OUT OF ANY ALLIED MASS DEPLOYMENT. IF THE GROUND DEPLOYMENT INVOLVES MASS AND DURATION, THERE IS A STRONG PROBABILITY THAT THE GROUND TROOPS WILL BECOME THE TARGETS OF ANOTHER CONFLICT, EVEN AFTER AL QAEDA ARE ERADICATED. (b)(2)
- B. ~~(S)~~ RULING OUT MASS GROUND DEPLOYMENT, THE ONLY SERIOUS OPTIONS MUST BE A STAND-OFF AIR REPRISAL. THIS OFFERS SOME IMMEDIATE MATERIAL AND PROPAGANDA GAIN, BUT ONLY IF THE RIGHT TARGETS ARE STRUCK WITH THE RIGHT RESULT. TARGETS LOCATED IN OR CLOSE TO CITIES SHOULD BE IGNORED REGARDLESS OF THE DESIRABILITY THAT THEY MIGHT OFFER. THE ODDS ARE WHAT IS THOUGHT TO BE IN THEM HAS ALREADY BEEN MOVED. ADDITIONALLY, COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO ALL NEIGHBORING AREAS ALREADY SUSTAINED IN THE WAR WILL BE BLAMED ON THE AIR STRIKES. AIR STRIKES WILL ALSO INVOLVE AN INEVITABLE PROPORTION OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, PROBABLY DISPROPORTIONAL TO THE SIZE OF THE TARGET. STRIKES AT THESE LOCATIONS WELD A BOND BETWEEN AL QAEDA, TALIBAN, AND THE WIDER AFGHANI POPULATION, AS THEY DO NOT EFFECTIVELY DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THEM. A VITAL COMPONENT OF ANY STRIKE ACTION SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT EMPHASIZING THEIR DIFFERENCES NOT MINIMIZING THEM. (b)(2)
- C. ~~(S)~~ IDEAL AIR TARGETS ARE THOSE WELL AWAY FROM ANY LARGE CITIES, SUCH AS KABUL, KANDAHAR, JALALABAD, HERAT, MAZIR-I-SHARIEF. MASSIVE, NEAR TOTAL DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY PREVIOUS CONFLICTS WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY BLAMED ON ALLIED ACTION. INSTEAD THEY SHOULD BE THOSE TARGETS AS CLOSE TO THE FRONT LINE WITH OPPOSITION FORCES AS POSSIBLE. IDEALLY LIMITED TO O55 AND ANY OTHER AL QAEDA RESOURCES. (b)(2)
- D. ~~(S)~~ AIR REPRISAL WITH LIMITED SF GROUND DEPLOYMENT IS THE BEST OPTION. GROUND DEPLOYMENT ENABLES AN IMMEDIATE AND SERIOUS APPRECIATION OF THE TERRAIN, WILL REINFORCE THE ERROR OF MASS GROUND DEPLOYMENT, AND IMPROVE THE ACCURACY OF THE AIR STRIKE TARGETING. AS A FIRST STEP, THE ONLY SERIOUSLY TENABLE OPTION IS DEPLOYMENT WITHIN OPPOSITION HELD TERRAIN. ONCE LOCAL RESISTANCE IS ESTABLISHED, THE ENGAGEMENT CAN HAVE WIDER FOCUS THAN AL QAEDA. (b)(2)
- SUBJ: IIR ~~(S)~~ THESE STEPS WOULD INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A SF LED OPERATIONS AND RECEIVE LOCAL SUPPORT. (b)(2)
- E. ~~(S)~~ STAND ALONE SF GROUND DEPLOYMENT. SINGLE RAID OPTIONS MIGHT BE ATTRACTIVE FOR SPEEDY RESULTS TO SATISFY DOMESTIC DEMANDS. BUT, WITHOUT A LOT MORE LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, THEY RUN SERIOUS RISKS DISPROPORTIONAL TO THE SHORT TERM GAINS. SF DEPLOYMENT WOULD ALSO, BY VIRTUE OF THE TERRAIN IDEALLY INVOLVE SIGNIFICANT AIR MOBILITY. WITHOUT AIR MOBILITY, RANGE AND CAPABILITY ARE SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED WHILE RISK IS SERIOUSLY INCREASED. (b)(2)
11. ~~(S)~~ TALIBAN AND AIR RESPONSE. TALIBAN GROUND FORCES (DISCOUNTING O55 BRIGADE WITH AL QAEDA) LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES ARE NEITHER VERY GOOD NOR VERY COMMITTED. GIVEN THE SMALL SCALE OF TALIBAN AIR CAPABILITY, ALLIED AIR POWER COULD BE USED TO REMOVE (b)(2)

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

THE TALIBAN AIR MOBILITY AND STRIKE CAPABILITY. HOWEVER, UNLESS THAT ARM POSES A SERIOUS DIRECT THREAT TO ANY ALLIED SF DEPLOYMENT IT SHOULD NOT FORM PART OF THE FIRST LIST OF AIR STRIKE TARGETS. TALIBAN AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND SHOULD BE LEFT INTACT WHILE AN EFFECTIVE NO-FLY ZONE IS DECLARED AND ENFORCED. THIS WOULD SERVE TO REINFORCE TO THE LOCAL TALIBAN THE PERCEPTION THAT AL QAEDA IS THE TARGET AND NOT THE TALIBAN. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THIS ACTION PROVIDES HOPE THAT IF THE TALIBAN ADOPT A NON-INTERFERENCE POLICY OVER STRIKES TARGETING AL QAEDA, THEY MIGHT BE LEFT UNMOLESTED. TARGETING AL QAEDA WOULD ISOLATE THEM AND EMPHASIS THE DISTINCTION MADE BY WESTERN MILITARIES OVER AFGHAN AND NON-AFGHAN FORCES INSIDE THE COUNTRY. THAT DISTINCTION IS NOT ONE THAT WOULD BE LOST ON THE AFGHANS. ALLOWING TALIBAN A HOPE OF ULTIMATE SURVIVAL MIGHT ALSO REDUCE THEIR SUPPORT, IF NOT THEIR RHETORIC, FOR AL QAEDA.

12. ~~(S)~~ THE ONLY EFFECTIVE DEFENSE TALIBAN CAN OFFER TO AIR STRIKE LIES IN WHAT STINGER MISSILES THEY MAY STILL HAVE STOCKPILED. IT SHOULD BE ASSUMED THAT AT LEAST SOME STINGERS ARE IN AL QAEDA HANDS CLOSE TO OSAMA BIN LADEN. THE REST WILL LARGELY BE STOCKPILED NEAR MAJOR CITIES AND AIRPORTS. ANOTHER REASON FOR LEAVING SUCH SITES WELL ALONE, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM.


13. ~~(S)~~ AL QAEDA AND AIR RESPONSE. ANY FAILURE OF SUPPORT FROM TALIBAN WILL INCREASE AL QAEDA PARANOIA AND MAY EVENTUALLY RESULT IN THE TALIBAN PREMATURELY TURNING ON THEIR HOSTS. THE TALIBAN WOULD INDIRECTLY AND UNWITTINGLY BE FORCED TO BECOME PART OF THE ALLIED EFFORT IN ERADICATING AL QAEDA OR AT LEAST MAKING ITS CONTINUED PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN UNTENABLE.

14. ~~(S)~~ LONG TERM. TO ENSURE THE LONG TERM EXTINCTION OF AL QAEDA IN AFGHANISTAN, THE TALIBAN MUST, AS A SECONDARY MEASURE, BE SUCCESSFULLY MODERATED OR REMOVED FROM OFFICE. SHOULD THE TALIBAN BE FORCED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST A DISAFFECTED AL QAEDA IT WOULD PRODUCE THE SPIN-OFF BENEFIT OF ALSO MATERIALLY WEAKENING THE TALIBAN. WHAT SHOULD FOLLOW IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE STABLE COALITION AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FREE OF THE TALIBAN AND PAKISTANI INTERFERENCE.

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)



(b)(1) (b)(2)

NOFORN
SECRET

Annex 9: U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan

~~SECRET~~

October 30, 2001 2:51 PM

*11/5/01
11/1/01
Revised for presentation
@ PCen 11/1*

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Strategy

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUL 20 2010

Here are some edits to the "U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan." It is a pretty good paper. Please take a look at the additions and changes. Mark them in bold type, do your own edit, and then I want to send it to some folks.

Here is a draft memo to send it with to the Vice President with copies to Colin Powell, Condi Rice and George Tenet:

Attached is a revision of the paper entitled "U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan." It seems to me that it is useful to update this from time to time.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/16/01 memo, "U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan"

DHR:dh
103001-50

.....
Please respond by _____

~~SECRET~~

SECDEF CONTROL # X02463 /02
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

Doc 1 09-M-2210

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: JUL 20 2010

~~SECRET~~~~CLOSE HOLD~~

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

Approved at
NSC meeting
10/16/01

October 16, 2001

7:43 AM

SUBJECT: U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan

All elements of U.S. strategy must be integrated—military, diplomatic, covert, humanitarian, financial, etc..

1. U.S. Goals re: Al-Qaida

- Eliminate Al-Qaida leadership and forces.
- Deal with Al-Qaida in a manner that clearly signals the rest of the world that terrorists and terrorism will be punished *end (offered)*
- Collect intelligence for the worldwide campaign against terrorism.

2. Goals re: Taliban

- Terminate the rule of the Taliban and their leadership.
- End the use of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism.
- Do so in a manner that signals the world that harboring terrorism will be punished severely.
- *Collect intelligence to help in the worldwide campaign against terrorism*
- Take steps to contribute to a more stable post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Note: The U.S. should be involved in the diplomatic effort, but it is not ~~within~~ *in*

U.S. power to assure a specific outcome. U.S. preference for a specific outcome ought not paralyze U.S. efforts to oust Al-Qaida and the Taliban.

The U.S. should not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement, since the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism effort

worldwide. *The US needs to be involved in this effort to*

3. Execution

- Al-Qaida's and the Taliban's main assets are people. They must be destroyed.

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

~~CLOSE HOLD~~~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 Authority: EO 13526
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
 Date: JUL 20 2010

~~SECRET~~
~~CLOSE HOLD~~
 DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

- Use any and all Afghan tribes and factions to eliminate Al-Qaida and Taliban personnel and military capabilities.
- DoD and CIA ^{work} coordinate closely in getting all factions engaged in eliminating Al-Qaida and Taliban; by the use of incentives and disincentives-money, food, military equipment, supplies, air strikes, etc.

4. Operations

OSD 1.4 (b)

- ^{We had many more} ~~Urgently~~ Insert additional CIA teams and Special Forces in country operational detachments (A teams), by any means, both in the North and the South. ~~Add~~ third country special forces if appropriate (UK, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) ^{should be inserted if possible}
- CIA and DoD teams on the ground are critical for success-U.S. influence, targeting, logistics and humanitarian efforts.
- Ground liaison teams should urge Afghan ground forces:
 - In the North, in this order, to:
 - Establish a land bridge to Uzbekistan by attacking and occupying land and major cities.
 - Eliminate Al-Qaida, Taliban and Arab forces to the north and northeast.
 - Move toward Kabul and, to the extent possible, threaten ~~surround~~ ^{or occupy} Kabul, while making pronouncements about a shared government with other key elements.
 - Sever Taliban lines of command, northwest and northeast of Kabul.
 - In the South and West to:
 - Move against Al-Qaida and Taliban forces and strongholds throughout the country.
- U.S. military and coalition forces will:

The US should prepare for a major coalition ground effort with
 prepared to do it, but with the goal of bringing the Taliban
 into Sutchan side.

SECRET
CLOSE HOLD

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

- Closely coordinate with forces on the ground to achieve the military goals.
- CINCENT will use all capabilities to encourage ground forces to achieve U.S. goals:
 - Attack from the air enemy capabilities, to facilitate success of Afghan forces on the ground.
 - Provide money, equipment, food, etc
 - Provide equipment
 - Provide food

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
 Authority: EO 13526
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
 Date: JUL 20 2010

5. Other

- Establish secure air and land supply routes in the North and South, so aid can be focused on opposition forces, rather than in Taliban-occupied areas.
- Build humanitarian supply routes and centers to help the US oppose the Taliban.

6. Kabul

Providing additional conventional support to Northern Alliance forces north of Kabul (the vicinity of Panshir and the Shomali plains) may set conditions for Northern Alliance to eliminate Taliban resistance in Kabul and take the city.

- The USG should not agonize over post-Taliban arrangements to the point that it delays success over Al Qaida and the Taliban. The sooner the Taliban is pushed out of Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and other key cities, the better. However, without slowing down the Northern Alliance's advance, the USG should begin discussing international arrangements for the administration of Kabul to relieve Pashtun fear of domination by Northern Alliance (Tajik-Uzbek) tribes.
- Engaging U.N. diplomacy too early beyond intent and general outline could interfere with U.S. military operations and inhibit coalition freedom of action. Diplomacy can be most useful:

Final major effort in 1) Occupy Mazarsharif and Achonik
 2) Occupy Kabul
 3) Occupy Herat
 4) Getting into the South

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION
CLOSE HOLD
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 Authority: EO 13526
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
 Date: JUL 20 2010

~~SECRET~~
~~CLOSE HOLD~~
 DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

- 1) bilaterally, particularly with Pakistan, but also with Iran and Russia, to reinforce our messages to the Northern Alliance and to Southern Pashtuns (see below);
 - 2) to enlist commitments from key allies and Muslim countries for a follow-on peacekeeping force for Kabul.
- An international group could be UN-based or an ad hoc collection of volunteer states (such as Turkey, [redacted] and Egypt, along with other NATO allies), but not the U.S. The U.S. will have a *major* deal of work to do in the rest of the world. *mil/boy* *not boy*

OSD 1.4 (b)

7. The South

It is critical that CIA and DoD speed up the process of establishing on-the-ground contacts in the South as well as the North. Pakistan could be key in this regard, particularly if the U.S. emphasizes to them that this is the key to balancing gains by the Northern Alliance. The U.S. should explore the value of ties with King Zahir Shah. He may have some influence with Pashtuns, particularly if he is seen to have the confidence of the U.S. The U.S. should be wary of associating closely with the still hated Russians or the Iranians, given Pashtun fear of domination by Iranian-backed Shia.

8. Message to Southern Tribes

The message to Southern tribes should emphasize the importance of joining the U.S. if they wish to balance the Northern Alliance:

- The U.S. is prepared to give them the same support it is giving Northern groups if they will join with the US.
- U.S. actions in the North demonstrate that the U.S. is able and willing to support its friends.
- The U.S. is committed to preserving Kabul as a capital for all Afghans, not one dominated by the Northern Alliance.

9. Message for the Northern Alliance

- The U.S. goal is to help Afghans drive out the foreign terrorists, defeat the Taliban and help Afghans regain control over their land and people.

4

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~CLOSE HOLD~~
DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
 Authority: EO 13526
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
 Date: JUL 20 2010

- The U.S. will provide support to accomplish those goals: coordinated air strikes with ground movement, ammunition, supplies and food.
- Long-term, the U.S. and its allies are prepared to provide economic support for reconstruction within an all-Afghan political framework.
- It is crucial that their forces conduct themselves humanely and professionally toward the civilian population. Atrocities will damage their cause. U.S. support depends on their dealing severely with breaches of professional conduct.
- The U.S. must also ally with anti-Taliban forces in the South. This means the future of Kabul should be decided by a political process, and not by military action alone. The U.S. expects them to declare, as soon possible, that their goal is not to establish dominion over the entire country, but to get a political process started that will reflect the interests of all the Afghan peoples.
- The U.S. envisions some kind of international security arrangement for Kabul and the surrounding area in which a political process could take place. The U.S. envisions a highly capable peacekeeping force drawn from allies in Europe, the Muslim world and elsewhere to help to secure Kabul until stability is achieved.
- The U.S. will consult on its plans for moving on Kabul. It may be wise to encourage the Taliban to surrender the city without the Northern Alliance forces having to invest and occupy it by force, possibly by surrounding the city and introducing a capable peacekeeping force.

Timing

The President has properly prepared the American public for a long campaign. However, it would be helpful to achieve some decisive results relatively early:

- An early defeat of Taliban/Al Qaida will make it more difficult for them to conduct additional terrorist operations.
- Making an example of the Taliban increases U.S. leverage on other state supporters of terrorism.

5

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION
~~CLOSE HOLD~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~CLOSE HOLD~~
DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUL 20 2010

- There will undoubtedly be intense diplomatic activity once winter slows down military operations. That diplomacy must operate against a background of U.S. success or it will inhibit U.S. actions.
- Success will build U.S. public confidence for action in other theaters.
- Success will maintain the support of key coalition members; protracted fighting may achieve the opposite.
- However, early successes may not be possible, and expectations should be kept to realistic levels.

Annex 10: Memorandum by State Department "Strategic Thought"



~~TOP SECRET CLOSE HOLD~~
~~TOP SECRET CLOSE HOLD~~
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SEP 30 2009 OCT -1 AM 11:17

SUBJECT: Strategic Thoughts

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

0001

The U.S. strategic theme should be aiding local peoples to rid themselves of terrorists and to free themselves of regimes that support terrorism. U.S. Special Operations Forces and intelligence personnel should make allies of Afghanis, Iraqis, Lebanese, Sudanese and others who would use U.S. equipment, training, financial, military and humanitarian support to root out and attack the common enemies.

Some air strikes against Al-Qaida and Taliban targets are planned to begin soon. But, especially in the war's initial period, I think U.S. military action should stress:

- indirect (through local, non-U.S. forces) action, in coordination with and in support of opposition groups;
- direct use of U.S. forces initially primarily to deliver logistics, intelligence and other support to opposition groups and humanitarian supplies to NGOs and refugees; and subsequently
- on-the-ground action against the terrorists as individuals--leaders and others--

rather than focusing too heavily on:

- direct,
- aerial attacks on
- things and people.

The U.S. should exercise care and restraint regarding initial air strikes until intelligence develops to permit impressive (worthwhile) strikes against Al-Qaida and other targets, strikes that in some instances can be coordinated to provide effective support to the opposition. We should avoid as much as possible creating images of Americans killing Moslems until we have set the political stage that the people we are going after are the enemies of Moslems themselves.

Public expectations still are shaped by conventional thinking rooted in recent history. It is therefore widely assumed that U.S. will strike soon and exclusively at Al-Qaida in Afghanistan.

DECLASSIFIED IAW E.O. 12958

MAY 7, 2009
CHIEF ROO WITS

Classified by: USDP, D.J.FEITH
REASON: 1.4(d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25SEP18

~~TOP SECRET CLOSE HOLD~~

COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES

305901

~~TOP SECRET CLOSE HOLD~~
TOP SECRET CLOSE HOLD

It would instead be surprising and impressive if we built our forces up patiently, took some early action outside of Afghanistan, perhaps in multiple locations, and began not exclusively or primarily with military strikes but with equip-and-train activities with local opposition forces coupled with humanitarian aid and intense information operations.

We could thereby:

- Garner actionable intelligence on lucrative targets, which we do not now have.
- Reduce emphasis on images of U.S. killing Moslems from the air.
- Signal that we intend to fight smart, rather than simply use direct force.
- Signal that our goal is not merely to damage terrorist-supporting regimes but to threaten their regimes by becoming partners with their opponents.
- Capitalize on our strong suit, which is not finding a few hundred terrorists in the caves of Afghanistan, but is the vastness of our military and humanitarian resources, which can strengthen enormously the opposition forces in terrorist-supporting States.

A key war aim would be to persuade or compel States to stop supporting terrorism. The regimes of such States should see that it will be fatal to host terrorists who attack the U.S. as was done on September 11. If the war does not significantly change the world's political map, the U.S. will not achieve its aim. There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change. The USG should envision a goal along these lines:

- New regimes in Afghanistan and another key State (or two) that supports terrorism (to strengthen political and military efforts to change policies elsewhere). 1.5d
- Syria out of Lebanon.
- Dismantlement or destruction of WMD capabilities in [redacted] 1.5d
- End of [redacted] support for terrorism. 1.5d
- End of many other countries' support or tolerance of terrorism.

cc:
Vice President
Mr. Powell
Mr. Tenet
Ms. Rice

DECLASSIFIED
IAW EO 12958
MAY 7, 2009
CHIEF, ROD WHS

[Handwritten signature]

~~TOP SECRET CLOSE HOLD~~
2

Annex 11: A Bill to Establish National Counter Terrorism Authority in Pakistan

[AS PASSED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY]

A

Bill

to establish National Counter Terrorism Authority in Pakistan

WHEREAS, the menace of terrorism and extremism is becoming an existential threat to the state and needs to be responded to and addressed comprehensively;

AND WHEREAS, in order to eliminate this menace, a focal institution to unify state response by planning, combining, coordinating and implementing Government's policy through an exhaustive strategic planning and necessary ancillary mechanism is needed;

It is hereby enacted as follows:-

PRELIMINARY

1. Short title, extent and commencement.- (1) This Act may be called the National Counter Terrorism Authority Act, 2013.

(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.

(3) It shall come into force at once.

2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-

- (a) "Authority" means the National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan established under section 3;
- (b) "Board" means the Board of Governors constituted under section 5;
- (c) "Chairman" means the Chairman of the Board of Governors;
- (d) "Executive Committee" means a Committee constituted under section 8;
- (e) "National Coordinator" means the National Coordinator of the Authority;
- (f) "Deputy National Coordinator" means the Deputy National Coordinator of the Authority;
- (g) "rules" means rules made under the Act;
- (h) "regulations" means regulations made under this Act, and
- (i) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules or, as the case may be, regulations.

2

3. Establishment of the Authority.- (1) As soon as may be, but not later than ninety days after the promulgation of this Act, the Federal Government shall, by notification in the official gazette, establish an Authority to be known as the National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2) The Authority shall be an independent body answerable directly to the Prime Minister.

(3) The Authority shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with powers, subject to the provision of this Act, to acquire and hold property, movable and immovable, and to sue and be sued by its name. The Authority shall have administrative and financial powers to carry out the functions of the Authority.

(4) The headquarters of the Authority shall be at Islamabad and it may set up offices at such other places in Pakistan.

4. Functions of the Authority.- The Authority shall have the following functions, namely:-

- (a) to receive and collate data/information/intelligence, and disseminate and coordinate between all relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessments with periodical reviews to be presented to the Federal Government for making adequate and timely efforts to counter terrorism and extremism;
- (b) to coordinate and prepare comprehensive National counter terrorism and counter extremism strategies, and review them on periodical basis;
- (c) to develop action plans against terrorism and extremism and report to the Federal Government about implementation of these plans, on periodical basis;
- (d) to carry out research on topics relevant to terrorism and extremism and to prepare and circulate documents;
- (e) to carry out liaison with international entities for facilitating cooperation in areas relating to terrorism and extremism;

3

- (f) to review relevant laws and suggest amendments to the Federal Government, and
- (g) to appoint committees of experts from Government and non-Government organizations for deliberations in areas related to the mandate and functions of the Authority.

5. Board of Governors.- (1) The Authority shall have a Board of Governors comprising:-

- (a) Prime Minister - Chairman;
- (b) Minister for Interior - Member;
- (c) Chief Ministers of Provinces - Members;
- (d) Chief Minister of Gilgit Baltistan - Member;
- (e) Minister for Law and Justice - Member;
- (f) Minister for Finance - Member;
- (g) Minister for Defence - Member;
- (h) Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir - Member;
- (i) One Senator (to be recommended by Chairman Senate) - Member;
- (j) One MNA (to be recommended by Speaker National Assembly) - Member;
- (k) Secretary, Ministry of Interior - Member;
- (l) DG Inter Services Intelligence - Member;
- (m) DG Intelligence Bureau - Member;
- (n) DG Military Intelligence - Member;
- (o) National Coordinator - Member;
- (p) Chief Secretaries of the Provinces, Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir - Member;
- (q) DG Federal Investigation Agency - Member, and
- (r) Inspector General of Police of Provinces, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan - Members.

4

- (2) The National Coordinator shall act as the Secretary to the Board.
- (3) The Board may invite any person to the meeting on special invitation.

6. Procedure of the meeting of the Board.- (1) The Prime Minister Azad Jammu and Kashmir or the Chief Ministers shall attend the meeting themselves, however, in case of unavoidable circumstances, may nominate a member of their cabinet to attend the meeting of the Board to represent them.

(2) The Federal Ministers shall attend the meeting themselves, however, in case of unavoidable circumstances, the Secretary of their Ministry shall attend the meeting.

(3) The quorum to hold a meeting shall be fifty percent of the total membership.

Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-clause (6), the presence of heads of various intelligence agencies who are members of the Board shall be mandatory in every meeting of the Board while taking decision on any policy matter.

(4) The Board may meet as and when required but it shall meet at least once in each quarter of a year.

(5) No act or proceedings of the Board shall be invalid by reasons only of the existence of a vacancy in, or defect in the constitution of the Board.

7. Powers and functions of the Board.- (1) The powers and functions of the Board shall include, but would not be limited to, the following, namely:-

- (a) the Board shall exercise all the powers and functions of the Authority;
- (b) to provide strategic vision and oversee activities of the Authority;
- (c) to recommend rules and approve policies and manuals in order to carry out the purposes of this Act, and
- (d) to approve the annual budget prepared by the Authority.

5

8. Executive Committee.- (1) The Board shall be assisted by an Executive Committee comprising of the following, namely:-

- | | | | |
|-----|--|---|----------|
| (a) | Minister for Interior | - | Chairman |
| (b) | Secretary, Ministry of Interior | - | Member |
| (c) | Secretary, Ministry of Finance | - | Member;“ |
| (d) | Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice; | - | Member; |
| (e) | Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs | - | Member |
| (f) | Secretary, Ministry of Defense | - | Member |
| (g) | National Coordinator | - | Member |
| (h) | Additional Chief Secretary (FATA) | - | Member |
| (i) | Chief Secretaries of Provinces, Gilgit Baltitstan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir | - | Members |
| (j) | Secretaries Home Department of the Provinces, Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir | - | Members; |
| (k) | Additional Inspector General incharge of Counter-Terrorism Departments of the Provinces, Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir | - | Members. |

(2) The National Coordinator shall also act as Secretary of the Executive Committee.

(3) The quorum to hold meeting of the Executive Committee shall be fifty percent of the total membership.

(4) The Executive Committee may co-opt any other relevant person to the Executive Committee.

(5) The Executive Committee shall ensure effective implementation of the decisions of the Board;

(6) The Executive Committee shall perform such other functions as are assigned to it by the Board.

6

9. National Coordinator.- (1) There shall be a National Coordinator of the Authority to be appointed by the Federal Government for tenure of three years.

(2) The National Coordinator shall be a professional of known integrity and competence in BPS-22 or equivalent and may be appointed in rotation from bureaucracy or Police Service of Pakistan.

(3) The National Coordinator shall have the following powers:

- (a) to execute the policies and plans approved by the Board and Instructions issued by the Federal Government;
- (b) to prescribe terms and conditions of the employees and grant additional allowances or any other incentives;
- (c) to have full financial and administrative powers for effective administration of the Authority, as approved by the Board;
- (d) to engage any person or entity on contract basis to carry out assignments for the consultancy in accordance with acclaimed best practices;
- (e) to establish administrative structures at the field level for efficient implementation and accessibility of the Authority;
- (f) to submit quarterly progress reports to the Board on the financial and functional aspects of the Authority;
- (g) to perform such other functions as may be delegated by the Board;
- (h) to undertake any other assignments given by the Board in the respective fields, and
- (i) produce periodical journals relating to counter terrorism and counter extremism issues.

10. Deputy National Coordinator.- (1) There shall be a Deputy National Coordinator of the Authority to be appointed by the Federal Government for a tenure of three years.

(2) The Deputy National Coordinator shall be an eminent professional of known integrity and competence in BPS-21 or equivalent and may be appointed in rotation from bureaucracy or Police Service of Pakistan.

7

(3) The National Coordinator may delegate any of his powers under sub-section (1) of section 9 to the Deputy National Coordinator with the approval of the Board subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in this behalf by the board.

11. Appointment of officers, staff etc., by the Authority.- (1) The Authority may, from time to time appoint, either through direct recruitment or through deputation, such officials, experts or consultants as it may consider necessary for the performance of functions in the prescribed manner.

(2) The Authority shall prescribe service regulations, with the approval of the Board for the appointment, promotion and transfer of officers, staff, experts and consultants, their terms and conditions of service including additional financial incentives such as special salaries, allowances, pension/gratuity etc., constitution and management of pension and gratuity and shall be competent to take disciplinary action against them.

(3) All appointments of officers and staff etc. shall be made with the approval of the Board and their security clearance shall be carried out by Directorate General ISI.

12. Appointment of officers, staff etc., in cases of special requirement.- Subject to the provisions of this Act, the National Coordinator may, in case of urgency, appoint officers, staff, experts and consultants on prescribed terms and conditions, provided that every such appointment shall be laid before the Board in the next meeting.

13. Delegation of powers.- The National Coordinator may by special order delegate his powers and functions to the Deputy National Coordinator or any other senior officer of the Authority:

Provided that the National Coordinator may delegate his powers and functions under this provision sparingly and not as a rule.

14. Fund.- (1) There shall be established a fund to be known as NACTA Research and Development Fund.

- (2) The Fund shall consist of,-
- (a) funds or budget amount received from the Federal Government;
 - (b) grants made by the international bodies, organizations and entities, in accordance with procedures laid down by the Federal Government;
 - (c) such other sums as may be received by the Authority.

8

(3) The Fund shall be administered by the National Coordinator in such manner as prescribed.

(4) The Authority may receive international assistance in the field of counter terrorism and counter extremism under the prescribed manner.

15. Budget for the Authority.- (1) The National Coordinator shall, in respect of each financial year in accordance with the financial procedures approved by the Board, prepare the annual budget estimates of the Authority and submit the same to the Federal Government after the approval of the Board.

(2) The National Coordinator shall have full powers to incur expenditures and re-appropriate funds as per system of financial control and budgeting of the Federal Government with the approval of the Board.

16. Maintenance of accounts and internal control.- The Authority shall maintain complete and accurate books of accounts in connection with the discharge of its responsibilities as may be prescribed by the Auditor-General of Pakistan.

17. Audit.- (1) The accounts of the Authority shall be audited every year by the Auditor-General of Pakistan in such manners as may be prescribed.

(2) The Authority shall appoint its own financial advisor to regulate the financial matters and for internal audit.

18. Annual Report.- The Authority shall compile and submit an annual report on its activities and accounts to the Board.

19. Assistance and provision of information.- (1) The Federal Government and Provincial Governments and their Departments shall assist the Authority in carrying out its functions, subject to applicable laws.

(2) All Federal Ministries and Provincial Departments including Corporations, bodies, set ups, controlled or administered by or under the authority of Federal or Provincial Governments shall provide information and data required for carrying out the purposes of this Act, subject to applicable laws.

20. Indemnity.- No prosecution, suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Authority or its officers and consultants for anything done in good faith for carrying out the purposes of this Act or rules and regulations made thereunder.

9

21. Power of the Federal Government to issue directives.- The Federal Government may, as and when it considers necessary, issue directives to the Authority on matters of policy and such directives shall be binding on the Authority, Federal, Provincial and Local Governments and if a question arises whether any matter is a matter of policy or not, the decision of the Federal Government thereon shall be final.

22. Power to make rules and regulations.- (1) The Federal Government may, on the recommendation of the Board, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2) The National Coordinator may make regulations for the following purposes, namely: -

- (a) effective and smooth functioning of the Authority;
- (b) internal working of the Authority;
- (c) terms and conditions of the employees and grant of additional allowances or any other incentives.

23. Provisions of this Act.- The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation to any other law for the time being enforced.

24. Employees deemed to be Public Servants.- The employees of the Authority shall be deemed to be Public Servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV 1860).

-10-

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

- The Bill reflects Pakistan's resolve to take all possible measures to counter terrorism and extremism.
- The Bill addresses the need for a focal institution to integrate and synergize national counter terrorism and counter extremism efforts in view of the nature and magnitude of terrorists' threat, present strategic policy options to the Government for consideration/implementation by the stakeholders after scientifically studying the phenomenon of extremism and terrorism in historic and professional perspective, develop action plans in that regard and report to the Federal Government about their implementation.
- The Bill aims at establishing the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), which is also at par with best international standards, to unify and orchestrate national counter terrorism and counter extremism measures and provide for their more effective and efficient enforcement. It would play a pivotal role by coordinating with all law enforcement agencies in taking effective actions against those who carryout acts of terrorism and extremism, besides preparing comprehensive national counter terrorism and counter extremism strategies.

A. REHMAN MALIK
Minister for Interior
Member-in-Charge