

# **Suicide Bombing In Pakistan**

**Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy in Anthropology**

**MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN SAIF**

**Department of Anthropology  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Quaid-i-Azam University  
Islamabad 2013**

**Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad**  
(Department of Anthropology)

Final Approval of Thesis

This is to certify that we have read the thesis submitted by Mr. Muhammad Ali Khan Saif. It is our judgment that this thesis is of sufficient standard to warrant its acceptance by the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad for the award of the Degree of "Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology".

Committee:

1. Dr. Saif-ur-Rehman Saif Abbasi  
(External Examiner)



2. Prof. Dr. Rashid Khan  
(External Examiner)



3. Prof. Dr. Hafeez-ur-Rehman  
(Supervisor)



4. Dr. Waheed Chaudhry  
(In-charge Dept. of Anthropology)



## **AUTHOR'S DECLARATIONS**

I hereby declare that this thesis represents the original work of the author. Works of all other people has been acknowledged in the text. The research has been carried out as part of partial fulfillment for the award of Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Anthropology.

Muhammad Ali Khan Saif

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to explore the causes and motivation factors behind suicide terrorism in Pakistan with special reference to the region of Waziristan. The area under research is large and complex. The research is focused on the main causes and motivation factors behind the ever burgeoning culture of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. It was planned at the very outset that the study should not expand into too many areas of investigation which always instigate a researcher to probe while losing sight of main problem. The main focus of the study is the region comprising of North and South Waziristan, the most troubled zone in the tribal areas of Pakistan which has emerged as a hub of *Al-Qaeda* supported religious extremists and a nursery of suicide bombers in Pakistan. Anthropological field work was the hardest activity to carry out in this region since both the militants and the security forces are engaged in hostilities. Visiting the region and conducting field research was not without risks. However, despite these difficulties my native ethnic connections and support of political and tribal leaders worked effectively and finally I was able to enter the field and conduct my research.

The study is highly qualitative in nature because of its obvious requirements but a handful of statistical tools were also employed to tabulate the supportive tangible information. The primary data has been presented by and large in the form of case studies but a sizeable part contains an account and analysis of in-depth interviews and personal field observations.

The study has been planned systematically, starting with theoretical discussion on the subject and moving logically towards the main analysis. A detailed discussion of the regional scenario and history of suicide bombing has been provided before addressing the central thesis problem pertaining to suicide bombing in Pakistan.

The data on tribal areas of Pakistan reveals that political and religious factors are not the sole reasons for motivating volunteers to carry out suicide bombing. It has also been discussed that the suicide bombing phenomenon in Pakistan is not totally comparable to rest of the world particularly to other Muslim regions such as Palestine and Iraq. The treatment and practice of religion is ethnographically grounded and highly context sensitive; therefore the conventional parameters of analysis are not applicable across the board. Thus, the frameworks proposed by Robert Pape and Samuel Huntington do not offer much relevance to understand terrorism and suicide bombing in Pakistan. The tribal culture and religious environment have a dominant role

here. The 'Pushtun' tribal cultural code of life called 'Pushtunwi' provides that every Pushtun is bound to take revenge against his enemy for his insult and dishonour. *Pashtunwali* mandates upon him to offer shelter to his guests or a person who seeks asylum. *Pashtunwali* also requires a *Pashtun* to be loyal to his faith, Islam, which is regarded as a matter of personal honour. The Islamic concept of *Jihad* also binds a Muslim to fight against the enemies of Islam. This concept has been interpreted by pro-militants clerics to motivate their followers for *Jihad* and martyrdom (*Shahadat*) which is the ultimate culmination of *Jihad*. These concepts have widely been used to engage youth in suicide terrorism by motivating them with religious emotionalism. This study argues that the phenomenon of suicide bombing can best be understood in a holistic manner by taking into account the interplay of strong cultural support factors, existing religious milieu and socio-economic and political conditions of Pakistan and in particular the *Pashtun* inhabitants of tribal areas. Suicide bombing and the resulting culture, the data strongly suggests, is not entirely an individual activity. It is a group activity, planned and organized by other players who have their own political agenda; the individual is used merely as a mule and an instrument. There were a number of questions proposed in the research problem which have been answered in the final analysis. It has been concluded that suicide bombers in Pakistan are not always alienated and marginalized individuals. It is rather peoples' disillusionment and frustration as a result of politically motivated problems that are channelized into suicide attacks. Religion in isolation of other social, cultural and economic factors is not the sole motivating factor behind suicide attacks. A set of motivational factors inducing an individual to commit suicide bombing may include a desire for social prestige, heroism, albeit pseudo, and recognition particularly with one's immediate social and tribal circles. The data also reveal that almost all known suicide bombers belong to religious schools of *Deobandis* who are *Sunnis* and followers of the *Hanafite* school of Islamic *fiqh*, with some adherents of the *Wahhabi* school as well. The data also show that finances are abundantly available for terrorist activities. However, the identification of main sources is undiscoverable through anthropological research because of the sensitivity of the subject. The main postulate that religion is the main motivation factor was, therefore, proved incorrect owing to the fact that at personal level it is not religion but personal individual traits and inclinations under which an individual succumbs to motivations for commission of such acts. Religious zeal is just one factor in addition to many others. Revenge appeared as a strong contributing factor. However, at a larger societal level, it was not found correct. The assumption

that the society in general is strongly supportive of suicide attacks was also proved false as the majority of the people do not agree with the interpretation of Islamic principles offered by the militant circles. Money, as a major inducement and contributor was also not proved correct.

The study was not aimed at offering a viable solution to the suicide bombing problem. However, it has come up with the finding that suicide terrorism is basically a reaction of extremist religio-political groups to political grievances, and that Pakistan's current social and political environment has provided an enabling environment and a fertile ground for this style of activity. Its internal political and social problems have facilitated the exploitation of religion and culture by the militants and disgruntled elements to spread their message through death and destruction.

This study is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter discusses the methodological approach adopted for the research. The second chapter discusses the relevant theoretical formulations and literature review. The third chapter provides an overview of the background of suicide terrorism in other Muslim states and Pakistan. Chapter four discusses the tribal areas of Pakistan, in particular, Waziristan and the cultural and traditions of its *Pashtun* inhabitants. Chapter five discusses developments in Waziristan after the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the emergence of militancy as a result and its relationship with suicide terrorism in the region. Chapter six and seven include ethnographic studies, including case studies, interviews etc. of the relatives of suicide bombers and would be suicide bombers. A discussion on public perceptions and response to suicide terrorism is also included. Chapter eight contains the final conclusion and observations.

## ABBREVIATIONS

ANP	<i>Awami National Party</i>
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crime Regulation 1901
FR	Frontier Regions
JI	<i>Jamaat Islami</i>
JUI	<i>Jamiat-e-Ulama-Islam</i>
KPK	<i>Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province</i>
MQM	<i>Muttahida Quami Movement</i>
PBUH	Peace Be Upon Him
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PPP	Pakistan Peoples' Party
PTI	Pakistan <i>Tehreek-e-Insaaf</i>
TTP	<i>Tehreek-e-Taliban</i> Pakistan
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

## TRANSLITERATION

<i>Ameer</i>	A leader
<i>Fatwa</i>	A religious decree issued by a scholar or a grand cleric on a question of Islamic law
<i>Fidai</i>	A person who offers his life for the cause of Islam
<i>Fidaeen</i>	Plural of <i>Fidai</i>
<i>Islam</i>	Religion of Muslims
<i>Ghairat</i>	Protection of honor
<i>Ibn ul Balad</i>	Arabic term for Sons of the Soil, local and/or Indigenous people
<i>Jihad</i>	Struggle for a holy cause in Islam
<i>Jirga</i>	A tribal council
<i>Lashkar</i>	A tribal militia
<i>Melmastia</i>	Hospitality, a <i>Pushtun</i> tradition
<i>Mulla</i>	A cleric and religious scholar
<i>Mujahid</i>	A person who is engaged in a holy struggle for Islam
<i>Muwajib</i>	An obligatory kind of payment
<i>Nanawatay</i>	Going to one's enemy's house for seeking truce, a gesture of willingness for peace
<i>Nang</i>	A term for honor
<i>Pir</i>	A religious leader in the Sufi tradition
<i>Pushto</i>	Language of <i>Pushtuns</i>
<i>Pushtun</i>	An ethnic group settled in Afghanistan and Pakistan
<i>Pushtunwali</i>	<i>Pashtun</i> code of social and cultural norms
<i>Raj</i>	Rule. It refers to the period of British colonial rule (1857-1947)

<i>Sanskrit</i>	An ancient Indian language of India. Hindu religious text is written in this language
<i>Shahadat</i>	Martyrdom
<i>Sharia</i>	Code of Islamic law
<i>Shia</i>	A Muslim religious sect
<i>Sunni</i>	A Muslim religious sect
<i>Syed</i>	Leader, also used for the descendants of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)
<i>Taghut</i>	Rule of Satan. A lie, an un-Islamic government
<i>Taliban</i>	Seekers of knowledge. Resistance fighters in Afghanistan
<i>Ulama</i>	Muslim religious scholars
<i>Ummah</i>	Nation of Islam/Muslims
<i>Urs</i>	A celebration of the birth or demise of a saint
<i>Wahhabi</i>	An Islamic school of thought, followers of Muhammad Abdul Wahhab. Official religious school of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY

#### 1.1. Introduction

Pakistan is passing through interesting times. Pakistanis appear to be living under the spell of an ancient Chinese curse, “may you live in interesting times”. An ‘interesting’ feature of today’s Pakistan, albeit macabre in manner, is suicide terrorism which has emerged as a hallmark of its socio-political mosaic. Terrorism is a manifestation of extremism. The most monstrous manifestation of contemporary terrorism is suicide bombing. In the past decade, this phenomenon has acquired new dimensions due to the growing number of horrific suicide attacks on civilian population and public property.

A phenomenal increase in suicide bombing has affected, in a devastating manner, the individual and collective psyche of people. If the very thought of a person wrapping explosives around his waist, blowing himself up in public and killing people indiscriminately is horrifying then the lethal consequences in terms of its psychological, social, cultural and political context are terrifying indeed. This phenomenon becomes even more alarming when we realize that the perpetrator of this horrendous act is a young person, with no apparent psychological disorders, religious in his convictions and whose actions are motivated by his desire to die as a martyr and acquire a place in paradise. However, even from an Islamic perspective, this act brings to fore too many questions, for instance, why has he chosen the road to hell for reaching heaven? How could he imagine reaching heaven after stepping over the blood and guts of so many innocent human beings? Even from an Islamic point of view, the quixotic nature of his act remains a source of anxiety for Muslims generally.

Adding to the gravity of the situation is the fact that not only is this activity being carried out mostly in Muslim regions but most of the militant organizations involved in these heinous acts project their Islamic credentials and Muslim identity as a matter of pride. International media's portrayal of suicide bombers as the icons of an Islamic "culture of death" or "Islamic terrorism" further exacerbates the situation.

The dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and the onset of a new millennium has brought a decade of pain and misery for people of this region. Pakistan and its neighboring Afghanistan have been suffering since then. Since the September 2001 attacks on the United States, Pakistan has remained a steadfast ally of US-led forces in the region in their war against terror. Pakistan's unequivocal cooperation has earned it the ire of anti-US militants in this region which has turned the country into a battlefield. A host of players are currently operating in Pakistan with diverse extremist agendas. As a result people are subjected to terror attacks, destruction of life and property, socio-political and economic turmoil.<sup>1</sup>

Terrorism and, in particular, suicide bombing has injured the social, economic and political fabric and has adversely affected the entire life pattern of Pakistani society. Pakistan has endured over 300 suicide attacks since 2001 and has sacrificed over 10,000 lives. In addition to ordinary citizens, the list of casualties includes high profile political leaders, religious scholars and members of civil society. Political leaders in Khyber

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<sup>1</sup> 2,654 civilians were killed in terrorist violence from January 2010 to May 2011, as compared to around 1,600 civilian deaths from 2003 to 2006. There were 76 suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2009 as compared to only two in 2003. The latest death toll in suicide attacks is more than 10,000. South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) 2010. South Asian Terrorism Portal, [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan).

Pukhtunkhwa province and the adjacent tribal belt (FATA)<sup>2</sup> have been the main targets of terrorists for their condemnation and opposition to militants engaged in insurgency against the state of Pakistan.

For some, it is a cost to bear in war against terror and to protect the free world, for others it is the price to pay for redeeming the honour of Islam and to free Muslims from Western exploitation. For most, living in fear of drone missiles and suicide blasts, it is a matter of day to day survival, in the most horrendous conditions of miserable poverty, social deprivations and political anarchy. This phenomenon has generated a debate on the identification and rectification of the problem.

Media, civil society forums, intellectuals and academia are all engaged in differential diagnosis of suicide terrorism<sup>3</sup>. It has raised multiple questions and requires a holistic and a non-partisan approach to address them both intellectually and empirically. Setting aside the commonly held views loaded with media created hypes and misnomers; a thorough anthropological investigation of the causes of suicide attacks and the actors on stage has become imperative.

Pakistan presents a unique case where a combination of multifold factors are responsible for this phenomenon. Factors such as ethnicity, religion and its sectarian

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<sup>2</sup> Official term for the tribal areas. It is an abbreviation for Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

<sup>3</sup> Pakistani writers including Amir Mir and Khurram Iqbal have provided empirical data to prove that suicide attacks in the country were introduced by Arab militants with the attack on Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad in 1995. Khurram Iqbal and Rohan Gunaratna (2011) claim that the masterminds of suicide attacks in Pakistan were *Al-Qaeda's* second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Faraj al-Libi, the Chief Operational Commander of *Al-Qaeda*.

component, growing scale of extremism, religious politics and its foreign dimensions are relevant to the subject.

The thrust in this study is based on the premise that cultural factors with a combination of religious, economic, political and ethnic features need to be studied with a view to identify the primary social motivators which are harvesting terrorism in the society.

This study is empirical in nature conducted with defined anthropological tools. It is part of an academic venture as well as a personal probe within scholarly parameters in order to explore suicide terrorism in a cultural perspective specific to Waziristan region in the tribal areas of Pakistan. This study was initiated in early 2007 but the structured and organized fieldwork began after 2009. It was and still is extremely dangerous to contact the militant organizations, masterminds and suicide bombers who cannot be identified before their final act. Relevant data was acquired from a host of players and was later stratified to the general public, terrorist organizations, local elders and opinion leaders in Waziristan, families and friends of suicide bombers and those suicide bombers who were apprehended alive, law enforcing agencies' personnel including police and the army.

Contacting and interviewing such fragile segments was very difficult but as the work progressed, it became manageable through better rapport and confidence building. Most of the data was acquired through informal techniques of free chat and observation which was later on recorded in field diaries. Fieldwork in Waziristan, which spanned over a period of almost eight months, was a strenuous task but it was managed due to two



main reasons; my family and ethnic ties in Waziristan and my personal contacts with some of the social and political organizations present in the area.

My main emphasis has been on preparing case studies which highlight the circumstances responsible for converting an ordinary young man to adopt a *Jihadi* way of life and undertake suicide missions? The objective was to explore their social, cultural and religious backgrounds, conditions in which they were brought up and external factors which affected their understanding of cultural and political environment and which drove them towards militancy. Case studies were also intended to highlight the attitudes and responses of their family members, friends and other people in their social surroundings in relation to their extreme actions.

A significant number of local people in Waziristan and other tribal areas were also interviewed. A separate set of interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in urban areas in Waziristan, Peshawar and Bannu, (cities in Khyber Punkhtunkhwa province) and Islamabad with a view to register the reactions and perception levels of common people who had been directly and indirectly affected by suicide attacks. A third category of people were political leaders and government functionaries who mostly demanded a guarantee that their views will never be presented in direct form. I promised not to, and have tried my best, to honor my commitment. There were political leaders who expressed both classified and unclassified views and allowed me to quote them up to a certain level,.

This study has been divided into seven chapters. Chapter one contains an introduction which explains the objectives of this research and provides a brief



background to the situation in Pakistan. This chapter also explains the rationale and methodology adopted for undertaking this research. Chapter two discusses relevant theoretical formulations and review of literature on the subject. Most of the work done on this subject is carried out by Western scholars and researchers. However, recently a few Pakistani journalists have also touched upon this subject. Most of their work deals with the political and security dimension of the subject and is journalistic in nature. An effort has been made to discuss all the relevant material. Chapter three discusses the regional background and history of suicide bombings in Palestine, Egypt and Iraq in order to present the ongoing situation with a view to draw comparison with the situation in Pakistan. This chapter also discusses the background and various aspects of suicide bombing in Pakistan. A comparatively lengthier account has been added to explain as to what is the cultural configuration and historical background of the area, so as to make the case presented in the following chapters.

Chapter four discusses the salient features of society and culture of *Pashtuns* inhabiting the North Western part of Pakistan and across the border in Afghanistan, with a view to elucidate their cultural traits and various social and cultural norms and values which affect their individual personalities, attitudes and behaviors in a collective manner. In particular, this chapter highlights the region of North and South Waziristan, the locale of this study. Historical developments since the colonial period, especially British military campaigns against the local tribes in this region, provide an insight into their *brigandier* and martial culture. The objective is to explain the habitat and culture of tribal areas<sup>4</sup> and to introduce the reader to the region in a comprehensive manner. This will

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<sup>4</sup>Chapter four describes the region of Federally Administered Tribal Areas in detail.

also enable a reader to understand the world view and current behavior towards regional events of the local tribesmen in the context of their history, cultural norms and traditions. The discussion will enable a reader to identify the *raison de etre* of current wave of militancy in the region and its nexus with suicide bombing in Pakistan which is further analyzed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 5 discusses recent developments in South and North Waziristan in the post 9/11 scenario. An analysis of the regional importance of Waziristan in the context of *Al-Qaeda's* war against US led forces, strategic significance of Waziristan and its role in strengthening and facilitating militancy in the region has been discussed. The discussion emphasizes the role of militants' strategies, *Al-Qaeda's* role and its nexus with militancy and suicide bombing in Pakistan with a view to elaborate the vital significance of Waziristan and its people in this context. This will enable a reader to understand the social and cultural factors responsible for the development of a particular world view of *Pashtuns*, in particular the inhabitants of Waziristan in the context of contemporary tumultuous events in their region. Chapter six provides findings of field research and deals with the ethnography of this region. This chapter along with chapter seven contains the primary data collected during the course of this research. Results of field work and interviews conducted are explained. Interviews of relatives and friends of suicide bombers have been conducted personally by the researcher both in Waziristan during field work and in different locations outside Waziristan. These include suicide bombers who carried out their operations both in Pakistan and also Afghanistan. In addition, interviews of would-be suicide bombers in detention with law enforcement officials who had interrogated them and media personnel who had interacted with them have been

included. Chapter seven is, to an extent, a continuation of its preceding chapter six. It discusses the results of interviews, focus group discussions etc. in Waziristan and other cities with people from Waziristan, journalists, civil society activists, academics and military personnel involved in army operations in the region.

The last chapter eight contains concluding remarks and observations based on this study including the final findings of this research. The section titled bibliography includes the secondary data in the form of books, articles both printed and electronic, including, web-based data, which have been read, consulted and referred to in this study. Some of the material has been consulted for acquiring a deeper understanding of the subject. Such material from which ideas have been borrowed has been referred to in general to acknowledge the contribution of its author. However, specific references and quotes have been mentioned along with detailed acknowledgments. Literature consulted for this study contains books in three languages, English, Urdu and Pashto and is mentioned in the list of bibliography under separate headings.

This study is supported by a theoretical framework based on the works of contemporary scholars on terrorism and suicide bombing. The study was never intended to explore suicide bombing with the aim of finding a solution to the problem. It is intended to be an exercise in understanding through exploration, the dynamics of suicide terrorism in Pakistan in its socio-cultural context with a particular focus on Waziristan.

This study focuses on the significance of Waziristan due to its particular social cultural and political dimensions and its influence and relationship with militancy and suicide terrorism. It is believed that the nexus of suicide terrorism and Waziristan is

significantly important for any research on the mechanics of suicide terrorism in the region. Several factors relevant to suicide terrorism have their genesis in the peculiar environment and milieu of Waziristan. This study explores the idea that society and culture in the Waziristan region has a greater role in facilitating the extremists by providing an enabling environment for the development and promotion of motivational factors for their ideology.

This research also attempts to explore the idea that suicide terrorism in Pakistan has its own peculiarities and unique characteristics which distinguishes it from similar attacks in other regions. It explains that the root cause of terrorism in Pakistan is primarily political and not religious. It is argued that it is the culture-specific aspects of politics and religion peculiar to Pakistan which have resulted in this development. It is also a particular interpretation and an exegesis of the sources of Islam based on an obscurantist and reactionary view point has been presented by militants to justify their campaign. The whole episode of war against terror in the context of regional peculiarities specific to Waziristan has been analyzed to discover the reasons due to which suicide terrorism has emerged as a manifestation of Taliban resistance against both Pakistan and US forces in Afghanistan.

I do hope that the study will elucidate a few hithertofore unexplored dimensions of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism in Pakistan.

## METHODOLOGY

### 1.2. Rationale of Research

This research attempts to establish that suicide terrorism is a distinct and unique form of terrorism which must be studied holistically alongside a multitude of factors. It is understood that all terrorists do not adopt or resort to suicide tactics. The motives, intentions and methods adopted by these groups should be studied with the objective to probe as to why some terrorist groups resort to this form of terrorism as opposed to others. There are innumerable ethnic, religious, racial and political groups engaged in pursuing similar agendas in different parts of the world. However, only a limited few resort to suicide bombings whereas a large majority operates with conventional methods.

There are certainly unexplained questions surrounding the phenomenon of suicide bombing. For instance, what are those seemingly numerous and hitherto inexplicable factors which motivate individuals to sacrifice their lives for a cause. What is the nature of that cause? Why is it so compelling and sacred that people willingly give up their lives for it? Who are these people? And is it their social and economic class and situation which compels them to perform such an act or is it their individual susceptibility, rooted in psychological cum emotional imbalances and deprivations which motivate their actions? Who instigates such feelings and inculcates the willingness to carry out such an extreme act in them and how? Can this phenomenon be linked to specific regional, ethnic, nationalistic, political or religious factors or not? Is there any proof of a causal nexus between the above factors and the individual propensity to carry out suicide bombing? Another question that comes to mind is whether suicide bombers are really convinced that they are dying for a greater cause and it merits their sacrifice with life?

This agenda is heavy and complex but at the same time it provokes researchers to dig out the latent and manifest factors behind this extreme act. This thesis is an attempt towards exploring hithertofore new dimensions of the phenomenon of suicide bombing in Pakistan by putting diverse factors together and analyzing the undercurrents of these mutually cohesive components of terrorism which apparently look incompatible and incomprehensible. This study will seek to gather qualitative information on the ethno-religious and ethno-geographical distribution of suicide attacks. Psychological factors will also be analyzed in reference to terrorists, their disciples and public at large. Response of various segments of society will elucidate the understanding of the subject issue in its social and cultural background and whether socio-cultural sanctions are instrumental in respect of such acts?

### **1.3. Questions addressed through research**

#### **1.3.1. Primary**

- i. Are suicide bombers alienated, excluded, marginalized individuals hailing from the wretched sections of society?
- ii. Why do some groups or organizations use suicide terrorism? And why do people join such militant groups?
- iii. Is religious fundamentalism a root cause of suicide terrorism in Pakistan? Or is it just a reflection of more fundamental political and social tensions? What is the role of religion in conflicts leading to terrorism?
- iv. Are religious schools (*Deeni Madaris*) nurseries of suicide bombers?
- v. Has the over-reaction of state machinery reinvigorated terrorist acts in Pakistan?
- vi. Who are these suicide bombers and who operates them?

- vii. What are the political and economic factors behind suicide attacks?
- viii. What is the role of US presence in Afghanistan in promoting suicide bombing?
- ix. How do common people react and why is there a certain segment of public with reservations on speaking out against such acts?
- x. Why is a section of society sympathetic towards suicide bombers?
- xi. Why do all suicide bombers and their sympathizers belong to a particular sect of Islam? What is the rationale and justification presented by various sects in support and against such acts?

#### **1.3.2. Secondary**

- i. What are the motivating factors for suicide bombers and how are people's frustrations and grievances channelled into suicide attacks by the militant ideologues?
- ii. Are the militant groups a product of state policies?
- iii. Why are some political parties less critical than others in respect of suicide attacks inside Pakistan?

#### **1.4. Hypotheses**

A set of hypothesis was presented to discover the cultural factors responsible for suicide bombing in Pakistan with particular focus on South and North Waziristan. A suggestive set of hypothesis was developed on pre-conceived knowledge of the subject which was partly based on general observations and common beliefs held by people, on the one hand, and on the basis of preliminary secondary data, on the other. These hypotheses were put to test in the research.



- i. In Pakistan, religion is the major motivation behind suicide attacks and militants are fighting for the glory of Islam. They have no option but to adopt suicide attacks as a tactical methodology in their war against Pakistan for its pro-US policies in the region.
- ii. Factors, including money, poverty and economic turmoil have a major role in suicide bombings.
- iii. Society in Pakistan at large is supporting suicide militants. All Muslim sects are equally involved in this activity.
- iv. Waziristan, its topographical features, geographical location, and socio-cultural characteristics of its *Pashtun* inhabitants are responsible in promoting the militant's cause, heightened militancy and suicide attacks in the region.

## **1.5. Locale of the Study**

**1.5.1. Universe:** Territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in South Asia.

**1.5.2. Sample Frame:** Waziristan (North and South).<sup>5</sup> This region lies at the Southern corner of Pakistani tribal region. It borders the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province on its Eastern borders and Afghanistan on its Western border. This rugged mountainous region is inhabited by *Pashtun* tribes including *Wazir*, *Mehsud*, *Bhittani* and *Daur* for centuries. These tribes are well known for their martial characteristics and take pride in their military exploits against invading armies, especially the British, the Soviets and now the US and Pakistan. They are deeply religious and fiercely jealous of any encroachment on their independence.

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<sup>5</sup> This region is discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 5.



## **1.6. Methodology of Research**

### **1.6.1. General**

This research is qualitative in nature. The variables are central to behavior and attitude and these are not tangible. The questions of 'why' and 'how' is central to the research. The information gathered through such a technique is less measurable and question of authenticity always remain a grey area. To overcome this problem, a sizable part of research has focused on statistically measurable data, that too is based on qualitative information.

### **1.6.2. Collection of Data**

Data for this research was collected from both primary and secondary sources. This thesis is based on primary sources mainly. The primary sources consist of personal interviews with a number of already identified respondents and some informants selected randomly in order to share their views. It also includes written and audiovisual material in a wide variety of forms from media interviews to contemporary media reports.

Most of the secondary sources consisted of literature including books, journals, and periodicals and media reports. The Internet was also used extensively.

### **1.6.3. Sample Selection**

Sample selection was a cumbersome job. There were two main bottlenecks; firstly, identification of suicide bomber and their compatriots. There is no possibility of interviewing a suicide bomber. His identity always remains a secret. Second, was the collection of first hand information from a person who has links with a militant organization. The system is one of a closed door and is tightly secret, therefore, approaching someone really involved carried sensitivities and was extremely difficult.

It was, therefore, decided to gather primary data through secondary sources by adopting a snowball technique. Researchers use this sampling method if the sample for the study is rare or is limited to a very small subgroup of population. This type of sampling technique works like chain referral. After observing the initial subject, the researcher asks for assistance from the subject to help identify people with a similar trait of interest. The process of snowball sampling is much like asking your subjects to nominate another person with the same trait as your next subject. The researcher then observes the nominated subjects and continues in the same way until finding a sufficient number of subjects.

Basically, this is a strictly stratified and carefully selected sample. Following categories of respondents were selected:

- i. Would-be suicide militants arrested by the security forces;
- ii. Former trainee suicide bombers, now undergoing rehabilitation;
- iii. Potential young persons wishing to become suicide bombers;
- iv. Families/friends of suicide bombers;
- v. Neighbourhood opinion leaders;
- vi. Religious leaders;
- vii. Political leaders;
- viii. Common citizens;
- ix. Families related to foreign militants through marriages; and
- x. Security agencies personnel.

Several visits were made to the region (Locale) and a period of almost eight months was spent there during the course of research.

#### 1.6.4. Sample Design

My sample was diverse but small in size due to the fact that information required was of a very sensitive and specialized nature and asking focused questions from people across the board was not advisable. The most practical workable strategy was to first categorize the sample and then design very focused but open ended questions.

The sample design was broad based but selective. It was ensured that a cross-section of population was covered and diverse opinions were gathered.

#### 1.6.5 . The Sample Size

Category	Structured questionnaire	In-depth Interview	Focus group discussion
Would be suicide terrorists arrested by the security forces	-	5	-
Former trainees suicide bombers, now undergoing rehabilitation	-	20	10
Potential young person wishing to become suicide bombers	50	40	10
Families of suicide bombers	10	05	2
Neighborhood opinion leaders	50	35	15
Religious leaders	28	17	12
Political leaders	50	25	10
Common citizens	55	38	10
Families related to foreign militants through marriages	20	10	10

Security agencies personnel

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**Students of Religious schools (*Deeni Madaris*)  
General knowledge**

	Percentage (N=130)			
	Completely (1)	Partially (2)	Very little (3)	No Idea at all (4)
Can read the Holy Quran	90	10	--	--
Understand Arabic	--	5	10	85
Can read the Holy Quran with translation	--	10	15	75
Ever read a book on life of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)?	15	20	25	80
Ever read a book on history of Islam	2	5	7	86
Knows the meaning of <i>Hadith</i>	40	30	30	-
Has the knowledge of controversy regarding different <i>Fiqh</i> (Schools of Law)	20	30	50	-
Knowledge about computers	0	0	10	90
Knowledge of the history of Pakistan	3	7	12	78
Has knowledge about the geography of Pakistan	0	2	4	94
Knowledge on Sports	15	20	13	62
Knows the names of President and Prime Minister of Pakistan	73	27	--	--
Knows the names of Governor, Chief Minister, Chief of Army Staff	22	13	8	57
Knowledge of the Continents of the World	--	--	2	98
Understand Difference between infidels and non-Muslims	11	22	23	54

**Profile of Religious Schools (*Deeni Madaris*)**

(N = 30)

	Average
Average number of students	50
Average number of teachers	2
Annexed with a mosque	100 %
Building owned by the <i>madressa</i>	80 %
Rented building	20 %
Average number of rooms	10
Average toilets available per <i>madressa</i>	19
Source of income through fees	0
Source of income through donations	100 %
Source of income through charity organizations	60 %
Average salary of teacher	Rs. 4000 per month
Tuition fee	0
Average number of orphan students per <i>Madressa</i>	02

#### 1.6.6. In-depth Interviews

In-depth interviews were conducted with the following categories of people:

- i) Friends and relatives of suicide bombers;
- ii) Security forces personnel;
- iii) Cultural, economic, social and religious groups;
- iv) Writers/Authors and academics;
- v) Students from school to university level;
- vi) Human Rights activists; and
- vii) Relevant persons from general public.

Interviews were held with a select group of people having a reputation of being highly informed and well conversant within their specialized fields and professions. These individuals were requested to educate the researcher, instead of informing him in conventional ways. The interviews spread over several hours and sometimes were repeated after a span of few months. The condition of anonymity has been respected whenever requested.

Interviews were recorded during 2009, 2010 and 2011. People belonging to Waziristan were interviewed, including, those who lived in the North and South Waziristan and those who belonged to Waziristan but had settled in other parts of KP province and Islamabad. In addition, people from other regions with opinions on the subject of suicide bombing were interviewed. These included religious scholars, students, businessmen, professionals such as teachers, doctors and lawyers, security forces personnel, political activists, and journalists etc.

Interviews were also conducted with relatives and friends of suicide bombers. Majority of them were residents of Waziristan and were interviewed during my visits to the region in 2011. During my earlier visits in 2009 and 2010, I made efforts to identify suitable

interviewees and made an effort to convince them to speak on the subject. Then during the followup visit in 2011, they were interviewed. Most of the interviews were recorded through notes. Due to the fear of retaliation by the militant groups in the region, most interviewees were reluctant to allow the recording of their statements. It was also dangerous for myself to be carrying tape recordings of such interviews. Therefore, most of the interviews were recorded in note form which were later reproduced. Interviews of the relatives of suicide bombers in Afghanistan were also recorded in North and South Waziristan where most of them were residing, however, some interviewees were met in Bannu and D.I.Khan districts as well.

#### **1.6.7. Focus Group Discussions**

Focus group discussions were held at Islamabad, Peshawar, Bannu and semi-urban towns in Waziristan including Miranshah, Mir Ali, Razmak, Wariki and Makeen during different periods from 2009 to 2012. People were invited from different segments of society for discussion on a particular issue concerning my topic. Debates were cautiously conducted while avoiding value judgment and suggestive questions. The outcome of these discussions was reported in writing although a recording facility was also at hand. Discussions with expert groups were more interesting and worthwhile due to the fact that discussions were open with a greater chance to verify and cross-check dissenting views. The outcome of these discussions was not recorded statistically as the replies were analytical, not a straight yes or no. Focus Group Discussions were largely representative and open in view of the fact that participants were speaking from their hearts and were persuaded and prompted by the fellow participants as well.





### **1.6.8. Case Studies**

The idea of preparing case studies appeared too complex in the beginning but later it proved to be the most successful technique of qualitative data collection. It also made it easier to see how people connect the happenings with their personal lives. These case studies also helped in analyzing the responses in relation to their world view on death and death for a cause. It was a little difficult in the beginning to select vocal, friendly and reactive people. It was again difficult to probe individuals on certain issues in the presence of others: particularly people with different or critical views on suicide bombers. Individual private discussions with family members of a suicide bomber seemed too difficult in the beginning. However, later it became easier as the acquaintance developed. Instead of selecting families randomly, I opted for those families for whom I had a personal reference through intermediaries and acquaintances. I selected the cases through my personal acquaintances including relatives, friends, colleagues and families known to me for quite some time. This facilitated staying with them in their households for longer and even during odd times. At the start of the research, there was cautious behavior which eased off gradually. In these case studies, a conventional participant observation technique was applied. This kind of data is qualitative in nature, but has been quantified to a certain extent in the form of tables. However, identity of respondents has strictly been kept confidential in view of the sensitivity and security of both the informants as well as the researcher.

### **1.6.9. Structured Questionnaires**

A selected number of structured questionnaires were run to collect the opinions of a cross section of society on suicide bombing, Taliban, military operations and Al-Qaeda. The



questionnaires were run randomly in rural and urban areas, but the population was stratified on the basis of age and occupation.

## **1.7. Sources of Data**

### **1.7.1. Primary**

Primary data was collected through formal and non-formal ways. It was then updated, revised and cross-checked through primary sources. The primary data comprises:

- i. Current situation;
- ii. Security forces actions;
- iii. Who is the primary decision-maker? ;
- iv. Role of local leaders and the government;
- v. Data on cultural practices, perceptions on value system through participant observation and structured questionnaire; and
- vi. The profiles and interviews of suicide bombers' families, potential and would be bombers and activists of *Jihadi* and militant organizations.

### **1.7.2. Secondary**

- i. Literature and research conducted on the subject;
- ii. Libraries;
- iii. Internet;
- iv. Official material;
- v. Newspaper articles, comments, critiques; and
- vi. Personal records compiled by some individuals.

## **1.8. Stages of Research**

The research was conducted in three stages:

### **1.8.1. Stage-I: Information compilation on present situation**

During this phase, ground work was prepared for the research. Information on the history and operations relating to the topic was collected. Separate and small profiles of various groups were prepared.

### **1.8.2. Stage-II: In-depth Study**

The actual in-depth study started during this phase after preliminary information gathered earlier was verified, cross-checked and registered. During this phase actual field work was conducted.

### **1.8.3. Stage-III: Analysis and dissertation writing**

In this phase, the information collected was computerized, edited, cross-checked and analyzed. The actual writing of dissertation began afterwards.

## **1.9. Unit of Analysis**

The unit of analysis was the individual. The sample frame, however, was Waziristan's population. Basically, it was a non-probability sample based partially on quota sampling. It was meant to decide which strata of the community may be relevant for the study. Then a quota was set for each stratum which was, to some extent, proportionate to its representation in the entire population. For instance, the number of groups or sub-groups was selected on the basis of their relevance with the topic.

## **1.10. The Operational Tools**

### **Profiles of Target Groups/Institutions/Channels**

Profiles of target groups were prepared for initiating the actual field work and in-depth study.

#### **1.10.1. Analysis and Conclusion**

Data analysis began soon after the collection of information reached a certain level. The benefit was that a lack of information in a specific area was identified earlier enabling me to rectify the situation right away by collecting additional information that would answer the outstanding questions. There was also an inherent risk involved in this approach. It was that information collected at a later stage might overturn conclusions reached in the earlier analysis. However, this was not all negative. If early hypotheses are challenged that ensures that the ones developed later will have greater credibility. Data gathered was analyzed on the basis of primary and secondary questions.

This thesis used textual analysis to compare and contrast various schools of thought and multiple perspectives. This method was based on the study of texts recorded in documents in various forms that include written, spoken, electronic, and visual. Data from a wide range of sources, addressing the thesis questions, was critically examined and analyzed. This analysis helped in arriving at conclusions.

The most challenging part of the task was to integrate the results of analysis into a set of conclusions. This process, or synthesis, is an important step in qualitative research methodology. The fact that information was collected from a rich variety of sources and, the focus was on the how and why? using a broad context from history, culture, society and other relevant spheres made the conclusions reliable.

### **1.10.2. Confidentiality and Precautions**

The most sensitive part of this research is the primary information which was gathered through focus group discussions and indepth individual interviews. The discussions and interviews were conducted in strict confidentiality without providing direct clues and references of the exact names, places and times. The researcher was highly cautious of the fact that under a strict security environment, the life of respondents was highly exposed and endangered. The researcher could reach to the respondents through a chain of references and was allowed to discuss the suicide phenomenon due to his family, ethnic and linguistic ties with some of the influential persons in the area.

The law enforcement agencies also provided access to their information network (though partially) with a secure guarantee that no direct reference of exact timings, places and names of the facilitators will be recorded.

The interviews were conducted in the research locale / area sometimes in a day or two, with a gap of one or two days, even months and in a few cases in a series. All this was dependent on the availability and convenience of the respondents. Please also note that the researcher's visits to the region were in intervals dependent upon security and other considerations and, therefore, the data was collected in a stretch on such occasions.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

*"While nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him"<sup>6</sup> - Fyodor Dostoevsky*

Terrorism and suicide bombing are an extremely complex phenomenon. Suicide bombing is a tactical methodology applied in the execution of terrorism. Terrorism operates as an overarching strategic framework within which one of the tactical manoeuvres is suicide bombing.

#### 2.1. Western Theories on Terrorism

Defining terrorism in today's world is perhaps one of the most difficult tasks given the fact that practitioners of terrorism and those combating the act view it from entirely different and conflicting perspectives. A consensus on the definition of terrorism is a cumbersome task since this in itself is part of a wider conflict between ideologies and political objectives. The problem is not of comprehensiveness or degree of detail in a definition but revolves around the very paradigm of the definition itself.<sup>7</sup> Terrorism is, however, distinct from psychological warfare on the grounds that it involves physical destruction with visible acts. Terrorism involves the use of violence by an organization other than a national government with the objective to intimidate or frighten a target audience.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Quote taken from Lacey, Roberts., *Inside the Kingdom*, Arrow Books, London, 2010, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Thackrah, R., *Terrorism : A Definitional Problem*, in P. Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, Aberdeen University Press, 1987, p. 39.

<sup>8</sup> Pape, R., *Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* Random House, N.Y., 2005.

It would be pertinent to discuss some of the principal causes of terrorism before embarking upon the analysis of suicide bombing as a phenomenon. Tore Bjorgo has attempted to identify certain factors which provide a conducive environment for terrorism; Foremost among them are facilitating or accelerating factors. As the term signifies, these factors act as prime stimulants for terrorism. These include factors such as weaker state control, developments in weapons and armaments and absence of control over their procurement, media sensationalism etc. These factors make it easy for terrorists to carry out their actions due to the convenience of methods and circumstances available at their disposal.

Secondly, there are factors which are a result of modern developments including globalization, demographic problems due to large scale movement of populations and ethnic groups, rapid breakdown of collective mode of livelihood, family oriented social systems and growth of individualism which causes rootlessness and atomization. This leads to a state of alienation among individuals which provides a breeding ground for extremist tendencies and behavioral problems.

Thirdly, are those factors which play a motivational role in the growth of terrorism. Politicians and ideologues may exploit disturbing situations, deprivations and grievances in a society through emotional appeals and may rally people around in order to exploit their reactionary sentiments for a political objective. This may result in an orchestration of individual violence into a politically or ideologically motivated extremism. Movements for secession and independence waged by groups due to

There are numerous definitions of terrorism proposed by various scholars, however, a definition of consensus has not been arrived at since one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. There is, however, a consensus on the core concept of terrorism. According to Bjørgo terrorism is considered by most scholars as a set of methods and strategies for combating a powerful enemy as opposed to an ideology or a movement. It includes, from a tactical point of view, the use of violence, in a premeditated manner, with the prime objective of causing fear, intimidation and psychological damage on the enemy for achieving a particular objective. This method targets non-combatants for this purpose.<sup>9</sup>

There is, however, disagreement over the question of who can be called a terrorist? Most definitions consider terrorism as an illegitimate method, irrespective of its political goals or purposes. A few definitions, albeit a minority, claim that armed struggle for certain just purposes is legitimate, irrespective of means. The emerging consensus, however, is that terrorism is primarily an extremism of means, not one of ends. It appears that researchers now tend to agree that terrorism must not be viewed as a phenomenon in a singular context. There is not just one terrorism but several different 'terrorisms'. The fact that there are different types of terrorisms with highly different manifestations, means therefore, that there are also diverse types of causes and levels of causation. Terrorism occurs in poor countries as well as in rich, in authoritarian societies as well as in democracies. What seems likely is that certain forms of terrorism are outcomes of certain combinations of factors, some of which may be more fundamental than others.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Bjørgo, Tore., *Racist and Right-wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators and Responses*, in *Myth, Reality and Way Forward*, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon 2005, p.31.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*



grievances ranging from socio-economic exploitation to religious and political discrimination may be cited as examples of motivational factors.

A fourth set is that of triggering factors which may include events which simply provoke an already simmering situation to reach a boiling point. Grievances which may exist for some time and which have already stirred resentment among a certain group of people, are pushed to such a stage that even an insignificant event may create circumstances in which a terrorist act may take place in retaliation.<sup>11</sup> For instance, the Egypt – Israel peace treaty in 1981 brought to fore the simmering resentment of the anti-Israel lobby which resulted in a series of high profile terrorist acts committed against Western tourists and supporters of peace treaty eventually culminating in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in October 1981.

Any discussion on this subject is inherently linked to the questions of causes of terrorism and the underlying motivation factors of terrorists. A better understanding of terrorism requires a deeper analysis of motivational factors which leads to extreme manifestations in the shape of suicide attacks.

### **2.1.1. The Dynamics of Suicide Terrorism**

In so far as suicide attacks are concerned, it is difficult to understand them in terms of the abnormality of their perpetrators. Treating them as psychopathic or immoral retards will lead us astray from a proper analysis. In fact, research reveals that they are ordinary people from normal social backgrounds. Their actions do not necessarily stem from hatred. Rather it may be due to the love of their own group and culture which in their view is being threatened and requires protection.

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.



In this context, it becomes imperative to analyze the distinction between a normal and ordinary suicide of an individual and a suicide attack in which the individual willingly blows himself up. A suicide in its normal sense is committed in a state of hopelessness and desperation. The individual committing suicide reaches a state of depression to such an acute degree that life loses all its charms and becomes meaningless for him. He considers the ending of his life as the only escape available for getting rid of his miseries and problems. On the other hand, the suicide of a bomber is carried out by a highly politicized, ideologically motivated individual who is committed and determined to destroy the enemy through his action in order to achieve a certain objective which in all probability is political in nature. The bomber is convinced that he is undertaking an act which is daring, gallant and honorable. He is also, especially in case of Muslim suicide bombers, infused with religious enthusiasm and believes that his action is sanctioned by Islam that and he will be rewarded in the life hereafter. This distinction between an ordinary individual suicide and suicide attack is of fundamental importance in order to understand the phenomenon from an anthropological perspective.

## **2.2. Theories on the Concept of Death**

Almost all cultures have traditions, customs, and cultural practices relating to death. In anthropology, death is treated as an institution, like marriage, worship and festivities of various kinds. It is closely associated with yet a larger concept of life after death. Legal aspects of death also form part of many cultures, particularly the settlement of the deceased's property and issues of inheritance. Religious traditions describe the nature of death and its relevance to life after death with related rewards and punishments which is a common concept among many religions. Death as the cessation of physical life is the

most common definition but interpreted with wide differences among different religions and faiths. There are three views on the nature of death:<sup>12</sup>

- i. *Animalism*: It explains that we are human beings. Animalism suggests that we persist over time just as long as we remain the same animal.
- ii. *Personism*: It explains that we are creatures with the capacity for self-awareness. It provides that our persistence is determined by our psychological features and the relations among them.
- iii. *Mindism*: It explains that we are minds (which may or may not have the capacity for self-awareness). Mindism suggests that we persist just when we remain the same mind.

### **2.2.1. The Concept of Life After Death**

The concept of life after death includes the concept of harm after death. Not everything finishes when physical life ends.

Man is in a continuous search for defining life and death and has been familiar with the concept of life after death. All the Prophets of God, in particular those of the Abrahamic tradition of religions,<sup>13</sup> invited their people to worship God and to believe in the after-life. They laid so much emphasis on the belief in life after death that even a slight doubt amounted to denial of God and made all other beliefs meaningless. The very fact that all the Prophets have dealt with this metaphysical question of life after death so confidently and so uniformly, the gap between their longevity in some cases, being thousands of years, prove that the source of their knowledge of life after death as proclaimed by them all, was common, i.e. Divine revelation.

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<sup>12</sup> *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Stanford University Press, [www.plato.stanford.edu/entries](http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries).

<sup>13</sup> Religions of Abrahamic traditions include Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

## 2.2.2. The Concept of Death in Various Religions

This section presents the concept of death in various religions in a summarized form. Followers of these religions have directly or indirectly been affected by suicide bombers in recent times.

### 2.2.2.1. Hinduism

*Atman* is an eternal, changeless core of the self, as described by the *Upanishads*, the ancient set of Hindu religious texts. This soul or changeless core of the self was viewed as being identical with *Brahma* (the unitary ground of being that transcends particular gods and goddesses). Untouched by spatial and temporal variations, the *Atman* is nevertheless trapped in "*Samsara*" (the cycle of death and rebirth). Hinduism, Buddhism, and some other South Asian religions consider the *Samsaric* process as unhappy. They believe that life in this world means a continuous state of suffering. The law of *Karma* ensures that a person remains trapped in the *Samsaric* cycle. The conceptual foundations of *Karma* are based on the notion that all deeds, good or bad, will eventually return in the form of either a reward or punishment to the individual. A person will be compelled to go back to the earth through the process of re-birth either to be punished in his next life for the bad deeds that he committed in his earlier life or will be rewarded through a better life.

Another desirable state is "*Moksha*". It signifies release from the cycle of reincarnation. A state of *Moksha* is the ultimate objective of a person since this is regarded as the ultimate objective of human struggle on earth. Following the attainment of the state of *Moksha*, the *Atman* becomes integrated within the state of *Brahma*. This is the ultimate state of desire for a believer in Hinduism.

Hinduism also introduces the notions of a heaven and hell. In hell, sinful individuals are to be awarded punishments. Hell in Hinduism resembles a purgatory in Catholicism where a sinful person will stay for sometimes getting cleaner and later will be placed in the cycle of reincarnation.<sup>14</sup>

#### **2.2.2.2. Buddhism**

Hindu beliefs in reincarnation and *Karma* were also adopted by Buddhism. The notion that the ultimate goal of a person in this world is to obtain release from the cycle of reincarnation forms an integral part of Buddhist religious philosophy. Buddha's beliefs revolve around the notion that it is human desires which attach us to the cycle of reincarnation. Buddhists believe that an individual has *Annata*. This signifies a collection of desires which are possessed by an individual in this world. *Annata* is the source of all problems since it binds the individual in love of this world. Buddhism believes that life in a human body is a source of all suffering. It is our body which has desires and wants to fulfill them through sinful acts. A person needs to get rid of his body to be liberated. If we release ourselves from the 'filth' of worldly desires, we will achieve the state of *Nirvana* which is a state of absence of worldly desires. This is a state of ultimate liberation which is the goal of a Buddhist.

Buddhists believe that once life in this world comes to a physical end in the form of death, the soul undergoes a process of transformation for a period of forty nine days. This

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<sup>14</sup> Kamal, Farooq. M., *Islam Barai Madahib-e-Hind*, Defenders of Islam Trust, 2003, pp. 94-97. See Also Hinduism Today - Death & Dying, 2010. [www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/hinduism/](http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/hinduism/)

is called the process of *Bardos*. At the end of this process, the process of *Nirvana* or reincarnation begins.<sup>15</sup>

### **2.2.2.3. Judaism**

Judaism is a religion within the Abrahamic tradition. It believes that death is not the end of human existence. Jews believe in a place like that of the Christian heaven where the souls of persons who have behaved well will rest. Souls of sinners, however, will be destroyed after death. There is a belief in the cycle of reincarnation as well. In addition, the concept of a Messiah who will eventually come also exists in Judaism.<sup>16</sup>

### **2.2.2.4. Christianity**

Catholics, Protestants, Baptists and other Christian denominations believe that there is an afterlife and our conduct on earth and the manner in which we behave will determine our fate in the afterlife. The Catholic Church believes in an eternal hell for the wicked ones and a heaven for those who behaved well in their worldly life. The Catholic Church also claims that there is an afterlife state which is between heaven and hell known as 'purgatory.' It is believed that after a certain time is spent in purgation, the spirit will eventually progress and will be transferred to heaven. There are other Christians, the Protestants, who do not accept purgatory. Catholic theology also states that sinners can confess their sins to Catholic priests and those sins are forgiven for ever.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> [www.webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/buddhaintro.html](http://www.webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/buddhaintro.html) and [www.thebuddhaistcentre.com/buddhism](http://www.thebuddhaistcentre.com/buddhism).

<sup>16</sup> [www.uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/religionet/er/judaism/jrlife.htm](http://www.uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/religionet/er/judaism/jrlife.htm), See also [www.religionfacts.com/judaism/beliefs.htm](http://www.religionfacts.com/judaism/beliefs.htm), See also [www.jewfaq.org/olamhaba.htm](http://www.jewfaq.org/olamhaba.htm).

<sup>17</sup> [www.religion.indianetzone.com/1/origin\\_christianity.htm](http://www.religion.indianetzone.com/1/origin_christianity.htm). See also [www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/](http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/)

### 2.2.3. The Concept of Death in Islam

In Islam, death is the end of worldly life and the beginning of a period of rest until the day of resurrection when Allah will judge all the souls. On that day of Judgment, everyone will be judged according to his/her deeds in life. Muslims believe that this worldly life is a process of preparation for the next life.<sup>18</sup> Islam strictly abhors the denial of life after death. The Holy Quran states those who do not believe in life after death have no proof for establishing their claim. They are the non-believers:

“And they say, “There is not but our worldly life; we die and live and nothing destroys us except time.” And they have of that no knowledge; they are only assuming. And when Our verses are recited to them as clear evidences, their argument is only that they say, “Bring [back] our forefathers, if you should be truthful.” Say, “God causes you to live, then causes you to die; then He will assemble you for the Day of Resurrection, about which there is no doubt,” but most of the people do not know.”<sup>19</sup>

Islam considers the period of life on this earth as temporary. Life in itself is eternal in its spiritual form, however, this worldly life is a phase of preparation for the next phase which begins after death. Death is simply a process of transformation of soul from physical world to a non-physical state.<sup>20</sup> In this phase, the soul will simply transcend from its physical existence into a transcendental spiritual state. All human beings will be judged according to their deeds in the worldly life.

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<sup>18</sup> Islam Guide: *Life After Death* [www.islam-guide.com](http://www.islam-guide.com).

<sup>19</sup> Quran, 45:24-26. Also see (<http://www.near-eath.com/muslim.html>) Islam's Views of Death and the Afterlife-Death & Dying: Islamic View.

<sup>20</sup> Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, the great Indian poet and philosopher has described death as an aspect of life.

### 2.3. The Concept of *Jihad* in Islam

*Jihad* is the most widely defined term in Islamic *fiqh*. These definitions deal with various facets of *Jihad* and its application.

1. *Jihad* connotes struggle. It means the act of exerting one's utmost efforts for the promotion of a cause. The conceptual meaning of *Jihad* has become a subject of debate among Muslim intelligentsia in the present times due to various conflicting interpretations by both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars relating to its scope and applicability.
2. *Jihad* has been defined in a saying of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), "The best *Jihad* is (by) the one who strives against his own self for Allah, the Mighty and Majestic."<sup>21</sup>
3. The Holy Quran stipulates, "Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loves not transgressors."<sup>22</sup>
4. Maulana Syed Abu al-Ala' Maududi, a leading Muslim scholar, while explaining the concept of armed struggle states,  
  
"When every method of persuasion (over 13 years of preaching) had failed, the Prophet (PBUH) took to the sword, that sword removed evil and mischief, the impurities of the heart and the filth of the soul. The sword did something more. It removed their blindness, they could see the light of truth, and it also cured them of their arrogance; arrogance

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<sup>21</sup> [http://www.irshad.org/islam/iiie/iiie\\_18.htm](http://www.irshad.org/islam/iiie/iiie_18.htm).

<sup>22</sup> The Holy Quran, 2:190.



which prevents people from accepting the truth, stiff necks and proud heads bowed with humility”<sup>23</sup>

Wilfred Cantwell Smith stated that Muhammad (PBUH) preached Islam with a sword in one hand and the Quran in the other.<sup>24</sup>

A Hindu intellectual, Gyanandra Dev Sharma Shastri, while disagreeing has stated that,

”the critics are blind. They cannot see that the only sword Muhammad wielded was the sword of mercy, compassion, friendship and forgiveness, the sword that conquers enemies and purifies hearts. His sword was sharper than the sword of steel.”<sup>25</sup>

These are two conflicting views about the way in which the message of Islam was conveyed to the world. Critics, especially Orientalists, claim that the wars the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) fought were offensive wars with the objective of forced conversions. According to other historians, however, this view is not upheld by the facts. The Prophet (PBUH) did not use force to preach and all the battles he fought were defensive. The expansion of Islam was due to the Prophet’s (PBUH) spiritual and moral prowess.

Nevertheless, the view that Islam was spread by force has a certain following even among both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. This view divides the life of the Prophet (PBUH) into the period in Mecca where Muslims were weak. Later, when they

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<sup>23</sup> Maududi, Abu-Ala’ Syed, *Aljihad Fil Islam*, Idara Tarjuman-ul-Quran, Lahore, 1948, p. 71. See also, Maududi, Abu-Ala.’ Syed., *Aljihad Fil Islam*, The Preaching Of Islam. [www.alislam.org/library/books/mna/chapter\\_2.html](http://www.alislam.org/library/books/mna/chapter_2.html).

<sup>24</sup> Smith, W.C., *On Understanding Islam, Selected Studies*, (Ed.), The Hague Mouton Publishers, 1981. Also see, [www.wikipedia.org/wiki/uncle\\_tom-cobley](http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/uncle_tom-cobley).

<sup>25</sup> [www.wikipedia.org/wiki/uncle\\_tom-cobley](http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/uncle_tom-cobley). See also, Maududi, Abu-Ala.’ Syed., *Al Jihad fil Islam*, Tarjuman- ul-Quran, Lahore 1948, pp. 10-11.



acquired strength at Medina, then they shed their submissive and tolerant attitude and resorted to the sword.

However, the great Hindu leader Mahatma Gandhi<sup>26</sup> while commenting on the personality of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said that the more I study the more I discover that the strength of Islam does not lie in the sword.

### 2.3.1. *Jihad* Interpreted

"*Jihad*" and "*Mujahid*" (One who carries out a *Jihad*) are two terms that have been given multiple meanings:

- i. *Jihad* has been defined as another term for "*holy war*." An armed clash between two groups, on religious basis, each of whom believes that God is on their side and that the other side is that of Satan. This explanation is widely presented on media in relation to the Middle East, when it is used to describe a call for Muslims to fight against non-Muslims in the defense of Islam.
- ii. Another meaning signifies *Jihad* as a struggle in a non-religious context. This reflects the origin of the word from the Arabic verb "*jahada*" which means to struggle or fight.<sup>27</sup>

### 2.3.2. *Jihad* and its Conventional Interpretation

There are mainly three levels of *jihad* as defined by jurists and scholars of Islamic *fiqh*.<sup>28</sup> It includes:

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<sup>26</sup> Ahmad, Tahir. Mirza., *Murder in the Name of Allah*, Lutterworth Cambridge, Eng, 1989, page 15. Also see for Mahatma Gandhi's views on Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), [www.nevedz.wordpress.com](http://www.nevedz.wordpress.com).

<sup>27</sup> *The concept of Jihad in Islam*: [www.religioustolerance.org.world\\_religions.islam](http://www.religioustolerance.org.world_religions.islam).

- i. **Personal *Jihad*:** This is the most important form. It is called the *Jihadun-Nafs*. It signifies an attempt to purify one's soul of evil influences both subtle and overt. It is the struggle to clean one's spirit of sin.

The most appropriate understanding of *Jihad* is given in the verses of the Holy Quran and the sayings of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as under:

- a. To place "Allah ahead of our loved ones, our wealth, our worldly ambitions and our own lives."
- b. To resist pressure of parents, peers and society in striving against "the rejecters of faith."<sup>29</sup>
- c. "to strive and struggle to live as true Muslims."
- d. "Striving for righteous deeds."
- e. Spreading the message of Islam. "The (true) believers are only those who believe in Allah and his messenger and afterward doubt not, but strive with their wealth and their selves for the cause of Allah. Such are the truthful."<sup>30</sup>

- ii. **Verbal *Jihad*:** It is the struggle for justice through speaking and writing, campaigning through the use of words and other non-violent actions. The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) encouraged Muslims to demand justice in the name of Allah. When asked: "What kind of *Jihad* is better?' Muhammad replied, 'A word of truth in front of an oppressive ruler.' Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) advocated the use of peaceful and non-violent ways for preaching Islam. However, he used armed struggle against his enemies whenever he found it inevitable.

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<sup>28</sup> [www.beliefnet.com/faith/islam/2002](http://www.beliefnet.com/faith/islam/2002). (Last visited January 14, 2006).

<sup>29</sup> The Holy Quran 25:52.

<sup>30</sup> The Holy Quran, 49:15.

- iii. **Physical *Jihad*:** This connotes physical activity which may involve the use of force in defense of Muslims against oppression and transgression by the enemies of Islam. Allah requires that Muslims lead peaceful lives and refrain from transgressing against others. However, in case they are transgressed against, then the Quran allows migration to a peaceful land: "Those who believe and those who emigrate (to escape persecution) and strive (*Jahadu*) in the way of Allah, these have hope of Allah's mercy."<sup>31</sup>

If it is not possible to find a place of peace, then Allah requires Muslims to defend themselves against oppression. The Holy Quran declares, "To those against whom war is made, permission is given, because they are wronged, and verily, Allah is Most Powerful to give them victory."<sup>32</sup>

Karen Armstrong states in her book *Muhammad*, "Fighting and warfare might sometimes be necessary, but it was only a minor part of the whole *jihad* or struggle. A well-known tradition (*Hadith*) has Muhammad say on returning from a battle, "We return from the *little jihad* to the greater *jihad*," the more difficult and crucial effort to conquer the forces of evil in oneself and in one's own society in all the details of daily life."<sup>33</sup>

### **2.2.3. *Jihad* and its non-conventional Interpretation**

*Jihad* in Islam has been subjected to countless interpretations. It has been portrayed in its distorted form as an invitation to and a license for Muslims to use violence on any pretext. This state of affairs has generated misunderstandings and a distorted view of *Jihad* has appeared. This unfortunate development has been further

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<sup>31</sup> The Holy Quran, 2:218

<sup>32</sup> The Holy Quran 22:39

<sup>33</sup> Armstrong, Karen., "*Muhammed: A Biography Of The Prophet*," Harper San Francisco, 1993, p. 83.

aggravated by some extremist Muslim scholars who have presented interpretations in order to justify armed action in today's world disputes. This situation can only be rectified through a rational and objective interpretation of the concept of *Jihad*.

In this context, it must be noted that the Holy Bible and the Holy Quran contain a great amount of material dealing with religion, spirituality, justice, laws, love, etc. Both the holy books also contain references to violence, hate, murder, war, and even genocide. The exact meaning of a term or a verse in these holy books is susceptible to varying interpretations. An interpretation which is intended to ascribe a specific meaning to a term or a verse may lead to different and required results. This is the problem with interpretation of terms such as *Jihad* as it had been subjected to interpretations on the basis of the objectives of the interpreter. In a similar vain, it would be very much possible to assemble passages from the Holy Bible which describe genocide, rape, execution of non-virgin unmarried women, murder of homosexuals, torture of prisoners, the rape of female prisoners of war, murder of a family because of the act of the father, regulation and condoning of human slavery, many other acts, cultural traditions and laws which are profoundly immoral by today's religious and secular standards as perfectly justified. If one reads in the Holy Bible a collection of selective passages without considering their contextual meaning, it would certainly compel one to conclude that these are passages from an evil document which advocates the promotion of violence and justifies immoral behavior.

On the other hand, one may obtain passages from the Holy Bible relating to good human behavior, love of human beings, compassion and mercy to others, advocating struggle for upholding truth and justice, offering support to orphans, the weak and infirm,

widows and the downtrodden. Similarly, one will find instructions to live a healthy and moral life, to respect the rights of others and to abstain from violence against others even animals.

An interpretation of a religious scripture with a specific purpose in mind would result in a specific purpose oriented interpretation. It will indeed be opposed to the general tenor of the scripture in question. This principle applies to both Muslim and Christian scriptures. Therefore, if an over zealous group of Muslims interpret the Quran and saying of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) with a specific objective in mind, then that particular group and its interpretation might not be taken as representing the whole community. A similar principle is applicable to some Christian hard-line groups who consider all non-white people inferior.<sup>34</sup>

#### **2.3.4. The Concept of *Shahadat* (*Istishad*) in Islam**

In any debate on the subject of *Jihad*, the concept of *Shahadat* appears to be inextricably linked with the discussion. *Shahadat* is closely linked to the concept of martyrdom in other religious cultures. Islam treats *Jihad* as a glorious act which is performed for seeking the pleasure of Allah and without any personal motives in the worldly context. The ultimate desire of a Muslim is to perform *Jihad* in his life for the glory of Islam and to die as a *Shaheed*. In most forms of actions, whether offensive or defensive, the conceptual understanding of *Shahadat* and its motivational dimensions plays a pivotal role in defining the parameters of a Muslim's actions. According to Islamic belief, a *Shaheed* is destined for heaven and will be placed in the most exalted

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<sup>34</sup> [www.religioustolerance.org](http://www.religioustolerance.org) › World religions › Islam.

place in the life hereafter. This conceptual understanding of *Jihad* and *Shahadat* is extremely important in comprehending the inter relationship of suicide bombing conducted by Muslims religious groups.

Farhad Khosrokhavar, an Iranian born anthropologist has dwelt at length over the relationship between Islam, *Jihad* and suicide bombing. His views are non-partisan in nature. He believes that *Jihad* is misinterpreted and used as a weapon to follow a certain agenda set outside the religious realm. His formulations about *Shahadat* introduces two types of martyrdom:<sup>35</sup>

- i. Defensive martyrdom: In this situation, the martyr takes the legitimated defense of his faith through offering his self-sacrifice. He does not resort to any violent means for achieving his goals but refuses to surrender before the evil and sinful deeds, and thus gives his life for the cause.
- ii. Offensive martyrdom: The martyr is inspired by a desire to destroy the enemy by resorting to violence that is sanctioned by religion. Nationalism has an indirect but strong connection with this concept.

Khosrokhavar has discussed the concept of martyrdom in various religions and territories as well as by Muslim sects including *Sunnis* and *Shias*. He states that martyrdom is connected to the belief in rewards in the world hereafter. Religions like Buddhism and Christianity eulogize defensive martyrdom. On the other hand, Islam advocates defensive as well as offensive martyrdom in the defense of faith,

“Whilst we have to note that contemporary Islamic Martyrdom can take different forms, we must also avoid two pitfalls. If we regard each case as it

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<sup>35</sup> Khosrokhavar, Farhad, *Suicide Bombers-Allah's New Martyrs*, Pluto press, London, 2005.

were unique or, on the contrary identify radicalization as mere fundamentalism or Islamism, there is a danger that analysis will be flawed.”<sup>36</sup> He defines martyrdom in Islam within two parameters. The first form relates to individuals wishing to establish their national identity or existence which he refers to as a sovereign collectivity. This group of Muslims resort to violence against their enemies and if their attempt to destroy their enemy is not possible due to political or military reasons, then they willingly opt for an honorable death as an alternative. This is the defensive form of martyrdom. On the other hand, there are those Muslims, who, while pursuing their agenda of spreading Islam and establishing an Islamic state or polity, believe that the use of violence is legitimate and sanctioned by *Sharia* against the enemies of Islam. This is the offensive form of martyrdom in which destruction of their enemy is deemed just and, if need be, even death through self-sacrifice is to be embraced willingly. He specifies several factors which contribute in the development of attitudes among Muslims which justify a resort to war. These include repressive and dictatorial regimes and feelings of alienation under foreign occupation, Khosrokhavar also points out distinctions between the concept of *Shahdat* and martyrdom,

“In the Quran, the word means bearing witness and not dying a holy death. Whenever dying for Allah is mentioned, the expression such as ‘slain in the cause of God’(4:74) or ‘fled their homes in the cause of God or afterwards died or were slain’(22:58). The cause of God (*Fi Sabil Lillah*) is the major expression used to designate what will subsequently become known as martyrdom (*Shahadat*).”<sup>37</sup>

His contention is that the term *Shahadat* acquired the meaning of holy death following the Muslim conquest of Palestine in the seventh century AD. Later, Muslim groups engaged in warfare for a variety of reasons sought justification for their struggle

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid. p. 73.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, p. 131.



by referring to it as *Jihad* and *Shahadat*. Their intention was to seek religious legitimacy in support of their objectives. "In Islam holy war is closely associated with martyrdom even though the latter expression is not used as such in the Quran and is a later addition to Islam's body of doctrine."<sup>38</sup> Khosrokhavar's thesis offers a reasonably balanced view of the numerous interpretations of the *Jihad* and *Shahadat*.

It is to be noted that verse 39 in *Sura-e-Al Hajj* in the Holy Quran instructs the Muslims that permission to resort to armed struggle is granted only in situations where wrongs have been committed against Muslims. *Jihad* in this situation becomes imperative and obligatory in the defense of Islam or a Muslim territory in a defensive manner.

#### **2.4. Theoretical Perspectives of Robert Pape and Samuel Huntington**

Contemporary intellectual discourse on terrorism and suicide bombing relating to Muslims and the Islamic world revolves around two major theoretical perspectives expounded by Robert Pape and Samuel Huntington. Their concepts offer a paradigm within which an analysis of this phenomenon can be carried out. Robert Anthony Pape gained worldwide fame after producing his rich work entitled 'Dying to Win' in 2005 under the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism. His findings contradict many widely held views about suicide terrorism. Based on an analysis of every known case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003 (315 attacks as part of 18 campaigns), he concludes that,

"there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism or any one of the world's religions. Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. 213.



goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland<sup>39</sup>

Pape asserts that suicide terrorism is an entirely secular nationalist response to the presence of a foreign-imposed military occupation. He argues that religion or for that matter Islamic fundamentalism may only be a motivating factor in explaining suicide terrorism but not the main cause.

On the other hand, Samuel Huntington while propounding his infamous theory the Clash of Civilizations a decade earlier, highlights the influence of Islamic extremism and anti-Western philosophical thought on violence between the Islamic and the Western worlds. He asserts that since Islamic and Western civilizations are incompatible, the result is terrorism from the weaker side. Here he cites the US invasion of Iraq as an example. He strongly believes that the role of secular forces is insignificant.

Robert Pape argues that nationalists, as weaker actors, are behind suicide campaigns trying to convince occupying forces to pull out of their homeland. Hizbollah's successful employment of suicide bombing in expelling occupying American, French, and Israeli forces from Lebanon is a great motivating factor for others. It proves the efficacy of suicide bombing and motivates others to adopt it against their stronger enemy. Suicide terror campaigns are meant to compel governments and their troops to succumb to the agenda of those who are employing this method. His argument further explains that the electorate can vote and bring a democratic government to agree that it must end foreign occupation. Pape argues that democratic governments are bound to respect their electorate and cannot sustain public pressure and violent acts such as suicide attacks.

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<sup>39</sup> Pape, Robert, *Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House, N.Y, 2005, p.4.

They succumb to such pressures while an authoritarian government does not. This is an important dimension of Pape's work. Democracies are more susceptible to the impact of suicide terrorism since it is a method of coercing them to change their policies. In this context, an even more interesting observation is that most of the Muslim states with undemocratic and oppressive regimes are more vulnerable to suicide terrorism as opposed to free democratic societies.<sup>40</sup> It might not be true for other Muslim countries but this argument does have some basis in the context of Pakistan.

Pape believes that suicide attacks can be a very effective tool of asymmetrical warfare. He further adds that a majority of suicide terrorist campaigns have been driven by secular groups, not religious fundamentalist organizations and that religion cannot be termed as the greatest motivation factor for suicide bombing since the known perpetrators of such bombings are secular groups and individuals and not religiously motivated ideologues. He presents the example of Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka with Marxist Leninist ideology.

This finding goes against much of the post-September 11th media image of suicide terrorists as Islamic extremists. He, however, agrees that religious differences can make insurgencies more likely to resort to suicide terrorism.

Pape contends that suicide terror organizations create videos, posters and other public images to celebrate fallen suicide bombers as "martyrs" who sacrificed their lives for their people. Often these images of martyrdom employ religious symbolism, even if

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<sup>40</sup> Wade, Sara Jackson and Dan Reiter, *Does Democracy Matter: Regime Type and Suicide Terrorism*, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 2, April 2007.

the resistance organization is secular. This allows the organization to claim that its fallen did not die in vain and enables its leaders to continue to recruit new members,

“My theory argues that national resistance to foreign occupation, a democratic political system in the occupying power, and a religious differences between the occupied and occupying societies are the main casual factors leading to the rise of suicide terrorist campaign, thus modern suicide terrorism is best understood as strategy used by groups seeking to compel an occupying democratic state to withdraw military forces from territory that they consider their national homeland. It also explains why a predominate religion of the two societies, not the religion of the occupied nation, Muslim or otherwise, is the main cause due to which some foreign occupations by a democratic state leads to suicide terrorism and others do not”<sup>41</sup>

Pape draws his conclusions on the basis of data collected from all over the world since 1980. His findings also take into account *Al-Qaeda's* war strategy. He maintains that the case of Muslims involved in suicide terrorism is important due to the fact that “Islam reduces the likelihood of suicide.”<sup>42</sup> Although as opposed to Christians and Jews, suicide rate is lowest among Muslims, however, despite the strict prohibition of suicide in Islam, most of the major suicide attacks have been carried out by Muslims. It is because of the fact that Muslim militants involved in militancy use their religion for drawing strength and commitment for their objectives and religion offers them a purpose and objectivity in this regard,

“Suicide terrorism is demand driven, not a supply limited phenomenon. Suicide terrorists are overwhelmingly walk-in volunteers, not long time members of terrorist groups. They do exhibit a number of individual motivations.”<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 126.

<sup>42</sup> Pape, p. 181.

<sup>43</sup> Pape, p. 280.

He argues that if terrorist campaigns are Islamic and without a genuine objective, then suicide terrorism should have continued even after the evacuation of foreign forces in Lebanon since Hezbollah was still there and had not compromised on its ideology (Islam). Pape also argues that suicide attacks increased in Afghanistan when the US forces moved out of capital Kabul to occupy Southern and Eastern of Afghanistan. His argument was that suicide attacks followed the US forces.

Mia Bloom while partly agreeing with Pape argues that although religion is a factor, it is, however, not the sole factor in case of suicide bombings since there are many groups which are secular for instance the LTTE and PKK. She states, “while it is a mistake to assume that only religious groups use suicide terror, it is equally faulty to view suicide terror as devoid of any religious content.”<sup>44</sup>

Another important point discussed by Mia Bloom is that suicide attacks are adopted as a means when conventional and routine methods of warfare fail to achieve results. Thus according to her, suicide attacks are a matter of last resort and in a way, a second generation tactic.

It must be noted that Pape’s main thrust is on Iraq and *Al-Qaeda*, and there is an insignificant mention of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is due to the fact that when he was developing his data bank in early 2000, Iraq was the center of focus for Western powers.

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<sup>44</sup> Bloom, Mia., *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*, Columbia University Press, NY, 2005.

Since Pakistan has turned into a major battle field between Islamic militants and the state recently, Pape's work can help little in understanding the undercurrents of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. However, his theoretical framework and general analysis is greatly helpful on conceptual aspects of such acts in Muslim and other societies.

In Pakistan, multifold factors including cultural, ethnic, sectarian and tribal contribute significantly to the situation since the society is sharply divided into multiple overlapping groups which at one point in time show great group solidarity and at the same time are at war with each other. For example, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and tribal region, within the strong tribal affinity, there is an overlapping sectarian affinity present within the tribes which pulls a section of a tribe towards outside groups.<sup>45</sup> This is an intriguing situation. Such a situation is not found in Iraq where the sectarian divide is consistent with ethnic divide. Sectarian aspects cannot be undermined in the analysis of the ethnic factor particularly because of the fact that most suicide attacks are planned by the extremist *Sunni* groups and there is no exception to it in Pakistan. This situation is incomparable with rest of the Muslim world.

According to Gunaratna,

“to target a common enemy, *Al-Qaeda* has gone beyond the ideological divide, which is unprecedented. In fact, the world's two most dangerous groups are *Hezbollah* and *Al-Qaeda*, a *Shia* group and a *Sunni* group that now work together.”<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> In the Kurram and Orakzai regions of tribal areas (FATA), tribes have divisions on sectarian basis. There are *Shias* and *Sunnis* who often belong to the same tribe but fight with each other on religious-sectarian basis. Similarly in Khyber agency, people from same tribes are fighting with groups within their tribes due to sectarian differences between *Brelvis* and *Deobandis*.

<sup>46</sup> Gunaratna, Rohan., *The Playboy Magazine*, August 12, 2003.

While Pape's statistical data makes the case that suicide bombers are motivated by strategic concerns, however, it fails to respond to the question that why do individuals agree to be recruited? This question invites an explanation in terms of motive. There must be a single clear answer to the issue of motivation.

Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations theory<sup>47</sup> is the exact opposite of Pape's arguments, which completely bails out Islamic fundamentalism in this respect. In this context, Kelley states that,

“Although Samuel Huntington's controversial piece *The Clash of Civilizations* was published fifteen years ago, many Americans praised it in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks and cited it in the buildup to the invasion of Iraq. While Huntington has not mentioned suicide terrorism in his paper, many scholars view the Global War on Terror as a fulfillment of his prediction that future international conflicts will be fought between liberal democracies and Islamic extremists.”<sup>48</sup>

Huntington's theory has also influenced the thinking of several architects of the Iraq War in the US, including President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who label suicide bombers as “Islamofascists” and enemies of Western civilization. Addressing Congress on September 20th, 2001, President Bush said,

“They hate our freedoms, our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.”<sup>49</sup>

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Gunaratna, Rohan & Iqbal, Khurram., *Pakistan-Terrorism Ground Zero*, Reaktion Books, London, 2011.

<sup>47</sup>Huntington, Samuel, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No. 3, Summer 1993. Available Online <http://moodle.eclac.cl/File.php/1/Documents/Grupo2/Huntington.Pdf>.

<sup>48</sup> Kelley, M. Brian., *Martyrs In Mesopotamia: The Logic Of Terrorism in Iraq*, University of Pennsylvania, 2008, p. 19.

<sup>49</sup> Bush, W. George., *Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, September 20, 2001. [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html).



Huntington's main argument in his clash of civilizations theory is that following World War One, disputes within the international system evolved from conflicts between states to conflicts between ideologies, such as liberalism, fascism and communism. However, after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the end of Cold War, a new world emerged which was marred by conflicts between civilizations. With the onset of globalization, traditional nation states will gradually become weaker. Their people will begin to identify themselves with their respective civilizations rather than these states. Huntington argues that civilizations offer the highest form of identity to its members since they are grounded in a long historical development and have acquired solid foundations over time. In contrast with states having nationality or ideological identity with fluid and temporary basis, civilizations portray strong identity and foundations. A person may acquire different nationalities or citizenships of many states but his civilizational identity remains the same. He will retain his identity as a member of either the Western, Islamic, African or Chinese civilization.

Huntington also propounds the idea of kin-country syndrome and states that in the event of a clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations, Muslims will identify themselves with Islamic civilization irrespective of their national, ethnic, sectarian or other regional identities.<sup>50</sup> Huntington defines these smaller identities within the framework of a greater identity of civilizations as sub-civilization divides. He mentions

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<sup>50</sup> The notion that Muslims are part of one *Ummah*, and therefore, all Muslims are one nation was first of all presented by a medieval Muslim philosopher Ibn-e-Khaldun. He stated that group identity is based on a common set of values and objectives. He called the resulting bond as *Assabia* and declared that it is more stronger and durable than ethnic identity and bonding. Ibn-e-Khaldun, *Muqaddama*, (1332-1406 AD) : [www.muslimphilosophy.com/ik/klf.htm](http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ik/klf.htm).



that the sub-civilizational divides among Muslims include the *Shia-Sunni*, Arab-Persian and Turk-Kurd divides. In the event of a clash with an alien civilization, Muslims will rally around Muslims. He believes that as compared to the nation states, wars between civilizations will be more violent. Huntington then states, "Islam has bloody borders."<sup>51</sup>

Huntington developed his thesis on the foundations provided by other scholars. Theories of Bernard Lewis in "The Roots of Muslim Rage"<sup>52</sup> in 1990, Francis Fukuyama<sup>53</sup> in "The End of History" and "The Last Man in 1992" are more relevant in this respect.

Lewis propounded that the conflict between Islamic states and the West is no less than a clash of civilizations. Huntington, writing a decade before the September 11th attacks, predicted that the conflict between Islam and the West will continue for the foreseeable future and will become increasingly hostile as the time passes.<sup>54</sup> Huntington states that Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism has emerged as a reaction to the implementation of democracy, Westernized reform in the Middle East and increased population growth. He further argues that Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state do not have any significance and relevance to Islamic thought. These concepts are also alien to Confucian, Japanese, Hinduism, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas generate a reaction against these attempts which are viewed as human rights imperialism. This in

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<sup>51</sup> Huntington, p. 153.

<sup>52</sup> Lewis, Bernard., *The Roots of Muslim Rage*. The Atlantic Monthly Vol. 17, No. 4, Sept. 1990. [Available Online] <http://www.cis.org.au/policy/summer01-02/polsumm01-3.Pdf>.

<sup>53</sup> Fukuyama, Francis., *The End of History and The Last Man*, Free Press, N.Y, 1992, p. 17.

<sup>54</sup> Huntington, p. 159.

turn results in greater affirmation of local and indigenous values, for instance, support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures.

Kelley states that Huntington's clash of civilizations theory argues for further expansion by Judeo-Christian Western civilization into the borders of the Islamic world and will inevitably lead to violent conflict.<sup>55</sup>

## 2.5. Islamic Theories on Suicide Attacks

Islam strictly prohibits suicide. It is considered to be an act for which there is no redemption. A person committing suicide does not die as a Muslim will and he will remain in hell in the life hereafter.

The Holy Quran prohibits suicide and declares it equivalent to disbelief in the existence of God. It is also prohibited in various statements of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). A person committing suicide is said to have died as a non-believer and is not deemed entitled to funeral as a Muslim.

In so far as suicide attacks are concerned, these are considered un-Islamic by a majority of Muslim scholars belonging to almost all the major schools of Islamic *fiqh*.<sup>56</sup> It is considered as an un-Islamic act by general Muslim populace as well. In the near past, this view was also prevalent among various *Jihadi* groups as well. For instance, Afghan *Mujahideen* fighting against the Soviet army in Afghanistan (1979-1989) and *Mujahideen* fighting in support of Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina (1991-1995), were under strict instructions never to commit suicide in situations where defeat or

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<sup>55</sup> Kelley, p. 79.

<sup>56</sup> *Fiqh* is defined as Islamic jurisprudence. There are four leading schools among *Sunni* Muslims, including, *Hanafi*, *Maliki*, *Shafai* and *Humbali*. *Shia* Muslims have their own *fiqh* schools. *Fiqh* expounded by these schools differ only in minor details.

capture at the hands of the enemy were absolutely certain. It was for this reason that even the most daring of *Mujahideen* in the most dangerous battles would refrain from acts which tantamount to suicide by exposing themselves to the enemy unnecessarily. During both the conflicts, commanders used to instruct the *Mujahideen* to avoid unnecessary risks during the battle. A common statement during such situations was that Islam is in need of fighters and not martyrs. However, there were situations during these campaigns when attacks were to be carried out in extremely dangerous situations and where chances of survival were almost negligible. Such attacks and operations were called *Fidayee* attacks. The condition, however, was that suicide will not be committed and the only permissible death was at the hands of the enemy soldiers.

Later developments in 1990s and with the emergence of *Al-Qaeda* style warfare, suicide attacks became the norm. The introduction of suicide attacks generated a heated debate among Muslim scholars and intellectuals. A general opinion within Muslim circles is that suicide attacks are not permissible under any circumstances and especially when they are designed to cause destruction of life and property of non-combatants in an indiscriminate manner. This still remains a majority view point among Muslims.

There are, however, divergent views as well which support carrying out of suicide attacks as a tactic of warfare. Adherents of such views do not agree that the person carrying out a suicide attack is committing suicide. They equate them with martyrdom operations. The intention of the bomber is not to commit suicide but to use his body as a carrier of explosives and converting it into a weapon.

An attempt has been made to present the views prohibiting suicide attacks and those of their supporters are presented below.

### **2.5.1. *Al-Qaeda* Inspired Ideology of Resistance**

*Jihadi* groups inspired by *Al-Qaeda's* ideology of armed resistance in various regions are now increasingly resorting to suicide attacks. This mode of attack has recently been introduced in African states like Nigeria and Mali where Muslim groups are engaged in militant activities. *Al-Qaeda* symbolizes the resistance of this specific group of extremist Muslims against Western domination. It has introduced a new pattern of resistance, the hall-mark of which is suicide bombing as a tactical methodology.

The underlying philosophy and inspiration for *Al-Qaeda's* ideology is not alien in the Islamic tradition though. *Al-Qaeda's* main ideologues were Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Dr. Fadl. Both were leaders of militant Islamic movements in Egypt. According to their ideology, a society and political system based on principles of *Sharia* is the ultimate objective of all Muslims, however, a society envisaged by *Sharia* cannot be realized in the presence of Western capitalist socio-economic and political philosophy. Syed Qutb, a leader of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt who was hanged in 1966 and Syed Maududi, founder of *Jamaat Islami* in the Indian sub-continent, had been the main proponents of similar ideas. Syed Qutb termed the present day society as based on principles of *Jahilliya*.<sup>57</sup> He advocated a movement for the complete elimination of all remnants of Western principles and systems. This, according to Syed Qutb, was a condition precedent for the establishment of a *Sharia* based system. Maududi presented similar ideas by

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<sup>57</sup> *Jahilliya* refers to the pre-Islamic period of ignorance of God's principles and period during which pagan customs were observed.

stating that if an Islamic society resolves consciously not to accept the *Sharia*, and decides to enact its own constitution and laws or borrows them from any other source in disregard of the *Sharia*, such a society breaks its contract with God and forfeits its right to be called Islamic.<sup>58</sup>

Later, this ideology manifested its extreme facets in the negation of all existing socio-economic and political systems in the Muslim states. Its followers rejected the notion of participative and electoral democracy by advocating that these systems have their genesis in Western philosophies. An attempt to fashion Muslim states according to democratic principles would amount to providing justification for maintaining the status quo in Muslim societies and this is the greatest impediment in the implementation of a social and political system based on the principles of *Sharia*. Such a society loses its identity as an Islamic society.

This ideology rejected any scope for compromise with any other system in conflict with *Sharia*. Any attempt to compromise would amount to providing a justification for a Western system to survive and this would amount to compromising on *Sharia*.<sup>59</sup> Thus, Islamic political parties like the Muslim Brotherhood and *Jamaat Islami* in Pakistan which recognized the existing political and democratic systems and advocated reforms through elections and constitutional means were declared as instruments lending credibility to anti-Islamic socio-political systems.

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<sup>58</sup> Maududi, Abu-Ala.' Syed., *Islamic Law and Its Introduction*, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1994.

<sup>59</sup> Robert Lacey refers to this behavior as the influence of Westoxification on Muslims. Lacey, Robert, *Inside the Kingdom*, Arrow Books, London, 2010, pp. 445-46.

### 2.5.2. Doctrines of *Takfeer* and *Khuruj*

The ideological underpinning of *Al-Qaeda's* brand of political thought is not alien to Muslim political and religious tradition. Concepts of *Takfeer* and *Khuruj* are not a novel phenomenon. Their genesis can be traced back to the early Caliphate period. Hard-line Muslim ideologues simply re-interpreted these thoughts in accordance with their need in their political struggle in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and applied them to their contemporary situations.

The concepts of *Takfeer* and *Khuruj* are relevant for understanding the *Al-Qaeda* theory of war. *Takfeer* means declaring a Muslim as non-Muslim on the basis of his negation of the supremacy of Allah and His message. It amounts to an act of refusal to submit to God's will and *Sharia*. It amounts to a declaration against another Muslim that he has been ousted from the religion of Islam. This also means that those who commit *Takfeer* lose their status as Muslims and become apostates. This principle further provides that those Muslim states which follow Western democratic or socialist systems are in fact committing *Takfeer*: All institutions of such a state and those segments of society which are supporting the rulers in such states are also committing *Takfeer*. Such a situation demands that the Believers (Muslims) must stand up in revolt against such rulers as it is incumbent upon them to defend their faith and ensure supremacy of *Sharia* by raising the flag of revolt against their deviant rulers. This revolt is called *Khuruj*. Once *Khuruj* is declared against *Takfeer*, then armed resistance to overthrow such deviant rulers becomes justified according to Islamic *Sharia*. There are numerous examples of such incidents of *Khuruj* in Islamic history, for instance, the *Khuruj* of Hadrat Imam



Hussain, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) against the Ummayyad ruler Yazid bin Muawiyah,<sup>60</sup>

Imam Ibn-e-Taymiyyah,<sup>61</sup> a renowned Muslim jurist, emerged as one of the greatest exponents of *Takfeer* and *Khuruj* principles during the period of Mongol onslaught. While attempting to harness Muslim resistance against Mongol invasion, he presented a hardline ideology and declared that every group of Muslims that transgresses Islamic Law must be combated, even though they profess to subscribe to Islam.<sup>62</sup> A modern day example of *Khuruj* was the November 20, 1979 revolt of Juhayman Al-Utaiba in Makkah, Saudi Arabia who laid siege to the Holy *Kaaba* in Makkah and demanded the removal of Saudi rulers on the basis that they are stooges of Western powers and have lost the right to rule.<sup>63</sup>

The Makkah revolt generated a debate in Islamic circles over a few of the questions that were raised by the rebels in their message, including issues such as the status of a Muslim by birth who has no belief in Islam, the status of a Muslim state with a non-Islamic constitution and a Muslim state which has effectively become an agent for the implementation of designs of non-Muslim powers. These questions raised a heated debate which resulted in the relevance of the principles of *Takfeer* and *Khuruj* in contemporary Muslim politics.

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<sup>60</sup> Hadrat Imam Hussain and his group was assassinated in October 680 AD at the site of Karbala, present day Iraq.

<sup>61</sup> 1263-1328 AD. A renowned Muslim scholar and theologian.

<sup>62</sup> Shehzad, S. Syed., *Inside Al Qaeda and Taliban. Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11*. Palgrave McMillan, USA, 2011, p. 148.

<sup>63</sup> Lacey, Robert, *Inside the Kingdom*, Arrow Books, London, 2010, pp. 24-36. Also see, Shahzad, Syed., *Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban*, p. 127.



Commission of *Takfeer* and the resulting insurrection *Khuruj* in response is the basic foundation of *Al-Qaeda's* war ideology.<sup>64</sup> Their view regards Muslim rulers as agents of Western powers and an obstacle in the implementation of *Sharia* based system. These rulers have, through their pro-Western policies, committed *Takfeer* and, therefore, have become apostates. They have, therefore, lost their right to rule Muslims and it has become imperative for all Muslims to raise the flag of *Khuruj* against such rulers in order to rid their states of apostates and hypocrites. There is no room for any compromise with the enemy in this ideology and war is to be fought till the final end. This is the kind of struggle being waged by *Al-Qaeda* and its constituent organizations all over the world. *Al-Qaeda* in fact revised and reintroduced the philosophy of *Takfeer* and *Khuruj* in contemporary Muslim political milieu and exploited it to the utmost in the justification of its struggle.<sup>65</sup>

### 2.5.3. Justifications for *Fidayee* attacks/Suicide attacks

Muslim scholars who advocate the use of suicide attacks refer to them as *Fidayee* attacks. These are also called Martyrdom operations.<sup>66</sup> Use of the term suicide is intentionally avoided since it carries a negative connotation. These scholars mostly belong to the *Sunni* sect of Muslims mostly ascribing to *Wahabi-Salafi* and *Hanafite* schools of thought. Some *Shia* scholars have also justified the use of *Fidayee/suicide*

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<sup>64</sup> *Al-Qaeda* has selectively appropriated scriptural text presented in support of its ideology. Jalal, Ayesha., *Partisans of Allah, Jihad in South Asia*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 2008, pp. 240-241.

<sup>65</sup> A modern exposition of *Khuruj* and revolt is *Qawaid al Takfeer* by Shaikh Abdul Mun`em Mustafa Halima Abu Basir aka Abu Baseer al Tartusi. He is a Syrian Islamist living in London. Also see Shahzad, Saleem, Syed., p.148.

<sup>66</sup> In the Arabic literature, suicide attacks are referred to as *Amaliyat-e-Istishhaadiya*. It literally means martyrdom operations.

attacks as an exception to the general proscription on suicide in Islamic *Sharia*. They explain these attacks as a tactical methodology to be employed in a struggle against an enemy which is superior in military strength. Thus, suicide attacks are referred to as *Fidayee* attacks in which the chances of survival are almost negligible. It is stated that the intention of the actor is not to commit suicide by deviating from Allah's orders but to use one's life and body as a weapon to destroy Allah's enemies.

This point is extremely important in understanding the rationale which is presented for justifying suicide attacks by some contemporary Muslim scholars. In order to understand the historical antecedents to this theological development, it is pertinent to take an overview of the developments which were responsible for the emergence of this extremist trend of thought.

Islamic radicalism in political context re-emerged with a new zeal in the last three decades of 20th century. 1979 proved to be the most important year in this respect. It witnessed several developments which were pivotal in the heightening of radical Islamic militancy including Iran's Islamic revolution, the siege of the Holy *Kaaba* and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Later in 1982, Islamic radicalization gained momentum in the aftermath of Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

These developments resulted in a series of theological discussions among Muslim intellectuals and religious scholars on the subject of resistance to foreign occupation and in the defense of Muslim lands. Debate over suicide missions or *Fidayee* missions in fact originated during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980's. During that war, Iranian public was motivated with Islamic revolutionary zeal and the government also left no stone unturned

in exploiting their religious fervor in support of its war with Iraq. Since Saddam's secular army had invaded Iranian territory and was openly supported by both the Eastern and Western block in its war with Iran, therefore, this provided an added justification to the Iranians to declare it as a campaign of the infidels against the Islamic republic in order to punish it for Islamic revolution and challenging the West. In addition to its regular army, the Iranians formed militias of *Fidayeen* whose members were infused with the vigor and emotional zeal required for waging a true *Jihad*. Foremost among those militias was the *Basij*.<sup>67</sup> It was composed of young zealots who were ready to sacrifice their lives without a question. They were the driving force behind the well known human wave campaigns which emerged as the most powerful tactical methodology of the Iranian offensive strategy against Iraq. Thousands of volunteers used to conduct daring frontal assaults on the Iraqi positions without fear of land mines and death. Undoubtedly thousands were killed in such attacks, comprising of human waves, but they would eventually capture the Iraqi positions and drive them away. This method can be rightly called the employment of a *fidayee* pattern of attacks, pioneered by the Iranians.

In 1983, a Lebanese *Shia* group called the Lebanese Islamic Jihad group<sup>68</sup> used this tactic against the Israeli army and the US embassy through a few suicide attacks.<sup>69</sup> It must be noted that religious justification for such attacks was provided by Iran's Supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini in his *Fatwas*.

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<sup>67</sup> The ideology of *Basij* took its inspiration from Imam Hussain (RA) martyrdom in Karbala in 7<sup>th</sup> Century AD.

<sup>68</sup> This organization later became *Hizbollah*.

<sup>69</sup> Donald Neff [www.wrmea.com/archives/november02/0211020.html](http://www.wrmea.com/archives/november02/0211020.html) (last visited 23, December 2010).

“These Martyrs saw nothing before them but God, and they defeated Israel and America for God. It was the Imam of the Nation (Khomeini) who showed them this path and instilled this spirit in them.”<sup>70</sup>

Later, this idea acquired strong foundations in the strategic planning of Middle Eastern groups engaged in war with Israel. *Hizbollah's* Supreme Commander Shaikh Fadlallah very eloquently supported suicide attacks against the enemy by stating that,

“Sometimes you may find some situations where you have to take risks. When reality requires a shock, delivered with violence, so you can call upon all those things buried within, and expand all the horizons around you, for example, in the self-martyrdom operations, which some called suicide operations.”<sup>71</sup>

Shaikh Muhammad Fadlallah defined these attacks as the “answer of the weak and oppressed to the powerful aggressors”.<sup>72</sup>

*Hizbollah's* successful employment of suicide attacks in Lebanon became a turning point both in militaristic and theological terms. On the militaristic side, this tactic was adopted by the Palestinian groups fighting against Israeli forces in the occupied territories whereas on the theological side, *Sunni* schools of Islamic theology borrowed religious justifications from *Shia* schools for suicide attacks.

Shaikh Yousaf al-Qaradawi emerged as the lead *Sunni* scholar who provided religious justification to suicide attacks.<sup>73</sup> He, while arguing in support of suicide attacks, justified them as supreme *Jihad* sanctioned by the *Sharia*,

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<sup>70</sup> Kramer, Martin., *Sacrifice and 'self-martyrdom' in Shiite Lebanon*, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3 (3) (1991), pp. 30–40. Also see, Saad, Ghorayeb. Amal., *Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion*, Pluto Press, London, 2002, p. 67.

<sup>71</sup> Saad, Ghorayeb. Amal., *Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion*, Pluto Press, London, 2002, p. 6.

<sup>72</sup> Harik, Palmer. Judith., *Hezbollah: The Changing Force of Terrorism*, I. B. Tauris, London and New York, 2004, pp. 65-70.

“These operations are the supreme form of *jihad* for the sake of Allah, and a type of terrorism that is allowed by *Sharia* ... the term “suicide operations” is an incorrect and misleading term, because these are heroic operations of martyrdom, and have nothing to do with suicide ... While someone who commits suicide has lost hope for himself and with the spirit of Allah, the *mujahid* is full of hope with regard to Allah’s spirit and mercy. He fights his enemy and the enemy of Allah with this new weapon, which destiny has put in the hands of the weak, so that they would fight against the evil of the strong and arrogant.”<sup>74</sup>

It must be noted that the religious rulings (*Fatwas*) of Ibn-e-Baz, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, have always been viewed with suspicion by scholars supporting radical points of views. He has been termed as the stooge and agent of the Saudi royal family. His *fatwa* against suicide bombings was also severely criticized by other pro-militant theologians including Sheikh Muhammad Isma‘il al-Jamal, Sheikh al-Bitawi and Dr. Abdulaziz al-Rantisi.<sup>75</sup>

Interestingly, however, Shaikh Tantawi, the grand Imam of Al-Azhar in Egypt, initially supported suicide attacks. He expressed the view that suicide attacks which cause

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<sup>73</sup> He is a leading figure of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He offered his *Fatwa* in refutation of the earlier *Fatwa* of Shaikh Abd al-Aziz inb Baz, Chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia. The Chief Mufti had condemned suicide attacks by asserting that these amount to self-murder which is strictly unlawful and prohibited in Islam. Such attacks are not part of the *jihad*, they are just suicides plain and simple. Although the Quran allows, indeed demands, that the enemy be killed, this has to happen in such a way that it does not run contrary to the religious laws. Shaul, Mishal. and Avraham, Sela., *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, p. 109.

<sup>74</sup> Qardawi, Yusuf., *Shari‘yia al-‘Amaliyat al-Istishhadiya fi Filastin al-Muhtalla*, [The legality of martyrdom operations in the Occupied Palestine], al-Islah, Vol. 375, August 1997, p. 44; available at: <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page5archives&Area5ia&ID5IA5301> (last visited 23, December 2010).

<sup>75</sup> Reuter, Christoph., *My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombings*, translated from German by Helena Ragg-Kirkby., Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J, 2004, also reproduced by Manas Publications, Delhi, 2005, p. 123.

fear in the hearts of the enemies of Allah are justified.<sup>76</sup> Later, however, he changed his views and held that there are no religious justifications for such attacks.<sup>77</sup>

#### 2.5.4. The Taliban Code - *Laay'ha*

It is pertinent here to mention that the operations of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan are subject to a manual called *Laay'ha*.<sup>78</sup> *Laay'ha* sanctions the use of suicide attacks for Taliban fighters.<sup>79</sup> It, however, mentions certain conditions for regulating the conduct of suicide attacks. For instance, the *Laay'ha* stipulates that suicide attackers must be highly trained for their missions; such attacks must only be conducted against high value targets; efforts must be made to avoid the killing of civilians and damage to property; and permission from higher provincial authorities must be obtained prior to such attacks.

Instructions in the *Laay'ha* clearly point to the fact that conducting warfare through the use of suicide attacks as a tactical methodology is authorized through the

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<sup>76</sup> Special Dispatch No. 363, 7 April 2002, available at <http://www.memri.org/> (last visited 22, December 2007).

<sup>77</sup> BBC July 11, 2003, [www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com). (Last visited December 2007).

<sup>78</sup> *Laay'ha* is a term of Arabic language, also used in Pashto. It means guidelines or rules. Taliban's *Laay'ha* is a set of guidelines laying down rulers for various matters relating to the administration and management of territories under their control. Most of these rules deal with collection of taxes like *Zakat* and *Ushar*, settlement of disputes of civil and criminal nature, dealing with POWs, however, there are also rules relating to the conduct of military operations against the enemy forces. Three editions of *Laay'ha* have been published so far, in 2006, containing thirty-nine sections, in 2009, containing sixty-seven sections, and in 2010, containing eighty-five sections. Its introductory paragraphs provide that all the military and administrative authorities, and the *mujahideen* must comply in their *jihadi* affairs with the provisions of the *Laay'ha* rules. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan *Laay'ha* [Rules] for the *Mujahideen*, 2010.

<sup>79</sup> Section 57 of *Laay'ha* terms suicide attacks as martyrdom attacks.



official sanctions of Taliban authorities. This also means that while conducting suicide attacks the rules of general Islamic law on the conduct of war are intentionally violated due to the exigencies of this particular style of warfare. Islamic rules prohibiting treachery, perfidy<sup>80</sup> and breaching the trust of the enemy combatants are clearly violated in the case of a suicide attack in which the attacker is either disguised as a civilian or wearing the army or police uniform of the enemy and committing an attack after infiltrating their jurisdictions.

Section 81 of *Laay'ha* further instructs Taliban combatants to disguise themselves by resembling the local population in their appearance, including dresses and hairstyle, so that they cannot be detected and can move freely in any direction they intend to for their operations. Once again such instructions are in clear violation of Islamic law since it prohibits acts of perfidy and treachery during the conduct of operations on the grounds that they violate rules governing distinction between belligerent combatants and combatants and civilians.

Another relevant provision in the *Laay'ha* is section 70 which prohibits the mutilation of dead bodies. However, by allowing suicide attacks, the *Laay'ha* in fact violates its own rules in addition to the Islamic law's prohibition in this respect. A suicide bomber while blowing himself up carries out mutilation of a living human beings rather than dead bodies, which is even more severe a crime in Islamic law.

The above discussion has highlighted the fact that there are historical precedents and theological foundations for both opponents and defenders of suicide bombings in

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<sup>80</sup> It must be noted that Islamic law specifically prohibits perfidy in warfare and there are strict instructions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) in this regard. This point has been elaborated in the text of this thesis in the subsequent paragraphs.



Islam, although a great bulk of Islamic legal reasoning is in support of the arguments of opponents of suicide bombing. Indeed the majority of Muslims consider suicide bombing as un-Islamic; however, it is also a fact that the majority of Muslims are considered infidels and apostates by the supporters of suicide bombings. Therefore, in a situation where extremists among Muslims can find easy justifications for their actions in the war campaigns being waged by the US and non-Muslim powers with the active collaborations of Muslim countries, there will always be abundant justification for them to resort to extreme measures such as suicide bombing. In such a situation, these groups do not bother taking into consideration the humane aspects of rules of warfare. They understand that suicide bombing is the only easily employed method against a superior military force, therefore its use is justified under the law of necessity.

In the course of academic debate on suicide bombing, a new and interesting trend has been pointed out by Bernard Freamon.<sup>81</sup> He argues that this phenomenon has introduced a new body of jurisprudence, *Fiqh*, into Islamic law. He refers to this as the new law of Military *Jihad* which advocates the use of suicide attacks have sanctioned the hitherto prohibited act of suicide as valid and supports the targeting of civilians.

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<sup>81</sup> Bernard, K. Freamon., “*Martyrdom, suicide, and the Islamic law of war: a short legal history*”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 27, 2003, p. 299.

Freamon's argument is only valid in relation to the views of scholars like Qaradawi and Malawi;<sup>82</sup> however, it seems that he has failed to take into account the views of those scholars who have argued against these views.

#### **2.5.5. Islamic Views Against Suicide Attacks**

Several Muslim scholars, in particular Pakistani scholars, have spoken out against the use of suicide attacks through their *Fatwas* and lectures. These scholars mostly include followers of the *Brelvi*<sup>83</sup> school of thought; however, a number of followers of the *Deobandi* school have also supported pronouncements against suicide terrorism. A few well known scholars have been assassinated by Taliban militants for their views. For instance, Maulana Hasan Jan and Mufti Sarfaraz Naemi were assassinated due to their vocal opposition of suicide attacks in 2007 and 2009 respectively.

##### **2.5.5.1. Sufism – A tradition of resistance through Peace and Tolerance**

Sufism is considered as an alternative to radicalism within the Islamic tradition. It is a relevant framework within which resistance to un-Islamic practices and vices may be organized albeit through unarmed and peaceful means. Sufis' message of love for humanity, tolerance and peace is the essence of Islam and it offers a convincing counter and alternative to the views of radicals.

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<sup>82</sup> Jonathan Halevi has identified sixteen scholars who support this extreme view. Halevi, Jonathan., '*Al Qaida's intellectual legacy: New radical Islamic thinking justifying the genocide of infidels*', Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, available at <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp508.htm> (last visited 22, December 2010).

<sup>83</sup> This is a school of thought founded by Imam Ahmad Raza Khan Brelvi in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in India. They are *Sunnis* but have an Indian specific traditional concept of Islam.

Sufism appeared in the beginning as a missionary Islamic movement which aimed at conversion of Non – Muslims.<sup>84</sup> However, on numerous occasions in Indian history, Sufism emerged as a counter narrative to the un-Islamic policies of Muslim rulers as well as the practices of traditional clerics. It became the voice of those segments who were disenchanted with the bureaucratic and stricter control of the political elite and their partners<sup>85</sup> within the religious clergy. This aspect of Sufism is conspicuous in the context of British colonization in the Indian subcontinent.<sup>86</sup> Sufis' personal charisma became the voice of the disenchanted and became an antithesis of the establishment.<sup>87</sup>

Charisma is relevant in the context of religious leaders of both the Sufi and radical orientation. Strong influential personalities having charisma which influences the actions of their followers is a hall mark of religious movements. It is the charismatic personalities which elevates a religious person to achieve the status of a Sufi for his followers who begin considering him as a representative of God and follow him blindly.<sup>88</sup> Sufism has become the voice of Muslim rebels, however, in a passive and peaceful manner. Sufi brand of Islam took roots as 'popular Islam' in the Indo subcontinent. It attracted the masses due to its simplistic approach and ritualistic methodology. Armed rebellion has never been a popular approach with Sufis and their followers. It must, however, be noted

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<sup>84</sup> Werbner, Pnina, *Pilgrims of Love: The Anthropology of a Global Sufi Cult*, London: C. Hurst & Co, 2003, p.24.

<sup>85</sup> The traditionalist and orthodox religious clerics.

<sup>86</sup> Schimmel, Annemarie., *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975, p.347.

<sup>87</sup> Weber, Max., *From Marx to Weber, Essays in Sociology*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948, p.245. Also see Werbner, Pnina., *Pilgrims of Love: The Anthropology of a Global Sufi Cult*, London: C. Hurst & Co, 2003, p. 23.

<sup>88</sup> Werbner, Pnina, p.282.

that Sufis have also played their role in militant struggles against the British<sup>89</sup> and even recently in the Khyber Agency of FATA against the supporter of Taliban.<sup>90</sup>

#### 2.5.5.2. *Brelvis & the Influence of Indianization on Muslim schools of thought*

Although Islam is a universal and global religion, and has unchanged universal textual sources, i.e the Quran and the *Ahadith*, however, it has undergone local variations especially in the context of Indian subcontinent. These variations have been the byproducts of indigenous social, cultural and political factors of the local region. Thus, Indian and South Asian variants of Islam are the result of a process of local hybridization.<sup>91</sup> Although the main features of Islamic faith remains the same but approaches and practices have witnessed changes according to regional conditions especially owing to politically charged situations. This process is the result of an interplay of local and regional factors which are in a conflicting or oppositional relationship with the new or imported ethos and values, i.e Islam. Islam in South Asia has emerged out of this oppositional relationship with the local Indian factors which can be observed in the context of its historical developments.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Followers of Sindhi saint Pir Pagara fought against British colonization in 19<sup>th</sup> century. Pir Pagara was sentenced to death by the British for his rebellion.

<sup>90</sup> Ansar-ul-Islam a tribal militia, headed by a Pir fought pitched battles with Taliban supported Lashkar-e-Islam group for several years in the FATA region of Khyber Agency from 2004 till 2013. However, this group was almost completely wiped out by the Taliban in 2013.

<sup>91</sup> Werbner, Pnina p.288.

<sup>92</sup> Barth, Frederick., '*The System of Social Stratification in Swat, North Pakistan*,' 1960, in E.R. Leach (ed.), *Aspects of cast in South India, Ceylon and North West Pakistan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Dumont, Louis., *Homo Hierarchicus*, London Paladin, 1972 ; Minault, Gail., '*Some Reflections on Islamic Revivalism v. Assimilation among Muslims in India*', *Contributions to Indian Sociology* (N.S.), 18(2), 1984, pp. 299-303; and Das, Veena., '*For a folk-theology and theological anthropology of Islam*' in *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, (N.S), 18 (2), 1984, pp. 293-299.

Thus, Muslims schools of thought have been significantly influenced by the peculiar socio-cultural and political circumstances in the Indian subcontinent. A prominent manifestation of this phenomenon is the confrontation between orthodox religious and sufi schools of thought within the Indian Muslim tradition. Orthodox and radical schools have always been opposed to the Sufi school of thought due to their strict insistence upon the principles of *Shariat* as opposed to the Sufis' practices of *Tariqat*. As a result, conflict developed between the adherents of both schools. Sufis also been blamed by the traditional clerics for adopting un-Islamic practices, for instance, grave worship and attribution of Godly qualities to saints.

Confrontation between the followers of traditionalist and sufi schools within Muslims remained intense throughout Muslim history, primarily as a result of numerous political factors which played a role in the aggravation of tensions. Throughout Islamic history, many reform movements were launched by the radicals and traditionalist in order to cleanse Islamic faith from the vices of so called un-Islamic practices of sufis and their followers.

A relevant feature of this phenomenon is the emergence of *Brelvi* school of thought in India. This school was founded by Imam Ahmad Raza Khan Brelvi in the 19<sup>th</sup> India. *Brelvi* school brought together the beliefs and practices of sufis and the traditionalist clerics and introduced a peculiar viewpoint which appealed to both the traditionalists and the followers of sufis. This brand of Islam became known as 'popular

Islam.’ It regarded sufis as friends of Allah and vicegerents of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and approved practices such as visitations of graves and celebrations of *Urs*<sup>93</sup>.

Such attempts were resisted by the orthodox schools, in particular, the school of *Deoband*. However, the *Brelvi* school of thought became popular due to its simplistic and populist appeal. *Brelvis* also managed to recruit and train their own clerics who managed mosques and provided an alternate version to that of the orthodox *Deobandi* clerics. This approach became successful since the practices of sufis found the source of pulpet and mosque in their support. *Brelvi* clerics eulogized the status of sufis and declared them a source of inspiration and guidance for Muslims. This was the reason for their popularity in general public.

There have been internal tensions between *Brelvi* clerics and some sufi cults for control over the followers.<sup>94</sup> It must also be noted that clerics have a tendency to adopt conflicting political positions on issues which bring them into conflict with the passive styles of Sufis.

This tension is quite visible even in the contemporary religious based conflicts in Pakistan.<sup>95</sup> The ongoing insurgency waged by the radical Taliban movement in Pakistan is a continuation of the historic conflict between radical Islamists and the followers of peaceful reformist schools. As explained earlier, radicals are inspired by the *Takfeeri*

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<sup>93</sup> *Urs* means a happy occasions when the soul of the saint leaves this world and reaches its permanent place of abode in the other world, with God. Although this is practically the occasion of the death of a saint but is celebrated as a event of celebration.

<sup>94</sup> Pnina Werbner, pp. 256-8.

<sup>95</sup> Militants groups have destroyed shrines of sufis and killed their followers during the ongoing conflict in Pakistan through suicide bombings. Several shrines have been targeted by suicide bombers, including, Sakhi Sarwar’s shrine in Dera Ghazi Khan, Data Gunj Bukhsh in Lahore and Pir Baba in Buner.



hardline ideologies and therefore staunchly opposed to the passive and liberal approach of Sufis. They regard sufi practices as heretic and un-Islamic. Visitation of graves and celebration of events like *Urs*<sup>96</sup> are regarded as *Shirk*<sup>97</sup>, the gravest form of *Kufr*.<sup>98</sup> It is for this reason that shrines of sufis have been desecrated and on a few occasions their dead bodies have been dug out and hung with trees<sup>99</sup> by the radicals in order to prove that they do not have any supernatural status.

Although sufi followers and *Brelvis* are known for their passive approaches and were regarded as opposed to militancy, however, they have also become vulnerable to militant tendencies due to the existing political milieu in Pakistan.<sup>100</sup>

*Brelvi* scholars have been in the forefront of criticizing suicide attacks and have issued several *fatwas* in this respect. For instance, Mufti Munib-ur-Rehman has issued a detailed *fatwa* in this respect. His *fatwa* deals with unjustified homicide through suicide attacks and criticizes suicide attacks in Pakistan.<sup>101</sup> Another Pakistani religious scholar, Muhammad Ismail, issued a *Fatwa* rejecting suicide attacks, especially those which target civilians. However, he states that such attacks may become justified in the course

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<sup>96</sup> Annual festivities for celebrating the birth or demise of a sufi saint by his followers.

<sup>97</sup> *Shirk* is the belief that Allah's characteristics etc are also shared by other entities, for instance, that sufis can also grant peoples wishes etc. In the Islamic belief, polytheism and its manifestations are regarded as *Shirk*.

<sup>98</sup> *Kufr* is the refusal to believe in the One-ness of Allah. Any belief and/or practice which amounts to this refusal will tantamount to *Kufr*.

<sup>99</sup> Such incidents took place during 2007 in Swat and 2009 in Peshawar districts.

<sup>100</sup> *Sunni Tehreek* is considered to be the militant wing of *Brelvis* in Pakistan and one of their follower is responsible for the murder of Salman Taseer, Governor of Punjab Province for supporting an accused of blasphemy.

<sup>101</sup> His *fatwa* titled *Qatl-e-Nahaq ka hokum* was issued on May 18, 2005. It was signed by fifty eight religious scholars, *Ulama*, from Pakistan and a few *Ulama* from abroad as well.



of an ongoing war.<sup>102</sup> Another *Fatwa* was issued in a convention of *Ulama* in Peshawar on April 17, 2007 where almost 2000 *Ulama* agreed to announce that suicide attacks are un-Islamic.<sup>103</sup>

### 2.5.5.3. Views of Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri

Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, a renowned Pakistani scholar, expressed his views against suicide bombing in his *Fatwa* on Terrorism.<sup>104</sup> He also belongs to the Brelvi school of thought. He states that,

"Terrorism is terrorism, violence is violence and it has no place in Islamic teaching and no justification can be provided for it, or any kind of excuses or ifs or buts.....No context, no discussion of foreign policy of a certain country, no occupation ... can create a pretext for the people to take up arms."<sup>105</sup>

Dr. Qadri further states that justifying murder in the name of Islam is against the spirit of Islam and perpetrators will be the dwellers of hell and not heaven. Qadri's *Fatwa* was hailed by Muslims opponents of suicide terrorism as well as in the non-Muslim circles.<sup>106</sup> It was indeed a daring step taken by a Muslim scholar.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Ismail, Muhammad., *Hawa Ki Nam*, Jami'a Islamia, Rawalpindi, 2005, p. 9.

<sup>103</sup> Daily *Mashriq*, Peshawar, April 18, 2007.

<sup>104</sup> *Fatwa* on Terrorism - a 512-page Islamic decree. It was published in the UK by Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications. Dr Qadri released the *fatwa* on 2 March 2010. This *fatwa* was a direct refutation of the ideology of *Al-Qaeda* and the Taliban. "It is one of the most extensive Islamic anti-terrorism rulings, an "absolute" condemnation of terrorism without "any excuses or pretexts" which goes further than ever and declares that terrorism is infidelity (*Kufri*) under Islamic law." (CNN, March 12, 2010). Qadri, Muhammad. Tahir. Dr., *Fatwa On Suicide Bombings and Terrorism*, Minhaj-ul-Quran International, London, 2010.

<sup>105</sup> Qadri, CNN March 21, 2010.

<sup>106</sup> Quilliam, a U.K based anti-extremist think tank, declared it a "highly significant step towards eradicating Islamist terrorism." BBC News 2011.

The *Fatwa* mentions the situation of the Muslim world in the light of international military issues surrounding the invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan and the ongoing problem of Palestine and resentment generated among Muslims against such policies. It explains that this situation has given rise to anger and despair which in turn has resulted in terrorism. However, a vast majority of Muslims do not approve of the methods of terrorists. There is only a small minority among Muslims who approve their tactics and support them. It is this group which is responsible for causing confusion among Muslims and giving a bad name to Islam and Muslims in the Western society.

The *Fatwa* condemns the attempts by terrorists to justify their actions on the basis of *Jihad* and states that this situation has generated confusion even among Muslim scholars and especially younger Muslims about the status of *Jihad* in Islam,

“These people (terrorists) justify their actions of human destruction and mass killing of innocent people in the name of *Jihad* and thus distort, twist and confuse the entire Islamic concept of *Jihad*. This situation is causing Muslims, the young in particular, to fall prey to doubts and reservations, muddling their minds in respect of *Jihad*, because those perpetrating these atrocities are from amongst the Muslims. The perpetrators practice Islamic rituals, perform acts of worship and put on outward forms set down in *Sharia*. This has put not only the common Muslims into a dilemma, but also a significant number of religious scholars and intellectuals, who are disconcerted and curious to know the exact and precise Islamic injunctions underpinning the workings, methods and measures these individuals and groups have adopted to cause their havoc.”<sup>108</sup>

The *fatwa* while discussing the role of the media states that the attitude of the media, especially in the West, is also adding fuel to the fire. Actions of a limited class of

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<sup>107</sup> Several prominent religious scholars have been killed in the past. Fear grips the scholars. "Many clerics were condemning, but they are scared, so they condemn in a very soft way, with ifs, and buts. To save themselves from the terrorists, they speak in a conditional and doublespeak way." Qadri while speaking in a press conference in London (BBC March 21, 2010).

<sup>108</sup> Qadri, p. 5.

terrorists are being portrayed as representative of Muslims as a whole. This negative imagery presents a hideous face of Islam to the Western public and sows misunderstandings about Muslims leading to hatred. Positive aspects of Muslim culture and the fact that a majority of Muslims are opposed to the acts of militants are downplayed by the media. This has also disturbed the younger generation of Muslims as well.

The *fatwa* argues that the misconception that it is Islamic religion which is promoting terrorism and hatred is dangerous for humanity and the international community. Conceptions which are bound to generate hatred in response will damage the human interaction at a global level and will result in tensions between Western and Muslim societies. This situation is leading Muslims and the world community to a catastrophe.

The *fatwa* holds that the teachings of the Holy Quran and statements of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) clearly prohibit terrorism and declares it unlawful and forbidden in Islam. The *fatwa* raises questions such as: “what power or conviction rouses him to kill people gathered in the mosque, and earn Paradise through carnage? Why does a terrorist decide to end his own life, the greatest blessing of Allah Almighty, with his own hands through suicide bombings? How does he come to believe that by killing innocent people through suicide bombing he would become a martyr and enter Paradise?”

In order to address these questions, the *Fatwa* further explains that these people who subscribe to such extremist and obscurantist ideas are *Khawarij*.<sup>109</sup> Such beliefs are

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<sup>109</sup> *Khawarij* was an extremist hardline religious group that appeared during the Caliphate period in Islamic history. They condemned Muslim Caliphs and companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) for not following Islam in its letter and spirit. Two Muslim caliphs Hadrat Usman and

those of the outcasts in Islam and these groups have always been regarded as outcasts throughout Islamic history.

While responding to the militant's claims that their war is in defense of Islam and Muslims and their campaign has successfully blocked the onslaught of Western powers in the Muslim world, the *Fatwa* states that this argument may appear justified; however, the methods employed by the terrorists to achieve their objectives cannot be justified on the basis of Islamic teachings,

“In the light of the Holy Quran and *Hadith*,<sup>110</sup> evil cannot become good under any circumstances, nor can oppression transform itself into virtuous deed due to goodness of intention.”

It must be noted that arguments in support of suicide attacks especially targeting civilians have, however, been refuted by other Muslim scholars who argue against the use of suicide attacks on the basis of rules governing the conduct of war both in Islamic law and rules of modern International Humanitarian Law. For instance, it is argued that those who justify suicide attacks on the basis of the principle of reciprocity have been in violation of the Quran's injunctions in this respect. Rules of reciprocal action against the enemy exclude damage to civilians who are afforded protection in all circumstances.<sup>111</sup>

The school of thought of modern Muslim intellectuals and scholars who oppose the Islamic credentials of suicide attacks base their arguments on the jurisprudence expounded by classical Muslim jurists. They base their arguments on the verses of the

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Hadrat Ali were assassinated by the *Khawarij* in 661 AD. This sect was later expelled from Madina. *Khawarij* in Arabic stands for those who were expelled.

<sup>110</sup> Traditions or statements made by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) on different subjects. *Hadith* is considered a source of Islamic *Sharia*.

<sup>111</sup> Munir, Muhammad. Dr., *Islamic Law and Suicide Attacks*. Journal of the Red Cross, 2011.

Holy Quran and traditions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) which deal with the issue of the conduct of warfare. According to the principles of classical Islamic Law of War governing the conduct of Muslim armies in a state of war, tactics such as suicide attacks are strictly prohibited. Islamic law has prescribed strict conditions for the conduct of war, the observance of which is obligatory upon Muslim soldiers. They include prohibition of treachery and perfidy in warfare in order to cheat the enemy soldiers and to damage their trust,<sup>112</sup> killing of women, children and all non-combatant civilians,<sup>113</sup> the killing or harming of enemy soldiers in reciprocal actions even if the enemy has taken such action against Muslim civilians or soldiers.<sup>114</sup>

#### 2.5.5.4. Views of Dr. Muhammad Munir

Dr. Muhammad Munir has emerged as an expert on the Islamic law of war. He argues that all actions which are prohibited in Islamic law remain prohibited and cannot be allowed on the grounds of reciprocity. Finally, Islamic law strictly prohibits wanton destruction of property and civilian objects.<sup>115</sup> Munir, while elaborating these principles, out-rightly rejects suicide attacks in all forms and situations and further expounds that the

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<sup>112</sup> The Prophet (PBUH) stated, "Fight with the name of God and in the path of God. Combat those who disbelieve in God. Fight yet do not cheat, do not break trust, do not mutilate, do not kill minors". Shaukani, Imam., Nail al-Awtar, *Ansar Al-Sunnah Al-Muhammadiyah*, Lahore, n.d., Vol. 7, p. 246.

<sup>113</sup> Quran 2:190, "Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you, and do not transgress. Verily Allah does not like transgressors." Taqi, M. Muft., *The Meaning of the Noble Quran*, Maktab Ma'ariful Quran, Karachi, 2006, Vol.1, p.60.

<sup>114</sup> The basis of this principle is the *Hadith* of the Prophet (PBUH) which states that, "If someone has an agreement with another community then there should be no unilateral alteration or change in it till its time is over. And if there is risk of a breach by the other side then give them notice of termination of the agreement on reciprocal basis." Tirmidhi, Imam., *Sunnan*, Dar Sahun (Gagri, Yayinlari), Istanbul, n.d., Vol 4, Hadith No. 1580, p. 143.

<sup>115</sup> The Holy Quran 2:60 and 2:205.

only martyrdom attacks in Islam are justified and permitted under the conditions that they may only take place during a war: they must be carried out by soldiers; soldiers must not pretend to be non-combatants; the attacks must not harm civilians or civilian property; and the device used must not mutilate bodies.<sup>116</sup>

## 2.6. Social and Psychological Theories of Terrorism

Terrorism, and to be more precise, suicide terrorism has a conspicuous psychological dimension since it involves such actions which in normal circumstances are never committed by normal human beings. It certainly requires a special mind set and a peculiar emotional state wherein a person commits such an act. Maxwell Taylor<sup>117</sup> attempted to understand the psychological underpinnings of a terrorist's state of mind. He states that most psychological studies have concluded that there is no consistent terrorist state of mind observed so far. However, Schmidt states that terrorism introduces, "a calculated exploitation of peoples' emotional reactions due to the causing of extra anxiety of becoming a victim of arbitrary violence."<sup>118</sup> There are two characteristics of terrorism:<sup>119</sup>

- i. A perception of the threatened and actual danger posed by terrorists which is disproportionate to the realistic threat posed by the capabilities of terrorists.

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<sup>116</sup> Munir. M. Dr., *Suicide attacks and Islamic Law*, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, Number 869, p. 88-89.

<sup>117</sup> Taylor, Maxwell., New York Times, January 9, 2002.

<sup>118</sup> Schmid, A.P., *Defining Terrorism: The Response Problem As A Definition Problem* in Schmid, A. P., and R.D. Crelinston (Eds) *Western Response To Terrorism*, Frank Case, London, 1993, p. 7-13.

<sup>119</sup> Horgan, John., *The Psychology Of Terrorism*, Routledge, London, 2005, page 3. Also see Schmid, A.P, and Ariel Merari., *Social, Organizational And Psychological Factors In Suicide Terrorism*, In 'Myths, Reality And Ways Forward', (Edt) Tore Bjørgo, Routledge. London, 2005.



- ii. Terrorism has the ability to affect a set of victims far greater than those suffering from the immediate results of a violent terrorist act.

The immediate aim is a perceived ideological or political change and the results of terrorists' violence including intimidation, injury, death, spreading of a general fear and aura of uncertainty among the target audience are the secondary aims. Therefore, one may safely assert that terrorism is a form of psychological warfare, outside of the immediate event. Terrorism can be classified into the following categories:<sup>120</sup>

- a) ***Demonstrative:*** Political in nature with the purpose of gaining publicity to recruit more activists and gain attention.
- b) ***Destructive:*** Aggressive, threatening to opponents without causing death in the first place.
- c) ***Suicide terrorism:*** Most aggressive. It aims at destruction of the target by offering the militant's own life. The perpetrator of the attack does not expect to survive the mission. Gaining the sympathy of the target audience, therefore, is not the objective.

Any terrorist activity requires three actors. It includes the terrorist, the immediate target and the ultimate target. The terrorist is the operator, the carrier of explosives or the one controlling the act. The immediate target is generally common people, vehicles, buildings or some installations which are the target of attack in order to create an impact through panic and intimidation. The ultimate target is where the message is intended to

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<sup>120</sup> Schmid, A.P., *Defining Terrorism: The Response Problem As A Definition Problem*" in Schmid, A.P., and R.D. Crellin (Eds) *Western Response To Terrorism*, Frank Case, London, 1993, pp. 7-13.



be sent finally to make a deal. This, in most cases, is a government and/or an organization. Many researchers have tried to explore the causes underlying the act which ends up in the death of innocent people and destruction of their property. The adverse public reaction to such atrocities is obvious and generates hatred towards the perpetrators of such activities. A question that is repeatedly asked is why terrorists invite such hatred while knowing that this will make the whole society hostile to their objectives?

Psychologists have offered different explanations to these questions. However, there is little agreement between them. Since terrorists are less political and more violent, they want to reach the ultimate as early as possible without bothering about the reaction of their audience. The manner in which people perceive the act is also important for them.

Neamatollah Nojumi<sup>121</sup> has attempted to describe the psychological characteristics of the personality of a potential terrorist and a suicide bomber. According to this analysis, there are six types of psychological personalities which may become suicide bombers including paranoids, paranoid schizophrenics, average mental defectives, schizophrenic types, passive-aggressive character types and sociopath personalities. Heskin<sup>122</sup> identifies two relevant factors which determine people's attitude towards terrorism. One is individual perception of the righteousness of a cause and the other is physical proximity to direct exposure to terrorism. He believes that only those who are away from the terrorist act usually do not feel the gravity of it and, therefore, do

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<sup>121</sup> Nojumi Neamatollah., *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region*, Pulgrave. New York, 2002, p. 260.

<sup>122</sup> Heskin, K., *The Psychology of Terrorism In Northern Ireland*, In Y. Alexander and A. O'day (Eds) *Terrorism In Ireland*, Croom Helm, Kent, 1984, pp. 85-90.

not condemn it as vehemently as those who are exposed to it. Taylor and Quayle<sup>123</sup> explain that our experience of the violence of terrorism, the way in which we view the rightness of the cause, the extent to which we are prepared to see the ends justify the means are critical qualities to how we approach the use of violence.<sup>124</sup> Many academics agree with Heskin that terrorism remains a deprecatory label, functioning primarily to express condemnation.<sup>125</sup>

### **2.6.1. Suicide Attack As A Tactical Methodology**

Terrorism has often been described as a synthesis of war and theater. This description aptly applies to suicide bombings. Suicide bombing is used because it is a simple and low-cost operation which requires no escape route or rescue mission; it increases the likelihood of mass casualties and extensive damage since the bomber can choose the exact time, location, and circumstances of the attack; and there is no fear that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information due to their almost certain death.

Suicide attacks have an immense impact on the public and the media, because it precipitates an overwhelming sense of helplessness.<sup>126</sup> In the context of suicide attacks, media publicity is one of the core objectives of its planners who understand that propaganda is the most effective weapon of today's war. For the terrorists, news coverage is like fresh blood and a life line for success of their mission. In an asymmetric war, they know fully well that an outright victory in a conventional sense is not possible against a

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<sup>123</sup> Taylor, M. and Quayle, E., *Terrorists Lives* Brassey's London, 1994.

<sup>124</sup> Horgan, John., *The Psychology Of Terrorism*, Routledge, London, 2005.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid, p. 47.

<sup>126</sup> Cindy, C. Combs., and Slann, Martin., *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, Facts on File, Inc., N.Y, 2002, p. 20.

superior force. It is the battle to create fear and distrust, through its adverse psychological manifestations, which makes them win their war and they are aware of the fact that this can be achieved more effectively through suicide attacks.

The military objective of suicide attacks is not to win the war in itself or to ensure the defeat of a superior power but is to draw the attention of the world to the seriousness of problem. The purpose of the perpetrators of suicide terrorism is achieved when the media flashes the gory images of killing and devastation all over the world. It is this publicity of their cause that is crucial for them rather than the magnitude of destruction of their enemy forces,

“When we who observe these acts take them seriously – are disgusted and repelled by them, and begin to distrust the peacefulness of the world around us – the purpose of this theatre is achieved.”<sup>127</sup>

Another important dimension of suicide terrorism is its worth and effectiveness in the case of an asymmetric warfare. It has emerged as the weapon of choice for the weaker side both in weaponry and numerical strength. It has been adopted as a tactical methodology by adversaries fighting a war with a strong enemy. In *Suicide Bombing As A Problem In Asymmetric Warfare*,<sup>128</sup> the authors offers some relevant discussion on the tactical importance of suicide bombing in a state of war where the adversaries' strength is not at par with each other. It has become a method of warfare of an inferior group against a more powerful and superior adversary. Thus, it is an unconventional tactic used against

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<sup>127</sup> Juergensmeyer, Mark., *Terror in the Name of God*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2003, p. 128.

<sup>128</sup> *Suicide Bombing As A Problem In Asymmetric Warfare, The Estimate Political and Security Intelligence Analysis of the Islamic World and its Neighbors*, 2010.

an enemy with superior military strength in conventional terms. It has certain advantages, for instance, the low cost of operations, impossible to interrogate the bomber since he is dead and extreme difficulty in tracing the master minds of the attack. It also creates havoc and psychological shock in the enemy circles.

### 2.6.2. Rationalizing the Suicide Attacks

This is a tricky and complex phenomenon still in the need of plausible explanation. Talal Asad<sup>129</sup> has attempted to understand the rationale behind the act of the bomber argues that it is difficult to point out the motives behind suicide attacks.

“Does he want to kill himself or to kill others and why? are very difficult questions. ‘I am going to kill these bastards: they killed my brother,’ or ‘God will reward me for dying in His cause.’ or simply ‘I cannot bear to live on under this cruel occupation?’ Or was it perhaps something utterly different? Were unconscious desires hidden by his conscious language? Was he ecstatic? Or did he have second thoughts, doubts, regrets, as he proceeded toward his objective? If so, in what way and to what extent were they overcome? How does one set about answering such questions if the perpetrator is no longer alive? I do not say that such questions are always unanswerable but that the matter is far more complicated than is commonly supposed.”<sup>130</sup>

Asad argues that a suicide bomber always proclaims his desire to conduct his attack against the enemies of Allah and expresses his will to become a Martyr. This proves that his inspiration comes from religion. However, his objective is generally political like in the case of Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. Even in the case of Pakistan, such proclamations declare that they are carrying out suicide mission against an apostate government which is acting as an agent of infidel US. Asad argues that death in this case

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<sup>129</sup> Asad, Talal., *On suicide Bombing*, The Weekly Lectures, Columbia University Press, NY, 2007.

<sup>130</sup> Asad Talal, p. 61.

is an effect not a motive. Intention occurs at a causal level but motives do not.<sup>131</sup> He also cites Ivan Strenski that explaining suicide operations in terms of personal psychological motivation is not enough, it needs a sociological and theological perspective as well.

Drawing on the writings of the Durkheimian school, Strenski<sup>132</sup> proposes that the phenomenon is better understood through religious concepts of sacrifice and rewards as opposed to theories seeking to explain suicide. Strenski argues that since sacrifice is the essence of religious subjectivity, violence is integral to it. Asad, however, counters this argument by stating this is not true. He states that according to Islamic belief the act of sacrifice does not render someone holy or sacred. He identifies the difference between Islamic concepts of rewards or gift and argues that there is a distinction between Islamic and Christian notions in this respect. The Arabic term for a gift is *Hadiyya*, but it has never been used in the Holy Quran to describe sacrifice. The Quran adopts the term *Qurban* for sacrifice and uses it almost three times at 3:183 by referring to burnt offerings according to Mosaic rites, then at 5:27 to refer to the biblical story of Cain and Abel, and then at 46.28 to refer to pre-Islamic beliefs about ritual mediation.<sup>133</sup>

Ariel Merari<sup>134</sup> states that suicide attacks are a symbol of terrorism. These attacks demonstrate their determination and devotion to their cause. Their commitment and determination is frightening. Such a resolve is intended to create fear and impression in the minds of others that such committed people who are willing to sacrifice their lives are

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<sup>131</sup> Asad Talal, p. 70.

<sup>132</sup> Strenski, Ivan., *Sacrifice, Gift and the Social Logic of Muslim Human Bombers*, in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 15, No. 3, 2003, p. 8.

<sup>133</sup> Asad, Talal., p. 44.

<sup>134</sup> Merari, Ariel., *Social, Organizational And Psychological Factors In Suicide Terrorism*. In 'Myths, Reality And Ways Forward', (Edt) Tore Bjørgo, Routledge, London, 2005.

invincible, they cannot be subjugated and they will eventually win. Merari believes that suicide terrorism is linked with religious fanaticism.

Many other writers have proposed numerous grounds and factors as being responsible for suicide terrorism including personality characteristics, poverty, ignorance, psychological disorders, emotional trauma and revenge for atrocities against person or community as a whole. Most of these explanations are dependent upon data of secondary nature and, therefore, not entirely authenticated.

“So far there has not been even a single case of a person who carried out a true terrorist suicide attack on his own whim. In all cases, it was an organization that decided to use this tactic, chose the target and the time, prepared the explosive charge, and arranged the logistics necessary for getting the human bomb to the target”<sup>135</sup>

Researchers have identified various motivational factors behind suicide terrorism, including, martyrdom, brainwashing, fanatic indoctrination, and religious fervor. It must be noted that religious fervor only explains the actions of suicide bombers to some extent. Terrorism should also be understood as a reaction to political grievances.

Borum Randy’s study titled "Understanding the Terrorist Mindset"<sup>136</sup> explains a four phase process for development of terrorist ideology. It begins with the identification of an undesirable act. This act is then projected to a certain level where it appears to be an unjust act or condition. Later, a group or a nation is identified which is blamed for the unjust conditions. The last phase in the process is the demonization of that group against which struggle can be declared as justified. Violence is then employed against that

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<sup>135</sup> Merari., p. 83.

<sup>136</sup> Borum, Randy., *Understanding the Terrorist Mindset*. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 72:7, 2003.



enemy. Stevens<sup>137</sup> maintains that terrorist activity can be understood as a backlash by those harmed, humiliated, or left behind by the new world order.

Giovanni Caracci<sup>138</sup> has produced a very valuable analysis of the psychology of terrorists. He argues that while psychological factors may play a role in terrorism, there are also cultural factors at work. Individual terrorists belong to groups that share their views and shape their beliefs and behaviors. An understanding of cultural meanings and group perspectives is crucial for studying what drives a terrorist's act? However, examining ideology, nationalism and religion is also crucial to understanding terrorist activity. Terrorists are not always psychologically deviant or operate outside the normal rules of behavior. They are rational people with a considerable understanding of their actions.

Silke<sup>139</sup> in his study argues that becoming a terrorist is a result of socialization. This happens as a reaction to the belief that the world is unjust and cruel. McCauley<sup>140</sup> suggests that terrorism emerges not out of pathology rather out of a normal psychology of emotional commitment to a cause and comrades. He argues that frustration, hopelessness, strong group relationships and an apocalyptic worldview are the major psychological factors which lead to terrorist activity.

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<sup>137</sup> Stevens, Michael. J., *The Unanticipated Consequences of Globalization: Contextualizing Terrorism*, "The Psychology of Terrorism: Theoretical Understandings and Perspectives, ed. Chris E. Stout, Praeger Publishers, Westport CT, 2002.

<sup>138</sup> Caracci, Giovanni., *Cultural and Contextual Aspects of Terrorism*, in *The Psychology of Terrorism: Theoretical Understandings and Perspectives*, ed. Chris E. Stout, Praeger Publishers, Westport CT, 2002, p. 63.

<sup>139</sup> Silke, Andrew., *The Role of Suicide in Terrorism*, *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 18, No. 1, 2006.

<sup>140</sup> McCauley, Clark., *Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism*, in *The Psychology of Terrorism: Theoretical Understandings and Perspectives*, ed. Chris E. Stout, Praeger Publishers, Westport CT, 2002.



David Lester's<sup>141</sup> work focuses on psychological profiling of suicide bombers. He maintains that suicide bombers may exhibit risk factors that predict suicidal behavior and that psychological profiling of such individuals is indeed possible. He believes that authoritarian personality traits are common in many suicide bombers.

Richard Pearleston believes that narcissist tendencies lead to the development of a terrorist personality. He believes that narcissism as a range of psychoanalytical orientations, impulses and behavioral patterns either wholly or overwhelmingly are subject to ego concerns as opposed to object concerns.<sup>142</sup>

### **2.6.3. Theories of Society and Culture**

A relevant theoretical paradigm which might help in the understanding of terrorism is within the context of sociological and anthropological theories. Although it might appear a digression, however, before further discussion on the theoretical formulations dealing with terrorism and suicide bombing in a socio-cultural perspective, it is pertinent to undertake an analysis of Emile Durkheim's views on suicide. Although his theory attempts to explain the characteristics and dynamics of a suicide committed by an individual in a non-terrorism context, however, his ideas are helpful in elucidating certain aspects of suicide which are relevant to the subject under discussion, i.e suicide terrorism.

#### **2.6.3.1. Emile Durkheim's theory on Suicide**

Emile Durkheim has analyzed suicide as a social phenomenon. His objective was not to explain or predict an individual's tendency to commit suicide but to explain a certain type

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<sup>141</sup> Lester, David., Bijou, Yang., and Mark, Lindsay., *Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?* Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27, 2004.

<sup>142</sup> Horgan, John., pp. 59-60. Also my article: Saif, Mohammad Ali., *Suicide Bombing, Terrorism versus Tactical Methodology*, in the Proceedings of International Conference on Terrorism and Extremism: Social Psychological Perspectives, organized by National Institute of Psychology, QAU Islamabad, 2008, p. 147.

of nonmaterial social facts and social currents which provides an enabling environment for the commission of suicide. Social currents are characteristics of society but may not have the permanence and stability that some parts of collective consciousness or collective representation have. They may be associated with characteristics such as enthusiasm, indignation, and pity.<sup>143</sup>

In the case of suicide, these social currents are expressed as suicide rates. These rates differ among societies and within different groups in a society. These rates exhibit regularities over time. Changes in these rates often occur at similar times in different societies. Thus, these rates can be regarded as social facts in the sense that they are not just personal, but are characteristics with relevance to society.

Religion is the most important factor in Durkheim's formulations. He believes that religion has a closer nexus with the act of suicide. In societies with Protestantism as dominant religion, the rate of suicide is higher as compared to societies observing Catholic religion. He further states that religion itself does not promote or demote suicides, however, it has an indirect, albeit strong, influence on suicide. Religious beliefs and a degree of commitment to those beliefs exert influence on suicidal tendencies. Most religions prohibit and proscribe suicide and consider it as an abhorrent act. However, a difference in the rate of suicide among followers of different religions is due to the social relationship and social environment within which the followers of religions live. It is thus the social organization of the followers of different religions which influence their attitude towards suicide.

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<sup>143</sup> Ritzer, George., *Sociological Theory*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed, McGraw-Hill, N.Y, 1992, p. 87.

Durkheim further argues that social relationship for instance with the family and its structure also influence the rate of suicide. He argues that suicide rates are lesser in closely integrated families and higher in weaker families.

The degree of integration and regulation within a social organization is important in Durkheim's theory. For him, integration is the "degree to which collective sentiments are shared" and regulation refers to "the degree of external constraint on people."<sup>144</sup> Catholicism offers a high degree of integration to its followers as opposed to Protestantism. The degree of integration in a community and within a family living in that community affect the rate of suicide among the members of that community. Individuals in larger families are less likely to commit suicide, whereas, those in smaller families, or single, are more likely to succumb to the temptation of suicide due to loneliness and depression.

Ritzer<sup>145</sup> argues that Durkheim has presented two arguments. Different collectivities have different collective consciousness or collective representation. As a result, different social currents are generated resulting in difference in suicide rates. These currents can be analyzed by observations of various groups and societies and their impact on suicide can be determined.

Durkheim categorized suicide into the following types:

**i. Egoistic Suicide.**

This type of suicide occurs in situations where the degree of social integration is low and a sense of meaninglessness exists among individuals. In traditional societies, with mechanical solidarity, this is not likely to be the cause of suicide. Those societies have a strong collective consciousness which offers a broad sense of meaning to

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<sup>144</sup> Ritzer, George., p. 90.

<sup>145</sup> Ritzer, George., p. 89.

people in their lives. Modern societies have weaker collective consciousness. People do not find meaning and purpose to their lives. An unrestrained pursuit of individual interests results in a strong feeling of dissatisfaction. Suicide emerges as the likely result of such a situation.

Individuals with strong integration into their families, religious communities or other groups do not confront this situation. They are therefore less likely to commit suicide. Factors leading to egoistic suicide can be social currents such as depression and disillusionment.

"Actors are never free of the force of the collectivity. However individualized a man may be, there is always something collective remaining, the very depression and melancholy resulting from this same exaggerated individualism."<sup>146</sup>

In his book 'Suicide' Durkheim states, "Thence are formed currents of depression and disillusionment emanating from no particular individual but expressing society's state of disillusionment---The bond attaching man to life relaxes because that attaching him to society is itself slack---The individual yields to the slightest shock of circumstance because the state of society has made him a ready prey to suicide." <sup>147</sup>

## ii Altruistic Suicide

This is the type of suicide which occurs in highly integrated societies. In such a society, the degree of integration results in a very strong collective consciousness which culminates in suicides of sensitive individuals.<sup>148</sup>

Integration in itself does not result in suicide but the resultant social currents create circumstances which may lead to suicide. In some societies like Japan, this high

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<sup>146</sup> Durkheim, Emile., *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, Free Press, N.Y, 1951, p. 214.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, pp. 214-215.

<sup>148</sup> Ritzer, p. 91.

degree of integration result in collective suicides as well. In such situations people are compelled to believe that it is their duty to commit suicide.<sup>149</sup> Examples in primitive society cited by Durkheim are suicides of those who are old and sick, suicides of women after the death of their husband, and suicides of followers after the death of a chief.

### iii Anomic Suicide

The term *Anomie* is derived from the Greek language meaning lawlessness. *Nomos* means usage, custom, or law and *nemein* means to distribute. Anomie thus is social instability resulting from breakdown of standards and values.<sup>150</sup>

This is a type of suicide related to too low a degree of regulation or external constraint on people. This type of anomic suicide occurs when the normal form of social relationship is disrupted, and

"the collectivity is temporarily incapable of exercising its authority over individuals."<sup>151</sup>

This may occur either during situations such as economic depression or over-rapid economic expansion. When the regulatory mechanism within a society is affected and it loses control, it may have negative consequences for people belonging to vulnerable segments of society. An individual may feel threatened, exposed and insecure. This is the influence of anomic social currents upon an individual. Others who are in a stronger position may engage in committing destructive acts detrimental to their society as a collectivity.

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid, p. 91.

<sup>150</sup> Webster's Dictionary: [www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/webster's\\_Dictionary](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/webster's_Dictionary).

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, p. 92.

According to Durkheim's view, these people become,

"slaves to their passions, and as a result, ---- commit a wide range of destructive acts, including killing themselves in greater numbers than they ordinarily would."<sup>152</sup>

There is another type of anomie which is called domestic anomie. This may occur as a result of the death of a close family member which disrupts the family relationship in a devastating manner. As a result, the living members feel depressed and commit suicide.

### **iii. Fatalistic Suicide**

This happens in conditions of strong regulations in a society. Strict regulations and discipline in a social structure may cause feelings of frustration and helplessness due to blocking of desires and ambitions. An Individual's desires are obstructed in a ruthless manner and he loses hope of ever achieving his goals in life. This results in depression and melancholy and may result in suicide.

Durkheim's analysis of suicide shows the manner in which the social as opposed to the psychological and biological can be used in order to analyze the actions of individuals. Suicide rates as expressions of social currents are social facts that affect societies and individuals within those societies. The study of psychology is still useful in attempting to determine individual motives and the manner in which their specific circumstances can drive them to voluntarily end their lives. However, an analysis of these circumstances should also be carried out within the context of the social currents to which that individual is subject.

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<sup>152</sup> Ibid, p. 92.



### 2.6.3.2. Other Theoretical Formulations

Society and culture have a profound bearing and impact on the development of individual and collective personality of its members. Ruth Benedict<sup>153</sup> argues that culture is like an individual and has a consistent pattern of thought and behavior. These patterns later takes on the emotional and intellectual characteristics of individuals in a society. This theory explains that culture influences the development of personality and personality influences culture as well.

Later the argument was further developed by Cora Du Bois who presented the Modal Personality theory. It explains that there is a link between psychology and society. This theory provides that a model personality structure occurs frequently within a society and the degree of popularity, fame, respect and influence associated with it in our societies. This theory provides a relevant explanation to some of the cultural and social characteristics of Pakistani society. For instance, in the Waziristan region of Pakistan, there is a marked influence of the personalities of Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* commanders on others, especially the junior militants and would-be suicide bombers. Stereotyped *Jihadi* personalities are looked up to by young militants and are viewed as heroes. They become role models for these youngsters.

Franz Boas has presented his ideas on the subject of cultural anthropology. He is regarded as the founder of Boasian school of American anthropologists. His theories of historical particularism and cultural relativism are pertinent to the discussion of terrorism in the context of society and culture. Historical Particularism suggests that all societies

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<sup>153</sup> Benedict, Ruth., *Patterns of Culture*, Paragon Publishers, New Delhi, 1989. Also see, Caffrey, Margaret. M., *Ruth Benedict, International Dictionary of Anthropologists*, Garland Publishing, New York and London. 1996, pp. 44-46. Also see Saif, Mohammad Ali., p. 148.



are products of historical developments. Their peculiar social and cultural characteristics have developed over a longer period of time through a historical evolutionary process. Therefore, to study the present day nature of a society and its culture we must take into consideration its historical background and experiences. In essence history is a mirror which explains the present status of a society and its culture.

Historical particularism accords importance to understanding the history of a society. It also emphasizes the importance of ethnographic studies and the collection of data in the process of cultural analysis. Boas believed that human society has distinct cultures and these are the outcomes of historical processes within those societies. The fact that different societies have different type of cultures is due to their distinct historical processes and experiences. He was of the view that each culture is unique and must be studied on its own basis. He believed that each culture has its own unique history and is to be studied in its specific historical perspective. Franz Boas was the key anthropologist in this school of thought. He viewed culture as a whole system comprising complete range of mental and physical reactions which characterize individuals with in a specific social group <sup>154</sup>

The Theory of cultural relativism<sup>155</sup> is also relevant for the subject under analysis. It approaches the study of a culture in relation to other cultures by comparison of data

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<sup>154</sup> Calhoun, Craig. J., ed., *Historical Particularism*, Dictionary of the Social Sciences, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 212.

<sup>155</sup> Darnell, Regna., *Invisible Genealogies: A History of Americanist Anthropology*, University of Nebraska Press, 2001, p. 34.

collected through field studies. It propounds that a person's culture must be studied and analyzed within the paradigm of that culture and not through the spectacles of other cultures. It places greater emphasis on understanding of cultures through field work and ethnographic studies. This data is then compared with other related cultures to study the similarities and distinctions between comparative cultures.

Another set of relevant theory include the Collective Identity and Crisis of Identity Theories. Crisis of identity has emerged as a serious issue in Muslim societies. It has a close relationship with religious extremism in some societies. Within the Western context, identity is defined as static, stable and based on universal traits including openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. These are called the Big Five personality traits. This concept of identity is, however, considered exclusive to Western societies and not entirely relevant to non-Western cultures. It is, therefore, pertinent to analyze the issue of identity as dynamic and undergoing constant changes through persons evolving in and with their cultural context. It is evident that individuals undergo a process of transformation throughout their lives wherein assimilation of identities takes place in those aspects of the world where the individuals perceive that their lives can be more productive. This phenomenon of change in identities may also lead to transforming certain individuals into terrorists as well. Terrorism thus emerges as a kind of personal morality for such persons.

This theory throws light on the challenge confronted by individuals in most Muslim societies. It can, therefore, be asserted that terrorists are not born but are created and engineered by social conditions. Palestinian militants are the best cases for study of

this theory. This theory also explains the influence of collective social environment for the emergence of individual characteristics. Since collective life forms a basis for individual life, therefore, terrorism can be understood by an understanding of the collective life and its impact on individuals in a community.<sup>156</sup>

In Pakistan, most young men become susceptible to such motivations due to socio-psychological reasons. They become involved in terrorism due to their personal identity syndrome. When the vacuum created by this frustration is filled by religion and an extremist group, the person's crisis of identity gets resolved and he attains a religious personality of a motivated terrorist.

A relevant explanation and rationale may be found in Maslow's theory.<sup>157</sup> It elucidates to a greater extent the inter-relationship between human needs and human behavior by providing rationales for varying nature of human motivation on the basis of needs. Maslow explains his model in the form of a hierarchical representation of human needs which work like a pyramid. Starting from its base are the biological and/or physiological requirements of human beings which includes basic necessities of life, for food, water, air, home, and related physical needs. The next set of 'needs' in this hierarchical ladder are his requirements for protecting his social order and security. It is followed by the need for affection, family and communal attachments for satisfying one's desire for love and care. This set of needs is followed by the requirement to accomplish a

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<sup>156</sup> Saif, Muhammad Ali, p. 147-148.

<sup>157</sup> In the 1940s, Abraham Maslow attempted to identify and rationalize human behavior in the context of human needs. This theory became known as the hierarchy of needs model. Janet, A. Simons., Donald, B. Irwin., and Beverly, A., *Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, The Search for Understanding*, Drinnen West Publishing Co, New York, 1987.

desired social status and reputation in society. At the top of the pyramid is the desire to fulfill the need for self actualization.

Maslow argues that if these needs are fulfilled, the individual feels confident and satisfied whereas a state of absence of fulfillment leads to frustration which may further lead to irrational or violent behavior.

Another explanation is provided by Taylor and Louis<sup>158</sup> which argues that a search or desire for some meaningful existence in life compels young people to join a group. If a group that offers them some meaningful activity happens to be a terrorist group, they will slowly acquire the collective identity of that group and become terrorists.

For some individuals the need for belonging is extremely important. It appears as a strong motivational factor in joining a group which acquires the status of a family for these individuals. Such a group offers friendships and acquaintances and protection from the outside hostile world.<sup>159</sup>

Social Learning theory suggests that behavior can be learnt by observing external happenings and also by observing the experiences of others. Behavior is also learnt through learning by observing the consequences. Oots and Wiegale further expound this argument by stating that,

“if aggression is a learned behavior, then terrorism, a specific type of aggressive behavior can also be learned.”<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Taylor, D. M., and Louis, W., *Terrorism and the Quest for Identity*. Moghaddam, F. M. and Marsella, An. J.ed. A., *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences, and Interventions*, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004, pp. 169-174.

<sup>159</sup> Marsella, A. J., *Terrorism, Reflections on Issues, Concepts and Directions*, in Moghaddam, F. M. and Marsella, A. J., ed., *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences, and Interventions*, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003, pp. 11-48.

<sup>160</sup> Oots, Kent., and Thomas, Wiegale., *Terrorist and Victim: Psychiatric and Physiological Approaches*, in *Terrorism: An International Journal* 8 (1), 1985, pp. 14-15.

Social surroundings where people are subjected to deprivation and are discriminated against becomes a breeding ground for extremism and eventually terrorism. The case of Palestinians living in miserable conditions in Gaza strip is a relevant example. Discrimination leads to feelings of alienation and frustrations.

“Discrimination can lead individuals to turn away from society and orient themselves on their own group, which provides the safety of a common identity. This is often coupled with a greater emphasis on religion.”<sup>161</sup>

The theory of *Tabula Rasa* propounded by John Locke in his book, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, in 1690, states that human beings resemble a blank slate. They are born without having an understanding of culture. However, later through their observations and experiences in life they develop an understanding of their culture. It is, therefore, the different cultural specificities and peculiarities that the individuals learn from their distinct cultural environments which cause difference in different human beings.<sup>162</sup> This theory provides that the personality of an individual is the product of his experiences in life and the way in which his understanding of his environment has evolved. This is defined as the process of enculturation which signifies the process by which culture is created and is transmitted from generation to generation. It is precisely the process of enculturation through which individuals become members of their societies. Another aspect of this theory is that every culture has a certain modal

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<sup>161</sup> Tillie, Jean and Slooman, Marieke., *Process of Radicalization' Why Some Amsterdam Muslims Become Radicals?* Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam, October 26, 2006, p. 26.

<sup>162</sup> Haviland, A. William., *Cultural Anthropology*, University of Vermont, Harcourt College Publishers, Fort Worth, 2002, p. 120

personality which is more typical than others. This modal personality reflects all the typical cultural traits of a particular culture and thus becomes a role model for others to emulate. A closely linked concept in anthropology<sup>163</sup> is that of group personality. It explains that an individual develops characteristics which are common within the group that he either lives in or interacts with. The argument is a refinement of the concept that it is the environment which determines one's personality.

Within the ambit of anthropology<sup>164</sup> a lot of research has been carried out on the question of a national character by pioneers such as Ruth Benedict (1887-1947) and Margaret Mead (1901-1978). It may be now stated that an extension of the arguments presented in support of ideas relating to role of personality development in the above paras, one may contend that national characteristics may develop in a national perspective. For instance, a typical British and a typical German reflect our general understanding or "view" of a nation.

In the context of our discussion, the *Pashtun* cultural traits are learnt by new members through observations and young members of *Pashtun* society emulate the Jihadist leaders as role models or modal personality. Being brought up in the religious and *Jihadi* environment in Waziristan is enough to transform a person into a militant with the same world view as that of the *Jihadis*.

Revenge for acts which are regarded as unjust and humiliating can become a powerful motivating factor for undertaking violent reprisals against the perpetrator. This may develop a strong desire for terrorism.

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<sup>163</sup> Wallace, A.F.C. *Culture and Personality*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Random House, New York, 1970.

<sup>164</sup> Barnouw, V., *Culture and Personality*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Dorsey Press, Homewood, IL, 1985.



“Vengeance can be obsessive or diffuse, but it is an obsessive drive that is a powerful motive for violence toward others especially people thought be responsible for injustices.”<sup>165</sup>

Sociopaths are regarded as most vulnerable to becoming suicide bombers. According to Post,<sup>166</sup> the most dangerous and unsafe terrorist is the religious terrorist. Terrorists motivated by a social or political objective have a clear political objective which they aim to achieve through heightened media attention or political reaction of opponents; however, the religious type terrorist can be dangerous as he is committed only on grounds of his religious beliefs and can commit extreme forms of atrocities believing it to be perfectly justified. Another study also found a closer relationship between suicide attacks and religious groups of radical orientation. They found that militant groups involved in civil insurgency do not resort to suicide attacks as a method of choice. This phenomenon is common in poor countries whereas suicide bombers do not care for such conditions.<sup>167</sup>

Jessica Stern<sup>168</sup> argues that terrorist organizations are formed by opportunistic leaders who appeal to religion to recruit the disenfranchised. She maintains that moral and religious fervor is manipulated by these organizations in order to gain money, power, and attention.

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<sup>165</sup> Crenshaw, M., *How Terrorists Think: Psychological Contributions to Understanding Terrorism*, Howard, L., Ed. *Terrorism: Roots, impact, responses*, Praeger, London, 1992, p. 71-73.

<sup>166</sup> Post, J., *The Taliban War and Religion in Afghanistan*, Zed Books, New York, 2002, p. 162.

<sup>167</sup> Berman, E., and Laitin, D. D., *Hard Targets: Theory and Evidence on Suicide Attacks*, NBER Paper No. 11740.

<sup>168</sup> Stern, Jessica., *Terror in the Name of God*, Harper Collins Publishers, Inc, NY, 2003.



An interesting study carried out by Madsen<sup>169</sup> discovers that suicide attacks require highly refined planning and meticulous supervision both from the point of view of the bomber and his commanders. These are flexible operations in the context of time. A bomber, unlike a time bomb or other devices, decides when to strike in accordance with the situation. This aspect of suicide attacks make it the most lethal and effective method. Therefore, the commonly held belief that a suicide bomber is an irrational or neurotic or a psychopath or under the influence of drugs etc is highly erroneous. On the contrary a suicide bomber must be a highly committed, determined and rational person to carry out this extreme act.

Suicide bombers have been described by some authors as rational fanatics. Ehud Sprinzak states that while combating suicide bombers it is important not to succumb to the idea that they are ready to do anything and lose everything.<sup>170</sup> The decision to initiate a campaign of violence to achieve an objective is a rational and calculated decision. Martha Crenshaw puts it very clearly by stating that ‘the resort to terrorism shall not be an aberration.’<sup>171</sup>

Terrorism and suicide attacks have also been analyzed from an economic perspective as well. Freytag’s study is based on a negative binomial regression model. It provides that the opportunity costs of participation in a terrorist

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<sup>169</sup> Madsen, J., 004). *Suicide Terrorism: Rationalizing the Irrational, Strategic Insights*, Vol. III, 8, 2004, p. 8.

<sup>170</sup> Sprinzak, Ehud., *Rational Fanatics*, Foreign Affairs, Sept-Oct 2000, 120: 73.

<sup>171</sup> Crenshaw, Martha., *The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice*, In Walter Riech (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 10.

enterprise are reduced due to deteriorating socio-economic condition of a region. This may even motivate a rational person to engage and take part in a terrorist activity.<sup>172</sup>

## 2.7. A General Overview

Most of the anthropologists, psychologists and social scientist whose views have been discussed in the above paragraphs, have discussed various factors responsible for the development of a personality which is willing to carry out suicide bombing. These factors range from social and cultural to psychological and political. Some of these causes have motivational relevance only and others may be responsible for producing reasons which cause terrorism and suicide bombing. However, religion in itself has not been proved to be the sole cause of terrorism. It may operate as a motivating factor indeed, in addition to other factors, and provide commitment and determination to the terrorist or a suicide bomber but does not provide a reason for the phenomenon on its own.

On the other hand, a number of Muslim scholars have provided deep analysis of religious interpretations of relevant verses of the Holy Quran to establish that suicide acts are un-Islamic and there exists no logic of justifying such activities under Islam. They have argued that a main reason of such attacks is ethnic or nationalistic factors or resentments as a result of discrimination and atrocities carried out by occupying forces on the lands of many Islamic countries.

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<sup>172</sup> Freytag, A., Kruger, J.J., and Meiericks, D., *The Origins of Terrorism: Cross Country Estimates on Socio Economic Determinants of Terrorism*, Economics of Security Working Paper, 27.

In the above analysis most of the discussion relates to a generalized discussion on terrorism and its manifestation in the form of suicide bombing. The works discussed have mostly been carried out by Western authors who have based their research primarily on observation of events in the Middle East and recently on *Al-Qaeda* inspired terrorist violence. Most writers on terrorism have focused on Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan under a preconceived notion that religion is the primary motivating factor in suicide attacks or people are dying for the protection of their homeland, culture, and religion. However, what is missing in this analysis is research on Pakistan-specific suicide terrorism and the various socio-cultural, socio-psychological and religio-political factors and their relationship with the subject phenomenon.

In Pakistan, majority of suicide bombers appear to have been from tribal areas of Pakistan (though exceptions are there) where the legal, moral and normative structure is peculiar and defined under the broader tribal code *Pashtunwali*. This study takes the socio-cultural and religio-political components into account and attempts to make them part of primary and secondary data in final analysis.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE REGIONAL BACKGROUND

#### 3.1. Historical Overview of Suicide Terrorism

##### 3.1.1. The Non-Muslim perspective

Terrorism is as old a phenomenon as human society itself. The history of terrorism spans over thousands of years. In a historical perspective, Samson's journey to free Israelis from oppression by the Philistines is probably the oldest recorded event. His mission can be referred to as a suicide mission since he knew that the probability of safe return in this venture was minimum and his objective was political in nature.<sup>173</sup>

Even before the advent of Christianity, Jewish groups, Zealots and Sicarii, practiced terrorism against the Roman occupiers of Jerusalem through assassinations.<sup>174</sup> These bold attacks were intended to warn the Roman occupiers to cease occupation.

Historical antecedents of terrorism also include the terrorist activities of French revolutionaries and their rival monarchists against each other in the aftermath of French revolution in 1789. Similar tactics were adopted by the Irish republican movement which carried out assassinations for independence against the British rule in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Dutch Lieutenant Jan Van Speijk destroyed his ship in Antwerp harbor in order to prevent it from getting into the hands of Belgians. Assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881 in St. Petersburg was another such incident. His assassin a Polish named Ignacy Hryniewiecki killed himself while blowing up the Czar. (Madsen 2004)

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<sup>173</sup> The Holy Bible, Judges 16, pages 28-30.

<sup>174</sup> Buregess, Mark., *A Brief history of Terrorism*, Center for Defense Information, July 2003.

Also in the Philippines, the local liberation fighters used this tactic by blowing themselves up with dynamite and explosives during their struggle against European colonial powers.<sup>175</sup>

The Japanese were primarily responsible for reintroducing this tactic in the modern era. Facing a U.S. invasion of mainland Japan, they recruited *kamikaze* pilots to sacrifice their lives by flying their planes into U.S. naval vessels in the Pacific Ocean. Their tactics to sacrifice their lives for “the emperor and the nation” convinced the U.S. that an invasion of mainland Japan would be too costly.<sup>176</sup> Later during 1980s, the Sri Lankan separatist movement striving for the liberation of Tamil Eelam region adopted suicide bombing in their war against the Sri Lankan government.. L.T.T.E<sup>177</sup> emerged as the champion of suicide attacks in Sri Lanka in 1990s. LTTE carried out almost 75 of the 186 suicide attacks between 1980 and 2001.

It must be noted that Islam and Muslims, as generally believed, are not the modern champions of suicide bombings. The highest score in modern times is that of the LTTE, which has a Marxist-Leninist ideology.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> Cronin, Kurth. Audrey., *Terrorists and Suicide Attacks*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington D.C, August 28, 2003, p. 2.

<sup>176</sup> Madsen, Julian., Madsen, *Suicide Terrorism: Rationalizing the Irrational, Strategic Insights*, Vol.3, No. 8, August 2004.

<sup>177</sup> LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a Sri Lankan ethnic secessionist group with Marxist-Leninist ideology was responsible for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India in 1991 in a suicide attack.

<sup>178</sup> Pape, Robert., *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, *American Political Science*, 97, 2003, pp. 343-361.

### 3.1.2. The Muslim Perspective

Hadrat Usman bin Affan, the third Muslim caliph, and Hadrat Ali bin Abu-Talib, the son in law of the Holy Prophet PBUH, and the fourth caliph of Islam fell victims to terrorism.<sup>179</sup> They were both assassinated by an extremist group known as *Khawarij*. This was a sect of religious extremists within Muslims. In the Islamic tradition, *Hashisheen* was the first group to employ such attacks against their enemies who were mostly rivals from the mainstream *Sunni* sect. They themselves were from a sect of *Ismaili Nazarites Shias* who were followers of Hasan bin Sabah. They were located in the mountains of Syria, Iraq, and Iran between the 11th and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries. They called themselves *Fidayeen*. Their mode of operations was similar to suicide bombers of today. They used to assassinate their target with daggers in public in order to ensure that witnesses were present and to gain publicity for their actions. Then they were either killed or used to commit suicide after their act.<sup>180</sup> The *Hashashin's* attacks resulted in the induction of word Assassin in the English language.

The year 1979 proved to be the most tumultuous year for the Muslim world. Three major incidents changed the course of modern Muslim history. The Iranian Revolution in February 1979, attack on Holy *Kaaba* by Muslim fundamentalists and the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces were earth shattering events for the Muslim world. They altered the drift of history from the direction of modernity, democracy and secularism towards religion. Fundamentalist movements in the Muslim world were

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<sup>179</sup> Hadrat Usman Ghani was assassinated on June 20, 656 AD, (Zil Huj 18, 35 AH). Hadrat Ali was assassinated in 661 AD (Ramadan 19, 40 AH).

<sup>180</sup> Gunaratna, Rohan., *Suicide terrorism: A Global Threat*, in *Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka*, IPCS Research Papers, No. 5, R. Ramasubramanian, August 2004, p. 3.

galvanized with everlasting consequences for the entire world. An ultra militant brand of Islam emerged with full vigor. This was a logical response to the ideology of Westoxification<sup>181</sup> which espoused that the West is responsible for all the ills and exploitation of Muslims. Embers which were already simmering in the Muslim world due to Western policies on Palestine, Kashmir and Afghanistan were transformed into a raging fire by radicals who diverted these resentments towards their grand vision of an Islamic renaissance movement for the realization of a global Islamic revolution. Militancy *Al-Qaeda style* and suicide attacks are just a manifestation of this development.

In modern times the early incidents of suicide bombing were the attacks on the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in December 1981 resulting in 27 deaths and 100 injured. Suicide attacks reappeared in 1982 during the American, French, and Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Hezbollah recruited both male and female suicide bombers. These Lebanese fighters orchestrated a campaign against American and French forces. In April and October 1983 they bombed the US embassy and marine barracks in Beirut. Almost 241 American military personnel were killed inside the Marine barracks. Hezbollah's suicide campaign proved highly effective in forcing out the occupying French and American troops from Lebanon.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Lacey, Robert., pp.45-46.

<sup>182</sup> President Ronald Reagan, confirming *Hezbollah's* influence on his decision to pull out of Lebanon, said of the attack: "The price we had to pay in Beirut was so great...We had to pull out...We couldn't stay there and run the risk of another suicide attack on the Marines." Pape, 2005, p.5.



Similar pattern of attacks was followed in Lebanon by *Hizbollah* and other Islamic groups against the Israeli forces and also against the South Lebanese Army.<sup>183</sup> *Hizbollah*, a militant *Shia* Muslim organization in Lebanon, pioneered the use of suicide attacks among Muslims. *Hezbollah* even inspired non-Muslim groups such as the Tamil Tigers and the Irish republicans. It also imparted training in suicide bombing to Palestinian groups, including, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.<sup>184</sup> *Hezbollah*'s successes in suicide attacks during the 1980s decade gained notoriety and were replicated by several other organizations later.

The lethal efficacy of suicide attacks compelled other separatist groups engaged in armed struggle all over the world to adopt them as a method of warfare. Palestinian groups began employing suicide attacks against Israel since 1994. The Kurdistan Workers Party known as P.K.K employed suicide attacks against Turkish army in 1996. Militant organizations, *Lashkar Taiba* and *Jaish Muhammad* involved in their struggle for liberation of Indian occupied Kashmir began using suicide attacks against the Indian army since 2000. Chechen Muslims fighting against Russian occupation utilized this technique in Chechnya, Daghestan and mainland Russia after observing its efficacy.

However, militants affiliated with *Al-Qaeda* and its sister organizations excelled in suicide attacks after 9/11. Although they had carried out suicide attacks even earlier against US embassies in Darussalam, Tanzania and Nairobi in Kenya in 1998 and against USS Cole in Aden harbor in Yemen, the attack on the World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 were the most lethal. This resulted in a long drawn

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<sup>183</sup> Schweitzer, Yoram., *Suicide Terrorism Development and Characteristics*, International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, April 21, 2000.

<sup>184</sup> Scott, Atran., *Mishandling Suicide Terrorism*, The Washington Quarterly, 2004.

confrontation between the militants and Western powers during which hundreds of suicide attacks had been conducted against US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and its allied states such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and numerous others in Europe including France, Spain and UK.

It must be noted that since the attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983 and the Marine Headquarters in October 1983,<sup>185</sup> there have been more than 1500 suicide terrorist attacks worldwide in Lebanon, Israel, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Turkey, Russia and the United States. The rate has increased from 31 in the 1980s, to 104 in the 1990s, to 53 in 2000–2001 alone.<sup>186</sup> This has further risen to over 100 in 2010-11. The rise of suicide terrorism is especially remarkable, given that the total number of terrorist incidents worldwide fell during the period, from a peak of 666 in 1987 to a low of 274 in 1998, with 348 in 2001.<sup>187</sup>

### **3.2. Palestine**

Palestine is a gaping wound in the Middle Eastern politics. The unresolved issue of Palestinian Occupied territories has been a source of much pain and anxiety in contemporary political disputes. In the context of this conflict, an increased resort to suicide bombing by Palestinian organizations has been witnessed in the last two decades. Suicide bombing phenomenon has taken a new turn through engagement of children and

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<sup>185</sup> Katz, Joseph., *Israel's invasion of Lebanon*, Operation Peace for Galilee, Eretz Yisroel, 2001. p. 14.

<sup>186</sup> Pape, Robert., *The Universe Of Suicide Terrorist Attacks Worldwide, 1980–2001*, University Of Chicago, 2002.

<sup>187</sup> US Department of State report, 2001. [www.state.gov/documents/organizations/9001.pdf](http://www.state.gov/documents/organizations/9001.pdf).

women beside male bombers. Teenagers are increasingly being selected and trained as suicide bombers in the Palestinian conflict.<sup>188</sup>

Female suicide bombers<sup>189</sup> have also been involved in attacks against Israel.<sup>190</sup> While the first suicide bombing undertaken by a Palestinian took place in 1994, the first female suicide bomber did not emerge until January 2002.<sup>191</sup> Her name was Wafa Idris. She was a 28 years old Westernized woman. She was a member of *Al-Fatah's Al-Aqsa* Martyrs' Brigade. This attack was followed by other female bombers from different Palestinian groups. These women include Hiba Daraghmeh of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). She carried out a suicide attack in May 2003. Another woman suicide bomber was Hanadi Jaradat, also from Palestinian Islamic Jihad who carried out suicide attack in

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<sup>188</sup> Abdullah Quran, a 12 years old Palestinian boy was arrested with a bomb in his school bag on March 16, 2005 in Israel. The bomb could not be detonated due to a fault in the cell phone attached to the bomb. On March 24, a 16-year-old teenager Hussam Abdo was arrested with an explosive belt. Attacks were carried out during the period September 2000 till 2003. All of these attacks were carried out by teenagers under 18 years of age. 40 teenagers were arrested before they could carry out their suicide mission. BBC News March 17, 2005.

<sup>189</sup> The profile of female Palestinian suicide bombers has been the subject of study by Katherine VanderKaay, who presented her profiling of the subjects at the American Psychological Association's annual meeting October 18, 2010.

<sup>190</sup> It has been observed that "the male-militancy path has met with greater social acceptance in Palestinian society than the female path. Women in particular have increasingly associated political violence with expanded citizenship rights due to the perceived failure of non-militaristic tactics to achieve political goals, primary amongst these, the achievement of Palestinian autonomy."

([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian\\_political\\_violence](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_political_violence)). Visited on Sept 20, September, 2011).

<sup>191</sup> *Daily Telegraph*, 31 January 2002.

October 2003 and Reem al-Reyashi of *Hamas* conducted a suicide attack in January 2005.<sup>192</sup>

Palestinian organizations including the *Al-Aqsa* Martyrs Brigades belonging to the *Al-Fatah* movement, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) and the Palestine Liberation Front General Command (PLFGC) have been designated as terrorist groups by the US government. The list also includes groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.<sup>193</sup>

The growing use of suicide attacks in Palestine highlights the challenges of fighting terror groups. Suicide attackers do not act as individuals, they are the product of militant organizations and act as part of a greater enterprise. It will continue to take its toll in terms of life till the root causes of terrorism and militancy are identified and addressed. Investment in law enforcement capabilities of a state's security apparatus can increase the rate of interdiction but will not resolve the root causes of the problem. The problem lies in eliminating the causes which generate such an extreme level of resentment which compel a person to destroy himself for the sake of killing others. Palestinian society has become a breeding ground for persons willing to conduct suicide attacks against Israel. Palestinian popular culture<sup>194</sup> views such attacks as martyrdom operations. It is regarded as an honorable act.

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<sup>192</sup> In total, the nine suicide attacks on Israelis by women bombers have left 53 people dead and hundreds injured. See Zedalis, D, Debra., *Female Suicide Bomber*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2004.

<sup>193</sup> A United States Congress decision from 1987 has described the PLO as a terrorist organization (US Code Collection, 1987). The military wing of *Hamas* is also recognized as a terrorist organization by Israel, Canada, Germany, Japan, Jordan, the United Kingdom and Australia.

<sup>194</sup> Nasser, Abu Farha, *The Making of Human Bomb: an Ethnography of Palestinian Resistance*, Duke University Press, 2009, pp 34-7.

### 3.3. Egypt

Egypt has always been the ideological mentor of Islamic renaissance movements of contemporary era. Many groups which have been the torch bearers of demand for Islamic revolution were formed here.<sup>195</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood was actively involved in the movement for the rule of *Sharia* in Egypt. This group has also been accused of engaging in militant activities.<sup>196</sup> The Egyptian political scene was marred by confrontation between Islamists and liberals during the regime of President Gamal Abdul Nasir and later his successors.<sup>197</sup>

The hanging of Syed Qutb, a Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, on charges of sedition, provided the much needed impetus to religious politics in Egypt. His thoughts became a beacon for Islamists' struggle all over the world.<sup>198</sup> Later, there was heightened confrontation between Islamists and opponents. In October 1981, President Anwar Sadaat

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<sup>195</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood (*Akhwan- ul-Muslimun*) was launched by Sheikh Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood remained the vanguard of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East. Many splinter groups emerged from this organization and became engaged in violent political activities like the Egypt Islamic Jihad, *Gamah-al-Islamia* and *Takfeer wal Hijra*.

<sup>196</sup> Violence erupted in Egypt in 1948 after the creation of Israel. The Muslim Brotherhood was accused of instigating violence against Egyptian Jews. It also actively participated in the Arab-Israel war in 1949. The Muslim Brotherhood was also accused of politically motivated assassinations of PM Mahmud Fami Naqrashi in 1948.

<sup>197</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood was accused of the attempted assassination of President Nasir on 26 October 1954. This was followed by a general crackdown against Islamist political groups, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood. Syed Qutb, the ideologue of MB, was hanged on charges of subversion in 1967. Chamieh, Jebran., *Traditionalists, Militants and Liberal in Present Islam*, Research and Publishing House, 1994, p.140.

<sup>198</sup> Syed Qutb authored *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestones), a manifesto for armed *jihad* for establishing the kingdom of God on earth and for eliminating the kingdom of man. He was charged with sedition on the basis of this book.

was assassinated by members of a militant group *Tazeem al Jihad* linked with *Takfir wal Hijra*<sup>199</sup> for signing a peace treaty with Israel.<sup>200</sup>

Islamic militancy raged on without abating during the 1980s. Militants organized themselves under different groups. Islamic militant organizations such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and *al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya* were formed.<sup>201</sup>

In October 1990, Egyptian Islamic Jihad attempted to assassinate Egyptian Interior Minister Abdel-Halim Moussa but ended up killing parliamentary Speaker Rifaat el-Mahgoub by mistake. 1993 was a particularly severe year for terrorist attacks in Egypt; 1106 persons were killed or wounded. Violent confrontation between the government and militants continued. Militants were engaged in assassinations and attacks on foreign tourists during the 1990s.<sup>202</sup>

Other groups joined the ranks of militants later and violence continued unabated.<sup>203</sup> Most of these militants have been former *Mujahideen* fighters from Afghanistan. They have now established operational linkages with *Al-Qaeda* supported

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<sup>199</sup> *Takfir wal Hijra* was formed by ultra hardline dissidents of MB, who believed in armed struggle for achieving their objectives. They were responsible for several high profile kidnappings and assassinations.

<sup>200</sup> Sageman, A. Marc., *Understanding Terror Networks*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 29.

<sup>201</sup> An Egyptian cleric Shaikh Omar Abdul Rehman emerged as the ideological mentor of militants. He also issued a *fatwa* sanctioning "the robbery and killing of Copts (an Egyptian Christian sect) in furtherance of the *jihad*." Sageman, A. Marc., *Understanding Terror Networks*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, pp. 31-34.

<sup>202</sup> The Luxor Massacre took place on 17 November 1997, at Deir-el-Bahri, an archaeological site located across the River Nile from Luxor in Egypt. These attacks were carried out by *Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* and *Jihad Talaat al-Fath* (Holy War of the Vanguard of the Conquest group) killing 62 tourists. Bughdadi, Jamil. Dr., *Jihad ya Fasad*, Noor-e-Islam Publishers, Lahore, 2009, p. 6.

<sup>203</sup> The *Mujahideen* of Egypt and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades took responsibility for 2005 bombings in Cairo and other attacks. In a statement Abdullah Azzam Brigade claimed responsibility for the attacks and called it a response to the government's crackdown after the Sinai Peninsula bombings. It later claimed responsibility for Dahab city bombing of April 2006.



organizations and have acquired lethal capacity to conduct their operations as a result.<sup>204</sup> Top leaders of *Al-Qaeda*, Dr. Al Zawahiri and Dr. Al Fadl are both Egyptians. It is their brand of *Jihadi* philosophy which advocates *Takfeer* and *Khuruj* that resulted in a resort to militancy and suicide attacks by the *Jihadi* groups.

### 3.4. Iraq

Since the 2003 invasion, Iraq has experienced a high degree of suicide attacks. Insurgency in Iraq differs from past instances of suicide attacks in terms of both the vast number of attacks and their highly unusual ethno-sectarian distribution. Essentially, Iraq has witnessed a *Sunni* monopolization of suicide attacks. America's initial failure in encountering suicide terrorism in Iraq can in part be explained by the Bush administration's lack of foresight in the buildup to the war. US Vice President Dick Cheney announced that the US troops will be greeted as liberators in Iraq.<sup>205</sup> In reality, the US forces had to endure an un-precedented wave of suicide attacks in Iraq. These attacks were carried out against US forces as well as *Shia* sectarian groups. There had been no reported incident of suicide attacks in Iraq prior to 2003, however, almost 1000 suicide attacks were recorded by 2007.<sup>206</sup> This figure makes Iraq a country with highest number of such attacks, almost 70% of recorded suicide attacks since 1980.<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> www.wikipedia, Last visited on September 13, 2012.

<sup>205</sup> Dick Cheney in Meet the Press, CNN Broadcast, March 13, 2003.

<sup>206</sup> <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244>

<sup>207</sup> Robert Pape studied these attacks in his remarkable research on suicide attacks and its related factors including foreign occupation and secular nationalism.



## 3.5. Pakistan

### 3.5.1. A Brief Historical Perspective

Pakistan has emerged as a major player in the war against terror. Following the US led military intervention in the region since October 2001, Pakistan has become a battlefield for militant groups taking their revenge on the US and its allied state of Pakistan. Militant groups have intensified their activities in different regions of Pakistan and suicide bombing has become a common occurrence.

In Pakistan, terrorism perpetrated by religious extremists was never a novel phenomenon when the 9/11 incident occurred. Terrorism Pakistani style can be divided broadly into the pre-9/11 phase and post 9/11 phase.<sup>208</sup>

#### 3.5.1.1. Pre-9/11 Phase

In this phase, extremists involved with sectarian organizations were engaged in attacking religious sites and processions of rival sects. Attacks on *Shias*, a minority Muslim sect, *Ahmadis*, a sect declared as non-Muslims by the constitution of Pakistan, and other religious denominations were carried out.

Suicide attacks on *Shias* have a significant share in the overall percentage of attacks. There were 13 out of 25 suicide attacks on *Shias* until 2006. This was almost 52% of all attacks.<sup>209</sup> It must be noted that *Shias* are not an exception in so far as sectarian attacks are concerned. *Brelvis*, another sect, whose beliefs are considered

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<sup>208</sup> Experts have divided suicide attacks in two phases, the pre 9/11 phase and the post 9/11 phase. Crenshaw, M., *Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay*, Security Studies, 16-1, pp. 133-162.

<sup>209</sup> Recent attacks on the *Shia* community in Quetta, Baluchistan have been the most lethal of all. More than 80 persons were killed in the first attack in January 2013 and almost 100 persons were killed in the second attack in February 2013.

heretic by the main stream *Deobandis* have been targeted. Their rally in Nishtar Park Karachi was attacked by a suicide bomber on April 11, 2006, killing a large number of participants and almost wiping out the entire political leadership of their political party.<sup>210</sup>

Extremist organizations like *Sipah-e-Sahaba*, *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* and *Sipah-e-Muhammad* were initially involved in sectarian violence exclusively. In addition, there were *Jihadi* organizations involved in struggle for the liberation of Indian occupied Kashmir. *Lashkar Taiba* has claimed responsibility for suicide attacks on Indian army positions in Occupied Kashmir during the 1980s. These organizations were primarily involved on an external front and had no interest in the internal sectarian violence. However, nowadays, they do work in cooperation with one another but at other times they may carry out attacks on their own. Therefore, it becomes very difficult for the investigation and law enforcement agencies to counter them.<sup>211</sup>

Pakistan had its own share of terrorist violence linked with regional and national developments. For instance, the Palestinian embassy in Pakistan was attacked by armed men in September 1978 and two diplomats were killed. Tensions with Afghanistan and *Pashtun* nationalists in the North Western Frontier Province supported by Afghanistan resulted in bomb blasts and targeted assassinations during the 1970s. However, violence

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<sup>210</sup> Daily The News, April 12, 2006. Also see Syed Ali Akhtar., *Suicide Attacks in Paksitan, Only one of its Kind*, Daily, The Nation, September 17, 2010 (image Lahorelhr@yahoo.com).

<sup>211</sup> Rana, Amir., *How the Suicide Attackers Operate in Pakistan?*, in Political Violence and Terrorism, PIPS Knowledge for Peace, South Asia Net. 2007, p.2.

linked to religious extremist groups and the adoption of suicide attacks as a method of choice by militant groups came in the 1990 decade.

It must be noted that suicide attacks is a foreign innovation in Pakistan. Such daring and extremist actions in war were introduced by Arab *Jihadis* during Afghan *Jihad* (1979-1989). In a way it can be stated that the first suicide attack of its kind took place in the tribal region of Bajaur agency in 1987 when an Arab fighter killed a *Wahabi* cleric and leader of a *Jihadi* group Shaikh Jameel-ur-Rehman. His assassin, an Arab named Abdullah Roomi, also killed himself later.

The first suicide attack with a car bomb in Pakistan was carried out on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad on November 19, 1995 by two Arab militants. It was ordered by militants of Egyptian Islamic Jihad based in Afghanistan, who were un-happy with Egyptian government's treatment of Egyptian fighters who were deported from Pakistan.<sup>212</sup> Three other attacks carried out in June 1998 remained unresolved. Although the government sources blamed them on Indian support, no clue and proper information exist. An attack on the office of *Nawa-e-Waqt* news paper group on November 6, 2006 also remained unresolved and no clue was ever found about its perpetrators and their motivation.<sup>213</sup>

These were extremely limited incidents wherein attacks were employed to carry out a mission. These attacks belong to the pre-9/11 phase of suicide bombings. In the post 9/11 phase, a spate of attacks ensued and is still going on relentlessly.

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<sup>212</sup> The group issued a statement that we warn the government of Pakistan that it will pay a heavy price if it continues to hand over Islamists living on its territory. Reuters, November, 19, 1995.

<sup>213</sup> Daily *Nawa-e-Waqt*, Islamabad, November 7, 2006.

### 3.5.1.2.

#### Post 9/11 Phase

In this phase, Pakistan emerged as the real battle ground. The situation took a drastic turn after the US invasion of Afghanistan. *Al-Qaeda* and several other Pakistani religious militant groups declared war against the Pakistani state for the support it offered to the US intervention in Afghanistan.<sup>214</sup> In solidarity with *Al-Qaeda* militants and Afghan Taliban, a campaign of suicide attacks was launched in Pakistan.

Osama bin Laden issued a scathing statement criticizing the Pakistani government for its support of the US invasion.

“When the American Foreign Minister Powell came to you, you cowered, bowed and submitted to him like a lowly slave and you permitted the American Crusader forces to use the air, soil and water of Pakistan, the country of Islam, to kill the people of Islam in Afghanistan, then in Waziristan. So woe to you and away with you.”<sup>215</sup>

*Al-Qaeda's* declaration of *Jihad* was based on the grounds that Pakistan, an Islamic state, had offered its resources to US in support of its invasion and occupation of Muslim lands. Pakistan and its army was declared as enemy number one on par with the United States.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> Sufi Muhammad, a religious leader from Swat region of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province organized a 10,000 strong militia of armed volunteers to fight against US forces and in support of the Taliban. His militia crossed the border into Afghanistan on October 27, 2001. Daily *The News*, Islamabad. October 28, 2001.

<sup>215</sup> Riedel, p. 40.

<sup>216</sup> *Al-Qaeda* military leader, Abu Yehya al Libi stated, “Pakistan’s army, intelligence and police now constitute the tip of the spear taking part in tearing our Muslim nation apart.” CBS, Internet Terror Monitor, 2009.

A detailed overview of the history of suicide attacks in Pakistan is offered by Amir Mir<sup>217</sup> a renowned Pakistani journalist.

“Suicide bombers actually came to Pakistan in force in 2002. The first attack of its kind occurred on March 16 that year, when a suicide bomber blew himself up in a church in Islamabad, killing five people and injuring 40 others. Fifteen people died and 35 others were injured on May 8 that year when a bomber rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into a bus near the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi. Those killed in the attack included nine French engineers and five Pakistanis technicians who were working on a naval project. The attacks placed Pakistan on the world map of countries marred by suicide bombings. The next year, in 2003, a total of 70 people were killed and 114 injured in three suicide attacks, two targeting the president, General Pervez Musharraf in December and one targeting former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in June. In 2004, 91 people were killed and 393 injured in seven incidents. The death toll in 2005 was 86 people killed and 219 injured in four strikes, while 161 people were killed and 352 injured in seven attacks in 2006. The following year saw an unprecedented rise in suicide attacks, in the wake of the army's gory Operation Silence against fanatical *Lal Masjid* (Red Mosque) clerics and their followers in the heart of Islamabad. A record number of 766 people were killed and 1,677 injured in 56 attacks in 2007.”<sup>218</sup>

Increased intensity of attacks was observed in the aftermath of the *Lal-Masjid* incident in July 2007 which had ignited the anger of these militants.<sup>219</sup> Several uniformed army officials were assassinated as part of their revenge campaign by the militants in 2007-2008. The situation reached such alarming heights that army officials were

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<sup>217</sup> A senior Pakistani journalist and author of several books on militant Islam and terrorism. His latest book is *The Bhutto Murder Trail: From Waziristan to GHQ*. [www.pakistanblogmagazine.wordpress.com/2011/01/24/book-review-the-murder-trail-from-waziristan-to-ghq-by-amir-mir/](http://www.pakistanblogmagazine.wordpress.com/2011/01/24/book-review-the-murder-trail-from-waziristan-to-ghq-by-amir-mir/).

<sup>218</sup> Mir, Amir., *Pakistan: The suicide-bomb capital of the world*, Asia Times Online Holdings Ltd. 2011. (site visited on 13<sup>th</sup> December, 2012).

<sup>219</sup> *Lal Masjid*, a mosque in the heart of Islamabad, capital of Pakistan was seized by the militants in early May 2007. It resulted in a standoff with the security forces for two months. Eventually in July 2009, the siege ended after an assault by the army which resulted in the death of 94 persons. The Military operation was codenamed Operation Silence.

instructed not to wear their uniforms in public, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region to avoid being targeted.

Later, pro-militant religious and tribal leaders exploited the *Lal Masjid* operation to provoke attacks against the army. Religious decrees<sup>220</sup> were issued by clerics against the war on terror operations with a view to demoralize the morale of troops engaged in operations against militants in Waziristan and other tribal regions. Their objective was to convince the intensively Islamized military rank and file that the army was making a mistake by following the American dictates under the leadership of a 'faithless' government headed by General Pervez Musharraf and his fellow generals.

In 2008, 60 suicide attacks were carried out. 895 people were killed while 1873 were injured. In 2009, 78 suicide attacks took the lives of 951 people and injured 2,361. This campaign of spilling blood claimed 1,172 lives and 2,204 were injured in 51 suicide attacks during 2010.

In 2011, the intensity went down and 82 persons were killed and 341 injured in 12 attacks. In 2012, 70 were killed and 198 wounded in 10 attacks.<sup>221</sup>

Initially, suicide attacks were not regarded as a legitimate methodology according to the *Jihadi* groups active in Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, in the aftermath of US

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<sup>220</sup> Religious decrees are called *Fatwas*. These are declarations on the Islamic status of an action. Pro militant religious leaders issued several *Fatwas* labeling all actions against militants as contrary to Islam and declaring the soldiers involved in operations as being apostates and dying as non-Muslims. These decrees had a devastating impact on the morale of soldiers.

<sup>221</sup> Report of the National Crisis Center, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan. 2012. Also see Rohan and Khurram., 2011.



led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, such attacks were introduced in the region by *Al-Qaeda* and its affiliate militant organizations. Previously, this method of warfare was not deemed appropriate under Islamic law of war and, therefore, was not employed by the *Jihadi* outfits both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, once its lethal significance against the enemy became established, it emerged the method of choice for militant organizations.

### 3.5.2. The Pakistan Army Joins the Campaign

Following the incursion of the Pakistan army into the Waziristan region during early 2002-3, it became the militant's favorite method for attacking targets, military and civilian, all over Pakistan.<sup>222</sup> Initially, the militants trained a corp of recruits for suicide bombings in training camps in South Waziristan in 2003. Trainees were mostly volunteers comprising of local *Pashtun* tribesmen from South Waziristan, Afghan and Uzbek fighters. Training camps were established in South Waziristan during 2003 under the command of *Al-Qaeda*. Later they were handed over to local Taliban militants. Qari Hussain Mehsud emerged as the major planner of suicide attacks in Pakistan.<sup>223</sup> Hussain's squad of suicide bombers gained notoriety as *Fidayeen-e-Islam*.<sup>224</sup> However, he later merged his group with the Pakistani Taliban commanded by Baitullah Mehsud.

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<sup>222</sup> Mulla Dadullah Akhund, a famous Afghan Taliban commander introduced suicide attacks in the war. He was notorious for beheadings of enemies and making their videos. He had adopted this method after observing its success in Iraq. He helped established training camps in Waziristan region as early as 2003. Dadullah was killed in May 2007 in a military raid by the US led troops in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

<sup>223</sup> Qari Hussain Mehsud was an activist of *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*, a militant sectarian outfit involved in the killings of *Shias* in Pakistan. He has reportedly been killed in a US drone attack in North Waziristan in October 7, 2010.

<sup>224</sup> Those who sacrifice their lives for Islam. Militants argue that suicide bombers do not commit suicide, an act strictly prohibited in Islam, rather *Fidayee* attacks in which they sacrifice their lives for Islam. Even after Qari Hussain's death, the TTP is believed to have at least 2,000 trained suicide bombers across the country.



Eventually, Hussain became known as the master trainer of suicide bombers in Pakistan.

His disciples (*Fidayeen*) are responsible for suicide attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

"Our *Ulamas* (Muslim scholars) have termed suicide attacks as an elite form of *jihād*. *Fidayeen* is a sophisticated weapon of the *Mujahideen*; our enemies have no idea how to counter these lethal bombers. Suicide attacks have made the *mujahideen* invincible."<sup>225</sup>

#### Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan: (2003- 2012)

Year	Civilians	Security (SFs)	Forces	Terrorists	Total
2003	140	24		25	189
2004	435	184		244	863
2005	430	81		137	648
2006	608	325		538	1471
2007	1523	597		1479	3599
2008	2155	654		3906	6715
2009	2307	1011		8267	11585
2010	1796	469		5170	7435
2011	2738	765		2800	6303
2012*	2938	691		2443	6072
Total	15086	4781		25131	44998

\* Data till December 23, 2012, Source: SATP

<sup>225</sup> Mir, Amir., *Pakistan: The suicide-Bomb Capital of the World*, Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd, 2011. Site visited on 13<sup>th</sup> December, 2012.

### Suicide Attacks Since 2001

Year	2001 to 2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Total attacks	130	86	52	12	10	280
Total death	1883	1217	1224	82*	70	4324
Total wounded	3819	2305	2157	341	198	8622

Source SATP; and National Crisis Center, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan.

This lethal game is still raging in Pakistan. It has wreaked havoc in almost all sectors of Pakistani society and has rendered the state and its organs helpless. The drastic consequences of this seemingly endless war are extremely adverse for socio-economic and political sectors in particular and society in general.

#### 3.5.3. Pak-Afghan relationship and Suicide Terrorism

Afghanistan has always been the focus of foreign military adventures throughout the recorded history of this region. These interventions have always had drastic consequences for the neighboring states of Afghanistan. Pakistan shares a 2640 kms (1500 miles) long border with Afghanistan in its North West known as the Durand Line.<sup>226</sup> From the mid of 19<sup>th</sup> century to mid 20<sup>th</sup> century, this region remained an active war zone between the British and Tsarist imperialists and witnessed almost three major wars till 1919. Later, during the cold war in the 1950s and 1960s, this region became a hotbed of intrigues due to the tussle between Pakistan backed by the US and Afghanistan supported by the Soviet

<sup>226</sup> Durand Line is named after British officer Sir Mortimer Durand who carried out a survey of the region and demarcated the border between Afghanistan and the then British India in 1893. Pakistan inherited the border after its independence in August 1947. This border has always been disputed by Afghanistan. Rana, Amir., p. 27.

Union and India. This resulted in several border clashes between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1963.<sup>227</sup> Pakistan and Afghanistan have remained at loggerheads with each other since 1947. Dissident groups on both sides have been supported by one country against the other. Afghanistan had always been forthcoming in supporting Baluch and Pashtun nationalists demanding separation from Pakistan since 1947. Afghan support for nationalist secessionist movements in Pakistan intensified during 1970s. Pakistan responded in kind through support of Islamic groups in their struggle against the secular governments in Afghanistan after the Socialist revolution in April 1978. Pakistan's clandestine support culminated into full fledged military and political support for Afghan *Mujahideen* in the post Soviet invasion scenario after 1979. Pakistan's military ruler General Zia-ul-Haq supported *Jihadi* groups involved in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan from 1979 till 1989. US provided funding to Pakistan for supporting Afghan *Mujahideen* fighters during the war.<sup>228</sup>

In 1995-6, Pakistan supported the Taliban movement which emerged as a result of the civil war between former *Mujahideen* factions which had devastated Afghanistan by that time. Taliban movement eventually managed to occupy vast swathes of Afghanistan with the exception of certain pockets in the north. Taliban's brand of Islam was based on their strict interpretations of Islamic creeds. Their religious policies and their method of implementation of *Sharia* did not receive approval from the mainstream Muslim scholars.

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<sup>227</sup> Siddiqui, Abdul. Qadir., [www.pajwak.com/en/journalist/](http://www.pajwak.com/en/journalist/), pp 10-18, (Visited on December 2011)

<sup>228</sup> In 1981, US government issued \$3.2 billion for Pakistan. Later this package was increased to \$4.02 billion in 1987. It was primarily for military aid worth \$1.7 billion. This period witnessed an alarming increase in opium and small arms-based war economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan particularly in the Tribal Areas. Profits from this illegal trade benefited the army, local warlords and *mujahideen* affiliated groups. Siddiqui, p. 26.

Their religio-political ideology was based on *fiqh* interpretations of *Deobandi* school of Indian Muslim tradition. Their practices were mostly rooted in centuries old *Pashtun* tribal traditions and customs which were implemented as being Islamic. During this period, Afghanistan became a base for *Jihadi* activists from all over the world especially the Arab states. *Jihadi* movements from various regions around the globe had established their offices and training camps in Afghanistan. Pakistan based *Jihadi* groups had by then intensified their activities in Indian occupied Kashmir. They were supported by the Taliban, for instance, *Harakat-ul-Mujahideen* and *Jaish Muhammad*. Even outfits with sectarian and anti-*Shia* ideologies including *Sipah-e-Sahaba* and *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* from Pakistan had established their bases and training camps in Afghanistan. During this period, Pakistani militant groups developed a close liaison with Arab and other militants in Afghanistan.<sup>229</sup>

The situation in the region drastically altered after the September 11, 2001 attacks on United States. The Bush administration alleged that *Al-Qaeda* leader Osama-bin-Laden based in Afghanistan was the mastermind of attacks. In October 2001, US led NATO troops invaded Afghanistan and ousted the Taliban regime. *Al-Qaeda*, Uzbek and other *Jihadi* groups took refuge in the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan and initiated their campaign against the US led forces in Afghanistan. They were supported by Pakistani residents of the tribal areas, especially South and North Waziristan. Pakistani tribesmen from their region not only provided sanctuary to militants but also joined their anti-US struggle wholeheartedly. This cooperation is still going on and the region has become a hotbed of anti-US militant activity. These militants consider

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<sup>229</sup> Chakesari, Saif-ul-Haq., *Islam ka Tasawwar-e-Jihad aur Al-Qaeda*, Shoaib Sons Publishers, Swat, 2010, pp. 134-136.

Pakistan and its military as a US stooge and have declared it as its enemy on par with the US-led forces in Afghanistan.

#### **3.5.4. The Situation in the Khyber Pakhtunkwa Province (KPK)**

Khyber Pakhtunkwa province (KPK) is worse hit due to its geographical proximity with the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. It lies in the North West region of Pakistan. Its regional proximity with Afghanistan and the militancy-infested tribal areas has adversely affected the situation in this province. The tribal areas, administratively called Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), have emerged as the nurseries of suicide bombers owing to the fact that many militants groups including *Al-Qaeda* established their bases there after the US led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. South Waziristan, having the longest porous border with Afghanistan and its difficult hilly terrain, was the ultimate destination for all militant groups seeking for a safe heaven. Several militant groups engaged in activities both in Afghanistan and Pakistan operate from here. These groups resorted to the use of suicide attacks as their principal offensive tactic primarily against Pakistani armed forces and later against civilian targets.<sup>230</sup>

This war has affected almost all segments of Pakistani society which have been enduring its negative consequences since the beginning of present century. After September 2001, US pressure on Pakistan compelled it to withdraw its support of *Jihadi* militants in Kashmir and in 2003 Pakistan's military ventured into South Waziristan to counter the growing influence of Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* in that region. Since then,

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<sup>230</sup> Suicide attacks became common during the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, an *Al-Qaeda* supported Taliban commander, based in South Waziristan. His predecessor was Abdullah Mehsud, a former detainee of Guantanamo Bay, who had earlier killed himself in a suicide operation in Zhob region of Baluchistan province on July 24, 2007. Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a drone attack on August 5, 2009.

militants have declared war against Pakistan and there seems no end to this state of affairs in the foreseeable future.

### 3.5.5. The Waziristan Region and Suicide Terrorism

The Waziristan<sup>231</sup> region of Pakistani tribal areas is divided into two main parts, North and South Waziristan. Both comprise parts of Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and lie adjacent to the Eastern border of Afghanistan. In the context of this study, this region has acquired a particular significance in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan. It emerged as the base of *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban militants waging war against US led forces in Afghanistan and later declaring war against Pakistan. Since 2001, this region is in turmoil and has a noteworthy role in the development of suicide bombing culture in Pakistan. After the US invasion, this region was inundated by the influx of militants belonging to various ethnic and national groups fighting against the US-led forces including Afghans, Arabs, Uzbeks, Uighurs and Chechen among many others. They were later organized in a loose command structure supervised by *Al-Qaeda* and managed and controlled by local militants who later became known as the Pakistani Taliban. Later, in 2007, they formed a militant group called *Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan*.<sup>232</sup>

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<sup>231</sup> A detailed analysis of Waziristan and its significance in the context of suicide bombing in Pakistan has been conducted in subsequent chapters.

<sup>232</sup> *Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan* is a loose organization of militants in Pakistan. They coordinate with *Al-Qaeda* and other militant groups and are at the forefront of war against Pakistani army. They are also responsible for conducting suicide attacks in Pakistan. TTP also owes allegiance to Mulla Muhammad Omar, leader of Afghan Taliban, as their patron-in-chief. Baitullah Mehsud formed TTP and he remained its leader till his death in a drone attack in August 2009. He has been replaced by Hakeemullah Mehsud, his cousin, as the new leader of TTP. Chakesari, Saif-ul-Haq., *Islam ka Tasawwar-e-Jihad aur Al Qaeda*, Shoaib Sons Publishers, Swat, 2010, pp. 409-416.



The situation in Waziristan turned precarious and hostile for Pakistan especially after the military invasion in early 2003. The Pakistan army established its foothold in South Waziristan in February 2003 and later ventured into North Waziristan in September 2005. Once again the army re-launched a major military offensive in South Waziristan in 2006. Militants' ranks were bolstered due to the resentment generated by the action of the Pakistan army and thousands of tribesmen took up arms in support of foreign militants. This state of affairs was a result of an ill conceived military operation by Pakistan army which infuriated the locals. They perceived the invasion and military's demand to oust or handover foreign militants who had sought sanctuary in their midst, as an affront and insult to their tribal customs and an attack upon Islam. The Pakistani army was perceived as an extension of the US army. Tribal and religious leaders declared that the Pakistani army is in cahorts with the US invaders on the other side of the border and are acting against the interest of Islam. The war cry was responded to by tribesmen in their thousands and thus began a long drawn war in the region which is still raging on. This conflict became intense in the last quarter of 2007 as a result of the reaction against the attack on *Lal Masjid* by the army. This incident was portrayed by the militants as an affront to Islam where a mosque was desecrated. Reportedly a large number of militants both from Pakistan and Afghanistan are using Waziristan as a base and sanctuary. Pakistan is under tremendous pressure from the US authorities to take action in North Waziristan. However, previous experience has made Pakistani authorities wiser and there is a clear reluctance to launch a fresh offensive in the region. The US is continuously using drone strikes to hit the alleged hideouts of militants in the region. Most of these drone attacks are causing civilian casualties. The silence of Pakistani authorities against



these attacks is perceived as a mark of tacit approval granted to the US for launching these lethal strikes by the locals and the militants. Such situations play to the hands of militants and anti-Pakistan elements who exploit the sentiments of locals against Pakistan. This results in a further escalation of conflict and increased animosity amongst the local tribesmen and Pakistani public in general against the West.

Thousands of people have fled from Waziristan and have been living in miserable conditions in makeshift camps as Internally Displaced Persons. Since 2009, South Waziristan is relatively peaceful; however, targeted assassinations do take place. North Waziristan is still regarded as an active base of militants. Drone strikes by US authorities are taking place regularly in both North and South Waziristan.<sup>233</sup> The Taliban responds to these hostilities in their peculiar style through suicide attacks against the army and civilian targets on mainland Pakistan. Investigations carried out after most of the suicide attacks have found links with the region of Waziristan in the sense that either the attacker is a resident of Waziristan, had received training there, had been monitored from there or the attack was planned by militants based there. Thus, the significance of Waziristan cannot be ruled out in any discussion of suicide attacks in Pakistan.

### **3.5.6. Militant Organizations in Pakistan**

A plethora of militant organizations operate in Pakistan ranging from religious, sectarian, nationalists and ethnic which are engaged in terrorist activities, however,

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<sup>233</sup> The recent death of a pro-Pakistan tribal leader Maulvi Nazir on January 2, 2013, in a drone attack in South Waziristan has escalated tensions. According to media reports, claims made by the authorities in relation to the death of militant leaders in drone strikes are exaggerated. Most of the casualties are civilians. Daily *The News*, Islamabad, January 07, 2013.

suicide bombing is being conducted only by religious and sectarian organizations. These groups can be categorized into the following types:<sup>234</sup>

- i) **Sectarian:** Groups such as the *Sunni* outfits *Sipah-e-Sahaba* and *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* and *Shia* outfit *Sipah-e-Muhammad*, which are engaged in violence within Pakistan.
- ii) **Anti-Indian:** Militant groups operating for the liberation of Indian Occupied Kashmir including *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (LeT), the *Harakat ul-Mujahadeen* (HuM) and *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (JeM).
- iii) **Afghan Taliban:** The original Taliban movement and especially its Kandahari leadership centered around Mullah Mohammad Omar.
- iv) **Al-Qaeda and its affiliates:** This includes the organization previously led by Osama bin Laden and now by Dr. Aiman-al-Zawahiri. *Al-Qaeda* operates as an umbrella organization for other militant groups with their alleged bases in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).<sup>235</sup>
- v) **The Pakistani Taliban:** This includes groups consisting of extremist outfits in the tribal areas led by individuals such as Hakeemullah Mehsud of the Mehsud in South Waziristan, Maulana Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur, and Maulana Qazi Fazlullah of Swat. Since December 2007, they have been organized under the umbrella of *Tehreek-e-Taliban* Pakistan. "They support each other, they coordinate

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<sup>234</sup> A classification of such groups into six distinct clusters has been worked out by Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in January 2008 House Foreign Affairs subcommittee (www.foreign relations council).

<sup>235</sup> According to Rohan Gunaratna of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore, other foreign militant groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad group, the Libyan Islamic Fighters Group and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement are also located in FATA.

with each other, sometimes they compete with each other and sometimes they even fight each other.”<sup>236</sup>

- vi) **Punjabi Taliban:** This group includes non-Pashtun militants from other parts of Pakistan particularly Punjab. They are responsible for several attacks in 2008 and 2009 in Pakistani cities of Lahore, Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi. The Punjabi Taliban network is a loose group of members of banned militant groups of Punjabi origin. Some of the groups were formerly engaged in sectarian violence like *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* and others like *Jaish Muhammad* were engaged in the Kashmir liberation struggle. They have established operational linkages with Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban and other militant groups. The Punjabi Taliban provides logistical support for operations on mainland Pakistan. Many of these militant groups directly benefited from state patronage in the 1990s and were professionally trained in asymmetrical warfare, guerrilla tactics and sabotage.<sup>237</sup>
- vii) **Other Groups:** There are other militant groups which cannot be classified into a particular category. For instance, secessionist groups such as the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA). The BLA was declared a terrorist organization by Pakistan in 2006. In recent years, many new terrorist groups have emerged in Pakistan. Several existing groups have renamed and reorganized themselves. A new breed of religious extremist militant groups has emerged which is more lethal and violent as compared to their predecessors. The Pakistani Taliban were initially fighting the Pakistani army. Later they began cooperating with Afghan

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<sup>236</sup> Gunaratna and Iqbal, p.183.

<sup>237</sup> Abbas, Sohail., *Probing the Jihadi mindset*, Islamabad, 2007.

Taliban in fighting the U.S. led forces across the border in Afghanistan.<sup>238</sup>

Violence in Pakistan has been on the rise as more militant groups target the state. *Al-Qaeda* can be credited for an increase in militant activity in Pakistan. Its highly professional and expert militants have trained Pakistani militants to carry out successful and daring missions inside Pakistan. *Al-Qaeda* has introduced sophistication into the methods of Taliban militants.

Besides providing militant groups in Pakistan with technical expertise and capabilities, *Al-Qaeda* is also playing an active role in coordinating the activities of a wide range of militant outfits.<sup>239</sup> *Al-Qaeda* has acquired specialized organizational skills and has mastered the art of coordination between clandestine clusters. It has successfully managed an assemblage of sympathetic terrorist outfits all over the globe thereby increasing its operational capability several folds.

Taliban militants have successfully engaged militant organizations all over Pakistan into their network. Their safe sanctuary in Waziristan has enabled them to coordinate and establish liaison with other groups. Their influence has now spread to other provinces in Pakistan, including Punjab and Karachi as well. They have even

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<sup>238</sup> David H. Petraeus, who has had a leading role in U.S. security efforts in the region, says the groups have long shared a symbiotic relationship. "They support each other, they coordinate with each other, sometimes they compete with each other, [and] sometimes they even fight each other making it difficult to distinguish between them." CFR Center for Foreign Relations, Interview May 2010.

<sup>239</sup> "*Al-Qaeda* has assumed a role as mediator and coalition builder among various Pakistani militant group factions by promoting the unification of entities that have opposed one another or had conflicting ideas about whether to target the Pakistani state." Don Rassler, an associate at the Combating Terrorism Center, an independent research institution based at the U.S. military academy at West Point. Rassler Don, *Terrorism-New Dimensions*, Journal of Defense Studies, August 2011, p. 7.

carried out operations in the territory of Azad Kashmir and also in the extreme Northern region called Gilgit Baltistan,<sup>240</sup>

Some of the famous militants groups which are involved in suicide attacks in Pakistan and in the region including India and Afghanistan are introduced in the following:

### 3.5.6.1. *Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)*

*Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)* is the militant wing of *Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD)*.<sup>241</sup> However, JD vehemently refutes such allegations. LeT came to light after its alleged involvement in Mumbai attacks on 26<sup>th</sup> November, 2008.<sup>242</sup> Prior to these attacks LeT was known for its operation against the Indian Army in Indian held Kashmir. It is also believed that LeT was allegedly involved in an attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001.

*Dawa-ul-Irshad* is the parent religious organization of LeT. It was established in 1987 with its headquarter near Lahore. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Zafar Iqbal and Arab Afghan fighter Dr. Abdullah Azam were its founding members. However, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed retains de facto control over the organization. The objective of this movement was to assist Afghan *mujahideen* to liberate Afghanistan from Soviet aggression. LeT's another wing *Maskar-e-Aqsa* was established near Muzaffarabad, Pakistan. This group began to infiltrate into Kashmir Valley in 1992. LeT was allegedly

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<sup>240</sup> On August 16, 2012, militants attacked a bus carrying Shia passengers to Gilgit in Northern Areas and killed 20 persons in cold blood. The Taliban claimed responsibility. A few months later another bus was attacked and around 15 persons were killed in the same region. The Taliban again admitted responsibility. Their operational capability is extending to all corners of Pakistan.

<sup>241</sup> Siddiqui, Qandeel., *What is Lashkar-e-Taiba?*  
[www.multimedia/archive/00118/Qandeels\\_foregrag\\_1\\_118041](http://www.multimedia/archive/00118/Qandeels_foregrag_1_118041).

<sup>242</sup> More than 195 people killed in these attacks. Westerners and particularly Jewish were the prime target of these attacks.

involved in attacks on Indian Army barracks in the Red Fort, Delhi, in December 2000 and in a series of bomb blasts in Mumbai in 2002-03. The proclaimed agenda of these militants was restoration of Islamic rule over India.

LeT has several thousand members in Pakistan, Kashmir and India. It is the only militant group based in Pakistan with support bases across India. LeT's major source of financing are donations from Pakistani and foreign based supporters. Most of its activists belong to the religious community of *Ahl-e-Hadith*, who are followers of the school of *Wahhabi fiqh* established by Muhammad Abdul Wahhab of Saudi Arabia. The Pakistani government imposed a ban on LeT under the Pakistan Anti-Terrorism Act in 2002. It has also been designated as a terrorist group by the US.<sup>243</sup>

#### 3.5.6.2. *Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)*

This is an old militant organization dating back to the days of Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion in 1980s. It has links with militant organizations all over the region including Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Xinjiang China and Bangladesh. The motto of HUJI declares that it is the 'Second line defense for all Muslim States.' Its members are followers of the *Deobandi* school of thought. Its declared objective is the imposition of the supremacy of Islam over the whole world.

Maulana Irshad Ahmed, Maulana Ahmed Umer, Qari Saifullah Akhtar and Qari Zafar were among its founding members. After the death of Maulana Irshad Ahmed during Afghan *Jihad* in June 1982, Qari Saifullah Akhtar was appointed its *Amir (Head)*. He was very close to *Al-Qaeda* and the Afghan Taliban before 9/11. He was based in

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<sup>243</sup> Chakesari, p.134. [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/index.html](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/index.html)



Kabul during that period. He was also believed to be the operational head of *Al-Qaeda* in Pakistan. HUJI commanders have been fighting wars in Indian held Kashmir, Chechnya, Uzbekistan and Sinkiang region of China. It is believed that four thousand (4000) HUJI fighters took part in Afghan war and it has developed strong relationship with Taliban. Later they also fought against the Northern Alliance. During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan its central Secretariat was located in Kabul. At that time it had six training camps located in the Kabul and Khost regions.

HUJI militants have been involved in suicide attacks and target killings. HUJI was also actively involved in the liberation struggle in Indian Occupied Kashmir. HUJI received funding from supporters in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other Muslim countries. Their activities were proscribed after the 9/11 incident.<sup>244</sup>

#### **3.5.6.3. *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen-al-Almi (HUMA)***

HUMA emerged as a splinter group of its mother organization called *Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami* HUJI due to internal tensions in the year 2002. It was a *Deobandi Jihadi* outfit and was the first such group formed after 9/11. Its foremost objective was to target American and Western interests in Pakistan and to force the Pakistani government to withdraw its support for war on terror. HUMA had close links with Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and was an associated group of *Al-Qaeda*.

Muhammad Imran was its founding organizational chief with Muhammad Hanif as his deputy and the chief of its militant wing. One of its activists, namely Sharib, was

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<sup>244</sup>Chakesari pp.133–134. See also [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist\\_outfits/harkat\\_ul\\_jehad\\_e\\_islami.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkat_ul_jehad_e_islami.htm).



believed to be the mastermind of the Sheraton Hotel suicide bombing in 2002. He had also planned an assassination attempt on President Musharraf in Karachi.

In 2002, the police arrested fourteen members of HUMA including Sharib and Mufti Zubair Ahmed from Karachi. HUMA's operation chief, Muhammad Junaid was also arrested from Karachi after a gun battle. In 2004, police arrested one of its terrorists and recovered a book from him comprising a set of guidelines for terrorists. HUMA's militants acquired training from camps located in Afghanistan.<sup>245</sup>

#### **3.5.6.4. *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (JeM)**

Maulana Masood Azhar founded *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (JeM) in Karachi after his differences with Fazlur Rahman Khalil of *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen* (HUM). JeM militants are hardliner *Deobandi Sunni* Muslims. The main objective of JeM was to liberate Kashmir from India and unite it with Pakistan. The group had targeted the Indian Army, their camps and convoys and other government installations.

JeM was allegedly receiving support and training etc. from the Afghan Taliban and from *Al-Qaeda*. JeM militants are in hundreds and have established camps in Azad Kashmir and Doda region of Indian-held Kashmir.

Maulana Azhar Masood, *Amir* (Head) of JeM belongs to the Bahawalpur region in South Punjab. He received his religious education from a known *Deobandi* religious

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<sup>245</sup> Gunaratna, Rohan., & Khurram, Iqbal., *Pakistan-Terrorism Ground Zero*, Reaktion Books, London, 2011. Also see, [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist\\_outfits/harkat\\_ul\\_jihad\\_e\\_islami.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkat_ul_jihad_e_islami.htm). Also see, [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/index.html](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/index.html).

school in Binori Town, Karachi. He was editor-in-chief of a religious magazine *Sada-i-Mujahid* (Voice of *Mujahideen*). In February, 1994 he was arrested by the Indian Army in Indian-occupied Kashmir for his alleged involvement with Kashmiri militants. In December 1999 an Indian Airline was hijacked by a *Jihadi* group called *Harkat-ul-Ansar* (HUA) and a demand was made for the release of Masood Azhar in exchange. JeM militants have conducted suicide operations and are closely linked with the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda*. JeM was officially banned in Pakistan and by the US authorities after September 11, 2001 attacks.<sup>246</sup>

#### 3.5.6.5. *Laskhar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)*

*Laskhar-e-Jhangvi* (LeJ) is a *Sunni* sectarian organization affiliated with the *Deobandi* group. It emerged as a splinter group from its parent organization *Sipah-e-Sahaba*. Its main objective is to transform Pakistan into a *Sunni* State. This group is responsible for the killings of members of the *Shia* community. Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq are founding members of LeJ. Riaz Basra was involved in the Afghan *Jihad* as well and also with the Taliban.

LeJ has now diverted its attention towards pro-Taliban militant activities. Its members have been involved in suicide bombings in Pakistan. LeJ was allegedly involved in the murder of Wall Street journalist Daniel Pearl and multiple assassination attempts on former President Pervez Musharraf and former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif, Mir Zafar-ullah-Jamali and Shaukat Aziz. It has close operational links with *Al-Qaeda*. LeJ has also been involved in training suicide bombers including women suicide

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<sup>246</sup> Chakesari, p. 134, Gunaratna, Khurram, *Pakistan-Terrorism Ground Zero*, Reaktion Books, London, 2011. See also [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/index.html](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/index.html)

bombers. LeJ has emerged as the most lethal militant group in Pakistan.<sup>247</sup> It has recently reinitiated its sectarian campaign against the Shia community. Recently it admitted responsibility for carrying out two consecutive attacks in Quetta city of Baluchistan and killed almost 200 persons in January and February 2013. These attacks were the worst of their kind in Pakistan's history of suicide terrorism.

#### 3.5.6.6. *Jundullah*

*Jundullah* (Army of God) is believed to be formed by Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, in Karachi. Its area of operations has been Karachi and its adjacent areas in Southern Pakistan.<sup>248</sup> *Jundullah* activists had received training in the tribal areas by the Taliban militants. Many militants and suicide bombers of *Jundullah* were former students of Islamabad's *Lal Masjid*. According to intelligence reports there were almost 600 *Jundullah* militants present in Karachi. Their commander was Ata-ur-Rehman, whereas Shahzad Ahmed Bajwa alias Umer was its Deputy Commander. Both were arrested after a daring assassination attempt on Pakistan Army Corps Commander in Karachi on June 10, 2004.<sup>249</sup>

*Jandullah* was responsible for carrying out high-profile attacks. It included several target killings, bomb blasts and suicide bombings.

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<sup>247</sup>Chakesari,p.151.Alsosee[www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/index.html](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/index.html)

<sup>248</sup> Two organizations operate under the title of *Jundullah*. One is the *Jundullah* operating in association with *Al-Qaeda* whereas the other was established by an Iranian Baluch separatist leader Abdul Malik Regi. He was primarily involved against the Iranian government in Iranian Baluchistan, however, had been cooperating with *Al-Qaeda* as well. Shehzad, S. Syed, *Inside Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11*. Palgrave McMillan, USA, 2011.

<sup>249</sup> Dr. Akmal Waheed, an orthopedic surgeon and his brother Dr. Arshad Waheed, a cardiologist, were alleged to be members of *Junduallah*. In 2004, they were arrested for providing medical treatment to high profile *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban leadership.

### **3.5.6.7. Tehrik-e-Islami Lashkar-e-Muhammadi (TILM)**

TILM was formed in Karachi in 2002. It was composed of former militants from *Deobandi jihadi* organizations including *Jaish-e-Muhammad*. Terrorists attacks carried out by TILM were intensified after the incident of *Lal Masjid* in Islamabad in 2007.

TILM was, reportedly, composed of just fourteen members and Wajahat alias Baber was head of the group. Muhammad Asif and Amar Hassan were key members of TILM with expertise in explosives and bomb making. TILM met its operational expenses through robberies from banks and multinational companies. TILM has links with Afghan Taliban and they supplied equipment to Afghan Taliban including laptops and blankets etc to the tribal areas. Its members were trained in the tribal areas and also Afghanistan.

### **3.5.7. Changing Patterns of Terrorism**

The conflict with these groups has adversely affected almost all segment of population. It includes a wide ranging spectrum from political arenas to social and cultural, education and health. In short, Pakistani society is suffering badly due to the wrath of terrorists. The negative consequences of terrorism can now be observed in almost every sphere of life. For instance, schools imparting secular education are being bombed and attacked almost every day. School vans carrying children are being fired upon with scores of children killed. Girls' education is abhorred by Taliban and several girl schools have been destroyed. The Taliban believes that polio vaccination drive is part of an evil design by the US to make Pakistanis impotent and sterile. Therefore, *fatwas* have been issued against Polio vaccination. Several members of Polio vaccination teams, male and female,

have been killed in different areas of Pakistan. As a result thousands of innocent children have been deprived of polio vaccines and now have no prevention against the virus.

Some of the major issues relating to Taliban insurgency and militancy are outlined below:

### **3.5.7.1. The *Madressa* System - In The Line of Fire**

The fact that most of the Taliban militants were students of *Madressa* (religious schools) has also raised a debate on the role of *Madressa* system in promotion of terrorism. There are thousands of *Madressas* in Pakistan imparting religious education to children.<sup>250</sup> Although *Madressas* and their culture are being accused of offering a breeding place for the Taliban and their ideology, however, a direct nexus with terrorism is yet to be established.

There were approximately 189 *Madressas* in Pakistan at the time of its independence in 1947. Later due to a mushroom growth, there are almost 45000 registered *Madressas*. The number of unregistered *Madressas* is even higher than the registered ones.<sup>251</sup>

The *Madressa's* role in extremism is not proved; however, the fact cannot be denied that due to their unregulated practices they do provide a conducive environment

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<sup>250</sup> Approximately 1.3% of children receive *Madressa* education, whereas, 65% receive education in public schools. The nexus of *Madressa* with militancy cannot be proved on the basis of available data and researches conducted so far. Andrabi, Tahir., Das, Jishus., C, Christine. Fair., Khwaja, Asim. Ijaz Khwaja., *The Madrassa Myth*, Foreign Policy, June, 2009.

<sup>251</sup> Jayshree, Bajoria., *Pakistan's Education System and Links to Extremism*, Council on Foreign Relations, October, 2009.

for the growth of extremist tendencies which might be exploited by religious extremist groups engaged in violence.

### 3.5.7.2. Children - Victims of Militancy

Children have always been the innocent victims of every war throughout history. The war against Terror has taken its toll on children in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Taliban militants are increasingly exploiting children in the execution of suicide attacks.

Baitullah Mehsud, Taliban leader of South Waziristan, had initiated the use of children as suicide bombers. His colleague Qari Hussain operated training centers for young militants and children in South Waziristan. Several training centers were established in Makeen and Baggar regions of South Waziristan during late 2003 for providing training to young militants in explosives and guerilla warfare.<sup>252</sup> Later they were shifted to remote areas in the aftermath of military operation in Waziristan in 2004.

The Taliban media cells usually distribute videos of children suicide bombers undergoing training in tribal areas as part of their war propaganda.<sup>253</sup> These videos are also used for attracting other young recruits through religious emotionalism. Videos contain songs and sermons with focus on *Jihad* and martyrdom for indoctrination of children and teenagers. A Taliban video containing a song sung by children: "If you try to find me after I have died, you will never find my whole body, you will find me in little pieces," was aimed at attracting young recruits.

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<sup>252</sup> Monthly *Herald*, Lahore, October 2006.

<sup>253</sup> Nic Robertson, report on CNN July 7, 2009.



A video distributed by Taliban militants contain interviews with young boys immediately before going for their missions. A young boy named Arshad Ali from Swat conducted a suicide attack on a polling station in February 2008. He states in his video message that, he is about to carry out a martyrdom operation. He further states that some hypocrites say that we are doing this for money, or because of brainwashing, but we are told by Allah to target these pagans. He also invited his fellows to sacrifice themselves.<sup>254</sup>

In yet another video, a young suicide bomber named Masood claims in a video message:

“Suicide bombers are the atomic weapons of Muslims because Muslims do not have the latest weapons to fight enemies who are committing atrocities in Kashmir, Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq.”<sup>255</sup>

The fact that children are even bought and sold by various groups with links to militants for this purpose is not entirely incorrect. It is said that a trained child suicide bomber can be sold to other terrorist groups for a price of US \$ 5000 to 6000. Taliban leaders have been openly boasting about their squad of child suicide bombers. Children as young as 8-9 years old are being trained.

The Pakistan army discovered this gruesome fact after their recovery of children from suicide bombing training camps during their operations in Waziristan and Swat in 2003 and 2009. It is believed that money is also being paid to poor families but not always with the information that their child will be used as a human bomb. They are told

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<sup>254</sup> Meo, Nick., *Taliban Recruits Teenage Suicide Bombers for Revenge Attacks*, Daily Telegraph May 30, 2009.

<sup>255</sup> Taliban Video Claims Pakistan Attacks, AFP, January 18, 2009.



that their child will receive education and free boarding and lodging in a *Madressa* and will be trained for *Jihad*. Some parents in low lying areas of Waziristan have secretly confided to reporters and administration about forced abduction of their children for this purpose as well.

“Taliban leader (Meshsud) had turned suicide bombing into a production output, not unlike Toyota cars --- Mehsud was also producing these suicide bombers, which are sold or bartered, which can be used by other groups.”<sup>256</sup>

Several children would-be suicide bombers have been apprehended prior to carrying out their lethal operation by security agencies.<sup>257</sup> Their interviews reveal horrific details of their trainings and the indoctrination process they have been subjected to by the Taliban.<sup>258</sup> Several boys rescued by the army during Swat operation narrated details of their training as suicide bombers: A 13 year old boy named Aman stated that they (Taliban) would call us to the mosque and tell us about *Jihad* and martyrdom, then take us to *Madressa* and teach us verses from the Quran. Another boy who was approximately 14 years old revealed that,

“they teach us how to use Kalashinkovs and machine guns, rocket launchers, grenades, bombs. They tell us to use them only against infidels. Then they

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<sup>256</sup> *Mehsud buying child bombers?*, Daily Times, July 3, 2009.

<sup>257</sup> A twelve years old boy was arrested on Pakistan Afghan border trying to enter Afghanistan on May 19, 2008. He stated that he was going to fulfill his suicide mission. *Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers*, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008-Afghanistan, May 20, 2008. See [www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/486cbOdf1a.html](http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/486cbOdf1a.html).

<sup>258</sup> Orla Guerin interview a 14 year old would be suicide bomber Jameel who was arrested by the army during operation in the tribal area of Bajaur agency in 2009. He had been recruited and trained for carrying out an attack on a mosque. However his arrest saved his life.

teach us how to do a suicide attack. There are thousand like us with them.”<sup>259</sup>

A boy named Siraj said, “we used to receive training for sixteen hours. We would carry out physical exercises daily. They taught us about *Jihad* and virtues of martyrdom.”

Khaleel Khan, another teenager stated that we were continuously reminded about our religious duty to receive training for fighting the enemies of Islam and we were also told that the Pakistani army is an enemy of Islam, as it is fighting at the behest of Christians and Jews.<sup>260</sup> Many children who have not been lucky to be apprehended before their mission have killed hundreds of innocent people so far. For instance, a famous anti-Taliban religious scholar Mufti Sarfaraz Naeemi who had issued *fatwas* against suicide attacks was killed by a teenage suicide bomber in his office on June 10, 2009. The assassin was allowed entry into the office because he looked like a student of the religious seminary of the scholar. Later investigations reveal that he was 14-15 years old.<sup>261</sup>

Another teenage bomber attacked the Peshawar Press Club on December 22, 2009<sup>262</sup> and killed a policeman posted on guard duty there. The boy was in his early teens with pimples on his face. Another teenager attacked a rally of a political party *Jamaat*

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<sup>259</sup> *Pakistan: Children of the Taliban*, April 2009, PBS – [www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/pakistan802/video/video\\_index.html](http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/pakistan802/video/video_index.html). Last accessed 2009.

<sup>260</sup> *Teenage bombers rescued from Taliban suicide training camps*, Daily *The Nation*, July 27, 2009.

<sup>261</sup> Daily *The News*, Lahore, June 11, 2009. Also see Rodriguez, Alex., *Taliban critic slain in Pakistan suicide bombing*, Los Angeles Time, June 13, 2009.

<sup>262</sup> Daily *The News*, Islamabad, December 22, 2009.

*Islami*, in Qissa Khawani bazaar, a crowded market place in Peshawar and killed 24 people on April 18, 2010.<sup>263</sup>

As already pointed out, Taliban leaders boast about their capability and the fact that they have a squad of children and teenage suicide bombers at their disposal.

Sharmain Obaid Chinoy interviewed Qari Hussain Mehsud, Taliban's master trainer of suicide attacks. He admitted that he recruits and train children as young as even six years old. "Children are tools to achieve God's will. And whatever comes your way, you sacrifice it."<sup>264</sup>

A Maulvi in Karachi told Ms Chinoy that there is no problem in finding sacrificial lambs (Children for suicide bombing).<sup>265</sup>

Qari Fazlullah, a Taliban leader in Swat, states that a lot of people have given us everything for *Jihad*, their homes, their money, their children too.<sup>266</sup>

Another Taliban commander Qari Abdullah, while commenting on the use of children as suicide bombers said,

"When you are fighting, then God provides you with the means. Children are tools to achieve God's will. And whatever comes your way, you sacrifice it, so it is fine."<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> Daily *The News*, Islamabad, April 19, 2009.

<sup>264</sup> Edge, Dan., *Children of the Taliban*, PBS Frontline, August 4, 2009.

<sup>265</sup> *Pakistan: Children of the Taliban*, April 2009, PBS – [www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/pakistan802/video/video\\_index.html](http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/pakistan802/video/video_index.html). Last accessed 2009.

<sup>266</sup> Interview with the author. August 11, 2007.

<sup>267</sup> *Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan*, Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Report 2010:12, p. 46.

It has also been observed that the majority of the suicide attackers before the *Lal Masjid* incident in July 2007 were between 18-24 years of age. However, in the post *Lal Masjid* scenario, younger recruits are now being increasingly employed for carrying out suicide attacks.<sup>268</sup>

It must be noted that Pakistan is one of world's few states with the highest ratio of youth in its population. Almost 40% of people are under the age of 14. This provides a readily available crop of teenage recruits for militants.

### **3.5.7.3. Women and Old men**

No segment of Pakistani population is immune from the spread of Talibanization and their ideology. Women and old men have also been used in carrying out suicide operations. However, as opposed to the use of young men and teenagers, the use of women and old men as suicide bomber is indeed limited.

There are only two known cases of women suicide attackers in Pakistan. On August 8, 2011, a 17 year old female clad in a *burqa* blew herself up near a police check post near the Lahori gate in Peshawar city. She went close to the post and shouted God is Great (*Allah-o-Akbar*) before blowing herself up, killing seven persons. Another women also clad in a *burqa* carried out an attack on the convoy of Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the late leader of *Jamaat Islami*, a religious political party, near a check post in Mohmand Agency on November 11, 2012. Three people were injured when she mistakenly hit the follow up vehicle.

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<sup>268</sup> *Into the mind of a suicide bomber*. Daily Dawn July 21, 2007.

An attack on Marhaba hotel in Peshawar on May 16, 2007 was conducted by an old man who entered the busy restaurant during lunch hour and exploded his belt. Later investigations revealed that a paper tied to his leg was recovered with a message stating that whoever is engaged in spying for Americans will be destroyed. This hotel was owned by an Afghan relative of Uzbek warlord Abdul Rasheed Dostum who is an ally of President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. A few weeks earlier, the security agencies had arrested a man who was allegedly the son of Afghan Taliban commander Mulla Dadullah. Later, Mulla Dadullah was killed in a US forces raid in Afghanistan. The attack was carried out by the Taliban in retaliation for his killing.<sup>269</sup>

Pakistan is in a state of *de facto* civil war.<sup>270</sup> It fulfills all the preconditions for existence of a state of civil war.<sup>271</sup> Militancy has spread to almost all parts of Pakistan. Pakistan army is engaged in large scale operations against the militants in tribal areas and law enforcement agencies are combating them in urban centers all over the country. This is a deplorable state of affairs and has adverse consequences for the state and society of Pakistan. This conflict has exposed and brought to surface the inherent weaknesses in the political and social fabric of Pakistani society. Religious prejudices have increased and sectarian cohesion has been adversely affected. Pakistani society has been thrown into a socio-cultural and political conflict between the liberals and religious fundamentalist

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<sup>269</sup> Daily *Mashriq*, Peshawar May 16, 2007.

<sup>270</sup> Pakistan is in a state of civil war against Taliban militants. Khattak, M. Shareef., *Civil War?* Daily *The News*, February 17, 2009.

<sup>271</sup> Fearon, James.,and Latin, David., *Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War*, APSR, Vol. 97, No. 1, February, 2003, pp. 75-90.

elements with the former feeling insecure and exposed to risks.<sup>272</sup> Militants are enjoying their dominant and intimidating status in the present day Pakistan since the social and political institutions have literally become dysfunctional in the face of extremism in Pakistan.

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<sup>272</sup> Murder of Governor Punjab Salman Taseer on allegations of blasphemy by a policeman on January 4, 2011 and Federal Minister Shahbaz Bhatti, a Christian on March 3, 2011 by religious militants is a proof of increasing tensions in Pakistan.

## CHAPTER 4

### PASHTUN SOCIETY, CULTURE AND THE WAZIRISTAN REGION

This chapter discusses the region of Waziristan which is part of the tribal areas of Pakistan and the society and culture of its *Pashtun* inhabitants. Tribal areas are administratively known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA). The region of Waziristan, comprising of North and South Waziristan, is located in its Southern part. *Pashtun* tribes comprising of Wazir and Mehsud inhabit the region. There are other tribes such as Bhattani, Dawar and Burki as well. This region, its population, social, cultural and political conditions have a great significance for the subject of this research.

#### 4.1. *Pashtun* History, Culture and Socio-Political Environment

The *Pashtun*<sup>273</sup> are an ethnic group with a rich history in this region. The ethnic origins and society of *Pashtuns* has been discussed by many historians and sociologists. For instance, that they originate around four thousand years ago from groups of Central Asian Aryan nomadic people. This school of thought believes that Pashto is a modern form of Saka language which belongs to the East Iranian family of languages.<sup>274</sup> Vocabulary of their language is heavily indebted to Persian, Arabic and Urdu languages.

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<sup>273</sup> The British referred to them as Pathans.

<sup>274</sup> Ghani, A., '*Pakhtun*', in *Encyclopaedia of Asian History*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988, quoted by Mukulika p. 21.



*Pashtuns* are highly conscious of their peculiar identity. Akbar Ahmad<sup>275</sup> describes them as:

1. *Pashtuns* are predominantly an Eastern Iranian people, speakers of the *Pashto* language, inhabit a region that is located between Afghanistan and Pakistan;
2. *Pashtuns* are *Sunni* Muslims, follow an ancient set of cultural values called *Pashtunwali*; and
3. *Pashtuns* trace their patrilineal descent back thousands of years in history.

#### **4.1.1. Ethnic definition**

The *Pashtuns* are defined as a people who have common Eastern Iranian ethnic origins. They share a common language called *Pashto* and have a common culture in the region. Their tribes are settled in the region that lies between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Historically this region was called Khurasan.

#### **4.1.2. Cultural definition**

All *Pashtuns* are Muslims. They consider the religion of Islam and its observance as an integral part of being a *Pashtun*.<sup>276</sup> They observe an ancient set of cultural norms called *Pashtunwali*. A non-Muslim is not recognized as a *Pashtun* by the *Pashtun* themselves even if he claims ancestral lineage with *Pashtun* ancestors. The majority of *Pashtuns* follow the *Sunni* sect of Islam; however, there are followers of *Shia* and various

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<sup>275</sup> Ahmad, Akbar. S., *Millennium and Charisma among Pathans: A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976.

<sup>276</sup> Banerjee, Mukulika, *The Pathan Unarmed*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2004, p. 29

other sects among them as well. *Shia* beliefs are practiced in parts of Turi and Bangash tribes who are mostly inhabitants of the Orakzai and Kurram regions.

#### 4.1.3. Ancestral definition

The *Pashtun* are an ethnic group and a claim to being a *Pashtun* is dependent on being the son of a *Pashtun* father. This patrilineal definition is based upon the traditions of *Pashtunwali*. This unwritten code has the force of law and has maintained the tradition of exclusively patriarchal tribal lineages for centuries. This definition places less emphasis on what language one speaks, such as Pashto, Persian, Urdu or English. For example, the *Pashtuns* settled in India have lost both the language and presumably many of the ways of their putative ancestors, but trace their fathers' ethnic heritage to the *Pashtun* tribes.<sup>277</sup>

## 4.2. Culture

*Pashtun* culture is grounded in traditions and norms which are almost three thousand years old. These norms have become ingrained in the cultural psyche of *Pashtuns*. They are collectively referred to as *Pashtunwali*. *Pashtun* tradition and culture also depend upon the understanding of the *Pashto* language as well. This language in fact carries the traditions and history of the *Pashtuns*. *Pashtun* culture is a combination of native customs with some influences from South and Western Asia.

#### 4.2.1. *Pashtunwali*

The tribal structure in Pakistan is unique and calls for analysis under its own parameters. The foremost governing component is *Pashtunwali* which describes the behavior and customs of *Pashtuns* in tribal areas.

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<sup>277</sup> Caroe, Olaf., *The Pathan*, Mc Millan & Co. London, 1984.

*Pashtunwali* is central to their identity as *Pashtuns* and as a male centered code of conduct. In the tribal model, conformity to *Pashtunwali* defines what it means to be a true *Pashtun*. “This code is the idiom through which the *Pushtun* expresses his *Pushtunness*.”<sup>278</sup> The cultural norms date back from the times of nomadic habitation of *Pashtuns* when each person was dependent for survival and existence upon his immediate relations, kinsmen and tribesmen. There were no laws and governments; however, there were tribes and their cultural codes and ethics which were sacrosanct for everyone without question. In this nomadic environment, harsh characteristics developed among these tribesmen for the sake of collective survival. The observance of codes became essential for respect and status within the tribe.

Traditionally, the individual and collective conduct of *Pushtuns* was guided by the *Pushtunwali*. As already mentioned it is a set of socio-cultural norms which are to be observed with full devotion by the *Pashtuns*. *Pashtunwali* is also described as a historical code of behavior, however, it is neither immutable nor static. It is a paradigm of ‘appropriate behavior’ which is very much prone to adaptation and transformation in response to emerging challenges.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>278</sup> Ahmed, p. 89.

<sup>279</sup> It is argued that that the adoption of the Gandhian theme of non-violence by the *Khudai Khidmatgar Tehreek* (A social and political movement in 1920s – 1940s) was indeed an exceptional measure, however, not inconsistent with the prescriptions of *Pashtunwali*. Banerjee, Mukulika, p. 15.

Some of the principal values of *Pashtunwali* are mentioned in the following:<sup>280</sup>

#### 4.2.1.1. *Nang* (Honor).

The *Pashtuns* accord a prominent status to honor in their individual and collective life. *Nang* or honor is the basic essence or core foundation of *Pashtunwali*.<sup>281</sup> Thus when a *Pashtun* lives and behaves in an honorable manner, he in fact, is following *Pashtunwali*.

A *Pashtun* does not consider his life worth a dime if it is without honor. Honor includes the respect and dignity of female members of a *Pashtun's* family, the sanctity of his home, which include his region or country, his religion and living in accordance with his traditions. The concept of honor includes the identity of a *Pashtun* as a man respecting and upholding his cultural and religious principles based on *Pashtun* traditions. According to *Pashtunwali*, every man defends himself and defies his neighbors. Honor demands the maintenance of sexual propriety. A violation of these values deprives a person of his respect and he loses face. A *Pashtun* is expected to protect his honor and even if need be, die for defending his values. The chastity of women of one's family, protection of his guests, and revenge for a wrong done to him, especially in case of a blood feud, encompass the notion of honor of a *Pashtun*.<sup>282</sup>

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<sup>280</sup> Mohmand, Sher. Muhammad., *Federally Administered Tribal Areas – A Socio-Cultural and Geo-Political History*, Saeed Book Bank, 1999, pp. 24-31. Afridi, Qayum., *The Hill Tribes- Along the Durand Line*. Iris Printers Peshawar, 2003, [www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/pashtunwali.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/pashtunwali.htm), visited on 11-7-2011.

<sup>281</sup> Ahmed, Akbar, S., *Pukhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society*, London, Boston & Henley, Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1980, p. 91.

<sup>282</sup> Barth argues that the quasi-caste hierarchy in the Frontier is not purity (of blood line like among Hindus), but rather ideas of honor and shame. Barth, F., *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans*, London, The Athlone Press, 1959.

#### 4.2.1.2. *Badal* (Revenge):

*Badal* means revenge. This is one of the most cherished of *Pashtun* values and dominant of all *Pashtun* traits. It means that any act which amounts to an infringement of a *Pashtun's* honor, must be avenged in the same style. If a blood relative is murdered, a *Pashtun* is duty bound to take revenge by spilling the blood of his enemy and until he takes revenge, his honor remains questioned. It includes the protection of guests as well. If the guest of a *Pashtun* is attacked or harmed while still in his protection, the *Pashtun* must take revenge. If the territory of a *Pashtun* is attacked, he is bound to defend it and either die in the process or destroy his enemy. Similarly, if Islam is insulted or attacked, a *Pashtun's* honor will remain at stake, unless he spills the blood of the enemies of his religion. A *Pashtun* is not worthy of being called a man until he redeems his honor by taking revenge. A *Pashtun* can wait for indefinite time to take revenge. Sometimes revenge for murders are taken by settling the scores by his next generation. According to a *Pashtun* saying, "Revenge is a dish best served cold". Another *Pashtun* saying is that, "Revenge tastes good after forty years."

*Pashtuns* have the propensity of aggressively responding to aggression. When violence is used against them, the natural reaction and popular approach is to resort to violence in retaliation especially if the aggressor is a non-Muslim power or its supporters. This is very much in accordance with the *Pashtun* traditional code of *Badal* and *Nang*.<sup>283</sup>

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<sup>283</sup> This particular characteristic of *Pashtuns* has been observed in anthropological studies as well. Banerjee, Mukulika, *The Pathan Unarmed*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2004, p.3.

**4.2.1.3. *Merana* (bravery):** A *Pashtun* is expected to be brave and courageous. Machismo is the hallmark of *Pashtun* culture. A *Pashtun* who is timid and un-courageous cannot acquire a place of honor among his folks.

**4.2.1.4. *Tura* (Sword):** This is synonymous with the concept of bravery and courage. The sword of a *Pashtun* must be used if there is a call for its use. In the event of a request for help, against an aggressive act and in protecting honor, the sword of a *Pashtun* must come out of its sheath and must only get back after being reddened with the blood of the transgressor. It also connotes a brave and courageous person. The closest term in English is chivalry. A *Pashtun* also considers carrying a sword as part of his dress code. Swords are now being replaced by modern weapons.

**4.2.1.5. *Nanawatay* (Refuge / Reconciliation):** In case a person wants to seek repentance for his wrongs against another, then the wrong doer goes to the house or abode of the person against whom the wrong has been committed. This act of visiting the victim of his act means that he wants to be forgiven and is here to mend fences. The act of *Nanawatay* can be performed in minor as well as serious cases involving even murder. In a way it is an ancient mechanism for the settlement of feuds. The other party is also expected to honor the *Nanawatay* of his wrong doer and show leniency and extend forgiveness. In the event of a *Nanawatay*, the aggressor party visits the place of abode of the victims along with elders of the tribe. This very act of going there is sufficient to signal that he is here to settle the dispute rather than carrying it on into full-fledged enmity. The aggressor party also takes sheep or other animals as an offer of feast. In the case of serious enmities even intermarriage of girls within the families is encouraged in order to forge stronger bonds with a view to end the enmity forever.

#### **4.2.1.6. *Jirga* (Council)**

This a *Pashtun* mechanism for settling disputes, a discussion forum and a decision making body on tribal issues. It varies in form and composition. It may include a *Jirga* in which all tribesmen participate or a *Jirga* where only the elders of a tribe or different tribes get together and discuss their matters. A *Jirga* may be called for settling dispute over land boundaries or water distribution with other tribes or within a tribe. It may even be called for settling inter-personal disputes among members of a tribe. Parties to a dispute must agree to settle their issues through a *Jirga* first. Once a *Jirga* renders its decision, it is considered binding on the parties.

**4.2.1.7. *Hujra*:** It is a place where male members of a tribe, village or a community meet together. There are private *hujras* in houses as well where male members not only meet male guests and visitors but here a *hujra* is also used for almost all social gatherings. In case of a community *hujra*, the place is used for communal activities and is the common meeting place. It is the focal point in a community's social life.

#### **4.2.1.8. *Teega* (Truce):**

In case of a raging dispute, *teega* connotes a temporary truce till a final solution is found to address the problem. It amounts to a ceasefire. The idea is to prevent blood-shed by suspending hostilities till the elders of the tribe settle the dispute. In this situation, a symbolic stone is placed between the warring groups and a commitment is taken from all sides that until this stone remains in its place, they will not resort to violence and even interaction with one another till the matter is resolved by a *Jirga*.



#### **4.2.1.9 *Lashkar* (Army / tribal militia):**

A *lashkar* is formed either to defend the territory of the tribe or to take punitive action against an aggressor. It can be formed for both defensive and offensive purposes. It may also be mandated to ensure the implementation of the decision of a *Jirga* by force. It comprises of the young and able bodied male members of a tribe or many tribes who assemble together under a command, armed with weapons and are tasked to perform a certain offensive or defensive function. This is the enforcement arm of a tribe.

#### **4.2.1.10. *Mashar* (Elder/Tribal leader):**

This term refers to an elder of the tribe whose command must be respected. Each tribe has elders who are men of mature age and holds a position of respect and status in the tribe. These tribal elders are in effect the leaders of their tribe. Each tribe may have many *Mashars*/elders. Unlike the tribes of other ethnic groups where there is generally one elder and his status is hereditary, *Pashtun* tribes can have many elders depending upon the size of a particular tribe. Elders are also eligible to participate in a *Jirga* and take decisions on tribal matters. They also lead *Lashkars* in a battle. Younger members of the tribe are expected to obey their elders in all personal and tribal matters.

#### **4.2.1.11. *Melmastia* (Hospitality):**

This is another long cherished *Pashtun* tradition and a highly respected cultural norm. It literally means hospitality. In essence it means that a *Pashtun* must always welcome guests and offer them hospitality in accord with their status. A *Pashtun* who claims to have honor (*ghairat*) must prove it with his hospitality. This trait is important for forging friendships and tribal alliances. In a *Pashtun* society, the road to leadership and status goes through the dining table of a *Pashtun*.

*Melmastia* may also include the requirement to offer protection to one's guests. The definition of a guest also extends to a person who has taken refuge either in the house of a *Pashtun* or the territory of a tribe. Protection of a guest or a refugee is part of the tradition of *Melmastia* and it is closely attached to the honor of the host, whether a person or a tribe. An attack or affront of one's guest is an attack or insult of the host and it requires to be avenged. A *Pashtun* is expected to take maximum steps for the protection of his guests, even at the cost of his life.

**4.2.1.12. *Panah* (Protection/Asylum):**

This means offering personal protection to a person who requests it. Once refuge is offered to a person either in one's house or in the territory of a tribe, that person is deemed to be within the *Panah* of a *Pashtun*. It amounts to a grant of an asylum. From that time onwards, the protection of life and honor of the refugee becomes an obligation of the *Pashtun*. He must go to any length for carrying out his obligations.

In the context of contemporary political developments, Pakistani *Pushtuns* welcomed Afghan refugees into their territory after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Almost three million refugees were provided shelter. The majority of these refugees were ethnic *Pashtuns* from Afghanistan. Later, in October 2001, following the US led invasion of Afghanistan, when Taliban and foreign fighters based in Afghanistan crossed over the border and took refuge in the tribal areas, they were offered protection and hospitality under the *Pashtun* traditions of *Melmastia* and *Panah*. It was against this violation of *Pashtun* traditions that *Pashtuns* in Waziristan took up arms in defending their foreign guests when action was taken by the Pakistan army to evict and arrest them. Waziristan's *Pashtuns* were not concerned with the alleged actions of their

guests; rather they were upset that their honor had been violated by the army by taking action against their guests and invading their territory.

### 4.3 Religion

Islam is placed at a very exalted pedestal in the individual and collective lives of *Pashtuns*. Islam is the identity of *Pashtuns* who accord it the most important status. It attracts a level of respect similar or equal to *Pushtunwali* in a *Pushtun* society. The mosque is the most prominent place in a *Pashtun* community. Observing religious decrees and traditions is regarded as part of *Pashtunwali* and the social status of a person in social circles is determined by the standard of his religious devotion and observance. *Pashtun* cultural traditions and Islam are considered synonymous and Islamic injunctions have become part of *Pashtun* culture. Almost all *Pashtuns* are Muslims<sup>284</sup> and no non-Muslim is considered a *Pashtun* even if he has a genealogical relationship with *Pushtuns*.<sup>285</sup> There are, however, many non-Muslims inhabiting *Pushtun* regions both in Afghanistan and Pakistan including Sikhs, Hindus and Christians etc. who speak fluent *Pushto* and dress up like *Pushtuns* as well. However, they are not recognized as *Pushtuns*.

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<sup>284</sup> *Pashtuns* believe that they are descendants of Qais Abdur Rashid, the first *Pashtun* who embraced Islam at the hands of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) during his visit to Medina. He travelled from Afghanistan specially to meet the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and came back as a Muslim. Later, upon his persuasion, *Pashtun* tribes converted to Islam. He had four sons namely Sarban, Batan, Ghourghusht and Karlan. *Pashtuns* are descendants of these four sons of Qais. Shah, Jalal., *Tareekh-e-Pashtun*, Adbiat Publishers, Peshawar, 1978, p.54.

<sup>285</sup> Before embracing Islam in a collective manner in the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD, *Pashtuns* may have been followers of ancient religions including Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism and Judaism since these were the major religions in Afghanistan and North Western India.

#### 4.4. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

The FATA region lies within the territorial limits of the state of Pakistan. The region has been divided into agencies and frontier regions primarily for administrative convenience. The actual reasons for this administrative partitioning can be traced back to British times. It appears, however, that the demarcation of agencies is based on administrative convenience rather than any other consideration. These demarcations were carried out while keeping in mind the colonial considerations of British colonial masters of India whose paramount concern was the administrative and military control of this region rather than caring for tribal settlements and other ground realities. This region was called *Yaghistan*<sup>286</sup> during the British period till the name was changed to tribal areas in 1926.

##### 4.4.1. Population

According to the census of 2010, the total population of FATA is approximately 3176000 (3.1 million appx).<sup>287</sup> The density of population is 114 persons per sq km. A pattern of continuous urban resettlement through migration of population has been noted. There are approximately 0.2 million tribesmen who have settled in urban centers of Pakistan.

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<sup>286</sup> *Yaghistan* means land of the unruled.

<sup>287</sup> Census Report, Government of Pakistan, 2010. Also see FATA Statistics, Ministry of State and Frontier Region, Government of Pakistan, 2011.

#### 4.4.2. Geography<sup>288</sup>

The total area of FATA is approximately 27,220 sq. kilometers. It is equivalent to approximately 2.6% of the area of Pakistan. There are six major passes and routes in the region. Most of these passes have been used by invaders for attacking India throughout various periods of history. The Gandab track passes through the Mohmand tribal area. The Khyber route passes through the Tatar range of mountains. It owes its name to the famous Khyber pass. The last point on this passage is Landi Khana on the Afghan border. It passes through the Afridi tribal area, The Paiwar track passes through the Kurram region and the land of the Bangash tribe. The Tochi route passes through North Waziristan and the Gomal route passes through South Waziristan. Both of these routes connect with the Paktia and Ghazni regions in Afghanistan.<sup>289</sup>

#### 4.4.3. Administrative Set Up

The FATA region is divided into administrative units. These units consist of seven Political Agencies and seven Frontier Regions (FRs). All Frontier Regions lie adjacent to the political agencies and the settled districts. The object of this set-up is administrative convenience. There is no material difference between the administrative setup of an agency and the FR, which is also administered on the pattern of an agency. The Frontier

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<sup>288</sup> "Geographically the Pathan country is hard to describe. It is best seen as a long narrow fortification running parallel in two belts along the line of the Indus. The first belt is made up of plains and valleys and the second standing over the valley is the great transept of the Suleman mountain coming southwards from the mighty range of the Hindu-Kush. This second belt of territory is the tribal area of the hill tribes and lies between the administrative border and the Durand line. This highland has some mountain peaks, ranging from 10,000 to 16,000 feet high. Almost everywhere in this territory, the foothills are bleak. But further up there are valleys in between the mountains, which are of great beauty.----- The variation of climate and season are extreme." Caroe, Olaf, *The Pathan*, Mc Millan & Co. London, 1984.

<sup>289</sup> Afridi, A. Qayyum., '*Hill Tribes*,' Iris Printers Peshawar 2003, pp 95-107. Also see Survey of Pakistan Report-1997, Vol III Government of Pakistan (1998) Printing Corporation of Pakistan

Crime Regulation of 1901 and related laws are applicable in both. Inhabitants of agencies and FRs manage their private and collective affairs in accordance with their tribal customs and traditions.

#### 4.4.4. The FATA Bureaucracy

The Political Agent is the administrative head of the agency. He works under the administrative supervision of the Commissioner and Home Secretary of the KPK<sup>290</sup> province. The Home Secretary oversees law and order in an agency. The Political Agent has multiple responsibilities. He derives his legal authority from the Frontier Crime Regulation of 1901 and other legal enactments extended to the agency. He performs the role of the Chief Executive, the Collector and also the Judge of his agency. He is assisted by Assistant Political Agents, who are in turn assisted by Tehsildars and Naib Tehsildars.<sup>291</sup> The Political Agent is also responsible for the implementation and hearing of appeals in criminal cases. It must be noted that the Frontier Crime Regulation is the procedural law of the agency. Substantive provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code and other laws are implemented through the FCR. Disputes are settled through adjudication procedure in *jirgas*. There are tribal *jirgas* and officially sanctioned *jirgas*. Officially sanctioned *jirgas* are appointed for settlement of disputes under the FCR or when one of the interested party in the dispute is the official administration. It deals with the adjudication of offences committed in areas under government control (the protected

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<sup>290</sup> Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province (KPP) formerly known as the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), This is the fourth province of Pakistan.

<sup>291</sup> Booklet No. 817 (TRC) *History, Origin & Background of Admin: Divisions/Distt in NWFP*,



area). The adjudication mechanism is provided in the FCR. *Jirga* members decide the dispute and send their recommendation for approval to the Political Agent.<sup>292</sup>

Frontier Regions are administered by the Deputy Commissioners of the adjacent settled districts for administrative convenience. The Frontier Region Peshawar is administered by the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar. The Frontier Regions of Tank and D.I.Khan are administered by the Deputy Commissioner D.I.Khan. The Frontier Region of Bannu and Lakki are administered by the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu and the Frontier Region of Kohat and Kurram are administered by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat.<sup>293</sup>

#### **4.5. South Waziristan Agency**

The South Waziristan Agency was established by the British colonial rulers in 1894. The South Waziristan Agency lies to the extreme south of FATA. It has a total area of 6,620 sq. kilometers. This comprises almost 32% of the total area of FATA. It shares its boundaries with the Frontier Region Tank, Baluchistan province and Afghanistan. Most of the terrain is mountainous and dry with some fertile regions around the main habitation centers. Most mountains are dry and barren whereas some have thick forests. The river Gomal is the main river. Chief sources of water are mountain streams and rainfall.

The Frontier Region Tank is situated close to the borders of the South Waziristan Agency.<sup>294</sup> Its total geographical area is 213 sq kilometers which is appx 0.9% of the total

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<sup>292</sup> *Jirga* are regulated under the Frontier Crime Regulation by the Political Agent.

<sup>293</sup> Administrative structure of Frontier Region operates in a similar manner as a Political Agency.

<sup>294</sup> Waziristan is situated at 69-70 degree longitude, east of Greenwich and 32-33 degree latitude North of Greenwich. It is divided into South and North Waziristan. According to Olaf Caroe, the region lying between river Gomal and Kurram is known as Waziristan. However, this definition has its flaws in the sense that there are areas lying between the two rivers which are deep inside Pakistan and cannot be included in this definition. On the other hand, there are areas in Afghanistan which are closely linked to the Wazirs but are across the Durand Line and therefore



FATA area. It is surrounded by the D.I Khan district and the South Waziristan Agency. The Frontier Region D.I. Khan is also situated in proximity, which has a total area of 3229 sq kms and appx. 1.2% of the total FATA population. Most of the region is inhabited by Sherani and Usthrani tribes. It shares its borders with D.I. Khan and Baluchistan. The total population is 430,000 appx. This constitutes 14 % of the total population of FATA. The density of population is 47 persons per sq. kilometer.

The Wazirs form the biggest tribe in South Waziristan. Wazirs in South Waziristan are mostly Derwesh Khel Wazirs. Their ancestor Musa Derwesh is buried in Birmal Afghanistan.<sup>295</sup> Ahmad Zai and Utmanzai are their sub tribes. Ahmadzai Wazirs form the major tribe inhabiting the area around Wana, the administrative center of SWA. The other major tribe is the Mehsud tribe which inhabits large swathes of territory in South Waziristan. Its members are settled around the towns of Makeen and adjoining areas.

#### **4.6. North Waziristan agency**

The North Waziristan Agency was established by the British in 1895. The agency shares its boundaries with the South Waziristan agency, the Frontier Region Bannu, the Kurram agency and the Paktia region of Afghanistan. It has a total area of 4707 sq. kilometers. This comprises almost 21% of the total area of FATA. The total population is 361000 appx. This constitutes 14.4 % of the total population of FATA. The density of population is 51 persons per sq. kilometer. Major tribes are Wazirs, mostly Utmanzai clan

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cannot be included in Caroe's definition of Waziristan, for instance, Birmal, which is the native place of the Wazir tribe is inside Afghanistan. Musa Neeka, the forefather of Wazirs, is buried in Birmal. See Mehsud, K. Arif., *Waziristan-Kurram say Gomal Tuk*, 1978, pp. 33-38.

<sup>295</sup> Wazirs and Mehsuds are related genealogically. The term Wazir is specific mainly to the Dervesh Khail tribe of Wazirs which is a tribe descended from Musa Dervesh [Musa Neeka] and are mainly divided into Utmanzai and Ahmadzai Wazirs.

of Wazirs, and Dawars. The Tochi is the main river and the Tochi pass connects the region with Afghanistan.

The Frontier Region Lakki Marwat has a total area of 1030 sq kilometers. It is surrounded by the Bannu district, the Frontier Region Bannu, the district of Lakki and North Waziristan.

The Frontier Region Bannu has a total area of 877 sq kilometers which constitutes almost 3.22 % of the total FATA area. In this Region, the total population is appx 114,000. This constitutes 3.6% of the total FATA population. The density of the population is 130 persons per sq. kilometer. It is surrounded by Bannu district and North Waziristan agency.

#### **4.7. Economy<sup>296</sup>**

Limited agriculture, fruits, timber, cattle breeding mainly of sheep and goats, and trade are the main sources of livelihood for ordinary people in North Waziristan. A large number of people are engaged in government services and other professions in Pakistan.

This region is comparatively more fertile than South Waziristan. It is a good breeding area for goats and sheep and has millet, rice, corn, sugarcane, barley and wheat as its chief crops.

#### **4.8. Social infrastructure**

The social structure of the tribal areas is based on tribal divisions. Tribes are ethnic entities with a common forefather and hereditary characteristics. Each tribe is divided

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<sup>296</sup> Annual Development Programme, 1992-93: Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Government of NWFP, Planning And Development Department FATA Development Section.

into further divisions called *Khels*.<sup>297</sup> These are further sub-divided into sub-*Khels*. The sub-division of *Khels* goes down to a family unit. The concept of family envisions an extended family structure, including, in addition to the husband, wife, and children, the father's brothers, uncles, cousins and nephews. The concept revolves around the notion of acceptance of responsibility for enmity. It means that the enemy of one family member will be considered as the enemy of the whole family.

#### **4.9. A Traditional *Pashtun* Village**

*Pashtuns* mostly live in villages called *Kalay*. This in general is a unit of population consisting of houses. The number of houses may range from a few less than ten to a few hundred. Almost all villages are tribe-specific settlements. This means that the lands surrounding the village are owned by members of the same tribe. This kind of exclusivity of land is jealously guarded and fiercely protected by the tribes. However, people from other tribes may also be permitted to live there. A village is generally constructed on a high altitude, mostly a mountainous slope. This is due to defense needs against attacks by rival tribes. Villages are surrounded by lands which are owned by the members of the tribe inhabiting the village. A stream of water or a spring is closely located to the village. In Pashto language this place is called *Gudar*. Women are usually responsible for fetching water from the *Gudar*. *Pashtun* history is full of accounts of tribal feuds over control of water sources.

A village is a collection of mud houses. All houses are surrounded by high walls and divided into male and female sections. The male section is called *Hujra*, which is exclusively reserved for male family members and guests. A house is a joint family

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<sup>297</sup> Afridis are divided into eight *Khels* whereas the Mahsuds have three and the Orakzais have eighteen *Khels*.

abode where two or three generations of a family live together under the supervision of a family head. Generally, all four corners of a house have high watch-towers. Young male members of the family are stationed there for guard duty at night and sometimes during the day in case of a continuing enmity. Most men carry guns. Women are also trained in the use of guns and actively participate with their male relatives in battles during tribal feuds.

It must be noted that these traditions are slowly changing with the onset of modernization.

#### **4.10. The Post-British Annexation Scene**

##### **4.10.1. The General scene**

The British entered into this region during the Sikh period in the 1820s after gaining the trust of Sikh rulers of Punjab. In the earlier phase, the British confined themselves to the role of military and political advisors of the Sikhs. The Sikh administration and military were not highly organized and the British gained influence in the court of the Sikh Maharajas by taking advantage of their lack of expertise. This provided them with an opportunity to observe the socio-political and strategic aspects of this area. The British East India Company, being an entity with commercial stakes, was interested in markets beyond the Oxus in Central Asia. British adventurers, including, William Moorcroft<sup>298</sup> and Sir Alexander Burns<sup>299</sup> traveled as far as Afghanistan and

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<sup>298</sup> The English first of all entered into Waziristan in around 1824. They surveyed the area through their spies disguised as travelers in these areas. William Morecroft, a British adventurer/spy ventured into Waziristan and befriended a local named Sohan Khan Wazir. He later gave him a letter with instructions that his host will get support from his countrymen upon showing this letter. After a few years when the British got engaged in the region, Sohan Khan did receive patronage and support from them. He became a trusted friend of the British and facilitated

Central Asia in order to study the region and to design a strategy for British involvement in the region.<sup>300</sup> The British had all along been interested in controlling this region due to its strategic importance.<sup>301</sup> They consolidated their hold in a tactful manner without raising the suspicions of the Sikhs. They observed the region through their agents and as the military and administrative advisors of the Sikhs. Eventually they moved in and secured the region of Bannu and surrounding districts after the collapse of Sikh rule and the consequent annexation of the entire region during the period of Lord Delhousie in the year 1849.<sup>302</sup>

For the British rulers of India, control over the region<sup>303</sup> had become a strategic and a tactical compulsion. Their attempts to consolidate authority and ensure effective

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their dealings with the locals. -----See Mehsud, Arif., *Waziristan-Kurram say Gomal Tuk*, Chapter 3.

<sup>299</sup> Alexander Burnes, Elphinstone, Willaian Moorcroft, Dr. Pannel and Charles Masson pioneered into the Pathan region. Their visits paved the way for British advance in the region. See Spain, W. James., *The Pathan Border Land*, Mouton and Company, The Hague Netherlands, 1963, p. 101. Also Herbert, B. Edwardes., *A Year on the Punjab Frontier* (2 Vols) R. Bentley, London, 1851. Pp. 27-28.

<sup>300</sup> Bangash, A. Mumtaz., *Political & Administrative Development of Tribal Areas*, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis submitted to Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1996, Chapter I, para 3.4.3.

<sup>301</sup> Cotton, Sydney., *Nine years on the North West Frontier of India (1854-1863)*, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London., 1880, pp. 34-37

<sup>302</sup> An interesting feature of the British advent in the region is that unlike the other invaders of history, the British came to the region from a "different direction." They had already occupied India and were moving towards the West. Other invaders either walked from or through Afghanistan and moved into India through the tribal region. Their objective was to secure the fertile plains of India. Most of them, like the Afghan/Turk monarch and Mughals, with the exception of Mahmud Ghaznavi and Ahmad Shah Abdali, never intended to go back to their barren mountains from where they had earlier descended and finally settled in India. They ventured into the plains and exploited the riches of India. The tribal area was just a gateway for them which was either to be crossed peacefully or through bribing their way into India.

<sup>303</sup> Another interesting point is that the British were the only Europeans who had entered the area after Alexander the Great. However, the strategic compulsions of Alexander were completely distinct from those of the British.....See Auriel. Stein., *Alexander's Track in India*, Cross Hill

control over the territory was necessitated by the desire to expand the boundaries of their empire to the West, on the one hand, and attempts to defend their Indian possession from the Russian advance to the South. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the threat of Czarist expansion towards India through the plains of Central Asia presented a grave reality which kept the British rulers of India on their guard. Therefore, the British moved into this area to secure their Western borders. In addition, exploitation of the Central Asian markets for their empire was yet another reason for British interest in the region, in order to secure entry passages into the region beyond the river Oxus.<sup>304</sup> Thus, the British move was stimulated both by strategic considerations to secure their Western border and the urge for economic exploitation of Central Asia.

A significant aspect of this move was that the British could not afford to leave their Western borders un-guarded. They had to maintain it is safe and secure at all costs. They felt compelled to push forward and to strengthen their hold on a region which proved very difficult. The presence of Russia, an unstable Afghanistan and an untrustworthy Persia were their major concerns.<sup>305</sup>

An assessment of the British moves in the region points to the fact that their military strategy was primarily of a defensive nature. This could only be ensured through a secure border to provide an effective safeguard against invasion. In order to maintain a secure border it was essential to keep the tribes in control and develop a system which

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& Maitland Publishers, London, NY & Sydney, 1966, and Mohmand, Sher. Mohammad., FATA, 2003, pp.37-39.

<sup>304</sup> Rawlinson, Henry. Sir., *England and Russia in the East*, London: J. Murray, 1875, Chapter III.

<sup>305</sup> Tytler, W. K. Fraser., *Afghanistan*, Norwich Lithography, Great Britain and Farrold & Sons, 1950, pp. 187-188 and Raverty, H.G. Major., *Notes on Afghanistan and part of Baluchistan*, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London. Ed, 1888, p. 41.



contained special provisions for the maintenance of law and order in a turbulent region inhabited by extremely recalcitrant tribes<sup>306</sup> whom the British had always considered as a mere nuisance but not a serious threat in military terms.<sup>307</sup>

A major problem for the British was not military occupation of this area although the situation never presented an easy option for the British from a military point of view. It took the British almost twenty years to bring the area under their control. It was, however, the continued nuisance of day to day trouble which constantly occupied them and increased their military expenditure.<sup>308</sup> Their policy was primarily aimed at containing the “nuisance” originating from the region. The British realized that a forward thrust and complete occupation of the region would not be conducive to their interest in the long term. Thus, they followed the policy of containment. A belated realization that resulted in giving up their ambition to bring the region into direct occupation did, however, come at the expense of heavy costs both in life and material, after which, the British finally gave up efforts to move into the area and to control the region.<sup>309</sup>

#### 4.10.2. Socio-Cultural Scenario

The socio-cultural dimensions of *Pushtun* tribal society presented a unique picture to the British. The inhabitants of tribal areas and frontier region were quite different to

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<sup>306</sup> Ward, A.W, Sir., and Gooch, G.P., eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*” (3 volumes-Cambridge e University Press, 1923, p. 205.

<sup>307</sup> Davies, Collins., *The Problem of NWFP 1890-1908*, Oxford Press, London, 1975, p. 29.

<sup>308</sup> Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1898, LXIII N-WF, Cmd 8714, pp. 11-17. Parallel can be drawn between the British predicaments in tribal areas and the present day position of the US in Iraq and Afghanistan.

<sup>309</sup> It is interesting to allude to an observation which advocated a minimum interference policy in the region. The Bray’s Committee Report-1922 suggested more freedom to the region. “If self determination is to be allowed any play at all in India it should surely be allowed to the Pathan race whom Providence has interposed between India and foreign aggression.” NWFP Enquiry Committee Report, 1922, p. 32.



other segments constituting Indian society. Even today the area still retains a romantic aura for foreigners, especially Europeans. Many an Englishmen were mesmerized by the romantic features of this region, including Rudyard Kipling.<sup>310</sup> However, this romanticism quickly dissipated when the British were confronted with the crude realities associated with the region in their efforts to bring it under their control.

Resistance to alien occupation is a natural phenomenon and is a characteristic of all nations. However, the intensity of resistance faced by the British and their eventual failure to subjugate this region as a consequence, was of unexpected proportions. They were confronted with continued resistance of both an active and passive nature in a consistent pattern. As opposed to other regions of India, they failed to establish their unchallenged executive administration in this region and their control of the region remained elusive. Local resistance to their rule resulted in a continued hemorrhage of the empire's resources throughout the *Raj*.

However, in order to analyze the treatment that the British received in the region at the hands of local inhabitants, it would be pertinent to allude to their peculiar socio-cultural characteristics which are specific to their society and surroundings. It would be highly appropriate to analyze the specific cultural traits of tribesman and their society on the basis of observations made by British officers who came into contact with them during their time in the region.<sup>311</sup>

There are certain distinct traits of character and culture which are peculiar to tribesmen of the frontier region. The British referred to them both with feelings of hatred

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<sup>310</sup> A British writer who wrote on the life and society of British India in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>311</sup> The society, tribes and their traditions have been discussed in other sections of this thesis as well.

and disgust as well as romantic fascination. The image of a wild nature and barbaric attitude with which the tribes impressed the British can be discerned from some observations.

Sir Robert Warburton while referring to Pathans of Afridi descent remarked,

“The Afridi is forced from his earliest childhood to look upon his nearest relative as a deadliest enemy. Distrust of all mankind, therefore, is almost a religion to the Afridi. Once this distrust is removed, he is capable of the greatest devotion, and may turn out to be your staunchest friend. But, treat him unfairly or abuse him, interfere with his customs for his women, and he will cut your throat without the slightest compunction.”<sup>312</sup>

On the other hand, Elphinstone called them as the greatest of robbers amongst robber hordes. Lady Lilian A. Starr, while commenting on the characteristics of tribesmen, stated that,

“It is an abode of outlaws, the unwritten law is ‘might is right,’ and the pride of the people is that they have never known a master and never will.”<sup>313</sup>

This observation would not appear too crude and irrational if examined in the context of peculiar geographical and social circumstances of that period.

#### **4.10.3. The Impact of the Environment on *Pashtun* Tribesmen**

Geography and surroundings are crucial determinants of the character of individuals and society. The geographical features of their terrain, deficient sources of livelihood and harsh and extreme conditions of survival had not only made their nature resilient but also retarded the growth of highly developed social and civic institutions and

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<sup>312</sup> Warburton, Robert. Sir., *Eighteen years in the Khyber, 1879-1898*, Oxford University Press, Lahore, 1988, pp. 341-2.

<sup>313</sup> Starr, Lillian. A., *Tales of Tirah*, Thistle & Sons, London, 1924, p. 29. See also Bangash, A. Mumtaz., *Political & Administrative Development of Tribal Areas*, Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1996.

consequentially a settled and peaceful society. This is partly due to the absence of a settled pattern of livelihood, like agriculture or trade, and the absence of such occupations / professions, which developed societies have historically had.

According to Lady Lillian Starr while commenting on the region and its inhabitants,

“There are no hospitals and no schools but those of the Mullahs. There is no desire of education on part of the young men, whose aims are mainly two, to possess more cattle or camels for trading purposes, and to be a more accurate shot than their neighbours in relations for attack or self-defence as often as that may be needed fierce and lawless, wild and masterless, yet in their reckless fashion they are brave true highlanders with an in-born love of fighting, and a pluck and hardness one cannot but admire. And yet he is a blackguard, treacherous and cruel, capable sometimes of strong affection, often of a deep hatred, and an unrivalled tenacity in holding to his highest ideal, which is revenge---With some looting is a past time, with others a profession. The Pathan tribes of the Afghan border are expert thieves, they indulge freely in raid.”<sup>314</sup>

Warfare remained a paramount option among a few others. Tytler, a British officer who had served in the region wrote in a letter that,

“Nowhere in the world are to be found better fighters among their own rugged hills than these Pathans, and in few places will a stranger, who comes in peace and is received among them as a guest, find a more courteous and hospitable welcome.”<sup>315</sup>

Life at the cutting edge transformed their individual and collective psyche with love for freedom and independence and hatred of subjugation to political authority and

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<sup>314</sup> Starr, Lillian. A., *Tales of Tirah*, pp. 32 and 39. Also Bangash, A. Mumtaz., *Political & Administrative Development of Tribal Areas*, Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1996. Chapter 1.

35. Afridi, Abdul. Qayyum., *The Hill Tribes, Along the Eastern Side of Durand Line*, Iris Publishers, Peshawar, 2003, p. 46.

aversion to executive administration which was deemed an alien phenomenon and the result of occupation.<sup>316</sup>

A British army officer Captain H. L. Nevill while commenting on the characteristics of tribesmen and their region stated that,

" The history of the North West Frontier of India is one long record of strife with the wild and war like tribes that inhabit the difficult mountainous region with the Borderland between the British India and Afghanistan. From Pre mutiny days (1857) down to the present time the trouble has been there, though there have been intervals of rest more or less frequent; and all the factors which contribute to a fiery and fanatical outbreak are still present, and may at any moment compel a fresh expedition to punish an outrage, to enforce restitution , and to restore order."<sup>317</sup>

This may also explain their wariness to laws and unwillingness to conform to regulations. The fact that they resisted the British occupation of their region does not necessarily mean that they cherished their freedom for the sake of some abstract notion of freedom. Rather on the contrary their freedom was essential for maintaining their life style.<sup>318</sup>

This elucidates my earlier contention that the geographical and sociological attributes of their terrain shaped up their psycho-social characteristics. This state of

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<sup>316</sup> For a similar analysis see Andrew, C.F., *The Challenge of the North-West Frontier*, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. London, 1937, p. 60, Vincent, Arthur., *The Defense of India*, India Today Series, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, London, 1922, p. 45.

<sup>317</sup> Neville, H.L. Capt., *Campaigns on the North West Frontier*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1977, p. xv.

<sup>318</sup> Herbert, Edwardes was a young British officer deputed to the Sikh court. During his participation in tax collecting exercises along with Sikh officials he visited Bannu and encountered the Pathan tribes there. He stated that although these Pathans were being badly persecuted by Sikhs but despite good offers for coming to terms with the Sikh administration, they persisted on their demand for freedom and kept on resisting Sikh domination at the cost of their lives and property. Herbert, B. Edwardes,, *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, 2 Vols. R. Bentley, London, 1851. Pp. 27-28.

affairs resulted in the development of a hard survival instinct, which at times exhibited a peculiar type of mercenary character, which would not accept subjugation to the rule of authority and order.<sup>319</sup> Probably due to this reason the British referred to Pathans as martial races.<sup>320</sup> This trait and characteristic was linked to the genealogical antecedents of the tribes which, over the centuries, materialized in the emergence of martial characteristics, potentially able to survive and dominate a tough inhospitable terrain.<sup>321</sup>

Lord Lytton, the Indian Viceroy commented on the region in a letter dated April 22, 1877 addressed to the British Foreign Office wrote that,

“I believe that our North West Frontier presents at this moment a spectacle unique in the world; at least I know no other spot where, after 25 years of peaceful occupation, a great civilized power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbors, and acquired so little knowledge of them, that the country within a day’s ride of its most important garrison is an absolute *terra incognita*, and that there is absolutely no security for British life a mile or two beyond our border.”<sup>322</sup>

This characteristic of the *Pashtuns* which found expression in their warlike nature and their historical resistance to invasions, is probably, a reflection of their socio-cultural developments which spanned over thousands of years of their history. This phenomenon appears to be the result of “the long-accumulated cultural deposit of unremembered events.”<sup>323</sup>

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<sup>319</sup> The term *Yaghistan* (land of the un-ruled) probably owes its emergence to this particular trait.

<sup>320</sup> Hayat, Azmat. Dr., *Durand Line-Its Geo Strategic Importance*, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar and Hanns Siedel Foundation, 2000, pp. 31-32.

<sup>321</sup> Halford, J. MacKinder, Sir., *The Sub Continent of India: The North West Frontier*, The Cambridge History of India, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1922, p. 27.

<sup>322</sup> Afridi, Abdul. Qayyum., *Hill Tribes*, p. 111-112.

<sup>323</sup> Spain, James, W., *The Listening Ebony: Moral Knowledge, Religion and Power among the Uduk of Sudan*, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1988, p.2.

Even in the various studies of *Pashtun* society conducted by the anthropologists<sup>324</sup> and Orientalists, the stereotype image of hotheaded, prone to violence *Pashtuns* prevail.<sup>325</sup> Non violent and peaceful behavior from a *Pashtun* has been traditionally regarded as an exception rather than a norm.<sup>326</sup>

#### 4.10.4. Economic Scenario

The economic deprivation of tribesmen influenced and eventually transformed their nature and personalities. The region's economic potential remained unexploited due to under development and primarily due to the tribes' continued internecine conflicts and feuds and an inherent xenophobia. The economy did not progress beyond pasturing and herdsman-ship. Their hardships were exacerbated by the absence of livelihood and income generating means. This resulted in the emergence of a brigandier type of psychological profile prone to violence and use of force to earn their living.<sup>327</sup>

These observations highlight the fact that socio-economic exigencies of their region resulted in the development of harsh and crude traits among them. A settled life style like other parts of India was not possible in this region. War and invasions meant means of livelihood. Fighting was the art mastered and war offered economic opportunities. By taking sides with invaders, they could exploit the situation both politically and economically in their interest.

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<sup>324</sup> Ahmed, A., *Millenium and Charisma among Pathans: a Critical Essay in Cultural Anthropology*, London, Routledge, & Kegan Paul, 1976; Barth, F. (1959) *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans*, London, The Athlone Press.

<sup>325</sup> Banerjee Mukulika, p.9.

<sup>326</sup> Non-violent ideology of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement has been studied as a novel phenomenon. *ibid*, p.13.

<sup>327</sup> Barton, William. Sir., *India's North West Frontier*, John Murray, London, 1939, p.156.



The British mind was not aloof to the reality of economic deprivation of the inhabitants of this area.<sup>328</sup> Motivated by their own administrative and military interests, they continued their attempts to develop roads and means of communication in the region but with little success owing to the opposition of the tribesmen. The foremost reason for the opposition of tribesmen to such moves was their lack of trust of the British. However, the activities of those years did result in the payment of money to the tribes in the form of *Miwajibs*,<sup>329</sup> in return for construction of roads and military installations. In addition, the British practice of appointing *Maliks* and *Khasadars* from amongst the tribesmen also remained a source of income for a limited number of people.

#### 4.10.5. The Governance Scenario

Tribal society has its own traditional institutions for managing their affairs. The offices of *Jirga* and *Masharan*<sup>330</sup> remained the central point of authority. The Pathan tribal elder was first among equals and not a despotic head.<sup>331</sup> In essence, the affairs of a tribe were managed in accordance with democratic standards and norms.<sup>332</sup>

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<sup>328</sup> Spain, James. W., *The Pathan Borderland*, Mouton & Co, 963 The Hague, Netherlands, 1963, p. 19.

<sup>329</sup> A form of regular payment paid to the tribes.

<sup>330</sup> *Pashto* term for tribal elders.

<sup>331</sup> This characteristic of Pathans was also distinct from other tribes, for instance, Baluchis and others, where the tribal *Sardars* enjoyed a more stronger and authoritarian position. The British (or for that matter other occupying powers) had considerable difficulty in dealing with or appeasing a *Pashtun* tribe where if they had to deal with several *Masharan*....Raverty, H.G. Major., *Notes on Afghanistan and part of Baluchistan*, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London. Ed. 1888, p.54.

<sup>332</sup> The instinctively strong survival characteristic and their socio-political conditions resulted in inculcating a strong inter-tribal and intra-tribal democratic culture among them. Dr. Azmat Hayat states that tribal areas were most difficult to control for the British because of the intense democratic culture prevailing among tribes. Hayat, Azmat. Dr., *Durand Line-Its Geo Strategic Importance*, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar and Hanns Siedel Foundation, 2000, p. 24.



However, the situation changed with the advent of the British from better to worse. The British introduced a class of *Maliks* within each tribe who became focal points in their communications with the tribe. Most of them were remunerated by the British authorities which made them likely to put their personal interest above those of their tribes. Siding with the authorities was always beneficial in times of crises. The *Maliki* system was a phenomenon which had both the negative and positive implications for the tribes. However, the fact remains that they always preferred their personal interests and those of their British masters whenever the situation demanded.

Among the class known as tribal elders, *Masharan*, the situation was comparatively different. They continued to oscillate between various poles. Some would go for an all out war for Islam or tribal independence against the British whereas others would seek compromises. Others preferred the intensity of conflict as it provided a greater opportunity to exploit the situation, both politically and economically, with the British and with the neighbouring Afghan government and even within the tribe.<sup>333</sup>

#### **4.10.6. The Religious Situation**

Religion has always been a dominant factor in tribal society. It had always been the most powerful catalyst in tribal affairs. J.M. Ewert comments on religious emotionalism in the region are relevant in understanding *Pashtuns'* religious propensities,

“-----and there were not wanting those who fanned the smoldering fires of this spirit to flame the appeal to religion. Specific grievances were played upon, all the passions of the Pathan were whetted by appropriate preaching by *Mullas* and intriguers and suddenly that happened which had never

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<sup>333</sup> See Mehsud, Arif, *Waziristan-Kurram say Gomal Tuk*, Chapter 1, 1978

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happened before. In the presence of what they considered a common danger the tribes found a sort of union (against the British presence)."<sup>334</sup>

While commenting further on the relationship between religion and their cultural history and the resulting impression on their characteristics, the author states,

‘History and Religion inculcate a spirit of fiery independence (among Pathans), which is fostered by the surrounding and conditions of life. This spirit is the keynote to the understanding of the Pathan. It permeates his politics and his personality. Add to this the facts that the invigorating climate and life of his native haunts produce an extraordinarily high average of physique, that he habitually goes armed-except where the law forbids him to do so--- and knows how to use his weapons and that----- life is so hard that the land could not support even the scanty population it produces but for the extraneous aids of trade, labor and military service, and the result is a man. This man may be a swash-buckling braggart, he may be cruel, treacherous, fanatical; he may have other vices, but he bows the knee to none, save to him who can uphold his right to be obeyed. To set against his vices the Pathan is brave, sober, religious according to his lights, ----- and when his respect and esteem has been won, he is capable of great devotion.’<sup>335</sup>

The great religious zeal and fanatic fervor of tribesmen had been the cause of concern for the British.<sup>336</sup> There was no dearth of hatred for the British on account of them being infidels trying to subjugate Muslims and this was greatly exploited by all those with a reason to fight the British. *Jihad* had been the dominant slogan and war cry

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<sup>334</sup> Ewert, J. M., and Howell, E. B., Howell., *Story of the North West Frontier Province*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, Reprint 2000, p. 21.

<sup>335</sup> Ewert, *ibid*, pp. 70-71.

<sup>336</sup> Pathans had a fanatic adherence to religion and have exhibited high degree of vulnerability to religious appeals for *Jihad*. The religious leaders including the Syeds and Mullahs have been instrumental in calls for *Jihad* against the British. For influence of Syeds and Mullahs see Hashmi, Taqi. Syed, *Society of the Kurram People*, Daily *The Frontier Post*. March 19, 1986. Also see Bangash, A. Mumtaz., *Political & Administrative Development of Tribal Areas*, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis submitted to Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1996, paras 2.3.3 Ch.

for tribesmen in their anti-British campaigns. There was no shortage of *Pirs, Syeds* and other religious figures<sup>337</sup> among the tribesmen who could rally thousands of armed men under their banner for *Jihad*. Tribesmen being mostly illiterate but deeply religious gave blind trust in their religious leaders

The war cry for *Jihad* remained the worst nightmare of the British military minds in the region. The British, however, largely attributed their fanatical religious zeal to the superstitious nature of tribesmen and the fact that they were largely under the spell of *Mullahs* and *Syeds* who inculcated hatred of non-Muslim in them and exhorted them to commit violence.<sup>338</sup>

Most of the tribal raids on the adjoining cities of Bannu and Kohat were conducted against Hindus living there and subsequent loot and plunder of their properties were the outcome of hate campaigns launched by the tribal religious leaders.<sup>339</sup>

#### 4.10.7. British Agreements with the Waziristan Tribes

The relationship with Mehsuds and Wazirs in Waziristan were tense and at times un-controllable during various phases of the British engagement in the region.<sup>340</sup> The

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<sup>337</sup> For the influence of *Mullahs* and their status in Pathan society see Spain, James, W., *The Pathan Borderland*, Mouton and Company, The Hague, Netherlands, 1963, pp. 55-56.

<sup>338</sup> Vincent, Arthur., *The Defense of India*, India Today Series, Vol. II, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, London, 1922, p. 43. Also see Hayat, Azmat. Dr., *The Durand Line-Its Geo Strategic Importance*, 2000, Area Study Center, University of Peshawar and Hanns Seidel Foundation, p. 33.

<sup>339</sup> A combination of factors were responsible for aggravating the situation in such cases. Noteworthy among these is the predominant position and status enjoyed by the religious segment in the tribal society---See Afridi, Abdul. Azeem., *Adam Khel Afridi-Tareekh kay aienay main* Hamidiya Printing Press, Peshawar, 1996, pp. 35-41. See also Obhrai, D.C., *The Evolution of North West Frontier Province*, Saeed Book Bank, Peshawar, 2004.

<sup>340</sup> *Independent and Dependent on the North West Frontier of the Punjab* in Selections from the Records of the Government of India, 1856, Government of India, Calcutta, n.d, p. 55.

Dawar tribe of North Waziristan, who were constantly tormented by the Wazirs entered into an agreement with the British in the region. They invited the British and went under their protection.<sup>341</sup> As a result the British were able to penetrate into the region right up to the Durand Line by 1895. The British entered into various agreements with some other tribes of the North Waziristan region, including Mada Khel and Tori Khels, for good behaviour and for permission to allow the construction of roads. In 1925, an agreement was signed with Tori Khel Wazirs for granting lease for the construction of the Razmak camp. Rs 20,853 were fixed as annual lease for the land. Several such agreements were signed with tribes for establishment of posts and construction of roads and for good behavior and refraining from attacks on government positions in 1929 and 1930.<sup>342</sup>

The Dawars entered into a pact in 1872 for peaceful behavior. In 1895 after the territory was taken over by the British, a settlement agreement was made with the Dawars whereby they were granted allowances amounting to Rs. 8000 subject to good behavior. It was later increased to Rs 36,000 on the basis of a re-settlement survey of their valley. After a punitive military expedition following a tribal revolt in 1919 and an attack on British installations, an agreement was reached whereby fines of Rs 27000 were imposed on the Dawar. In 1922, under the Waziristan settlement, the allowances of the Dawars were increased to Rs 17000.<sup>343</sup>

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<sup>341</sup> Mohmand, Sher Mohammad., *FATA*, p. 274.

<sup>342</sup> Andrew C.F., *The Challenge of the North-West Frontier*, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1937, pp. 56-58.

<sup>343</sup> A Record Of The Expeditions Against The North West Frontier Tribes Since The Annexation Of The Punjab, 1937, Directorate of Archives, Peshawar, pp. 76-81.

#### 4.10.8. Troubles in the Waziristan Region

In 1851, a joint party of Daur and Wazirs attacked a police guard. Such attacks were made as late as 1890s in the region and were responded to through punitive expeditions by the British in retaliation.<sup>344</sup> During the Afghan wars of 1879 and 1880 there were uprisings and attacks on British installations.<sup>345</sup> Troubles broke out in Khyber and Waziristan in 1919. Mehsuds also attacked government installations and convoys. The British resorted to a campaign of aerial bombing against them as part of punitive expeditions. Heavy guns were used and Mehsud area was regularly shelled. This strong arm policy of British in dealing with insurgency yielded results. It later became known as the Razmak Policy.<sup>346</sup>

In order to appease the tribes and calm the situation, allowances were marked for tribesmen in addition to other facilities. However, this did not alleviate the situation in a significant manner. Religious groups also remained active in inciting the tribes for waging a *Jihad* against the British.<sup>347</sup> Troubles were widespread all over the region. Incidents of violence and tribal raids were reported from Waziristan in the South to Kaladaka in the North.<sup>348</sup> Situation aggravated in almost all the tribal areas and a general uprising started against the British.

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<sup>344</sup> Mason, A. H., *Expeditions against the Black Mountain, 1899*, Charles Naper & Co, Edinburgh, 1912, p 36.

<sup>345</sup> *Ibid*, p. 33.

<sup>346</sup> *Operation in Waziristan – 1919-20*, Compiled by General Staff Army Headquarter, India – 1921.

<sup>347</sup> British officers including Major G. Dodd, Political Agent, Wana and Capt J. Brown were killed in South Waziristan, whereas, Lt Hickie was killed in Tank. Unwin, G.B., *History of the blockade of the Mehsud Wazir*, Doherty Baldwin Publishers, London, NY, 1936.

<sup>348</sup> Hazara was also in flames, especially, Mansehra, where Maulvi Ishaq was leading the rebellion. He defied the government and had established his own Islamic administration and courts. Mansehra Tehsil practically refused to acknowledge the British rule. The villagers,

Several high profile kidnappings also occurred during this period. In 1910, Akram Siddiqui, a British military worker, along with a Hindu Sundar Lal, were kidnapped while travelling between Bannu and Miranshah<sup>349</sup> In 1923, the wife of a British army officer stationed in Kohat was murdered and his daughter Ms. Ellis Mollie was kidnapped by Afridi tribesmen.<sup>350</sup>

#### 4.10.9. Mindset of the British & Indians towards *Pashtun* Tribesmen

Most of the administrative and legal measures, including, the imposition of FCR and other stringent laws, taken by the British in the region were influenced by their perceptions in respect of *Pashtuns*.

British were cognizant of their occupier's status in the region. They were also aware of the intensity of hatred which the natives harbored against their rule. They were also cognizant of their responsibility for the safety and security of non-Muslim inhabitants of this area. In the volatile context of this region, Hindu-Muslim tensions were also prone to getting out of hand without notice. Several incidents of violence against Hindus, including, rioting and tribal raids occurred during the British rule. Tribal raids on Bannu city and the ensuing violence sparked as a result of the Islam Bibi

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especially in Dhudial and Shinkiari, had appointed their own officials as Tehsildars and Thanadars. They attempted to carry on the functions of administration. Even government officials who were carrying out their official duties were assaulted on numerous occasions. Keene, W. Colonel., *The NWF Province and the War*, James Webster & Co. 1934, pp. 77-81. Also for a chronological account of the events Obhrai, D.C., *The Evolution of North West Frontier Province*, Saeed Book Bank, Peshawar, 2004, pp.165-173.

<sup>349</sup> Siddiqui, Akram., *Qaid-i-Yaghistan – 1937*, quoted in Khan, Haseen., *The Captives of Tirah*, Royal Book Company, POBOX 7737, Saddar Karachi, 74400, Pakistan, pp.67-70.

<sup>350</sup> Incidents of Colonel Faulkes and others killed in Darra and SWA also took place. See Donald, D. Major. Esq., *Notes on the Adam Khel Afridis 1901*, TRC Directorate of Archives Peshawar, pp. 23-24.



incident is a vivid example.<sup>351</sup> This state of affairs resulted in the development of a mindset which viewed the Pathan and especially tribesmen as the personification of trouble and bloodshed. These perceptions generated a lack of trust between the British and their non-Muslim subjects on the one hand and tribesmen on the other and became the *raison de etre* of imposition of strict laws like the FCR and the administrative and punitive measures taken by the authorities. The anxiety of non-Muslims and a higher degree of “*Pathanophobia*” became acute and a predominant concern.

If a fair view is taken, this phobia of non-Muslim was not entirely unfounded. It was indeed a matter of concern for the non-Muslims to worry about their physical safety, their property and the honour of their women due to their proximity to tribal borders in areas like D. I. Khan, Bannu, Kohat and Peshawar, given the vulnerability of these towns to tribal raids.

This reflection of *Pathanophobia*, did exist and it resulted in portraying an emergency situation in the frontier region and tribal areas, thereby creating every justification, however, misguided and groundless they may have been, to control these tribes with an iron fist.

The same mindset still prevails about the tribesmen even today in Pakistan and an impression of them being unruly and recalcitrant is paramount. This impression is

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<sup>351</sup> Islam Bibi, a Hindu girl converted to Islam and got married to a Muslim. Following protest by Hindus, the British authorities took her into custody and later as a result of a court order declaring her as under age and not legally competent to enter into a marital bond, was dispatched to Hoshiarpur in India. She was made to disappear. This incident sparked rioting and resulted in tribal raids against Hindus in Bannu. Several Hindus lost their lives and property as a result. The incident also became a catalyst for the anti-British movement by Faqir Ipi of Waziristan. See Mehsud, Arif, *Waziristan-Kurram say Gomal Tuk*, Jawedan Publishers, Peshawar, 1978, pp. 66-73.



generally exploited by all the stakeholders in the region for their own advantage. Whatever weight this “perceived threat” from a Muslim dominated region in the frontier actually carried, however, it did develop the image of tribesmen as being unpredictable and unruly people, prone to violence and thereby un-trustworthy for the British administrators.<sup>352</sup>

However, despite their efforts to inculcate liberal tendencies in the *Pashtuns*, the British realized the fruitlessness of their efforts. They grew appreciative of the policy to refrain from interfering in their social life and injuring the religious sentiments of Muslims. British officers were keenly sensitized to the potential for trouble in this regard. This point is mentioned by Mr. Samarath in his minority report to the NWFP Enquiry Committee,<sup>353</sup>

“with politics and religion intermingled is the Pan-Islamic idea of an Islamic League of Nations, which is presumably entertained by many Pathans of the Province – with the easily corruptible material of the trans-border tribes of whose susceptibility to outside intrigues and religious fanatics, we had so much evidence adduced before us.”

This point was succinctly elaborated by General Sir George Mc Munn,<sup>354</sup>

“It must be remembered that when we are confronted in India with Islamic excitement on religious questions, the North West Frontier, whence can pour two lakh (200,000) well armed savage tribesmen in India, is always an anxiety. Pan-Islamic enthusiasm so often means the beating of the drum of the ecclesiastic on the Frontier, with devil to play round in consequence. Also, in the more fanatical centres of India itself, there is always an

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<sup>352</sup> Observations expressed in the Simon Commission's report also highlighted the typical problems pertaining to India, including, the immense area and population, the diversities of race, creed and caste, the existence of Indian states, the predominance in numbers of the rural population, the high percentage of illiteracy, and last but not the least, the standing menace of the North West Frontier.

<sup>353</sup> Report of the NWFP Inquiry Committee 1922, p. 111.

<sup>354</sup> Mc. Munn, General. George, Sir., *The Turmoil and Tragedy in India*, James Maddon and John Oliver, London, 1934, p. 45.

answering to any role of the Muslim drum. They were merely actuated by the belief, with which the borderland is imbued that every true Mohammadan must rise and fight for Islam, whenever a good opportunity offers for striking a blow at the infidel. Even in the settled district of the Province, the situation during the critical period was far from reassuring when the Khilafat agitation and Hijrat movement were at their height. Peshawar was thrown off its balance and the infection spread southwards.”

Another dimension of this issue was the perceived nexus of *Pashtuns* with Afghanistan. It was believed that the *Pashtuns* have a closer affiliation with Afghanistan as opposed to India and cherish deeper affinity with the trans-border hills of their own stock rather than the Indians.

The impact of these events in the region had an adverse impact on the psyche and the resulting policy of British administrators in the region. This region presented the image of a hostile, unruly and tumultuous area requiring strong-arm administrative policy supported by arbitrary and draconian laws for ensuring peace and security. The predominant consideration that can be easily discerned from the above deliberations in relation to the tribal areas seems to be the result of perceiving the *Pashtuns* as the personification of trouble and rebellion.<sup>355</sup>

A cursory glance at the recurring themes in the above cited excerpts point to the existence of a typical regimented mindset modeled on the notions of threat to the sovereignty and integrity of British India lurking in the region, which, if not handled with an iron hand would result in violence and war. The desire to perpetuate British control in the region was necessitated by strategic compulsions thereby rendering the area as a war zone and a training ground for British troops. Undoubtedly, British concerns could not be

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<sup>355</sup> The spectacular land in which the Pathans live has had a major effect on their history and their way of life. Spain, James. W., p. 21.

rejected as unfounded altogether given the tumultuous events of tribal warfare and British losses as a result of Afghan adventures.<sup>356</sup>

#### **4.11. Post Independence Situation**

Problems confronted by the tribesmen of Pakistan are due to both internal and external factors. The role of state policies towards them has been adequately highlighted in the preceding part of this discourse.

##### **4.11.1. Tribal Areas After Independence**

Pakistan was established after the partition of British India on August 14, 1947. Tribal areas which were under the political control of British government in India also came under the domination of Pakistan. However, at a later stage an agreement was entered into between the Pakistani authorities and tribal representatives under which allowed political control over the region to the government of Pakistan.

##### **4.11.1.1. Socio-cultural and economic problems**

Tribal areas were annexed to Pakistan after independence from Britain in 1947. The economy of the region remained underdeveloped after 1947. No long term policies existed for economic developments of this region. Presently, the anti-Taliban campaign by the army and related problems has resulted in further deterioration of the economic situation. Smuggling, drug trafficking and petty crime, including car theft and kidnapping for ransom, remained major sources of livelihood for many people.

##### **4.11.1.2 Introvert Attitude**

There are other characteristics which have contributed in the deterioration of the state of affairs in *Pashtun* tribal society. Foremost among them is their ethnocentric and

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<sup>356</sup> Rawlinson, Henry. Sir., pp. 67-68.

introvert attitude. It is one of the major causes of their problems. Deep rooted hatred, suspicions and xenophobia has resulted in the development of a closed mindset<sup>357</sup> which refuses to accept modern requirements of governance. This has manifested in their refusal to accept a proper and settled system of administration. One may ascribe various causes to the problem. Lack of education, employment opportunities, a low standard of life and an absence of better prospects for a future has resulted in a reactionary and backward looking mindset.<sup>358</sup> A kind of self pity syndrome has developed among the inhabitants of the region as well. There is a sense of deprivation and despondency. This can be addressed by the acceptance of general system of administration and the introduction of a better system of governance by the state. The Government must support community empowerment initiatives in the region.

#### **4.11.1.3. The Emergence of an Elite Class**

The present system has also manifested itself in the emergence of an elite class which in itself is dangerous for its own people. The elite class comprises of Members of Parliament, bureaucrats, *Maliks*, religious groups and, last but not the least, the drug barons, smugglers and people who have made money through illegal and unlawful means. Before the extension of adult franchise to the area in 1997, the electoral college for Parliamentary elections comprised of *Maliks* only. The majority of elected

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<sup>357</sup> For a good exposition of the characteristics of tribal society and its anthropological aspects see Lindhom, Charles., *Frontier Perspective: Essays in Comparative Anthropology*, Oxford Press, Karachi, 1995 and Ahmad, Akbar, S., *Millennium and Charisma among Pathans, A critical essay in social anthropology*, Routledge & Kegan Ltd, London, 1976.

<sup>358</sup> This contention may be supported with the observation that tribesmen who have acquired education and skills and economic opportunities have performed well as any other Pakistani citizen. They have attained higher positions in bureaucracy, army and other professions and have proved themselves as excellent businessmen.

representatives at that time were mostly drug barons who could buy their way into the Parliament. They still exercise enormous influence in the tribal society in an indirect manner.

#### **4.11.1.4. Religious Hardliners**

The clergy has always exercised a strong influence on tribal society. This is the educated and intellectual class. Due to a lack of general education, they have always enjoyed influence among the masses. The tribesmen's zeal for religion helps the clergy maintain their strength in the society. The influence of orthodox groups and tribal *Mullah* have emerged as a matter of serious concern. This has resulted in the weakness of administration and resulting despondency among the people and is also due to the *jihadi* sentiments generated by the foreign intervention in Afghanistan. Keeping in view the ongoing surge of Taliban militancy, the *Mullah's* influence has increased and conservative and orthodox viewpoints have gained strength.<sup>359</sup> In the present scenario, religious groups have become masters and *de facto* rulers of the tribal areas under the protection of Taliban.

#### **4.11.1.5. Vested Interests - Opposition to Reforms**

Reforms in the real sense of development and empowerment had been resisted by the *Maliks*, *Mullahs* and the bureaucracy as well since it is contrary to their vested interests. Such vested groups defend the status quo on the false pretext of tribal independence and religion. The situation has resulted in the emergence of groups with vested interests; the major players of this group are the religious classes and the

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<sup>359</sup> In Khyber Agency, groups like the *Ittehad Qabail*, *Tanzim Ittehad Ulema Bara* (TIUB) *Tanzeem Qabail*, *Islahi Committee Bara*, *Lashkar-e-Islam* and *Ansar-ul-Islam* had emerged during the 1990s. They acted as vigilantes and were deeply influenced by the Taliban style of government. When the Taliban emerged as a force, all these groups merged into their ranks.

entrepreneurs (mostly smugglers and drug traffickers). This has adverse implications for the common tribal man who has become a hostage and is a potential target for exploitation in the hands of these powerful groups by virtue of his ignorance and lack of opportunities in the oppressed system.

#### **4.11.1. 6. Breakdown of Governance**

Owing to the wide gulf between the administration and the ordinary man, coupled with the presence of a draconian system of FCR, public frustration has indeed been heightened and has resulted, among other factors, in the breakdown of law and order. The Taliban and vigilante groups have emerged to fill the vacuum and have established a parallel administrative and judicial system. Such situations have almost always ended up in more trouble and misery for the ordinary man. This situation, coupled with lack of an effective system of administration has resulted in a serious failure of governance. The writ of the state has vanished, resulting in the emergence of radical religious groups which offer a rallying point for the discontented and un-protected public. The result has been nothing short of widespread bloodshed and loss of life. This has exposed the follies and short-sighted vision of Pakistan's policy-makers and administrators who remained utterly oblivious to the mistakes committed by the British in the region and instead of learning lessons from their experiences ventured head on into repeating the mistakes of history.

#### **4.12. Concluding Observations**

In concluding the discussion, it may be stated that the present situation in the region is a continuation of the same state of affairs that existed in the tribal areas since the last few centuries. The socio-cultural, economic and political conditions have remained the same

with hardly any improvement. This is one of the primary reason for the breakdown of law and order which resulted in the creation of an administrative and governance vacuum. This facilitated the militants to exploit the situation by organizing themselves and challenging the authority of the government and resulting in the present state of affairs.



## CHAPTER 5

### WAZIRISTAN, MILITANCY AND SUICIDE TERRORISM

This section attempts to analyze the geo-political and strategic significance of Waziristan region with respect to its influence on suicide terrorism in Pakistan. This section will discuss the socio-cultural and political situation in Waziristan in the context of the War on Terror, *Al-Qaeda's* war strategy and the resulting impact on the development of a peculiar *Jihadi* mindset which adopted suicide attacks as a tactical methodology. If one attempts to understand the philosophy and psychology of a suicide bomber's motivations, one must understand the social conditions where a would be bomber has grown up and lived. Nowadays, Waziristan has emerged as the perfect site for nurturing and motivating a young man to become a suicide bomber. In this context, Waziristan has remained the central reference point for this research.

#### 5.1. Waziristan as the New Hub of Militancy - *Al-Qaeda Style*

North and South Waziristan, forming part of Pakistan's tribal region, acquired a new significance in the backdrop of post 9/11 scenario in terms of military importance. Pakistan's porous frontier with Afghanistan in the West offered numerous accessible entry points into Pakistani territory.

Pakistan's frontier with Afghanistan known as the Durand Line is approximately 2640 kms (1500 miles) long. It originates in the *Hindu Kush* mountain range to the North and reaches down to Baluchistan province of Pakistan. It has numerous valleys surrounded by high mountains and is famous for its inaccessible terrain.

After the fall of Taliban in October 2001, US forces pushed them further towards East and South of Afghanistan. This region was adjacent to Pakistani frontier. *Al-Qaeda*

fighters and remnants of Taliban militia crossed over to Pakistan from various border entry points.<sup>360</sup>

Almost 1600 Arab fighters and their families took refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas after US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. Some ventured into South Waziristan and others went to Jalaluddin Haqqani in North Waziristan.<sup>361</sup>

The North and South Waziristan Agencies attracted the majority of the fighters. This region had numerous entry points linking it with Afghanistan. Only two entry points had road links and were under the scrutiny of security forces,<sup>362</sup> however, there were several informal entry points without roads and border check posts. They were used by travelers and smugglers for centuries and also by the *Mujahideen* fighters while resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan until 1989. By November 2001, refugees from Afghanistan including civilians and militants had starting crossing over into this region. Within a few weeks, Waziristan became the favorite landing point for *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban militants from across the border making it a hub of militants waging war against the US forces in the region.

There are several reasons for this, including the fact that it was more accessible from Afghanistan. Several gorges and valleys criss-cross the border and offer easy and undetected access into Waziristan. The absence of check points on both sides of the border made it easy even further. The local tribes accorded warm welcome to the

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<sup>360</sup> Noteworthy among them was the entry of hundreds of *Al Qaeda* fighters into Kurram Agency in the aftermath of Tora Bora operation by US forces and their Afghan allies in the Nangarhar province in 2001. Hundreds of others crossed over into the Mohmand and Bajaur regions of Pakistan which are accessible from Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan.

<sup>361</sup> Rana, Amir, *Daily Times*, Lahore, April 9, 2004.

<sup>362</sup> The Ghulam Khan checkpoint in North Waziristan and Angor Ada in South Waziristan.

militants due to their *Jihadi* credentials and offered them not just hospitality but also protection under the *Pashtun* traditional norms of *Melmastia*.<sup>363</sup> These militants were well received and honored as *Mujahideen*.

Marital linkages and family relationships were already established between Arabs, Chechen and Uzbek fighters and tribes in Waziristan as early as 1980s. After the post October 2001 US invasion, hundreds of marriages and family relationships were established with a view to forge relationships between the *Mujahideen* and tribesmen. The Arabs and other foreign fighters wear local clothes, speak fluent Pashto and it is difficult to distinguish them from locals as they have fully immersed in local traditions.

Pakistani government's control in Waziristan was confined mostly to the main towns and government installations. There was no government writ over large swathes of territory specifically in the inaccessible mountains and valleys.

The state of affairs in both agencies of Waziristan in relation to Taliban is unique and distinct as opposed to other tribal agencies. In contrast to Waziristan, Taliban militants had never been able to acquire such a degree of control in other tribal agencies. In Waziristan, the Taliban were able to gain absolute control not only in the military and territorial context but they were also successful in ideologically motivating the local tribes in their support.<sup>364</sup>

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<sup>363</sup> *Melmastia* is a *Pashtun* tradition of hospitality which requires that a person taking refuge with a *Pashtun* becomes his guest and his life and honor becomes the life and honor of the host. He must be protected against his enemies at the cost of even one's life. See chapter four for details.

<sup>364</sup> Those who dared oppose Taliban were either killed or have left the territory to save their lives. Several leading tribal elders were eliminated by Taliban militants in the early phase of their emergence, 2001-2003. Noteworthy among them was Malik Fareedullah Khan Wazir, former Federal Minister and Senator, who was assassinated by Taliban in 2004.

In other tribal agencies, the situation is comparatively different. Although the Taliban have emerged as a force and are fighting daily battles with the army in Orakzai, Khyber and Bajaur agencies and on various occasions, they have been able to take control of certain areas from Pakistani military as well, however, it cannot be compared to their hold on Waziristan where they have a dominant position in ideological, political, administrative and military terms.<sup>365</sup>

Waziristan was especially attractive as the tribes living there were trusted by the foreign fighters. They did not trust the other tribes like the Afridis in Khyber and Mengal and Orakzais in Kurram and Orakzai agencies. In a few incidents some Arab fighters were detained and robbed by these tribes after entering their territory and were later handed over to the authorities. Also, there was a considerable *Shia* population in Kurram and Orakzai agencies. Arab fighters who were staunch *Sunnis* did not trust *Shia* and stayed away from those other tribal agencies.

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<sup>365</sup> For instance, the Kunar region of Afghanistan is adjacent to Bajaur and Mohmand agencies in Pakistan. In 1984, five years before the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, *Mujahideen* had taken complete control of the region. Their influence also spilled over to adjacent Pakistani territory as well. In the present, however, the Taliban do not have effective control of Mohmand and Bajaur despite the fact that the adjacent Afghan province of Kunar is now free from US influence. The Taliban neither exercise absolute military and administrative control in the Pakistani territory nor have its inhabitants accepted their ideology wholeheartedly. During the 2008 elections, candidates of secular parties, opposed to the Taliban, including Awami National Party and Pakistan Peoples' Party won elections from this region. This is despite the fact that Afghan groups such as *Hezb-e-Islami* of Gulbudin Hekmatyar also enjoy influence in Kunar province.

In October 2001, a clash between the Arab fighters and Pakistani security forces resulted in a number of deaths. These fighters had crossed over from the Nangarhar region of Afghanistan into the Kurram agency after the operation in Tora Bora.<sup>366</sup>

Tribes in Waziristan were considered more honorable and pro-*Jihad*. Another reason was the geographical location of Waziristan. It lies towards South East of Afghanistan. After the US takeover of Kabul and Qunduz, most fighters moved towards Kandahar in the South East. When the US and Anti Taliban forces captured Kandahar, the fighters could easily cross over the border and moved into Waziristan.

In so far as other agencies were concerned, they lay in the North East of Afghanistan. Those areas were under the control of the Northern Alliance and Taliban influence in the areas adjacent to Kunar was low. Also, the only anti-Northern alliance force in those areas was *Hezb-e-Islami* of Gulbudin Hekmatyar, while most of the Arabs were allied to Taliban. Therefore, even for these reasons, Waziristan emerged as the only convenient destination for these fighters.

*Al-Qaeda* adopted a clever strategy for control of Waziristan region. Initially, it gained a foothold in South Waziristan and after consolidating its position, it gradually moved towards North Waziristan. *Al-Qaeda's* military strategists attempted to create a safe haven for the Taliban in the region during the early phase of their war. The whole process took a few years during the period 2001-2005 following their withdrawal from Afghanistan. This safe sanctuary was required for the purposes of regrouping and

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<sup>366</sup> Rehman, Anees. ur., *Kia Osama ka huliya badal gaya? (Did Osama's face change?)*, *Nidaa-e-Millat*, Issue December 2, 2002.

recruitment. Finally by late 2005 and early 2006, Taliban militants had acquired the capability to launch offensives against US troops inside Afghanistan. All the strategic planning was conducted by *Al-Qaeda* whereas the Taliban acted as their foot soldiers. From 2006 onwards, guerrilla operations were launched in the adjacent provinces of Paktika and Zabul reaching as far as Uruzgan and Helmand in Afghanistan.

Waziristan acquired the status of a life support ventilator for Taliban militants in Afghanistan. Without this region, the sustainability of Taliban movement would have been impossible in 2002. In Afghanistan, despite Mulla Omar's and Taliban claims of having 30,000 Taliban fighters at their disposal, what actually happened was that the long war and Afghan government's amnesty schemes resulted in dispersal and diffusion of Taliban fighters into the populace. Many of them became absorbed in other worldly activities and discarded their role as Taliban.

In Waziristan, however, this did not happen. Local tribes emerged as vanguard of the Taliban movement through their active participation. The presence of highly radicalized militant groups of Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs, Chinese, Arabs, Afghans and Pakistanis kept the impetus and flame of Taliban radicalism alive during the crucial period between 2001-2005.

## **5.2. Militants and the South Waziristan**

During the earlier phase 2001-2002, *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban militants developed South Waziristan as their stronghold. One of the reason was the strategic significance of the area due to its close proximity with Afghan provinces of Paktika, Uruzgan and Helmand. This region was like an extension of Afghanistan in term of the Taliban's military strategy. South Waziristan is inhabited by Wazir and Mehsud tribes. Mehsuds



have traditionally been loyal to Pakistan and considered peaceful as compared to Wazirs.<sup>367</sup> Wazirs have been historically the rivals of Mehsuds. They are a majority tribe in South Waziristan.<sup>368</sup> In the early phase of the war in Afghanistan, Wazirs supported and offered protection to Taliban militants. During this period, most of the Taliban related activity was taking place in the Wazir area. Mehsuds remained silent spectators during this period. However, the situation changed after the military operation by the Pakistan army in 2003.

After increasing US pressure on Pakistan for taking action against the buildup of foreign fighters in Waziristan, operations began by the Pakistan army in South Waziristan in February 2003.<sup>369</sup> In the early phase these operations were termed as small scale exercises; however, their ambit increased in intensity with passage of time and due to the increased resistance of the local tribes. The army soon realized the futility of its operations. Negotiations and agreement began between the army and the tribesmen for limiting the activities of foreign fighters.<sup>370</sup> This did not resolve the problem. The army was demanding the handing over of fighters to the government, whereas, the tribes considered them as their guests and were supporting their activities against the US led forces in Afghanistan. This confrontation took a serious turn in October 2003, when the two sub-clans of the Wazir tribe, the Kurri Khels and Zali Khels, refused to hand over

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<sup>367</sup> The education ratio among Mehsuds is comparatively higher as opposed to Wazirs and a good number of them are either government employees or in the army. Before 1947, Mehsuds fought battles against the British in the region and later they allied themselves with the government of Pakistan.

<sup>368</sup> They were known for their ferocity since British times due to their fierce resistance to British attempts to occupy Waziristan. British officers referred to them as Wolves owing to their traits.

<sup>369</sup> Daily Times February 20, 2003.

<sup>370</sup> One such agreement in this respect was signed as early as June 27, 2002, before the military operation began in February 2003.



foreign fighters to the army. In the ensuing hostilities between Wazirs and the army, from October 12 to 18, 2003, several men were killed from both sides.

There was widespread resentment against the army action in Waziristan. Tribes considered the army action as incursion into their territory and a violation of their *Pashtun* honor. Following the deaths of hundreds of tribesmen in the army action, a widespread resistance began in South Waziristan.

The military operation in South Waziristan ended in a de facto victory for tribesmen and foreign fighters. The army lost almost 400 soldiers. Later, with the efforts of parliamentarians from tribal areas Maulana Abdul Malik and Maulana Merajuddin, belonging to the religious parties' alliance called MMA, *Muttahida Majlis Amal*, an agreement was signed between the tribes and the army on March 27, 2004.<sup>371</sup> The senior-most officer Corp Commander Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain visited the village Shakai in South Waziristan to sign the agreement. He had to visit the place without any weapons whereas several thousand armed tribesmen were present there. Foreign fighters, mostly Uzbeks, were also present among the crowd but did not appear on the scene.

The major terms agreed included:

1. The government will evacuate the area immediately after the announcement of the agreement;
2. The government will pay compensation for deaths and properties of the tribes destroyed during the operation;

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<sup>371</sup> Daily, *The News*, March 29, 2004.

3. The government will do its best to minimize its interference in tribal areas;
4. The government will release all the innocent people arrested during the operation;
5. The government will give deadline of one month to foreign elements to voluntarily hand over themselves to the government or announce the start of a peaceful social life after getting them registered, The tribes have to give the guarantee of their peaceful conduct;
6. The Peshawar Corp Commander will visit Wana along with the FATA Secretary and the ISI Director as a goodwill gesture to local tribes;
7. The tribesmen will never conduct violent activity in Pakistan; and
8. The tribes will never allow use of their lands against any other country;

Nek Muhammad Wazir, the Taliban commander who led the resistance against the government forces, stated that their resistance was a moral and a strategic compulsion. Tribes are like an atom bomb and the government has to choose whether it uses them against itself or its enemies. He said that if they are persecuted they will have no option but to take up arms against the government. The major responsibility upon the tribes was to ensure registration of foreigners and further ensure that they live peacefully and do not take part in activities against another country from Pakistani soil.

In May 2004, Wazir tribesmen of Zali Khel clan formed a Lashkar of appx 1200 armed men to search for foreign fighters in accordance with the Shakai agreement. They searched a few places including Raghzai and Shoalam. However, the government soon realized that this is a time-wasting exercise and an eye wash.

The hitherto peaceful and neutral Mehsuds also joined the resistance and openly took up arms against Pakistan army.<sup>372</sup> Taliban leader Nek Muhammad Wazir was killed in a missile attack on April 30, 2004. His death was a setback for Taliban.

Tension with the army and clashes continued even after Nek Muhammad's death. The government was pressurizing the tribesmen on the issue of registration; however, the foreign fighters were of the view that the army is more interested in their weapon factories located in the remote Shawal region. There was a huge dump of ammunition in the Shawal mountains and the US army was pressurizing the Pakistani government to seize those arms. In addition to military means, economic sanctions were also used to pressurize the Wazir tribesmen to capitulate, but this did not work either.

Nek Muhammad Wazir was succeeded by Abdullah Mehsud.<sup>373</sup> This shifted the balance of power into the hands of Mehsud tribe. After Abdullah's death, Baitullah Mehsud was appointed as the new head (*Ameer*) of the Taliban militants and the stage was now set for a new phase of war with its focus on Pakistan. With Baitullah Mehsud's appointment, a strong Mehsud lobby was now on Taliban's side. In this situation, Wazir support for the Taliban was gradually replaced with Mehsud support in South Waziristan. Waziri support of Taliban militants had decreased and they began to side with the Pakistani military. It might have been partly due to monetary incentives offered by the

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<sup>372</sup> It must be noted that the 2003 military operation in South Waziristan did not enjoy public support in Pakistan. It was an ill conceived operation which was opposed by both the religious and secular groups. Secular groups were opposed to the operation since they viewed it as lending support to the US imperialist designs in the region.

<sup>373</sup> A former *Mujahid* and Taliban fighter who had lost his leg while fighting alongside Taliban in Afghanistan. He was a confidant of Uzbek militant leader Tahir Yeldoshev. Abdullah Mehsud was later killed by Pakistani border forces in Baluchistan region while traveling back from Afghanistan.

army. Mulla Nazir who earlier supported Taliban militants, later turned against them, ostensibly due to the activities of Uzbek militia. His men attacked Uzbek positions and killed hundreds of them in 2004. His opponents blamed him for siding with the Pakistani army for financial incentives. This change of heart can be better interpreted in terms of tribal cultural feuds which have always been central to their existence. Sailing smoothly with two traditional arch rivals was not possible. It was tactically wrong and strategically impossible. The state (Pakistan) had no option but to retain the support of either of the tribes for its ensured presence in the area. The Pakistan Army attempted to root out Taliban militants first from South Waziristan in 2003 and later from North Waziristan in 2004. Both the operations failed to achieve the target of flushing out Taliban militants and bringing the region under effective control.<sup>374</sup>

The army action, however, resulted in scattering the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* leadership. Many were killed and arrested while the others had to disperse in different locations to avoid capture. This resulted in the division of resistance into several smaller groups. *Al-Qaeda* was primarily divided into the Osama and Al-Zawahiri groups. The Taliban were also divided into groups controlled by commanders on a regional and tribal basis. This had a negative effect on their organizational strength. It also weakened their capability to launch coordinated operations. However, they managed to survive as it

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<sup>374</sup> Both the military operations were also adversely affected by religious decrees (*Fatwas*) against army action in Waziristan. Maulana Abdul Aziz of *Lal Masjid* had already issued a *fatwa* in 2004 against military operation in South Waziristan by declaring it as un-Islamic. His *fatwa* further declared that the Pakistan army soldiers killed during the operation have not died as Muslims. Their funeral prayers and burial cannot be arranged as Muslims. This *fatwa* resulted in refusals to obey orders and even desertions in the army. Some parents even refused to receive the dead bodies of their sons who had been killed in South Waziristan. This situation adversely affected the morale of Pakistan army.

became more difficult to deal with them in several small factions which had acquired the capability to operate independently of one another.<sup>375</sup>

By 2004, after the unsuccessful attempt of Pakistan army to flush out Taliban militants in South Waziristan, the Taliban had become masters of the region. Government authority remained confined to army camp in agency headquarters Wana. The Taliban established their own administrative and judicial system and started deciding cases according to *Sharia* law. They also introduced their own tax collection system.

The Taliban's control of South Waziristan strengthened their position in Afghanistan. South Waziristan enabled them to launch military operations in the entire area of South Eastern Afghanistan, especially against the British troops stationed in Helmand. By November 2006, almost entire Helmand province with the exception of urban areas of Lashkar Gah and Garam Shehr were under Taliban control. This facilitated their movement from South Waziristan deep into Southern Afghanistan. In 2006, almost seven districts of Qandahar province were under the *de facto* control of Taliban. Most of the regions including Kunar, Paktia, Paktika, Uruzgan, Khost, Nangarhar, Gardez and Zabul were also under Taliban influence.

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<sup>375</sup> Most Taliban militants took refuge in the difficult mountains of Shawal, Birmal, Angor Adda and Shakai regions of North and South Waziristan during the military onslaught. Osama and Zwahiri spent time together with their few hundred followers in the inaccessible Shawal region of North Waziristan. This area lies at the junction of Afghanistan and South Waziristan. They waited for the right opportunity to strike again and in the meantime deliberated upon their future war strategy in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

### 5.3. Militants and the North Waziristan

North Waziristan has a significant population of Wazirs especially in areas adjacent to the borders with South Waziristan. Wazirs are in majority and the only powerful tribe in North Waziristan. The Dawar tribe also inhabits North Waziristan.<sup>376</sup>

During the anti-Soviet *Jihad*, the border region of North Waziristan was especially developed from the point of view of anti-Soviet guerrilla operations. Camps known as *Zhawar* and *Jihadwal* hosted Arab fighters from various countries. These Arabs were followers of the *Wahhabi* school of thought which is the official *fiqh* of Saudi Arabia. *Sunni* and *Wahhabi* schools of thought were the dominant schools among Afghan, Pakistani and Arab *Mujahideen*. Jalaluddin Haqqani's support to the *Mujahideen* was crucial in their war and he emerged as their lynchpin.

"At the center stood Jalaluddin Haqqani, the long bearded fearless rebel commander with strong Islamic beliefs, who had come very close to Pakistani and Saudi intelligence during the last years of the anti-Soviet war. The CIA officers and the others considered him, perhaps the most impressive *Pashtun* battlefield commander."<sup>377</sup>

During this period, the Pakistani *Jihadi* group *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen* preached support for *Jihad* among local tribes in order to provide a crop of *Jihadis* for the war against Soviets. A network of charitable organizations, clinics, etc., was also established

<sup>376</sup> The Dawar are a peaceful tribe settled in Miranshah region of North Waziristan. They have a higher ratio of educated individuals who are engaged in professional vocations and government services.

<sup>377</sup> Excerpt from Coll, Steve., *The Ghost Wars*, Penguin Publishers Inc USA, p. 35. Also quoted in Rana, Amir., p. 25. Available online, [www.google.com.pk/books?id=ToYFL5wmBIC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs\\_ge\\_summary\\_r&cad](http://www.google.com.pk/books?id=ToYFL5wmBIC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad).



to help local people. Marriages and family relations between Arab and foreign fighters and locals strengthened their social and cultural bonds as well. Waziristan became the place of asylum and home in exile for Arab *Jihadis*.

During the Afghan *Jihad* (1980-1988), several training camps operated in this region where fighters received training in basic weaponry, rocket launchers, grenades and later the advance training on urban warfare including car bombing, sniper operations and assassinations etc. This crop of expert guerrillas was aimed at defeating Russians in Afghanistan. However, later they turned their guns on their trainers after September 2001. "Given what was already being done, it was a perverse twisting of reality----"<sup>378</sup>

The Wazir tribe in North Waziristan openly supported Taliban militants and emerged as the die-hard vanguard of their cause. By early 2005, even the relatively peaceful Dawar tribe in North Waziristan was also engaged in resistance against the army and in support of Taliban militants.

In 2005, a seemingly unrelated incident brought the whole of Waziristan under the effective control of the Taliban. An Afghan gangster Hakim Khan Zadran had established his base in the Danday Darpa Khel region of North Waziristan. His group was involved in kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activities. The Taliban took action by attacking the criminals' base, killing and dragging their bodies in the streets. Beheaded corpses of criminals were hanged on poles and trees. Following this incident, virtually the whole of Waziristan came under the Taliban's control. Gun wielding Taliban

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<sup>378</sup> Crille, George., *Charlie Wilson's War*, Grove Press, New York, p. 335. Quoted also on Rana. Amir.,m p.27.



youngsters in their teens and twenties became masters of Waziristan. They became foot soldiers for Taliban.

Afterwards, the Taliban launched a propaganda campaign inside Pakistan in their support. This resulted in the influx of thousands of *Jihadis*, who after the Pakistani government's crackdown on *Jihadi* activities, especially those relating to Kashmir struggle, were desperate to fight for the Taliban in Waziristan. As a result, the Taliban acquired tremendous strength both in morale and manpower. The combined strength of armed men at their disposal reached almost 40, 000 by the end of 2005.<sup>379</sup> In addition to Waziristani tribesmen, these included Afghans, Uzbeks, Chechens and Pakistani *Jihadis*. As a result, the Pakistan army had been put into a defensive posture. Government functionaries barricaded themselves in the agency headquarters, Miranshah, and the administrative authority of the government became confined within the army camps.

During 2006, as a reaction to a surge in Taliban activity in Afghanistan, the US increased its pressure on Pakistan for military action against the Taliban in North Waziristan. In order to thwart this threat, a grand Taliban Council met in North Waziristan in August 2006<sup>380</sup> and decided that engagements with the Pakistan army in Waziristan should be decreased through a cessation of hostilities. The idea was that *Al-Qaeda* wanted to focus on Afghanistan and resist US military gains there.<sup>381</sup>

An agreement was signed between tribal supporters of Taliban and government of Pakistan. Taliban militants remained in the background and did not speak in the *Jirga*.

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<sup>379</sup> Daily *Aaj*, Peshawar, December 22, 2005.

<sup>380</sup> Daily *Mashriq*, Peshawar, August 19, 2006.

<sup>381</sup> Speakers in Grand Council were mostly leaders and *Ulama* belonging to JUI F, Wazir tribe was represented by elders of Utmanzai tribe and their religious and political leaders whereas Pakistani government was represented by Political Agent.

Their point of view was expressed by religious and political elders of the tribes. For instance, the agreement mentions the names of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Abdul Khaliq and Maulana Sadiq Noor who are all tribal religious leaders of North Waziristan and Taliban supporters.<sup>382</sup> This agreement stated that the Utman Zai Wazir tribe will be responsible for maintaining peace in North Waziristan. Under the agreement, the Pakistani government provided monetary compensation for loss of life and property during earlier army operations and released Taliban activists from custody. As a result, the Taliban were able to regain their dominance in the region and shift their attention to Afghanistan. The Taliban announced the establishment of Islamic State of North Waziristan in August 2006.

#### **5.4. *Al-Qaeda's War Strategy in Waziristan***

*Al-Qaeda* has the capability of learning from its global experiences. Its ideological and intellectual leaders like Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Shaikh Issa Al-Misri and Abu Mosaab Al-Suri had developed their military strategy in the light of their experience in *Jihadi* movements all over the world.

They began devising their war strategy in the immediate aftermath of their incursion into Waziristan. Their prime concern was to secure a safe base for themselves in order to maintain the momentum of *Jihad* against US led forces in Afghanistan. In their war strategy, Waziristan emerged as an obvious and only choice as a base for their military operations in the region.

In order to effectively use Waziristan for its military objectives, *Al-Qaeda* devised its strategy by taking care of the socio-cultural norms of *Pashtun* tribal culture since it

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<sup>382</sup> They now comprise the top ranking leadership of *Tehreek-e-Taliban*, Pakistan of North Waziristan Agency.

knew very well the relevance and strength of local cultural codes. Their familiarity with this region dated back to the days of *Jihad* against Soviet forces. Later, in 1995, hundreds of them took refuge here when they were ousted from Pakistani cities during Benazir Bhutto's government.<sup>383</sup> Many Arab fighters had lived in the region and had developed cordial relationships with locals. Their familiarity with Waziristan proved an important asset for their success. *Al-Qaeda's* appreciation of social and cultural values and mindset of *Pashtun* tribes in the region has proved to be an edge over its US opponents.

### **5.5. *Pashtun* Tribal Culture and Militancy**

In Waziristan *Al-Qaeda* was cognizant of the sensitivities of *Pashtun* to their tribal culture. They knew that Islam carries an emotional appeal for *Pashtuns*. For a *Pashtun*, Islam is not merely a set of religious prayers and rituals. Islam becomes his identity and with that a matter of personal honor for him. It symbolizes his honor just like his family and land. Any act which attacks his honor is regarded as an affront and a challenge to his *Ghairat* – the foremost component of *Pashtunwali*, as discussed in preceding sections. A *Pashtun* cannot claim to be a *Pashtun* if he does not revenge an act of affront which challenges his *Ghairat*. Islam for a *Pashtun* symbolizes his individual and collective identity and, therefore, is a matter of personal and collective honor. He must avenge any affront and attack on Islam. This is what his *Ghairat* demands. A *Pashtun* sees only two options in such a case. Fight and destroy your enemy who has

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<sup>383</sup> Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's PPP remained in power from October 1993 till November 1996. In March 1995, her government ordered a crackdown against former Afghan Arab *Mujahideen* who had settled in Pakistan. Several of them were deported to their home countries where they were imprisoned and executed. A large number escaped to the tribal areas and Afghanistan.

challenged your honor or die while fighting your enemy. Honor can only be redeemed through the act of either killing one's enemy or dying while fighting him.

Revenge (*Badal*) is another *Pashtun* tradition. It is a barometer of one's *Ghairat*. A *Pashtun* must avenge dishonor, otherwise, his social status as a *Pashtun* becomes questionable. *Pashtun* mothers are the main nurseries for indoctrinating their children, especially sons in these traditions and cultural values. They inculcate the values of appreciating *Ghairat* and *Badal*, against their enemies. An enemy can be either a family enemy, enemy of one's land (Country or birth-place) or Islam. Training in weapons is a tradition as well. Fathers take pride in gifting weapons to their adolescent sons. Machismo and bravado, gallantry and chivalry, are the natural characteristics among these men. Fighting with one's enemy and dying in battle is a symbol of bravery and manhood. Even Pashto poetry during medieval times has eulogized death during battle as a desire of men of honor as opposed to dying in bed,

*Death must be like that of the shaheed (martyr) who dies in the clatter of naked swords*

*To hell with the dying hiccups of a man waiting for death lying in his bed.*<sup>384</sup>

*In this world, braves have only two options*

*Either they are victorious or they die in battle.*<sup>385</sup>

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<sup>384</sup> *Marg kho da shaheed de pa shrangar da speeno turo kay*

*Rukay sha salgay da zankadan pa bistaro kay la.*

<sup>385</sup> *Pa Jahan da nangyalo hum dagha dwa di kara*

*Ya ba okhri kakaray ya ba she kamrana*

(Khushal Khan Khattak, a 17<sup>th</sup> century Pashtun warrior and poet.)

Even *Pashtun* romantic poetry is replete with appreciation for gallantry and sacrifice. A *Pashtun* girl perceives her beloved as a brave fighter and only deems him worthy of her love if he proves his worth in battle.

*O my beloved fighter, charge the enemy and destroy their trenches*

*Only then will I offer the shade of my long black hair for you to sleep under*<sup>386</sup>

This is the centuries-old *Pashtun* culture. These traditions have shaped a *Pashtun's* personality. The intensity of impact of these traditions may vary from region to region but the basics are similar everywhere. Among some *Pashtuns*, these traits have become diluted with time, education, exposure to modern social trends etc. However, the seeds of these traditions can always be found among *Pashtuns* belonging to all social backgrounds. All it requires is a slight provocation and the fire erupts. Al Qaeda strategists did not have to wait for years to train their fighters. These *Pashtuns* were already ready for recruitment in hundreds. *Al-Qaeda* while taking full advantage of this situation, recruited hundreds of *Pashtun* fighters in their ranks.

## **5.6. Tribal-Ethnic Rivalries and Militancy**

*Al-Qaeda* strategists were conscious of the lethal consequences of internecine conflicts and rivalries between *Pashtun* tribes for its *Jihadi* agenda. They were aware of the fact that *Pashtun* traditions may at times require that tribal identities and rivalries be treated with a higher priority as opposed to *Jihad*. This would involve a situation where a tribe may put the *Jihadi* agenda in jeopardy while acting against its rival tribe. *Al-Qaeda* had catered for this eventuality in their war strategy for Waziristan.

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<sup>386</sup> *Wa sarbaza yara kheja pa morcha baanday*  
*Bya ba de ooda kama soori da orbal landay*

*Al-Qaeda* was also aware of the centuries-old rivalry between the Wazir and Mehsud tribes. These tribes are jealous of each others' influence. These rivalries made them susceptible to exploitation by their enemies. Until 2003, *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban fighters were settled in the area of the Wazir tribe. Their traditional rivals, the Mehsuds, remained neutral observers of the situation. The Wazir tribe treated their guests in accordance with their cultural norms and values. They were observing *Pashtun* values of *Melmastia*, which required that a guest be protected against his enemies. Foreign militants, including, Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks were treated as guests who had taken refuge in the region and thereby worthy of protection. The idea of handing them over to their enemy was deemed despicable and utterly unacceptable. The fact that these 'guests' were Muslim brothers and their enemies, the US forces, were seen as non-Muslim aggressors, strengthened the *Pashtun* resolve to protect them at all costs.

Local tribal leaders like Mulla Nazir, a former *Mujahideen* fighter during the Soviet occupation, was one such figure for whom observance of *Pashtun* cultural norms were a matter of personal honor and worth dying for. There were many like him in the region.<sup>387</sup>

After the army operation in 2003, however, differences arose between Uzbeks and Wazirs. In reality, it was the presence of thousands of armed Uzbeks which posed a threat to the authority of the Wazir tribes. The Wazirs accused them of involvement in criminal activities and murders of political opponents. Mulla Nazir took armed action, raided their

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<sup>387</sup> Mulla Nazir was a former Mujahidin fighter affiliated with *Hezb-e-Islami* of Gulbadin Hekmatyar during the period of Soviet occupation (1979-1989). Later he allied himself with Taliban and now owe allegiance to Mulla Omar. He belongs to the Ahmad Zai clan of Wazir tribe of South Waziristan. He was killed in a drone attack in South Waziristan in January 02, 2013.



bases and killed them in large numbers. Uzbeks moved over to the territory of the Mehsud tribe.

*Al-Qaeda* strategists saw the clash between Uzbeks and Wazirs as a forecast of upcoming explosive tribal jealousies. They had catered for this situation and Mehsud territory was earlier identified as the next home. Abdullah Mehsud was already in close liaison with *Al-Qaeda*.<sup>388</sup> Tahir Yeldoshev, leader of Uzbek fighters, had old relationship with Abdullah Mehsud (Later head of Pakistani Taliban) who fought alongside Uzbeks during the Soviet occupation and also during the US attack on Afghanistan in 2001. On numerous occasions, Uzbek fighters had sided with the Mehsuds against the Wazirs in their internal conflicts. This created animosity between the Wazirs and Uzbeks. After Mulla Nazir's action, the Uzbeks were given protection by the Mehsud tribe.

### **5.7. Legitimacy of *Jihad* against Pakistan Army**

In Waziristan, all the tribes had supported the Afghan *Jihad* since Soviet invasion in 1979. However, the post 2001 situation presented a different set of issues. Although both the tribes were in agreement over the Islamic credentials of Taliban resistance against US forces and accepted it as *Jihad*, there were disagreements and conflicting viewpoints on the religious status of war against the Pakistani forces. Foreign militants and Arab ideologues like Shaikh Issa Al-Misri and the Uzbek leader of UIM, Tahir Yeldoshev<sup>389</sup> were of the view that attacks on Pakistan army are legitimate, justified and

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<sup>388</sup> Pakistan army also supported Mulla Nazir in this campaign and provided him with support and arms to crush the Uzbeks.

<sup>389</sup> Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. An Islamic group in Uzbekistan and an *Al-Qaeda's* ally. Tahir Yeldoshev, IMU leader was a veteran of Afghan *Jihad*. He took over IMU after the death of its commander Djumma Namangani during the US attacks on Afghanistan in November 2001. Tahir was a fighter and famous for his fiery and emotional speeches on *Jihad*. He was popular



in accordance with *Sharia* principles. It was established that waging *Jihad* was justified on the grounds that the Pakistan army is supporting the US forces across the border and are engaged in armed struggle against the Taliban. It was propagated that the Pakistani army is nothing but an extension of the US forces across the border in Afghanistan. This fact provided legitimacy to waging war against the Pakistan army. This point of view, although it carried weight and was supported with *Sharia* reasoning, did not receive immediate acceptance by local tribesmen and also leaders of the Afghan Taliban. They resisted attempts to declare hostilities against the Pakistani army as *Jihad* for a considerable period of time. The situation, however, changed when the Pakistan army began operation in South Waziristan in 2003 and in North Waziristan in 2004.

This campaign was waged by Shaikh Issa Al-Misri, a 70 years old Arab veteran of the Afghan *Jihad*. He was an Egyptian ideologue of *Al-Qaeda* who significantly influenced the thinking of Waziristani tribesmen against the Pakistan army and in support of *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban militants in Waziristan. He had influenced local *Ulama*, including, Sadiq Noor and Abdul Khaliq, and had convinced them of the Islamic credentials of resistance against the Pakistan army's efforts to remove the Taliban in North Waziristan. His efforts ensured that the message of *Al-Qaeda* becomes popularized in the region. He advocated the theory that the Pakistan army is as bad an enemy of Islam as the US army. He stated that those who do not consider the Pakistan army as an enemy

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among young men in Waziristan and many joined the ranks of Taliban fighter impressed with his speeches. IMU is a well trained and organized group and comprise of appx 3000 fighters.

of Islam deserving attack are not Muslims. His views radicalized Waziristani inhabitants and motivated them to act against the Pakistan army.<sup>390</sup>

## 5.8. Training and Capacity Building for *Jihad*

*Al-Qaeda's* military strategists were cognizant of the fact that Taliban militants desperately need familiarization with modern techniques of guerrilla warfare in order to take on the combined might of the US and Pakistan army. Three organizations, formed by *Al-Qaeda*, played an important role in strengthening the overall resistance and military capability of the Taliban for operations in Waziristan, Afghanistan and mainland Pakistan.

1. *Jaish-al-Qiba-al-Jihadi-al Sirri-al-Alami*: (The Secret Army of Islamic *Jihad*)

This was founded during the period between 2001-2004. It was responsible for organizing Arab and Afghan Taliban. It had global objectives and trained people for waging wars and *Jihad* all over the world.

2. *Jundullah*: (Army of Allah): This was responsible for the organizing and training of militants for activities in Waziristan and Pakistan. It focused on recruitment, training and operationalization of Taliban supporters. It was responsible for a daring attack on the convoy of Corp. Commander in Karachi, Lt. Gen. Ahsan Hayat Malik in June 2004.

3. *Lashkar-Al-Zill*: (The Shadow Army) This is literally translated as the Shadow Army. It was composed of expert militants from Iraq, Somalia and Yemen etc. They were used to train Taliban militants in the art of organized guerrilla warfare and suicide attacks. Qari Zai-ur-Rehman of Bajaur currently heads this outfit.

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<sup>390</sup> Shehzad, S. Syed., *Inside Al Qaeda and Taliban. Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11*, Palgrave McMillan, USA, 2011, p. 19.

## 5.9 Local Ownership of *Jihad*

*Al-Qaeda* strategists were aware of the importance of a secure base and loyalty of its local population. Once Waziristan was identified and secured as a base, a plan to establish a new local leadership was put in place. The idea was to engage sons of the soil *Ibn-ul-Bilad* as leaders and to conduct military operations under their command, while *Al-Qaeda*'s own leadership was to remain behind the scene and operate as planners and executioners at the higher strategic level. A cardinal component of the plan was to maintain ideological control over the local militants. This was imperative in order to keep them under *Al-Qaeda*'s influence for political and strategic purposes.<sup>391</sup>

*Al-Qaeda* had by now started contemplating the fact that the tribal support it enjoys needs to be transformed from a loose tribal network of unreliable individuals into a strong organizational platform. Tribal disturbances, ethnic and clan rivalries and egoistic tribal leaders were a serious impediment in ensuring the overall sustainability of its movement. Thus, an organizational platform guided by an ideology became imperative for the survival of Al Qaeda's struggle.

In Waziristan, by the years 2003, as a result of the army action and tribal insurgency, the hundred years' old tribal infrastructure, which was based on *Maliks*,<sup>392</sup> Political Agents and Frontier Crime Regulations had been dismantled by the Taliban. The dynamics of leadership had changed and the old guard of tribal elders had either been killed or had left the region.

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<sup>391</sup> *Al-Qaeda* had learnt through bitter experience with *Sumi* tribal groups fighting under its command in Iraq, most of whom broke free from *Al-Qaeda* and entered into agreements with US authorities in return for control over their respective territories. These militants were more loyal to their tribes than *Al-Qaeda*'s ideology; therefore, they switched sides easily in return for tribal interests.

<sup>392</sup> A tribal elder.

The region was now effectively controlled by young men wielding Kalashnikovs and rocket launchers, driving heavy vehicles, sponsored by *Al-Qaeda*. The only authority recognized by these rebellious young men was that of the religious clerics affiliated with the Taliban movement.

This drastic change of scenario had transformed the social and cultural values in the process. Tribal Councils locally known as *Jirga*,<sup>393</sup> hithertofore, and, used as a platform for settlement of disputes, were no longer in existence. All the tribal affairs including the imposition of religion rites were now under the supervision of these young men.

*Al-Qaeda* also wanted to recruit and nurture its own leaders from the *Pashtun* tribes who had an ideological commitment to its cause rather than depend upon their traditional tribal leaders. *Al-Qaeda's* ideologues had by this time successfully recruited, from amongst the tribes of Waziristan, a few dynamic individuals, who could be projected now into a leadership role. Noteworthy among them was Nek Muhammad Wazir from South Waziristan. He had emerged as the commander of the Taliban resisting the Pakistan Army operation in 2003.<sup>394</sup> Another young man who emerged as the leader of Taliban militants was Baitullah Mehsud. He belonged to the Mehsud tribe of South Waziristan.

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<sup>393</sup> A tribal council composed of tribal elders.

<sup>394</sup> He rose to fame after the Shakai agreement was signed between Pakistan army and Wazir tribe in South Waziristan. Through this agreement, the army virtually ceded local administrative control to the militants. Nek Muhammad, however, was killed in a missile attack soon afterwards.

These leaders were deemed suitable for managing tribal militants. However, their tribal identity was required to be transformed into the status of a leader of a movement with ideological orientation and free from tribal rivalries and prejudices.

#### **5.10. *Tehreek-e- Taliban, Pakistan as Al-Qaeda's Army***

The developments stated above resulted in the formation of *Tehreek-e-Taliban* Pakistan (TTP). It was initially designed as a loose arrangement in order to facilitate the amalgamation and absorption of various Taliban-affiliated regional outfits into one entity. It was formed in Waziristan in December 2009. Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan was appointed as its *Amir*.<sup>395</sup> Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan and Maulvi Faqir of Bajaur were appointed as Deputies. In order to provide the much needed legitimacy and sanctity to the organization, Mulla Omar of Afghanistan was announced as its Patron-in-Chief. *Al-Qaeda* was the mastermind and spiritual mentor of this organization.

The formation of the TTP was an important milestone in *Al-Qaeda's* war strategy. It had all along been trying to carve out its own sphere of influence among the *Jihadi* groups in Afghanistan and needed an organization which would follow the ideology of *Al-Qaeda* and would be willing to act as its foot soldiers. The TTP emerged as an organization with thousands of fighters at its disposal and had the capacity to pursue *Al-Qaeda's* objectives anywhere in Pakistan. In addition, it was composed of the sons of soil, *Ibn-ul-Bilad* as required by *Al-Qaeda*.

*Al-Qaeda*, through the TTP, could now gain its foothold in Afghanistan as well, independent of Mulla Omar's people. It could even use the TTP against any future

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<sup>395</sup> *Amir* is an Arabic term for leader.

agreement between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan. Thus, the TTP was a chip in the hands of *Al-Qaeda* to be used in the protection of its interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Baitullah Mehsud was ideologically committed to the cause and had risen above tribal cultural norms and ethnic loyalties. He was, therefore, ideally suited to the strategists of *Al-Qaeda*. His deputy commanders, Mulla Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan and Mulla Nazir in South Waziristan were simple tribal militants, with minimal ideological foundations. They were only there to provide a broad tribal mix required for better optics in TTP. *Al-Qaeda* focused its resources on strengthening Baitullah with a view to promote him as the undisputed leader of the Pakistani Taliban.<sup>396</sup> The TTP thus became the foot soldiers in operations designed and masterminded by *Al-Qaeda*.<sup>397</sup>

### **5.11. Waziristan – A Citadel of *Jihadi* Militants?**

Waziristan emerged as the citadel for rallying *Jihadis* from all over the world and in particular Pakistan. From 2005 onwards there was a remarkable rise in militant operations in Pakistan. Several factors contributed to this phenomenon including the Pakistan army crackdown against Punjabi and Kashmiri militants. This resulted in the

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<sup>396</sup> The TTP was also established in the other tribal agencies with a view to expand its power base and to make it difficult for authorities to crush it. Later it expanded its influence to other areas in Pakistan including, the Punjab, Baluchistan and as far South as Karachi. Although the TTP expresses its allegiance to Mulla Omar and introduces itself as an extension of the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan, in reality it operates independently of them. Its operations are devised for pursuing its objectives independently in Pakistan. Attacks on military positions and suicide bombings in Pakistan are being conducted despite the displeasure and numerous warnings by the Afghan Taliban not to engage in confrontation with Pakistan.

<sup>397</sup> The TTP also supported the Afghan Taliban through participation of its fighters in Taliban operations inside Afghanistan. In 2008, a contingent of 250 fighters was dispatched to Helmand by Baitullah Mehsud to take part in guerrilla operations.



influx of *Jihadis* to Waziristan. Taliban's ranks were strengthened even further. It remained a source of supply of fighters for Taliban militants both inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. The influx of *Mujahideen* of all shades ranging from local Waziristani tribesmen to Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs, Afghans and even Kashmiris and Punjabis changed the cultural patterns of Waziristan and made it look like an international base for *Jihad*.

#### 5.11.1. Waziristan and its *Jihadi* Culture

All these developments created a *Jihadi* ambiance in Waziristan. Its environment was charged with *Jihadi* slogans and sentiments and the overall milieu in Waziristan became *Jihadi*. This environment had a remarkable influence on individuals of all ages and social status, especially those of young and impressionable age groups.

The popularity of the *Al-Qaeda Jihadi* philosophy<sup>398</sup> among Waziristani *Pashtuns* specifically and Pakistanis in general can be attributed to various factors, including the hatred of the US in the aftermath of the Afghanistan invasion, the US invasion of Iraq, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the successful resistance offered by *Hizbullah* fighters, the incarceration of *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban activists in Guantanamo, the killings of innocent civilians during US military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan army action in Waziristan resulting in loss of life and property of locals, attempts to crush *Jihadi* groups

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<sup>398</sup> The degree of influence of *Jihadi* sentiments in Waziristan was summarized by Syed Saleem Shahzad in his words that the environment in Waziristan is so captivating and stimulating for *Jihadis* that anybody can be motivated to become a *Takfeeri* in 20 days. Shahzad, S. Syed., p. 168.



in Pakistan, etc. Yet there are a host of other factors which have contributed significantly to suicidal and terrorist activities.<sup>399</sup>

### 5.11.2. The Punjabi Taliban phenomenon<sup>400</sup>

Waziristan has been a nursery for grooming of Taliban militants from all over Pakistan. The influence of *Jihadi* culture in Waziristan can be witnessed by the presence of hundreds of Taliban militants from all ethnic groups, particularly Punjabis and Kashmiris who are the most common non-*Pashtuns* comprising the ranks of Taliban militants. Waziristan had never been an alien territory for Punjabis. Even during the Soviet occupation, they were engaged with Afghan *Mujahideen*. Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani, a famous Afghan *Mujahideen* commander with his base in North Waziristan, had a large contingent of Punjabi fighters under his command.<sup>401</sup>

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, some of them became engaged in *Jihad* in Indian-occupied Kashmir. Others joined various religious and sectarian outfits. Now, his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, a Taliban Commander, has a large contingent of Punjabis.

As a result of the US pressure on the Pakistani government in the post 9/11 scenario, *Mujahideen* fighters in Kashmir became victims of crackdowns and persecution. Later, in the aftermath of two suicide attacks on Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in 2003, hundreds of Punjabi militants fled Pakistan following a crackdown

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<sup>399</sup> These factors have roots in culture, the political system and, the economy as well. This has been discussed in preceding chapters and will be further analyzed in subsequent upcoming section.

<sup>400</sup> A term used for non-*Pashtun* Taliban belonging to other nationalities and ethnic groups in Pakistan. Although it literally means Taliban belonging to Punjab, however, in practice this term is used for all non-*Pashtun* Taliban, including Kashmiris and Punjabis.

<sup>401</sup> He had established a *Madressa* called *Jamia Mumbaa-ul-Uloom* in Waziristan. It housed hundreds of Punjabi Mujahidin during Afghan *Jihad*. This *madressa* was shut down by the Pakistani authorities in 2001.

against them. All these developments caused widespread disillusionment among their ranks. When the Taliban movement offered them a chance to participate in *Jihad* and a safe sanctuary in Waziristan, they immediately responded. Trained but disgruntled fighters from all over Pakistan flocked towards North Waziristan and swelled the ranks of the Taliban. From Waziristan, they could freely carry out their *Jihadi* program and take revenge on Pakistan for its sell-out of Kashmir. These Punjabis harbored deep hatred against the Pakistani government and did not spare a moment to spread it in Waziristan.<sup>402</sup>

Most of them were indoctrinated into *Al-Qaeda's* militant and political ideology through interaction with *Al-Qaeda* ideologues such as Shaikh Issa Al-Misri, Abu Waleed Ansari and Abu Yahya Al-Libbi.

### 5.11.3. The Kashmir factor

An important factor that affected the intensification of militant activities in Waziristan was a shift in Pakistani policy on Kashmiri *Mujahideen* groups. Several groups were formed in order to wage *Jihad* in Kashmir, including, *Lashkar Tayyaba*, *Harkat-Jihad-Al-Islami*, *Jaish Muhammad*, *Al-Badar Mujhaideen* and *Hizb-ul-Mujahideen*. They are affiliated with different religious and political schools of thought in Pakistan.<sup>403</sup>

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<sup>402</sup> Punjabi Taliban also included militants from the anti-*Shia* sectarian outfits such as *Sipah-e-Sahaba* and its splinter group *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*. Majority of their militants hail from Southern Punjab. They are staunch *Deobandis* and ideologically affiliated with *Harkat-Jihad-Al-Islami* and *Jaish Muhammad*.

<sup>403</sup> *Lashkar Taiba* is affiliated with *Jumaat-ul-Daawa* and the *Wahhabi* school of thought, *Harkat-Jihad-Al-Islami* is affiliated with JUI and the *Deobandi* school of thought, *Jaish Muhammad* is a splinter group from *Harkat*, headed by Maulana Azhar Mehmud. Its area of influence is the Southern Punjab region of Bahawalpur and Multan etc. *Hizbul Mujahideen* is the name shared by two distinct groups, one belonging to indigenous Kashmiris from Indian

The state did not show the required wisdom to handle this strategic issue. Kashmiri militants, who, hitherto, enjoyed full support from the Pakistani military, were not only prevented from conducting operations inside Indian-occupied Kashmir but were ordered to pack up and close their bases inside Pakistan. Overnight their status changed from being friends to foes of Pakistan. Their leaders were arrested, tortured and insulted. This caused a widespread disillusionment with the Pakistani military resulting in hatred among the militants' rank and file. As a result, a large number of trained and battle-hardened Kashmiri militants moved to Waziristan to join Taliban cadres. This offered much needed support to the Taliban whose number grew to almost 50,000 armed men by the beginning of 2007. Kashmiri militant commanders like Abdul Jabbar and Ilyas Kashmiri arrived in Waziristan.

The arrival of Ilyas Kashmiri had a great impact on the operational capability of the Taliban. Ilyas Kashmiri had settled in Waziristan as early as 2005. Keeping in view his exceptional brilliance in guerilla warfare and his earlier exploits, *Al-Qaeda* opened its doors to him. He was instrumental in introducing his own war plan into the *Al-Qaeda* war strategy. He was finally appointed as commander of *Al-Qaeda* military operations. He formed his headquarter in Razmak, North Waziristan and began his operations. He also brought in a large number of battle hardened Kashmiri militants into the fold of the

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Occupied Kashmir and the other is affiliated with *Jamaat Islami* of Pakistan. *Al-Badar Mujahideen* is a splinter group of *Hizb-ul-Mujahideen* which broke off from the main party due to their differences with *Jamaat Islami*. Chakesari, Sail-ul-Haq, *Islam ka tassawar-e-Jihad aur Al Qaeda*, Shoaib Sons Publishers, Swat 2010, pp 33-38.

Taliban, thereby adding to their battle experience. Most of them settled in Waziristan and made it their home.<sup>404</sup>

#### 5.11.4. The Haqqani Factor

Afghan Taliban Commander Sirajuddin Haqqani's influence within Taliban ranks is noteworthy with drastic consequences for Pakistan.<sup>405</sup> *Al-Qaeda* successfully managed to bring Sirajuddin Haqqani under its influence. His father Jalaluddin Haqqani was a famous *Mujahideen* commander during Soviet occupation who later joined the Taliban. According to my analysis based on interviews with him in person and some of his colleagues, the Taliban never accepted him genuinely due to his non-*Mulla* credentials. He was never trained as a cleric and, therefore, did not qualify for an important position within the Taliban establishment. *Al-Qaeda* understood this sensitivity and successfully managed to win him over to their side during their earlier days in Waziristan. This facilitated their establishment in the region. He also proved to be an important asset for *Al-Qaeda* and the Taliban militants, especially the TTP.

In 2007, after succeeding his father, Sirajuddin Haqqani unleashed a series of attacks on US troops in Afghanistan. He also harbored many *Al-Qaeda* leaders,

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<sup>404</sup> Ilyas Kashmiri, born in AJK, was initially affiliated with *Harkat-Al-Jihad-Al-Islami*. Later he formed his own group known as The 313 Brigade. He gained fame for conducting various daring operations in Indian Occupied Kashmir. He was arrested in 2003 on suspicion of involvement in the attack on President Pervez Musharraf. Following his release in 2005, he became engaged in activities in Indian Occupied Kashmir. He was also involved in a jail breaking operation in which he had managed to release 25 of his fighters from Indian jail. He had association with Shaikh Omar Saeed, a suspect in the Daniel Pearl murder case in Karachi. Ilyas Kashmiri is also suspected of involvement in attack on Taj Hotel in Bombay in November 2008.

<sup>405</sup> In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, while his father Jalaluddin Haqqani was still alive, his *Madressa* was closed down. Several of his assets in Pakistan were seized. Jalaluddin Haqqani, however, did not budge from his support for the Taliban. His contingent actively participated in resisting the US led Operation Anaconda in the Zurmat region of Paktia alongside other Taliban militants. He also kept the US troops engaged in the Khost area of Paktia.

including, Abul-Laith-Al-Libbi, an *Al-Qaeda* mastermind of several suicide operations in Afghanistan.<sup>406</sup> *Al-Qaeda* managed to bring Sirajuddin close to Baitullah Mehsud. An operational understanding was established with the TTP. In 2009 his base located in Dande Darpa Khel area of North Waziristan was attacked and he suffered the loss of life of family members. In 2009, his brother Naseeruddin was released from the custody of the Pakistan army in a prisoner exchange with Baitullah Mehsud. This indebted Sirajuddin to Baitullah Mehsud. He, therefore, cooperated with Baitullah Mehsud in fighting against the Pakistan army in 2009.

### **5.12. *Al Qaeda's New Breed of Jihadis***

Another milestone achieved by *Al-Qaeda* in its war strategy was the strengthening of its position through a successful networking and interaction with various *Jihadi* outfits in Pakistan. This target was achieved with sheer perseverance. *Al-Qaeda* simply managed to channel the anger and negative sentiments generated as a result of the actions of US and Pakistani governments against its enemies. *Al-Qaeda* got support without much of its own efforts as Pakistani governments' policies were doing its job by alienating all the hitherto pro-Pakistani *Jihadi* groups through an unnecessary use of harsh tactics. *Al-Qaeda* simply exploited the situation by bringing smaller *Jihadi* groups together and broadened their ranks and approaches.

With the increase of its supporters who were now openly expressing their allegiance with its ideology, a new brand of *Jihadi* segment emerged in Waziristan. They

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<sup>406</sup> US intelligence named Abu Laithal-Libbi based in North Waziristan for a suicide attack on February 27, 2007, at Bagram base during the visit of Dick Cheney. It resulted in almost 23 deaths.

were Pakistanis and foreigners based in Waziristan who operated as *Al-Qaeda's* fighters. It was no longer an organization in shadows. This new breed of *Al-Qaeda* branded militants have been labeled as Neo-Taliban by some authors.<sup>407</sup>

The most remarkable achievement of *Al-Qaeda* is that it transformed several small sectarian and regional religious groups into an international Islamic resistance movement through successful networking. Waziristan played a crucial role in this respect. It provided *Al-Qaeda* a safe and secure environment for interaction with *Jihadi* outfits from all over the world enabling them to unite for its cause.

### **5.13. U.S Af-Pak policy and the Militants**

By the end of 2006, US policy on Afghanistan witnessed a paradigm shift in approach. So far the US viewed Afghanistan and Pakistan as distinct entities in its War against Terror, however, now they had realized that both regions share common factors which affect the situation in Afghanistan. Pakistan and its tribal areas were identified as the root cause of the problem. This approach became known as the Af-Pak policy. Another component of the Af-Pak policy was to engage 'moderate Taliban' in dialogue.<sup>408</sup>

*Al-Qaeda* viewed this as a conspiracy to weaken the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan through weaning away the soft and moderates from amongst the hard liners. This shift in US policy alarmed *Al-Qaeda*. It increased its threat perception in terms of a US military operation in North and South Waziristan. *Al-Qaeda* started envisioning a joint Pak-US military operation in Waziristan as most likely. *Al-Qaeda* desperately

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<sup>407</sup> They are Taliban but consider themselves as part of *Al-Qaeda*.

<sup>408</sup> This process was part of the Af-Pak policy introduced in 2006-7. It was the brainchild of the British Ambassador in Kabul Sir Shepherd Cowper-Cole. His idea was to establish a militia called *Arbakai* comprising of tribes headed by moderate Taliban with the task to safeguard their areas from hard-line insurgents. Shehzad, Saleem, S., pp. 108-9.



required that Waziristan region remain its safe sanctuary so that it can focus on tackling US forces in Afghanistan.

With the TTP at its disposal, *Al-Qaeda's* war strategy was unfolded. Its plan was to engage Pakistani forces in its own territory by opening up as many fronts as possible, to dissipate its military resources and make it impossible to conduct military operations in North and South Waziristan.

It was in this context that *Al-Qaeda* in 2006-7 expanded its theatre of war from Waziristan to other agencies, Swat and eventually to the rest of Pakistan. It planned to engage the Pakistan army in a large battleground in order to weaken its ability to invade Waziristan.

#### **5.14. *Al-Qaeda's* Blitz Krieg<sup>409</sup>**

As per plan, militant activities in mainland Pakistan were launched with a view to engage Pakistani forces in their own territory rather than Waziristan. A massive program of attacks on the army and targets associated with the government was put into action. It may be rightly called *Al-Qaeda's* Blitz Krieg unleashed against Pakistan.

##### **5.14.1 Advance Diplomacy of Militants**

Prior to the launching of its blitz krieg, *Al-Qaeda* initiated a pre-war diplomacy campaign to muster support for its operations within the religious circles in Pakistan. The intention was to minimize misunderstandings with Pakistani religious groups in order to avoid its own isolation in future.

*Al-Qaeda* stalwarts, especially Shaikh Issa Al-Misri, was deputed to engage in dialogue with religious and extremist groups in Pakistan. The idea was to initiate a joint

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<sup>409</sup> A German language term used by the Nazis for intense bombardment without regard for civilian casualties during the Second World War.



political and militant campaign against the government in order to divert its focus from military intervention in Waziristan. Meetings were held with several Pakistani religious groups including *Jamaat Islami*, JUI-F<sup>410</sup> and *Jamaat-ul-Daawa's* chief Hafiz Saeed. Shaikh Issa had also reportedly met Maulana Abdul Aziz of *Lal Masjid* and encouraged him in his mission. He convinced Maulana Aziz not to surrender to the government and to remain besieged in *Lal Masjid*. *Al-Qaeda* knew the propaganda worth of the *Lal Masjid* incident and desired to exploit it to its advantage in its war with Pakistan army.<sup>411</sup>

#### 5.14.2. The Militants' Expanding Operations

In January 2007, the Taliban declared a unilateral renunciation of the ceasefire in Waziristan. Military check points and convoys were attacked. In North Waziristan alone there were almost daily attacks on army positions. During July 24 to August 24, almost 250 militants and 60 soldiers were killed in fighting in North Waziristan. In September 2007, in South Waziristan, an army convoy of almost 17 vehicles was attacked by militants under the command of Baitullah Mehsud. 247 soldiers and officers were arrested. They were badly treated and insulted before cameras, and films were subsequently released to the media and posted on Taliban websites. Later, on September 12, 2007, militants captured a post and arrested 12 soldiers. On September 13, a suicide attack resulted in the death of 20 soldiers belonging to the Special Services Group in

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<sup>410</sup> *Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Islam*, Fazal-ur-Rehman group, a political party of *Deobandi* school of thought.

<sup>411</sup> Shehzad, S. Syed, *Inside Al Qaeda and Taliban, Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11*. Palgrave McMillan, USA, 2011, p. 40.

Ghazi, Tarbela. On September 20, 2007, almost 25 soldiers were captured and five posts destroyed in both South and North Waziristan.<sup>412</sup>

The Pakistani army retaliated by a massive counter attack on Mir Ali area of North Waziristan, on October 7, 2007. As a result of intense engagement till October 10, 2007, almost 175 militants, 47 soldiers and 35 civilians were killed.

#### **5.14.3. The *Lal Masjid* Incident and Waziristan**

In this charged atmosphere, the *Lal Masjid* debacle in July 2007 added much needed fuel to the fire. An alarming rise in religious militancy was witnessed throughout Pakistan in the subsequent period. The incident was exploited to the utmost by Taliban militants to their advantage. In a video message released by *Al-Qaeda*, Ghazi Abdul Rasheed<sup>413</sup> was declared as *Imam bur Haq* (A leader of the true path).

In the aftermath of the *Lal Masjid* incident, there were reports of several joint strategy sessions of *Al-Qaeda* and the Taliban militants for operations inside Pakistan. It is witnessed by the fact that *Al-Qaeda's* leader Osama bin Laden announced the appointment of Abdul Hameed aka Abu Obaida Al-Misri as the leader of revolt in Pakistan.<sup>414</sup> Suicide attacks intensified in the aftermath of *Lal Masjid* incident.

#### **5.14.4. NATO Supply Lines & Waziristan**

The Khyber Agency, which was free from Taliban influence so far, was targeted by the TTP militants in 2007. This agency had a strategic importance since it was the supply

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<sup>412</sup> Daily *The News*, Islamabad, September 14, 2007.

<sup>413</sup> A leader of the insurgents and brother of Maulana Abdul Aziz who was killed in *Lal Masjid* operation.

<sup>414</sup> Leader of Revolt is the literal translation of *Imam al Khuruj*. *Al-Qaeda* had declared *Takfeer* (Declaration of the loss/negation of status as a Muslim) against the Pakistan army and government. It means that *Khuruj* (armed rebellion/revolt) against the army and government became incumbent upon Muslims. This situation requires that a person be appointed as a leader to oversee the rebellion against a state against which a declaration of *Takfeer* has been pronounced.

route for NATO troops in Afghanistan. Ustad Yasir, a former Afghan Mujahidin commander from Ittehad-e-Islami of Prof. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, was appointed as *Amir* of the TTP in the Khyber Agency in 2007. Baitullah Mehsud dispatched his 28 year old cousin Hakimullah Mehsud<sup>415</sup> along with trained fighters from South Waziristan in June 2007 to this region, with the aim of organizing attacks on NATO supply line. Daily attacks on NATO convoys enroute to Afghanistan were launched. NATO terminals were attacked in Peshawar and containers destroyed. Warnings were issued to contractors and drivers of vehicles engaged in supply to US troops. Several were killed and their vehicles were destroyed. Thus, TTP successfully managed to cut off supply to NATO troops through Khyber Agency.

Several suicide attacks were also conducted against their tribal opponents in 2008-9 especially the leaders of the *Brelvi* school of thought. A militant commander Haji Namdar was assassinated on suspicion of collusion with the army. This sent a strong message to another local militant commander Mangal Bagh whose submission to TTP was finally ensured.

#### **5.14.5. The Swat Campaign and Waziristan**

As part of *Al-Qaeda's* blood and gut campaign, Swat was particularly identified as a soft target on mainland Pakistan. Taliban militants from Waziristan were dispatched to Swat under the command of Qari Hussain Mehsud.<sup>416</sup> His brigade of suicide bombers

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<sup>415</sup> Hakimullah Mehsud is the current Amir of the TTP. He was appointed to this post after the death of Baitullah Mehsud on August 5, 2009.

<sup>416</sup> Qari Hussain Mehsud, a member of the hard line sectarian group *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*. Later he settled in Waziristan and allied himself with Baitullah Mehsud's TTP. He was responsible for recruitment, training and provision of suicide bombers.

wreaked havoc in Swat.<sup>417</sup> Taliban belonging to Swat were headed by a TTP activist Bani Amin aka Bin Yameen from Pehhear valley of Swat. However, all the militant operations were commanded by Qari Hussain and a few hundred battle hardened fighters including Uzbeks from Waziristan. They also provided training and organized Swati Taliban.

Several training camps for suicide bombers were also established in Swat. Later in 2008, Mufti Aftab, linked with *Al-Qaeda* in North Waziristan, was sent to Swat to supervise military operations and to ensure that any attempt to engage in dialogue for peace with the Pakistan army by the local Swati Taliban was foiled.

The threat of the Taliban loomed large over the rest of Pakistan. This state of affairs compelled Pakistani authorities to conduct army operation in Swat in 2007. The army had to divert its resources and the threat of an operation in Waziristan was thwarted. This situation provided *Al-Qaeda* with much needed relief to keep Waziristan under their control.

#### **5.14.6. The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto and Waziristan**

The Taliban also targeted former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto for her pro-US stance. On October 18, 2007, her procession was attacked in Karachi by suicide bombers resulting in the death of almost 180 persons. She herself fell victim to militants on December 27, 2007, in a suicide blast in Rawalpindi during a political rally. According to

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<sup>417</sup> They attacked police stations, government offices, courts and shopping/public areas. Funeral congregations of opponents were targeted by conducting suicide attacks. ANP, a political party with nationalist cum secular program was especially targeted and its local leaders were assassinated in large numbers. Militants butchered their opponents in public view by slitting their throats and displaying their severed heads. Even tombs and graves of Sufis were desecrated and their bodies were hanged on trees warning the public to refrain from visiting shrines.

media reports and information gathered by the ISI,<sup>418</sup> Baitullah Mehsud ordered her assassination. Suicide bombers Saeed aka Bilal and Ikramullah, both residents of Badar village in South Waziristan, were involved in the assassination.<sup>419</sup>

### 5.15. Concluding Observations

*Al-Qaeda* suffered a setback due to the death of its *Amir ul Khuruf*, Abu Obaida Al-Misri during the last quarter of 2007. Although Khalid Habeeb was immediately appointed as the replacement *Amir*, he was also killed during a drone strike a few days later. *Al-Qaeda*, therefore, was unable to exploit the security debacle in Pakistan to its maximum advantage due to its internal leadership crisis.

All these activities resulted in a serious internal security situation in Pakistan. The analysis suggests that the sudden flaring up of extremist militancy in different regions of Pakistan, especially the *Lal Masjid* debacle, spread militancy to other tribal agencies including Orakzai, Khyber, Bajaur and Mohmand, and even the settled districts of Dir and Swat. The increase in suicide attacks on military and civilian targets on mainland Pakistan was a manifestation of *Al-Qaeda's* plan to divert the Pakistan army from military intervention in Waziristan. The activities of *Al-Qaeda* were fuelled through drone attacks by the US which were and are strongly condemned by Pakistanis. Opposition to drone attacks has become part of the manifesto of some national political parties for the May 2013 national elections.

An analysis of the 2007 situation clearly points to the fact that Taliban militants did in fact succeed in their plan by terrorizing the public and thereby creating serious obstacles for the government. The operation in Waziristan was shelved by Pakistani

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<sup>418</sup> Inter Services Intelligence, a premier intelligence outfit of Pakistan army.

<sup>419</sup> Baitullah Mehsud's *Tehreek-e-Taliban* had also claimed responsibility of her assassination.

authorities at the cost of the annoyance of the US. On the other hand, the US strategy to appease and engage moderate Taliban failed in Afghanistan and it was compelled to dispatch an additional number of 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan around this period.

This was what *Al-Qaeda* had desired, planned and achieved. It had successfully managed to develop Waziristan as its base and thus has engaged Pakistan government, the military and the US in an area which is geographically and politically insurmountable.

*Al-Qaeda* could succeed in its objective due to the prevailing culture in Waziristan which provided a conducive environment for *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban to muster support for their cause. They found volunteers willing to support their cause through sacrifices of their lives. This was due to the peculiar historical and cultural factors prevailing in Waziristan and the way its culture has influenced the development of a specific mindset and personality which was in accordance with the requirement of militants.



## CHAPTER 6

### THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF SUICIDE BOMBING

This chapter contains the observations and finding made during the course of the research in the region of South and North Waziristan and during interaction with the relevant people in other parts of the country. This chapter contains observations made during meetings with relevant individuals in the course of group discussions, interviews and one on one meetings. The observations made are part of the ethnographic study of the phenomenon of suicide bombing in Pakistan and form part of the research carried out for this study.<sup>420</sup>

#### 6.1. Suicide Bomber - A General Profile

In Pakistan, the average age of suicide bombers ranges between 14-25 years. Young persons are mostly susceptible to religious emotional and sentimental indoctrination. Their youthful energies render them vulnerable in the hands of a clever and manipulative operator who can convince them to perform such an act. Their social circumstances and psychological personalities also play a role in their readiness to carry out such an act. There are a few cases of older men and women committing suicide attacks in Afghanistan and a negligible number in Pakistan also.

#### 6.2. The Regional and Ethnic Identity of Suicide Bombers

The regional and ethnic identities of suicide bombers vary from North and South Waziristan to other tribal agencies, various regions of KPK including Swat and also Punjab. Initially most of the suicide attacks were conducted by suicide bombers from

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<sup>420</sup> Explanation of the research methodology and procedures adopted for carrying out the subject has already been highlighted in chapter one.

South Waziristan. Later, men from North Waziristan got involved as well. Gradually with the expansion of Taliban activities to other tribal agencies and to mainland Pakistan, the regional and ethnic characteristics of suicide attackers expanded as well.

Suicide attacks have been carried out in mainland Pakistan against sectarian rivals. Groups like *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* acquired fame for conducting suicide attacks on places of worship of *Shia* community all over Pakistan. The intensity of suicide attacks increased during 2003-2008. The trend of attacks against government and army emerged in response to anti-Taliban operations in tribal areas was observed with increased intensity.

In the present context, suicide attackers cannot be identified in relation to a specific regional and ethnic identity. Their regional or ethnic composition has expanded in the recent past and now includes a wide variety of ethnic and regional mix from all over Pakistan. However, the fact remains that the main nursery of suicide bombers remains the tribal areas of Pakistan. more specifically the Waziristan region.

### **6.3. Training Centers for Suicide Bombers**

During the early phase of army operation in 2003, training centers for suicide bombers were established in South Waziristan. Trainers belong to various regions. In most of the reported cases, the majority of them belong to Waziristan but there are reports of trainers from other regions as well, including Swat and Punjab. Original trainers were mostly Arabs and Uzbeks. During the earlier phase of the Taliban movement, trainings were conducted in the Mehsud region of South Waziristan, in Makeen and Badar regions. Qari Hussain, a Taliban leader, had his training centers established in various parts including one in Jandola region of South Waziristan. After the military operation in South

Waziristan in 2003, he shifted his centers to North Waziristan serving various Taliban groups. There are reports of training camps in the territory of Darpa Khel, Datta Khel and even Shawal region of North Waziristan by various Taliban outfits. Afghan Taliban Commander Sirajuddin Haqqani has his own training centers. However, they are exclusively reserved for training suicide bombers for operations in Afghanistan. Pakistani militant organizations like *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen* and *Jaish Muhammad* have their own training centers in Waziristan where people are trained with an exclusive focus on carrying out attacks in Pakistan.

Majority of suicide training centers have been operating, in the North and South Waziristan. However, there are training centers in Mohmand, Bajaur and Khyber agencies as well. During 2007-2008, centers were operating in Swat. The location of training centers is constantly changing in response to military action by Pakistani army or drone attacks by US forces from across the border. Several centers have been targeted in the past few years. It must be noted that the training centers do not have highly sophisticated equipment. It is generally a small house with a few rooms and a ground. Rooms are used for lectures and residential purposes whereas the ground is used for demonstrations and physical exercises as well. There is a praying area as well. Training also includes the handling of small arms and weapons, information about explosives etc and how to attack a target. It also involves a rigorous religious and physical routine.

A training center which was destroyed by a US drone in October 2011 had a statement written on one of its walls in red color, 'Terrorism is a Prophetic Tradition.' Another had a painting of heaven on a wall with rivers, fruit trees and virgins sitting on fresh green grass.

#### 6.4. Commitment Levels of Suicide Bombers

Suicide bombing requires an extreme degree of motivation and commitment. There is no going back once the vest is put on. Information obtained so far reveals that it is an activity for which volunteers are sought. People who volunteer are already motivated to the required level. They are also physically and mentally capable of conducting an attack.

It is just logical that a successful suicide attack can only be conducted by a person who is fully committed to his mission; otherwise, the mission will become exposed to jeopardy and risk. Most of the suicide bombers who have so far conducted their attacks appeared to be committed which explains the high percentage of successful attacks so far. Another related observation is the escape of some suicide bombers from the scene. So far, we only have two cases in which this has happened:

- i. The first was that of the assassination attempt on Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007. According to police investigation, two suicide bombers were sent to carry out the attack with the help of local handlers. They were Saeed aka Bilal and Ikramullah. Both were from South Waziristan. Saeed succeeded in his task and exploded his vest. The other did not carry out the attack and apparently escaped from the scene.<sup>421</sup>
- ii. Another case where such a situation occurred is the attack on the shrine of the Sufi saint Sakhi Sarwar in Dera Ghazi Khan. According to information provided by the

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<sup>421</sup> Interviews of Muhammad Razaqat and other accused persons in Benazir Bhutto's murder case are mentioned in later sections.

arrested bomber Umar Fidayee, their third accomplice Naeemullah Kakar managed to escape the scene.<sup>422</sup>

In both the cases, my investigation reveals that the attackers did not leave the place because they were scared or had lost heart. Although this possibility cannot be logically ruled out altogether, it appears that the reason for their escape was predominantly a tactical decision taken at the spot that another explosion would be futile since the target had already been achieved by the first explosion; the fear factor is, therefore, less convincing. In the case of Benazir Bhutto's assassination, the only reason that two suicide bombers were sent for the mission was that if she was missed by one of them, the other could carry out the attack. This is exactly what happened in the assassination attempt on President Pervez Musharraf in December 2003, when two suicide squads were used during the attack. When the first one missed the target, the second carried out the attack.

### **6.5. Suicide Attacks under Duress**

During the investigation of cases, it became clear that sending a person for suicide attacks is too risky an enterprise to be undertaken from the perspective of a master-mind of the attack. It involves considerable investment in time and resources by the planners. Therefore, coercing an unwilling and non-committed person carries the risk of his escape and thereby jeopardizing the operation.

Almost all would-be suicide bombers with the exception of the nine year old girl, Sohana Jawed from Peshawar, and boys who have been recovered by the military during

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<sup>422</sup> Statement of the arrested would be suicide bomber to media. Details in subsequent sections.

the Swat operation, all were willing volunteers. The case of Sohana Jawed is quite astonishing in certain respects and there are numerous grey areas and unresolved issues pertaining to this particular case. Logically it seems quite idiotic on the part of the mastermind of suicide attacks to engage an unwilling girl in circumstances where the chances of failure are far higher than success.<sup>423</sup>

There are very few stories of this type and there is a severe dearth of information on this particular aspect of suicide attacks, therefore, it would be wise to refrain from making any further observation.

## **6.6. Suicide Attacks and their Relationship with Waziristan**

There is a definite and established link between suicide attacks and the Waziristan region. In most cases of recent origin, the focus has now shifted to North Waziristan. The link with Waziristan may have multifarious dimensions. For instance, either the suicide bomber is a native of Waziristan, or has lived there for a considerable period of time and has interacted with the militants, the mastermind, training centers, the handler or friends and co-suicide bombers who all have some kind of relationship and link with Waziristan. There are some other aspects as well. For instance, either the material used in the preparation of the suicide vest/ jacket, or financial resources may have originated from this area. In most cases, however, the planning of suicide missions and their management is linked with Waziristan in some manner.

An explanation for this state of affairs is simple. Waziristan has emerged as the center of Taliban activity. Most of the *Jihadi* outfits affiliated with Taliban have their

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<sup>423</sup> See details in Interview No.9 in the forthcoming sections of this chapter.



bases and centers in Waziristan and their leadership resides there as being a safe sanctuary for Pakistani Taliban.

### **6.7. Suicide Attackers? - The Motivational Factors**

Identifying the underlying cause of suicide bombers' motivation is a cumbersome task indeed. I have attempted to explore the causes and primary motivation factors through in-depth interviews and preparation of case studies. Interviews were conducted with families of suicide bombers, elders in the community and people who had close contacts with banned outfits or with persons who support and justify these acts on religious and cultural grounds. There are no definite conclusions but the data which has been presented in case studies suggests that there is a stream of common traits and mindsets among all suicide bombers which motivate them to perform the act. Their motivation factors are strongly linked to culture which provides them with a satisfactory justification for their activity. Their acts have individual as well as collective dimensions. The conventional wisdom that bombers are insane or religious fanatics is not wholly correct. Individual bombers show no personality disorders. Their attacks are more often politically motivated, aimed at achieving specific strategic goals such as forcing concessions or generating greater support. Moreover, their motivations are complex and varying in nature. Humiliation, revenge and altruism, all drive the individual to engage in, and the community to condone suicide bombing. Indeed, as Hassan notes, participating in suicide bombing can fulfill a range of meanings from personal to

communal. Without understanding these motivations, it would appear, the governments or organizations that seek to end suicide bombings are likely to be disappointed.<sup>424</sup>

Suicide bombing attacks have become a weapon of choice for terrorist groups because of their lethality and ability to cause disorder and horror. Though depressing, the almost daily news reports of deaths caused by suicide attacks rarely explain what motivates the attackers.<sup>425</sup> Analysis of the information contained therein yields some interesting clues that it is politics more than religious fanaticism that has led terrorists to blow themselves up.<sup>426</sup> The data so far available and analysis carried out has found no direct evidence that religion is the main cause of suicide attacks; however, there is strong empirical support available in favor of the assumption that religion is a principal motivating factor for an individual suicide attacker. My data, which is primarily focused on individual interviews, conducted in confidence and on oath of not disclosing the identity of interviewees, shows that suicide bombers were psychologically normal and were active in social life, and, that they had strong opinions and dedication to national, religious and tribal affinities.

The assumption that terrorist bombers are abnormal, possess some personality disorder and are religious fanatics is misleading and detracts the analyst from reaching

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<sup>424</sup> Hassan, Riaz., Yale Global, 3 September 2009, p. 191. Available at [www.riazhassan.com/archive/Global\\_Rise\\_of\\_Suicide\\_Terrorism.pdf](http://www.riazhassan.com/archive/Global_Rise_of_Suicide_Terrorism.pdf) and Hassan Riaz, Yale Global, 3 September 2009.

<sup>425</sup> Between 1981 and 2006, 1200 suicide attacks constituted 4 percent of all terrorist attacks in the world and killed 14,599 people or 32 percent of all terrorism related deaths. Suicide Terrorism Database in Flinders University in Australia, the most comprehensive in the world, holds information on suicide bombings in Iraq, Palestine-Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which together accounted for 90 per cent of all suicide attacks between 1981 and 2006. Suicide terrorism data base in Flanders University Australia, [www.forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/emilsen.pdf](http://www.forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/emilsen.pdf).

<sup>426</sup> Hassan Riaz, (2009)

right conclusions. It also hides the intentions behind such mega motives which are sponsored and planned at sophisticated and much higher level. Such assumptions also help hide the political motives behind the acts, which are organizational not individual.

Injustice and revenge in isolation of other factors cannot become the principal motivating factors. The victims of 9/11 in the US and victims of drone attacks in Waziristan deserve equal sympathy since both were subjected to injustice. Those who claim responsibility for dismantling the World Trade Centre justify their act under some political cause with historical and religious motivations and in a similar vein the US justifies killings of people through drone attacks in Waziristan and aerial bombings in the region.

People react aggressively to injustice. Revenge becomes the only manifestation of their reactions. One consequence of the desire for vengeance is an individual's willingness to go to maximum lengths to settle scores with his enemy. Death and destruction, both of himself and of his enemy, is the maximum limit to which an individual may go in taking his revenge. However, death on its own is not the objective per se. The higher objective is to take revenge and to settle the score for wrongs done to the community as well as the individual. In this case, death is only a process through which a higher objective is achieved but not an objective on its own. This is the distinguishing feature which differentiates between a suicide bomber and a normal suicide.

## **6.8. Ethnographies of Suicide Bombers**

The data on actual and real suicide bombing incidences, suicide bombers, operators and master minds cannot be obtained through conventional anthropological methods such as survey, structured interviews, open ended interviews and participant observation in their bookish meaning. I, therefore, collected and compiled ethnographies of suicide bombers through my personal contacts in the area, with police and law enforcing agencies and Taliban supporters, ensuring extreme confidentiality. These interviews were conducted on random dates sometimes in series and in few cases with intervals of months as per the availability of respondents.

These ethnographies of bombers have been discussed under the following four sections;

- i. Section I, case studies
- ii. Section II, statements and interviews of relatives of suicide bombers in self- narrative style.
- iii. Section III, statements and interviews of would be suicide bombers before police and media
- iv. Section IV, Interviews with relatives of suicide bombers who carried out attacks in Afghanistan

### **6.8.1 Section I (Case Studies)**

#### **6.8.1.1 Case Study No. 1 - Dilawar Khan**

**Date of Interview May 16, 2011.**

Gul Muhammad belonged to the Yousafzai tribe of Pathans. His native village having a population of about 6000 was surrounded by green hills, pastures, small fields,

streams and trees in the District of Swat. Gul Muhammad owned a small piece of land near his home beside the stream. He was living in his ancestral home and also owned some livestock. Farming and cattle were enough to feed his family and he lived a happy life with his wife, only son Dilawar Khan and two daughters. His son Dilawar Khan was a good student but had to leave school and earn a living after marriage. His father bought him a Van for carrying passengers from his village to Mingora city. Besides he also worked in his fields. Both father and son used to offer prayers in the nearby Mosque.

Dilawar Khan raised a family having two sons and three daughters. With the passage of time he became sad and a bit angry due to the poor economic conditions of his family. There was a lot of social, economic and emotional pressure on him. He did not send his daughters to school while the sons left education after primary level.

During those days the religious movement in Swat valley for the restoration of the *Sharia* code of life and conduct was in full swing. Dilawar soon joined the campaign and firmly started believing that return to an Islamic way of life was the only solution to his problems. He started talking against the western powers and the existing system of the country. Finally, the provincial Government announced *Sharia* for the Swat region under which *Qazi* Courts were established. The local clergy was not satisfied with these arrangements. They began preaching all over the valley for the banning of female education, demanding separate hospitals and paramedical staff for women, a ban on all kinds of music, movies and cultural activities. Dilawar Khan subscribed to all these popular views from his heart. This was the situation when the 9/11 bombings took place and the US attacked Afghanistan.

Soon after, Dilawar Khan sent one of his sons aged 17 along with the *Lashkar*<sup>427</sup> to Afghanistan for *Jihad*. He never came back. It is believed that his son was killed in the US bombing but his dead body was also never found. Dilawar celebrated the death of his son as *Shahadat* and<sup>428</sup> distributed sweets in the village. He announced, “I am a proud father who sacrificed his son for Islam and surrendered before the will of God, like the Prophet Ibrahim”.

Lately he himself joined the local Taliban in Swat and became a Spy for them. Dilawar reminisced with a glint in his eyes, “in the early days of Islam, Muslims used to find the opportunities to render service for the holy causes, today we are lucky that opportunities have come to us. It is time to show our faith because Muslims are in trouble and the whole world is our enemy”

Dilawar is strong in his conviction. His other son joined the Taliban forces, obviously with his consent, and left home. Dilawar himself kept on working for the extremist forces for three years until the Swat operation in 2009 when he and his family had to flee to other places of the KPK as Internally Displaced persons (IDPs). During the Swat operation his second son who had joined Taliban army also got killed. Dilawar Khan was told that his younger son carried out a suicide attack on an army post. This was the second in his family. Dilwar Khan accepted this death also with courage and vowed to sacrifice all his sons at the altar of God. He has a firm belief that the forces of evils will be defeated and one day Islam will prevail. He himself has escaped death so many times but he is still adamant and ready to become a *Shaheed*. “I am still alive and not

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<sup>427</sup> A tribal militia of volunteers. A famous cleric Maulana Sufi Muhammad organized a *Lashkar* of thousands of volunteers in support of Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001. The *Lashkar* went to Afghanistan. Thousands got killed or missing in action.

<sup>428</sup> Martyrdom.



lucky like my sons. Perhaps this is the will of God, he loves my children more than me” he laments. His house in Swat has been raided several times by the law enforcement agencies while Dilwar is on the run for his life. But he still believes that they will win this war and God will help them.

#### 6.8.1.2. Case Study No. 2 - Noor Mohammad

Date of Interview: July 20, 2011.

The *Madressa* was not a strange place for Noor Mohammad as many of his age mates from the village were already studying there. It was a single storey building on the outskirts of the Southern city of Punjab, Dera Ghazi Khan. Noor Mohammad was initially sent to the primary school located in his own village at the age of eleven where he spent two years but could not develop an interest in his studies. His father, a poor daily wage laborer, working in the fields of a local land lord, decided to send Noor to the *madressa* for religious education and training. This could guarantee that his son would have three meals a day, clothing and a secure future. Noor’s day would begin with early *Fajar* prayer<sup>429</sup> followed by a simple breakfast with *roti* (*bread*) and tea. Students would recite the holy Quran loudly in a large hall in front of *Maulana sahib*, their teacher. Students were assigned various duties including cooking, washing and repair of mosque and madresssa building. Afternoons were mostly free when students could play, sit, and sleep. The evening schedule was different. Students were assigned houses from where they could go and fetch evening meals. Life was stagnant and slow. Noor stayed there for three years. His life changed when he developed acquaintance with Qari Sher Shah, a

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<sup>429</sup> Early morning prayers.

teacher in his *madressa*. He was fascinated by his stories of *Jihad* in Afghanistan. His stories were enthralling.

Noor had now turned seventeen. One night he calmly left with his mentor, Sher Shah, for a greater cause, which to him, was going to bring some meaning to his life and promise for a grand eternal destiny. They reached Dera Ismail Khan, the nearest Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KPK) city bordering South Waziristan. They were transported in a car by a young man to a village, inhabited by a few houses, surrounded by barren hills. The training started the next day. A middle aged man, called Haji sahib gave an impressive and emotional speech on the philosophy of *Jihad* and its necessity. His punch line was that everybody has to die, no matter rich or poor. However, those, he emphasized, who die for the will of God as *shaheed*, will have enormous gifts like beautiful women, lavish food, clothing of your taste and houses like kings. The acts considered as sins in this world will become your rights as gifts of God. This life will be endless and full of joy", Haji sahib would say this to everyone and every day.

This was a batch of seven people; all drawn from various parts of the country but mostly *Pashtuns* from KPK province. They were provided better food as compared to their food in the *Madressa*. Beds were comfortable and people extremely friendly, loving and affectionate. In the initial days, they learnt about the philosophy and benefits of *Jihad*. During the second phase, glimpses of eternal life in heavens were demonstrated through pictures, charts and videos. In the third phase, trainees were told about the overall situation in the world and atrocities being committed by foreign forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. Haji sahib and a new speaker discussed drone attacks and the role of the Pakistani security forces in the genocide of innocent Muslims. It was now

time that the guests were openly asked to play their role as true Muslims. Haji sahib explained that *Jihad* is not only necessary against infidels but against all who support the infidels. It is not necessary that the victims of holy war are always infidels. They could be Muslims as well. A well spoken and impressive middle aged man who had joined the camp recently, gave an overall review of international and regional situation. He provided statistics about the killings of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan by the Americans and the role local national security agencies were playing in support of occupants and aggressors. The group was shown pictures of martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the cause and became immortal.

After the evening meal on the 30<sup>th</sup> day of their arrival, Haji sahib, after the *Isha* prayers<sup>430</sup> asked for volunteers. There was not a single person who could afford missing this blessed moment. Three persons were selected; two from South Waziristan and one from Punjab- Noor Mohammad.

The training started the next day. It was simple. They had to wear a jacket, under their long shirts and unplug/ pull the wire at a place already mentioned. It was explained that during the operation they must continue to recite verses from the Holy Quran in their heart.

The night before their departure, there was a feast in their honor followed by prayers for the success of their mission and heavenly place for the parents of the volunteers.

Noor Mohammad travelled with another young man named Zahir for the city of Peshawar the next morning. They stayed in a large house in a beautiful settlement in

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<sup>430</sup> Last prayer in the night.

Peshawar city. Two days passed, Noor met nobody except Zahir and the servant who provided them meals. The last day, Noor along with Zahir and another person discussed the route to reach the target and possible last moment change in plan and site, if necessary. Their meeting ended with prayers. Then Zahir wrapped the Jacket around the waist of Noor, hugged him and kissed his forehead. A Toyota Corolla car was waiting. Zahir drove the car to a busy street, parked the vehicle in front of a building and said good bye to Noor. Noor was nervous, unexpectedly. His confidence was intact but his face started sweating badly. He started walking towards the main entrance. He was asked to avoid the metal gate and take the side door. At the side door, he was the only who was asked to show his identity card. It was probably the expression on his face which made the guards suspicious and before he could detonate the explosives, both of his arms were locked from behind. He was immediately taken to the security room. His shirt was torn from the front and the Jacket unfolded quickly. Noor was taken in custody and shifted to an unknown place.

## **6.8.2 Section II (Interviews with Relatives & Friends)**

### **6.8.2.1. Interview No. 1 - Elder Brother of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview:    October 19, 2011**

“My Name is Rahmatullah Khan Mahsud. I lived in Wana in South Waziristan. This is located in the territory of Wazir tribe. My father owns two Toyota cars. Renting of cars is our family business. Our family is religious. My father goes regularly for *Tableegh*<sup>431</sup>.”

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<sup>431</sup> Preaching of Islam while visiting various places.

My younger brother Nematullah had problems with my father and used to run away frequently. He was not interested in education; however, he was extremely devout in religious matters. In 2002, when the military operation started in South Waziristan, the situation became very tense for all. We had to shift to the Gomal-Zam area where a distant cousin of my father provided us shelter. Later, we moved down to Tank city. My brother became even more zealous in religious matters. He was frequently interacting with other young men whose families had also been displaced from South Waziristan due to the military operation. People were very frustrated due to the ongoing military action and law and order situation but could not do much. My father had put up a grocery shop in Tank bazaar and I helped him in the business to make ends meet. My brother did not take any interest and would spend most of his time with his friends. In 2005, my brother disappeared again after a minor altercation with my father. We did not take much notice as it was his routine and he used to get back every time. Later, when time went by, I tried searching for him but there was no information. South Waziristan was in turmoil and almost everyone I knew had been displaced from Waziristan to different places. It was difficult to travel back to Wana due to fighting and curfew. There was almost daily fighting between the army and the Taliban. My search ended in failure. Later, in 2006, after about a year of his disappearance, I met a friend of my brother named Rooh-ul-Amin who was from the Mehsud tribe. He told me that he was in Waziristan fighting alongside a group of tribal fighters against the army. He was injured and was brought secretly to D.I. Khan for treatment. Rooh-ul-Amin was planning to go back to Waziristan to fight again after he had recovered from his injury. He informed me that my brother had been in his group among other Taliban fighters. They had a large number of Uzbeks and

Chechens in their group as well. Their commander was a Taliban fighter named Zabit Khan Mehsud. As a result of intense army action in South Waziristan, their Group had shifted to North Waziristan which was relatively safe for them. In June 2006, their group decided to attack a military check post which was located on Bannu Miranshah road. Since the check post was manned very strictly by the army, it was decided to conduct a suicide attack on the post. Five people from the group volunteered for the attack. Since it was difficult to decide among the five volunteers, a random selection was made. My brother's name was selected. He was to hit the check post with a vehicle laden with explosives. Later that day, we had a meal together, my brother offered Nafal prayers, then he hugged all of us and drove the vehicle away towards the target. It was a successful operation and several soldiers were killed in the hit. Roohullah said that I must not feel depressed and sad. My brother is a *Shaheed* and we must be proud of him for his bravery and sacrifice.

#### **6.8.2.2. Interview No. 2 - Friend of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview: October 10, 2011.**

“My name is Jan Sher Khan. I am about 26 years old. I belong to South Waziristan. My village is located about seven miles from the town of Jandola. My father worked as a guard in a government office in D.I. Khan. I had six siblings, four sisters and two brothers. I was admitted to the *Madressa* of Molvi Noor Muhammad in Wana town. It is a famous *Madressa* in Wana and Molvi Noor Muhammad is a well known personality of South Waziristan. I stayed in Wana for eight years. Sangeen Khan Wazir was a course mate of mine. He belonged to Tanai village located a few miles outside Wana on the



Wana D.I. Khan road. His father was a driver of a long ten-wheeler truck, mostly traveling to Karachi. Sangeen was my best friend and we always stayed together.

In 2001, when the war started in Afghanistan, we were very angry and upset. Almost all our *Madressa* colleagues and teachers were furious. Mostly our discussion revolved around this issue and we spoke about going for *Jihad*. Some of the Afghan boys in our *Madressa* had already left for Afghanistan saying that they would rather engage in *Jihad* against the infidel US rather than waste time studying. We were also emotionally charged and wanted desperately to go for *Jihad* but had no idea how to do that? Photographs of Osama bin Laden appeared everywhere in Wana. We has also pasted them on our books. A few months later, the situation became even more precarious since lots of people fighting the Americans in Afghanistan crossed over to Waziristan. We were very excited as there was a lot of talk about Arab *Mujahideen* in Wana. The situation deteriorated in 2002 when the threat of the Pakistani military operation in South Waziristan intensified. Our *Madressa* was also closed due to the worsening situation of the region. We had in the meantime established contact with some people who were going for *Jihad*. They told us that the Pakistani government and army is trying to handover the Arab *Mujahideen* to US forces. It is therefore necessary to fight and protect our Arab *Mujahideen* brothers. We agreed and decided to join the *Mujahideen*. Many of our *Madressa* friends had already joined Nek Muhammad Wazir's forces, who was a brave young man and stood against the Pakistani army in support of the *Mujahideen*. Sangeen Khan and myself joined his group along with several other friends from our *Madressa*. Since Sangeen Khan was a driver, he was asked to drive a vehicle of *Mujahideen*. We would just follow commander Khan Badshah Wazir who was a close

friend of Nek Muhammad Wazir. Later, after the death of Nek Muhammad Wazir, we shifted to the territory of the Mehsud tribe. Since our group of *Mujahideen* included many Uzbek and Afghans, therefore, we also went with them to Uruzgan in Afghanistan twice for *Jihad* and attacked US and British forces there. In 2006, we were told to shift over to North Waziristan. We kept on moving from one location to another with our group. However, I always remained close to Sangeen Khan. We lived most of the time in a compound in the Danday Darpa Khel region of North Waziristan, which belonged to a Taliban commander. We also went with the Afghan Taliban to the Khost region to attack a US post, but it did not work out and we came back after five days.

It was in the hot summer of 2007, when Sangeen Khan told me that he had been asked if he would be willing to take part in a *Fidayee* mission and he had agreed. He did not share details about the mission since it was not allowed and I also did not insist as I understood the need to maintain secrecy. Sangeen Khan was however very excited about this. Then one day early in the morning when we finished offering our *Fajar* prayers, Sangeen Khan came and told me that he had to leave for the *Fidayee* mission. He had just received the message to report for the mission. I was a little shocked to know that he was about to go. However, he told me that he had broken his promise and told me the secret but he wanted me to inform his parents whenever I get a chance to let them know that he went willingly on the mission and was happy that he had been given this chance. His prayers had been answered. He said to me to tell his parents never to feel as he is a *Shaheed* and they must be proud of him. I hugged him and said goodbye. I wanted to see him off outside but he stopped me there. Later that day, I heard that there was an attack on an army convoy and lots of soldiers have been killed. I knew that it was my friend

Sangeen Khan. I felt very emotional and depressed as I missed my friend since he was my only friend but I knew that he is a *Shahheed* and has not died and is still alive.

Later after a few weeks, I took his clothes and other personal belongings including a copy of the Holy Quran and an old book of Pashto poetry and went to South Waziristan but I did not venture beyond the Mehsud area. Sangeen Khan's village Tanai was under army control. I gave the clothes and personal belongings to a common friend named Salar Hayat Mehsud who took them to his village. Later he told me that he gave it to his elder brother and informed him of the death of Sangeen Khan”.

### **6.8.2.3. Interview No. 3 - Elder Brother of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview: October 18, 2011**

“My name is Sohbat Khan. I belong to Matta tehsil of Swat. My two elder brothers are settled in Karachi where they drive public transport. I could not learn to drive so I was admitted in a *Madressa* in Fizaghat Swat. In 2001, I was 19 years old when the Americans invaded Afghanistan. There was a lot of anger and emotionalism in Swat as a result of that war. Molana Sufi Muhammad announced that he will lead a *lashkar* to fight against the Americans and sought volunteers. I also volunteered along with my younger brother Ziarat Khan who was about two years younger than me. My brother was a Hafiz of Quran and very religious. We registered ourselves with the *Tehreek* people who were making announcements for *Jihad* in mobile vans. We were told to bring our guns with us; however, later we will be given weapons when we reach Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, just one day before our group was supposed to leave for *Jihad*, my mother became ill and I had to stay with her during her treatment in Peshawar. I sent Ziarat Khan with the group. After a few months, we got the news that the volunteer

*Mujahideen* had suffered a lot in Afghanistan and my brother was arrested by men of Rasheed Dostum. Most of the others were either killed by the Northern Alliance people or died in US bombings. For many years we did not receive any news of my younger brother; however, later, after five years, in 2006, he came back. He was released by the Northern Alliance people when the Red Cross visited their camp and found my brother in a very sick condition. My brother was, however, full of anger towards the US and their sympathizers. During this period, Mulla Fazlullah had emerged as a preacher and people in almost every household used to tune to his channel almost daily. My mother also prayed for him and heard his sermons. His sermons also infused me with religious zeal and I regularly visited his mosque in Imam Dheri along with my brother Ziarat Khan for sermons on *Juma* (Friday). In December 2006, my brother said that he had met a person at Imam Dheri who is a *Mujahid* and has come to Swat with a group of his friends to meet Mulla Fazlullah. My brother said that he had been castigated by the *Mujahid* from Waziristan for sitting at home and not doing Jihad when it is incumbent upon every Muslim. He had invited my brother to visit Waziristan for *Jihadi* training. Next day, I went with my brother to Imam Dheri and met the guest from Waziristan. His name was Khitab Gul. He also convinced me to join him in Waziristan for *Jihadi* training. He told me that he is from the Khal region of Dir but have been living in Waziristan for the last five years. He said that Miranshah is a center for Jihad and there are people from all over the world living and getting *Jihadi* training there. Khitab Gul was a veteran of the Afghan *Jihad* during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and had spent a year in the Indian-Occupied Kashmir. He was a trained *Jihadi*. We immediately agreed and after two days we left for North Waziristan with Khitab Gul and his three friends, two of whom were

from Dir and one from North Waziristan. We went to Miranshah and after five days we were sent to the Mir Ali region of North Waziristan with a group of other people, mostly Pashto speaking but some were Punjabis as well. We stayed in a large compound with rooms at one end and a large ground in the center where we used to get weapon training and physical exercises. We were also given instructions in the proper recitation of the Holy Quran as well, and other related matters. After a month, I along with my brother left for Swat. My brother Ziarat Khan visited Miranshah a few more times again. Later, when the army operation started, everything changed in Swat. I joined the group of Taliban commander Bani Amin who had about two hundred people. My family got displaced to Mardan and I remained with Bani Amin and we fought against the Pakistan army for a few months. Later we left for Afghanistan through Bajaur and crossed over to Kunar via the Nawa Pass. My brother had disappeared during this period. I could not go to Pakistan due to the fact that the Pakistani army knew my details. I, however, managed to get to North Waziristan in January 2009. I traveled from within Afghanistan and did not enter Pakistani territory. I met Khitab Gul and stayed with him for about two months. I inquired from him about my brother. He told me that he was with my brother during the army operation and they fought against the army together in Swat. He said that they had about 30 men in their group in Swat and they were engaged in guerrilla attacks against the army for quite some time. Most of our fighters had either died or became seriously wounded or had left after getting disheartened with the fighting. By the onset of winter, their group had only four people left including my brother. Their commander Khan Zaman was a Mehsud from South Waziristan. He decided to go back as there was no point in continuing their fight. It was also getting difficult due to the onset of cold

weather in Swat. However, my brother Ziarat Khan decided not to go back. He told the commander that he would rather die in Swat than go back. He volunteered for a suicide attack on the army positions. Later, he did conduct a suicide attack on an army checkpost and died. Approximately ten persons, including four army soldiers, were killed in the attack. Khitab praised the bravery of my brother. He said that he was very relaxed and happy that his wish to carry out a suicide attack had been granted. Before leaving for the attack, he offered *Nafal* prayers and had hugged everybody warmly in the group.

My mother and my nephews had by then moved down to a IDP camp in Mardan. I only once spoke with my mother on phone. She did not utter a word but kept weeping on the phone. This upset me a lot. I am here in North Waziristan and do not intend to go back to Swat. I want to be a *Shaheed* and this is the only place where I can hope to achieve my objective”.

#### **6.8.2.4. Interview No. 4 - Friend and co-Taliban fighter**

**Date of Interview: October 16, 2011**

“My name is Sahibzada Khan. I am now 27 years old. I belong to the Spinkay Raghzay region of South Waziristan. After my father’s death in 1998, I lived with my uncle in Karachi. I attended school up to class 5 but was not interested in studies. I used to suffer a lot of physical punishment from my teachers for indiscipline. Finally I left school and my uncle employed me at a truck station in Maripur Karachi. This area of Karachi is like mini Waziristan. This is a major point of loading and unloading of trucks from KPK. I met Nur Khan and Hazrat Yar here in 2003. Nur Khan was a Wazir from Shakai village of South Waziristan. Hazrat Yar was a Wazir from the Aisha region of North Waziristan. Hazrat Yar was brought here by his elder brother who was also a truck



driver. Hazrat Yar was very religious. He had also attended a *Madressa* in North Waziristan but had to leave his studies uncompleted when his *Madressa* was closed down due to the army action. He wanted to continue his studies in Karachi but the *Madressas* had restricted their admission policy after the government crackdown and he was unable to get admission. This made him quite frustrated. During this period, everybody used to talk about Baitullah Mehsud and his suicide bombers' squads and we used to get very excited. Truck drivers who came to Karachi used to bring fresh stories of the Taliban and their suicide attacks which we were always keen to hear. In September 2006, Hazrat Yar decided to go back to Waziristan as he was quite bored in Karachi doing the mundane work of filling in registers. He kept on urging me that he wants to do something worthwhile and exciting in his life rather than remain a *Munshi* (A Clerk) like me. Finally, in September 2008, he went back to Waziristan telling us that he will be back in a few days. He did not return back. His brother kept telling us that he will be coming back soon. He did, however, keep in touch with us sometimes via phone. He came back unannounced in May of 2009. He told me that he had gone to Afghanistan for *Jihad* and had fought alongside *Mujahideen* of the Sirajuddin Haqqani group. He was very excited and told us about his exploits and the attacks that they carried out on American troops and their Afghan allies. Those were exciting stories. He said to me that you are nothing but a coward wasting your time in Karachi. *Jihad* is the best vocation and it is obligatory upon all Muslims in the present situation. I also noticed that he had become much more bitter about the Pakistani army and the government. He was not that critical before going to Waziristan. He kept on mentioning that the Pakistani army and government had sold itself to the Americans. They cannot call themselves Muslims since they are taking

money from Americans to kill the *Mujahideen*. He was also very bitter about the *Lal Masjid* incident and said that the Pakistani army had killed lots of innocent children and women at the behest of Americans. Hazrat Yar kept on talking about his feelings and was very frank in expressing his support for Baitullah Mehsud and the Taliban fighting the Pakistani army in Waziristan. Some people advised him not to be so blunt as there were agents and spies of ISI all around. He had fully convinced me by then to go for *Jihad* and join the ranks of Taliban. In July 2009, I and Hazrat Yar left for Waziristan in his brother's truck. I did not inform any other person except our common friend, Nur Khan Wazir, who stayed in Karachi. We went to North Waziristan. Hazrat Yar knew many Taliban fighters and we roamed around with them brandishing weapons. We were living for most part in Mir Ali. Hazrat Yar took me to a sermon at night delivered by scholars, among whom two were Arabs. They were middle aged and spoke very fluent Pashto. Once there was intense shelling of our neighborhood area in retaliation for a suicide attack on a Pakistani military convoy on the road. Several people including women and children were killed. This made everyone very angry. They were all innocent people. The army's shelling was callous and indiscriminate. The Taliban fighters of our group held a meeting the following night and decided to take revenge. It was suggested that the army posts on Miranshah Bannu road must be targeted. Several volunteers presented themselves for the action including Hazrat Yar. He was selected. He was very happy and excited. He said that from now on he would like to be called Hazrat Yar Fidai.

I feel happy for him that he achieved his desire of *Shahadat* but miss his company as a friend".

#### 6.8.2.5. Interview No. 5 – First Cousin and Friend of a Suicide Bomber

**Date of Interview:** October 19, 2011.

“My name is Shiraz Khan. My family lives in Peshawar city. My parents settled here in the 1990’s after shifting from the Upper Dir area. My cousin Muhammad Safdar Khan became a *Mujahid* in 2000. He was about 18 years in 2000. His father had died in 1995 and his family was supported by his elder brother who worked in the UAE. He had finished his inter education but instead of studying further, he decided to go to Kashmir for *Jihad*. He used to read a lot of literature including *Jihadi* magazines of *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and *Al-Badar Mujahideen*. He had many audio and video tapes of *Jihadi* programs which he used to enjoy watching. He would make us watch them as well. They were emotionally motivating for the viewers. In 2001, Safdar Khan disappeared from home and later we discovered that he had joined the *Harkat-ul-Mujahidin* organization involved in the Kashmir *Jihad*. Since then Safdar Khan used to come and go off and on. His beard grew in size and he became very conservative in religious matters. Later after the 9/11 incident, he disappeared again. We found out that he had been detained by some agency for involvement in anti state activities. In 2003 he reappeared again. He told us that he was arrested by Pakistani intelligence agencies along with many others. He was very bitter about the agencies and government saying that they are responsible for the bad and insulting treatment meted out to *Mujahideen*. If it was not for them selling themselves to the Americans, the *Mujahideen* would have liberated not only Kashmir but also Afghanistan. After about two months, he disappeared again. Later, we heard that he had joined people from his group in North Waziristan. He was now a member of *Jaish Muhammad* organization.

In June 2009, Arsalan, son of the elder brother of Safdar Khan, told me that they had a visitor at their house from *Jaish Muhammad* group, who informed them that his uncle Safdar Khan had died in a suicide attack on an army check post in the North Waziristan region in January this year. We gathered in his house and offered *fateha* secretly for his soul. His elder brother later told us that Safdar Khan had left a will before leaving for his suicide mission in which he expressed his happiness for getting an opportunity of *Shahadat*. He had advised his family not to mourn his death, rather celebrate it as an occasion of joy and happiness”.

#### **6.8.2.6. Interview No. 6 - Real Uncle of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview: October 21, 2011**

“My name is Janbaz Khan Wazir from Birmal region of South Waziristan. My nephew Behram Khan was 19 years old. He had joined the Taliban of the Baitullah Mehsud group. After a few months, he was selected for a *Fidayee* mission. After that he was kept by the *Mujahideen* in isolation and was undergoing training most of the time. Only once he came to visit his parents in January of 2007. His father and my brother Jehangir Khan invited my family to meet Behram Khan. My brother told me Behram has been selected for a *Fidayee* mission and that he has come home to say goodbye to us. Behram was happy and told us stories of his training and glorified *Jihad* in his talk. In the beginning I felt upset and stressed at what he intended to do but when I heard him talk with such emotional zeal, my fears and anxiety gave way to a kind of shame. He said to us that there is no point in pursuing worldly gains as there is never an end to them and nobody has ever gone satisfied from this life. The only life worthwhile for a Muslim is the life of the hereafter and only those who take part in Jihad can receive an assurance of

heavenly rewards. His commitment and emotional zeal made me feel ashamed of my own weak faith. His father was also very excited and I could see the flicker of pride in his eyes. My nephew Behram said that his *Ustad* (teacher/trainer) had finally honored him with acceptance of his request to volunteer for a suicide attack. He said that from among 20 others, only he was selected for the next mission. After having meal with him, we were all emotionally charged. However, deep in my heart I felt a slight pain and grief for his parents. Later the next day, we all said goodbye to him and he went to his center where he lived with other Mujahidin. I kept in touch with his father, who kept telling me that there is no news of his son. Later after three months in April 2007, I heard the news that he had been martyred. I went to his house and met his father. He told me that he received a messenger from his center that my son has achieved his target and has become a *Shaheed*. They had returned to him his belongings in a bag which I saw. Other relatives and friends were gathered there and were offering *fateha* for Behram Khan. He was being referred to as Shaheed Behram Khan. His mother was crying but at the same time she told me that she is happy that her son has become a *Shaheed*. He will ensure her entry into heaven as well. Nobody knew where and how he died as these details were not disclosed to anyone. I felt mixed emotions of pride and sadness over the death of my nephew”.

#### **6.8.2.7. Interview No. 7 - Family friend of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview: 22 October 2011.**

“My name is Khan Sher Wazir. I belong to Datta Khel region of North Waziristan. There are many families in my village who have shifted from South Waziristan after the army operation started there. They have been provided shelter in our

area by our tribal elders. We have very good relationship with them. I know the family of Akbar Hayat Khan Wazir. I believe he is from Khaisura region of South Waziristan. Akbar Hayat is a good friend of my father and they usually spend time together.

He shifted to our area about six years ago. About three years ago, in 2009, I was informed by my father that the son of Akbar Hayat has died and we have to go for his *Janaza* (Funeral). I accompanied my father to the house. There were lots of people in their *Hujra*, Akbar Hayat was sitting there and everyone was offering their condolences to him. I had never seen his son nor had ever met him in our village. Upon my asking, my father told me that his son Fazal Hayat Wazir was a Taliban fighter. He remained behind in South Waziristan when his family shifted their place of abode. My father said that he was last known to be with a group of men under Baitullah Mehsud. Yesterday, his father had received information about the death of his son through a messenger sent by his Taliban colleagues. They informed him that his son had died during a mission in the Afghan province of Kandahar. He had attacked a US army convoy in Kandahar and had killed many US and Afghan soldiers.

Maulana Hazrat Din of our mosque made a short speech. After describing the virtues of *Jihad* and the status of *shaheed*, he said that the death of Fazal Hayat is *Shahadat*. He has died in war with non-Muslim usurpers who are occupiers of Muslim land. The US is the enemy of Islam and all Muslims are duty-bound to wage *Jihad* against it. He also said that although suicide is prohibited in Islam but what Fazal Hayat did was not suicide. It was a *Fidayee* attack on non-Muslim forces. Maulana Hazrat Din also said that a *Shaheed* will be given a choice to recommend 70 persons for heaven (*Jannat*). The *Shaheed's* family is lucky since their names will be recommended by him.



Afterwards Akbar Hayat, the father of Fazal Hayat, got up and he also said that he is proud of what his son did. His son was engaged in *Jihad* for five years since the war started in Afghanistan. He always used to say that he will only rest when the enemies of Islam are defeated both in Afghanistan and also in Pakistan. His father said that he is proud to have a son like Fazal Hayat. Later the father said that although people have come to offer their prayers (*Fateha*) over his son's demise but they must not make this gathering appear like a funeral. It is an occasion of happiness for him and his family and therefore he wants people to share his joy rather than grief. Although some people were offering *Fateha* (prayers at the occasion of death), I also saw many people hugging Akbar Hayat and congratulating him on his son's *Shahadat*.

Even outside the premises, two younger brothers of Fazal Hayat Shaheed were busy in firing into the air as celebration for the *Shahadat* of their elder brother. Lots of young men were gathered there and it was an emotional and sentimental occasion. Most of the people were infused with emotions and I heard several people praising Akbar Hayat and his family's response to the *Shahadat* of their son. The thoughts and memories of this day are embedded in my mind and I cannot forget them".

### **6.8.3. Section III (Media and Police Interviews of would be Suicide Bombers)**

There are several cases where "would be" suicide bombers have been interviewed. The interviewees include those suicide bombers who were arrested prior to the attack or apprehended after their explosive vests failed to detonate or failed to kill. Some of them were also recovered from training centers while still going through training.

### **6.8.3.1. Interview No. 1**

#### **Sohana Jawed**

Sohana Jawed, a 9 year old girl, student of Class 3, was kidnapped while going home from school in Peshawar. She was taken from Peshawar to Dir the same day. Next morning she was forced to wear an explosive laden jacket weighing appx 20 kg and was taken close to the Darra Islam checkpost near Timergarah city. There were two women with her in the vehicle along with two male terrorists. She was asked to walk towards the military checkpost. She had realized what was going on and the moment she got the chance, she started shouting to army personnel showing them her suicide jacket. They got hold of her and defused the explosives.

This is a strange case and does not follow the usual pattern of cases. Most of the suicide bombers are either willing to perform the act or are unaware of the explosives in their possession. It is illogical to imagine that the Taliban would expect an unwilling person to detonate explosives the moment he/she gets a chance to free himself from his/her handlers. The only logical explanation that can be offered for such a situation is that the explosives were intended to be detonated through a remote control device and the little girl was intended to be used as a mule for taking them close to the check post.

### **6.8.3.2. Interview No. 2 - Umar Fidayee<sup>432</sup>**

Umar Fidayee is 14 years of age. He belongs to Essa Khel region of North Waziristan. His father has died and he has two younger sisters. He was a student of Class 7 in Nur Public School, in Waziristan. He also attended a *Madressa* for religious lessons.

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<sup>432</sup> [www.dnaindia.com/world/report\\_350-suicide-bombers-receiving-training-in-north-waziristan\\_1529856](http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_350-suicide-bombers-receiving-training-in-north-waziristan_1529856).

On April 07, 2011, he was involved in a suicide attack at the shrine of a 13<sup>th</sup> century Saint, Sakhi Sarwar, in Dera Ghazi Khan district of Southern Punjab. There were three suicide attackers but only one managed to explode his vest, killing at least 50 people and injuring hundreds. Umar was arrested by the police in a seriously injured condition. His suicide vest had failed to explode. His interviews were aired on all national TV channels. TV footage showed him lying on the ground in an injured condition immediately after the attack. He told his interrogators that he was recruited by a person named Qari Zafar in North Waziristan to become a suicide bomber. Qari Zafar had several meetings with him during which he kept on convincing Umar to shed his school studies and instead win *Jannat* (heaven) by becoming a suicide bomber. After initially refusing Qari Zafar's invitations, Umar said that he eventually became convinced that this is the only way to salvation. Qari Zafar inducted him in a training center for suicide bombers in Mir Ali, North Waziristan. There were about 350 other recruits being trained to become suicide bombers.

Umar said that his desire was to conduct an attack against non-Muslims in Afghanistan and his trainers had promised to send him there. However, he was sent to Dera Ghazi Khan instead. According to Umar, he inquired from his colleague that this is Pakistan and these people are not non-Muslims. However, he was told that these people are worse than non-Muslims since they are engaged in *Shirk*.<sup>433</sup>

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<sup>433</sup> A belief that some other entity shares the qualities and characteristics of Allah. This is considered to be the worst manifestation of disbelief as a Muslim. According to classical Islamic jurists especially the *Deobandis* and *Wahhabis*, visiting shrines and belief in saints are tantamount to *Shirk*. The Taliban's ideology is against such practices.

There were three suicide bombers in total. Umar and Ismael who belonged to Mir Ali in North Waziristan and Naeemullah Kakar.<sup>434</sup> Ismael exploded his vest and killed several people. Naeemullah did not detonate his vest and probably escaped from the scene. Umar said that he was instructed to detonate his vest half an hour later when people are busy rescuing the injured. He tried doing that but his vest did not explode. He was also told that in case his vest failed to detonate, he must kill himself with a hand grenade. That is what he was going to do. When he saw three police men standing nearby he decided to explode his grenade so that he can kill them as well. However, before he could remove the grenade's pin, he was shot in the hand by a policeman. They later defused his explosive filled jacket.

It seems quite clear that Umar was quite convinced about his mission and its Islamic justification as *Jihad*. Even while he was seriously wounded and lying on ground, he was not scared of being injured or of death, rather he tried to kill the policemen with his hand grenade even in that condition. This reveals his state of mind and the degree of his conviction in his cause.

**6.8.3.3. Interview No. 3 - Waqar Ahmed, Arshad Khan and their handler Abdul Razzak<sup>435</sup>**

This group of three was arrested in Karachi along with a cache of weapons and suicide jackets. They were part of a sleeper cell in Karachi. Arrests were made by the Crime Investigation Department of Sindh Police.

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<sup>434</sup> Kakar is a *Pashtun* tribe mainly settled in Baluchistan.

<sup>435</sup> <http://tribune.com.pk/story/187780/suicide-bombers-two-reluctant-fundamentalists-arrested-with-handler/>

According to the CIA interrogation, Abdul Razzak was their group leader. In July 2009, he took six young boys from Karachi to Waziristan. They included the two arrested young men, namely Waqar Ahmad and Arshad Khan. There were four others, namely, Ibadullah, Arif, Abdul Qadeer and Hazrat Ali, as well. Abdul Razzak said that he was affiliated with Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud who is a Taliban commander linked with Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. Wali Rehman is also closely associated with Qari Hussain who is a notorious Taliban commander famous for recruiting and training suicide bombers.

Waqar Ahmad is 21 years old. He is a resident of Frontier Colony Karachi. He has seven brothers and sisters and he is the youngest child. His father was a factory worker in Karachi and his brothers worked as helpers in local shops. He used to attend religious classes in *Jamia Islamia Imdad ul Uloom* in Karachi. He was introduced to Abdul Razzak in the *Madressa*, who convinced him through CDs and literature to go for *Jihad*.

Arshad Khan is 18 years old. His mother was divorced years ago. She brought him up on her own. He is a resident of Frontier Colony, Karachi. He was also convinced by Razzak to go for Jihad.

In July, 2009, they left their homes without their parents' permission and went to Waziristan under the guidance of Razzak. They were also accompanied by four others whose names have been mentioned earlier. They spent time in Waziristan and got training in the use of weapons and explosives at a training center. They were also told by their trainers that attacks are justified on the Pakistan army and *Jihad* can be waged

against it since it is allied with the US forces and is pursuing their objectives against Muslims.

They also revealed that four of their colleagues were killed in a drone attack on their training center. They escaped since they were on guard duty that night.

#### **6.8.3.4. Interview No. 4 - Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim**

Hafiz Ibrahim was arrested in Dera Ghazi Khan district in Southern Punjab after his unsuccessful attempt to conduct a suicide attack on a police patrol.

According to police investigation, he became convinced to become a *Jihadi* due to the influence of Muhammad Hanif who was a teacher in a local *Madressa* at Chak Jalohar village. Hafiz Ibrahim and three of his friends, namely Muhammad Lal, Javed Iqbal and Fayyaz, were taken to Waziristan where they were provided with training in arms and explosives for about a month.

After their training, a commitment was taken from them that they will conduct a *Fidayee* attack, whenever required. However, he was arrested before he could carry out the attack in D. G.Khan.

#### **6.8.3.5. Interview No. 5 – Mina, a twelve years Old Girl**

Mina, a twelve years old *Pashtun* girl, provided harrowing details to Peshawar police about her experiences within her family after her escape. She revealed that her father and brother were part of a Taliban network. Her elder brother was the commander of a Taliban unit. Another (brother) had already carried out a suicide attack in Peshawar in October 2009, killing himself along with several other people. She said that she watched when her brother and another man were strapping explosives and shrapnels to her nine year old sister Naheeda as they were preparing her for a suicide attack. Mina



said that her sister was crying while her brother, along with another man were preparing her for the gruesome act. She said that at one point when the man attaching wires to her sister's body said that the weight of explosives will make it difficult for her to walk, her brother replied that it does not matter. When she sits in the car, she will be OK. She remembered that her mother fainted while watching all this. She said that she never saw her sister after that day.

After her sister, it was her turn and her brother started insisting that she conducts an attack as well. He kept on telling her that she will go to paradise long before them. At this point, she decided to run away from her family.

She said that her brother had been training other young children for suicide attacks.

Mina was revealing these horrific details about Taliban's war tactics in the safe custody of the Peshawar police. Police have kept her full identity and that of her family confidential.

She commented, "People say that I have a strong heart. I have to be strong as God will not even let me die." She stated that the Taliban should be burnt alive for their cruel deeds.

#### **6.8.3.6. Interview No. 6 – Three Young Boys, Masood, Nur Alam and Sadiq**

A report aired by Indian TV Channel *Aaj Tak* showed three young boys expressing their views on suicide terrorism. The report included video clips released by the Taliban as part of their propaganda campaign. The report included the video statements by the following children:

Masood: He commented that it is a wrong perception to say that he is unhappy with life or has nothing to live for. He had decided to become a *Fidayee* and conduct a suicide attack on the basis of his faith and commitment to his faith. He further stated that the reason he has become a *Fidayee* is that the enemies of Muslims are equipped with modern sophisticated weapons. The only way to counter their strength is to use our bodies as weapons to destroy them.<sup>436</sup>

Nur Alam: He stated that he wants to take revenge from those people who are committing atrocities against Muslims. He further said that it is the duty of all Muslims to support and help the *Mujahideen*.

Sadiq: He also made similar statements.

Later in the video, the background commentator stated that all the *Fidayeen* have successfully accomplished their missions.

#### **6.8.3.7. Interview No. 7 – Sohail Zeb aka Waheedullah**

Sohail Zeb was arrested in D.I. Khan city. The city lies close to South Waziristan. He stated that his code name was Waheedullah. He had spent about two months and twenty days in a training camp in Azam Warsak region of South Waziristan. He was given both ideological and physical training during this period.

Trainees were given books to read on various topics related to *Jihad* and suicide attacks. They were repeatedly told that once they embrace martyrdom, they will find their places in heaven and will be able to nominate seventy members of their family for heaven as

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<sup>436</sup> The Taliban, through such video messages, have been attempting to counter the accusation that perpetrators of suicide attacks are either deprived individuals who have no interest in life or psychopaths with no prospects, and are being brainwashed and exploited in the name of religion by the Taliban.

well. He also revealed that most of the trainees were young men between the ages of 18-25 years. Sohail Zeb was a college student studying in Grade 12 and was almost 18 years old.

**6.8.3.8. Interview No. 8 – Roohullah from Miran Shah, North Waziristan**

**Journalist and TV anchor Saleem Safi interviewed this would-be suicide bomber who was under detention. This interview was aired on Geo TV news in 2012.**

- Suicide bomber: “I will take revenge on everyone as much as I can, even if it involves my family. If I am going for suicide bombing and I see my family there, even then I will blow myself at my target.”
- Saleem Safi: “Is there nobody innocent in Pakistan?”
- Suicide bomber: “Nobody in Pakistan is innocent. Whoever is outside Waziristan is not innocent. They should visit Waziristan if they consider themselves innocent.” He further said, “Only those are innocent who are taking part in *Jihad* in Miran Shah and except them, No one is innocent.” Then he stated “ I have no repentance, no sorrow for killings. If our *Ameer* (Leader) orders us to kill one person or one hundred, I will kill.”
- Saleem Safi: “Sometimes suicide blasts are committed in mosques and sometime even very young children are killed in suicide attack.”
- Suicide bomber: “Why do you consider these children as innocent? “
- Saleem Safi: “A Child who is merely born, he may become like you when he grows up. So are you not killing the innocents?”
- Suicide bomber: “No, no-one is innocent, even the newly born is not innocent.”
- Saleem Safi: “How many brothers and sisters do you have?”

- Suicide bomber: “Nine, including me.”
- Saleem Safi: “Do they know the path you are following?”
- ☐ Suicide bomber: “Yes. All praises to Allah, they know about me.”
- Saleem Safi: “Have they (parents) granted you permission?”
- Suicide bomber: “No. They have not allowed permission. Permission is not essential when *Jihad* becomes obligatory and then it is not compulsory to have parents’ permission.”
- Saleem Safi: “You (a Taliban) say that *Jihad* has become obligatory but religious scholars say that for *Jihad* permission from an Islamic State is essential.”
- Suicide bomber: “I do not accept the scholars of Pakistan.”
- Saleem Safi: “Do you have any *fatwa* (verdict) about the legitimacy of suicide attacks and of which Scholar?”
- Suicide bomber: “I don’t know the name of Scholar but a *fatwa* is there.”
- Saleem Safi: “Is there any justification from Quran and Hadith?”
- Suicide bomber: “There is a book justifying suicide attacks by an Arab Scholar.”
- Saleem Safi: “The Quran says, do not commit suicide.”
- Suicide bomber: “There are many reasons for it.”
- Saleem Safi: “You say that you do it to seek Allah’s pleasure but Muslim Scholars like Maulana Hassan Jan and Mufti Sarfaraz Naeema have been killed in such suicide blasts?”
- Suicide bombers: “All these scholars neither participate nor believe in *Jihad*. On the contrary, they condemn *Jihad*, the Taliban and specifically Maulana Naeemi had issued a *Fatwa* against the Taliban.”

- Saleem Safi: Are you married?
- Suicide bomber: “No. Seventy virgins (Maidens) are waiting for me in heaven. Why should I prefer only one here.”
- Saleem Safi: “Are virgins also waiting for those who are killed at your hands in suicide blasts?”
- Suicide bomber: “No, they will be treated there as per their intentions. If they support government, then they will be answerable accordingly. Our *Ameer* told us that you will not be responsible for the killing of those who are killed other than your target.”

**6.8.3.9. Interview No. 9 – Muhammad Razaqat. Accomplice of suicide bombers in the Benazir Bhutto Murder Case.<sup>437</sup>**

Date of Interview September 12, 2011.

“I am 24 years of age and educated till Matric, grade 10. I used to do various manual laborer jobs and also kept on going for *Tableegh*. In March 2007, my father bought me a taxi Registration No. BK 1427 for the purpose of earning my livelihood. I used to drive it in Rawalpindi.

My cousin (also a co-accused in the case), Husnain aka Ali, used to study in a *Madressa* in Attock city and also used to go for *Jihadi* training to Miranshah, North Waziristan. He had also rented a house near his *Madressa* in Attock and was imparting *Jihadi* training to his *Madressa* colleagues. Later, the *Madressa* kicked him out due to

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<sup>437</sup> He was involved in the assassination case of Benazir Bhutto on 27-12-2007 in Rawalpindi city during an election rally. His statement under section 164 CrPC was also recorded on 13-02-2008 by the Judicial Magistrate, Rawalpindi.

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such activities. In 2006 his father admitted him into *Madressa Muhammadia* in China Chowk Islamabad.

During this period in 2007, the operation against Lal-Masjid started and a good *Jihadi* friend of Husnain Ali named Fayaz was killed. My cousin Husnain swore that he will not visit his friends' grave until he takes his revenge. He then left to meet his *Jihadi* friend Qari Ismail in *Madressa Haqqania* in the town of Akora Khattak. Later, in August 2007, I alongwith his father and his brother Zul Qarnain went to the *Madressa Haqqania* and brought him back after a lot of difficulty and persuasion. After a few months Ali again visited the *Madressa* along with me. His father reluctantly allowed him to go accompanied by me. We stayed there for a night. The next day Husnain Ali told me that he and Qari Ismail and other colleagues have decided to launch attacks against the government and army by attacking government ministers like Shaikh Rasheed and others to take revenge for *Lal Masjid*. They convinced me as well to support them and narrated various *Ahadith*<sup>438</sup> and verses of the Holy Quran in order to convince me that their actions are justified. Their arguments convinced me and I promised to help them.

Qari Ismail had links with the Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud as well and used to visit him frequently. Later he brought a *fidai* named Usman and handed him over to Husnain Ali. Husnain Ali brought him to Rawalpindi. A few days later Ali brought a suicide jacket as well. This jacket and the *Fidai* named Usman were used in a suicide attack on an army colonel's car in RA Bazar Rawalpindi on September 4, 2007. Later another *fidai* was sent by Qari Ismail who carried out suicide attack on a police picket near the Golf Course in Rawalpindi on October 30, 2007. Qari Ismail also made attempts

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<sup>438</sup> Plural of *Hadith*, traditions and statements of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)



to attack Shaikh Rasheed Ahmad, a former minister, near Abu Huraira Mosque Transit Camp and an *Ahmadi* praying place at Murree Road Rawalpindi where, according to the information, a personal friend and National Security Advisor of President Pervez Musharraf used to offer *Juma* prayers. However, these plans could not succeed due to various reasons.

Suicide jackets were supplied to Ali by Ibad-ur-Rehman aka Noman aka Usman, Nasrullah aka Ahmad aka Saddam aka Abdullah and Faiz Muhammad aka Kaskut. There were two grenades and three jackets placed in Husnain Gul aka Ali's house. These were brought by Faiz Muhammad aka Kaskut.

In November 2007, Qari Ismail and Nasrullah ordered Husnain Ali to conduct a suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto. He ordered to attack her in one of her election rallies. Husnain Ali was told by them that BB has been tasked to eradicate *Mujahideen* and the Taliban in Waziristan by the US and if she assumes power, will order the military to act against the Taliban in order to appease the US.

Nasrullah aka Ahmad came to Rawalpindi five or six days before *Eid-ul-Adha*<sup>439</sup>. He arrived at Pir Wadhai bus station and I and Husnain Ali brought him to Ali's house in my taxi. Husnain Ali explained the details of the venue of the rally which was to be held at Liaqat Bagh, Rawalpindi. Next day we all went in my taxi to the venue. Nasrullah himself inspected the ground while sitting on the stage and made observations.

On November 26, 2007, I was informed by Husnain Ali that Nasrullah is arriving tonight. Around midnight, we picked up Nasrullah and two suicide bombers, namely

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<sup>439</sup> An Islamic festival.

Saeed aka Bilal and Ikramullah, and brought them to my house. Saeed was a smart young man with fair color and athletic body. He was a Pashtun from Waziristan. Husnain Ali also spent the night at my house. The next morning, I along with Nasrullah went to the venue of the Pakistan Peoples Party's rally in Liaqat Bagh and Husnain Ali took both the suicide bombers to his house. Nasrullah had decided that the bombers will attack Benazir Bhutto on her return from the venue. This decision was based on our observation of another rally at Pabbi town where it was observed that the security was strict while coming but lax while getting out. Thus, Nasrullah called Husnain Ali on his mobile phone and told him, "there is nobody at the house, bring the guests so we have food outside." This was our code sentence. Meal meant attack. He came with both the bombers. Husnain Ali told me that both are wearing suicide jackets and that he has also given Saeed aka Bilal a pistol and a hand grenade to Ikramullah. Saeed had placed the pistol under his waist coat and was also wearing sun glasses. The glasses belonged to Husnain Gul Ali which he had earlier purchased from the Pirwadhai bus station. Saeed aka Bilal was with me while Ikramullah was with Husnain Gul aka Ali. Nasrullah aka Ahmad called me on my mobile and asked me to reach the venue. I called Husnain Ali and asked him to be quick. Then we crossed College road and reached Liaqat Road. I stationed Saeed aka Bilal in front of the gate of Liaqat Hall, which was to be Benazir Bhutto's return route whereas Husnain Ali stationed Ikramullah near the other gate that was nearby. It was done in order to cater for a possibility that Benazir Bhutto might leave the car and might walk towards the other gate. Ikramullah was supposed to take care of that eventuality. Also if Saeed aka Bilal fails, then Ikramullah was supposed to conduct the second suicide attack. Afterwards, I along with Husnain Ali went inside Liaqat Bagh

and met Nasrullah. He asked me to go out and stay close to my car and drive towards Fawara chowk after hearing the explosion. I walked out and was close to my car when I heard the explosion.

I drove towards Fawara chowk, saw ambulances running on the road. I and Husnain Gul aka Ali searched for Ikramullah, the other suicide bomber but could not see him anywhere. Later, we heard that Benazir Bhutto had died. We also saw the footage of the incident in which I clearly saw Saeed aka Bilal, wearing the same sun glasses, first firing at Benazir Bhutto with pistol and then exploding himself.

**6.8.3.10. Interview No. 10 – Husnain Gul aka Ali. Accomplice of suicide bombers in Benazir Bhutto Murder Case.<sup>440</sup>**

Date of Interview: September 12, 2011.

“My age is approximately 18 years. I am educated till class 8<sup>th</sup>. I reside in Shah Jewan colony, near Dhok Saidan, Rawalpindi. In the year 2002, I got admission in *Madressa Taaleem ul Islam* in Hazro, Attock, for reading religious books. Students of this *Madressa* used to go for *Jihadi* training. I also developed an interest in *Jihad*. In 2005, I through my friend Fayaz of Abbottabad acquired training in weapons at the training center of Qari Abbas in Miranshah, North Waziristan. During this period, I met the Amir of the group from *Madressa Haqania*, Akora Khattak, namely, Nadir Khan aka Qari Ismail, who was famous for his *Jihadi* background. Qari Ismail had contacts with Baitullah Mehsud and other *Jihadi* commanders. Later I was expelled from the *Madressa*

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<sup>440</sup> His confessional statement under section 164 CrPC was also recorded on 13-02-2008 pm by Judicial Magistrate, Rawalpindi.

when the administrators discovered my *Jihadi* activities. In 2007, my father admitted me in *Madressa Muhammadia*, China Chowk, Islamabad. My friend Fayaz also got admitted in *Jamia Faridia* in Islamabad. Later he died during the July 2007 military operation in the *Lal Masjid*. I was very upset due to his death and I swore that I will avenge his death. I left my *Madressa* and went to *Madressa Haqania*, Akora Khattak, to meet Qari Ismail. Qari Ismail and his other colleagues, including Nasrullah aka Ahmad, Ibad-ur-Rehman aka Noman aka Usman, Abdullah aka Saddam, were all seriously upset due to the *Lal Masjid* operation. We made a plan to take revenge by conducting *Fidai* operations (Suicide attacks) against government supporters including Shaikh Rasheed, former Minister Information and Railways, police and military personnel. I was entrusted with the role of identification of targets in Rawalpindi and Qari Ismail was to provide suicide jackets and bombers. I engaged my cousin Rifaqat Hussain after convincing him for this purpose. We conducted attacks including one on September 4, 2007, against the car of an army colonel in RA Bazar, Rawalpindi, on September 9, 2007 on a police picket. We also tried unsuccessfully to target Shaikh Rasheed Ahmad, the former Information and Railway Minister but could not succeed. Nadir Khan aka Qari Ismail, Nasrullah aka Ahmad, Ibad-ur-Rehman aka Noman aka Usman, Faiz Muhammad aka Kaskut and Abdullah aka Saddam used to provide suicide jackets and related material.

In November 2007, when I visited Akora Khattak, I was informed by Qari Ismail that an order has been issued from the top for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto due to her plans to crush *Mujahideen* and the Taliban in Waziristan at the behest of USA. She has been sent by the US for this purpose. Therefore, we decided to conduct *Fidai* attacks (suicide attacks) on her during election rallies in KPK province and Punjab. It was

announced that she will address rallies in Pabbi on December 12, Peshawar on December 26 and Liaqat Bagh on December 27. We decided to hit her during either of these rallies.

I conducted reconnaissance of Liaqat Bagh in Rawalpindi and prepared a site plan. The next day we went to the venue with Nasrullah who inspected the site. Then we showed the parliament building to him in Islamabad. He made observations of the building with a view to conduct suicide operations there as well sometimes in future. Nasrullah then left by saying that he will send *Fidai* (suicide bombers) for the attack on the rally.

On December 26, 2007, Ibad-ur-Rehman aka Noman aka Usman called on my mobile phone No. 0332-5609682 and informed me that he is sending Nasrullah aka Ahmad, Saeed aka Bilal and Ikramullah. Later, after 2-3 hours, Nasrullah aka Ahmad also called and informed that they are arriving. They arrived at midnight and we went to Razaqat's house. Nasrullah informed us that today they tried to attack Benazir Bhutto during her rally in Peshawar but could not succeed. Therefore, they have to carry out the attack tomorrow in Rawalpindi. Nasrullah also said that they even tried attacking her in Pabbi during her rally on December 12 but, however, could not succeed. Although Saeed aka Bilal, the suicide bomber, had gotten so close that he even saw BB opening her car window and waving her hand after the rally was over. They had also learned that the security is strict before the rally and at the time of her arrival but relaxed at the end while she leaves. They had therefore planned to attack her at the time of her departure from the venue of the rally.

The next day, December 27, I took the suicide bombers to my house. We waited there for the signal to move. Nasrullah finally called and said that I must bring them to eat since there is nobody in the house. This was the code for bringing in the bombers. I informed both the *Fidaeen*. First they offered two nafal prayers each. Then they put their jackets on. Saeed aka Bilal also put on my sun glasses while leaving the house. I also gave him a 30 bore, local made pistol which had "made in China" inscribed on it. I also gave him 3 magazines with 8 rounds each and he concealed the pistol under his waistcoat. Saeed was about to put on his jogger shoes, however, I asked him not to wear Joggers to avoid suspicion since this is the typical mark of *Jihadis* as they all wear joggers. He also left his shawl and cap in my house as well to avoid suspicion.

I gave a hand grenade to Ikramullah. Then we went to the venue in Rifaqat's taxi. We went inside the ground and met Nasrullah who was standing at the back of the seats with people who were standing there. The stage was on the right side. Nasrullah had, after seeing the venue, planned to attack BB inside the ground. However, in case it was not possible to ensure the entry of the *Fidai* inside the ground/ venue due to the rush and crowds, the attack would be conducted near the exit gate at the time of departure from the ground. Therefore, Nasrullah asked me to bring in one of the *Fidai*. I along with Rifaqat went outside and observed that due to the influx and outbound flow of lots of people, the security checking was almost over. I also felt that we can easily bring the *Fidai* inside the ground. We indicated to Saeed aka Bilal to come inside. He started walking after me but then we could not re-enter due to rush of people near the gate. He, therefore, went back to his previous position. The rally was over by then and a few vehicles left the venue. I got perturbed. I did not want BB's vehicle to move out without being hit. At this moment, I



heard firing and then an explosion. People were running around and chaos ensued. I waited for Nasrullah and Ikramullah, the other *Fidai*. Then I called Nasrullah and he told me that he is leaving for the Daewoo bus station. I and Razaqat kept on searching for Ikramullah on Liaqat road. Since we had heard only one explosion therefore we were sure that one of the *Fidai*, Ikramullah, was still alive. We could not find him. Later, we heard and watched the TV footage of BB's assassination. In the footage on TV we saw Saeed aka Bilal firing at BB and then the explosion.

**6.8.3.11. Interview No. 11 – Rasheed Ahmad. Accomplice of suicide bombers in Benazir Bhutto Murder Case.<sup>441</sup>**

**Date of Interview: September 14, 2011.**

I received education upto Class 6<sup>th</sup>. From 2000 onwards, I studied religious books in *Madressa Jamia Muhammadia* in the village Matta Mughal Khel in KPK province for three years. Then I read religious books in *Madressa Haqqania*, Akora Khattak for two years. In 2005, I went to *Madressa Mumba-ul-Islam*, Miranshah, North Waziristan along with my colleagues. In addition to our studies, we took *Jihadi* training in a house. I also used to impart training to others in the absence of my teacher. In 2007, I could not go on vacations for *Eid-ul-Adha* due to the illness of our teacher. I therefore spent about 10-15 days in Miranshah. On 20-12-2007, I was in my *Madressa*, when my old colleague from *Madressa Haqqania*, Qari Ismail, a resident of Swabi, Nasrullah aka Ahmad, a resident of Waziristan, and Abdullah aka Saddam, a resident of Mohmand Agency, visited me.

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<sup>441</sup> His confessional statement under Section 164 CrPC was also recorded on 15-02-2008 by Judicial Magistrate, Rawalpindi.

They used to visit us for a temporary stay occasionally. They said that they were going to meet Baitullah Mehsud who had invited them for a special task. After staying for two days, they left for South Waziristan. I dropped them off at Makeen Adda (Bus station) in my *Madressa's* vehicle. Two days later they arrived back from South Waziristan. They were accompanied by another young man who was approximately 20 years old. He was clean shaven, medium height, very fair color and healthy. Abdullah aka Saddam introduced him as Saeed aka Bilal. He was not talkative and did not speak much. He only spent one night there. Qari Ismail told me that he is taking him for admission in the *Madressa*; however, Abdullah aka Saddam informed me that he is a *Fidai* and has been handed over to them by Baitullah Mehsud for an attack on Benazir Bhutto. He also said that they have planned to attack Shaikh Rasheed, Minister of Railways as well and Baitullah Mehsud has given Rs. four hundred thousand to Qari Ismail for this purpose.

After their departure, I visited Akora Khattak *Madressa* and met Qari Ismail, Nasrullah aka Ahmad, and Abdullah aka Saddam. However, Saeed aka Bilal was not there. Upon my inquiry about Saeed aka Bilal, Nasrullah aka Ahmad said that he had gone home. However, Abdullah aka Saddam told me that the suicide attack on BB was carried out by Saeed aka Bilal and it was jointly managed by Qari Ismail, Nasrullah aka Ahmed and Ali Punjabi.

Afterwards I visited *Madressa* Akora Khattak again and was asked by Syed Arab aka Mufti Tariq of Swabi and Faiz Muhammad aka Kaskut to work with them for avenging the *Lal Masjid* incident and atrocities committed by the Pakistan army in Waziristan. They invited me to work with them inside Pakistan. I was also upset by this and I agreed to support them due to my religious sentiments and beliefs.

Around January 15, 2008, I went to the house of Mufti Tariq in Swabi. There were five missiles given to him by Commander Abdul Wali, the Commander of the *Taliban Tehreek*, Mohmand Agency. Abdullah aka Saddam, Sadiq, Usman and Tehseen, all students of the *Madressa* at Akora Khattak, were also present at his house. We planned an attack on the Kamra Aeronautical Complex with these missiles. Later in accordance with the site plan/map prepared by Faiz Muhammad aka Kaskut, we fixed five missiles in the nearby fields and fixed timers at 4.30 pm. We left our place around 2.30 pm. Later, we found from the newspapers that the missiles did launch at the fixed time but instead of hitting the target, which was the air force base at Kamra, they landed in the nearby residential area. We wanted to damage the government property/assets and not the general public.

**6.8.3.12. Interview No. 12 – Aitzaz Shah - A would be suicide bomber. Accomplice of suicide bombers in the Benazir Bhutto Murder Case.<sup>442</sup>**

Date of Interview: September 14, 2011.

My name is Aitzaz Shah also known as Saifullah. I was born in Karachi and attended school till class 10. Later I memorized the Holy Quran. Later I attended a *Madrissah*.

I wanted to take part in Jihad and went to South Waziristan with some colleagues and offered myself as volunteer for suicide attacks. I was stationed in a camp called Dhalay Markaz where the person in-charge was Wali Muhammad. I was told that I will

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<sup>442</sup> His confessional statement under Section 164 CrPC was recorded on 16-02-2008 by Judicial Magistrate, Rawalpindi.

be sent to conduct an attack on Benazir Bhutto. I kept on waiting. On December 27, 2007, I heard on the BBC news that Benazir Bhutto has been assassinated. After four or five days, Wali Muhammad told me that the boys who conducted the attack were from the Barond Camp training center. He said that they were Saeed aka Bilal and Ikramullah. Ikramullah has escaped and has reached safely. After a few days, the person in-charge of the Barond camp, namely Maulvi Azizullah, told me that according to the plan, you were chosen to conduct a suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto in the event of the failure of the Rawalpindi attack. However, since she has been killed in the attack, therefore, you will now be assigned to another mission soon. During my stay in Waziristan I met Baitullah Mehsud (the top leader of the Taliban) 3 or 4 times along with Wali Muhammad. I kept on asking him that why was I not been sent for the attack on Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi as promised? He said that it is a matter of luck that others had to be sent instead of you, but do not worry as you will get your chance soon. The last time I met Baitullah Mehsud was before my departure to the city of D.I.Khan, in the market place of a village Spinkay Raghzay in South Waziristan. He was in a vehicle and asked me why have I not gone away by now? I told him that I am going soon. He said goodbye and said that we will meet next in *Jannat* (heaven). On January 16, I was told by Sher Zaman, my colleague in Dhalay training camp that your turn has arrived for conducting a *Fidai* / suicide attack and you will be going today. I got ready and met my other friends and said goodbye. I was instructed that you will reach D.I. Khan and will call Sher Zaman on phone number 0302-5791151. He is your guide who will take you to Karachi where you have to conduct a *Fidai* attack on a tower (a hotel) which is frequently visited by Americans and other foreigners. We went to Miranshah and then travelled to D.I.Khan

along with Ali Afghani and Nazir who were confidants and trusted men of Baitullah Mehsud. They told me that you will be received and supervised by Faiz Muhammad in Karachi who is a trusted man of Baitullah Mehsud. I reached D.I.Khan and while waiting for Sher Zaman I was arrested by the police. Later during interrogation they made me listen to a recorded conversation. It was about the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. I recognized the voice of Baitullah Mehsud and told my interrogators.

#### **6.8.4. Section IV (Suicide bombers who conducted operations in Afghanistan)**

##### **6.8.4.1. Interview No. 1 - Father & brother of a Suicide Bomber**

Date of Interview: October 20, 2011

“My name is Maulvi Hamdullah Khan. I belong to village Haider Khel, Tehsil Mir Ali, North Waziristan. I am a teacher of religious studies in a local *madressa*. My eldest son Ehsanullah conducted a suicide attack against US soldiers in Afghanistan. Several foreign soldiers were killed in the attack including my son. The attack was conducted on June 09, 2003.

I believe that my son’s actions were the result of his convictions and faith. He strongly believed that it is his obligation to wage *Jihad* against US invaders in Afghanistan. My son was a courageous person who sacrificed himself for the protection of his religion. I had wished to educate my son with religious and contemporary education. I wanted him to be a religious scholar. My son’s involvement and his mission in Afghanistan was without my knowledge. I never knew that my son had become a ‘*Fidayee*’ until the time I was informed of his death”.

The younger brother of the suicide bomber Ishfaqullah was not, however, very appreciative of his brother's action. He stated that his brother was an emotional person and was very sentimental in religious matters. This is why he got motivated to conduct a suicide attack in Afghanistan.

#### **6.8.4.2. Interview No. 2 – Friend of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview: October 21, 2011**

“My name is Zar Gul Khan. Mekail Khan was almost 22 years old at the time of his death. He belonged to the Shiwa region of North Waziristan. We were friends since our childhood. I grew up with him and we used to play together. He did not receive a formal education although he did attend the local school for some time, but later left his education incomplete. He was a brave young man. He was also very religious in his life. According to my information, he had conducted a suicide attack on a military post in Afghanistan somewhere near Kabul and killed many soldiers. This incident took place on December 29, 2003. The attack was later acknowledged by the Haqqani group in their announcement.

As a friend I do feel a kind of pride in what he did. However, I also feel sad as I have lost a friend to this ugly war. His cousins are happy and feel honored that their relative has rendered the ultimate sacrifice for his religion.

#### **6.8.4.3. Interview No. 3 – Father of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview: October 21, 2011**

**Haji Abdul Ghaffar**

“My name is Abdul Ghaffar. Abdul Sattar was my son. He was almost 20 years old at the time of his death. We are Afghan citizens but have been residing in Tehsil



Laddha, South Waziristan for the last 25 years. My son was a brave man and wanted to join the army but he had no opportunity to do so due to the situation in my country, Afghanistan. He was also very religious and offered his prayers regularly. He often used to discuss *Jihad* and his desire to die as a *shaheed* with me.

Two years before his death, he had become associated with Taliban groups. He had visited Helmand and Uruzgan several times in those two years for *Jihad*. In 2005, we heard that he had died in a suicide attack on a NATO military convoy in Helmand region of Afghanistan. He had strapped explosives to his motorbike and had rammed it into a NATO truck in the convoy.

I am happy for what my son did but sad as a father. It is difficult for me to cover up my feelings for my son. His mother is also pleased for his sacrifice but sad as she is, after all, his mother”.

#### **6.8.4.4. Interview No. 4 – Father of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview: October 21, 2011**

“My name is Abdullah Khan. Hayatullah Khan was my son. He was 23 years old at the time of his death. We belong to the Badar region of South Waziristan but for the last six years, we have been living in Miranshah, North Waziristan. I drive a wagon for a living. I have four other sons.

My son Hayatullah Khan had received *Madressa* education in South Waziristan for five years but could not complete his course due to the start of war and we had to shift our home. He was actively engaged with Taliban fighters and for most of the time he would move around in their company. They had motivated him for *Jihad* and he was very

emotional about taking part in *Jihad*. He used to go away either for *Tableegh* (religious preaching) or Jihad for short durations. We were used to his routine.

In December 2005, we were informed by one of his colleague in the group of Taliban named Fazal Malik that my son has died in a suicide attack in Kandahar a few days ago. As a father I grieve for my son and cannot resist being sad. However, as a Muslim I know that my son did a great deed and I am proud of his sacrifice for Islam”.

#### **6.8.4.5. Interview No. 5 – Younger Brother Father of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview: October 22, 2011**

“My name is Zainuddin Khan. My brother Nur-ud-Din was a student of religious studies in North Waziristan. We are residents of the Boya area in North Waziristan. My brother was 19 years old at the time of his death in 2005. He was involved in a suicide attack on NATO forces in Herat region of Afghanistan in December 2005. He was affiliated with the Afghan Taliban.

Zainuddin said that his brother did offer a great sacrifice for Islam and we are proud of his bravery and courage. However, he had wet eyes while speaking and certainly missed his deceased brother. He said that my father is also proud of his son but sad at the same time. Zainuddin said that if the government has paid attention to development in our region and if we had educational facilities and prosperity, lots of young men would have been engaged in constructive activities rather than dying in wars”.

#### **6.8.4.6. Interview No. 6 – Father of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview: October 22, 2011**

“My name is Mir Qadir Khan. My son Mubarak Khan was 22 years old at the time of his death. We belong to the Kani Guram region of South Waziristan but now live

in Mir Ali, North Waziristan. I have two sons and four daughters. I used to work in a flour mill in Miranshah as a laborer but nowadays, I am doing manual labor due to the shortage of jobs in North Waziristan.

My son told me about a year ago that they pay good wages in Kabul therefore he is going there to earn money. He never informed me about his *Jihadi* ambitions. In January 2006, we received information that Mubarak Khan has been killed in a suicide attack in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

I am sad and upset over my son's death. I wish he was alive and was doing some job. We are poor people and it is difficult for us to make ends meet. His friends and people tell me that he has rendered great sacrifice for Islam and that I must be proud of my son. I am an illiterate man and do not understand such things. Maybe they are right. May God bless my son's soul and accept his sacrifice”.

#### **6.8.4.7. Interview No. 7 – Father of a Suicide Bomber**

**Date of Interview:** October 22, 2011

“My name is Maulvi Noor Ali. My son Fazal Ali was a *Hafiz* of Quran. He was 24 years old at the time of his death. I am a native of the Zanghra village in South Waziristan. My son died in a suicide attack in Helmand province of Afghanistan. I was told that he had attacked a military convoy in January 2006. It is difficult for me to control my emotions. My son was a brave man but not all brave men have to die like this. Since Russia interfered in Afghanistan, we have had no opportunities to earn our livelihood in a respectable manner. All our lives we have been waiting for peace so that we can focus our attention on education and proper employment opportunities for our

children. The blood of our people is being shed in this part of the world for almost 30 years now. God knows, when will our miseries come to an end?"

The above stated narration of interviews has been provided to reflect the feelings and mindset of the relatives and friends of suicide bombers and also some of the would be suicide bombers who were taken into custody either before or after a failed operation. It provides an insight into the level of commitment of the bomber, his socio-cultural, economic and educational background together with the standard of religious understanding. Responses of the family members and friends points to the fact that their social and cultural environment in their peculiar regions has a bearing, albeit indirectly on the development of that particular mindset which motivates them to carry out such actions. These interviews which have been particularly reproduced in this research are self explanatory and do not require explicit elaboration to reveal the feelings and viewpoints of the interviewees.

## CHAPTER 7

### SOCIAL RESPONSE TO SUICIDE BOMBING

This chapter discusses the response of the general public and community representatives in relation to suicide bombing. Many of the suicide attacks are watched in Pakistan and abroad through electronic media. These acts are watched not just in the metropolitan centers but over a much wider area. My main focus, however, is on reactions to these acts specifically by Pakistani audiences both in urban and tribal/ rural areas. Has the broadcasting of these acts helped in creating a reaction which transcends national barriers or not? I have attempted to answer this question. The other area of focus is on the reaction of the tribal population, particularly those living in Waziristan who have a first-hand but a different kind of exposure to these incidents.

The evidence comes from a range of different interviews, discussion groups and surveys which were carried out by myself in the main Pakistani cities and a few towns of South and North Waziristan over an eight months period in 2010-2011.

The picture it paints is impressionistic but it is sufficient to show that a new wave of thinking has been generated and shared across a cross-section of population. These include the propagation of new atrocities, their rejection by the society, growth of hatred resulting from the targeting of children and controversies provoked by media discussions and religious clergy in public meetings.

While asking the question ‘who patronizes the suicide bombing?’ an attempt is made to probe the ideas and objectives of the perpetrators and sponsors of these acts. I have also attempted to examine the interconnection of suicide acts and its implications for the society as a whole. In analyzing suicide acts which successfully appeal to the

youth, I have tried to explore the terms on which the global and local forces meet in finding a new strategy to address the problem.

For many interviewees, suicide attempts are part of a general reactionary thinking process. The entry into Pakistan of suicide attacks has had an impact on public perceptions of these attempts and the manner in which they relate to the social process. These interviews and discussion groups have produced, not just reactions to particular acts or situations but also broader reflections on the state of affairs in general.

The discussion below offers an overview of the suicide era, its impact on the middle class and tribal people, especially youth, and the manner in which it differs from other forms of reaction to this unacceptable state of affairs.

### **7.1. Pakistan in the Era of Suicide Bombing**

After years of peaceful life, the advent of suicide bombing was a horrifying experience for common Pakistanis. Those living in urban towns were shocked by daily killings and alarming news of explosions. The most affected were the middle classes and the poor in large cities. Though only approximately 30 per cent of the population, they are nonetheless economically and politically an influential segment. Suicide bombers have appeared as powerful carriers of a new message of threat and fear. Unlike other resistant groups which have traditionally propagated the political and religious ideology of Islam, suicide bombers have questioned the existing system and state of affairs, presented a new fusion of death and eternal life, and put the debate on martyrdom (*shahadat*) much higher on the agenda. Tribal areas and Waziristan in particular, have been the flag bearers of this new trend in which revenge and eternal rewards are the hallmarks of success.



One of the most renowned interpreters of these trends, Journalist and TV anchor Hamid Mir,<sup>443</sup> argues that revenge is the primary motivating factor. He believes that the move to freedom and a philosophy of survival forever constituted a whole new way of thinking which would gradually become a new culture of revenge. Hamid Mir divides Pakistan since independence into three age groups; the first constitute those who brought independence, second are the ones with an Islamic mindset, and third is the post 9/11 age group. They are today's warriors. He says that the outer-directed culture of suicide attacks by the new generation of bombers changes much faster than the inner-directed culture, which relates to the home and family and long-established beliefs.

Anthropologist Dr. Anwar Iqbal argues that the 'genetic coding of Pakistani society', which he defines as 'acceptance and adaptability'; will ensure that 'Pakistan's cultural response to suicide acts, resulting from the invasion of foreign forces will be strong.'<sup>444</sup> Translating this response into action has been the job of religious *Madressas*, who have worked closely with resistance forces in Afghanistan for over three decades. According to Anwar, 'Liberalization of the mind has occurred alongside liberalization of the acts.'

Suicide bombings are being experienced by all sections of the urban community, from students to laborers in cities like Lahore and Karachi. However, the poor and lower middle class youth are a key target group which has been offered a new image of themselves. Bravery, gallantry, eternal life and a fabulous tomorrow which will never end, are the promises. In addition, suicide bombing has had a cloning effect on the youth.

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<sup>443</sup> Mir, Hamid, Capital Talk show on Geo TV, dated October 18, 2012.

<sup>444</sup> Interview. Anthropologist Dr. Syed Anwar Iqbal, 2010, Islamabad.

The consequences of the Afghan and Kashmir *Jihads*, reaction to US intervention in Afghanistan and the rejuvenation of religious political parties have contributed to the emergence of a more conservative cultural atmosphere. Religious *Madressas* have invested heavily in their infrastructure; examples are the grand majestic buildings of the *Madressas* in all the metropolitan areas as well as in smaller towns and even in rural areas. However, these *Madressas* have been aiming at different clients and offering different visions of religion. They have travelled from isolation to interaction with the rest of the Islamic world, from curbing liberalism to stimulating demand. Their relentless pursuit of sectarian competition has resulted in religious misunderstanding and increase intolerance which has in turn generated a Crisis of Identity which does not show any sign of resolution. In many parts of Pakistan, it is the urban middle class that is finding it difficult to live in peace in a climate of religious and sectarian tensions.

## **7.2. The Urban Elite**

As far as Pakistan's elite are concerned, it is often said that they have more in common with each other than with their own compatriots.<sup>445</sup> Among the educated middle class, there is a widespread rejection of the extension in religious extremism. From the intellectuals in cities or teachers in district towns, everyone acknowledges that suicide attacks have damaged the society and its image worldwide.

However, there is a section which supports and subscribes to the militants' ideology as well.

Discussions held by myself with the middle class urban groups in Peshawar indicate that suicide bombing has been a means of reinforcing the ideology of extremism.

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<sup>445</sup> Waheed, Rana., *Cultural Communication Through Television in Pakistan*, Ph.D thesis, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, 2003.

A similar trend was recorded during a Focus Group Discussion held in Islamabad where youth as well as middle aged participants had come to a consensus that suicide attacks at the individual level have varied objectives, not all erupting as result of anti-US sentiments. They indicated a number of factors including local political forces, anti-Pakistan forces and international organizations involved in sponsoring of terrorism. They were noted that whatever the agenda of the sponsors and perpetrators of terrorism maybe, the ultimate victim is always the innocent public.

The other striking finding of my Focus Group Discussions is the dramatic increase in religious practices both in rural and urban Pakistan. The media features religious programs frequently in the lists of favorite programs.

### **7.3. The Birth of a New Suicide Culture**

It is among the youth of tribal Pakistan that suicide attempts have made the greatest impact because this group is most affected by the new wave of extremism. Earlier, the incorporation of hatred and dislike about the international community took place in a more subtle and limited way. Now US drone attacks are thrusting the brutal face of Western civilization into almost every tribal household and helping to create a new ethos which affects a far larger number of people. The foundation of a shared culture of revenge is already laid.

A group discussion organized during my research with 17 to 20 year old students from Waziristan in Bannu revealed that most of them are scared of suicide attempts and want to live in peace. It is not the society as a whole, they claimed, but a few miscreants who otherwise were involved in drugs and the looting of caravans. These people are hired with the promise of money and pushed to do suicide attacks under the unconscious state

of mind through drugs obviously, a student from the degree college Miranshah in North Waziristan boldly said. Some others did not agree and said that these young suicide bombers are religious-minded and innocent but have been misguided by clerics for their nefarious designs.

None of the group members were ever involved in fighting with foreign forces and neither had their parents. However there was a strong reaction against the army actions in the area. "It can't be accepted. Most of our people are peace loving and want to join the mainstream national process. US Drone attacks and the Pakistan army operation have ruined our lives, and the result is what you see. These law-breakers and terrorists use these actions as a justification for their acts," said a student of Commerce in Bannu.

A similar University student group in Peshawar, hailing mostly from Waziristan expressed worries and frustration at the picture portrayed by the media about Waziristan. One participant said, 'I get an inferiority complex when I see all these programs. People are looking suspiciously at us. I am not a terrorist'. The group also differed over the situation in the area and the role of army and the government. One said, 'The TV anchors are the most irritating souls on earth. They talk rubbish, they don't know us.' Others said, 'They are copying foreign media. They are not even bothering to meet us. They are aping.'

Terrorist groups offer young people a vision of a freer, more liberated world, the promise of more gratification and escape from economic and social pressures. Dr Anwar Iqbal, an anthropologist, who studied the influence of Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* in Pakistan found that 'there is a moral panic among these groups, especially those working in

Pakistan because people say that they are afraid and want to leave their regions and go away elsewhere since they are afraid that their children will turn against them.<sup>446</sup>

The scale of culture shock emerging due to terrorist activities has also prompted some heart-searching among those involved in peace efforts. 'The question that worries me', said Dr. Saeedullah Shah,<sup>447</sup> a cardiologist from Waziristan, 'is that because of the high aspirations and media floating around...are we going to see more wars? ...When will the tribal and religious heads turn around and say why the hell do we have to keep on suffering?'

Sohrab Khan,<sup>448</sup> a student of a local Law college, believes that it is the promise of a different kind for the next generation in Pakistan that has caused anxiety. He says, 'There is nothing else that is bothering nice people, including myself, but the issue of terror and killings and religious extremism.'

According to Mr. Ahmad Ali<sup>449</sup> of Behria University, Islamabad, an enabling environment for suicide bombing is provided by our *Madressa* culture. It is misguiding people, young men and children, about *Jihad* and death (*Shahadat*). The germs of heroism, individualism and religiosity without practice are already present in the youth of this class. Dying with a bomb has become a popular culture in rural /tribal Pakistan. From their childhood, kids have taken to wearing guns and see people being killed. These are the negative affects which are mounting up.

Most young Pushtuns in tribal area love their culture and respect their traditions but they also acknowledge the power of the new influences. 'That way (referring to the

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<sup>446</sup> Interview. Anthropologist Dr. Syed Anwar Iqbal, 2010, Islamabad

<sup>447</sup> Interviews, Dr. Saeedullah Shah, 2009-10, Peshawar

<sup>448</sup> Interview, Sohrab Khan, 2010, Rawalpindi

<sup>449</sup> Interview, Prof. Ahmad Ali, 2010, Islamabad

recent trend of suicide bombers and militancy) other people will also know something of our country.” said an elderly man in Miranshah, North Waziristan.

However, there are concerns that this new life style influenced by religious extremism is a dangerous phenomenon which reflects the dominance of certain extremist groups in the society.

Dr. Shaheena Altaf,<sup>450</sup> a gynaecologist originally from Miranshah, North Waziristan, said with nostalgia that we miss the days when we used to visit Miranshah for holidays and meet our family and relatives. Years have passed but we cannot visit our region now.

#### **7.4. Children – The Victims**

The need to protect children as a vulnerable group from exposure to brutal acts of suicide attacks is a responsibility which the government, law enforcing authorities, civil society and the media take seriously all over the world. Many experts suggest that broadcasters should keep their programs with adult story lines or excessive violence off the air until children are supposed to be in bed. However, such policies are only partially effective, even with active parenting.<sup>451</sup> Another area of concern and one which is more difficult to monitor and control is the targeting of children in suicide attacks. Suicide attacks on school buses, school buildings and targeting children in public places is no longer a strange phenomenon in Pakistan. The recent attack on Malala Yousafzai, a

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<sup>450</sup> Interview, Dr. Shaheena Altaf, 2009, Peshawar.

<sup>451</sup> Media in Pakistan does not follow the recognized code of ethics in respect of showing violent acts. For instance, in 2007, in the aftermath of a suicide attack in Lahore, almost all TV channels were showing live coverage repeatedly, of an infant girl who had died as a result of the shock of the blast. It was extremely distressing for people watching this scene. Again in 2007 media channels were airing coverage of an attack in Karachi on a religious cleric and the head of the suicide bomber was stuck in a tree. Such images are broadcasted repeatedly and are a great nuisance due to their adverse psychological manifestations.



fourteen years old girl, in Mingora, Swat on 9th October, 2012 has shaken the world. The responsibility for the attack was admitted by the Pakistani Taliban, immediately after the incident. Malala suffered serious brain damage.

Amoon Pasha and Mulazim Hussain Rai,<sup>452</sup> who studied the impact of television advertising on children in Pakistan, present a case for real concern at the profound changes which are taking place in cultural attitudes among the younger generation. According to their research, young people spend an increasing number of hours watching TV and are enthralled by it. They said that TV shows presenting terrorism as a way of life, and while terrorists are portrayed as brave and courageous people who care little for their own lives. They argue that many children have begun to associate thrills with owning or possessing toy guns and wearing a tribal outfit with long hair and a spread beard. The most dangerous sphere where control is minimum is the social media. Youtube and other sites contain a large amount of content, especially *Jihadi* websites which promote extremist views among young men of impressionable age groups.

### **7.5. The Reaction**

Many reflections on the impact of suicide bombing in Pakistan are similar to those observed in other societies experiencing the same phenomenon. The respondents and discussants expressed nostalgia for the loss of a peaceful society and social interaction which was the hallmark of city life in the pre-suicide bombing era. Farzana Khan,<sup>453</sup> a sociologist, stated in an interview in 2010 that, 'the cities used to be full of small restaurants and places for going out, whereas today 'most people are confined to their homes'.

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<sup>452</sup> Interview, Amoon Pasha & Mulazim Hussain Rai, 2012, Islamabad and Lahore.

<sup>453</sup> Interviews, Farzana Khan, 2011, Islamabad and Multan.

Discussions in various cities and towns confirm a decline in public socializing. People are fearful and scared; they ask children to stay inside and watch TV. A general sense of fear and anxiety haunt people in public areas, even while visiting mosques for congregational prayers. A common complaint of parents that children are glued to the television set and neglect sports is now a compliment from parents. Some parents have installed cable connections to keep children and youth at home. A discussion group accepted that violence in society had its origins in economic deprivation and social breakdown and could not be blamed solely on a religious wave of extremism.

A religious scholar, Maulana Chiragh-ud-Din Shah,<sup>454</sup> during an interview in 2011 in Rawalpindi said that, 'blaming *Al-Qaeda* and *Jihadis* for all the problems is to find a scapegoat for our own failures. We must not shift the blame and examine our own behavior as well.'

Many discussants in the group discussion blamed the media for the escalation of violence. They held that people were willing to accept a greater degree of violence because of their exposure to it on media.

Another important observation made during the focused group discussions is that people have now apparently become insensitive and callous in their reaction to suicide attacks. A general attitude of not being bothered with the ongoing violence anymore since it has become a common and a usual 'thing' has also been observed in certain quarters.

It is worth mentioning that sympathy for the Taliban and their struggle against the US and its allies also exists in some segments of Pakistani society. Although the majority of people do not support suicide bombings, general sentiments of support do, however,

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<sup>454</sup> Interview, Maulana Chiragh-ud-Din, 2011, Rawalpindi.

exist. This fact is revealed by the results of a survey conducted in 2007, 2008 and 2009.<sup>455</sup>

In 2007, 907 persons were interviewed in almost ten cities in Pakistan. 66% of the public responded against attacks on innocent civilians by militants. However, 15% supported attacks against civilians as necessary in a war against terror. They believed that harm to civilians during Taliban operations is unfortunate but an unavoidable reality in a war of this kind. In responding to another question, whether the Pakistan government should pursue the Taliban in FATA, 44% supported the government whereas 36% were opposed to government action. 72% believed that the US is posing a greater threat to the stability of the region than the Taliban whereas 41% believed the Taliban to be a threat.

Later similar surveys were conducted in 2008 and 2009. The surveys indicated a 15% increase in support for *Al-Qaeda* and the Taliban. This support also shows that anti-US feelings are on the rise in Pakistan. Approximately 46% support insurgency in Pakistan.

A class dimension to the reactions to violence was also observed. Working class people in Peshawar were more divided on this question than some middle class groups from the same city. A large segment of people from the educated urbanized middle class held religious *Madressas* responsible for an increase in violence. However, support for *Madressa* style of education was more visible among a segment of the lower middle class. They believed that *Madressas* had a pacifying influence on youth and believed that

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<sup>455</sup> USIP /World Public Opinion Pakistani Public Opinion. College Park, University of Maryland, USA.

they are the bastions of Islamic traditions. Maulana Wasi-ur-Rehman<sup>456</sup> said that *Madressas* are the bearers of the true message of Islam and must not be maligned due to extremism. Extremism has increased due to the US invasion of Afghanistan and the pro-US policies of Pakistan and for no other reason.

Some analysts also stress these as differences of class perception. For the middle class, the level of violence is outside their normal experience, whereas for the working class it is not regarded as unusual. Rana Asghar Hussain,<sup>457</sup> a lawyer who was interviewed in 2012 said that, “When you take a clip from an incidence of violence and show them, nine times out of ten they say ‘this is nothing unusual’. This is because every day they see such incidents on their TV screens and have become used to it.”

All the discussions show that people are worried about the social impact of suicide attacks, not for the larger destruction they cause but for their own immediate safety and security.

My research suggests that most people are far from passive in their reactions. In addition to their condemnation of the terrorist acts, they have tended to show active support for social change, social egalitarianism, a right to participation in national affairs and a greater confidence in their nationhood. They have also been critical of the shortcomings of the successive governments. Many of them, particularly outside the elites of the big cities, have shown themselves to be much more socially conservative and religious minded. However, they feel that violence of the Taliban does not merely target the pro-US liberal and secular groups. “This has nothing to do with conservatism or religion, we are all victims equally [of violence],” Noman Ghani, a business man in

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<sup>456</sup> Interview, Maulana Wasi-ur-Rehman, 2011, Islamabad.

<sup>457</sup> Interview, Rana Asghar Hussain Advocate, 2012, Rawalpindi.

Peshawar interviewed in 2011<sup>458</sup>, said. Similar conclusions are also being reached by many of the personnel in government and law enforcing agencies who have played an important role in combating terrorism.

The entire social, cultural and economic system is facing devastating effects, said Naseem Zaman,<sup>459</sup> a police officer in an interview in 2011. People are highly divided at all levels on the impact of suicide attacks. They are still trying to detect the real cause of such happenings and who is behind them.

Another striking feature of my research is that in the course of group discussions and interviews conducted in the urban centers, it has been observed that views expressed on suicide bombing and its causes represent only less than 30 percent of the urban segment of the population, while 70 percent of the rural population is still silent. Perhaps this powerful segment will voice their views too, but not in the immediate future. This is probably due to the fact that suicide attacks have mostly targeted urban centers. The other striking outcome of suicide bombings can be seen as a sharp cultural divide among rural and urban population. Since the principal victims are cities (big towns), the reaction and response to suicide attacks by the rural population based on first hand social experience, are still outside the scope of this research.

## **7.6. The Threat Factor**

Suicide attacks have created a perception of a looming threat in almost all segments of the Pakistani society. Threats and warnings issued by the militant organizations against their critics, including journalists, intellectuals, artists, anti-Taliban clerics and politicians has become a common phenomenon. Since 2005, when the attacks

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<sup>458</sup> Interview, Noman Ghani, 2011, Peshawar.

<sup>459</sup> Interview, Naseem Zaman, 2011, Peshawar.

began, the activists of civil society, media persons, TV anchors and political leaders have been cautious in commenting on acts of terrorism. I have observed, during the course of my research, that people were reluctant to condemn terrorist incidents. Even powerful political parties and media outlets are careful in expressing their condemnation of these terrorists. The reasons are twofold:

- i. Fear of a physical consequence in the form of directly targeting the accuser;
- ii. Fear of losing political sympathy of religious segments by the political parties which is evident from their weak arguments in justifying the actions of terrorists under different pleas. For instance, American drone attacks, military operations in FATA and Pakistani government's support for the US are issues which are used as justifications for defending Taliban by political parties, including the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), in addition to the religious parties such as *Jamaat-e-Islami* (JI) and *Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Islam* (JUI).

Political parties are also big players. They have yet to take a clear and unified stance on the issue. A political analyst, Sarmad Salik, while commenting during an interview with me in Islamabad in 2012,<sup>460</sup> “the state has become a victim because of inconsistent policies of the various governments. We initially patronized the *Mujahideen* during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan and later the Taliban. Now, we have turned our backs to them at a time when they have sown the seeds of their influence in our tribal areas through kin ties and long associations. The tribal code *Pushtunwali* cannot be totally disregarded, which compels a *Pashtun* to provide shelter to his guest, take revenge and die for honor. *Al-Qaeda*-linked militants are now in the second generation of their

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<sup>460</sup> Interview Sarmad Salik, 2012, Islamabad.



presence in our tribal areas and through matrimonial ties have blood relations with tribal families. An unconditional and long term indemnity has to be granted under a broader agreement. Americans have to stay away at least for the next few years until the wounds are healed”.

Mohammad Munir, Associate Professor of Faculty of Sharia and Law at the International Islamic University, Islamabad while being interviewed in 2012<sup>461</sup>, stated, “Whatever are the reasons for suicide bombings, the acts are condemnable and heinous. How can you teach a lesson to the Americans or Pakistan military or political and military governments by killing innocent people?”

#### **7.7 Political Parties’ Response**

The table given below shows how political parties react to the questions on suicide bombing and its patronage. It also shows that there is complete absence of consensus on how to tackle the situation. Looking at the newspapers reports, statements of the heads of the parties and their election manifestos as well as their policy stance in the parliament on suicide bombings and terrorism, the following picture emerges. This scenario is clear and well documented in political parties’ own manifestos and from their media statements. The data is based on almost one year’s deep analysis of the reactions and responses given by these parties.

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<sup>461</sup> Interviews, Mohammad Munir, 2012, Islamabad.

### Political Parties' responding to Suicide Bombing

Parties	Suicide bombers are killers and such acts are un-Islamic	Supporters of Suicide Bombing re our enemies	We should take harsh stance against them	<i>Al-Qaida</i> is Anti-Pakistan	Taliban are not friends of Pakistan	We need to eliminate the Taliban and <i>Al-Qaida</i> from Pakistan	There should be a strong monitoring of <i>Madressas</i>	The problem should be solved amicably through negotiations
PML(N)	7	5	5	4	4	4	3	8
PML(Q)	9	7	8	8	8	9	7	8
PPP	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	7
MQM	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	6
ANP	10	10	10	10	10	10	8	8
PTI	8	8	6	6	6	6	6	9
JUI	4	4	3	-	-	-	-	10

JI	5	6	6	-	-	-	-	10
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N=80 (10 leaders from each party)

The responses are multiple. Source: Interviews conducted with party heads during 2011-2012.

Political parties appear to be more concerned about populism and not the problem itself. The data shows that the parties are divided. The Muslim League (all factions including thrice winner Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) have been highly careful in condemning suicide attacks and their masterminds. Being associated with right-wing voters, this party has been over cautious in taking a bold stance against suicide terrorism. A recent announcement by the Taliban said that they will enter into peace talks with the government on the condition that PML-N, JUI-F and *Jamaat Islami* assure them and guarantee that the government is sincere in peace talks. This shows that both the Taliban and these political parties have some level of understanding and trust one another.

Similarly PML(Q) another right wing split unit of Muslim League, which is being allied with the ruling Pakistan Peoples' Party is a bit bolder but still cautious of its right-wing agenda. MQM,<sup>462</sup> ANP<sup>463</sup> and PPP<sup>464</sup> are labeled as liberal parties having milder religious leanings. They are categorically against such acts and unconditionally condemn suicide bombing, its sponsors and supporters and the masterminds in the ranks of Taliban and *Al-Qaeda*. PTI<sup>465</sup> of Imran Khan which has recently won a wave of sympathy among youth is also highly careful in attacking Taliban, *Al-Qaeda*, and even suicide bombers.<sup>466</sup> PTI is struggling to win the right-wing support through abstaining from criticizing the

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<sup>462</sup> *Muttahida Quami Movement* is a political party with presence in the urban centers of Sindh province. Manzar Imam, a member of Provincial assembly of Sindh was assassinated in Karachi on January 14, 2013. Taliban have taken responsibility for his murder.

<sup>463</sup> *Awami National Party*, a political party of *Pashtuns*. Several of its office bearers and parliamentarians have been killed in targeted assassinations and suicide bombs. Bashir Bilour, a Senior Minister in KPK and leader of party was assassinated on December 23, 2012 in a suicide attack in Peshawar.

<sup>464</sup> Pakistan Peoples Party. Its leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in a suicide attack in Rawalpindi on December 27, 2007.

<sup>465</sup> *Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf*, party headed by a cricketer turned politician Imran Khan.

<sup>466</sup> PTI leader Imran Khan is also known as Taliban Khan by his opponents. His narrative is close to that of Taliban's.

Taliban and *Al-Qaeda*. A hard-line right-wing religious party, the JUL,<sup>467</sup> is accused of nurturing the first generation of the Taliban in Pakistan and being sponsors of the *Madressa* network in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province. It has a clear stance that suicide attacks are the consequence of local reactions against US occupation of Afghanistan but not caused by the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda*. *Jamaat-e-islami*<sup>468</sup> is another party which has been associated with *Mujahideen* during the early days of Afghan War. It has strong anti-US views and has a pro-*Jihad* stance.<sup>469</sup> However, ironically, their late leader Qazi Hussain Ahmad was attacked in Mohmand agency by a female suicide bomber recently from which he miraculously escaped unhurt. Its reaction on suicide bombing is also calculated and cautious.

Religious parties provide no direct answer but conditional and restricted replies. The parties interviewed have presence in the parliament but their policies show a certain degree of confusion and lack of clarity on how to deal with the Taliban and militancy. Pakistan Peoples' Party, PPP, is and has always advocated anti-Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* policies for many reasons. PPP proclaims itself a left wing party and has a strong belief that their leader Benazir Bhutto was killed by *Al-Qaeda* and the Taliban jointly. The other parties, ANP and MQM have similar views on such acts but for different reasons. ANP, which is primarily based in KPK province has been against Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan war since the very beginning, and has demanded that the Pakistani government to stay away from interfering in the affairs of its neighbors. MQM, based in Karachi, is opposed to the *Pashtun* influence in the city, which generally constitutes a

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<sup>467</sup> *Jamiat ul Ulema Islam*. A party dominated by the right wing *Deobandi* clerics.

<sup>468</sup> *Jamaat Islami* is a religious party founded by Maulana Syed Abu'al Ala Maududi.

<sup>469</sup> Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, a leader of *Al-Qaeda*, was arrested in the house of one of its leaders in Rawalpindi.

majority of the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* forces operating in Pakistan. The situation on political front is thus grim and complicated. Pakistan still needs a clear political commitment and to develop a combat strategy against suicide bombing and terrorism.

### **7.8. Opinion Leaders in South Waziristan**

Is South Waziristan a nursery which is producing all kinds of terrorists and suicide bombers and is a safe heaven for terrorists from Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Africa and all around the world?

Security forces personnel who have direct knowledge due to their service in the region and directly confronting the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* in Waziristan agree that the area has become a focal center for terrorist organizations and has emerged as a platform for militant activities in Pakistan, Afghanistan and also other parts of the world. There is a visible connection between local and foreign militant groups. Some believe that foreigners from the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Chechnya and Egypt who are the warriors of the *Al-Qaeda* network, settled down in South Waziristan and entered into matrimonial relations with local tribal families, after the departure of Russians from Afghanistan. After the US-led invasion of Afghanistan these fighters wanted to use Pakistani soil for war against the US forces. Pakistan had suffered significantly during the past two decades due to wars and was not inclined to oblige. Pakistan had its own geo-political interests which demanded a close liaison with the international community in the War against Terrorism. In retaliation, these militant groups become engaged in hostilities against Pakistani forces. One senior Army officer posted in South Waziristan was of the opinion that,

“the war is spreading and we are trying to hit only those who are involved in terrorism but unfortunately they are living inside villages and as a result of



army and drone attacks, innocent people also die. This we never wanted. The problem with common people is that they have become hostage to terrorists even inside their own communities due to the centuries old *Pushtun* cultural traditions and kin ties”.

Logically, this explanation sounds convincing but the other opinion cannot be brushed aside totally.

The supporters of the Taliban say that people killed in army operation and drone attacks were never terrorists or *Al-Qaeda* men. They were innocent children and women and their revengeful relatives and survivors are now desperate and do not know whom to take revenge on. “They are perhaps easy clients of terrorists,” Rasool Khan, a retired school teacher in Angoor Adda, South Waziristan said during my interview with him.

Another interviewee during my research, Sadiqullah Khan Wazir<sup>470</sup> from the Khojal Khel clan and a native of Wana, now living in Peshawar, said that Waziristan has been destroyed by the foreign militants. Everything is now in the hand of Taliban militants. No decent person can survive and live a respectable life under the prevailing conditions.

There is weight in both versions but still local people do not agree with killing innocent people. It is largely acknowledged that South Waziristan has become the worst affected area. Even local people cannot go out at night and do business. Poverty is increasing with the closure of shops and markets.

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<sup>470</sup> Interview, Sadiqullah Khan Wazir, 2009, 2010 & 2011, Peshawar.

### Mixed Responses by a Cross Section of Society

Category	Suicide bombers killers such un-Islamic	Supporters of Suicide Bombing are our enemies	Military operation can eliminate the terrorists	<i>Al-Qaida</i> is present in SW	Taliban are doing a good Job	We need to eliminate the Taliban and <i>Al-Qaeda</i> from SW	<i>Madressas</i> are used for training	The problem should be solved by involving local leaders
Sub Khel								
leaders (20)	15	05	3	10	4	4	4	20
Students/ Youth (50)	40	42	7	35	6	18	28	31
Shopkeepers (30)	23	18	20	19	15	14	9	27

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Farmers (30)	18	15	6	17	11	10	5	28
Government functionaries (20)	18	16	12	18	6	8	15	25

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**N = 150**

The responses are multiple. Source: Data collected through structured questionnaires during 2010-2012.

In total 150 people from Waziristan and other regions were interviewed and their responses reflect a great variation. Tribal leaders of sub-khels (sub-clans) were cautious and their responses were calculated. They were, however, clear to a large extent that suicide bombing, as carried out with the result that innocent people get killed rather than military targets, is un-Islamic and *Al-Qaeda* and its supporters are present in the area. They did not agree with the common claim that *Madressas* are used for suicide attacks. A large majority was against eliminating Arabs and other foreign militants settled in the tribal areas through military action. There is a widespread belief that the ongoing struggle against the US influence in the region is just struggle. All wanted the solution of problem through involvement of local leaders and peaceful means and not through military action.

Youth from outside Waziristan were bolder and less cautious. They called suicide bombing un-Islamic and an enemy act and criticized its perpetrators. However, some of them expressed the view that if suicide attacks are conducted against the US in Afghanistan, then it is justified. People living in Waziristan were cautious in their criticism of *Al-Qaeda* and the Taliban. Interestingly, a good number of shopkeepers were in favor of army action as they need immediate peace, obviously for their business.

The table reveals the fact that general response of people is against terrorism but they still hold the opinion that Taliban are not solely responsible for terrorism. They hold a milder view towards Taliban and religiosity. However, they also hold the opinion that *Madaris* are controlled by affiliates of *Al-Qaeda*. Only few believe that military operation can eliminate terrorism.

**Table 3 Religious community**

Views on Basic Concept of Jihad

N=200

	Compulso ry against non- Muslims	against infidels only	Against st all evil forces	Agains t the allies of evils	Against a tyrant governme nt	Against all enemies of Muslim state	Against those Muslims who are not supporters of Islamic way	all Only enemies when they attack the	Suicide bombing is part of <i>Jihad</i>
Students of <i>Madressas</i> (100)	85	5	70	63	25	90	10	9	80
Heads/ Teachers of <i>Madressa</i> (50)	80	20	90	53	20	75	30	21	43

Religious clergy										
outside <i>Madressa</i>	64	59	93	49	32	83	27	19	34	
(50)										

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*\*Responses in percentages are multiple*

The religious community in *Madressas* is less divided on the issue of *Jihad* and strong on their ideas. They unanimously believe that *Jihad* is compulsory against all non Muslims, enemies of Islam, and, that suicide bombing is part of *Jihad*. Only very few agree that *Jihad* is necessary only when the enemy attacks and against a tyrant government. The most striking factor was that youth was less clear on the concept of *Jihad* and its logic.

Source: Survey conducted through structured questionnaires in various cities and rural areas in 2012.



**Table 4 The General Public on *Jihad* and Suicide Bombing**

Age and Residence

N=250

	Males age 16-24	Males age 25-35	Males age 35-45	Males age 45 and above	Urban Males ( average)	Rural Males (Average)
<b><i>Jihad is Compulsory</i></b>						
against non – Muslims	61	39	12	37	22	47
against infidels only	63	53	18	71	57	76
Against all evil forces	37	41	54	63	53	61
Against the allies of evils	45	51	44	53	44	63
Against a tyrant government	53	51	46	52	57	67
Against all enemies of Muslim state	59	32	17	49	19	77
Against all those Muslims who are not supports of the Islamic way	44	37	41	32	31	48
Only against the enemies when they attack	11	17	18	21	35	25

Suicide bombing is part of *Jihad*

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The general public was also found to be equally unclear over the concept of *Jihad*. They simply could not separate *Jihad* from killing. There was a better understanding found among urban males over the concept. The rural males considered *Jihad* more important against all enemies of Muslims, while majority of urban males were of the opinion that it was not necessary.

**Table 5      The General Public on *Jihad* and Suicide Bombing**

Qualification and Income      N=250

<i>Jihad is Compulsory</i>	Under Matric	Grade 10-14	Grade 14 and Above	Total Average
Against non – Muslims	98	32	21	50
against infidels only	98	67	32	66
Against all evil forces	92	69	66	76
Against the allies of evils	87	68	71	75
Against a tyrant government	81	76	89	82
Against all enemies of Muslim states	91	69	32	64
Against all those Muslims who are not on Islamic way	87	22	19	43
Only against the enemies when they attack	21	44	100	55
Suicide bombing is part of <i>Jihad</i>	98	34	67	66

Quite understandably, the table reflects that with better education, the concept of *Jihad* becomes clearer. This shows that illiteracy is one of the main causes of holding irrational opinions on *Jihad*. However, across the board both the educated and the uneducated do not condemn wrong perceptions of *Jihad* with consensus.

**Table 6 Views on Suicide bombing**

N = 300

	<i>Madressa</i> teachers	<i>Madressa</i> Students	General public In Waziristan	South General Public in KP
Compulsory when attacked by the enemy	98	99	88	43
When asked by the <i>Ulema</i>	70	80	45	14
When asked by the leader	73	74	34	9

Needs a <i>Fatwa</i>	88	75	42	6
It's a martyrdom	69	79	29	2
A service to the <i>Ummah</i>	68	81	22	2
Killing innocent people is legitimate if doing for Islam	43	51	8	1
Bomb blasts in mosque is Islamic if done for a religious cause	12	10	3	1
Killing children who have not committed any sin is also Islamic (for a cause)	9	13	1	1

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Source: Survey conducted through structured questionnaire in 2012. Responses are multiple.

The table shows that the general public, even outside *Madressas* are in favour of waging *Jihad* against all non-Muslims and becomes compulsory when asked by the leaders( leaders of tribal factions) and *Ulama*.

**Table 7 Who are the Suicide Bombers?**

N=250

	Misguided	Frustrated	Revengeful	Poor	addicts	Foreigner	Not amongst us	Taliban
Taliban (60)	0	22	75	2	0	0	22	10
General Public (80)	80	75	50	78	24	35	10	83
Law enforcement								
Personal (30)	75	54	35	32	3	12	0	97

Responses are multiple and in percentages

The table shows the general perception of people about the suicide bombers. The Taliban justify them as revengeful, general public as poor, misguided, poor, frustrated and revengeful as well. Law enforcement agencies also agree to this perception but with a different degree.





**Table 8 Suicide Bombers - Reaction.**

N=200

		<b>They are criminals</b>	<b>Working against the country</b>	<b>Destroyed the social life</b>	<b>Destroyed the economy</b>	<b>Enemies of Islam</b>	<b>American (foreign) agents</b>	<b>Working for agencies</b>	<b>Reaction of drone attacks/Forces Attacks</b>
General	Public								
SW		10	7	54	78	4	9	12	75
General	Public								
KP		43	67	79	93	39	28	37	53

Responses are multiple and in percentages

The table shows that there is a large variation of views on suicide bombers among the people in KP and South Waziristan. A sizeable number of People in KP believe that Suicide bombers are criminals, working against the country, enemies of Islam and

working for agencies or American interests. Whereas in South Waziristan, people have an opinion that they are not criminals, not working against the their country, not enemies of Islam and not working for agencies.

## **7.9. Perceptions of local people in North Waziristan**

In this section the views of ordinary people in North Waziristan have been recorded. Their views about the situation in their region, the Taliban and its policies reflect a mindset prevalent in the area and explain why and how the efforts to bring the situation on to the path of recovery have been futile. These views are not necessarily based on rational thinking but help to understand how the minds of the people have been tuned to explain the situation.

Zamarrud Khan, a resident of Mir Ali, North Waziristan, is 49 years old. He is a trader by profession. He said in his observation the majority of suicide attackers are volunteers between the ages of 12 to 20 years old. They are very emotional youngsters and when they are shown videos of American troops committing atrocities, they become revengeful. Most of them can become volunteers for suicide attacks readily due to their emotional character and offer themselves for sacrifice for their religion. He said, it is wrong, however, to say that people commit suicide attacks due to financial gains. "I have never heard of any person who has done it for money even though most of them are very poor. They are motivated by the desire for martyrdom".

Haji Zartab Khan, a resident of Sessan Wam, North Waziristan is an old man of 67 and a retired government employee. He had his own view of the matter:

"It appears sometime that the Taliban and America have a mutual understanding to keep the tribal people, particularly Waziristan, underdeveloped and backward. It is sad that the Taliban are exploding bombs and destroying government buildings, educational institutions and other infrastructure. The Taliban should also take care while conducting suicide attacks as a bomb cannot differentiate between an enemy and an innocent person. Lots of people are being alienated from the good cause of the Taliban due to such issues".

Khan Amir Khan is a resident of Boya region, North Waziristan. He is a jobless young man, aged 25. He said that, "If Muslims, who are weak in arms and weapons, had not initiated suicide bombings against the American troops, these Americans would have continued their advancement in all other Muslim countries".

Gul Jabat Khan Wazir, a resident of Tehsil Datta Khel, North Waziristan is a 29 years old shopkeeper. He said, "NATO forces are equipped with sophisticated weapons while the Taliban's best option against these NATO troops is a suicide attack. It has restricted the movement of NATO troops. It is the people of Waziristan who are paying the price of American interference. The economy of the region has almost collapsed, our schools and colleges are deserted and even some schools are now occupied by the Taliban and other groups for their accommodation and training centers." He was clear in his analysis.

Shams Ali, a 26 year old farmer and a resident of Tehsil Gharrion, North Waziristan, said, there is, "no doubt that suicide bombings also affect common people. Drone attacks and suicide blasts are against humanity but what other options do we have against the American forces? To retaliate against drone attacks, the best option for the Taliban is *Fidayee* attacks. This is the only method to restrict the foreign forces inside their barracks".

Abdur Rehman of Tehsil Spinwan, North Waziristan, aged 21 years, is a jobless person. He was bitter in his remarks, "the *Mujahideen* have defeated the foreign troops. If the Americans conducts drone attacks, then we also have the right to conduct suicide attacks. The enemy is very strong and to tackle the powerful enemy, suicide attacks are justified as this is the sole option for the *Mujahideen* to overcome their enemy".

*Madressa* teacher, Gul Khan in Tehsil Shiwa, North Waziristan, said, "I have visited some of the training camps where people get training for *Jihad*. I have also met many under training *Fidayeen* (suicide attackers) in these camps. I have also asked many questions from these *Fidayeen* about various perceptions that people have about them. For instance, I asked them about the comment that most of the suicide attackers are unwilling to perform their act, and are intoxicated with drugs etc before they are sent on missions. The majority of the *Fidayeen* replied negatively to my comments and stated that it is only their religious commitment and desire to embrace *Shahadat* which motivates them to carry out suicide attacks. They said that it is their religious obligation and they very well know that their ultimate sacrifice will strengthen their religion against its enemies. Each drop of blood spilled by us will strengthen Islam against the enemies of Allah".

#### **7.10. Views of the Security Forces officials**

The views of security forces officials were also recorded. For obvious reasons, all of them requested anonymity. They were in agreement about the fact that the problem in Waziristan is due to the presence of US troops in Afghanistan. The problem will be resolved once the US troops exit the region. There were no other views nor was there a dissenting analysis.

One senior soldier (Junior Commissioned Officer, JCO) stated that most of the Taliban fighting against the US forces in Afghanistan have no ill feelings towards the Pakistan army. However, some people among the ranks of the Taliban are miscreants and they are engaged in conspiracies in league with the enemies of Pakistan. They are actually Indian

agents but pretend to be *Mujahideen*. We are only fighting those miscreants and do not allow them to harm Pakistan in the guise of *Mujahideen*.

A soldier of the Frontier Constabulary said, “There was a time when tribal people honored Pakistani forces but now due to this war, people in Waziristan do not consider that Pakistani forces are right in fighting the Taliban. They think we are fighting because we have taken money from the Americans.

One young officer was clear in his views, “We are soldiers and are not supposed to undertake analysis of the situation. However, the fact that we are stationed here in Waziristan, in battle ready status, shows that there is a problem and a serious one indeed. It is the job of the government to take decisions on such strategic issues”. He continued. “As a soldier, I will fight till death or leave without looking back. All depends on what I am told to do”.

### **7.11. Concluding Observations**

- i) Most people interviewed were open to admitting their relatives’ involvement in attacks in Afghanistan. However, there was a marked reluctance to state the facts about suicide bombing and attacks in Pakistan by local Pakistanis. This may be due to the fact that the notion of considering attacks against the Pakistan army as *Jihad* is still a controversial topic among the public. Most people in Waziristan are Pakistani citizens. They carry Pakistani identity cards and passports. Their ties and relationship with Pakistan are quite close. Although there are grievances against the actions of the army, it is still difficult for them to accept the *Al-Qaeda*-inspired theory that attacks against the Pakistan army are justified. However, during their interviews with the researcher (Myself), there was a marked

- reluctance to profess their rejection of such thoughts due to the fear of the Taliban. In the context of Afghanistan, though, there seems to be no disagreement that *Jihad* must be waged in order to liberate Afghanistan from the clutches of US forces.
- ii) It has also been observed that people, whose relatives have been involved in suicide attacks, can be broadly divided into two groups on grounds of their willingness to admit frankly their knowledge of such acts. People having knowledge of a suicide bomber who acted prior to 2005 have generally shown their willingness to talk about them and to discuss their actions. However, people with knowledge of perpetrators of recent incidents have been observed to be reluctant to express their feelings. The only explanation that can be presented for this behavior is the probability that recent attacks or incidents involve additional risks if commented upon and the old ones are less likely to put them in jeopardy due to a considerable lapse of time.
  - iii) It has also been observed that relatives and acquaintances of suicide bombers from Waziristan, especially those still residing in the area, have been more open to talk about such incidents as opposed to those who are living in other parts of Pakistan. It is probably the fact that they feel more secure that the authorities cannot catch them in Waziristan.
  - iv) It has been observed that most of the indoctrination is already done before a suicide bomber enters the training phase. Their counseling is either done within the family or through social interaction with friends and people with a *Jihadi* mindset. Among the indoctrinated ones, there are many with a genuine motivation



for *Jihad* and with a desire to adopt a glorious path in their life. For instance, many volunteers have become motivated due to either emulating a relative or a friend who is a *Jihadi* and has gained respect and reputation within the family or social circles.

- v) There are those people whose relatives have died or suffered in militant actions. For instance, firstly friends and relatives of those who were killed in *Lal Masjid*, Swat or similar operations. For them, personal grief and revenge is the major motivation. A number of *Jihadis* now living and fighting against the Pakistan army in Waziristan are those who have lost their family members in Swat and other regions. They cannot forget the scars of such incidents and are bent upon taking revenge by destroying the families of army personnel.
- vi) There is another category of people whose regions have been subjected to military action and have been dealt with in a “humiliating and insulting manner.” For instance, a Taliban commander in Swat, Bani Amin had turned against the army for his allegedly insulting and humiliating treatment by ISI personnel during his detention before the beginning of the operation in Swat. His hatred of the army and his eagerness to behead captured army soldiers in Swat may be explained in the light of this observation. There are many like him in Waziristan living in safe hiding and carrying out militant operations.
- vii) In its earlier phase from 2002-2005, most of the attacks were targeting *Shia* community, their leaders, religious processions and places of worship. There was a clear sectarian dimension to it. In that scenario, suicide attackers mostly

belonged to Punjab and sympathizers of hardliner sectarian groups like *Sipah-e-Sahaba* and *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*.

- viii) Following the emergence of Taliban, the pattern as well as the dynamics of suicide attacks underwent a visible variation. *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban gave it a political dimension. This now included attacks on political and religious personalities with political identity, government installations and especially army buildings and personnel and whosoever is engaged in anti-Taliban activities.

## CHAPTER 8

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Suicide terrorism has emerged as a curse in contemporary Pakistan. Its devastating influence has wreaked havoc in the socio-economic and political spheres of society in Pakistan.

Suicide terrorism has existed since the dawn of history. Scholars are trying to understand and explore the fundamental motivation behind suicide bombing. Their major focus has been either on individual persuasions or on the group behavior which is rooted in socialization. They have also focused on ideology and the process of how these ideas develop and influence people. There is a lengthy discussion available in the academic literature produced by criminologists, psychologists and experts on terrorism which emphasizes a correlation between individual psychology and external factors that set an ideal stage for suicide terrorism. Scholars have put suicide bombers and their ideology under the following broad categories:

- a) Those who regard themselves as victims of injustice. This helps justify aggression against the evildoers.
- b) Suicide bombers who believe that they are on a Divine mission and by blowing themselves up in a crowd, they become martyrs and their destiny is heaven. They are motivated by the promise of a happy afterlife and heavenly reward. Radical religious organizations profess the concepts of self-sacrifice and martyrdom to convince their followers that suicide bombing is a noble and Godly act.
- c) Those who believe that through their actions, they can uphold the family, tribal, religious, ethnic values and serve the cause of the nation. God has conferred a

noble responsibility upon them to defend these values even at the cost of their lives.

- d) Suicide bombers whose actions are a reaction to perceived political oppression and the belief that they are victims of an unjust process of exploitation. They believe that life under occupation/ oppression is humiliating and that they will find a better life in paradise. For them, suicide is a cost paid to buy religious and political salvation.
- e) Martyrdom is also viewed as a status symbol. Those who participate are regarded as brave heroes who are destined to be rewarded with a happy after life. The cultural message is that sacrificing one's own life for a cause and to kill others in the process is highly desirable. The entire cultural structure comprising family, friends, teachers, religious institutions and political leaders may share this notion.

This thesis offers a new theoretical framework, which argues that suicide terrorism is a practical tactic of war employed by a tribal and religious group with a political ideology and with limited military capability in conventional terms to achieve its objectives which are political in nature. It is a tactical methodology adopted for achieving their political objectives while satisfying their religious needs.

Suicide terrorism has dramatically increased in popularity over the past ten years after the arrival of American forces in Afghanistan. Suicide terrorism in Pakistan remains a distinctively different phenomenon. The number of suicide attacks in Pakistan has outnumbered all other worldwide suicide attacks combined. The data on suicide terrorism coming out of Pakistan is unprecedented.

In seeking to explain suicide terrorism in Pakistan, scholars and politicians alike have adopted two opposing theoretical frameworks, both of which were presented in Chapter 2. The first framework, presented by Robert Pape, argues that suicide terrorism is a secular nationalist response to foreign occupation. In this sense, suicide terrorism has very little to do with Islamic culture or values. Iraqis have risen together in a unified, nationalist response to expel the occupying forces through suicide campaigns. Since the U.S. is a democracy, Iraqi nationalists conducted suicide terrorism in order to convince the administration to abandon the occupation or convince the American public to elect a new government that will.

The second framework, presented by Samuel Huntington, argues that suicide terrorism is a manifestation of the clash of civilizations between the Western and Islamic worlds unfolding in Iraq. This framework explains that civilization is the highest form of identity and, unlike wars of the past, clashes of civilization will be particularly violent and bloody. Thus, suicide terrorism, the most extreme tactic imaginable, perfectly exemplifies the intensity of a clash of civilizations. The incompatibility of Western and Islamic culture and values has driven insurgents in Iraq to suicide terrorism.

There is much evidence to corroborate Pape's framework in Pakistan. Before the 2003 invasion of Afghanistan, there had never been a suicide attack in Pakistan by forces opposed to Pakistan. However, the situation changed in the post 2001 scenario and the region turned into a playing field for suicide terrorism.

My analysis suggests that Pape's framework explains suicide terrorism in Pakistan to a good extent but leaves certain points unanswered. For one, suicide attacks in the Taliban insurgency are not conducted uniformly by all Pakistanis. Only certain

religio-political extremist groups, which are a minority in Pakistan, are engaged in suicide terror campaigns. In addition, suicide attacks most frequently target Pakistani security forces and innocent civilians and not the occupying coalition forces. Pape's framework cannot explain why a sizeable number of suicide terrorists in Pakistan are either foreign fighters or their Pakistani supporters. There is no widespread and open public recognition or celebration of martyrdom for these bombers. Instead, each suicide attack receives condemnation from most quarters. Pape's framework cannot explain why the most prolific suicide terror groups are Islamists, neither of which espouses Pakistani nationalism.

Another contention of Pape based on the difference between the religion of the occupier and the occupied is also not relevant in Pakistan's case since there is no occupier as such, and the belligerents are the Taliban and the Pakistani army, which are both Muslims.

Pakistan's situation cannot be presented as a suitable example for justifying or contradicting Pape's observations. There are several features which are Pakistan-specific and, therefore, place Pakistan as distinct from the application of Pape's findings.

No suicide attacks ever took place in Pakistan before Western and Islamic civilizations met in a sharp and lasting clash in 2003 in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Pakistan, suicide terrorism is carried out by extremist religio-political and not nationalist groups. Huntington's framework predicted a flood of foreign fighters entering Iraq to conduct suicide terrorism through the concept of kin-country syndrome. This does not apply to Pakistan. In this case the term *Ummah* (Nation of Muslims) appears more suitable.

However, like Pape's framework, Huntington's framework has failed to fully account for suicide terrorism in Pakistan, an Islamic country.

This thesis observes that the case for Huntington's framework was weakened by the fact that only the *Pashtun* ethnic tribal groups in support of the *Sunni* and *Wahhabi Jihadis* had conducted suicide terrorism, even though, in line with their cultural and historical traditions and in accordance with their religious tradition, *Shia* are more inclined to seek martyrdom. Yet every foreign suicide bomber who supposedly acted in accordance with Huntington's kin-country syndrome, came from a *Sunni* country, despite the fact that Iran shares a long border with Pakistan. Furthermore, the targets of these suicide attacks are most frequently civilians, not Western forces. Although religio-political extremist groups do conduct the most suicide terror attacks, Huntington's framework still cannot account for the secular anti-American forces in Pakistan. Despite being fundamental opposites, both of these frameworks overlook the deep ethno-cultural and sectarian divisions within Pakistan. With these weaknesses identified, the need for a new theoretical framework has been proposed that could more accurately explain suicide terrorism in Pakistan and which may not coincide with the Iraqi case. This framework argues that groups that employ suicide terrorism in Pakistan share three traits:

1. they subscribe to an extremist religious and political ideology;
2. their inability to pursue their goals using the current political process; and
3. their inability to pursue their goals using conventional military means.



Following the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, groups lacking both political and military means to achieve their goals, including tribal Islamists and foreign fighters turned to suicide terrorism.

However, the question remains; why would a segment of a community view suicide bombing as normal behavior? Some blame military actions and/or deplorable economic and social conditions. While those may be valid considerations, why haven't all cultures that have endured similar experiences supported suicide bombers?

Brian Barber,<sup>471</sup> a psychologist, interviewed 900 young adults from Gaza and a comparison group of Bosnian Muslims,

“who had also suffered through violence but had not become a source of suicide bombers. Faith was the largest difference: the Palestinians routinely invoked religion to interpret personal trauma with social meaning, whereas Bosnians did not consider religion significant to their lives.” This is a critical distinction: “The strictly hierarchical nature of religious terrorist groups with a highly disciplined structure and obedient cadre means not only that the main clerical leaders command full control over the political as well as military activities of the organization, but also the strategies of terrorism are unleashed in accordance with general political directives and agendas”<sup>472</sup>.

Now consider Pakistan's case. An analysis of *Al-Qaeda's* war strategy reflects that it had planned the use of Waziristan as its base and safe haven for its fighters in the post-US invasion scenario in Afghanistan. *Al-Qaeda's* attention to Waziristan became focused in early 2002. It infiltrated its fighters and supporters in this region by sending Uzbeks, Chechen and other militants to South Waziristan primarily because it was a safe heaven and later to be used as a launching pad for their *Jihad*. This means that *Al-Qaeda* had, far earlier, realized the significance of this region for its military operations.

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<sup>471</sup> Brian, Barber., *Survey in Gaza*, [www.pij.org/details.php](http://www.pij.org/details.php).

<sup>472</sup> *Ibid.*

One may assert that the Af-Pak strategy which the US devised for the region in 2006-7, was in fact implemented five years earlier by *Al-Qaeda*. *Al-Qaeda's* plan for Waziristan envisaged the use of this region as a launching pad for operations against US troops in Afghanistan. Waziristan was the natural and logical choice due to its geography, topography and culture. It provided an ideal location as a guerrilla base.

*Al-Qaeda* controlled the situation in South and North Waziristan through the influx of fighters and by aligning local tribesmen who were sympathizers of the militants. The result was that the Pakistan army lost the initiative to control Waziristan once the militants solidified their position. Waziristan's capture by the militants was a great boost to their military prowess against the governments of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. *Al-Qaeda* leaders like Osama Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri and many others reportedly lived in safe refuge in the region of Shawal and adjacent areas for several years.

Waziristan's culture, its people and terrain provided a much needed breathing space for militants, which rejuvenated their strength and they survived the most lethal situation which would have otherwise crushed them to annihilation by 2003.<sup>473</sup>

This state of affairs was succinctly described by the author of an article in a journal of the Pakistani *Jihadi* organization *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen*,

*"Mujahideen* and local tribes have strong and cordial relationships. The infiltration into the tribal areas of Pakistan cannot be stopped even by America, what to talk of Pakistan. On the one hand, the long stretch of this border is a cause for the impossibility to stop infiltration, while on the other, there are fighting tribes on either side and they are also relatives of each other, They have a tradition of being warm to the guests and remain united against the aliens. The strength of the states of Khost and Pakistan in Afghanistan is also because of their physical proximity with Waziristan. Well

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<sup>473</sup> By 2009, seven Islamic Emirates were announced in all the tribal agencies. According to estimates, by 2009, Taliban had almost 100,000 armed fighters at their disposal in Pakistan tribal areas with majority of them based in Waziristan.

known Taliban commanders Jalauddin Haqqani and Qari Saifullah Akhtar are popular in countless families. The tribes are not strangers to the Taliban; in fact, they happen to be their kith and kin. They have a history of their own. They did not allow the British to enter their areas by waging guerrilla war. The story of Russian is quite fresh in this regard. An army may stand in the battle ground only when it has the support of locals.”<sup>474</sup>

My analysis is that there is a visible and definite relationship between the adoption of suicide attacks as a tactical methodology by Taliban militants, the *Pashtun* culture and Waziristan in particular which provided a conducive environment for the development of this peculiar brand of *Jihadi* current.

*Pashtun* culture, Waziristani brand, had already done most of the work for these militants by producing personality traits and specific characteristics among local *Pashtun* tribesmen which was the perfect requirement of *Al-Qaeda* strategists. *Jihadis* had their fighters already made for them in that particular socio-cultural milieu. They simply had to groom and train them. The process of transformation from an egoistic and proud young *Pashtun* into a diehard *Jihadist* did not take long.

The *Jihadi* sentiment and resulting emotional energy it generated had a strong, stimulating and motivating impact on the minds of young men who, due to their intense interaction with *Jihadi* militants, were captivated by their ideas and their behavior. These young men, with their impressionable personality, after experiencing the emotional energy generated in this environment by the strongly permeating *Jihadi* culture, became

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<sup>474</sup> *Al-Hilal*, a journal of *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen*, September 2003. Quoted in Rana, Amir.,2010, p. 28.

ready for the ultimate limits of sacrifice<sup>475</sup>. *Jihadi* culture in Waziristan facilitated the development of a mindset which was willing to adopt the extreme of measures for fighting the enemy. The *Jihadi* spirit rejuvenated their desire for martyrdom. Suicide attacks emerged as just one manifestation of the Waziristani brand of *Jihadi* culture.

Militants who settled in Waziristan were the ideal type of role model for young *Pashtun* tribesmen. They were brave *Mujahids* who were in war with a mighty super power. They had already defeated the might of the Soviet Red Army and have now challenged the power of the United States, the only super power in the world. With their Klashinkovs and RPG-7 rocket launchers, these men had braved B-52 bombers and their 3000 kilograms heavy Daisy Cutter bombs in Afghanistan. Their resolve was still intact and even stronger. They were waging *Jihad*, the ultimate test that proves the worth of a Muslim man. Their battle experiences had a charismatic appeal which attracted the young *Pashtuns* towards them. Their desire to emulate these battle-hardened brave militants became intense and they started joining their ranks in hundreds.

In this scenario, *Al-Qaeda* militants found a conducive environment for the achievement of their war objectives in Waziristan. They carefully nurtured the *Jihadi* sentiments which was in abundance here, articulated and channelled its inertia, and set up a stage for unfolding their war strategy against the United States.

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<sup>475</sup> Taliban power in North and Waziristan has rejuvenated the *Jihadi* spirit. Youngsters trying to emulate Taliban rule in Afghanistan have taken matters in their own hands under the leadership of local religious leaders. Clerics have emerged as the new pillars of power and have replaced the old traditional tribal elders. Thousands of young men have been recruited by pro-Taliban preachers even in the adjoining settled district of Bannu, Karak and Lakki Marwat. Religion carries great attraction and appeal in this part of the world and is being exploited by the pro-Taliban circles. Daily *Mashriq*, Peshawar, October 6, 2006.

This analysis suggests that had *Al-Qaeda* failed in securing Waziristan as their military base in the early phase of the war, its inertia for resistance would have died out, and it would have been crushed by the combined might of both the Pakistan and the US army as earlier as 2003. Taliban militia in Afghanistan would also have failed to sustain their resistance without a solid base and a steady supply of men and equipment deep inside mainland Afghanistan.

It is Waziristan which saved *Al-Qaeda*, provided it with a breathing space, allowed time to its planners to refine their war strategy and to regroup. It is Waziristan which allowed *Al-Qaeda* to organize the scattered remnants of disgruntled and disillusioned Afghan Taliban, build their morale and pack them off to fight yet another war. Mulla Dadullah and other leaders of Afghan Taliban frequently visited Waziristan for guidance and equipment. The Taliban's capture of the Afghan towns of Helmand and Uruzgan by 2005 would have been nothing but a dream for Mulla Omar had *Al-Qaeda* not offered his men the sanctuary of Waziristan.

Waziristan is also one of the reasons that suicide bombing was introduced in the war as a tactical methodology for taking on the might of superior armies on both sides. It offered an ample supply of volunteers and training facilities for suicide bombings.

The fact that *Al-Qaeda* had earlier, as part of its war strategy, declared war against the state of Pakistan for its pro US policies on the basis of the Islamic doctrines of *Takfeer* and *Khuruj*, provided it with justification to exploit all means available against its enemy. The Pakistan army's invasion of Waziristan further escalated mutual hostilities and elevated the conflict to the level of a civil war.<sup>476</sup> This was exactly what Al Qaeda

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<sup>476</sup> Conditions qualifying a state of conflict to civil war are described in Fearon, James., Latin, David., *Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War*, APSR, Vol. 97, No. 1, February, 2003, pp. 75-90.

and its local militant supporters had desired for, since in a state of war all parties are at liberty to resort to violence against one another. The nature of violence however depends upon the means available at the disposal of these parties. For terrorists, fighting against the superior fighting force of Pakistan army, suicide attacks are a weapon of choice by default. They are fully cognizant of the lethal and virulent efficacy of this weapon and its propaganda importance. The perpetrators of suicide attacks justify their acts on the basis of religion and military necessity.

“One of the reasons that a state of war is preferable to peace is that it gives moral justifications to acts of violence. Violence in turn, offers the illusion of power.”<sup>477</sup>

*Al-Qaeda* decides to initiate a blood and guts campaign in Pakistan through the use of suicide bombers. *Al-Qaeda* trainers from Palestine and Iraq taught this technique to the locals.<sup>478</sup>

Suicide vests and explosives were manufactured in Waziristan and volunteers went through training as bombers in relative safety. Waziristan, owing to its geography, offered an easy access to suicide bombers for venturing into both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Targets for suicide attacks were available in abundance on both sides of the border.

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<sup>477</sup> Juergensmeyer, Mark., *Terror in the Name of God*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2003, No. 6, p. 157.

<sup>478</sup> After realizing that there is a need to reinvigorate the resistance in Afghanistan, they dispatched, Maulvi Mehmoodullah Haq Yar from Iraq to reorganize Taliban resistance in early 2004 with money and fighters. He introduced the tactic of suicide bombing in Afghanistan and later in Pakistan after observing its lethal efficacy in Iraq. Maulvi Haq Yar was an Afghan Taliban commander who participated in *Al-Qaeda* resistance in Iraq. Weekly Wajood Karachi, September 7, 2005. Also Rana, Amir., pp105-106.



Waziristan also provided safe sanctuary and training in ideology and warfare to militants from mainland Pakistan. They flocked to Waziristan in thousands where they had the opportunity to openly interact with *Al-Qaeda* ideologues. These militants were inspired by *Al-Qaeda's* ideology of *Takfeer*, *Khuruj* and *Shahada*. They went back to Pakistan with renewed zeal to fight an un-Islamic government which is supporting the greatest enemy of Muslims, the United States, in crushing the *Jihadi* movement in Waziristan. The methodology of suicide bombing was easy to employ against the army and government of the *Taghut*<sup>479</sup> in Pakistan. Easy access between Waziristan and mainland Pakistan facilitated the master minds of suicide bombings to execute their plans effectively.

The above analysis has focused on the political and strategic aspects of the phenomenon. Indeed there are numerous other socio-cultural factors which are relevant for a better understanding. As already discussed, *Pashtun* society and culture and its influence on the personalities of its young members is an important factor. In addition, the theory of historical particularism also provides tools for a better insight. The region, social and political changes and their influence on society and culture must be examined with reference to its past history and it is this historical paradigm which offers an incisive analysis of existing situations.

History has a tremendous bearing on the development of attitudes and behavior towards various internal and external stimuli. Political history and events shape up the collective psyche and socio-cultural response to later developments. In the case of Waziristan in particular and the *Pashtun* region in general, the historical antecedents

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<sup>479</sup> Rule of the Devil. A rule against which struggle is justified.



point to a very close nexus between their current political and cultural attitudes and response to political challenges such as the occupation of Afghanistan by US forces, Pakistan's military operations in tribal areas in support of the US forces and other related factors.

Waziristan's history tells us that the current behavior and response as witnessed in the region must not have come as a surprise to the world. The past and present experience predict that the inhabitants of this region would have behaved in all probability in the manner that they did. The situation in Waziristan and other related regions in the context of the war against terror is simply history repeating itself and nothing much.

Therefore historical antecedents must not be ruled out in any analysis of this problem. The region of Waziristan had a tumultuous history and an explosive sensitivity in terms of Islam when its existence is perceived as threatened. The British invaders of this region had earlier experienced it. *Jihadi* militants of today have successfully exploited it against their enemies.

Another important and related aspect is the role of social change due to contemporary developments and their negative implications must be analyzed in the context of socio-cultural reactions of a violent nature.

My understanding is that change shakes up the social order. Change may be radical and political in nature or slow through the influx of money and economic development. Whatever the nature of the change is, it does affect the existing social and cultural fabric of society. Traditional values are transformed into modern ones. Old norms are replaced by new ones. Relationships are affected and result in new alliances

and new groups that are formed. Those who are either not part of economic development and are alienated from the process form their own grouping with the likes of their own. This introduces social and cultural tensions in society and in relationships. Classes based on ownership of wealth emerge which have conflict with others. As a result the weaker segments and those who become alienated may get closer to religion which provided them comfort and solace. This group perceives the changes brought about by modernity as threatening to their existence. However the threats to their own existence are perceived as threats to religion and the old social order. Modernity and material development is regarded as alien and, therefore, a serious challenge to their individual and social existence and identity. Their orientation turns backwards in time and the past becomes their *Utopia* since it provides a sense of belonging and identity. This process also generates tensions and animosity between opponent groups. This introduces an element of aggression and extremist tendencies develop within such groups. Terrorism presents itself as the only course of action to make their presence felt. To an extent, the Taliban influence in Waziristan can be explained in the light of this argument.

This analysis also shows that the suicide phenomenon in Pakistan should be viewed independently of the suicide attacks elsewhere in the neighboring and regional countries. There are a host of contributing factors such as a shaky political system vulnerable to external forces as well as internal pressure groups, the absence of political commitment against terrorism, the political parties' indifference, a weak response of civil society, a military-clergy connivance, a scared population, an unregulated media, a hostile neighborhood of the country, sectarian support for violence by religious organizations, cultural and religious sanctions available for such acts.

The concepts of asylum and revenge under the *Pashtun* code of honor *Pashtunwali* have been discussed in Chapters 4 & 5. I analyzed in detail that a *Pashtun* considers it a moral, religious and social responsibility to take revenge when attacked and to provide asylum to his guests and friends. The phenomenon of suicide bombing and the mindset of recruits should be viewed always under this perspective.

The most powerful causes which have supported the employment of suicide tactics are the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, drone attacks in Pakistan and military operations in tribal areas, particularly in Waziristan, which have greatly fueled sentiments of hatred and revenge among the local population. This has multiple adverse side effects also. On the one hand, terrorist organizations have used these sentiments for accelerating retaliatory actions against the state and on the other hand, the intensity of reaction against such atrocious activities as suicide attacks among the population in general and tribal areas in particular remain muted.

Several incidents of suicide bombing have been carried out under the impulses of revenge and humiliation. For instance, two would-be suicide attackers who were interviewed were angry due to the alleged atrocities committed by the army in South Waziristan. Previously they were ordinary teenagers, cricket players and loved to watch Indian movies, and were not otherwise religious persons.<sup>480</sup> Another young man from Kashmir named Shahbaz Ali Khalid who was arrested in Mianwali in June 2009 with a suicide jacket, was motivated by the killing of girls and innocent persons in the July 2007 *Lal Masjid* incident in Islamabad.

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<sup>480</sup> Khan, N. Akbar., *Analyzing Suicide Attacks in Pakistan*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Oct-Dec 2010, p. 2.

Problems such as lack of education, poverty, unemployment etc. appear only as support factors which contribute to ignite the already existing sentiments of anger. Once a spark flares up then even smaller insignificant ills turn into big monsters. Socio-economic issues and a mass of disempowered population becomes a ticking bomb ready to explode especially when militants have the detonator of religion in their hands.

Social factors are extremely important in providing the basis for the increase in extremism. Social integration within Pakistani society is decreasing with time, and tribal and family ties are losing their grip. Individuals are becoming more vulnerable in the face of growing economic and social problems. There is a wide gap emerging between various classes based on their economic and social status. The number of poor is increasing with an alarming rate and the lower and upper middle classes are shrinking rapidly. Another negative consequence of this state of affairs is wide-spread discriminatory practices in society as well as due to government policies. This has adverse consequences as it leads to feelings of alienation among the vulnerable segments and frustration with those in power. In contemporary society of Pakistan, the impoverished and low income groups cannot make ends meet due to this having almost no chances of earning a decent livelihood. A majority of them feel discriminated by the more affluent and powerful segments of society. They also have a closer attachment to their religion and therefore there is a greater possibility that their feelings of alienation and despair will find consolation in religious groups which offer them a group identity and social bonding and a well-reasoned objectivity in their otherwise purposeless life.

Social prestige is a powerful motivation factor which is strongly connected to the ideals of teenage heroism. These youngsters extract fascination from the booming *Jihadi*

atmosphere in Waziristan where a *Mujahid* (holy fighter) and *Shaheed* (martyr) enjoys very high prestige and status. After suicide missions are accomplished, the death of a suicide bomber is celebrated rather than mourned by his family. TTP generally issues a 'Martyrdom Certificate' to the family of a suicide bomber.<sup>481</sup>

It will not be naïve to state that an obscurantist interpretation of religion is one of the main causes for terrorism and suicide bombing. It is preached that a Muslim *Pashtun* should always be prepared to kill, if need be himself and others, for the sake of Islam and his dignity. This is partly true to the extent that most volunteer terrorists and suicide bombers had a "greater cause" in their mind and that was the cause of Islam or, in other words, a cause which as a Muslim they should pursue. The data shows that not all militants and suicide bombers are religious in their spiritual behavior, nor are they necessarily very regular, practicing Muslims; rather the majority of them possess very little knowledge of religion (Islam). Most of the students of *Deeni Madaris* possess very little or incomplete knowledge of Islam. It was observed that for most of them Islam is more a social and cultural practice and a source of cultural identity rather than a spiritual and moral system.

Religion is an integral part of culture. It is almost impossible to differentiate between the boundaries of religion and culture in a predominantly Muslim country like Pakistan. It is the cultural understanding of religion that plays an important role in suicide bombing in Pakistan. Religion is not understood by common people in its philosophical and academically rational context. It is the understanding of religion by a secluded and marginalized segment of society, imbued with cultural factors and fuelled by political

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<sup>481</sup> Iqbal & Gunaratna, 2011.

grievances, which has manifested itself in the phenomenon of suicide bombing in Pakistan.

It is clear that religion is the most convenient instrument in the environment where militants are recruited, trained and finally launched on their targets. There was a general consensus amongst the social scientists and scholars in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province and other areas that Pakistan offers a perfect ground for instigating extreme reactions on any subject under the slogan of religion.

Another pertinent observation is the failure of emergence of a Pakistani nationalist identity. Pakistan is country comprising of many different ethnic and tribal groups with their own cultural specific identities. Various attempts to form a nationalistic identity have not been very successful. Official attempts to forge a nationalistic identity were directed to evolve an identity primarily on the basis of an anti-Indian premise. This view point has been projected as a consequence of security concerns primarily projected by the Pakistani establishment.<sup>482</sup> It may, therefore, be argued that Pakistani nationalism is not founded on strong foundations and, therefore, groups which profess ethnic, sectarian and religious and anti-Pakistan viewpoints can conveniently weaken the nationalistic identity of Pakistan. In the case of religious militancy, the Islamic credentials of Pakistani state have been attacked and exploited by the militants in order to justify their armed insurrection.

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<sup>482</sup> Scholars including Ian Talbot and Pierre Lafrance have labeled it as a case of nationalism based primarily on anti-Indianness. Jaffrelot, Christoph (ed.), *Pakistan - Nationalism without a Nation*, Manohar Publishers Delhi, 2004.



Factors which have been identified as catalysts for terrorist and suicide attacks are diverse and innumerable. These have been discussed in chapters 6 and 7 and in the preceding part of this chapter as well.

The findings of this study in response to questions posed in chapter I, are:

1. Suicide bombers are not always alienated or excluded, marginalized and wretched sections of society. They are, in most cases, committed young men highly conscious of their role and objectives.
2. People join militant groups for various reasons ranging from personal reasons through effective persuasive techniques employed by the militant organizations.
3. People's frustrations are channelled by exploiting cultural and religious means into suicide attacks by the ideologues. Findings show that suicide attacks are not individual decisions (and cannot be for practical reasons) but part of a group mechanics where the individual is only an instrument.
4. It was revealed very clearly that religious fundamentalism is one of the causes but not the sole and only root cause of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. The role of religion in conflicts leading to terrorism is obvious but only on face value. The real cause is much more complex and multifaceted.
5. There are two types of *Madaris* (Religious Schools). Those, which are in the majority, concentrate on direct religious education and are not affiliated with any militant organization. There is another set of training and recruitment centres also called *Madaris* which have been set up to recruit and train militants and suicide bombers. These centres provide accommodation to a select group of youngsters recruited for specific purposes and brainwashed for militant activities under



religious doctrines. As regards the role of *Deeni Madaris* (Religious Schools) as institutions nurturing and training suicide bombers, no direct role was witnessed which could establish that these schools are in any manner directly involved in training or counseling activities. However, the fact cannot be denied that most of the raw material namely the suicide bombers and recruits were a product of such schools due to the reason that they are easy targets for the job. There are multifold reasons, for example, the humble background of students from poor and low socio-economic strata, less attention by parents, the unfriendly atmosphere of government-run schools, social rejection, humiliation, alienation, frustration, curricula professing a special and narrow meaning of *Jihad* and the accessibility of militant groups to the students.

6. The impression that the overreaction of the state machinery has reinforced terrorist acts in Pakistan was not proved correct. Rather, the role of the state machinery was found a little lenient. The primary victims of suicide attacks are common people but their reaction cannot be direct.
7. Sometimes it appears that the population is divided over the causes of such acts. Results have provided sufficient evidence that the population is extremely scared, confused and therefore silent for very obvious reasons.
8. It was also found that all suicide bombers and their sympathizers belong to *Sunni-Deobandi* and *Wahhabi* sects. These sects of Islam propagate hardline *Jihadi* doctrines of *Takfeer* and *Khuruj*; they run a large number of *Deeni Madaris* and are custodians of mosques throughout Pakistan. Another reason is that the masterminds of terrorism and suicide bombing in Pakistan were mostly *Sunni*

Arabs who patronized and sponsored *Madaris* and religious organizations of their own brand of faith.

9. The issue of whether suicide bombers are pursuing the ideal of creating a transnational *neo-Ummah* was a complex question. It has many dimensions. Data shows that at the level of the individual and local groups, no such concept exists. At the level of meta ideologies, this is perhaps the principle agenda; however, it is not visible and reflected in the areas and among organizations operating in Pakistan.
10. The financing of suicide activities is a mystery as yet. There are several players involved in financing such activities for a specific pre-designed agenda, directly and indirectly. Since no data can be collected through individual efforts, this question remains unexplored and unanswered. The flow of money, however, was an observable phenomenon during my field work in Waziristan although the main source was impossible to discover. Different groups were receiving huge funds, and spending and distributing them lavishly. The network is huge and complex and operators are highly sensitive of their identity. An investigation and probe can be extremely dangerous and deadly.

A set of hypotheses was developed with a number of sub-postulates. A sub-postulate that religion is the main motivation behind adopting the suicide option was proved incorrect owing to the fact that at the individual level it is not only Islam in the context of its comprehensive teachings but other types of personal rewards that also motivate a suicide bomber. This was proved by the fact that those who opt for suicide

bombing (and their families) are not willing to sacrifice other worldly things such as wealth, personal belongings and property. These people are also less inclined towards other tenets of Islam such as charity, service to community and helping poor and sick people. The assumption that terrorists are not against the state but are fighting for the evacuation of American forces from Pakistan and Afghanistan was proved partly true but with the exception of those who are killing people for other reasons which they consider as justifiable. There is a group which considers Pakistan as a state responsible for destructions of Muslims so should be wiped out from the world map.

The postulate that militants from Waziristan have no option but to attack state organs in order to convey the message of their displeasure is again proved only partly true because a number of anti-Pakistan forces have camped out in the area as well. For example, Pakistani security agencies claim to have proof of India's role in this insurgency.

Revenge as a strong contributing factor was proved correct but only for individuals who are tuned either to a certain doctrine or direct victims of aggression and act accordingly. However, for group motives, this was not supported by any empirical evidence.

The assumption that society at large is supportive of the objectives which suicide terrorists are pursuing was proved totally false. Individuals and groups condemn such acts vehemently in private but with caution. The assumption that ethnic, sectarian and cultural factors have a larger role in suicide bombing phenomenon was proved largely true.

The role of money as a motivating factor was studied very carefully but could not be proved as having a direct impact on suicide bombers. This needs a little deeper analysis. Firstly, money is used freely for operational purposes such as hiring, training, transportation and communication arrangements. Then come the aspect of direct payment which is hard to prove for the simple reason that if recruits are offered money for the ultimate sacrifice, their operators can not convince them on 'otherworldly' rewards. Recruits are trained and served well and money is spent lavishly for this purpose. Payments are made to the suppliers of recruits in *Madaris* and in terrorist outfits and to the families of recruits also in some limited cases. The role of money as a catalyst is not supported by the data as a motivator but rather as a facilitator in operations.

The above discussion reveals that an attempt to rationalize the behavior of a suicide bomber through psychological and sociological theories alone would not yield realistic results. Suicide bombing is not exclusively a psychological or a sociological issue. It is caused by a combination of multifold factors with multifaceted dimensions. It is an organizational activity not an individual enterprise. Socio-psychological dynamics within a group have a crucial role rather than individual traits. These organizations and groups are regulated through a high degree of discipline and an individual has very limited choices in the conception, formulation and execution of a plan.

My observation is that the behavior of a suicide bomber is not motivated by frustration, disillusionment and despondency alone since they are highly motivated and committed individuals, at least their actions point to such characteristics. Individual propensities may, however, be considered as a factor in combination with many others.

An attempt to rationalize the behavioral aspects of a suicide bomber must include an understanding of the inter-action of individual and group behavioral dynamics rather than a compartmentalized approach with an individual specific focus.<sup>483</sup>

The above stated characteristic of suicide as part of a suicide attacks distinguishes it from a suicide committed by an individual due to his inability to cope with his personal circumstances. Durkheim explanations of suicide relates, first, to ordinary individualistic suicide. According to Durkheim religion and social integration is a motivating factor in preventing recourse to suicide whereas our case fits in the category of altruistic suicide. The suicide bomber is highly motivated in religious context and closely integrated in his group and his very act is for collective objectives of his group or society. His actions reflect altruism, albeit in a perverse manner.

This study was primarily conducted to explore the phenomenon and causal nexus and factors supportive of suicide bombing in Pakistan. The results show two points very clearly: that Pakistan and especially its tribal area has provided a fertile ground for the genesis of suicide terrorism and has been unable to resist this activity as a state. Religion and culture are two strong components of the suicide bombing phenomenon owing to the fact that they provide at least a suitable justification to sacrifice one's life and kill others for a greater cause. This cause and associated rewards are defined, justified and legitimized by religion and culture. Militant organizations are highly conscious of the religio-cultural and political configuration of Pakistani society and have designed an

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<sup>483</sup> Moghaddam and Silke's works describes this aspect in their research. See Moghaddam, Assaf., *Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects*, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2003, pp. 65-92, and Silke, Andrew., *Courage in Dark Places: Reflections on Terrorist Psychology*, Social Research, Vol. 70, No. 1, 2004, pp. 11.

effective and workable strategy for its exploitation for their objectives. Tribal structure and the locale of tribal areas offer an ideal playing ground for militants' ideology.

The fear factor has also played a significant role in reducing the resistance. Masses, civil society, the media, state machinery and political parties alike are cautious and fearful to openly display their disapproval and condemnation. Their apprehensions are not entirely baseless. Assassinations of numerous high-profile opponents are a living proof of their lethal prowess. It was also very clearly established through this research that *Al-Qaeda* is no more the sole regulator of all terrorist and suicide bombing activities in Pakistan. A number of operatives are active in the arena and pursuing their own agendas which are not mutually consistent; therefore, a solution-based model is not possible externally any more. The analysis suggests that social and cultural factors which have deep roots inside Pakistan's own soil and social structure may play a role. An internal drive with grand political and social consensus may lead to a solution but not definitely in the very near future.

The Understanding of *Jihad* is a variable and time-linked phenomenon.<sup>484</sup> Its conceptual understanding has varied from time to time in response to contemporary developments. The geo-political scenario of our times has presented novel challenges and the response of today's Muslim world is also unique.

From an Islamic *Sharia's* perspective, the discussion reveals that injunctions of the Islamic law of war are relevant only to the regulation of practices of states or organized polities rather than this new phenomenon in the militant groups that are waging

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<sup>484</sup> Ayesha Jalal refers to it as a temporal specific understanding. Jalal, Ayesha., *Partisans of Allah, Jihad in South Asia*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 2008.



*Jihad* against their own governments or states in a non-conventional manner. They have declared war against their own governments as well as US and its allies whereas at present no Muslim state is officially at war with the US and none are employing suicide attacks. These groups do not conduct their operations like a regular army. Neither do they consider themselves bound by the Geneva Conventions. They do not have an organized and recognized command structure or an area under their control. The Geneva Conventions or other relevant international legal instruments cannot be made applicable to them. They can be classified as a non-state combatant group under the principles of International Humanitarian Law. It is not possible for them to wage this type of war without employing terrorism and suicide attacks is their choice of terror tactics. This is a completely novel situation even from an Islamic law perspective. In my opinion, Islamic scholars had not envisaged this type of warfare. Keeping this fact in mind, *Sharia*-based regulations dealing with classical notions of warfare are not entirely relevant to today's situation. Islamic law is today confronted with a novel modern reality, the privatization of *Jihad*. There is a dire need for *Sharia* scholars to devise new regulatory mechanisms through a new *Ijtihad*.<sup>485</sup>

This study was not aimed at proposing a viable solution to the problem confronting Pakistan nor has it come out with a new anti-suicide tactical model. However, it is obvious that suicide attacks have emerged as a new and dangerous challenge for the law enforcement agencies of Pakistan. There is no easy cure or panacea for this terrible activity.

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<sup>485</sup> *Ijtihad* is a process of re-interpretation of *Sharia* sources to devise new rules in order to deal with newly emerging challenges.



Government cannot curb suicide attacks in a routine manner through its law enforcement agencies. Instead of an approach based on interdiction of the suicide bombers and their master-minds, there must be greater focus on eradicating the root causes of terrorism. This requires a long-term strategic intervention in the sectors of socio-economic development, education, health, employment and income-generating opportunities for the public. The absence of these interventions results in economic deprivation, disillusionment and despair among the population. This state of affairs provides a conducive environment to religious extremists to exploit the impoverished and disillusioned young men to become militants. Political oppression and the absence of representation also give rise to extremist political ideologies and as a result desperate groups resort to achieving their political objectives through violent means.

Although hard action based on strict law enforcement measure is the only available method to handle this situation, it is not sufficient to eliminate the root cause of the problem. A sustained and effective effort for the elimination of this problem would be ideally based on a long term policy of intervention. This must target the factors and motivation that provide grounds for militancy and lead to suicide terrorism.

As already pointed out, the foremost solution lies in the political arena. It is primarily a political problem and the only workable solution is a political settlement of the dispute between Taliban militants and the government. Indeed, there are international and global factors which have a bearing on political issues in Pakistan, including, the presence of US forces in Afghanistan and other causes of concern in Kashmir, Palestine and the newly emerging theatres of war. In so far as treatment of the indigenous factors is

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concerned, I am of the opinion that it is a problem closely rooted in social and cultural factors. Motivating factors are generated in this arena.

Religion has an important role in the mentality, psychology and personality development in Pakistan. Religion is also mixed with culture to such an extent that drawing a distinction between the two is almost impossible. The cultural manipulation of religion has resulted in heightened extremism in response to political challenges. Now a solution to the problem of extremism and militancy must also be found in culture and religion. Religious teachings with rational and logical arguments must be propagated and efforts must be made to counter the logic of extremists on the basis of religion and culture. Schools and *Madressas* must be primarily focused on educating young impressionable minds.

In addition, religious scholars and civil society stakeholders must come forward and confront the extremists' narrative in a bold and logical manner. Militancy in the name of religion must be denounced categorically. The general public must be made aware of the un-Islamic nature of suicide terrorism and the use of violence in the name of Islam.

This must involve efforts to attack and expose the religious narratives of militant groups. Their argument and logic based on erroneous interpretation of religious sources must only be effectively countered through religious arguments and logic to the contrary. Civil society groups and organizations must conduct largescale awareness and advocacy campaigns in order to raise awareness against the exploitation of the public through

religious slogans. A defensive and timid response is bound to fail. Islam must be presented in its humane, rational and enlightened aspects to the public.

The media must also play an assertive role to be effective in this campaign. It must refrain from scaremongering and sensationalizing the news.

The Law enforcement agencies must be provided with high tech equipment and training and added attention is required to improve the intelligence-gathering potential of the agencies.

Military intervention in terrorist-affected regions must not be considered a solution to the problem. It must be regarded as a step among many others to follow. Those other steps must include an active and assertive role of civilian agencies of government, effective administration and judicial functions and eliminating feelings of despondency and despair in the public who have so far experienced their governments as inefficient and corrupt and nothing more.

Extremism and terrorism is a problem created by the politicians and religious leaders. Its solution lies with them as well. Political will must be expressed and put in practice in Pakistan. Our religious leaders have so far exploited the attachment of the public with religion for their personal and group objectives. Clerics have emerged as the biggest exploiters of Islam in Pakistan. It is their sectarian differences and bigotry which has enabled extremists to spill blood in the name of Islam. Islam, whose very name signifies peace and protection, has been exploited and abused by these hypocrites and bigots for the sake of their personal and group interests. It is very interesting to note that none of the *Mullas* who preach to their young disciples the virtues of suicide bombing and dishing out tickets to paradise so generously, have ever sent their own sons to heaven

on such a free ticket. The dirty faces of these bigots who are spilling innocent blood in the name of Islam must be exposed by those Muslims who have a love for their religion, take pride in being Muslims and are followers of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the very embodiment of mercy and compassion. Ironically it is Islam and not Muslims which needs liberation from those who profess it without understanding its message.

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