The Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the United States: a study of Indo-US collaboration against China

Abstract

In 1962, India and China fought a war which lasted for about one month. India was humiliated in the war. At that time, the United States also regarded China as its enemy number one. As Indian and American security interests converged, both countries collaborated against China in a variety of ways, even after the war was over. Indian approach regarding preservation of its security interests underwent a drastic change. Previously, for protecting her security interests vis-a-vis China, India had primarily relied on political and diplomatic means and had severely criticized those countries which forged military alliances or sought military aid from external powers. In the Indian view, acceptance of military aid from an external power was tantamount to alignment with that power. In the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, however, India sought large-scale military aid from the United States and other Western powers. She also I made desperate appeals for direct American intervention in the war with squadrons of bombers and fighter planes. But still Indian Prime Minister claimed that India was non-aligned. How far this Indian claim was valid? The present study aims at providing a comprehensive answer to this question. It shows that in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, India actually followed a policy of bi-alignment (or double alignment) with the United States and the Soviet Union against China. The second major issue relating to this study is the impact of Pak.istan factor on America's 'trms aid policy for India. It is generally assumed in Pakistan that in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the United States provided large-scale military aid to India and in the process completely ignored Pakistan and its interests. The present study challenges the validity of this assumption and shows that the Pakistan factor, along with some other factors, significantly limited the scope and potential of Indo-US collaboration against China. Other factors included prevalence of calm over the Sino-Indian border after November 21, 1962, Ambassador Galbraith's efforts to confine the Sino-Indian conflict, Indian efforts to maintain the posture of non-alignment, the increasing involvement of the United States in the V1etnam war and a number of other factors. The quantum of military equipment and weapons actually given to India by the United States in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian war was quite limited. This study, however, shows that the US military aid, despite being limited in amount and quality, had great value for Indian v vi security as it sought to deter Chinese aggression against India by showing that the United States was on the side of India. Moreover, Indo-US collaboration against China was not limited to the supply of American military equipment and weapons to India. India and the United States collaborated against China in a number ot other ways also, both militarily and diplomatically