PERSIAN GULF SECURITY IN 1990s AND AMERICAN OPTIONS

Abstract

After every major war the victor always take efforts to construct a durable peace to construct the new architecture of a security. As the most striking feature of the postGulf war (1991) is the priinacy of US power, it has raised the credibility of its military power and substantially altered the Gulf security order by inducting US forces as a vital component of regional security structure. What policy the US has come to adopt to Persian Gulf security structure in the 1990s? What were the elements of this strategy? How successfully it was carried out? Of what nature are the potential threats to Gulf security? Are there any options for the US to bring greater sta~ility in the Gulf security order? This dissertation has attempted to address these questions as best as it can. Initially, the former US president George Bush during Gulf war offered rational analysis by identifying some vulnerable areas that needed to be addressed after the and of the war. His speech at the joint session of US congress after the Gulf War, reflected the real security concerns, which are still valid. He outlined four key challenges shared security; fair distribution of economic resources and economic development; arms control; and the settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. This dissertation analyses / dissects how far these goals were sought in letter and spirit. The US response to Gulf realities was to follow the traditional policies of the Cold war . Then containment policy enjoyed bipartisan support in the United States; the only differences was how to conduct the strategy. Nevertheless, ironically, in the Gulf case, the US intelligentsia had reservations about the logic of containment as a policy/tool. Over the past decade, the US has established itself as a chief protector of pro- Western states in the region. Its has established military relations with the GCC states on bilateral level. Saudi Arabia is a key country and in this political arrangement and a statusquo power in US scheme of things. After 1991GulfWar, the GCC states' ruling elite became more vocal and open in their security relations with the United States. They were now more willing to confront the radical elements instead of appeasing or coopting them. This changed attitude had been instrumental in shaping the US dominated security order in the region. It enabled the US to institutionalise the presence of its forces to support its policy of forward presence and quick crisis response. The Clinton government adopted the path of retribution and retaliation by adhering to the policy of "dual containment". It downplayed/ignored th<;: role of Iran and Iraq in the post-Gulf war security set up. This policy was aimed to modify the national policies of both states - Iran and Iraq - in terms of compliance with the US strategic objectives. The pattern of "zero-sum" game based on reliance on deterrence and sanctions were applied to achieve the same ends. The Clinton administration however preferred conflict management approach than conflict resolution in addressing the Gulf security Issues. The presence of foreign forces naturally raised security concerns of Iran and Iraq. They opposed the induction of external powers in the Persian Gulf sub-system. The GCC states accepted the US forces to act as a counterpoise to the security challenges accruing from Iraq and Iran. These states were convinced that any regional order lacking a powerful foreign guarantor would put their security jeopardy/risk. Throughout the 1990s, these two extreme positions have created a paradoxical phenomenon in the realm of Persian Gulf security. It has generated a security dilemma on the lines of an anarchical order. During the democratic presidency in the US, the latter sought to ensure that no rival power, regional or extra - regional, should emerge to pose any threat to its position in the Gulf. This study is a modest effort to identify the hegemonic dilemma in a complex security system. It has not only arrested the growth of regional order but has heightened the security concerns of Iran and Iraq. The fear of survival places them in an acute security dilemma. Since they can not directly challenge US power, it could push them to rely on alternative unconventional mode of warfare, thus putting the security of foreign forces at stake. The focal issue stressed in the study is: how can the US reconcile its policy to make the Gulf security system comprehensive enough to bring belligerent states into a workable partnership. This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is intro,ductory to the Gulf security scenario in the 1990s. It encompasses various elements bearing implications for Gulf security. At the outset, it portrays the fragility of Gulf security, which makes it more unpredictable in international affairs. The centrality of oil to global economy has enhanced the geo-economic significance of the region while paradoxically raising its geo-political vulnerability outside powers. The chapter also lay emphasis on various structural factors that have security bearings on Gulf polities. It explains how the distribution of power causes polarisation in the Gulf affairs. The study discusses numerous factors having security ramification on Gulf security. At the close of the chapter three models of security that determine Gulf security order after the 1991 Gulf war are reviewed / brought under focus. The second chapter is concentrated on the evolution of US role in the region. It narrate$ three phases of US involvement in a historical perspective. In the first phase US role was associated with and complimentary to Great Britain. The withdrawal of British from Southwest the Asia in 1971 and oil embargo in 1973 impelled Nixon administration to support "twin pillars" policy in the Gulf for protection of its vital interests. The third phase showed US firm resolve to intervene directly in support of its strategIc mterests. he ownfaIl 0 the Sl1ah 0 Iran and SOVIet Umon's mIlItary occupation of Afghanistan prompted then US president in 1980 to declare the "Carter Doctrine". The third chapter of dissertation is attempts to identify vital interests of United States in the Gulf region. Chapter four evaluates different modes of US strategies applied for promotion its national interests. During the 1990s, Clinton's policy mainly stressed crisis management rather than conflict resolution. Chapter five and six are the core chapters · of the dissertation. Both chapters are complimentary to each other in identifying the varied threats to Gulf security. Two levels of analysis are posited to understand the complicate interplay between internal and external elements that impinge on the Persian Gulf security system .. To this end, the work explores different variables and invariables influencing the regional security spectrum. The fact is highlighted that conditions of misperception run high in the region, which makes the security quite volatile. At the same time it is pointed out how proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) act as catalysts scenario towards engendering instability in the Gulf region. In the second section, a linkage is made between arms purchase, oil prices and political stability in inter-state affairs. One cannot help subscribing to the position that any substantial reduction in oil prices evokes inter-state and intra-states tensions which affect security. The central premise of the study is that potential threats to Gulf security are primarily internal and political. Any major failure in economic sustainability will weaken the position of US and its allies to defend the issues arising from political legitimacy. On the question of Western concerns about "Islamic fundamentalism", this analysis holds that existing cleavages in Islamic bloc are not poised on the lines of clash of civilizations. The main targets of these Islamic movements are internal, and their agenda is more likely to be overwhelmingly domestic. During Clinton period, the enemy gap between US and Iran and Iraq became wider. It subjected both states to face security dilemmas. And, in tum, they have created same phenomena (real or imaginary) towards GCe states. Chapter seven finally offer some conclusions · and recommendations to explore US options to address security dilemma in the Gulf. The pattern of security outlook/steps followed by Clinton administration has not resolved the security concerns of GCC member states. In all international conferences held so for, on Gulf security, "recently in March 2001 and Arab summit in Oman by end of March 2001 ", hegemonic behaviour ofIraq and Iran have figured prominently. The US has its own agenda when dealing with Iraq and Iran. It does not necessarily represent the long-term security interests of GCC states. Simply relying on a foreign military power as a guarantor is detrimental to durable peace. The GCC states will have to engage "regional giants" Iran and Iraq - on security matters. Any military build up by the smaller states pretending to oppose or challenge Iraq and Iran will only aggravate the political situation. In order to moderate the policies of what Clinton administrations team termed "rogue states", the US needs to build a new paradigm of security structure which engages Iran and Iraq in the regional order. It will give all states a stake in the preservation of peace and security. By negating or flouting this regional order, the security dilemma will only linger on. The most effective Gulf security framework will only come to fruition when a regional order is developed in conformity with a foreign guarantor. No doubt a difficult task but it can be achieved if the US strategy applies rules of positive-sum game. Threats of punishment and intimidation/coercion as a strategic methodology is not likely to achieve results. US can resolve its hegemonic dilemma by curtailing/abstaining from unnecessary use or show of force. Restraint and cooption can evolve a security process in keeping with common security. The essence of the study rests on the principles of common security: Application of theory of balance of interests can achieve the obj ectives of peaceful co-existence and ultimately to conciliation and resolution of conflicts. The dissertation takes historical-cum analytical approach. It has utilized the inductive methods to explain the problem of security discourse in the Gulf region. Deterrence and sanctions are "top-down" approach while cooperative security is "bottom up" approach to similar goals. In broader theoretical framework conclusion are drawn from Joseph Nye's idea of "soft power" and theory of "challenge and response" presented by Arnold Toynbee. The moment hegemonic stability declines, the response from allies will erode. In other scenario, if the cost of managing the Gulf security becoms high, the question of presence of US forces will arise. Thus, US need to strengthen its power of pull to bring compatibility in its interaction with Gulf States. The sources of information are varied. The US senate hearing's are largely consulted as a main source of my research work.