EXTREMISM IN INDIA UNDER MODI & ITS IMPACT ON THE VIABILITY OF NUCLEAR RESTRAINT REGIME IN SOUTH ASIA

Abstract

Strategic stability in South Asia remains challenged primarily due to the two nuclear rivals – India and Pakistan. The two states share a long history of unresolved issues, such as deep-rooted distrust and animosity rising out of contested territorial problems such as Indian-occupied territories of Jammu & Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, water disputes, terrorism, and resulting growing nuclear and conventional arms racing as well as the damage wreaked by Modi‘s extremist mindset. This thesis highlights the importance of a nuclear restrain regime to maintain stability and peace in South Asia and how it stands affected by growing intolerance and extremism in India. The dissertation applies qualitative research methodology and consults secondary sources to highlight the establishment, its effects, and the challenges of creating a restraint regime. The study examines the phenomenon of an arms race between India and Pakistan through a theoretical construct of arms control and how the Modi regime‘s fascist ideology impacts establishment of a nuclear restraint regime in South Asia. Different models explain why states build nuclear weapons. The analysis of these models suggests that in South Asia, the security dilemma (neo-realist perspective) has been one of the primary reasons for the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The significant impediments to the establishment of a restraint regime are the extremist behaviours of the Modi government, the role of media, the Hindutva ideology, accompanied by ultra-nationalist and anti-Pakistan hatemongering, which exacerbate the security dilemma, Emerging technologies, the nuclear doctrines, and presence of non-state actors on both sides. The last part of the paper aims at highlighting the impacts of the restraint regime, like the CBMs on a regional level, resolution of disputes, conflict management, and responsible deterrence. Keywords: Nuclear restraint regime, arms race, arms control, stability-instability paradox, South-Asia