TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE STABILITY BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Abstract

This study has tried to explore the causes of the development of tactical nuclear weapons, their role and impact on the deterrence stability between India and Pakistan, the two nuclear competitors of South Asia. Pakistan developed its tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) by testing its short-range ballistic missile, Nasr in 2011. It officially announced the strategy of Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) in line with its Credible Minimum Deterrence in 2013. The country also possesses other short-range missiles; Abdali and Ghaznavi that can serve as dual-use platforms while cruise missiles, Babur, and Ra’ad may serve the purpose of tactical operations against its adversary from long distances. The FSD aimed at maintaining deterrence at all rungs of the conflict ladder including India’s offensive doctrines like the Cold Start Doctrine / proactive strategy. This study suggests that this strategy has been effective during 2011-19, the period of investigation of this research. India substantially modernised its conventional and nuclear forces inter alia, by developing dual-use platforms consisting of short-range missiles, Prahaar, Nirbhay and Brahmos and bringing in the Ballistic Missile Defence system ostensibly given its changing nuclear doctrine from No First Use coupled with massive retaliation to a pre-emptive counter-force strategy against Pakistan. These developments along with India’s strategic calculations based on different modes of warfare such as limited war, pre-emptive counterforce strike/s, and surgical strikes are well considered to understand the deterrence relationship between India and Pakistan. The study is aimed to fill the gaps into existing literature on three aspects mainly. First, the research on the role of the TNWs in deterrence relationship between India and Pakistan has been evaluated through applying a theoretical framework of nuclear deterrence and graduated deterrence. Second, the study has been carried out to undertake comprehensive research to understand why and how the introduction of the TNWs by Pakistan and India have impacted their overall deterrence relationship in terms of posturing, strategy, and doctrinal shifts. Third, the research has tried to evaluate whether Pakistan’s introduction of the TNWs have significantly contributed in strengthening the country’s deterrence strategy vis-à-vis India. There have been debates regarding Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) posture yet a detailed analysis on its effectiveness and efficacy as a strategy and policy needed to be understood, which this study has tried to analyse. The thesis has been produced using qualitative methods of research. It utilised descriptive and analytical tools of research to reach findings. The discourse analysis, process tracing and historical representation techniques of qualitative research have been used to identify issues, make analyses, build propositions and provide recommendations. Both primary and secondary sources of data collection have been employed. The study developed a conceptual framework for analysis based on the theory of deterrence and its further extension of ‘graduated deterrence’ to understand the interplay of the TNWs in the deterrence relationship between India and Pakistan. The graduated deterrence theory evolved during the Cold War concerning the employment of these weapons by NATO to deter conventionally superior Soviet v aggression in Europe. The graduated deterrence theory along with NATO’s experience of the employment of these weapon systems helped this study to take some analogies for India and Pakistan deterrence relationship. The study also tried to understand the interplay of crisis behaviour and limited war options to assess the origins and evolution of the debate over the tactical nuclear weapons between India and Pakistan. For that matter, a period from 1998 (the year India and Pakistan became nuclear weapon possessors) till 2019 is taken to understand these dynamics. During this twenty-one-year period, five crises occurred between them; those were the two-month conflict in Kargil in 1999, the ten-month border mobilization stand-off in 2001-02, the Mumbai crisis in 2008, the surgical strike crisis in 2016 and the Pulwama crisis of 2019. The study found that India and Pakistan lack a crisis management mechanism for escalation control. It, therefore, recommends a Crisis Management Mechanism based on either bilateral arrangements or involving a neutral and acceptable third party to de-escalate tensions in any possible crisis in future. For durable peace and stability, this study urges that the two states should seek to establish conflict management and conflict resolution mechanism. It stresses both states to strengthen the existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), establishing new CBMs, developing arms control arrangements and finding conflict resolution by reviving comprehensive dialogue (based on composite dialogue agreed in 2004). This study further supports Pakistan’s proposal of a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) to India along with these recommendations.