THE U.S. SECURITIZATION OF THE WAR ON TERROR: A CASE STUDY OF POST 9/11 PAKISTAN

Abstract

Theoretically informed by critical and non-traditional approaches to security studies more specifically by the Copenhagen School of Securitization and Regional Security Complex of Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver; this doctoral study critically examines the Pakistan-U.S. partnership within the global War on Terror through the lens of securitization. Focused on the post-9/11 period, the case study delves into the profound impact of U.S. securitization on various facets of Pakistani society and polity. The central argument posits that, despite initial hesitations, U.S. securitization efforts during the War on Terror significantly bolstered bilateral relations between Pakistan and the U.S. Both nations, while initially exhibiting reluctance, actively served mutual interests in the post-9/11 context. The study advances the hypothesis that U.S. securitization in the War on Terror improved the bilateral relationship, yet persistent embedded reluctance signaled a complex association shaped by divergent strategic objectives and security goals. Employing a mixed-methods approach, this research combines qualitative analysis of official documents, policy statements, and discourses with quantitative data on political, social, and economic indicators. The study adopts the securitization theory from the Copenhagen School of thought as its foundational framework, elucidating how security issues are constructed and transformed into threats to legitimize public policy and discourse. It thoroughly explores strategies, policy shifts, and implications for both the U.S. and Pakistan in the War on Terror. The findings reveal that while the U.S. ostensibly securitized the global War on Terror to eliminate terrorism, it also aimed at achieving long-term geo-strategic objectives. The U.S.- Pakistan alignment in the War on Terror inadvertently fueled terrorism, extremism, and counterinsurgency efforts in Pakistan, exposing the hegemonic nature of the U.S. discourse characterized by imperial overstretch that ultimately led to failure. Despite this, U.S. securitization temporarily neutralized mistrust due to the convergence of mutual interests. The effective securitization by the U.S. in the War on Terror and Pakistan's swift support stemmed from an existing traditional security environment and opportunism, revealing the historical, structural, and inescapable dependence of Pakistan on the U.S. for domestic and regional considerations. The study contends that the U.S.-Pakistan alliance in the War on Terror was more driven by tactical maneuvering than a strategic partnership. This research significantly contributes to a broader understanding of securitization in the War on Terror, providing xvi policymakers and academia with valuable insights into the politics of securitization and discourse in this global conflict.